Company: BLLN
Filing Date: 2025-08-11
Form Type: DRS/A
Source: 0000950123-25-007483
Chunk: 114

Company: BillionToOne, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-08-11
Form: DRS/A
Chunk 114
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 common stock at a price higher than the price you paid for them or at all. Anti-takeover provisions in our governing documents and under Delaware law could make an acquisition of our company more difficult, limit attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management, and depress the market price of our Class A common stock. We are a Delaware corporation, and the anti-takeover provisions of Delaware law impose various impediments to the ability of a third party to acquire control of us, even if a change of control would be beneficial to our existing stockholders. In addition, our Post-IPOCertificate of Incorporation and Post-IPOBylaws will contain provisions that could have the effect of rendering more difficult, delaying or preventing an acquisition deemed undesirable by our Board of Directors, including transactions in which stockholders might otherwise receive a premium for their shares. Among others, our Post-IPOCertificate of Incorporation and Post-IPOBylaws will include the following provisions:

| • |     | the dual-class structure that provides holders of shares of our Class B common stock with the ability to significantly                                               
 influence the outcome of matters requiring stockholder approval, even if they own significantly less than a majority of the shares of our outstanding capital stock; |

| • |     | the delegation to our Board of Directors of the exclusive right to expand the size of our Board of Directors and to elect                                                                                  
 directors to fill a vacancy created by any such expansion or the resignation, death or removal of a director, which will prevent stockholders from being able to fill vacancies on our Board of Directors; |

| • |     | the division of our Board of Directors into three classes, with each class serving staggered three-year terms, which may 
 delay the ability of stockholders to change the membership of a majority of our Board of Directors;                      |

| • |     | limitations on convening special stockholder meetings once our Class B common stock no longer represents a majority of                 
 voting power of our outstanding capital stock, which could make it difficult for our stockholders to adopt desired governance changes; |

| • |     | advance notice procedures, which apply for stockholders to nominate candidates for election as directors or to bring                                                                                                                           
 matters before an annual meeting of stockholders, which may discourage or deter a potential acquirer from conducting a solicitation of proxies to elect the acquirer’s own slate of directors or otherwise attempting to obtain control of our 
 company;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

| • |     | a prohibition on stockholder action by written consent once