Company: OXLCZ
Filing Date: 2025-05-20
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001213900-25-045605
Chunk: 82

Company: Oxford Lane Capital Corp.
Filing Date: 2025-05-20
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 82
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. We may also invest in multiple CLOs managed by the same CLO collateral manager, thereby increasing our risk of loss in the event the CLO collateral manager were to fail, experience the loss of key portfolio management employees or sell its business. Failure to maintain adequate diversification of underlying obligors across the CLOs in which we invest would make us more vulnerable to defaults. Even if we maintain adequate diversification across different CLO issuers, we may still be subject to concentration risk since CLO portfolios tend to have a certain amount of overlap across underlying obligors. This trend is generally exacerbated when demand for bank loans by CLO issuers outpaces supply. Market analysts have noted that the overlap of obligor names among CLO issuers has increased recently, and is particularly evident across CLOs of the same year of origination, as well as with CLOs managed by the same asset manager. To the extent we invest in CLOs which have a high percentage of overlap, this may increase the likelihood of defaults on our CLO investments occurring together. We and our investments are subject to reinvestment risk. As part of the ordinary management of its portfolio, a CLO will typically generate cash from asset repayments and sales and reinvest those proceeds in substitute assets, subject to compliance with its investment tests and certain other conditions. The earnings with respect to such substitute assets will depend on the quality of reinvestment opportunities available at the time. If the CLO collateral manager causes the CLO to purchase substitute assets at a lower yield than those initially acquired (for example, during periods of loan compression or in response to the need to satisfy the CLO’s covenants) or sale proceeds are maintained temporarily in cash, it would reduce the excess interest -relatedcash flow that the CLO collateral manager is able to achieve. The investment tests may incentivize a CLO collateral manager to cause the CLO to buy riskier assets than it otherwise would, which could result in additional losses. These factors could reduce our return on investment and may have a negative effect on the fair value of our assets and the market value of our securities. In addition, the reinvestment period for a CLO may terminate early, which would cause the holders of the CLO’s securities to receive principal payments earlier than anticipated. In addition, in CLO transactions in which we own a minority of the equity tranche, the holders of a majority of the equity tranche direct a call or refinancing of a CLO, thus causing such CLO