Company: CALX
Filing Date: 2025-04-22
Form Type: 10-Q
Source: 0001406666-25-000016
Chunk: 140

Company: CALIX, INC
Filing Date: 2025-04-22
Form: 10-Q
Item: Part I, Item 2
Chunk 140
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 and volume fluctuations that have often been unrelated or disproportionate to the operating performance of those companies. Broad market and industry factors may seriously affect the market price and volatility of our common stock, regardless of our actual operating performance. Historically, following periods of volatility in the market price of a company’s securities, there is increased risk that stockholders may initiate securities class action litigation against the company. Such litigation, if instituted against us, could result in substantial costs and a diversion of our management’s attention and resources.

Provisions in our charter documents and under Delaware law could discourage a takeover that stockholders may consider favorable and may lead to entrenchment of our management and Board of Directors.

Our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and amended and restated bylaws contain provisions that could have the effect of delaying or preventing changes in control or changes in our management or our Board of Directors. These provisions include: (i) a classified Board of Directors with three-year staggered terms, which may delay the ability of stockholders to change the membership of a majority of our Board of Directors; (ii) no cumulative voting in the election of directors, which limits the ability of minority stockholders to elect director candidates; (iii) the exclusive right of our Board of Directors to elect a director to fill a vacancy created by the expansion of the Board of Directors or the resignation, death or removal of a director, which prevents stockholders from being able to fill vacancies on our Board of Directors; (iv) the ability of our Board of Directors to issue shares of preferred stock and to determine the price and other terms of those shares, including preferences and voting rights, without stockholder approval, which could be used to significantly dilute the ownership of a hostile acquirer; (v) a prohibition on stockholder action by written consent, which forces stockholder action to be taken at an annual or special meeting of our stockholders; (vi) the requirement that a special meeting of stockholders may be called only by the chairman of the Board of Directors, the chief executive officer or the Board of Directors, which may delay the ability of our stockholders to force consideration of a proposal or to take action, including the removal of directors; and (vii) advance notice procedures that stockholders must comply with in order to nominate candidates to our Board of Directors or to propose matters to be acted upon at a stockholders’ meeting, which may discourage or deter a potential acquirer from conducting a solicitation of proxies to elect the acquirer’s own slate of directors or otherwise attempting