Company: IR
Filing Date: 2025-04-25
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001140361-25-015748
Chunk: 41

Company: Ingersoll Rand Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-04-25
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 41
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 heavily weighted toward long-term incentives to ensure retention and alignment with stockholders and enforce the ownership culture that has been a critical component of the Company’s success. In general, when the Committee considers target compensation relative to market for its NEOs, it considers experience, tenure and individual performance when determining individual positioning relative to the market.

| Element                |     | Primary Objectives                                                                                                                                                        |
| Base Salary            |     | Provides fixed compensation to mitigate inappropriate risk-taking to maximize variable pay and allow a reasonable standard of living relative to peers                    |
| Annual Cash Incentives |     | Significant component of executive compensation intended to provide pay differentiation for those that drive strong performance needed to meet challenging annual targets |
| Long-term Incentives   |     | Most significant component of executive compensation; supports retention and engagement while directly aligning to stockholder value                                      |

Ingersoll Rand 42 2025 Proxy Statement

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The charts below illustrate that a majority of NEO annual target total direct compensation (“TDC”) is performance-based. For our CEO, 89% of TDC is at risk with the vast majority delivered through long-term incentives. For our other NEOs, on average, at-risk compensation represents 75% of TDC. Compensation Governance Practices and Policies The Committee has adopted the following practices and policies reflecting what it believes to be a best practices approach to executive compensation.

| WHAT WE DO                                                                          |     | WHAT WE DON’T DO                                                |
| Significant Portion of Pay Focused on Long-Term Value Creation                      |     | No Guaranteed Bonuses                                           |
| 50% of Annual Long-Term Incentive Compensation in Performance-Vesting Equity Awards |     | No Tax Gross-Ups in Connection with Change-in-Control Severance |
| Incentive Plan Goals Aligned with Stockholder Interests                             |     | No Executive Pensions                                           |
| Minimum one-year vesting on all equity awards                                       |     | No Fixed-Term Employment Agreements                             |
| Market-Leading Stock Ownership and Retention Guidelines                             |     | No Stock Option Repricing                                       |
| Capped Incentive Opportunities                                                      |     | No Hedging or Pledging of Company Stock                         |
| Mitigation of Risk Through Compensation Risk Assessments                            |     |                                                                 |
| Incentive Compensation Clawback Policy                                              |     |                                                                 |
| Independent Compensation Consultant                                                 |     |                                                                 |

Ingersoll Rand 43 2025 Proxy Statement

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2024 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROGRAM