Company: DVAX
Filing Date: 2025-03-10
Form Type: DFAN14A
Source: 0001193125-25-050430
Chunk: 4

Company: DYNAVAX TECHNOLOGIES CORP
Filing Date: 2025-03-10
Form: DFAN14A
Chunk 4
---
 shareholders. The conflict of interests that exists between Mr. Myers and shareholders is troubling: Mr. Myers is the architect of the Company’s misguided strategy, and, given                                                                                                                                                                                    
 the fact that he is up for reelection at this year’s Annual Meeting, he is literally fighting for his job. On a related note, we were disappointed that the Company abruptly canceled our meeting scheduled for March 4th at the TD Cowen 45th Annual Healthcare Conference (and did so with just one day’s notice). This was also the first time we can remember that 
 the Company did not reach out to schedule a post-earnings call with management.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |

| • |     | Blatantly mischaracterized our negotiations – In another example of needless gamesmanship, one of                                                                                                                                                 
 your public comments inaccurately portrays the terms of potential settlement that have been discussed. Despite your claims, we were never offered a solution which involved a third independent director to be mutually agreed upon, but rather a 
 construct under which new directors chosen by the existing Board would be counted as “new directors” that should suit us. As you know, we first asked for three new directors, then two, and then were willing to settle for one, if the Board    
 agreed to take basic steps to improve governance. The fact that this proposal was rejected baffles us – and substantiates our belief that even more change is needed on the Board.                                                                |

These sorts of tactics serve no purpose other than to waste shareholder capital on needless advisor fees and poison the well around reaching a potential settlement. We call on the Board to abandon this course of action and instead engage on the substance of our concerns. Why Are You Doubling Down on Questionable Corporate Finance Strategy So Close to the Annual Meeting? Last week, the Company announced the refinancing of the majority of its outstanding convertible debt, which resulted in an increaseto debt obligations from $225 million to $265 million. The existing notes had a conversion price of $10.47 per share, effectively rendering them an equity equivalent given that the stock is trading ~35% above the conversion price. In fact, the Company already had the ability to force conversion of the notes under certain circumstances which were likely to occur in the near term. We applaud the decision to effectively buy back stock by eliminating these notes; this is precisely what we have been advocating. However, we are baffled at the Board’s choice of capital source to enact this buyback. Convertible notes are generally the most expensive cost of capital securities next