Company: OIA
Filing Date: 2025-03-13
Form Type: 424B5
Source: 0001104659-25-023508
Chunk: 159

Company: Invesco Municipal Income Opportunities Trust
Filing Date: 2025-03-13
Form: 424B5
Chunk 159
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 Attendance rate and concurrent duties ● All statutory auditors are expected to attend board or board of statutory auditors meetings in principle. A companies is generally obligated to facilitate all statutory auditors to attend these meetings. We generally vote against the reappointment of statutory auditors who attended less than 75% of board or board of statutory auditors meetings. ● We take into account not only the number of attendance but nomination reasons and candidates’ real contributions if disclosed. ● We take extra care when we assess the capability of statutory auditors who have many concurrent duties as an outside director or outside statutory auditor of listed companies, as such cases potentially arise doubts about their capacity given the importance of outside statutory auditors’ role and responsibilities. Accordingly, we consider voting against the appointment of statutory auditors who perform five or more duties as a board director or statutory auditor of a listed company or equivalent company. If a company nominates a statutory auditor with many concurrent duties, it should give reasonable explanations. It is also desirable that the company contrives disclosure timing and methods to allow investors to understand the situation enough. (3) Accountability ● If there are material concerns about a published audit report or audit procedures, or insufficiencies of required disclosures, we vote against the reappointment of statutory auditors. (4) Company’s anti-social activities ● If we judge that a corporate scandal damages or is likely to damage shareholder value with having a significant impact on society during a statutory auditor’s tenure, we conduct adequate dialogues with the subject company on the background and subsequent resolutions of the scandal. Based on the dialogues, we decide how to vote on the reappointment of statutory auditors, considering the impact on shareholder value. ● With respect to domestic corporate scandals, at the time a company receives administrative B-27 dispositions to cartel, bid-rigging, and so on from authorities, such as the Fair Trade Commission, we consider voting against the reappointment of statutory auditors. However, in case the final dispositions are subsequently determined based on appeal or complaints resolutions, we do not vote against the reappointment again at that time. We vote on a case-by-case basis concerning compensation orders in a civil case, dispositions from the Consumer Affairs Agency or administrative dispositions from overseas authorities. ● With respect to administrative dispositions to an unlisted subsidiary or affiliate, we consider voting against the reappointment of statutory auditors of the holding or parent company. If a subsidiary or affiliate is listed, we consider voting against the reappointment of statutory auditors of both the subsidiary or