Company: GLU-PB
Filing Date: 2025-03-10
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001829126-25-001658
Chunk: 158

Company: GABELLI GLOBAL UTILITY & INCOME TRUST
Filing Date: 2025-03-10
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 158
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 to devote all of their attention to the management of only the Fund.

ALLOCATION OF LIMITED INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES. As indicated above, the Portfolio Managers manage managed accounts with investment strategies and/or policies that are similar to the Trust. In these cases, if the Portfolio Manager identifies an investment opportunity that may be suitable for multiple accounts, a fund may not be able to take full advantage of that opportunity because the opportunity may be allocated among all or many of these accounts or other accounts managed primarily by other Portfolio Managers of the Adviser, and their affiliates. In addition, in the event a Portfolio Manager determines to purchase a security for more than one account in an aggregate amount that may influence the market price of the security, accounts that purchased or sold the security first may receive a more favorable price than accounts that made subsequent transactions.

SELECTION OF BROKER/DEALERS. Because of Mr. Gabelli’s indirect majority ownership interest in G.research, LLC, he may have an incentive to use G.research to execute portfolio transactions for a fund.

PURSUIT OF DIFFERING STRATEGIES. At times, the Portfolio Managers may determine that an investment opportunity may be appropriate for only some of the accounts for which he/she exercises investment responsibility, or may decide that certain of the funds or accounts should take differing positions with respect to a particular security. In these cases, the Portfolio Manager may execute differing or opposite transactions for one or more accounts which may affect the market price of the security or the execution of the transaction, or both, to the detriment of one or more other accounts.

VARIATION IN COMPENSATION. A conflict of interest may arise where the financial or other benefits available to the Portfolio Manager differs among the accounts that they manage. If the structure of the Adviser’s management fee or the Portfolio Manager’s compensation differs among accounts (such as where certain accounts pay higher management fees or performance-based management fees), the portfolio managers may be motivated to favor certain accounts over others. The portfolio managers also may be motivated to favor accounts in which they have an investment interest, or in which the Adviser, or their affiliates have investment interests. Similarly, the desire to maintain assets under management or to enhance a Portfolio Manager’s performance record or to derive other rewards, financial or otherwise, could influence the Portfolio Manager in affording preferential treatment to those accounts that could most significantly benefit the Portfolio Manager. For example, as reflected above, if the Portfolio Manager manages accounts which have performance fee arrangements, certain portions of his/her compensation will depend on