Company: IQI
Filing Date: 2025-05-02
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001193125-25-111545
Chunk: 73

Company: Invesco Quality Municipal Income Trust
Filing Date: 2025-05-02
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 73
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 leadership generally enhances management accountability to investors. Companies deviating from this best practice should provide a strong justification and establish safeguards to ensure that there is independent oversight of a board’s activities (e.g., by appointing a lead or senior independent director with clearly defined powers and responsibilities). ● We will generally vote against the incumbent nominating committee chair, or nearest equivalent, where the board chair is not independent unless a lead independent or senior director is appointed. ● We will review shareholder proposals requesting that the board chair be an independent director on a case-by-case basis, taking into account several factors, including, but not limited to, the presence of a lead independent director and a sufficiently independent board, a sound governance structure with no record of recent material governance failures or controversies, and sound financial performance. Invesco will also positively consider less disruptive proposals that will enter into force at the subsequent leadership transition. ● We will generally not vote against a CEO or executive serving as board chair solely on the basis of this issue, however, we may do so in instances where we have significant concerns regarding a company’s corporate governance, capital allocation decisions and/or compensation practices. Attendance and over boarding: Director attendance at board and committee meetings is a fundamental part of their responsibilities and provides efficient oversight for the company and its investors. In addition, directors should not have excessive external board or managerial commitments that may interfere with their ability to execute the duties of a director. ● We will generally vote against or withhold votes from directors who attend less than 75% of board and committee meetings for two consecutive years. We expect companies to disclose any extenuating circumstances, such as health matters or family emergencies, that would justify a director’s low attendance, in line with good practices. ● We will generally vote against directors who have more than four total mandates at public operating companies, if their attendance is below 75% of all board and committee meetings in the year under review, or if material governance failures have been identified. We apply a lower threshold for directors with significant commitments such as executive positions and chairmanships. Diversity: In our view, an effective board should be comprised of directors with a mix of skills, experience, tenure, and industry expertise together with a diverse profile of individuals of different genders, ethnicities, race, culture, age, perspectives and backgrounds. The board should reflect the diversity of the workforce, customers, and the communities in which a business operates. In our view, greater diversity in the boardroom contributes to robust challenge and debate, avoids groupthink, fosters innovation,