Company: EVF
Filing Date: 2025-05-01
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001076598-25-000099
Chunk: 30

Company: Eaton Vance Senior Income Trust
Filing Date: 2025-05-01
Form: 424B3
Chunk 30
---
 reasonable claw back provisions for executive or director compensation related to these
missed milestones depending on the circumstances.

We generally evaluate each compensation plan and any related proposals,
including shareholder proposals, within the context of the market and the company. In order to make a suitable evaluation about compensation
and related matters, we expect appropriate disclosures on relevant aspects.

D. Shareholder Rights and Defenses

Companies should take actions and make decisions with the intent of
maximizing long-term shareholder value creation. We generally support proposals that enhance shareholder rights and vote against those
that seek to undermine them. We believe that in most cases, each common share should have one vote, and that a simple majority of voting
shares should be what is required to effect change.

Shareholder rights plans, commonly known as poison pills, and similar
take-over defenses should aim to promote long-term shareholder value creation. When designing plans and defenses, companies should ensure
that they do not suppress potential value by unduly discouraging acquirers. We generally expect companies to seek shareholder approval
or ratification of shareholder rights plans.

We generally expect companies to adhere to the one share one vote principle.
When companies have dual-class structures, they should ensure that such structures are not misused to support instances where a few insiders
may benefit at the cost of other shareholders. Ultimately, structures should strive to create alignment between the shareholders’
economic interests and their voting power.

We typically prefer a majority vote standard for binding votes. We also
expect management to be responsive to non-binding votes that have received majority support. We generally expect companies to protect
minority shareholder rights as their primary goal when considering supermajority vote requirements.

We generally expect companies to allow large shareholders to call special
meetings. A large shareholder may be defined by a reasonable threshold or in line with prevalent market practices.

We generally consider ownership thresholds, holding periods, the number
of directors that shareholders may nominate and any restrictions on forming a group in our evaluation of proposals related to proxy access.

E. Capital Structure

We expect any changes to the capital structure to be driven by legitimate
business needs and not as a means of anti-takeover defense. We generally expect companies to ensure that such changes do not disadvantage
shareholders.

Companies should provide a clear business rationale when requesting
the authorization, or increase in authorization, of new shares or new share classes. They ought to request a reasonable number of shares
in relation to the purpose outlined. Companies should follow prevalent market practices, such as offering pre-