Company: MAGH
Filing Date: 2025-03-20
Form Type: DRS/A
Source: 0001641172-25-000048
Chunk: 145

Company: Magnitude International Ltd
Filing Date: 2025-03-20
Form: DRS/A
Chunk 145
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 but our post-offering articles of association do not provide for cumulative voting. As a result, our shareholders are not afforded any less protections or rights on this issue than shareholders of a Delaware corporation.

Removal of Directors. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a director of a corporation with a classified board may be removed only for cause with the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Under our post-offering articles of association, directors may be removed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the directors then in office (except with regard to the removal of the chairman, who may be removed from office by the affirmative vote of all directors) or by an ordinary resolution (except with regard to the removal of the chairman, who may be removed from office by special resolution) of our shareholders. In addition, a director’s office shall be vacated if the director (i) becomes bankrupt or makes any arrangement or composition with his creditors; (ii) is found to be or becomes of unsound mind or dies; (iii) resigns his office by notice in writing to the company; or (iv) is removed from office pursuant to any other provisions of our Post-offering Memorandum and Articles.

Transactions with Interested Shareholders. The Delaware General Corporation Law contains a business combination statute applicable to Delaware corporations whereby, unless the corporation has specifically elected not to be governed by such statute by amendment to its certificate of incorporation, it is prohibited from engaging in certain business combinations with an “interested shareholder” for three years following the date that such person becomes an interested shareholder. An interested shareholder generally is a person or a group who or which owns or owned 15% or more of the target’s outstanding voting share within the past three years. This has the effect of limiting the ability of a potential acquirer to make a two-tiered bid for the target in which all shareholders would not be treated equally. The statute does not apply if, among other things, prior to the date on which such shareholder becomes an interested shareholder, the board of directors approves either the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the person becoming an interested shareholder. This encourages any potential acquirer of a Delaware corporation to negotiate the terms of any acquisition transaction with the target’s board of directors.

Cayman Islands law has no comparable statute. As a result, we cannot avail ourselves of the types of protections afforded by the Delaware business combination statute. However, although Cayman Islands law does not regulate transactions between a company and its significant shareholders