Company: MYI
Filing Date: 2025-07-16
Form Type: N-14 8C
Source: 0001193125-25-159991
Chunk: 444

Company: BLACKROCK MUNIYIELD QUALITY FUND III, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-07-16
Form: N-14 8C
Chunk 444
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 the financial outcome for our clients as minority shareholders. Management should provide an assessment of the proposed transaction’s strategic and financial rationale, along with its execution and operational risks.
We review each transaction independently based on these factors and the degree to which the transaction enhances shareholder value. The board should

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consider establishing an ad hoc transaction committee to undertake an independent assessment of a significant merger or acquisition, in advance of making its recommendation to shareholders.

We will vote against transactions that, in our assessment, do not advance our clients’ financial interests.

Anti-takeover defenses

In principle, we do not support
companies using anti-takeover defenses, also known as poison pills or shareholder rights plans, as they can entrench management and boards which have not delivered long-term shareholder value. By exception, a poison pill may be supported if its
purpose is to delay a takeover that is considered sub-optimal and enable management to seek an improved offer. Similarly, management could make the case to use a poison pill to block a shareholder activism
campaign that may be counter to the interests of other investors. Defense mechanisms introduced in these circumstances should be limited in term and threshold, and also be closely monitored by the independent members of the board. We look for a
shareholder vote for any mechanisms expected to be in place for more than 12 months.

Shareholder activism

When companies are the focus of an activism campaign, we may engage with the activist to understand their analysis and objectives, once they have gone public.
We will also engage with company management and possibly board members, especially those the activist may be seeking to replace. In our assessment, we evaluate various factors, including the concerns raised by the activist and the case for change;
the quality of both the activist’s and management’s plans; and the qualifications of each party’s candidates. We evaluate each contested situation by assessing the potential financial outcome for our clients as minority shareholders.

We may support board candidates nominated by a shareholder activist if the activist has demonstrated that their case for change enhances shareholder
value, or if the incumbent board members do not demonstrate the relevant skills and expertise or have a poor track record of protecting shareholders’ interests.

Significant shareholders and related party transactions

Boards of companies with affiliated shareholders or directors should be able to demonstrate that the interests of all shareholders are given equitable
consideration.

Transactions with related parties, such as significant shareholders or companies connected with the public company, should be disclosed in
detail and conducted on terms similar to what would objectively have been agreed with a non-related