Company: OWLS
Filing Date: 2025-01-24
Form Type: DRS/A
Source: 0000950123-25-000547
Chunk: 220

Company: OBOOK HOLDINGS INC.
Filing Date: 2025-01-24
Form: DRS/A
Chunk 220
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 and Articles do not provide for cumulative voting. As a result, our shareholders are not afforded any less protections or rights on this issue than shareholders of a Delaware
corporation.

Removal of Directors

Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a director of a corporation with a classified board may be removed only for cause with the approval
of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Under the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Memorandum and Articles, directors may be removed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the directors then in office (except with regard to the removal of the chairman, who may be removed from office by the affirmative vote of all directors) or by an ordinary resolution (except with
regard to the removal of the chairman, who may be removed from office by special resolution) of our shareholders. In addition, a director’s office shall be vacated if the director (i) becomes bankrupt or makes any arrangement or
composition with his creditors; (ii) is found to be or becomes of unsound mind or dies; (iii) resigns his office by notice in writing to the company; or (iv) is removed from office pursuant to any other provisions of the
Company’s Second Amended and Restated Memorandum and Articles.

Transactions with Interested Shareholders

The Delaware General Corporation Law contains a business combination statute applicable to Delaware corporations whereby, unless the
corporation has specifically elected not to be governed by such statute by amendment to its certificate of incorporation, it is prohibited from engaging in certain business combinations with an “interested shareholder” for three years
following the date that such person becomes an interested shareholder. An interested shareholder generally is a person or a group who or which owns the target’s outstanding voting share within the past three years. This has the effect of
limiting the ability of a potential acquirer to make a two-tiered bid for the target in which all shareholders would not be treated equally. The statute does not apply if, among other things, prior to the date
on which such shareholder becomes an interested shareholder, the board of directors approves either the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the person becoming an interested shareholder. This encourages any potential acquirer
of a Delaware corporation to negotiate the terms of any acquisition transaction with the target’s board of directors.

Cayman Islands
law has no comparable statute. As a result, we cannot avail ourselves of the types of protections afforded by the Delaware business combination statute. However, although Cay