Company: NCL
Filing Date: 2025-01-29
Form Type: S-1/A
Source: 0001575872-25-000097
Chunk: 59

Company: Northann Corp.
Filing Date: 2025-01-29
Form: S-1/A
Chunk 59
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, either by a Compensation Committee comprised of independent directors or by a majority of the independent
directors on its Board of Directors and that compensation for all other officers must be determined, or recommended to the Board for determination,
either by such Compensation Committee or a majority of the independent directors on the company’s Board of Directors. Although we
do not intend to rely on the “controlled company” exemption under the NYSE American Company Guide, we could elect to rely
on this exemption in the future. If we elect to rely on the “controlled company” exemption, a majority of the members of our
Board of Directors might not be independent directors and our nominating and corporate governance and compensation committees might not
consist entirely of independent directors. Accordingly, during any time while we remain a controlled company relying on the exemption
and during any transition period following a time when we are no longer a controlled company, you would not have the same protections
afforded to shareholders of companies that are subject to all of the NYSE American corporate governance requirements. Our status as a
controlled company could cause our common stock to look less attractive to certain investors or otherwise harm our trading price.

Anti-takeover provisions in our charter documents and Nevada law could discourage, delay or prevent a change in control of our company and may affect the trading price of our common stock.

We are a Nevada corporation and the anti-takeover provisions
of the Nevada Revised Statutes may have the effect of deterring unsolicited takeovers or delaying or preventing a change in
control of our company or changes in our management, including transactions in which our stockholders might otherwise receive a premium
for their shares over then current market prices. In addition, these provisions may limit the ability of stockholders to approve transactions
that they may deem to be in their best interests. These provisions include:

| · | the inability of stockholders to call special meetings; |

| · | the “business combinations” and “control share acquisitions” provisions of Nevada                                                           
 law, to the extent applicable, could discourage attempts to acquire our stockholders stock even on terms above the prevailing market price; 
 and                                                                                                                                         |

| · | the ability of our board of directors to designate the terms of and issue new series of preferred stock                                
 without stockholder approval, which could include the right to approve an acquisition or other change in our control or could be used  
 to institute a rights plan, also known as a poison pill, that would dilute the stock ownership of a potential hostile acquirer,