Company: VVR
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form Type: 424B5
Source: 0001104659-25-026711
Chunk: 181

Company: Invesco Senior Income Trust
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form: 424B5
Chunk 181
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, required disclosures are insufficient. ● In case an accounting auditor has a service contract other than accounting audit services with the subject company, it is regarded that such a contract creates a conflict of interest between them. ● Excessive audit fees are paid. ● It is regarded that an accounting auditor makes fraud or negligence. ● If it is regarded that an accounting auditor has issues in other company’s audits, in case a company appoints or reappoints the accounting auditor without replacing it, we take the impact on the company’s corporate value full consideration into voting decisions. ● We generally vote against proposals concerning accounting auditor replacement if it is regarded that a company changes an incumbent accounting auditor due to a dispute about accounting principles. B-28 7. Compensation for Board Directors, Statutory Auditors (Kansayaku) and Employees (1) Board directors’ salaries and bonuses ● It is desirable to increase the proportion of stock incentive plans in board directors’ salaries and bonuses, on condition that a performance-based compensation structure is established, transparency, such as disclosures of a benchmark or formula laying the foundations for calculation, ensures accountability, and the impact on shareholders, such as dilution, are taken into considerations. The Remuneration Committee at a company with three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration) or the arbitrary Remuneration Committee preferably deployed at a company with the other governance structures should ensure the accountability of compensation schemes. It is desirable that an independent outside director serves as Remuneration Committee Chair. ● We consider voting against proposals seeking approval for salaries and bonuses in the following cases. ● Negative correlation between company’s financial performance and directors’ salaries and bonuses are observed. ● Inappropriate systems and practices are in place. ● The total amount of salaries and bonuses is not disclosed. ● Management failures, such as a significant share price decline or serious earnings deterioration, are apparent. ● The remuneration proposal includes people determined to be responsible for activities against shareholder interest. ● We generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting disclosure of individual directors’ salaries and bonuses. ● If a company implements any measures ensuring transparency other than disclosure, we take it into consideration. ● If there is no proposal seeking approval for directors’ salaries and bonuses, and the compensation structure lacks transparency, we consider voting against the appointment of top executives. ● We generally vote against bonuses for statutory auditors at a company with Board of Statutory Auditors and audit committee board members at a company with Audit Committee. ● We separately consider voting to audit committee board members at a company with three Committees.