Company: PPT
Filing Date: 2025-09-26
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001133228-25-010195
Chunk: 213

Company: PUTNAM PREMIER INCOME TRUST
Filing Date: 2025-09-26
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 213
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 or any board committee. Putnam believes that the receipt
of such compensation for services other than service as a director raises significant independence issues.

| Ø | Putnam will withhold votes from any nominee for director who is considered an independent director by the company and who                    
 has received compensation within the last three years from the company for the provision of professional services (e.g., investment banking, 
 consulting, legal or financial advisory fees).                                                                                               |

| Ø | Putnam will withhold votes from any nominee for director who attends fewer than 75% of board and committee meetings. Putnam    
 may refrain from withholding votes on a case-by-case basis if a valid reason for the absence exists, such as illness, personal 
 emergency, potential conflict of interest, etc.                                                                                |

| Ø | Putnam will withhold votes from any incumbent nominee for director who served on a board that has not acted to implement                      
 a policy requested in a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the votes actually cast on the matter at its previous 
 two annual meetings, or                                                                                                                       |

| Ø | Putnam will withhold votes from any incumbent nominee for director who served on a board that adopted, renewed, or made               
 a material adverse modification to a shareholder rights plan (commonly referred to as a “poison pill”) without shareholder            
 approval during the current or prior calendar year. (This is applicable to any type of poison pill, for example, advance-warning type 
 pill, EGM pill, and Trust Defense Plans in Japan.)                                                                                    |

Putnam will refrain from opposing the board members who served at the time
of the adoption of the poison pill if the duration is one year or less, if the plan contains other suitable restrictions; or if the company
publicly discloses convincing rationale for its adoption and seeks shareholder approval of future renewals of the poison pill. (Suitable
restrictions could include but are not limited to, a higher threshold for passive investors. Convincing rationale could include circumstances
such as, but not limited to, extreme market disruption or conditions, stock volatility, substantial merger, active investor interest,
or takeover attempts.)

| Ø | Putnam will vote on a case-by-case basis and may consider voting against the Nominating Committee Chair if there is a lack of evidence 
 of board diversity.                                                                                                                    |

Putnam is concerned about over-committed directors. In some cases, directors
may serve on too many boards to make a meaningful contribution. This may be particularly true for senior executives of public companies
(or other