Company: HBCYF
Filing Date: 2025-02-20
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0001089113-25-000040
Chunk: 431

Company: HSBC HOLDINGS PLC
Filing Date: 2025-02-20
Form: 20-F
Chunk 431
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 a lower maximum LTI opportunity for the Group CFO but decided against this, reflecting on the relative complexity of the Group CFO role at HSBC compared to other listed peers in the FTSE 30, practice at international banks, and internal pay compression. We tested this with shareholders during our engagement who were largely supportive of the approach. In line with current market practice and in direct response to investor feedback, we propose to increase the shareholding guideline to equal the LTI opportunity of 600% of salary for both the Group CEO and Group CFO. The Committee also intends to implement a post-employment shareholding guideline in line with Investment Association guidelines, which will apply for two-years post cessation of employment. Overall, the structure ensures that a significant portion of pay is tied to the creation of long-term, sustainable shareholder value. Shareholders we spoke to were supportive of the principle and simplicity of returning to our 2014 structure, reducing reliance on fixed pay and increasing the proportion of variable pay. 2025 total remuneration opportunity The Committee reflected on the appropriate maximum opportunity for the Group CEO and Group CFO considering (i) the maximum opportunity in 2014; (ii) market data for our international banking peers and the largest FTSE 30 companies; and (iii) internal pay compression challenges with members of the Group Operating Committee. After considering these factors, which are described further below, the Committee determined the appropriate maximum opportunity for 2025 should be £15,150,000 for the Group CEO role and £8,837,500 for the Group CFO. Returning to the pre-2014 structure increases the proportion of pay subject to performance to 89% , compared to 69% under the current policy. This provides less certainty in pay outcomes with higher pay at maximum performance offset by lower pay for weaker performance. The Committee felt that a higher maximum opportunity was required to reflect the additional volatility given the lower fixed pay and reverse the reduction in total compensation when FPAs were introduced. Group CEO payout under different performance scenarios (£m) n Fixed pay n Variable pay ’Target’, ’Minimum’ and ’Below Minimum’ scenarios assume performance outcomes of 50%, 25% and 0% respectively for both the annual incentive and LTI. Current Proposed

| Group CEO maximum total compensation opportunity (£000) |                                 | Group CFO maximum total compensation opportunity (£000) |                                 |
| International banking peer group                        | Top 10 by market cap in FTSE 30 | International banking peer group                        | Top 10 by market cap in