Company: CAF
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001104659-25-021323
Chunk: 124

Company: Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 124
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, unless the board or state law has set a policy or law establishing such rights at a threshold that we believe to be acceptable.

| - | Written Consent Rights |

In the U.S. context, we examine proposals for shareholder written consent rights on a case-by-case basis.

| - | Reincorporation |

We consider management and shareholder proposals to reincorporate to a different jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. We oppose such proposals if we believe the main purpose is to take advantage of laws or judicial precedents that reduce shareholder rights.

| - | Anti-greenmail Provisions |

Proposals relating to the adoption of anti-greenmail provisions will be supported, provided that the proposal: (i) defines greenmail; (ii) prohibits buyback offers to large block holders (holders of at least 1% of the outstanding shares and in certain cases, a greater amount) not made to all shareholders or not approved by disinterested shareholders; and (iii) contains no anti-takeover measures or other provisions restricting the rights of shareholders.

| - | Bundled Proposals |

We may consider opposing or abstaining on proposals if disparate issues are "bundled" and presented for a single vote. G. Auditors We generally support management proposals for selection or ratification of independent auditors. However, we may consider opposing such proposals with reference to incumbent audit firms if the company has suffered from serious accounting irregularities and we believe rotation of the audit firm is appropriate, or if fees paid to the auditor for non-audit-related services are excessive. Generally, to determine if non-audit fees are excessive, a 50% test will be applied (i.e., non-audit-related fees should be less than 50% of the total fees paid to the auditor). We generally vote against proposals to indemnify auditors. H. Executive and Director Remuneration We generally support the following:

| - | Proposals for employee equity                                                               
 compensation plans and other employee ownership plans, provided that our research does not  
 indicate that approval of the plan would be against shareholder interest. Such approval may 
 be against shareholder interest if it authorizes excessive dilution and shareholder cost,   
 particularly in the context of high usage ("run rate") of equity compensation in            
 the recent past; or if there are objectionable plan design and provisions.                  |

| - | Proposals relating to fees                                                                          
 to outside directors, provided the amounts are not excessive relative to other companies            
 in the country or industry, and provided that the structure is appropriate within