Company: SMNR
Filing Date: 2025-08-13
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001193125-25-179226
Chunk: 402

Company: Semnur Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-08-13
Form: 424B3
Chunk 402
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), of which Scilex will hold 18,000 shares; |

| • |     | 86,625 shares of New Semnur Common Stock expected to be issued to the Denali Underwriters pursuant to a deferred 
 discount agreement to be entered into;                                                                           |

| • |     | the 24,400,000 shares of Semnur Common Stock issued pursuant to the Consulting Services Agreements are converted                                                 
 into an aggregate of 30,500,000 shares of New Semnur Common Stock in connection with the Business Combination pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement; and |

| • |     | 8,760,000 shares of New Semnur Common Stock issuable upon exercise of the New Semnur Warrants. |

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The Denali Board believes that it is important for New Semnur to have available for issuance a number of
authorized shares of common stock and preferred stock sufficient to support our growth and to provide flexibility for future corporate needs (including, if needed, for employee compensation, financings and/or acquisitions).

Advisory Proposal B — Number of Directors

Subject to the rights of any holders of preferred stock to elect directors, the number of directors that shall constitute the New Semnur Board shall be as
determined from time to time exclusively by the New Semnur Board; provided that, at any time the Scilex Group beneficially owns, in the aggregate, at least 50% in voting power of the then-outstanding shares of
stock of New Semnur entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, the stockholders may also fix the number of directors by resolution adopted by the stockholders.

Advisory Proposals C, D and E — Required Vote for the Removal of Directors; Required Vote to Amend Certain Provisions of the Proposed Charter; Required Vote to Amend the Proposed Bylaws

The Denali Board believes that supermajority voting requirements described in Advisory
Governance Proposals C, D and G are appropriate to protect all stockholders of Denali against the potential self-interested actions by one or a few large stockholders after the business combination. In
reaching this conclusion, the Denali Board is cognizant of the potential for certain stockholders to hold a substantial beneficial ownership of shares of common stock following the business combination.

Advisory Proposal F — Stockholder Action by Written Consent

The Denali Board believes that it is desirable to prohibit, from and after the Scilex Trigger Event, stockholder