Company: COOT
Filing Date: 2025-10-23
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0001493152-25-019123
Chunk: 16

Company: Australian Oilseeds Holdings Ltd
Filing Date: 2025-10-23
Form: 20-F
Item: Item 3
Chunk 16
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 and directors and could expose us to potentially self-funding certain future
liabilities ordinarily mitigated by director and officer liability insurance.

In
addition, a substantial number of lawsuits have been filed by former special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) shareholders seeking
to contest the terms of, or disclosures surrounding, de-SPAC merger transactions. While shareholders and plaintiffs’ firms have
long contested public company M& A transactions and are bringing similar challenges to de-SPAC merger transactions, certain structural
features of SPACs have led shareholders to make new twists on those arguments. For example, shareholders in a SPAC sued in Delaware state
court to enjoin a de-SPAC transaction arguing that the SPAC directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties by rushing to sign
a deal just before the time limit to return capital to investors expired that was not in the best interests of SPAC shareholders. The
plaintiffs also alleged that several of the SPAC’s managers lacked independence because they were promised board membership in
the post-transaction company. The lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed after the SPAC issued additional disclosures.

Shareholders
have also filed dozens of nuisance claims alleging misleading disclosures in proxy statements soliciting shareholder approval of de-SPAC
merger transactions. These kinds of proxy statement challenges, which are common in the public M& A setting, are frequently brought
under Section 14 of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9. In these actions, plaintiffs’ lawyers threaten to enjoin a shareholder
vote until the issuer releases supplemental information. These actions frequently settle or are voluntarily dismissed when the company
issues additional disclosures, and plaintiffs’ lawyers then seek a “mootness fee” usually after the closing of the
business combination. Commentators and courts have criticized this minuet on the ground that the supplemental disclosures confer no real
benefits on shareholders. We can expect plaintiffs’ securities law firms to continue to file these claims in connection with many
de-SPAC merger transactions to recoup these fees.

Unfavorable
outcomes or developments relating to proceedings to which we are a party or transactions involving our products, such as judgments for
monetary damages, injunctions, or denial or revocation of permits, could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition,
and results of operations. In addition, settlement of claims could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.

  11  

The
retail price of our products may be subject to control by government authorities,