Patent Description:
Known key management services offered by cloud service providers include a Bring Your Own Key feature, which allows a user to import a user key or a randomly generated key in an HSM, which is then used with envelope encryption to encrypt data at rest. Data services, such as database-as-a-service and infrastructure services integrate with the known key management services to use key-encrypting-keys that securely store data encryption keys locally in their service and decrypt the data by accessing the key management service to unwrap the data encryption key. A known key management service allows a user to generate a root key (also known as a wrapping key or a master key) on a system the user controls that is outside the key management service and further allows the user to upload the root key via a key ceremony. The user is burdened by needing to maintain physical security and processes around managing the copy of the root key.

Accordingly, there is a need for a root key distribution system that protects data in a cloud computing environment with the use of key encrypting keys, but with user ownership and exclusive control of the root key of the key hierarchy.

Prior art document <CIT> discloses a Firmware Extension for Secure Cryptocurrency Key Backup, Restore, and Transaction Signing Platform Apparatuses, Methods and Systems ("SFTSP") which transforms transaction signing request, key backup request, key recovery request inputs via SFTSP components into transaction signing response, key backup response, key recovery response outputs. A key backup request that includes an encrypted master key associated with a hosting HSM is received by a backup HSM from a backup utility. A private key decryption key corresponding to a public key encryption key previously provided by the backup HSM to the backup utility for the hosting HSM is retrieved from the backup HSM's tamper-proof storage and used to decrypt the encrypted master key. A specified number of master key shares to generate for the decrypted master key is determined and generated using a secret sharing method. The generated master key shares are provided to the backup utility.

In one embodiment, the present invention provides a computer system that includes a central processing unit (CPU), a memory coupled to the CPU, and one or more computer readable storage media coupled to the CPU. The one or more computer readable storage media collectively contain instructions that are executed by the CPU via the memory to implement a method of distributing a root key to a hardware security module (HSM) of an HSM cluster. The method includes the computer system transmitting a first command to a source HSM to create a master key. The first command is signed by an administrator of HSMs in the HSM cluster. The method further includes the computer system receiving, from the source HSM, a fingerprint of the master key in a response signed by the source HSM using a module signing key hardcoded into the source HSM at a manufacturing time of the source HSM. The method further includes the computer system transmitting a second command to a first HSM in the HSM cluster. The second command generates an importer key pair comprising an importer private key and an importer public key. The method further includes in response to the transmitting the second command, the computer system receiving the importer public key from the first HSM. The method further includes the computer system transmitting to the source HSM a request to export the master key and the importer public key. The method further includes in response to the transmitting the request, the computer system receiving from the source HSM (i) the master key wrapped with a transport key and (ii) an exporter public key. The transport key is derived from the importer public key and an exporter private key. The method further includes the computer system transmitting, to the first HSM, (i) the master key wrapped with the transport key and (ii) the exporter public key. The method further includes the computer system activating the master key in the first HSM.

The aforementioned embodiment advantageously allows the customer or end user to authenticate each of the nodes of the HSM cluster that is holding the root key to ensure that each node is a trusted destination.

In an optional aspect of the present invention, the method further includes the computer system using the activated master key as a root key in a key management service, which provides a customer or end user with a total control over encryption keys that protect data in a cloud computing environment without requiring a management of the root key outside of the key management service, and which prevents a cloud service provider from accessing the data. The aforementioned aspect of the present invention advantageously requires an end user and a remote system to authorize the actions of root key distribution, rather than relying on a difficult coordination between two HSMs used to maintain the root key in a key management service.

In another optional aspect of the present invention, the method further includes subsequent to the transmitting the master key and the exporter public key, the first HSM deriving the transport key from the exporter public key and the importer private key stored by the first HSM. The method further includes the first HSM unwrapping the master key with the transport key. The method further includes the first HSM registering the unwrapped master key as a new master key in a register of the first HSM in an uncommitted state. The aforementioned aspect of the present invention advantageously uses ephemeral keys to securely transport the root key rather than using a less secure shared secret across all nodes in an HSM cluster.

In another optional aspect of the present invention, the method further includes the computer system transmitting a command to a second HSM in the HSM cluster to generate a second importer key pair comprising a second importer private key and a second importer public key. The second importer key pair is different from the importer key pair. The method further includes the computer system receiving the second importer public key from the second HSM. The method further includes the computer system transmitting to the source HSM a request to export the master key and the second importer public key. The method further includes the computer system receiving from the source HSM (i) the master key wrapped with a second transport key and (ii) a second exporter public key, the second transport key being different from the transport key and derived from the second importer public key and a second exporter private key. The method further includes the computer system transmitting, to the second HSM, (i) the master key wrapped with the second transport key and (ii) the second exporter public key, wherein the second HSM derives the second transport key from the second exporter public key and the second importer private key stored by the second HSM, unwraps the master key with the second transport key, and registers the master key in a register of the second HSM in an uncommitted state. The method further includes the computer system setting the master key registered in the second HSM to a committed state and activating the master key stored by the second HSM. The aforementioned aspect of the present invention advantageously uses ephemeral keys to securely transport the root key rather than using a less secure shared secret across all nodes in an HSM cluster used to hold the root key of the key hierarchy.

A computer program product and a method corresponding to the above-summarized computer system are also described herein. The advantages discussed above relative to the computer system also apply to the computer program product and method.

In a conventional key management service in a cloud environment, maintenance of a root key involves coordination between two nodes (i.e., two HSMs) and a shared secret across all nodes in a cluster used to hold the root key of the key hierarchy, which allows the cloud service provider to access encryption keys in an HSM, thereby preventing the user who is encrypting data in the cloud environment from having full control of the access to the encryption keys. Further, in a cloud computing environment in which the end user wants to secure the end user's encryption key, another party may have physical access to the system and may have the ability to log in and clone the domain key without the end user's knowledge. As used herein, a node is a node in an HSM cluster and is also referred to as an HSM.

Embodiments of the present invention address the aforementioned unique challenges of managing the root key by protecting data in the cloud environment with the use of key encrypting keys, but with the user having ownership and exclusive control of the root key of the key hierarchy. Embodiments of the present invention require an end user and a remote system to authorize key management actions, rather than using the conventional coordination between two nodes to maintain the root key. Embodiments of the present invention use ephemeral keys to securely transport the root key, rather than using the known technique of using a shared secret across all nodes in the HSM cluster used to hold the root key. Embodiments of the present invention allow the user to authenticate each of the nodes in the HSM cluster that is holding the root key to ensure the destination is a trusted destination. The user has total control of the authorization of the distribution process and the authentication of the destinations, where the distribution process distributes the root key of a key hierarchy used to protect data in multiple cloud services to nodes in an HSM cluster without the need to generate or protect a copy of the root key outside the HSM cluster.

In one embodiment, the root key distribution system uses the activated master key as a root key in a key management service, which provides a customer or end user with a total control over encryption keys that protect data in a cloud computing environment without requiring a management of the root key outside of the key management service, and which prevents a cloud service provider from accessing the data.

In one embodiment, a root key distribution system establishes the administrator of HSMs (i.e., nodes) of an HSM cluster, uploads private/public key pairs to the nodes for authorization of commands for a given node after the node is taken out of imprint mode, generates a root key, synchronizes the nodes in response to a user authorizing the process by using a key management service (e.g., IBM® Cloud Trusted Key Entry (TKE)) in a cloud computing environment, and uses the root key in the key management service to protect data in the cloud computing environment. IBM is a registered trademark of International Business Machines Corporation located in Armonk, New York.

In one embodiment, the root key distribution system described herein allows a user to protect data via a control of a key hierarchy, without the need for managing the root key outside of the key management service. The first (i.e., top) level of the key hierarchy includes the HSM root key (i.e., master key), which is stored in the HSM, set by a user via TKE command line interface (CLI) or smart cards, and whose backups are stored only on the client. The second level in the key hierarchy includes customer root keys (CRKs), which are stored only in wrapped form by the Hyper Protect Crypto Services (HPCS), created randomly by HSM or imported by an API, and backed up within geographic region by HPCS. The third level in the key hierarchy includes data encryption keys (DEKs), which are stored in wrapped form by an application or other service, created randomly by HSM or imported by an API, and are backed up by an application using the DEK.

<FIG> is a block diagram of a system <NUM> for securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. System <NUM> includes a computer <NUM> that includes a software-based root key distribution system <NUM>, which includes an HSM administrator establishment module <NUM>, a root key generation and HSM synchronization module <NUM>, and a root key activation module. In one embodiment, root key distribution system <NUM> is included in an IBM® Trusted Key Entry workstation).

Root key distribution system <NUM> receives a signing private key <NUM> from a computer system (not shown) of an administrator. System <NUM> also includes an instance of key management service and cloud HSMs <NUM> in communication with root key distribution system <NUM>. The instance of key management service and cloud HSMs <NUM> can be, for example, an IBM® Hyper Protect Crypto Services instance.

Instance of key management service and cloud HSMs <NUM> includes a cluster of crypto units <NUM>-<NUM>,. <NUM>-N, where N is an integer greater than one. A crypto unit is a singular unit representing an HSM and the corresponding software stack. The cluster of crypto units <NUM>-<NUM>,. , <NUM>-N operates as one logical entity for key management and key governance. Each of the crypto units <NUM>-<NUM>,. , <NUM>-N includes an HSM <NUM> (i.e., a cloud HSM), which collectively comprise an HSM cluster. A cloud HSM is a tamper-resistant and tamper-evident hardware device configured to securely manage, process, and store cryptographic keys.

Instance of key management service and cloud HSMs <NUM> also includes a source HSM <NUM>, which is also a hardware security module. HSM <NUM> creates a master key, creates an exporter key pair, derives a transport key, and wraps the master key with the transport key. In one embodiment, each of the crypto units <NUM>-<NUM>,. , <NUM>-N includes a key management service application programming interface (KMS API) (not shown) and an Enterprise Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #<NUM> application programming interface (EP11 API) (not shown). The KMS API manages keys for a key management service. The EP11 API provides remote access to instance <NUM> (e.g., IBM® Hyper Protect Crypto Services instance) for data encryption and management.

HSM administrator establishment module <NUM> establishes the administrator of the HSMs of the HSM cluster. For example, IBM® Crypto Express cards provides a capability for establishing the administrator of the HSMs. HSM administrator establishment module <NUM> uploads a certificate from a private/public key pair to each HSM <NUM>. Root key distribution system <NUM> uses the certificate to authorize commands for a given node in the HSM cluster after the given node is taken out of imprint mode.

Root key generation and HSM synchronization module <NUM> generates a root key and synchronizes the nodes in the HSM cluster in response to a user authorizing the root key distribution process by using a TKE client.

Root key activation module <NUM> activates a pending root key in instance of key management service and cloud HSMs <NUM> to protect data in a cloud computing environment.

The functionality of the components shown in <FIG> is described in more detail in the discussion of <FIG> and <FIG> presented below.

<FIG> depict a flowchart of a process of securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. The process of <FIG> begins at a start node <NUM> in <FIG>. In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives a command from a computer system of an administrator to create a new master key. As used herein, a master key is a synonym for a root key. A master key is an encryption key used to protect the instance of key management service and cloud HSMs <NUM> (see <FIG>) by encrypting contents of HSMs <NUM> (see <FIG>) and securing cryptographic operations.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) generates, signs, and transmits to source HSM <NUM> (see <FIG>) a command to create the master key. Root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) signs the command to create the master key by using the signing private key <NUM> (see <FIG>).

Subsequent to step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>, source HSM <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives the command transmitted in step <NUM>, validates the signature of the command transmitted in step <NUM>, generates the master key (also referred to herein as the new master key), and generates and signs a response with a module signing key, which is hard coded into source HSM <NUM> (see <FIG>) at the time of manufacture of source HSM <NUM> (see <FIG>).

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives a fingerprint of the master key in the response generated with the module signing key after step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) validates the signature of the response generated with the module signing key after step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) sends to the computer system of the administrator an indication of completion of the creation of the new master key.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) generates, signs, and transmits a command to a first HSM (i.e., HSM <NUM> in crypto unit <NUM>-<NUM> in <FIG>) in the HSM cluster. The command transmitted in step <NUM> is for generating an importer key pair comprising an importer private key and an importer public key.

Subsequent to step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>, the first HSM receives the command transmitted in step <NUM>, generates the importer key pair, and saves the importer private key.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives the importer public key from the first HSM.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) generates, signs, and transmits to the source HSM <NUM> (see <FIG>) a request to export the master key and the public importer key.

After step <NUM>, the process of <FIG> continues with step <NUM> in <FIG>. Subsequent to step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>, source HSM <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives the request transmitted in step <NUM>, generates an exporter key pair comprising an exporter private key and an exporter public key, derives a transport key from the importer public key and the exporter private key, wraps the master key with the transport key, generates a response to the request transmitted in step <NUM>, and destroys the importer public key, the exporter private key, and the transport key. As used herein, wrapping the master key means encrypting the master key using another key.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives the wrapped master key and the exporter public key in the response.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) generates, signs, and transmits to the first HSM the wrapped master key and the exporter public key.

Subsequent to step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>, the first HSM receives the wrapped master key and exporter public key transmitted in step <NUM>, derives a transport key from the importer private key and the exporter public key, unwraps the master key with the transport key derived from the importer private key and the exporter public key, places the unwrapped master key in a new master key register in an uncommitted state. The unwrapped master key placed in the new master key register is also referred to herein as a pending master key. As used herein, unwrapping the master key means decrypting a wrapped master key by using another key.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives an indication that the import of the master key to the first HSM is completed.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) generates, signs, and transmits a command to the first HSM to commit the pending master key.

Subsequent to step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>, the first HSM receives the command transmitted in step <NUM>, and in response to the received command, changes the state of the pending master key from uncommitted to committed.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives an indication from the first HSM that the pending master key is in a committed state.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) generates, signs, and transmits a command to the first HSM to finalize the pending master key.

Subsequent to step <NUM> and prior to step <NUM>, the first HSM receives the command transmitted in step <NUM> and sets the pending master key to become active (i.e., activates the pending master key).

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) receives an indication from the first HSM that the pending master key is activated.

After step <NUM>, the process of <FIG> continues with step <NUM> in <FIG>.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) determines whether there is another HSM in the HSM cluster that has not been used in the loop starting at step <NUM> (see <FIG>). If root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) determines that there is another HSM (i.e., a next HSM), then the Yes branch of step <NUM> is taken and the process of <FIG> loops back to step <NUM> (see <FIG>), with the first HSM in the descriptions of steps <NUM> through step <NUM> being replaced by the next HSM.

If root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) determines in step <NUM> that there not another HSM in the HSM cluster to be used in the aforementioned loop, then the No branch of step <NUM> is taken and step <NUM> is performed.

In step <NUM>, root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) sends to the computer system of the administrator an indication that the distribution of the master key within the HSM cluster is completed.

The process of <FIG> ends at an end node <NUM>.

<FIG> is a block diagram of a computer that is included in the system of <FIG> and that implements the process of <FIG>, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. Computer <NUM> is a computer system that generally includes a central processing unit (CPU) <NUM>, a memory <NUM>, an input/output (I/O) interface <NUM>, and a bus <NUM>. Further, computer <NUM> is coupled to I/O devices <NUM> and a computer data storage unit <NUM>. CPU <NUM> performs computation and control functions of computer <NUM>, including executing instructions included in program code <NUM> for root key distribution system <NUM> (see <FIG>) to perform a method of securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster, where the instructions are executed by CPU <NUM> via memory <NUM>. CPU <NUM> may include a single processing unit or processor or be distributed across one or more processing units or one or more processors in one or more locations (e.g., on a client and server).

Memory <NUM> includes a known computer readable storage medium, which is described below. In one embodiment, cache memory elements of memory <NUM> provide temporary storage of at least some program code (e.g., program code <NUM>) in order to reduce the number of times code must be retrieved from bulk storage while instructions of the program code are executed. Moreover, similar to CPU <NUM>, memory <NUM> may reside at a single physical location, including one or more types of data storage, or be distributed across a plurality of physical systems or a plurality of computer readable storage media in various forms. Further, memory <NUM> can include data distributed across, for example, a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN).

I/O interface <NUM> includes any system for exchanging information to or from an external source. I/O devices <NUM> include any known type of external device, including a display, keyboard, etc. Bus <NUM> provides a communication link between each of the components in computer <NUM>, and may include any type of transmission link, including electrical, optical, wireless, etc..

I/O interface <NUM> also allows computer <NUM> to store information (e.g., data or program instructions such as program code <NUM>) on and retrieve the information from computer data storage unit <NUM> or another computer data storage unit (not shown). Computer data storage unit <NUM> includes one or more known computer readable storage media, where a computer readable storage medium is described below. In one embodiment, computer data storage unit <NUM> is a non-volatile data storage device, such as, for example, a solid-state drive (SSD), a network-attached storage (NAS) array, a storage area network (SAN) array, a magnetic disk drive (i.e., hard disk drive), or an optical disc drive (e.g., a CD-ROM drive which receives a CD-ROM disk or a DVD drive which receives a DVD disc).

Memory <NUM> and/or storage unit <NUM> may store computer program code <NUM> that includes instructions that are executed by CPU <NUM> via memory <NUM> to securely distribute a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster. Although <FIG> depicts memory <NUM> as including program code, the present invention contemplates embodiments in which memory <NUM> does not include all of code <NUM> simultaneously, but instead at one time includes only a portion of code <NUM>.

Further, memory <NUM> may include an operating system (not shown) and may include other systems not shown in <FIG>.

As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, in a first embodiment, the present invention may be a method; in a second embodiment, the present invention may be a system; and in a third embodiment, the present invention may be a computer program product.

Any of the components of an embodiment of the present invention can be deployed, managed, serviced, etc. by a service provider that offers to deploy or integrate computing infrastructure with respect to securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster. Thus, an embodiment of the present invention discloses a process for supporting computer infrastructure, where the process includes providing at least one support service for at least one of integrating, hosting, maintaining and deploying computer-readable code (e.g., program code <NUM>) in a computer system (e.g., computer <NUM>) including one or more processors (e.g., CPU <NUM>), wherein the processor(s) carry out instructions contained in the code causing the computer system to securely distribute a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster. Another embodiment discloses a process for supporting computer infrastructure, where the process includes integrating computer-readable program code into a computer system including a processor. The step of integrating includes storing the program code in a computer-readable storage device of the computer system through use of the processor. The program code, upon being executed by the processor, implements a method of securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster.

While it is understood that program code <NUM> for securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster may be deployed by manually loading directly in client, server and proxy computers (not shown) via loading a computer-readable storage medium (e.g., computer data storage unit <NUM>), program code <NUM> may also be automatically or semiautomatically deployed into computer <NUM> by sending program code <NUM> to a central server or a group of central servers. Program code <NUM> is then downloaded into client computers (e.g., computer <NUM>) that will execute program code <NUM>. Alternatively, program code <NUM> is sent directly to the client computer via e-mail. Program code <NUM> is then either detached to a directory on the client computer or loaded into a directory on the client computer by a button on the e-mail that executes a program that detaches program code <NUM> into a directory. Another alternative is to send program code <NUM> directly to a directory on the client computer hard drive. In a case in which there are proxy servers, the process selects the proxy server code, determines on which computers to place the proxy servers' code, transmits the proxy server code, and then installs the proxy server code on the proxy computer. Program code <NUM> is transmitted to the proxy server and then it is stored on the proxy server.

Another embodiment of the invention provides a method that performs the process steps on a subscription, advertising and/or fee basis. That is, a service provider can offer to create, maintain, support, etc. a process of securely distributing a root key to an HSM in an HSM cluster. In this case, the service provider can create, maintain, support, etc. a computer infrastructure that performs the process steps for one or more customers. In return, the service provider can receive payment from the customer(s) under a subscription and/or fee agreement, and/or the service provider can receive payment from the sale of advertising content to one or more third parties.

The computer program product may include a computer readable storage medium (or media) (i.e., memory <NUM> and computer data storage unit <NUM>) having computer readable program instructions <NUM> thereon for causing a processor (e.g., CPU <NUM>) to carry out aspects of the present invention.

The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible device that can retain and store instructions (e.g., program code <NUM>) for use by an instruction execution device (e.g., computer <NUM>).

Computer readable program instructions (e.g., program code <NUM>) described herein can be downloaded to respective computing/processing devices (e.g., computer <NUM>) from a computer readable storage medium or to an external computer or external storage device (e.g., computer data storage unit <NUM>) via a network (not shown), for example, the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network and/or a wireless network. A network adapter card (not shown) or network interface (not shown) in each computing/processing device receives computer readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer readable program instructions for storage in a computer readable storage medium within the respective computing/processing device.

Computer readable program instructions (e.g., program code <NUM>) for carrying out operations of the present invention may be assembler instructions, instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state-setting data, configuration data for integrated circuitry, or either source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including an object oriented programming language such as Smalltalk, C++, or the like, and procedural programming languages, such as the "C" programming language or similar programming languages.

Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations (e.g., <FIG>) and/or block diagrams (e.g., <FIG> and <FIG>) of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer readable program instructions (e.g., program code <NUM>).

These computer readable program instructions may be provided to a processor (e.g., CPU <NUM>) of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus (e.g., computer <NUM>) to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks. These computer readable program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage medium (e.g., computer data storage unit <NUM>) that can direct a computer, a programmable data processing apparatus, and/or other devices to function in a particular manner, such that the computer readable storage medium having instructions stored therein comprises an article of manufacture including instructions which implement aspects of the function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

The computer readable program instructions (e.g., program code <NUM>) may also be loaded onto a computer (e.g. computer <NUM>), other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus or other device to produce a computer implemented process, such that the instructions which execute on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

In some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the Figures.

While embodiments of the present invention have been described herein for purposes of illustration, many modifications and changes will become apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the appended claims are intended to encompass all such modifications and changes as fall within the true spirit and scope of this invention.

Measured service: cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both the provider and consumer of the utilized service.

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): the capability provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, deployed applications, and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).

Deployment Models are as follows:
Private cloud: the cloud infrastructure is operated solely for an organization. It may be managed by the organization or a third party and may exist on-premises or off-premises.

It is understood that the types of computing devices 54A, 54B, 54C and 54N shown in <FIG> are intended to be illustrative only and that computing nodes <NUM> and cloud computing environment <NUM> can communicate with any type of computerized device over any type of network and/or network addressable connection (e.g., using a web browser).

Referring now to <FIG>, a set of functional abstraction layers provided by cloud computing environment <NUM> (see <FIG>) is shown.

Service Level Agreement (SLA) planning and fulfillment <NUM> provides pre-arrangement for, and procurement of, cloud computing resources for which a future requirement is anticipated in accordance with an SLA.

Claim 1:
A computer system comprising:
a central processing unit (CPU) (<NUM>);
a memory (<NUM>) coupled to the CPU; and
one or more computer readable storage media coupled to the CPU, the one or more computer readable storage media collectively containing instructions that are executed by the CPU via the memory to implement a method of distributing a root key to a hardware security module (HSM) of an HSM cluster, the method comprising:
the computer system transmitting a first command to a source HSM (<NUM>) to create a master key, the first command being signed by an administrator of HSMs in the HSM cluster;
the computer system receiving, from the source HSM (<NUM>), a fingerprint of the master key in a response signed by the source HSM (<NUM>) using a module signing key hardcoded into the source HSM (<NUM>) at a manufacturing time of the source HSM (<NUM>);
the computer system transmitting a second command to a first HSM in the HSM cluster, the second command generating an importer key pair comprising an importer private key and an importer public key;
in response to the transmitting the second command, the computer system receiving the importer public key from the first HSM;
the computer system transmitting to the source HSM (<NUM>) a request to export the master key and the importer public key;
in response to the transmitting the request, the computer system receiving from the source HSM (<NUM>) (i) the master key wrapped with a transport key and (ii) an exporter public key, the transport key derived from the importer public key and an exporter private key;
the computer system transmitting, to the first HSM, (i) the master key wrapped with the transport key and (ii) the exporter public key; and
the computer system activating the master key in the first HSM.