Company: PGYWW
Filing Date: 2025-03-12
Form Type: 10-K
Source: 0001883085-25-000050
Chunk: 182

Company: Pagaya Technologies Ltd.
Filing Date: 2025-03-12
Form: 10-K
Item: Item 1A
Chunk 182
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 the terms of the Pagaya Articles, including the circumstances under which a Founder’s Class B Ordinary Shares will convert into Class A Ordinary Shares. Accordingly, except with respect to the limited matters as to which Israeli corporate law requires approval by a majority of votes cast by shareholders other than controlling shareholders, and although such Founders are not parties to any voting agreement (other than the Pagaya Voting Agreement) or similar arrangement and are free to act independently of one another and without coordination or collaboration, such Founders will collectively effectively control all matters submitted to the our shareholders for the foreseeable future, including the election of directors, amendments of our organizational documents, compensation matters, and any merger, consolidation, sale of all or substantially all of our assets, or other major corporate transaction requiring shareholder approval.

The Founders may have interests that differ from yours and may vote in a way with which you disagree and which may be adverse to your interests. This concentrated control is likely to have the effect of limiting the likelihood of an unsolicited merger proposal, unsolicited tender offer, or proxy contest for the removal of directors. As a result, our governance structure and the adoption of the Pagaya Articles may have the effect of depriving our shareholders of an opportunity to sell their shares at a premium over prevailing market prices and make it more difficult to replace our directors and management.

The dual class structure of Pagaya Ordinary Shares may adversely affect the trading market for Class A Ordinary Shares.

Our dual class structure has likely been a contributing factor, either directly or indirectly, in a lower or more volatile market price of Class A Ordinary Shares, and may also result in adverse publicity or other adverse consequences. For example, certain index providers have announced restrictions on including companies with dual class or multi-class share structures in certain of their indices. In July 2017, S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell announced changes to their eligibility criteria for the inclusion of shares of public companies on certain indices, including the Russell 2000, the S&P 500, the S&P Mid Cap 400 and the S&P SmallCap 600, to disfavor companies with multiple classes of shares from being added to these indices. Beginning in 2017, MSCI Inc. (“MSCI”), a leading stock index provider, opened public consultations on their treatment of no-vote and multi-class structures and temporarily barred new multi-class listings from certain of its indices; however, in October 2018, MSCI announced its decision to include equity securities “with unequal voting structures” in its indices and to launch a