Company: GEF
Filing Date: 2025-01-10
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0000043920-25-000004
Chunk: 38

Company: GREIF, INC
Filing Date: 2025-01-10
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 38
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 relative to the Russell 2000 Index. The Compensation Committee further believes that a portion of each executive’s compensation should be linked to our short-term and long-term performance. In that regard, the Company has the STIP, an annual cash incentive bonus plan that links the annual payment of cash bonuses to the achievement of targeted financial performance goals, and the LTIP, which links the long-term issuance of stock to the achievement of targeted financial performance goals over a three-year performance period that further aligns long-term stockholder value by including a total shareholder return metric and providing for payouts in restricted stoc k. See “Elements of Our Compensation Program - Short-Term Incentive Plan" and "Long-Term Incentive Plan.” The LTIP is also intended to facilitate compliance with our stock ownership guidelines. See “Elements of Our Compensation Program - Stock Ownership Guidelines” below. At-Risk Compensation Philosophy In determining the award levels for each of the elements in our total compensation program, the Compensation Committee's philosophy is to "pay-for-performance". As a result, the Compensation Committee places relatively greater emphasis on the variable components of compensation (STIP and LTIP) to align the interests of our executive officers with the interests of our stockholders and motivate them to drive stockholder value. These variable components are balanced with retention incentives provided by base salary and restricted stock awards. The LTIP is designed to provide retention incentives for our executive officers through the granting of restricted share units at or near the commencement of each performance period that are subject to a vesting period. We look to the experience and judgment of the Compensation Committee to determine what it believes to be the appropriate compensation mix for each NEO. As shown in the charts below, at the time the Compensation Committee established fiscal 2024 base salary amounts and STIP targets, incentive components at risk accounted for approximately 82% of the CEO's compensation and approximately 72% of the other NEOs average compensation for fiscal 2024. . * Percentages for at-risk compensation calculated using target award levels. Risk Assessment During fiscal 2024, our management and the Compensation Committee, with the assistance of Willis Towers Watson, performed an assessment of the risks associated with our incentive plans and determined that the risks associated with such plans are not reasonably likely to cause a material adverse effect to the Company's business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows. Peer Group Review The Compensation Committee, working with Willis Towers Watson, periodically, but at least annually, reviews peer group data and market information for comparable positions in our