Company: CCNE
Filing Date: 2025-03-03
Form Type: S-4/A
Source: 0001193125-25-044149
Chunk: 112

Company: CNB FINANCIAL CORP/PA
Filing Date: 2025-03-03
Form: S-4/A
Chunk 112
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ive Plan”) uses a balanced scorecard approach. The performance measures and goals are selected and approved by the ECC, and then affirmed by the CNB Board of Directors, at the beginning of each year. The ECC reviews CNB’s Incentive Plan annually. For 2024, the ECC modified the Incentive Plan by replacing commercial loan revenues with loan growth, combining interest-bearing deposit growth and noninterest-bearing deposit growth into a single deposit growth metric and removed the wealth and asset management fee. These changes were made to align the 2024 Incentive Plan with CNB’s key strategic goals. For 2024, the ECC selected, and the CNB Board of Directors approved the following absolute metrics for the annual Incentive Plan: (i) fully-diluted EPS; (ii) efficiency ratio; (iii) organic loan growth (excluding syndicated loans); and (iv) deposit growth (excluding time deposits). For Mr. Peduzzi, the CEO, the ECC added a qualitative portion to his scorecard as a fifth component. The qualitative portion is based on his board-rated performance with respect to certain objectives for the year. Each NEO has a target opportunity based on his or her position at CNB and competitive market data. For 2024, each NEO’s target opportunity (as a percentage of base salary) was reduced from 2023. An NEO can earn 60.87% of his or her target incentive for achieving minimum performance goals, 100% of target incentive for achieving target performance goals and 260.87% of target incentive for achieving stretch performance goals. Incentive payouts will be interpolated for performance at or above target. If performance falls between minimum performance and target performance levels, there is no interpolation of payout. If the minimum performance goal has not been achieved with respect to a performance goal, then no payout would be earned with respect to that performance goal. For 2024, the target incentive payout for the CEO was reduced from 35% to 28.75%, and for the other NEOs the target incentive payout was reduced 35% to 20.13%, in conjunction with CNB’s efforts to manage the rate of growth in its operating expenses. This adjustment is intended to be temporary in nature as CNB continues to make progress in achieving its financial performance goals.

| NEO                 |     | Title                                                        |     | 2024 Incentive 
 Target         
 Opportunity    
 (% of Base     
 Salary)        |       |   |     | 2024 In