Company: BNRG
Filing Date: 2025-03-04
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0001213900-25-020178
Chunk: 39

Company: Brenmiller Energy Ltd.
Filing Date: 2025-03-04
Form: 20-F
Item: Item 3
Chunk 39
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 company with the Israel Registrar of Companies and at least 30 days have passed from the date on which
the shareholders of both merging companies have approved the merger. In addition, a majority of each class of securities of the target
company must approve a merger. Moreover, a tender offer for all of a company’s issued and outstanding shares can only be completed
if the acquirer receives positive responses from the holders of at least 95% of the issued share capital. Completion of the tender offer
also requires approval of a majority of the offerees that do not have a personal interest in the tender offer, unless, following consummation
of the tender offer, the acquirer would hold at least 98% of the Company’s outstanding shares. Furthermore, the shareholders, including
those who indicated their acceptance of the tender offer, may, at any time within six months following the completion of the tender offer,
claim that the consideration for the acquisition of the shares does not reflect their fair market value, and petition an Israeli court
to alter the consideration for the acquisition accordingly, unless the acquirer stipulated in its tender offer that a shareholder that
accepts the offer may not seek such appraisal rights, and the acquirer or the company published all required information with respect
to the tender offer prior to the tender offer’s response date.

Certain
provisions of our amended and restated articles of association may delay changes in control. Our amended and restated articles of association
provide for a staggered board of directors consisting of three classes of directors. Directors of each class are chosen for three-year
terms upon the expiration of their current terms and each year one class of our directors will be elected by our shareholders. This classified
board provision could have the effect of making the replacement of incumbent directors more time consuming and difficult. At least two
annual meetings of shareholders, instead of one, will generally be required to effect a change in a majority of our board of directors.
Thus, the classified board provision could increase the likelihood that incumbent directors will retain their positions. The staggered
terms of directors may delay, defer or prevent a change in control in the Company, even though a change in control might be considered
by our shareholders to be in their best interest.

Furthermore,
Israeli tax considerations may make potential transactions unappealing to us or to our shareholders whose country of residence does not
have a tax treaty with Israel exempting such shareholders from Israeli tax. For example, Israeli tax law does not recognize tax-free share
exchanges