Company: TRUE
Filing Date: 2025-11-13
Form Type: PREM14A
Source: 0001104659-25-111498
Chunk: 102

Company: TrueCar, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-11-13
Form: PREM14A
Chunk 102
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 including its relationships with employees, customers, and suppliers, such as the possible loss of key management or other personnel of TrueCar during the pendency of the Merger.

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The risk that the Merger may not be completed, even if the Company Stockholder Approval is obtained from TrueCar Stockholders, due to a level of closing certainty in the Merger Agreement that is less than customary, including the following factors:

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If Parent fails to complete the Merger or otherwise breaches the Merger Agreement in certain circumstances, TrueCar’s remedies are effectively limited to a $15.0 million reverse termination fee, which may be inadequate to compensate TrueCar for the damage caused;

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TrueCar is entitled to seek specific performance of Parent’s obligation to complete the Merger and the Investor’s obligation to provide the Equity Financing only if Fair has obtained commitments for an additional $60 million of debt or equity financing;

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The uncommitted nature of additional financing that is required to be secured between signing and closing effectively provides Parent with the option to choose to pay the Parent Termination Fee in lieu of Closing if it no longer desires to complete the Merger or does not secure additional financing;

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The possibility that even if Parent desires to complete the Merger, additional financing may not be available on acceptable terms;

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The fact that Parent and the Investor are newly formed entities with no assets other than the Merger Agreement and the Equity Commitment Letter, and as a result TrueCar’s monetary remedy in the event of a breach of the Merger Agreement by Parent is limited to receipt of the Parent Termination Fee;

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The lack of visibility into the Investor’s sources of funds to satisfy its commitment to provide Equity Financing to Parent despite requests for financial information regarding the Investor;

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The fact that although affiliates of the Investor are well-known participants in the automotive retail industry with potentially significant assets, these affiliates are not parties to the Equity Commitment Letter or other transaction documents and TrueCar will not have recourse to their assets; and

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The possibility that these limited obligations provide Parent and the Investor leverage to renegotiate the Merger Agreement after TrueCar has exposed itself to the disruption of public announcement.

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The likelihood that even though the Merger Agreement allows TrueCar to seek alternative Acquisition Proposals for a thirty (30) day go-shop period, as well as respond to unsolicited Acquisition Proposals thereafter, that the number of parties previously contacted and who declined to proceed with a transaction reduces the likelihood of a Superior Proposal coming forth.

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The fact that certain No-Shop Parties have