Company: PLDGP
Filing Date: 2025-03-28
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001193125-25-067058
Chunk: 80

Company: Prologis, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-28
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 80
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am, 6% of the compensation pool would have been paid to Mr. Nekritz, approximately 2.2% of the compensation pool would have been paid to Mr. Letter, approximately 1.5% of the compensation pool would have been paid to Mr. Arndt and approximately 1.2% of the compensation pool would have been paid to each of Mr. Ghazal and Mr. Andrus. POP awards did not fund for the 2022-2024 performance period because the applicable POP Performance Hurdle was not met. |

| l |     | For the 2023-2025 performance period, the Compensation Committee made POP Allocations to the NEOs such that 15% of the compensation pool will be paid to Mr. Moghadam, 4% of the compensation pool will be paid to Mr. Nekritz, approximately 3.5% of the compensation pool will be paid to Mr. Letter, approximately 2.5% of the compensation pool will be paid to Mr. Arndt and approximately 1.5% of the compensation pool will be paid to each of Mr. Ghazal and Mr. Andrus, if such awards are earned. |

In allocating the percentage of the compensation pools to the NEOs, the Compensation Committee took into consideration external market data concerning the typical ratio of CEO compensation to that of other NEOs and employees. The Compensation Committee generally allocated a smaller portion of the total compensation pool to the NEOs relative to the other participants than is typical in the outperformance plans of other companies the committee reviewed at the inception of the plan. Earned POP awards can be paid in either cash or equity. The Compensation Committee has determined that the awards will be paid, if at all, in equity. POP was designed to align the interests of the Company’s executives with the Company’s stockholders in a pay for performance structure and to reward outperformance relative to the REIT industry. POP utilizes a formulaic performance hurdle. Under POP, for each three-year performance period, all eligible participants share in a performance pool equal to three percent of the amount, if any, that the Company’s compound annualized TSR over the applicable three-year performance period exceeds the return that would have been generated if the Company’s compound, annualized total shareholder return was equal to (x) the compound, annualized percentage return for the MSCI US REIT Index (assuming dividends reinvested on a daily basis) plus (y) 100 basis points (