Company: PIM
Filing Date: 2025-12-01
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001133228-25-012988
Chunk: 233

Company: PUTNAM MASTER INTERMEDIATE INCOME TRUST
Filing Date: 2025-12-01
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 233
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| Ø | Putnam will generally vote for proposals relating to transfer of reserves/increase of reserves (i.e., France, Japan). 
 However, Putnam will vote on a case-by-case basis if the proposal falls outside of normal market practice.            |

| Ø | Putnam will generally vote for proposals to increase the maximum variable pay ratio. However, Putnam will vote on a 
 case-by-case basis if we are voting against a company’s remuneration report or if the proposal seeks an increase in 
 excess of 200%.                                                                                                     |

| Ø | Putnam will review stock option plans on a case-by-case basis which allow for the options exercise price to be reduced 
 by dividend payments (if the plan would normally pass Putnam’s Guidelines).                                            |

| Ø | Putnam will generally vote for requests to provide loan guarantees however, Putnam will vote on a case-by-case 
 basis if the total amount of guarantees is in excess of 100% of the company’s audited net assets.              |

| Ø | Putnam will generally support remuneration report/policy proposals (i.e., advisory/binding) where a company’s executive compensation          
 is linked directly with the performance of the business and executive. Putnam will generally support compensation proposals which incorporate 
 a mix of reasonable salary and performance based short- and long-term incentives. Companies should demonstrate that their remuneration        
 policies are designed and managed to incentivize and retain executives while growing the company’s long-term shareholder value.               |

Generally, Putnam will vote against remuneration report/policy
proposals (i.e., advisory/binding) in the following cases:

| • | Disconnect between pay and performance |

| • | No performance metrics disclosed; |

| • | No relative performance metrics utilized; |

| • | Single performance metric was used and it was an absolute measure; |

| • | Performance goals were lowered when management failed or was unlikely to meet original goals; |

| • | Long Term Incentive Plan is subject to retesting (e.g., Australia); |

| • | Service contracts longer than 12 months (e.g., United Kingdom); |

| • | Allows vesting below median for relative performance metrics; |

| • | Ex-gratia / non-contractual payments have been made (e.g., United Kingdom and Australia); |

| • | Contains provisions to automatically vest upon change-of-control; or |

| • | Other poor compensation practices or structures. |

| • | Pension provisions for new executives