Patent Description:
Trustworthy operation of network equipment is of importance to realize an overall trustworthy communications network that user can utilize for all kinds of services. Security procedures are therefore followed when incorporating new network equipment in new or existing communications networks.

As an example, in communications networks within the third generation partnership project (3GPP) the procedure to securely incorporate new network equipment is based on the use of so-called vendor hardware credentials, here after referred to as vendor credentials (VCs). In general terms, VCs are cryptographic identities by which a piece of network equipment can prove, during the enrolment in the communications network, that it is a genuine product from a genuine manufacturer.

Equipment manufacturers have to deploy secure provisioning procedures during manufacturing of network equipment that assure that the installation of VCs is done in a manner such that the VC truly identifies the correct network equipment and that VC are not illegally passed to unauthorized manufacturers.

The VCs themselves are traditional public-key cryptography based keys and certificates and one uses a public key infrastructure (PKI) to securely maintain the collection of true VCs. Via the PKI one also maintains those VC that are revoked either because the provisioning into the hardware malfunctioned or the hardware has been reported as broken or has reached end-of-life.

A common procedure is that in the manufacturing site of the network equipment there is a VC programming station that is connected to the hardware of the network equipment and to a PKI service in order to obtain a VC certificate for a credential that resides on the network equipment or a VC certificate and credential pair. In order to prevent that VC credentials are obtained in a non-authorized manner for non-approved purposes, access to the PKI service is commonly only available to factory operators and equipment in the manufacturing site that are trustworthy. In the manufacturing site, the VC certificates are securely stored in the network equipment using hardware protection features which guarantee that, the VC private key is encrypted when stored in non-volatile memory such as flash memory, and that the VC certificate is stored so it cannot be tampered with without being detected by the network equipment.

<FIG> schematically illustrates a system 100a in which a traditional way of providing VC certificates to network equipment <NUM> is used. The network equipment comprises an application <NUM> in which there is provided an enclave <NUM>. The network equipment has a hardware identity (HW ID). The VC certificate is provided from a server <NUM> by means of an operator <NUM> operating a programming station <NUM>. Towards this end, the operator is given access credentials to the PKI service. Public keys (pubkey) <NUM>, <NUM> are used for setting up secure communications between the network equipment and the programming station.

In this way of organizing, the setup and the operation of the secure environment in the manufacturing site incurs considerable production cost and operational practical problems, such as management of personnel that must be vetted before allowing to operate the programming station and getting access to the encryption keys that make the programming station to be able to connect to the PKI service.

Some work has been performed with regards to retrieve general certificates or registering devices in a secure manner. For example, <CIT> discusses how an authenticating equipment in a distributed gaming environment use embedded, digital keys and digital certificates in a private key infrastructure (PKI). This is performed by issuing a key from a trusted root server. Authentication is performed in a serial manner throughout the operational chain of hardware and/or software modules that collectively serve to support the gaming environment. <CIT> discusses a method for enabling a service for an electronic device. This is at least partially performed by generating a unique identification and registering the electronic device to the service via a secure runtime environment. <CIT> discusses a method for a certificate request for a client process on a mobile device. Granting the request may comprises determining that a certain security assurance character provides a certain security assurance attribute, e.g. that the mobile device has a key generation entity which operates in a secure execution environment.

Hence, there is still a need for an improved provision of VC certificates to network equipment.

An object of embodiments herein is to provide efficient provisioning of VC certificates to network equipment.

According to a first aspect there is presented a method for obtaining a VC certificate from a server. The method is performed by network equipment. The method comprises performing, by an enclave of the network equipment, measurements on at least one property of the network equipment. The method comprises providing, by the enclave, a request for the VC certificate from the server upon having attested the measurements. The method comprises receiving, from the server, the VC certificate in response to the request and storing the VC certificate in the network equipment.

According to a second aspect there is presented network equipment for obtaining a VC certificate from a server. The network equipment comprises processing circuitry. The processing circuitry is configured to cause the network equipment to perform, by an enclave of the network equipment, measurements on at least one property of the network equipment. The processing circuitry is configured to cause the network equipment to provide, by the enclave, a request for the VC certificate from the server upon having attested the measurements. The processing circuitry is configured to cause the network equipment to receive, from the server, the VC certificate in response to the request and to store the VC certificate in the network equipment.

According to a third aspect there is presented network equipment for obtaining a VC certificate from a server. The network equipment comprises processing circuitry and a storage medium. The storage medium stores instructions that, when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the network equipment to perform operations, or steps. The operations, or steps, cause the network equipment to perform, by an enclave of the network equipment, measurements on at least one property of the network equipment. The operations, or steps, cause the network equipment to provide, by the enclave, a request for the VC certificate from the server upon having attested the measurements. The operations, or steps, cause the network equipment to receive, from the server, the VC certificate in response to the request and to store the VC certificate in the network equipment.

According to a fourth aspect there is presented network equipment for obtaining a VC certificate from a server. The network equipment comprises a measurement module configured to perform, by an enclave of the network equipment, measurements on at least one property of the network equipment. The network equipment comprises a provide module configured to provide, by the enclave, a request for the VC certificate from the server upon having attested the measurements. The network equipment comprises a receive module configured to receive, from the server, the VC certificate in response to the request and to store the VC certificate in the network equipment.

According to a fifth aspect there is presented a computer program for obtaining a VC certificate from a server. The computer program comprises computer program code which, when run on processing circuitry of network equipment, causes the network equipment <NUM> to perform a method according to the first aspect.

According to a sixth aspect there is presented a method for providing a VC certificate to network equipment. The method is performed by a server. The method comprises receiving a request for the VC certificate from an enclave of the network equipment. The method comprises providing the VC certificate to the enclave.

According to a seventh aspect there is presented a server for providing a VC certificate to network equipment. The server comprises processing circuitry. The processing circuitry is configured to cause the server to receive a request for the VC certificate from an enclave of the network equipment. The processing circuitry is configured to cause the server to provide the VC certificate to the enclave.

According to an eighth aspect there is presented a server for providing a VC certificate to network equipment. The server comprises processing circuitry and a storage medium. The storage medium stores instructions that, when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the server to perform operations, or steps. The operations, or steps, cause the server to receive a request for the VC certificate from an enclave of the network equipment. The operations, or steps, cause the server to provide the VC certificate to the enclave.

According to a ninth aspect there is presented a server for providing a VC certificate to network equipment. The server comprises a receive module configured to receive a request for the VC certificate from an enclave of the network equipment. The server comprises a provide module configured to provide the VC certificate to the enclave.

According to a tenth aspect there is presented a computer program for providing a VC certificate to network equipment, the computer program comprising computer program code which, when run on processing circuitry of a server, causes the server to perform a method according to the sixth aspect.

According to an eleventh aspect there is presented a computer program product comprising a computer program according to at least one of the fifth aspect and the tenth aspect and a computer readable storage medium on which the computer program is stored. The computer readable storage medium could be a non-transitory computer readable storage medium.

Advantageously these methods, these network equipment, these servers, and these computer programs provide efficient provisioning of VC certificates to the network equipment.

Advantageously these methods, these network equipment, these servers, and these computer programs enable simplification of, or obsolete, the inspection procedures prior to manufacturing start of the network equipment and reduction of the operational costs and practical hurdles to maintain security of procedures.

Advantageously these methods, these network equipment, these servers, and these computer programs enable the security requirements on the programming station hardware at the manufacturing site to be reduced.

It is to be noted that any feature of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth seventh, eight, ninth, tenth and eleventh aspects may be applied to any other aspect, wherever appropriate. Likewise, any advantage of the first aspect may equally apply to the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eight, ninth, tenth, and/or eleventh aspect, respectively, and vice versa.

Even though some embodiments and examples have been summarized above, the claimed subject matter is defined in the attached claims <NUM>-<NUM>.

As noted above, there is need for an improved provision of VC certificates to network equipment.

In more detail, since the PKI service is commonly realized in a secure environment which safeguards the private (Certificate Authority; CA) key that is used to sign the certificates, the manufacturing site and the PKI service are not co-located but are separated and connected via a network by which the manufacturing site can request certificates. The precise interactions between the manufacturing site and the PKI service depend on several design choices, such as if the VC private key is locally generated in the programming station, in the hardware of the network equipment, or if it comes from the PKI service.

The communication between the manufacturing site and the PKI service is commonly protected using a secure communication protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec). In addition, there may be protection on the individual messages exchanged between the programming station and the PKI service. The latter is so if certificates are obtained using the Certificate Management Protocol version <NUM> (CMPv2) or similar secure certificate enrollment protocols.

The operator of the programming station is given access to the credentials by which the programming station can securely connect to the PKI service. Hence it is important that the procedures for appointing trustworthy operators must follow strict rules and before operators will be given the credentials, the procedures in place must be reviewed with the requirements (set by the PKI service operation). This requires on-site inspection of the manufacturing site and regular follow-up inspections that must assure that the procedures are maintained. Also, the programming station itself and the production environment at the manufacturing site must be inspected. The programming station must be secure enough to store the access credentials to the PKI service at least during its operation and possibly also at rest; in such a case the operator only has to remember an access credential that opens the main credential for PKI service access that he/she has to enter when working with the programming station.

The need for inspection before manufacturing can start as well as inspections during manufacturing (e.g. by randomly times inspection visits) causes that these security measures incur increased lead-time before a manufacturing site becomes operational. It also increases production costs.

The embodiments disclosed herein enable the efforts on, and cost for, the checking and maintenance of the programming station and operational procedures to be considerably lowered.

The embodiments disclosed herein particularly relate to mechanisms for obtaining a VC certificate from a server <NUM> and providing a VC certificate to network equipment <NUM>. In order to obtain such mechanisms there is provided network equipment <NUM>, a method performed by the network equipment <NUM>, a computer program product comprising code, for example in the form of a computer program, that when run on processing circuitry of the network equipment <NUM>, causes the network equipment <NUM> to perform the method. In order to obtain such mechanisms there is further provided a server <NUM>, a method performed by the server <NUM>, and a computer program product comprising code, for example in the form of a computer program, that when run on processing circuitry of the server <NUM>, causes the server <NUM> to perform the method.

Reference is now made to <FIG> schematically illustrating a system 100b in which provisioning of VC certificates to network equipment <NUM> is performed according to embodiments disclosed herein.

Assume that the network equipment <NUM> is to receive a VC certificate from a server <NUM>, the server <NUM> for example providing a PKI service. Assume further that the hardware of the network equipment <NUM> supports an enclave technology. Assume further that the hardware of the network equipment <NUM> supports a secure boot mechanism. The secure boot mechanism might use a software key (swkey) <NUM> to check, for example, the signature of software (SW) <NUM> that is booted or of the policy file that guides the secure boot decisions. The secure boot mechanism might be configured with a launch policy that is stored in the hardware. In general terms, the launch policy comprises instructions used for controlling the boot process in the sense that it instructs measured values of the booted software, as recorded by the hardware in the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) <NUM> of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) <NUM>, to be checked against reference values that have a signature in the policy data <NUM>. The launch policy could be avoided if the boot behavior is fixed.

In general terms, a TPM might be defined as a hardware cryptographic module that is enabled to securely store sensitive data and perform various cryptographic operations. Authentication (a process to prove the identity attribute of an entity, i.e. the TPM acting as the integrity reporting entity) and attestation (a process that enables the software integrity state to be reported and verified in order to determine its trustworthiness) are some steps that might be performed to ensure trusted computing. A TPM can authenticate itself using the credentials stored in shielded memory and provide integrity measurements reports to prove that software is trustworthy. The nature of a TPM's shielded memory ensures that information may be stored and protected from external software attacks. A variety of applications storing data and secrets protected by a TPM can be developed. These applications make it much harder to access information on a computing platform without proper authorization. If the software configuration of a platform has changed as a result of unauthorized activities, access to such data and secrets can be denied. Various TPM specifications exist. TPMs can provide a hardware root of trust on a hosting service platform, and can be leveraged for operations such as measured boot and attestation.

A public key (pubkey) <NUM>, <NUM> used for verification is handled by a trusted computing base (TCB) <NUM> and stored using integrity protection mechanisms. For example, a cryptographic hash of the public key might be burnt into the hardware. A suitable hash algorithm is SHA256, but other hash algorithms may be used. This public key may also be used to allow and verify the enclave but for the sake of generality the network equipment <NUM> might be configured with a launch enclave (public) key (LEK) <NUM>, <NUM> that allows enclaves signed by the manufacturer of the network equipment <NUM> to be started.

A production application (PA) comprises a Production Application Enclave (PAE). This PAE is signed by the launch enclave's (secret) private key (LEKS) <NUM> which the node manufacturer <NUM> keeps secret from the manufacturing site and the server <NUM>.

In addition, as will be further disclosed below, the PAE might comprise a whitelist of approved hardware chipset identifiers (such as an HW ID <NUM>) or measured state so that the PAE only properly works on identified hardware and the hardware properly booted in one of the approved state(s). As will also be further disclosed below, such a whitelist might be provisioned at a later stage when the PAE has started, e.g., by letting the PAE pause until a signed whitelist has been provided.

In order to facilitate secure communication between the PAE and the server <NUM> the PAE is handed a connection credential by the server <NUM> after the server <NUM> has received attested information from the PAE about its launch measurements. These measurements may already depend on the measurements recorded in the TPM. Alternatively, appraisal of these measurements is performed after the appraisal of the enclave launch, as in the illustrative example of <FIG>.

An optional enclave attester <NUM> is provided in the enclave for attesting the enclave in the network equipment <NUM>. An optional enclave appraiser <NUM> is provided in the server <NUM> for performing appraisal of the enclave in the network equipment <NUM>.

A TPM appraiser <NUM> is provided with the necessary information what measurements done by the TPM are acceptable. To increase efficiency, the PAE might comprise logics for acting as an appraiser towards the TPM in case the PAE not directly has (secure) access to the TPM but must interact with the TPM via the less trusted software in the public (i.e., non-enclave) part of the PA. In this manner, the TPM appraiser only has to compare the received measurements with the references provided. Alternatively, the server <NUM> might redirect the task of appraisal of the network equipment <NUM> to an appraiser service that is operated by the manufacturer of the network equipment <NUM>. In such an alternative, the server <NUM> might receive a positive acknowledgement "OK" or a negative acknowledgement "NOT OK" back from the appraisal service. In either case, when the appraisal was successful, the server <NUM> might signal a connection credential that the PAE can use to setup a secure communications tunnel.

Optionally, the server <NUM> might pass a one time-password (OTP) to the network equipment <NUM>. Such an OTP serves as authentication when sending the actual certificate sign request. The PAE can now generate the VC private and public key values and create a certificate sign request that it passes to the server <NUM>.

In an alternative, as illustrated by dashed lines in <FIG>, the PAE/PA interacts with a token <NUM> that is provided, for example, in the programming station or other terminal present at the manufacturing site. The token might be required to be manually activated by an operator using, for example, a password, or a biometric entry, such as a fingerprint. The token is authenticated by a token authenticator <NUM> in the enclave. Although this extra security requires management procedures with respect to personnel handling and possibly handling of tokens, it results in increased assurance that the PA/PAE is operating under authorized conditions.

As part of the appraisal it is possible to check the PAE operations against agreed working shift schedules. This will prevent personal at the manufacturing site to make the AP/PAE fully operational outside the agreed production schedule.

Reference is now made to <FIG> illustrating a method for obtaining a VC certificate from a server <NUM> as performed by the network equipment <NUM> according to an embodiment.

Measurements are performed on the network equipment <NUM> before the VC certificate is requested. Thus the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform step S104:
S104: The network equipment <NUM> performs, by means of an enclave of the network equipment <NUM>, measurements on at least one property of the network equipment <NUM>. The measurements might be performed on software and/or hardware of the network equipment <NUM>, such as on hardware functions that are detected (or undetected) and/or enabled (or disabled), which software components have started (or not started, or stopped) execution.

Only once the measurements have been attested is the VC requested for. Thus the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform step S108:
S108: The network equipment <NUM> provides, by means of the enclave, a request for the VC certificate from the server <NUM> upon having attested the measurements.

It is assumed that the server provides the VC certificate to the network equipment <NUM>. Thus the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform step S110:
S110: The network equipment <NUM> receives, from the server <NUM>, the VC certificate in response to the request and stores the VC certificate in the network equipment <NUM>.

Embodiments relating to further details of obtaining a VC certificate from a server <NUM> as performed by the network equipment <NUM> will now be disclosed.

In general terms, the term enclave as used herein could be regarded as short for hardware-mediated execution enclave. The enclave might generally be defined as an area of process space and memory within a system environment, such as network equipment <NUM>, within a computer host which delivers confidentiality and integrity of instructions and data associated with that enclave. This enclave is protected from eavesdropping, replay and alteration attacks as the programs within the enclave are executed. An enclave is considered capable of executing processes, and executable code can be loaded into it. Various capabilities may be provided by such an enclave, but at minimum, the following might be enabled: the ability for executable software to be loaded into the enclave, the ability for the host to attest to the integrity of the executable code prior to execution, and the ability to load data into the enclave. The ability to execute software within the enclave without other processes on the computer host being able to inspect, alter or replay the instructions or associated data. Note that these protections are not just against unprivileged processes, but also against the TPM and hypervisor processes which may be running at an escalated privilege level.

There could be different examples of network equipment <NUM>. Examples include, but are not limited to, radio access network nodes, core network nodes, as well as other network equipped nodes and devices that could benefit from being provided with a VC certificate.

There could be different ways to provide the enclave in the network equipment <NUM>. In some aspects, the enclave is received from the server <NUM>. That is, according to an embodiment the enclave is provided to the network equipment <NUM> from the server <NUM>.

There could be different types of information provided in the request. In some aspects, the request comprises acceptable configuration information. According to an embodiment the request for the VC certificate comprises an indication of the attested measurements. This could help the server <NUM> to further attest the network equipment <NUM>.

There could be different ways to provide the request to the server <NUM>. In some aspects, the request is signed by the enclave. That is, according to an embodiment the request for the VC certificate is signed by the enclave. This could enable the request to be provided to the server <NUM> in a secure way, and enable the server <NUM> to verify that the request is from the enclave, and thus has not been tampered with.

There could be different ways for the network equipment <NUM> to handle the VC certificate once it has been obtained. In some aspects, the VC certificate is bound to the enclave, etc. before storage. Thus, according to an embodiment the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S112 before storing the VC certificate:
S112: The network equipment <NUM> binds the VC certificate to the enclave and the measurements. This could enable the network node <NUM> to establish an association between the VC certificate, the enclave, and the measurements.

There could be different ways for the measurements to be attested. In some aspects, there is a whitelist, such as a boot appraiser whitelist, according to which the measurements are performed. Thus, according to an embodiment the measurements are performed on the at least one property according to a whitelist. In some aspects, the whitelist comprises boot measurement recordings. Hence, according to an embodiment the whitelist comprises boot measurement recordings to which the measurements are compared. In some aspects, the obtained measurements are compared to the whitelist with acceptable measurements. That is, according to an embodiment the measurements are compared to the boot measurement recordings by a boot appraiser in the enclave. In some aspects, the comparison is successful only when the measurements match the boot measurement recordings. That is, according to an embodiment the measurements only are attested when matching or being within a threshold value from the boot measurement recordings.

There could be different ways for the whitelist to be provided to the enclave. In some aspects, the whitelist is received from the server <NUM>. That is, according to an embodiment the whitelist is provided to the enclave from the server <NUM>. In some aspects, the whitelist is received using at least integrity protected (and, optional, encrypted) communications. Thus, according to an embodiment the whitelist is provided to the enclave using integrity protected communications between the enclave and the server <NUM>. In other aspects the whitelist is provided to the enclave from an entity outside the server <NUM>, or even hardcoded into the enclave.

When the whitelist is not received from the server <NUM>, the server <NUM> could establish a trust with the provider of the whitelist. This could require the network equipment <NUM> to be authenticated by the server <NUM> before the measurements are performed. That is, according to an embodiment the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S102 when the enclave is provided to the network equipment <NUM> from a provider outside the server <NUM>:
S102: The network equipment <NUM> authenticates, by means of the enclave and with the server <NUM>, before performing the measurements.

There could be different ways for the enclave in the network equipment <NUM> to act when the attest is not successful.

In some aspects the enclave requests further information from the server <NUM> when the attest is not successful. Thus, according to an embodiment the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S114 when not being able to attest the measurements:
S114: The network equipment <NUM> requests, by means of the enclave, further information from the server <NUM> in order for the enclave to perform further measurements on the at least one property of the network equipment <NUM> or on at least one further property of the network equipment <NUM>.

In some aspects the enclave reports the measurements to the server <NUM> when the attest is not successful. According to an embodiment the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S116 when not being able to attest the measurements:
S116: The network equipment <NUM> reports, by means of the enclave, the measurements to the server <NUM>.

As disclosed above, in some examples the provisioning of the VC certificate to the network equipment <NUM> is based on the use of a token. The enclave could then wait for an authenticated presence check of the token (as performed by the token authenticator). Particularly, according to an embodiment the network equipment <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S106:
S106: The network equipment <NUM> obtains an indication of a successful authenticated presence check of a token. The request for the VC certificate from the server <NUM> is then only provided upon having obtained the indication.

There could be different ways to provide the token. In some aspects the token is provided in a programming station. That is, according to an embodiment the token is provided in a programming station of the network equipment <NUM>.

There could be different examples of the at least one property. One example of such at least one property is configuration parameters. That is, according to an embodiment the at least one property relates to configuration parameters of the network equipment <NUM>. The configuration parameters might relate to software and/or hardware of the network equipment <NUM>. The configuration parameters might be recorded in security protected registers (PCRs) of the network equipment <NUM>. This recording may comprise storing the parameters values or cumulatively recording the hashes of the parameters. In the latter case the actual parameters may be stored in log files and the PCR values can be used to verify the integrity of the log files.

One particular embodiment for obtaining a VC certificate from a server <NUM> as performed by the network equipment <NUM> based on at least some of the above disclosed embodiments will now be disclosed in detail.

According to this embodiment the network equipment <NUM> uses signed software and a trusted boot process that performs measurements on the software and the hardware of the network equipment <NUM> to be started and which is capable to run enclaves delivered from the manufacturer of the network equipment <NUM>.

The network equipment <NUM> performs a secure boot process and reports its configuration parameters into protected registers.

The network equipment <NUM> can use one or several public swkeys during the secure boot process to verify the software it boots. Each swkey is programmed into the network equipment <NUM> during the manufacturing process, at least prior to software programs being started.

The network equipment <NUM> contacts the server <NUM>, possibly via an intermediator (such as a programming station).

The network equipment <NUM> receives an enclave from the server <NUM>.

The enclave performs measurements on the software and hardware of the network equipment <NUM> and attests the measurements to the server <NUM>. In order to do so the enclave first receives encrypted communication key material from the Server <NUM>. The enclave then performs an interaction with the server <NUM> to compute a communications session key. The enclave and the server <NUM> switch to a secure communication using the communication session key. The enclave receives a whitelist of boot measurement recordings with acceptable measurements from the server <NUM>. The enclave starts a boot appraiser which requests an attestation report of the measurements reported in the protected registers. The boot appraiser compares the obtained measurements to the boot measurement recordings of the whitelist. The enclave prepares a VC certificate (after having generated the VC credentials) request or a signed request for VC credential delivery when the measurements are in accordance with the boot measurement recordings of the whitelist. The enclave halts execution and waits for external input upon measurements not being in accordance with the boot measurement recordings of the whitelist.

The network equipment <NUM> receives the VC certificate or the VC credentials and the VC certificate from the server <NUM> and stores it securely in the network equipment <NUM> by binding it the VC credentials to the specific combination of enclave, hardware, and measurements.

Reference is now made to <FIG> illustrating a method for providing a VC certificate to network equipment <NUM> as performed by the server <NUM> according to an embodiment.

As disclosed above, the network equipment <NUM>, by means of the enclave, requests a VC certificate from the server <NUM>. Thus, the server <NUM> is configured to perform step S208:
S208: The server <NUM> receives a request for the VC certificate from an enclave of the network equipment <NUM>.

The server <NUM> then provides the VC certificate to the enclave. Thus the server <NUM> is configured to perform step S212:
S212: The server provides the VC certificate to the enclave.

Embodiments relating to further details of providing a VC certificate to network equipment <NUM> as performed by the server <NUM> will now be disclosed.

There could be different kinds of servers <NUM>. In some aspects the server provides a PKI service, and might thus be regarded as a PKI server.

As disclosed above, in some aspects the request comprises acceptable configuration information. Thus, according to an embodiment the request for the VC certificate comprises an indication of measurements of the network equipment <NUM> as attested by the enclave.

In some aspects the VC certificate is only provided if configuration information is attested by the enclave. Thus, according to an embodiment the VC certificate only is provided to the enclave when the measurements of the network equipment <NUM> have been attested by the enclave.

As disclosed above, in some aspects the request is signed by the enclave. That is, according to an embodiment the request for the VC certificate is signed by the enclave.

In some aspects the network equipment <NUM> (e.g. via the programming station) requests to be certified. Thus, according to an embodiment the server <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) steps S202 and S204:.

In some aspects the server <NUM> performs appraisal of the enclave. Thus, according to an embodiment the server <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S206:
S206: The server <NUM> performs measurements on the enclave upon the enclave having been provided to the network equipment <NUM>.

In some aspects there is a first whitelist that is used by the server <NUM> for appraising the enclave. Particularly, according to an embodiment the measurements are performed on the enclave according to a first whitelist.

In some aspects there is a second whitelist used by the enclave for appraising the network equipment <NUM>. Particularly, according to an embodiment the server <NUM> is configured to perform (optional) step S210:
S210: The server <NUM> provides, in response to having received the request for the VC certificate from the enclave, a second whitelist to the enclave for the enclave to perform measurements on at least one property of the network equipment <NUM>. The second whitelist comprises boot measurement recordings.

In some aspects the second whitelist is sent using encrypted communications. Particularly, according to an embodiment the second whitelist is provided to the enclave using integrity protected communications between the enclave and the server <NUM>.

In some aspects the second whitelist is sent only when appraisal of the enclave is successful. That is, according to an embodiment the second whitelist only is provided to the enclave upon the server <NUM> having attested the measurements on the enclave.

In some aspects, before the VC certificate is provided to the enclave, the server <NUM> considers data received from the programming station, such as operation hours, hardware serial number, etc. of the network equipment <NUM>. The server <NUM> might then use this information at the moment when the V certificate is to be provided to the network equipment <NUM>.

One particular embodiment for providing a VC certificate to network equipment <NUM> as performed by the server <NUM> based on at least some of the above disclosed embodiments will now be disclosed in detail.

The server <NUM> is configured to issue VC certificates or VC credentials and VC certificates. The server <NUM> receives an application with an enclave from a manufacturer of the network equipment <NUM> and receives data comprising at least two whitelists; one whitelist (enclave whitelist) which the server <NUM> uses to perform an appraisal of the enclave instance running on the network equipment <NUM> and another whitelist (boot appraiser whitelist with boot measurement recordings) which the server <NUM> provides to the enclave when the enclave appraisal was successful.

The server <NUM> receives a request to start a VC certificate delivery to the network equipment <NUM>. The request is received either from the network equipment <NUM> or from an intermediary, such as the programming station.

The server <NUM> sends the enclave to the network equipment <NUM> and starts an enclave appraisal.

Upon receiving the enclave attested information the server <NUM> compares this information with whitelist data received from the manufacturer of the network equipment <NUM>.

Upon successful comparison, the server <NUM> generates communications key material and encrypts communications key material using the enclave public key. The server <NUM> sends the encrypted key material to the enclave. If the enclave appraisal is unsuccessful the server <NUM> instead sends an error indication.

The server <NUM> engages with the enclave in the communication session key agreement and switches to secure communications.

The server <NUM> sends boot appraiser whitelist received from the manufacturer of the network equipment <NUM> manufacturer to the enclave and waits for a response from the enclave.

The server <NUM> receives a certificate sign request, or a request for VC credentials and VC certificate, from the enclave.

If the request comprises acceptable configuration information of the network equipment <NUM> and is properly signed by the enclave instance, the server <NUM> generates a VC certificate (and also the needed VC credentials) and sends it to the enclave.

While the embodiments thus far have been described for use to provision VC certificates, the embodiments can be applied to similar settings where a product has to be given an identity, or platform certificate, during manufacturing.

<FIG> schematically illustrates, in terms of a number of functional units, the components of network equipment <NUM> according to an embodiment. Processing circuitry <NUM> is provided using any combination of one or more of a suitable central processing unit (CPU), multiprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor (DSP), etc., capable of executing software instructions stored in a computer program product 910a (as in <FIG>), e.g. in the form of a storage medium <NUM>. The processing circuitry <NUM> may further be provided as at least one application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or field programmable gate array (FPGA).

Particularly, the processing circuitry <NUM> is configured to cause the network equipment <NUM> to perform a set of operations, or steps, S102-S116, as disclosed above. For example, the storage medium <NUM> may store the set of operations, and the processing circuitry <NUM> may be configured to retrieve the set of operations from the storage medium <NUM> to cause the network equipment <NUM> to perform the set of operations. Thus the processing circuitry <NUM> is thereby arranged to execute methods as herein disclosed.

The network equipment <NUM> may further comprise a communications interface <NUM> for communications at least with the server <NUM>. As such the communications interface <NUM> may comprise one or more transmitters and receivers, comprising analogue and digital components.

The processing circuitry <NUM> controls the general operation of the network equipment <NUM> e.g. by sending data and control signals to the communications interface <NUM> and the storage medium <NUM>, by receiving data and reports from the communications interface <NUM>, and by retrieving data and instructions from the storage medium <NUM>. Other components, as well as the related functionality, of the network equipment <NUM> are omitted in order not to obscure the concepts presented herein.

<FIG> schematically illustrates, in terms of a number of functional modules, the components of network equipment <NUM> according to an embodiment. The network equipment <NUM> of <FIG> comprises a number of functional modules; a measurement module 210b configured to perform step S104, a provide module 210d configured to perform step S108, and a receive module 210e configured to perform step S110. The network equipment <NUM> of <FIG> may further comprise a number of optional functional modules, such as any of an authentication module 210a configured to perform step S102, an obtain module 210c configured to perform step S106, a bind module 210f configured to perform step S112, a request module <NUM> configured to perform step S114, and a report module <NUM> configured to perform step S116. In general terms, each functional module 210a-<NUM> may be implemented in hardware or in software. Preferably, one or more or all functional modules 210a-<NUM> may be implemented by the processing circuitry <NUM>, possibly in cooperation with the communications interface <NUM> and/or the storage medium <NUM>. The processing circuitry <NUM> may thus be arranged to from the storage medium <NUM> fetch instructions as provided by a functional module 210a-<NUM> and to execute these instructions, thereby performing any steps of the network equipment <NUM> as disclosed herein.

<FIG> schematically illustrates, in terms of a number of functional units, the components of a server <NUM> according to an embodiment. Processing circuitry <NUM> is provided using any combination of one or more of a suitable central processing unit (CPU), multiprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor (DSP), etc., capable of executing software instructions stored in a computer program product 910b (as in <FIG>), e.g. in the form of a storage medium <NUM>. The processing circuitry <NUM> may further be provided as at least one application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or field programmable gate array (FPGA).

Particularly, the processing circuitry <NUM> is configured to cause the server <NUM> to perform a set of operations, or steps, S202-S212, as disclosed above. For example, the storage medium <NUM> may store the set of operations, and the processing circuitry <NUM> may be configured to retrieve the set of operations from the storage medium <NUM> to cause the server <NUM> to perform the set of operations. Thus the processing circuitry <NUM> is thereby arranged to execute methods as herein disclosed.

The server <NUM> may further comprise a communications interface <NUM> for communications at least with the network equipment <NUM>. As such the communications interface <NUM> may comprise one or more transmitters and receivers, comprising analogue and digital components.

The processing circuitry <NUM> controls the general operation of the server <NUM> e.g. by sending data and control signals to the communications interface <NUM> and the storage medium <NUM>, by receiving data and reports from the communications interface <NUM>, and by retrieving data and instructions from the storage medium <NUM>. Other components, as well as the related functionality, of the server <NUM> are omitted in order not to obscure the concepts presented herein.

<FIG> schematically illustrates, in terms of a number of functional modules, the components of a server <NUM> according to an embodiment. The server <NUM> of <FIG> comprises a number of functional modules; a receive module 310d configured to perform step S108, and a provide module 310f configured to perform step S112. The server <NUM> of <FIG> may further comprise a number of optional functional modules, such as any of an obtain module 310a configured to perform step S202, a provide module 310b configured to perform step S204, a measurement module 310c configured to perform step S206, and a provide module 310e configured to perform step S210. In general terms, each functional module 310a-310f may be implemented in hardware or in software. Preferably, one or more or all functional modules 310a-310f may be implemented by the processing circuitry <NUM>, possibly in cooperation with the communications interface <NUM> and/or the storage medium <NUM>. The processing circuitry <NUM> may thus be arranged to from the storage medium <NUM> fetch instructions as provided by a functional module 310a-310f and to execute these instructions, thereby performing any steps of the server <NUM> as disclosed herein.

The network equipment <NUM> and/or server <NUM> may each be provided as a standalone device or as a part of at least one further device. For example, the network equipment <NUM> may be provided as part of a node of a radio access network or as part of a node of a core network, whereas the server <NUM> might be provided as part of a node in a service network. Alternatively, functionality of the network equipment <NUM> and/or server <NUM> may be distributed between at least two devices, or nodes.

Thus, a first portion of the instructions performed by the network equipment <NUM> and/or server <NUM> may be executed in a respective first device, and a second portion of the of the instructions performed by the network equipment <NUM> and/or server <NUM> may be executed in a respective second device; the herein disclosed embodiments are not limited to any particular number of devices on which the instructions performed by the network equipment <NUM> and/or server <NUM> may be executed. Hence, the methods according to the herein disclosed embodiments are suitable to be performed by network equipment <NUM> and/or server <NUM> residing in a cloud computational environment. Therefore, although a single processing circuitry <NUM>, <NUM> is illustrated in <FIG> the processing circuitry <NUM>, <NUM> may be distributed among a plurality of devices, or nodes. The same applies to the functional modules 210a-<NUM>, 310a-310f of <FIG> and the computer programs 920a, 920b of <FIG> (see below).

<FIG> shows one example of a computer program product 910a, 910b comprising computer readable means <NUM>. On this computer readable means <NUM>, a computer program 920a can be stored, which computer program 920a can cause the processing circuitry <NUM> and thereto operatively coupled entities and devices, such as the communications interface <NUM> and the storage medium <NUM>, to execute methods according to embodiments described herein. The computer program 920a and/or computer program product 910a may thus provide means for performing any steps of the network equipment <NUM> as herein disclosed. On this computer readable means <NUM>, a computer program 920b can be stored, which computer program 920b can cause the processing circuitry <NUM> and thereto operatively coupled entities and devices, such as the communications interface <NUM> and the storage medium <NUM>, to execute methods according to embodiments described herein. The computer program 920b and/or computer program product 910b may thus provide means for performing any steps of the server <NUM> as herein disclosed.

In the example of <FIG>, the computer program product 910a, 910b is illustrated as an optical disc, such as a CD (compact disc) or a DVD (digital versatile disc) or a Blu-Ray disc. The computer program product 910a, 910b could also be embodied as a memory, such as a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), or an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and more particularly as a non-volatile storage medium of a device in an external memory such as a USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory or a Flash memory, such as a compact Flash memory. Thus, while the computer program 920a, 920b is here schematically shown as a track on the depicted optical disk, the computer program 920a, 920b can be stored in any way which is suitable for the computer program product 910a, glob.

Claim 1:
A method performed by a network equipment (<NUM>) for obtaining a Vendor Credentials, VC, certificate from a server (<NUM>), the VC certificate comprising a cryptographic identity for the network equipment (<NUM>) for use in public key cryptography, the network equipment (<NUM>) comprising an enclave, which enclave is a process space and memory area within the network equipment (<NUM>), the method comprising:
performing (S104), by the enclave of the network equipment (<NUM>), measurements on at least one property of the network equipment (<NUM>);
providing (S108), by the enclave, a request for the VC certificate from the server (<NUM>) upon having attested the measurements, wherein the request for the VC certificate comprises an indication of the attested measurements; and
receiving (S110), from the server (<NUM>), the VC certificate in response to the request and storing the VC certificate in the network equipment (<NUM>); and
wherein the enclave is arranged to be able to execute software within the enclave without other processes being able to inspect, alter, and replay instructions or associated data.