Company: BHM
Filing Date: 2025-03-20
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001104659-25-026164
Chunk: 96

Company: Bluerock Homes Trust, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-20
Form: 424B3
Chunk 96
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 during cyclical economic downturns, which could adversely affect the trading price of our stock.

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Table of Contents

We may be obligated to pay our Manager quarterly Incentive Fees even if we incur a net loss during a particular quarter and our Manager will receive a Base Management Fee regardless of the performance of our portfolio.

Our
Manager will be entitled to a quarterly Incentive Fee based on our pre-Incentive Fee AFFO, which will reward our Manager if our quarterly
AFFO exceeds an 8% hurdle on our adjusted stockholders’ equity. Our AFFO for a particular quarter will exclude the effect of any
unrealized gains, losses or other items during that quarter that do not affect realized net income, even if these adjustments result in
a net loss on our statement of operations for that quarter. Thus, we may be required to pay our Manager an Incentive Fee for a fiscal
quarter even if we incur a net loss for that quarter as determined in accordance with GAAP. In addition, our Manager will be entitled
to receive a Base Management Fee based on a percentage of stockholders’ equity, regardless of our performance or its performance
in managing our business. Our Manager will also receive reimbursement of expenses and fees incurred directly on our behalf regardless
of its or our performance. As a result, even if our Manager does not identify profitable investment opportunities for us, it will still
receive material compensation from us. This compensation structure may reduce our Manager’s incentive to devote time and effort
to seeking profitable opportunities for our portfolio.

If we acquire properties from affiliates of our Manager, the price may be higher than we would pay if the transaction were the result of arm’s-length negotiations.

We
may acquire properties or investments from Bluerock, our Manager, directors or officers, or their respective affiliates. The prices we
pay for such properties will not be the subject of arm’s-length negotiations, which means that the acquisitions may be on terms
less favorable to us than those negotiated in an arm’s-length transaction. Even though we expect to use an independent third-party
appraiser to determine fair market value when acquiring properties from our Manager and its affiliates, we may pay more for particular
properties than we would have in an arm’s-length transaction, which would reduce our cash available for investment in other properties
or distribution to our stockholders.

If we internalize our management functions, we could incur other significant costs associated with being self-managed.

At
any time, our Board may, but