Company: NLY-PF
Filing Date: 2025-05-06
Form Type: DEFA14A
Source: 0001104659-25-045048
Chunk: 3

Company: ANNALY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT INC
Filing Date: 2025-05-06
Form: DEFA14A
Chunk 3
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 REIT through a number of operating achievements, including:

| § | Total economic return of 11.9% |

| § | Executing a record 21 whole loan securitizations totaling $11.0 billion |

| § | Ended 2024 with $6.9 billion of assets available for financing, including cash and unencumbered Agency 
 MBS of $3.9 billion                                                                                    |

| § | Raised $1.6 billion of accretive common equity through the Company’s at-the-market sales program3 |

| § | Maintained operating expenses of 1.44%, below the mREIT peer average of 6.55% |

Board Refreshment

Our Board of Directors (the “Board”)
maintains a Director refreshment policy requiring that Independent Directors not stand for re-election following the earlier of their
15 anniversary on the Board or their 73 birthday. In accordance with this refreshment policy, three of our Directors
– Michael Haylon, Francine J. Bovich and John H. Schaefer – will conclude their service on the Board following the Annual
Meeting. Collectively, these three Directors have diligently represented our stockholders for close to 40 years and the Company and the
Board are grateful for their many years of dedicated service.

Advisory Stockholder Proposal
to Adopt the Right to Act by Written Consent

A stockholder proponent has submitted
an advisory proposal requesting that the Board take steps to adopt the right for stockholders to act by written consent. The Company is
dedicated to strong and effective corporate

3Net of sales agent commissions and excluding other offering expenses.

governance practices and the Company’s bylaws provide stockholders with the meaningful
ability to call and act at a special meeting to address issues that arise outside of the annual meeting cycle. Our Board amended our bylaws
in 2022 to reduce the ownership threshold for stockholders to call a special meeting to 25% of shares outstanding after conducting extensive
stockholder engagement on the subject, which revealed that many of the Company’s major investors favor special meeting rights over
written consent rights.

Compared to special meetings,
the written consent process is less transparent, less informed and less equitable and could disenfranchise many stockholders by allowing
a subset of stockholders to approve critical actions on their own, without notice to the other stockholders or the Company and without
the benefit of enabling all stockholders to participate. Additionally, the written consent process could result in confusion and