Patent Description:
Embodiments disclosed herein generally relate to contactless cards, and more specifically, to secure verification of medical status using contactless cards.

Often, people must provide proof of a medical status, such as immunization, to a requesting entity. This requirement is exacerbated during a pandemic and thereafter. However, it is impractical for people to carry physical documentation. Furthermore, the authenticity of documentation of any type must be considered. Similarly, the privacy of each person must be preserved. Conventional solutions fail to address these and other considerations.

<NPL>, describes an Open eCardPlug-in for accessing the German national Personal Health Record.

<NPL>, describes a mobile phone app and scalable distributed server architecture that facilitates instant verification of tamper-proof test results.

<NPL>, describes the Security and Privacy-Preserving Challenges of e-Health Solutions in Cloud Computing.

<NPL>, describes a Cryptographic Key Management Solution for HIPAA Privacy/Security Regulations.

<CIT> describes a portable electronic data storage and retrieval system for group data.

<CIT> describes the use of a mobile telecommunication device as an electronic health insurance card.

<NPL>, describes a Smart-Card-Enabled Privacy Preserving E-Prescription System.

<NPL>, describes an efficient key management for preserving HIPAA regulations.

<CIT> describes Controlling Access to Medical Records.

According to a first aspect of the present disclosure there is provided a method according to claim <NUM>. According to a second aspect of the present disclosure there is provided an apparatus according to claim <NUM>. According to a third aspect of the present disclosure there is provided a machine-readable medium according to claim <NUM>. Embodiments disclosed herein provide systems, methods, articles of manufacture, and computer-readable media for secure verification of medical status using a contactless card. An application receives a request specifying a subject and a medical condition. The application receives a cryptogram from a contactless card associated with an account of the subject. The application receives a decryption result from a server and determines that the server decrypted the cryptogram. The application receives, from the contactless card, preferably based on the decryption result, a medical attestation, a digital signature of the medical attestation, and a public key of the digital signature. The application decrypts the digital signature based on the public key of the digital signature and verifies the medical attestation based on the decrypted digital signature. The application determines, based on the verification of the medical attestation, that the subject is immune to the medical condition. The application may output an attestation result specifying that the subject is immune to the medical condition.

Embodiments disclosed herein provide techniques for secure verification of medical status using a contactless card. Generally, a contactless card may store a medical attestation. The medical attestation may relate to any health attribute of a person, such as immunization status, infection status, and the like. The medical attestation may be signed by a certified entity, such as a healthcare provider who administered a vaccine.

At a later time, the associated person may need to verify the medical attestation, e.g., prove that they have received an immunization. For example, the person may attempt to use public transit, and a terminal at the public transit station may request the proof of immunization. The person may tap their contactless card to the terminal, which causes the contactless card to generate a data package. The data package may include a dynamic cryptogram generated using key diversification. The terminal may transmit the cryptogram to an authentication server for decryption using key diversification. If the authentication server is able to decrypt the cryptogram, the authentication server may generally verify and/or validate the identity of the person. The authentication server may then transmit a decryption result to the terminal, e.g., whether the cryptogram was decrypted and/or the identity of the person is verified.

If decryption result indicates authentication server decrypted the cryptogram, the application receives the medical attestation, a digital signature of the medical attestation, and a public key of the digital signature, which may be provided in the initial data package and/or another data package generated by the contactless card responsive to another tap to the terminal. The terminal then validates the digital signature, e.g., based on validating a certificate chain of the digital signature. The terminal then decrypts the digital signature using the public key. The terminal may then compare the decrypted digital signature to the received medical attestation. If the comparison results in a match, e.g., the decrypted digital signature matches the medical attestation, the terminal may validate the medical attestation. The terminal may then determine that the person has proven their immunization. The terminal may then output an indication of the proven immunization and/or perform any other operation, e.g., opening a turnstile and/or door to permit entry to the public transit facilities.

Advantageously, embodiments disclosed herein provide techniques to securely prove medical attestations. By leveraging key diversification to validate the cryptogram, embodiments of the disclosure may securely verify the identity of the cardholder. By leveraging cryptography, digital signature validation, and certificate validation, embodiments disclosed herein may securely verify the medical attestation stored in the contactless card. The combination of these techniques may provide for more accurate, secure, and scalable verification of medical attestations. Furthermore, embodiments disclosed herein may preserve data privacy and/or personal privacy by limiting the exposure of sensitive information.

With general reference to notations and nomenclature used herein, one or more portions of the detailed description which follows may be presented in terms of program procedures executed on a computer or network of computers. These procedural descriptions and representations are used by those skilled in the art to most effectively convey the substances of their work to others skilled in the art. A procedure is here, and generally, conceived to be a self-consistent sequence of operations leading to a desired result. These operations are those requiring physical manipulations of physical quantities. Usually, though not necessarily, these quantities take the form of electrical, magnetic, or optical signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined, compared, and otherwise manipulated. It proves convenient at times, principally for reasons of common usage, to refer to these signals as bits, values, elements, symbols, characters, terms, numbers, or the like. It should be noted, however, that all of these and similar terms are to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient labels applied to those quantities.

Further, these manipulations are often referred to in terms, such as adding or comparing, which are commonly associated with mental operations performed by a human operator. However, no such capability of a human operator is necessary, or desirable in most cases, in any of the operations described herein that form part of one or more embodiments. Rather, these operations are machine operations. Useful machines for performing operations of various embodiments include digital computers as selectively activated or configured by a computer program stored within that is written in accordance with the teachings herein, and/or include apparatus specially constructed for the required purpose or a digital computer. Various embodiments also relate to apparatus or systems for performing these operations. These apparatuses may be specially constructed for the required purpose. The required structure for a variety of these machines will be apparent from the description given.

Reference is now made to the drawings, wherein like reference numerals are used to refer to like elements throughout. In the following description, for the purpose of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding thereof. It may be evident, however, that the novel embodiments can be practiced without these specific details. The intention is to cover all modification, equivalents, and alternatives within the scope of the claims.

<FIG> depicts an exemplary system <NUM>, consistent with disclosed embodiments. Although the system <NUM> shown in <FIG> has a limited number of elements in a certain topology, it may be appreciated that the system <NUM> may include more or less elements in alternate topologies as desired for a given implementation.

As shown, the system <NUM> comprises one or more computing devices <NUM>, one or more contactless cards <NUM>, and one or more authentication servers <NUM>. The contactless card <NUM> is representative of any type of payment card, such as a credit card, debit card, ATM card, gift card, and the like. The contactless card <NUM> may comprise one or more communications interfaces <NUM>, such as a radio frequency identification (RFID) chip, configured to communicate with a communications interface <NUM> of the computing devices <NUM> via NFC, the EMV standard, or other short-range protocols in wireless communication. Although NFC is used as an example communications protocol, the disclosure is equally applicable to other types of wireless communications, such as the EMV standard, Bluetooth, and/or Wi-Fi. The computing device <NUM> is representative of any number and type of computing device, such as smartphones, tablet computers, wearable devices, laptops, portable gaming devices, virtualized computing system, merchant terminals, point-of-sale systems, servers, desktop computers, and the like. The computing device <NUM> may be controlled by an operating system (OS) (not pictured). Example operating systems include the Android® OS, iOS®, macOS®, Linux®, and Windows® operating systems.

The server <NUM> is representative of any type of computing device, such as a server, workstation, compute cluster, cloud computing platform, virtualized computing system, and the like. Although not depicted for the sake of clarity, the computing device <NUM>, contactless card <NUM>, and server <NUM> each include at least one processor circuit to execute programs and/or instructions.

As shown, a memory <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> includes an applet <NUM>, a counter <NUM>, a master key <NUM>, a diversified key <NUM>, and a unique customer identifier (ID) <NUM>. The applet <NUM> is executable code configured to perform the operations described herein. The counter <NUM>, master key <NUM>, diversified key <NUM>, and customer ID <NUM> are used to provide security in the system <NUM> as described in greater detail below.

A memory <NUM> of the computing device <NUM> includes a client application <NUM> and an attestation <NUM>. The attestation <NUM> is representative of any type of health-related data, e.g., immunization records, vaccination records, health history, disease history, infection history, pathogen history, and the like. More generally, the attestation <NUM> may include any type of protected health information (PHI) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), where such PHI was created, used, or disclosed in the course of providing a health care service, such as a diagnosis or treatment. In one example, the attestation <NUM> is related to the COVID-<NUM> disease caused by the SARS-CoV-<NUM> virus, e.g., whether a person has received a vaccination and is therefore immune to the virus, is immune based on a previous infection and the presence of antibodies in the bloodstream, and/or is not immune based on lack of vaccination and/or previous infection.

The attestation <NUM> may be generated by the client application <NUM> and/or provided to the client application <NUM> from a different source. The client application <NUM> may be any type of application that is configured to perform the techniques described herein. In at least one embodiment, the client application <NUM> is provided by a financial institution associated with the contactless card <NUM>, and/or includes logic provided by the financial institution (e.g., software development kits (SDKs), APIs, etc.) configured to perform the techniques described herein. For example a medical records system may include an SDK that facilitates the cryptographic and other techniques described herein.

The attestation <NUM> may take any suitable format, such as words, phrases, alphanumeric codes, and the like. For example, a medical health professional may enter the relevant data for the attestation <NUM> via the client application <NUM>. In such an example, a physician and/or other health professional may administer a COVID-<NUM> vaccine to the patient. The physician may then generate the attestation <NUM> for the patient using the client application <NUM>. In one embodiment, the attestation <NUM> includes a date of the attestation (e.g., a date the vaccine was administered), an indication of the relevant PHI (e.g., an alphanumeric code corresponding to the vaccine, a phrase indicating the person has been vaccinated, etc.), and the customer ID <NUM> received from the contactless card <NUM>. As stated in greater detail below, in some embodiments, the attestation <NUM> may include a cryptogram (e.g., the encrypted customer ID <NUM>) generated by the contactless card <NUM>.

Generally, to generate and/or store the attestation <NUM> in the contactless card <NUM>, the system <NUM> must authenticate and/or verify the identity of the user. To authenticate the identity of the user, embodiments disclosed herein may leverage the contactless card <NUM>. More specifically, once the user requests to store the attestation <NUM> in the contactless card <NUM>, the client application <NUM> may output a notification instructing the user to tap the contactless card <NUM> to the device <NUM>. Generally, once the contactless card <NUM> is brought within communications range of the communications interface <NUM> of the device <NUM>, the applet <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> may generate an encrypted customer ID <NUM>, e.g., a cryptogram, as part of the authentication process required to store the attestation <NUM> in the contactless card. To enable NFC data transfer between the contactless card <NUM> and the device <NUM>, the client application <NUM> may communicate with the contactless card <NUM> when the contactless card <NUM> is sufficiently close to the communications interface <NUM> of the device <NUM>.

As stated, the system <NUM> is configured to implement key diversification to secure data, which may be referred to as a key diversification technique herein. Generally, the server <NUM> (or another computing device) and the contactless card <NUM> may be provisioned with the same master key <NUM> (also referred to as a master symmetric key). More specifically, each contactless card <NUM> is programmed with a distinct master key <NUM> that has a corresponding pair in the server <NUM>. For example, when a contactless card <NUM> is manufactured, a unique master key <NUM> may be programmed into the memory <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM>. Similarly, the unique master key <NUM> may be stored in a record of a customer associated with the contactless card <NUM> in the account data <NUM> of the server <NUM> (and/or stored in a different secure location, such as the hardware security module (HSM) <NUM>). The master key <NUM> may be kept secret from all parties other than the contactless card <NUM> and server <NUM>, thereby enhancing security of the system <NUM>. In some embodiments, the applet <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> may encrypt and/or decrypt data (e.g., the customer ID <NUM>) using the master key <NUM> and the data as input a cryptographic algorithm. For example, encrypting the customer ID <NUM> with the master key <NUM> may result in the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. Similarly, the authentication server <NUM> may encrypt and/or decrypt data associated with the contactless card <NUM> using the corresponding master key <NUM>.

In other embodiments, the master keys <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> and server <NUM> may be used in conjunction with the counters <NUM> to enhance security using key diversification. The counters <NUM> comprise values that are synchronized between the contactless card <NUM> and server <NUM>. The counter value <NUM> may comprise a number that changes each time data is exchanged between the contactless card <NUM> and the server <NUM> (and/or the contactless card <NUM> and the device <NUM>). When preparing to send data (e.g., to the server <NUM> and/or the device <NUM>), the contactless card <NUM> may increment the counter value <NUM>. The contactless card <NUM> may then provide the master key <NUM> and counter value <NUM> as input to a cryptographic algorithm, which produces a diversified key <NUM> as output. The cryptographic algorithm may include encryption algorithms, hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) algorithms, cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) algorithms, and the like. Non-limiting examples of the cryptographic algorithm may include a symmetric encryption algorithm such as 3DES or AES <NUM>; a symmetric HMAC algorithm, such as HMAC-SHA-<NUM>; and a symmetric CMAC algorithm such as AES-CMAC. Examples of key diversification techniques are described in greater detail in <CIT>.

Continuing with the key diversification example, the contactless card <NUM> may then encrypt the data (e.g., the customer ID <NUM> and/or any other data) using the diversified key <NUM> and the data as input to the cryptographic algorithm. For example, encrypting the customer ID <NUM> with the diversified key <NUM> may result in the encrypted customer ID <NUM>.

Regardless of the encryption technique used, the contactless card <NUM> may then transmit the encrypted data (e.g., the encrypted customer ID <NUM>) to the client application <NUM> of the device <NUM> (e.g., via an NFC connection, Bluetooth connection, etc.). The client application <NUM> of the device <NUM> may then transmit the encrypted customer ID <NUM> to the server <NUM> via the network <NUM>. In at least one embodiment, the contactless card <NUM> transmits the counter value <NUM> with the encrypted data. In such embodiments, the contactless card <NUM> may transmit an encrypted counter value <NUM>, or an unencrypted counter value <NUM>.

Once received, the authentication application <NUM> may authenticate the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. For example, the authentication application <NUM> may attempt to decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM> using a copy of the master key <NUM> stored in the memory <NUM> of the authentication server <NUM>. In another example, the authentication application <NUM> may provide the master key <NUM> and counter value <NUM> as input to the cryptographic algorithm, which produces a diversified key <NUM> as output. The resulting diversified key <NUM> may correspond to the diversified key <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM>, which may be used to decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM>.

Regardless of the decryption technique used, the authentication application <NUM> may successfully decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM>, thereby verifying the encrypted customer ID <NUM> (e.g., by comparing the resulting customer ID <NUM> to a customer ID stored in the account data <NUM>, and/or based on an indication that the decryption using the key <NUM> and/or <NUM> was successful). Although the keys <NUM>, <NUM> are depicted as being stored in the memory <NUM>, the keys <NUM>, <NUM> may be stored elsewhere, such as in a secure element and/or the HSM <NUM>. In such embodiments, the secure element and/or the HSM <NUM> may decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM> using the keys <NUM> and/or <NUM> and a cryptographic function. Similarly, the secure element and/or HSM <NUM> may generate the diversified key <NUM> based on the master key <NUM> and counter value <NUM> as described above.

If, however, the authentication application <NUM> is unable to decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM> to yield the expected result (e.g., the customer ID <NUM> of the account associated with the contactless card <NUM>), the authentication application <NUM> does not validate the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. In such an example, the authentication application <NUM> transmits an indication of the failed verification to the client application <NUM>. As such, the client application <NUM> may reject performance of the requested storing of the attestation <NUM> to preserve the security of the attestation <NUM>.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment where the authentication application <NUM> has successfully decrypted the encrypted customer ID <NUM>, thereby verifying (or authenticating) the cryptogram, and by association, the identity of the user. As shown, the authentication application <NUM> transmits a decryption result <NUM> to the device <NUM>, where the decryption result <NUM> indicates that the authentication application <NUM> successfully decrypted the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. Responsive to receiving the decryption result <NUM>, the client application <NUM> may determine that the authentication application <NUM> successfully decrypted the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. Based on this determination, the client application <NUM> may determine to proceed with the process of storing the medical attestation <NUM> in the card <NUM>.

To improve security and privacy, the client application <NUM> may compute a digital signature <NUM> of the attestation <NUM> using a private key (not pictured). Generally, the attestation <NUM> and the private key may be provided as input to an algorithm that computes the digital signature <NUM>. The public key <NUM> may correspond to the private key and may be used to decrypt the digital signature <NUM>.

Therefore, continuing with the previous example, the attestation <NUM> may include a date the vaccine was administered to the patient, an indication of the relevant PHI (e.g., an alphanumeric code corresponding to the vaccine, a phrase indicating the person has been vaccinated, etc.), the customer ID <NUM> received from the contactless card <NUM>. Therefore, the digital signature <NUM> may include a signature of the date, the PHI, the customer ID <NUM>. As stated, in some embodiments, the attestation <NUM> includes the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. In such embodiments, the digital signature <NUM> further includes a signature of the encrypted customer ID <NUM>.

As shown, the client application <NUM> may then instruct the user to tap the contactless card <NUM> to the device <NUM>. Doing so causes the client application <NUM> to transfer the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and the public key <NUM> to the contactless card <NUM>. The applet <NUM> may then store the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and the public key <NUM> in the memory <NUM>.

<FIG> depicts a schematic of an exemplary system <NUM>, consistent with disclosed embodiments. Although the system <NUM> shown in <FIG> has a limited number of elements in a certain topology, it may be appreciated that the system <NUM> may include more or less elements in alternate topologies as desired for a given implementation.

As shown, the system <NUM> includes the computing device <NUM>, contactless card <NUM>, and server <NUM>. Generally, <FIG> depicts an embodiment where the medical attestation <NUM> stored in the contactless card <NUM> is used to verify a medical status of a user. For example, the user may require proof of immunity to the COVID-<NUM> disease, e.g., via vaccination or otherwise. In such examples, the user of the computing device <NUM> may request to use the attestation <NUM> to prove the immunity to COVID-<NUM>. In some embodiments, the user may provide authentication credentials to client application <NUM> to access the account associated with the contactless card <NUM> (e.g., an account reflected in the account data <NUM>). For example, the authentication credentials may include a username (or login) and password, biometric credentials (e.g., fingerprints, Face ID, etc.), and the like.

The client application <NUM> may then instruct the user to tap the contactless card <NUM> to the computing device <NUM>. Doing so causes the applet <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> to generate an encrypted customer ID <NUM> based on the customer ID <NUM> and the diversified key <NUM> generated as described above. The applet <NUM> may then transmit the encrypted customer ID <NUM> to the device <NUM>, e.g., via NFC. Once received, the client application <NUM> may transmit the encrypted customer ID <NUM> to the authentication application <NUM>.

Once received, the authentication application <NUM> may authenticate the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. For example, the authentication application <NUM> may attempt to decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM> by providing the master key <NUM> and incremented counter value <NUM> as input to the cryptographic algorithm, which produces the diversified key <NUM> as output. The resulting diversified key <NUM> may correspond to the instance of the diversified key <NUM> generated by the contactless card <NUM> to create the encrypted ID <NUM>, which may be used to decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. Generally, the authentication application <NUM> may transmit a decryption result to the client application <NUM> indicating whether the decryption was successful or unsuccessful.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment where the authentication application <NUM> successfully decrypted the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. In response, the authentication application <NUM> transmits a decryption result <NUM> to the computing device <NUM> indicating that the encrypted customer ID <NUM> was decrypted. Based on the decryption result <NUM>, the client application <NUM> determines that the encrypted customer ID <NUM> was decrypted. If the client application <NUM> determines that the decryption was not successful, the client application <NUM> may restrict any further operations to prevent unauthorized exposure of the attestation <NUM>.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment where the client application <NUM> instructs the user to tap the contactless card <NUM> to the device <NUM>. Doing so causes the applet <NUM> to transmit the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM> of the attestation <NUM>, and public key <NUM> of the digital signature <NUM> to the device <NUM>. Although depicted as being transmitted based on separate taps of the card to the device, in some embodiments, the encrypted customer ID <NUM>, the attestation <NUM>, the digital signature <NUM>, and public key <NUM> may be transmitted to the client application <NUM> via a single tap of the card to the device. In such embodiments, the client application <NUM> parses these elements to perform the functionality described herein.

In some embodiments, the applet <NUM> may provide a zero-knowledge proof of the medical attestation <NUM>, e.g., without exposing any information that may personally identify the user and/or the underlying PHI of the medical attestation <NUM>. More generally, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may include a protocol of conformity that includes one or more rules for processing the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and/or public key <NUM>. For example, the rules of the applet <NUM> and/or client application <NUM> may require validation of a certificate chain for the digital signature <NUM> and/or the public key <NUM>. Generally, when the attestation <NUM> is stored in the card, the public key <NUM> and/or digital signature <NUM> may be associated with a certificate of the entity signing the attestation <NUM> (e.g., the medical entity, the issuer of the contactless card <NUM>, a governmental agency, etc.). The certificate may include one or more cryptographic elements (e.g., a digital signature) that may be decrypted or verified by the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> using a corresponding public key.

If multiple entities sign the attestation <NUM>, each entity may have an associated certificate. In such embodiments, these certificates link to form a certificate chain, and the digital signature of each certificate in the chain may be verified (e.g., decrypted using the corresponding public key) by the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM>. If each certificate is not verified, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may refrain from exposing the medical attestation <NUM>. In some embodiments, the certificates may be stored by the contactless card and/or the client application <NUM>. In other embodiments, the client application <NUM> may receive the certificates from a certificate authority (not pictured) via the network <NUM>.

In another example, one or more rules of the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may require that at least one known (or predefined) entity sign the attestation <NUM>. For example, the rules may require one or more of a governmental agency, the financial institution associated with the contactless card <NUM>, a hospital, laboratory, or other entity to have signed the attestation. If the certificate chain does not indicate that the at least one known entity has signed the attestation and/or the associated certificate is not validated, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may refrain from exposing the medical attestation <NUM>.

As shown in <FIG>, all rules have been satisfied and the client application <NUM> receives the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and public key <NUM> from the contactless card <NUM>. As stated, in some embodiments, the attestation <NUM> includes a cryptogram (e.g., the encrypted customer ID <NUM>). In such embodiments, the rules of the client application <NUM> may require validation of this cryptogram prior to exposing the medical attestation <NUM>. In such embodiments, the client application <NUM> may extract the encrypted customer ID <NUM> and transmit the encrypted customer ID <NUM> to the server <NUM> for verification. Because the diversified key used to generate the encrypted customer ID <NUM> would not be reproduced using the most current counter value <NUM>, the server <NUM> may store the diversified key <NUM> used to decrypt the initial instance of the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. Additionally and/or alternatively, the attestation <NUM> may include the counter value <NUM> used to generate the diversified key <NUM> that produced the encrypted customer ID <NUM>, and the client application <NUM> may send this counter value <NUM> to the server <NUM> with the encrypted customer ID <NUM>. Doing so allows the server <NUM> to subsequently decrypt the encrypted customer ID <NUM> included in the medical attestation <NUM> using the diversified key <NUM>. The server <NUM> may then transmit a decryption result to the client application <NUM>. If the decryption of the encrypted customer ID <NUM> is not successful, the client application <NUM> may refrain from exposing the medical attestation <NUM>. If the decryption of the encrypted customer ID <NUM> is successful, the client application <NUM> may continue processing.

If all rules have been satisfied, including the optional decryption of the encrypted customer ID <NUM> in the attestation <NUM>, the client application <NUM> may decrypt the digital signature <NUM>. The client application <NUM> may then compare the digital signature <NUM> to the attestation <NUM>. If the comparison results in a match, the client application <NUM> may verify the medical attestation <NUM>. Because the digital signature <NUM> combines each data element cryptographically, the attestation <NUM> must be unmodified to match the decrypted digital signature <NUM>. If the attestation <NUM> is tampered or modified in any way, the comparison to the decrypted digital signature <NUM> may fail. If the attestation <NUM> is not modified, the comparison to the decrypted digital signature <NUM> may pass, and the client application <NUM> verifies the attestation <NUM>.

If the client application <NUM> verifies the attestation based on the comparison resulting in a match, the client application <NUM> may generate an attestation result. The attestation result may generally reflect the medical attestation <NUM>, e.g., that the user is immune and/or not immune to COVID-<NUM>, or any other medical condition. In some embodiments, the client application <NUM> outputs the attestation result and/or the attestation <NUM> on a display of the device <NUM>. In addition and/or alternatively, the client application <NUM> may transmit the attestation <NUM> and/or attestation result to another computing device <NUM>, e.g., via email, text message, push notification, etc. In some embodiments, the device <NUM> is a mobile device that may communicate with other card reading devices using NFC. In such examples, the client application <NUM> may generate an NDEF file that includes the attestation <NUM> and/or the attestation result that can be read by another device <NUM> via NFC.

For example, if a public transit system includes computing devices <NUM> comprising a plurality of terminals, point of sale devices, or other computing devices <NUM>, the user may need to prove immunity from COVID-<NUM> to use the public transit. In such embodiments, the user may tap the contactless card <NUM> directly to the terminal. The terminal may then perform the operations described herein to verify the encrypted customer IDs <NUM> and/or <NUM> and verify the attestation <NUM> stored in the contactless card <NUM> (including certificate validation, decryption of digital signature <NUM>, and comparison). In other examples, the terminal may communicate with the computing device <NUM> of the user (e.g., a smartphone) to request the medical attestation <NUM>. In such embodiments, the device of the user <NUM> operates as described above and transmits the attestation result to the terminal.

When receiving the attestation result, the terminal <NUM> may perform one or more operations in response. For example, if the attestation result indicates the person was recently diagnosed with COVID-<NUM> (e.g., within a predefined number of days), the terminal <NUM> may restrict access to public transit systems, public places, private places, etc., by locking doors, locking turnstiles, initiating an alarm, etc. Similarly, if the attestation result indicates the person is immune to COVID-<NUM> and/or is otherwise healthy, the terminal <NUM> may permit access to the public transit or other places by unlocking doors, turnstiles, etc. Similarly, the client application <NUM> may perform and/or initiate these and/or other operations in response to a determination to expose the medical attestation <NUM>.

In some embodiments, the client application <NUM> may decode the decrypted digital signature <NUM> and/or the attestation <NUM>. As stated, in some embodiments, different coding schemes may be used to encode a medical attestation <NUM>. Therefore, in such embodiments, the client application <NUM> ensures that the proper comparison is being made (e.g., comparing encoded data to encoded data and/or comparing decoded data to decoded data). Similarly, the client application <NUM> may decode and/or encode the medical attestation <NUM> to provide output that is readable by a user (e.g., converting an alphanumeric string to a word or phrase that conveys a specific medical status, such as immunity to COVID-<NUM>).

<FIG> is a schematic 300a illustrating an example mobile computing device <NUM>-<NUM>. As shown, the client application <NUM> outputs a notification specifying to tap a contactless card <NUM> to the device <NUM> to prove that the user is immune to COVID-<NUM>. In one embodiment, the application <NUM> receives a request from the other device <NUM>-<NUM> to prove immunity. In another embodiment, the application <NUM> outputs the notification without receiving a request from an external device.

As shown, the user may tap the contactless card <NUM> to the computing device <NUM>-<NUM>. Doing so causes the applet <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> to generate a cryptogram (e.g., an encrypted customer ID) based on the customer ID <NUM> and a diversified key <NUM> as described above. The applet <NUM> may then transmit the cryptogram to the device <NUM>-<NUM>, e.g., via NFC. As stated, in some embodiments, the contactless card <NUM> transmits the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and public key <NUM> to the device <NUM>-<NUM> with the cryptogram. Once received, the client application <NUM> may transmit the cryptogram to the authentication application <NUM> for processing.

Once received, the authentication application <NUM> may attempt to verify the cryptogram. For example, the authentication application <NUM> may attempt to decrypt the cryptogram by providing the master key <NUM> and incremented counter value <NUM> as input to the cryptographic algorithm, which produces the diversified key <NUM> as output. The resulting diversified key <NUM> may correspond to the instance of the diversified key <NUM> generated by the contactless card <NUM> to create the cryptogram, which may be used to decrypt the cryptogram. Generally, the authentication application <NUM> may transmit a decryption result to the client application <NUM> indicating whether the decryption was successful or unsuccessful.

<FIG> is a schematic 300b illustrating an example where the client application <NUM> receives a decryption result indicating the authentication server decrypted the cryptogram. In response, the client application <NUM> attempts to decrypt the digital signature <NUM>. If the client application <NUM> has not received the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and/or public key <NUM>, the client application <NUM> may instruct the user to tap the card to the device <NUM>, which causes the applet <NUM> to transmit the attestation <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, and/or public key <NUM> based on the decryption of the cryptogram by the server.

The client application <NUM> may then verify the certificate chain of the digital signature <NUM> and decrypt the digital signature <NUM>. The client application <NUM> may then compare the decrypted digital signature <NUM> to the attestation <NUM>. If a match exists, the client application <NUM> verifies the medical records included in the attestation <NUM>. The client application <NUM> may then output an indication specifying an attestation result, e.g., that the user is immune to COVID-<NUM>. As stated, the client application <NUM> may transmit an indication of the attestation result to the requesting device <NUM>-<NUM>, e.g., via Wi-Fi and/or NFC.

Furthermore, the client application <NUM> and/or requesting device <NUM>-<NUM> may perform and/or initiate performance of any number and/or types of operations based on the attestation result. For example, if the request indicates to determine whether a person has COVID-<NUM>, the client application <NUM> and/or the requesting device <NUM>-<NUM> may close access points to public places, public transit, buildings, etc., based a determination that the verified medical attestation <NUM> indicates the person was diagnosed with COVID-<NUM> within a predefined number of days. Similarly, if the verified medical attestation <NUM> indicates the person is immune to COVID-<NUM> via vaccine, the client application <NUM> and/or the requesting device <NUM>-<NUM> may open access points to public places, public transit, buildings, etc..

<FIG> is a schematic <NUM> illustrating an example configuration of a contactless card <NUM>, which may include a payment card, such as a credit card, debit card, or gift card, issued by a service provider as displayed as service provider indicia <NUM> on the front or back of the contactless card <NUM>. In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> is not related to a payment card, and may include, without limitation, an identification card. In some examples, the contactless card may include a dual interface contactless payment card, a rewards card, and so forth. The contactless card <NUM> may include a substrate <NUM>, which may include a single layer or one or more laminated layers composed of plastics, metals, and other materials. Exemplary substrate materials include polyvinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride acetate, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, polycarbonate, polyesters, anodized titanium, palladium, gold, carbon, paper, and biodegradable materials. In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> may have physical characteristics compliant with the ID-<NUM> format of the ISO/IEC <NUM> standard, and the contactless card may otherwise be compliant with the ISO/IEC <NUM> standard. However, it is understood that the contactless card <NUM> according to the present disclosure may have different characteristics, and the present disclosure does not require a contactless card to be implemented in a payment card.

The contactless card <NUM> may also include identification information <NUM> displayed on the front and/or back of the card, and a contact pad <NUM>. The contact pad <NUM> may include one or more pads and be configured to establish contact with another client device, such as an ATM, a user device, smartphone, laptop, desktop, or tablet computer via contactless cards. The contact pad may be designed in accordance with one or more standards, such as ISO/IEC <NUM> standard, and enable communication in accordance with the EMV protocol. The contactless card <NUM> may also include processing circuitry, antenna and other components as will be further discussed in <FIG>. These components may be located behind the contact pad <NUM> or elsewhere on the substrate <NUM>, e.g. within a different layer of the substrate <NUM>, and may electrically and physically coupled with the contact pad <NUM>. The contactless card <NUM> may also include a magnetic strip or tape, which may be located on the back of the card (not shown in <FIG>). The contactless card <NUM> may also include a Near-Field Communication (NFC) device coupled with an antenna capable of communicating via the NFC protocol. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.

As illustrated, the contact pad <NUM> of contactless card <NUM> may include processing circuitry <NUM> for storing, processing, and communicating information, including a processor <NUM>, a memory <NUM>, and one or more communications interface <NUM>. It is understood that the processing circuitry <NUM> may contain additional components, including processors, memories, error and parity/CRC checkers, data encoders, anti-collision algorithms, controllers, command decoders, security primitives and tamper proofing hardware, as necessary to perform the functions described herein.

The memory <NUM> may be a read-only memory, write-once read-multiple memory or read/write memory, e.g., RAM, ROM, and EEPROM, and the contactless card <NUM> may include one or more of these memories. A read-only memory may be factory programmable as read-only or one-time programmable. One-time programmability provides the opportunity to write once then read many times. A write once/read-multiple memory may be programmed at a point in time after the memory chip has left the factory. Once the memory is programmed, it may not be rewritten, but it may be read many times. A read/write memory may be programmed and re-programed many times after leaving the factory. A read/write memory may also be read many times after leaving the factory. In some instances, the memory <NUM> may be encrypted memory utilizing an encryption algorithm executed by the processor <NUM> to encrypt data.

The memory <NUM> may be configured to store one or more applets <NUM>, one or more counters <NUM>, a customer ID <NUM>, and one or more account number(s) <NUM>, which may be virtual account numbers. The one or more applets <NUM> may comprise one or more software applications configured to execute on one or more contactless cards, such as a Java® Card applet. However, it is understood that applets <NUM> are not limited to Java Card applets, and instead may be any software application operable on contactless cards or other devices having limited memory. The one or more counters <NUM> may comprise a numeric counter sufficient to store an integer. The customer ID <NUM> may comprise a unique alphanumeric identifier assigned to a user of the contactless card <NUM>, and the identifier may distinguish the user of the contactless card from other contactless card users. In some examples, the customer ID <NUM> may identify both a customer and an account assigned to that customer and may further identify the contactless card <NUM> associated with the customer's account. As stated, the account number(s) <NUM> may include thousands of one-time use virtual account numbers associated with the contactless card <NUM>.

The processor <NUM> and memory elements of the foregoing exemplary embodiments are described with reference to the contact pad <NUM>, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto. It is understood that these elements may be implemented outside of the contact pad <NUM> or entirely separate from it, or as further elements in addition to processor <NUM> and memory <NUM> elements located within the contact pad <NUM>.

In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> may comprise one or more antenna(s) <NUM>. The one or more antenna(s) <NUM> may be placed within the contactless card <NUM> and around the processing circuitry <NUM> of the contact pad <NUM>. For example, the one or more antenna(s) <NUM> may be integral with the processing circuitry <NUM> and the one or more antenna(s) <NUM> may be used with an external booster coil. As another example, the one or more antenna(s) <NUM> may be external to the contact pad <NUM> and the processing circuitry <NUM>.

In an embodiment, the coil of contactless card <NUM> may act as the secondary of an air core transformer. The terminal may communicate with the contactless card <NUM> by cutting power or amplitude modulation. The contactless card <NUM> may infer the data transmitted from the terminal using the gaps in the power connection of the contactless card <NUM>, which may be functionally maintained through one or more capacitors. The contactless card <NUM> may communicate back by switching a load on the coil or load modulation. Load modulation may be detected in the terminal's coil through interference. More generally, using the antenna(s) <NUM>, processor <NUM>, and/or the memory <NUM>, the contactless card <NUM> provides a communications interface to communicate via NFC, Bluetooth, and/or Wi-Fi communications.

As explained above, contactless card <NUM> may be built on a software platform operable on smart cards or other devices having limited memory, such as JavaCard, and one or more or more applications or applets may be securely executed. Applet <NUM> may be added to contactless cards to provide a one-time password (OTP) for multifactor authentication (MFA) in various mobile application-based use cases. Applet <NUM> may be configured to respond to one or more requests, such as near field data exchange requests, from a reader, such as a mobile NFC reader (e.g., of a mobile device or point-of-sale terminal) and produce an NDEF message that comprises a cryptographically secure OTP encoded as an NDEF text tag.

One example of an NDEF OTP is an NDEF short-record layout (SR=<NUM>). In such an example, one or more applets <NUM> may be configured to encode the OTP as an NDEF type <NUM> well known type text tag. In some examples, NDEF messages may comprise one or more records. The applets <NUM> may be configured to add one or more static tag records in addition to the OTP record.

In some examples, the one or more applets <NUM> may be configured to emulate an RFID tag. The RFID tag may include one or more polymorphic tags. In some examples, each time the tag is read, different cryptographic data is presented that may indicate the authenticity of the contactless card <NUM>. Based on the one or more applet <NUM>, an NFC read of the tag may be processed, the data may be transmitted to a server, such as a server of a banking system, and the data may be validated at the server.

In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> and server <NUM> may include certain data such that the card may be properly identified. The contactless card <NUM> may include one or more unique identifiers (not pictured). Each time a read operation takes place, the counter <NUM> may be configured to increment. In some examples, each time data from the contactless card <NUM> is read (e.g., by a computing device <NUM>), the counter <NUM> is transmitted to the server for validation and determines whether the counter <NUM> are equal (as part of the validation) to a counter of the server.

The one or more counter <NUM> may be configured to prevent a replay attack. For example, if a cryptogram has been obtained and replayed, that cryptogram is immediately rejected if the counter <NUM> has been read or used or otherwise passed over. If the counter <NUM> has not been used, it may be replayed. In some examples, the counter that is incremented on the card is different from the counter that is incremented for transactions. The contactless card <NUM> is unable to determine the application transaction counter <NUM> since there is no communication between applet <NUM> on the contactless card <NUM>. In some examples, the contactless card <NUM> may comprise a first applet <NUM>-<NUM>, which may be a transaction applet, and a second applet <NUM>-<NUM>, which may be a medical attestation applet for processing one or more medical attestations <NUM> stored in the contactless card <NUM>. Each applet <NUM>-<NUM> and <NUM>-<NUM> may comprise a respective counter <NUM>.

In some examples, the counter <NUM> may get out of sync. In some examples, to account for accidental reads that initiate transactions, such as reading at an angle, the counter <NUM> may increment but the application does not process the counter <NUM>. In some examples, when the device <NUM> is woken up, NFC may be enabled and the device <NUM> may be configured to read available tags, but no action is taken responsive to the reads.

To keep the counter <NUM> in sync, an application, such as a background application, may be executed that would be configured to detect when the device <NUM> wakes up and synchronize with the server of a banking system indicating that a read that occurred due to detection to then move the counter <NUM> forward. In other examples, Hashed One Time Password may be utilized such that a window of mis-synchronization may be accepted. For example, if within a threshold of <NUM>, the counter <NUM> may be configured to move forward. But if within a different threshold number, for example within <NUM> or <NUM>, a request for performing re-synchronization may be processed which requests via one or more applications that the user tap, gesture, or otherwise indicate one or more times via the user's device. If the counter <NUM> increases in the appropriate sequence, then it possible to know that the user has done so.

The key diversification technique described herein with reference to the counter <NUM>, master key, and diversified key, is one example of encryption and/or decryption a key diversification technique. This example key diversification technique should not be considered limiting of the disclosure, as the disclosure is equally applicable to other types of key diversification techniques.

During the creation process of the contactless card <NUM>, two cryptographic keys may be assigned uniquely per card. The cryptographic keys may comprise symmetric keys which may be used in both encryption and decryption of data. Triple DES (3DES) algorithm may be used by EMV and it is implemented by hardware in the contactless card <NUM>. By using the key diversification process, one or more keys may be derived from a master key based upon uniquely identifiable information for each entity that requires a key.

In some examples, to overcome deficiencies of 3DES algorithms, which may be susceptible to vulnerabilities, a session key may be derived (such as a unique key per session) but rather than using the master key, the unique card-derived keys and the counter may be used as diversification data. For example, each time the contactless card <NUM> is used in operation, a different key may be used for creating the message authentication code (MAC) and for performing the encryption. This results in a triple layer of cryptography. The session keys may be generated by the one or more applets and derived by using the application transaction counter with one or more algorithms (as defined in EMV <NUM> Book <NUM> A1. <NUM> Common Session Key Derivation).

Further, the increment for each card may be unique, and assigned either by personalization, or algorithmically assigned by some identifying information. For example, odd numbered cards may increment by <NUM> and even numbered cards may increment by <NUM>. In some examples, the increment may also vary in sequential reads, such that one card may increment in sequence by <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>, <NUM>,. The specific sequence or algorithmic sequence may be defined at personalization time, or from one or more processes derived from unique identifiers. This can make it harder for a replay attacker to generalize from a small number of card instances.

The authentication message may be delivered as the content of a text NDEF record in hexadecimal ASCII format. In another example, the NDEF record may be encoded in hexadecimal format.

Operations for the disclosed embodiments may be further described with reference to the following figures. Some of the figures may include a logic flow. Although such figures presented herein may include a particular logic flow, it can be appreciated that the logic flow merely provides an example of how the general functionality as described herein can be implemented. Further, a given logic flow does not necessarily have to be executed in the order presented unless otherwise indicated. Moreover, not all acts illustrated in a logic flow may be required in some implementations. In addition, the given logic flow may be implemented by a hardware element, a software element executed by a processor, or any combination thereof.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment of a logic flow <NUM>. The logic flow <NUM> may be representative of some or all of the operations executed by one or more embodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow <NUM> may include some or all of the operations to use the contactless card <NUM> to provide secure verification of medical status using a contactless card. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

As shown, at block <NUM>, the logic flow <NUM> includes storing a medical attestation <NUM> in a contactless card <NUM>. Generally, as stated, an attestation <NUM> may relate to any PHI of a user. A digital signature <NUM> of the attestation <NUM> may be generated using a private key associated with the signing entity (e.g., a healthcare provider, etc.). The corresponding public key <NUM>, the digital signature <NUM>, and attestation <NUM> may then be stored in the contactless card <NUM>. In some embodiments, a certificate chain associated with the digital signature is stored in the contactless card <NUM>.

At block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> and/or the applet <NUM> receives a request to verify the medical attestation <NUM> stored in the card <NUM>. As stated, the request may be initiated by a user, an application, a device, or any other requesting entity. The request may specify a medical condition to be verified based on the medical attestation <NUM>. At block <NUM>, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> processes the request using the medical attestation <NUM>, public key <NUM>, and digital signature <NUM>. One or more associated operations to process the request are further described with reference to <FIG> and <FIG>. Generally, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may validate the certificate chain of the digital signature <NUM>, decrypt the digital signature <NUM> using the public key <NUM>, and compare the decrypted digital signature <NUM> to the medical attestation <NUM>. If the comparison results in a match, the medical attestation <NUM> is verified. Similarly, based on the request, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may generate an attestation result. Generally, the attestation result is a response to the request based on the verified medical attestation <NUM>. For example, if the request specifies to prove immunity to COVID-<NUM>, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may return a response indicating whether the person is immune to COVID-<NUM> based on the attestation <NUM>. Similarly, the applet <NUM> and/or the client application <NUM> may initiate performance of one or more operations based on the attestation result.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment of a logic flow <NUM>. The logic flow <NUM> may be representative of some or all of the operations executed by one or more embodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow <NUM> may include some or all of the operations to verify medical status based on the attestation <NUM> stored in the contactless card <NUM>. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

In block <NUM>, logic flow <NUM> receives a request specifying a subject and a medical condition. For example, the client application <NUM> may receive a request specifying to verify that an authenticated account holder associated with a contactless card <NUM> prove immunity to COVID-<NUM>. For example, the client application <NUM> may include one or more selectable elements that allow the user to generate the request. In other examples, the request may be received from another application and/or another device. In block <NUM>, logic flow <NUM> receives, by the application <NUM>, a cryptogram from a contactless card associated with an account of the subject. The cryptogram may be generated based on the diversified key <NUM> and the customer ID <NUM>. The diversified key <NUM> may be generated based on the counter <NUM> and the master key <NUM>. The application <NUM> may transmit the cryptogram to the server <NUM> for verification at block <NUM>.

In block <NUM>, the server <NUM> decrypts the cryptogram by generating the diversified key from the current counter and the master key as described herein. At block <NUM>, the application <NUM> receives a decryption result from the server <NUM>. In block <NUM>, the application <NUM> determines, based on the decryption result, that the server decrypted the cryptogram. In block <NUM>, logic flow <NUM> receives, by the application <NUM> from the contactless card <NUM> based on the decryption result and/or based on the decryption of the cryptogram by the server, a medical attestation <NUM>, a digital signature <NUM> of the medical attestation, and a public key <NUM> of the digital signature. In block <NUM>, the application <NUM> decrypts the digital signature <NUM> based on the public key <NUM>. In block <NUM>, the application <NUM> verifies the medical attestation <NUM> based on the decrypted digital signature by comparing the decrypted digital signature to the medical attestation and determining the comparison results in a match. In block <NUM>, the application <NUM> determines, based on the verification of the medical attestation <NUM>, that the subject is immune to the medical condition. In block <NUM>, the application <NUM> generates an attestation result specifying that the subject is immune to the medical condition. In block <NUM>, the application <NUM> transmits the attestation result to a recipient device. Doing so may cause the recipient device to perform an operation, e.g., permit and/or deny access to public places.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment of a logic flow <NUM>. The logic flow <NUM> may be representative of some or all of the operations executed by one or more embodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow <NUM> may include some or all of the operations to process an attestation <NUM> stored in the contactless card <NUM>. Embodiments are not limited in this context. Although discussed with reference to the client application <NUM>, an applet <NUM> of the contactless card <NUM> may perform some or all of the operations of the logic flow <NUM>.

In block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> decrypts the digital signature <NUM> based on the public key <NUM>. In block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> verifies each certificate in a certificate chain associated with the digital signature <NUM>. At block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> determines that each of one or more rules are satisfied. For example, the rules may require that the digital signature <NUM> be signed by one or more predefined entities, e.g., a hospital, governmental agency, etc. If the digital signature <NUM> is signed by the one or more predefined entities (e.g. as reflected in the certificate chain), the client application <NUM> determines that these rules are satisfied. Similarly, decryption of the cryptogram by the server <NUM> may be another rule that is satisfied. In block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> optionally decodes the medical attestation <NUM> from a first format to a second format, where the first and second formats are different data formats, different data types, etc..

At block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> compares the medical attestation <NUM> to the decrypted digital signature <NUM>. At block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> determines that the decrypted digital signature matches the received medical attestation <NUM>, thereby verifying the medical attestation <NUM>. In block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> determines, based on the verification of the medical attestation, that the subject is immune to the medical condition. In block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> generates, by the application, an attestation result specifying that the subject is immune to the medical condition. In block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> transmits the attestation result to a recipient device. At block <NUM>, the client application <NUM> outputs the attestation result on a display of the device <NUM>.

<FIG> illustrates an NDEF short-record layout (SR=<NUM>) data structure <NUM> according to an example embodiment. One or more applets may be configured to encode the OTP as an NDEF type <NUM> well known type text tag. In some examples, NDEF messages may comprise one or more records. The applets may be configured to add one or more static tag records in addition to the OTP record. Exemplary tags include, without limitation, Tag type: well known type, text, encoding English (en); Applet ID: D2760000850104; Capabilities: read-only access; Encoding: the authentication message may be encoded as ASCII hex; type-length-value (TLV) data may be provided as a personalization parameter that may be used to generate the NDEF message. In an embodiment, the authentication template may comprise the first record, with a well-known index for providing the actual dynamic authentication data. In various embodiments, the payload of the data structure <NUM> may store a cryptogram (e.g., an encrypted customer ID <NUM>), a medical attestation <NUM>, a digital signature <NUM>, and/or a public key <NUM>.

<FIG> illustrates an embodiment of an exemplary computer architecture <NUM> comprising a computing system <NUM> that may be suitable for implementing various embodiments as previously described. In one embodiment, the computer architecture <NUM> may include or be implemented as part of computing architecture <NUM> or <NUM>. In some embodiments, computing system <NUM> may be representative, for example, of the contactless card <NUM>, computing devices <NUM>, and server <NUM> of the systems <NUM>-<NUM>. More generally, the computing architecture <NUM> is configured to implement all logic, applications, systems, methods, apparatuses, and functionality described herein with reference to <FIG>.

As used in this application, the terms "system" and "component" are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or software in execution, examples of which are provided by the exemplary computing computer architecture <NUM>. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to being, a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard disk drive, multiple storage drives (of optical and/or magnetic storage medium), an object, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both an application running on a server and the server can be a component. One or more components can reside within a process and/or thread of execution, and a component can be localized on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers. Further, components may be communicatively coupled to each other by various types of communications media to coordinate operations. The coordination may involve the uni-directional or bi-directional exchange of information. For instance, the components may communicate information in the form of signals communicated over the communications media. The information can be implemented as signals allocated to various signal lines. In such allocations, each message is a signal. Further embodiments, however, may alternatively employ data messages. Such data messages may be sent across various connections. Exemplary connections include parallel interfaces, serial interfaces, and bus interfaces.

As shown in <FIG>, the computing architecture <NUM> includes a processor <NUM>, a system memory <NUM> and a system bus <NUM>. The processor <NUM> can be any of various commercially available processors.

The system bus <NUM> provides an interface for system components including, but not limited to, the system memory <NUM> to the processor <NUM>. Interface adapters may connect to the system bus <NUM> via slot architecture.

The computing architecture <NUM> may include or implement various articles of manufacture. An article of manufacture may include a computer-readable storage medium to store logic. Examples of a computer-readable storage medium may include any tangible media capable of storing electronic data, including volatile memory or non-volatile memory, removable or non-removable memory, erasable or non-erasable memory, writeable or re-writeable memory, and so forth. Examples of logic may include executable computer program instructions implemented using any suitable type of code, such as source code, compiled code, interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code, object-oriented code, visual code, and the like. Embodiments may also be at least partly implemented as instructions contained in or on a non-transitory computer-readable medium, which may be read and executed by one or more processors to enable performance of the operations described herein.

In the illustrated embodiment shown in <FIG>, the system memory <NUM> can include non-volatile <NUM> and/or volatile <NUM>. A basic input/output system (BIOS) can be stored in the non-volatile <NUM>.

The computer <NUM> may include various types of computer-readable storage media in the form of one or more lower speed memory units, including an internal (or external) hard disk drive <NUM>, a magnetic disk drive <NUM> to read from or write to a removable magnetic disk <NUM>, and an optical disk drive <NUM> to read from or write to a removable optical disk <NUM> (e.g., a CD-ROM or DVD). The hard disk drive <NUM>, magnetic disk drive <NUM> and optical disk drive <NUM> can be connected to system bus <NUM> the by an HDD interface <NUM>, and FDD interface <NUM> and an optical disk drive interface <NUM>, respectively. The HDD interface <NUM> for external drive implementations can include at least one or both of Universal Serial Bus (USB) and IEEE <NUM> interface technologies.

The drives and associated computer-readable media provide volatile and/or nonvolatile storage of data, data structures, computer-executable instructions, and so forth. For example, a number of program modules can be stored in the drives and non-volatile <NUM>, and volatile <NUM>, including an operating system <NUM>, one or more applications <NUM>, other program modules <NUM>, and program data <NUM>. Example operating systems <NUM> include the Android® OS, iOS®, macOS®, Linux®, and Windows® operating systems. In one embodiment, the one or more applications <NUM>, other program modules <NUM>, and program data <NUM> can include, for example, the various applications and/or components of the systems <NUM>-<NUM>, such as the applet <NUM>, counter <NUM>, master key <NUM>, diversified key <NUM>, customer ID <NUM>, client application <NUM>, attestation <NUM>, encrypted customer ID <NUM>, authentication application <NUM>, account data <NUM>, digital signature <NUM>, decryption result <NUM>, public key <NUM>, encrypted customer ID <NUM>, and decryption result <NUM>.

A user can enter commands and information into the computer <NUM> through one or more wire/wireless input devices, for example, a keyboard <NUM> and a pointing device, such as a mouse <NUM>. Other input devices may include microphones, infra-red (IR) remote controls, radio-frequency (RF) remote controls, game pads, stylus pens, card readers, dongles, finger print readers, gloves, graphics tablets, joysticks, keyboards, retina readers, touch screens (e.g., capacitive, resistive, etc.), trackballs, track pads, sensors, styluses, and the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processor <NUM> through an input device interface <NUM> that is coupled to the system bus <NUM> but can be connected by other interfaces such as a parallel port, IEEE <NUM> serial port, a game port, a USB port, an IR interface, and so forth.

A monitor <NUM> or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus <NUM> via an interface, such as a video adapter <NUM>.

The computer <NUM> may operate in a networked environment using logical connections via wire and/or wireless communications to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer(s) <NUM>. The remote computer(s) <NUM> can be a workstation, a server computer, a router, a personal computer, portable computer, microprocessor-based entertainment appliance, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all the elements described relative to the computer <NUM>, although, for purposes of brevity, only a memory and/or storage device <NUM> is illustrated. The logical connections depicted include wire/wireless connectivity to a local area network <NUM> and/or larger networks, for example, a wide area network <NUM>.

When used in a local area network <NUM> networking environment, the computer <NUM> is connected to the local area network <NUM> through a wire and/or wireless communication network interface or network adapter <NUM>. The network adapter <NUM> can facilitate wire and/or wireless communications to the local area network <NUM>, which may also include a wireless access point disposed thereon for communicating with the wireless functionality of the network adapter <NUM>.

When used in a wide area network <NUM> networking environment, the computer <NUM> can include a modem <NUM>, or is connected to a communications server on the wide area network <NUM> or has other means for establishing communications over the wide area network <NUM>, such as by way of the Internet. The modem <NUM>, which can be internal or external and a wire and/or wireless device, connects to the system bus <NUM> via the input device interface <NUM>. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer <NUM>, or portions thereof, can be stored in the remote memory and/or storage device <NUM>. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers can be used.

The computer <NUM> is operable to communicate with wire and wireless devices or entities using the IEEE <NUM> family of standards, such as wireless devices operatively disposed in wireless communication (e.g., IEEE <NUM> over-the-air modulation techniques). This includes at least Wi-Fi (or Wireless Fidelity), WiMax, and Bluetooth™ wireless technologies, among others. Thus, the communication can be a predefined structure as with a conventional network or simply an ad hoc communication between at least two devices. Wi-Fi networks use radio technologies called IEEE <NUM> (a, b, g, n, etc.) to provide secure, reliable, fast wireless connectivity. A Wi-Fi network can be used to connect computers to each other, to the Internet, and to wire networks (which use IEEE <NUM>-related media and functions).

The various elements of the devices as previously described with reference to <FIG> may include various hardware elements, software elements, or a combination of both. Examples of hardware elements may include devices, logic devices, components, processors, microprocessors, circuits, processors, circuit elements (e.g., transistors, resistors, capacitors, inductors, and so forth), integrated circuits, application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), programmable logic devices (PLD), digital signal processors (DSP), field programmable gate array (FPGA), memory units, logic gates, registers, semiconductor device, chips, microchips, chip sets, and so forth. Examples of software elements may include software components, programs, applications, computer programs, application programs, system programs, software development programs, machine programs, operating system software, middleware, firmware, software modules, routines, subroutines, functions, methods, procedures, software interfaces, application program interfaces (API), instruction sets, computing code, computer code, code segments, computer code segments, words, values, symbols, or any combination thereof. However, determining whether an embodiment is implemented using hardware elements and/or software elements may vary in accordance with any number of factors, such as desired computational rate, power levels, heat tolerances, processing cycle budget, input data rates, output data rates, memory resources, data bus speeds and other design or performance constraints, as desired for a given implementation.

Such representations, known as "IP cores," may be stored on a tangible, machine readable medium and supplied to various customers or manufacturing facilities to load into the fabrication machines that make the logic or processor. Some embodiments may be implemented, for example, using a machine-readable medium or article which may store an instruction or a set of instructions that, if executed by a machine, may cause the machine to perform a method and/or operations in accordance with the embodiments. Such a machine may include, for example, any suitable processing platform, computing platform, computing device, processing device, computing system, processing system, computer, processor, or the like, and may be implemented using any suitable combination of hardware and/or software. The machine-readable medium or article may include, for example, any suitable type of memory unit, memory device, memory article, memory medium, storage device, storage article, storage medium and/or storage unit, for example, memory, removable or non-removable media, erasable or non-erasable media, writeable or re-writeable media, digital or analog media, hard disk, floppy disk, Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD-ROM), Compact Disk Recordable (CD-R), Compact Disk Rewriteable (CD-RW), optical disk, magnetic media, magneto-optical media, removable memory cards or disks, various types of Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), a tape, a cassette, or the like. The instructions may include any suitable type of code, such as source code, compiled code, interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code, encrypted code, and the like, implemented using any suitable high-level, low-level, object-oriented, visual, compiled and/or interpreted programming language.

Claim 1:
A method, comprising:
receiving, by an application executing on a device, a request specifying a subject and a medical condition (<NUM>);
receiving, by the application, a cryptogram from a contactless card associated with an account of the subject (<NUM>);
transmitting, by the application, the cryptogram to a server;
receiving, by the application, a decryption result from the server (<NUM>);
determining, by the application based on the decryption result, that the server decrypted the cryptogram (<NUM>);
receiving, by the application from the contactless card, a medical attestation, a digital signature of the medical attestation, and a public key of the digital signature (<NUM>);
decrypting the digital signature by the application based on the public key of the digital signature (<NUM>);
verifying, by the application, the medical attestation based on the decrypted digital signature (<NUM>);
determining, based on the verification of the medical attestation, that the subject is immune to the medical condition (<NUM>);
generating, by the application, an attestation result specifying that the subject is immune to the medical condition (<NUM>); and
transmitting, by the application, the attestation result to a recipient device (<NUM>).