Company: XOMAP
Filing Date: 2025-04-15
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001193125-25-081538
Chunk: 56

Company: XOMA Royalty Corp
Filing Date: 2025-04-15
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 56
---
 and can generally present a risk of terms that may be less favorable than would be available in a board-approved transaction. In contrast, board-approved transactions may be carefully planned and undertaken at an opportune time in order to obtain maximum value for the corporation and all of its stockholders by determining and pursuing the best strategic alternative, obtaining negotiating leverage to achieve the best terms available, and giving due consideration to matters such as tax planning, the management and business of the acquiring corporation, and the most effective deployment of corporate assets.**

<div align='center'>37</div>

The Board recognizes that hostile takeover attempts do not always have the unfavorable consequences or effects described above and may be beneficial to stockholders, providing them with considerable value for their shares. However, the Board believes that the potential disadvantages of unapproved takeover attempts are sufficiently great that prudent measures are needed to give the Board the time and flexibility to determine and pursue potentially superior strategic alternatives and take other appropriate action in an effort to maximize stockholder value. Accordingly, the Delaware Charter and Delaware Bylaws include certain provisions that are intended to accomplish these objectives, but which may have the effect of discouraging or deterring hostile takeover attempts.

Nevada law includes some features that may deter hostile takeover attempts. The Nevada Charter contains certain anti-takeover provisions similar to those set forth in the Delaware Charter; for example, both the Delaware Charter and Nevada Charter allow the Board alone to fill any directorship vacancies. Notwithstanding these similarities, as discussed above, there are several differences between Nevada and Delaware law and between the governing documents of the Delaware Corporation and the Nevada Corporation that could have a bearing on unapproved takeover attempts.

The Board may in the future propose other measures designed to address hostile takeovers apart from those discussed in this proxy statement, if warranted from time to time in the judgment of the Board.

#### Interests of Certain Persons
There are currently no known pending claims or lawsuits against any of our directors or officers for breach of fiduciary duty related to their service as directors or officers of the Company. Nevertheless, in reaching its decision to approve the Reincorporation and to recommend that our stockholders vote in favor of this proposal, the Board was aware and considered that a potential litigant might argue, and a court could determine, under Delaware law, that the directors and officers of the Company have an interest in the Reincorporation to the extent that it might afford them greater limitations on liability under Nevada law for acts in their capacities as directors and officers occurring after the Reincorporation