Company: GWW
Filing Date: 2025-02-20
Form Type: PRE 14A
Source: 0001104659-25-015730
Chunk: 107

Company: W.W. GRAINGER, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-02-20
Form: PRE 14A
Chunk 107
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 1:ELECTION OFDIRECTORS | ​ | ​ | PROPOSAL 2:RATIFY THEINDEPENDENTAUDITOR | ​ | ​ | EXECUTIVECOMPENSATION | ​ | ​ | PROPOSAL 3:SAY ON PAY | ​ | ​ | PROPOSAL 4: APPROVALAND ADOPTION | ​ | ​ | QUESTIONS ANDANSWERS | ​ | ​ | APPENDICES | ​ |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| ​ | invest.grainger.com | ​ | ​ | 77 | ​ | ​ | ● | ​ |

policy, together with the majority voting standard, reflect Grainger’s commitment to governance policies and practices that serve the interests of the Company and its shareholders. • Proxy Access. Grainger has adopted proxy access By-laws under which qualified shareholders have the right to submit director nominations for inclusion in the Company’s proxy statement, which allows our shareholders access to the ballot for their director nominees without a veto from the BANC. When combined with this proxy access right that our shareholders have under the By-laws, cumulative voting could produce adverse consequences. Cumulative voting increases the risk that minority shareholders with a relatively small economic interest in our Company could take advantage of the proxy access right to elect directors who are unsupported by a large percentage of our shareholders. Minority shareholders with special interests and goals inconsistent with those of the holders of a majority of our shares could use the proxy access right, coupled with cumulative voting, to elect a director whose interests are in accord with the minority group responsible for their election, rather than with Grainger and the holders of a majority of our shares. The election of such directors could result in Board dysfunction and impair the ability of our Board to act in the best interests of Grainger and all of its shareholders. • “One Share, One Vote” Framework is Prevailing Practice. A system in which shareholders can cast one vote per share for each director nominee is the prevailing election standard among large U.S. public companies. As of the date of this proxy statement, 98% of S&P 500 companies do not permit cumulative voting. Accordingly, the Board views the Proposed Amendment as an appropriate balancing measure in light of the annual elections of Grainger’s directors, the majority voting standard employed in Grainger’s elections of directors and the proxy access rights provided to Grainger’s shareholders under the By-laws. The Board recommends that shareholders enhance the Company’s corporate governance and shareholder rights structure by voting to approve and adopt the Proposed Amendment to eliminate cumulative voting.