Company: SNPS
Filing Date: 2025-02-14
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0000883241-25-000008
Chunk: 123

Company: SYNOPSYS INC
Filing Date: 2025-02-14
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 123
---
 risk of job loss following a change of control, coupled with a 2.99x limit on the value that may be realized from previously granted equity awards absent a stockholder vote, could present an unnecessary distraction for our executives and could lead them to seek the certainty of new employment while a transaction is being negotiated or is pending. This could result in a risk of the transaction not being completed or being finalized with less favorable terms for stockholders.

The proposal would unnecessarily restrict our Compensation Committee’s ability to structure market competitive executive compensation and could limit our ability to attract and retain executive talent.

We operate in a highly competitive industry and have carefully designed our compensation programs to attract, motivate and retain a team of highly qualified executives who drive our success. We believe that our Compensation Committee, which is composed entirely of independent, non-employee directors subject to annual re-election by our stockholders and oversees all matters regarding executive compensation, is in the best position to design and implement executive compensation practices and principles that are aligned with the interests of our stockholders. To do that, our Compensation Committee must have the flexibility and discretion to structure an effective and competitive executive compensation program governing all aspects of compensation, including post-termination compensation. Imposing the proposed requirement that we secure stockholder approval of certain severance arrangements could constrain our Compensation Committee’s ability to exercise its judgment in structuring compensation arrangements that it believes is in our stockholders’ best interests in a timely manner.

#### 104
| Stockholder Proposal |

Further, requiring stockholder approval of certain of our executive’s severance protections would be both impractical and inconsistent with market practice. Calling a meeting of our stockholders to obtain prior approval, even if it is non-binding approval, of a severance arrangement would be expensive and time-consuming. Top executives are unlikely to wait for such a vote and may instead seek employment elsewhere, including at one of our competitors who do not face similar restrictions on their ability to offer severance protection. Similarly, employment offers that are contingent on a stockholder vote, which could take months to achieve after an offer is extended, lack certainty and may discourage prospective executives from accepting our offer. Delay and uncertainty would be injected into the hiring and compensation review process. As a result, the proposal may put us at a severe competitive disadvantage by limiting our ability to attract and retain key talent. This would undermine the purpose of our executive compensation program, and we believe remaining competitive for top-level talent is in the best interest of our stockholders.

Our stockholders already have effective means to express their views