Company: RIG
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form Type: PRE 14A
Source: 0001451505-25-000024
Chunk: 102

Company: Transocean Ltd.
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form: PRE 14A
Chunk 102
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 of grant. This practice is utilized to most closely approximate the expected grant value. The values disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table reflect the actual grant date fair value and may vary slightly from the target value. In connection with his promotion to CFO, and in consultation with the Committee’s independent consultant, the Committee awarded Mr. Vayda a promotional equity grant in May 2024 calibrated to the compensation target of his new position and prorated for the portion of the year following his promotion, delivered equally in PSUs and RSUs. The total LTI value granted to Mr. Vayda for 2024 was $1,497,916 as shown in the preceding table. Based on his compensation package approved by the Committee in May 2024, Mr. Vayda’s LTI target value for a full year as CFO would be $1,875,000. PERFORMANCE UNITS (“PSU”) In 2024, the Committee decided to base the 2024 PSU design 100% on the market-based measure of relative Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”). The target award value of the 2024 PSU grants to each of the Named Executive Officers was weighted at 50% of each officer’s total 2024 LTI target award value and each PSU granted represents one share and is earned based on comparing the Company’s TSR relative to the Company’s Performance Peer Group over a three-year period from January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2026. Payout potential ranges for the entirety of the PSU award from 0% to 200% of target award value, calculated by linear interpolation between the percentages assigned below.

Transocean 2025 P-105 Proxy Statement

#### ​COMPENSATION DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS​​

#### In recognition of the importance of shareholder alignment, the Committee capped the earning of PSUs at target if the Company’s absolute TSR during the performance period is less than negative 15%. The Committee set the cap at this level to ensure that management does not benefit disproportionately from shareholder returns that are more than marginally negative. The Committee also set a floor such that PSU achievement may not be less than threshold performance (50% of target) if TSR is above positive 15% to recognize delivered shareholder return irrespective of performance within the peer group. Additionally, the Committee has applied a price cap such that if the fair market value of a share exceeds $20 on the date the Committee makes a determination with respect to achievement of TSR performance over the performance cycle (such