Company: VVR
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form Type: 424B5
Source: 0001104659-25-026711
Chunk: 163

Company: Invesco Senior Income Trust
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form: 424B5
Chunk 163
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 authorization of classes of shares of preferred stock with unspecified voting, dividend, conversion or other rights (“blank check” authorizations). ● We generally support proposals for the removal of anti-takeover provisions. Shareholder rights: We support the rights of shareholders to hold boards and management teams accountable for company performance. We generally support best-practice-aligned proposals to enhance shareholder rights: ● Proxy access: Within the US market, we generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access that employ guidelines reflecting the SEC framework for proxy access with the following provisions: ● Ownership threshold: at least three percent (3%) of the voting power; ● Ownership duration: at least three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group; ● Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group; and ● Cap: cap on nominees of one (1) director or twenty-five percent (25%) of the board, whichever is higher. ● Shareholder ability to call special meetings: Generally, we vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings with a minimum threshold of 10% but not greater than 25%. We will not support proposals to prohibit shareholders’ right to call special meetings. ● Shareholder ability to act by written consent: Generally, assess shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent case-by-case taking into account the following factors, among other things: ● Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; and ● Investor ownership structure. B-12 ● Supermajority vote requirements: Generally, vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote. We will vote for management and shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements, in favor of a simple majority threshold. Lowering this requirement can democratize corporate governance and facilitate a more fair and dynamic decision-making that empowers and represents a wider shareholder base; especially for key corporate actions such as mergers, changes in control, or proposals to amend or repeal a portion of a company’s articles of incorporation. ● Bundling of proposals: It is our view that the bundling of multiple proposals or articles amendments in one single voting item restricts shareholders’ ability to express their views, with an all-or-nothing vote. We generally oppose such proposals unless all bundled resolutions are deemed acceptable and conducive of long-term shareholder value. Virtual shareholder meetings : Companies should hold their annual or special shareholder meetings in a manner that best serves the needs of its shareholders and the company. Shareholders should