Company: ETV
Filing Date: 2025-04-29
Form Type: N-2ASR
Source: 0001193125-25-103160
Chunk: 215

Company: Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Buy-Write Opportunities Fund
Filing Date: 2025-04-29
Form: N-2ASR
Chunk 215
---
 decisions with the intent of maximizing long-term shareholder value creation. We generally support proposals that enhance shareholder rights and vote against those that seek to undermine them. We believe that in most cases, each common share should have one vote, and that a simple majority of voting shares should be what is required to effect change. Shareholder Rights Plans Shareholder rights plans, commonly known as poison pills, and similar take-over defenses should aim to promote long-term shareholder value creation. When designing plans and defenses, companies should ensure that they do not suppress potential value by unduly discouraging acquirers. We generally expect companies to seek shareholder approval or ratification of shareholder rights plans.

| 7 | For example, we may withhold support for a director we believe is responsible for a company’s involvement/remediation of breach of global conventions such as UN Global Compact Principles on Human Rights, Labor Standards, Environment and Business Malpractice. |

Unequal Voting Rights We generally expect companies to adhere to the one share one vote principle. When companies have dual-class structures, they should ensure that such structures are not misused to support instances where a few insiders may benefit at the cost of other shareholders. Ultimately, structures should strive to create alignment between the shareholders’ economic interests and their voting power. Voting Requirements We typically prefer a majority vote standard for binding votes. We also expect management to be responsive to non-bindingvotes that have received majority support. We generally expect companies to protect minority shareholder rights as their primary goal when considering supermajority vote requirements. Right to call Special Meetings We generally expect companies to allow large shareholders to call special meetings. A large shareholder may be defined by a reasonable threshold or in line with prevalent market practices. Proxy Access We generally consider ownership thresholds, holding periods, the number of directors that shareholders may nominate and any restrictions on forming a group in our evaluation of proposals related to proxy access. E. Capital Structure We expect any changes to the capital structure to be driven by legitimate business needs and not as a means of anti-takeover defense. We generally expect companies to ensure that such changes do not disadvantage shareholders. Companies should provide a clear business rationale when requesting the authorization, or increase in authorization, of new shares or new share classes. They ought to request a reasonable number of shares in relation to the purpose outlined. Companies should follow prevalent market practices, such as offering pre-emptiverights, to ensure shareholders are not excessively diluted, unless required by specific circumstances which are clearly stated. We generally consider specific company and market context when we evaluate proposals on dividend payout