Company: OXLCZ
Filing Date: 2025-11-05
Form Type: N-CSRS
Source: 0001213900-25-106331
Chunk: 107

Company: Oxford Lane Capital Corp.
Filing Date: 2025-11-05
Form: N-CSRS
Chunk 107
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 comply with the applicable Due Diligence Requirements in respect of a securitization position which it holds may become subject to a range of regulatory sanctions including, in the case of a credit institution, investment firm, insurer or reinsurer, a punitive regulatory capital charge with respect to such securitization position, or, in certain other cases, a requirement to take corrective action. To the extent a CLO is structured in compliance with the Securitization Regulations, our ability to invest in the CLO equity of such CLOs could be limited, or we could be required to hold our investment for the life of the CLO. If a CLO has not been structured to comply with the Securitization Regulations, it will limit the ability of Institutional Investors to purchase CLO securities, which may adversely affect the price and liquidity of the securities (including the CLO equity) in the secondary market. Additionally, the Securitization Regulations and any regulatory uncertainty in relation thereto may reduce the issuance of new CLOs and reduce the liquidity provided by CLOs to the leveraged loan market generally. Reduced liquidity in the loan market could reduce investment opportunities for collateral managers, which could negatively affect the return of our investments. Any reduction in the volume and liquidity provided by CLOs to the leveraged loan market could also reduce opportunities to redeem or refinance the securities comprising a CLO in an optional redemption or refinancing and could negatively affect the ability of obligors to refinance of their collateral obligations, either of which developments could increase defaulted obligations above historic levels. Japanese Risk Retention.The Japanese Financial Services Agency (the “JFSA”) published a risk retention rule as part of the regulatory capital regulation of certain categories of Japanese investors seeking to invest in securitization transactions (the “JRR Rule”). The JRR Rule mandates an “indirect” compliance requirement, meaning that certain categories of Japanese investors will be required to apply higher risk weighting to securitization exposures they hold unless the relevant originator commits to hold a retention interest equal to at least 5% of the 80 exposure of the total underlying assets in the transaction (the “Japanese Retention Requirement”) or such investors determine that the underlying assets were not “inappropriately originated.” The Japanese investors to which the JRR Rule applies include banks, bank holding companies, credit unions (shinyo kinko), credit cooperatives (shinyo kumiai), labor credit unions (rodo kinko), agricultural credit