Company: G
Filing Date: 2025-04-09
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001140361-25-013031
Chunk: 31

Company: Genpact LTD
Filing Date: 2025-04-09
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 31
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 EPS growth, which led to higher-than-target performance against the goals set for the first year under our three-year 2024 performance share unit (“PSU”) awards. The 2024 bonus pool for our NEOs funded at target, reflecting the continued rigor of the goals we set for our performance-based compensation plans. Compensation objectives The primary objectives of our compensation program for our executives, including our named executive officers, are to attract, motivate and retain highly talented individuals. Our compensation program is designed to incentivize and reward the achievement of our annual, long-term and strategic goals, such as growing revenues and improving profitability. It is also designed to align the interests of our executives, including our named executive officers, with those of our shareholders by rewarding performance that exceeds our target goals, with the ultimate objective of increasing shareholder value. Our compensation committee is responsible for overseeing the goals and objectives of our executive compensation plans and programs. The compensation committee bases our executive compensation programs on the same objectives that guide us in administering the compensation programs for all of our employees globally:

| • | Compensation is based on the individual’s level of job responsibility. |

| • | Compensation reflects the value of the job in the marketplace. |

| • | Compensation programs are designed to incentivize and reward performance, both on an individual and Company basis. |

Our compensation committee considers risk when developing our compensation program and believes that the design of our current compensation program does not encourage excessive or inappropriate risk taking. For example, we believe that our annual cash bonus plan, which is based on a number of different performance measures together with a meaningful cap on the potential payout, deters executives from focusing exclusively on the specific financial metrics that might encourage excessive short-term risk taking. For 2024, our named executive officers were also granted PSU awards tied to the attainment of multiple performance goals over a three-year period (with a maximum payout of 240% of target) and restricted share unit (“RSU”) awards that vest ratably in equal one-third installments over a three-year period. We believe that these awards do not encourage unnecessary or excessive risk taking since the ultimate value of the awards is tied to the Company’s share price. Additionally, these awards are subject to long-term vesting schedules, which help ensure that executives have significant value tied to long-term share price performance. See the sections titled “2024 Restricted share unit awards” and “2024 Performance share unit awards” for additional information. In addition, we have implemented several policies that mitigate excessive risk-taking, including a clawback