Company: CGCT
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form Type: S-1/A
Source: 0001104659-25-026623
Chunk: 285

Company: Cartesian Growth Corp III
Filing Date: 2025-03-21
Form: S-1/A
Chunk 285
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 or class of creditors
with whom the arrangement is to be made and who must in addition represent 75% in value of such creditors or class of creditors, as the
case may be, that are present and voting either in person or by proxy at a meeting summoned for that purpose; and (ii) in relation
to a compromise or arrangement between a company and its shareholders or any class of them, shareholders who represent 75% in value of
the company’s shareholders or class of shareholders, as the case may be, that are present and voting either in person or by proxy
at a meeting summoned for that purpose. The convening of the meetings and subsequently the terms of the arrangement must be sanctioned
by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. While a dissenting shareholder would have the right to express to the court the view that the
transaction should not be approved, the court can be expected to approve the arrangement if it satisfies itself that:

| · | we                                                                                        
 are not proposing to act illegally or beyond the scope of our corporate authority and the 
 statutory provisions as to majority vote have been complied with;                         |

| · | the                                                                   
 shareholders have been fairly represented at the meeting in question; |

| · | the                                                                
 arrangement is such as a businessman would reasonably approve; and |

| · | the                                                                                      
 arrangement is not one that would more properly be sanctioned under some other provision 
 of the Companies Law or that would amount to a “fraud on the minority.”                  |

If a scheme of arrangement or takeover offer
(as described below) is approved, any dissenting shareholder would have no rights comparable to dissenters’ rights or appraisal
rights (providing rights to receive payment in cash for the judicially determined value of the shares), which would otherwise ordinarily
be available to dissenting shareholders of United States corporations.

Squeeze-out Provisions.When a takeover offer is made and accepted by holders of 90% in value of the shares to whom the offer relates
within four months, the offeror may, within a two-month period after the expiration of the initial four-month period, require the
holders of the remaining shares to transfer such shares on the terms of the offer. An objection can be made to the Grand Court of the
Cayman Islands, but this is unlikely to succeed unless there is evidence of fraud, bad faith, collusion or inequitable treatment of the
shareholders.

Further, transactions similar to a merger, reconstruction
and/or an amalgamation may in some