case_id stringlengths 23 53 | design stringclasses 10
values | family stringclasses 39
values | invariant stringclasses 34
values | is_failure bool 2
classes | naive_detail stringclasses 47
values | naive_held bool 2
classes | prior_art_analogue stringclasses 39
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
naive_hybrid_akm::algorithm_substitution | naive_hybrid_akm | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_hybrid_akm::ap_flood | naive_hybrid_akm | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_hybrid_akm::beacon_batch_replay | naive_hybrid_akm | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
naive_hybrid_akm::beacon_forgery | naive_hybrid_akm | beacon_forgery | no_unauth_capability | true | acted on an unauthenticated/forged capability beacon | false | Rogue AP / evil-twin (unauthenticated beacon) |
naive_hybrid_akm::capability_spoof | naive_hybrid_akm | capability_spoof | no_silent_downgrade | true | STA used SAE while AP top is PQC-HYBRID | false | Dragonblood (downgrade) |
naive_hybrid_akm::combiner_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | combiner_downgrade | no_combiner_downgrade | true | hybrid key forced to a single component (combiner downgrade) | false | hybrid KEM combiner downgrade / single-component forcing (X-Wing draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing; the historical 'keys_match=ok or hybrid' fudge) |
naive_hybrid_akm::compression_bomb | naive_hybrid_akm | compression_bomb | no_compression_bomb | true | compression bomb inflated without bound (memory DoS) | false | compression/zip bomb on the auth path (PQC large-object compression) |
naive_hybrid_akm::cross_protocol_confusion | naive_hybrid_akm | cross_protocol_confusion | no_cross_protocol_confusion | true | foreign-protocol-domain credential/transcript accepted (cross-protocol confusion) | false | cross-protocol confusion: a PQC credential/transcript minted in protocol-domain A (e.g. TLS/QUIC/IKEv2/EAP/MLS) replayed/presented in protocol-domain B (Wi-Fi) (genuinely-first: no unambiguous transcript-bound protocol-domain label (proto-id + version) folded into the KDF in the multi-protocol PQC era; distinct from wi... |
naive_hybrid_akm::eap_pqc_strip | naive_hybrid_akm | eap_pqc_strip | no_eap_suite_downgrade | true | PQC suite stripped to classical across the EAP relay (suite downgrade) | false | EAP/802.1X PQC-suite strip across the EAP<->4-way relay (cf. Köder et al. arXiv:2601.22892, no downgrade modeling) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fec_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | fec_downgrade | no_fec_downgrade | true | forced into a weak/no-FEC fragmentation mode | false | fragmentation/FEC-mode downgrade (PQC large-object loss) |
naive_hybrid_akm::flood_starvation | naive_hybrid_akm | flood_starvation | no_legit_starvation | true | legitimate roamer starved under flood (unbounded tail) | false | anti-clogging starvation / tail-latency DoS (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::forced_fallback | naive_hybrid_akm | forced_fallback | no_silent_downgrade | true | implicit AKM fallback accepted | false | Dragonblood (transition-mode downgrade) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fragment_splice | naive_hybrid_akm | fragment_splice | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (fragment injection) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fragment_swap | naive_hybrid_akm | fragment_swap | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (mixed fragments) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fragment_truncate | naive_hybrid_akm | fragment_truncate | no_partial_transcript | false | spliced/partial transcript rejected | true | FragAttacks (truncation) — fail-closed control |
naive_hybrid_akm::ft_roam_fs_erosion | naive_hybrid_akm | ft_roam_fs_erosion | no_ft_fs_extension | true | FT roam extends the PQC FS epoch (PMK-R0 compromise exposes roamed sessions) | false | 802.11r FT key-reuse extending the PQC forward-secrecy epoch across roams (genuinely-first: no source links FT key-reuse to PQC FS) |
naive_hybrid_akm::group_key_injection | naive_hybrid_akm | group_key_injection | no_group_key_injection | true | replayed/cross-session group-key (GTK/IGTK) install accepted (group-key reinstallation) | false | group-key (GTK/IGTK) reinstallation / cross-session injection (KRACK group variant; genuinely-first: the group-key install is unbound to the PQC pairwise transcript + has no monotonic epoch in the PQC era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::kem_impersonation_no_confirm | naive_hybrid_akm | kem_impersonation_no_confirm | no_unconfirmed_implicit_auth | true | implicit KEM auth installed without confirmation (impersonation accepted) | false | KEMTLS/AuthKEM implicit auth without a key-confirmation gate (Schwabe-Stebila-Wiggers CCS'20; AuthKEM I-D) |
naive_hybrid_akm::krack_retransmission | naive_hybrid_akm | krack_retransmission | no_key_reinstall | true | 1 key reinstall(s) -> nonce/replay reset | false | KRACK (key reinstallation) |
naive_hybrid_akm::length_fingerprint | naive_hybrid_akm | length_fingerprint | no_length_identity_leak | true | on-air fragmentation shape leaks the identity (length fingerprint) | false | PQC fragmentation-shape / on-air length metadata leak (traffic-analysis genus; PQC-size-specific) |
naive_hybrid_akm::mlo_key_crosslink | naive_hybrid_akm | mlo_key_crosslink | no_mlo_crosslink | true | MLO link key reused across links (cross-link) | false | MLO shared-key cross-link reuse (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::mlo_misbind | naive_hybrid_akm | mlo_misbind | no_silent_downgrade | true | MLO link bound outside committed link set | false | MLO link substitution (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::mtu_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | mtu_downgrade | no_mtu_downgrade | true | fragment MTU forced to a pathological value (fragment explosion) | false | forced fragment-MTU downgrade / fragment explosion (PQC large-object) |
naive_hybrid_akm::owe_quantum_recoverable | naive_hybrid_akm | owe_quantum_recoverable | no_owe_quantum_recovery | true | ECDH OWE session key quantum-recoverable (harvest-now-decrypt-later) | false | OWE/Enhanced-Open (RFC 8110) ECDH harvest-now-decrypt-later; no ML-KEM OWE draft exists |
naive_hybrid_akm::policy_substitution | naive_hybrid_akm | policy_substitution | no_policy_downgrade | true | device-class/battery policy silently downgraded | false | Device-class / battery policy downgrade (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::recovery_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | recovery_downgrade | no_recovery_downgrade | true | replayed/unconfirmed in-place recovery/rekey re-entry accepted (recovery downgrade) | false | in-place PTK rekey / disassoc-recovery re-entry replay or unconfirmed resume (genuinely-first: the recovery transition re-confirms no current transcript root + has no monotonic recovery epoch in the PQC era; distinct from install/roam/resumption surfaces) |
naive_hybrid_akm::resumption_replay | naive_hybrid_akm | resumption_replay | no_zero_rtt_replay | true | 0-RTT resumption token replayed / accepted by a rogue AP | false | 0-RTT resumption replay / cross-AP (PQC-era session resumption; cf. TLS-1.3 0-RTT) |
naive_hybrid_akm::roam_key_reuse | naive_hybrid_akm | roam_key_reuse | no_roam_key_reuse | true | roam key minted for one AP reused at another (cross-AP) | false | cross-AP roam-key reuse (domain-wide fast-roam ticket, PQC-era multi-target) |
naive_hybrid_akm::sig_profile_substitution | naive_hybrid_akm | sig_profile_substitution | no_sig_role_confusion | true | a signature minted for one role was accepted in another (role confusion) | false | cross-role/cross-algorithm signature substitution (transcript-bound signature profiles) |
naive_hybrid_akm::single_family_break | naive_hybrid_akm | single_family_break | no_single_assumption_dependence | true | key exposed by a single math-family break (single-assumption dependence) | false | single-math-family dependence (ML-KEM (+) HQC assumption diversity; HQC standardized NIST 2025) |
naive_hybrid_akm::skipped_reencryption_check | naive_hybrid_akm | skipped_reencryption_check | no_indcca_downgrade | true | tampered ciphertext accepted (FO check skipped -> IND-CPA) | false | skipped Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check -> IND-CCA->IND-CPA downgrade (cf. eprint 2025/450, HQC ref impl) |
naive_hybrid_akm::stale_credential_replay | naive_hybrid_akm | stale_credential_replay | no_stale_credential | true | acted on a stale/forged cached AP credential | false | cached-credential / signature replay (PQC-era airtime cache) |
naive_hybrid_akm::suite_rollback | naive_hybrid_akm | suite_rollback | no_suite_rollback | true | rolled-back/unconfirmed crypto-agility suite rotation accepted (suite rollback) | false | crypto-agility suite/credential ROTATION over the deployment lifetime rolled back to a retired suite or rotated without confirmation (genuinely-first: the deliberate suite-rotation transition re-confirms no current transcript over the new suite identity + has no monotonic suite epoch; distinct from initial negotiation/... |
naive_pqc_eaptls::algorithm_substitution | naive_pqc_eaptls | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::ap_flood | naive_pqc_eaptls | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::beacon_batch_replay | naive_pqc_eaptls | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::beacon_forgery | naive_pqc_eaptls | beacon_forgery | no_unauth_capability | true | acted on an unauthenticated/forged capability beacon | false | Rogue AP / evil-twin (unauthenticated beacon) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::capability_spoof | naive_pqc_eaptls | capability_spoof | no_silent_downgrade | true | STA used SAE while AP top is PQC-EAP-TLS | false | Dragonblood (downgrade) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::combiner_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | combiner_downgrade | no_combiner_downgrade | true | hybrid key forced to a single component (combiner downgrade) | false | hybrid KEM combiner downgrade / single-component forcing (X-Wing draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing; the historical 'keys_match=ok or hybrid' fudge) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::compression_bomb | naive_pqc_eaptls | compression_bomb | no_compression_bomb | true | compression bomb inflated without bound (memory DoS) | false | compression/zip bomb on the auth path (PQC large-object compression) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::cross_protocol_confusion | naive_pqc_eaptls | cross_protocol_confusion | no_cross_protocol_confusion | true | foreign-protocol-domain credential/transcript accepted (cross-protocol confusion) | false | cross-protocol confusion: a PQC credential/transcript minted in protocol-domain A (e.g. TLS/QUIC/IKEv2/EAP/MLS) replayed/presented in protocol-domain B (Wi-Fi) (genuinely-first: no unambiguous transcript-bound protocol-domain label (proto-id + version) folded into the KDF in the multi-protocol PQC era; distinct from wi... |
naive_pqc_eaptls::eap_method_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | eap_method_downgrade | no_eap_method_downgrade | true | enterprise EAP method / certificate-capsule downgraded | false | EAP-TLS legacy-method forcing / cert substitution (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::eap_pqc_strip | naive_pqc_eaptls | eap_pqc_strip | no_eap_suite_downgrade | true | PQC suite stripped to classical across the EAP relay (suite downgrade) | false | EAP/802.1X PQC-suite strip across the EAP<->4-way relay (cf. Köder et al. arXiv:2601.22892, no downgrade modeling) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fec_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | fec_downgrade | no_fec_downgrade | true | forced into a weak/no-FEC fragmentation mode | false | fragmentation/FEC-mode downgrade (PQC large-object loss) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::flood_starvation | naive_pqc_eaptls | flood_starvation | no_legit_starvation | true | legitimate roamer starved under flood (unbounded tail) | false | anti-clogging starvation / tail-latency DoS (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::forced_fallback | naive_pqc_eaptls | forced_fallback | no_silent_downgrade | true | implicit AKM fallback accepted | false | Dragonblood (transition-mode downgrade) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fragment_splice | naive_pqc_eaptls | fragment_splice | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (fragment injection) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fragment_swap | naive_pqc_eaptls | fragment_swap | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (mixed fragments) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fragment_truncate | naive_pqc_eaptls | fragment_truncate | no_partial_transcript | false | spliced/partial transcript rejected | true | FragAttacks (truncation) — fail-closed control |
naive_pqc_eaptls::ft_roam_fs_erosion | naive_pqc_eaptls | ft_roam_fs_erosion | no_ft_fs_extension | true | FT roam extends the PQC FS epoch (PMK-R0 compromise exposes roamed sessions) | false | 802.11r FT key-reuse extending the PQC forward-secrecy epoch across roams (genuinely-first: no source links FT key-reuse to PQC FS) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::group_key_injection | naive_pqc_eaptls | group_key_injection | no_group_key_injection | true | replayed/cross-session group-key (GTK/IGTK) install accepted (group-key reinstallation) | false | group-key (GTK/IGTK) reinstallation / cross-session injection (KRACK group variant; genuinely-first: the group-key install is unbound to the PQC pairwise transcript + has no monotonic epoch in the PQC era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::kem_impersonation_no_confirm | naive_pqc_eaptls | kem_impersonation_no_confirm | no_unconfirmed_implicit_auth | true | implicit KEM auth installed without confirmation (impersonation accepted) | false | KEMTLS/AuthKEM implicit auth without a key-confirmation gate (Schwabe-Stebila-Wiggers CCS'20; AuthKEM I-D) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::krack_retransmission | naive_pqc_eaptls | krack_retransmission | no_key_reinstall | true | 1 key reinstall(s) -> nonce/replay reset | false | KRACK (key reinstallation) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::length_fingerprint | naive_pqc_eaptls | length_fingerprint | no_length_identity_leak | true | on-air fragmentation shape leaks the identity (length fingerprint) | false | PQC fragmentation-shape / on-air length metadata leak (traffic-analysis genus; PQC-size-specific) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::mtu_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | mtu_downgrade | no_mtu_downgrade | true | fragment MTU forced to a pathological value (fragment explosion) | false | forced fragment-MTU downgrade / fragment explosion (PQC large-object) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::owe_quantum_recoverable | naive_pqc_eaptls | owe_quantum_recoverable | no_owe_quantum_recovery | true | ECDH OWE session key quantum-recoverable (harvest-now-decrypt-later) | false | OWE/Enhanced-Open (RFC 8110) ECDH harvest-now-decrypt-later; no ML-KEM OWE draft exists |
naive_pqc_eaptls::policy_substitution | naive_pqc_eaptls | policy_substitution | no_policy_downgrade | true | device-class/battery policy silently downgraded | false | Device-class / battery policy downgrade (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::recovery_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | recovery_downgrade | no_recovery_downgrade | true | replayed/unconfirmed in-place recovery/rekey re-entry accepted (recovery downgrade) | false | in-place PTK rekey / disassoc-recovery re-entry replay or unconfirmed resume (genuinely-first: the recovery transition re-confirms no current transcript root + has no monotonic recovery epoch in the PQC era; distinct from install/roam/resumption surfaces) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::resumption_replay | naive_pqc_eaptls | resumption_replay | no_zero_rtt_replay | true | 0-RTT resumption token replayed / accepted by a rogue AP | false | 0-RTT resumption replay / cross-AP (PQC-era session resumption; cf. TLS-1.3 0-RTT) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::roam_key_reuse | naive_pqc_eaptls | roam_key_reuse | no_roam_key_reuse | true | roam key minted for one AP reused at another (cross-AP) | false | cross-AP roam-key reuse (domain-wide fast-roam ticket, PQC-era multi-target) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::sig_profile_substitution | naive_pqc_eaptls | sig_profile_substitution | no_sig_role_confusion | true | a signature minted for one role was accepted in another (role confusion) | false | cross-role/cross-algorithm signature substitution (transcript-bound signature profiles) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::single_family_break | naive_pqc_eaptls | single_family_break | no_single_assumption_dependence | true | key exposed by a single math-family break (single-assumption dependence) | false | single-math-family dependence (ML-KEM (+) HQC assumption diversity; HQC standardized NIST 2025) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::skipped_reencryption_check | naive_pqc_eaptls | skipped_reencryption_check | no_indcca_downgrade | true | tampered ciphertext accepted (FO check skipped -> IND-CPA) | false | skipped Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check -> IND-CCA->IND-CPA downgrade (cf. eprint 2025/450, HQC ref impl) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::stale_credential_replay | naive_pqc_eaptls | stale_credential_replay | no_stale_credential | true | acted on a stale/forged cached AP credential | false | cached-credential / signature replay (PQC-era airtime cache) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::suite_rollback | naive_pqc_eaptls | suite_rollback | no_suite_rollback | true | rolled-back/unconfirmed crypto-agility suite rotation accepted (suite rollback) | false | crypto-agility suite/credential ROTATION over the deployment lifetime rolled back to a retired suite or rotated without confirmation (genuinely-first: the deliberate suite-rotation transition re-confirms no current transcript over the new suite identity + has no monotonic suite epoch; distinct from initial negotiation/... |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::algorithm_substitution | naive_pqc_fast_roam | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::ap_flood | naive_pqc_fast_roam | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::beacon_batch_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::beacon_forgery | naive_pqc_fast_roam | beacon_forgery | no_unauth_capability | true | acted on an unauthenticated/forged capability beacon | false | Rogue AP / evil-twin (unauthenticated beacon) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::capability_spoof | naive_pqc_fast_roam | capability_spoof | no_silent_downgrade | true | STA used SAE while AP top is PQC-FT | false | Dragonblood (downgrade) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::combiner_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | combiner_downgrade | no_combiner_downgrade | true | hybrid key forced to a single component (combiner downgrade) | false | hybrid KEM combiner downgrade / single-component forcing (X-Wing draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing; the historical 'keys_match=ok or hybrid' fudge) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::compression_bomb | naive_pqc_fast_roam | compression_bomb | no_compression_bomb | true | compression bomb inflated without bound (memory DoS) | false | compression/zip bomb on the auth path (PQC large-object compression) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::cross_protocol_confusion | naive_pqc_fast_roam | cross_protocol_confusion | no_cross_protocol_confusion | true | foreign-protocol-domain credential/transcript accepted (cross-protocol confusion) | false | cross-protocol confusion: a PQC credential/transcript minted in protocol-domain A (e.g. TLS/QUIC/IKEv2/EAP/MLS) replayed/presented in protocol-domain B (Wi-Fi) (genuinely-first: no unambiguous transcript-bound protocol-domain label (proto-id + version) folded into the KDF in the multi-protocol PQC era; distinct from wi... |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::eap_pqc_strip | naive_pqc_fast_roam | eap_pqc_strip | no_eap_suite_downgrade | true | PQC suite stripped to classical across the EAP relay (suite downgrade) | false | EAP/802.1X PQC-suite strip across the EAP<->4-way relay (cf. Köder et al. arXiv:2601.22892, no downgrade modeling) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fec_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fec_downgrade | no_fec_downgrade | true | forced into a weak/no-FEC fragmentation mode | false | fragmentation/FEC-mode downgrade (PQC large-object loss) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::flood_starvation | naive_pqc_fast_roam | flood_starvation | no_legit_starvation | true | legitimate roamer starved under flood (unbounded tail) | false | anti-clogging starvation / tail-latency DoS (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::forced_fallback | naive_pqc_fast_roam | forced_fallback | no_silent_downgrade | true | implicit AKM fallback accepted | false | Dragonblood (transition-mode downgrade) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fragment_splice | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fragment_splice | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (fragment injection) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fragment_swap | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fragment_swap | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (mixed fragments) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fragment_truncate | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fragment_truncate | no_partial_transcript | false | spliced/partial transcript rejected | true | FragAttacks (truncation) — fail-closed control |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::ft_roam_fs_erosion | naive_pqc_fast_roam | ft_roam_fs_erosion | no_ft_fs_extension | true | FT roam extends the PQC FS epoch (PMK-R0 compromise exposes roamed sessions) | false | 802.11r FT key-reuse extending the PQC forward-secrecy epoch across roams (genuinely-first: no source links FT key-reuse to PQC FS) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::group_key_injection | naive_pqc_fast_roam | group_key_injection | no_group_key_injection | true | replayed/cross-session group-key (GTK/IGTK) install accepted (group-key reinstallation) | false | group-key (GTK/IGTK) reinstallation / cross-session injection (KRACK group variant; genuinely-first: the group-key install is unbound to the PQC pairwise transcript + has no monotonic epoch in the PQC era) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::kem_impersonation_no_confirm | naive_pqc_fast_roam | kem_impersonation_no_confirm | no_unconfirmed_implicit_auth | true | implicit KEM auth installed without confirmation (impersonation accepted) | false | KEMTLS/AuthKEM implicit auth without a key-confirmation gate (Schwabe-Stebila-Wiggers CCS'20; AuthKEM I-D) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::krack_retransmission | naive_pqc_fast_roam | krack_retransmission | no_key_reinstall | true | 1 key reinstall(s) -> nonce/replay reset | false | KRACK (key reinstallation) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::length_fingerprint | naive_pqc_fast_roam | length_fingerprint | no_length_identity_leak | true | on-air fragmentation shape leaks the identity (length fingerprint) | false | PQC fragmentation-shape / on-air length metadata leak (traffic-analysis genus; PQC-size-specific) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::mtu_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | mtu_downgrade | no_mtu_downgrade | true | fragment MTU forced to a pathological value (fragment explosion) | false | forced fragment-MTU downgrade / fragment explosion (PQC large-object) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::owe_quantum_recoverable | naive_pqc_fast_roam | owe_quantum_recoverable | no_owe_quantum_recovery | true | ECDH OWE session key quantum-recoverable (harvest-now-decrypt-later) | false | OWE/Enhanced-Open (RFC 8110) ECDH harvest-now-decrypt-later; no ML-KEM OWE draft exists |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::policy_substitution | naive_pqc_fast_roam | policy_substitution | no_policy_downgrade | true | device-class/battery policy silently downgraded | false | Device-class / battery policy downgrade (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::recovery_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | recovery_downgrade | no_recovery_downgrade | true | replayed/unconfirmed in-place recovery/rekey re-entry accepted (recovery downgrade) | false | in-place PTK rekey / disassoc-recovery re-entry replay or unconfirmed resume (genuinely-first: the recovery transition re-confirms no current transcript root + has no monotonic recovery epoch in the PQC era; distinct from install/roam/resumption surfaces) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::resumption_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | resumption_replay | no_zero_rtt_replay | true | 0-RTT resumption token replayed / accepted by a rogue AP | false | 0-RTT resumption replay / cross-AP (PQC-era session resumption; cf. TLS-1.3 0-RTT) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::roam_key_reuse | naive_pqc_fast_roam | roam_key_reuse | no_roam_key_reuse | true | roam key minted for one AP reused at another (cross-AP) | false | cross-AP roam-key reuse (domain-wide fast-roam ticket, PQC-era multi-target) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::roam_ticket_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | roam_ticket_replay | no_roam_replay | true | roam ticket replay accepted | false | 802.11r FT (ticket/PMK replay) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::sig_profile_substitution | naive_pqc_fast_roam | sig_profile_substitution | no_sig_role_confusion | true | a signature minted for one role was accepted in another (role confusion) | false | cross-role/cross-algorithm signature substitution (transcript-bound signature profiles) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::single_family_break | naive_pqc_fast_roam | single_family_break | no_single_assumption_dependence | true | key exposed by a single math-family break (single-assumption dependence) | false | single-math-family dependence (ML-KEM (+) HQC assumption diversity; HQC standardized NIST 2025) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::skipped_reencryption_check | naive_pqc_fast_roam | skipped_reencryption_check | no_indcca_downgrade | true | tampered ciphertext accepted (FO check skipped -> IND-CPA) | false | skipped Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check -> IND-CCA->IND-CPA downgrade (cf. eprint 2025/450, HQC ref impl) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::stale_credential_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | stale_credential_replay | no_stale_credential | true | acted on a stale/forged cached AP credential | false | cached-credential / signature replay (PQC-era airtime cache) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::suite_rollback | naive_pqc_fast_roam | suite_rollback | no_suite_rollback | true | rolled-back/unconfirmed crypto-agility suite rotation accepted (suite rollback) | false | crypto-agility suite/credential ROTATION over the deployment lifetime rolled back to a retired suite or rotated without confirmation (genuinely-first: the deliberate suite-rotation transition re-confirms no current transcript over the new suite identity + has no monotonic suite epoch; distinct from initial negotiation/... |
naive_pqc_fils::algorithm_substitution | naive_pqc_fils | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_pqc_fils::ap_flood | naive_pqc_fils | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_pqc_fils::beacon_batch_replay | naive_pqc_fils | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
Dataset Card — PQC-MFB
Summary
322 executed cases describing how post-quantum migrations of authenticated key-exchange protocols fail. Each case pairs an unrepaired ("naive") design with a failure family and the protocol invariant that breaks. 312 of the 322 are failures; the remaining 10 pass even unrepaired and serve as regression controls.
- Cases: 322 (312 failures, 10 controls)
- Failure families: 39
- Unrepaired designs: 10
- Format: JSON Lines, one case per line
- Licence: CC-BY-4.0 (data) / Apache-2.0 (code)
Fields
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
case_id |
string | <design>::<family>, unique |
design |
string | which unrepaired design was executed |
family |
string | failure family (one of 39) |
invariant |
string | the protocol invariant under test |
is_failure |
bool | whether the unrepaired design fails this case |
naive_detail |
string | what the unrepaired design actually did |
naive_held |
bool | whether the invariant held unrepaired |
prior_art_analogue |
string | a published failure of similar shape, where one exists |
Deliberately withheld
repair_mechanism, repaired_detail and repaired_held are removed from the public
release. Together they form the failure-to-mechanism incidence matrix, which is the input
to a minimum-cover computation over the repair set and belongs to the closed core.
Scoring does not need them: the benchmark asks whether your implementation holds the
invariant, not which mechanism you used. The projection step is
src/pqc_mfb/build_dataset.py, and a test asserts the withheld fields never appear in
the published file.
How it was produced
Cases were executed against a modeled protocol state machine — not captured from network traffic or from shipping products. For each (design, family) pair the harness runs the adversary for that family against the unrepaired design and records whether the named invariant held.
The public file is derived from the internal manifest by a single reproducible projection; regenerate it with:
python -m pqc_mfb.build_dataset <internal_manifest.json> src/pqc_mfb/data/pqc_mfb.jsonl
Intended use
- Scoring a post-quantum AKE implementation for migration-failure coverage.
- Teaching: a concrete catalogue of what breaks when key material outgrows a frame.
- Research on protocol state-machine failure taxonomies.
Out of scope
- Not a vulnerability disclosure. No case is an assertion about a named product.
- Not a security certification. A perfect score means 312 modeled cases handled.
- Not byte-exact CVE reproduction.
prior_art_analoguenames a failure of similar shape. It is a pointer for the reader, not a claim of equivalence. - Not a fuzzing corpus. There are no packet captures or binary inputs here.
Limitations and biases
- Cases derive from one modeled state machine, so they inherit its modelling choices. A failure mode that model cannot express is not represented.
- Coverage across families is uneven — some families have one case, others many. Overall coverage therefore weights families unequally, which is why the scorer also reports per-family results and names zero-coverage families explicitly.
- The 10 unrepaired designs are constructed baselines, not third-party implementations.
- Wireless-derived. Families transfer to other transports, but the designs are wireless.
Citation
@misc{pqcmfb2026,
title = {PQC-MFB: A Post-Quantum Migration Failure Benchmark},
author = {{PQC Migration Safety Lab}},
year = {2026},
note = {322 cases, 39 failure families, 10 unrepaired designs}
}
Contact
Issues and submissions via the repository. For the closed core, open a GitHub Discussion or an issue.
The PQC migration toolkit
Nine free tools for teams moving authenticated key exchange to post-quantum. They find and measure; they do not repair.
| Tool | What it does | Where |
|---|---|---|
| pqc-sizes | Sizes, fragment counts, and the two-sided reassembly window | PyPI |
| pqc-sizes-js | The same arithmetic for Node and the browser | npm |
| pqc-guard-action | Fail the build when the window is empty | GitHub Action |
| pqc-dos-embedded | 169 lines of C: the failure on a real 64 KB device | source |
| farkas-check | Re-verify the bound on-device, no SMT solver | source |
| pqc-migration-mcp | Six MCP tools for AI agents | PyPI |
| pqc-mfb | 322 cases · 39 failure families · scorer | PyPI |
| pqc-mfb (data) ← you are here | The benchmark as a dataset | HF |
| pqc-formal-corpus | 122 named formal results, 6 provers | HF |
| pqc-explorer | Try it in your browser, no install | HF Space |
Start here: pqc-sizes tells you in five seconds whether your credential fragments and whether a safe cap exists. pqc-explorer does the same in a browser.
The closed core
Closing the 39 failure families — downgrade binding, retransmission-safe installation, fragmentation transcripts, roaming forward secrecy, multi-link key separation, admission control, group-key binding — is a separate proprietary codebase. Relevant subject matter is covered by a filed provisional patent application.
That split is measured, not asserted: under a replicate noise control only 4 of 32 repair mechanisms are externally distinguishable, so publishing these detectors does not disclose the repairs.
For commercial licensing, open a GitHub Discussion or an issue on any of these repos.
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