Company: MYI
Filing Date: 2025-09-02
Form Type: N-14 8C/A
Source: 0001193125-25-193985
Chunk: 435

Company: BLACKROCK MUNIYIELD QUALITY FUND III, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-09-02
Form: N-14 8C/A
Chunk 435
---
 or the chair of the relevant committee, where a company has not demonstrated it has an appointment process that
results in a high functioning board with the appropriate complement of skills, backgrounds and experience amongst the directors to support strong financial performance over time. We may vote against newly nominated directors who do not seem to have
the appropriate skills or experience to contribute to the board’s effectiveness.

Independence

Director independence from management, significant shareholders or other stakeholders (e.g., government or employees) is of paramount importance to the protection of
the interests of minority shareholders such as BlackRock’s clients. At least half of the directors should be independent and free from conflicts of interest or

See the Corporate Governance Codes of
Germany,Japan, and theUK, as well as the corporate governance principles of the USBusiness Roundtableas examples.

B-8

undue influence. This ensures sufficient independent directors to have appropriately independent board committees. Companies domiciled in
markets with a higher threshold for board independence should meet those requirements.

We may vote against the election of
non-independent directors if the board does not have a sufficient balance of independence. We may also vote against the election of the chair of the committee responsible for board composition if this is a
perennial issue.

Independent board leadership

Practices
across markets differ, as do board structures, but we observe two main approaches to independent board leadership. One is a non-executive, independent chair of the board who is responsible for leading the
board in the effective exercise of its duties. The other is a lead or senior independent director, who is responsible for coordinating with the other non-executive directors and working closely with the
executive chair on the board agenda and other board procedures. In this case, the executive chair and the lead independent director work together to ensure the board is effectively fulfilling its responsibilities. In our view, the independent leader
of the board, and/or the chair of a relevant committee, should be available to investors to discuss board governance matters such as CEO succession, executive pay, and board performance. We look to boards to explain their independent board
leadership model and how it serves the interests of shareholders.

We may vote against the election of the chair of the committee responsible for board
composition if there is not an identified independent leader of the board with clear responsibilities for board performance. We may vote against the most senior independent director if the board has a policy of not engaging with shareholders.

Tenure and succession

Boards should establish the length of time
a director would normally be