Company: BCS
Filing Date: 2025-02-13
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0000312069-25-000114
Chunk: 260

Company: BARCLAYS PLC
Filing Date: 2025-02-13
Form: 20-F
Chunk 260
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 clients. In annual bonus, we have increased the weighting allocated to the strategic objectives that support our three-year plan. Emphasis that it is important not to incentivise excessive risk taking The Committee considered this in detail and ensured that the new DRP retains existing guardrails, such as the Committee&#8217;s overrides and discretions to ensure incentive outcomes are aligned with the results achieved. With the reduction in fixed pay and increase in variable pay opportunity, the new DRP will see a greater proportion of pay subject to malus and clawback provisions. Support for higher pay opportunities &#8211; provided any higher payout is justified by strong performance The new DRP increases the Executive Directors' pay competitiveness, though without the maximum total compensation opportunity approaching that of US peers, recognising the Group's UK-listed context &#8211; and recognising that maximum would only be delivered for outstanding outperformance, e.g. average RoTE of 14% or more. Payout &#8216;cross-over&#8217; versus the current DRP, where payout under the proposed DRP equals that under the current DRP, is c.11% RoTE, a level achieved in only one of the last 10 years, and higher than our previous greater-than-10% external RoTE target. Other levels of maximum total compensation opportunity were considered. Balancing the range of considerations and perspectives, the Committee determined the proposals to provide the appropriate level of maximum total compensation opportunity. Recognition that Barclays has consistently set stretching targets, and will continue to do so For example, over 2019-2023 (the five years prior to the DRP review) the average CEO annual bonus outcome was 67% of maximum, and the average LTIP vesting was 49%. Recent bonus and LTIP calibrations are aligned with the Group&#8217;s external targets and truly stretching, with maximum payout only for performance well above those targets. For example, maximum 2024-2026 LTIP payout requiring delivery of 2026 RoTE of 14% is extremely stretching in light of our 2026 external target of >12% RoTE. Calibrations for 2025-2027 LTIP require sustained RoTE performance of 14% over 2026 and 2027 to achieve maximum payout (as shown on page 128). Support for increased shareholding requirements Shareholding requirements to be equal to the LTIP opportunity. This results in a significant increase in the absolute value from the shareholding required under the current