GORK โ€” a cybersecurity model.

Run on Heimdallm License Base Params Context

Gork-27B-Cybersecurity

A 27B cybersecurity assistant fine-tuned from Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B for threat intelligence, incident response and secure-code review.

Highlights

  • Far stronger on security knowledge. Well ahead of the base on CyberMetric and held-out security data, and ahead on SecEval and CTIBench.
  • No general-capability regression. At or above the base on GSM8K, MMLU-Pro and IFEval.
  • Strong tool use. Higher pass rate than the base on Sleipnir's tool-use suite, and ahead of it on single calls and user-contributed functions in BFCL.
  • Concise. About 1.4x fewer output tokens per answer than the base, at higher accuracy.
  • 262K context. Extensible to 1M with YaRN as in the base model.
  • Open weights, Apache-2.0. Run it directly, or per token on Heimdallm.

Model Overview

Model type Causal LM. Dense hybrid of Gated DeltaNet (linear attention) and full attention in a 3:1 layer pattern, with a 1-layer multi-token-prediction head (inherited from Qwen3.8).
Base model Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B (text model only)
Parameters 27B (incl. MTP head)
Context length 262,144 native ยท 1,000,000 with YaRN
Modalities Text in, text out
Languages English (security corpora are overwhelmingly English; multilingual chat is inherited, not tuned)
Precision BF16 safetensors
License Apache-2.0

Quantized versions

Repository Format Size
Gork-27b-Cybersecurity-FP8-Dynamic FP8 weights and activations 30 GB
Gork-27b-Cybersecurity-NVFP4 NVFP4 MLP, FP8 attention 24 GB

Both stay within two points of this model on the security and general benchmarks. On BFCL, FP8 stays within two points in every category, and NVFP4 does too except parallel tool calls, where it is three to four points higher. Results in BENCHMARK-RESULTS.md.

Intended Use

Primary use cases

  • Threat-intel summarisation and extraction (IOCs, TTPs, actor attribution with confidence)
  • Incident-response playbook assistance and post-incident report drafting
  • Secure-code review and vulnerability explanation (CWE mapping, remediation guidance)
  • Security education and certification study (CISSP / Sec+ style Q&A)

Out of scope

  • Autonomous offensive operations against systems without written authorisation to test
  • Generating novel, weaponised exploit code or malware
  • Legal, compliance or regulatory determinations without a qualified human reviewer

Dual-use notice. Security knowledge is inherently dual-use. The model is tuned to be more useful to defenders than a general model, and it will still explain how attacks work because defenders need that. Read Safety before exposing it to untrusted users.

Training

Supervised fine-tune of Qwen3.8-27B on a curated cybersecurity dataset, trained with QLoRA and merged back into BF16 weights, then averaged in equal parts with the base weights. The averaging keeps the security gains and restores most of the base model's multi-call tool use.

Knowledge cut-off: November 2026. CVEs and advisories published after this date are unknown unless supplied in context.

Evaluation

All numbers compare Gork against the unmodified Qwen3.8-27B base with no input truncation. Higher is better except NLL. Benchmarks ran on lm-evaluation-harness and the BFCL runner over vLLM; scoring details are in BENCHMARK-RESULTS.md.

Security

Benchmark What it measures Gork-27B Qwen3.8-27B (base)
Validation NLL โ€” held-out in-domain examples fit to the security distribution (lower is better; perplexity in parentheses) 0.640 (1.90) 0.962 (2.62)
CyberMetric-500 security knowledge QA 0.952 0.746
SecEval (2,182, multi-select) security knowledge across nine domains 0.794 0.781
CTIBench โ€” MCQ (2,500) threat-intel knowledge 0.736 0.714
CTIBench โ€” RCM (1,000) map CVE โ†’ CWE 0.734 0.726
MMLU โ€” computer_security general security knowledge 0.87 0.88

Gork is far stronger on the in-domain objective and on CyberMetric, and ahead on SecEval and both CTIBench tasks.

General-capability regression

Identical settings for both models. IFEval and GSM8K are full; MMLU-Pro is a 33% stratified subset (~4,000 of ~12,000 questions). GSM8K is scored through the chat template (few-shot examples as turns).

Benchmark What it measures Gork-27B Qwen3.8-27B (base)
GSM8K (flexible-extract) grade-school math reasoning 0.917 0.898
MMLU-Pro (~4,000-Q subset) broad reasoning across 14 domains 0.721 0.612
IFEval โ€” prompt-level strict instruction following 0.649 0.529
IFEval โ€” instruction-level strict instruction following 0.753 0.629

The security tuning did not cost general capability: Gork is at or above the base on every task.

Token efficiency

On the same 1,000 CTIBench CVEโ†’CWE prompts, Gork is more accurate than the base while emitting 1.4x fewer output tokens per answer.

Gork-27B Qwen3.8-27B (base)
Mean output tokens/answer 134.0 192.0
Median 95 127
p90 192 327
Accuracy 0.734 0.726

Tool calling (BFCL v4)

Category What it measures Gork-27B Qwen3.8-27B (base)
Simple (Python, Java, JavaScript) one call to one given function 0.808 0.800
Multiple choosing the right function among several 0.965 0.975
Parallel several calls in one turn 0.725 0.820
Parallel multiple several calls across several functions 0.720 0.835
Live (user-contributed) real-world function definitions 0.844 0.823
Multi-turn stateful tasks over several turns 0.495 0.583
Irrelevance declining tools that do not fit the request 0.846 0.732

Gork leads the base on single calls and user-contributed functions, and declines unrelated tools more reliably.

Agent use (Sleipnir)

Measured in Sleipnir, a coding-agent harness, over the same OpenAI-compatible endpoint.

Test What it measures Gork-27B Qwen3.8-27B (base)
Tool-use suite (9 scenarios, 5 samples each) picking the right next tool call in situations taken from real team runs 0.76 0.60

In single end-to-end runs, Gork fixed a failing unit-test suite and triaged a 200 KB SSH log, identifying the brute-force source and the compromised account.

Quickstart

vLLM

vllm serve ConsensusProtocol-Thanos/Gork-27b-Cybersecurity \
  --max-model-len 262144 \
  --enable-auto-tool-choice --tool-call-parser qwen3_coder

Transformers

Requires transformers>=5.20.

from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
import torch

model_id = "ConsensusProtocol-Thanos/Gork-27b-Cybersecurity"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(model_id, dtype=torch.bfloat16, device_map="auto")

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Classify this URL as phishing or benign and explain: hxxp://login-micros0ft[.]support"}]
inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=True,
                                       return_dict=True, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)
out = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=2048)
print(tokenizer.decode(out[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))

Heimdallm (hosted, OpenAI-compatible)

from openai import OpenAI

client = OpenAI(base_url="https://staging.heimdallm.com/v1", api_key="YOUR_HEIMDALLM_KEY")
resp = client.chat.completions.create(
    model="conpro/gork-27b",
    messages=[
        {"role": "system", "content": "You are a security analyst. Be concise."},
        {"role": "user", "content": "Review this Python for security problems and name the CWE: cur.execute(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'\" % name)"},
    ],
)
print(resp.choices[0].message.content)

Chat Template and Tool Calling

Gork is a direct-answer model: it replies without a chain-of-thought phase, and thinking is disabled in the chat template. It uses ChatML-style roles and XML-style <tool_call><function=โ€ฆ> calls, with the standard function-calling schema.

Sampling

temperature=0.7, top_p=0.8, top_k=20, presence_penalty=1.5. The shipped generation_config.json carries this preset.

Safety and Limitations

Known limitations

  • CVE details recalled from memory (IDs, CWE, CVSS) can be wrong; verify them against NVD.
  • Attribution confidence is over-stated; treat actor names as hypotheses.
  • English-centric. Non-English security content is handled by inherited base capability only.
  • Text only. For screenshots, OCR first or use the vision-capable base model.
  • Designed for the chat template; raw text completion is not supported.
  • This is a v0.1 preview checkpoint.

Safety behaviour

  • Refuses or redirects weaponised exploit development, unauthorised access to named targets, non-consensual surveillance, and malware generation.
  • Will explain attack techniques and reverse-engineer provided samples.

License

Apache-2.0. Base model ยฉ Alibaba Cloud (Qwen), Apache-2.0. Fine-tuned weights ยฉ 2026 Consensus Protocol LLC. Not affiliated with xAI.

Citation

@misc{gork2026,
  title        = {Gork-27B-Cybersecurity: A Cybersecurity Fine-tune of Qwen3.8-27B},
  author       = {Consensus Protocol LLC},
  year         = {2026},
  url          = {https://huggingface.co/ConsensusProtocol-Thanos/Gork-27b-Cybersecurity},
  note         = {Version 0.1 preview}
}

Acknowledgements

Qwen team for the base model. The Sigma, YARA, MITRE ATT&CK and NVD communities for making defensive knowledge public.

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