Company: VMO
Filing Date: 2025-05-02
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001193125-25-111525
Chunk: 73

Company: Invesco Municipal Opportunity Trust
Filing Date: 2025-05-02
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 73
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 definitions of director independence, but applies a proprietary standard for assessing director independence considering a director’s status as a current or former employee of the business, any commercial or consulting relationships with the company, the level of shares beneficially owned or represented and familial relationships, among others. Board and committee independence: The board of directors, board committees and regional equivalents should be sufficiently independent from management, substantial shareholders and conflicts of interest. We consider local market practices in this regard and in general we look for a balance across the board of directors. Above all, we like to see signs of robust challenge and discussion in the boardroom.

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● We will generally vote against one or more non-independent directors when a board is less than majority independent, but we will take into account local market practice with regards to board independence in limited circumstances where this standard is not appropriate. ● We will generally vote against non-independent directors serving on the audit committee. ● We will generally vote against non-independent directors serving on the compensation committee. ● We will generally vote against non-independent directors serving on the nominating committee. ● In relation to the board, compensation committee and nominating committee we will consider the appropriateness of significant shareholder representation in applying this policy. This exception will generally not apply to the audit committee. Independent Board Chair: It is our view that independent board leadership generally enhances management accountability to investors. Companies deviating from this best practice should provide a strong justification and establish safeguards to ensure that there is independent oversight of a board’s activities (e.g., by appointing a lead or senior independent director with clearly defined powers and responsibilities). ● We will generally vote against the incumbent nominating committee chair, or nearest equivalent, where the board chair is not independent unless a lead independent or senior director is appointed. ● We will review shareholder proposals requesting that the board chair be an independent director on a case-by-case basis, taking into account several factors, including, but not limited to, the presence of a lead independent director and a sufficiently independent board, a sound governance structure with no record of recent material governance failures or controversies, and sound financial performance. Invesco will also positively consider less disruptive proposals that will enter into force at the subsequent leadership transition. ● We will generally not vote against a CEO or executive serving as board chair solely on the basis of this issue, however, we may do so in instances where we have significant concerns regarding a company’s corporate governance, capital allocation decisions and/or compensation practices. Attendance and over boarding: Director attendance at board and committee meetings is a fundamental part