Company: ZVRA
Filing Date: 2025-04-16
Form Type: PRRN14A
Source: 0000897069-25-000815
Chunk: 10

Company: ZEVRA THERAPEUTICS, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-04-16
Form: PRRN14A
Chunk 10
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the two incumbent directors whose terms were set to expire at the Annual Meeting and who are nominated by the Board for re-election at the Annual Meeting), provided that the Board also supports Dr. Mickle (the “ Updated Mangless Offer”). On March 21, 2025, Mr. DeBoom sent an email to Mr. Thompson, copying a representative of Latham & Watkins LLP, to reiterate the Updated Mangless Offer. On March 24, 2025, Mr. Thompson sent an email to Mr. DeBoom, copying a representative of Latham & Watkins LLP, providing Mr. Mangless with the required notification of the Company’s nominees for election at the Annual Meeting, Ms. Favorito and Dr. Dixon, pursuant to Rule 14a-19(d) under the Exchange Act. On March 31, 2025, the Company filed a preliminary proxy statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“ SEC”) in connection with the 2025 Annual Meeting. On April 10, 2025, the Proponent filed a preliminary proxy statement with the SEC in connection with the Annual Meeting followed by a press release to the stockholders of the Company. On April [15], 2025, the Proponent filed an amended and restated preliminary proxy statement with the SEC in connection with the Annual Meeting. 7 REASONS FOR OUR SOLICITATION We believe Zevra is dramatically undervalued and our goal is to help the Company reach its full potential. Zevra has a troubling history of underperformance and poor corporate governance practices and the stockholders have long suffered under the leadership of the current Board of Directors. While the election at Zevra’s 2023 Annual Meeting of Stockholders brought about important change, including new leadership with extensive commercial experience, I believe that other important governance issues remain unresolved, to the detriment of all Zevra stockholders. Namely, I believe these unresolved issues include the Company’s governance practice of having a classified board and the use of a plurality voting standard for the election of directors in uncontested elections. I believe declassification would provide stockholders the ability to evaluate each director annually, which is viewed by many institutional stockholders as increasing the accountability of directors to such stockholders. With regard to using a majority vote standard for the election of directors in uncontested elections, I believe this would give stockholders a greater voice because it eliminates the ability of a small minority of stockholders, or even as few as one stockholder, to elect directors