Company: OSOL
Filing Date: 2025-10-22
Form Type: S-1
Source: 0001493152-25-018952
Chunk: 25

Company: Osprey Solana Trust
Filing Date: 2025-10-22
Form: S-1
Chunk 25
---
 the minority non-attackers might reach social   
 consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker’s ability to engage in malicious           
 activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively.                 |
| ● | “>66%                                                                                                                                    
 attack” where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked         
 SOL on the Solana Network, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the blockchain, including censorship,         
 double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, both on a forward-and backward-looking basis. The attacker could unilaterally finalize 
 their preferred chain without the votes of any other stakers, and could also reverse past finalized blocks. The Solana Network’s         
 proof-of-stake consensus mechanism requires a 2/3 supermajority of validators who have staked SOL to vote in favor in order to finalize  
 transactions and add blocks to the Solana Blockchain.                                                                                    |

For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic Network. The attack resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of over $5.0 million and $1.0 million.

In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a >50% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the Solana Network, which could negatively impact the value of SOL and the value of the Shares.

Although there are no known reports of malicious control of the Solana Network, if groups of coordinating or connected SOL holders that together have a more than 50% of outstanding SOL, were to stake that SOL and run validators, they could exert authority over the validation of SOL transactions. This risk is heightened if such amount of the validating power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators