Company: MYI
Filing Date: 2025-09-05
Form Type: 424B3
Source: 0001193125-25-196285
Chunk: 436

Company: BLACKROCK MUNIYIELD QUALITY FUND III, INC.
Filing Date: 2025-09-05
Form: 424B3
Chunk 436
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 include but are not limited to: current or recent employment at the                                                                                                                                      
 company or a subsidiary; being, or representing, a shareholder with a substantial shareholding in the company; interlocking directorships; lengthy tenure, and having any other interest, business, or other relationship which could, or could 
 reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with a director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company and shareholders.                                                                                                        |

B-7

Independent board leadership

Practices across markets differ, as do board structures, but we observe two main approaches to independent board leadership. One is a non-executive, independent chair of the board who is responsible for leading the board in the effective exercise of its duties. The other is a lead or senior independent director, who is responsible for coordinating
with the other non-executive directors and working closely with the executive chair on the board agenda and other board procedures. In this case, the executive chair and the lead independent director work
together to ensure the board is effectively fulfilling its responsibilities. In our view, the independent leader of the board, and/or the chair of a relevant committee, should be available to investors to discuss board governance matters such as CEO
succession, executive pay, and board performance. We look to boards to explain their independent board leadership model and how it serves the interests of shareholders.

We may vote against the election of the chair of the committee responsible for board composition if there is not an identified independent
leader of the board with clear responsibilities for board performance. We may vote against the most senior independent director if the board has a policy of not engaging with shareholders.

Tenure and succession

Boards
should establish the length of time a director would normally be expected to serve, in line with market norms where those exist. In such markets, we find it helpful when companies disclose their approach to director tenure particularly around the
contributions of directors who have served for longer periods than provided for in local practices. In our experience, long-serving directors could become less independent given their relationship with management and involvement in past board
decisions.

Succession planning for board roles helps achieve the appropriate cadence of turnover that balances renewal through the
regular introduction of directors with fresh perspectives and expertise with continuity through the retention of directors with long-term knowledge of the board and company.

In markets where there is not specific director tenure guidance, we may vote against the election of the chair of the committee responsible
for board composition if there is not a clearly disclosed approach to director tenure and board renewal