Company: BCS
Filing Date: 2025-02-13
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0000312069-25-000114
Chunk: 255

Company: BARCLAYS PLC
Filing Date: 2025-02-13
Form: 20-F
Chunk 255
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. The targets over the performance period are set so that they are appropriately stretching in the context of the Board- approved medium-term business plan, taking into account factors such as strategic priorities, external targets, recent performance, market expectations and the wider economic landscape. Straight-line vesting typically applies between the defined threshold and maximum performance targets. For each measure, no more than 25% will vest at threshold performance. At the end of the performance period, the Committee considers performance against those measures and targets in determining the LTIP outcome for the Executive Directors. There is no retesting allowed of performance in future years if targets are not met. The Committee is able to apply discretion to reduce the vesting of any award, to ensure the proportion that vests is reflective of the performance of the Group and the individual over the period. To incentivise execution of Barclays&#8217; strategy over the longer-term. The multi-year performance period and deferral into Barclays shares encourage a long-term view and serve to align Executive Directors&#8217; interests with those of shareholders. Element and purpose Operation Maximum value and performance measures Strategy Shareholder information Climate and sustainability report Risk review Financial review Financial statements Barclays PLC 2024 Annual Report on Form 20-F 132Governance Remuneration report (continued)

Shareholding requirement To further enhance the alignment of Executive Directors&#8217; interests with those of shareholders, in long-term value creation. Executive Directors have a contractual obligation to build up a shareholding, within five years from their date of appointment as Executive Director, with a value equivalent to 550% of salary for the Group Chief Executive and 500% of salary for the Group Finance Director. Executive Directors will have a reasonable period to build up to this requirement again if it is not met because of a significant share price depreciation. For two years after stepping down as an Executive Director, they must maintain a shareholding at a level equal to: (i) the number of shares to be held under the shareholding requirement, as determined immediately prior to their stepping down as an Executive Director; or (ii) the actual number of shares held on stepping down, if lower (subject to the Committee determining that the resulting level of shareholding is appropriate given the relevant Executive Director&#8217;s tenure). Shares that count towards the shareholding requirement are those beneficially owned by the Executive Director, plus the value of any vested share awards (including those subject only to holding periods), the estimated after-tax value of any shares from unvested deferred share bonuses, and the estimated