category stringlengths 4 19 | kind stringclasses 5
values | module stringlengths 5 19 | name stringlengths 7 40 | polarity stringclasses 8
values | prover stringclasses 6
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
other | query | sae_online | guessed | other | cryptoverif |
authentication | lemma | MerkleBeacon | beacon_forge_reduces_to_euf_cma | reduction | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | TranscriptForge | bound_blocks_free_substitution | bound | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | TranscriptForge | bound_blocks_role_confusion | bound | easycrypt |
hybrid-combiner | lemma | Combiner | combiner_robust | other | easycrypt |
password | lemma | SAE_PAKE | commit_hides_pw | security-property | easycrypt |
password | lemma | SAE_PAKE | commit_is_uniform | security-property | easycrypt |
composition | lemma | EnvelopeAKM | composition_union | structural | easycrypt |
composition | lemma | Composition | composition_union_pr | structural | easycrypt |
composition | lemma | EnvelopeAKM | envelope_composable | structural | easycrypt |
composition | lemma | EnvelopeSSP | envelope_concrete_multi | other | easycrypt |
composition | lemma | EnvelopeSSP | envelope_concrete_negl | other | easycrypt |
hardness-assumption | lemma | MLKEM_IND_CCA | envelope_grounded_in_mlwe | structural | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO | envelope_grounded_via_qrom | structural | easycrypt |
composition | lemma | EnvelopeAKM | envelope_pq_when_components_pq | other | easycrypt |
hardness-assumption | lemma | MLKEM_IND_CCA | envelope_secure_under_mlwe | other | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO_Concrete | fo_loss_baseline_derived | reduction | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO_Concrete | fo_loss_ge0 | other | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO | fo_reduction_structured | reduction | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO_Concrete | fo_reduction_structured_concrete | reduction | easycrypt |
policy-binding | lemma | PolicyInevitability | forall_policy_implies_gate | other | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | ForwardSecrecy | fs_reduces_to_ephemeral_cpa | reduction | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | FtRoamFS | ft_roam_fs_reduces_to_ephemeral_cpa | reduction | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | TranscriptForge | injective_partnering | security-property | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | KdfKeySecrecy | kdf_secrecy_is_prf_over_kem | security-property | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | MLKEM_IND_CCA | kem_grounded_in_mlwe | structural | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | KemKeySecrecyCCA | ks_cca_reduces_to_kem_ror_cca | reduction | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | KemKeySecrecy | ks_reduces_to_kem_ror | reduction | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | SigForge | ma_reduces_to_euf_cma | reduction | easycrypt |
password | lemma | OCAKE_noIC | mask_hides_pw | security-property | easycrypt |
password | lemma | OCAKE_noIC | masked_is_uniform | security-property | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | MloKeyHierarchy | mlo_link_key_independence_reduces_to_prf | reduction | easycrypt |
other | lemma | MerkleBeacon | naive_bare_root_replay_is_free | control | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | TranscriptForge | naive_forgery_is_free | control | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | TranscriptForge | naive_role_confusion_is_free | control | easycrypt |
policy-binding | lemma | PolicyInevitability | no_safe_policy_skips_gate | safety | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO_Concrete | o2h_bound_derived | reduction | easycrypt |
password | lemma | OCAKE_noIC | ocake_noic_offline_resistance | security-property | easycrypt |
password | lemma | OCAKE_offline | ocake_offline_resistance | security-property | easycrypt |
password | lemma | SAE_PAKE | offline_hiding_derived | reduction | easycrypt |
kem-reduction | lemma | PostCompromise | pcs_reduces_to_prf | reduction | easycrypt |
other | lemma | Composition | pr_or_le | bound | easycrypt |
password | lemma | RunningCodeLink | ptk_binds_committed_object | structural | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO | qrom_secure_under_mlwe | other | easycrypt |
qrom | lemma | Qrom_FO_Concrete | qrom_secure_under_mlwe_concrete | other | easycrypt |
dichotomy | lemma | Qrom_FO | recovers_import | reachability | easycrypt |
password | lemma | SAE_PAKE | sae_offline_resistance | security-property | easycrypt |
password | lemma | SAE_PAKE | sae_online_only_bound | other | easycrypt |
password | lemma | SAE_PAKE | sae_pfs_bound | other | easycrypt |
authentication | lemma | TranscriptForge | subst_reduces_to_euf_cma | reduction | easycrypt |
hybrid-combiner | lemma | Combiner | survives_one_break | reachability | easycrypt |
transcript-binding | lemma | RunningCodeLink | transcript_binding | structural | easycrypt |
bound | theorem | AuthEntropy | advantage_exceeds_target | bound | lean |
non-mergeability | theorem | NonMergeability | af_ag_not_mergeable | structural | lean |
resource-bound | theorem | Bound | bounded | bound | lean |
resource-bound | theorem | Bound | bounded_at_canonical | bound | lean |
dichotomy | theorem | ReassemblyFloor | buffer_all_covers | structural | lean |
lower-bound | theorem | AuthEntropy | deception_floor | bound | lean |
non-mergeability | theorem | NonMergeability | disjoint_epoch_families_not_mergeable | structural | lean |
lower-bound | theorem | AuthEntropy | floor_achievable | bound | lean |
lower-bound | theorem | Bound | floor_necessary | bound | lean |
dichotomy | theorem | ReassemblyFloor | gate_covers | structural | lean |
other | theorem | Bound | gated_le_naive | bound | lean |
non-mergeability | theorem | NonMergeability | idempotent_advances_neither_coord | structural | lean |
non-mergeability | theorem | NonMergeability | idempotent_not_strict | structural | lean |
lower-bound | theorem | AuthEntropy | movable_but_irreducible | bound | lean |
resource-bound | theorem | Bound | naive_unbounded | control | lean |
dichotomy | theorem | ReassemblyFloor | no_third_option | safety | lean |
epoch | theorem | NonMergeability | oneshot_fold_cannot_close_epoch_family | other | lean |
resource-bound | theorem | Bound | separation | bound | lean |
resource-bound | theorem | Bound | window_admits_and_bounded | bound | lean |
resource-bound | theorem | Bound | window_nonempty | bound | lean |
authentication | goal | envelope_kex | confirmation_key_secret | security-property | squirrel |
quantum-adversary | lemma | quantum | classical_secret_under_quantum | other | tamarin |
roaming | lemma | pqc_akm_core | e_roam_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
admission-control | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | f_puzzle_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
roaming | lemma | pqc_akm | ft_roam_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
admission-control | lemma | pqc_akm | gate_then_expensive_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
multi-link | lemma | pqc_akm_core | h_linkb_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
capability-binding | lemma | pqc_akm_core | i_cap_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
policy-binding | lemma | pqc_akm_core | j_policy_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
other | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | k_method_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
credential | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | l_cred_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
other | lemma | envelope_necessity | legit_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
error-correction | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | m_fec_reachable | reachability | tamarin |
password | lemma | pqc_akm_offline | masking_secret_secret | security-property | tamarin |
downgrade | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | no_eap_method_downgrade | safety | tamarin |
downgrade | lemma | pqc_akm | no_eap_suite_downgrade | safety | tamarin |
admission-control | lemma | pqc_akm | no_expensive_before_gate | safety | tamarin |
downgrade | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | no_fec_downgrade | safety | tamarin |
other | lemma | pqc_akm | no_ft_fs_extension | safety | tamarin |
downgrade | lemma | pqc_akm | no_indcca_downgrade | safety | tamarin |
key-installation | lemma | envelope | no_key_reinstall | safety | tamarin |
multi-link | lemma | pqc_akm_core | no_mlo_key_crosslink | safety | tamarin |
password | lemma | pqc_akm_offline | no_offline_dictionary | safety | tamarin |
transcript-binding | lemma | envelope | no_partial_transcript | safety | tamarin |
downgrade | lemma | pqc_akm_core | no_policy_downgrade | safety | tamarin |
admission-control | lemma | pqc_akm_core2 | no_puzzle_replay | safety | tamarin |
roaming | lemma | pqc_akm_core | no_replay_roaming_epoch | safety | tamarin |
downgrade | lemma | envelope | no_silent_downgrade | safety | tamarin |
Dataset Card — PQC Formal Corpus
Summary
122 named formal results — theorems, lemmas, goals, queries and invariants — from a single sustained effort to mechanically verify a post-quantum authenticated key exchange, spread across 6 prover dialects.
Each row records what was named and where, plus two derived index fields. It is a map of what has been mechanically established about one PQC migration: usable as an index, a teaching aid, or a target list for independent re-derivation.
- Rows: 122
- Provers: 6 (Lean, EasyCrypt, Tamarin, TLA+, CryptoVerif, Squirrel)
- Format: JSON Lines, one result per line
- Licence: Apache-2.0
Schema
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
prover |
string | dialect the result lives in: lean, easycrypt, tamarin, tla, cryptoverif, squirrel |
name |
string | identifier the result is proven under, e.g. no_key_reinstall |
kind |
string | theorem · lemma · goal · query · invariant |
module |
string | source module stem, no path, e.g. MerkleBeacon |
category |
string | derived subject bucket, e.g. downgrade, resource-bound |
polarity |
string | derived role: safety · reachability · reduction · control · bound · security-property · structural · other |
Distribution
| prover | results |
|---|---|
| easycrypt | 51 |
| tamarin | 35 |
| lean | 20 |
| tla | 14 |
| cryptoverif | 1 |
| squirrel | 1 |
| polarity | results |
|---|---|
| safety | 32 |
| reachability | 15 |
| structural | 15 |
| bound | 14 |
| reduction | 14 |
| security-property | 13 |
| other | 15 |
| control | 4 |
⚠️ category and polarity are heuristics, not ground truth
Both are derived from the identifier string alone by substring matching, not from the proof body or any semantic analysis. They exist to make 122 rows browsable. They are useful for filtering and wrong often enough that you should not build a claim on them.
Two known behaviours, documented rather than hidden:
- Controls are checked before safety properties. A control is typically named for the
property it deliberately fails to uphold (
naive_forgery_is_free), so testing safety first would file it as the property itself. There is a test asserting this ordering. - 15 rows land in
polarity: otherand 7 incategory: other. Those are rows whose names carry no signal the heuristic recognises, not rows that mean nothing.
prover, name, kind and module are extracted directly and carry no interpretation.
What is NOT in this dataset
No proof bodies. No tactic scripts. No model source.
A name plus its provenance is an index. The mechanised argument stays in the closed tree, because several of these proofs encode repair mechanisms directly, and publishing the argument would publish the repair.
Two tests enforce this. One greps the shipped file for proof syntax (:=, by omega,
qed, Proof., sorry, admit) and fails if any appears. The other asserts that every
row carries exactly the six documented fields and nothing else, so no internal annotation
can ride along with an identifier.
Prover builtins are excluded. attacker is a ProVerif builtin predicate, not a lemma.
Before the denylist it was extracted as the sole "ProVerif result" — which would have made
the corpus quietly wrong. ProVerif therefore contributes zero rows: its models are
query-driven in a form this extractor does not treat as named results. That is a real
limitation, not an omission.
How it was produced
One regex per dialect over the committed prover sources, then:
- drop identifiers shorter than 5 characters (they collide with ordinary language);
- drop anything in the builtin denylist;
- deduplicate on
(prover, name); - derive
categoryandpolarityfrom the name; - sort by
(prover, name)so the output is byte-stable across runs.
python -m pqc_formal_corpus.build <formal-models-root> \
src/pqc_formal_corpus/data/pqc_formal_corpus.jsonl
CLI
The package ships a pqc-corpus command:
pip install git+https://github.com/nickharris808/pqc-formal-corpus
pqc-corpus stats
pqc-corpus query --prover lean --category resource-bound
pqc-corpus export --format csv -o corpus.csv
Usage
from pqc_formal_corpus import load, by_prover, by_category
results = load()
len(results) # 122
by_prover(results) # {'cryptoverif': 1, 'easycrypt': 51, ...}
safety = [r for r in results if r.polarity == "safety"]
[r.name for r in safety][:3]
# ['no_safe_policy_skips_gate', 'no_third_option', 'no_eap_method_downgrade']
# every result about resource bounds, whichever prover proved it
[r.name for r in results if r.category == "resource-bound"]
# ['bounded', 'bounded_at_canonical', 'naive_unbounded', 'separation',
# 'window_admits_and_bounded', 'window_nonempty']
Note no_third_option in that safety list: it is really a dichotomy result, filed as
safety because the heuristic matches the no_ prefix first. That is the imprecision the
warning above describes, shown rather than hidden.
# Hugging Face
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("nickh007/pqc-formal-corpus")
Intended use
- An index into what one PQC migration has actually proven, and in which prover.
- A re-derivation target list — every row names something a third party could independently formalise and check against.
- Research on verification practice: how effort distributes across provers, how many results are controls versus properties, what a multi-prover corpus looks like in shape.
Out of scope
- Not the proofs. You cannot check these results from this dataset; it names them.
- Not a benchmark. There is no task, no split, no metric. For a scorable benchmark see PQC-MFB.
- Not a completeness claim. These are the results this effort named. A property nobody named is absent, and absence here says nothing about the protocol.
- Not a vulnerability disclosure.
Limitations and biases
- One effort, one protocol family. Everything derives from a single verification push on post-quantum Wi-Fi authentication. Category proportions reflect that effort's priorities, not the field's.
- Extraction is regex-based, so a result declared in an unusual syntactic form is missed. ProVerif contributing zero rows is the clearest instance.
easycryptdominates at 51/122, which reflects where the computational proofs live, not that EasyCrypt results matter more.- Derived fields are heuristic — see the warning above.
Citation
@misc{pqcformalcorpus2026,
title = {PQC Formal Corpus: named results from a post-quantum verification effort},
author = {{PQC Migration Safety Lab}},
year = {2026},
note = {122 named results across 6 prover dialects}
}
Contact
Issues via the repository. For the closed core, open a GitHub Discussion or an issue.
The PQC migration toolkit
Nine free tools for teams moving authenticated key exchange to post-quantum. They find and measure; they do not repair.
| Tool | What it does | Where |
|---|---|---|
| pqc-sizes | Sizes, fragment counts, and the two-sided reassembly window | PyPI |
| pqc-sizes-js | The same arithmetic for Node and the browser | npm |
| pqc-guard-action | Fail the build when the window is empty | GitHub Action |
| pqc-dos-embedded | 169 lines of C: the failure on a real 64 KB device | source |
| farkas-check | Re-verify the bound on-device, no SMT solver | source |
| pqc-migration-mcp | Six MCP tools for AI agents | PyPI |
| pqc-mfb | 322 cases · 39 failure families · scorer | PyPI |
| pqc-mfb (data) | The benchmark as a dataset | HF |
| pqc-formal-corpus ← you are here | 122 named formal results, 6 provers | HF |
| pqc-explorer | Try it in your browser, no install | HF Space |
Start here: pqc-sizes tells you in five seconds whether your credential fragments and whether a safe cap exists. pqc-explorer does the same in a browser.
The closed core
Closing the 39 failure families — downgrade binding, retransmission-safe installation, fragmentation transcripts, roaming forward secrecy, multi-link key separation, admission control, group-key binding — is a separate proprietary codebase. Relevant subject matter is covered by a filed provisional patent application.
That split is measured, not asserted: under a replicate noise control only 4 of 32 repair mechanisms are externally distinguishable, so publishing these detectors does not disclose the repairs.
For commercial licensing, open a GitHub Discussion or an issue on any of these repos.
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