Company: MYI
Filing Date: 2025-09-02
Form Type: N-14 8C/A
Source: 0001193125-25-193985
Chunk: 439

Company: BLACKROCK MUNIYIELD QUALITY FUND III, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-09-02
Form: N-14 8C/A
Chunk 439
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itates one-off, discretionary payments.                |

| • |     | Outcomes that are consistent with the returns to investors over the relevant time period. |

| • |     | Board discretion, if allowed within the variable pay arrangements, to be used sparingly, responsibly and transparently. |

| • |     | A requirement, that participants in long-term share-based incentive plans build a meaningful shareholding in the company 
 within a defined time period, as determined by the board.                                                                |

| • |     | Change of control provisions that appropriately balance the interests of executives and shareholders. |

| • |     | Clawback or malus provisions that allow the company to recoup or hold back variable compensation from individuals whose 
 awards were based on fraudulent activities, misstated financial reports, or executive misconduct.                       |

| • |     | Severance arrangements that protect the company’s interests but do not cost more than is contractual. |

We may vote against proposals to introduce new share-based incentives, approve existing policies or plans, or approve the compensation report where we do not see alignment between executive compensation arrangements and our clients’ financial interests. When there is not an alternative, or where there have been multi-year issues with compensation misaligned with performance, we may vote against the election of the chair of the responsible committee, or the most senior independent director. Non-executivedirector compensation Companies generally pay non-executivedirectors an annual retainer or fee in cash, shares or a combination of the two. Some companies also pay additional fees for service on board committees or in board leadership roles. We do not support non-executivedirectors participating in performance-based incentive plans as doing so may create a conflict of interest and undermine their independence from management, whom they oversee. Capital structure Boards are responsible for ensuring senior executive leadership has established a capital strategy that achieves appropriate capital allocation and management in support of long-term financial resilience. Where company practices diverge from those set out below, we look for companies to disclose why they view these practices to be aligned with shareholders’ interests. We may vote against management proposals seeking capital-related authorities or the election of the most senior independent director if we have concerns about a company’s approach. We may also support a shareholder proposal seeking conversion of shares with differentiated voting rights to a one-share, one-votestandard. B-12

Share issuance

We
assess requests for share issuance for particular transactions on a case-by-case basis. We will generally support authorities to issue shares when subject to pre-emptive