Company: BCS
Filing Date: 2025-02-13
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0000312069-25-000114
Chunk: 250

Company: BARCLAYS PLC
Filing Date: 2025-02-13
Form: 20-F
Chunk 250
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 financial and non-financial, including risk. &#8226; Continues to deliver the vast majority of variable pay in shares, which release over a multi-year period. &#8226; Retains the Committee&#8217;s discretion to reduce incentive outcomes if these are considered not to be commensurate with performance delivered &#8211; the Committee has a proven track record of using discretion to reduce ED outcomes when it determines that to be appropriate. &#8226; Delivers a larger proportion of variable pay opportunity via LTIP, so based on longer-term performance measured over concurrent overlapping multi-year periods. &#8226; Includes increased shareholding requirements, and continues to require Executive Directors to maintain a shareholding for two years after stepping down as an Executive Director. &#8226; Continues to apply malus and clawback provisions to all variable pay, whereas malus and clawback terms cannot be applied to fixed pay, so the shift to lower fixed pay means these provisions apply to significantly more of total compensation. Malus and clawback mean variable pay awards can be revisited and reduced, or forfeited entirely, if conduct or performance later comes to light that would warrant such an adjustment. Amending our LTIP rules to support the new DRP To support the operation of the new DRP, we are proposing a corresponding change to the individual limits set out in our LTIP rules. Currently, the LTIP rules limit awards granted to an Executive Director each year to the lower of the maximum LTIP grant permitted under the DRP, or 500% of fixed pay. This was based on our old Executive Director pay construct, with very high fixed pay under a 2:1 bonus cap. The new DRP sees salaries almost 50% lower, and the Group Chief Executive&#8217;s maximum LTIP award increased to 550% of salary. As a result, we propose to amend the LTIP rules, so that the maximum award that might be granted to an Executive Director each year is set as the maximum permitted under the binding DRP that shareholders have approved at that time. The Board recommends that shareholders vote in favour of the proposed new DRP and corresponding LTIP rule change at the 2025 AGM The new DRP will strengthen the alignment of the Executive Directors' pay with performance, and with shareholder interests, achieved by delivering a greater proportion of maximum total compensation opportunity in the form of variable pay and reducing fixed pay, placing a higher weighting on LTIP and increasing shareholding requirements. The pay opportunity under the