Company: CAF
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001104659-25-021323
Chunk: 118

Company: Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 118
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.g., New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq rules for most U.S. companies, and The Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom). Thus, for an NYSE company with no controlling shareholder, we would expect that at a minimum a majority of directors should be independent as defined by NYSE. Where we view market standards as inadequate, we may withhold votes based on stronger independence standards. Market standards notwithstanding, we generally do not view long board tenure alone as a basis to classify a director as non-independent.

| 1. | At a                                                                                           
 company with a shareholder or group that controls the company by virtue of a majority economic 
 interest in the company, we have a reduced expectation for board independence, although we     
 believe the presence of independent directors can be helpful, particularly in staffing the     
 audit committee, and at times we may withhold support from or vote against a nominee on the    
 view the board or its committees are not sufficiently independent. In markets where board      
 independence is not the norm (e.g. Japan), however, we consider factors including whether      
 a board of a controlled company includes independent members who can be expected to look       
 out for interests of minority holders.                                                         |

| 2. | We consider                                                                                  
 withholding support from or voting against a nominee if he or she is affiliated with a major 
 shareholder that has representation on a board disproportionate to its economic interest.    |

■Depending on market standards, we consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee who is interested and who is standing for election as a member of the company's compensation/remuneration, nominating/governance or audit committee. ■We consider withholding support from or voting against nominees if the term for which they are nominated is excessive. We consider this issue on a market-specific basis. ■We consider withholding support from or voting against nominees if in our view there has been insufficient board renewal (turnover), particularly in the context of extended poor company performance. Also, if the board has failed to consider diversity, including but not limited to, gender and ethnicity, in its board composition. ■We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee standing for election if the board has not taken action to implement generally accepted governance practices for which there is a "bright line" test. For example, in the context of the U.S. market, failure to eliminate a dead hand or slow hand poison pill would be seen as a basis for opposing one or more incumbent nominees. ■In markets that encourage designated audit committee financial experts, we consider voting against members of