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hll-240052-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0052",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462693/240052.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kelly Hancock, Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; The Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; and Ken Pax... | {
"[A]": "Kelly Hancock, Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas",
"[B]": "RJR Vapor Co., LLC",
"[C]": "Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas",
"[Product]": "VELO",
"[Justice]": "Justice Busby",
"[Concurring Justice]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | [B] sells oral nicotine pouches in Texas under the brand [Product]. Each pouch is a porous fleece sachet, somewhat like a tea bag, filled with a dry powder whose primary ingredient is microcrystalline cellulose (processed non-tobacco plant matter) infused with nicotine isolate (99% pure nicotine chemically extracted fr... | Must the Supreme Court of Texas conduct a separate void-for-vagueness analysis of the tax statute? Identify the two due-process concerns vagueness doctrine addresses, explain how the court treats each in the tax context, and state the court's disposition of the vagueness argument. | {
"outcome": "other",
"issue": "Whether a taxpayer's void-for-vagueness challenge to a tax statute requires independent analysis where the court has held the statute unambiguously applies to the taxpayer's product and the taxpayer also asserts an equal-and-uniform challenge.",
"standard": "A vague statute can off... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that RJR’s void-for-vagueness argument is inapt."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, there is no need for a distinct analysis of RJR’s vagueness challenge."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "A vague statute can offend due process... | {
"hallucination": "Any citation not in the opinion or fabricated case name/holding caps the item at 25%; check reporter volumes and pin cites against the opinion.",
"issue": "Full credit: frames the issue as whether vagueness adds anything beyond existing tax doctrines, not as a freestanding merits question on vag... | null | null |
hll-240102-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0102",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462695/240102.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. City of Corsicana and Navarro County"
} | {
"[A]": "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.",
"[B]": "City of Corsicana",
"[C]": "Navarro County",
"[D]": "Corsicana Industrial Foundation",
"[E]": "Gander Mountain",
"[F]": "Fun Town RV",
"[G]": "Home Depot",
"[Shopping Center]": "Corsicana Crossing",
"[Justice]": "Blacklock",
"[Dissenting Justice]": "Gray... | A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site,... | The lower courts held the agreements unconstitutional in part because they lacked sufficient controls to ensure the public purpose would be accomplished, reasoning that nothing in the contracts ensured the anchor store would keep operating. Assume the Supreme Court of Texas holds that Gift Clause scrutiny (including th... | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether, measured against the constitutionally relevant public purpose of economic development (rather than continued operation of one store), the sales-tax grant agreements contained sufficient controls to ensure the public purpose is accomplished and to protect the ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "An overly narrow conception of the deal’s public purpose also infected the lowe... | {
"issue": "Full credit: identifies that the controls question must be measured against economic development generally, not the single store.",
"standard": "Full credit: TML's 'retain public control over the funds to ensure the public purpose is accomplished and protect the public's investment'; partial for a gener... | null | null |
hll-240385-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0385",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462610/240384_240385pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-24T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of... | {
"[Governor]": "Abbott, Greg (Governor of the State of Texas)",
"[Commissioner]": "Muth, Stephanie (Commissioner of DFPS)",
"[Former Commissioner]": "Masters, Jaime",
"[Agency]": "Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS)",
"[A]": "Doe, Jane and John (parents of Mary Doe)",
"[A-child]": "Doe, Mar... | Several families of minors diagnosed with gender dysphoria obtained temporary injunctions in a Texas district court prohibiting the state's child-protective-services agency ([Agency]) and its commissioner from investigating reports that a minor received puberty blockers or hormone therapy for gender transitioning, afte... | Evaluate the plaintiffs' voluntary-cessation argument. State the standard the Supreme Court of Texas applies to a defendant's voluntary cessation of challenged conduct in the mootness analysis, explain whether the agency's closure of the investigations and its testimony satisfy that standard despite the plaintiffs' con... | {
"outcome": "vacated",
"issue": "Whether an agency's voluntary closure of its investigations, coupled with its testimony that it will not investigate new reports involving the same allegation, moots the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief notwithstanding the plaintiffs' argument that voluntary cessation is a ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgments, dismiss the appeals, and vacate the trial court’s temporary-injunction orders for lack of jurisdiction."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "Instead, they argue that dismissal for... | {
"issue": "Full credit: frames the question as whether voluntary cessation (closure plus no-reinvestigation commitment) moots the injunctive claims; recognizes plaintiffs do not dispute the facts but contest the legal effect.",
"standard": "Full credit: 'absolutely clear the conduct could not reasonably be expecte... | null | null |
hll-240782-2 | 0.1 | constitutional | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0782",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462696/240782.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita ... | {
"[A]": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida Garcia, Aniceto Garcia, Betty Garcia, Railey Rincones, Gary Busse, Alison Savage (the individual Taxpayers)",
"[B]": "Lyford Conso... | [C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters jo... | Does [B] have standing? Identify the governing test and the standard for reviewing an evidence-based plea to the jurisdiction, explain how each element applies to [B]'s alleged injuries and to its reliance on the school-finance cases, and state the disposition as to [B]'s claims. | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a school district located within a neighboring taxing district's boundaries has constitutional standing to challenge that district's ad valorem tax based on alleged funding disadvantages, double taxation of its residents, and competitive harm.",
"standard": "When a plea ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Thus, we hold the court of appeals did not err in dismissing LCISD’s claims for lack of standing."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "and we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment to the extent it dismisses LCISD’s claims on that basis."
},
{
"field": "stan... | {
"issue": "Full credit: standing of the neighboring district on all three elements, distinct from the individual taxpayers.",
"standard": "Full credit: evidence-based plea reviewed like traditional summary judgment (Alamo Heights/Miranda), plea must be granted if no fact issue; three-part standing test including t... | true | null |
hll-240782-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0782",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462696/240782.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita ... | {
"[A]": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida Garcia, Aniceto Garcia, Betty Garcia, Railey Rincones, Gary Busse, Alison Savage (the individual Taxpayers)",
"[B]": "Lyford Conso... | [C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters jo... | As to [A] only: which standing framework applies (the general three-part constitutional test or the taxpayer-standing doctrine), and why? Address each of [C]'s three arguments and the 'significant disruption' rationale drawn from Bland, and state whether the court of appeals' dismissal of [A]'s claims should stand. | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether individual taxpayers who personally pay an allegedly unconstitutional ad valorem tax must satisfy the narrow taxpayer-standing doctrine-and may be denied standing because their suit would disrupt government operations-or whether their pocketbook injury satisfi... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "But we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the Taxpayers’ claims for lack of standing."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because these allegations establish the Taxpayers’ constitutional standing, the court of appeals erred in relying on the taxpay... | {
"issue": "Full credit: recognizes the choice of framework (ordinary constitutional standing vs. taxpayer-standing doctrine) is itself the dispositive question and that pocketbook injury satisfies the ordinary test.",
"standard": "Full credit: three-part test; shared injury still particularized (Data Foundry, Mexi... | true | null |
hll-240924-4 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0924",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462698/240924.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "MV Transportation, Inc. v. GDS Transport, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "MV Transportation, Inc.",
"[A-Sub]": "MVCT (MV Contract Transportation, Inc.)",
"[B]": "GDS Transport, LLC",
"[Authority]": "Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority (DART)",
"[Justice]": "Young, J."
} | [Authority] is one of the state's largest regional public-transit authorities organized under Chapter 452 of the Tex. Transp. Code. Its mission includes microtransit and paratransit services (small-vehicle and origin-to-destination service for riders who cannot use fixed routes). After a request for information seeking... | Was the court of appeals correct that [A]'s § 452.056(d) defense was not established as a matter of law, so that the fraud claim survives Rule 91a? State what Rule 91a permits the court to consider, whether an affirmative statutory limitation on liability can ground a Rule 91a dismissal at the pleading stage, the stand... | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an affirmative statutory defense limiting a contractor's liability to that of the transit authority can support Rule 91a dismissal when the facts establishing the defense come from the plaintiff's own live pleading and its incorporated agreement.",
"standard... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The trial court correctly granted the Rule 91a motion. We reverse the court of appeals’ contrary judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment of dismissal as to MV Transportation."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "The court held, see id., that the trial court... | {
"issue": "Full credit: whether an affirmative statutory defense (§ 452.056(d)) is established as a matter of law on the plaintiff's own pleading (and incorporated agreement) so as to support Rule 91a dismissal; not a general derivative-immunity question.",
"standard": "Full credit: 91a.1 no-basis-in-law test; 91a... | null | null |
hll-250012-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-0012",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462613/250010_250012pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-24T00:00:00",
"caseName": "The Mabee Ranch Royalty Partnership, L.P.; 315 MR, Inc.; 93 JM, Inc.; Rock River Minerals, LP; Primitive Petroleum, Inc.; Austen Campbell, Co-Executor... | {
"[A]": "Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd.; Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.; and Fasken Royalty Investments, Ltd. (plaintiffs/respondents, the royalty holder)",
"[B]": "The Mabee Ranch Royalty Partnership, L.P.; 315 MR, Inc.; 93 JM, Inc.; Rock River Minerals, LP; Primitive Petroleum, Inc.; Austen Campbell and Janet Campbe... | Under a 1930s deed covering a large ranch in West Texas ([Ranch]), [A] holds a reserved “undivided one-fourth (1/4th) of the usual one eighth (1/8th) royalty” in the oil, gas, and other minerals. For roughly 85 years the parties to the deed and their successors treated the instrument as reserving a fixed 1/32 royalty: ... | Decide the petitions for review as to jurisdiction. Was the court of appeals correct that it lacked jurisdiction in a permissive interlocutory appeal to reach the presumed-grant doctrine because the trial court’s certification order did not expressly list that doctrine among its controlling questions of law? State the ... | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an appellate court that has accepted a permissive interlocutory appeal has jurisdiction to reach an issue (the presumed-grant doctrine) that the trial court’s certification order did not expressly identify as a controlling question of law.",
"standard": "Onc... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We accordingly grant the petitions for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment as to jurisdiction, vacate the judgment on the merits, and remand the case to the court of appeals for a fresh consideration of the merits."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We... | {
"issue": "Identifies scope of permissive-appeal jurisdiction (fairly-included subsidiary/ancillary issues), not merely whether the doctrine was listed.",
"standard": "States the Elephant Ins. v. Kenyon rule: same principles as any other appeal; the order is reviewed; no strict construction of issues presented.",
... | null | null |
hll-250461-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-0461",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462700/250461.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In re ACE American Insurance Company; Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company; GuideOne National Insurance Company; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, Lon... | {
"[A]": "ACE American Insurance Company",
"[B]": "Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company",
"[C]": "GuideOne National Insurance Company",
"[D]": "Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and Company Market",
"[E]": "StarStone Specialty Insurance Company",
"[F]": "Starr Specialty Lines Insurance Agency, LLC",... | [I], [J], and [K] (collectively, the Insured) own, lease, and manage commercial properties nationwide. A group of carriers, [A], [B], [C], [D], [E], [F], and [G] on behalf of [H] (collectively, the Insurers), issued commercial-property policies covering those properties for a one-year policy period. A water line supply... | Was the Insurers' right to demand appraisal triggered? Decide whether a policy clause conditioned on the parties' disagreeing on the amount of loss requires the insurer to have stated a definitive, consistent valuation (or to have reached an impasse) before a genuine disagreement exists, and state the Court's dispositi... | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a genuine 'disagreement on the amount of loss' sufficient to trigger the appraisal clause requires the insurer to have taken a definitive and consistent position on the amount of loss.",
"standard": "To 'disagree' is simply 'to fail to agree'; the appraisal ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We conditionally grant Insurers’ petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to grant Insurers’ motion to compel appraisal."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "To “disagree” is, quite simply, “to fail to agree.”"
},
{
"field": "standard",
... | {
"issue": "Identifies trigger question: whether a definitive valuation is a precondition to disagreement.",
"standard": "Plain meaning of disagree = fail to agree; distinguishes impasse (waiver-by-delay) from disagreement (trigger).",
"authority": "In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d 404 (impasse vs disagre... | null | null |
hll-251085-1 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-1085",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462701/251085pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kevin F. Karli, James W. Dobbs, Margaret E. Dobbs, Henry C. McQuaide, III, Chris H. Hoegemeyer, Kyle W. Hoegemeyer, William H. Hoegemeyer II, Sam Wigington, ... | {
"[A1]": "Kevin F. Karli",
"[A2]": "James W. Dobbs",
"[A3]": "Margaret E. Dobbs",
"[A4]": "Henry C. McQuaide, III",
"[A5]": "Chris H. Hoegemeyer",
"[A6]": "Kyle W. Hoegemeyer",
"[A7]": "William H. Hoegemeyer II",
"[A8]": "Sam Wigington, III",
"[A9]": "Justin T. Price",
"[A10]": "Robert Hugh William... | This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing s... | Decide the petition for review. Identify the doctrinal issue the deed implicates, the intervening authority that controls how the Supreme Court of Texas handles the petition, and the precise disposition the Court should enter (grant/deny; affirm/reverse/vacate; render or remand, and to which court), and explain why the... | {
"outcome": "vacated",
"issue": "Whether a court of appeals decision construing a deed that uses double fractions-and thus implicating the Van Dyke presumption-should stand when it was issued without the benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Clifton v. Johnson.",
"standard": "Under Van Dyke v. Nav... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we grant the petition for review, vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "This oil-and-gas case involves a deed that uses double fractions and thus implicates the pre... | {
"issue": "Full credit: identifies the double-fraction / Van Dyke presumption issue and that the dispositive problem is an intervening Supreme Court decision (Clifton v. Johnson) the court of appeals lacked.",
"standard": "Full credit: states the Van Dyke presumption for double fractions in antiquated instruments ... | null | null |
hll-251085-3 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-1085",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462701/251085pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kevin F. Karli, James W. Dobbs, Margaret E. Dobbs, Henry C. McQuaide, III, Chris H. Hoegemeyer, Kyle W. Hoegemeyer, William H. Hoegemeyer II, Sam Wigington, ... | {
"[A1]": "Kevin F. Karli",
"[A2]": "James W. Dobbs",
"[A3]": "Margaret E. Dobbs",
"[A4]": "Henry C. McQuaide, III",
"[A5]": "Chris H. Hoegemeyer",
"[A6]": "Kyle W. Hoegemeyer",
"[A7]": "William H. Hoegemeyer II",
"[A8]": "Sam Wigington, III",
"[A9]": "Justin T. Price",
"[A10]": "Robert Hugh William... | This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing s... | What substantive doctrine does this deed implicate, and what are the controlling Supreme Court of Texas authorities on it as of the time the petition is decided (name both the foundational 2023 decision and the later 2026 decision the court of appeals lacked)? Given that the court of appeals ruled without that later au... | {
"outcome": "vacated",
"issue": "Whether a double-fraction deed implicating the Van Dyke presumption must be reconsidered by the court of appeals in light of the Supreme Court's later opinion in Clifton v. Johnson.",
"standard": "A deed using double fractions implicates the presumption discussed in Van Dyke v. N... | [
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "involves a deed that uses double fractions and thus implicates the presumption discussed in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group"
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023). When the court of appeals issued its decision, it di... | {
"issue": "Full credit: double-fraction deed / Van Dyke presumption plus the intervening Clifton v. Johnson decision.",
"standard": "Full credit: names Van Dyke and Clifton as the controlling double-fraction authorities and the vacate-and-remand consequence.",
"authority": "Full credit: 668 S.W.3d 353 and 2026 W... | null | null |
hll-cl11229891-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11229891",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461808/250641c.pdf",
"decided": "2025-12-22T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Ken Paxton and the Office of the Attorney General"
} | {
"[A]": "Ken Paxton",
"[B]": "Office of the Attorney General",
"[C]": "the State",
"[D]": "the real parties in interest (district attorneys, local attorneys, and counties)"
} | [A] and [B] promulgated rules requiring [D] to submit twelve categories of information, including work product and privileged matters, with non-compliance punishable as official misconduct. [D] brought ultra vires and constitutional challenges to the rules. After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded th... | Did the court of appeals abuse its discretion by granting a stay under Rule 29.3 without considering the prosecutors' likelihood of success on the merits? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the court of appeals erred in granting a stay under Rule 29.3 without evaluating the preliminary merits of the parties' positions.",
"standard": "Appellate courts must inquire into the likely merits of the parties' positions and the balance of harms to the p... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree the court of appeals erred in not evaluating the preliminary merits of the parties' positions before issuing a stay to preserve its jurisdiction. I therefore concur with the Court's decision to grant relief."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "the court of a... | {
"issue": "Identify that the dispositive issue is the failure to consider merits, not the balance of harms.",
"standard": "Cite In re State for the two-part test: merits and harms.",
"application": "Explain that the court of appeals only did a harm analysis, which is insufficient.",
"outcome": "The correct out... | null | null |
hll-cl11229891-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11229891",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461808/250641c.pdf",
"decided": "2025-12-22T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Ken Paxton and the Office of the Attorney General"
} | {
"[A]": "Ken Paxton",
"[B]": "Office of the Attorney General",
"[C]": "the State",
"[D]": "the real parties in interest (district attorneys, local attorneys, and counties)"
} | [A] and [B] promulgated rules requiring [D] to submit twelve categories of information, including work product and privileged matters, with non-compliance punishable as official misconduct. [D] challenged the rules as ultra vires and unconstitutional. The trial court granted a temporary injunction after a hearing, find... | What legal standard must an appellate court apply when considering a Rule 29.3 motion to stay enforcement of a trial court's temporary injunction after [C] has superseded the order? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "The legal standard for a Rule 29.3 stay against the State's supersedeas right requires both a preliminary merits evaluation and a balance of harms.",
"standard": "Appellate courts must inquire into the likely merits of the parties' positions and the balance of harms... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree the court of appeals erred in not evaluating the preliminary merits of the parties' positions before issuing a stay to preserve its jurisdiction. I therefore concur with the Court's decision to grant relief."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "the court of a... | {
"issue": "Identify that the standard requires both merits and harms, not just one.",
"standard": "Quote the exact standard from In re State as restated in the opinion.",
"application": "Explain that the court of appeals only did the harms part, missing the merits part.",
"outcome": "The Court conditionally gr... | null | null |
hll-cl11229892-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11229892",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461807/250641pc.pdf",
"decided": "2025-12-22T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Ken Paxton and the Office of the Attorney General"
} | {
"[A]": "Ken Paxton",
"[B]": "Office of the Attorney General",
"[C]": "Garza"
} | Relators [A] and [B] (the Attorney General and his office) promulgated administrative rules requiring local prosecutors to report certain information. A group of counties, county attorneys, and district attorneys sued, alleging that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to issue the rules. The trial court gra... | Did the court of appeals abuse its discretion by issuing a stay under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 without conducting a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits of the parties' legal positions? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a court of appeals may issue a stay under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 without a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits of the parties' legal positions.",
"standard": "Appellate courts asked to issue temporary relief pending appeal should make ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "P. 52.8(c), we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the court of appeals to evaluate the merits to determine, by January 5, 2026, whether a Rule 29.3 stay is warranted."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "This Court has held that \"appellate courts aske... | {
"issue": "The key issue is whether the court of appeals was required to conduct a merits inquiry before issuing a Rule 29.3 stay. The answer is yes, as per In re State.",
"standard": "The correct standard is that appellate courts must make a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits. The model should cite the ex... | null | null |
hll-cl11239022-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11239022",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461914/240796pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-01-09T00:00:00",
"caseName": "4 Families of Hobby, LLC, 4 Families of Houston, LLC, and Pappas Restaurants, Inc v. City of Houston, Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "4 Families of Hobby, LLC, 4 Families of Houston, LLC, and Pappas Restaurants, Inc. (collectively 'Pappas')",
"[B]": "City of Houston, Texas",
"[C]": "Areas HOU JV, LLC",
"[D]": "Hobby Airport"
} | [A] sued [B] alleging that the [C] Agreement with [C] violated Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code because it required an expenditure of more than $50,000. [B] filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the contract was a revenue-generating contract and therefore not subject to Chapter 252. The court of a... | Did the court of appeals err in holding that Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code applies only to expenditure contracts and not to revenue-generating contracts? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether Chapter 252 distinguishes between revenue contracts and expenditure contracts, such that a revenue-generating contract is not subject to the statute's requirements.",
"standard": "Chapter 252 makes no distinction between revenue contracts and expenditure con... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "CONCLUSION Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, without hearing oral argument, we grant the petition for review, reverse the portion of the court of appeals' judgment dismissing Pappas's Chapter 252 claims, and remand those claims to the trial court for jurisdi... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11241975-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11241975",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461980/240581c.pdf",
"decided": "2026-01-16T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Shamrock Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Frsteam gulfcoast/la v. Top Notch Movers, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "Shamrock Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Frsteam gulfcoast/la",
"[B]": "Top Notch Movers, LLC",
"[C]": "Summerdale, Alabama",
"[D]": "Foley, Alabama",
"[E]": "Kenner, Louisiana"
} | [B] sued [A] in Texas state court. [A] is an [C] company with no registered agent in Texas, so [B] requested substituted service through the Texas Secretary of State at an address in [D]. The Secretary of State sent the citation by certified mail to that address; the mailing was returned bearing the notation "Return to... | According to the concurring opinion, what does the Due Process Clause require when a plaintiff's attempt at service via certified mail is returned undelivered, and why did the plaintiff's actions here fail to meet that standard? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether due process requires a plaintiff to take additional reasonable steps to notify a defendant after a certified mailing is returned undelivered, and whether the plaintiff's failure to do so here violates due process.",
"standard": "Notice reasonably calculated,... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree with the Court that this record does not show strict compliance with the applicable service statute and that default judgment was therefore improper."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "For this reason, under both the United States and Texas Constitutions... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the dispositive sub-issue is the constitutional due process requirement for additional reasonable steps after a failed mailing.",
"standard": "The model should quote the Mullane standard and the 'desirous of actually informing' language.",
"application": "The model must ap... | true | null |
hll-cl11248468-3 | 0.1 | family | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11248468",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462036/240053.pdf",
"decided": "2026-01-30T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Debbie Jo Morrison v. Rodney Wayne Morrison"
} | {
"[A]": "Debbie Jo Morrison",
"[B]": "Rodney Wayne Morrison",
"[Judge]": "Justice Bland",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel"
} | After the parties' divorce, [A] moved for enforcement of the decree, alleging [B] damaged the marital home and failed to deliver personal property. The trial court held hearings over 18 months. During that time, the court's registry received $850,434 from sales of the marital home ($449,254.96), shop ($140,392.68), per... | When a trial court exceeds its enforcement authority under Section 9.007 by reallocating property without proper findings, does that error deprive the court of all subject matter jurisdiction to consider the enforcement motion, or does the court retain continuing jurisdiction to enter a proper enforcement order? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a trial court that exceeds its enforcement authority under Section 9.007 by entering an order that improperly modifies the property division loses all subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding, or whether the court retains continuing jurisdic... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because the trial court had jurisdiction to order enforcement but erred in interpreting the decree and Chapter 9's relevant provisions, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "standard",... | {
"issue": "Must identify the distinction between lack of jurisdiction to modify and retention of jurisdiction to enforce.",
"standard": "Must recognize that Section 9.007 is jurisdictional but only limits the power to modify, not the power to enforce under Sections 9.002/9.006.",
"authority": "Must cite Herrera ... | null | null |
hll-cl11259842-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11259842",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462113/240132.pdf",
"decided": "2026-02-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff"
} | {
"[A]": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange",
"[B]": "Jeff Mankoff",
"[C]": "Staci Mankoff"
} | In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of [B] and [C] (collectively, the insureds). Following the tornado, it 'likely' rained for approximately two minutes. The damaged property was covered by a homeowners insurance policy issued by [A] (the insurer). The insureds submitted a claim for damages, but the insurer paid only a... | Did the court of appeals err in holding that the term 'windstorm' in the homeowners insurance policy is ambiguous and does not unambiguously include a tornado, such that the windstorm or hail deductible should not apply to damage caused by a tornado? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the term 'windstorm' in a homeowners insurance policy unambiguously includes a tornado for purposes of applying a windstorm or hail deductible.",
"standard": "When a contract's meaning is disputed, we ascertain the parties' intent as expressed in the instrum... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Conclusion We hold that the term \"windstorm,\" when undefined in a homeowners insurance policy, is not ambiguous and that its ordinary meaning encompasses a tornado. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Insurer on the ground that Insureds' cove... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11259842-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11259842",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462113/240132.pdf",
"decided": "2026-02-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff"
} | {
"[A]": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange",
"[B]": "Jeff Mankoff",
"[C]": "Staci Mankoff"
} | In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of [B] and [C]. Their homeowners insurance policy, issued by [A], contained a deductible for 'Windstorm or Hail' but did not define 'windstorm.' The insurer applied the deductible, and the insureds sued. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted su... | Did the separate listing of 'tornado' and 'windstorm' in Texas Insurance Code and Property Code provisions create ambiguity in the insurance policy's use of the term 'windstorm,' such that a reasonable interpretation could exclude a tornado? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the separate listing of 'tornado' and 'windstorm' in Texas statutes indicates that the ordinary meaning of 'windstorm' excludes a tornado for purposes of interpreting an insurance policy.",
"standard": "To determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term,... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Conclusion We hold that the term \"windstorm,\" when undefined in a homeowners insurance policy, is not ambiguous and that its ordinary meaning encompasses a tornado."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "We have recognized that the Legislature may repeat itself fo... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11259843-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11259843",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462112/240778pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-02-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Estate of J. Hugh Wheatfall"
} | {
"[A]": "Isaiah Wheatfall",
"[B]": "Theresa DeBose",
"[C]": "J. Hugh Wheatfall"
} | In a probate proceeding, [A] filed an application for letters of administration of [C]'s estate, claiming [C] died intestate and [A] was the sole heir. [B] filed an application to probate a 2009 will. The trial court heard both applications together. Before the court ruled, [A] filed a contest to probate of the will, a... | Was the trial court's September 16, 2019 order admitting the will to probate a final, appealable judgment that disposed of [A]'s will contest? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's September 16, 2019 order admitting the will to probate was a final, appealable judgment that disposed of all issues in the probate phase, including [A]'s will contest filed the day before the order.",
"standard": "Under the general one-fina... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand to that court to consider the merits of the appeal."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under the general one-final-judgment rule, a judgment is final if it either \"actually disposes of every pending claim and... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11275135-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11275135",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462452/240525.pdf",
"decided": "2026-03-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd. and Zurich American Insurance Company v. Scallon Controls, Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd.",
"[B]": "Zurich American Insurance Company",
"[C]": "Scallon Controls, Inc.",
"[D]": "Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations GP, LLC and Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | [B] is the insurer of [D] and intervened to assert subrogation claims for indemnification against [C] after [D] nonsuited its claims. The accident occurred in January 2015, and the workers settled with [A] and [D] in May 2019. [B] intervened in December 2021, nearly seven years after the accident but less than three ye... | The court of appeals held that [B]'s indemnity claim was time-barred because it intervened more than four years after the accident. Did the Texas Supreme Court agree? What is the correct standard for when an indemnity claim accrues, and what is the disposition? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an indemnity claim brought by an intervening insurer is time-barred when it was filed less than three years after the settlement that fixed the indemnitee's liability.",
"standard": "Indemnity claims begin to run when 'the indemnitee's liability becomes fixe... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Indemnity claims begin to run when \"the indemnitee's liability becomes fixed and certain\" through settlement o... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11292024-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11292024",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462490/241049.pdf",
"decided": "2026-03-27T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. Gac Equipment, LLC D/B/A Austin Crane Service"
} | {
"[A]": "Diamond Hydraulics, Inc.",
"[B]": "GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service",
"[C]": "Dr. John Behrendt",
"[D]": "Dr. Kevin Macfarlan",
"[E]": "KnightHawk Engineering, Inc.",
"[F]": "Dr. Jim Wiethorn",
"[G]": "Dr. Michael Hoerner",
"[Judge]": "Justice James P. Sullivan"
} | [A] repaired a crane cylinder for [B]. The cylinder later bent while lifting a bridge. [B] sued [A] for breach of contract and warranty. Discovery was hotly contested. Under the local rules, expert designations were due by a deadline. [A] timely designated [C] as its testifying expert. However, [B] delayed allowing [A]... | Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6(a), when a trial court finds good cause for an untimely expert designation, must it also consider whether the failure will not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other party? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a court must consider the unfair surprise/prejudice exception in Rule 193.6(a) when good cause has already been established, given that the two exceptions are joined by the disjunctive 'or'.",
"standard": "Rule 193.6(a) states that a party may offer untimely... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for a new trial."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But Rule 193.6(a) uses the disjunctive \"or\" to join its two exceptions."
},
{
"field": "application",
"quote": "Because we hold ... | {
"issue": "Identify the disjunctive nature of the two exceptions.",
"standard": "Correctly state Rule 193.6(a) and the 'or' language.",
"authority": "Cite Rule 193.6(a) and Jackson v. Takara.",
"application": "Explain that good cause obviates the need to consider the second exception.",
"outcome": "Reversed ... | null | null |
hll-cl11308098-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11308098",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462567/240966.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Texas Department of Public Safety v. Robert Christopher Callaway"
} | {
"[A]": "Texas Department of Public Safety",
"[B]": "Robert Christopher Callaway",
"[C]": "Steve McCraw",
"[Judge]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | [A] hired [B] as a Texas Ranger in 2012. [B] suffered from PTSD and took medical leave. On January 15, 2020, [B] rushed to his daughter's high school with his badge, handcuffs, and gun, and menaced counselors and police officers. [A] terminated [B] after an investigation. [B] sued [A] under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labo... | Did the trial court err in denying [A]'s plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment on [B]'s disability discrimination claim, given that the claim fails as a matter of law under Section 21.105 of the Texas Labor Code? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the trial court erred in denying DPS's plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment because Callaway's disability discrimination claim fails as a matter of law under §21.105.",
"standard": "Section 21.105 provides that a provision referring to discriminatio... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse in part the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment dismissing Callaway's claims against DPS."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The plain text of Section 21.105, however, makes short work of the lone claim left in this case: A provision ... | {} | true | null |
hll-cl11308100-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11308100",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462568/240879.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S., and the Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A."
} | {
"[A]": "Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S.",
"[B]": "The Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A.",
"[C]": "Jose Torres",
"[D]": "Dr. Henry",
"[E]": "Dr. Hua",
"[F]": "Dr. Robison",
"[G]": "Dr. Conoley",
"[H]": "Dr. Rensimer",
"[Judge]": "James D. Blacklock"
} | Same background as item 1. During deliberations, the jury asked: 'Does the charge relate to the whole finger or partial finger?' The court declined to answer. The jury returned a defense verdict. [C] moved for a new trial, arguing that the loss of chance instruction caused confusion and probably resulted in an improper... | Did the district court abuse its discretion by granting a new trial on the ground that the jury's question about the instruction indicated confusion that probably caused an improper judgment? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the district court erred in concluding that the jury's question about the instruction, without more, demonstrated that the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.",
"standard": "The question is whether the defect in the instructions 'probably cause... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The question is whether the defect in the instructions \"probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.\" TEX."
},
{
"field": "application",
"quote... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11308102-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11308102",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462570/240310.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "H-E-B, L.P. v. Marissa Peterson"
} | {
"[A]": "H-E-B, L.P.",
"[B]": "Marissa Peterson",
"[C]": "John Wayne",
"[Judge]": "Justice Bland",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel"
} | While shopping in the toy aisle at an HEB grocery store, [B] slipped on a clear liquid puddle and fell. She sued [A] for premises liability. The trial court granted [A]'s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that earlier roof leaks in the store need not be in the area of a puddle to su... | Under Texas premises liability law, can evidence of roof leaks in other parts of a store, combined with the presence of buckets and signs elsewhere in the store, establish constructive knowledge of a puddle in a specific aisle where the plaintiff fell? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether evidence of roof leaks in other locations of the store and the presence of buckets and signs elsewhere can establish constructive knowledge of a puddle in a specific aisle, or whether the leak must be in the vicinity of the dangerous condition.",
"standard":... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and reinstate the trial court's summary judgment for the grocer."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "The knowledge inquiry-whether actual or constructive-concerns knowledge of the dangerous condition \"at the ti... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the issue is whether evidence of leaks in other locations can establish constructive knowledge of a condition in a specific location.",
"standard": "Must articulate the 'vicinity' requirement from Rodriguez and the 'time and place' requirement from Mohammadi and Taylor.",
"authority... | true | null |
hll-cl11315031-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11315031",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462612/240883.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-24T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Bell Helicopter Services Inc. and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "Bell Helicopter Services Inc. and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.",
"[B]": "Matthew Kawamura",
"[C]": "Westwind Helicopters, Inc."
} | The same helicopter crash as above. The plaintiffs' theory was that the flight manual was defective because it omitted a warning about flying with a loose cowling. The manual had never contained such a warning. The plaintiffs argued that because [A] revised the manual in other respects within 18 years of the crash, tho... | Did the Texas Supreme Court correctly hold that GARA bars a failure-to-warn claim when the allegedly defective warning was never included in the flight manual, and the manufacturer's revisions to the manual did not add or alter the omitted warning, because the rolling provision does not treat a continued omission as a ... | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a manufacturer's failure to include a warning in a flight manual, where the manual has never contained the warning, can be treated as a 'new' part under GARA's rolling provision when the manual is revised in unrelated respects.",
"standard": "The rolling pro... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The rolling provision, the court explained, requires a \"causal nexus between the replaced part and the complained of injuries\"; absent that causal connection, the ro... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11319047-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11319047",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462654/230887.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-01T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Texas Department of State Health Services and Dr. Jennifer A. Shuford, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Ser... | {
"[A]": "Texas Department of State Health Services",
"[B]": "Dr. Jennifer A. Shuford",
"[C]": "Sky Marketing Corp.",
"[D]": "Create a Cig Temple, LLC",
"[E]": "Darrell Surif",
"[F]": "David Walden",
"[G]": "Hometown Hero",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young",
"[Judge2]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | In 2020, the federal DEA issued an interim final rule clarifying that hemp-derived extracts with less than 0.3% delta-9 THC are decontrolled. The commissioner of [A] objected to that rule under [A] & Safety Code § 481.034(g), which allows the commissioner to reject federal scheduling changes. The commissioner published... | Did the commissioner act ultra vires by modifying the 2021 schedules under § 481.034(g) rather than following the alternative procedures in §§ 481.034–.035? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the commissioner's use of the § 481.034(g) objection procedure to modify the schedules was within her lawful discretion, thereby defeating the procedural ultra vires claim and preserving sovereign immunity.",
"standard": "the commissioner's § 481.034(g) obje... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that the commissioner complied with the procedural requirements enumerated in § 481.034(g), which means that the vendors' procedural 22 ultra vires claim fails and sovereign immunity applies."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The commissioner's § 481.03... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the procedural ultra vires claim turns on whether the commissioner properly invoked § 481.034(g) and whether the alternative procedures were required.",
"standard": "The model should cite the finality provision of § 481.034(g) and the court's holding that the commissioner ha... | true | null |
hll-cl11319049-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11319049",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462653/230953d.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-01T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Tatia Ortiz v. Ramu Nelapatla"
} | {
"[A]": "Tatia Ortiz",
"[B]": "Ramu Nelapatla",
"[Judge]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | [A] sued [B] for personal injuries. At trial, [A] sought to prove medical expenses using affidavits under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 18.001. [B] served a controverting affidavit that challenged only part of the matters in [A]'s affidavits. The trial court excluded the affidavits entirely and refused to grant a new t... | After a defendant serves a counteraffidavit that challenges only part of the plaintiff's medical expense affidavit under Section 18.001, what is the plaintiff's evidentiary burden regarding the uncontroverted portions of the affidavit? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the plaintiff's burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses is shifted for the entire affidavit or only for the controverted parts when a counteraffidavit is served.",
"standard": "the affidavit remains admissible as to everything th... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The Court reads the unless clause differently."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "This case is about the scope of that italicized exception-to-the-exception."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "the affidavit remains admissible as to everything the coun... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11323652-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11323652",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462696/240782.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angel... | {
"[A]": "South Texas Independent School District",
"[B]": "Lyford Consolidated Independent School District",
"[C]": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida Garcia, Aniceto Garc... | In 1974, voters in [D] approved the formation of [F] (later renamed [A]) to serve disabled persons, authorizing an ad valorem tax up to 5 cents per $100 valuation. [A] now primarily serves non-disabled students. In 2023, [A]'s board levied the tax. [C] (individual taxpayers in [D]) and [B] (a school district in [D]) su... | After the Supreme [E] held that the individual taxpayers have standing, what must the court of appeals do on remand regarding the alternative jurisdictional arguments that [A] raised but the court of appeals did not reach? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the court of appeals must consider the defendant's alternative jurisdictional challenges—the political question doctrine and governmental immunity—when it previously dismissed the case for lack of standing without reaching those issues.",
"standard": "A cour... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We 15 remand the case to the court of appeals for it to consider STISD's unaddressed jurisdictional challenges in the first instance."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But because the \"political question doctrine is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction,\" V... | {
"issue": "Identify that the issue is the scope of remand: the court of appeals must consider the political question and immunity arguments because they were not previously decided.",
"standard": "Explain that the political question doctrine is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any time, and that the co... | true | null |
hll-cl11323654-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11323654",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462698/240924.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Mv Transportation, Inc. v. Gds Transport, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "MV Transportation, Inc.",
"[B]": "GDS Transport, LLC",
"[C]": "MV Contract Transportation, Inc.",
"[D]": "Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | This case arises from a dispute over a subcontract for paratransit and microtransit services. [D] is a regional public transportation authority. In 2018, [D] issued a request for information and awarded a contract to [A] via a master agreement. [A]'s wholly owned subsidiary, [C], then contracted with [B] for vehicles a... | Should the Texas Supreme Court reverse the court of appeals' judgment and reinstate the trial court's dismissal of [B]'s fraud claim against [A] under Rule 91a, based on [A]'s statutory immunity under Tex. Transp. Code § 452.056(d)? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether [A] is entitled to statutory immunity under Tex. Transp. Code § 452.056(d) such that [B]'s fraud claim has no basis in law under Rule 91a.",
"standard": "Under Rule 91a, a cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with i... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the court of appeals' contrary judgment, reinstate the trial court's judgment of dismissal as to the fraud claim, and remand what is left of the case to the trial court."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Appellate courts review the merits of a Rule 9... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11323654-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11323654",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462698/240924.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Mv Transportation, Inc. v. Gds Transport, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "MV Transportation, Inc.",
"[B]": "GDS Transport, LLC",
"[C]": "MV Contract Transportation, Inc.",
"[D]": "Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | This case arises from a dispute over a subcontract for paratransit and microtransit services. [D] is a regional public transportation authority. In 2018, [D] awarded a contract to [A] via a master agreement. [A]'s subsidiary [C] then contracted with [B] for vehicles and drivers. After [B] terminated the subcontract, [B... | Does the omission of the master agreement (the contract between [D] and [A]) from the appellate record preclude the Texas Supreme Court from reviewing the trial court's Rule 91a dismissal of the fraud claim? | {
"outcome": "other",
"issue": "Whether the omission of a document relied on in the pleading from the appellate record prevents a court from determining the legal viability of a claim under Rule 91a.",
"standard": "Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, the court may not consider evidence and must decide the mo... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "For several reasons, however, the omission here is not an obstacle to our review, and neither party suggests otherwise."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "When an original petition invokes a document in that way, the document is not mere \"evidence\" but may ins... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11328857-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328857",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462723/240250.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Sadie Weldon v. the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity"
} | {
"[A]": "Sadie Weldon",
"[B]": "The Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity",
"[C]": "Neesha Davé",
"[Judge]": "Justice J. Brett Busby"
} | Respondent [B] sued Petitioner [A] for a declaratory judgment that S.B. 8 (the Texas Heartbeat Act) is unconstitutional, along with injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The suit was filed 48 days after [A] filed a Rule 202 petition in Jack County to depose [C], [B]'s deputy director, regarding potential violations of... | Does the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) apply to [B]'s declaratory judgment action against [A] that was filed in response to [A]'s Rule 202 petition? The lower courts disagreed on the applicability of the TCPA at step one. | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the Fund's declaratory judgment action is 'based on or in response to' Weldon's Rule 202 petition such that the TCPA applies at step one.",
"standard": "The TCPA applies if the legal action is 'based on or in response to' the defendant's exercise of the righ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that the Fund's legal action is based on or in response to Weldon's exercise of her right to petition, so the TCPA applies. Because Weldon's motion to dismiss satisfied step one of the TCPA analysis, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment affirming the denial of th... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11328861-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328861",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462729/250674_0687.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Greg Abbott",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "the absent House members",
"[D]": "the Attorney General",
"[Judge]": "Chief Justice Blacklock"
} | In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ... | Did the Texas Supreme Court properly decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writ of quo warranto because the political branches resolved the dispute themselves, or should the court have addressed the merits of the removal claims? | {
"outcome": "denied",
"issue": "Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo warranto when the political branches have resolved the underlying dispute through their own mechanisms.",
"standard": "The courts’ institutional 'reluctance . . . to involve themselves ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "the petitions for writ of quo warranto, which are denied."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The courts' institutional \"reluctance . . . to involve themselves in contests of factional political power,\" a reluctance we reiterate and reinforce today, is a check ... | {
"issue": "Identify the court's reliance on the political question doctrine and its discretionary jurisdiction.",
"standard": "Quote the 'reluctance to involve themselves in contests of factional political power' language.",
"application": "Explain that the political resolution made judicial intervention unneces... | null | null |
hll-cl11328864-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328864",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462725/250317.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Home Depot U.S.A., Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",
"[B]": "Werner Enterprises, Inc.",
"[C]": "Werner's driver",
"[D]": "Natalio Garcia",
"[E]": "Garcia's parents and estate"
} | The decedent, [D], died when his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned by [B] and operated by [C] after [C] ran a red light. [E] sued [B] and [C] for negligence and later added [A] as a defendant, alleging negligent hiring of [B]. [A] moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing that the... | Under Texas law, what standard of review applies to a trial court's denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, and is mandamus an appropriate remedy to challenge such a denial? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "The standard of review for a Rule 91a motion and the availability of mandamus to review a denial of such a motion.",
"standard": "Whether that standard is met is a legal question we consider de novo based on the allegations in the plaintiffs’ live petition, which we... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because the trial court should have granted the customer's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, we conditionally grant mandamus relief directing it to do so."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Whether that standard is met is a legal question we consider de ... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the standard of review is de novo for the legal question and that mandamus is available for abuse of discretion.",
"standard": "The model should quote the de novo standard and the mandamus standard verbatim.",
"authority": "The model should cite Rule 91a, Bethel, In re Far... | null | null |
hll-cl11328864-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328864",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462725/250317.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Home Depot U.S.A., Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",
"[B]": "Werner Enterprises, Inc.",
"[C]": "Werner's driver",
"[D]": "Natalio Garcia",
"[E]": "Garcia's parents and estate"
} | The decedent, [D], died when his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned by [B] and operated by [C] after [C] ran a red light. [E] sued [B] and [C] for negligence and later added [A] as a defendant, alleging that [A] was directly liable for negligently hiring [B] as an independent motor carrier. [A] moved to d... | Under Texas law, can a shipper be held directly liable for negligent hiring of an independent motor carrier, and does such a claim impose a duty to investigate the carrier's safety record when the cargo is ordinary? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a shipper can be held directly liable for negligent hiring of an independent motor carrier and whether such a claim imposes a duty to investigate the carrier's safety record.",
"standard": "Even if such a claim is viable, it is no less derivative than vicari... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because the trial court should have granted the customer's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, we conditionally grant mandamus relief directing it to do so."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "As an initial matter, \"we have not ruled definitively on the ex... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the core issue is whether a negligent-hiring claim against a shipper of ordinary goods imposes a duty to investigate the carrier's safety.",
"standard": "The model should note that even if such a claim exists, it is derivative and requires control or creation of risk, which ... | null | null |
hll-cl11328865-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328865",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462727/250812pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Helena Chemical Company v. Phillip Bales, Derek Dieringer, Wilbert Dieringer, Michael Hoch, Cmh Farms, Inc., Mh Farms Services, Inc., Whit Braden, Donald... | {
"[A]": "Helena Chemical Company",
"[B]": "Phillip Bales",
"[C]": "Derek Dieringer",
"[D]": "Wilbert Dieringer",
"[E]": "Michael Hoch",
"[F]": "CMH Farms, Inc.",
"[G]": "MH Farms Services, Inc.",
"[H]": "Whit Braden",
"[I]": "Donald Braden",
"[J]": "Streicher Farms, Inc."
} | A group of farmers ([B] through [J]) claim that [A] damaged their crops through the aerial application of herbicide to a neighboring property. The Texas Supreme Court previously decided a similar case, [A] [A] Co. v. Cox, 664 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2023), involving different farmers but similar facts. In Cox, the Court held t... | Did the court of appeals err in denying the permissive interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(d) by holding that the existence of controlling precedent precludes a finding of a 'substantial ground for difference of opinion'? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a trial court's order that may be at odds with binding precedent satisfies Section 51.014(d)(1)'s requirement of 'a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.'",
"standard": "Section 51.014(d)(1) is satis... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we grant the petition for review and direct the court of appeals to accept the appeal"
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Section 51.014(d)(1) is satisfied when there is a substantial ground for concluding that a trial-court ruling is at odds with binding precede... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11338096-3 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11338096",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462852/260077c.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-05T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Interest of K.L.B., a Child"
} | {
"[A]": "Mother",
"[B]": "K.L.B.",
"[C]": "DFPS"
} | In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then ... | Under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b-3), when is a trial court required to make an extraordinary-circumstances finding to extend the automatic dismissal date, and did that provision apply to [A]'s case? | {
"outcome": "denied",
"issue": "Whether the trial court was required to make an extraordinary-circumstances finding under § 263.401(b-3) when the parent made a good-faith effort to complete the service plan and DFPS's permanency goal was reunification.",
"standard": "Subsection (b-3) of § 263.401 provides that t... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I concur in today's decision to deny review because Mother isn't entitled to relief from the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under the new Subsection (b-3), a trial court must make such a finding if (1) ... | null | null | null |
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio
Humanity's Last Lawsuit — public split
The public split of HLL, a legal-reasoning benchmark built from REAL appellate opinions with the parties redacted. Each item: blinded facts + a question whose gold answer (disposition, controlling standard, authorities) is the court's actual decision — grading is fully mechanical against the source opinion; no model judges another model. The private leaderboard split is withheld.
Per-jurisdiction configs are added as each state's bank matures (Texas first; California in development on the same pipeline). Item provenance: every item carries its source docket, author and critic models, and verbatim evidence quotes from the opinion.
Built by DocketX from the public record — the same team behind the us-caselaw 51-jurisdiction series. Site: https://docketrouter.ai/hll
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