Company: NAZ
Filing Date: 2025-02-28
Form Type: N-2
Source: 0001839882-25-012465
Chunk: 128

Company: NUVEEN ARIZONA QUALITY MUNICIPAL INCOME FUND
Filing Date: 2025-02-28
Form: N-2
Chunk 128
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 company’s lobbying expenditures. Closed-endfunds We recognize that many exchange-listed closed-endfunds (“CEFs”) have adopted particular corporate governance practices that deviate from certain policies set forth in the Guidelines. We believe that the distinctive structure of CEFs can provide important benefits to investors, but leaves CEFs uniquely vulnerable to opportunistic traders seeking short-term gains at the expense of long-term shareholders. Thus, to protect the interests of their long-term shareholders, many CEFs have adopted measures to defend against attacks from short-term oriented activist investors. As such, in light of the unique nature of CEFs and their differences in corporate governance practices from operating companies, we will consider on a case-by-casebasis proposals involving the adoption of defensive measures by CEFs. This is consistent with our approach to proxy voting that recognizes the importance of case-by-caseanalysis to ensure alignment with investment team views, and voting in accordance with the best interest of our shareholders. Compensation issues Advisory votes on executive compensation (say on pay) General Policy: We will consider on a case-by-casebasis the advisory vote on executive compensation (say on pay). We expect well-designed plans that clearly demonstrate the alignment between pay and performance, and we encourage companies to be responsive to low levels of support by engaging with shareholders. We also prefer that companies offer an annual non-bindingvote on executive compensation. In absence of an annual vote, companies should clearly articulate the rationale behind offering the vote less frequently. We generally note the following red flags when evaluating executive compensation plans: Undisclosed or Inadequate Performance Metrics: We believe that performance goals for compensation plans should be disclosed meaningfully. Performance hurdles should not be too easily attainable. Disclosure of these metrics should enable shareholders to assess whether the plan will drive long-term value creation. Excessive Equity Grants: We will examine a company’s past grants to determine the rate at which shares are being issued. We will also seek to ensure that equity is being offered to more than just the top executives at the company. A pattern of excessive grants can indicate failure by the board to properly monitor executive compensation and its costs. Lack of Minimum Vesting Requirements: We believe that companies should establish minimum vesting guidelines for senior executives who receive stock grants. Vesting requirements help influence executives to focus on maximizing the company’s long-term performance rather than managing for short-term gain. Misalignment of Interests: We support equity ownership requirements for senior executives and directors to align their interests with those of shareholders. Special Award Grants: We will generally not support mega