Company: ABTC
Filing Date: 2025-08-14
Form Type: 10-Q
Source: 0001213900-25-076632
Chunk: 253

Company: American Bitcoin Corp.
Filing Date: 2025-08-14
Form: 10-Q
Item: Item 1A
Chunk 253
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the terms of the ABTC Merger Agreement.

The Gryphon Board was aware of these interests
and considered them, among other matters, in the decision to approve the ABTC Merger Agreement.

42

Certain provisions of the ABTC Merger
Agreement may discourage third parties from submitting alternative takeover proposals, including proposals that may be superior to
the arrangements contemplated by the ABTC Merger Agreement.

The ABTC Merger
Agreement contains “no-shop” restrictions on Gryphon’s ability to solicit, initiate, endorse, knowingly encourage
or facilitate third party proposals relating to alternative transactions or to provide information to or engage in discussions with,
a third party in relation to an alternative transaction, subject to certain exceptions to permit the Gryphon Board to comply with
its fiduciary duties. The ABTC Merger Agreement also contains “force the vote” provisions that require Gryphon to hold
the Special Meeting even if the Gryphon Board withdraws, amends or modifies its recommendation regarding the Proposals. Before the
Gryphon Board may change its recommendation to stockholders to vote in favor of the Proposals, Gryphon must, among other things,
provide ABTC with notice and negotiation rights. Upon the termination of the ABTC Merger Agreement in certain circumstances,
including in connection with a Gryphon Recommendation Change in response to a Superior Proposal, Gryphon may be required to pay up
to $5,000,000 as a termination fee, in addition to the out-of-pocket fees and expenses incurred by or on behalf of ABTC in
connection with the transactions contemplated by the ABTC Merger Agreement.

These provisions could discourage a potential
third party acquiror from considering or proposing an acquisition transaction, even if it were prepared to pay a higher price than what
would be received in the Mergers. These provisions might also result in a potential third party acquiror proposing to pay a lower price
than it might otherwise have proposed to pay because of the added expense of the $5,000,000 termination fee and additional ABTC fees and
expenses that may become payable.

If the ABTC Merger Agreement is terminated and Gryphon determines to
seek another business combination, Gryphon may not be able to negotiate a transaction with another party on terms comparable to or better
than, the terms of the ABTC Merger Agreement or at all.

Furthermore, as noted above, certain Gryphon securityholders holding
an aggregate of approximately 19.29% of the outstanding voting securities of Gry