Company: MYI
Filing Date: 2025-09-05
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001193125-25-196285
Chunk: 441

Company: BLACKROCK MUNIYIELD QUALITY FUND III, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-09-05
Form: 424B3
Chunk 441
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 the company’s financial position.

Differentiated voting rights

We prefer
companies to adopt a one-share, one-vote structure for share classes with the same economic exposure. Certain companies, particularly those new to public markets, could
make the case to adopt a differentiated voting rights structure, or dual class stock. In those situations, we encourage companies to evaluate and seek approval for their capital structure on a periodic basis.

B-11

Transactions and special situations

We monitor developments in transactions and special situations closely and undertake our own detailed analyses of proposals.

Mergers and acquisitions

We evaluate
proposed mergers or acquisitions by assessing the financial outcome for our clients as minority shareholders. Management should provide an assessment of the proposed transaction’s strategic and financial rationale, along with its execution and
operational risks. We review each transaction independently based on these factors and the degree to which the transaction enhances shareholder value. The board should consider establishing an ad hoc transaction committee to undertake an independent
assessment of a significant merger or acquisition, in advance of making its recommendation to shareholders.

We will vote against
transactions that, in our assessment, do not advance our clients’ financial interests.

Anti-takeover defenses

In principle, we do not support companies using anti-takeover defenses, also known as poison pills or shareholder rights plans, as they can
entrench management and boards which have not delivered long-term shareholder value. By exception, a poison pill may be supported if its purpose is to delay a takeover that is considered sub-optimal and enable
management to seek an improved offer. Similarly, management could make the case to use a poison pill to block a shareholder activism campaign that may be counter to the interests of other investors. Defense mechanisms introduced in these
circumstances should be limited in term and threshold, and also be closely monitored by the independent members of the board. We look for a shareholder vote for any mechanisms expected to be in place for more than 12 months.

Shareholder activism

When companies are
the focus of an activism campaign, we may engage with the activist to understand their analysis and objectives, once they have gone public. We will also engage with company management and possibly board members, especially those the activist may be
seeking to replace. In our assessment, we evaluate various factors, including the concerns raised by the activist and the case for change; the quality of both the activist’s and management’s plans; and the qualifications of each
party’s candidates. We evaluate each contested situation by assessing the potential financial outcome for our