Company: MYI
Filing Date: 2025-07-16
Form Type: N-14 8C
Source: 0001193125-25-159991
Chunk: 439

Company: BLACKROCK MUNIYIELD QUALITY FUND III, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-07-16
Form: N-14 8C
Chunk 439
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, the independent leader of the board, and/or the chair of a relevant committee, should be available to investors to discuss board governance matters such as CEO
succession, executive pay, and board performance. We look to boards to explain their independent board leadership model and how it serves the interests of shareholders.

We may vote against the election of the chair of the committee responsible for board composition if there is not an identified independent leader of the board
with clear responsibilities for board performance. We may vote against the most senior independent director if the board has a policy of not engaging with shareholders.

Tenure and succession

Boards should establish the
length of time a director would normally be expected to serve, in line with market norms where those exist. In such markets, we find it helpful when companies disclose their approach to director tenure particularly around the contributions of
directors who have served for longer periods than provided for in local practices. In our experience, long-serving directors could become less independent given their relationship with management and involvement in past board decisions.

Succession planning for board roles helps achieve the appropriate cadence of turnover that balances renewal through the regular introduction of directors with
fresh perspectives and expertise with continuity through the retention of directors with long-term knowledge of the board and company.

In markets where
there is not specific director tenure guidance, we may vote against the election of the chair of the committee responsible for board composition if there is not a clearly disclosed approach to director tenure and board renewal. We may vote against
the election of directors who have served for longer duration than typical in markets with specific guidance, where the case for their continued service is not evident.

Capacity

Common impediments to independence may include but are not limited to: current or recent employment at
the company or a subsidiary; being, or representing, a shareholder with a substantial shareholding in the company; interlocking directorships; lengthy tenure, and having any other interest, business, or other relationship which could, or could
reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with a director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company and shareholders.

B-9

To be effective and engaged, directors must commit appropriate time and energy to the role. A board should assess the ability of its members to maintain an appropriate focus on board matters and the company taking into consideration competing responsibilities. We recognize that board leadership roles vary across markets in responsibilities and required time commitment but note that they are generally more intensive than a standard directorship. We will take local norms and practices into consideration when making