Patent Description:
Vehicles of all types are becoming increasingly complex, as they are fitted with network connections, automated operation components (e.g., "auto-pilot" or "self-driving" features), connected safety and security features, and the like. As vehicles become increasingly complex and connected, a range of security issues have become more prevalent, and the mechanisms to detect and remedy the security issues need to advance accordingly. These security issues include both physical security and cyber security issues from actors both inside and outside the vehicle operating organization.

In the field of aircraft vehicles, in particular, several aircraft incidents have occurred in which personnel on board the aircraft, including crew members, have deliberately flown the aircraft off course or the aircraft has deviated from a planned flight path. A first example is the Germanwings Flight <NUM> incident. The Germanwings Flight <NUM> incident involved a co-pilot locking other vehicle operators outside the cockpit and initiating a controlled descent until the aircraft impacted a mountainside of the French Alps. A second example is the Malaysia Airlines Flight <NUM> incident. The Malaysia Airlines Flight <NUM> incident involved a missing aircraft that was out of radar detection from Air Traffic Control (ATC) and military radar over open ocean, while deviating westwards from the aircraft's planned flight path and transmitting Inmarsat satellite messages.

Also, flight crews may be flying off course due to unintentional changes and/or intentional malicious changes of an aircraft database (or databases), for example the Flight Management System (FMS) and/or a terrain database in a synthetic vision system. These changes may occur via cyber-attacks mechanisms that may not be easily detectable by an unsuspecting flight crew. This can become especially challenging if the flight crew is flying in automatic fully-coupled flight control modes of operation on approach or departure, and could be compounded in poor weather conditions. Furthermore, a concern in providing aircraft data security involves ensuring that any databases, for example the FMS navigation database and/or terrain and obstacle databases for synthetic vision display, are not maliciously tampered with. Cyber security issues may result in aircraft sensors being corrupted such that misleading aircraft guidance or other data is provided to the aircrew or autopilot.

With or without aircraft datalink connectivity, it may be possible for a malicious actor with physical access to the aircraft to deliberately corrupt a database of the aircraft in a subtle, but malicious manner. Data may be deliberately corrupted in a manner where a checking mechanism is also defeated. For example, Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC) for a corrupted data value could be calculated and used to replace the CRC of the original data along with replacing the original data. These mechanisms might also not be effective after the data has been decoded in the system and the CRCs or other protective layers have been removed from the data, such as when an authorized or unauthorized entity has physical access or local network access to the various databases. Existing efforts to address physical security and cyber security in aircraft have focused on adding security protections to the cockpit (e.g., cockpit door locks) and adding security protections to the primary avionics to preclude outside actors from gaining access. These techniques typically rely on trusted actors within the aircraft operating organization to operate the vehicle and perform maintenance and maintain security of access mechanisms, such as passwords. Thus, these techniques are susceptible to the potential for undiscovered cyber security threats and for even trusted actors to act in a malicious manner. Specifically, a trusted actor could purposefully deviate from a planned flight path. Further, a trusted actor could alter on-board systems so that one or more sub-systems indicate data to the flight crew that could cause the flight crew to deviate from a planned flight path, to deviate from standard and safe routes or approaches, to descend at an incorrect destination, to request a destination change, and to plan a flight path through restricted air space.

<CIT> relates to an operating method for aircraft, by engaging automated control unit on aircraft to execute preprogrammed flight path or contingency protocol that contradicts flight plan modification if potentially hostile situation cannot be ruled out;.

<CIT> relates to an avionic system and ground station for aircraft out of route management and alarm communications. More particularly, it relates to a system for handling events in case of deviations from the authorized flight paths and from the pre-set altitude or flight level or spatial limits, and automatically transmitting the onboard situation in real time to ground control stations when potentially dangerous events occur;.

<CIT> relates to a tracking system for aircraft, has aircraft transponder aboard aircraft for transmitting data packets to ground-based receiving station;.

<CIT> relates to an aircraft safety and configuration monitoring system and method which automatically monitors aircraft safety and configuration process data and reports the data to an airline maintenance operation check (AMOC) system or the like for security, supply chain and maintenance planning purposes;.

<CIT> relates to a security system for use in aircraft, having controller to produce signal in area in responsive to keypad, when access code is entered, and logic system in communication with switch and keypad.

The present disclosure is directed to systems and methods for addressing these goals and interests. Thus, techniques discussed herein disclose systems and methods for detecting security threats in vehicle systems and operations.

According to certain aspects of the systems and methods according to claims <NUM> and <NUM> respectively are disclosed for detecting security threats during vehicle operations utilizing an on-board monitoring system.

Various embodiments of the present disclosure relate generally to detecting security threats and, more particularly, to monitoring data in aircraft systems for errors, data corruption, data tampering, and malicious activity of authorized and unauthorized personnel.

In general, the present disclosure is directed to use of an enhanced ground proximity warning system and wireless connectivity interface for implementing a malicious actor or other cyber security threat alert system. As described in more detail below, the proposed malicious actor alert could be implemented by using an enhanced ground proximity warning system ("EGPWS"). The software algorithms to detect suspicious behavior may be implemented in the EGPWS. Connection to the ground may be implemented by using a Wi-Fi connection to the cabin satcom system together with a VPN to provide security of the datalink. The Wi-Fi interface may also be used to provide alerts to other cabin crew members including any air marshal on board. The datalink connection to the ground may be used to validate unusual flight path changes and to alert cognizant personnel on the ground. While there are significant cyber security concerns associated with linking cockpit systems to the cabin, these concerns may be mitigated by the use of the VPN connection and by the fact that while the EGPWS system receives substantial data from aircraft systems, its ability to transmit data to other aircraft systems may be very limited.

The terminology used below may be interpreted in its broadest reasonable manner, even though it is being used in conjunction with a detailed description of certain specific examples of the present disclosure. Indeed, certain terms may even be emphasized below; however, any terminology intended to be interpreted in any restricted manner will be overtly and specifically defined as such in this Detailed Description section. Both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the features, as claimed.

As used herein, the terms "comprises," "comprising," "having," including," or other variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements, but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus.

In this disclosure, relative terms, such as, for example, "about," substantially," "generally," and "approximately" are used to indicate a possible variation of ±<NUM>% in a stated value.

The term "exemplary" is used in the sense of "example" rather than "ideal. " As used herein, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" include plural reference unless the context dictates otherwise.

While this disclosure describes the systems and methods with reference to aircraft (e.g., aircraft primary avionics systems), it should be appreciated that the present systems and methods are applicable to security of any vehicle management systems, including those of drones, automobiles, trains (locomotives), or any other autonomous and/or Internet-connected vehicle.

Referring now to the appended drawings, <FIG> depicts an exemplary data infrastructure for a vehicle, such as an aircraft system, according to techniques presented herein. In general, <FIG> depicts an exemplary data infrastructure system <NUM> for detecting security threats of an aircraft system. As shown, exemplary data infrastructure system <NUM> comprises a global positioning system ("GPS") <NUM>, flight management system ("FMS") <NUM>, aircraft sensors <NUM>, audio system <NUM>, enhanced ground proximity warning system (or "EGPWS" or on-board monitoring system) <NUM>, aircraft satcom system (datalink) <NUM>, speaker <NUM>, display system <NUM>, Cabin Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) Router <NUM>, and Personal Communication device <NUM>.

A flight management system (or "FMS") <NUM> may be any type of computer that acts as a type of navigation equipment, and may be configured for receiving input data from a variety of other navigational instruments. Other navigational instruments may include aircraft sensors <NUM>, such as inertial navigation instruments, radio navigational instruments, including one or more very high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) systems, and global positioning system (GPS) <NUM>. Aircraft sensors <NUM> may generate various data, including altitude data, heading data, air data reference, radar altimeter data, etc. Using this data and/or data from the GPS <NUM>, the FMS <NUM> may generate position information, and may further engage in in-flight management of a flight plan, which may be stored in an FMS database (or database of vehicle). Using FMS database data, the FMS <NUM> may calculate a course for the aircraft to follow, including a lateral flight plan and/or a vertical flight plan.

The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS or on-board monitoring system) <NUM> is configured to alert pilots if the aircraft is in immediate danger of impacting the ground or an obstacle. EGPWS <NUM> may receive data from many aircraft systems including FMS <NUM>, GPS <NUM>, and/or aircraft sensors <NUM>, such as air data, radar altimeter, inertial system, etc. EGPWS <NUM> may be configured to communicate with datalink <NUM> by direct communication (dashed line) or indirect communication (through the cabin Wi-Fi router <NUM>). The data link <NUM> may have one or more antenna <NUM>. EGPWS <NUM> may further communicate with audio system <NUM>, which may produce an audio output at one or more speakers <NUM>, which may comprise, for example, an audible alarm if the airplane altitude falls below a threshold. FMS <NUM> and/or EGPWS <NUM> may be associated with at least one display system <NUM>, which may display flight path information, location information, ground proximity data, temperature data, aircraft sensor data, etc., to the crew. EGPWS <NUM> may further include a Wi-Fi router (not shown), either connected thereto or built-in, which may communicate with cabin Wi-Fi router <NUM>. Cabin Wi-Fi router <NUM> may communicate with aircraft satcom system <NUM> and at least one personal communication device <NUM>. Personal communication device <NUM> may belong to one or both of a member of the flight crew or an air marshal, and personal communication device <NUM> may be a cell-phone, a mobile computer, a tablet, etc..

<FIG> depicts an exemplary infrastructure for EGPWS <NUM>, according to techniques presented herein. In one embodiment, EGPWS <NUM> may have a memory or data store <NUM> comprising an independent copy of one or more of aircraft databases, including a terrain database <NUM>, obstacle database <NUM>, and navigation and/or runway database <NUM>. EGPWS <NUM> may further comprise a processor <NUM>, GPS receiver <NUM>, altitude encoder <NUM>, temperature probe <NUM>, display <NUM>, alert/light <NUM>, and speaker <NUM>. The EGPWS <NUM> may also include a set of input and/or output (IO) paths (not shown) for monitoring data on aircraft data busses. The IO may include analog signals, discrete signals, Arinc <NUM>, RS-<NUM>, and/or RS-<NUM> data, and/or Ethernet databuses. Processor <NUM> may be configured to retrieve data from memory and/or data store <NUM>, and/or receive data from aircraft sensors <NUM>, to perform techniques presented herein. Processor <NUM> may be configured to produce outputs to display <NUM>, such as to a computer screen, outputs to one or more indicator lights <NUM>, outputs to one or more audio speakers <NUM>, and/or outputs to cabin Wi-Fi router <NUM> or data link <NUM>.

EGPWS <NUM> may be associated with, and transmit and receive data to and from, a separate array of sensors, which may be embedded, such as GPS receiver <NUM>, altitude encoder <NUM>, and/or temperature probe <NUM>, any of which may be embedded in the EGPWS <NUM> or separate from EGPWS <NUM>. These sensors may be independent or duplicates of sensors associated with the FMS <NUM>, or other aircraft sensors. All of the foregoing sensors may transmit data to processor <NUM> and be stored in data store <NUM> (collectively "route parameters" or "flight parameters"). EGPWS <NUM> may be configured to use independent database copies and connections to aircraft sensors to monitor other aircraft systems, such as FMS <NUM>, and provide alerts to the crew and/or ground in the event of a security threat. EGPWS <NUM> may share a display with FMS <NUM>, or there may be separate displays. The display <NUM> of EGPWS <NUM> may be used to provide alerts to the crew. Potential security threats could also be provided to this display <NUM>. For example, in one embodiment, FMS <NUM> may transmit flight plan information to display system <NUM> as well as to EGPWS <NUM>.

In one embodiment, the EGPWS <NUM> may receive the flight plan information data from the FMS <NUM>, while the EGPWS <NUM> receives sensor data information from the various sensors (e.g., GPS receiver <NUM>, altitude encoder <NUM>, and/or temperature probe <NUM>, or aircraft sensors <NUM> or GPS <NUM>) or from data store <NUM>. Such received data may be used to monitor for security threats (e.g., unusual crew actions and unusual flight plan information), including the following potential items with corresponding threat detection algorithms:.

The above item <NUM> (significant deviation from the entered flight plan) may be detected by monitoring, by the EGPWS <NUM>, flight parameters (e.g., altitude, heading, etc.) of the aircraft based on input signals to the EGPWS <NUM>; and detecting, by the EGPWS <NUM>, significant deviations from the flight plan by comparing the retrieved flight plan to the monitored flight parameters.

The above items <NUM>-<NUM> and <NUM>-<NUM> may be detected by forecasting, by the EGPWS <NUM>, the flight plan with respect to a various items included in the terrain database <NUM>, the obstacle database <NUM>, or the runway database <NUM>, or other database of the EGPWS <NUM>, so as to forecast relative interactions of the aircraft and the external environment and external aircraft features; and detecting, by EGPWS <NUM>, anomalies based on the forecast relative interactions.

For instance, a relative interaction of the aircraft and the external environment may be that the aircraft is at a low altitude (closer to ground than is standard), even when the elevation above sea level is substantially normal. For instance, an elevation of <NUM>,<NUM> feet above sea level would not be abnormal, but an elevation of <NUM>,<NUM> feet planned in the flight plan near Denver, Colorado, United States, would indicate a low altitude situation, as Denver is around <NUM>,<NUM> feet above sea level and the Rocky Mountains (near Denver) range up to around <NUM>,<NUM> feet above sea level. Another relative interaction might be that the flight plan may include a route with a trajectory that intersects restricted airspace. Each of the various interactions could be flagged as anomalies.

The above item <NUM> could be detected by the EGPWS <NUM> monitoring a data bus of the aircraft system <NUM> and noting that a destination has been changed in the flight plan.

Therefore, an on-board monitoring device (like EGPWS <NUM>) may review a portion of a route or a portion of a route plan of a vehicle using the above described threat detection algorithms to detect security threats. For instance, the on-board monitoring device may compare the route plan against independent data sources including database of terrain, navigation aids, airways, runways and/or compare an aircraft state (as based on, e.g., sensors) such as GPS position, airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, attitude, and acceleration to the route plan, to detect unusual behavior as the security threat. Moreover, specific thresholds for the threat detection algorithms may be chosen to be able to be sensitive enough to detect threats while still minimizing nuisance alerts.

The EGPWS <NUM> may be provided with a datalink connection, such as aircraft satcom system <NUM>, that allows off aircraft communication. By using an aircraft satcom system <NUM>, the EGPWS <NUM> may transmit a validation request to a ground based service (or validation service), which may be an airline ground operations center, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), etc., to validate the above potential items, before issuing an alert of a security threat.

For example, the flight plan may be compared with the flight plan maintained by the airlines ground operations center. The weather at the destination may be checked to ensure that the aircraft was not making a legitimate diversion. Turbulence reports may be checked to ensure that altitude changes are the result of a flight crews actions to minimize turbulence. Specifically, the EGPWS <NUM> transmits a portion of the flight (i.e., the significant deviation from the entered flight plan) or a portion of the flight plan (e.g., destination, change of destination, planned descent, flight path, etc.) to the validation service via the aircraft satcom system <NUM>. The EGPWS <NUM> also transmits an indication of what caused the portion of the flight or the portion of the flight plan to be flagged to the EGPWS <NUM> (e.g., low altitude compared to terrain of terrain database <NUM>, destination has waypoint that is different than waypoint included in runway database <NUM>, route of flight plan intersects restricted airspace, etc.).

The validation service transmits a response back to the EGPWS <NUM> via the aircraft satcom system <NUM>. The response may provide information for the EGPWS <NUM> to evaluate the potential item and determine whether the flagged condition is, or is not, a security threat; or the response may indicate that the potential item is or is not a security threat.

The same monitor functions proposed above could also potentially mitigate some cybersecurity issues where a database or flight plan is unintentionally changed or maliciously modified by authorized or unauthorized personal onboard the aircraft. The authorized or unauthorized personal may load the modified database or flight plan information in the aircraft with valid integrity mechanisms defeated. Cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs) are typically used to preclude corruption of data by the transmission mechanism; however valid CRCs can be readily created by a hacker and used to load seemingly valid data that has been subtly corrupted. The proposed algorithms for detecting unusual planned flight paths in the flight plan may also detect some cases of corruption due to cyber security issues.

Moreover, the EGPWS <NUM> may be equipped with a wireless communication mechanism, such as Wi-Fi. The EGPWS <NUM> may use the Wi-Fi interface to connect to the cabin Wi-Fi router <NUM>, so as to alert the flight crew, flight attendants, or an on-board air marshal via personal communication devices <NUM>.

Additionally, another aspect is that the EGPWS <NUM> may control a cockpit security door(s). Due to aircraft hijacking incidents, cockpit security doors (not shown) have been added to many aircraft. This has, however, resulted in events in which crew members were locked out of the cockpit and therefore were unable to intervene. The EGPWS <NUM> may include an interface to unlock the cockpit door in the event that significant flight path deviations are validated as a security threat (or one of the other potential items are validated as a security threat). For example, if the EGPWS <NUM> detects a potential item, the EGPWS <NUM> may transmit a message to the ground for confirmation; if the EGPWS <NUM> receives confirmation that the potential item is a security threat, the EGPWS <NUM> or another on-board system may automatically unlock the cockpit door. The EGPWS <NUM> may also (or alternatively) automatically change the aircraft transponder code to <NUM> and alert Air Traffic Control (ATC) to the potential hijack. This would preclude both malicious unlock commands from the ground and unlocking of the door in the event of legitimate flight path changes such as weather diversions.

An additional aspect is that the connection from the EGPWS <NUM> to the ground (or the validation service) may be implemented by using the Cabin Wi-Fi Router <NUM> and the aircraft satcom system <NUM>, together with a virtual private network (VPN) to provide security of the datalink. While there are cyber security concerns associated with linking cockpit systems (e.g., the EGPWS <NUM>) to the cabin, these concerns would be mitigated (<NUM>) by the use of the VPN connection and (<NUM>) by the fact that, while the EGPWS <NUM> receives significant data from aircraft systems, the EGPWS <NUM> ability to transmit data to other aircraft systems is very limited. Moreover, the EGPWS <NUM> would have no way or very little control of the aircraft or ability to provide misleading guidance to the crew should it be hacked. However, it is likely that the crew would respond to such an alert by climbing to a safe altitude, so such a misleading guidance or nuisance alert would not in itself be a hazard.

<FIG> depicts a flow chart of an exemplary method for detecting security threats during vehicle operations utilizing an on-board monitoring system, according to techniques presented herein.

First, the on-board monitoring system may retrieve a route plan for a route of a vehicle from a database of the vehicle (block <NUM>).

Then, the on-board monitoring system identifies either a portion of the route or a portion of the route plan to validate based on an analysis of the route plan (block <NUM>).

Then, the on-board monitoring system, in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan to validate, transmits a validation request to a validation service via a wireless communication interface (block <NUM>).

Then, the on-board monitoring system receives a response from the validation service via the wireless communication interface (block <NUM>).

Then, the on-board monitoring system identifies the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as a security threat based on the response from the validation service (block <NUM>).

Then, the on-board monitoring system, in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as the security threat, transmits an alert of the security threat via the wireless communication interface (block <NUM>).

<FIG> is a simplified functional block diagram of a computer that may be configured as any of the systems of <FIG> to execute techniques described herein, according to exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure. Specifically, in one embodiment, any of the aircraft systems <NUM>, including the EGPWS <NUM> and/or FMS <NUM>, may be an assembly of hardware <NUM> including, for example, a data communication interface <NUM> for packet data communication. The platform may also include a central processing unit ("CPU") <NUM>, in the form of one or more processors, for executing program instructions. The platform may include an internal communication bus <NUM>, program storage, and data storage for various data files to be processed and/or communicated by the platform such as ROM <NUM> and RAM <NUM>, although the system <NUM> may receive programming and data via network communications. The system <NUM> also may include input and output ports <NUM> to connect with input and output devices such as keyboards, mice, touchscreens, monitors, displays, etc. Of course, the various system functions may be implemented in a distributed fashion on a number of similar platforms, to distribute the processing load. Alternatively, the systems may be implemented by appropriate programming of one computer hardware platform.

Any suitable system infrastructure may be put into place to allow for the assessment of models monitoring devices. <FIG> and the following discussion provide a brief, general description of a suitable computing environment in which the present disclosure may be implemented. In one embodiment, any of the disclosed systems, methods, and/or graphical user interfaces may be executed by or implemented by a computing system consistent with or similar to that depicted in <FIG>. Although not required, aspects of the present disclosure are described in the context of computer-executable instructions, such as routines executed by a data processing device, e.g., a server computer, wireless device, and/or personal computer. Those skilled in the relevant art will appreciate that aspects of the present disclosure can be practiced with other communications, data processing, or computer system configurations, including: Internet appliances, hand-held devices (including personal digital assistants ("PDAs")), wearable computers, all manner of cellular or mobile phones (including Voice over IP ("VoIP") phones), dumb terminals, media players, gaming devices, virtual reality devices, multi-processor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, set-top boxes, network PCs, mini-computers, mainframe computers, and the like. Indeed, the terms "computer," "server," and the like, are generally used interchangeably herein, and refer to any of the above devices and systems, as well as any data processor.

Aspects of the present disclosure may be embodied in a special purpose computer and/or data processor that is specifically programmed, configured, and/or constructed to perform one or more of the computer-executable instructions explained in detail herein. While aspects of the present disclosure, such as certain functions, are described as being performed exclusively on a single device, the present disclosure may also be practiced in distributed environments where functions or modules are shared among disparate processing devices, which are linked through a communications network, such as a Local Area Network ("LAN"), Wide Area Network ("WAN"), and/or the Internet. Similarly, techniques presented herein as involving multiple devices may be implemented in a single device. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and/or remote memory storage devices.

Aspects of the present disclosure may be stored and/or distributed on non-transitory computer-readable media, including magnetically or optically readable computer discs, hard-wired or preprogrammed chips (e.g., EEPROM semiconductor chips), nanotechnology memory, biological memory, or other data storage media. Alternatively, computer implemented instructions, data structures, screen displays, and other data under aspects of the present disclosure may be distributed over the Internet and/or over other networks (including wireless networks), on a propagated signal on a propagation medium (e.g., an electromagnetic wave(s), a sound wave, etc.) over a period of time, and/or they may be provided on any analog or digital network (packet switched, circuit switched, or other scheme).

Program aspects of the technology may be thought of as "products" or "articles of manufacture" typically in the form of executable code and/or associated data that is carried on or embodied in a type of machine-readable medium. "Storage" type media include any or all of the tangible memory of the computers, processors or the like, or associated modules thereof, such as various semiconductor memories, tape drives, disk drives and the like, which may provide non-transitory storage at any time for the software programming. All or portions of the software may at times be communicated through the Internet or various other telecommunication networks. Such communications, for example, may enable loading of the software from one computer or processor into another, for example, from a management server or host computer of the mobile communication network into the computer platform of a server and/or from a server to the mobile device. Thus, another type of media that may bear the software elements includes optical, electrical and electromagnetic waves, such as used across physical interfaces between local devices, through wired and optical landline networks and over various air-links. The physical elements that carry such waves, such as wired or wireless links, optical links, or the like, also may be considered as media bearing the software. As used herein, unless restricted to non-transitory, tangible "storage" media, terms such as computer or machine "readable medium" refer to any medium that participates in providing instructions to a processor for execution.

While the presently disclosed methods, devices, and systems are described with exemplary reference to transmitting data, it should be appreciated that the presently disclosed embodiments may be applicable to any environment, such as a desktop or laptop computer, an automobile entertainment system, a home entertainment system, etc. Also, the presently disclosed embodiments may be applicable to any type of Internet protocol.

Claim 1:
A method for detecting security threats during vehicle operations utilizing an on-board monitoring system (<NUM>) of a vehicle, comprising:
retrieving, by the on-board monitoring system (<NUM>), a route plan for a route of the vehicle from a database (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) of the vehicle;
identifying, by the on-board monitoring system (<NUM>), either a portion of the route or a portion of the route plan as a security threat based on an analysis of the route plan by:
transmitting a validation request to a validation service via a wireless communication interface (<NUM>), the validation request including the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan and an indication of what caused the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan to be identified as a security threat;
receiving a response from the validation service at the on-board monitoring system (<NUM>) via the wireless communication interface (<NUM>); and
identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as the security threat based on the response from the validation service; and
in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as the security threat, transmitting, by the on-board monitoring system (<NUM>), an alert of the security threat.