Company: KMRK
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form Type: DRS/A
Source: 0001213900-25-029283
Chunk: 71

Company: K-TECH SOLUTIONS CO LTD
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form: DRS/A
Chunk 71
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 extent we choose to follow home country practice with respect to corporate governance matters, our shareholders may be afforded less protection than they otherwise would under rules and regulations applicable to U.S. domestic issuers. As a result of all of the above, our public shareholders may have more difficulty in protecting their interests in the face of actions taken by management, members of the Board or the Controlling Shareholder than they would as public shareholders of a company incorporated in the U.S. For a discussion of significant differences between the provisions the Companies Act and the laws applicable to companies incorporated in the U.S. and their shareholders, please refer to the section titled “Description of Shares — Differences in Corporate Law”. Our dual-class voting structure will limit your ability to influence corporate matters and could discourage others from pursuing any change of control transactions that holders of our Class A Shares may view as beneficial. We have a dual -classvoting structure consisting of Class A Shares and Class B Shares. Based on our dual -classvoting structure, holders of Class A Shares will be entitled to one (1) vote per share in respect of matters requiring the votes of shareholders, while holders of Class B Shares will be entitled to ten (10) votes per share. Due to the disparate voting powers associated with our two classes of ordinary shares, our Controlling Shareholders will beneficially own [91.8]% of the aggregate voting power of our Company immediately following the completion of this Offering and the sale of our Shares by the Selling Shareholders pursuant to the Resale Prospectus, assuming that the underwriters do not exercise their over -allotmentoption. The interests of our Controlling Shareholders may not coincide with your interests, and it may make decisions with which you disagree, including decisions on important topics such as the composition of the board of directors, compensation, management succession, and our business and financial strategy. To the extent that the interests of our Controlling Shareholders differ from your interests, you may be disadvantaged by any action that they may seek to pursue. This concentrated control could also discourage others from pursuing any potential merger, takeover or other change of control transactions, which could have the effect of depriving the holders of our Class A Shares of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium over the prevailing market price. We cannot predict the effect our dual-class structure may have on the market price of our Class A Shares. We cannot predict whether our dual -classstructure will result in a lower or more volatile market price of our Class A Shares, adverse publicity or other adverse consequences