Company: ETV
Filing Date: 2025-05-01
Form Type: 424B5
Source: 0001193125-25-109401
Chunk: 240

Company: Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Buy-Write Opportunities Fund
Filing Date: 2025-05-01
Form: 424B5
Chunk 240
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 incentivize executives to make risk-reward decisions that align with the business strategy and goals, and long-term shareholder value creation. Compensation plans should also build in retention mechanisms for high performing executives. We generally expect compensation plan payouts to align with performance and long-term value creation. We expect director compensation to follow market best practice and be aligned with long-term shareholder interests. For executives and directors who gain shares through equity compensation plans, we generally expect reasonable guidelines and holding requirements. Typically, stock options issued to executives should be priced at fair market value on the date of the grant and any re-pricingshould not incur a significant cost to shareholders.

| 1 | For example, we may withhold support for a director we believe is responsible for a company’s involvement/remediation of breach of global conventions such as UN Global Compact Principles on Human Rights, Labor Standards, Environment and Business Malpractice. |

We generally expect employee ownership, retirement and severance plans to be designed in a manner that does not disadvantage shareholders. These plans should not be excessively dilutive or incur a high cost. We generally expect discounted employee stock purchase plans to be broad-based and include non-executiveemployees. Discount rates should be in line with market best practice and not excessive. For compensation plans with performance metrics, in instances where performance milestones are not met, we may expect reasonable claw back provisions for executive or director compensation related to these missed milestones depending on the circumstances. We generally evaluate each compensation plan and any related proposals, including shareholder proposals, within the context of the market and the company. In order to make a suitable evaluation about compensation and related matters, we expect appropriate disclosures on relevant aspects.

| D. | Shareholder Rights and Defenses |

Companies should take actions and make decisions with the intent of maximizing long-term shareholder value creation. We generally support proposals that enhance shareholder rights and vote against those that seek to undermine them. We believe that in most cases, each common share should have one vote, and that a simple majority of voting shares should be what is required to effect change. Shareholder Rights Plans Shareholder rights plans, commonly known as poison pills, and similar take-over defenses should aim to promote long-term shareholder value creation. When designing plans and defenses, companies should ensure that they do not suppress potential value by unduly discouraging acquirers. We generally expect companies to seek shareholder approval or ratification of shareholder rights plans. Unequal Voting Rights We generally expect companies to adhere to the one share one vote principle. When companies have dual-class structures, they should ensure