# EDGAR Filing Document

**Accession Number:** 0000059478
**File Stem:** 0001214659-26-005225
**Filing Date:** 2026-4
**Character Count:** 8346
**Document Hash:** 42941f6a34860ae42a508ce5836719a1
**Contains OCR:** False
**Source Format:** 

## Filing Content

## Filing Summary
**0001214659-26-005225.hdr.sgml**: 20260429

**ACCESSION NUMBER**: 0001214659-26-005225

**CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE**: PX14A6G

**PUBLIC DOCUMENT COUNT**: 2

**FILED AS OF DATE**: 20260429

**DATE AS OF CHANGE**: 20260429

**EFFECTIVENESS DATE**: 20260429

**SUBJECT COMPANY**: 

**COMPANY DATA:**
- **COMPANY CONFORMED NAME:** ELI LILLY & Co
- **CENTRAL INDEX KEY:** 0000059478
- **STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION:** PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS [2834]
- **ORGANIZATION NAME:** 03 Life Sciences
- **EIN:** 350470950
- **STATE OF INCORPORATION:** IN
- **FISCAL YEAR END:** 1231

**FILING VALUES:**
- **FORM TYPE:** PX14A6G
- **SEC ACT:** 1934 Act
- **SEC FILE NUMBER:** 001-06351
- **FILM NUMBER:** 26913399

**BUSINESS ADDRESS:**
- **STREET 1:** LILLY CORPORATE CTR
- **STREET 2:** DROP CODE 1094
- **CITY:** INDIANAPOLIS
- **STATE:** IN
- **ZIP:** 46285
- **BUSINESS PHONE:** 3172762000

**MAIL ADDRESS:**
- **STREET 1:** LILLY CORPORATE CENTER
- **STREET 2:** DROP CODE 1094
- **CITY:** INDIANAPOLIS
- **STATE:** IN
- **ZIP:** 46285

**FORMER COMPANY:**
- **FORMER CONFORMED NAME:** LILLY ELI & CO
- **DATE OF NAME CHANGE:** 19941024
**FILED BY**: 

**COMPANY DATA:**
- **COMPANY CONFORMED NAME:** Friends Fiduciary Corp
- **CENTRAL INDEX KEY:** 0001696940

**ORGANIZATION NAME:**
- **EIN:** 231968136
- **STATE OF INCORPORATION:** PA
- **FISCAL YEAR END:** 1231

**FILING VALUES:**
- **FORM TYPE:** PX14A6G

**BUSINESS ADDRESS:**
- **STREET 1:** 1700 MARKET STREET
- **STREET 2:** SUITE 1535
- **CITY:** PHILADELPHIA
- **STATE:** PA
- **ZIP:** 19103
- **BUSINESS PHONE:** 2152417272

**MAIL ADDRESS:**
- **STREET 1:** 1700 MARKET STREET
- **STREET 2:** SUITE 1535
- **CITY:** PHILADELPHIA
- **STATE:** PA
- **ZIP:** 19103

**Notice of Exempt Solicitation**

![](ff_logo.jpg)

**NAME OF REGISTRANT:** Eli Lilly and Company

**NAME OF PERSON RELYING ON EXEMPTION:** Friends Fiduciary Corporation

**ADDRESS OF PERSON RELYING ON EXEMPTION:** 1700 Market Street, Suite 1535, Philadelphia, PA 19103

**Written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The soliciting person does not beneficially own more than $5 million of the class of subject securities, and the notice is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.**

**This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy.**

**Please DO NOT send us your proxy card as it will not be accepted**

**The Shareholder Proposal:**

*Shareholders request the Board of Directors adopt as policy, and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require henceforth that the Chair of the Board of Directors, whenever possible, be an independent member of the Board. This independence policy shall apply prospectively so as not to violate any contractual obligations. If the Board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, the Board shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of the policy within a reasonable amount of time. Compliance with this policy is waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair. This policy would be phased in for the next chief executive officer (CEO) transition.*

The Shareholder Proposal was filed by Mercy Investment Services and Friends Fiduciary Corporation.

**ELI LILLY FACES FINANCIAL, LEGAL AND REPUTATIONAL RISKS**

As one of the three primary insulin makers worldwide, Eli Lilly faces substantial financial, legal and reputational risks stemming from allegations that it has engaged in anti-competitive pricing and related behavior in the insulin and GLP-1 markets. In January of this year, Strive Specialties sued the company and Novo Nordisk claiming the drugmakers entered into exclusive agreements with telehealth providers, which were then barred from working with compounders; interfered with relationships that compounders have with payment processors and social media platforms; and regularly disparaged compounded medicines as illegal or unsafe<sup>1</sup>. There is also ongoing litigation with several states alleging that the Pharmacy Benefit Managers worked in coordination with Eli Lilly, Sanofi, and Novo Nordisk to distort the market for diabetic treatments to their benefit, at the expense of diabetics.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2026/01/14/pharmacy-compounder-antitrust-lilly-novo-weight-obesity/#:~:text=During%20the%20shortages%2C%20Lilly%20and,competition%2C%20although%20the%20outcomes%20varied

<sup>2</sup> https://www.mcaginc.com/post/insulin-pricing-under-fire-what-it-means-for-self-funded-plans

Additionally, advocacy groups in the United Kingdom (U.K.) have sent a letter to regulators calling out Eli Lilly, AstraZeneca and Merck for allegedly acting in concert with U.K. trade group the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) to drive up drug prices in the U.K<sup>3</sup>. These legal challenges and investigations have generated substantial media attention, which raises concerns about reputational and financial harm to the company and its shareholders.

Investors may disagree about whether an independent board chair is considered the best governance practice at all companies. However, independent board leadership is clearly at a premium when a company is in the midst of the kind of legal scrutiny and pressure facing Eli Lilly. We believe a structure where the CEO runs the business and is accountable to a board led by an independent chair is in the best interests of the company's shareholders for the following reasons:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;· <u>Eliminates Structural Conflicts of Interest in Dual Role</u>. The management of a complex global pharmaceutical
company is a full-time job. It is unrealistic – and needlessly complicated – to expect one person to perform well as CEO on
top of his or her responsibilities for providing rigorous board oversight. An independent board chair eliminates the structural conflicts
of interest caused by the CEO essentially being his or her own boss and clarifies where the authority of the CEO ends and responsibility
of the independent board members begins.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;· <u>Significant Governance Concern Resulting from Board Failure to Oversee Material Risks</u>. In light
of potentially material legal, regulatory, financial and reputational risks, as well as controversies and legal challenges facing the
company, we are concerned that the board is not providing sufficiently robust oversight of the company's culture, strategy, and
risk management. Adopting best governance practices, including an independent board chair, should ensure that oversight.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;· <u>Significant Governance Concern Resulting from Large Insider Ownership</u>. An independent board chair
would be especially useful at Eli Lilly, as its shareholders already have a diluted voice due to the company's largest shareholder
being the company's own foundation. This insider ownership makes it extremely difficult for outside shareholders to exercise their
rights. Having a board chair who is not independent of the company compounds this issue.

U.S. boards are increasingly recognizing the value of an independent board chair. As of 2024, approximately 40 percent<sup>4</sup> of S&P 500 firms had an independent chair. ISS reported in September 2025 that 81 percent<sup>5</sup> of investors responding to its policy survey indicated that an independent chair is their preferred model. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies headquartered in Europe are required to have separate roles and have not suffered as a result.

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<sup>3</sup> https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/uk-advocacy-groups-call-investigation-alleged-cartel-scheme-drive-uk-drug-prices-report

<sup>4</sup> https://www.conference-board.org/publications/Board-Practices-and-Composition-2024-Edition

<sup>5</sup> https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/policy-survey-summary-2025.pdf

This is not a proxy solicitation, to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send us your proxy card, as it will not be accepted.

For these reasons we urge you to VOTE FOR ITEM 6.

_____________________________

This is not a proxy solicitation, to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send us your proxy card, as it will not be accepted.