Company: BPOPM
Filing Date: 2025-03-25
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001140361-25-010189
Chunk: 43

Company: POPULAR, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-03-25
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 43
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 key positions, as well as to address security concerns. We do not provide employment or change in control agreements. 2024 Executive Compensation Program and Pay Decisions Base Salary With the exception of Mr. García, who was promoted to CFO effective April 1, 2024, our NEOs did not receive a salary adjustment in 2024. The Committee approved a base salary adjustment for Mr. García, increasing his salary from $406,249 to $590,000, effective April 1, 2024, in connection with his promotion to the role of CFO.

| NEO                  |     | 2024 Base Salary(a) |     | % of Adjustment |
| Ignacio Alvarez      |     |         $ 1,130,000 |     |              0% |
| Carlos J. Vázquez(b) |     |             765,000 |     |               0 |
| Jorge J. García      |     |             590,000 |     |           45.2% |
| Javier D. Ferrer     |     |             790,000 |     |               0 |
| Lidio V. Soriano     |     |             590,000 |     |               0 |
| Manuel Chinea        |     |             565,000 |     |               0 |

50 | 2025 POPULAR, INC. PROXY STATEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Short-Term Incentive Compensation Opportunity Popular’s short-term incentive rewards the achievement of annual financial and non-financial goals that reinforce our business strategy and priorities. Actual payouts depend on performance and are capped at 1.5 times the target award. Pre-defined threshold levels of performance must be achieved for any payouts to be awarded. Each executive has a defined short-term incentive target opportunity expressed as a percentage of the executive’s base salary and a payout range. Target incentive opportunities are defined by role and consider market practice and target pay mix. The CEO’s target is defined as 135% of base salary; and the other NEOs’ target is defined as 80% of their base salary. The Committee also defined the performance criteria that would be used to determine payouts. Actual payouts for each component of the STI plan can range from 50% of target (for threshold performance) to 150% of target (for stretch performance). Actual performance below threshold results in no payout. Threshold performance is defined as 85% of target, whereas stretch performance is defined as 115% of