Company: LIDRW
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form Type: DEFC14A
Source: 0001140361-25-012590
Chunk: 50

Company: AEye, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form: DEFC14A
Chunk 50
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 such director’s earlier death, resignation or removal. Under Delaware law, directors of companies that have a classified Board may be removed only for cause, unless the certificate provides otherwise, but directors of companies that do not have a classified board may be removed with or without cause. Therefore, Section V must also be amended to provide for removal with or without cause as provided by Delaware law. Shareholders recommend and request that the board take the action specified in the proposal. The Proposal’s Supporting Statement This resolution urges the shareholders to vote for DECLASSIFICATION of the board. Such change would enable shareholders to register their views on the performance of all directors at each annual meeting. Having directors stand for election annually makes directors more accountable to shareholders, and could thereby contribute to improving performance and increasing Company value. Over the past 20 years, many S&P 500 companies have declassified their board of directors. According to data cited by Harvard University, the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards declined from 50% to 10% in the last 20 years and the average percentage of votes cast in favor of shareholder proposals to declassify the boards of S&P 500 companies during the period January 1, 2010 – June 30, 2011, exceeded 75%. The significant shareholder support for proposals to declassify the boards is consistent with empirical studies reporting that classified boards could be associated with lower Company valuation and/or worse corporate decision-making. Studies report that:

| • | Classified boards are associated with lower Company valuation (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005. Confirmed by Faleye (2007) and Frakes (2007). |

| • | Takeover targets with classified boards are associated with lower gains to shareholders (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002). |

| • | Firms with classified boards are more likely to be associated with value-decreasing acquisition decisions (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007); and |

| • | Classified boards are associated with lower sensitivity of compensation to performance and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance (Faleye, 2007). |

Please vote for this proposal to make directors more accountable to shareholders. The Board’s Statement of Opposition A MAJORITY OF THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT YOU VOTE AGAINST PROPOSAL 4 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: The Board has concluded, after carefully considering the stockholder proposal, that it is in the Company and its stock