Company: TOXR
Filing Date: 2025-11-20
Form Type: S-1/A
Source: 0001213900-25-112826
Chunk: 78

Company: 21Shares XRP ETF
Filing Date: 2025-11-20
Form: S-1/A
Chunk 78
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 tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone. A clone may also adversely affect the price of XRP at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. Following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016.

Cancer nodes.

Cancer nodes are computers that appear to be participating in the XRP Ledger but that are not in fact connected to the XRP Ledger, which a malicious actor sets up to place users onto a separate network or disconnect them from the XRP Ledger. By using cancer nodes, a malicious actor can disconnect the target user from the XRP economy entirely by refusing to relay any blocks or transactions.

Double-spending risks.

The XRP Ledger is designed
to be resistant to double-spending risks through the XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol. The XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol ensures that once
a transaction is confirmed by a supermajority of trusted validators, it is immutable and cannot be reversed. This immediate finality
is a key defense against double-spending. Additionally, transactions on the XRP Ledger are atomic, meaning they are either fully executed
or not executed at all. This prevents any partial completion that could lead to inconsistencies or double-spending. Nonetheless, if the
consensus mechanism fails (e.g., due to a significant portion of validators being compromised), conflicting transactions could potentially
be validated by different parts of the network. Additionally, if a malicious actor controlled or colluded with a supermajority of validators,
they could attempt to manipulate the ledger to allow a double spend. However, this would require controlling or influencing over 80%
of the trusted validators on the majority of UNLs (Unique Node Lists), which is considered highly improbable given the nature of the
validators. A highly sophisticated network attack that isolates parts of