Company: TEM
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001193125-25-074642
Chunk: 29

Company: Tempus AI, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-04-07
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 29
---
 circumstances require directors to seek to maximize the value of the corporation for the long-term benefit of the stockholders unless the corporation is specifically incorporated as a public benefit corporation. As a result, as a Nevada corporation, it is possible that our directors and officers may consider the interests of other constituencies in a manner different from what Delaware law may require.

Our Board has identified certain other areas where the law in Nevada differs in some respect from that of Delaware. These are generally procedural in nature. The potentially most important area is related to antitakeover**

<div align='center'>27</div>

**protections. Both Delaware and Nevada permit a range of antitakeover defenses, including poison pills. Both states have prohibitions (unless statutorily mandated conditions are met) on business combinations with “interested” stockholders owning certain proportions of the outstanding shares, though they apply at different ownership thresholds and have differing moratorium periods: 15% of the voting power of the outstanding voting stock for three years in Delaware and 10% of the voting or investment power of the outstanding voting stock for up to four years in Nevada. Both allow for classified boards of directors, though there are different default standards for director removal: in Delaware, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, directors on a classified board may only be removed for cause and by the holders of at least a majority of the voting power of the outstanding shares entitled to vote at an election of directors, and in Nevada, there is no distinction between removals for cause and removals without cause, and a two-thirds stockholder vote is generally required to remove any director. Another potential area of difference involves cash-out merger transactions (i.e., when one company buys another company and pays the stockholders of the bought company in cash) and directors’ obligations: in such transactions, the NRS allows directors to consider all relevant facts, circumstances, contingencies or constituencies, which may include the interests of stakeholders other than stockholders. Delaware law, at least in certain circumstances, requires directors to accept the highest price reasonably available, although in many circumstances directors are allowed, as directors of a Nevada corporation would be, to “just say no” to a potential transaction and consider the long-term interests of the corporation and its stockholders.

There may be further changes to the DGCL and/or the NRS that are not currently contemplated and we cannot predict the nature or extent of any such future changes to the DGCL and/or the NRS. If this Proposal 3 is approved, the Board