Patent Description:
Telephone call authentication involves attempting to identify a calling party. However, current methods lack the ability to reliably authenticate the devices called from and the parties calling from them. Furthermore, such methods are at best sparsely implemented and subject to practices such as spoofing, in which a caller may use a false identity and/or number in order to trick a call recipient into answering. As a result, users often have a mistrust of communication systems at best. At worst, they may be subject to nuisances and/or security risks. <CIT> relates to a known system and method for automatically identifying a caller using a call interface. <CIT> refers to further techniques for authenticating the identity of a telephone caller.

According to one aspect of the invention, a method for performing peer to peer authentication of calls includes the steps of receiving an incoming call data stream from a first mobile phone device, the incoming call data stream comprising an incoming call number of a second mobile phone device and an encrypted payload comprising payload data encrypted using a private key associated with the first mobile phone device. In some embodiments, the private key comprises a dynamic key of the first mobile phone device and the encrypted payload comprises a cryptogram. The method may include authenticating the incoming call data stream in response to a match between the encrypted payload and stored information related to the first mobile phone device. In various aspects, the authentication includes forwarding the cryptogram to an authentication server, wherein the authentication server maintains and modifies a copy of the dynamic key concurrently with the first mobile phone device as the stored information related to the first mobile phone device. In some embodiments, the authentication further includes receiving a validation of the first mobile phone device from the authentication server in response to a counter match between a counter extracted from the cryptogram using the copy of the dynamic key and an expected counter associated with the first mobile phone device. The method may further include selectively establishing a call connection between the first mobile phone device and the second mobile phone device in response to the step of authenticating.

According to another aspect of the invention, a system for authenticating calls between devices comprises an interface configured to receive an incoming call data stream from a first mobile phone device. In some embodiments, the incoming call data stream comprises an incoming call number associated with a second mobile phone device and an encrypted payload comprising payload data encrypted using a private key associated with the first mobile phone device. In some embodiments, the system includes a processor coupled to the interface and a non-volatile memory having program code stored thereon, the program code operable when executed upon by the processor to authenticate the incoming call data stream in response to a match between information of the encrypted payload and stored information related to the first mobile phone device. The system further includes a communication interface coupled to the processor and configured to selectively establish a call connection between the first mobile phone device and the second mobile phone device in response to the step of authenticating.

According to yet another aspect of the invention, a method for authenticating calls between mobile devices includes the steps of receiving an incoming call data stream from a first mobile phone device. In some embodiments, the incoming call data stream comprises an incoming call number associated with a second mobile phone device, and an encrypted payload comprises payload data encrypted using a private key associated with the first mobile phone device and a voice message an attribute. The method includes retrieving a public key of the incoming call number from a data storage device and decrypting the encrypted payload using the public key of the incoming call number to produce a decrypted payload comprising an identifier. The method includes comparing the identifier of the decrypted payload to an expected identifier associated with the incoming call number to determine a first factor authentication match and comparing the attribute of the voice message to an expected voice message attribute to identify a second factor authentication match. The method further includes selectively establishing a connection between the first mobile phone device and the second mobile phone device in response to the first factor authentication match and the second factor authentication match.

With such an arrangement, a system and method are provided for reliably authenticating incoming calls.

An objective of some embodiments of the present disclosure is the use of one or more keys that have been incorporated into one or more contactless cards as described in U. Patent Application(s) Serial Number <CIT>, et. al, entitled "Systems and Methods for Cryptographic Authentication of Contactless Cards" (hereinafter the '<NUM> Application). The contactless card may be used to perform authentication and numerous other functions that may otherwise require the user to carry a separate physical token in addition to the contactless card. By employing a contactless interface, contactless cards may be provided with a method to interact and communicate between a user's device (such as a mobile phone) and the card itself. For example, the near-field communication (NFC) protocol, which underlies many credit card transactions, includes an authentication process which suffices for operating systems for Android® but presents challenges for iOS,®, which is more restrictive regarding NFC usage, as it can be used only in a read-only manner. Exemplary embodiments of the contactless cards described in the '<NUM> Application may utilize NFC technology. Authenticating users via the contactless card interface may overcome prior art identity theft issues by validating endpoints of a call link.

Various embodiments described herein are directed towards authenticating calls by using one or more keys associated with a specific user. In examples, the user is the sender of a call. In various embodiments, when a call is made, an identifying payload is encrypted using a private key associated with the user. The encrypted identifying payload is appended to the call data stream. The identifying payload may be decrypted with a public key. In embodiments, the identifying payload may be verified. In various embodiments, further authentication methods may be performed by using an object such as a contactless card to provide one or more components of the identifying payload and/or keys. In embodiments, a connection may be made between the sender and the intended recipient of a call based on the verification of the identifying payload.

In some embodiments described herein, the private key used to encrypt the identifying payload may be stored or issued with respect to a particular user device. Such a user device may be a network-enabled computer. As referred to herein, a network-enabled computer may include, but is not limited to: e.g., a computer device, or communications device including, e.g., a server, a network appliance, a personal computer (PC), a workstation, a mobile device, a phone, a handheld PC, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a thin client device, a fat client device, or other device.

In some embodiments described herein, the private key used to encrypt the identifying payload may be stored or issued with respect to a separate object associated with the user. For example, the separate object may be a contactless card, as referenced in the incorporated '<NUM> application and in greater detail herein. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

In various embodiments described herein, the identifying payload may comprise text data, audio data, numerical data, or a combination thereof. For example, an identifying payload may comprise information about a user's association with a communication service provider, a voice message, or a counter as associated with a contactless card. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

While unsolicited calls may come from a variety of callers with a variety of purposes, they are often difficult for a recipient to identify, leading to poor user experience for communication system clients and user mistrust of the communication system.

For example, caller ID may indicate to a call recipient that a caller is a known contact or show the caller's phone number so that the recipient may recognize an area code in it. However, caller ID can be turned off by the caller. Furthermore, in this example, the recipient is still notified of the incoming call and must still deliberately deny it. Furthermore, harassers can avoid proper identification, for example, by spoofing or blocking caller ID. In further examples, voice over IP users may send false caller ID or route calls through servers in multiple countries.

For the field of phone communications, the FCC has called for the implementation of Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using toKENs (SHAKEN) and the Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) standards, but these procedures also fall short of fully authenticating the identity of a caller. In SHAKEN/STIR, the service provider of a caller may create a digital signature based on what it knows about the call origination, such as the customer and their right to use the number called from, the customer (but not the number), or the point from which the call enters their network. An origination identifier may be assigned to uniquely identify the call origination. However, in these procedures, the end verification is that a caller has a right to appear as a certain calling party to the recipient. The call may not actually come from the number that appears as the caller. For example, service provider-approved spoofing may still take place. Even after the implementation of such methods, recipients will not have certainty of the identity on the other end of an incoming communication. There is a need for an improved system to authenticate identities of parties originating communication.

Various embodiments described herein include components that can enable one or more of the following: (<NUM>) authentication of a communication initiator in association with the device used to initiate the communication, (<NUM>) authentication of a communication initiator in association with the device used to initiate the communication and separate identifying information provided by and/or relating to the communication initiator, and (<NUM>) authentication of a communication initiator in association with the device used to initiate the communication and a separate object uniquely possessed by the communication initiator, for example, a contactless card.

Authentication of communications based on the device from which they were sent reduces the potential for nuisance communications, including fraud attempts, to reach a receiving client, thereby improving the security of their information. In some embodiments, selective connection of a first client device and second client device for communication-based on the results of the authentication or multifactor authentication may reduce the load of unwanted communications on clients and thereby improve client experience.

Embodiments disclosed herein thus leverage authentication features of at least one client device and/or service provider in practical applications to increase security of network communications and/or improve client confidence in the authenticity of received communications. In several embodiments, components described herein may provide specific and particular manners of authenticating communications and/or managing communications based on the results of authentication. In many embodiments, one or more of the components described herein may be implemented as a set of rules that improve computer-related technology by allowing a function not previously performable by a computer that enables an improved technological result to be achieved. For example, authenticating a communication based on identifying information related to the communication initiator is such an improved technological result. In another example, the function may include secure multifactor authentication via leveraging of features of a client device and/or separate object, such as a contactless card. In another example, the function may include managing communications by selectively connecting devices for communication according to the results of multifactor authentication.

These and other features of the invention will now be described with reference to the figures, wherein like reference numerals are used to refer to like elements throughout.

As used in this application, the terms "system", "component" and "unit" are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or software in execution, examples of which are described herein. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to being, a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard disk drive, multiple storage drives (of optical and/or magnetic storage medium), an object, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both an application running on a server and the server can be a component. One or more components can reside within a process and/or thread of execution, and a component can be localized on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers.

Further, components may be communicatively coupled to each other by various types of communications media to coordinate operations. The coordination may involve the uni-directional or bi-directional exchange of information. For instance, the components may communicate information in the form of signals communicated over the communications media. The information can be implemented as signals allocated to various signal lines. In such allocations, each message is a signal. Further embodiments, however, may alternatively employ data messages. Such data messages may be sent across various connections. Exemplary connections include parallel interfaces, serial interfaces, and bus interfaces.

<FIG> illustrates a system <NUM> including <NUM> or more client devices <NUM> and <NUM> coupled via a network <NUM>. In various embodiments, a client devices <NUM> and <NUM> comprise network-enabled computers and communicate with each other via network <NUM>. Specifically, various embodiments include each client device being associated with a private key and a public key. In embodiments, a client device <NUM> initiating communication may send a message <NUM> comprising a phone number and a payload encrypted with its own private key <NUM>. The message may be passed through an authentication router <NUM> which is part of the network <NUM>. The encrypted payload of the message <NUM> may be decrypted using the public key <NUM> associated with the client device <NUM>. The communication may be passed to client device <NUM>. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

In various embodiments, a first client device <NUM> may initiate a communication with the intention of reaching one or more client devices <NUM>. While only one device is illustrated in <FIG>, it will be understood that the communication could have a plurality of recipients, for example, as in a group message, conference call, or group video chat. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

The client devices <NUM> and <NUM> can include a processor and a memory, and it is understood that the processing circuitry may contain additional components, including processors, memories, error and parity/CRC checkers, data encoders, anti-collision algorithms, controllers, command decoders, security primitives, and tamper-proofing hardware, as necessary to perform the functions described herein. The client devices <NUM> and <NUM> may further include a display and input devices. The display may be any type of device for presenting visual information such as a computer monitor, a flat panel display, and a mobile device screen, including liquid crystal displays, light-emitting diode displays, plasma panels, and cathode ray tube displays. The input devices may include any device for entering information into the user's device that is available and supported by the user's device, such as a touch-screen, keyboard, mouse, cursor-control device, microphone, digital camera, video recorder or camcorder. These devices may be used to enter information and interact with the software and other devices described herein.

One or more client devices <NUM> and <NUM> also may be a mobile device for example, such as an iPhone, iPod, iPad from Apple® or any other mobile device running Apple's iOS operating system, any device running Microsoft's Windows® Mobile operating system, and/or any other smartphone or like wearable mobile device.

Client devices <NUM> and <NUM> may include a thin client application specifically adapted for communication with a service provider. A service provider may be a business or other entity providing computer-related services over a network. The thin client application may be stored in a memory of the client device and be operable when executed upon by the client device to control an interface between the client device and a service provider application, permitting a user at the client device to access service provider content and services.

In embodiments, the client device <NUM> is associated with a private key <NUM> and a public key <NUM>. The private key <NUM> and the public key <NUM> may be related so as to be able to encrypt and decrypt data, such as in symmetric key encryption or asymmetric key encryption (also known as public key encryption). In embodiments, the private key <NUM> and the public key <NUM> may be different, with the public key <NUM> being available to systems external to the client device <NUM> and the private key <NUM> intended only to be known by the client device <NUM>. In such embodiments, the system <NUM> may be directed to use asymmetric key encryption. In some embodiments, the same public key may be available to and/or associated with multiple client devices, for example, with client device <NUM> and with the client device <NUM>.

In various embodiments, the private key <NUM> may be persistent or static. In other embodiments, the private key may be a dynamic key. For example, a private key <NUM> may be a rolling key. A private key <NUM> may be changed, for example, as a function of time, of a counter, or other dynamic condition. In various embodiments, a counter by which a private key <NUM> is updated may be advanced by a client's use of the client device <NUM> or of a separate object, such as a contactless card as described in the '<NUM> application and in more detail herein. It will be readily understood that a dynamic key may be updated in response to other events, changes in circumstance, and/or a combination of any described above.

In various embodiments, association of the private key <NUM> and/or the public key <NUM> with the client device <NUM> may be established at or before the issuance of the client device <NUM> to the client. For example, the keys may be set by a manufacturer of the device, by a service provider, or other entity. In other embodiments, the private key <NUM> and/or the public key <NUM> may be linked to the device later. For example, a client device <NUM> may receive updated keys <NUM> and <NUM>. In various embodiments, the private key <NUM> and/or the public key <NUM> may be stored to memory on the client device <NUM> or to an external server or database. In various embodiments, the private key <NUM> and/or the public key <NUM> may be updated by using an application on the client device and/or by using a separate computer. For example, the private key <NUM> and/or public key <NUM> may be updated or diversified in accordance with dynamic data such as a counter. Such examples are found in the '<NUM> reference.

The client device <NUM> may initiate communication with another client device <NUM> by generating a message <NUM>. In embodiments, the message <NUM> may comprise an encrypted payload and a phone number. The encrypted payload may be encrypted using the private key <NUM>. The phone number may comprise the phone number of the client device <NUM> and/or the client device <NUM>. In embodiments, the payload encrypted as the encrypted payload of message <NUM> may comprise text, numerical, audio, other data, or a combination thereof. The payload may comprise uniquely identifying information for the client, the client device <NUM>, or a combination thereof. Furthermore, the encrypted payload may contain hashed data. Such information may be stored in memory accessible to the client device <NUM>, for example, local to the client device or accessible via a network connection. In various embodiments, the encrypted payload may comprise dynamic information relating to the client, the client device <NUM>, or a separate object, for example, a contactless card as described in greater detail herein. Dynamic information may change with each communication sent by the client device <NUM> or at another rate. In some embodiments, the public key <NUM> may be included in the message <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the encrypted payload and/or message <NUM> may be appended to a communication from the client device <NUM>. For example, the encrypted payload may be appended to a call data stream. In some embodiments, a communication from the client device <NUM> may be included in the encrypted payload.

The message <NUM> may be sent from the client device <NUM>. In various embodiments, the message <NUM> may pass through an authentication router <NUM>. The authentication router <NUM> may be associated with a network <NUM>.

In some examples, network <NUM> may be one or more of a wireless network, a wired network or any combination of wireless network and wired network and may be configured to connect client device <NUM> to service provider <NUM>. For example, network <NUM> may include one or more of a fiber optics network, a passive optical network, a cable network, an Internet network, a satellite network, a wireless local area network (LAN), a Global System for Mobile Communication, a Personal Communication Service, a Personal Area Network, Wireless Application Protocol, Multimedia Messaging Service, Enhanced Messaging Service, Short Message Service, Time Division Multiplexing based systems, Code Division Multiple Access based systems, D-AMPS, Fixed Wireless Data, IEEE <NUM>. 11b, <NUM>. <NUM>, <NUM>. 11n and <NUM>, Bluetooth, NFC, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Wi-Fi, and/or the like.

In addition, network <NUM> may include, without limitation, telephone lines, fiber optics, IEEE Ethernet <NUM>, a wide area network ("WAN"), a wireless personal area network ("WPAN"), a local area network ("LAN"), or a global network such as the Internet. In addition, network <NUM> may support an Internet network, a wireless communication network, a cellular network, or the like, or any combination thereof. Network <NUM> may further include one network, or any number of the exemplary types of networks mentioned above, operating as a stand-alone network or in cooperation with each other. Network <NUM> may utilize one or more protocols of one or more network elements to which they are communicatively coupled. Network <NUM> may translate to or from other protocols to one or more protocols of network devices.

Furthermore, it should be appreciated that according to one or more examples, network <NUM> may be part of a plurality of interconnected networks, such as, for example, the Internet, a service provider's private network, a cable television network, corporate networks, such as credit card association networks, and home networks. In some embodiments, the authentication router <NUM> and/or network <NUM> may be associated with a communication service provider. In addition, a private network may be implemented as a virtual private network layered upon network <NUM>.

For example, network <NUM> may comprise a public switched telephone network (PSTN), and the authentication router may be associated with the communication service provider used by the client of client device <NUM> and/or client device <NUM>.

The authentication router <NUM> may have access to the public key <NUM> associated with the client device <NUM>. In some cases, the authentication router <NUM> may receive the public key <NUM> from the client device <NUM> via the message <NUM>. In other embodiments, the authentication router <NUM> may have access to a database, table, or other storage or memory in which the public key <NUM> is stored. In these embodiments, the memory may be local to the authentication router <NUM> or otherwise available via the network <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the authentication router <NUM> has access to storage as described above which includes dynamic information pertaining to the encrypted payload of the message <NUM>. For example, dynamic information included in the encrypted payload may be reflected by the information available to the authentication router. For example, if the payload comprises current information about a client's account with a communication service provider, the memory may comprise separately maintained current information about the client's account with the service provider. In another example, if the encrypted payload comprises a counter that is increased each time a client uses the client device <NUM> to make a call, a counter may be updated in the memory accessible to the authentication router <NUM> each time the client device <NUM> makes a call.

Such information as pertaining to the client and/or client device <NUM> may be made initially available to the authentication router <NUM> upon activation of a client device <NUM> or issuance of a client device <NUM> to a client. Furthermore, such information should be associated with the client and/or client device. For example, a counter associated with a client device may be set to zero or some other predetermined number in response to activation of a device, or initial account information for a client may be entered by a communication service provider employee in response to account creation for the client. However, such information is updated independently from the content of the message <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the public key <NUM> is stored in such memory accessible to the authentication router <NUM>. In embodiments, the public key <NUM> may be entered with a memory location associated with the client and/or client device <NUM> upon the issuance of the client device <NUM> to the client and/or beginning of service by the communication service provider. If the public key is updated, for example, to match an updated private key, the public key <NUM> in the memory may be updated. In some embodiments, this update may be automatic. In other embodiments, this update may be performed in response to an event, for example, the sending of a message <NUM> from the client device <NUM>. In some embodiments, the public key <NUM> may be updated in response to being received as part of a message <NUM>.

In various embodiments, the authentication router <NUM> may decrypt the message <NUM> using the public key <NUM>. In embodiments wherein the encrypted payload comprises hashed data, a hash function may be applied to the decrypted payload to extract information, for example, an identifier. In embodiments, contents of the decrypted payload of message <NUM> may then be compared to information known by the authentication router pertaining to the client and/or client device. For example, if the payload comprises a counter, that counter may be compared to the counter known by the authentication router. The matching of the information of the decrypted payload and the information known by the authentication router <NUM> allows for authentication of the message <NUM> as being genuinely sent from the client device <NUM>.

As the public key <NUM> is related to the private key <NUM>, which is known only to the client device <NUM>, successful decryption of the message <NUM> using the public key <NUM> indicates that the message <NUM> was in fact sent from the client device <NUM>. However, a mismatch between the encrypted payload of a message sent from a client device and the information available to the authentication router pertaining to the client and/or client device <NUM> may indicate nefarious activity. For example, a hacker or imposter may have gained access to the private key <NUM> of client device <NUM> and the message received by the authentication router may not be from the client device <NUM> as identified. In cases where an incoming message was unable to be decrypted using the public key <NUM> and/or the decrypted payload of the message could not be authenticated, the communication may be flagged for recipient client device <NUM>. In some embodiments, the connection for the communication between client devices <NUM> and <NUM> may not be completed based upon such a failure of authentication. Information pertaining to the client device <NUM> and/or the message <NUM> may be flagged, stored in a database, and/or sent to the service provider or other entity, for example, law enforcement, based upon such failure of authentication. In some embodiments, client devices <NUM> and <NUM> may be connected for communication based upon successful authentication of the initiating client device <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the client device <NUM> has an associated private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> of its own. It will be understood that these keys may allow for returned communication from client device <NUM> to client device <NUM> by the same methods described with respect to communications from client device <NUM> to client device <NUM>.

In various embodiments, authentication processes may take place locally to recipient client device <NUM> as opposed to locally to an authentication router <NUM>. Specifically, a message <NUM> may be routed by network <NUM> to client device <NUM> while still encrypted.

In such embodiments, the client device <NUM> may have access to the public key <NUM> associated with the client device <NUM>. In some cases, the client device <NUM> may receive the public key <NUM> from the client device <NUM> via the message <NUM>. In other embodiments, the client device <NUM> may have access to a database, table, or other storage or memory in which the public key <NUM> is stored. In these embodiments, the memory may be local to the client device <NUM> or otherwise available via the network <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the client device <NUM> has access to storage as described above which includes dynamic information pertaining to the encrypted payload of the message <NUM>. For example, dynamic information included in the encrypted payload may be reflected by information available to the authentication router. For example, if the payload comprises current information about a client's account with a communication service provider, the memory may comprise separately maintained current information about the client's account with the service provider. In another example, if the encrypted payload comprises a counter that is increased each time a client uses the client device <NUM> to make a call, a counter may be updated in the memory accessible to the client device <NUM> each time the client device <NUM> makes a call. In such an example, counters relating to client device <NUM> local to client device <NUM> and local to client device <NUM> may be updated specifically in response to communications between client device <NUM> and client device <NUM>.

Such information as pertaining to the client and/or client device <NUM> may be made initially available to the client device <NUM> upon activation of a client device <NUM> or issuance of a client device <NUM> to a client. Furthermore, such information should be associated with the client and/or client device. For example, a counter associated with a client device <NUM> may be set to zero or other predetermined number in response to activation of the client device <NUM>, or initial account information for a client may be entered by a communication service provider employee in response to account creation for the client. In this example, information may be stored in memory external to client device <NUM>, such as a database located on a network server. However, such information is updated independently from the content of the message <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the public key <NUM> is stored in such memory accessible to the client device <NUM>. In embodiments, the public key <NUM> may be entered into the memory in association with the client and/or client device <NUM> upon the issuance of the client device <NUM> to the client and/or beginning of service by the communication service provider. If the public key is updated, for example, to match a rolling private key, the public key <NUM> in the memory may be updated. In some embodiments, this update may be automatic. In other embodiments, this update may be performed in response to an event, for example, the sending of a message <NUM> from the client device <NUM> to the client device <NUM>. In some embodiments, the public key <NUM> may be updated in memory available to client device <NUM> in response to being received as part of a message <NUM>.

In various embodiments, the client device <NUM> may decrypt the message <NUM> using the public key <NUM>. In embodiments, the decrypted payload of message <NUM> may then be compared to information known by the client device <NUM> pertaining to the client and/or client device. For example, if the payload comprises a counter, that counter may be compared to the counter known by the client device <NUM>. The matching of the information of the decrypted payload and the information known by the client device <NUM> allows for authentication of the message <NUM> as being genuinely sent from the client device <NUM>.

As the public key <NUM> is related to the private key <NUM>, which is known only to the client device <NUM>, successful decryption of the message <NUM> using the public key <NUM> indicates that the message <NUM> was in fact sent from the client device <NUM>. However, a mismatch between the encrypted payload of a message sent from a client device and the information available to the authentication router pertaining to the client and/or client device <NUM> may indicate nefarious activity. For example, a hacker or imposter may have gained access to the private key <NUM> of client device <NUM> and the message received by the authentication router may not be from the client device <NUM> as identified. In cases where an incoming message was unable to be decrypted using the public key <NUM> and/or the decrypted payload of the message could not be authenticated, the communication may be flagged for recipient client device <NUM>. In some embodiments, the connection for the communication between client devices <NUM> and <NUM> may not be completed or continued based upon such a failure of authentication. Information pertaining to the client device <NUM> and/or the message <NUM> may be flagged, stored in a database, and/or sent to the service provider or other entity, for example, law enforcement, based upon such failure of authentication. In some embodiments, client devices <NUM> and <NUM> may be connected for communication based upon successful authentication of the initiating client device <NUM>.

<FIG> is a block diagram illustrating various exemplary components which may be useful for implementing methods such as discussed with respect to <FIG>. System <NUM> may, for example, be implemented to allow encryption and/or decryption of data. As such, similar components may be implemented as client device <NUM>, authentication router <NUM>, and/or client device <NUM>. System <NUM> is particularly directed to communications comprising phone calls. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

In embodiments, system <NUM> may include a processor <NUM>. It is understood that the processing circuitry may contain additional components, including processors, memories, error and parity/CRC checkers, data encoders, anti-collision algorithms, controllers, command decoders, security primitives and tamper-proofing hardware, as necessary to perform the functions described herein. Furthermore, the processor <NUM> can be any of various commercially available computer processors, including without limitation an AMD® Athlon®, Duron® and Opteron® processors; ARM® application, embedded and secure processors; IBM® and Motorola® DragonBall® and PowerPC® processors; IBM and Sony® Cell processors; Intel® Celeron®, Core®, Core (<NUM>) Duo®, Itanium®, Pentium®, Xeon®, and XScale® processors; and similar processors. Dual microprocessors, multi-core processors, and other multi-processor architectures may also be employed as the processor <NUM>. Such a processor may enable a network-enabled device to communicate with other network-enabled devices via using a PSTN interface <NUM> managed by an SS7 network interface <NUM>.

Specifically, the PSTN interface <NUM> allows the system <NUM> to connect with a network <NUM> and associated services. A signaling system no. <NUM> (SS7) network interface is used to manage the system's <NUM> use of the network <NUM> via the PSTN interface <NUM> by using a path and facility distinct from the voice channel to signal set up and release of a communication.

Memory systems such as those referenced with respect to the client device <NUM>, authentication router <NUM>, and client device <NUM> may be embodied as memory <NUM>, in some examples. The memory <NUM> may be a read-only memory, write-once read-multiple memory or read/write memory, e.g., RAM, ROM, and EEPROM, and the system <NUM> may include one or more of these memories. A read-only memory may be factory programmable as read-only or one-time programmable. One-time programmability provides the opportunity to write once then read many times. A write once/read-multiple memory may be programmed at a point in time after the memory chip has left the factory. Once the memory is programmed, it may not be rewritten, but it may be read many times. A read/write memory may be programmed and re-programed many times after leaving the factory. A read/write memory may also be read many times after leaving the factory.

The memory <NUM> may be configured to store one or more of key data <NUM>, encrypt/decrypt code <NUM>, and key validation code <NUM>. Key data may comprise keys used to encrypt and/or decrypt information such as a message such as message <NUM>, an identifying payload, or other information. For example, key data <NUM> may comprise a private key <NUM> and a public key <NUM>.

Encrypt/decrypt code <NUM> may comprise code to encrypt and/or decrypt information such as a message such as message <NUM>, an identifying payload, or other information using key data <NUM>.

Key validation code <NUM> may comprise code to validate the encryption and/or decryption of information such as a message such as message <NUM>, an identifying payload, or other information using the key data <NUM> according to the encrypt/decrypt code <NUM>. In some embodiments, key validation code <NUM> may comprise a payload identifying the client and/or client device, for example, an identifying payload of message <NUM>.

<FIG> is a block diagram illustrating a system <NUM> in which a client device <NUM> is coupled via a network <NUM> to a service provider <NUM>. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

The service provider <NUM> is, in one embodiment, a business providing computer-based services to clients over a network <NUM>. Almost all modern service providers use the internet to provide service offerings to potential consumers. The service offerings are generally provided in the form of software applications which operate using dedicated resources of the service provider. The combination of the software and hardware that provides a particular service to a client is referred to herein as a 'server. ' The servers may communicate over a private network <NUM> of the service provider, often referred to as a corporate or enterprise network. The private network <NUM> may comprise a wireless network, a wired network or any combination of wireless network and wired network as described above with regard to network <NUM>.

In system <NUM>, service provider <NUM> is shown to include an authentication server <NUM>. Although the server is illustrated as a discrete device, it is appreciated that the applications and servers may be distributed throughout the enterprise or, in the case of distributed resources such as 'cloud' resources, throughout the network <NUM>.

Database <NUM> comprises data storage resources that may be used, for example, to store customer account, credential and other authentication information for use by the authentication server <NUM>. The database <NUM> may be comprised of coupled data resources comprising any combination of local storage, distributed data center storage or cloud-based storage.

A contactless card <NUM> may comprise a payment card, such as a credit card, debit card, or gift card, issued by a service provider <NUM> displayed on the front or back of the card <NUM>. In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> is not related to a payment card, and may comprise, without limitation, an identification card. In some examples, the payment card may comprise a dual interface contactless payment card. The contactless card <NUM> may comprise a substrate, which may include a single layer, or one or more laminated layers composed of plastics, metals, and other materials. Exemplary substrate materials include polyvinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride acetate, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, polycarbonate, polyesters, anodized titanium, palladium, gold, carbon, paper, and biodegradable materials. In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> may have physical characteristics compliant with the ID-<NUM> format of the ISO/IEC <NUM> standard, and the contactless card may otherwise be compliant with the ISO/IEC <NUM> standard. However, it is understood that the contactless card <NUM> according to the present disclosure may have different characteristics, and the present disclosure does not require a contactless card to be implemented in a payment card.

The contactless card <NUM> may also include identification information displayed on the front and/or back of the card, and a contact pad. The contact pad may be configured to establish contact with another communication device, such as a user device, smart phone, laptop, desktop, or tablet computer. The contactless card <NUM> may also include processing circuitry, antenna and other components not shown in <FIG>. These components may be located behind the contact pad or elsewhere on the substrate. The contactless card <NUM> may also include a magnetic strip or tape, which may be located on the back of the card (not shown in <FIG>).

According to one aspect, a contactless card <NUM> may be in wireless communication, for example, NFC, with one or more client devices <NUM>. For example, contactless card <NUM> may comprise one or more chips, such as a radio frequency identification chip, configured to communicate via NFC or other short-range protocols. In other embodiments, contactless card <NUM> may communicate with client devices <NUM> through other means including, but not limited to, Bluetooth, satellite, and/or WiFi. As described in the '<NUM> application, contactless card <NUM> may be configured to communicate with one of a client device <NUM> through NFC when the contactless card <NUM> is within range of the respective client device. As will be described in more detail below, the contactless card <NUM> may generate a cryptogram for use by the service provider to authenticate the client device.

The contactless card <NUM> may be used to generate a message authentication code (MAC) cryptogram which may function as a digital signature for purposes of verification. Other digital signature algorithms, such as public key asymmetric algorithms, e.g., the Digital Signature Algorithm and the RSA algorithm, or zero knowledge protocols, may be used to perform this verification.

More specifically, the contactless card <NUM> may be used to generate a session key. The session key may be received via the communication between the contactless card <NUM> and the client device <NUM> and act as a private key as described with respect to <FIG>. In embodiments, this process may be an alternative to the generation of or storage of a private key local to the client device <NUM> as described with respect to <FIG>.

In embodiments, the contactless card <NUM> may be used to pass an identifier to the client device <NUM>. An identifier could be a counter, for example. In various embodiments, a private key associated with the client device <NUM> may be diversified using the counter and/or used to encrypt the identifier from the contactless card <NUM> as part of an encrypted identifying payload.

The client device <NUM> may send a message, for example, message <NUM>. In embodiments, the message may be appended to a call data stream. The message may comprise an encrypted identifier payload associated with the client and/or client device <NUM>. The identifier payload may comprise audio data, for example, a voice message. The message may further comprise at least one phone number, for example, as found in message <NUM>.

In embodiments, the audio data may be recorded from a human voice, for example, from the client or from a service provider employee. In some embodiments, the audio data may comprise a custom voice message. In other embodiments, the audio data may be generated by a computer. In such embodiments, the audio data may be generated in response to a computer device interpretation of the text and/or numerical data, for example, by a text-to-speech application or program. Interpretation of text and/or numerical data may be performed locally to the client device <NUM> or on another network-enabled device. The data interpreted may comprise identifying information of the client and/or client device. Such information may be stored in memory accessible to the client device <NUM>, for example, local to the client device, local to the contactless card, or accessible via a network connection. For example, information for a particular client may be found in a database in association with the phone number of the client device from which the message was sent. In some embodiments, the information may comprise dynamic information, such as a counter.

The payload may comprise further information including at least one identifier, in some embodiments. Such an identifier may comprise a counter from the contactless card <NUM>, for example, as described in more detail herein and in the '<NUM> application.

In embodiments, a network <NUM> may include a system enabled with interactive voice response (IVR). The IVR system may receive and decrypt the encrypted identifying payload sent by the client device <NUM>. Decryption may take place by methods necessary, for example, by methods described in the '<NUM> application or by methods described with respect to <FIG>.

The identifier of the decrypted payload, for example, a counter, may be compared to an expected identifier associated with the client device from which the message was sent. In embodiments, the expected identifier may be associated with the client device by reference of a phone number associated with that client device. In embodiments, the expected identifier may be updated independently of the contents of incoming communications from the associated device. For example, a counter may be increased upon reception of a communication from the client device, but regardless of the contents of the messages received from the client device. In another example, a counter may be increased for each message received from the client device when a message contains a certain type of information. The comparison of the identifier of the decrypted payload to the expected identifier may be made by the IVR system, by another network-enabled device, by an application thereon, or another capable processor. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

The matching of the identifier of the decrypted payload with the expected identifier may determine a first-factor authentication match. This authentication adds a layer of security farther than symmetric key or asymmetric key authentication alone by requiring not only successful decryption, but also matching of an identifier known only by the client device <NUM> and the memory in which the expected identifier is stored. For example, a counter value of a number X matched from the decrypted payload to an expected value may indicate not only that the payload had been able to be properly decrypted, but that the sending client device had the same record of the number X in past communications with the server as the record of the server.

In embodiments, the IVR system may perform second-factor authentication using the audio data included in the identifying payload. In particular, the IVR system may interpret the audio data included in the identifying payload. In some embodiments, the audio data of the decrypted payload may be interpreted by a speech transcription program, such as a speech-to-text application. In some embodiments, the audio data may be analyzed for characteristics of the audio data itself. In embodiments, attributes such as voice message attributes may be identified from the audio data. Voice message attributes may include recognized words, human speech vs. computer-generated speech, voice characteristics such as tone, language, accent, cadence, background noise, volume, and other characteristics recognizable in audio data by a computer. Such attributes may be identified using methods known in the art of language processing, for example, keyword identification or recognition in accordance with a model trained by one or more machine learning algorithms, neural networks, or another training method. In some embodiments, at least one confidence level may be calculated according to the likelihood that the audio data contains at least one attribute.

The interpreted audio data may, in embodiments, be received by a service provider <NUM>. The service provider <NUM> may include a private enterprise network <NUM>, an authentication server <NUM>, and a database <NUM>. In embodiments, aspects of analysis of audio data may take place on the enterprise network <NUM> as opposed to the public network <NUM>. In cases where analysis is performed as described above on network <NUM>, identified attributes of the audio data may be sent to the enterprise network.

An authentication server <NUM> may compare identified attributes of the audio data from the decrypted payload to expected attributes of audio data from a particular client and/or client device <NUM>. Such attributes may be stored in association with a client and/or client device in the database <NUM>. For example, a custom voice message from the decrypted payload may be compared to a previously known custom voice message associated with the client device <NUM> in the database <NUM>. In some embodiments, a binary analysis of the matching of attributes may be used. In other embodiments, attributes may be matched according to a confidence level within a certain range. Such a confidence level may be calculated by one or more machine learning methods, keyword identification methods, and/or other methods known in the art, for example. Based upon the comparison of the identified attributes to the expected attributes of the audio data, the authentication server <NUM> may or may not be able to establish a second factor authentication match. As such a second-factor authentication match may be based on information and/or audio data that is unique to the expected user of the client device <NUM>, the authentication may provide confidence that the actual user of the client device <NUM> is the expected user, rather than an imposter.

In some embodiments, the IVR system may selectively establish a connection between the first client device <NUM> and the second client device <NUM> based on the results of the first and/or second factor authentication match. In some embodiments, the authentication server <NUM> may communicate to the IVR system the results of the first and/or second factor authentication match. In some embodiments, the authentication server <NUM> may further communicate instructions to connect or to not connect the first client device <NUM> and the second client device <NUM> based on the result of one or more factor authentication matches. In other embodiments, the PSTN or IVR system on network <NUM> may receive the results of the first and/or second authentication match and determine whether or not to connect the first client device <NUM> and the second client device <NUM> for communication based on the results of the one or more factor authentication matches. In some embodiments, the IVR system may be used to limit access of the first client device <NUM> to the second client device <NUM> based upon the first client device <NUM> being authenticated as one of at least one known validated callers. For example, such validated callers may be known and/or marked in the system as making problematic unsolicited calls.

<FIG> is a timing diagram illustrating an example sequence for providing authenticated access according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. System <NUM> may comprise contactless card <NUM> and client device <NUM>, which may include an application <NUM> and processor <NUM>. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

At step <NUM>, the application <NUM> communicates with the contactless card <NUM> (e.g., after being brought near the contactless card <NUM>). Communication between the application <NUM> and the contactless card <NUM> may involve the contactless card <NUM> being sufficiently close to a card reader (not shown) of the client device <NUM> to enable NFC data transfer between the application <NUM> and the contactless card <NUM>.

At step <NUM>, after communication has been established between client device <NUM> and contactless card <NUM>, the contactless card <NUM> generates a MAC cryptogram. In some examples, this may occur when the contactless card <NUM> is read by the application <NUM>. In particular, this may occur upon a read, such as an NFC read, of a near field data exchange (NDEF) tag, which may be created in accordance with the NFC Data Exchange Format. For example, a reader, such as application <NUM>, may transmit a message, such as an applet select message, with the applet ID of an NDEF producing applet. Upon confirmation of the selection, a sequence of select file messages followed by read file messages may be transmitted. For example, the sequence may include "Select Capabilities file", "Read Capabilities file", and "Select NDEF file". At this point, a counter value maintained by the contactless card <NUM> may be updated or incremented, which may be followed by "Read NDEF file. " At this point, the message may be generated which may include a header and a shared secret. Session keys may then be generated. The MAC cryptogram may be created from the message, which may include the header and the shared secret. The MAC cryptogram may then be concatenated with one or more blocks of random data, and the MAC cryptogram and a random number (RND) may be encrypted with the session key. Thereafter, the cryptogram and the header may be concatenated, and encoded as ASCII hex and returned in NDEF message format (responsive to the "Read NDEF file" message).

In some examples, the MAC cryptogram may be transmitted as an NDEF tag, and in other examples the MAC cryptogram may be included with a uniform resource indicator (e.g., as a formatted string).

In some examples, application <NUM> may be configured to transmit a request to contactless card <NUM>, the request comprising an instruction to generate a MAC cryptogram.

At step <NUM>, the contactless card <NUM> sends the MAC cryptogram to the application <NUM>. In some examples, the transmission of the MAC cryptogram occurs via NFC, however, the present disclosure is not limited thereto. In other examples, this communication may occur via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or other means of wireless data communication.

At step <NUM>, the application <NUM> communicates the MAC cryptogram to the processor <NUM>.

At step <NUM>, the processor <NUM> verifies the MAC cryptogram pursuant to an instruction from the application <NUM>. For example, the MAC cryptogram may be verified, as explained below.

In some examples, verifying the MAC cryptogram may be performed by a device other than client device <NUM>, such as a service provider <NUM> in data communication with the client device <NUM>. For example, processor <NUM> may output the MAC cryptogram for transmission to service provider <NUM>, which may verify the MAC cryptogram.

In some examples, the MAC cryptogram may function as a digital signature for purposes of verification. Other digital signature algorithms, such as public key asymmetric algorithms, e.g., the Digital Signature Algorithm and the RSA algorithm, or zero knowledge protocols, may be used to perform this verification.

More specifically, according to one aspect, a contactless card <NUM> may be used in conjunction with first authentication credentials provided to a service provider, such as service provider <NUM>, to authenticate a communication from a client device <NUM>, for example, a call. The use of the contactless card as a second factor of authentication enables the association of a particular device/phone number with a specific individual (i.e., the owner of the card), thereby removing the ability for a malicious third party to spoof, i.e., impersonate, the client. According to another aspect of the invention, authentication communication protocols described herein identify or use specific communication channels for call handling, thereby reducing the opportunity for client impersonation.

The security factor authentication may comprise a plurality of processes. In some embodiments, a first authentication process may comprise logging in and validating a user via one or more applications executing on a device. A second authentication process may operate following successful login and validation to cause a user to engage in one or more behaviors associated with one or more contactless cards. In effect, the security factor authentication process comprises a multi-factor authentication process that may include both securely proving identity of the user and encouraging the user to engage in one or more types of behaviors, including but not limited to one or more tap gestures, associated with the contactless card. In some examples, the one or more tap gestures may comprise a tap of the contactless card by the user to a device. In some examples, the device may comprise a mobile device, a terminal, a tablet, or any other device configured to process a received tap gesture.

For example, to provide a first layer of authentication, a client may access an application operating on the client device. In other examples, the client may access the website of the service provider by linking to a service provider web page using an internet browser application executing on the client device. The browser is a software application such as Google® Chrome®, Internet Explorer ®, Safari ®, etc., and includes programming code for translating Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) web pages of the service provider application to a format suitable for a client operating the client device.

As part of accessing the application or the service provider website, the service provider may request first authorization information, including password information, answers to pre-stored queries, biometric information, an image, or other mechanism of verifying that a user of the client device is authorized to access content and services, including accounts, managed by the service provider. Furthermore, this level of authentication provides confidence that the user of the client device <NUM> is the expected client. In other words, while the methods described above may be particularly helpful for at least authenticating that a communication is coming from an authenticated device, these steps may further authenticate that a communication is coming from an authenticated user of said device.

According to one aspect, the contactless card <NUM> may be used to provide a second authentication for a user of a client device. In one embodiment, and as described in more detail below, the contactless card includes a key, a counter, and cryptographic processing functionality that may be used to generate a cryptogram that may be used to validate a user of a client device. The counter advantageously reflects previous behaviors of the holder of the card. For example, the counter may reflect the number of times that the user has previously communicated with a particular party, information which is virtually impossible for a malicious third party to garner accurately.

A further level of authentication may be made by using the contactless card <NUM>, for example, by communicatively coupling the card <NUM> to one of the client devices <NUM> by tapping or otherwise, as mentioned above. In some embodiments, this constitutes the second authentication. In other embodiments, the second authentication is continued with further analysis of an identifying payload, for example, as described with respect to <FIG>.

Following the second authentication, and as described in more detail herein, data may be returned to the client device. For example, the data may include data allowing the client to initiate a communication link with the second client device or information about the success or failure of the authentication attempt.

It should be noted that although in the above description the first authentication is described as using personal, biometric, questions or other authentication information, it is recognized that in some examples, a client application executing on a device may respond to a tap of a contactless card to initially activate or launch the application of the device. In such examples, both the first and second authentication processes use the key/counter contactless card authentication process described in more detail below.

In some embodiments, if the client-side application is not installed on a client device, a tap of the contactless card proximate the card reader may initiate a download of the application, (such as navigation to a download page of the application). Subsequent to installation, a tap of the contactless card may activate or launch the application, and then initiate, for example via the application or other back-end communication), activation of the contactless card. In some examples, the one or more applications may be configured to determine that it was launched via one or more tap gestures of the contactless card, such that a launch occurred at <NUM>:<NUM> PM, that a transaction was processed or took place at <NUM>:<NUM> PM, in order to verify the identity of the user.

In some examples, data may be collected on tap behaviors as biometric/gestural authentication. For example, a unique identifier that is cryptographically secure and not susceptible to interception may be transmitted to one or more backend services. The unique identifier may be configured to look up secondary information about the individual. The secondary information may comprise personally identifiable information about the user. In some examples, the secondary information may be stored within the contactless card.

<FIG> illustrates an exemplary system <NUM> in which an authenticated call may be made. System <NUM> comprises two or more client devices <NUM> and <NUM>. As illustrated, a single client device <NUM> is the device used to initiate the communication and a single client device <NUM> is the device used to receive the communication. However, it will be readily understood that communication could be transmitted from client device <NUM> to client device <NUM> and/or that each client device as illustrated may comprise a plurality of client devices, such as in a group call. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

Client device <NUM> may be associated with a private key <NUM> and a public key <NUM>. Client device <NUM> may be associated with a private key <NUM> and a public key <NUM>. In embodiments in which at least one of client device <NUM> or client device <NUM> represents a plurality of client devices, each client device may be associated with a private key and a public key.

For each client device, the private key and the public key may be related so that one decrypts data encrypted by the other. In some embodiments, the private key and the public key for a device may be the same, enabling symmetric key encryption. In other embodiments, the private key and the public key may be different, enabling asymmetric key encryption. Keys may be persistent or dynamic. In some embodiments, a private key may be a session key diversified by use of dynamic information local to the client device or provided by an external object or device, such as a contactless card, as described above.

In various embodiments, client device <NUM> may initiate a communication with client device <NUM>, for example, a call data stream. A message <NUM> may be appended to the communication. The message <NUM> may comprise an encrypted payload, at least one phone number, the at least one phone number comprising a phone number associated with recipient client device <NUM>, and a voice memo. In embodiments, the voice memo may be customizable by the owner of the sending client device <NUM>, for example, a phrase or greeting. In some embodiments, the message <NUM> may further include the public key <NUM> of client device <NUM>.

The encrypted payload may be encrypted using the private key of client device <NUM>. The encrypted payload may comprise at least one identifier. In some cases, the voice memo may be included in the encrypted payload.

The second client device <NUM> may have access to the public key <NUM> of the first client device <NUM> in association with the phone number or other identifying data for the client device <NUM>. For example, the public key <NUM> of the first client device <NUM> may be received with the message <NUM>, stored locally to memory of the client device <NUM> after a previous communication between the two devices, or available via another memory or database, such as an internet-linked database. Furthermore, the second client device <NUM> may have access to an expected identifier in association with the client device <NUM>. For example, the same database may be used to store at least one client device <NUM>, an associated public key, and an expected identifier associated with that client device <NUM>.

The message <NUM> may be received by the client device <NUM>. The client device <NUM> may retrieve the public key <NUM> associated with client device <NUM> and use the public key <NUM> to decrypt the encrypted payload of the message <NUM>.

Failure of decryption of the payload with the public key <NUM> may indicate potential fraudulent behavior. As a result, the communication connection supposedly coming from client device <NUM> may be denied. In some embodiments, feedback may be provided to the user of client device <NUM>, to a service provider, or to a third party, for example, law enforcement.

In some embodiments, the voice memo of message <NUM> may be presented to the user of client device <NUM>, for example, via a user interface by playing the voice memo audio data to the user of client device <NUM> when they answer the incoming call. The user interface may be a part of an application on the client device <NUM>. In some embodiments, the voice memo of message <NUM> may only be presented to the user based upon a successful first authentication of the identifier of the encrypted payload.

The client device <NUM> may then receive feedback from its user if they do or do not recognize the voice memo from the user of the first client device <NUM>. For example, feedback may be received via a user interface. This verification of recognition of the voice memo from the first client by the second client provides a further layer of authentication. In some embodiments, the client device <NUM> may receive instructions from the user via the user interface directing continuation or denial of the communication connection between the client devices <NUM> and <NUM>.

Based on the feedback concerning voice memo recognition received from the user, the client device <NUM> may selectively establish a connection between the client device <NUM> and the client device <NUM>. In some embodiments, based on the feedback, the client device <NUM> may save the public key <NUM> of the client device <NUM> to local memory or add the client device <NUM> to a list of recognized and/or trusted devices.

In some embodiments, continued communication between recognized and/or trusted devices may take place with streamlined authentication methods. For example, only a first level of authentication may be required.

<FIG> is a logic flow <NUM> illustrating a method for selectively connecting a first client device and a second client device for communication based upon results of authentication. Specifically, <FIG> illustrates an example in which the first and second client devices are both mobile phone devices and the communication is a call data stream. Embodiments are not limited herein.

In step <NUM>, an incoming call data stream is received from a first mobile phone device. The incoming call stream comprises a phone number associated with a second mobile phone device and an encrypted payload. The encrypted payload is encrypted using a private key associated with the first mobile device. In embodiments, the encrypted payload may be appended to the incoming call data stream. The payload data may comprise information pertaining to the first client and/or client device.

In step <NUM>, the incoming call data stream may be authenticated in response to a match between the information of the encrypted payload and stored information related to the first mobile phone device. In various embodiments, the match between the information of the encrypted payload and stored information related to the first mobile phone device may be judged by successful decryption of the payload. For example, a payload may have been encrypted with a public key diversified using a counter. In this example, successful decryption of the payload with a public key diversified by an independently maintained counter may indicate proper authentication.

In step <NUM>, the system may establish a call connection between the first mobile phone device and the second mobile phone device in response to the step of authenticating.

In some embodiments, a system's failure to properly authenticate a call may prompt denial of the call or other method of dismissal of the call. In some embodiments, a first client device and/or second client device may be notified of the failed attempt and provided details of the attempt, such as the phone number of the caller and/or recipient. In some embodiments, a recipient may be prompted via the user interface of the second client device to add the phone number of the calling first client device to a list of numbers to be blocked. In various embodiments, the system may provide a service provider or third party, for example, law enforcement, with information relating to the unauthenticated call.

In some embodiments, a system's successful authentication of a call may prompt establishment of a connection between the first mobile device and the second mobile device. In various embodiments, information about the first mobile device may be saved to and/or by the second mobile device identifying the first mobile device as having been engaged with via an authenticated call. Such registration may be referenced in subsequent communications between the two client devices to efficiently check probable authenticity of the subsequent communications based on the authentication of a prior communication.

In some embodiments, a call connection may be made between a first and second mobile phone device in response to the step of authenticating, and the results of the step of authenticating may be indicated to the recipient, for example, via a user interface of the second client device. For example, a call connection may be made despite authentication failure, but a warning may be communicated to the recipient via the user interface of their mobile phone that the call is unauthenticated. In a further example, a call connection may be made in response to authentication success, with a verification being communicated to the recipient via the user interface of their mobile phone that the call has been authenticated.

<FIG> is a logic flow <NUM> illustrating a method for selectively connecting a first client device and a second client device for communication based upon results of a multifactor authentication. Specifically, <FIG> illustrates an example in which the first and second client devices are both mobile phone devices and the communication is a call data stream. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

Step <NUM> discloses the retrieval of an incoming call number's public key from a data storage device. In some embodiments, the data storage device may be local to the second client device. In other embodiments, the data storage device may be an external memory, such as that discussed above with reference to authentication router <NUM> or database <NUM>, for example.

Step <NUM> discloses the decryption of the encrypted payload using the incoming call number's public key, retrieved in step <NUM>, to produce a decrypted payload comprising an identifier. The encrypted payload may be received with the incoming call number, for example, as in message <NUM>. The identifier may be related to the sending client and/or first client device.

Step <NUM> discloses comparison of the decrypted payload's identifier to an expected identifier associated with the incoming call number to determine a first factor authentication match. In various embodiments, the expected identifier associated with the incoming call number may be retrieved from memory, which may be the same data storage device referenced in step <NUM> or a separate data storage device.

Step <NUM> discloses comparison of the attribute of a voice message to an expected voice message attribute to identify a second factor authentication match. The voice message may be received in association with or as part of the encrypted payload.

Step <NUM> discloses selective establishment of a connection between the first mobile phone device and the second mobile phone device in response to the first factor authentication and the second factor authentication match.

In some embodiments, a system's failure to properly authenticate a call via the first factor and/or the second factor authentication matches may prompt denial of the call, dropping of the call, or other method of dismissal of the call. In some embodiments, a first client device and/or second client device may be notified of the failed attempt and provided details of the attempt, such as the phone number of the caller and/or recipient. In some embodiments, a recipient may be prompted via the user interface of the second client device to add the phone number of the calling first client device to a list of numbers to be blocked. In various embodiments, the system may provide a service provider or third party, for example, law enforcement, with information relating to the unauthenticated call. Such information may specify which factor of authentication failed and include further details of the attempt.

In some embodiments, a system's successful authentication of a call via the first factor and/or the second factor authentication matches may prompt establishment of a connection between the first mobile device and the second mobile device. In various embodiments, information about the first mobile device may be saved to and/or by the second mobile device identifying the first mobile device as having been engaged with via a multifactor authenticated call. Such registration may be referenced in subsequent communications between the two client devices to efficiently check probable authenticity of the subsequent communications based on the multifactor authentication of a prior communication.

In some embodiments, a call connection may be made between a first and second mobile phone device in response to the first factor and/or the second factor authentication matches, and the results of the step of authenticating may be indicated to the recipient, for example, via a user interface of the second client device. For example, a call connection may be made despite multifactor authentication failure, but a warning may be communicated to the recipient via the user interface of their mobile phone that the call is unauthenticated or only partially authenticated. In a further example, a call connection may be made in response to multifactor authentication success, with a verification being communicated to the recipient via the user interface of their mobile phone that the call has been authenticated via multifactor authentication.

Claim 1:
A computing device (<NUM>, <NUM>), comprising:
a memory (<NUM>) configured to store instructions; and
processing circuitry (<NUM>) coupled with the memory (<NUM>), the processing circuitry (<NUM>) configured to execute the instructions, and when executed, the instructions to cause processing circuitry (<NUM>) to:
determine to establish a communication connection with a second computing device (<NUM>);
detect a contactless card (<NUM>) within wireless communication range of the computing device (<NUM>, <NUM>);
receive an encrypted payload (<NUM>) from the contactless card (<NUM>), the encrypted payload (<NUM>) comprising an identifier and being encrypted with a key (<NUM>, <NUM>) and a cryptographic algorithm (<NUM>) by the contactless card (<NUM>), the identifier to uniquely identify a customer associated with the contactless card (<NUM>), the computing device (<NUM>, <NUM>), or both;
send the encrypted payload (<NUM>) and a call number to a service provider system (<NUM>) to initiate establishment of the communication connection with the second computing device (<NUM>); and
establish the communication connection with the second computing device (<NUM>) based on a successful authentication performed by the service provider system (<NUM>) utilizing the encrypted payload (<NUM>) including the identifier.