Company: WCC
Filing Date: 2025-04-10
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001193125-25-078098
Chunk: 76

Company: WESCO INTERNATIONAL INC
Filing Date: 2025-04-10
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 76
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 the Board unanimously recommends a vote AGAINST this proposal. The Board recognizes that providing stockholders with special meeting rights can be an important governance practice. For this reason, the Board has recommended that stockholders approve Proposal 3 to provide stockholders owning a combined 25% of our outstanding shares of Common Stock the right to request a special meeting, subject to the procedural and related requirements described in Proposal 3. The Board believes a 25% ownership threshold strikes the appropriate balance between enhancing stockholder rights and protecting the long-term interests of the Company and its stockholders. Market Practice Supports a 25% Threshold– The 10% threshold requested by the stockholder is lower than that of a significant majority of S&P 500 companies that offer stockholders a special meeting right. According to recent FactSet data, approximately 55% of S&P 500 companies that provide stockholders with special meeting rights have set the ownership

| Wesco 2025 Proxy Statement |     | Proposal 5 - Shareholder Proposal to Give Shareholders the Ability to Call for a Special 
 Shareholder Meeting                                                                      |     | 71 |

threshold at 25% or higher, while only about 15% have adopted a 10% threshold. The Board believes that aligning with market standards better serves the interests of our stockholders. Protection Against Misuse and Disproportionate Influence– Special meetings impose significant costs on the Company, both administrative and operational. Our Board, management team, and employees must devote substantial time and attention to prepare for a special meeting, diverting resources from their primary focus of operating our business and creating long-term stockholder value. Given the Company’s current ownership structure, a 10% threshold could allow a single stockholder or small group of stockholders to unilaterally call a special meeting to advance narrow interests that may not be shared by the broader stockholder base. Appropriate Safeguards and Cost Considerations– The Board believes the 25% threshold creates appropriate safeguards while still ensuring stockholder access. This structure helps prevent duplicative meetings and ensures that special meetings are called only by stockholders with demonstrated long-term investment in the Company’s success. Each special meeting imposes substantial costs, including:

| • |     | preparation and distribution of required disclosure documents |

| • |     | proxy solicitation expenses and vote tabulation |

| • |     | costs to host the meeting virtually or in person |

| • |     | significant legal and administrative expenses |

| • |     | time and resources diverted from business management and