Company: STAA
Filing Date: 2025-09-24
Form Type: DFAN14A
Source: 0001213900-25-091197
Chunk: 16

Company: STAAR SURGICAL CO
Filing Date: 2025-09-24
Form: DFAN14A
Chunk 16
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 our view, the Proposed Merger materially undervalues the Company and its extremely valuable assets. A Windfiall fio» ǐkc Excc"ǐivcs Given these apparent deficiencies, we have wondered why the Board would support an inadequate transaction such as this one, especially when the management team has noted that the Company’s “short - term tactical challenges will mostly be addressed by the end of [the second quarter of 2025 ]” 20 and that it is “optimistic for the future . ” 21 Having read the Company’s proxy statement, we believe we understand the reason for STAAR’s abrupt change in strategic direction . Under the Company’s compensation program, named executive officers (“NEOs”) are entitled to receive cash severance and other benefits in the event of a change in control of the Company and a qualifying termination. 22 Payments of this nature are generally referred to as “double - trigger” change in control benefits. 23 However, under the terms of the Merger Agreement, the Company’s compensation program will be revised so that NEOs’ equity awards vest immediately upon the consummation of the Proposed Merger (i . e . , “single - trigger”) . 24 A substantial portion of the value of those awards reflects assumed performance at 160 % of target levels, 25 with no evidence that the Company’s performance in 2025 would otherwise merit such a generous payout . 26 In the aggregate, STAAR’s NEOs are poised to earn approximately $55 million in compensation payable in connection with the Proposed Merger. 27 The Company’s CEO alone stands to receive approximately $24 million in compensation, 28 despite the fact that he had been serving in his role for just five months at the time the Merger Agreement was executed. 29 A Conflicǐcd Ðoa»d and anagc½cnǐ fica½ We are concerned that the otherwise inexplicable decision to sell the Company at an obviously inopportune time, after a limited and questionable process and at an inadequate price, was influenced by the Board’s numerous business entanglements with Alcon and management’s personal financial interests. The Chair of the Board was a consultant to Alcon when the dialogue with Alcon began, while two other directors at that time had significant business interests with Alcon. As best we can tell from the proxy disclosure, it was not until our firm raised the conflict - of - interest issue with STAAR’s CEO that the Chair revealed the extent