WardenSight-1B

WardenSight-1B is a 1-billion parameter terminal agent specialized for vulnerability file localization in WordPress plugins. It is built on Antares-1B (Cisco Foundation AI), itself built on IBM Granite 4.0 1B, and adapts that general-purpose localizer to a single ecosystem through supervised fine-tuning on vulnerability-localization trajectories from security fixes in WordPress plugins.

Given a plugin repository and a CWE class, WardenSight explores the code through a read-only terminal interface — issuing grep, find, cat and similar commands — and submits a ranked list of files it believes contain that weakness. It runs entirely on-premises at 1B parameters, so client code never leaves the machine.

On 1,646 held-out WordPress plugin tasks, WardenSight-1B achieves a File-F1 of 0.3263 against the base model's 0.2671 — a +22.2% relative improvement, paired bootstrap 95% CI [+0.0378, +0.0797], P(better) = 1.00. It reaches that by being more selective: it names 1.31 files per task where the base model names 2.55.

WardenSight is a triage instrument. It tells an analyst which files to read first. It does not produce line numbers, exploits, patches, or proof that code is vulnerable.

To our knowledge, WardenSight-1B is the first publicly released open-weight model specialized and evaluated for vulnerability file localization in WordPress plugins.

Model Details

Attribute	Value
Parameters	1B-class (GraniteMoeHybridForCausalLM)
Base	fdtn-ai/antares-1b
Task	CWE-conditioned, repository-level vulnerable-file ranking
Ecosystem	WordPress plugins (PHP)
Interface	Sandboxed terminal agent, raw completions API
Context	16,384 tokens
License	Apache-2.0
Release	July 2026

Intended Use

Intended Use Cases

WordPress plugin security review by authorized personnel, where a vulnerability class is already known or suspected and the task is locating it. Typical uses are triaging a disclosure, narrowing a code review, or prioritizing files for manual audit.

Downstream Use

The model emits standard tool calls and integrates into any agentic loop providing a sandboxed read-only terminal. Reports are available in human-readable, JSON and SARIF formats for ingestion by code-scanning platforms.

Out-of-Scope Use

• Determining that code is safe. The model has no reliable ability to report the absence of a vulnerability — see Limitations. Point it at clean code and it will name a file anyway.
• Autonomous remediation or any workflow acting on output without human review.
• Compliance evidence or attestation of code security.
• WordPress themes. Every training and evaluation task is a plugin — no theme appears anywhere in the 1,807 tasks used for this work. Themes are structurally similar PHP and the model will run against one, but its accuracy there is entirely unmeasured. Treat theme results as unvalidated.
• Non-WordPress codebases. Specialization was measured on WordPress plugin PHP only; on other ecosystems use the general-purpose base model instead.
• Offensive use. The model localizes weaknesses for defensive review; it does not generate exploits and must not be used to attack systems without authorization.

How to Get Started with the Model

WardenSight is an agent model, not a one-shot text classifier. It needs three pieces: the weights, a raw-completions model server, and the Antares CLI agent loop with the WardenSight prompt adapter.

1. Download the weights

python -m pip install -U "huggingface_hub[cli]"
hf download emiluzelac/wardensight-1b --local-dir ./wardensight-1b

2. Serve with vLLM

Use the raw completions API — not chat completions, whose server-side templating rewrites the tool prompt the model was trained on:

python -m pip install "vllm>=0.19,<0.20"
vllm serve ./wardensight-1b \
  --served-model-name wardensight-1b \
  --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 \
  --dtype bfloat16 --max-model-len 16384 \
  --trust-remote-code --generation-config vllm

3. Install the agent loop and WardenSight adapter

Install the Antares CLI distributed with fdtn-ai/antares-1b, then apply the release's prompt adapter and profile:

hf download fdtn-ai/antares-1b assets/antares-cli.zip \
  --local-dir ./antares-cli-source
unzip ./antares-cli-source/assets/antares-cli.zip -d ./antares-cli-source
python -m venv ~/antares-venv
~/antares-venv/bin/pip install ./antares-cli-source

git clone https://github.com/emiluzelac/wardensight-1b
cd wardensight-1b
bash tooling/install.sh ~/antares-venv
export ANTARES_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1
~/antares-venv/bin/antares query ./some-wordpress-plugin \
  --cwe CWE-79 --profile wardensight

For a version-pinned WordPress.org plugin, install tooling/ws-scan on your PATH and run wardensight plugin-slug@1.2.3 CWE-79. It downloads and extracts the requested plugin release before invoking the same agent loop. See tooling/README.md for installation details and the exact division between Cisco's CLI and the WardenSight wrapper.

The adapter matters. WardenSight is fine-tuned on a three-tool contract (terminal, submit_vulnerable_files, submit_no_vulnerability_found) with a specific system message; the CLI's default adapter presents a fourth tool the model has never seen, and under it the model degrades into repeated commands. The adapter, profile and a convenience wrapper are in wardensight-1b/tooling.

Sampling settings used for every published number: temperature 0.3, frequency penalty 0.3, 15 terminal calls, 2,048 max tokens, stop tokens ["<|end_of_text|>", "<|start_of_role|>"].

Training and Evaluation

Training Data

584 agent trajectories over WordPress plugin repositories with known, fixed vulnerabilities, drawn from Wordfence Intelligence advisories (CC BY 4.0). Each trajectory explores a plugin snapshot taken at the last vulnerable release and terminates in a file submission.

Ground truth is derived from security-relevant diff hunks, not whole release diffs. This distinction is load-bearing: 58% of files in a typical WordPress vulnerable→fix release diff contain no security change, and under whole-diff labels a constant guess of <slug>.php scores 0.3428 and outranks every trained model. Labels were rebuilt around CWE-aware hunks, which drops that control to 0.1041 and makes the benchmark able to rank localizers at all.

Training plugins are disjoint at the plugin level from every evaluation set.

Training Setup

Full fine-tune of fdtn-ai/antares-1b, no adapters or quantization.

Training setting	Value
Method	Supervised fine-tuning on 584 localization trajectories
Training length	2 epochs
Learning rate	8e-6
Maximum sequence length	5,120 tokens
Numeric precision	bfloat16
Training hardware	1× ASUS Ascent GX10 (NVIDIA GB10, 128 GB unified memory)

Evaluation

Evaluated on WP-VLoc, a WordPress-specific benchmark built for this work: plugin snapshots reconstructed at the pre-fix release, paired with security-hunk ground truth files. Held-out plugins never appear in training. Scored by exact path-set File-F1 with a paired bootstrap (20,000 resamples) against the base model on identical tasks. WardenSight-1B has not been evaluated on Cisco's separate 500-task, six-ecosystem VLoc Bench, so its WP-VLoc score should not be inserted into that benchmark's cross-model table.

model	File-F1	precision	recall	files named	n
WardenSight-1B	0.3263	0.397	0.315	1.31	1,646
Antares-1B (base)	0.2671	0.289	0.330	2.55	1,646
constant guess <slug>.php	0.1041	0.132	0.094	1.00	1,646
constant guess slug + index.php	0.0816	0.074	0.104	2.00	1,646

Paired improvement +0.0592 File-F1 (+22.2%), 95% CI [+0.0378, +0.0797], P(better) = 1.00. Task level: 453 improved, 340 regressed, 853 unchanged; 5% trimmed mean +0.0621, so the gain is not driven by outliers.

Safety Alignment

This model operates as a component in a sandboxed agentic loop, not as a conversational assistant, and no standalone safety alignment was performed on it. Safety should be addressed at the system level:

• Run the agent inside an isolated sandbox (Docker with network=none)
• Restrict deployment to authorized security personnel
• Require human review of output before any remediation action
• Audit agent trajectories in high-risk workflows

Do not expose this model as a general-purpose assistant endpoint.

Limitations

1. It cannot report a clean repository. On 500 already-patched snapshots it declared a vulnerability present in every one (TNR 0.000), and its abstention rate across all held-out evaluation is 0.000 — it has never declined to name a file. This is a property of the model family rather than this checkpoint alone; the base model scored TNR 0.006 on the same test. Use it only when a vulnerability is known or strongly suspected to exist.
2. Coverage is partial. It places a correct file in its ranked output on ~41% of held-out tasks. It is a filter that reorders analyst attention, not a detector that finds everything — and it solves 76 tasks the base model misses while missing 90 the base model solves.
3. Terminal budget. Performance degrades on large plugins where 15 commands cannot cover the codebase, and on vulnerabilities spanning many files.
4. Pattern dependence. Strongest on weaknesses with grep-able signatures (XSS, missing authorization); weaker where the flaw requires semantic reasoning about behavior (unsafe deserialization, injection through indirect data flow).
5. Ecosystem scope. WordPress plugins only — 1,807 plugin tasks, no themes and no non-WordPress code. Specialization was not measured beyond that and should not be assumed to transfer.
6. Knowledge cutoff. Inherits the base model's April 2025 cutoff; training data covers WordPress advisories through July 2026.

Recommendations

Give it a plugin you already suspect and the correct CWE class — supplying the wrong class produces unhelpful output rather than an admission that nothing was found. Pin the plugin version when investigating a known advisory; scanning the current release often re-finds files whose vulnerability shipped a fix. Read the ranked output as a reading order, and confirm every finding in the source before acting on it.

Provenance

The 584 training trajectories for this checkpoint were generated with Claude Code. WardenSight-1B is a full fine-tune of fdtn-ai/antares-1b; Claude was the teacher used to produce the WordPress localization demonstrations, not the student or base model.

WardenSight-1B is not affiliated with or endorsed by Anthropic. The raw Claude trajectories are not distributed with this release. Users are responsible for evaluating any provider terms that may apply to downstream use of model-generated training data.

Attribution and License

Component	Source and license
Base model	fdtn-ai/antares-1b — Cisco Foundation AI, Apache-2.0
Base architecture	IBM Granite 4.0 1B — GraniteMoeHybridForCausalLM
Evaluation harness	Cisco vulnerability-localization-benchmark, Apache-2.0, with local corrections to the command validator, path normalization and the true-negative scorer
Advisory data	Wordfence Intelligence, CC BY 4.0
Plugin code	each plugin's own license (GPL)

Code and weights are released under Apache-2.0. See the Provenance section for the training-data disclosure.