Company: ECC-PD
Filing Date: 2025-04-11
Form Type: N-2ASR
Source: 0001104659-25-034204
Chunk: 67

Company: Eagle Point Credit Co Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-04-11
Form: N-2ASR
Chunk 67
---
 on several factors including its ability to offer competitive compensation, benefits and professional growth opportunities. Many of the entities, including investment funds (such as private equity funds, mezzanine funds and business development companies) and traditional financial services companies, with which the Adviser will compete for experienced personnel have greater resources than the Adviser has. There are significant actual and potential conflicts of interest which could impact our investment returns. Our executive officers and directors, and the Adviser and certain of its affiliates and their officers and employees, including the Senior Investment Team, have several conflicts of interest as a result of the other activities in which they engage. For example, the members of the Adviser’s investment team are and may in the future become affiliated with entities engaged in business activities similar to ours and may have conflicts of interest in allocating their time. Moreover, each member of the Senior Investment Team is engaged in other business activities which divert their time and attention. The professional staff of the Adviser will devote as much time to us as such professionals deem appropriate to perform their duties in accordance with the Investment Advisory Agreement. However, such persons may be committed to providing investment advisory and other services for other clients, and engage in other business ventures in which we have no interest. As a result of these separate business activities, the Adviser has conflicts of interest in allocating management time, services and functions among us, other advisory clients and other business ventures. Our incentive fee structure may incentivize the Adviser to pursue speculative investments, use leverage when it may be unwise to do so, or refrain from de-levering when it would otherwise be appropriate to do so. The incentive fee payable by us to the Adviser may create an incentive for the Adviser to pursue investments on our behalf that are riskier or more speculative than would be the case in the absence of such compensation arrangement. Such a practice could result in our investing in more speculative securities than would otherwise be the case, which could result in higher investment losses, particularly during economic downturns. The incentive fee payable to the Adviser is based on our Pre-Incentive Fee Net Investment Income, as calculated in accordance with our Investment Advisory Agreement. This may encourage the Adviser to use leverage to increase the return on our investments, even when it may not be appropriate to do so, and to refrain from de-levering when it would otherwise be appropriate to do so. Under certain circumstances, the use of leverage may increase the likelihood of default, which would impair the value of our securities. See “— Risks