Company: FLDDW
Filing Date: 2025-04-01
Form Type: S-1
Source: 0001213900-25-026537
Chunk: 98

Company: Fold Holdings, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-04-01
Form: S-1
Chunk 98
---
 meeting of stockholders may be called only by the chairperson of the board                              
 of directors, the chief executive officer, the president or the board of directors, which may delay the ability of our stockholders to 
 force consideration of a proposal or to take action, including the removal of directors;                                               |

| ● | limiting the liability of, and providing indemnification to, our directors and officers; |

| ● | controlling the procedures for the conduct and scheduling of stockholder meetings; |

| ● | providing for a staggered board, in which the members of the board of directors are divided into three classes 
 to serve for a period of three years from the date of their respective appointment or election;                |

| ● | granting the ability to remove directors with cause by the affirmative vote of 66⅔% in voting power 
 of the outstanding shares of Common Stock entitled to vote thereon;                                 |

| ● | requiring the affirmative vote of at least 66⅔% of the voting power of the outstanding shares of Common                                   
 Stock entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting together as a single class, to amend the Proposed Bylaws or ARTICLE 
 IV, ARTICLE V, ARTICLE VI, ARTICLE VII, ARTICLE VIII, and ARTICLE IX of the Proposed Charter; and                                         |

| ● | advance notice procedures that stockholders must comply with in order to nominate candidates to our Board                             
 or to propose matters to be acted upon at a stockholders’ meeting, which may discourage or deter a potential acquirer from conducting 
 a solicitation of proxies to elect the acquirer’s own slate of directors or otherwise attempting to obtain control of us.             |

These provisions, alone or together, could delay hostile takeovers and changes in control of us or changes in our Board and our management. 51 As a Delaware corporation, we are also subject to provisions of Delaware law, including Section 203 of the DGCL, which will prevent some stockholders holding more than 15% of the Common Stock from engaging in certain business combinations without approval of the holders of substantially all of our Common Stock. Any provision of our certificate of incorporation, our bylaws or Delaware law that has the effect of delaying or deterring a change in control could limit the opportunity for our stockholders to receive a premium for their shares of Common Stock and could also affect the price that some investors are willing to pay for our Common Stock. Our certificate of incorporation requires, to the fullest extent permitted by law, that derivative actions brought in our name against our respective directors