Company: DHR
Filing Date: 2025-03-26
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0000313616-25-000081
Chunk: 40

Company: DANAHER CORP /DE/
Filing Date: 2025-03-26
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 40
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 incentivize shareholder value creation since their value is tied directly to our stock price at all valuation levels, and the four-year vesting period promotes stability and encourages officers to take a long-term view of our performance.

PSU Performance Criteria

The executive officer PSUs granted in 2024 are subject to two performance criteria:

Relative TSR

The number of shares of Common Stock that vest pursuant to each PSU award is based primarily on the Company’s TSR ranking relative to the S&P 500 Index over an approximately three-year performance period. The Committee established threshold, target and maximum relative TSR performance levels and developed a payout curve that requires above-median performance to earn the target opportunity and upper quartile results to earn the maximum opportunity, as illustrated in the table below:

| Performance Level (Relative TSR Rank Within S&P 500 Index) |     | Payout             
 (as a % of Target) |
| Below 35thpercentile                                       |     | 0%                 |
| 35thpercentile                                             |     | 50%                |
| 55thpercentile                                             |     | 100%               |
| 75thpercentile or above                                    |     | 200%               |

The payout percentages for performance between the performance levels indicated above are determined by linear interpolation. The Committee selected the S&P 500 Index as the relative TSR comparator group because the index consists of a broad and stable group of companies that represents investors’ alternative capital investment opportunities, reinforcing the linkage between our executive compensation program and the long-term interests of our shareholders. The Committee requires 55th percentile performance to receive a target-level payout, which we believe is more demanding than the target-level standard applied by most of our peer companies and which further strengthens the linkage between pay and performance.

ROIC

The Company’s three-year average ROIC performance beginning with the year of grant, compared to the Company’s ROIC for the year immediately preceding the year of grant (the “baseline year”), can increase or decrease the number of shares that would otherwise vest by 10% (but cannot cause the payout percentage to exceed 200%), as illustrated in the table below:

| Three-Year Average ROIC Change(2)(Compared to Baseline Year ROIC) |     | ROIC Modifier Factor |
| At or above + 200 basis points                                    |     | 110%                 |
| Below + 200 basis points and above zero basis points              |     | 100%                 |
| At or below zero basis points                                     |     | 90