Company: SXI
Filing Date: 2025-09-05
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001437749-25-028442
Chunk: 31

Company: STANDEX INTERNATIONAL CORP/DE/
Filing Date: 2025-09-05
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 31
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 of the executive compensation program embody this principle by linking the annual incentive opportunity and long-term equity grants directly to such performance.

On an annual basis, the Compensation Committee reviews an independent report, provided by the external compensation consultant, on realizable pay for performance to ensure that our executives’ realizable pay is in line with overall Company performance and is also competitive when compared to the Company’s peer group.

Incentive Compensation Should Represent the Majority of Total Target Compensation

The Compensation Committee believes that the majority of an executive’s compensation should be “at risk,” as an incentive to drive the creation of sustainable shareholder value and align the interests of our executives with those of our shareholders. In FY 2025, our Named Executive Officers’ incentive compensation amounted to 64% of their total target compensation, on average. The Committee believes that the CEO’s incentive compensation should be a higher percentage of total compensation given the CEO’s strategic position and responsibility to drive company performance. In FY 2025, the CEO’s incentive compensation was 81% of his total target compensation. The below table presents the percentage of total target compensation that was “at- risk” for each Named Executive Officer.

| Name            | Percent of FY 2025 Pay “At Risk” (%) |
| David Dunbar    | 81.1 %                               |
| Ademir Sarcevic | 71.8 %                               |
| Alan Glass      | 60.8 %                               |
| Annemarie Bell  | 58.3 %                               |
| Max Arets       | 50.0 %                               |

2025 Proxy Statement 37

Incentive Compensation Should Balance Short-Term and Long-Term Performance

The Compensation Committee believes that driving sustained shareholder value creation requires that executive incentive compensation be appropriately balanced between short and long-term objectives. In addition, the Compensation Committee believes that such balancing discourages excessive risk taking that otherwise could drive short-term results at the expense of sustained long-term performance. Our executive compensation program promotes this objective by balancing the long-term incentive components in the form of equity-based awards, such as restricted stock awards and contingent performance shares, with short-term annual cash incentive opportunities.

The value of long-term incentive components is tied, in part, to our stock price, thereby aligning executives’ interests with those of shareholders. However, the Compensation Committee recognizes that our share price is an incomplete measure of Company performance in the short term, as other factors may significantly impact stock prices. Accordingly, the annual cash incentive opportunity component of executive compensation emphasizes current or short