Company: VVR
Filing Date: 2025-05-02
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001193125-25-111542
Chunk: 91

Company: Invesco Senior Income Trust
Filing Date: 2025-05-02
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 91
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mission differentiated voting rights. ● Where unequal voting rights are established, we expect these to be accompanied by reasonable safeguards to protect minority shareholders’ interests. Anti-takeover devices: Mechanisms designed to prevent or delay takeover attempts may unduly limit the accountability of boards and management teams to shareholders. ● We generally will not support proposals to adopt antitakeover devices such as poison pills. Exceptions may be warranted at entities without significant operations and to preserve the value of net operating losses carried forward or where the applicability of the pill is limited in scope and duration. ● In addition, we will generally not support capital authorizations or amendments to corporate articles or bylaws at operating companies that may be utilized for antitakeover purposes, for example, the authorization of classes of shares of preferred stock with unspecified voting, dividend, conversion or other rights (“blank check” authorizations). ● We generally support proposals for the removal of anti-takeover provisions. Shareholder rights: We support the rights of shareholders to hold boards and management teams accountable for company performance. We generally support best-practice-aligned proposals to enhance shareholder rights: ● Proxy access: Within the US market, we generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access that employ guidelines reflecting the SEC framework for proxy access with the following provisions: ● Ownership threshold: at least three percent (3%) of the voting power; ● Ownership duration: at least three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group; ● Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group; and ● Cap: cap on nominees of one (1) director or twenty-five percent (25%) of the board, whichever is higher. ● Shareholder ability to call special meetings: Generally, we vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings with a minimum threshold of 10% but not greater than 25%. We will not support proposals to prohibit shareholders’ right to call special meetings. ● Shareholder ability to act by written consent: Generally, assess shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent case-by-case taking into account the following factors, among other things: ● Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; and ● Investor ownership structure.

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● Supermajority vote requirements: Generally, vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote. We will vote for management and shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements, in favor of a simple majority threshold. Lowering this