Daily Papers

Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.

Linear time-invariant state space models (SSM) are a classical model from engineering and statistics, that have recently been shown to be very promising in machine learning through the Structured State Space sequence model (S4). A core component of S4 involves initializing the SSM state matrix to a particular matrix called a HiPPO matrix, which was empirically important for S4's ability to handle long sequences. However, the specific matrix that S4 uses was actually derived in previous work for a particular time-varying dynamical system, and the use of this matrix as a time-invariant SSM had no known mathematical interpretation. Consequently, the theoretical mechanism by which S4 models long-range dependencies actually remains unexplained. We derive a more general and intuitive formulation of the HiPPO framework, which provides a simple mathematical interpretation of S4 as a decomposition onto exponentially-warped Legendre polynomials, explaining its ability to capture long dependencies. Our generalization introduces a theoretically rich class of SSMs that also lets us derive more intuitive S4 variants for other bases such as the Fourier basis, and explains other aspects of training S4, such as how to initialize the important timescale parameter. These insights improve S4's performance to 86% on the Long Range Arena benchmark, with 96% on the most difficult Path-X task.

Creating secure and resilient applications with large language models (LLM) requires anticipating, adjusting to, and countering unforeseen threats. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical technique for identifying vulnerabilities in real-world LLM implementations. This paper presents a detailed threat model and provides a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of red-teaming attacks on LLMs. We develop a taxonomy of attacks based on the stages of the LLM development and deployment process and extract various insights from previous research. In addition, we compile methods for defense and practical red-teaming strategies for practitioners. By delineating prominent attack motifs and shedding light on various entry points, this paper provides a framework for improving the security and robustness of LLM-based systems.

We explore the feasibility and effectiveness of using LLM-driven autonomous systems for Assumed Breach penetration testing in enterprise networks. We introduce a novel prototype that, driven by Large Language Models (LLMs), can compromise accounts within a real-life Active Directory testbed. Our research provides a comprehensive evaluation of the prototype's capabilities, and highlights both strengths and limitations while executing attack. The evaluation uses a realistic simulation environment (Game of Active Directory, GOAD) to capture intricate interactions, stochastic outcomes, and timing dependencies that characterize live network scenarios. The study concludes that autonomous LLMs are able to conduct Assumed Breach simulations, potentially democratizing access to penetration testing for organizations facing budgetary constraints. The prototype's source code, traces, and analyzed logs are released as open-source to enhance collective cybersecurity and facilitate future research in LLM-driven cybersecurity automation.

State Space Models (SSMs) have emerged as efficient alternatives to Transformers, mitigating their quadratic computational cost. However, the application of Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) methods to SSMs remains largely unexplored. In particular, prompt-based methods like Prompt Tuning and Prefix-Tuning, which are widely used in Transformers, do not perform well on SSMs. To address this, we propose state-based methods as a superior alternative to prompt-based methods. This new family of methods naturally stems from the architectural characteristics of SSMs. State-based methods adjust state-related features directly instead of depending on external prompts. Furthermore, we introduce a novel state-based PEFT method: State-offset Tuning. At every timestep, our method directly affects the state at the current step, leading to more effective adaptation. Through extensive experiments across diverse datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Code is available at https://github.com/furiosa-ai/ssm-state-tuning.

State-space models (SSMs) offer a powerful framework for dynamical system analysis, wherein the temporal dynamics of the system are assumed to be captured through the evolution of the latent states, which govern the values of the observations. This paper provides a selective review of recent advancements in deep neural network-based approaches for SSMs, and presents a unified perspective for discrete time deep state space models and continuous time ones such as latent neural Ordinary Differential and Stochastic Differential Equations. It starts with an overview of the classical maximum likelihood based approach for learning SSMs, reviews variational autoencoder as a general learning pipeline for neural network-based approaches in the presence of latent variables, and discusses in detail representative deep learning models that fall under the SSM framework. Very recent developments, where SSMs are used as standalone architectural modules for improving efficiency in sequence modeling, are also examined. Finally, examples involving mixed frequency and irregularly-spaced time series data are presented to demonstrate the advantage of SSMs in these settings.

State-space models (SSMs) provide a flexible framework for modelling time-series data. Consequently, SSMs are ubiquitously applied in areas such as engineering, econometrics and epidemiology. In this paper we provide a fast approach for approximate Bayesian inference in SSMs using the tools of deep learning and variational inference.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Structured state-space models (SSMs) such as S4, stemming from the seminal work of Gu et al., are gaining popularity as effective approaches for modeling sequential data. Deep SSMs demonstrate outstanding performance across a diverse set of domains, at a reduced training and inference cost compared to attention-based transformers. Recent developments show that if the linear recurrence powering SSMs allows for multiplicative interactions between inputs and hidden states (e.g. GateLoop, Mamba, GLA), then the resulting architecture can surpass in both in accuracy and efficiency attention-powered foundation models trained on text, at scales of billion parameters. In this paper, we give theoretical grounding to this recent finding using tools from Rough Path Theory: we show that when random linear recurrences are equipped with simple input-controlled transitions (selectivity mechanism), then the hidden state is provably a low-dimensional projection of a powerful mathematical object called the signature of the input -- capturing non-linear interactions between tokens at distinct timescales. Our theory not only motivates the success of modern selective state-space models such as Mamba but also provides a solid framework to understand the expressive power of future SSM variants.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread popularity across diverse domains involving text generation, summarization, and various natural language processing tasks. Despite their inherent limitations, LLM-based designs have shown promising capabilities in planning and navigating open-world scenarios. This paper introduces a novel application of pre-trained LLMs as agents within cybersecurity network environments, focusing on their utility for sequential decision-making processes. We present an approach wherein pre-trained LLMs are leveraged as attacking agents in two reinforcement learning environments. Our proposed agents demonstrate similar or better performance against state-of-the-art agents trained for thousands of episodes in most scenarios and configurations. In addition, the best LLM agents perform similarly to human testers of the environment without any additional training process. This design highlights the potential of LLMs to efficiently address complex decision-making tasks within cybersecurity. Furthermore, we introduce a new network security environment named NetSecGame. The environment is designed to eventually support complex multi-agent scenarios within the network security domain. The proposed environment mimics real network attacks and is designed to be highly modular and adaptable for various scenarios.

The Mamba layer offers an efficient selective state space model (SSM) that is highly effective in modeling multiple domains including NLP, long-range sequences processing, and computer vision. Selective SSMs are viewed as dual models, in which one trains in parallel on the entire sequence via IO-aware parallel scan, and deploys in an autoregressive manner. We add a third view and show that such models can be viewed as attention-driven models. This new perspective enables us to compare the underlying mechanisms to that of the self-attention layers in transformers and allows us to peer inside the inner workings of the Mamba model with explainability methods. Our code is publicly available.

Transformers and their variants have achieved great success in speech processing. However, their multi-head self-attention mechanism is computationally expensive. Therefore, one novel selective state space model, Mamba, has been proposed as an alternative. Building on its success in automatic speech recognition, we apply Mamba for spoofing attack detection. Mamba is well-suited for this task as it can capture the artifacts in spoofed speech signals by handling long-length sequences. However, Mamba's performance may suffer when it is trained with limited labeled data. To mitigate this, we propose combining a new structure of Mamba based on a dual-column architecture with self-supervised learning, using the pre-trained wav2vec 2.0 model. The experiments show that our proposed approach achieves competitive results and faster inference on the ASVspoof 2021 LA and DF datasets, and on the more challenging In-the-Wild dataset, it emerges as the strongest candidate for spoofing attack detection. The code has been publicly released in https://github.com/swagshaw/XLSR-Mamba.

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the future of cybersecurity through Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs). We explore LLM applications across various domains, including hardware design security, intrusion detection, software engineering, design verification, cyber threat intelligence, malware detection, and phishing detection. We present an overview of LLM evolution and its current state, focusing on advancements in models such as GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Mixtral-8x7B, BERT, Falcon2, and LLaMA. Our analysis extends to LLM vulnerabilities, such as prompt injection, insecure output handling, data poisoning, DDoS attacks, and adversarial instructions. We delve into mitigation strategies to protect these models, providing a comprehensive look at potential attack scenarios and prevention techniques. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of 42 LLM models in cybersecurity knowledge and hardware security, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We thoroughly evaluate cybersecurity datasets for LLM training and testing, covering the lifecycle from data creation to usage and identifying gaps for future research. In addition, we review new strategies for leveraging LLMs, including techniques like Half-Quadratic Quantization (HQQ), Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Quantized Low-Rank Adapters (QLoRA), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). These insights aim to enhance real-time cybersecurity defenses and improve the sophistication of LLM applications in threat detection and response. Our paper provides a foundational understanding and strategic direction for integrating LLMs into future cybersecurity frameworks, emphasizing innovation and robust model deployment to safeguard against evolving cyber threats.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to attack graphs for penetration testing, however, trained agents do not reflect reality because the attack graphs lack operational nuances typically captured within the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that include notions of (cyber) terrain. In particular, current practice constructs attack graphs exclusively using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and its components. We present methods for constructing attack graphs using notions from IPB on cyber terrain analysis of obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment. We demonstrate our methods on an example where firewalls are treated as obstacles and represented in (1) the reward space and (2) the state dynamics. We show that terrain analysis can be used to bring realism to attack graphs for RL.

Selective state space models (SSM), such as Mamba, have gained prominence for their effectiveness in modeling sequential data. Despite their outstanding empirical performance, a comprehensive theoretical understanding of deep selective SSM remains elusive, hindering their further development and adoption for applications that need high fidelity. In this paper, we investigate the dynamical properties of tokens in a pre-trained Mamba model. In particular, we derive the dynamical system governing the continuous-time limit of the Mamba model and characterize the asymptotic behavior of its solutions. In the one-dimensional case, we prove that only one of the following two scenarios happens: either all tokens converge to zero, or all tokens diverge to infinity. We provide criteria based on model parameters to determine when each scenario occurs. For the convergent scenario, we empirically verify that this scenario negatively impacts the model's performance. For the divergent scenario, we prove that different tokens will diverge to infinity at different rates, thereby contributing unequally to the updates during model training. Based on these investigations, we propose two refinements for the model: excluding the convergent scenario and reordering tokens based on their importance scores, both aimed at improving practical performance. Our experimental results validate these refinements, offering insights into enhancing Mamba's effectiveness in real-world applications.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

The rapid evolution of cyber threats necessitates innovative solutions for detecting and analyzing malicious activity. Honeypots, which are decoy systems designed to lure and interact with attackers, have emerged as a critical component in cybersecurity. In this paper, we present a novel approach to creating realistic and interactive honeypot systems using Large Language Models (LLMs). By fine-tuning a pre-trained open-source language model on a diverse dataset of attacker-generated commands and responses, we developed a honeypot capable of sophisticated engagement with attackers. Our methodology involved several key steps: data collection and processing, prompt engineering, model selection, and supervised fine-tuning to optimize the model's performance. Evaluation through similarity metrics and live deployment demonstrated that our approach effectively generates accurate and informative responses. The results highlight the potential of LLMs to revolutionize honeypot technology, providing cybersecurity professionals with a powerful tool to detect and analyze malicious activity, thereby enhancing overall security infrastructure.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

This work explores the in-context learning capabilities of State Space Models (SSMs) and presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first theoretical explanation of a possible underlying mechanism. We introduce a novel weight construction for SSMs, enabling them to predict the next state of any dynamical system after observing previous states without parameter fine-tuning. This is accomplished by extending the HiPPO framework to demonstrate that continuous SSMs can approximate the derivative of any input signal. Specifically, we find an explicit weight construction for continuous SSMs and provide an asymptotic error bound on the derivative approximation. The discretization of this continuous SSM subsequently yields a discrete SSM that predicts the next state. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our parameterization empirically. This work should be an initial step toward understanding how sequence models based on SSMs learn in context.

This paper introduces the Multi-Step Action Model (MSAM), a closed-source AI model designed by Empsing to address challenges hindering AI adoption in enterprises. Through a holistic examination, this paper explores MSAM's foundational principles, design architecture, and future trajectory. It evaluates MSAM's performance via rigorous testing methodologies and envisions its potential impact on advancing AI adoption within organizations.

Recent interest in human-AI interactions in agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) has grown rapidly due to the widespread utilization of large language models (LLMs). ABMS is an intelligent approach that simulates autonomous agents' behaviors within a defined environment to research emergent phenomena. Integrating LLMs into ABMS enables natural language interaction between humans and models. Meanwhile, it introduces new challenges that rely on human interaction to address. Human involvement can assist ABMS in adapting to flexible and complex research demands. However, systematic reviews of interactions that examine how humans and AI interact in ABMS are lacking. In this paper, we investigate existing works and propose a novel taxonomy to categorize the interactions derived from them. Specifically, human users refer to researchers who utilize ABMS tools to conduct their studies in our survey. We decompose interactions into five dimensions: the goals that users want to achieve (Why), the phases that users are involved (When), the components of the system (What), the roles of users (Who), and the means of interactions (How). Our analysis summarizes the findings that reveal existing interaction patterns. They provide researchers who develop interactions with comprehensive guidance on how humans and AI interact. We further discuss the unexplored interactions and suggest future research directions.

Restless multi-armed bandits (RMAB) have demonstrated success in optimizing resource allocation for large beneficiary populations in public health settings. Unfortunately, RMAB models lack flexibility to adapt to evolving public health policy priorities. Concurrently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as adept automated planners across domains of robotic control and navigation. In this paper, we propose a Decision Language Model (DLM) for RMABs, enabling dynamic fine-tuning of RMAB policies in public health settings using human-language commands. We propose using LLMs as automated planners to (1) interpret human policy preference prompts, (2) propose reward functions as code for a multi-agent RMAB environment, and (3) iterate on the generated reward functions using feedback from grounded RMAB simulations. We illustrate the application of DLM in collaboration with ARMMAN, an India-based non-profit promoting preventative care for pregnant mothers, that currently relies on RMAB policies to optimally allocate health worker calls to low-resource populations. We conduct a technology demonstration in simulation using the Gemini Pro model, showing DLM can dynamically shape policy outcomes using only human prompts as input.

Finite state machines (FSMs) are widely used to manage robot behavior logic, particularly in real-world applications that require a high degree of reliability and structure. However, traditional manual FSM design and modification processes can be time-consuming and error-prone. We propose that large language models (LLMs) can assist developers in editing FSM code for real-world robotic use cases. LLMs, with their ability to use context and process natural language, offer a solution for FSM modification with high correctness, allowing developers to update complex control logic through natural language instructions. Our approach leverages few-shot prompting and language-guided code generation to reduce the amount of time it takes to edit an FSM. To validate this approach, we evaluate it on a real-world robotics dataset, demonstrating its effectiveness in practical scenarios.

With more and more deep neural networks being deployed as various daily services, their reliability is essential. It is frightening that deep neural networks are vulnerable and sensitive to adversarial attacks, the most common one of which for the services is evasion-based. Recent works usually strengthen the robustness by adversarial training or leveraging the knowledge of an amount of clean data. However, retraining and redeploying the model need a large computational budget, leading to heavy losses to the online service. In addition, when training, it is likely that only limited adversarial examples are available for the service provider, while much clean data may not be accessible. Based on the analysis on the defense for deployed models, we find that how to rapidly defend against a certain attack for a frozen original service model with limitations of few clean and adversarial examples, which is named as RaPiD (Rapid Plug-in Defender), is really important. Motivated by the generalization and the universal computation ability of pre-trained transformer models, we come up with a new defender method, CeTaD, which stands for Considering Pretrained Transformers as Defenders. In particular, we evaluate the effectiveness and the transferability of CeTaD in the case of one-shot adversarial examples and explore the impact of different parts of CeTaD as well as training data conditions. CeTaD is flexible for different differentiable service models, and suitable for various types of attacks.

State space models (SSMs) have shown remarkable empirical performance on many long sequence modeling tasks, but a theoretical understanding of these models is still lacking. In this work, we study the learning dynamics of linear SSMs to understand how covariance structure in data, latent state size, and initialization affect the evolution of parameters throughout learning with gradient descent. We show that focusing on the learning dynamics in the frequency domain affords analytical solutions under mild assumptions, and we establish a link between one-dimensional SSMs and the dynamics of deep linear feed-forward networks. Finally, we analyze how latent state over-parameterization affects convergence time and describe future work in extending our results to the study of deep SSMs with nonlinear connections. This work is a step toward a theory of learning dynamics in deep state space models.

Serverless computing is an emerging cloud paradigm with serverless functions at its core. While serverless environments enable software developers to focus on developing applications without the need to actively manage the underlying runtime infrastructure, they open the door to a wide variety of security threats that can be challenging to mitigate with existing methods. Existing security solutions do not apply to all serverless architectures, since they require significant modifications to the serverless infrastructure or rely on third-party services for the collection of more detailed data. In this paper, we present an extendable serverless security threat detection model that leverages cloud providers' native monitoring tools to detect anomalous behavior in serverless applications. Our model aims to detect compromised serverless functions by identifying post-exploitation abnormal behavior related to different types of attacks on serverless functions, and therefore, it is a last line of defense. Our approach is not tied to any specific serverless application, is agnostic to the type of threats, and is adaptable through model adjustments. To evaluate our model's performance, we developed a serverless cybersecurity testbed in an AWS cloud environment, which includes two different serverless applications and simulates a variety of attack scenarios that cover the main security threats faced by serverless functions. Our evaluation demonstrates our model's ability to detect all implemented attacks while maintaining a negligible false alarm rate.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has revolutionized our comprehension of intelligence bringing us closer to Artificial Intelligence. Since their introduction, researchers have actively explored the applications of LLMs across diverse fields, significantly elevating capabilities. Cybersecurity, traditionally resistant to data-driven solutions and slow to embrace machine learning, stands out as a domain. This study examines the existing literature, providing a thorough characterization of both defensive and adversarial applications of LLMs within the realm of cybersecurity. Our review not only surveys and categorizes the current landscape but also identifies critical research gaps. By evaluating both offensive and defensive applications, we aim to provide a holistic understanding of the potential risks and opportunities associated with LLM-driven cybersecurity.

Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs) are critical in many high-stakes applications, where decisions must optimize cumulative rewards while strictly adhering to complex nonlinear constraints. In domains such as power systems, finance, supply chains, and precision robotics, violating these constraints can result in significant financial or societal costs. Existing Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods often struggle with sample efficiency and effectiveness in finding feasible policies for highly and strictly constrained CMDPs, limiting their applicability in these environments. Stochastic dual dynamic programming is often used in practice on convex relaxations of the original problem, but they also encounter computational challenges and loss of optimality. This paper introduces a novel approach, Two-Stage Deep Decision Rules (TS-DDR), to efficiently train parametric actor policies using Lagrangian Duality. TS-DDR is a self-supervised learning algorithm that trains general decision rules (parametric policies) using stochastic gradient descent (SGD); its forward passes solve {\em deterministic} optimization problems to find feasible policies, and its backward passes leverage duality theory to train the parametric policy with closed-form gradients. TS-DDR inherits the flexibility and computational performance of deep learning methodologies to solve CMDP problems. Applied to the Long-Term Hydrothermal Dispatch (LTHD) problem using actual power system data from Bolivia, TS-DDR is shown to enhance solution quality and to reduce computation times by several orders of magnitude when compared to current state-of-the-art methods.

We introduce Compartmentalized Diffusion Models (CDM), a method to train different diffusion models (or prompts) on distinct data sources and arbitrarily compose them at inference time. The individual models can be trained in isolation, at different times, and on different distributions and domains and can be later composed to achieve performance comparable to a paragon model trained on all data simultaneously. Furthermore, each model only contains information about the subset of the data it was exposed to during training, enabling several forms of training data protection. In particular, CDMs are the first method to enable both selective forgetting and continual learning for large-scale diffusion models, as well as allowing serving customized models based on the user's access rights. CDMs also allow determining the importance of a subset of the data in generating particular samples.

With the proliferation of red-teaming strategies for Large Language Models (LLMs), the deficiency in the literature about improving the safety and robustness of LLM defense strategies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This paper introduces the LLM-based sentinel model as a plug-and-play prefix module designed to reconstruct the input prompt with just a few (<30) additional tokens, effectively reducing toxicity in responses from target LLMs. The sentinel model naturally overcomes the parameter inefficiency and limited model accessibility for fine-tuning large target models. We employ an interleaved training regimen using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize both red team and sentinel models dynamically, incorporating a value head-sharing mechanism inspired by the multi-agent centralized critic to manage the complex interplay between agents. Our extensive experiments across text-to-text and text-to-image demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating toxic outputs, even when dealing with larger models like Llama-2, GPT-3.5 and Stable-Diffusion, highlighting the potential of our framework in enhancing safety and robustness in various applications.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more integrated into our daily lives, it is crucial to identify and mitigate their risks, especially when the risks can have profound impacts on human users and societies. Guardrails, which filter the inputs or outputs of LLMs, have emerged as a core safeguarding technology. This position paper takes a deep look at current open-source solutions (Llama Guard, Nvidia NeMo, Guardrails AI), and discusses the challenges and the road towards building more complete solutions. Drawing on robust evidence from previous research, we advocate for a systematic approach to construct guardrails for LLMs, based on comprehensive consideration of diverse contexts across various LLMs applications. We propose employing socio-technical methods through collaboration with a multi-disciplinary team to pinpoint precise technical requirements, exploring advanced neural-symbolic implementations to embrace the complexity of the requirements, and developing verification and testing to ensure the utmost quality of the final product.

The autonomous AI agents using large language models can create undeniable values in all span of the society but they face security threats from adversaries that warrants immediate protective solutions because trust and safety issues arise. Considering the many-shot jailbreaking and deceptive alignment as some of the main advanced attacks, that cannot be mitigated by the static guardrails used during the supervised training, points out a crucial research priority for real world robustness. The combination of static guardrails in dynamic multi-agent system fails to defend against those attacks. We intend to enhance security for LLM-based agents through the development of new evaluation frameworks which identify and counter threats for safe operational deployment. Our work uses three examination methods to detect rogue agents through a Reverse Turing Test and analyze deceptive alignment through multi-agent simulations and develops an anti-jailbreaking system by testing it with GEMINI 1.5 pro and llama-3.3-70B, deepseek r1 models using tool-mediated adversarial scenarios. The detection capabilities are strong such as 94\% accuracy for GEMINI 1.5 pro yet the system suffers persistent vulnerabilities when under long attacks as prompt length increases attack success rates (ASR) and diversity metrics become ineffective in prediction while revealing multiple complex system faults. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adopting flexible security systems based on active monitoring that can be performed by the agents themselves together with adaptable interventions by system admin as the current models can create vulnerabilities that can lead to the unreliable and vulnerable system. So, in our work, we try to address such situations and propose a comprehensive framework to counteract the security issues.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to enhance Agent-Based Modeling by better representing complex interdependent cybersecurity systems, improving cybersecurity threat modeling and risk management. However, evaluating LLMs in this context is crucial for legal compliance and effective application development. Existing LLM evaluation frameworks often overlook the human factor and cognitive computing capabilities essential for interdependent cybersecurity. To address this gap, I propose OllaBench, a novel evaluation framework that assesses LLMs' accuracy, wastefulness, and consistency in answering scenario-based information security compliance and non-compliance questions. OllaBench is built on a foundation of 24 cognitive behavioral theories and empirical evidence from 38 peer-reviewed papers. OllaBench was used to evaluate 21 LLMs, including both open-weight and commercial models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, Meta and so on. The results reveal that while commercial LLMs have the highest overall accuracy scores, there is significant room for improvement. Smaller low-resolution open-weight LLMs are not far behind in performance, and there are significant differences in token efficiency and consistency among the evaluated models. OllaBench provides a user-friendly interface and supports a wide range of LLM platforms, making it a valuable tool for researchers and solution developers in the field of human-centric interdependent cybersecurity and beyond.

The growth in the number of parameters of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to a significant surge in computational requirements, making them challenging and costly to deploy. Speculative decoding (SD) leverages smaller models to efficiently propose future tokens, which are then verified by the LLM in parallel. Small models that utilise activations from the LLM currently achieve the fastest decoding speeds. However, we identify several limitations of SD models including the lack of on-policyness during training and partial observability. To address these shortcomings, we propose a more grounded architecture for small models by introducing a Mixture of Attentions for SD. Our novel architecture can be applied in two scenarios: a conventional single device deployment and a novel client-server deployment where the small model is hosted on a consumer device and the LLM on a server. In a single-device scenario, we demonstrate state-of-the-art speedups improving EAGLE-2 by 9.5% and its acceptance length by 25%. In a client-server setting, our experiments demonstrate: 1) state-of-the-art latencies with minimal calls to the server for different network conditions, and 2) in the event of a complete disconnection, our approach can maintain higher accuracy compared to other SD methods and demonstrates advantages over API calls to LLMs, which would otherwise be unable to continue the generation process.

As smart grids (SG) increasingly rely on advanced technologies like sensors and communication systems for efficient energy generation, distribution, and consumption, they become enticing targets for sophisticated cyberattacks. These evolving threats demand robust security measures to maintain the stability and resilience of modern energy systems. While extensive research has been conducted, a comprehensive exploration of proactive cyber defense strategies utilizing Deep Learning (DL) in {SG} remains scarce in the literature. This survey bridges this gap, studying the latest DL techniques for proactive cyber defense. The survey begins with an overview of related works and our distinct contributions, followed by an examination of SG infrastructure. Next, we classify various cyber defense techniques into reactive and proactive categories. A significant focus is placed on DL-enabled proactive defenses, where we provide a comprehensive taxonomy of DL approaches, highlighting their roles and relevance in the proactive security of SG. Subsequently, we analyze the most significant DL-based methods currently in use. Further, we explore Moving Target Defense, a proactive defense strategy, and its interactions with DL methodologies. We then provide an overview of benchmark datasets used in this domain to substantiate the discourse.{ This is followed by a critical discussion on their practical implications and broader impact on cybersecurity in Smart Grids.} The survey finally lists the challenges associated with deploying DL-based security systems within SG, followed by an outlook on future developments in this key field.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become more widespread, the content safety risks associated with their use also increase. We find a notable deficiency in high-quality content safety datasets and benchmarks that comprehensively cover a wide range of critical safety areas. To address this, we define a broad content safety risk taxonomy, comprising 13 critical risk and 9 sparse risk categories. Additionally, we curate AEGISSAFETYDATASET, a new dataset of approximately 26, 000 human-LLM interaction instances, complete with human annotations adhering to the taxonomy. We plan to release this dataset to the community to further research and to help benchmark LLM models for safety. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the dataset, we instruction-tune multiple LLM-based safety models. We show that our models (named AEGISSAFETYEXPERTS), not only surpass or perform competitively with the state-of-the-art LLM-based safety models and general purpose LLMs, but also exhibit robustness across multiple jail-break attack categories. We also show how using AEGISSAFETYDATASET during the LLM alignment phase does not negatively impact the performance of the aligned models on MT Bench scores. Furthermore, we propose AEGIS, a novel application of a no-regret online adaptation framework with strong theoretical guarantees, to perform content moderation with an ensemble of LLM content safety experts in deployment

Agent-based modeling (ABM) seeks to understand the behavior of complex systems by simulating a collection of agents that act and interact within an environment. Their practical utility requires capturing realistic environment dynamics and adaptive agent behavior while efficiently simulating million-size populations. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) present an opportunity to enhance ABMs by using LLMs as agents with further potential to capture adaptive behavior. However, the computational infeasibility of using LLMs for large populations has hindered their widespread adoption. In this paper, we introduce AgentTorch -- a framework that scales ABMs to millions of agents while capturing high-resolution agent behavior using LLMs. We benchmark the utility of LLMs as ABM agents, exploring the trade-off between simulation scale and individual agency. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, we demonstrate how AgentTorch can simulate 8.4 million agents representing New York City, capturing the impact of isolation and employment behavior on health and economic outcomes. We compare the performance of different agent architectures based on heuristic and LLM agents in predicting disease waves and unemployment rates. Furthermore, we showcase AgentTorch's capabilities for retrospective, counterfactual, and prospective analyses, highlighting how adaptive agent behavior can help overcome the limitations of historical data in policy design. AgentTorch is an open-source project actively being used for policy-making and scientific discovery around the world. The framework is available here: github.com/AgentTorch/AgentTorch.

We study the variance of stochastic policy gradients (SPGs) with many action samples per state. We derive a many-actions optimality condition, which determines when many-actions SPG yields lower variance as compared to a single-action agent with proportionally extended trajectory. We propose Model-Based Many-Actions (MBMA), an approach leveraging dynamics models for many-actions sampling in the context of SPG. MBMA addresses issues associated with existing implementations of many-actions SPG and yields lower bias and comparable variance to SPG estimated from states in model-simulated rollouts. We find that MBMA bias and variance structure matches that predicted by theory. As a result, MBMA achieves improved sample efficiency and higher returns on a range of continuous action environments as compared to model-free, many-actions, and model-based on-policy SPG baselines.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

In today's digital age, conspiracies and information campaigns can emerge rapidly and erode social and democratic cohesion. While recent deep learning approaches have made progress in modeling engagement through language and propagation models, they struggle with irregularly sampled data and early trajectory assessment. We present IC-Mamba, a novel state space model that forecasts social media engagement by modeling interval-censored data with integrated temporal embeddings. Our model excels at predicting engagement patterns within the crucial first 15-30 minutes of posting (RMSE 0.118-0.143), enabling rapid assessment of content reach. By incorporating interval-censored modeling into the state space framework, IC-Mamba captures fine-grained temporal dynamics of engagement growth, achieving a 4.72% improvement over state-of-the-art across multiple engagement metrics (likes, shares, comments, and emojis). Our experiments demonstrate IC-Mamba's effectiveness in forecasting both post-level dynamics and broader narrative patterns (F1 0.508-0.751 for narrative-level predictions). The model maintains strong predictive performance across extended time horizons, successfully forecasting opinion-level engagement up to 28 days ahead using observation windows of 3-10 days. These capabilities enable earlier identification of potentially problematic content, providing crucial lead time for designing and implementing countermeasures. Code is available at: https://github.com/ltian678/ic-mamba. An interactive dashboard demonstrating our results is available at: https://ic-mamba.behavioral-ds.science.

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

State-space models (SSMs) have emerged as a potential alternative architecture for building large language models (LLMs) compared to the previously ubiquitous transformer architecture. One theoretical weakness of transformers is that they cannot express certain kinds of sequential computation and state tracking (Merrill and Sabharwal, 2023), which SSMs are explicitly designed to address via their close architectural similarity to recurrent neural networks (RNNs). But do SSMs truly have an advantage (over transformers) in expressive power for state tracking? Surprisingly, the answer is no. Our analysis reveals that the expressive power of SSMs is limited very similarly to transformers: SSMs cannot express computation outside the complexity class TC^0. In particular, this means they cannot solve simple state-tracking problems like permutation composition. It follows that SSMs are provably unable to accurately track chess moves with certain notation, evaluate code, or track entities in a long narrative. To supplement our formal analysis, we report experiments showing that Mamba-style SSMs indeed struggle with state tracking. Thus, despite its recurrent formulation, the "state" in an SSM is an illusion: SSMs have similar expressiveness limitations to non-recurrent models like transformers, which may fundamentally limit their ability to solve real-world state-tracking problems.

Despite extensive pre-training and fine-tuning in moral alignment to prevent generating harmful information at user request, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we propose AutoDefense, a response-filtering based multi-agent defense framework that filters harmful responses from LLMs. This framework assigns different roles to LLM agents and employs them to complete the defense task collaboratively. The division in tasks enhances the overall instruction-following of LLMs and enables the integration of other defense components as tools. AutoDefense can adapt to various sizes and kinds of open-source LLMs that serve as agents. Through conducting extensive experiments on a large scale of harmful and safe prompts, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed AutoDefense in improving the robustness against jailbreak attacks, while maintaining the performance at normal user request. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/XHMY/AutoDefense.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities for leveraging artificial intelligence in various domains, including cybersecurity. As the volume and sophistication of cyber threats continue to grow, there is an increasing need for intelligent systems that can automatically detect vulnerabilities, analyze malware, and respond to attacks. In this survey, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on the application of LLMs in cybersecurity (LLM4Security). By comprehensively collecting over 30K relevant papers and systematically analyzing 127 papers from top security and software engineering venues, we aim to provide a holistic view of how LLMs are being used to solve diverse problems across the cybersecurity domain. Through our analysis, we identify several key findings. First, we observe that LLMs are being applied to a wide range of cybersecurity tasks, including vulnerability detection, malware analysis, network intrusion detection, and phishing detection. Second, we find that the datasets used for training and evaluating LLMs in these tasks are often limited in size and diversity, highlighting the need for more comprehensive and representative datasets. Third, we identify several promising techniques for adapting LLMs to specific cybersecurity domains, such as fine-tuning, transfer learning, and domain-specific pre-training. Finally, we discuss the main challenges and opportunities for future research in LLM4Security, including the need for more interpretable and explainable models, the importance of addressing data privacy and security concerns, and the potential for leveraging LLMs for proactive defense and threat hunting. Overall, our survey provides a comprehensive overview of the current state-of-the-art in LLM4Security and identifies several promising directions for future research.

Despite the promising performance of state space models (SSMs) in long sequence modeling, limitations still exist. Advanced SSMs like S5 and S6 (Mamba) in addressing non-uniform sampling, their recursive structures impede efficient SSM computation via convolution. To overcome compatibility limitations in parallel convolutional computation, this paper proposes a novel non-recursive non-uniform sample processing strategy. Theoretical analysis of SSMs through the lens of Event-Triggered Control (ETC) theory reveals the Non-Stable State (NSS) problem, where deviations from sampling point requirements lead to error transmission and accumulation, causing the divergence of the SSM's hidden state. Our analysis further reveals that adjustments of input sequences with early memories can mitigate the NSS problem, achieving Sampling Step Adaptation (SSA). Building on this insight, we introduce a simple yet effective plug-and-play mechanism, State Memory Replay (SMR), which utilizes learnable memories to adjust the current state with multi-step information for generalization at sampling points different from those in the training data. This enables SSMs to stably model varying sampling points. Experiments on long-range modeling tasks in autoregressive language modeling and Long Range Arena demonstrate the general effectiveness of the SMR mechanism for a series of SSM models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

Models using structured state space sequence (S4) layers have achieved state-of-the-art performance on long-range sequence modeling tasks. An S4 layer combines linear state space models (SSMs), the HiPPO framework, and deep learning to achieve high performance. We build on the design of the S4 layer and introduce a new state space layer, the S5 layer. Whereas an S4 layer uses many independent single-input, single-output SSMs, the S5 layer uses one multi-input, multi-output SSM. We establish a connection between S5 and S4, and use this to develop the initialization and parameterization used by the S5 model. The result is a state space layer that can leverage efficient and widely implemented parallel scans, allowing S5 to match the computational efficiency of S4, while also achieving state-of-the-art performance on several long-range sequence modeling tasks. S5 averages 87.4% on the long range arena benchmark, and 98.5% on the most difficult Path-X task.

We are releasing a new suite of security benchmarks for LLMs, CYBERSECEVAL 3, to continue the conversation on empirically measuring LLM cybersecurity risks and capabilities. CYBERSECEVAL 3 assesses 8 different risks across two broad categories: risk to third parties, and risk to application developers and end users. Compared to previous work, we add new areas focused on offensive security capabilities: automated social engineering, scaling manual offensive cyber operations, and autonomous offensive cyber operations. In this paper we discuss applying these benchmarks to the Llama 3 models and a suite of contemporaneous state-of-the-art LLMs, enabling us to contextualize risks both with and without mitigations in place.

Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the behavior of multiple AI agents in simulated wargames, specifically focusing on their predilection to take escalatory actions that may exacerbate multilateral conflicts. Drawing on political science and international relations literature about escalation dynamics, we design a novel wargame simulation and scoring framework to assess the escalation risks of actions taken by these agents in different scenarios. Contrary to prior studies, our research provides both qualitative and quantitative insights and focuses on large language models (LLMs). We find that all five studied off-the-shelf LLMs show forms of escalation and difficult-to-predict escalation patterns. We observe that models tend to develop arms-race dynamics, leading to greater conflict, and in rare cases, even to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Qualitatively, we also collect the models' reported reasonings for chosen actions and observe worrying justifications based on deterrence and first-strike tactics. Given the high stakes of military and foreign-policy contexts, we recommend further examination and cautious consideration before deploying autonomous language model agents for strategic military or diplomatic decision-making.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

The rapid progress in the reasoning capability of the Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has triggered the development of autonomous agent systems on mobile devices. MLLM-based mobile agent systems consist of perception, reasoning, memory, and multi-agent collaboration modules, enabling automatic analysis of user instructions and the design of task pipelines with only natural language and device screenshots as inputs. Despite the increased human-machine interaction efficiency, the security risks of MLLM-based mobile agent systems have not been systematically studied. Existing security benchmarks for agents mainly focus on Web scenarios, and the attack techniques against MLLMs are also limited in the mobile agent scenario. To close these gaps, this paper proposes a mobile agent security matrix covering 3 functional modules of the agent systems. Based on the security matrix, this paper proposes 4 realistic attack paths and verifies these attack paths through 8 attack methods. By analyzing the attack results, this paper reveals that MLLM-based mobile agent systems are not only vulnerable to multiple traditional attacks, but also raise new security concerns previously unconsidered. This paper highlights the need for security awareness in the design of MLLM-based systems and paves the way for future research on attacks and defense methods.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

The rapid advancement and widespread deployment of foundation model (FM) based systems have revolutionized numerous applications across various domains. However, the fast-growing capabilities and autonomy have also raised significant concerns about responsible AI and AI safety. Recently, there have been increasing attention toward implementing guardrails to ensure the runtime behavior of FM-based systems is safe and responsible. Given the early stage of FMs and their applications (such as agents), the design of guardrails have not yet been systematically studied. It remains underexplored which software qualities should be considered when designing guardrails and how these qualities can be ensured from a software architecture perspective. Therefore, in this paper, we present a taxonomy for guardrails to classify and compare the characteristics and design options of guardrails. Our taxonomy is organized into three main categories: the motivation behind adopting runtime guardrails, the quality attributes to consider, and the design options available. This taxonomy provides structured and concrete guidance for making architectural design decisions when designing guardrails and highlights trade-offs arising from the design decisions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being deployed across various domains today. However, their capacity to solve Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges in cybersecurity has not been thoroughly evaluated. To address this, we develop a novel method to assess LLMs in solving CTF challenges by creating a scalable, open-source benchmark database specifically designed for these applications. This database includes metadata for LLM testing and adaptive learning, compiling a diverse range of CTF challenges from popular competitions. Utilizing the advanced function calling capabilities of LLMs, we build a fully automated system with an enhanced workflow and support for external tool calls. Our benchmark dataset and automated framework allow us to evaluate the performance of five LLMs, encompassing both black-box and open-source models. This work lays the foundation for future research into improving the efficiency of LLMs in interactive cybersecurity tasks and automated task planning. By providing a specialized benchmark, our project offers an ideal platform for developing, testing, and refining LLM-based approaches to vulnerability detection and resolution. Evaluating LLMs on these challenges and comparing with human performance yields insights into their potential for AI-driven cybersecurity solutions to perform real-world threat management. We make our benchmark dataset open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench along with our playground automated framework https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/llm_ctf_automation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are malicious techniques used by malware to dynamically generate seemingly random domain names for communication with Command & Control (C&C) servers. Due to the fast and simple generation of DGA domains, detection methods must be highly efficient and precise to be effective. Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in real-time detection tasks, making them ideal candidates for detecting DGAs. Our work validates the effectiveness of fine-tuned LLMs for detecting DGAs and DNS exfiltration attacks. We developed LLM models and conducted comprehensive evaluation using a diverse dataset comprising 59 distinct real-world DGA malware families and normal domain data. Our LLM model significantly outperformed traditional natural language processing techniques, especially in detecting unknown DGAs. We also evaluated its performance on DNS exfiltration datasets, demonstrating its effectiveness in enhancing cybersecurity measures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that empirically applies LLMs for DGA and DNS exfiltration detection.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

Model-based reinforcement learning (RL) often achieves higher sample efficiency in practice than model-free RL by learning a dynamics model to generate samples for policy learning. Previous works learn a dynamics model that fits under the empirical state-action visitation distribution for all historical policies, i.e., the sample replay buffer. However, in this paper, we observe that fitting the dynamics model under the distribution for all historical policies does not necessarily benefit model prediction for the current policy since the policy in use is constantly evolving over time. The evolving policy during training will cause state-action visitation distribution shifts. We theoretically analyze how this distribution shift over historical policies affects the model learning and model rollouts. We then propose a novel dynamics model learning method, named Policy-adapted Dynamics Model Learning (PDML). PDML dynamically adjusts the historical policy mixture distribution to ensure the learned model can continually adapt to the state-action visitation distribution of the evolving policy. Experiments on a range of continuous control environments in MuJoCo show that PDML achieves significant improvement in sample efficiency and higher asymptotic performance combined with the state-of-the-art model-based RL methods.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

Recent large language models (LLMs) advancements sparked a growing research interest in tool assisted LLMs solving real-world challenges, which calls for comprehensive evaluation of tool-use capabilities. While previous works focused on either evaluating over stateless web services (RESTful API), based on a single turn user prompt, or an off-policy dialog trajectory, ToolSandbox includes stateful tool execution, implicit state dependencies between tools, a built-in user simulator supporting on-policy conversational evaluation and a dynamic evaluation strategy for intermediate and final milestones over an arbitrary trajectory. We show that open source and proprietary models have a significant performance gap, and complex tasks like State Dependency, Canonicalization and Insufficient Information defined in ToolSandbox are challenging even the most capable SOTA LLMs, providing brand-new insights into tool-use LLM capabilities. ToolSandbox evaluation framework is released at https://github.com/apple/ToolSandbox

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is crucial in today's cybersecurity landscape, providing essential insights to understand and mitigate the ever-evolving cyber threats. The recent rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown potential in this domain, but concerns about their reliability, accuracy, and hallucinations persist. While existing benchmarks provide general evaluations of LLMs, there are no benchmarks that address the practical and applied aspects of CTI-specific tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce CTIBench, a benchmark designed to assess LLMs' performance in CTI applications. CTIBench includes multiple datasets focused on evaluating knowledge acquired by LLMs in the cyber-threat landscape. Our evaluation of several state-of-the-art models on these tasks provides insights into their strengths and weaknesses in CTI contexts, contributing to a better understanding of LLM capabilities in CTI.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

Dynamical systems with complex behaviours, e.g. immune system cells interacting with a pathogen, are commonly modelled by splitting the behaviour into different regimes, or modes, each with simpler dynamics, and then learning the switching behaviour from one mode to another. Switching Dynamical Systems (SDS) are a powerful tool that automatically discovers these modes and mode-switching behaviour from time series data. While effective, these methods focus on independent objects, where the modes of one object are independent of the modes of the other objects. In this paper, we focus on the more general interacting object setting for switching dynamical systems, where the per-object dynamics also depends on an unknown and dynamically changing subset of other objects and their modes. To this end, we propose a novel graph-based approach for switching dynamical systems, GRAph Switching dynamical Systems (GRASS), in which we use a dynamic graph to characterize interactions between objects and learn both intra-object and inter-object mode-switching behaviour. We introduce two new datasets for this setting, a synthesized ODE-driven particles dataset and a real-world Salsa Couple Dancing dataset. Experiments show that GRASS can consistently outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of Large Language Models (LLMs), ensuring robust safety measures is paramount. To meet this crucial need, we propose SALAD-Bench, a safety benchmark specifically designed for evaluating LLMs, attack, and defense methods. Distinguished by its breadth, SALAD-Bench transcends conventional benchmarks through its large scale, rich diversity, intricate taxonomy spanning three levels, and versatile functionalities.SALAD-Bench is crafted with a meticulous array of questions, from standard queries to complex ones enriched with attack, defense modifications and multiple-choice. To effectively manage the inherent complexity, we introduce an innovative evaluators: the LLM-based MD-Judge for QA pairs with a particular focus on attack-enhanced queries, ensuring a seamless, and reliable evaluation. Above components extend SALAD-Bench from standard LLM safety evaluation to both LLM attack and defense methods evaluation, ensuring the joint-purpose utility. Our extensive experiments shed light on the resilience of LLMs against emerging threats and the efficacy of contemporary defense tactics. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/OpenSafetyLab/SALAD-BENCH. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.

We introduce HackSynth, a novel Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent capable of autonomous penetration testing. HackSynth's dual-module architecture includes a Planner and a Summarizer, which enable it to generate commands and process feedback iteratively. To benchmark HackSynth, we propose two new Capture The Flag (CTF)-based benchmark sets utilizing the popular platforms PicoCTF and OverTheWire. These benchmarks include two hundred challenges across diverse domains and difficulties, providing a standardized framework for evaluating LLM-based penetration testing agents. Based on these benchmarks, extensive experiments are presented, analyzing the core parameters of HackSynth, including creativity (temperature and top-p) and token utilization. Multiple open source and proprietary LLMs were used to measure the agent's capabilities. The experiments show that the agent performed best with the GPT-4o model, better than what the GPT-4o's system card suggests. We also discuss the safety and predictability of HackSynth's actions. Our findings indicate the potential of LLM-based agents in advancing autonomous penetration testing and the importance of robust safeguards. HackSynth and the benchmarks are publicly available to foster research on autonomous cybersecurity solutions.

Honeypots are essential tools in cybersecurity for early detection, threat intelligence gathering, and analysis of attacker's behavior. However, most of them lack the required realism to engage and fool human attackers long-term. Being easy to distinguish honeypots strongly hinders their effectiveness. This can happen because they are too deterministic, lack adaptability, or lack deepness. This work introduces shelLM, a dynamic and realistic software honeypot based on Large Language Models that generates Linux-like shell output. We designed and implemented shelLM using cloud-based LLMs. We evaluated if shelLM can generate output as expected from a real Linux shell. The evaluation was done by asking cybersecurity researchers to use the honeypot and give feedback if each answer from the honeypot was the expected one from a Linux shell. Results indicate that shelLM can create credible and dynamic answers capable of addressing the limitations of current honeypots. ShelLM reached a TNR of 0.90, convincing humans it was consistent with a real Linux shell. The source code and prompts for replicating the experiments have been publicly available.

The integration of tools in LLM-based agents overcame the difficulties of standalone LLMs and traditional agents' limited capabilities. However, the conjunction of these technologies and the proposed enhancements in several state-of-the-art works followed a non-unified software architecture resulting in a lack of modularity. Indeed, they focused mainly on functionalities and overlooked the definition of the component's boundaries within the agent. This caused terminological and architectural ambiguities between researchers which we addressed in this paper by proposing a unified framework that establishes a clear foundation for LLM-based agents' development from both functional and software architectural perspectives. Our framework, LLM-Agent-UMF (LLM-based Agent Unified Modeling Framework), clearly distinguishes between the different components of an agent, setting LLMs, and tools apart from a newly introduced element: the core-agent, playing the role of the central coordinator of the agent which comprises five modules: planning, memory, profile, action, and security, the latter often neglected in previous works. Differences in the internal structure of core-agents led us to classify them into a taxonomy of passive and active types. Based on this, we proposed different multi-core agent architectures combining unique characteristics of various individual agents. For evaluation purposes, we applied this framework to a selection of state-of-the-art agents, thereby demonstrating its alignment with their functionalities and clarifying the overlooked architectural aspects. Moreover, we thoroughly assessed four of our proposed architectures by integrating distinctive agents into hybrid active/passive core-agents' systems. This analysis provided clear insights into potential improvements and highlighted the challenges involved in the combination of specific agents.

Having explored an environment, intelligent agents should be able to transfer their knowledge to most downstream tasks within that environment. Referred to as "zero-shot learning," this ability remains elusive for general-purpose reinforcement learning algorithms. While recent works have attempted to produce zero-shot RL agents, they make assumptions about the nature of the tasks or the structure of the MDP. We present Proto Successor Measure: the basis set for all possible solutions of Reinforcement Learning in a dynamical system. We provably show that any possible policy can be represented using an affine combination of these policy independent basis functions. Given a reward function at test time, we simply need to find the right set of linear weights to combine these basis corresponding to the optimal policy. We derive a practical algorithm to learn these basis functions using only interaction data from the environment and show that our approach can produce the optimal policy at test time for any given reward function without additional environmental interactions. Project page: https://agarwalsiddhant10.github.io/projects/psm.html.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

Recently, diffusion models (DMs) have demonstrated their advantageous potential for generative tasks. Widespread interest exists in incorporating DMs into downstream applications, such as producing or editing photorealistic images. However, practical deployment and unprecedented power of DMs raise legal issues, including copyright protection and monitoring of generated content. In this regard, watermarking has been a proven solution for copyright protection and content monitoring, but it is underexplored in the DMs literature. Specifically, DMs generate samples from longer tracks and may have newly designed multimodal structures, necessitating the modification of conventional watermarking pipelines. To this end, we conduct comprehensive analyses and derive a recipe for efficiently watermarking state-of-the-art DMs (e.g., Stable Diffusion), via training from scratch or finetuning. Our recipe is straightforward but involves empirically ablated implementation details, providing a solid foundation for future research on watermarking DMs. Our Code: https://github.com/yunqing-me/WatermarkDM.

We introduce Cognitive Kernel, an open-source agent system towards the goal of generalist autopilots. Unlike copilot systems, which primarily rely on users to provide essential state information (e.g., task descriptions) and assist users by answering questions or auto-completing contents, autopilot systems must complete tasks from start to finish independently, which requires the system to acquire the state information from the environments actively. To achieve this, an autopilot system should be capable of understanding user intents, actively gathering necessary information from various real-world sources, and making wise decisions. Cognitive Kernel adopts a model-centric design. In our implementation, the central policy model (a fine-tuned LLM) initiates interactions with the environment using a combination of atomic actions, such as opening files, clicking buttons, saving intermediate results to memory, or calling the LLM itself. This differs from the widely used environment-centric design, where a task-specific environment with predefined actions is fixed, and the policy model is limited to selecting the correct action from a given set of options. Our design facilitates seamless information flow across various sources and provides greater flexibility. We evaluate our system in three use cases: real-time information management, private information management, and long-term memory management. The results demonstrate that Cognitive Kernel achieves better or comparable performance to other closed-source systems in these scenarios. Cognitive Kernel is fully dockerized, ensuring everyone can deploy it privately and securely. We open-source the system and the backbone model to encourage further research on LLM-driven autopilot systems.

We present ShieldGemma, a comprehensive suite of LLM-based safety content moderation models built upon Gemma2. These models provide robust, state-of-the-art predictions of safety risks across key harm types (sexually explicit, dangerous content, harassment, hate speech) in both user input and LLM-generated output. By evaluating on both public and internal benchmarks, we demonstrate superior performance compared to existing models, such as Llama Guard (+10.8\% AU-PRC on public benchmarks) and WildCard (+4.3\%). Additionally, we present a novel LLM-based data curation pipeline, adaptable to a variety of safety-related tasks and beyond. We have shown strong generalization performance for model trained mainly on synthetic data. By releasing ShieldGemma, we provide a valuable resource to the research community, advancing LLM safety and enabling the creation of more effective content moderation solutions for developers.

It is a notable trend to use Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex tasks, e.g., tasks that require a sequence of actions and dynamic interaction with tools and external environments. In this paper, we propose StateFlow, a novel LLM-based task-solving paradigm that conceptualizes complex task-solving processes as state machines. In StateFlow, we distinguish between "process grounding" (via state and state transitions) and "sub-task solving" (through actions within a state), enhancing control and interpretability of the task-solving procedure. A state represents the status of a running process. The transitions between states are controlled by heuristic rules or decisions made by the LLM, allowing for a dynamic and adaptive progression. Upon entering a state, a series of actions is executed, involving not only calling LLMs guided by different prompts, but also the utilization of external tools as needed. Our results show that StateFlow significantly enhances LLMs' efficiency. For instance, StateFlow achieves 13% and 28% higher success rates compared to ReAct in InterCode SQL and ALFWorld benchmark, with 5x and 3x less cost respectively. We also show that StateFlow can be combined with iterative refining methods like Reflexion to further improve performance.

Model merging has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple single-task fine-tuned models into a unified one that can perform well on multiple tasks. However, existing model merging techniques primarily focus on resolving conflicts between task-specific models, they often overlook potential security threats, particularly the risk of backdoor attacks in the open-source model ecosystem. In this paper, we first investigate the vulnerabilities of existing model merging methods to backdoor attacks, identifying two critical challenges: backdoor succession and backdoor transfer. To address these issues, we propose a novel Defense-Aware Merging (DAM) approach that simultaneously mitigates task interference and backdoor vulnerabilities. Specifically, DAM employs a meta-learning-based optimization method with dual masks to identify a shared and safety-aware subspace for model merging. These masks are alternately optimized: the Task-Shared mask identifies common beneficial parameters across tasks, aiming to preserve task-specific knowledge while reducing interference, while the Backdoor-Detection mask isolates potentially harmful parameters to neutralize security threats. This dual-mask design allows us to carefully balance the preservation of useful knowledge and the removal of potential vulnerabilities. Compared to existing merging methods, DAM achieves a more favorable balance between performance and security, reducing the attack success rate by 2-10 percentage points while sacrificing only about 1% in accuracy. Furthermore, DAM exhibits robust performance and broad applicability across various types of backdoor attacks and the number of compromised models involved in the merging process. We will release the codes and models soon.

As the development of large language models (LLMs) rapidly advances, securing these models effectively without compromising their utility has become a pivotal area of research. However, current defense strategies against jailbreak attacks (i.e., efforts to bypass security protocols) often suffer from limited adaptability, restricted general capability, and high cost. To address these challenges, we introduce SafeAligner, a methodology implemented at the decoding stage to fortify defenses against jailbreak attacks. We begin by developing two specialized models: the Sentinel Model, which is trained to foster safety, and the Intruder Model, designed to generate riskier responses. SafeAligner leverages the disparity in security levels between the responses from these models to differentiate between harmful and beneficial tokens, effectively guiding the safety alignment by altering the output token distribution of the target model. Extensive experiments show that SafeAligner can increase the likelihood of beneficial tokens, while reducing the occurrence of harmful ones, thereby ensuring secure alignment with minimal loss to generality.

Diffusion models (DMs) represent state-of-the-art generative models for continuous inputs. DMs work by constructing a Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE) in the input space (ie, position space), and using a neural network to reverse it. In this work, we introduce a novel generative modeling framework grounded in phase space dynamics, where a phase space is defined as {an augmented space encompassing both position and velocity.} Leveraging insights from Stochastic Optimal Control, we construct a path measure in the phase space that enables efficient sampling. {In contrast to DMs, our framework demonstrates the capability to generate realistic data points at an early stage of dynamics propagation.} This early prediction sets the stage for efficient data generation by leveraging additional velocity information along the trajectory. On standard image generation benchmarks, our model yields favorable performance over baselines in the regime of small Number of Function Evaluations (NFEs). Furthermore, our approach rivals the performance of diffusion models equipped with efficient sampling techniques, underscoring its potential as a new tool generative modeling.

Cyber attacks pose existential threats to nations and enterprises. Current practice favors piece-wise analysis using threat-models in the stead of rigorous cyber terrain analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Automated penetration testing using reinforcement learning offers a new and promising approach for developing methodologies that are driven by network structure and cyber terrain, that can be later interpreted in terms of threat-models, but that are principally network-driven analyses. This paper presents a novel method for crown jewel analysis termed CJA-RL that uses reinforcement learning to identify key terrain and avenues of approach for exploiting crown jewels. In our experiment, CJA-RL identified ideal entry points, choke points, and pivots for exploiting a network with multiple crown jewels, exemplifying how CJA-RL and reinforcement learning for penetration testing generally can benefit computer network operations workflows.

The observations documented in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports play a critical role in describing adversarial behaviors, providing valuable insights for security practitioners to respond to evolving threats. Recent advancements of Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in various cybersecurity applications, including CTI report understanding and attack knowledge graph construction. While previous works have proposed benchmarks that focus on the CTI extraction ability of LLMs, the sequential characteristic of adversarial behaviors within CTI reports remains largely unexplored, which holds considerable significance in developing a comprehensive understanding of how adversaries operate. To address this gap, we introduce AttackSeqBench, a benchmark tailored to systematically evaluate LLMs' capability to understand and reason attack sequences in CTI reports. Our benchmark encompasses three distinct Question Answering (QA) tasks, each task focuses on the varying granularity in adversarial behavior. To alleviate the laborious effort of QA construction, we carefully design an automated dataset construction pipeline to create scalable and well-formulated QA datasets based on real-world CTI reports. To ensure the quality of our dataset, we adopt a hybrid approach of combining human evaluation and systematic evaluation metrics. We conduct extensive experiments and analysis with both fast-thinking and slow-thinking LLMs, while highlighting their strengths and limitations in analyzing the sequential patterns in cyber attacks. The overarching goal of this work is to provide a benchmark that advances LLM-driven CTI report understanding and fosters its application in real-world cybersecurity operations. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Javiery3889/AttackSeqBench .

We investigate the use of transformer sequence models as dynamics models (TDMs) for control. In a number of experiments in the DeepMind control suite, we find that first, TDMs perform well in a single-environment learning setting when compared to baseline models. Second, TDMs exhibit strong generalization capabilities to unseen environments, both in a few-shot setting, where a generalist model is fine-tuned with small amounts of data from the target environment, and in a zero-shot setting, where a generalist model is applied to an unseen environment without any further training. We further demonstrate that generalizing system dynamics can work much better than generalizing optimal behavior directly as a policy. This makes TDMs a promising ingredient for a foundation model of control.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Federated learning is used to train a shared model in a decentralized way without clients sharing private data with each other. Federated learning systems are susceptible to poisoning attacks when malicious clients send false updates to the central server. Existing defense strategies are ineffective under non-IID data settings. This paper proposes a new defense strategy, FedCPA (Federated learning with Critical Parameter Analysis). Our attack-tolerant aggregation method is based on the observation that benign local models have similar sets of top-k and bottom-k critical parameters, whereas poisoned local models do not. Experiments with different attack scenarios on multiple datasets demonstrate that our model outperforms existing defense strategies in defending against poisoning attacks.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

The field of software security testing, more specifically penetration testing, is an activity that requires high levels of expertise and involves many manual testing and analysis steps. This paper explores the potential usage of large-language models, such as GPT3.5, to augment penetration testers with AI sparring partners. We explore the feasibility of supplementing penetration testers with AI models for two distinct use cases: high-level task planning for security testing assignments and low-level vulnerability hunting within a vulnerable virtual machine. For the latter, we implemented a closed-feedback loop between LLM-generated low-level actions with a vulnerable virtual machine (connected through SSH) and allowed the LLM to analyze the machine state for vulnerabilities and suggest concrete attack vectors which were automatically executed within the virtual machine. We discuss promising initial results, detail avenues for improvement, and close deliberating on the ethics of providing AI-based sparring partners.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly capable and can now interact with tools (i.e., call functions), read documents, and recursively call themselves. As a result, these LLMs can now function autonomously as agents. With the rise in capabilities of these agents, recent work has speculated on how LLM agents would affect cybersecurity. However, not much is known about the offensive capabilities of LLM agents. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously hack websites, performing tasks as complex as blind database schema extraction and SQL injections without human feedback. Importantly, the agent does not need to know the vulnerability beforehand. This capability is uniquely enabled by frontier models that are highly capable of tool use and leveraging extended context. Namely, we show that GPT-4 is capable of such hacks, but existing open-source models are not. Finally, we show that GPT-4 is capable of autonomously finding vulnerabilities in websites in the wild. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLMs.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been gaining a lot of interest due to their adaptability and extensibility in emerging applications, including communication networks. It is anticipated that ZSM networks will be able to support LLMs as a service, as they provide ultra reliable low-latency communications and closed loop massive connectivity. However, LLMs are vulnerable to data and model privacy issues that affect the trustworthiness of LLMs to be deployed for user-based services. In this paper, we explore the security vulnerabilities associated with fine-tuning LLMs in ZSM networks, in particular the membership inference attack. We define the characteristics of an attack network that can perform a membership inference attack if the attacker has access to the fine-tuned model for the downstream task. We show that the membership inference attacks are effective for any downstream task, which can lead to a personal data breach when using LLM as a service. The experimental results show that the attack success rate of maximum 92% can be achieved on named entity recognition task. Based on the experimental analysis, we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present possible research directions to make the LLMs more trustworthy in the context of ZSM networks.

In the current cybersecurity landscape, protecting military devices such as communication and battlefield management systems against sophisticated cyber attacks is crucial. Malware exploits vulnerabilities through stealth methods, often evading traditional detection mechanisms such as software signatures. The application of ML/DL in vulnerability detection has been extensively explored in the literature. However, current ML/DL vulnerability detection methods struggle with understanding the context and intent behind complex attacks. Integrating large language models (LLMs) with system call analysis offers a promising approach to enhance malware detection. This work presents a novel framework leveraging LLMs to classify malware based on system call data. The framework uses transfer learning to adapt pre-trained LLMs for malware detection. By retraining LLMs on a dataset of benign and malicious system calls, the models are refined to detect signs of malware activity. Experiments with a dataset of over 1TB of system calls demonstrate that models with larger context sizes, such as BigBird and Longformer, achieve superior accuracy and F1-Score of approximately 0.86. The results highlight the importance of context size in improving detection rates and underscore the trade-offs between computational complexity and performance. This approach shows significant potential for real-time detection in high-stakes environments, offering a robust solution to evolving cyber threats.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

This paper explores the rapidly evolving ecosystem of publicly available AI models, and their potential implications on the security and safety landscape. As AI models become increasingly prevalent, understanding their potential risks and vulnerabilities is crucial. We review the current security and safety scenarios while highlighting challenges such as tracking issues, remediation, and the apparent absence of AI model lifecycle and ownership processes. Comprehensive strategies to enhance security and safety for both model developers and end-users are proposed. This paper aims to provide some of the foundational pieces for more standardized security, safety, and transparency in the development and operation of AI models and the larger open ecosystems and communities forming around them.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, introduces the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. To effectively mitigate this concern, this paper presents a comprehensive study focused on evaluating and enhancing code LLMs from a software security perspective. We introduce SecuCoGenSecuCoGen has been uploaded as supplemental material and will be made publicly available after publication., a meticulously curated dataset targeting 21 critical vulnerability types. SecuCoGen comprises 180 samples and serves as the foundation for conducting experiments on three crucial code-related tasks: code generation, code repair and vulnerability classification, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that existing models often overlook security concerns during code generation, leading to the generation of vulnerable code. To address this, we propose effective approaches to mitigate the security vulnerabilities and enhance the overall robustness of code generated by LLMs. Moreover, our study identifies weaknesses in existing models' ability to repair vulnerable code, even when provided with vulnerability information. Additionally, certain vulnerability types pose challenges for the models, hindering their performance in vulnerability classification. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

State space models (SSM) have been widely applied for the analysis and visualization of large sequential datasets. Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) is a very popular particle-based method to sample latent states from intractable posteriors. However, SSM is significantly influenced by the choice of the proposal. Recently Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling has shown success in many practical problems. In this paper, we propose an SMC augmented by HMC (HSMC) for inference and model learning of nonlinear SSM, which can exempt us from learning proposals and reduce the model complexity significantly. Based on the measure preserving property of HMC, the particles directly generated by transition function can approximate the posterior of latent states arbitrarily well. In order to better adapt to the local geometry of latent space, the HMC is conducted on Riemannian manifold defined by a positive definite metric. In addition, we show that the proposed HSMC method can improve SSMs realized by both Gaussian Processes (GP) and Neural Network (NN).

Intelligent agents must be generalists - showing the ability to quickly adapt and generalize to varying tasks. Within the framework of reinforcement learning (RL), model-based RL algorithms learn a task-agnostic dynamics model of the world, in principle allowing them to generalize to arbitrary rewards. However, one-step models naturally suffer from compounding errors, making them ineffective for problems with long horizons and large state spaces. In this work, we propose a novel class of models - generalized occupancy models (GOMs) - that retain the generality of model-based RL while avoiding compounding error. The key idea behind GOMs is to model the distribution of all possible long-term outcomes from a given state under the coverage of a stationary dataset, along with a policy that realizes a particular outcome from the given state. These models can then quickly be used to select the optimal action for arbitrary new tasks, without having to redo policy optimization. By directly modeling long-term outcomes, GOMs avoid compounding error while retaining generality across arbitrary reward functions. We provide a practical instantiation of GOMs using diffusion models and show its efficacy as a new class of transferable models, both theoretically and empirically across a variety of simulated robotics problems. Videos and code at https://weirdlabuw.github.io/gom/.

The rapid development in large language models (LLMs) has transformed the landscape of natural language processing and understanding (NLP/NLU), offering significant benefits across various domains. However, when applied to scientific research, these powerful models exhibit critical failure modes related to scientific integrity and trustworthiness. Existing general-purpose LLM guardrails are insufficient to address these unique challenges in the scientific domain. We provide comprehensive guidelines for deploying LLM guardrails in the scientific domain. We identify specific challenges -- including time sensitivity, knowledge contextualization, conflict resolution, and intellectual property concerns -- and propose a guideline framework for the guardrails that can align with scientific needs. These guardrail dimensions include trustworthiness, ethics & bias, safety, and legal aspects. We also outline in detail the implementation strategies that employ white-box, black-box, and gray-box methodologies that can be enforced within scientific contexts.

Software engineers operating in complex and dynamic environments must continuously adapt to evolving requirements, learn iteratively from experience, and reconsider their approaches based on new insights. However, current large language model (LLM)-based software agents often rely on rigid processes and tend to repeat ineffective actions without the capacity to evaluate their performance or adapt their strategies over time. To address these challenges, we propose SWE-Search, a multi-agent framework that integrates Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with a self-improvement mechanism to enhance software agents' performance on repository-level software tasks. SWE-Search extends traditional MCTS by incorporating a hybrid value function that leverages LLMs for both numerical value estimation and qualitative evaluation. This enables self-feedback loops where agents iteratively refine their strategies based on both quantitative numerical evaluations and qualitative natural language assessments of pursued trajectories. The framework includes a SWE-Agent for adaptive exploration, a Value Agent for iterative feedback, and a Discriminator Agent that facilitates multi-agent debate for collaborative decision-making. Applied to the SWE-bench benchmark, our approach demonstrates a 23% relative improvement in performance across five models compared to standard open-source agents without MCTS. Our analysis reveals how performance scales with increased search depth and identifies key factors that facilitate effective self-evaluation in software agents. This work highlights the potential of self-evaluation driven search techniques to enhance agent reasoning and planning in complex, dynamic software engineering environments.

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (e.g. GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, etc.) in software engineers' daily practices, it is important to ensure that the code generated by these tools is not only functionally correct but also free of vulnerabilities. Although LLMs can help developers to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can generate insecure code. There are two contributing factors to the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) do not adequately represent genuine software engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on competitive programming challenges or classroom-type coding tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger codebases, introducing potential security risks. There's a clear absence of benchmarks that focus on evaluating the security of the generated code. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security considerations. Metrics such as pass@k gauge the probability of obtaining the correct code in the top k suggestions. Other popular metrics like BLEU, CodeBLEU, ROUGE, and METEOR similarly emphasize functional accuracy, neglecting security implications. In light of these research gaps, in this paper, we described SALLM, a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This framework has three major components: a novel dataset of security-centric Python prompts, an evaluation environment to test the generated code, and novel metrics to evaluate the models' performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in Metaverse environments to generate dynamic and realistic content and to control the behavior of non-player characters (NPCs). However, the cybersecurity concerns associated with LLMs have become increasingly prominent. Previous research has primarily focused on patching system vulnerabilities to enhance cybersecurity, but these approaches are not well-suited to the Metaverse, where the virtual space is more complex, LLMs are vulnerable, and ethical user interaction is critical. Moreover, the scope of cybersecurity in the Metaverse is expected to expand significantly. This paper proposes a method for enhancing cybersecurity through the simulation of user interaction with LLMs. Our goal is to educate users and strengthen their defense capabilities through exposure to a comprehensive simulation system. This system includes extensive Metaverse cybersecurity Q&A and attack simulation scenarios. By engaging with these, users will improve their ability to recognize and withstand risks. Additionally, to address the ethical implications of user input, we propose using LLMs as evaluators to assess user content across five dimensions. We further adapt the models through vocabulary expansion training to better understand personalized inputs and emoticons. We conduct experiments on multiple LLMs and find that our approach is effective.

Evasion attacks are a threat to machine learning models, where adversaries attempt to affect classifiers by injecting malicious samples. An alarming side-effect of evasion attacks is their ability to transfer among different models: this property is called transferability. Therefore, an attacker can produce adversarial samples on a custom model (surrogate) to conduct the attack on a victim's organization later. Although literature widely discusses how adversaries can transfer their attacks, their experimental settings are limited and far from reality. For instance, many experiments consider both attacker and defender sharing the same dataset, balance level (i.e., how the ground truth is distributed), and model architecture. In this work, we propose the DUMB attacker model. This framework allows analyzing if evasion attacks fail to transfer when the training conditions of surrogate and victim models differ. DUMB considers the following conditions: Dataset soUrces, Model architecture, and the Balance of the ground truth. We then propose a novel testbed to evaluate many state-of-the-art evasion attacks with DUMB; the testbed consists of three computer vision tasks with two distinct datasets each, four types of balance levels, and three model architectures. Our analysis, which generated 13K tests over 14 distinct attacks, led to numerous novel findings in the scope of transferable attacks with surrogate models. In particular, mismatches between attackers and victims in terms of dataset source, balance levels, and model architecture lead to non-negligible loss of attack performance.

Reinforcement learning (RL) tasks are typically framed as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), assuming that decisions are made at fixed time intervals. However, many applications of great importance, including healthcare, do not satisfy this assumption, yet they are commonly modelled as MDPs after an artificial reshaping of the data. In addition, most healthcare (and similar) problems are offline by nature, allowing for only retrospective studies. To address both challenges, we begin by discussing the Semi-MDP (SMDP) framework, which formally handles actions of variable timings. We next present a formal way to apply SMDP modifications to nearly any given value-based offline RL method. We use this theory to introduce three SMDP-based offline RL algorithms, namely, SDQN, SDDQN, and SBCQ. We then experimentally demonstrate that only these SMDP-based algorithms learn the optimal policy in variable-time environments, whereas their MDP counterparts do not. Finally, we apply our new algorithms to a real-world offline dataset pertaining to warfarin dosing for stroke prevention and demonstrate similar results.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly helpful in text generation, even writing code in programming languages based on user prompts written in natural language. They are even applied to generate simulation models for multibody systems from natural language. Research results suggest that LLMs surpass the mere replication of existing code examples, where some LLMs have been trained on an open-source multibody simulation code. However, for closed-source simulation software, such results are not to be expected as their ideas and concepts might differ from other publicly available ones. LLMs can hallucinate for knowledge-intensive tasks, such as model creation, which can lead to wrong responses. This is especially the case for the LLM unknown closed-source simulation software. The same applies to other internal knowledge kept private to protect intellectual property or data privacy. The Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) approach might yield a solution for these knowledge-intensive tasks. This paper explores the application of RAG to closed-source simulation software and presents first experiments. After a brief introduction to LLMs, the RAG approach, and the simulation method applied by the close-source simulation software, several examples are provided to test LLMs' knowledge of the simulation software and the creation of simulation models using two RAG systems. The examples show promising results indicating the benefits of applying RAG systems to closed-source simulation software, helping to access their knowledge. Nevertheless, they also reveal gaps in the applied information and open questions for further research.

We propose a new policy representation based on score-based diffusion models (SDMs). We apply our new policy representation in the domain of Goal-Conditioned Imitation Learning (GCIL) to learn general-purpose goal-specified policies from large uncurated datasets without rewards. Our new goal-conditioned policy architecture "BEhavior generation with ScOre-based Diffusion Policies" (BESO) leverages a generative, score-based diffusion model as its policy. BESO decouples the learning of the score model from the inference sampling process, and, hence allows for fast sampling strategies to generate goal-specified behavior in just 3 denoising steps, compared to 30+ steps of other diffusion based policies. Furthermore, BESO is highly expressive and can effectively capture multi-modality present in the solution space of the play data. Unlike previous methods such as Latent Plans or C-Bet, BESO does not rely on complex hierarchical policies or additional clustering for effective goal-conditioned behavior learning. Finally, we show how BESO can even be used to learn a goal-independent policy from play-data using classifier-free guidance. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that a) represents a behavior policy based on such a decoupled SDM b) learns an SDM based policy in the domain of GCIL and c) provides a way to simultaneously learn a goal-dependent and a goal-independent policy from play-data. We evaluate BESO through detailed simulation and show that it consistently outperforms several state-of-the-art goal-conditioned imitation learning methods on challenging benchmarks. We additionally provide extensive ablation studies and experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for goal-conditioned behavior generation. Demonstrations and Code are available at https://intuitive-robots.github.io/beso-website/

This paper introduces a new method for adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) called the Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA). Building on the multi-turn crescendo attack method introduced by Russinovich, Salem, and Eldan (2024), which gradually escalates the context to provoke harmful responses, the STCA achieves similar outcomes in a single interaction. By condensing the escalation into a single, well-crafted prompt, the STCA bypasses typical moderation filters that LLMs use to prevent inappropriate outputs. This technique reveals vulnerabilities in current LLMs and emphasizes the importance of stronger safeguards in responsible AI (RAI). The STCA offers a novel method that has not been previously explored.

Most existing works focus on direct perturbations to the victim's state/action or the underlying transition dynamics to demonstrate the vulnerability of reinforcement learning agents to adversarial attacks. However, such direct manipulations may not be always realizable. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent setting where a well-trained victim agent nu is exploited by an attacker controlling another agent alpha with an adversarial policy. Previous models do not account for the possibility that the attacker may only have partial control over alpha or that the attack may produce easily detectable "abnormal" behaviors. Furthermore, there is a lack of provably efficient defenses against these adversarial policies. To address these limitations, we introduce a generalized attack framework that has the flexibility to model to what extent the adversary is able to control the agent, and allows the attacker to regulate the state distribution shift and produce stealthier adversarial policies. Moreover, we offer a provably efficient defense with polynomial convergence to the most robust victim policy through adversarial training with timescale separation. This stands in sharp contrast to supervised learning, where adversarial training typically provides only empirical defenses. Using the Robosumo competition experiments, we show that our generalized attack formulation results in much stealthier adversarial policies when maintaining the same winning rate as baselines. Additionally, our adversarial training approach yields stable learning dynamics and less exploitable victim policies.

Recent advancements in generative AI have led to the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering, addressing numerous long-standing challenges. However, a comprehensive study examining the capabilities of LLMs in software vulnerability detection (SVD), a crucial aspect of software security, is currently lacking. Existing research primarily focuses on evaluating LLMs using C/C++ datasets. It typically explores only one or two strategies among prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning for open-source LLMs. Consequently, there is a significant knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of diverse LLMs in detecting vulnerabilities across various programming languages. To address this knowledge gap, we present a comprehensive empirical study evaluating the performance of LLMs on the SVD task. We have compiled a comprehensive dataset comprising 8,260 vulnerable functions in Python, 7,505 in Java, and 28,983 in JavaScript. We assess five open-source LLMs using multiple approaches, including prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning. These LLMs are benchmarked against five fine-tuned small language models and two open-source static application security testing tools. Furthermore, we explore two avenues to improve LLM performance on SVD: a) Data perspective: Retraining models using downsampled balanced datasets. b) Model perspective: Investigating ensemble learning methods that combine predictions from multiple LLMs. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that SVD remains a challenging task for LLMs. This study provides a thorough understanding of the role of LLMs in SVD and offers practical insights for future advancements in leveraging generative AI to enhance software security practices.

Foundation models (FMs), particularly large language models (LLMs), have shown significant promise in various software engineering (SE) tasks, including code generation, debugging, and requirement refinement. Despite these advances, existing evaluation frameworks are insufficient for assessing model performance in iterative, context-rich workflows characteristic of SE activities. To address this limitation, we introduce SE Arena, an interactive platform designed to evaluate SE-focused chatbots. SE Arena provides a transparent, open-source leaderboard, supports multi-round conversational workflows, and enables end-to-end model comparisons. Moreover, SE Arena incorporates a new feature called RepoChat, which automatically injects repository-related context (e.g., issues, commits, pull requests) into the conversation, further aligning evaluations with real-world development processes. This paper outlines the design and capabilities of SE Arena, emphasizing its potential to advance the evaluation and practical application of FMs in software engineering.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance as few-shot learners. However, their security risks under such settings are largely unexplored. In this work, we conduct a pilot study showing that PLMs as few-shot learners are highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks while existing defenses are inadequate due to the unique challenges of few-shot scenarios. To address such challenges, we advocate MDP, a novel lightweight, pluggable, and effective defense for PLMs as few-shot learners. Specifically, MDP leverages the gap between the masking-sensitivity of poisoned and clean samples: with reference to the limited few-shot data as distributional anchors, it compares the representations of given samples under varying masking and identifies poisoned samples as ones with significant variations. We show analytically that MDP creates an interesting dilemma for the attacker to choose between attack effectiveness and detection evasiveness. The empirical evaluation using benchmark datasets and representative attacks validates the efficacy of MDP.

This paper introduces a new environment LLM-PySC2 (the Large Language Model StarCraft II Learning Environment), a platform derived from DeepMind's StarCraft II Learning Environment that serves to develop Large Language Models (LLMs) based decision-making methodologies. This environment is the first to offer the complete StarCraft II action space, multi-modal observation interfaces, and a structured game knowledge database, which are seamlessly connected with various LLMs to facilitate the research of LLMs-based decision-making. To further support multi-agent research, we developed an LLM collaborative framework that supports multi-agent concurrent queries and multi-agent communication. In our experiments, the LLM-PySC2 environment is adapted to be compatible with the StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC) task group and provided eight new scenarios focused on macro-decision abilities. We evaluated nine mainstream LLMs in the experiments, and results show that sufficient parameters are necessary for LLMs to make decisions, but improving reasoning ability does not directly lead to better decision-making outcomes. Our findings further indicate the importance of enabling large models to learn autonomously in the deployment environment through parameter training or train-free learning techniques. Ultimately, we expect that the LLM-PySC2 environment can promote research on learning methods for LLMs, helping LLM-based methods better adapt to task scenarios.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare applications offers promising advancements in medical diagnostics, treatment recommendations, and patient care. However, the susceptibility of LLMs to adversarial attacks poses a significant threat, potentially leading to harmful outcomes in delicate medical contexts. This study investigates the vulnerability of LLMs to two types of adversarial attacks in three medical tasks. Utilizing real-world patient data, we demonstrate that both open-source and proprietary LLMs are susceptible to manipulation across multiple tasks. This research further reveals that domain-specific tasks demand more adversarial data in model fine-tuning than general domain tasks for effective attack execution, especially for more capable models. We discover that while integrating adversarial data does not markedly degrade overall model performance on medical benchmarks, it does lead to noticeable shifts in fine-tuned model weights, suggesting a potential pathway for detecting and countering model attacks. This research highlights the urgent need for robust security measures and the development of defensive mechanisms to safeguard LLMs in medical applications, to ensure their safe and effective deployment in healthcare settings.

Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure. Conversely, interpretability studies that analyze these internal mechanisms lack practical applications beyond runtime interventions. We bridge this gap by introducing a novel white-box approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability techniques to craft practical adversarial inputs. Specifically, we first identify acceptance subspaces - sets of feature vectors that do not trigger the model's refusal mechanisms - then use gradient-based optimization to reroute embeddings from refusal subspaces to acceptance subspaces, effectively achieving jailbreaks. This targeted approach significantly reduces computation cost, achieving attack success rates of 80-95\% on state-of-the-art models including Gemma2, Llama3.2, and Qwen2.5 within minutes or even seconds, compared to existing techniques that often fail or require hours of computation. We believe this approach opens a new direction for both attack research and defense development. Furthermore, it showcases a practical application of mechanistic interpretability where other methods are less efficient, which highlights its utility. The code and generated datasets are available at https://github.com/Sckathach/subspace-rerouting.

LLM-based agents have recently emerged as promising tools for solving challenging problems without the need for task-specific finetuned models that can be expensive to procure. Currently, the design and implementation of such agents is ad hoc, as the wide variety of tasks that LLM-based agents may be applied to naturally means there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to agent design. In this work we aim to alleviate the difficulty of designing and implementing new agents by proposing a minimalistic, high-level generation framework that simplifies the process of building agents. The framework we introduce allows the user to specify desired agent behaviors in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). The declarative LTL specification is then used to construct a constrained decoder that guarantees the LLM will produce an output exhibiting the desired behavior. By designing our framework in this way, we obtain several benefits, including the ability to enforce complex agent behavior, the ability to formally validate prompt examples, and the ability to seamlessly incorporate content-focused logical constraints into generation. In particular, our declarative approach, in which the desired behavior is simply described without concern for how it should be implemented or enforced, enables rapid design, implementation and experimentation with different LLM-based agents. We demonstrate how the proposed framework can be used to implement recent LLM-based agents, and show how the guardrails our approach provides can lead to improvements in agent performance. In addition, we release our code for general use.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

We introduce Diffusion World Model (DWM), a conditional diffusion model capable of predicting multistep future states and rewards concurrently. As opposed to traditional one-step dynamics models, DWM offers long-horizon predictions in a single forward pass, eliminating the need for recursive quires. We integrate DWM into model-based value estimation, where the short-term return is simulated by future trajectories sampled from DWM. In the context of offline reinforcement learning, DWM can be viewed as a conservative value regularization through generative modeling. Alternatively, it can be seen as a data source that enables offline Q-learning with synthetic data. Our experiments on the D4RL dataset confirm the robustness of DWM to long-horizon simulation. In terms of absolute performance, DWM significantly surpasses one-step dynamics models with a 44% performance gain, and achieves state-of-the-art performance.

Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges are puzzles related to computer security scenarios. With the advent of large language models (LLMs), more and more CTF participants are using LLMs to understand and solve the challenges. However, so far no work has evaluated the effectiveness of LLMs in solving CTF challenges with a fully automated workflow. We develop two CTF-solving workflows, human-in-the-loop (HITL) and fully-automated, to examine the LLMs' ability to solve a selected set of CTF challenges, prompted with information about the question. We collect human contestants' results on the same set of questions, and find that LLMs achieve higher success rate than an average human participant. This work provides a comprehensive evaluation of the capability of LLMs in solving real world CTF challenges, from real competition to fully automated workflow. Our results provide references for applying LLMs in cybersecurity education and pave the way for systematic evaluation of offensive cybersecurity capabilities in LLMs.

Foundation model development attracts a rapidly expanding body of contributors, scientists, and applications. To help shape responsible development practices, we introduce the Foundation Model Development Cheatsheet: a growing collection of 250+ tools and resources spanning text, vision, and speech modalities. We draw on a large body of prior work to survey resources (e.g. software, documentation, frameworks, guides, and practical tools) that support informed data selection, processing, and understanding, precise and limitation-aware artifact documentation, efficient model training, advance awareness of the environmental impact from training, careful model evaluation of capabilities, risks, and claims, as well as responsible model release, licensing and deployment practices. We hope this curated collection of resources helps guide more responsible development. The process of curating this list, enabled us to review the AI development ecosystem, revealing what tools are critically missing, misused, or over-used in existing practices. We find that (i) tools for data sourcing, model evaluation, and monitoring are critically under-serving ethical and real-world needs, (ii) evaluations for model safety, capabilities, and environmental impact all lack reproducibility and transparency, (iii) text and particularly English-centric analyses continue to dominate over multilingual and multi-modal analyses, and (iv) evaluation of systems, rather than just models, is needed so that capabilities and impact are assessed in context.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have achieved promising results in information retrieval. NRMs have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. A typical Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) against NRMs was proposed recently, in which an attacker promotes a target document in rankings by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to its text. This raises concerns when deploying NRMs in real-world applications. Therefore, it is important to develop techniques that defend against such attacks for NRMs. In empirical defenses adversarial examples are found during training and used to augment the training set. However, such methods offer no theoretical guarantee on the models' robustness and may eventually be broken by other sophisticated WSRAs. To escape this arms race, rigorous and provable certified defense methods for NRMs are needed. To this end, we first define the Certified Top-K Robustness for ranking models since users mainly care about the top ranked results in real-world scenarios. A ranking model is said to be Certified Top-K Robust on a ranked list when it is guaranteed to keep documents that are out of the top K away from the top K under any attack. Then, we introduce a Certified Defense method, named CertDR, to achieve certified top-K robustness against WSRA, based on the idea of randomized smoothing. Specifically, we first construct a smoothed ranker by applying random word substitutions on the documents, and then leverage the ranking property jointly with the statistical property of the ensemble to provably certify top-K robustness. Extensive experiments on two representative web search datasets demonstrate that CertDR can significantly outperform state-of-the-art empirical defense methods for ranking models.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

LLM agents have become increasingly sophisticated, especially in the realm of cybersecurity. Researchers have shown that LLM agents can exploit real-world vulnerabilities when given a description of the vulnerability and toy capture-the-flag problems. However, these agents still perform poorly on real-world vulnerabilities that are unknown to the agent ahead of time (zero-day vulnerabilities). In this work, we show that teams of LLM agents can exploit real-world, zero-day vulnerabilities. Prior agents struggle with exploring many different vulnerabilities and long-range planning when used alone. To resolve this, we introduce HPTSA, a system of agents with a planning agent that can launch subagents. The planning agent explores the system and determines which subagents to call, resolving long-term planning issues when trying different vulnerabilities. We construct a benchmark of 15 real-world vulnerabilities and show that our team of agents improve over prior work by up to 4.5times.

Stateful policies play an important role in reinforcement learning, such as handling partially observable environments, enhancing robustness, or imposing an inductive bias directly into the policy structure. The conventional method for training stateful policies is Backpropagation Through Time (BPTT), which comes with significant drawbacks, such as slow training due to sequential gradient propagation and the occurrence of vanishing or exploding gradients. The gradient is often truncated to address these issues, resulting in a biased policy update. We present a novel approach for training stateful policies by decomposing the latter into a stochastic internal state kernel and a stateless policy, jointly optimized by following the stateful policy gradient. We introduce different versions of the stateful policy gradient theorem, enabling us to easily instantiate stateful variants of popular reinforcement learning and imitation learning algorithms. Furthermore, we provide a theoretical analysis of our new gradient estimator and compare it with BPTT. We evaluate our approach on complex continuous control tasks, e.g., humanoid locomotion, and demonstrate that our gradient estimator scales effectively with task complexity while offering a faster and simpler alternative to BPTT.

While server-side Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate proficiency in function calling and complex reasoning, deploying Small Language Models (SLMs) directly on devices brings opportunities to improve latency and privacy but also introduces unique challenges for accuracy and memory. We introduce CAMPHOR, an innovative on-device SLM multi-agent framework designed to handle multiple user inputs and reason over personal context locally, ensuring privacy is maintained. CAMPHOR employs a hierarchical architecture where a high-order reasoning agent decomposes complex tasks and coordinates expert agents responsible for personal context retrieval, tool interaction, and dynamic plan generation. By implementing parameter sharing across agents and leveraging prompt compression, we significantly reduce model size, latency, and memory usage. To validate our approach, we present a novel dataset capturing multi-agent task trajectories centered on personalized mobile assistant use-cases. Our experiments reveal that fine-tuned SLM agents not only surpass closed-source LLMs in task completion F1 by~35\% but also eliminate the need for server-device communication, all while enhancing privacy.

Penetration testing, an essential component of software security testing, allows organizations to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems, thus bolstering their defense mechanisms against cyberattacks. One recent advancement in the realm of penetration testing is the utilization of Language Models (LLMs). We explore the intersection of LLMs and penetration testing to gain insight into their capabilities and challenges in the context of privilege escalation. We introduce a fully automated privilege-escalation tool designed for evaluating the efficacy of LLMs for (ethical) hacking, executing benchmarks using multiple LLMs, and investigating their respective results. Our results show that GPT-4-turbo is well suited to exploit vulnerabilities (33-83% of vulnerabilities). GPT-3.5-turbo can abuse 16-50% of vulnerabilities, while local models, such as Llama3, can only exploit between 0 and 33% of the vulnerabilities. We analyze the impact of different context sizes, in-context learning, optional high-level guidance mechanisms, and memory management techniques. We discuss challenging areas for LLMs, including maintaining focus during testing, coping with errors, and finally comparing LLMs with human hackers. The current version of the LLM-guided privilege-escalation prototype can be found at https://github.com/ipa-labs/hackingBuddyGPT.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

Evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for understanding their capabilities and limitations across various applications, including natural language processing and code generation. Existing benchmarks like MMLU, C-Eval, and HumanEval assess general LLM performance but lack focus on specific expert domains such as cybersecurity. Previous attempts to create cybersecurity datasets have faced limitations, including insufficient data volume and a reliance on multiple-choice questions (MCQs). To address these gaps, we propose SecBench, a multi-dimensional benchmarking dataset designed to evaluate LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. SecBench includes questions in various formats (MCQs and short-answer questions (SAQs)), at different capability levels (Knowledge Retention and Logical Reasoning), in multiple languages (Chinese and English), and across various sub-domains. The dataset was constructed by collecting high-quality data from open sources and organizing a Cybersecurity Question Design Contest, resulting in 44,823 MCQs and 3,087 SAQs. Particularly, we used the powerful while cost-effective LLMs to (1). label the data and (2). constructing a grading agent for automatic evaluation of SAQs. Benchmarking results on 16 SOTA LLMs demonstrate the usability of SecBench, which is arguably the largest and most comprehensive benchmark dataset for LLMs in cybersecurity. More information about SecBench can be found at our website, and the dataset can be accessed via the artifact link.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Foundation models, such as large language models (LLMs), have been widely recognised as transformative AI technologies due to their capabilities to understand and generate content, including plans with reasoning capabilities. Foundation model based agents derive their autonomy from the capabilities of foundation models, which enable them to autonomously break down a given goal into a set of manageable tasks and orchestrate task execution to meet the goal. Despite the huge efforts put into building foundation model based agents, the architecture design of the agents has not yet been systematically explored. Also, while there are significant benefits of using agents for planning and execution, there are serious considerations regarding responsible AI related software quality attributes, such as security and accountability. Therefore, this paper presents a pattern-oriented reference architecture that serves as guidance when designing foundation model based agents. We evaluate the completeness and utility of the proposed reference architecture by mapping it to the architecture of two real-world agents.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Language agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have seen exploding development. Their capability of using language as a vehicle for thought and communication lends an incredible level of flexibility and versatility. People have quickly capitalized on this capability to connect LLMs to a wide range of external components and environments: databases, tools, the Internet, robotic embodiment, etc. Many believe an unprecedentedly powerful automation technology is emerging. However, new automation technologies come with new safety risks, especially for intricate systems like language agents. There is a surprisingly large gap between the speed and scale of their development and deployment and our understanding of their safety risks. Are we building a house of cards? In this position paper, we present the first systematic effort in mapping adversarial attacks against language agents. We first present a unified conceptual framework for agents with three major components: Perception, Brain, and Action. Under this framework, we present a comprehensive discussion and propose 12 potential attack scenarios against different components of an agent, covering different attack strategies (e.g., input manipulation, adversarial demonstrations, jailbreaking, backdoors). We also draw connections to successful attack strategies previously applied to LLMs. We emphasize the urgency to gain a thorough understanding of language agent risks before their widespread deployment.

The drive toward automating cellular network operations has grown with the increasing complexity of these systems. Despite advancements, full autonomy currently remains out of reach due to reliance on human intervention for modeling network behaviors and defining policies to meet target requirements. Network Digital Twins (NDTs) have shown promise in enhancing network intelligence, but the successful implementation of this technology is constrained by use case-specific architectures, limiting its role in advancing network autonomy. A more capable network intelligence, or "telecommunications brain", is needed to enable seamless, autonomous management of cellular network. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as potential enablers for this vision but face challenges in network modeling, especially in reasoning and handling diverse data types. To address these gaps, we introduce Hermes, a chain of LLM agents that uses "blueprints" for constructing NDT instances through structured and explainable logical steps. Hermes allows automatic, reliable, and accurate network modeling of diverse use cases and configurations, thus marking progress toward fully autonomous network operations.

The Vision of Autonomic Computing (ACV), proposed over two decades ago, envisions computing systems that self-manage akin to biological organisms, adapting seamlessly to changing environments. Despite decades of research, achieving ACV remains challenging due to the dynamic and complex nature of modern computing systems. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) offer promising solutions to these challenges by leveraging their extensive knowledge, language understanding, and task automation capabilities. This paper explores the feasibility of realizing ACV through an LLM-based multi-agent framework for microservice management. We introduce a five-level taxonomy for autonomous service maintenance and present an online evaluation benchmark based on the Sock Shop microservice demo project to assess our framework's performance. Our findings demonstrate significant progress towards achieving Level 3 autonomy, highlighting the effectiveness of LLMs in detecting and resolving issues within microservice architectures. This study contributes to advancing autonomic computing by pioneering the integration of LLMs into microservice management frameworks, paving the way for more adaptive and self-managing computing systems. The code will be made available at https://aka.ms/ACV-LLM.

Stochastic partial observability poses a major challenge for decentralized coordination in multi-agent reinforcement learning but is largely neglected in state-of-the-art research due to a strong focus on state-based centralized training for decentralized execution (CTDE) and benchmarks that lack sufficient stochasticity like StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC). In this paper, we propose Attention-based Embeddings of Recurrence In multi-Agent Learning (AERIAL) to approximate value functions under stochastic partial observability. AERIAL replaces the true state with a learned representation of multi-agent recurrence, considering more accurate information about decentralized agent decisions than state-based CTDE. We then introduce MessySMAC, a modified version of SMAC with stochastic observations and higher variance in initial states, to provide a more general and configurable benchmark regarding stochastic partial observability. We evaluate AERIAL in Dec-Tiger as well as in a variety of SMAC and MessySMAC maps, and compare the results with state-based CTDE. Furthermore, we evaluate the robustness of AERIAL and state-based CTDE against various stochasticity configurations in MessySMAC.

Large Language Models have gained considerable attention for their revolutionary capabilities. However, there is also growing concern on their safety implications, making a comprehensive safety evaluation for LLMs urgently needed before model deployment. In this work, we propose S-Eval, a new comprehensive, multi-dimensional and open-ended safety evaluation benchmark. At the core of S-Eval is a novel LLM-based automatic test prompt generation and selection framework, which trains an expert testing LLM Mt combined with a range of test selection strategies to automatically construct a high-quality test suite for the safety evaluation. The key to the automation of this process is a novel expert safety-critique LLM Mc able to quantify the riskiness score of a LLM's response, and additionally produce risk tags and explanations. Besides, the generation process is also guided by a carefully designed risk taxonomy with four different levels, covering comprehensive and multi-dimensional safety risks of concern. Based on these, we systematically construct a new and large-scale safety evaluation benchmark for LLMs consisting of 220,000 evaluation prompts, including 20,000 base risk prompts (10,000 in Chinese and 10,000 in English) and 200, 000 corresponding attack prompts derived from 10 popular adversarial instruction attacks against LLMs. Moreover, considering the rapid evolution of LLMs and accompanied safety threats, S-Eval can be flexibly configured and adapted to include new risks, attacks and models. S-Eval is extensively evaluated on 20 popular and representative LLMs. The results confirm that S-Eval can better reflect and inform the safety risks of LLMs compared to existing benchmarks. We also explore the impacts of parameter scales, language environments, and decoding parameters on the evaluation, providing a systematic methodology for evaluating the safety of LLMs.

Large language models (large LMs) are increasingly trained on massive codebases and used to generate code. However, LMs lack awareness of security and are found to frequently produce unsafe code. This work studies the security of LMs along two important axes: (i) security hardening, which aims to enhance LMs' reliability in generating secure code, and (ii) adversarial testing, which seeks to evaluate LMs' security at an adversarial standpoint. We address both of these by formulating a new security task called controlled code generation. The task is parametric and takes as input a binary property to guide the LM to generate secure or unsafe code, while preserving the LM's capability of generating functionally correct code. We propose a novel learning-based approach called SVEN to solve this task. SVEN leverages property-specific continuous vectors to guide program generation towards the given property, without modifying the LM's weights. Our training procedure optimizes these continuous vectors by enforcing specialized loss terms on different regions of code, using a high-quality dataset carefully curated by us. Our extensive evaluation shows that SVEN is highly effective in achieving strong security control. For instance, a state-of-the-art CodeGen LM with 2.7B parameters generates secure code for 59.1% of the time. When we employ SVEN to perform security hardening (or adversarial testing) on this LM, the ratio is significantly boosted to 92.3% (or degraded to 36.8%). Importantly, SVEN closely matches the original LMs in functional correctness.

In recent years, the widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked interest in their potential for application within the military domain. However, the current generation of LLMs demonstrate sub-optimal performance on Army use cases, due to the prevalence of domain-specific vocabulary and jargon. In order to fully leverage LLMs in-domain, many organizations have turned to fine-tuning to circumvent the prohibitive costs involved in training new LLMs from scratch. In light of this trend, we explore the viability of adapting open-source LLMs for usage in the Army domain in order to address their existing lack of domain-specificity. Our investigations have resulted in the creation of three distinct generations of TRACLM, a family of LLMs fine-tuned by The Research and Analysis Center (TRAC), Army Futures Command (AFC). Through continuous refinement of our training pipeline, each successive iteration of TRACLM displayed improved capabilities when applied to Army tasks and use cases. Furthermore, throughout our fine-tuning experiments, we recognized the need for an evaluation framework that objectively quantifies the Army domain-specific knowledge of LLMs. To address this, we developed MilBench, an extensible software framework that efficiently evaluates the Army knowledge of a given LLM using tasks derived from doctrine and assessments. We share preliminary results, models, methods, and recommendations on the creation of TRACLM and MilBench. Our work significantly informs the development of LLM technology across the DoD and augments senior leader decisions with respect to artificial intelligence integration.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

"Bigger the better" has been the predominant trend in recent Large Language Models (LLMs) development. However, LLMs do not suit well for scenarios that require on-device processing, energy efficiency, low memory footprint, and response efficiency. These requisites are crucial for privacy, security, and sustainable deployment. This paper explores the "less is more" paradigm by addressing the challenge of designing accurate yet efficient Small Language Models (SLMs) for resource constrained devices. Our primary contribution is the introduction of an accurate and fully transparent open-source 0.5 billion (0.5B) parameter SLM, named MobiLlama, catering to the specific needs of resource-constrained computing with an emphasis on enhanced performance with reduced resource demands. MobiLlama is a SLM design that initiates from a larger model and applies a careful parameter sharing scheme to reduce both the pre-training and the deployment cost. Our work strives to not only bridge the gap in open-source SLMs but also ensures full transparency, where complete training data pipeline, training code, model weights, and over 300 checkpoints along with evaluation codes is available at : https://github.com/mbzuai-oryx/MobiLlama.

There is a growing interest in applying pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to planning problems. However, methods that use LLMs directly as planners are currently impractical due to several factors, including limited correctness of plans, strong reliance on feedback from interactions with simulators or even the actual environment, and the inefficiency in utilizing human feedback. In this work, we introduce a novel alternative paradigm that constructs an explicit world (domain) model in planning domain definition language (PDDL) and then uses it to plan with sound domain-independent planners. To address the fact that LLMs may not generate a fully functional PDDL model initially, we employ LLMs as an interface between PDDL and sources of corrective feedback, such as PDDL validators and humans. For users who lack a background in PDDL, we show that LLMs can translate PDDL into natural language and effectively encode corrective feedback back to the underlying domain model. Our framework not only enjoys the correctness guarantee offered by the external planners but also reduces human involvement by allowing users to correct domain models at the beginning, rather than inspecting and correcting (through interactive prompting) every generated plan as in previous work. On two IPC domains and a Household domain that is more complicated than commonly used benchmarks such as ALFWorld, we demonstrate that GPT-4 can be leveraged to produce high-quality PDDL models for over 40 actions, and the corrected PDDL models are then used to successfully solve 48 challenging planning tasks. Resources including the source code will be released at: https://guansuns.github.io/pages/llm-dm.

A rapidly growing number of applications rely on a small set of closed-source language models (LMs). This dependency might introduce novel security risks if LMs develop self-recognition capabilities. Inspired by human identity verification methods, we propose a novel approach for assessing self-recognition in LMs using model-generated "security questions". Our test can be externally administered to keep track of frontier models as it does not require access to internal model parameters or output probabilities. We use our test to examine self-recognition in ten of the most capable open- and closed-source LMs currently publicly available. Our extensive experiments found no empirical evidence of general or consistent self-recognition in any examined LM. Instead, our results suggest that given a set of alternatives, LMs seek to pick the "best" answer, regardless of its origin. Moreover, we find indications that preferences about which models produce the best answers are consistent across LMs. We additionally uncover novel insights on position bias considerations for LMs in multiple-choice settings.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Effective control and prediction of dynamical systems often require appropriate handling of continuous-time and discrete, event-triggered processes. Stochastic hybrid systems (SHSs), common across engineering domains, provide a formalism for dynamical systems subject to discrete, possibly stochastic, state jumps and multi-modal continuous-time flows. Despite the versatility and importance of SHSs across applications, a general procedure for the explicit learning of both discrete events and multi-mode continuous dynamics remains an open problem. This work introduces Neural Hybrid Automata (NHAs), a recipe for learning SHS dynamics without a priori knowledge on the number of modes and inter-modal transition dynamics. NHAs provide a systematic inference method based on normalizing flows, neural differential equations and self-supervision. We showcase NHAs on several tasks, including mode recovery and flow learning in systems with stochastic transitions, and end-to-end learning of hierarchical robot controllers.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being adopted as components in software systems. Creating and specializing DNNs from scratch has grown increasingly difficult as state-of-the-art architectures grow more complex. Following the path of traditional software engineering, machine learning engineers have begun to reuse large-scale pre-trained models (PTMs) and fine-tune these models for downstream tasks. Prior works have studied reuse practices for traditional software packages to guide software engineers towards better package maintenance and dependency management. We lack a similar foundation of knowledge to guide behaviors in pre-trained model ecosystems. In this work, we present the first empirical investigation of PTM reuse. We interviewed 12 practitioners from the most popular PTM ecosystem, Hugging Face, to learn the practices and challenges of PTM reuse. From this data, we model the decision-making process for PTM reuse. Based on the identified practices, we describe useful attributes for model reuse, including provenance, reproducibility, and portability. Three challenges for PTM reuse are missing attributes, discrepancies between claimed and actual performance, and model risks. We substantiate these identified challenges with systematic measurements in the Hugging Face ecosystem. Our work informs future directions on optimizing deep learning ecosystems by automated measuring useful attributes and potential attacks, and envision future research on infrastructure and standardization for model registries.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the automation of software development tasks, including code synthesis, program repair, and test generation. More recently, researchers and industry practitioners have developed various autonomous LLM agents to perform end-to-end software development tasks. These agents are equipped with the ability to use tools, run commands, observe feedback from the environment, and plan for future actions. However, the complexity of these agent-based approaches, together with the limited abilities of current LLMs, raises the following question: Do we really have to employ complex autonomous software agents? To attempt to answer this question, we build Agentless -- an agentless approach to automatically solve software development problems. Compared to the verbose and complex setup of agent-based approaches, Agentless employs a simplistic two-phase process of localization followed by repair, without letting the LLM decide future actions or operate with complex tools. Our results on the popular SWE-bench Lite benchmark show that surprisingly the simplistic Agentless is able to achieve both the highest performance (27.33%) and lowest cost (\$0.34) compared with all existing open-source software agents! Furthermore, we manually classified the problems in SWE-bench Lite and found problems with exact ground truth patch or insufficient/misleading issue descriptions. As such, we construct SWE-bench Lite-S by excluding such problematic issues to perform more rigorous evaluation and comparison. Our work highlights the current overlooked potential of a simple, interpretable technique in autonomous software development. We hope Agentless will help reset the baseline, starting point, and horizon for autonomous software agents, and inspire future work along this crucial direction.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

With the growing applications of Deep Learning (DL), especially recent spectacular achievements of Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and LLaMA, the commercial significance of these remarkable models has soared. However, acquiring well-trained models is costly and resource-intensive. It requires a considerable high-quality dataset, substantial investment in dedicated architecture design, expensive computational resources, and efforts to develop technical expertise. Consequently, safeguarding the Intellectual Property (IP) of well-trained models is attracting increasing attention. In contrast to existing surveys overwhelmingly focusing on model IPP mainly, this survey not only encompasses the protection on model level intelligence but also valuable dataset intelligence. Firstly, according to the requirements for effective IPP design, this work systematically summarizes the general and scheme-specific performance evaluation metrics. Secondly, from proactive IP infringement prevention and reactive IP ownership verification perspectives, it comprehensively investigates and analyzes the existing IPP methods for both dataset and model intelligence. Additionally, from the standpoint of training settings, it delves into the unique challenges that distributed settings pose to IPP compared to centralized settings. Furthermore, this work examines various attacks faced by deep IPP techniques. Finally, we outline prospects for promising future directions that may act as a guide for innovative research.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

Deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications requires robust safety guard models to detect and block harmful user prompts. While large safety guard models achieve strong performance, their computational cost is substantial. To mitigate this, smaller distilled models are used, but they often underperform on "hard" examples where the larger model provides accurate predictions. We observe that many inputs can be reliably handled by the smaller model, while only a small fraction require the larger model's capacity. Motivated by this, we propose SafeRoute, a binary router that distinguishes hard examples from easy ones. Our method selectively applies the larger safety guard model to the data that the router considers hard, improving efficiency while maintaining accuracy compared to solely using the larger safety guard model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our adaptive model selection significantly enhances the trade-off between computational cost and safety performance, outperforming relevant baselines.

A common problem for agents operating in real-world environments is that the response of an environment to their actions may be non-deterministic and observed through noise. This renders environmental state and progress towards completing a task latent. Despite recent impressive demonstrations of LLM's reasoning abilities on various benchmarks, whether LLMs can build estimates of latent state and leverage them for reasoning has not been explicitly studied. We investigate this problem in the real-world domain of autonomous UI agents. We establish that appropriately prompting LLMs in a zero-shot manner can be formally understood as forming point estimates of latent state in a textual space. In the context of autonomous UI agents we then show that LLMs used in this manner are more than 76% accurate at inferring various aspects of latent state, such as performed (vs. commanded) actions and task progression. Using both public and internal benchmarks and three reasoning methods (zero-shot, CoT-SC & ReAct), we show that LLM-powered agents that explicitly estimate and reason about latent state are able to successfully complete up to 1.6x more tasks than those that do not.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a variety of risks, from non-faithful output to biased and toxic generations. Due to several limiting factors surrounding LLMs (training cost, API access, data availability, etc.), it may not always be feasible to impose direct safety constraints on a deployed model. Therefore, an efficient and reliable alternative is required. To this end, we present our ongoing efforts to create and deploy a library of detectors: compact and easy-to-build classification models that provide labels for various harms. In addition to the detectors themselves, we discuss a wide range of uses for these detector models - from acting as guardrails to enabling effective AI governance. We also deep dive into inherent challenges in their development and discuss future work aimed at making the detectors more reliable and broadening their scope.

Solving complex planning problems requires Large Language Models (LLMs) to explicitly model the state transition to avoid rule violations, comply with constraints, and ensure optimality-a task hindered by the inherent ambiguity of natural language. To overcome such ambiguity, Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) is leveraged as a planning abstraction that enables precise and formal state descriptions. With PDDL, we can generate a symbolic world model where classic searching algorithms, such as A*, can be seamlessly applied to find optimal plans. However, directly generating PDDL domains with current LLMs remains an open challenge due to the lack of PDDL training data. To address this challenge, we propose to scale up the test-time computation of LLMs to enhance their PDDL reasoning capabilities, thereby enabling the generation of high-quality PDDL domains. Specifically, we introduce a simple yet effective algorithm, which first employs a Best-of-N sampling approach to improve the quality of the initial solution and then refines the solution in a fine-grained manner with verbalized machine learning. Our method outperforms o1-mini by a considerable margin in the generation of PDDL domain, achieving over 50% success rate on two tasks (i.e., generating PDDL domains from natural language description or PDDL problems). This is done without requiring additional training. By taking advantage of PDDL as state abstraction, our method is able to outperform current state-of-the-art methods on almost all competition-level planning tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP), providing versatile capabilities across various applications. However, their application to complex, domain-specific tasks, such as cyber-security, often faces substantial challenges. In this study, we introduce SecKnowledge and CyberPal.AI to address these challenges and train security-expert LLMs. SecKnowledge is a domain-knowledge-driven cyber-security instruction dataset, meticulously designed using years of accumulated expert knowledge in the domain through a multi-phase generation process. CyberPal.AI refers to a family of LLMs fine-tuned using SecKnowledge, aimed at building security-specialized LLMs capable of answering and following complex security-related instructions. Additionally, we introduce SecKnowledge-Eval, a comprehensive and diverse cyber-security evaluation benchmark, composed of an extensive set of cyber-security tasks we specifically developed to assess LLMs in the field of cyber-security, along with other publicly available security benchmarks. Our results show a significant average improvement of up to 24% over the baseline models, underscoring the benefits of our expert-driven instruction dataset generation process. These findings contribute to the advancement of AI-based cyber-security applications, paving the way for security-expert LLMs that can enhance threat-hunting and investigation processes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable potential across various domains, including cybersecurity. Using commercial cloud-based LLMs may be undesirable due to privacy concerns, costs, and network connectivity constraints. In this paper, we present Hackphyr, a locally fine-tuned LLM to be used as a red-team agent within network security environments. Our fine-tuned 7 billion parameter model can run on a single GPU card and achieves performance comparable with much larger and more powerful commercial models such as GPT-4. Hackphyr clearly outperforms other models, including GPT-3.5-turbo, and baselines, such as Q-learning agents in complex, previously unseen scenarios. To achieve this performance, we generated a new task-specific cybersecurity dataset to enhance the base model's capabilities. Finally, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the agents' behaviors that provides insights into the planning abilities and potential shortcomings of such agents, contributing to the broader understanding of LLM-based agents in cybersecurity contexts

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various tasks in different domains. However, the emergence of biases and the potential for generating harmful content in LLMs, particularly under malicious inputs, pose significant challenges. Current mitigation strategies, while effective, are not resilient under adversarial attacks. This paper introduces Resilient Guardrails for Large Language Models (RigorLLM), a novel framework designed to efficiently and effectively moderate harmful and unsafe inputs and outputs for LLMs. By employing a multi-faceted approach that includes energy-based training data augmentation through Langevin dynamics, optimizing a safe suffix for inputs via minimax optimization, and integrating a fusion-based model combining robust KNN with LLMs based on our data augmentation, RigorLLM offers a robust solution to harmful content moderation. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate that RigorLLM not only outperforms existing baselines like OpenAI API and Perspective API in detecting harmful content but also exhibits unparalleled resilience to jailbreaking attacks. The innovative use of constrained optimization and a fusion-based guardrail approach represents a significant step forward in developing more secure and reliable LLMs, setting a new standard for content moderation frameworks in the face of evolving digital threats.

Machine Learning (ML) models have been utilized for malware detection for over two decades. Consequently, this ignited an ongoing arms race between malware authors and antivirus systems, compelling researchers to propose defenses for malware-detection models against evasion attacks. However, most if not all existing defenses against evasion attacks suffer from sizable performance degradation and/or can defend against only specific attacks, which makes them less practical in real-world settings. In this work, we develop a certified defense, DRSM (De-Randomized Smoothed MalConv), by redesigning the de-randomized smoothing technique for the domain of malware detection. Specifically, we propose a window ablation scheme to provably limit the impact of adversarial bytes while maximally preserving local structures of the executables. After showing how DRSM is theoretically robust against attacks with contiguous adversarial bytes, we verify its performance and certified robustness experimentally, where we observe only marginal accuracy drops as the cost of robustness. To our knowledge, we are the first to offer certified robustness in the realm of static detection of malware executables. More surprisingly, through evaluating DRSM against 9 empirical attacks of different types, we observe that the proposed defense is empirically robust to some extent against a diverse set of attacks, some of which even fall out of the scope of its original threat model. In addition, we collected 15.5K recent benign raw executables from diverse sources, which will be made public as a dataset called PACE (Publicly Accessible Collection(s) of Executables) to alleviate the scarcity of publicly available benign datasets for studying malware detection and provide future research with more representative data of the time.

With the rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), ensuring their safety has emerged as a crucial area of research. This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of LVLM safety, covering key aspects such as attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods. We introduce a unified framework that integrates these interrelated components, offering a holistic perspective on the vulnerabilities of LVLMs and the corresponding mitigation strategies. Through an analysis of the LVLM lifecycle, we introduce a classification framework that distinguishes between inference and training phases, with further subcategories to provide deeper insights. Furthermore, we highlight limitations in existing research and outline future directions aimed at strengthening the robustness of LVLMs. As part of our research, we conduct a set of safety evaluations on the latest LVLM, Deepseek Janus-Pro, and provide a theoretical analysis of the results. Our findings provide strategic recommendations for advancing LVLM safety and ensuring their secure and reliable deployment in high-stakes, real-world applications. This survey aims to serve as a cornerstone for future research, facilitating the development of models that not only push the boundaries of multimodal intelligence but also adhere to the highest standards of security and ethical integrity. Furthermore, to aid the growing research in this field, we have created a public repository to continuously compile and update the latest work on LVLM safety: https://github.com/XuankunRong/Awesome-LVLM-Safety .

Recently, language models like Llama 3.1 Instruct have become increasingly capable of agentic behavior, enabling them to perform tasks requiring short-term planning and tool use. In this study, we apply refusal-vector ablation to Llama 3.1 70B and implement a simple agent scaffolding to create an unrestricted agent. Our findings imply that these refusal-vector ablated models can successfully complete harmful tasks, such as bribing officials or crafting phishing attacks, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current safety mechanisms. To further explore this, we introduce a small Safe Agent Benchmark, designed to test both harmful and benign tasks in agentic scenarios. Our results imply that safety fine-tuning in chat models does not generalize well to agentic behavior, as we find that Llama 3.1 Instruct models are willing to perform most harmful tasks without modifications. At the same time, these models will refuse to give advice on how to perform the same tasks when asked for a chat completion. This highlights the growing risk of misuse as models become more capable, underscoring the need for improved safety frameworks for language model agents.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are extensively used in critical infrastructures ensuring efficient, reliable, and continuous operations. However, their increasing connectivity and addition of advanced features make them vulnerable to cyber threats, potentially leading to severe disruptions in essential services. In this context, honeypots play a vital role by acting as decoy targets within ICS networks, or on the Internet, helping to detect, log, analyze, and develop mitigations for ICS-specific cyber threats. Deploying ICS honeypots, however, is challenging due to the necessity of accurately replicating industrial protocols and device characteristics, a crucial requirement for effectively mimicking the unique operational behavior of different industrial systems. Moreover, this challenge is compounded by the significant manual effort required in also mimicking the control logic the PLC would execute, in order to capture attacker traffic aiming to disrupt critical infrastructure operations. In this paper, we propose LLMPot, a novel approach for designing honeypots in ICS networks harnessing the potency of Large Language Models (LLMs). LLMPot aims to automate and optimize the creation of realistic honeypots with vendor-agnostic configurations, and for any control logic, aiming to eliminate the manual effort and specialized knowledge traditionally required in this domain. We conducted extensive experiments focusing on a wide array of parameters, demonstrating that our LLM-based approach can effectively create honeypot devices implementing different industrial protocols and diverse control logic.

The study of provable adversarial robustness for deep neural networks (DNNs) has mainly focused on static supervised learning tasks such as image classification. However, DNNs have been used extensively in real-world adaptive tasks such as reinforcement learning (RL), making such systems vulnerable to adversarial attacks as well. Prior works in provable robustness in RL seek to certify the behaviour of the victim policy at every time-step against a non-adaptive adversary using methods developed for the static setting. But in the real world, an RL adversary can infer the defense strategy used by the victim agent by observing the states, actions, etc., from previous time-steps and adapt itself to produce stronger attacks in future steps. We present an efficient procedure, designed specifically to defend against an adaptive RL adversary, that can directly certify the total reward without requiring the policy to be robust at each time-step. Our main theoretical contribution is to prove an adaptive version of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma -- a key lemma for smoothing-based certificates -- where the adversarial perturbation at a particular time can be a stochastic function of current and previous observations and states as well as previous actions. Building on this result, we propose policy smoothing where the agent adds a Gaussian noise to its observation at each time-step before passing it through the policy function. Our robustness certificates guarantee that the final total reward obtained by policy smoothing remains above a certain threshold, even though the actions at intermediate time-steps may change under the attack. Our experiments on various environments like Cartpole, Pong, Freeway and Mountain Car show that our method can yield meaningful robustness guarantees in practice.

In this paper, we present a novel framework for enhancing the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) by leveraging the power of multi-agent systems. Our framework introduces a collaborative environment where multiple intelligent agent components, each with distinctive attributes and roles, work together to handle complex tasks more efficiently and effectively. We demonstrate the practicality and versatility of our framework through case studies in artificial general intelligence (AGI), specifically focusing on the Auto-GPT and BabyAGI models. We also examine the "Gorilla" model, which integrates external APIs into the LLM. Our framework addresses limitations and challenges such as looping issues, security risks, scalability, system evaluation, and ethical considerations. By modeling various domains such as courtroom simulations and software development scenarios, we showcase the potential applications and benefits of our proposed multi-agent system. Our framework provides an avenue for advancing the capabilities and performance of LLMs through collaboration and knowledge exchange among intelligent agents.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for addressing modern challenges and enabling practical applications. However, their computational expense remains a significant barrier to widespread adoption. Quantization has emerged as a promising technique to democratize access and enable low resource device deployment. Despite these advancements, the safety and trustworthiness of quantized models remain underexplored, as prior studies often overlook contemporary architectures and rely on overly simplistic benchmarks and evaluations. To address this gap, we introduce OpenSafetyMini, a novel open-ended safety dataset designed to better distinguish between models. We evaluate 4 state-of-the-art quantization techniques across LLaMA and Mistral models using 4 benchmarks, including human evaluations. Our findings reveal that the optimal quantization method varies for 4-bit precision, while vector quantization techniques deliver the best safety and trustworthiness performance at 2-bit precision, providing foundation for future research.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Language models (LMs) derive their capabilities from extensive training on diverse data, including potentially copyrighted material. These models can memorize and generate content similar to their training data, posing potential concerns. Therefore, model creators are motivated to develop mitigation methods that prevent generating protected content. We term this procedure as copyright takedowns for LMs, noting the conceptual similarity to (but legal distinction from) the DMCA takedown This paper introduces the first evaluation of the feasibility and side effects of copyright takedowns for LMs. We propose CoTaEval, an evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of copyright takedown methods, the impact on the model's ability to retain uncopyrightable factual knowledge from the training data whose recitation is embargoed, and how well the model maintains its general utility and efficiency. We examine several strategies, including adding system prompts, decoding-time filtering interventions, and unlearning approaches. Our findings indicate that no tested method excels across all metrics, showing significant room for research in this unique problem setting and indicating potential unresolved challenges for live policy proposals.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant progress in advancing artificial general intelligence (AGI), leading to the development of increasingly large models such as GPT-4 and LLaMA-405B. However, scaling up model sizes results in exponentially higher computational costs and energy consumption, making these models impractical for academic researchers and businesses with limited resources. At the same time, Small Models (SMs) are frequently used in practical settings, although their significance is currently underestimated. This raises important questions about the role of small models in the era of LLMs, a topic that has received limited attention in prior research. In this work, we systematically examine the relationship between LLMs and SMs from two key perspectives: Collaboration and Competition. We hope this survey provides valuable insights for practitioners, fostering a deeper understanding of the contribution of small models and promoting more efficient use of computational resources. The code is available at https://github.com/tigerchen52/role_of_small_models

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

We propose a novel model- and feature-based approach to development of vehicle software systems, where the end architecture is not explicitly defined. Instead, it emerges from an iterative process of search and optimization given certain constraints, requirements and hardware architecture, while retaining the property of single-system illusion, where applications run in a logically uniform environment. One of the key points of the presented approach is the inclusion of modern generative AI, specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), in the loop. With the recent advances in the field, we expect that the LLMs will be able to assist in processing of requirements, generation of formal system models, as well as generation of software deployment specification and test code. The resulting pipeline is automated to a large extent, with feedback being generated at each step.

We present an approach called Dialogue Action Tokens (DAT) that adapts language model agents to plan goal-directed dialogues. The core idea is to treat each utterance as an action, thereby converting dialogues into games where existing approaches such as reinforcement learning can be applied. Specifically, we freeze a pretrained language model and train a small planner model that predicts a continuous action vector, used for controlled generation in each round. This design avoids the problem of language degradation under reward optimization. When evaluated on the Sotopia platform for social simulations, the DAT-steered LLaMA model surpasses GPT-4's performance. We also apply DAT to steer an attacker language model in a novel multi-turn red-teaming setting, revealing a potential new attack surface.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Most prior safety research of large language models (LLMs) has focused on enhancing the alignment of LLMs to better suit the safety requirements of humans. However, internalizing such safeguard features into larger models brought challenges of higher training cost and unintended degradation of helpfulness. To overcome such challenges, a modular approach employing a smaller LLM to detect harmful user queries is regarded as a convenient solution in designing LLM-based system with safety requirements. In this paper, we leverage a smaller LLM for both harmful query detection and safeguard response generation. We introduce our safety requirements and the taxonomy of harmfulness categories, and then propose a multi-task learning mechanism fusing the two tasks into a single model. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, providing on par or surpassing harmful query detection and safeguard response performance compared to the publicly available LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a broad spectrum of tasks. They have attracted significant attention and been deployed in numerous downstream applications. Nevertheless, akin to a double-edged sword, LLMs also present potential risks. They could suffer from private data leaks or yield inappropriate, harmful, or misleading content. Additionally, the rapid progress of LLMs raises concerns about the potential emergence of superintelligent systems without adequate safeguards. To effectively capitalize on LLM capacities as well as ensure their safe and beneficial development, it is critical to conduct a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation of LLMs. This survey endeavors to offer a panoramic perspective on the evaluation of LLMs. We categorize the evaluation of LLMs into three major groups: knowledge and capability evaluation, alignment evaluation and safety evaluation. In addition to the comprehensive review on the evaluation methodologies and benchmarks on these three aspects, we collate a compendium of evaluations pertaining to LLMs' performance in specialized domains, and discuss the construction of comprehensive evaluation platforms that cover LLM evaluations on capabilities, alignment, safety, and applicability. We hope that this comprehensive overview will stimulate further research interests in the evaluation of LLMs, with the ultimate goal of making evaluation serve as a cornerstone in guiding the responsible development of LLMs. We envision that this will channel their evolution into a direction that maximizes societal benefit while minimizing potential risks. A curated list of related papers has been publicly available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/Awesome-LLMs-Evaluation-Papers.

The ubiquity of large-scale Pre-Trained Models (PTMs) is on the rise, sparking interest in model hubs, and dedicated platforms for hosting PTMs. Despite this trend, a comprehensive exploration of the challenges that users encounter and how the community leverages PTMs remains lacking. To address this gap, we conducted an extensive mixed-methods empirical study by focusing on discussion forums and the model hub of HuggingFace, the largest public model hub. Based on our qualitative analysis, we present a taxonomy of the challenges and benefits associated with PTM reuse within this community. We then conduct a quantitative study to track model-type trends and model documentation evolution over time. Our findings highlight prevalent challenges such as limited guidance for beginner users, struggles with model output comprehensibility in training or inference, and a lack of model understanding. We also identified interesting trends among models where some models maintain high upload rates despite a decline in topics related to them. Additionally, we found that despite the introduction of model documentation tools, its quantity has not increased over time, leading to difficulties in model comprehension and selection among users. Our study sheds light on new challenges in reusing PTMs that were not reported before and we provide recommendations for various stakeholders involved in PTM reuse.

In this paper, we introduce SecQA, a novel dataset tailored for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the domain of computer security. Utilizing multiple-choice questions generated by GPT-4 based on the "Computer Systems Security: Planning for Success" textbook, SecQA aims to assess LLMs' understanding and application of security principles. We detail the structure and intent of SecQA, which includes two versions of increasing complexity, to provide a concise evaluation across various difficulty levels. Additionally, we present an extensive evaluation of prominent LLMs, including GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4, Llama-2, Vicuna, Mistral, and Zephyr models, using both 0-shot and 5-shot learning settings. Our results, encapsulated in the SecQA v1 and v2 datasets, highlight the varying capabilities and limitations of these models in the computer security context. This study not only offers insights into the current state of LLMs in understanding security-related content but also establishes SecQA as a benchmark for future advancements in this critical research area.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

Enabling effective collaboration among LLMs is a crucial step toward developing autonomous systems capable of solving complex problems. While LLMs are typically used as single-model generators, where humans critique and refine their outputs, the potential for jointly-trained collaborative models remains largely unexplored. Despite promising results in multi-agent communication and debate settings, little progress has been made in training models to work together on tasks. In this paper, we present a first step toward "Multi-agent LLM training" (MALT) on reasoning problems. Our approach employs a sequential multi-agent setup with heterogeneous LLMs assigned specialized roles: a generator, verifier, and refinement model iteratively solving problems. We propose a trajectory-expansion-based synthetic data generation process and a credit assignment strategy driven by joint outcome based rewards. This enables our post-training setup to utilize both positive and negative trajectories to autonomously improve each model's specialized capabilities as part of a joint sequential system. We evaluate our approach across MATH, GSM8k, and CQA, where MALT on Llama 3.1 8B models achieves relative improvements of 14.14%, 7.12%, and 9.40% respectively over the same baseline model. This demonstrates an early advance in multi-agent cooperative capabilities for performance on mathematical and common sense reasoning questions. More generally, our work provides a concrete direction for research around multi-agent LLM training approaches.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

Interactive digital agents (IDAs) leverage APIs of stateful digital environments to perform tasks in response to user requests. While IDAs powered by instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) can react to feedback from interface invocations in multi-step exchanges, they have not been trained in their respective digital environments. Prior methods accomplish less than half of tasks in sophisticated benchmarks such as AppWorld. We present a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains IDAs directly in their target environments. We formalize this training as a partially observable Markov decision process and derive LOOP, a data- and memory-efficient variant of proximal policy optimization. LOOP uses no value network and maintains exactly one copy of the underlying LLM in memory, making its implementation straightforward and as memory-efficient as fine-tuning a single LLM. A 32-billion-parameter agent trained with LOOP in the AppWorld environment outperforms the much larger OpenAI o1 agent by 9 percentage points (15% relative). To our knowledge, this is the first reported application of RL to IDAs that interact with a stateful, multi-domain, multi-app environment via direct API calls. Our analysis sheds light on the effectiveness of RL in this area, showing that the agent learns to consult the API documentation, avoid unwarranted assumptions, minimize confabulation, and recover from setbacks.