Company: CAF
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form Type: N-CSR
Source: 0001104659-25-021323
Chunk: 123

Company: Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-06
Form: N-CSR
Chunk 123
---
 unreasonably     
 dilutive, particularly if there are no preemptive rights for existing shareholders. However, 
 depending on market practices, we consider voting for proposals giving general authorization 
 for issuance of shares not subject to pre-emptive rights if the authority is limited.        |

| - | Proposals that authorize share                                                                  
 issuance at a discount to market rates, except where authority for such issuance is de minimis, 
 or if there is a special situation that we believe justifies such authorization (as may be      
 the case, for example, at a company under severe stress and risk of bankruptcy).                |

| - | Proposals relating to changes      
 in capitalization by 100% or more. |

We consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals to increase dividend payout ratios, in light of market practice and perceived market weaknesses, as well as individual company payout history and current circumstances. For example, currently we perceive low payouts to shareholders as a concern at some Japanese companies, but may deem a low payout ratio as appropriate for a growth company making good use of its cash, notwithstanding the broader market concern. F. Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights

| - | Shareholder Rights Plans |

We generally support proposals to require shareholder approval or ratification of shareholder rights plans (poison pills). In voting on rights plans or similar takeover defenses, we consider on a case-by-case basis whether the company has demonstrated a need for the defense in the context of promoting long-term share value; whether provisions of the defense are in line with generally accepted governance principles in the market (and specifically the presence of an adequate qualified offer provision that would exempt offers meeting certain conditions from the pill); and the specific context if the proposal is made in the midst of a takeover bid or contest for control.

| - | Supermajority Voting 
 Requirements         |

We generally oppose requirements for supermajority votes to amend the charter or bylaws, unless the provisions protect minority shareholders where there is a large shareholder. In line with this view, in the absence of a large shareholder we support reasonable shareholder proposals to limit such supermajority voting requirements. Also, we oppose provisions that do not allow shareholders any right to amend the charter of bylaws.

| - | Shareholders Right to Call 
 a Special Meeting          |

We consider proposals to enhance a shareholder's rights to call meetings on a case-by-case basis. At large-cap U.S. companies, we generally support efforts to establish the right of holders of 10% or more of shares to call special meetings