Company: XHG
Filing Date: 2025-09-09
Form Type: F-3
Source: 0001213900-25-086186
Chunk: 63

Company: XChange TEC.INC
Filing Date: 2025-09-09
Form: F-3
Chunk 63
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, our existing articles of association do not
provide for cumulative voting. As a result, our shareholders are not afforded any less protections or rights on this issue than shareholders
of a Delaware corporation.

Removal of Directors

Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a
director of a corporation with a classified board may be removed only for cause with the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Subject to any provision to the contrary in our existing
articles of association, a director may, at any time before the expiration of his or her period of office (notwithstanding anything in
our existing articles of association or in any agreement between our company and such director (but without prejudice to any claim for
damages under any such agreement)) be removed by way of either (a) a special resolution of the shareholders; or (b) the affirmative vote
of a majority of the remaining directors present and voting at a board meeting; or (c) a resolution in writing (which complies with the
requirements of the provisos contained in article 119 of our existing articles of association) signed by all the directors other than
the director being removed.

Transactions with Interested Shareholders

The Delaware General Corporation Law contains
a business combination statute applicable to Delaware corporations whereby, unless the corporation has specifically elected not to be
governed by such statute by amendment to its certificate of incorporation, it is prohibited from engaging in certain business combinations
with an “interested shareholder” for three years following the date that such person becomes an interested shareholder. An
interested shareholder generally is a person or a group who or which owns or owned 15% or more of the target’s outstanding voting
stock within the past three years. This has the effect of limiting the ability of a potential acquirer to make a two-tiered bid for the
target in which all shareholders would not be treated equally. The statute does not apply if, among other things, prior to the date on
which such shareholder becomes an interested shareholder, the board of directors approves either the business combination or the transaction
which resulted in the person becoming an interested shareholder. This encourages any potential acquirer of a Delaware corporation to negotiate
the terms of any acquisition transaction with the target’s board of directors. Cayman Islands law has no comparable statute. As
a result, we cannot avail ourselves of the types of protections afforded by the Delaware business combination statute. However, although
Cayman Islands law does not regulate transactions between a