Company: STAA
Filing Date: 2025-09-24
Form Type: DFAN14A
Source: 0001213900-25-091197
Chunk: 27

Company: STAAR SURGICAL CO
Filing Date: 2025-09-24
Form: DFAN14A
Chunk 27
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 primary and premium solutions for patients seeking visual freedom from wearing eyeglasses or contact lenses while achieving excellent
visual acuity through refractive vision correction.

Given STAAR’s momentum and bright future, we believe the $28
per share offer price significantly undervalues our Company. We are disappointed that STAAR’s Board of Directors (“Board”)
has agreed to sell our Company to Alcon Inc. (SIX/NYSE:ALC) (“Alcon”) at this inadequate valuation and on the terms of the
definitive merger agreement dated August 4, 2025 (the “Merger Agreement”, and such proposed transaction, the “Proposed
Merger”).

To be clear, we would not necessarily be opposed
to a potential merger of these two parties at an appropriate price or on other appropriate terms. As long-term investors, we want the
best for the Company and all its shareholders.

However, based on our analysis, the proposed sale at the current proposed
terms materially undervalues the Company and does not reflect the Company’s intrinsic value and its standalone prospects were it
not to be acquired by Alcon. In our view, the transaction unfairly transfers this value to Alcon without rewarding STAAR’s shareholders
for investing in and supporting the Company.

We are, of course, aware of the campaign being launched by Broadwood
Partners, L.P. and its affiliates (“Broadwood Partners”), a 27.4% stockholder, to solicit proxies against the Company’s
proposal to approve the Proposed Merger, and we agree with the clear and detailed rationale that has been included in its communications
to STAAR shareholders.

We also submit to the STAAR shareholders our own perspectives on the
Proposed Merger:

STAAR’s Board Failed to Undertake a Thorough Process to
Maximize Value as It Explored Strategic Alternatives

First, like Broadwood Partners, we believe a deficient process was
conducted in relation to the Proposed Merger. We believe the Board chose to engage meaningfully only with Alcon as the sole counterparty,
rather than conducting a sufficient market check or thoroughly soliciting potential interest from a range of alternative buyers and potential
strategic partners. Further, the terms of the Merger Agreement materially impede the Company’s ability to actively attract other
potential bids, with the agreement’s lack of a “go shop” provision, the extent of termination fees payable by the Company
under the agreement, and the short “window-shop” period provided