Company: GWW
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form Type: DEFA14A
Source: 0001104659-25-032713
Chunk: 2

Company: W.W. GRAINGER, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form: DEFA14A
Chunk 2
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'>Questions and Answers on Eliminating Cumulative Voting</div>

Q. What is cumulative voting?

A.Grainger shareholders have the
right to “cumulate” their votes in the election of directors. This means that a shareholder has a number of votes in the election
equal to the number of shares owned by such shareholder multiplied by the number of directors being elected. Shareholders may cast those
votes for the nominees as they choose. For example, a shareholder may cast all votes for one nominee, or may apportion votes among two
or more nominees.

We refer to regular, non-cumulative voting, where
shareholders can cast one vote per share for each director nominee, as “straight voting” in this document.

Q. What are the effects of cumulative voting?

A.Under cumulative voting, a shareholder
can cumulate all of their votes and vote them all “for” one nominee. Accordingly, it is possible that a shareholder or group
of shareholders holding a relatively small number of shares would be able to elect one or more directors by cumulating votes.

In other words, cumulative voting amplifies the
vote of minority holders at the expense of other shareholders, potentially allowing them to gain board representation in cases where the
application of straight voting would not. Essentially, this allows a minority shareholder to maintain a position of power in Grainger
that is greater than the shareholder’s economic interest in the company.

Q. Is cumulative voting a common governance practice at other large public companies?

A.No. Less than 2% of S&P
500 companies have cumulative voting in director elections. This means that the vast majority of S&P 500 companies — more than 98% —use straight voting in director elections. All of Grainger’s peer companies (as identified in our 2025 Proxy
Statement) use straight voting as well. Grainger’s cumulative voting practice is clearly a minority approach, distancing Grainger’s
governance framework from the governance practices recognized at other S&P 500 companies as well as Grainger’s peers.

Our Board believes that the elimination of cumulative
voting would not only enhance Grainger’s corporate governance practices, but would also serve to align Grainger’s voting framework
with the prevailing practice of straight voting observed at other large public companies.

Q. Why is Grainger seeking to eliminate cumulative voting?

A.The Board has determined that
the elimination of cumulative voting is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. By eliminating cumulative voting, our
shareholders would reduce