Company: CAF
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001104659-25-021323
Chunk: 120

Company: Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 120
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 markets, that female directors represent not less than a third of the board, unless there is evidence that the company has made significant progress in this area. In markets where information on director ethnicity is available, and it is legal to obtain it, and where it is relevant, we will generally also consider not supporting the re-election of the nomination committee chair (or other resolutions when the nomination chair is not up for re-election) if the board lacks ethnic diversity and has not outlined a credible diversity strategy.

| e. | Majority 
 Voting   |

We generally support proposals requesting or requiring majority voting policies in election of directors, so long as there is a carve-out for plurality voting in the case of contested elections.

| f. | Proxy  
 Access |

We consider proposals on procedures for inclusion of shareholder nominees and to have those nominees included in the company's proxy statement and on the company's proxy ballot on a case-by-case basis. Considerations include ownership thresholds, holding periods, the number of directors that shareholders may nominate and any restrictions on forming a group.

| g. | Reimbursement          
 for Dissident Nominees |

We generally support well-crafted U.S. shareholder proposals that would provide for reimbursement of dissident nominees elected to a board, as the cost to shareholders in electing such nominees can be factored into the voting decision on those nominees.

| h. | Proposals                          
 to Elect Directors More Frequently |

In the U.S. public company context, we usually support shareholder and management proposals to elect all directors annually (to "declassify" the board), although we make an exception to this policy where we believe that long-term shareholder value may be harmed by this change given particular circumstances at the company at the time of the vote on such proposal. As indicated above, outside the United States we generally support greater accountability to shareholders that comes through more frequent director elections, but recognize that many markets embrace longer term lengths, sometimes for valid reasons given other aspects of the legal context in electing boards.

| i. | Cumulative 
 Voting     |

We generally support proposals to eliminate cumulative voting in the U.S. market context. (Cumulative voting provides that shareholders may concentrate their votes for one or a handful of candidates, a system that can enable a minority bloc to place representation on a board.) U.S. proposals to establish cumulative voting in the election of directors generally will not be supported.

| j. | Separation                    
 of Chairman and CEO Positions |

We vote on shareholder proposals to separate the Chairman and CEO positions and/or to appoint an independent