Company: BHM
Filing Date: 2025-03-20
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001104659-25-026164
Chunk: 95

Company: Bluerock Homes Trust, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-20
Form: 424B3
Chunk 95
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 possibility that our Manager, its officers and their respective affiliates will face conflicts of interest relating to the purchase and 
 leasing of properties and that such conflicts may not be resolved in our favor, thus potentially limiting our investment opportunities, 
 impairing our ability to make distributions and adversely affecting the trading price of our stock;                                     |

| ● | The                                                                                                                                     
 possibility that if we acquire properties from Bluerock or its affiliates, the price may be higher than we would pay if the transaction 
 were the result of arm’s-length negotiations with a third party;                                                                        |

| ● | The                                                                                                                                                
 possibility that our Manager will face conflicts of interest caused by its indirect ownership by Bluerock, some of whose officers are              
 also our officers and one of whom is a director of ours, resulting in actions that may not be in the long-term best interests of our stockholders; |

| ● | Our                                                                                                                                       
 Manager will have considerable discretion with respect to the terms and timing of our acquisition, disposition and leasing transactions,  
 and the Incentive Fee payable by us to our Manager will be determined based on AFFO (as defined in the Management Agreement), which may   
 create an incentive for our Manager to make investments that are risky or more speculative than would otherwise be in our best interests; |

| ● | The                                                                                                                         
 possibility that we may acquire or merge with our Manager, resulting in an internalization of our management functions; and |

| ● | The                                                                                                                                          
 possibility that the competing demands for the time of our Manager, its affiliates and our officers may result in them spending insufficient 
 time on our business, which may result in our missing investment opportunities or having less efficient operations, which could reduce       
 our profitability and result in lower distributions to you.                                                                                  |

The Incentive Fee we pay our Manager may induce it to make riskier investments, which could adversely affect our financial condition, results of operations and the trading price of our stock. The Incentive Fee payable by us to our Manager will be determined based on AFFO, which may create an incentive for our Manager to make investments that are risky or more speculative than would otherwise be in our best interests. In evaluating investments and other management strategies, the incentive fee structure may lead our Manager to place undue emphasis on the maximization of AFFO at the expense of other criteria, such as preservation of capital, in order to increase the Incentive Fee. Investments with higher yields generally have higher risk of loss than investments with lower yields, and could result in higher investment losses, particularly