Company: BHM
Filing Date: 2025-10-08
Form Type: S-11
Source: 0001104659-25-097905
Chunk: 81

Company: Bluerock Homes Trust, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-10-08
Form: S-11
Chunk 81
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 Management Fee regardless of the performance of our portfolio.

Our Manager will be entitled
to a quarterly Incentive Fee based on our pre-Incentive Fee AFFO, which will reward our Manager if our quarterly AFFO exceeds an 8% hurdle
on our adjusted stockholders’ equity. Our AFFO for a particular quarter will exclude the effect of any unrealized gains, losses
or other items during that quarter that do not affect realized net income, even if these adjustments result in a net loss on our statement
of operations for that quarter. Thus, we may be required to pay our Manager an Incentive Fee for a fiscal quarter even if we incur a net
loss for that quarter as determined in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the Unites States of America (“GAAP”).
In addition, our Manager will be entitled to receive a Base Management Fee based on a percentage of stockholders’ equity, regardless
of our performance or its performance in managing our business. Our Manager will also receive reimbursement of expenses and fees incurred
directly on our behalf regardless of its or our performance. As a result, even if our Manager does not identify profitable investment
opportunities for us, it will still receive material compensation from us. This compensation structure may reduce our Manager’s
incentive to devote time and effort to seeking profitable opportunities for our portfolio.

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If we acquire properties from affiliates of our Manager, the price may be higher than we would pay if the transaction were the result of arm’s-length negotiations.

We may acquire properties
or investments from Bluerock, our Manager, directors or officers, or their respective affiliates. The prices we pay for such properties
will not be the subject of arm’s-length negotiations, which means that the acquisitions may be on terms less favorable to us than
those negotiated in an arm’s-length transaction. Even though we expect to use an independent third-party appraiser to determine
fair market value when acquiring properties from our Manager and its affiliates, we may pay more for particular properties than we would
have in an arm’s-length transaction, which would reduce our cash available for investment in other properties or distribution to
our stockholders.

If we internalize our management functions, we could incur other significant costs associated with being self-managed.

At any time, our board of
directors may, but is not obligated to, pursue the internalization of the functions performed for us by our Manager through the acquisition
of our Manager or similar