Company: BPOPM
Filing Date: 2025-03-25
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001140361-25-010189
Chunk: 51

Company: POPULAR, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-03-25
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 51
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 Awards (Granted in February 2024) In February 2024 the Committee approved NEO equity grants, as follows: Performance Shares Performance shares, reflecting 50% of the target LTI opportunity, reward our future performance and vest only if pre-defined performance goals are achieved. Awards were granted at target award level and vest three years following the grant based on actual performance during the 2024-2026 period. Two measures, weighted equally, are used to determine vesting:

| • | 3-year relative TSR compared to an industry index of United States banks with assets between $25 billion and $500 billion (50% of performance shares); and |

| • | absolute 3-year simple average ROATCE (50% of performance shares). |

Each performance measure has a pre-defined threshold (minimum result for which an incentive would be payable), target and maximum (stretch) level of performance that determines vesting at the end of the 3-year period. Performance below threshold results in forfeiture of the shares allocated to the corresponding performance measure. Dividend equivalents are accrued and paid at the end of the performance period upon vesting based on the actual number of shares earned. The TSR portion pays at 100% of target if Popular’s 3-year relative TSR is at the 50 thpercentile of the Corporation’s comparator group, scaling down to 50% of target if Popular’s 3-year relative TSR is at the 25 thpercentile. Performance below the 25 thpercentile results in forfeiture of allocated shares. Conversely, if Popular’s 3-year relative TSR is at or above the 75 thpercentile, the TSR portion pays the maximum of 150% of target. If Popular’s 3-year absolute TSR is negative, payout will be capped at 100% of target, even if Popular’s relative positioning is above the 50 thpercentile. The ROATCE portion sets a goal for 3-year average ROATCE whereby target reflects an expectation that aligns with our Board-approved budget and is deemed by the Committee as reasonable but challenging. Threshold for the 3-year period represents the minimum level of ROATCE that should warrant a reduced (i.e., 50%) payout. The maximum goal reflects superior performance over the 3-year period that represents stretch performance that is possible, but less likely to be achieved and results in a maximum award (i.e., 150%). We do not disclose in advance the internal absolute performance targets set for the 3-year performance period because such disclosure could be