Company: GWW
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form Type: DEFA14A
Source: 0001104659-25-032713
Chunk: 1

Company: W.W. GRAINGER, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form: DEFA14A
Chunk 1
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, majority voting in director elections, proxy access and the ability of shareholders to call
special meetings, and other provisions that are aligned with our shareholders’ preferences.

Grainger’s current director election structure includes a majority voting standard and resignation policy; the majority voting standard is the minimum standard permitted by Illinois law, even in contested elections.As a result, Grainger is unable to implement a carve-out plurality voting standard for
contested elections. However, Grainger has adopted a director resignation policy providing that any incumbent director who fails to receive
the required majority vote is expected to tender their resignation for consideration by the Board Affairs and Nominating Committee. Our
director resignation policy is an important safeguard to help ensure that our shareholders’ wishes are appropriately reflected in
the composition of our Board — even in the absence of a plurality carve-out for contested elections.

The Board believes that cumulative voting in the election of directors is fundamentally inconsistent with the Company’s majority voting standard because it potentially allows relatively small shareholders to elect directors who are not supported by the holders of a majority of our shares. With cumulative
voting, a shareholder or group of shareholders holding a relatively small number of shares would be able to elect one or more directors
by concentrating votes, even when a significant majority of shares were voted against the election of such director or directors. Further,
we believe that cumulative voting is inconsistent with the “one share, one vote” framework strongly supported by many of our
shareholders.

Elimination of cumulative voting, while maintaining majority voting, reinforces the Board’s responsibility and accountability to the views of holders of a majority of our shares.98%
of S&P 500 companies use “straight voting” in director elections. Grainger’s cumulative voting framework is clearly
a minority approach, distancing Grainger’s voting practices from the structure overwhelmingly used at other S&P 500 companies
as well as Grainger’s peers.

Removal of the cumulative voting provision would
not only enhance Grainger’s corporate governance practices but would also serve to align Grainger’s voting framework with
the prevailing practice of straight voting used at other large public companies.

We appreciate you considering this additional
information, the Board’s recommendation in the proxy statement as well as the following Q&A which is intended to provide additional
background on cumulative voting and the Company’s governance structure. We ask that you vote FOR Proposal 4, in support of the Board’s recommendation.Thank you for your investment in W.W. Grainger and for casting your vote at the upcoming meeting.

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