Company: CAF
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001104659-25-021323
Chunk: 117

Company: Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 117
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 unqualified auditor's opinion. |

| - | General updating/corrective                                                               
 amendments to the charter, articles of association or bylaws, unless we believe that such 
 amendments would diminish shareholder rights.                                             |

Most proposals related to the conduct of the annual meeting, with the following exceptions. We generally oppose proposals that relate to "the transaction of such other business which may come before the meeting," and open-ended requests for adjournment. However, where management specifically states the reason for requesting an adjournment and the requested adjournment would facilitate passage of a proposal that would otherwise be supported under this Policy (i.e., an uncontested corporate transaction), the adjournment request will be supported. We do not support proposals that allow companies to call a special meeting with a short (generally two weeks or less) time frame for review. We generally support shareholder proposals advocating confidential voting procedures and independent tabulation of voting results. MSIM is supportive of the use of technology to conduct virtual shareholder meetings in parallel with physical meetings, for increased investor participation. However, adoption of a ‘virtual-only’ approach would restrict meaningful exchange between the company and shareholders. Therefore, MSIM is generally not supportive of proposals seeking authority to conduct virtual-only shareholder meetings. B. Board of Directors

| a. | Election     
 of Directors |

Votes on board nominees can involve balancing a variety of considerations. In vote decisions, we may take into consideration whether the company has a majority voting policy in place that we believe makes the director vote more meaningful. In the absence of a proxy contest, we generally support the board's nominees for director except as follows: ■We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee if we believe a direct conflict exists between the interests of the nominee and the public shareholders, including failure to meet fiduciary standards of care and/or loyalty. We may oppose directors where we conclude that actions of directors are unlawful, unethical or negligent. We consider opposing individual board members or an entire slate if we believe the board is entrenched and/or dealing inadequately with performance problems; if we believe the board is acting with insufficient independence between the board and management; or if we believe the board has not been sufficiently forthcoming with information on key governance or other material matters. ■We consider withholding support from or voting against interested directors if the company's board does not meet market standards for director independence, or if otherwise we believe board independence is insufficient. We refer to prevalent market standards as promulgated by a stock exchange or other authority within a given market (e