Company: HBAN
Filing Date: 2025-07-21
Form Type: S-4
Source: 0001140361-25-026508
Chunk: 156

Company: HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC /MD/
Filing Date: 2025-07-21
Form: S-4
Chunk 156
---
 the corporation’s voting shares or (b) is an affiliate or associate of the corporation and, during the preceding two-year period, was the beneficial owner of ten percent (10%) or more of the corporation’s voting shares. A person is not an interested stockholder under the MGCL if, prior to the most recent time at which the person would otherwise have become an interested stockholder, the board of directors of the corporation approved the transaction which otherwise would have resulted in the person becoming an interested stockholder. After any such five (5)-year period, any business combination between the Maryland corporation and an interested stockholder generally must be recommended by the board of directors of the corporation and approved by the affirmative vote of at least:

| • | eighty percent (80%) of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation, voting together as a single voting group; and |

| • | two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast by holders of voting shares other than voting shares held by the interested stockholder who will (or whose affiliate will) be a party to the business combination or by an affiliate or associate of the interested stockholder, voting together as a single voting group. |

These supermajority approval requirements do not apply if, among other conditions, the corporation’s common shareholders receive a minimum price (as provided in the MGCL) for their shares and the consideration is received in cash or in the same form as previously paid by the interested stockholder for its shares. The MGCL may have the effect of inhibiting a non-negotiated merger or other business combination involving Huntington, even if some or a majority of Huntington’s shareholders might believe it to be in their best interests or in which Huntington’s shareholders might receive a premium for their stock over Huntington’s then market price. Certain Charter and Bylaw Provisions Potentially Having an Anti-Takeover Effect Huntington’s charter and bylaws contain certain provisions that could have an anti-takeover effect and thus discourage potential takeover attempts and make it more difficult for Huntington’s shareholders to change management or receive a premium for their shares. These provisions include:

| • | authorization for Huntington’s board of directors to issue shares of one or more series of preferred stock without shareholder approval; |

| • | a requirement that directors only be removed from office for cause and only upon the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of all the votes entitled to be cast generally in the election of directors; |

| • | a requirement under Maryland law that shareholder action without a meeting requires unanimous written consent; |

| •