Attack-Mitigation-Corpus v1
One JSONL file of 123 security records. Each record is either a described attack technique or a mitigation, and each attack record is paired with a mitigation record covering a related defensive concern.
Measured composition
| metric | value | command |
|---|---|---|
| rows | 123 | wc -l < attack_mitigation_corpus.jsonl |
kind == "attack" |
106 | python3 -c "import json,collections;print(collections.Counter(json.loads(l)['kind'] for l in open('attack_mitigation_corpus.jsonl')))" |
kind == "mitigation" |
17 | as above |
attack rows with a mitre_id |
106 | python3 -c "import json;print(sum(1 for l in open('attack_mitigation_corpus.jsonl') if json.loads(l).get('mitre_id')))" |
attack rows carrying a paired_mitigation object |
106 | python3 -c "import json;print(sum(1 for l in open('attack_mitigation_corpus.jsonl') if 'paired_mitigation' in json.loads(l)))" |
attack rows with a short letter grade (A / B+ / B) |
71 | see below |
attack rows whose grade is a long descriptive string instead |
35 | see below |
distinct technique values |
106 | python3 -c "import json;print(len({json.loads(l).get('technique') for l in open('attack_mitigation_corpus.jsonl') if json.loads(l).get('kind')=='attack'}))" |
distinct phase values |
34 | as above on phase |
Schema
| field | type | rows containing it |
|---|---|---|
id |
str | 123 |
kind |
str | 123 |
phase |
str | 106 |
tactic |
str | 106 |
technique |
str | 106 |
how |
str | 106 |
mitre_id |
str | 106 |
tooling |
str | 106 |
limitations |
str | 106 |
grade |
str | 123 |
source |
str | 123 |
paired_mitigation |
NoneType/dict | 106 |
threat |
str | 17 |
detection |
str | 17 |
hardening |
str | 17 |
kind takes two values, attack (106) and mitigation (17).
The two record shapes differ:
- attack rows carry
mitre_id,phase,tactic,technique,how,tooling,limitations, a long-formgrade,source, and a nestedpaired_mitigationobject withthreat,detection, andhardeningfields. - mitigation rows carry
threat,detection, andhardeningdirectly.
All 106 attack rows carry paired_mitigation. Every
mitre_id value is a MITRE ATT&CK identifier (technique IDs such as T1558.003 and
tactic IDs such as TA0008 both appear).
The grade field is not categorical
This matters for anyone filtering on it. On attack rows, grade holds one of two
different things:
- a short letter rating on 71 rows —
A(62),B(1),B+(8); - a long descriptive string (typically a high/medium/low judgement with its conditions) on 35 rows.
Only 71 of 106 attack rows can be filtered into A/B/B+ buckets. The remaining
35 rows require parsing prose or dropping them. Treat grade as free text.
phase on attack rows:
| phase | rows |
|---|---|
Exploitation - Web |
13 |
Initial Access |
10 |
Evasion |
7 |
Exploitation - AI/LLM |
7 |
Vulnerability Discovery - Fuzzing |
6 |
Exploitation - Memory Corruption |
6 |
Lateral Movement - AD |
6 |
Reconnaissance |
5 |
Exfiltration |
4 |
C2 |
4 |
Persistence |
3 |
Credential Access |
3 |
Privilege Escalation - Linux |
3 |
Privilege Escalation - Windows |
3 |
Reconnaissance - Fuzzing |
3 |
Web Exploitation |
2 |
Vulnerability Discovery - Symbolic Execution |
2 |
Vulnerability Discovery - Binary Analysis |
2 |
Lateral Movement / Credential Access |
2 |
Privilege Escalation / Linux |
1 |
Privilege Escalation / Active Directory |
1 |
Command and Control |
1 |
Web Exploitation / XSS |
1 |
Web Exploitation / Injection |
1 |
Vulnerability Discovery - OSINT / Recon |
1 |
Exploitation - Binary |
1 |
Vulnerability Discovery - Fuzzing / AI-Augmented |
1 |
Evasion / Persistence |
1 |
Exploitation - Mobile / Thick Client |
1 |
Exploitation - Web / GraphQL |
1 |
Reconnaissance / Initial Access |
1 |
Exploitation - Web / Node.js |
1 |
Evasion / Obfuscation |
1 |
Exploitation - Physical / Hardware |
1 |
The 17 mitigation rows carry no phase.
Content scope
Attack techniques in the file span initial access, exploitation (including web and AI/LLM
targets), privilege escalation, lateral movement, credential access, and evasion. Each
record cites public sources (MITRE ATT&CK, public tooling repositories, public writeups)
in its source field, describes the technique, lists the public tooling that implements
it, and states its limitations — the conditions under which the technique fails or is
detected. The paired mitigation gives the corresponding detection and hardening
measures.
Example record (excerpt)
{"id": "ATK-005", "kind": "attack", "phase": "Privilege Escalation / Active Directory",
"technique": "Kerberoasting — offline cracking of service account TGS tickets",
"mitre_id": "T1558.003",
"tooling": "Rubeus, Impacket GetUserSPNs.py, BloodHound/SharpHound, hashcat",
"limitations": "AES-encrypted TGS tickets are significantly harder to crack than RC4 …
Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) use 240-character random passwords — effectively
uncrackable. Detection: Windows Event 4769 … with RC4 encryption type from
non-service accounts is a strong indicator.",
"source": "MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003 (public); Impacket GetUserSPNs.py (public OSS); …",
"paired_mitigation": { "threat": "…", "detection": "…", "hardening": "…" }}
Honest notes
- Dual-use content. This file describes offensive security techniques at a level of
detail that includes tooling names and command shapes, alongside the detections and
hardening measures that counter them. It is a public-source survey: every technique is
attributed in
sourceto publicly available material, and the record structure pairs each technique with its defensive counterpart. It is not exploit code —howdescribes technique, and no working payload is included. - Not independently verified. The descriptions are compiled from public sources named in each row; no row carries a verification verdict, and the mitigation guidance has not been tested by the author.
gradeis a judgement, not a measurement — see above. The long-form values mix severity with conditional caveats in a single string.limitationsis empty on some rows. Do not treat it as always-populated.paired_mitigationis a cross-cutting pairing, not a topical one. The mitigation paired with an attack is not necessarily the mitigation for that attack; pairings join across attack and mitigation pools. Do not read a row'spaired_mitigationas its countermeasure.- Example domains use reserved or fictional names (e.g.
domain.local); no real credentials, hosts, or personal data are present. The file was scanned for secret material before staging. - No held-out split is shipped; make your own.
Files
attack_mitigation_corpus.jsonl— 372607 B, 123 rows.LICENSE— CC-BY-4.0 (added at staging; the source directory carried no licence file).
Licence
CC-BY-4.0. Free to use with attribution, including commercially.
Copyright 2026 Christopher Betances (catqualia.com)
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