Company: CAF
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001104659-25-021323
Chunk: 125

Company: Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 125
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 the market        
 context. While stock-based compensation to outside directors is positive if moderate and            
 appropriately structured, we are wary of significant stock option awards or other performance-based 
 awards for outside directors, as well as provisions that could result in significant forfeiture     
 of value on a director's decision to resign from a board (such forfeiture can undercut director     
 independence).                                                                                      |

| - | Proposals for employee stock                                                                
 purchase plans that permit discounts, but only for grants that are part of a broad-based    
 employee plan, including all non-executive employees, and only if the discounts are limited 
 to a reasonable market standard or less.                                                    |

| - | Proposals for the establishment                                                          
 of employee retirement and severance plans, provided that our research does not indicate 
 that approval of the plan would be against shareholder interest.                         |

We generally oppose retirement plans and bonuses for non-executive directors and independent statutory auditors. In the U.S. context, we generally vote against shareholder proposals requiring shareholder approval of all severance agreements, but we generally support proposals that require shareholder approval for agreements in excess of three times the annual compensation (salary and bonus) or proposals that require companies to adopt a provision requiring an executive to receive accelerated vesting of equity awards if there is a change of control andthe executive is terminated. We generally oppose shareholder proposals that would establish arbitrary caps on pay. We consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals that seek to limit Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs), but support such shareholder proposals where we consider SERPs excessive. Shareholder proposals advocating stronger and/or particular pay-for-performance models will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with consideration of the merits of the individual proposal within the context of the particular company and its labor markets, and the company's current and past practices. While we generally support emphasis on long-term components of senior executive pay and strong linkage of pay to performance, we consider factors including whether a proposal may be overly prescriptive, and the impact of the proposal, if implemented as written, on recruitment and retention. We generally support proposals advocating reasonable senior executive and director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements for shares gained in executive equity compensation programs. We generally support shareholder proposals for reasonable "claw-back" provisions that provide for company recovery of senior executive bonuses to the extent they were based on achieving financial benchmarks that were not actually met in light of subsequent restatements. Management proposals effectively to re-price stock options are considered on a case-by-case basis. Considerations include the company's reasons and