Company: OSRH
Filing Date: 2025-01-24
Form Type: S-4/A
Source: 0001213900-25-006139
Chunk: 174

Company: OSR Holdings, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-01-24
Form: S-4/A
Chunk 174
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 and prosecuted as criminal offenses with both the company and the company’s executive officers being named as defendants in such proceedings. As a result of these current and changing risks, OSR Holdings’ executive officers may be named in the future in criminal investigations or proceedings stemming from its operations. In Korea, company executive officers being named in such investigations or proceedings are a common occurrence, even though in practice many such cases result in no liability to the individual. If OSR Holdings’ executive officers were to be named in such criminal proceedings or held either directly or vicariously criminally liable for the actions of OSR Holdings and its executives and employees, New OSR Holdings’ business, financial condition, and results of operations may be harmed. OSR Holdings is subject to certain requirements and restrictions under Korean law that may, in certain circumstances, require it to act in a manner that may not be in New OSR Holdings’ or its stockholders’ best interest. Under applicable Korean law, directors of a Korean company, such as OSR Holdings, owe a fiduciary duty to the company itself rather than to its stockholders. This fiduciary duty obligates directors of a Korean company to perform their duties faithfully for the good of the company as a whole. In addition, while the facts and circumstances 92 of each case will differ, the duty of care required of a director under Korean law may not be the same as the fiduciary duty of a director of a U.S. corporation. Although the “business judgment rule” concept exists in Korea, there is insufficient case law or precedent to provide guidance to the management and stockholders as to how it should be applied or interpreted. As a result, if circumstances arise in which the best interests of OSR Holdings conflicts with the best interests of New OSR Holdings or its stockholders, OSR Holdings may not be permitted under applicable Korean law to act in a manner that is in the best interest of New OSR Holdings or its stockholders. Approval by the board of directors of a Korean company is required for, among other things, all transactions between a director or major stockholder (including a 10% or more stockholder) and the company for the director’s or the major stockholder’s account. As a result, intercompany transactions between New OSR Holdings and OSR Holdings (or any other Korean subsidiary we may own, from time to time), could arise in the future in which the directors of the Korean subsidiary are not able to act in New OSR Holdings or its stockholders’