Daily Papers

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have revolutionized multimodal AI applications but introduce novel security vulnerabilities that remain largely unexplored. We present the first comprehensive study of steganographic prompt injection attacks against VLMs, where malicious instructions are invisibly embedded within images using advanced steganographic techniques. Our approach demonstrates that current VLM architectures can inadvertently extract and execute hidden prompts during normal image processing, leading to covert behavioral manipulation. We develop a multi-domain embedding framework combining spatial, frequency, and neural steganographic methods, achieving an overall attack success rate of 24.3% (plus or minus 3.2%, 95% CI) across leading VLMs including GPT-4V, Claude, and LLaVA, with neural steganography methods reaching up to 31.8%, while maintaining reasonable visual imperceptibility (PSNR greater than 38 dB, SSIM greater than 0.94). Through systematic evaluation on 12 diverse datasets and 8 state-of-the-art models, we reveal moderate but meaningful vulnerabilities in current VLM architectures and propose effective countermeasures. Our findings have significant implications for VLM deployment in security-critical applications and highlight the need for proportionate multimodal AI security frameworks.

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose Agent-ToM, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a Reason-Verify-Refine pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent semantic guardrail memory, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

Researchers have proposed a wide variety of model explanation approaches, but it remains unclear how most methods are related or when one method is preferable to another. We examine the literature and find that many methods are based on a shared principle of explaining by removing - essentially, measuring the impact of removing sets of features from a model. These methods vary in several respects, so we develop a framework for removal-based explanations that characterizes each method along three dimensions: 1) how the method removes features, 2) what model behavior the method explains, and 3) how the method summarizes each feature's influence. Our framework unifies 26 existing methods, including several of the most widely used approaches (SHAP, LIME, Meaningful Perturbations, permutation tests). Exposing the fundamental similarities between these methods empowers users to reason about which tools to use, and suggests promising directions for ongoing model explainability research.

Mental manipulation on social media poses a covert yet serious threat to individuals' psychological well-being and the integrity of online interactions. Detecting such behavior is challenging due to the difficult-to-annotate training data, its highly covert and multi-turn nature, and the lack of real-world datasets. To address these challenges, we propose MentalMAD, a framework that enhances large language models for mental manipulation detection. Our approach consists of three key components: EvoSA, an annotation-free data augmentation method that combines evolutionary operations with speech-act-aware prompting; teacher-model-generated complementary-task supervision; and Complementary-Convergent Distillation, a phase-wise strategy for transferring manipulation-specific knowledge to student models. We then constructed the ReaMent dataset, comprising 5,000 real-world-sourced dialogues. Extensive experiments show that MentalMAD improves accuracy by 14.0%, macro-F1 by 27.3%, and weighted F1 by 15.1% over the strongest baseline. The code and the dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/Yuansheng-Gao/MentalMAD.

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features-including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns-DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves a 95.99\% detection accuracy with a latency of <0.5s, reducing false negatives by 78.65\% compared to static analysis and 82.24\% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged 11 packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

As large language models become increasingly integrated into daily life, audio has emerged as a key interface for human-AI interaction. However, this convenience also introduces new vulnerabilities, making audio a potential attack surface for adversaries. Our research introduces WhisperInject, a two-stage adversarial audio attack framework that can manipulate state-of-the-art audio language models to generate harmful content. Our method uses imperceptible perturbations in audio inputs that remain benign to human listeners. The first stage uses a novel reward-based optimization method, Reinforcement Learning with Projected Gradient Descent (RL-PGD), to guide the target model to circumvent its own safety protocols and generate harmful native responses. This native harmful response then serves as the target for Stage 2, Payload Injection, where we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to optimize subtle perturbations that are embedded into benign audio carriers, such as weather queries or greeting messages. Validated under the rigorous StrongREJECT, LlamaGuard, as well as Human Evaluation safety evaluation framework, our experiments demonstrate a success rate exceeding 86% across Qwen2.5-Omni-3B, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and Phi-4-Multimodal. Our work demonstrates a new class of practical, audio-native threats, moving beyond theoretical exploits to reveal a feasible and covert method for manipulating AI behavior.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit communication, less is known about how interacting agents coordinate implicitly. In particular, agents may engage in covert communication, relying on indirect or non-linguistic signals embedded in their actions rather than on explicit messages. This paper presents a game-theoretic study of covert communication in LLM-driven multi-agent systems. We analyse interactions across four canonical game-theoretic settings under different communication regimes, including explicit, restricted, and absent communication. Considering heterogeneous agent personalities and both one-shot and repeated games, we characterise when covert signals emerge and how they shape coordination and strategic outcomes.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues, sandbagging, or topic-conditioned censorship. Such behaviors are difficult to detect without prior knowledge what to look for. We present activation-matched finetuning, an unsupervised detection method that assumes no knowledge of the trigger or the target behavior. Given a suspect model and a publicly available anchor, we finetune the anchor to reproduce the suspect's activations on a small benign corpus, and score each evaluation prompt by the residual between the two models. Since no benign corpus covers the sparse trigger region, the reference learns the benign computation but not the hidden behavior. Therefore, trigger prompts -- and, crucially, their semantic neighbors -- incur a large residual that signal the presence of unusual behavior to the defender. Testing our method across third-party models and custom models, activation-matched finetuning surfaces hidden behavior reliably. Furthermore, we empirically consider a natural defense-aware attack and showcase that it fails to suppress our detection method without sacrificing the behavior itself.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Language Models (LMs) emit Chains-of-Thought (CoTs) that drive much of their capability. However, the same sequence that carries useful reasoning can also covertly convey messages: a misaligned model may embed covert information in its CoT that slips through human supervision, a form of steganography known as encoded reasoning. Prior LM steganography schemes operate in the token or lexical space, and a content-preserving paraphraser is the canonical and effective defense in recent work. We introduce conceptual steganography, in which each step of a CoT carries information through patterns of high-level reasoning behavior, rather than through lexical choice. Across four model families and two reasoning domains, this backdoor communication channel is shown to be consistently more robust to a strong paraphrase defense than standard keyword approaches, and the encoding of information into CoTs does not affect their utility in the reasoning process. Having raised awareness of this new risk, we then demonstrate that a strategy-aware paraphraser can close much of the channel, highlighting new challenges and recommended defenses for ensuring faithful LLM reasoning in the wild.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Large language models are beginning to show steganographic capabilities. Such capabilities could allow misaligned models to evade oversight mechanisms. Yet principled methods to detect and quantify such behaviours are lacking. Classical definitions of steganography, and detection methods based on them, require a known reference distribution of non-steganographic signals. For the case of steganographic reasoning in LLMs, knowing such a reference distribution is not feasible; this renders these approaches inapplicable. We propose an alternative, decision-theoretic view of steganography. Our central insight is that steganography creates an asymmetry in usable information between agents who can and cannot decode the hidden content (present within a steganographic signal), and this otherwise latent asymmetry can be inferred from the agents' observable actions. To formalise this perspective, we introduce generalised V-information: a utilitarian framework for measuring the amount of usable information within some input. We use this to define the steganographic gap -- a measure that quantifies steganography by comparing the downstream utility of the steganographic signal to agents that can and cannot decode the hidden content. We empirically validate our formalism, and show that it can be used to detect, quantify, and mitigate steganographic reasoning in LLMs.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side effects. We propose self-incrimination training, which instead trains agents to produce a visible signal when they covertly misbehave. We train GPT-4.1 and Gemini-2.0 agents to call a report_scheming() tool when behaving deceptively and measure their ability to cause harm undetected in out-of-distribution environments. Self-incrimination significantly reduces the undetected successful attack rate, outperforming matched-capability monitors and alignment baselines while preserving instruction hierarchy and incurring minimal safety tax on general capabilities. Unlike blackbox monitoring, self-incrimination performance is consistent across tasks regardless of how suspicious the misbehavior appears externally. The trained behavior persists under adversarial prompt optimization and generalizes to settings where agents pursue misaligned goals themselves rather than being instructed to misbehave. Our results suggest self-incrimination offers a viable path for reducing frontier misalignment risk, one that neither assumes misbehavior can be prevented nor that it can be reliably classified from the outside.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments? We introduce RevengeBench, a benchmark of 75 LLM generated, Elo-calibrated policies across five game environments, drawn from CodeClash tournament trajectories. The learner observes the hidden target policy play against sampled opponents and designs behavioral probes in the form of custom opponent policies that elicit informative behavior. It then submits an executable hypothesis, which is evaluated using continuous action-distance metrics. We further validate that recovered code carries informative signal in downstream player-versus-player tournaments. Across twelve frontier LLMs, recovery quality varies substantially (34 to 72% of initial distance closed), with reconstructed policies yielding measurable competitive advantage, particularly for weaker models that otherwise struggle to design effective counter-strategies. Our benchmark positions behavioral recovery of programmatic policies as a tractable inverse problem in code-space, opening a path to opponent modeling, policy interpretability, and the broader question of inferring latent mechanisms from observations.

We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.