Company: BIP-PB
Filing Date: 2025-03-24
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0001628280-25-014380
Chunk: 133

Company: Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P.
Filing Date: 2025-03-24
Form: 20-F
Item: Item 3
Chunk 133
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 16 of the Exchange Act, and certain corporate governance rules imposed by the NYSE are inapplicable to our partnership as it is a foreign private issuer.

Brookfield Infrastructure 37

We may be subject to the risks commonly associated with a separation of economic interest from control or the incurrence of debt at multiple levels within an organizational structure.

Our ownership and organizational structure is similar to structures whereby one company controls another company which in turn holds controlling interests in other companies; thereby, the company at the top of the chain may control the company at the bottom of the chain even if its effective equity position in the bottom company is less than a controlling interest. Brookfield controls the sole shareholder of our General Partner and, as a result of such ownership of our General Partner, Brookfield is able to control the appointment and removal of our General Partner’s directors and, accordingly, exercises substantial influence over us. In turn, we often have a majority controlling interest or a significant influence in our investments. Even though the Brookfield Holders currently collectively have an effective economic interest in our partnership of approximately 26.6%, on a fully-exchanged basis, as a result of ownership of our units, the Redeemable Partnership Units and class A.2 exchangeable shares, over time Brookfield may reduce this economic interest while still maintaining its controlling interest, and, therefore, Brookfield may use its control rights in a manner that conflicts with the economic interests of our other unitholders and preferred unitholders. For example, despite the fact that we have conflicts protocols in place, which addresses the requirement for independent approval and other requirements for transactions in which there is greater potential for a conflict of interest to arise, including transactions with affiliates of Brookfield, as well as between BIPC and Brookfield, because Brookfield will be able to exert substantial influence over us, and, in turn, over our investments, there is a greater risk of transfer of the assets of our investments at non-arm’s length values to Brookfield and its affiliates. In addition, debt incurred at multiple levels within the chain of control could exacerbate the separation of economic interest from controlling interest at such levels, thereby creating an incentive to leverage us and our investments. Any such increase in debt would also make us more sensitive to declines in revenues, increases in expenses and interest rates, and adverse market conditions. The servicing of any such debt would also reduce the amount of funds available to pay distributions to us and ultimately to our unitholders and preferred unitholders and holders of BIPC exchange