Company: OIA
Filing Date: 2025-02-07
Form Type: N-2/A
Source: 0001104659-25-010545
Chunk: 156

Company: Invesco Municipal Income Opportunities Trust
Filing Date: 2025-02-07
Form: N-2/A
Chunk 156
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 reappointment of top executives, directors in charge and audit committee board members at a company with Audit Committee or three Committees of the holding or parent company. If a subsidiary or affiliate is listed, we consider voting against the reappointment of top executives, directors in charge and audit committee board members at a company with Audit Committee or three Committees of both the subsidiary or affiliate and the holding or parent company. However, we may vote on a case-by-case basis, depending on the importance of the disposition to the subsidiary or affiliate, its impact on the holding or parent company’s financial performance, and so on. ● With respect to employees’ scandals, if the scandal damages or is likely to damage shareholder value, and we judge that the subject company owes management responsibility, we consider voting against the reappointment of top executives, directors in charge and audit committee board members at a company with Audit Committee or three Committees. ● We consider voting against the reappointment of board directors if the subject company engages in window dressing or inadequate accounting practices during their tenures. (5) Activities against shareholder interest ● If a company raises capital through an excessively dilutive third-party allotment without a shareholders’ meeting’s approval, we consider voting against the reappointment of board directors, particularly top executives. ● If a company raises capital through a large-scale public offering without reasonable explanations, we consider voting against the reappointment of board directors, particularly top executives. ● If a company does not execute a shareholder proposal regarded as favorable for minority shareholders receiving the majority support from shareholders or does not make a similar company proposal at an AGM in the following year, we consider voting against the appointment of top executives. (6) Others ● If a company insufficiently discloses board director candidates’ information, we generally vote against such candidates. B-25 3. Composition of Board of Directors While each company’s board structure would differ depending on its size and so on, we believe that a company with three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration) is desirable to achieve better governance as a listed company. For a company with Board of Statutory Auditors (Kansayaku) or Audit Committee, it is also desirable to voluntarily deploy a Nomination Committee, a Remuneration Committee and other necessary committees. Besides, it is desirable that Board Chair is an independent outside director. We believe that a highly transparent board composition ensures management accountability and contributes to sustained enterprise value expansion. Finally, the disclosure of the third-party assessment on the Board of Directors is desirable. To strengthen the Board of Directors