Company: ADAMM
Filing Date: 2025-04-28
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001273685-25-000038
Chunk: 61

Company: ADAMAS TRUST, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-04-28
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 61
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 of market data for our peer group companies, the Compensation Committee determined to leave target bonus multiples for 2024 unchanged from 2023 multiples for each of our NEOs. The increases to Mr. Mah's and Ms. Nario-Eng's target bonus in 2024 was a function of an increase in each such NEO's base salary in 2024.

Prior to 2023, a portion of annual incentive compensation earned by our NEOs has been payable, depending on the size of the total award earned, in shares of restricted stock, subject, in each case, to the discretion of the Compensation Committee and the terms of the 2017 Stock Plan (or any future successor plan adopted by us). In reviewing our executive compensation programs in recent years against those of our peer group, the Compensation Committee concluded that a significant majority of the peer group pays 100% of its annual incentive compensation in cash and the minority of companies that continue to pay a portion of annual incentive compensation in stock tend to pay annual bonuses to their chief executive officers at a significantly higher level than we do. In light of this data, the Compensation Committee determined, beginning with the 2023 Annual Incentive Plan and maintained again under the 2024 Annual Incentive Plan, that 100% of annual incentive compensation was expected to be paid in cash. Consistent with this expectation, the Compensation Committee approved the payment of annual incentive compensation for 2024 in cash only.

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#### Quantitative Component

#### (Weighted 75%)
Historically, the Quantitative Component under our annual incentive plans was based on one or more absolute performance measures. While the Compensation Committee valued the formulaic and absolute return framework under those annual incentive plans, it has determined that basing 100% of the Quantitative Component on a single absolute performance measure is not always compatible with the overall performance of management during difficult macro-environments for mortgage REITs, as evidenced during the market disruption in 2020 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and again in 2022 as a result of fed funds rate hikes, when a measure of relative performance may provide a better assessment of management performance.

In both 2020 and 2022, the use of a single absolute performance measure resulted in the NEOs receiving no compensation under the Quantitative Component, yet the Company outperformed more than half of its peers on the same or similar metric during those periods. The Compensation Committee also gave consideration to its strong preference to avoid the use of positive discretion under