Patent Description:
The sophistication of electronic control technology for automobiles and the widespread use of connection of in-vehicle devices with a communication network give rise to the security risk to information for automobiles. Accordingly, the countermeasure technology is required. For example, CAN (Controller Area Network) standards have been employed for backbone networks of automobiles. Existing security countermeasure technologies for the in-vehicle network of the CAN include a technique for detecting anomaly by receiving periodically sent data frames and matching the transmission period against a predetermined rule regarding a transmission period (refer to, for example, PTL <NUM>).

Recently, the sophistication of connection with a communication network outside the vehicle and the advancement and increase in the capacity of the processing information give rise to use of Ethernet (registered trademark) as an alternative of the existing CAN in-vehicle network standard. Ethernet provides the data size per transaction that is much larger than that in CAN. Accordingly, a technique has been developed for putting together data corresponding to a plurality of CAN frames into an Ethernet frame in accordance with the order of transmission/reception of the data and transmitting the data (refer to, for example, PTL <NUM>). PTL <NUM> relates to a system and method for providing security to a network which may include maintaining, by a processor, a timing model of an expected behavior of data communications over the in-vehicle communication network; receiving, by the processor, a message sent over the network; determining, by the controller, based on the model and based on a timing attribute of the message, whether or not the message complies with the model; and if the message does not comply with the model then performing, by the processor, at least one action related to the message. PTL <NUM> relates to a vehicle-mounted relay device, a vehicle-mounted communication system and a relay program with which it is possible to prevent unauthorized messages from being relayed between networks. A vehicle-mounted relay device having a plurality of communication units to which a plurality of CAN buses are connected determines whether or not messages transmitted by ECUs connected to the CAN buses are authorized. If a message is determined to be unauthorized, the vehicle-mounted relay device notifies the CAN buses connected to the communication unit that received the message that an unauthorized message has been transmitted. The vehicle-mounted relay device prohibits subsequent relaying of messages having the same CAN-ID as the CAN-ID included in the message determined to be unauthorized. At this time the vehicle-mounted relay device notifies communication lines connected to communication units other than the communication unit that received the message determined to be unauthorized that relaying of messages has been prohibited. PTL <NUM> relates to a fraud-detection method for use in an in-vehicle network system including a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs) that exchange messages on a bus and a fraud-detection ECU connected to the bus, the fraud-detection ECU includes a memory that stores rule information indicating a rule regarding transmission of a message to be transmitted on the bus, the fraud-detection ECU determines whether or not a message transmitted on the bus is malicious by using the rule information, and, in a case where the message is malicious, transmits an error message including a message identifier of the malicious message. The fraud-detection ECU acquires updated rule information transmitted from an external server, and updates the rule information by using the updated rule information.

However, the above-described existing configuration has a first problem in that if an in-vehicle network includes a CAN control network and an Ethernet control network, anomaly determination using the transmission periodicity lacks reliability, since the configuration of the Ethernet network is not of a bus type.

In addition, in the above-described existing configuration, a single Ethernet frame including control data corresponding to a plurality of CAN frames does not always include a series of CAN control commands to be processed continuously or in a short time. For this reason, a series of control commands may be set in a plurality of different Ethernet frames and may be transmitted separately. At this time, according to Ethernet, delivery of a frame may fail, and the undelivered frame is retransmitted. However, when the undelivered frame is retransmitted, a second problem occurs. That is, a control device (hereinafter also referred to as an "ECU (Electronic Control Unit)") connected to the CAN network may not correctly control the vehicle due to the occurrence of mismatch between the order in which a plurality of control commands are processed and the order in which the control commands are received or due to a situation in which a plurality of control commands to be processed within a certain period of time are not received within the certain period of time.

Accordingly, the present disclosure provides an in-vehicle relay device capable of making a more reliable anomaly determination on a frame including a plurality of control commands by using a method that does not require use of a transmission period and preventing the occurrence of an anomaly of a control command transmitted and received over control networks having different data sizes transmittable in one frame.

According to an aspect of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle relay device that solves the above-described problems is provided. The in-vehicle relay device relays communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected. The in-vehicle relay device includes a communication unit that receives control data from a first control network included in the plurality of networks, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices, and a determination unit that makes a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter makes a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputs a result of the second determination.

According to another aspect of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle monitoring device that solves the above-described problem is provided. The in-vehicle monitoring device is included in an in-vehicle network having a first control network and a second control network between which communication is relayed by a relay device and is connected to the first control network. The in-vehicle monitoring device includes a communication unit that receives control data transmitted from a control device connected to the first control network, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands for control to be performed by a control device connected to the second control network, and a determination unit that makes a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter makes a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination and outputs a result of the second determination. In the first control network, the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame is larger than the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame in the second control network.

According to another aspect of the present disclosure, to solve the above-described problem, a communication monitoring method for use of an in-vehicle relay device that relays communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected is provided. The in-vehicle relay device includes a communication unit and a processor. The method includes receiving, by using the communication unit, control data from a first control network included in the plurality of networks, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices, and making, by using the processor, a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter making a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputting a result of the second determination.

According to another aspect of the present disclosure, to solve the above-described problem, a program for use in an in-vehicle relay device that relays communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected is provided. The in-vehicle relay device includes a communication unit and a processor. The program includes a program code executing a method, when the program is executed by the processor. The method includes receiving, by using the communication unit, control data from a first control network included in the plurality of networks, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices, and making, by using the processor, a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter making a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputting a result of the second determination.

According to another aspect of the present disclosure, to solve the above-described problem, an in-vehicle control network system includes a first control network and a second control network having a plurality of control devices connected thereto, where communication between the control devices is relayed by an in-vehicle relay device. In the first control network, the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame is larger than the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame in the second control network. The control data transmitted from the first control network to the second control network includes, in one frame, a combination of a plurality of control commands that cause control devices connected to the second control network to perform predetermined control operations simultaneously.

Note that as used herein, the term "simultaneous execution of a plurality of control commands" refers to execution of a combination of control commands selected from among a plurality of types of control commands related to an acceleration instruction, a deceleration instruction, a steering instruction, and a turn signal instruction in parallel, in sequence, or in a very short time (within several seconds). In addition, the term "simultaneously executable" means that there is no inconsistency in a combination of the types of control commands to be executed simultaneously.

Still note that an "anomaly of control data" is not limited to the occurrence of improper data caused by a cyber attack against a control network. For example, an "anomaly of control data" as used herein may be caused by a difference between the specifications of control networks included in the in-vehicle control network system, a difference between the specifications mixed in a control network system, or a malfunction of a device that constitutes the communication network.

According to the in-vehicle relay device or the like of the present disclosure, more reliable anomaly determination is made on a frame including a plurality of control commands by using a technique not requiring the use of a transmission period. In a network system including control networks having different sizes transmittable in one frame, a communication trouble of a control command over the control networks can be prevented.

According to an aspect of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle relay device is provided that relays communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected. The in-vehicle relay device includes a communication unit that receives control data from a first control network included in the plurality of networks, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices, and a determination unit that makes a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter makes a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputs a result of the second determination.

In this way, the occurrence of an anomaly of a frame that carries control data including a plurality of control command can be determined without depending on the transmission period of the control commands.

In addition, for example, if, as a result of the first determination, the combination of types of the control commands is not the first combination, the determination unit may determine that an anomaly of the control data occurs in the second determination in the second determination.

In this way, if a combination of a plurality of types of control commands included in the control data is not a known combination that does not cause danger even when they are simultaneously executed, execution of these control commands can be avoided and, thus, the safety of the vehicle is ensured.

In addition, for example, the control data may further include a control ID indicating a type of the control, and the first combination may be set for the type of control indicated by the control ID.

In this manner, unless the combination of the types of control commands included in the control data is a known combination for controlling a predetermined operation performed by the vehicle, the combination can be prevented from being used in the in-vehicle control network system. As a result, the safety of the vehicle can be ensured. As used herein, the term "predetermined operation of the vehicle" refers to control needed for operations, such as cruise control, a lane change, overtaking, parallel parking, obstacle avoidance, and pull-off to the shoulder when in danger, which are performed under automatic control. The control ID is used to identify the control of such an operation.

In addition, for example, the determination unit may acquire state data indicating a state of the vehicle and make the first determination by using the first combination that varies in accordance with the state indicated by the state data. More specifically, for example, the state data may be data based on data transmitted by at least one of the control device.

In this manner, the combination of the types of control commands simultaneously executable on the in-vehicle control network system can be dynamically changed in accordance with the state of the vehicle. Thus, for example, it can be determined whether a combination of a plurality of control commands can be safely executed in accordance with a variety of states of a vehicle that is traveling. The variety of states of the vehicle can be obtained from the data transmitted by the control device in the vehicle (i.e., an ECU) as needed. Consequently, the presence/absence of an anomaly of the control data can be determined in accordance with a condition (e.g., the vehicle speed) that may change at any time and that may change the level of danger depending on the magnitude thereof when the control thereof is combined with control of increased acceleration or control of increased turn of a steering wheel.

In addition, for example, if as a result of the first determination, the combination of the types of control commands is the first combination, the determination unit may further make a third determination as to whether a combination of information in the control commands is a second combination preset for the first combination and may output a result of the third determination. If in the third determination, the combination of information in the control commands is not the second combination, the determination unit may determine that the control data is anomalous. More specifically, for example, the second combination may be a combination of predetermined value ranges within each of which an operational amount included in one of the control commands is to be included. Furthermore, for example, the determination unit may acquire the state data indicating the state of the vehicle and use the predetermined ranges that vary in accordance with the state indicated by the state data.

In this manner, even a plurality of control commands that are not determined to be anomalous on the basis of the combination of the types are not executed if, for example, the combination of detailed information about the control operations indicated by the control data values is not a known combination that does not cause danger when the control commands are simultaneously executed. This leads to further improvement of the safety of the vehicle. In some control operations, the safety may be impaired depending on the operational amount, which is detailed information about the control operation. For example, a combination of steering control and acceleration control appears in normal overtaking. If the operational amount of each of the control operations is appropriately small, the two operations performed at the same time do not cause danger. However, if the control operations are performed with a large steering angle and a large acceleration, the vehicle may skid or roll over. According to the above-described configuration, a combination of control operations that causes the vehicle to skid or roll over can be avoided. Furthermore, for example, it can be determined whether a combination of a plurality of control commands can be safely executed for a variety of states of a vehicle that is traveling.

In addition, for example, the in-vehicle relay device may further include a relay unit. If the result output by the determination unit indicates that the control data is not anomalous, the relay unit may transmit the plurality of control commands to a second control network of the plurality of control networks. The second control network differs from the first control network and is a predetermined network corresponding to each of the control commands.

As a result, a plurality of control commands determined, without using the transmission period, not to cause a problem of the vehicle itself or the travel of the vehicle even when the control commands are combined and simultaneously executed are acquired and executed by the corresponding control devices.

In addition, for example, the control data may further include control command IDs each indicating the type of one of the control commands. The relay unit may convert each of the control command IDs indicating the type of the control command into a control command ID in accordance with a predetermined conversion rule and transmit the control command ID to the second control network together with the control command. Furthermore, the relay unit may convert each of the control commands in accordance with a predetermined conversion rule and, thereafter, transmit the control command. Still furthermore, for example, in the first control network, the largest data size of the control command transmittable in the one frame may be larger than the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame in the second control network, and the relay unit may separate a plurality of control commands included in a frame of the control data received from the first control network into a plurality of frames and transmit the frames to the second control network. More specifically, for example, the first control network and the second control network may comply with different standards. Still more specifically, the standard with which the first control network complies may be Ethernet (registered trademark), and the standard with which the second control network complies may be CAN (Controller Area Network).

In this way, for example, in a control network system in which control data is communicated across a plurality of control networks that comply with different standards or a plurality of control networks that comply with the same standard but have different control data size transmittable in one frame, an anomaly determination is more reliably made on a frame including a plurality of control commands by using a technique that does not require use of the transmission period.

According to another aspect of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle monitoring device is provided that is included in an in-vehicle network having a first control network and a second control network between which communication is relayed by a relay device and that is connected to the first control network. The in-vehicle monitoring device includes a communication unit that receives control data transmitted from a control device connected to the first control network, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands for control to be performed by a control device connected to the second control network, and a determination unit that makes a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously, makes a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputs a result of the second determination. In the first control network, the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame is larger than the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame in the second control network.

In this way, the presence/absence of an anomaly can be determined for one frame that carries control data including a plurality of control commands, without depending on the transmission period of the control commands.

According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, a communication monitoring method for use of an in-vehicle relay device that relays communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected is provided. The in-vehicle relay device includes a communication unit and a processor. The method includes receiving, by using the communication unit, control data from a first control network included in the plurality of networks, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices, and making, by using the processor, a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter making a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputting a result of the second determination.

In this manner, the presence/absence of an anomaly of a frame that carries control data including a plurality of control commands can be determined without depending on the transmission period of the control commands.

According to yet still another aspect of the present disclosure, a program for use in an in-vehicle relay device is provided. The in-vehicle relay device relays communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected. The in-vehicle relay device includes a communication unit and a processor. The program includes a program code executing a method, when the program is executed by the processor. The method includes receiving, by using the communication unit, control data from a first control network included in the plurality of networks, where the control data includes, in a frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices, and making, by using the processor, a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in the frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter making a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputting a result of the second determination.

According to yet still another aspect of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle control network system includes a first control network and a second control network having a plurality of control devices connected thereto, where communication between the control devices is relayed by an in-vehicle relay device. In the first control network, the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame is larger than the largest data size of the control command transmittable in one frame in the second control network, and the control data transmitted from the first control network to the second control network includes, in one frame, a combination of a plurality of control commands that cause control devices connected to the second control network to perform predetermined control operations simultaneously. In addition, for example, the combination of the control commands may be a combination of control commands executable simultaneously set for the predetermined type of control. Furthermore, for example. Furthermore, for example, the control data may further include control IDs indicating the types of control operations corresponding to a combination of the control commands.

In such a network system, the presence/absence of an anomaly of a frame that carries control data including a plurality of control commands can be determined without depending on the transmission period of the control commands.

It should be noted that general or specific embodiments may be implemented as a system, a method, an integrated circuit, a computer program, a computer-readable recording medium, such as a CD-ROM, or any selective combination thereof.

In-vehicle control network systems each including a plurality of control networks in which communication between control devices is relayed by an in-vehicle relay device according to embodiments are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Each of the embodiments described below represents one specific example of the present disclosure. Therefore, a value, a constituent element, the positions and the connection form of the constituent elements, steps (operations), and the sequence of steps used in the embodiments are only examples and shall not be construed as limiting the scope of the present disclosure. Among the constituent elements in the embodiments described below, the constituent element that does not appear in an independent claim, which has the broadest scope, is described as an optional constituent element. In addition, all the drawings are schematic and not necessarily to scale.

<FIG> is a diagram illustrating an example of the configuration of a vehicle control network system commonly used as an example in first and second embodiments.

A vehicle <NUM> has an in-vehicle network system <NUM> mounted therein. In the following description, it is assumed that the vehicle <NUM> has a self-driving capability and is based on a technology regarding state monitoring and remote control via a communication network, which can be put to practical use in the near future.

The in-vehicle network system <NUM> includes a CAN network constructed according to CAN, an Ethernet network constructed according to Ethernet, a plurality of ECUs, and a communication control unit (hereinafter referred to as "TCU (Telematics Control Unit)") <NUM>.

The CAN network of the in-vehicle network system <NUM> includes a first CAN communication line <NUM> and a turn signal control ECU <NUM> connected to the first CAN communication line <NUM>. The turn signal control ECU <NUM> performs lighting on/off control of right and left turn signals of the vehicle <NUM>. In addition, the CAN network includes a second CAN communication line <NUM> and travel control ECUs connected to the second CAN communication line <NUM>. Examples of a travel control ECU include an accelerator control ECU <NUM>, a brake control ECU <NUM>, and a steering control ECU <NUM>.

The accelerator control ECU <NUM> performs acceleration control including starting of the vehicle <NUM> in accordance with the position of an accelerator pedal. The brake control ECU <NUM> performs a deceleration control including stoppage of the vehicle <NUM> in accordance with the operation performed on the brake pedal. The steering control ECU <NUM> performs steering control in accordance with the steering angle of the steering wheel.

These ECUs are only examples of ECUs that can be included in the CAN network, and other ECUs (not illustrated) may be included. For example, a chassis system ECU, such as a window opening/closing control ECU, connected to the first CAN communication line <NUM> may be part of the CAN network. In addition, for example, a travel control ECU other than the above-described ECUs may be connected to the second CAN communication line <NUM>.

Furthermore, the first CAN communication line <NUM> and the second CAN communication line <NUM> are relay connected to a second Ethernet communication line <NUM> (described below), which constitutes an Ethernet network, by the first relay conversion ECU <NUM>. The first relay conversion ECU <NUM> is described in more detail below.

The Ethernet network of the in-vehicle network system <NUM> includes a first Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a second Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a third Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a relay ECU <NUM> and a second relay ECU <NUM> that relay connect these Ethernet communication lines with one another, and a camera ECU <NUM>, a sensor ECU <NUM>, and a self-driving control ECU <NUM> connected to these Ethernet communication lines. More specifically, the relay ECU <NUM> relay connects the first Ethernet communication line <NUM> with each of the second Ethernet communication line <NUM> and the third Ethernet communication line <NUM>. The second relay ECU <NUM> relay connects the third Ethernet communication line <NUM> with each of the fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, and the sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM>.

The relay ECU <NUM> has the function of an Ethernet Switch. The relay ECU <NUM> refers to the address included in a received frame and transmits the frame to a destination corresponding to the address.

The second relay ECU <NUM> is an ECU having an Ethernet Switch function. The second relay ECU <NUM> relay connects the third Ethernet communication line <NUM> with each of the fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, and the sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM> and performs data transfer with the ECU connected in accordance with the destination of the received data.

The camera ECU <NUM> controls a camera (not illustrated) that captures the image of the surroundings of the vehicle <NUM> to generate video data. Thereafter, the camera ECU <NUM> delivers the video data to the in-vehicle control network <NUM>. The sensor ECU <NUM> controls a sensor (not illustrated) that senses the surrounding condition for the vehicle <NUM>. Thereafter, the sensor ECU <NUM> delivers the sensing result to the in-vehicle control network <NUM> as sensing data. The self-driving control ECU <NUM> performs self-driving control on the vehicle <NUM> on the basis of the data transmitted from the camera ECU <NUM> and the sensor ECU <NUM> and received via the second relay ECU <NUM>. The self-driving control ECU <NUM> performs the self-driving control on the vehicle <NUM> by transmitting a control command to the travel system ECUs, that is, the accelerator control ECU <NUM>, the brake control ECU <NUM>, and the steering control ECU <NUM>. That is, control data including a control command for self-driving control is transmitted from the Ethernet network to the CAN network.

Exchange of data between the CAN network and the Ethernet network is achieved by the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> that relay connects the relay ECU <NUM> with the first CAN communication line <NUM> and the second CAN communication line <NUM>. The first relay conversion ECU <NUM> is an ECU that performs bidirectional conversion of data exchanged between the Ethernet network and the CAN network in accordance with the protocols of two standards. More specifically, the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> generates a frame of the CAN format including a control command from a frame of the Ethernet format including the control command received from the second Ethernet communication line <NUM> and transmits the generated CAN frame to at least one of the first CAN communication line <NUM> and the second CAN communication line <NUM> in accordance with the type of the CAN frame. In addition, the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> generates an Ethernet frame on the basis of a frame of the CAN format received from the first CAN communication line <NUM> or the second CAN communication line <NUM> and transmits the generated Ethernet frame to the second Ethernet communication line <NUM>.

In addition, the in-vehicle network system <NUM> is connected to a vehicle external communication network <NUM> by using wireless communication <NUM> performed by the TCU <NUM> connected to the first Ethernet communication line <NUM>. Furthermore, the TCU <NUM> is connected to the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> and the second relay ECU <NUM> via the relay ECU <NUM>.

An example of the vehicle external communication network <NUM> is a communication network such as the Internet.

The in-vehicle network system <NUM> is connected to a monitoring server <NUM> and a remote control device <NUM> via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>. The monitoring server <NUM> and the remote control device <NUM> are implemented, for example, by executing a predetermined program in one or more information processing apparatuses each including a processor, a storage device, an input/output device, and a communication device. Alternatively, the monitoring server <NUM> and the remote control device <NUM> may be integratedly implemented integrated in the same information processing apparatus.

The monitoring server <NUM> receives, from the vehicle <NUM>, positional information acquired by an in-vehicle GPS (Global Positioning System) receiver (not illustrated), the video data generated by the camera, or sensing data generated by the sensors via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>. Thereafter, the monitoring server <NUM> monitors the state of the vehicle <NUM> by using the received information.

Upon receiving a remote control request from the vehicle <NUM> via the vehicle external communication network <NUM> or upon receiving a forced remote control request for the vehicle <NUM> from the monitoring server <NUM> monitoring the state of the vehicle <NUM>, the remote control device <NUM> transmits remote control data to the vehicle <NUM>.

Like the above-described control data transmitted from the self-driving control ECU <NUM>, the remote control data transmitted from the remote control device <NUM> includes a control command for the travel system ECUs of the vehicle <NUM>. The control command included in the remote control data has an Ethernet format. When the control command is received by the TCU <NUM>, the control command is delivered to the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> via the Ethernet network of the in-vehicle network system <NUM>. The first relay conversion ECU <NUM> converts the control command into the CAN format and transmits the control command to the CAN network including the travel system ECUs or the turn signal control ECU.

In the in-vehicle network system <NUM> described above, a control command sent from the self-driving control ECU <NUM> in the vehicle or the remote control device <NUM> outside the vehicle is delivered to the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> via the Ethernet network. However, the control command is subsequently delivered to the control ECU that executes each of control commands via the CAN network. The largest size of the control data that can be delivered in one frame of the CAN network is <NUM> bits (<NUM> bytes), which is the prescribed length of the data field. In contrast, the size of the control data that can be delivered in one frame of the Ethernet network is much larger than <NUM> bits. To efficiently deliver the control data in the in-vehicle network system <NUM>, control data of a size corresponding to control data delivered in a plurality of CAN frames is included in one Ethernet frame. That is, control data that groups a plurality of control commands is stored in one Ethernet frame. Thereafter, through a process of generating CAN frames from one Ethernet frame, the plurality of control commands are separated into a plurality of CAN frames. Note that in the generation process, data addition, data deletion, or data conversion may be performed as necessary so that the control commands conform to the specifications of the implemented in-vehicle control network <NUM>.

Among the constituent elements of the in-vehicle control network system <NUM>, each of the Ethernet network and the CAN network is an example of a control network according to the embodiments described below. In addition, each of the ECUs is an example of a control device according to the embodiments described below, and each of the relay ECU and the relay conversion ECUs is an example of an in-vehicle relay device according to the embodiments described below.

Note that the configuration of the in-vehicle control network system <NUM> described above is an example of the configuration to which the embodiments described below can be commonly applied, and each of the embodiments is applicable to an in-vehicle control network system having a configuration that differs from the above configuration. Other examples of the configuration of an in-vehicle control network system to which each of the embodiments is applicable is described below as modifications of the embodiment.

An example of anomaly determination made on control data by the in-vehicle control network system <NUM> is described below.

The anomaly determination is made on control data that includes a control command and that is transmitted from the Ethernet network to the control ECU in the CAN network. The transmission source of the control data is the remote control device <NUM>. The control data is included in an Ethernet frame and is transmitted. The control data anomaly determination is made by the relay ECU <NUM>.

In the following description of a determination as to an anomaly, the case where the relay ECU <NUM> makes a determination as to an anomaly of the control data transmitted from the self-driving control ECU <NUM> or the remote control device <NUM> is discussed as an example.

An example of a situation in which control data destined for a control ECU in a CAN network is transmitted from the self-driving control ECU <NUM> or the remote control device <NUM> is described first.

For example, in the vehicle <NUM> that is self-driving, the self-driving control ECU <NUM> recognizes the state of the vehicle body and the surrounding situation on the basis of the information indicated by the video data and the sensing data transmitted from the camera ECU <NUM> and the sensor ECU <NUM>, respectively. Subsequently, the self-driving control ECU <NUM> makes a determination as to details of a control operation performed on the vehicle <NUM> on the basis of the recognition and, thereafter, transmits control data including a series of control commands reflecting the information regarding a control operation to the accelerator control ECU <NUM>, the brake control ECU <NUM>, and the steering control ECU <NUM>.

In addition, for example, a state of the vehicle body or the surrounding situation that differs from a normal one may occur during self-driving and, thus, the case where the self-driving control ECU <NUM> cannot perform control may occur. Examples of such a case include the case where a policeman helps with traffic control due to, for example, a road construction that requires a detour or the occurrence of a traffic accident and the case where an emergency vehicle is approaching and, thus, the vehicle <NUM> needs to pull over to the edge of the roadway. If such a case occurs, the self-driving control ECU <NUM> determines that it is impossible to control the vehicle <NUM> by its own determination and transmits a remote control request destined for the remote control device <NUM>. The remote control request is delivered to the remote control device <NUM> via the second relay ECU <NUM>, the relay ECU <NUM>, and the TCU <NUM> via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>. Furthermore, the relay ECU <NUM> and the self-driving control ECU <NUM> that have transmitted the remote control request enter a remote control mode.

In addition, for example, the monitoring server <NUM> monitors the vehicle <NUM> on the basis of the state of the vehicle indicated by the positional information, the video data, and the information indicated by the sensing data and the recognition of the surrounding situation, which are sent from the vehicle <NUM>. If the monitoring server <NUM> determines that remote control is necessary for the vehicle <NUM> on the basis of the recognition, the monitoring server <NUM> transmits, to the remote control device <NUM>, a remote control request for the vehicle <NUM> and transmits, to the relay ECU <NUM> and the self-driving control ECU <NUM> of the vehicle <NUM>, a forced remote control message via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>. Upon receiving the forced remote control message, the relay ECU <NUM> and the self-driving control ECU <NUM> enter the remote control mode.

Upon receiving the above-described remote control request for the vehicle <NUM> from the vehicle <NUM> or the monitoring server <NUM>, the remote control device <NUM> determines the details of the control operation performed on the vehicle <NUM> on the basis of the positional information and the state of the vehicle <NUM> and the recognition of the surrounding situation base on the video data and sensing data, which are received from the vehicle <NUM>. For example, before the determination as to the details of the control operation is made, a monitoring staff may perform an input operation. Alternatively, information processing may be performed by a self-driving program that is more advanced than in the self-driving control ECU <NUM>, or artificial intelligence may be used. Furthermore, in the remote control device <NUM>, a control ID corresponding to the type of control corresponding to the determined details of a control operation is acquired, and a frame storing control data including a control command corresponding to the control ID and the details of a control operation (hereinafter, the frame is referred to as a "control frame") is generated. An example of the format of the control frame for remote control generated in this way is illustrated in <FIG>.

As can be seen from a control frame format <NUM>, one frame includes a control ID indicating the type of control and a plurality of control commands corresponding to a plurality of control operations simultaneously performed by the control ECUs. Each of the control commands includes a control command ID indicating the type of control command and control command data indicating the details of the control operation. The control command further includes a remote control flag indicating whether the control frame is for remote control or self-driving control performed by the vehicle.

<FIG> illustrates an example of a control ID table indicating a correspondence between the control ID and the type of control indicated by the control ID. In a control ID table <NUM>, two types of control for pull-off (pull-off A, pull-off B) and detour control (detour A) at a construction site are illustrated as examples of the types of control operations. Note that a control ID of 0x01 is assigned to and associated with pull-off A, a control ID of 0x02 is assigned to and associated with pull-off B, and a control ID of 0x03 is assigned to and associated with detour A. The control ID table <NUM> is stored in the storage device of the remote control device <NUM>, for example. A monitoring stuff or a program responsible for remote control refers to the control ID table <NUM>, selects the type of control corresponding to the determined details of the control operation, and uses the control ID associated with the selected type of the control operation. Note that the type of control may be determined before the details of a control operation is determined.

The control frame generated by the remote control device <NUM> is transmitted to the vehicle <NUM> via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>. To prevent wiretapping and tampering of the control frame in the vehicle external communication network <NUM>, a session defined by TLS (Transport Layer Security) is established between the TCU <NUM> of the vehicle <NUM> and the remote control device <NUM>. Thus, the control frame is encrypted and transmitted.

The control frame received and decrypted by the TCU <NUM> is transmitted to the relay ECU <NUM> via the first Ethernet communication line <NUM>. An example of the configuration of the relay ECU <NUM> is illustrated in <FIG>.

The relay ECU <NUM> includes a first communication unit <NUM>, a second communication unit <NUM>, a third communication unit <NUM>, a memory unit <NUM>, a nonvolatile memory unit <NUM>, a determination unit <NUM>, a generation unit <NUM>, a relay unit <NUM>, a control unit <NUM>, and a setting interface (hereinafter referred to as "I/F") unit <NUM>.

The first communication unit <NUM> is connected to the first Ethernet communication line <NUM>. The first communication unit <NUM> exchanges data with the TCU <NUM> via Ethernet. The second communication unit <NUM> is connected to the second Ethernet communication line <NUM>. The second communication unit <NUM> exchanges data with the relay conversion ECU <NUM> via Ethernet. The third communication unit <NUM> is connected to the third Ethernet communication line <NUM>. The third communication unit <NUM> exchanges data with the second relay ECU <NUM> via Ethernet.

The determination unit <NUM>, the generation unit <NUM>, the relay unit <NUM>, and the control unit <NUM> are functional constituent elements achieved by the processor included in the relay ECU <NUM> that executes a predetermined program. The program is stored in the nonvolatile memory unit <NUM> at the time of manufacturing the vehicle <NUM> and is executed by using the memory unit <NUM>. The flowchart in <FIG> illustrates an example of the procedure for the operation performed by the relay ECU <NUM> that executes the program to determine the presence/absence of an anomaly of the control data.

The determination unit <NUM> determines whether the data received by the first communication unit <NUM> (step S500) is a control frame of the vehicle <NUM> first (step S502).

If, as a result of the determination, the frame is not a control frame (NO in step S502), the frame is sent to the relay unit <NUM>. The relay unit <NUM> transmits the frame to at least one of the control networks via one or both of the second communication unit <NUM> and the third communication unit <NUM> in accordance with the destination of the frame (step S510).

If the received data is a control frame (YES in step S502), the determination unit <NUM> makes a determination regarding the remote control mode (step S503). More specifically, the determination unit <NUM> checks whether the control frame is for remote control on the basis of the value of the remote control flag in the control frame (refer to <FIG>). In this example, upon confirming that the control frame is for remote control on the basis of the value of the remote control flag being <NUM>, the determination unit <NUM> further determines whether the current operation mode of the relay ECU <NUM> is a remote control mode.

Even in the case where the control frame is for remote control, if the current operation mode of the relay ECU <NUM> is not the remote control mode (YES in step S503), the determination unit <NUM> determines that the received control frame is anomalous. The processing performed by the relay ECU <NUM> proceeds to an after-anomaly detection process (step S512). The after-anomaly detection process is described in more detail below.

If an anomaly is not detected in the determination regarding the remote control mode (NO in step S503), the determination unit <NUM> extracts the control ID and the control command ID from the control frame (step S504).

Subsequently, the determination unit <NUM> further matches the extracted control ID and control command ID against the control command combination list (step S506). The control command combination list is a list describing a combination of appropriate types of control commands set for a control ID indicated by the control ID. As used herein, the term "appropriate" means that the control commands in a combination are simultaneously executable in the vehicle <NUM>. <FIG> illustrates an example of a control command combination list.

A control command combination list <NUM> illustrated in <FIG> indicates that it is appropriate that the control frame corresponding to a control ID of 0x01 consists of a steering control command, a brake control command, and a turn signal control command.

The control command combination list <NUM> is stored in the nonvolatile memory unit <NUM> via the setting I/F <NUM> at the time of manufacturing the vehicle <NUM>. In addition, even after the start of use of the vehicle <NUM>, the control command combination list <NUM> may be updated by reprogramming via the setting I/F <NUM> or OTA (Over-The-Air) reprogramming.

If a match is found between the combination of the control command IDs for a control ID described in the control command combination list <NUM> and the actually extracted combination of the control ID and the control command IDs (YES in step S508), the determination unit <NUM> determines that the received control frame is not anomalous. The control frame determined not to be anomalous is sent to the relay unit <NUM> and is transmitted from the second communication unit <NUM> to the second Ethernet communication line <NUM> (step S510).

If a match is not found between the actually extracted combination of the control ID and the control commands (NO in step S508), the determination unit <NUM> determines that the control frame is anomalous, and the processing performed by the relay ECU <NUM> proceeds to an after-anomaly detection process (step S512).

The after-anomaly detection process is described below. The flowchart in <FIG> illustrates an example of a procedure for the after-anomaly detection process according to the present embodiment.

If the determination unit <NUM> determines that the control frame is anomalous, the generation unit <NUM> generates an anomaly message packet for notifying of detection of an anomaly of the control frame (step S700). The anomaly message packet is transmitted to the relay unit <NUM> and the first communication unit <NUM> and is transmitted from the second communication unit <NUM> and the third communication unit <NUM> to the control network of the vehicle <NUM>. In addition, the anomaly message packet is transmitted from the first communication unit <NUM> to the monitoring server104 and the remote control device <NUM> outside the vehicle <NUM> (step S702).

As described above, the procedure for determination as to whether the presence/absence of an anomaly of the control data made by the relay ECU <NUM> according to the present embodiment is performed and completed. The determination process is performed for each of frames received by the relay ECU <NUM>.

Upon receiving, via the second Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the control frame determined not to be anomalous and output by the relay ECU <NUM>, the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> sequentially retrieves the control commands from the control frame.

Furthermore, the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> converts the control command ID included in the retrieved control command into a CAN ID. For this conversion, for example, the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> uses the control command ID conversion table <NUM> illustrated in <FIG> as an example. The control command ID conversion table <NUM> is an example that defines a predetermined conversion rule for converting the control command ID transmitted in an Ethernet frame into a CAN ID used in the in-vehicle control network system <NUM> of the vehicle <NUM>. The control command ID conversion table <NUM> is stored in, for example, the nonvolatile memory unit <NUM> provided in the relay conversion ECU <NUM> at the time of manufacturing the vehicle <NUM>.

Instead of the control command ID, the entire control command or the control command data (i.e., control command data a, b, c in <FIG>), which is the information in the control command, may be converted in accordance with a predetermined conversion rule so as to support a CAN network if the specification of the in-vehicle network system <NUM> requires the conversion. In this manner, a remote control system that does not depend on the configuration of CAN can be designed.

Each of the commands (hereinafter also referred to as "CAN commands") obtained through the above-mentioned conversion performed by the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> is sequentially transmitted to a corresponding CAN network. The correspondence between a CAN command and a CAN network is indicated by, for example, a list describing a correspondence between a CAN ID and a CAN network which is the transmission destination of the CAN ID. The list is stored in the memory unit of the first relay conversion ECU <NUM>.

Each of the control ECUs performs its own control function in accordance with the details of the control operation in the received control command. In this way, a variety of control operations are performed on the vehicle <NUM>.

Note that an anomaly determination process similar to that performed on the control frame generated by the remote control device <NUM> (except for setting of the remote control flag) is performed on a control frame generated by the self-driving control ECU <NUM> for self-driving control. In addition, in conversion of the control command ID or the control command data, different rules may be employed for the control frame for remote control and the control frame for self-driving control. Also note that the conversion may be performed as needed in the in-vehicle control network system <NUM> and is not an essential process.

According to the above-described configuration, in the self-driving control ECU <NUM> and the remote control device <NUM>, a control frame to be transmitted by using Ethernet consists of a data set in which control commands corresponding to the type of control are combined. As a result, control commands to be executed simultaneously are not separately set in a plurality of different Ethernet frames. Consequently, the proper order in which the control ECUs connected to the CAN network perform their own control operations can be reliably maintained. In addition, the occurrence of or an increase in a delay between the control commands can be prevented.

Furthermore, by checking whether the control data to be relayed consists of a data set in which the control commands corresponding to the type of control are combined, the relay ECU <NUM> detects an anomaly of the control frame. As a result, anomalous control of the vehicle <NUM> caused by execution of anomalous control data can be prevented.

Still furthermore, by conversion into the CAN ID using the control command ID conversion table <NUM>, the degree of dependence of the relay ECU <NUM>, the remote control device <NUM>, and the self-driving control device <NUM> on the configuration of the CAN network can be reduced and, thus, the need for a change in a control command in accordance with the type of vehicle to be controlled or the manufacturer of the vehicle can be eliminated.

Like the first embodiment, the second embodiment is described with reference to an example of anomaly determination made by the in-vehicle network system <NUM> illustrated in <FIG>. In the following description, differences from the first embodiment are mainly described, and description of the constituent elements and the processing procedure the same as those of the first embodiment is briefly given as needed.

According to the present embodiment, among the processing procedures for determination of an anomaly of control data made by the relay ECU <NUM> according to the first embodiment, the process performed in the case of "YES" in step <NUM>, that is, the process performed in the case where a match is found as the result of the matching process using the control command combination list is modified. This is only a difference from the first embodiment. <FIG> is a flowchart illustrating an example of the procedure for the operation performed by the relay ECU <NUM> to determine the presence/absence of an anomaly of control data, according to the present embodiment.

Steps S900, S902, S904, S906, and S908 are the same as steps S500, S502, S504, S506, and S908 according to the first embodiment, respectively.

Step S918 executed when the result of determination in step S902 is NO is the same as step S510 according to the first embodiment.

In addition, step S920 executed immediately after the result of the determination in step S908 is NO is the same as step S512 according to the first embodiment.

According to the present embodiment, the step corresponding to determination regarding the remote control mode according to the first embodiment may be executed subsequent to step S902. However, for simplicity, description and the figure of the step is not repeated.

If a match is found between the combination of the control command IDs for a control ID described in the control command combination list <NUM> illustrated in <FIG> and the actually extracted combination of the control ID and control command IDs (YES in step S908), the processing performed by the determination unit <NUM> proceeds to a value check combination list matching process (step S910).

In the value check combination list matching process (step S910), the control command ID extracted from the control frame is matched against a value check combination list <NUM> illustrated in <FIG>. Thus, a check table used for value check is identified. For example, if three control commands having control command IDs 0x01, 0x03, and 0x04 are included in a control frame, the fields for "0x01 - 0x03", "0x01 - 0x04", and "0x03 - 0x04" of the value check combination list <NUM> are referenced to identify the check tables. In this example, a check table CT2 and the check table CT3 are identified as check tables used for value check. Examples of check tables are illustrated in <FIG>. Note that there is no check table corresponding to the combination "0x03 - 0x04". This means that a combination of invalid values is not defined between the control command having a control command ID of 0x03 and the control command having a control command ID of 0x04.

Each of the check tables CT1 to CT5 indicates anomalous information in the control command, that is, an anomalous combination of data values. For example, a first one of the data rows of the check table CT1 illustrated in <FIG> indicates that a combination of a steering angle greater than <NUM> and an acceleration instruction value greater than <NUM> is anomalous if the control command IDs are 0x01 (steering angle) and 0x02 (accelerator instruction). When the value of the data to be checked is a numerical value, the condition may be indicated by, for example, the range of the numerical value. In addition, as indicated by the details of the turn signal control operation illustrated in the check tables CT3 and CT5, the condition may be indicated by a value that is not a numerical value or a value that is not the range of the numerical value. For example, the check table CT5 indicates that anomalous control occurs if the details of the acceleration control operation indicates an accelerator instruction value larger than <NUM> and the details of the turn signal light control operation indicates a "hazard light flashing instruction" (an instruction to flash both right and left turn signal lights simultaneously).

The above-described value check combination list <NUM> and check tables CT1 to CT5 are stored in the nonvolatile memory unit <NUM> via the setting I/F <NUM> at the time of manufacturing the vehicle <NUM>. In addition, even after the start of use of the vehicle <NUM>, the value check combination list <NUM> and check tables CT1 to CT5 may be updated by reprogramming via the setting I/F <NUM> or OTA (Over-The-Air) reprogramming.

If there is no check table to be used for value checking (NO in step S912), the received data is sent to the relay unit <NUM> and is transmitted from the second communication unit <NUM> to the Ethernet communication line <NUM> (step S918).

If there is a check table to be used for value checking (YES in step S912), determination of an anomalous value combination is made by using the identified check table (step S914).

For example, the check table CT2 is used for a combination of commands having control command IDs of 0x01 and 0x03. In this case, the determination unit <NUM> determines whether either one of the following anomaly conditions is satisfied: "the steering angle indicated by the control command data having a control command ID of 0x01 is greater than <NUM>, and the brake command indicated by the control command data having a control command ID of 0x03 is greater than <NUM>" and "the control command data having a control command ID of 0x01 is less than -<NUM>, and the brake command indicated by the control command data having a control command ID of 0x03 is greater than <NUM>". If any one of the anomaly conditions indicated in the identified check table is satisfied (YES in step S916), it is determined that the control data included in the frame is anomalous and, thus, the processing performed by the relay ECU <NUM> proceeds to the after-anomaly detection process (step S920).

However, if none of the anomaly conditions indicated in the identified check table is satisfied (NO in step S916), it is determined that the control data included in the frame is not anomalous. The control data determined to be not anomalous is sent to the relay unit <NUM> and is transmitted from the second communication unit <NUM> to the Ethernet communication line <NUM> (step S918).

As described above, the procedure for determination as to the presence/absence of an anomaly of the control frame made by the relay ECU <NUM> according to the present embodiment is performed and completed. The determination process is made for each of the frames received by the relay ECU <NUM>.

Upon receiving, via the second Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the control frame output by the relay ECU <NUM> that has determined that the control frame is not anomalous, the first relay conversion ECU <NUM> sequentially retrieves the control commands from the control frame. According to the present embodiment, the subsequent processes performed on the control frame are the same as those according to the first embodiment.

According to the above-described configuration of the present embodiment, the same effects as those of the first embodiment can be obtained.

Furthermore, according to the configuration of the present embodiment, the relay ECU <NUM> determines whether the information in the control command included in a control frame to be relayed satisfies a condition predetermined according to the combination of types of control commands and, thus, detects whether the control frame is anomalous. In this manner, the occurrence of anomalous control of the vehicle <NUM> caused by execution of anomalous control data can be reliably prevented.

<FIG> is a diagram illustrating an example of the configuration of a vehicle control network system according to a modification of the first or second embodiment. In <FIG>, the same reference numerals are used for the same constituent elements as those in <FIG>, and description of the constituent elements is not repeated.

Unlike the in-vehicle network system <NUM> according to the first or second embodiment, an in-vehicle network system <NUM> mounted in a vehicle <NUM> of the present modification does not include a relay ECU. In addition, the in-vehicle network system <NUM> includes a relay conversion ECU having a plurality of CAN bus interfaces and Ethernet interfaces. A plurality of control networks including an Ethernet network and a CAN network are connected to the relay conversion ECU. The relay conversion ECU is responsible for determination of an anomaly of the received data, necessary conversion according to the destination of the control data, and transmission of the control data.

Note that in the following description, it is assumed that the vehicle <NUM> has a self-driving capability and is based on a technology regarding state monitoring and remote control via a communication network, which can be put to practical use in the near future.

As illustrated in <FIG>, a first CAN communication line <NUM> and a second CAN communication line <NUM> constituting a CAN network are connected to a relay conversion ECU <NUM>. The first CAN communication line <NUM> and the second CAN communication line <NUM> correspond to the first CAN communication line <NUM> and the second CAN communication line <NUM> according to the first and second embodiments, respectively. A variety of control ECUs are connected to each of the Ethernet and CAN systems.

In addition, a first Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, a fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, and a sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM> are connected to the relay conversion ECU <NUM>. The first Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, and the sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM> correspond to the first Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, the fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM>, and the sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM> according to the first and second embodiments, respectively. A variety of ECUs and a TCU are connected to these communication lines. The in-vehicle network system <NUM> is connected to the vehicle external communication network <NUM> via radio communication <NUM> performed by the TCU <NUM>. Furthermore, the TCU <NUM> is connected to each of the control networks via the relay conversion ECU <NUM>. The configuration of the relay conversion ECU <NUM> is described below.

The in-vehicle network system <NUM> is connected to the monitoring server <NUM> and a remote control device <NUM> via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>. According to the present modification, the monitoring server <NUM> used in the first and second embodiments is not provided. Upon receiving a remote control request from the vehicle <NUM> via the vehicle external communication network <NUM>, the remote control device <NUM> transmits remote control data to the vehicle <NUM>. The remote control device <NUM> is implemented by, for example, executing a predetermined program in one or more information processing apparatuses each including a processor, a memory unit, an input/output device, and a communication device.

<FIG> is a block diagram illustrating an example of the configuration of the relay conversion ECU <NUM>.

The relay ECU <NUM> includes a first communication unit <NUM>, a second communication unit <NUM>, a third communication unit <NUM>, a fourth communication unit <NUM>, a fifth communication unit <NUM>, a sixth communication unit <NUM>, a memory unit <NUM>, a nonvolatile memory unit <NUM>, a determination unit <NUM>, a generation unit <NUM>, a relay conversion unit <NUM>, a control unit <NUM>, and a setting I/F unit <NUM>.

The first communication unit <NUM> is connected to the first Ethernet communication line <NUM> and exchanges data with the TCU <NUM> via Ethernet. The second communication unit <NUM> is connected to the fourth Ethernet communication line <NUM> and exchanges data with the camera ECU <NUM> via Ethernet. The third communication unit <NUM> is connected to the fifth Ethernet communication line <NUM> and exchanges data with the sensor ECU <NUM> via Ethernet. The fourth communication unit <NUM> is connected to the sixth Ethernet communication line <NUM> and exchanges data with the self-driving control ECU <NUM> via Ethernet. The fifth communication unit <NUM> is connected to the first CAN communication line <NUM> and exchanges data with the turn signal control ECU <NUM> via CAN. The sixth communication unit <NUM> is connected to the second CAN communication line <NUM> and exchanges data with the accelerator control ECU <NUM>, the brake control ECU <NUM>, and the steering control ECU <NUM> via CAN.

The determination unit <NUM>, the generation unit <NUM>, the relay conversion unit <NUM>, and the control unit <NUM> are functional constituent elements achieved by the processor included in the relay ECU <NUM> that executes a predetermined program. The program is stored in the nonvolatile memory unit <NUM> at the time of manufacturing the vehicle <NUM> and is executed by using the memory unit <NUM>.

Execution of self-driving control and remote control in the vehicle <NUM> and switching between the control modes are basically the same as those according to the first and second embodiments. The process performed by the relay conversion ECU <NUM>, which makes the present modification differ from the first and second embodiments, is described below with reference to an example. The relay conversion ECU <NUM> performs the process by executing the above-described predetermined program. The process includes determination as to the presence/absence of an anomaly of control data for the self-driving control operation or remote control operation. The flowchart illustrated in <FIG> describes an example of the procedure for the operation, which includes determination as to the presence/absence of an anomaly of the control data, performed by the relay conversion ECU <NUM> that executes the program. In the following description, differences from the first and second embodiments are mainly described, and description of the processing procedure the same as that of the first embodiment is briefly described as needed.

It is determined by the determination unit <NUM> whether the data received by the first communication unit <NUM> (step S1400) is a control frame of the vehicle <NUM> first (step S1402).

If as a result of this determination, the data is not a control frame (NO in step S1402), the frame is sent to the relay conversion unit <NUM>. In the relay conversion unit <NUM>, the frame is transmitted to one or more control networks via one or more of the transmission/reception units <NUM> to <NUM> corresponding to the destination of the frame (step S1418). Note that if the destination of the frame is a CAN network, the relay conversion unit <NUM> performs Ethernet-CAN conversion on the frame and, thereafter, transmits the frame.

If the received data is a control frame (YES in step S1402), the determination unit <NUM> extracts the control ID and the control command from the control frame (step S1404). In a description below, steps S1410, S1412, S1414 and S1416 correspond to steps S910, S912, S914 and S916 of the second embodiment, respectively. However, like the case of NO in step S1402, in the case of NO in step S1412 and in the case of NO in step S1416, the control command included in the control frame having a destination of a CAN network is subjected to Ethernet-CAN conversion in the relay conversion unit <NUM>. Thereafter, the control command is transmitted.

Note that according to the present modification, a step corresponding to determination regarding the remote control mode (step S503) made in the first embodiment may be executed subsequently to step S1402. In addition, a step corresponding to the matching process against the control command combination list (step S506) according to the first embodiment may be executed subsequent to step S1402. However, according to the present modification, for simplicity, description and figures of the steps are not given. Determination regarding the remote control mode may be made subsequent to step S1402. Furthermore, the matching process against the control command combination list may be performed subsequent to step S1404.

However, if the determination is YES in step S1416, the determination unit <NUM> determines that an anomaly is found in the control frame, and the processing performed by the relay conversion ECU <NUM> proceeds to the after-anomaly detection process (step S1420). The flowchart illustrated in <FIG> describes an example of the procedure for the after-anomaly detection process according to the present modification.

If the determination unit <NUM> determines that an anomaly is found in the control frame, the generation unit <NUM> removes, from the received vehicle control frame, a combination of control commands determined to be anomalous in value check (step S1500) and re-generates a control frame (step S1502).

The control frame without having the removed control command including the anomalous value is sent to the relay conversion unit <NUM>. In the relay conversion unit <NUM>, the control frame is transmitted to one or more of the control networks via one or more of the transmission/reception units <NUM> to <NUM> corresponding to the destination of the frame (step S1504). However, if the destination of the control frame is a CAN network, the relay conversion unit <NUM> performs Ethernet-CAN conversion on the frame and transmits the frame. This conversion includes conversion of the control command ID into the CAN ID using the control command ID conversion table <NUM>.

In addition, the generation unit <NUM> generates an anomaly message packet for notifying that an anomaly has been detected (step S1506). The anomaly message packet is transmitted to the relay conversion unit <NUM> and the first communication unit <NUM> and is transmitted from the second to sixth communication units <NUM> to <NUM> to the control network of the vehicle <NUM>. In addition, the anomaly message packet is transmitted from the first communication unit <NUM> to the remote control device <NUM> outside the vehicle (step S1508).

According to the above-described configuration of the present modification, the same effects as those of the first and second embodiments can be obtained.

As described above, the first and second embodiments and the modifications thereof have been described as examples of a technique according to the present disclosure. However, the technique according to the present disclosure is not limited thereto. The technique is applicable to the embodiments for which a change, substitution, addition, and deletion are made as appropriate. For example, the following modifications are also encompassed within an aspect of the present disclosure.

The configuration of the in-vehicle control network is not limited to those illustrated in <FIG> or <FIG>. For example, the technique according to the present disclosure is applicable to an intermediate configuration of the configuration illustrated in <FIG> or <FIG>. <FIG> is a diagram illustrating an example of such a configuration of a vehicle control network system.

A vehicle <NUM> according to the modification includes a vehicle control network system <NUM>. As compared with the vehicle control network system <NUM>, the vehicle control network system <NUM> has a relay ECU that relays data between the relay conversion ECU and the TCU, like the in-vehicle network system <NUM>. However, the relay conversion ECUs differ from each other. Unlike the vehicle control network system <NUM>, the vehicle control network system <NUM> includes a relay ECU. However, like the vehicle control network system <NUM>, the vehicle control network system <NUM> has only one relay conversion ECU to which all of the control networks (the CAN networks and the Ethernet networks) are connected.

In the vehicle control network system <NUM> having such a configuration, a determination of an anomaly of the control data may be made by either a relay ECU <NUM> or a relay conversion ECU <NUM>. If the determination is made by the relay ECU <NUM>, the relay ECU <NUM> has a configuration indicated by the block diagram illustrated of <FIG>.

The configuration is also an example of the configuration of the in-vehicle control network system. The configuration may include, for example, an ECU that further provides functions other than those described above. In addition, the configuration may include an increased number of CAN networks or Ethernet networks. Furthermore, different system control ECUs may be connected to one CAN network. Still furthermore, according to the above-described embodiments and modifications, the plurality of functions are provided by the plurality of ECUs. However, the plurality of functions may be provided by a single ECU.

In addition, while the above embodiments and modifications have been described with reference to the processing procedure for a determination of an anomaly made on the data received by the first communication unit by using the relay ECU or the relay conversion ECU, the same process is applicable to Ethernet data received by another communication unit.

In addition, while the above second embodiment and modification have been described with reference to the procedure for value checking using a condition including a combination of two types of control commands, a condition included by three or more types of control commands may be used. The load imposed on the determination process and the load imposed on the list management increase with increasing number of types of combined control commands. However, the determination of an anomaly can be made more finely and accurately.

In addition, a plurality of types of control command combination list, value check combination list, or check table described in each of the embodiments and modifications may be provided. Thus, the plurality of types of each list or the like may be switched and referenced in accordance with the state of the vehicle. The relay ECU <NUM> or the relay conversion ECU may acquire the state of the vehicle on the basis of, for example, state data indicating the state of the vehicle and transmitted from each of the control ECUs. Alternatively, the relay ECU <NUM> or the relay conversion ECU may acquire the state of the vehicle from the monitoring server outside the vehicle. Examples of the state of the vehicle include, but not limited to, the type of controller (e.g., manual driving, self-driving, or remote control), an ON/OFF operation of a particular temporary function (e.g., an autoparking function), information as to whether a breakdown of a particular part occurs, a driving location, weather, a travel speed, a shift position, a fuel level or a battery level, and information as to whether an obstacle is detected.

While the above embodiments and modifications have been described with reference to the vehicle <NUM> and the remote control device <NUM> communicating with each other via the TCU, another path, such as Wi-Fi, may be used. In addition, the functions of the TCU may be included in another ECU not mentioned above, such as an ECU that provides the IVI (In-Vehicle Infotainment) function.

While the above embodiments and modifications have been described with reference to a TLS session established between the remote control device and the TCU, a TLS session may be established between the remote control device <NUM> and one of the relay ECU <NUM> and the relay conversion ECU <NUM>.

Furthermore, according to the above-described embodiments and modifications, a control frame format to be processed is not limited to the control frame format <NUM> illustrated in <FIG>. For example, a control frame format 1800A illustrated in <FIG> may be employed in a vehicle for which remote control is not performed.

In addition, a determination of an anomaly can be made for even the control frame format 1800B not having a control ID indicating the type of control as illustrated in <FIG>. In this case, if a combination of types of control commands each indicated by the control command ID of a control command is not a preset certain combination, it may be determined that an anomaly occurs regardless of the type of control indicated by the control ID. As a result, a broader range and more exhaustive combination of control frames can be subjected to a determination of anomaly, and anomaly detection can be performed for various details of control operations indicated by combinations of control frames. It should be noted that even when anomaly detection is performed on a control frame having a format including a control ID, anomaly detection may be performed on the basis of a combination of control commands each indicated by a control command ID without using the control ID.

In addition, a control frame format <NUM> illustrated in <FIG> may be employed. In the control frame format <NUM>, a CAN ID and a CAN payload (a data field) are used as a control command ID and control command data, respectively.

While the above embodiments and modifications have been described with reference to the control operations performed by the self-driving control ECU and the remote control device that use control frames having the same format except for the remote control flag, control frames having different formats can be used.

In addition, according to the above-described embodiments and modifications, various data are written into the nonvolatile memory unit via the setting I/F unit. However, the various data may be written via any one of the communication units, instead of the setting I/F unit.

In addition, while the above embodiments and modifications have been described with reference to data conversion performed between different standards (i.e., Ethernet and CAN), the range of application of the technology according to the present disclosure is not limited thereto. For example, the technology according to the present disclosure is applicable to a network systems that comply with various standards, such as CAN-FD, Ethernet (registered trademark), MOST, LIN (Local Interconnect Network), and Flexray (registered trademark). Furthermore, in a situation in which the size of a payload included in control data needs to be changed at a relay point, conversion based on the same standard can be applied.

In addition, while the above embodiments and modifications have been described with reference to a determination of an anomaly of the control data made by the in-vehicle communication relay device, the determination of an anomaly of the control data may be made by a monitoring device that is located on an Ethernet network and that is not involved in the relay function, for example.

In addition, while the above embodiments and modifications have been described under the condition that they are applied to an in-vehicle control network system, the application range of the present disclosure is not limited thereto. For example, the present disclosure is applicable to the field of mobility, such as a construction machine, an agricultural machine, a ship, a railway, or an airplane. Furthermore, the present disclosure is effectively applicable to the industrial field and the field of factory control, such as a smart factory.

Claim 1:
An in-vehicle relay device for relaying communication between a plurality of control devices in a vehicle (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) over a plurality of networks to which the plurality of control devices are connected, wherein the plurality of networks includes a first and a second control network, wherein the largest data size of a control command transmittable in one frame in the first control network is larger than the largest data size of a control command transmittable in one frame in the second control network, the in-vehicle relay device comprising:
a communication unit (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) that receives control data from the first control network included in the plurality of networks, the control data including, in one frame, a plurality of control commands to be executed by at least some of the control devices; and
a determination unit (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) that makes a first determination as to whether types of the control commands included in said frame form a first combination preset as a combination of control commands executable simultaneously and thereafter makes a second determination as to whether the control data is anomalous by using a result of the first determination, and outputs a result of the second determination.