Patent Description:
A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material that is subject to copyright protection. Copyright <NUM> Trilicon LLC.

This invention relates to monitoring and protection of processor-based systems.

The technology described herein is most broadly applicable in the embedded systems market where processor-based systems are used for specific purposes (as opposed to a general computation platform like a personal computer, tablet, or the like). Such systems cover a very wide range of end markets - generally, any market where one would find 'smart' devices. Such markets include "internet-of-things" (IoT) appliances, electronic medical devices, automated system control devices, mobile devices, automotive electronics, and the like. Underneath all these end markets are the embedded systems contained in the end product that are configured specifically for the end application. The technology described herein relates to those embedded systems.

<CIT>) "Security Switch" teaches a security device protecting a device core from unauthorized access. The security device may have an external component required for the device operation.

<CIT>) discloses, in the Abstract, "Security device for preventing access to confidential information stored in a semiconductor chip, or protected chip. The security device comprises a second semiconductor chip, or protective chip, with the two chips facing each other and being coupled to each other by communication terminals. The protected chip is coupled to external circuits via the protective chip, and the two semiconductor chips are separated by a semiconductor resin having a non-homogeneous electrical resistivity. The protective chip is provided with means for measuring a plurality of resistances through the semiconductor resin and with means for determining, at least from the measured resistances, an encryption key intended to be communicated to the protect chip to protect the confidential information. " Rigal represents an early attempt at protecting digital information using a hardware approach for encryption, but does not provide for any level of system security other than encryption of information. In addition, the invention encoded encryption keys in a resistive resin that was incorporated into the semiconductor packaging of the two chips involved (meaning, the encryption chip and the chip containing the encrypted data). The primary feature of Rigal is the storage of key information in the resin.

<CIT>) discloses, in the Abstract, "An embedded security module includes a security processor, volatile and non-volatile memory, and an interface. The security processor includes transistors formed in one or more semiconductor layers of a semiconductor die, and implements one or more security-related functions on data and/or code accessed by the security processor. The volatile memory is fabricated on the same semiconductor die as the security processor and stores the data and/or code accessed by the security processor. The non-volatile memory includes non-volatile storage cells disposed above each semiconductor layer of the semiconductor die, and securely stores at least one of the data and/or code accessed by the security processor and security information relating to the data and/or code accessed by the security processor. The interface is fabricated on the same semiconductor die as the security processor and provides a communication interface for the security processor. " This invention relates to the construction and use of a separate processor system for security functions.

<CIT>) discloses, in the Abstract, "Semiconductor device security is provided as follows. A unique identification is generated by randomly forming a plurality of defects in one or more circuit elements of the semiconductor device. This method may yield a semiconductor device which is not susceptible to being replicated or cloned. " This invention discloses a method that can be used to 'program' a unique identifier or key into a semiconductor chip that, it is claimed, is more area efficient than other commonly known and used methods. The invention described relates only to establishment of a unique key in a semiconductor chip using purposeful introduction of defects. As such, the invention relates to semiconductor processing and not to semiconductor system security. Leobandung may, for some systems, improve key creation and storage.

United States Publication <CIT>) discloses, in the Abstract, "A method of analyzing cyber-security risks in an industrial control system (ICS) including a plurality of networked devices includes providing a processor and a memory storing a cyber-security algorithm. The processor runs the cyber-security algorithm and implements data collecting to compile security data including at least vulnerability data including cyber-risks (risks) regarding the plurality of networked devices by scanning the plurality of devices, processing the security data using a rules engine which associates a numerical score to each of the risks, aggregating data including ranking the risks across the plurality of networked devices and arranging the risks into at least one logical grouping, and displaying the logical grouping(s) on a user station. " This invention is typical of the current state of the art in cybersecurity, namely, it pertains to the collection and analysis of data and the use of the data to assess risk, detect malicious activity, and provide alerts when irregular activity is detected. The major flaw with these approaches is that the software and hardware used in the implementation of the invention is itself subject to the same risks as the system being monitored. Furthermore, the analysis is based on heuristic algorithms and statistical analysis.

<CIT>) discloses, in the Abstract, "A method of providing cyber security for a vehicle includes monitoring, by a cyber security system of the vehicle, a plurality of parameters acquired from at least one communication bus of the vehicle. The parameters are filtered to identify parameters of interest for cyber security threat detection. An evaluation of the parameters of interest is performed with respect to one or more of normal conditions and abnormal conditions to identify at least one likely cyber security threat in the vehicle based on identifying at least one condition that does not match the normal conditions or at least one condition that does match the abnormal conditions. One or more recovery actions are triggered based on identifying the at least one likely cyber security threat in the vehicle. " This invention describes a system for detecting anomalous behavior in a vehicle electronics system based on analysis and monitoring of the vehicle system bus.

<CIT>) discloses, in a translation of the Abstract, "A security semiconductor chip is presented. Semiconductor chips can detect when there is a physical attack such as depackaging. According to one embodiment, the semiconductor chip includes an energy harvesting element in the package. Illustratively, the energy harvesting element may include an on-chip photodiode. A depackaging attack causes the voltage generation of the photodiode, so that physical state changes to the packaging can be detected. " This invention relates to detection of physical attacks on a semiconductor chip, meaning, prevention of 'reverse engineering' of the chip contents by mechanically altering a packaged part, and does not relate to prevention of misuse of the chip itself. As such, the invention discusses a means by which the circuitry on a chip could detect intrusion into the chip package. In short, this application in no way provides any kind of protection for executable code or data and merely provides indication of tampering of the chip package. Cited in examination, <CIT> discloses a system and method for securing a personal device, that includes a device core and a peripheral device, from unauthorized access or operation. The system comprises a user operated switch that cannot be affected in its operation by either the device core or the peripheral device. The switch may be operated by an authorized user of the personal device either preemptively or in response to a detected threat.

As computing and processor-based systems have proliferated, so has the threat posed by intrusion into these systems. As indicated by the prior art, efforts have focused on detecting malicious intent in general purpose computing environments, akin to using a police force to identify and react to criminals lurking in a community. The present system is not based on that approach and is instead designed for protection of systems where intended function and purpose is known. Using the police analogy, it is the equivalent of using a bodyguard to protect a specific target, not a police force to protect a general population.

None of the prior art provides the comprehensive "bodyguard" system security that includes:.

What is needed, therefore is a solution that overcomes the limitations in the prior art and embodies all these features.

The present invention can also optionally include (<NUM>) simultaneous hardware control of communications channels and (<NUM>) use of the physical presence device for pre-authenticated, mathematically secure communication to a remote location using standard communication channels. These additional features further strengthen security in systems where remote telemetry is desired.

The present system uses a semiconductor-based hardware security device that is used to provide code security for processor-based systems. Currently security approaches all target a general purpose, "personal-computer-like" model where systems are expected to have unfettered code access; the focus is on identifying malicious code, encryption of data (to make hacking more difficult), and compartmentalization of code (to try to limit the damage from malicious code). Every current approach falls into one of these categories.

Modern 'smart' devices have properties that differ substantially from the general-purpose model. The code running the devices is mostly static - the software is designed for a dedicated purpose and is (ideally) never updated; updates are limited to (hopefully infrequent) bug-fix updates or system upgrades. Network connectivity of the devices is provided for a limited purpose - usually data transfer/collection and/or coordination with a mobile device or remote monitor; connectivity is not intended for general purpose access.

The present system addresses security for this new usage model via a hardware-based security system. It consists of:.

In embedded systems, the code base is fixed, and access to CPU instructions can be limited to the known fixed code base. Unlike most security systems, there is no need to 'guess' to identify malicious code. In this system, the code base resides entirely within the protected storage area, so any attempt to access code outside of the protected storage area is immediately suspect and can be blocked at the physical (electrical) level.

The system combines several features not concurrently found in traditional implementations:.

In the drawings, closely related figures and items have the same number but different alphabetic suffixes. Processes, states, statuses, and databases are named for their respective functions.

In the following detailed description of the invention, reference is made to the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof, and in which are shown, by way of illustration, specific embodiments in which the invention may be practiced. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be used, and structural changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention.

The terminology and definitions of the prior art are not necessarily consistent with the terminology and definitions of the current invention. Where there is a conflict, the following definitions apply.

CHIP means an electronic integrated circuit.

CODE means machine-language instructions used to control the actions of the microprocessor core(s) of the CPU SYSTEM.

CPU SYSTEM means one or more microprocessor cores and all other support devices and circuits of the microprocessor core(s).

CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION means any data associated with one or more functions of the SECURITY DEVICE. Such data includes, but is not limited to, encryption keys, identification keys, authentication keys, key shares, or hashes of any of these elements.

IC means an electronic integrated circuit that is implemented as either a CHIP or as SEMICONDUCTOR IP.

PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (PPD) means an electrical circuit, possibly consisting of one or more CHIPs, that is capable of being electrically connected to a PROTECTED SYSTEM, for example shown as item <NUM> in <FIG>.

PROGRAMMER means an electrical circuit or collection of circuits used to generate CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION that is stored on the SECURITY DEVICE and/or the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE.

PROTECTED SYSTEM means the system being protected, for example shown as item <NUM> in <FIG>. It consists of the CPU SYSTEM and the SECURITY DEVICE.

SECURITY DEVICE means an electrical circuit, typically a CHIP or SEMICONDUCTOR IP, that is not removable from the PROTECTED SYSTEM. As part of its function it provides the only means of electrically connecting the PROTECTED SYSTEM to the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE or PROGRAMMER.

SEMICONDUCTOR IP means an electronic circuit that can be integrated on to a CHIP. This may consist of all representations of the circuit, including computer files of models, characterization data, geometric data, manufacturing data, or any other data representations attributable to the electronic circuit.

Embedded systems consist of microprocessor-based general computing platforms which run dedicated CODE (meaning, a fixed, pre-determined set of instructions for the microprocessor to execute). These systems differ from general computing systems in that the function(s) of the system is/are known and are well defined. An example of such a system would be a 'smart' thermostat that is meant to provide temperature regulation. These devices, especially when connected to a computer network (such as the internet), are subject to compromise by malicious actors attempting to interfere with normal function of the system. Many approaches have been used to prevent such intrusions, but these approaches all fail because they rely on the primary CPU SYSTEM for implementation of security functions. This reliance on the CPU SYSTEM means that the embedded system cannot know with certainty when it has been compromised, since an attacker controlling the CPU SYSTEM can alter the system to appear unthreatening.

The present system is implemented as a set of related electronic circuits consisting of a SECURITY DEVICE, a PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE, and a PROGRAMMER. The SECURITY DEVICE and the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE would typically be constructed as CHIPS but could also be realized as SEMICONDUCTOR IP. There is no requirement that the SECURITY DEVICE and the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE are implemented using the same method; one could be a CHIP and one could be SEMICONDUCTOR IP without alteration of function.

The SECURITY DEVICE is a separate IC that is designed to act as a "bodyguard" for the CPU SYSTEM. It implements any number of security-related functions without any interaction with the main CPU SYSTEM microprocessor core(s) and without using general-purpose microprocessor core(s) of its own in the performance of its security functions. It is electrically connected to the processor via its standard interfaces (system bus, memory interfaces, and the like) and monitors electrical activity on the interfaces. It also controls access to protected storage (which is likely separate but electrically connected to the SECURITY DEVICE). A key feature is that its operation is in essence 'transparent' to the CPU SYSTEM in that any interactions with the primary microprocessor interfaces are examined and handled by it without the knowledge of the CPU SYSTEM.

When an instance of a PROTECTED SYSTEM is constructed, the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE and the SECURITY DEVICE associated with that instance both receive CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION from the PROGRAMMER. The CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION provided to the PPD is not necessarily the same as that provided to the SECURITY DEVICE. Once the PROGRAMMER has generated and transmitted the appropriate CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION to the PPD and the SECURITY DEVICE, the system instance is unique in that the PPD will only recognize the single instance of the SECURITY DEVICE and vice versa. A PPD from one instance cannot be used with another instance of the PROTECTED SYSTEM. Once this uniqueness is established, the PROGRAMMER is disconnected and is no longer needed for the instance. It discards any CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION that was generated. A single PROGRAMMER could be used repeatedly in this fashion to create additional unique instances of the PROTECTED SYSTEM.

Certain security functions are only electrically enabled when the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE is electrically connected to the PROTECTED SYSTEM. When the PPD is connected, the SECURITY DEVICE validates the device using some or all of the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION stored on the SECURITY DEVICE. Once the SECURITY DEVICE determines that the PPD is the correct match for the specific instance of the PROTECTED SYSTEM, certain security functions are permitted. These functions involve one or more electrical circuits contained within the PPD to ensure that operations cannot be performed without the electrical connection and correct match of the PPD. Such functions may include, but are not limited to, encryption and loading of CODE or other data into the storage area protected by the SECURITY DEVICE; modification of SECURITY DEVICE state; or synchronization of some (but not all) of the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION stored on either the PPD or the SECURITY DEVICE.

The key features of the system include: Electrical uniqueness of each instance of the PROTECTED SYSTEM via the use of the SECURITY DEVICE and the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION stored within it; implementation of SECURITY DEVICE function entirely in hardware, without the use of general-purpose microprocessor core(s) in the performance of its security functions; and use of a PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE to require direct "hands-on" interaction with the PROTECTED SYSTEM to enable certain security-related operations.

In normal operation, without the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE electrically connected to the system, the SECURITY DEVICE, as one of its primary functions, services all request, including CODE requests, for the microprocessor core(s). Requests from the microprocessor core(s) for CODE not contained in the storage area protected by the SECURITY DEVICE are identified as invalid requests and are handled in a manner that prevents the microprocessor from receiving any functional instructions. The invalid requests can be handled according to any number of methods not germane to the system, but in any event invalid requests will not result in the requested information being transmitted to the CPU SYSTEM for execution.

An additional feature of the present system is the ability of the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE to serve as a pre-authenticated device for communication with the PROTECTED SYSTEM. Because of the unique pairing of a PPD to a SECURITY DEVICE (and therefore a single instance of a PROTECTED SYSTEM), the PPD can use its CRYTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION to establish a provably secure communications channel with its paired PROTECTED SYSTEM over a shared network. This is done by including electrical circuitry for an interface to a communication network (via any protocol such as Bluetooth, Ethernet, etc) on the PPD. When information is transmitted from the PROTECTED SYSTEM to the communication network, the SECURITY DEVICE modifies the transmitted data frame and encodes the frame payload using methods controlled by some of the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION in its possession. Because the SECURITY DEVICE is modifying the transmitted data frame after the CPU SYSTEM has provided the fame data, the CPU SYSTEM is completely unaware that any modification has taken place. The modified data frame is sent over the communication network. Although the modified data frame could be detected and captured by any other devices on the network, the payload in the frame is encoded and cannot be read. When the PPD device is connected to the communication network, it can receive and decode the encoded payload because it has the requisite CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION stored. In systems where remote monitoring is useful, this feature provides a simple means of secure point-to-point communication over a possibly shared network. Because no authentication step is required before establishing communication, there is no risk to common interference predicated on a malicious actor pretending to be one of the parties to the communication (so called 'man in the middle' attacks).

The preferred embodiment is shown in <FIG>, <FIG>, and <FIG>. In all three figures, the collection of elements <NUM> is the PROTECTED SYSTEM consisting of the SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> connected to and monitoring the interfaces of the CPU SYSTEM <NUM> and connected to and managing storage area <NUM>.

<FIG> shows the PROTECTED SYSTEM under normal operating conditions. SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> monitors interfaces from and acts as a "bodyguard" for CPU SYSTEM <NUM>. The system CODE is secured in storage area <NUM>. CPU SYSTEM <NUM> does not have direct contact with the storage area and can only execute CODE passed to it from SECURITY DEVICE <NUM>. Other devices that would ordinarily be connected directly to the bus or busses of CPU SYSTEM <NUM> are instead connected to SECURITY DEVICE <NUM>. In <FIG> the system consists of SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> but may also include storage area <NUM>.

<FIG> consists of the same PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM> described above, with the same function described above. <FIG> also includes PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM> that is electrically and mechanically connected to SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> inside PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM>. In this configuration, SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> detects and verifies the presence of PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM> and, as a result, allows certain restricted operations to take place within SECURITY DEVICE <NUM>. These operations rely, in part, on electrical circuits contained on PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM>, guaranteeing that these restricted operations cannot take place without PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM>. This configuration allows for the loading of information into storage area <NUM>.

<FIG> consists of the same PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM> described above but shows the system configuration during initial programming. PROGRAMMER <NUM> is electrically connected to SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> and PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM>. When connected, and with proper validation of the connection, PROGRAMMER <NUM> generates CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION unique to the particular system instance and stores one set of CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION on SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> and another set on PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM>. PROGRAMMER <NUM> generates and stores CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION necessary for PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM> and SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> to uniquely identify each other, so that other instances of PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM> cannot share the same PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE.

<FIG> shows the means by which SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> acts on communications from CPU SYSTEM <NUM> when a network interface is not directly a part of CPU SYSTEM <NUM>. In this case, SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> intercepts all network traffic, extracts the data payload from a network frame, encodes the payload, reconstructs the frame with the encoded payload, and sends the modified frame to NETWORK INTERFACE <NUM> for transmission. Data frames received from NETWORK INTERFACE <NUM> are similarly decoded on arrival before being provided to CPU SYSTEM <NUM>. Because SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> is performing this operation without the knowledge of CPU SYSTEM <NUM>, it is not possible for CPU SYSTEM <NUM> to detect, counteract, or otherwise prevent the data payload encoding done by SECURITY DEVICE <NUM>. The encoded data payload can only be decoded by PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM>, which in this configuration is remotely located with respect to PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM>. PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM> can perform the decoding because it contains CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION that matches it to SECURITY DEVICE <NUM>. Similarly, any transmission of information from PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM> to PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM> uses the same encoding/decoding procedure before data is allowed to be received by CPU SYSTEM <NUM>.

In some cases, CPU SYSTEM <NUM> may contain a network port as shown in <FIG>. In this case, both CPU SYSTEM <NUM> and network port <NUM> are contained within the same system-on-a-chip shown as CPU SOC <NUM>. SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> performs the same encoding and decoding operations, and communicates only with its matched, remotely located PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE <NUM> as before. Unlike <FIG>, however, SECURITY DEVICE <NUM> passes information through the CPU SOC rather than an explicit connection to the external network port. The overall result is the same, but the electrical connection is slightly different to account for the different configuration of the CPU SOC.

As will also be apparent to those skilled in the art, there are alternate embodiments of the architecture including implementation with more than one PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE. In that embodiment, the PROGRAMMER <NUM> in <FIG> is used to program a single instance of PROTECTED SYSTEM <NUM> as well as two or more PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICEs <NUM>. The electrical circuits on each PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE are not necessarily identical, and are used for providing (possibly) differing levels of access to SECURITY DEVICE <NUM>, or for providing multiple secure point-to-point communication channels. This embodiment retains all the features and benefits of a system with a single PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE.

Another embodiment apparent to those skilled in the art is an implementation in which the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE is electrically removable but not physically removable from the PROTECTED SYSTEM. Such an implementation is made by providing a mechanism for breaking the electrical connection between the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE and the PROTECTED SYSTEM. Mechanisms include, but are not limited to, using an implementation of an electronic switch or relay to electrically disconnect the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE. For example, a PROTECTED SYSTEM containing a fingerprint sensor uses the sensor to connect or disconnect the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE based on validation of an authorized fingerprint. This type of system provides a system logging capability to monitor privileged access to the SECURITY DEVICE.

Also apparent to those skilled in the art is an implementation in which the mechanism of programming the system varies, since there are many obvious ways in which the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION can be generated and stored. A key feature of the system is the storage of the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION on a per-instance basis and not the specific use of a PROGRAMMER to do so. As such, any implementation of the programming function using software, hardware, or any other technique for generating and storing the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION may be substituted without exceeding the scope of this invention.

Claim 1:
A security system for embedded systems, comprising:
a PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>) comprising a CPU SYSTEM (<NUM>) and a SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>)
the CPU SYSTEM (<NUM>) comprising one or more microprocessor cores for running CODE comprising machine-language instructions for controlling actions of the microprocessor cores of the CPU SYSTEM (<NUM>);
the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) being an electronic integrated circuit (IC) separate from the CPU SYSTEM (<NUM>) that is not and does not use any general purpose microprocessors,
wherein the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) is irremovable from the PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>);
a PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) being an electrical circuit connectable to the PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>); and
a PROGRAMMER (<NUM>) being an electrical circuit or collection of circuits for generating CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION for storage on the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) and the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>)
the PROGRAMMER (<NUM>) being connectable to the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) and the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) during construction of the PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>) and disconnectable during operation of the PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>),
and wherein the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) provides the only means of electrically connecting the PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>) to the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) or PROGRAMMER (<NUM>),
the system further comprising the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION received from the PROGRAMMER (<NUM>) during construction of the PROTECTED SYSTEM (<NUM>) and stored on the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) and the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>), wherein the CRYTPOGRAPHIC INFORMATION is unique to both the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) and the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) such that other PROTECTED SYSTEMS (<NUM>) cannot share the same PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>),
and wherein when the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) is physically connected to the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) after construction and validated based on the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, electrical circuits within the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) enable one or more functions within the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>) to:
encrypt and load CODE or other data into protected storage;
modify a state of the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>); or
synchronize some of the CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION on either the PHYSICAL PRESENCE DEVICE (<NUM>) or the SECURITY DEVICE (<NUM>).