Company: SNPS
Filing Date: 2025-02-14
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0000883241-25-000008
Chunk: 121

Company: SYNOPSYS INC
Filing Date: 2025-02-14
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 121
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employment consulting fees or office expense and equity awards if vesting is accelerated, or a performance condition waived, due to termination.

The Board shall retain the option to seek shareholder approval after material terms are agreed upon.

This proposal is relevant even if there are current golden parachute limits. A limit on golden parachutes is like a speed limit. A speed limit by itself does not guarantee that the speed limit will never be exceeded. Like this proposal the rules associated with a speed limit provide consequences if the limit is exceeded. With this proposal the consequences are a non-binding shareholder vote is required for unreasonably rich golden parachutes.

This proposal places no limit on long-term equity pay or any other type pay. This proposal thus has no impact on the ability to attract executive talent and does not discourage the use of long-term equity pay because it places no limit on golden parachutes. It simply requires that overly rich golden parachutes be subject to a non binding shareholder vote at a shareholder meeting already scheduled for other matters.

This proposal is relevant because the annual say on executive pay vote does not have a separate section for approving or rejecting golden parachutes.

This proposal topic also received between 51 % and 65% support at:
FedEx (FDX)
Spirit AeroSystems (SPR)
Alaska Air (ALK)
AbbVie (ABBV)
Fiserv (FISV)

<div align='center'>Please vote yes:

Shareholder Ratification of Golden Parachutes – Proposal 6</div>

#### 2025 Proxy Statement103
| Stockholder Proposal |

Synopsys' Statement in Opposition to Proposal 6

Our Board of Directors (the “ Board ”) recommends that you vote AGAINST Proposal 6 because, as described below:

• Our existing severance plans and agreements already place reasonable and appropriate limits on cash severance compensation;

• The proposal could create a misalignment between our executives and our stockholders, including during a change of control transaction;

• The proposal would unnecessarily restrict our Compensation Committee’s ability to structure market competitive executive compensation and could limit our ability to attract and retain executive talent; and

• Our stockholders already have effective means to express their views on executive compensation, including our post-termination compensation programs.

Our existing severance plans and agreements already place reasonable and appropriate limits on cash severance compensation.

We believe our current executive compensation policies and practices align the interests of our NEOs with those of our stockholders and provide reasonable and appropriate limits on post-termination compensation. Our NEOs, other than our CEO