Company: GWW
Filing Date: 2025-02-20
Form Type: PRE 14A
Source: 0001104659-25-015730
Chunk: 106

Company: W.W. GRAINGER, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-02-20
Form: PRE 14A
Chunk 106
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 with cumulative voting, because a shareholder can cumulate all of their votes and vote them all “for” one nominee, it is possible that a shareholder or group of shareholders holding a relatively small number of shares would be able to elect one or more directors by cumulating votes. Cumulative voting is only available for director elections. In order to eliminate cumulative voting, the Company will amend the Restated Articles of Incorporation to expressly provide that no holder of shares of any class of the Company shall have any cumulative voting rights, which amendment requires shareholder approval. By eliminating cumulative voting, our shareholders will gain the protections of a “one share, one vote” framework in director elections. In addition, eliminating cumulative voting would prevent any individual shareholder from having the ability to exercise disproportionate voting power, control or influence over director elections in excess of their actual economic ownership of Grainger shares. By eliminating cumulative voting, our shareholders would also reduce the risk that a minority shareholder or constituency would be able to override or subvert the will of the holders of a majority of our shares. The Board has determined that the elimination of cumulative voting is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. Reasons for Elimination of Cumulative Voting The Board believes that the elimination of cumulative voting is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders for the following reasons: • Annual Elections. Coupled with Grainger’s practice of annual election of all directors, cumulative voting increases the risk that a minority shareholder could take disruptive actions in opposition to the wishes of the holders of a majority of our shares. • Majority Voting Standard. Grainger currently employs a majority voting standard in elections of directors, which is the minimum standard permitted by Illinois law, even in contested elections. Under such standard, Grainger directors are elected by the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of the Company’s common stock present or represented by proxy and entitled to vote. The Board has determined that cumulative voting is incompatible, and fundamentally at odds, with a majority vote standard because it potentially allows relatively small shareholders to elect directors who are not supported by the holders of a majority of our shares. The Board believes that each director should represent the interests of, and be accountable to, all shareholders, rather than the interests of a minority shareholder or a special constituency. Grainger has also adopted a director resignation policy, providing that any incumbent director who fails to receive the required majority vote is expected to tender their resignation for consideration by the BANC. Such

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