Company: BACC
Filing Date: 2025-06-02
Form Type: S-1/A
Source: 0001185185-25-000574
Chunk: 140

Company: Blue Acquisition Corp/Cayman
Filing Date: 2025-06-02
Form: S-1/A
Chunk 140
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 shareholders, this would represent a significant increase
in value for our initial shareholders relative to the price it paid for each founder share. At $6.45 per Class A ordinary share,
the 6,543,975 Class A ordinary shares that the initial shareholders would own upon completion of our initial business combination
(after automatic conversion of the 6,147,750 founder shares and the conversion of private placement rights) would have an aggregate implied
value of $65,439,750. As a result, even if the trading price of our Class A ordinary share significantly declines, the value of the
founder shares held by our initial shareholders will be significantly greater than the amount our initial shareholders paid to purchase
such shares. In addition, our initial shareholders could potentially recoup their entire investment in our company even if the trading
price of our Class A ordinary shares after the initial business combination is as low as $0.56 per share. As a result, our initial
shareholders are likely to earn a substantial profit on its investment in us upon disposition of its Class A ordinary shares even
if the trading price of our Class A ordinary shares declines after we complete our initial business combination. Our initial shareholders
may therefore be economically incentivized to complete an initial business combination with a riskier, weaker-performing or less-established target
business than would be the case if our initial shareholders had paid the same per share price for the founder shares as our public shareholders
paid for their public shares. The non-managing sponsor investors will share in any appreciation of the founder shares through their membership
interests in the sponsor if we successfully complete a business combination. Accordingly, non-managing sponsor investors’ interests
in the founder shares owned by them indirectly through their membership interests in the sponsor may provide them with an incentive to
vote any public shares they own in favor of a business combination, and make a substantial profit on such interests, even if the business
combination is with a target that ultimately declines in value and is not profitable for other public shareholders.

This dilution would increase to the extent that the anti-dilution provisions of the founder shares result in the issuance of Class A ordinary shares on a greater than one-for-one basis upon conversion of the founder shares at the time of our initial business combination and would become exacerbated to the extent that public shareholders seek redemptions from the trust for their public shares. In addition, because of the anti-dilution protection in the founder shares, any equity or equity-linked securities issued in connection with our initial