Company: ABBV
Filing Date: 2025-03-10
Form Type: PRE 14A
Source: 0001558370-25-002603
Chunk: 89

Company: AbbVie Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-10
Form: PRE 14A
Chunk 89
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 shareholders but opposed by the ABBV Corporate Governance Committee. ABBV shareholders have given 95% support to 5 ABBV proposals on this topic since 2018. However the corporate governance of ABBV is so undemocratic that these 95% votes did not equal 80% of votes from all shares outstanding which is the undemocratic requirement at ABBV. One solution to this is to adjourn the annual meeting and seek more votes until the 80% requirement is met. The ABBV Corporate Governance Committee is potentially derelict in not taking this simple step in response to 5 ABBV Solutions shareholder votes of 95% approval since 2018. The ABBV Corporate Governance Committee has relied on the Skadden law firm of 1700 attorneys and $3 Billion in annual revenue. Why hasn’t the Skadden law firm come up with a means to adopt an ABBV proposal topic that has been approved by 95% of ABBV shares 5-times since 2018? ABBV scores 9 in regard to shareholder rights with 10 being the worse possible score. Why can’t the Skadden law firm be given the assignment to get this important proposal adopted and improve ABBV shareholder rights? Please vote yes:

78 | 2025 Proxy Statement

| ​ | STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS |

Simple Majority Vote – Proposal 5 Board of Directors Statement in Opposition to the Stockholder Proposal on Simple Majority Vote The Board of Directors recommends that stockholders vote AGAINST this proposal. Given the management proposal on the same topic to eliminate supermajority voting included this year and in prior years, this stockholder proposal is redundant, unnecessary, and confusing. Changing the By-Laws to simple majority vote as the stockholder proposes (and as management similarly proposes in its own proposal) requires 80% of outstanding shares to vote in favor. Supporting this stockholder proposal adds nothing to the effort to eliminate supermajority voting; rather, it is the management proposal that ultimately must pass in order to eliminate supermajority voting (and ultimately, declassify the Board). In other words, even if a stockholder votes in favor of this stockholder proposal, unless the management proposal passes, it has no effect. The Board of Directors recommends that stockholders vote in favor of its management proposal instead of this stockholder proposal. The Board has long demonstrated its commitment to eliminating the supermajority voting provisions in our charter and By-Laws, as evidenced by this year’s