Company: ABTC
Filing Date: 2025-07-31
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001213900-25-069998
Chunk: 258

Company: American Bitcoin Corp.
Filing Date: 2025-07-31
Form: 424B3
Chunk 258
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, if the Mergers are consummated, ABH will, except as required by law, have the unilateral power to control the outcome of all matters submitted to the Combined Company’s stockholders for approval, including the election of directors. The Gryphon Board believes that the proposed multi -classstock structure will preserve ABTC’s existing founder -ledgovernance structure, promote management retention and engagement, permit the Combined Company to continue to prioritize long -termgoals rather than short -termresults, enhance the likelihood of continued stability in the composition of the Combined Company Board and its policies and discourage certain types of transactions that may involve an actual or threatened acquisition of the Combined Company, all of which the Gryphon Board believes is essential to the long -termsuccess of the Combined Company and to long -termstockholder value. 136 Advisory Charter Proposal 6 — Stockholder Action by Written Consent The Proposed Charter permits any action that is required or permitted to be taken by the stockholders of the Combined Company to be effected by written consent in lieu of a meeting until the Voting Threshold Date and thereafter any action required or permitted to be taken by the stockholders of the Combined Company must be effected at a duly called annual or special meeting of stockholders of the Combined Company. The Gryphon Board believes it is appropriate to permit stockholder action by written consent for so long as ABH and other holders of Class B Common Stock hold at least 50% of the voting power of the Combined Company’s outstanding shares, as this provision will allow the Combined Company to take corporate action faster and more efficiently than if a stockholder meeting were required. The Gryphon Board believes that eliminating the right of Combined Company stockholders, after the Voting Threshold Date, to act by written consent will limit the circumstances under which stockholders can act on their own initiative to remove directors or alter or amend the Combined Company’s organizational documents outside of a duly called special or annual meeting of the stockholders of the Combined Company. Further, the Gryphon Board believes that limiting Combined Company stockholders’ ability to act by written consent after the Voting Threshold Date will reduce the time and effort the Combined Company Board and Combined Company management would need to devote to stockholder proposals, which time and effort could distract those directors and management from other important company business. In addition, the elimination of the stockholders’ ability, after the Voting Threshold Date, to act by written consent may have certain anti -takeovereffects by forcing a potential acquirer to take control of the Combined Company Board only at a duly