Company: CVBF
Filing Date: 2025-04-08
Form Type: DEF 14A
Source: 0000950170-25-051966
Chunk: 77

Company: CVB FINANCIAL CORP
Filing Date: 2025-04-08
Form: DEF 14A
Chunk 77
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 for each of our NEOs. These objective financial metrics and individually-tailored goals, in turn, are calibrated to focus each of our NEOs on the drivers of Company growth over which we believe the respective NEO can have the greatest influence. We believe this binary approach strikes the appropriate balance between holding our executives accountable to quantitative financial and performance metrics while at the same time fostering the achievement of qualitative goals and projects.

Consistent with our historical practice, our Compensation Committee typically reviews and approves two separate, independent and specific annual PCPs covering (1) the objective incentive compensation and plan-based discretionary bonus compensation opportunities for our President and CEO, and (2) the objective incentive compensation and plan-based discretionary bonus compensation opportunities for each of our four other NEOs, namely, Messrs. Nicholson, Farnsworth, Harvey and Wohl.

Our President and CEO’s incentive compensation and plan-based discretionary bonus opportunities are governed by our CEO Performance Compensation Plan for 2024 (“CEO Plan”). Under our CEO Plan, our CEO may earn from 0% to 180% of his annualized base salary, with 0% to 150% available in the form of an incentive award dependent upon the achievement of specified performance levels on five objective financial metrics, and with an additional 0% to 30% available in the form of a potential discretionary bonus award based on a set of enumerated subjective criteria.

With respect to the CEO’s available incentive compensation, the five objective financial metrics are individually weighted, on a percentage basis, so that, in the aggregate, the five metrics add up to 100% of the overall incentive payment calculation, with net income being the largest constituent component at 50% of the overall metrics-based opportunity. Each of the five financial metrics, in turn, is evaluated on the basis of specified minimum, target and outperformance levels, so that the incentive payment on each such metric would amount to (i) 0% of the target opportunity at performance levels below a specified minimum threshold, (ii) 75% of the target opportunity at specified minimum performance levels (Level I), (ii) 100% of the target opportunity at specified targeted performance levels (Level II), and (iii) a maximum of 150% of the target opportunity at or above specified outperformance levels (Level III). Moreover, there is no interpolation for performance on any metric above, below or between the specified achievement levels, which means that, for each metric, the available incentive payment would be either 0%, 75%, 100% or