Patent Description:
The following paper discloses a protocol for a blockchain-based identity management system:.

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are a new type of identifier, which are independent of any centralized registry, identity provider, or certificate authority. Distributed ledger technology (such as blockchain) provides the opportunity for using fully decentralized identifiers. Distributed ledger technology uses globally distributed ledgers to record transactions between two or more parties in a verifiable way. Once a transaction is recorded, the data in the section of ledger cannot be altered retroactively without the alteration of all subsequent sections of the ledger, which provides a fairly secure platform. In such a decentralized environment, each owner of DID generally has control over his/her own data using his/her DID. The DID owner may access the data stored in the personal storage that is associated with the DID via a DID management module, which may be a mobile app, a personal computer, a browser, etc..

This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that is further described below in the Detailed Description.

Embodiments disclosed herein are related to encrypting and sharing one or more data objects stored or to be stored in a personal storage that is associated with a DID. An encryption/decryption key is generated using a passphrase and an identifier of the personal storage that stores or is to store a data object. The data object stored or to be stored in the personal storage is then encrypted using the generated encryption/decryption key. The encrypted data object is then stored in the personal storage that is associated with the DID.

In some embodiment, a DID management module that is configured to manage the DID is allowed to access the data object. In this embodiment, a request for accessing the data object from the DID management module may first be received. In response to the request, the encrypted data object is sent to the DID management module. The DID management module is caused to have access to the passphrase and the identifier of the first personal storage, such that the DID management module is capable of regenerating the encryption/decryption key that was used to encrypt the data object.

In some embodiment, another entity that is not associated with the DID may be allowed to access the data object. In this embodiment, a request for accessing the encrypted data object from another entity may first be received. In response to the request, a protection strategy for protecting the encryption/decryption key is negotiated between the computing system that encrypted the data object and the other entity. In some embodiment, the protection strategy may include encrypting the encryption/decryption key using a second encryption/decryption key of the other entity. The encrypted encryption/decryption key may then be sent to the other entity with the encrypted data object. The other entity may decrypt the encrypted encryption/decryption key. Thereafter, the other entity may decrypt the encrypted data using the decrypted encryption/decryption key.

Additional features and advantages will be set forth in the description which follows, and in part will e obvious from the description, or may be learned by the practice of the teachings herein.

The principles described herein allow a DID owner's personal data be stored as encrypted data and allow the DID owner's management module to securely access the encrypted data. Further, the encrypted data can also be securely shared with another entity that is not associated with the DID owner. Additionally, the other entity's identifier (e.g., DID or another identifier) is not required to be recorded in the metadata of the shared data object or anywhere in the personal storage, such that the service provider of the personal storage cannot correlate the relationships between the DID owner and the other entity. Thus, the privacy of the DID owner and the other entity is further protected.

Because the principles described herein may be performed in the context of a computing system, some introductory discussion of a computing system will be described with respect to <FIG>. Then, this description will return to the principles of the DID platform with respect to the remaining figures.

As illustrated in <FIG>, in its most basic configuration, a computing system <NUM> typically includes at least one hardware processing unit <NUM> and memory <NUM>. The processing unit <NUM> may include a general purpose processor and may also include a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any other specialized circuit. The memory <NUM> may be physical system memory, which may be volatile, non-volatile, or some combination of the two. The term "memory" may also be used herein to refer to non-volatile mass storage such as physical storage media. If the computing system is distributed, the processing, memory and/or storage capability may be distributed as well.

The computing system <NUM> also has thereon multiple structures often referred to as an "executable component". For instance, the memory <NUM> of the computing system <NUM> is illustrated as including executable component <NUM>. The term "executable component" is the name for a structure that is well understood to one of ordinary skill in the art in the field of computing as being a structure that can be software, hardware, or a combination thereof. For instance, when implemented in software, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the structure of an executable component may include software objects, routines, methods, and so forth, that may be executed on the computing system, whether such an executable component exists in the heap of a computing system, or whether the executable component exists on computer-readable storage media.

In such a case, one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the structure of the executable component exists on a computer-readable medium such that, when interpreted by one or more processors of a computing system (e.g., by a processor thread), the computing system is caused to perform a function. Such structure may be computer readable directly by the processors (as is the case if the executable component were binary). Alternatively, the structure may be structured to be interpretable and/or compiled (whether in a single stage or in multiple stages) so as to generate such binary that is directly interpretable by the processors. Such an understanding of example structures of an executable component is well within the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art of computing when using the term "executable component".

If such acts are implemented exclusively or near-exclusively in hardware, such as within an FPGA or an ASIC, the computer-executable instructions may be hard coded or hard-wired logic gates.

While not all computing systems require a user interface, in some embodiments, the computing system <NUM> includes a user interface system <NUM> for use in interfacing with a user. The user interface system <NUM> may include output mechanisms 112A as well as input mechanisms 112B. The principles described herein are not limited to the precise output mechanisms 112A or input mechanisms 112B as such will depend on the nature of the device. However, output mechanisms 112A might include, for instance, speakers, displays, tactile output, holograms and so forth. Examples of input mechanisms 112B might include, for instance, microphones, touchscreens, holograms, cameras, keyboards, mouse of other pointer input, sensors of any type, and so forth.

Embodiments described herein may comprise or utilize a special purpose or general-purpose computing system including computer hardware, such as, for example, one or more processors and system memory, as discussed in greater detail below. Such computer-readable media can be any available media that can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computing system.

Computer-readable storage media includes RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM, or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage, or other magnetic storage devices, or any other physical and tangible storage medium which can be used to store desired program code means in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures and which can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computing system.

Transmissions media can include a network and/or data links which can be used to carry desired program code means in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures and which can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computing system.

Computer-executable instructions comprise, for example, instructions and data which, when executed at a processor, cause a general purpose computing system, special purpose computing system, or special purpose processing device to perform a certain function or group of functions. Alternatively or in addition, the computer-executable instructions may configure the computing system to perform a certain function or group of functions.

The remaining figures may discuss various computing system which may correspond to the computing system <NUM> previously described. The computing systems of the remaining figures include various components or functional blocks that may implement the various embodiments disclosed herein as will be explained. The various components or functional blocks may be implemented on a local computing system or may be implemented on a distributed computing system that includes elements resident in the cloud or that implement aspects of cloud computing. The various components or functional blocks may be implemented as software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware. The computing systems of the remaining figures may include more or less than the components illustrated in the figures and some of the components may be combined as circumstances warrant. Although not necessarily illustrated, the various components of the computing systems may access and/or utilize a processor and memory, such as processor <NUM> and memory <NUM>, as needed to perform their various functions.

Some introductory discussion of a decentralized identification (DID) and the environment is which they are created and reside will not be given with respect to <FIG>. As illustrated in <FIG>, a DID owner <NUM> may own or control a DID <NUM> that represents an identity of the DID owner <NUM>. The DID owner <NUM> may register a DID using a creation and registration service, which will be explained in more detail below.

The DID owner <NUM> may be any entity that could benefit from a DID. For example, the DID owner <NUM> may be a human being or an organization of human beings. Such organizations might include a company, department, government, agency, or any other organization or group of organization. Each individual human being might have a DID while the organization(s) to which each belongs might likewise have a DID.

The DID owner <NUM> may alternatively be a machine, system, or device, or a collection of machine(s), device(s) and/or system(s). In still other embodiments, the DID owner <NUM> may be a subpart of a machine, system or device. For instance, a device could be a printed circuit board, where the subpart of that circuit board are individual components of the circuit board. In such embodiments, the machine or device may have a DID and each subpart may also have a DID. A DID owner might also be a software component such as the executable component <NUM> described above with respect to <FIG>. An example of a complex executable component <NUM> might be an artificial intelligence. An artificial intelligence may also own a DID.

Thus, the DID owner <NUM> may be any reasonable entity, human or non-human, that is capable of creating the DID <NUM> or at least having the DID <NUM> created for and associated with them. Although the DID owner <NUM> is shown as having a single DID <NUM>, this need not be the case as there may be any number of DIDs associated with the DID owner <NUM> as circumstances warrant.

As mentioned, the DID owner <NUM> may create and register the DID <NUM>. The DID <NUM> may be any identifier that may be associated with the DID owner <NUM>. Preferably, that identifier is unique to that DID owner <NUM>, at least within a scope in which the DID is anticipated to be in use. As an example, the identifier may be a locally unique identifier, and perhaps more desirably a globally unique identifier for identity systems anticipated to operate globally. In some embodiments, the DID <NUM> may be a Uniform Resource identifier (URI) (such as a Uniform Resource Locator (URL)) or other pointer that relates the DID owner <NUM> to mechanism to engage in trustable interactions with the DID owner <NUM>.

The DID <NUM> is "decentralized" because it does not require a centralized, third party management system for generation, management, or use. Accordingly, the DID <NUM> remains under the control of the DID owner <NUM>. This is different from conventional centralized IDs based trust on centralized authorities and that remain under control of the corporate directory services, certificate authorities, domain name registries, or other centralized authority (referred to collectively as "centralized authorities" herein). Accordingly, the DID <NUM> may be any identifier that is under the control of the DID owner <NUM> and independent of any centralized authority.

In some embodiments, the structure of the DID <NUM> may be as simple as a user name or some other human understandable term. However, in other embodiments, the DID <NUM> may preferably be a random string of number and letters for increased security. In one embodiment, the DID <NUM> may be a string of <NUM> letters and numbers. Accordingly, the embodiments disclosed herein are not dependent on any specific implementation of the DID <NUM>. In a very simple example, the DID <NUM> is shown as "123ABC".

As also shown in <FIG>, the DID owner <NUM> has control of a private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair that are associated with the DID <NUM>. Because the DID <NUM> is independent of any centralized authority, the private key <NUM> should at all times be fully in control of the DID owner <NUM>. That is, the private and public keys should be generated in a decentralized manner that ensures that they remain under the control of the DID owner <NUM>.

As will be described in more detail to follow, the private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair may be generated on a device controlled by the DID owner <NUM>. The private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair should not be generated on a server controlled by any centralized authority as this may cause the private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair to not be fully under the control of the DID owner <NUM> at all times. Although <FIG> and this description have described a private and public key pair, it will also be noted that other types of reasonable cryptographic information and/or mechanism may also be used as circumstances warrant.

<FIG> also illustrates a DID document <NUM> that is associated with the DID <NUM>. As will be explained in more detail to follow, the DID document <NUM> may be generated at the time that the DID <NUM> is created. In its simplest form, the DID document <NUM> describes how to use the DID <NUM>. Accordingly, the DID document <NUM> includes a reference to the DID <NUM>, which is the DID that is described by the DID document <NUM>. In some embodiments, the DID document <NUM> may be implemented according to methods specified by a distributed ledger <NUM> that will be used to store a representation of the DID <NUM> as will be explained in more detail to follow. Thus, the DID document <NUM> may have different methods depending of the specific distributed ledger.

The DID document <NUM> also includes the public key <NUM> created by the DID owner <NUM> or some other equivalent cryptographic information. The public key <NUM> may be used by third party entities that are permitted by the DID owner <NUM> to access information and data owned by the DID owner <NUM>. The public key <NUM> may also be used by verifying that the DID owner <NUM> in fact owns or controls the DID <NUM>.

The DID document <NUM> may also include authentication information <NUM>. The authentication information <NUM> may specify one or more mechanisms by which the DID owner <NUM> is able to prove that the DID owner <NUM> owns the DID <NUM>. In other words, the mechanisms of authentication information <NUM> may show proof of a binding between the DID <NUM> (and thus it's DID owner <NUM>) and the DID document <NUM>. In one embodiment, the authentication information <NUM> may specify that the public key <NUM> be used in a signature operation to prove the ownership of the DID <NUM>. Alternatively or in addition, the authentication information <NUM> may specify that the public key <NUM> be used in a biometric operation to prove ownership of the DID <NUM>. Accordingly, the authentication information <NUM> may include any number of mechanisms by which the DID owner <NUM> is able to prove that the DID owner <NUM> owns the DID <NUM>.

The DID document <NUM> may also include authorization information <NUM>. The authorization information <NUM> may allow the DID owner <NUM> to authorize third-party entities the rights to modify the DID document <NUM> or some part of the document without giving the third party the right to prove ownership of the DID <NUM>. For example, the authorization information <NUM> may allow the third party to update any designated set of one or more fields in the DID document <NUM> using any designated update mechanism. Alternatively, the authorization information may allow the third party to limit the usages of DID <NUM> by the DID owner <NUM> for a specified time period. This may be useful when the DID owner <NUM> is a minor child, and the third party is a parent or guardian of the child. The authorization information <NUM> may allow the parent or guardian to limit the use of the DID <NUM> until such time as the child is no longer a minor.

The authorization information <NUM> may also specify one or more mechanisms that the third party will need to follow to prove they are authorized to modify the DID document <NUM>. In some embodiments, this mechanism may be similar to those discussed previously with respect to the authentication information <NUM>.

The DID document <NUM> may also include one or more service endpoints <NUM>. A service endpoint may include a network address at which a service operates on behalf of the DID owner <NUM>. Examples of specific services include discovery services, social networks, file storage services such as identity servers or hubs, and verifiable claim repository services. Accordingly, the service endpoints <NUM> operate as pointers for the services that operate on behalf of the DID owner <NUM>. These pointers may be used by the DID owner <NUM> or by third-party entities to access the services that operate on behalf of the DID owner <NUM>. Specific examples of service endpoints <NUM> will be explained in more detail to follow.

The ID document <NUM> may further include identification information <NUM>. The identification information <NUM> may include personally identifiable information such as the name, address, occupation, family members, age, hobbies, interests, or the like of DID owner <NUM>. Accordingly, the identification information <NUM> listed in the DID document <NUM> may represent a different persona of the DID owner <NUM> for different purposes. For instance, a persona may be pseudo-anonymous, e.g., the DID owner <NUM> may include a pen name in the DID document when identifying him or her as a writer posting articles on a blog; a persona may be fully anonymous, e.g., the DID owner <NUM> may only want to disclose his or her job title or other background data (e.g., a school teacher, an FBI agent, an adult older than <NUM> years old, etc.) but not his or her name in the DID document; and a persona may be specific to who the DID owner <NUM> is as an individual, e.g., the DID owner <NUM> may include information identifying him or her as a volunteer for a particular charity organization, an employee of a particular corporation, an award winner of a particular award, etc..

The DID document <NUM> may also include credential information <NUM>, which may also be referred to herein as an attestation. The credential information <NUM> may be any information that is associated with the DID owner <NUM>'s background. For instance, the credential information <NUM> may be (but not limited to) a qualification, an achievement, a government ID, a government right such as a passport or a driver's license, a payment provider or bank account, a university degree or other educational history, employment status and history, or any other information about the DID owner <NUM>'s background.

The DID document <NUM> may also include various other information <NUM>. In some embodiments, the other information <NUM> may include metadata specifying when the DID document <NUM> was created and/or when it was last modified. In other embodiments, the other information <NUM> may include cryptographic proofs of the integrity of the DID document <NUM>. In still further embodiments, the other information <NUM> may include additional information that is either specified by the specific method implementing the DID document or desired by the DID owner <NUM>.

<FIG> also illustrates a distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM>. The distributed ledger <NUM> may be any decentralized, distributed network that includes various computing systems that are in communication with each other. For example, the distributed ledger <NUM> may include a first distributed computing system <NUM>, a second distributed computing system <NUM>, a third distributed computing system <NUM>, and any number of additional distributed computing systems as illustrated by the ellipses <NUM>. The distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM> may operate according to any known standards or methods for distributed ledgers. Examples of conventional distributed ledgers that may correspond to the distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM> include, but are not limited to, Bitcoin [BTC], Ethereum, and Litecoin.

In the context of DID <NUM>, the distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM> is used to store a representation of the DID <NUM> that points to the DID document <NUM>. In some embodiments, the DID document <NUM> may be stored on the actual distributed ledger. Alternatively, in other embodiments the DID document 210may be stored in a data storage (not illustrated) that is associated with the distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM>.

As mentioned, a representation of the DID <NUM> is stored on each distributed computing system of the distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM>. For example, in <FIG> this is shown as the DID has <NUM>, DID has <NUM>, and DID has <NUM>, which are ideally identical copies of the same DID. The DID hash <NUM>, DID has <NUM>, and DID hash <NUM> may then point to the location of the DID document <NUM>. The distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM> may also store numerous other representations of other DIDs as illustrated by references <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, and <NUM>.

In one embodiment, when the DID user <NUM> creates the DID <NUM> and the associated DID document <NUM>, the DID has <NUM>, DID has <NUM>, and DID hash <NUM> are written to the distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM>. The distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM> thus records that the DID <NUM> now exists. Since the distributed ledger or blockchain <NUM> is decentralized, the DID <NUM> is not under the control of any entity outside of the DID owner <NUM>. The DID hash <NUM>, DID has <NUM>, and DID has <NUM> may include, in addition to the pointer to the DID document <NUM>, a record or time stamp that specifies when the DID <NUM> was created. At a later date when modifications are made to the DID document <NUM>, this may also be recorded in DID has <NUM>, DID has <NUM>, and DID has <NUM>. The DID has <NUM>, DID has <NUM>, and DID hash <NUM> may further include a copy of the public key <NUM> so that the DID <NUM> is cryptographically bound to the DID document <NUM>.

Having described DIDs and how they generally operate with reference to <FIG>, specific embodiments of DIDs will now be explained. Turning to <FIG>, an environment <NUM> that may be used to perform various DID lifecycle management operations and services will now be explained. It will be appreciated that the environment of <FIG> may reference elements from <FIG> as needed for ease of explanation.

As shown in <FIG>, the environment <NUM> may include various devices and computing systems that may be owned or otherwise under the control of the DID owner <NUM>. These may include a user device <NUM>. The user device <NUM> may be, but is not limited to, a mobile device such as a smartphone, a computing device such as a laptop computer, or any device such as a car or an appliance that includes computing abilities. The device <NUM> may include a web browser <NUM> operating on the device and an operating system <NUM> operating the device. More broadly speaking, the dashed line <NUM> represents that all of these devices may be owned or otherwise under the control of the DID owner <NUM>.

The environment <NUM> also includes a DID lifestyle management module <NUM>. It will be noted that in operation, the DID lifecycle management module <NUM> may reside on and be executed by one or more of user device <NUM>, web browser <NUM>, and the operating system <NUM> as illustrated by the lines 301a, 302a, and 303a. Accordingly, DID lifecycle management module <NUM> is shown as being separate for ease of explanation.

As shown in <FIG>, the DID lifecycle management module <NUM> includes a DID creation module <NUM>. The DID creation module <NUM> may be used by the DID owner <NUM> to create the DID <NUM> or any number of additional DIDs, such as DID <NUM>. In one embodiment, the DID creation module may include or otherwise have access to a User Interface (UI) element <NUM> that may guide the DID owner <NUM> in creating the DID <NUM>. The DID creation module <NUM> may have one or more drivers that are configured to work with specific distributed ledgers such as distributed ledger <NUM> so that the DID <NUM> complies with the underlying methods of that distributed ledger.

A specific embodiment will now be described. For example, the UI <NUM> may provide a prompt for the user to enter a user name or some other human recognizable name. This name may be used as a display name for the DID <NUM> that will be generated. As previously described, the DID <NUM> may be a long string of random numbers and letters and so having a human recognizable name for a display name be advantageous. The DID creation module <NUM> may then generate the DID <NUM>. In the embodiments having the UI <NUM>, the DID <NUM> may be shown in a listing of identities and may be associated with the human recognizable name.

The DID creation module may also include a key generation module <NUM>. The key generation module may generate the private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair previously described. The DID creation module <NUM> may then use the DID <NUM> and the private and public key pair to generate the DID document <NUM>.

In operation, the DID creation module <NUM> accesses a registrar <NUM> that is configured to the specific distributed ledger that will be recording the transactions related to the DID <NUM>. The DID creation module <NUM> uses the registrar <NUM> to record the DID hash <NUM>, DID hash <NUM>, and DID hash <NUM> in the distributed ledger in the manner previously described and to store the DID document <NUM> in the manner previously described. This process may use the public key <NUM> in the has generation.

In some embodiments, the DID lifecycle management module <NUM> may include an ownership module <NUM>. The ownership module <NUM> may provide mechanisms that ensure that the DID owner <NUM> is aware that the DID owner <NUM> is in sole control of the DID <NUM>. In this way, the provider of the DID lifecycle management module <NUM> is able to ensure that the provider does not control the DID <NUM>, but is only providing the management services.

As previously discussed, the key generation module <NUM> generates the private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair and the public key <NUM> is then recorded in the DID document <NUM>. Accordingly, the public key <NUM> may be used by all devices associated with the DID owner <NUM> and all third parties that desire to provide services to the DID owner <NUM>. Accordingly, when the DID owner <NUM> desires to associate a new device with the DID <NUM>, the DID owner <NUM> may execute the DID creation module <NUM> on the new device. The DID creation module <NUM> may then use the registrar <NUM> to update the DID document <NUM> to reflect that the new device is now associated with the DID <NUM> and this would be reflected in an updated transaction on the distributed ledger <NUM> as previously described.

In some embodiments, however, it may be advantageous to have a public key per device <NUM> owned by the DID owner <NUM> as this may allow the DID owner <NUM> to sign with the specific device public key without having to access a general public key. In other words, since the DID owner <NUM> will use different devices at different times (for example using a mobile phone in one instance and then using a laptop computer in another instance) it is advantageous to have a key associated with each device to provide efficiencies in signing using the keys. Accordingly, in such embodiments the key generation module may generate additional public keys <NUM> and <NUM> when the additional devices execute the DID creation module <NUM>. These additional public keys may be associated with private key <NUM> or in some instances may be paired with a new private key.

In those embodiments where the additional public keys <NUM> and <NUM> are associated with different devices, the additional public keys <NUM> and <NUM> may be recorded in the DID document <NUM> as being associated with those devices. This is shown in <FIG>. It will be appreciated that the DID documents <NUM> may include the information previously described in relation to <FIG> in addition to the information shown in <FIG>. If the DID document <NUM> existed prior to the device specific public keys being generated, then the DID document <NUM> would be updated by the creation module <NUM> via the registrar <NUM> and this would be reflected in an updated transaction on the distributed ledger <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the DID owner <NUM> may desire to keep the association of a device with a public key or even with the DID <NUM> a secret. Accordingly, the DID creation module <NUM> may cause that such data be secretly shown in the DID document <NUM>.

As described thus far, the DID <NUM> has been associated with all the devices under the control of the DID owner <NUM>, even when the devices have their own public keys. However, in some embodiments it may be useful for each device or some subset of devices under the control of the DID owner <NUM> to each have their own DID. Thus, in some embodiments the DID creation module <NUM> may generate an additional DID, for example DID <NUM>, for each device. The creation module would then generate private and public key pairs and DID documents for each of the devices and have them recorded on the distributed ledger <NUM> in the manner previously described. Such embodiments may be advantageous for devices that may change ownership as it may be possible to associate the specific device DID to the new owner of the device by granting the new owner authorization rights in the DID document and revoking such rights from the old owner.

As mentioned, the private key, to ensure that it is totally in the control of the DID owner <NUM>, is created on the user device <NUM>, browser <NUM>, or operating system <NUM> owned or controlled by the DID owner <NUM> that executed the DID management module <NUM>. In this way, there is little chance that a third party may gain control of the private key <NUM>, especially the provider of the DID lifecycle management module <NUM>. However, there is a chance that the device storing the private key <NUM> may be lost by the DID owner <NUM>, which may cause the DID owner <NUM> to lose access to the DID <NUM>. Accordingly, in some embodiments the UI <NUM> may include the option to allow the DID owner <NUM> to export the private key <NUM> to an off device secured database <NUM> that is under the control of the DID owner <NUM>. In some embodiments, the private key <NUM> may be stored as a QR code that may scanned by the DID owner <NUM>.

In other embodiments, the DID lifecycle management module <NUM> may include a recovery module <NUM> that may be used to recover a lost private key <NUM>. In operation, the recovery module <NUM> allows the DID owner <NUM> to select one or more recovery mechanisms <NUM> at the time the DID <NUM> is created that may later be used to recover the lost private key. In those embodiments having the UI <NUM>, the UI <NUM> may allow the DID owner <NUM> to provide required information that will be needed by the one or more recovery mechanisms <NUM> when the recovery mechanisms are implemented. The recovery module may then be run on any device associated with the DID <NUM>.

The DID lifecycle management module <NUM> may also include a revocation module <NUM> that is used to revoke or sever a device from the DID <NUM>. In operation, the revocation module may use the UI element <NUM>, which may allow the DID owner <NUM> to indicate a desire to remove a device from being associated with the DID <NUM>. In one embodiment, the revocation module may access the DID document <NUM> and may cause that all references to the device be removed from the DID document. Alternatively, the public key for the device may be removed. This change in the DID document <NUM> may then be reflected as an updated transaction on the distributed ledger <NUM> as previously described.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment of an environment <NUM> in which a DID such as DID <NUM> may be utilized. Specifically, the environment <NUM> will be used to describe the use of the DID <NUM> in relation to one or more decentralized personal storages or identity hubs. It will be noted that <FIG> may include references to elements first discussed in relation to <FIG> or <FIG> and thus use the same reference numeral for ease of explanation.

In one embodiment, the identity hubs <NUM> may be multiple instances of the same identity hub. This is represented by the line 410A. Thus, the various identity hubs <NUM> may include at least some of the same data and services. Accordingly, if any change is made to one of the identity hubs <NUM>, the change may be reflected in the remaining identity hubs. For example, the first identity hub <NUM> and second identity hub <NUM> are implemented in cloud storage and thus may be able to hold a large amount of data. Accordingly, a full set of the data may be stored in these identity hubs. However, the identity hubs <NUM> and <NUM> may have less memory space. Accordingly, in these identity hubs a descriptor of the data stored in the first and second identity hubs may be included. Alternatively, a record of changes made to the data in other identity hubs may be included. Thus, changes in one of the identity hubs <NUM> are either fully replicated in the other identity hubs or at least a record or descriptor of that data is recorded in the other identity hubs.

Because the identity hubs may be multiple instances of the same identity hub, only a full description of the first identity hub <NUM> will provided as this description may also apply to the identity hubs <NUM>-<NUM>. As illustrated, identity hub <NUM> may include data storage <NUM>. The data storage <NUM> may be used to store any type of data that is associated with the DID owner <NUM>. In one embodiment the data may be a collection <NUM> of a specific type of data corresponding to a specific protocol. For example, the collection <NUM> may be medical records data that corresponds to a specific protocol for medical data. The collection <NUM> may be any other type of data.

In one embodiment, the stored data may have different authentication and privacy settings <NUM> associated with the stored data. For example, a first subset of the data may have a setting <NUM> that allows the data to be publically exposed, but that does not include any authentication to the DID owner <NUM>. This type of data may be for relatively unimportant data such as color schemes and the like. A second subset of the data may have a setting <NUM> that that allows the data to be publically exposed and that includes authentication to the DID owner <NUM>. A third subset of the data may have a setting <NUM> that encrypts the subset of data with the private key <NUM> and public key <NUM> pair (or some other key pair) associated with the DID owner <NUM>. This type of data will require a party to have access to the public key <NUM> or to some other associated public key in order to decrypt the data. This process may also include authentication to the DID owner <NUM>. A fourth subset of the data may have a setting <NUM> that restricts this data to a subset of third parties. This may require that public keys associated with the subset of third parties be used to decrypt the data. For example, the DID owner <NUM> may cause the setting <NUM> to specify that only public keys associated with friends of the DID owner <NUM> may decrypt this data.

In some embodiments, the identity hub <NUM> may have a permissions module <NUM> that allows the DID owner <NUM> to set specific authorization or permissions for third parties such as third parties <NUM> and <NUM> to access the identity hub. For example, the DID owner <NUM> may provide access permission to his or her spouse to all the data <NUM>. Alternatively, the DID owner <NUM> may allow access to his or her doctor for any medical records. It will be appreciated that the DID owner <NUM> may permission to any number of third parties to access a subset of the data <NUM>. This will be explained in more detail to follow.

The identity hub <NUM> may also have a messaging module <NUM>. In operation, the messaging module allows the identity hub to receive messages such as requests from parties such as third parties <NUM> and <NUM> to access the data and services of the identity hub. In addition, the messaging module <NUM> allows the identity hub <NUM> to respond to the messages from the third parties and to also communicate with a DID resolver <NUM>. This will be explained in more detail to follow. The ellipses <NUM> represent that the identity hub <NUM> may have additional services as circumstances warrant.

In one embodiment, the DID owner <NUM> may wish to authenticate a new device <NUM> with the identity hub <NUM> that is already associated with the DID <NUM> in the manner previously described. Accordingly, the DID owner <NUM> may utilize the DID management module <NUM> associated with the new user device <NUM> to send a message to the identity hub <NUM> asserting that the new user device is associated with the DID <NUM> of the DID owner <NUM>.

However, the identity hub <NUM> may not initially recognize the new device as being owned by the DID owner <NUM>. Accordingly, the identity hub <NUM> may use the messaging module <NUM> to contact the DID resolver <NUM>. The message sent to the DID resolver <NUM> may include the DID <NUM>.

The DID resolver <NUM> may be a service, application, or module that is configured in operation to search the distributed ledger <NUM> for DID documents associated with DIDs. Accordingly, in the embodiment the DID resolver <NUM> may search the distributed ledger <NUM> using the DID <NUM>, which may result in the DID resolver <NUM> finding the DID document <NUM>. The DID document <NUM> may then be provided to the identity hub <NUM>.

As discussed previously, the DID document <NUM> may include a public key <NUM> or <NUM> that is associated with the new user device <NUM>. To verify that the new user device is owned by the DID owner <NUM>, the identity hub <NUM> may provide a cryptographic challenge to the new user device <NUM> using the messaging module <NUM>. This cryptographic challenge will be structured such that only a device having access to the private key <NUM> will be able to successfully answer the challenge.

In the embodiment, since the new user device is owned by DID owner <NUM> and thus has access to the private key <NUM>, the challenge may be successfully answered. The identity hub <NUM> may then record in the permissions <NUM> that the new user device <NUM> is able to access the data and services of the identity hub <NUM> and also the rest of the identity hubs <NUM>.

It will be noted that this process of authenticating the new user device <NUM> was performed without the need for the DID owner <NUM> to provide any username, password or the like to the provider of the identity hub <NUM> (i.e., the first cloud storage provider) before the identity hub <NUM> could be accessed. Rather, the access was determined in a decentralized manner based on the DID <NUM>, the DID document <NUM>, and the associated public and private keys. Since these were at all times in the control of the DID owner <NUM>, the provider of the identity hub <NUM> was not involved and thus has no knowledge of the transaction or of any personal information of the DID owner <NUM>.

In another example embodiment, the DID owner <NUM> may provide the DID <NUM> to the third party entity <NUM> so that the third party may access data or services stored on the identity hub <NUM>. For example, the DID owner <NUM> may be a human who is at a scientific conference who desires to allow the third party <NUM>, who is also a human, access to his or her research data. Accordingly, the DID owner <NUM> may provide the DID <NUM> to the third party <NUM>.

Once the third party <NUM> has access to the DID <NUM>, he or she may access the DID resolver <NUM> to access the DID document <NUM>. As previously discussed, the DID document <NUM> may include an end point <NUM> that is an address or pointer to the identity hub <NUM>. The third party <NUM> may then use the address or pointer to access the identity hub <NUM>.

The third party <NUM> may send a message to the messaging module <NUM> asking for permission to access the research data. The messaging module <NUM> may then send a message to the DID owner <NUM> asking if the third party <NUM> should be given access to the research data. Because the DID owner desires to provide access to this data, the DID owner <NUM> may allow permission to the third party <NUM> and this permission may be recorded in the permissions <NUM>.

The messaging module <NUM> may then message the third party <NUM> informing the third party that he or she is able to access the research data. The identity hub <NUM> and the third party <NUM> may then directly communicate so that the third party may access the data. It will be noted that in many cases, it will actually be an identity hub associated with the third party <NUM> that communicates with the identity hub <NUM>. However, it may a device of the third party <NUM> that does the communication.

Advantageously, the above described process allows the identity hub <NUM> and the third party <NUM> to communicate and to share the data without the need for the third party to access the identity hub <NUM> in the conventional manner. Rather, the communication is provisioned in the decentralized manner using the DID <NUM> and the DID document <NUM>. This advantageously allows the DID owner to be in full control of the process.

As briefly discussed above, the identity hub <NUM> may be hosted in a cloud service. The service provider may have access to the data stored in each user's identity hub <NUM>. Furthermore, the service provider may also have access to certain activities of the DID owner. For example, the entities with whom the DID owner has shared his/her data may be stored in the identity hub <NUM>. As another example, a user may have multiple DIDs and have shared data amongst the multiple DIDs, alternatively, the user may have used different DID management modules to access the same data. Based on the data sharing activities, the service provider of the identity hub <NUM> may correlate the relationships of different DIDs and find out that two DIDs may be related or owned by the same owner. Thus, the user's privacy may be compromised.

The principles described herein will solve these potential privacy concerns of DID owners by encrypting the personal data stored in the identity hub <NUM>. The encryption/decryption keys are not stored or accessible by the identity hub <NUM>, so that the DID owners not only have great control to their data from other DID owners or users, but also have their privacy protected from the service providers.

There may be many different objects stored in the identity hub <NUM>. A data object may be a file, a folder, or any portion of data stored in the identity hub <NUM>. The whole identity hub <NUM> may be encrypted with one encryption/decryption key as one object. Alternatively, different portion of the data stored in the identity hub <NUM> may be encrypted with different encryption/decryption keys. In particular, the principles described herein allow encrypting different data objects separately, so that an encrypted individual data object can be shared easily.

As described above, decentralized systems provide a fairly secure data storage for the users (e.g., DID owners). Generally, without the private key of DID, it almost impossible for tor other parties to access the DID owner's data, unless the DID owner grants a permission to the other party to access the DID owner's data. However, when a DID owner grants a permission to another party, the other party's identifier (e.g., DIDs) is often required to be recorded in the permission rules or in the metadata of the identity hub <NUM>, thus, the service provider of the identity hub <NUM> may be able to correlate the relationships among the DID associated with the data and the other parties that are granted permission to access the data. For example, a user may have multiple DIDs, each of which is dedicated for a persona or a specific purpose. The user may grant permission to each of the same user's DIDs for access the user's personal data stored in different identity hubs. Based on the personal data shared amongst the same user's different DIDs, the service provider of the identity hubs may be able to determine that these different DIDs are likely to belong to a same user.

The principles described herein provide users a greater privacy over their personal data by encrypting the personal data and storing the encrypted personal data in the identity hub <NUM>, while still allowing the encrypted personal data to be accessed via a DID owner's management module, and/or to be shared with other entities. Further details of the embodiments of encrypting and sharing data objects stored in a personal storage that is associated with a DID are described with respect to <FIG>.

<FIG> illustrates an example embodiment <NUM> for generating encryption keys. As illustrated in <FIG>, a seed <NUM>, a personal storage identifier <NUM>, and a key identifier <NUM> are used as three inputs <NUM>, <NUM>, and <NUM> into a function <NUM> to generate an output <NUM>. The output <NUM> is then used as an encryption/decryption key <NUM> for encrypting a data object <NUM>. The data object <NUM> is a data object that is stored or is to be stored in a personal storage (e.g., identity hub <NUM>) that is associated with a DID. After the data object <NUM> is encrypted, the data object <NUM> is converted to the encrypted data object <NUM>. The encrypted data object <NUM> is often called ciphertext, which can only be viewed in its original form if it is decrypted with the correct decryption key <NUM>.

The function <NUM> may be any deterministic function that can generate a different result when different inputs are received, or only in very rare cases, different inputs may result in a same result. When the possibility of generating the same result from different inputs is very small, such possibility may be ignored, because it is almost impossible for someone to regenerate the encryption/decryption key <NUM> without the correct three inputs <NUM>, <NUM> and <NUM>. Also, it is desirable that the function <NUM> is a one-way function, such that the it is computationally difficult for one to reverse the three inputs using the result. For example, the function <NUM> may be a hash function that is configured to generate a fixed size code.

The personal storage identifier <NUM> may be any constant value that is associated with the personal storage (e.g., the ID hub <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM> or <NUM>). The constant value may be a combination of more than one constant values. For example, the identity hub <NUM> may have a storage identifier assigned by its service provider, when the DID owner first started using the service. Alternatively, or in addition, the personal storage identifier <NUM> may be a combination of an identifier of the service provider (e.g., the service provider's name, a numerical identifier, etc.) and an identifier of the identity hub <NUM>. As another example, the personal storage identifier <NUM> may be a combination of an identifier of the identity hub and the associated DID.

The key identifier <NUM> may be an identifier generated by the system or entered by the DID owner for the particular data object, such that a different key may be generated for encrypting/decrypting a different data object stored in the same identity hub <NUM>. Accordingly, many different encryption/decryption keys may be generated, and each encryption/decryption key is used to encrypt and decrypt a particular data object. Each time, a new encryption/decryption key is to be generated, a different key identifier <NUM> may be generated or entered by the DID owner. The system can merely use a natural number as the key identifier <NUM>, and each time a new key is to be generated, the key identifier increases by one. Alternatively, a random number can be generated as a new key identifier, which is indexed or stored in a storage, that is accessible by the DID owner or the DID owner's management module. Alternatively, certain information related to the data object (e.g., metadata of the data object) that is to be encrypted may be used as the key identifier, such that each time a different object is to be encrypted, a different key identifier will be generated based on the particular information related to the corresponding data object.

The seed <NUM> may be an input by a user or DID owner, like a passphrase. Alternatively, the seed <NUM> may be a code generated based on the passphrase that is entered by the user or the DID owner. Further details of an example embodiment for generating the seed <NUM> will be described below with respect to <FIG>.

<FIG> illustrates an example embodiment <NUM> for generating a seed <NUM>, which may correspond to the seed <NUM> in <FIG>. Referring to <FIG>, a passphrase <NUM> and a personal storage identifier <NUM> are used as two inputs of the function <NUM> to generate an output <NUM>. The output <NUM> is then used as the seed <NUM>. The passphrase <NUM> may be an input from the user (e.g., the DID owner) <NUM>. In some embodiment, the personal storage identifier <NUM> here may be the same personal storage identifier <NUM>. Alternatively, the personal storage identifiers <NUM> and <NUM> may be generated using different regime or a different constant value related to the same personal storage; thus, they may not necessarily be the same value.

The function <NUM> may be any deterministic function that can generate a different result when different inputs <NUM> and <NUM> are received. Alternatively, it may be that only in very rare cases different inputs <NUM> and <NUM> may result in a same result. As long as the chance of generating the same results using different inputs is very rare, such potential risk may be ignored. Also, it is desirable that the function <NUM> is a one-way function, such that it is computationally difficult for one to reverse the two inputs <NUM> and <NUM> using the output <NUM>. For example, the function <NUM> may be a hash function that is configured to generate a fixed size code. The generated fixed size code may then be used as the seed <NUM>.

The seed <NUM> is then used as one of the inputs in function <NUM> of <FIG> to generate the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. Accordingly, even though the encryption/decryption key may be long and complex (e.g., <NUM> bits), a user or a DID owner does not have to remember it. Instead, the user or the DID owner only needs to remember the passphrase that he/she originally entered. Each time, when the passphrase is received, the system will be able to regenerate the seed <NUM>, <NUM>. At the same time, the system (e.g., the identity hub <NUM> and/or a DID management module <NUM> that is configured to manage the DID) can retrieve the personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM> based on the predetermined key generation regime. Based on the regenerated seed <NUM>, <NUM>, the retrieved personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM>, the system can regenerate the encryption/decryption key <NUM> at any time.

Different types of cryptographic methods may be implemented to encrypt the data object <NUM>. Based on the type of cryptographic method that is implemented, a particular type of encryption/decryption key <NUM> may be generated. For example, the cryptographic method implemented may be a symmetric encryption key algorithm or an asymmetric key encryption algorithm.

A symmetric key encryption algorithm uses a single symmetric key for both encryption and decryption. Symmetric algorithms generally have the advantage of being much faster than asymmetric key.

An asymmetric key encryption algorithm uses a key pair that includes two different but related keys for encryption and decryption. For example, if the data is encrypted by one of the keys, the encrypted data can be decrypted by the other key; vice versa. Thus, either key can be used to encrypt data. The benefit of the asymmetric key is that one of the keys can be shared with other entities and the other key can be kept secret. Thus, the other entities can use the public key to encrypt data before sending the data to the key owner. The encrypted data can only be decrypted by the private key. As such, the data is protected during communication because only the key owner can decrypt and review the decrypted data, since only the key owner has access to the private key.

<FIG> illustrates an example embodiment <NUM> for allowing a DID management module of a DID owner to access the data object stored in a personal storage (e.g., the identity hub <NUM>). Referring to <FIG>, an identity hub <NUM> of a DID owner <NUM> is hosted in an identity hub service <NUM>. The identity hub service <NUM> may be a cloud service. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that the identity hub service <NUM> may host multiple identity hubs, each of which corresponds to a different DID. The identity hub <NUM> may correspond to the identity hub <NUM> of <FIG>, and stores one or more encrypted data objects <NUM>, <NUM> of the DID owner. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any number of encrypted data objects stored in the identity hub <NUM>.

Each of these encrypted data objects <NUM> and <NUM> may be encrypted using the embodiment described with respect to <FIG> and <FIG> above. Thus, each of the encrypted objects <NUM> and <NUM> may be encrypted by a different encryption/decryption key. As described with respect to <FIG> and <FIG>, at least some of the data objects may be encrypted by encryption/decryption keys generated based on the passphrase <NUM>, the personal storage identifier <NUM>, the personal storage identifier <NUM>, <NUM>, and a key identifier <NUM>.

The DID management module <NUM> is associated with the DID owner <NUM> who owns the data stored in the identity hub <NUM>. The DID management module <NUM> may correspond to the DID management module <NUM>. The DID management module <NUM> may be a mobile wallet app, an app installed on a personal computer, and/or a browser. The DID management module <NUM> is configured to have access to the data <NUM> and <NUM> stored in the identity hub <NUM>. As illustrated in <FIG>, the DID management module <NUM> or <NUM> may be able to manage multiple DIDs. For example, as illustrated in <FIG>, the DID management module <NUM> manages the DID <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that the DID management module <NUM> may manage any natural number of DIDs that may be owned by a same user, the DID owner <NUM>.

Also, the DID <NUM> is associated with the identity hub <NUM>. Thus, the DID management module <NUM> is capable of access data objects <NUM>, <NUM> stored in the identity hub <NUM>. However, since the data objects <NUM> and <NUM> stored in the identity hub <NUM> are encrypted, the DID management module <NUM> not only needs to be able to receive the encrypted data objects <NUM> and <NUM>, but also needs to be able to decrypt the encrypted data objects <NUM> and <NUM>.

As described above with respect to <FIG> and <FIG>, the encryption/decryption keys that are used to encrypt the data object <NUM> and <NUM> were generated using a passphrase and some other constants that can be retrieved by computing systems (e.g., the identity hub <NUM> and/or the DID management module <NUM>). Accordingly, the DID management module <NUM> will be able to regenerate the encryption/decryption key as long as the DID management module <NUM> has access to the passphrase <NUM>.

Referring to <FIG>, the passphrase <NUM> may be entered each time by the DID owner <NUM> when a data object <NUM> or <NUM> is to be accessed. Alternatively, the passphrase <NUM> may be entered initially by the DID owner <NUM> and stored in the DID management module <NUM>. Thus, each time, when a data object <NUM> or <NUM> is to be accessed again, the DID management module <NUM> can access the stored passphrase <NUM> automatically. Also, the personal storage identifier <NUM> of each personal storage (e.g., identity hub <NUM>) may be obtained from the identity hub <NUM> each time when the encrypted data <NUM> or <NUM> is to be accessed. Alternatively, the personal storage identifier <NUM> may first be obtained from the identity hub <NUM>, and then stored in the DID management module <NUM>. Thus, each time, when a data object <NUM> or <NUM> is to be accessed, the DID management module <NUM> can access the stored personal storage identifier <NUM> directly.

The bi-directional arrow <NUM> represents a communication channel between the identity hub <NUM> and the DID management module <NUM>. The DID management module <NUM> may request for the data object <NUM> stored at the identity hub <NUM> on behalf of the DID <NUM>. In response to the request, the identity hub <NUM> may verify the identity of the DID <NUM>. Alternatively, the identity hub <NUM> may not have to verify any identity, since the data object <NUM> has been encrypted. The identity hub <NUM> may send the encrypted data object <NUM> to the DID management module <NUM>. The DID management module <NUM> may temporarily store or permanently store the received encrypted data object <NUM>' at a local storage or a memory. Since the data object <NUM>' is an encrypted data object, the DID management module will not be able to access it unless the encryption/decryption key is available.

In some embodiment, the identity hub <NUM> may cause the DID management module to have the DID owner <NUM> to enter the passphrase <NUM>. In some embodiments, the DID owner <NUM> may have previously entered the passphrase <NUM>, and the previously entered passphrase <NUM> has been stored at the DID management module <NUM>. The DID management module <NUM> is also configured to obtain the personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM>. The personal storage identifier <NUM> corresponds to the identity hub <NUM>. The key identifier <NUM> corresponds to the encryption/decryption key used to encrypt the data object <NUM>.

The personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM> may be readily accessible from the identity hub <NUM> or in the metadata of the encrypted data object <NUM>, <NUM>'. Alternatively, the DID management module <NUM> may request the information related to the personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM> from the identity hub <NUM>. In response to the request, the DID management module <NUM> may then send the personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM> to the DID management module <NUM>. The communications related to requesting and receiving the personal storage identifier <NUM> and the key identifier <NUM> are represented by the dotted arrows <NUM> and <NUM>.

Based on the passphrase <NUM> and the personal storage identifier <NUM>, the DID management module <NUM> is configured to regenerate the seed <NUM> based on the function <NUM>. The DID management module <NUM> is also configured to regenerate the encryption/decryption key <NUM> using the regenerated seed <NUM>, the personal storage identifier <NUM> or <NUM>, and the key identifier <NUM>, based on the function <NUM> of <FIG>. The functions <NUM> and <NUM> are represented by the functions block <NUM>. In some embodiment, the functions <NUM> may be included in the metadata of the encrypted data <NUM>, <NUM>'. Alternatively, the functions <NUM> may be obtained from the identity hub, which is represented by the dotted arrow <NUM>. Alternatively, in some embodiment, the functions <NUM> may have been installed as part of the system of the DID management module <NUM> and/or the identity hub <NUM>.

Once the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is generated, the DID management module <NUM> may then decrypt the encrypted data object <NUM>' to recover the accessible data object <NUM>. The decrypted data object <NUM> may be stored in a non-volatile storage (e.g., a hard drive) at the DID management module <NUM>. Alternatively, the decrypted data object <NUM> may be stored temporarily (e.g., in a volatile memory, a RAM). As such, only when the DID owner needs to review the content of the data object <NUM>', the encrypted data <NUM>' is decrypted for the DID owner's review. Such an embodiment provides additional security for protecting the personal data of the DID owner.

Further, the principles described herein not only allows the encrypted data objects stored in a personal storage that is associated with a DID to be accessible by the DID management modules that is configured to manage the DID, but also allow the encrypted data to be shared to another entity that may not be associated with the DID. <FIG> illustrates an example embodiment for sharing with another entity an encrypted data object stored in a DID owner's personal storage via a negotiated protection strategy.

Referring to <FIG>, the identity hub service <NUM> may be similar to the identity hub service <NUM> of <FIG>, and the identity hub <NUM> may be similar to the identity hub <NUM> of <FIG>. The identity hub <NUM> stores one or more encrypted data objects <NUM> and <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any number of encrypted data objects stored in the identity hub <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any number of identity hubs that are hosted at the identity hub service <NUM>. Each of these identity hubs is associated with a corresponding DID, and each of these identity hubs stores personal data of the corresponding DID owner.

However, unlike <FIG>, in which the DID management module that manages the DID is requesting for accessing a data object stored at the identity hub <NUM>, in <FIG>, another entity <NUM> that is not associated with the DID is requesting for accessing a data object <NUM> stored at the identity hub <NUM>, which is represented by the one-directional arrow <NUM>.

Once the identity hub <NUM> receives the request from the other entity <NUM>, the identity hub <NUM> and the other entity <NUM> communicate with each other to "negotiate" a protection strategy for protecting the encryption/decryption key of the encrypted data <NUM>. The communications related to the negotiation between the identity hub <NUM> and the other entity <NUM> are represented by the bi-directional arrow band <NUM>. The negotiation may be based on the type of data requested.

In some embodiments, the more important data, the more secured protection is required. For example, the data object <NUM> may be medical data of the DID owner. In such a case, more secured protection may be required. The more secured protection may require the identity hub <NUM> to encrypt the encryption/decryption key before sending it to the other entity <NUM>. In some embodiment, the negotiation <NUM> may be based on the pre-set rules related to the data object <NUM>, the metadata of the data object <NUM>, and/or any other information stored in the identity hub <NUM>.

In some embodiment, the negotiation <NUM> may require the identity hub <NUM> to communicate with the DID management module <NUM> that manages the corresponding DID. For example, the identity hub <NUM> may require the DID owner's consent before committing to any data protection strategy. As another example, the identity hub <NUM> may require the DID owner's input to determine what type of protection is to be implemented to protect the encryption/decryption key.

In some situations, the data may not be worth protection. For example, if the data object <NUM> is social media data or a personal photo that the DID owner does not mind sharing with the public, the encryption/decryption key may be directly sent to the other entity <NUM> without additional protection. As another example, the identity hub <NUM> may decrypt the encrypted data <NUM> and send the decrypted data to the other entity without any protection.

However, in many situations, a protection strategy is negotiated, and the encryption/decryption key will be further protected before being shared with the other entity <NUM> via a computer network. Based on the negotiated protection strategy, the identity hub <NUM> then protects the encryption/decryption key, which is represented by the arrow <NUM>. For example, the protection strategy may require the encryption/decryption key to be encrypted <NUM>. The protected encryption/decryption key <NUM> and the encrypted data object <NUM> are then sent to the other entity <NUM> via a computer network.

After receiving the encrypted data object <NUM>' and the protected encryption/decryption key <NUM>', the other entity <NUM> may then recover the protected encryption/decryption key <NUM>', and the use the recovered encryption/decryption key to decrypt the encrypted data object <NUM>'. As such, both the DID owner's personal data <NUM> and the encryption/decryption key <NUM> are protected during the transmission via the computer network. If the data <NUM> and/or the protected encryption key <NUM> are obtained or stolen by a third entity during the transmission, the third entity cannot read the encrypted data object <NUM> without the encryption/decryption key, because the encryption/decryption key has been protected prior to being transmitted in the computer network.

<FIG> further illustrates an example of protection strategy <NUM> that may be implemented to protect the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The protection strategy <NUM> includes using a private/public key pair of the other entity to encrypt/decrypt the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The encrypted data object <NUM> may correspond to the encrypted data object <NUM> or <NUM> of <FIG>.

As illustrated in <FIG>, a data object <NUM> is associated DID <NUM>. The data object <NUM> is first encrypted by an encryption/decryption key <NUM> into an encrypted data object <NUM>. The encryption/decryption key <NUM> may be generated using the embodiment described with respect to <FIG> and <FIG>. The encrypted data object <NUM> cannot be read or accessed until it is decrypted using the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. There may be more than one other entity that has requested to access the data object <NUM> or the encrypted data <NUM>. As illustrated in <FIG>, there are two other entities, a first other entity <NUM> and a second other entity <NUM>, each of which has requested to access the data object <NUM> or the encrypted data object <NUM>.

Assuming each of the first other entity <NUM> and the second other entity <NUM> has negotiated with the DID <NUM> (i.e., the identity hub that stores the data object <NUM> and/or the DID management module that manages the DID <NUM>) a protection strategy for protecting the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The negotiated protection strategy for the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is to use the other entity's key to encrypt the encryption/decryption key before transmitting the encryption/decryption key via any computer network. In particular, an asymmetric encryption regime using a private/public key pair is implemented to encrypt the encryption/decryption key.

As briefly discussed previously, a private/public key pair is a pair of different but related keys, one of which may be used to encrypt a data object, and the other one of which may be used to decrypt the encrypted data object. One of the keys is kept secret to the owner itself, and the secret key is called a private key. The other key is given to the public, and that key is called a public key.

Each of the other entities <NUM> and <NUM> has its own private/public key pairs. As illustrated, the first other entity <NUM> has a first public key <NUM> and a first private key <NUM>. The public key <NUM> is shared with the identity hub that stores the data object <NUM> or <NUM> and/or the DID management module that is configured to manage the DID <NUM>. The private key <NUM> is kept to the first other entity <NUM> itself. Similarly, the second other entity <NUM> has a second public key <NUM> and a second private key <NUM>. Also, the second public key <NUM> is shared with the DID <NUM> (e.g., the associated identity hub and/or the DID management module) and the second private key <NUM> is kept secret to the second other entity <NUM> itself.

As illustrated in <FIG>, in response to the negotiated protection strategy, the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is encrypted by the first public key <NUM> to generate a first encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The first encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> is then stored with the encrypted data object <NUM>. Similarly, the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is also encrypted by the second public key <NUM> to generate a second encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The second encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> is also stored with the encrypted data object <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any number of other entities that are granted access to the encrypted data object <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any number of encrypted encryption/decryption keys stored with the encrypted data object <NUM>.

The encrypted data object <NUM> stored with each encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>, <NUM> forms a data object <NUM>. When one of the other entities <NUM> and <NUM> requests to access the encrypted data object <NUM>, the data object <NUM> (including the encrypted data object <NUM> and each encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> and <NUM>) may be sent to the requesting entity. The requesting entity (e.g., the first other entity <NUM>, or the second other entity <NUM>) may then use its private key <NUM> or <NUM> to decrypt the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> or <NUM>. The decrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> may then be used to decrypt the encrypted data object <NUM>.

For example, the first other entity <NUM> may request for the data object <NUM> or the encrypted data object <NUM> from the identity hub (not shown) that stores the data object <NUM> and/or <NUM>. The identity hub may send the data object <NUM> to the first other entity <NUM>. The first other entity <NUM> may then use its private key that is related to the first public key <NUM> to decrypt the first encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> to recover the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The first other entity <NUM> can then use the recovered encryption/decryption key <NUM> to decrypt the encrypted data object <NUM> to recover the data object <NUM>.

As described above, when the data object <NUM> is transmitted via a computer network, the encrypted data object <NUM> and the encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM> and <NUM> are transmitted via the computer network. As such, in case a third party (that should not have access to the data object <NUM>) obtains the data object <NUM>, the third party cannot easily decrypt the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> and/or the encrypted data object <NUM>.

Furthermore, the above described embodiment also allows a DID owner to share its data without recording the requesting entities identities or identifiers. The identities of the data requesting (or data receiving) entities are embedded in the encrypted encryption/decryption keys. However, merely having the encrypted encryption/decryption keys cannot reconstruct identities of the first other entity <NUM> and the second other entity <NUM>. As such, not only the shared data is protected during transmission via the computer network, but also the relationships amongst the DID owner and the data receiving entities are protected from the service provider of the identity hub.

In particular, the first and second other entities <NUM> and <NUM> may be related to the owner of DID <NUM>. For example, the first and second other entities <NUM> and <NUM> may be associated with other DIDs, and the other DIDs and the DID <NUM> may be owned by the same owner. If the identity hub's service provider knows each of the DIDs of the other entities, the identity hub's service provider may be able to determine the relationship of these different DIDs, thus, compromise the privacy of the owner of the multiple related DIDs. The principles described herein solve the above-mentioned problem by allowing the sharing of encrypted data object <NUM> without recording the other entities' identities (e.g., DID or any other identifier), so that the privacy of the owner of the DID <NUM>, and the other entities <NUM> and <NUM> are further protected.

<FIG> further illustrates an example environment <NUM> in which a data object is encrypted using an encryption/decryption key <NUM>, and the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is protected via a public key of the other entity. Referring to <FIG>, the identity hub service <NUM> may correspond to the identity hub service <NUM> of <FIG>; the identity hub <NUM> may correspond to the identity hub <NUM> of <FIG>, the encrypted data object <NUM> may correspond to any one of the data objects <NUM> and <NUM> of <FIG>. The identity hub <NUM> is hosted at the identity hub service <NUM>. The identity hub <NUM> is associated with a DID <NUM>. The identity hub <NUM> stores the encrypted data object <NUM>.

A first other entity <NUM> and a second other entity <NUM> may correspond to the first other entity <NUM> and the second other entity <NUM> of <FIG>. Each of the first and second other entities <NUM> and <NUM> is not associated with the DID <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any number of other entities that are not associated with the DID <NUM>, and may request for access to the encrypted data object <NUM>.

The first other entity <NUM> may first send a request for access to the encrypted data object <NUM> to the identity hub <NUM>. The identity hub <NUM> and/or a DID management module <NUM> of the DID <NUM> may negotiate a protection strategy for protecting the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The protection strategy is to protect the encryption/decryption key <NUM> with a public key of the first other entity <NUM>. Accordingly, the first other entity <NUM> sends its public key <NUM> to the identity hub <NUM>, while the private key <NUM> that is related to the public key <NUM> is kept secret at the first other entity <NUM>.

At substantially the same time, based on the negotiated protection strategy, the identity hub <NUM> (and/or the DID management module <NUM>) regenerates the encryption/decryption key <NUM> based on a passphrase <NUM> and the personal storage identifier <NUM>. In some embodiment, a key identifier (not shown) may also be required to regenerate the encryption/decryption key. The regenerated encryption/decryption key <NUM> is then encrypted using the received public key <NUM> of the first other entity <NUM>. The encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> is then stored with the encrypted data object <NUM>. To protect the encrypted data object <NUM>, the regenerated encryption/decryption key <NUM> should not be permanently stored in a non-volatile storage. In some embodiment, the regenerated encryption/decryption key <NUM> may be temporarily stored in the identity hub <NUM> (e.g., stored in a RAM), and once the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is encrypted by the public key <NUM>, the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is deleted from the identity hub <NUM>.

Similarly, at a different time or at a substantially the same time, a second other entity <NUM> may request for access to the same encrypted data object <NUM> stored in the identity hub <NUM>. The identity hub <NUM> and/or the DID management module <NUM> may negotiate the same protection strategy to protect the encryption/decryption key <NUM>, i.e., to protect the encryption/decryption key <NUM> using a public key <NUM> of the second other entity <NUM>. Similarly, the second other entity <NUM> sends its public key <NUM> to the identity hub <NUM>, while keeping its private key <NUM> secret.

Since the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is not stored permanently in the identity hub <NUM>, each time the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is needed, the identity hub <NUM> (and/or the DID management module <NUM>) regenerates the encryption/decryption key <NUM> again at least based on a passphrase <NUM> and the personal storage identifier <NUM>. Similarly, here, when the protection strategy of the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is determined, the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is regenerated. The regenerated encryption/decryption key <NUM> is then encrypted using the public key <NUM> of the second other entity <NUM>. The encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> is also stored with the encrypted data object <NUM>. Also, once the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM> is generated, the encryption/decryption key <NUM> should be deleted from the identity hub <NUM>.

<FIG> illustrates an example embodiment <NUM> in which another entity <NUM> receives the encrypted data object <NUM> from a personal storage (i.e., an identity hub <NUM>) that is associated with a DID <NUM>. The identity hub <NUM> may correspond to the identity hub <NUM> of <FIG>, the identity hub service <NUM> may correspond to the identity hub service <NUM> of <FIG>, and the DID <NUM> may correspond to the DID <NUM> of <FIG>. The identity hub <NUM> stores one or more encrypted data objects <NUM> and <NUM>. The ellipsis <NUM> represents that there may be any natural number of encrypted data objects stored in the identity hub <NUM>. The identity hub <NUM> is hosted in the identity hub service <NUM>, and the ellipsis <NUM> represents that the identity hub service <NUM> may host any natural number of identity hubs, each of which is associated with a DID. The other entity <NUM> may correspond to any one of the first and second other entities <NUM> and <NUM> of <FIG>.

Assuming, the other entity <NUM> has previously negotiated a protection strategy with the identity hub <NUM> for accessing the encrypted data object <NUM> as illustrated in <FIG>. Accordingly, the encryption/decryption key that used to encrypt the data object <NUM> has already been encrypted by public keys of the other entities <NUM>, and the encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM> and <NUM> have been stored with the encrypted data object <NUM>. The data object <NUM> is a data object, including the encrypted data object <NUM> and the encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM> and <NUM>.

In response to the request for accessing the encrypted data object <NUM>, the identity hub <NUM> sends the data object <NUM> to the other entity <NUM>. The other entity <NUM> may store the data object <NUM>' at a local storage. The stored data object <NUM>' includes multiple encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM>' and <NUM>'. One of the encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM>' and <NUM>' (e.g., key <NUM>') was encrypted using the other entity <NUM>'s public key. Thus, the other entity <NUM> can decrypt the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>' using its private key <NUM> to recover the encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The other entity <NUM> can then use the recovered encryption/decryption key <NUM> to decrypt the encrypted data object <NUM>' to recover the data object.

Although the method acts may be disused in a certain order or illustrated in a flow chart as occurring in a particular order, no particular ordering is required unless specifically stated, or required because an act is dependent on another act being completed prior to the act being performed.

<FIG> illustrates a flow chart of an example method <NUM> for encrypting and storing one or more encrypted objects in a personal storage that is associated with a DID. The method <NUM> includes generating an encryption key using a passphrase and an identifier of a personal storage that stores data associated with a DID (act <NUM>). The passphrase may correspond to the passphrase <NUM> of <FIG>. The identifier of the personal storage may correspond to the personal storage identifier <NUM> of <FIG> and/or <NUM> of <FIG>. Referring back to <FIG>, the passphrase <NUM> and the personal storage identifier <NUM> may be used as inputs <NUM> and <NUM> of function <NUM> to generate an output <NUM>. The output <NUM> may then be used as a seed <NUM>. Referring back to <FIG>, the seed <NUM>, <NUM>, the personal storage identifier <NUM>, and a key identifier <NUM> may then be used as inputs <NUM>, <NUM> and <NUM> of function <NUM> to generate an output <NUM>. The key identifier <NUM> may be automatically generated by the computing system or be entered by the DID owner. The output <NUM> may then be used as the encryption/decryption key <NUM>.

As briefly described above, in some embodiments, a symmetric encryption algorithm may be implemented. In such a case, the encryption/decryption key may be one key that is used to encrypt and decrypt the data object. In some embodiments, an asymmetric encryption algorithm may be implemented. In such a case, the encryption/decryption key may be a private/public key pair.

The method <NUM> also includes encrypting a data object stored or to be stored in the personal storage using the encryption key (act <NUM>). The data object may correspond to the data object <NUM> of <FIG>. Referring back to <FIG>, the data object <NUM> is encrypted by the encryption/decryption key <NUM> to generate an encrypted data object <NUM>. The encrypted data object is then stored in the personal storage (act <NUM>).

The method <NUM> further includes allowing a DID management module associated with the DID to access the encrypted data object (act <NUM>).

<FIG> illustrates a flowchart of an example method <NUM> for allowing a DID management module associated with the DID to access an encrypted data object, which may correspond to the act <NUM> of <FIG>. The method <NUM> may include receiving a request for the encrypted data object from the DID management module (act <NUM>). The encrypted data object may correspond to the encrypted data object <NUM> of <FIG>. The DID management module may correspond to the DID management module <NUM> of <FIG>.

The method <NUM> may also include causing the DID management module to have access to the passphrase and the identifier of the first personal storage in response to the request (act <NUM>). Referring back to <FIG>, the passphrase <NUM> may be caused to be entered by the DID owner <NUM>. Alternatively, or in addition, the passphrase <NUM> may be stored at the DID management module <NUM> after the DID owner <NUM> first entered it. Further, the personal storage identifier <NUM> and/or the key identifier <NUM> may be included in the metadata of the encrypted data object <NUM>'. Alternatively, or in addition, the personal storage identifier <NUM> and/or key identifier <NUM> may be obtained from the identity hub <NUM> where the encrypted data object <NUM> is stored.

Thereafter, the encrypted data object is sent to the DID management module (act <NUM>). Referring back to <FIG> again, the encrypted data object <NUM> is sent to the DID management module <NUM>. The DID management module is then caused to regenerate the encryption/decryption key (act <NUM>). As illustrated in <FIG>, the DID management module <NUM> uses the passphrase <NUM>, personal storage identifier <NUM>, and the key identifier <NUM> as inputs of functions <NUM> to regenerate the encryption/decryption key <NUM>.

Finally, the DID management module is caused to decrypt the received encrypted data object using the regenerated encryption/decryption key (act <NUM>). As illustrated in <FIG>, the encrypted data object <NUM>' is decrypted using the recovered encryption/decryption key <NUM> to generate the data object <NUM>.

Further, the principles described herein not only allowing the encrypted data objects associated with a DID to be accessed by the DID management module that manages the DID, but also allowing the encrypted data to be shared with another entity that is not associated with the DID.

<FIG> illustrates a flowchart of an example method <NUM> for sharing an encrypted data object stored in a personal storage that is associated with a DID with another entity that is not associated with the DID. The personal storage may correspond to the identity hub <NUM> of <FIG>; the encrypted data object may correspond to the encrypted data object <NUM> of <FIG>; and the other entity may correspond to the other entity <NUM> of <FIG>. The method <NUM> includes receiving a request for accessing an encrypted data object from another entity that is not associated with the DID (act <NUM>).

In response to the request, a protection strategy for protecting the encryption/decryption key is caused to be negotiated between the personal storage that is associated with the DID (and/or the DID management module that manages the DID) and the other entity (act <NUM>). The other entity may be an entity associated with another DID that is different from the DID. The other entity may be a DID management module that is configured to manage the other DID. The "negotiation" may be based on the type of data being accessed. For example, some data objects that the DID owner does not mind to share with the public may not require a highly secured protection, and some data objects that the DID owner would like to keep private may require more secure protection (e.g., medical data, data including personally identifiable information, etc.).

Based on the negotiated protection strategy, the encryption/decryption key may then be protected (act <NUM>). The protection strategy may be to encrypt the encryption/decryption key before sending it to the other entity via a computer network. Finally, the encrypted data object and the protected encryption/decryption key are then sent to the other entity via a computer network (act <NUM>).

<FIG> illustrates a flowchart of an example method <NUM> for protecting the encryption/decryption key via an example protection strategy in which a public key of another entity is used to encrypt the encryption/decryption key.

The method <NUM> includes receiving a public key from the other entity (act <NUM>). The encryption/decryption key here may correspond to the encryption/decryption key <NUM> of <FIG>, the other entity here may correspond to any one of the first and second other entities <NUM> and <NUM> of <FIG>, and the public key of the other entity here may correspond to any one of the public keys <NUM> and <NUM> of <FIG>. As illustrated in <FIG>, the first other entity <NUM> sends its public key <NUM> to the identity hub <NUM>, and the second other entity <NUM> sends its public key <NUM> to the identity hub <NUM>.

The encryption/decryption key is then encrypted using the received public key of the other entity (act <NUM>). Referring to <FIG>, the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is encrypted by the first other entity's public key <NUM> into the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>, and the encryption/decryption key <NUM> is also encrypted by the second other entity's public key <NUM> into the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>.

The encrypted encryption/decryption key is then stored with the encrypted data object (act <NUM>). As illustrated in <FIG>, the encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM> and <NUM> are stored with the encrypted data <NUM>.

The encrypted data object and the encrypted encryption/decryption key are then sent to the other entity (act <NUM>). The encrypted data object may correspond to the encrypted data object <NUM> of <FIG>. The encrypted encryption/decryption key may correspond to the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>. The other entity may correspond to the other entity <NUM> of <FIG>. Referring back to <FIG>, the data object <NUM> including the encrypted data object <NUM> and the encrypted encryption/decryption keys <NUM>, <NUM> are then sent to the other entity <NUM>.

The other entity is then caused to decrypt the encrypted encryption/decryption key using a private key that corresponds to the public key that was used to encrypt the encryption/decryption key (<NUM>). The private key here may correspond to the private key <NUM> of <FIG>. As illustrated in <FIG>, the encrypted encryption/decryption key <NUM>' is decrypted using the other entity <NUM>'s private key <NUM> to recover the encryption/decryption key <NUM>.

Finally, the other entity is caused to decrypt the encrypted data object using the decrypted encryption/decryption key (act <NUM>). Referring back to <FIG>, the recovered encryption/decryption key <NUM> is used to decrypt the encrypted data object <NUM>' to generate the decrypted data object <NUM>. The decrypted data object <NUM> can then be accessed (e.g., read) by the other entity <NUM>.

For the processes and methods disclosed herein, the operations performed in the processes and methods may be implemented in differing order. Furthermore, the outlined operations are only provided as examples, an some of the operations may be optional, combined into fewer steps and operations, supplemented with further operations, or expanded into additional operations without detracting from the essence of the disclosed embodiments.

Claim 1:
A computing system (<NUM>) comprising:
one or more processors (<NUM>); and
one or more computer-readable media having thereon computer-executable instructions that are structured such that, when executed by the one or more processors (<NUM>), cause the computing system (<NUM>) to perform a method for encrypting and sharing one or more data objects stored in a personal storage that is associated with a first DID (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>), the method comprising:
generating an encryption/decryption key (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) using a passphrase (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) and an identifier (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) of the personal storage that stores or is to store a data object (<NUM>, <NUM>);
encrypting the data object (<NUM>, <NUM>) stored or to be stored in the personal storage using the encryption/decryption key (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>);
storing the encrypted data object (<NUM>, <NUM>) in the personal storage;
receiving a request for accessing the encrypted data object (<NUM>, <NUM>) from another entity (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) that is not associated with the DID (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>);
negotiating with the other entity (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) a protection strategy for protecting the encryption/decryption key (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>);
protecting the encryption/decryption key (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) based on the negotiated protection strategy; and
sending the encrypted data object and the protected encryption/decryption key (<NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>) to the other entity.