Company: FEBO
Filing Date: 2025-05-14
Form Type: 20-F
Source: 0001641172-25-010075
Chunk: 141

Company: Fenbo Holdings Ltd
Filing Date: 2025-05-14
Form: 20-F
Item: Item 10
Chunk 141
---
 to receive payment in cash
for the judicially determined value of the shares.

  86  

Shareholders’ Suits

In principle,
we will normally be the proper plaintiff and as a general rule a derivative action may not be brought by a minority shareholder. However,
based on English authorities, which would in all likelihood be of persuasive authority in the Cayman Islands, there are exceptions to
the foregoing principle, including when:

  a company acts or proposes to act illegally or ultra vires;                                                                                                     
  the act complained of, although not ultra vires, could only be effected duly if authorized by more than a simple majority vote that has not been obtained; and  
  those who control the company are perpetrating a “fraud on the minority”.                                                                                       

Indemnification
of Directors and Executive Officers and Limitation of Liability

Cayman
Islands law does not limit the extent to which a company’s articles of association may provide for indemnification of officers and
directors, except to the extent any such provision may be held by the Cayman Islands courts to be contrary to public policy, such as to
provide indemnification against civil fraud or the consequences of committing a crime. Our Articles of Association permit indemnification
of officers and directors for losses, damages, costs and expenses incurred in their capacities as such unless such losses or damages arise
from dishonesty or fraud which may attach to such directors or officers. This standard of conduct is generally the same as permitted under
the Delaware General Corporation Act for a Delaware corporation. In addition, we intend to enter into indemnification agreements with
our directors and senior executive officers that will provide such persons with additional indemnification beyond that provided in our
Articles of Association.

Insofar
as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act may be permitted to our directors, officers or persons controlling
us under the foregoing provisions, we have been informed that, in the opinion of the SEC, such indemnification is against public policy
as expressed in the Securities Act and is therefore unenforceable.

Anti-Takeover
Provisions in the Memorandum and Articles of Association

Some
provisions of our Amended Memorandum and Articles of Association may discourage, delay or prevent a change in control of our company or
management that shareholders may consider favorable, including provisions that authorize our board of directors to issue preference shares
in one or more series and to designate the price, rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions of such preference shares without any
further vote