Company: OIA
Filing Date: 2025-03-13
Form Type: 424B5
Source: 0001104659-25-023508
Chunk: 155

Company: Invesco Municipal Income Opportunities Trust
Filing Date: 2025-03-13
Form: 424B5
Chunk 155
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 appointment of statutory auditors in principle. ● We generally consider voting against the appointment of top executives and a nominating committee chair at a company with three Committees if independent outside directors of the subject company account for less than 1/3 of the Board after the AGM. However, this shall not apply if we confirm sufficient planning or special circumstances on increasing the number of independent outside directors in engagements. ● In case the subject company has a parent company, we generally consider voting against the appointment of top executives and a nominating committee chair at a company with three Committees if independent outside directors account for less than half of the Board after the AGM. However, this shall not apply if we confirm sufficient planning or special circumstances on increasing the number of independent outside directors in engagements. (2) Attendance rate and concurrent duties ● All members are expected to attend board and respective committee meetings in principle. A Company is generally obligated to facilitate all members to attend these meetings. We generally vote against the reappointment of board directors who attended less than 75% of board or respective committee meetings. ● We take into account not only the number of attendance but nomination reasons and candidates’ real contributions if disclosed. ● We take extra care when we assess the capability of board directors who have many concurrent duties as an outside director or outside statutory auditor of listed companies, as such cases potentially arise doubts about their capacity given the importance of outside directors’ role and responsibilities. Accordingly, we consider voting against the appointment of board directors who perform five or more duties as a director or statutory auditor of a listed company or equivalent company. ● If a company nominates a board director with many concurrent duties, it should provide reasonable explanations. It is also desirable that the company contrives disclosure timing and methods to allow investors to understand the situation enough. (3) Company’s business performance ● We consider voting against the reappointment of board directors if the subject company made a loss for the three consecutive years during their tenures. B-24 ● We consider voting against the reappointment of board directors if we judge that the subject company’s business performance significantly lags the peers in the same industry during their tenures. ● We consider voting against top executives if, concerning capital efficiency including return on capital, business strategies achieving corporate value expansion and sustainable growth are not demonstrated, and constructive dialogues are not conducted. (4) Company’s anti-social activities ● If we judge that a corporate scandal damages or is likely to damage shareholder value with having a significant effect on society during a board tenure, we conduct adequate dialog