Company: TEM
Filing Date: 2025-03-28
Form Type: PRE 14A
Source: 0001193125-25-067098
Chunk: 31

Company: Tempus AI, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-28
Form: PRE 14A
Chunk 31
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 law. 30

Delaware law and the Delaware Charter and Delaware Bylaws contain provisions that may have the effect of deterring hostile takeover attempts. A hostile takeover attempt may have a positive or negative effect on the Company and its stockholders, depending on the circumstances surrounding a particular takeover attempt. Takeover attempts that have not been negotiated or approved by our Board can be opportunistically timed to take advantage of an artificially depressed stock price. Takeover attempts can also be coercively structured, can disrupt the business and management of a corporation and can generally present a risk of terms that may be less favorable than would be available in a board-approved transaction. In contrast, transactions approved by our Board may be carefully planned and undertaken at an opportune time in order to obtain maximum value for the corporation and all of its stockholders by determining and pursuing the best strategic alternative, obtaining negotiating leverage to achieve the best terms available, and giving due consideration to matters such as tax planning, the management and business of the acquiring corporation and the most effective deployment of corporate assets. Our Board recognizes that hostile takeover attempts do not always have the unfavorable consequences or effects described above and may be beneficial to stockholders, providing them with considerable value for their shares. However, our Board believes that the potential disadvantages of unapproved takeover attempts are sufficiently great that prudent measures are needed to give our Board the time and flexibility to determine and pursue potentially superior strategic alternatives and take other appropriate action in an effort to maximize stockholder value in accordance with Delaware law. Accordingly, the Delaware Charter and Delaware Bylaws include certain provisions that are intended to accomplish these objectives, but which may have the effect of discouraging or deterring hostile takeover attempts. Nevada law includes some additional features that may deter hostile takeover attempts. The Nevada Charter contains certain anti-takeover provisions similar to those set forth in the Delaware Charter; both the Delaware Charter and Nevada Charter allow vacancies on the Board and the size of the Board to be set:

| • |     | before the Final Conversion Date (as defined below in “—Dual-Class Capital Structure”), by (i) a resolution approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the voting power of the Class A common stock and Class B common stock, voting together as a single class, or (ii) by the Board; and |

| • |     | on and after the Final Conversion Date, only by the Board. |

Notwithstanding these similarities, there are certain differences between Nevada and Delaware law which could have a bearing on unapproved takeover attempts. For example