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bond_raw
B
capital
B_i = effectiveBond_i
i=OOV2 proposal/dispute
request
raw token integer
Principal placed at risk by the proposal and, when challenged, the dispute.
Risk-bearing commitment and the private cost of an incorrect claim.
Higher B_i may deter frivolous proposals/challenges but raises entry and capital costs.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.effective_bond_raw; currency supplies the asset
T1
event
Null when no proposal exists; a source value of 0 is verified zero.
Integer string; positive for proposed requests; reconcile with token transfers.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0
Request-level bond does not alone identify each actor's duration of exposure.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_token_flows
41,826
reward_configured_raw
B
incentive
R_i^cfg = request.reward_i
i=OOV2 request
request
raw token integer
Reward offered by the requester before a report is supplied.
Ex-ante incentive for costly information production/reporting.
A larger configured reward may attract participation but is not yet realized income.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.question_reward_raw (cross-check reward_raw)
T0
contract_parameter
Null means the request parameter was not recovered; zero is a valid no-reward request.
question_reward_raw = reward_raw where both are populated.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Configured reward may later be refunded or rolled and must not be labelled paid.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds
42,675
reward_to_bond_ratio
B
incentive
rho_i = R_i^cfg / B_i for B_i > 0
i=OOV2 proposed request
request
dimensionless ratio
Configured compensation relative to capital placed at risk.
Incentive intensity and risk-return trade-off.
Higher rho_i may affect proposal or dispute participation conditional on observable selection.
question_reward_raw / effective_bond_raw within the same asset and decimals
T1
derived
Null when B_i is null or zero; never divide by zero or combine assets.
Both inputs share currency; ratio is nonnegative and recomputable from raw integers.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Not a causal incentive estimate; request composition and adapter versions confound comparisons.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds
41,826
dispute_decision
C
monitoring
D_i = 1[DisputePrice event observed before d_i]
i=OOV2 proposal
request
binary
Whether at least one actor paid the on-chain cost to challenge the proposal.
Costly monitoring and public-good provision.
Low dispute rates may reflect agreement, weak monitoring, or high challenge cost; they do not prove truth.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.dispute_tx; polygon_oov2_events.event='DisputePrice'
T1
event
0 only when the full challenge window is observed; otherwise right-censored/null.
One request has at most one canonical dispute event in OOV2; transaction and event agree.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
Undisputed acceptance is a protocol outcome, not independent factual correctness.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events
41,827
proposal_upheld
C
outcome
U_i = 1[resolvedPrice_i = proposedPrice_i] for disputed i
i=disputed OOV2 request
dispute
binary
Whether the DVM-supported settlement agrees with the proposal.
Ex-post adjudication of the challenger/proposer conflict.
Conditional outcome for studying challenge precision, not population truth accuracy.
proposed_price_raw and resolved_price_raw; Grade-A DVM link where cross-chain
terminal_only
cross_chain_link
Null for undisputed, unresolved or non-exactly linked requests.
For Grade-A links, DVM, child-pushed and OOV2 settled prices must be consistent.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x004395edb43EFca9885CEdad51E...
Protocol resolution may differ from independent ground truth.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; uma_polygon_ethereum_grade_a_links
832
mandatory_wait_seconds
B
timing
W_i = d_i - t_i^proposal
i=OOV2 proposal
proposal
seconds
Protocol-defined minimum period during which a proposal remains challengeable.
Institutional delay that enables monitoring but locks capital.
Separates designed waiting time from excess operational delay.
expiration_time minus ProposePrice.block_time
T1
derived
Null when either timestamp is missing; never assume the default liveness.
W_i >= 0; compare to exact event payload and contract version.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md
The period can be request-specific and must not be filled from the current global default.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events
41,827
settlement_delay_seconds
C
timing
L_i = t_i^settle - t_i^request
i=OOV2 request
request
seconds
Elapsed calendar time from request initiation to settlement.
Total institutional and operational friction.
Longer delay increases uncertainty and may increase capital opportunity cost.
Settle.block_time - RequestPrice.block_time
terminal_only
derived
Right-censored at the fixed cutoff for unsettled requests.
Nonnegative; both timestamps come from canonical event logs.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md
Does not by itself identify which stage caused delay.
complete
polygon_oov2_events
41,826
excess_delay_seconds
C
timing
X_i = max(0, L_i - W_i)
i=settled OOV2 request with observed W_i
request
seconds
Delay beyond the protocol-defined challenge window.
Operational friction net of mandatory institutional waiting.
Separates design-imposed waiting from settlement execution latency.
settlement_delay_seconds - mandatory_wait_seconds
terminal_only
derived
Null unless both L_i and W_i are known.
X_i >= 0 and inputs trace to event timestamps.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md
For disputed requests, DVM adjudication is part of excess delay and should later be decomposed.
complete
polygon_oov2_events; polygon_uma_request_rounds
41,826
reward_paid_raw
C
outcome
R_i^paid = explicitReportReward_i + disputeWinnerReward_i
i=settled OOV2 request and economic winner
request
raw token integer
Non-principal compensation actually embedded in the verified settlement transfer.
Realized incentive payment.
Distinguishes promised reward from realized income.
explicit_report_reward_raw + dispute_winner_reward_raw; settlement transfer QC
terminal_only
token_flow
Null when unsettled or transfer evidence unavailable; zero is valid after exact decomposition.
principal_returned + reward_paid = gross_payout where protocol fees are handled by the rule; flow QC exact.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Request-level winner payment requires an actor-role table before individual net payoff analysis.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_request_flow_qc; polygon_uma_token_flows
41,826
principal_returned_raw
C
capital
P_i^ret = decomposed returned bond principal
i=settled OOV2 request and settlement recipient
request
raw token integer
Recovery of previously locked principal; not income.
Capital recovery and exposure closure.
Separating return of capital prevents payout from overstating rewards.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.principal_returned_raw
terminal_only
token_flow
Null when unsettled; zero only when exact decomposition proves no principal return.
Must be reconciled within the same transaction and asset; never counted as reward.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0
A request aggregate may combine multiple principal components; actor allocation must be explicit.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_token_flows
41,826
bond_forfeited_raw
C
penalty
F_i^bond = losing bond amount not returned
i=settled disputed OOV2 request
dispute
raw token integer
Principal lost by the economically losing side of a dispute.
Penalty enforcement and risk realization.
Measures realized downside rather than a configured slash parameter.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.bond_forfeited_raw
terminal_only
token_flow
Null outside a settled eligible dispute; verified zero only after complete decomposition.
Positive only for settled disputed requests; reconcile winner transfer and protocol fee.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Final fee and redistributed bond components must remain separately identified.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_token_flows
834
protocol_fee_raw
B
cost
C_i^fee = protocol fee transferred from disputed escrow
i=settled disputed OOV2 request
dispute
raw token integer
On-chain fee retained or routed by the mechanism during dispute settlement.
Mechanism operation cost paid from escrow.
Reduces private net payoff and may affect willingness to challenge.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.protocol_fee_raw and final_fee_forfeited_raw
terminal_only
token_flow
Null outside eligible settled disputes; do not infer from current fee parameters.
Reconcile with settlement transaction flows and economic rule id.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
Protocol fee is not the off-chain social cost of adjudication.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_token_flows
834
gross_payout_raw
C
outcome
G_i = total settlement transfer to recipient
i=settled OOV2 request
request
raw token integer
Total transferred amount, including returned principal and reward components; it is not an economic reward.
Cash-flow reconciliation variable, not an economic reward measure.
Used only to verify decomposition; treating G_i as reward overstates incentives.
polygon_uma_request_rounds.gross_payout_raw; request flow QC
terminal_only
token_flow
Null when unsettled or transfer unavailable.
gross_payout_raw equals settlement_transfer_raw for all exact-QC settlements.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Cannot be compared as income without subtracting capital and fees.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_request_flow_qc
41,826
realized_payoff_raw
C
outcome
Pi_ia = rewards_ia - forfeitures_ia - fees_ia - gas_ia
i=episode, a=actor
actor-episode
raw asset units by asset
Actor-specific realized economic gain or loss excluding returned principal.
Private economic consequence of reporting, monitoring or challenging.
Outcome for incentive compatibility and economic-regret evaluation.
Requires role-resolved token flows plus gas receipts and reward/forfeiture decomposition
retrospective_only
derived
Null unless all included components share asset and actor attribution; never treat missing cost as zero.
Component sum reconciles to actor-address flows; principal return excluded.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Current request table is not fully actor-role normalized and gas coverage is incomplete.
partial
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_uma_token_flows; receipt archives
41,826
capital_days_locked_raw
B
capital
K_ia = B_ia * (t_release - t_lock)/86400
i=episode, a=actor
actor-episode
raw token units multiplied by days
Quantity of capital tied up over time in its native asset.
Liquidity constraint and capital opportunity cost.
Higher K may discourage participation even if expected payoff is positive.
bond lock/release token flows and their block timestamps
terminal_only
derived
Right-censored capital-days use cutoff duration and retain censor flag; never sum across assets.
Release time cannot precede lock time; asset address and decimals remain attached.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0
Request-level principal is available, but exact actor-specific lock timestamps require a normalized flow lifecycle.
partial
polygon_uma_token_flows; polygon_oov2_events
41,826
gas_cost_native_raw
B
cost
C_ia^gas = gasUsed_tx * effectiveGasPrice_tx
i=decision transaction, a=actor
actor-episode
native chain smallest unit
Direct blockchain execution cost paid by the acting account.
Participation and verification cost.
Higher execution costs can suppress monitoring and challenge activity.
transaction receipt gasUsed and effectiveGasPrice for proposal/dispute/settlement actions
T1
transaction_receipt
Null when receipt is absent; never zero-fill missing receipts.
Recompute product from hexadecimal receipt fields and match transaction sender.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
Current archives cover targeted dispute and settlement receipts, not every relevant action uniformly.
partial
raw Polygon receipt archives
835
verification_cost_usd
B
cost
C_ia^verify = C_ia^gas,USD + C_ia^investigation + C_ia^delay
i=monitoring decision, a=monitor
actor-episode
USD at documented timestamps
Total private cost of investigating and executing a verification action.
Costly information acquisition and public-good provision.
Challenge occurs only when expected benefit exceeds verification and risk cost.
gas receipts plus externally measured labor/API/time costs and timestamped FX conversion
retrospective_only
external_evidence
Null if any required cost component is unavailable; partial cost must be labelled partial.
Each USD component cites source and conversion time; no silent zero labor cost.
NIST AI RMF characteristics; economic cost-accounting design in project guidance; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805228
Gas is measured and timestamp-converted for the strict cohort; investigation and labor remain scenario assumptions.
partial
trustworthy_ai_usd_economics; Polygon dispute receipts; historical Chainlink proxy state
810
monitoring_concentration_hhi
A
monitoring
HHI_t = sum_a s_at^2, s_at = challenges_at / sum_b challenges_bt
a=challenger, t=preregistered time window
protocol-time window
dimensionless [0,1]
Concentration of observed challenge activity among monitoring actors.
Public-good provision, specialization and monitoring fragility.
High concentration can indicate reliance on a small set of monitors, without identifying welfare effects.
disputer addresses from canonical DisputePrice events
retrospective_only
derived
Null when actor attribution or full window coverage is unavailable; no challenges is not HHI=0.
Shares sum to one within protocol, chain, asset and time window.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
Address concentration is not entity concentration; sybils and delegated execution remain possible.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events
835
monitoring_top_k_share
A
monitoring
TopShare_t(k) = sum_{a=1}^k s_(a)t for preregistered k in {1,5,10}
a=challenger ordered by activity share; t=preregistered protocol-time window
protocol-time-window-k
dimensionless [0,1]
Share of observed challenge activity supplied by the k most active monitoring addresses.
Verification concentration and dependence on a small monitor set.
A high top-k share indicates operational reliance on few addresses, not necessarily few entities.
canonical DisputePrice disputer addresses aggregated within protocol, chain, asset and time window
retrospective_only
derived
Null when the complete window or actor attribution is unavailable; no challenges is undefined, not zero.
Shares use the same denominator as HHI; TopShare_t(k) is nondecreasing in k and at most one.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
Addresses may be sybils, delegates or shared infrastructure; k must be reported with every value.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events
835
monitoring_effective_n
A
monitoring
N_eff,t = 1 / HHI_t
t=preregistered protocol-time window with at least one observed challenge
protocol-time window
effective address count
Inverse-HHI effective number of equally active monitoring addresses.
Verification breadth and fragility under unequal participation.
Lower effective N indicates that nominal address counts overstate effective monitoring breadth.
monitoring_concentration_hhi derived from canonical DisputePrice disputer shares
retrospective_only
derived
Null when HHI is null or the window contains no observed challenges; never divide by zero.
N_eff,t lies in [1,n_t] and recomputes exactly as the inverse of the released HHI.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
Effective address count is not an independently resolved count of human or institutional entities.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events
835
monitoring_threshold_n
A
monitoring
N_t(tau) = min{k: sum_{a=1}^k s_(a)t >= tau}, tau in {0.5,0.8,0.9}
a=challenger ordered by activity share; t=window; tau=preregistered coverage threshold
protocol-time-window-threshold
address count
Minimum number of top monitoring addresses needed to supply a specified share of challenges.
Threshold dependence and operational concentration of costly verification.
Small N_t(tau) indicates that removing a few active addresses could sharply reduce observed monitoring.
canonical DisputePrice disputer shares within the same denominator used by HHI and top-k share
retrospective_only
derived
Null without a complete nonempty activity window; tau is part of the observation key and cannot be omitted.
N_t(tau) is an integer in [1,n_t] and is nondecreasing in tau.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0; https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805...
This is an address-activity threshold, not a protocol security threshold or causal failure estimate.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events
835
expected_verifier_utility_usd
B
incentive
EU_i(a|I_i,s) = sum_o p_i(o|I_i) Payoff_i(a,o,s) - Cost_i(a,s)
i=decision episode; a in {Accept,Investigate,Challenge,Abstain}; s=preregistered cost scenario
decision-episode-action-scenario
USD
Expected private utility of a feasible verifier action under a declared information set and cost scenario.
Economic incentive compatibility under uncertain protocol outcomes and costly verification.
A challenge is privately attractive only when its expected token payoff exceeds Gas, capital and investigation costs.
decision-time calibrated probability; exact protocol payoff mapping; timestamped FX/Gas; registered investigation and APR scenarios
T1
derived
Null unless probability, action-contingent payoff and every included cost component are available; scenario assumptions are never observations.
No outcome-only field enters I_i; probabilities sum to one; all action utilities use one registered scenario and USD timestamp policy.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://airc.nist.gov/airmf-resources/airmf/3-sec-characteristics/; https://doi...
Private scenario utility is not social welfare; investigation labor and capital APR remain assumptions.
partial
trustworthy_ai_usd_economics; trustworthy_ai_complete_task; historical Chainlink proxy state
810
dvm_signed_payoff_delta_raw
C
outcome
Delta_iar = signedSlashTokens_iar
i=DVM request, a=voter, r=round/request index
actor-episode
raw UMA integer, signed
Request-level accrued redistribution: positive for correct-vote redistribution and negative for wrong/no-vote slash.
Voting incentive, participation penalty and redistribution.
Connects voting behavior to request-specific economic accrual.
uma_dvm_voter_payoffs.signed_slash_delta_raw from VoterSlashed
terminal_only
state_delta
Null if request-voter event is missing; zero is a real emitted zero delta.
positive + zero + negative classifications are exhaustive; VoterSlashApplied is excluded from this sum.
https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x004395edb43EFca9885CEdad51EC9fAf93Bd34ac; reports/contract_semantics_audit.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
It is accrued to unappliedSlash and is not the same as the later account-level stake mutation.
complete
uma_dvm_voter_payoffs
2,663,684
right_censored
C
outcome
C_i = 1[t_i^terminal is not observed by fixed cutoff T]
i=economic episode; T=fixed release cutoff
economic episode
binary
Whether the lifecycle remains without an observed terminal event at the fixed release cutoff.
Accountability realization and duration measurement under incomplete follow-up.
Retention of censored episodes prevents completed-only outcome and delay estimates.
terminal event timestamps, protocol-native open/closed state and fixed cutoff manifest
terminal_only
derived
Never infer zero from a missing terminal timestamp unless source coverage through T and finality checks pass.
C_i=0 requires a canonical terminal event at or before T; C_i=1 retains observed duration T-t_i^start.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Administrative censoring does not identify the eventual outcome and must not be treated as failure.
complete
polygon_uma_request_rounds; polygon_oov2_events; release cutoff manifest
42,676
dvm_applied_stake_delta_raw
C
outcome
A_ak = emitted unappliedSlash at VoterSlashApplied_k
a=voter, k=stake-update transaction
actor stake-update
raw UMA integer, signed
Net accumulated slash/redistribution actually applied to the voter stake balance.
Realized account-level balance mutation.
Supports stake reconciliation but not request-level causal attribution.
uma_dvm_staking_events VoterSlashApplied raw_data_words and emitted postStake
terminal_only
state_delta
Null when application has not occurred by cutoff; not zero.
pre-stake + applied delta = emitted postStake subject to zero floor; never add VoterSlashed again.
https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x004395edb43EFca9885CEdad51EC9fAf93Bd34ac; reports/contract_semantics_audit.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
One application can aggregate multiple request-level accruals.
complete
uma_dvm_staking_events
262,448
independent_ground_truth_available
C
outcome
G_i = 1[independent, timestamped reference outcome passes validation]
i=oracle request
request
binary
Whether outcome correctness can be judged independently of the protocol's own settlement.
Separates protocol consensus from empirical truth.
Required before reporting accuracy or truthfulness rather than protocol agreement.
validated external source record linked to immutable request semantics and resolution rule
retrospective_only
external_evidence
0 only after an explicit coverage audit; otherwise unavailable/null.
External source timestamp and extraction rule are preserved and independent of model output.
https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320; https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Available for a deterministic Binance-candle subcohort; most requests still provide only protocol outcomes.
partial
trustworthy_ai_independent_truth; Binance finalized klines
34
token_only_action_regret_raw
C
trustworthy_ai
Regret_i^token = max(0, Pi_i^challenge) - Pi_i(a_agent)
i=resolved decision episode; a in {Accept,Challenge,Abstain}
decision episode
raw episode-token integer
Ex-post private token payoff forgone relative to the better of taking no token action and challenging.
Action quality under asymmetric bond/reward consequences.
Tests whether an action policy improves private token outcomes before Gas and investigation costs.
exact OOV2 winner reward, losing bond/final-fee forfeiture, protocol outcome, and registered agent action
retrospective_only
derived
Null for Investigate because its subsequent action and investigation cost are unobserved; never subtract MATIC Gas from USDC.
Computed within one token address and decimals; challenge payoff reconciles to exact settlement flows.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/a16ee53125c433dfa4e29738b73d9069ff109c03/packages/core/contracts/optimistic-oracle-v2/implementation/OptimisticOracleV2.sol; https://github.com/UMAprotocol/uma-docs/blob/master/faqs.md; project next-stage guidance; https://airc.nist.gov/airmf-resources/airmf/3-sec-...
Partial private-payoff regret only: excludes Gas, labor, external harm, independent truth and USD welfare.
partial
trustworthy_ai_requirements_audit; polygon_uma_request_rounds; Polygon dispute receipts
810
economic_regret_usd
C
trustworthy_ai
Regret_i = max_a U_i(a | I_i) - U_i(a_agent | I_i)
i=agent decision episode, a in {Accept,Investigate,Challenge,Abstain}
decision episode
USD
Economic loss from the agent's chosen action relative to the best feasible action under the preregistered payoff model.
Decision quality under costly verification, uncertainty and abstention.
Evaluates whether predictive gains survive action costs and asymmetric errors.
decision-time evidence, realized protocol outcome, cost matrix, gas and capital costs
retrospective_only
derived
Null without a preregistered utility matrix and sufficient realized cost/outcome evidence.
No future fields in I_i; recompute all action utilities and preserve cost assumptions.
NIST AI Risk Management Framework; project next-stage guidance; https://airc.nist.gov/airmf-resources/airmf/3-sec-characteristics/
Constructed as private-verifier scenario regret with measured FX/Gas/payoff; investigation cost and APR are assumptions, not observations.
partial
trustworthy_ai_usd_economics; historical Chainlink proxy state; registered cost scenarios
810

OracleEconLab Oracle Incentives and Accountability v1

This review-sized draft turns fixed, public UMA protocol evidence into complete or right-censored economic lifecycles. It is a release candidate for the paper Who Verifies Decentralized Information? Economic Incentives, Accountability, and Trustworthy AI Across Oracle Protocols.

Dataset configurations

Configuration Rows Observation unit Purpose
abc_dictionary 28 economic variable Formulas, units, sources, missing rules and A/B/C family
uma_real_episode 1 cross-chain episode End-to-end Polygon OOV2 to Ethereum DVM validation
uma_real_episode_abc 28 case-measure status Honest mapping of every A/B/C measure to the real case
uma_public_rpc_episode 1 cross-chain episode Clean-room episode reconstructed without curated-ledger input
uma_public_rpc_abc 28 case-measure status Public-source-only A/B/C mapping and explicit unavailable states
uma_decisions 810 challenged proposal-time decision Minimal four-action AI evaluation
uma_decision_splits 810 decision split assignment Frozen chronological train/validation/test partition
decision_evidence 2430 timestamped evidence reference Prediction-level provenance and leakage audit
ai_feature_dictionary 16 decision-time feature Feature meaning, source and availability
public_ai_episodes 64 public-source cross-chain episode Economic lifecycle reconstructed from fixed public receipts
public_ai_decisions 64 proposal-time decision Credential-free public-source AI demonstration inputs
public_ai_splits 64 split assignment Label-free chronological 44/10/10 partition
public_ai_evidence 192 timestamped evidence reference Decision-time traceability for every demonstration prediction
public_ai_predictions 70 model/action output Four-action predictions, confidence, evidence and protocol endpoint
public_ai_metrics 7 model evaluation Calibration, coverage, abstention and stylized economic cost

A/B/C economic measure families

  • A — Verification concentration (Who verifies?): HHI, top-k share, effective number of monitors and threshold monitor count.
  • B — Incentives and frictions (Why verify?): reward/bond, capital-days, fees, Gas, verification cost and scenario-based expected private utility.
  • C — Accountability outcomes (What happens?): dispute, adjudication, transfer, realized payoff, delay and right censoring.

A/B/C are measure families. They are not the project's Sample A/B/C data cohorts. Identity, decision-time, cross-chain-link and provenance fields remain supporting fields rather than being mislabeled as economic outcomes.

Construction and provenance

The fixed cutoff is 2026-06-30T23:59:59Z. The real case begins with canonical Polygon request, proposal, dispute and settlement records, links them to the Ethereum DVM with a Grade-A deterministic match, reconciles token flows, and separates returned principal from realized reward. Every processed episode or decision contains transaction/evidence references and a deterministic provenance identifier. File integrity is recorded in checksums.csv.

The main reconstruction commands live in the GitHub real-release-v1.5 branch. public_evidence/ includes the five fixed receipts, canonical headers, case specification, source checksums and verified contract-semantic rules used by the clean-room entry. This draft contains review-sized processed evidence; it does not claim that every protocol ledger can be regenerated without archive infrastructure.

The executed notebooks/uma_minimal_trustworthy_ai_demo.ipynb loads the frozen tables, reruns the leakage audit and chronological evaluation, and writes the review-sized artifacts under demo_outputs/. Its reported performance is not edited or filtered after execution.

The independent public_ai_evidence/ path closes the public-source chain for a fixed 64-episode demonstration: a label-free transaction registry, 280 canonical Polygon/Ethereum receipt and header bundles, decoded economic episodes, decision-time features, model outputs and QC. Live mode uses credential-free public endpoints; offline mode deterministically replays the frozen snapshot. The model result is intentionally reported even when weak. It is a pipeline demonstration rather than evidence of production challenge quality.

Trustworthy-AI task

At the OOV2 proposal timestamp, the benchmark emits one of Accept, Investigate, Challenge, or Abstain. The endpoint is whether the later UMA protocol resolution rejects the proposal. Only decision-time fields may be used as model inputs. Columns whose names end in _outcome_only, the protocol label, dispute result and settlement evidence are evaluation-only and must not enter the model.

The 810 observations condition on proposals that were actually challenged, Grade-A linked, price-consistent and flow-exact. The task is therefore a conditional protocol-outcome evaluation, not a causal policy for all proposals and not an independent truth classifier.

Intended uses

  • audit economic variable construction and source traceability;
  • reproduce the real UMA episode and its payoff decomposition;
  • evaluate calibration, abstention, leakage and robustness on the conditional decision cohort;
  • study A/B/C constructs within their declared observation units.

Uses that are not validated

  • production deployment of automated challenges;
  • causal claims that rewards or penalties improve truthfulness;
  • treating protocol acceptance or DVM resolution as independent factual truth;
  • identity, geography or intent inference from blockchain addresses;
  • aggregation of heterogeneous token amounts without asset-preserving conversion.

Biases and limitations

The decision cohort has selective labels because it includes only actually challenged UMA requests. It over-represents mechanisms and market adapters for which exact cross-chain and token-flow evidence is recoverable. Address-level concentration is not entity-level concentration. Off-chain investigation labor is unavailable and remains a declared scenario. Independent factual truth is available only for a small external-rule subset outside the core protocol label.

Personal and sensitive information

The data contain public pseudonymous contract/account addresses, transaction hashes and block metadata. They contain no asserted mapping from an address to a natural person and must not be used to infer human identity. RPC endpoint URLs, credentials and private keys are not included.

Licensing

Original curated tables and documentation are CC BY 4.0. Upstream contracts, APIs and third-party records remain governed by their own terms. See DATA_LICENSE.md and CITATION.cff.

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