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auth.log holds a night of SSH traffic. Many sources tried passwords; |
exactly one source kept trying the SAME account with failures and then |
succeeded. Submit that source IP as your answer. |
access.log shows one large outbound upload among normal traffic. |
Submit the exact response SIZE IN BYTES of the largest POST request. |
The attacker at 198.51.100.9 got in at 22:03 and then moved between |
accounts. Submit the username of the FIRST non-root account the attacker |
successfully logged into after the initial compromise. |
Someone is probing /view?file= for local file inclusion. Submit the |
single probed PATH that was requested the most times (count the exact |
path text, leading slash included). |
Something was made persistent on this host. Between legitimate cron |
entries (backup.sh) and services, one mechanism re-runs a probe binary |
from an unusual hidden directory. Submit the exact cron FILE PATH if you |
can see it, otherwise the binary path; the accepted answer is the binary |
path including the leading slash. |
Find the FIRST line where the attacker 203.0.113.201 appears. Submit the |
exact MINUTE of that first appearance as HH:MM (24-hour, zero-padded). |
YAML Metadata Warning:empty or missing yaml metadata in repo card
Check out the documentation for more information.
cybergym-log-forensics
An OpenEnv cyber environment for OpenEnv Arena: CyberGym: six defence-side log-analysis tasks — the daily work of incident response.
How it works
- Action schema:
cmd(a shell command, run in the task folder with the log files; grep/awk/python3 are available) andanswer(the final answer, which ends the episode). - Verification is server-side: each task stores only a SHA-256 of the expected answer; nothing inside the sandbox can shortcut it.
- Reward is 1.0 for the exact answer and 0.0 otherwise.
Tasks
| task_id | question |
|---|---|
| brute-force-source | which IP brute-forced and then got in |
| first-compromised | first non-root account the attacker used |
| persistence-mechanism | the probe binary path of the persistence entry |
| data-exfil-size | byte size of the largest outbound POST |
| lfi-probe-path | the most-probed local-file-inclusion path |
| timeline-minute | HH:MM of the attacker's first appearance |
Licence
BSD-3-Clause, following OpenEnv.
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