Company: OIA
Filing Date: 2025-03-13
Form Type: 424B5
Source: 0001104659-25-023508
Chunk: 154

Company: Invesco Municipal Income Opportunities Trust
Filing Date: 2025-03-13
Form: 424B5
Chunk 154
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 information cannot be obtained due to insufficient disclosure on a board chair, each committee’s function and committee chairs in Notice of Annual General Meeting (AGM) and a corporate governance report, as well as untimeliness of these issuances. We generally make decisions based on Notice of AGM, a corporate governance report and an annual securities report disclosed by the time of voting. However, this shall not apply if we obtain such information from direct engagement with the company or find relevant disclosure elsewhere. (1) Independence We generally vote for the appointment of outside directors. However, we generally vote against if a candidate is not regarded as independent of the subject company. It is desirable that the company discloses information, such as numerical data, which supports our decision on board independence. ● We view the following outside director candidates are not independent enough. ● Candidates who have been working for the following companies for the last ten years or are those people’s relatives. ● The subject company ● Its subsidiary ● Its parent company ● Candidates who have been working for the following companies for the last five years or are those people’s relatives. ● Shareholders who own more than 10% of the subject company ● Principal loan lenders ● Principal securities brokers ● Major business partners ● Auditors ● Audit companies, consulting companies or any related service providers which have any consulting contracts with the subject company ● Any other counterparts which have any interests in the subject company B-23 In cases other than above, we separately scrutinize the independence of candidates who are regarded as not independent enough. ● We take extra care when we assess the independence of candidates from a company which is regarded as a policy shareholder under cross shareholding, mutually sends outside directors to each other, and so on, as such cases potentially raise doubts about their independence. The company should give reasonable explanations. It is also desirable that the company contrives the timing and method of disclosure to allow investors to understand those relationships enough. ● We judge board independence according to the stock exchange’s independence criteria with emphasizing independence ensured practically. We consider each company’s business environment and make the best effort to engage with the subject company to determine the independence of the candidates. ● We regard an outside director with a significantly long tenure as non-independent and consider voting against the reappointment of such an outside director. We generally consider voting against the reappointment of outside directors whose tenures are longer than ten years. ● If the subject company is a company with Audit Committee, we judge the independence of outside director candidates who become audit committee board members using the same independence criteria for the