Company: BANC-PF
Filing Date: 2025-03-27
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001169770-25-000015
Chunk: 53

Company: BANC OF CALIFORNIA, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-03-27
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 53
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     | 160%    |     | $                            | 250,000 |     | $      |   500,000 |     | $       | 1,000,000 |
| John Sotoodeh(1) |     | 40%                          |     | 80%    |     | 160%    |     | $                            | 250,000 |     | $      |   500,000 |     | $       | 1,000,000 |

(1) Mr. Sotoodeh, who departed from the Company effective November 7, 2024, was not eligible to earn an incentive award for 2024.

The CNG Committee recognizes the importance of rewarding and incentivizing the executive team for performance that supports our Board-approved strategic plan and focuses on financial metrics that drive long-term stockholder value while also being within management's control. In early 2024, the CNG Committee defined and set the following performing metrics and corresponding weights for the 2024 incentive award:

• [35%] 4Q24 Core Return on Average Tangible Common Equity (Core ROATCE) (core earnings / average tangible common equity). Core earnings is defined as net earnings available to common and equivalent stockholders excluding certain items (see Appendix - Non-GAAP Measures for further details);

• [25%] 4Q24 Core Adjusted Noninterest Expense (total noninterest expense, less (1) customer-related expenses; and (2) merger and integration costs)(see Appendix - Non-GAAP Measures for further details);

• [15%] 4Q24 Average Noninterest-Bearing Deposits Growth (Average NIB Deposits Growth) (growth in 4Q24 average noninterest-bearing deposits from 4Q23 average noninterest-bearing deposits); and

• [25%] Qualitative Considerations (represents CNG Committee discretion related to other qualitative considerations not reflected in the foregoing performance metrics).

These metrics were selected by the CNG Committee to reward executives for executing specific strategic initiatives that the CNG Committee and Board believe drive our profitability and long-term stockholder value. In addition to utilizing the performance criteria described above, in order to mitigate risk, the 2024 incentive awards included a gating measure requiring that the Company and the Bank be “well-capitalized” under all regulatory definitions, which if not met, would result in executive management not being eligible to receive incentive compensation.

The Executive Incentive Plan provides the CNG Committee the authority