nickh007/cve-proof-corpus

CVE Proof Corpus

Six real vulnerability classes, each with a machine-checkable proof that the shipped fix eliminates it — and a checker that shares no code with whatever produced the proof.

Every record carries the safety relation, the guard the upstream project shipped, the declared attacker domain, and the nonnegative multipliers that prove the guard implies safety. All six verify.

pip install "certkit@git+https://github.com/nickharris808/certkit@main"
python verify.py

  VERIFIED  curl_ntlm_type3          CVE-2019-3822    2 obligation(s)
  VERIFIED  libpng_rfc1123           CVE-2015-7981    2 obligation(s)
  VERIFIED  libxml2_len_overflow     CVE-2015-8317    1 obligation(s)
  VERIFIED  openssl_heartbeat        CVE-2014-0160    1 obligation(s)
  VERIFIED  sudo_set_cmnd            CVE-2021-3156    1 obligation(s)
  VERIFIED  zlib_inflate_extra       CVE-2022-37434   2 obligation(s)

6 of 6 records verified by certkit
Every published certificate re-checks against its published spec.

That output is a real run.

Why this exists

Proof-carrying security work usually publishes conclusions — "we verified it" — which a reader has no way to check. This corpus publishes the proofs, in a format small enough to re-verify with a checker you can read in an afternoon.

The relations are the real ones. openssl_heartbeat is the CVE-2014-0160 length relation, not a paraphrase or a toy analogue. Six classes across six ecosystems and two weakness families.

Contents

id	CVE	Project	CWE	Weakness	Safety conjuncts
openssl_heartbeat	CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed)	OpenSSL	CWE-125	out-of-bounds read	1
libxml2_len_overflow	CVE-2015-8317	libxml2	CWE-125	out-of-bounds read	1
zlib_inflate_extra	CVE-2022-37434	zlib	CWE-787	out-of-bounds write	2
libpng_rfc1123	CVE-2015-7981	libpng	CWE-125	out-of-bounds read	2
sudo_set_cmnd	CVE-2021-3156 (Baron Samedit)	sudo	CWE-787	heap OOB write	1
curl_ntlm_type3	CVE-2019-3822	curl	CWE-787	stack OOB write	2

Schema

One JSON object per line.

Field	Type	Meaning
schema	string	cve-proof-corpus/v1
id	string	stable class identifier
cve	string	upstream CVE identifier
common_name	string	the name people actually use (e.g. "Heartbleed")
project	string	upstream project
cwe	string	weakness classification
weakness	string	plain-English weakness type
relation_in_words	string	what the safety relation means, in one sentence
variables	list[string]	the variables the relations range over
spec	object	a certkit/spec/v1 object: domain, guard, safety, fingerprint
certificate	object	a certkit/farkas/v1 object: multipliers per obligation
n_safety_conjuncts	int	number of obligations
n_domain_atoms	int	size of the declared domain
n_guard_atoms	int	size of the shipped guard
has_certificate	bool	whether every obligation carries multipliers

An atom is a linear relation in canonical form, with exact rational coefficients encoded as [numerator, denominator] pairs:

{"coeff": {"hb_payload": [1, 1], "hb_record_len": [-1, 1]}, "const": [19, 1], "strict": false}

meaning hb_payload - hb_record_len + 19 <= 0, i.e. 19 + payload <= record_len.

The obligation model

The claim for each record is: within domain, guard implies safety.

safety is a conjunction, so its negation is a disjunction — which is not a single atom list. So there is one obligation per safety conjunct, and obligation i is the atom list

domain ++ guard ++ [negate(safety[i])]

in exactly that order. Multiplier indices refer to positions in that reconstructed list, not to anything the certificate carries. The property holds only if every obligation is refuted.

Usage

from loader import load_corpus, to_certkit
from certkit import check_certificate

for rec in load_corpus():
    spec, cert = to_certkit(rec)
    report = check_certificate(spec, cert)
    print(rec["cve"], "->", "VERIFIED" if report.ok else "FAILED")

With datasets:

from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("json", data_files="cve-proof-corpus.jsonl", split="train")
print(ds[0]["cve"], ds[0]["relation_in_words"])

Provenance

Exported by export.py from a specification manifest and its Farkas certificates. The manifest encodes each CVE's bounds relation as small integer inequalities; the certificates were produced by a solver-free decision procedure that is not part of this release.

That asymmetry is deliberate and is the reason the corpus is publishable at all: producing these certificates is the hard part, and checking them is cheap enough that you need not trust us. Re-run export.py --repo-root <path> to regenerate, and verify.py to re-check.

Limitations

• Six classes is a small corpus. It is a demonstration that the format carries real relations, not a statistical sample of anything.
• Quantifier-free linear integer arithmetic only. These are bounds and length relations. Nothing here involves the heap shape, aliasing, or nonlinear arithmetic.
• A proof about a relation, not about a program. Each record proves the guard implies the stated bounds relation over the declared domain. It does not prove the upstream project is free of other defects, nor that the relation captures every safety requirement of that code path. The relation is stated explicitly so you can judge that yourself.
• The domain is declared, not inferred. A conclusion holds over the domain in the record and says nothing outside it.
• Fingerprints detect drift, not forgery. The spec.fingerprint binds a certificate to a spec and catches accidental mismatch. A deliberate forger would edit the spec and recompute it — soundness rests on a human reading the relations, which is why they are kept small.

The rest of the toolkit

certkit	the checker that verifies this corpus
exploit-counter	how many states an unsound guard admits
crs-mcp	the verdict surface AI agents call
soundnessbench	the benchmark that grades soundness tools
Try it in your browser	re-verify all six live, no install

License

Apache-2.0. The CVE identifiers and upstream relations are public facts; the encoding and certificates are released for copying and re-verification.

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Part of certified discovery — ten artifacts built on one asymmetry: checking a proof is cheap and auditable, so the thing that produced it does not have to be trusted.