Company: SYBT
Filing Date: 2025-03-12
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0001437749-25-007118
Chunk: 48

Company: Stock Yards Bancorp, Inc.
Filing Date: 2025-03-12
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 48
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 the culmination of executive officers’ efforts regarding profitability, revenue growth, expense control, risk profile and other elements.

The target annual incentive plan opportunities of each of Messrs. Hillebrand, Poindexter, and Stinnett were denominated as a percentage of base salary and ranged from 45% to 65% of base salary. Payouts were capped at 200% of the target payout.

Company-wide performance accounted for 100% of the annual incentive plan opportunity for Messrs. Hillebrand, Poindexter, and Stinnett; there was no allocation to individual performance goals. All our eligible NEOs participate in the annual incentive plan on the same terms, other than the target percentage of base salary. Mr. Rehm and Ms. Budnick have additional components relating to their respective areas of responsibility. For 2024, our EPS of $3.89 was above the maximum performance level and resulted in a maximum payout for the EPS metric for all NEOs.

Mr. Rehm

Mr. Rehm’s short-term incentive includes two components: production and other goals and diluted EPS of the Company. Mr. Rehm’s incentive is weighted 75% for his line of business and 25% for overall Company performance, and the Committee considers his line of business goals to be appropriately challenging to attain.

Ms. Budnick

Ms. Budnick’s short-term incentive includes three components. Two of the components, income before overhead allocations and taxes and net new business growth, are directly linked to the WM&T line of business. The third component, diluted EPS of the Company, is directly linked to overall company performance. Ms. Budnick’s incentive is weighted 75% for her line of business and 25% for overall Company performance, and the Committee considers her line of business goals to be appropriately challenging to attain.

Long-Term Incentive Equity. As in 2023, the Company’s 2024 long-term incentives consisted of 75% PSUs (by grant date value) that vest based on performance over a three-year measurement period, and 25% SARs that vest over five years.

The performance metrics for the PSUs, which are weighted 50% each, are three-year relative ROAA, with the target set at the 85 percentile and the threshold set at the 80 percentile of the comparator group, a very challenging relative level of performance; and three-year cumulative EPS, a true long-term performance period using a metric viewed as central to increasing long-term shareholder value