Company: MRCY
Filing Date: 2025-09-10
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001049521-25-000029
Chunk: 62

Company: MERCURY SYSTEMS INC
Filing Date: 2025-09-10
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 62
---
 Steven V. Ratner            |     |              |   450,883 |     |                |     | 113.2% |     | $              |   510,400 |

#### Long-Term Incentives
Long-term incentive ("LTI") awards are intended to align the interests of our named executive officers with shareholders by linking a meaningful portion of executive pay to shareholder value creation over a multi-year period. LTI awards are also provided to drive the performance of our long-term business strategy, engage and retain our key executives and facilitate ownership of our common stock. The Committee generally grants long-term incentives to our named executive officers in the form of restricted stock units ("RSUs") and performance stock units ("PSUs").

#### Restricted Stock Units
RSUs are awarded to named executive officers under our LTI program to facilitate executive ownership of company stock, to align the interests of our executives with those of our shareholders and to support retention. RSUs vest in annual increments over a three-year period and the ultimate value of these awards to recipients is dependent on our stock price at the time of vesting.

#### Performance Stock Units
PSUs are awarded to named executive officers under our LTI program primarily to motivate multi-year financial achievements that are aligned with shareholder value creation. Award payouts under PSUs are tied to Mercury's financial performance over a three-year fiscal period beginning with the year in which they are granted. The financial performance measures used to calculate award payouts are adjusted EBITDA margin (which is adjusted EBITDA divided by organic revenue ) and organic revenue , each of which is equally weighted in determining overall performance. The payout factor for each measure ranges from 0% to 200%. The award payout is also subject to a modifier based on Mercury's TSR for the performance period relative to the companies within the SPADE® Defense Index. This modifier can increase or decrease

<div align='center'>51</div>

the payout percentage of the award by up to 25 percentage points. Accordingly, if maximum performance is achieved for the two performance measures (200%) and the TSR modifier (+ 25%), the award payout would be 225% of target shares.

For PSUs granted in fiscal 2025 (our fiscal 2025-2027 PSU awards), the Committee set annual performance goals for adjusted EBITDA margin and organic revenue for each year within the fiscal 2025-2027 performance period, subject to a three-year TSR-based performance modifier. The fiscal 2025 financial performance goals are set forth in the