Company: KMRK
Filing Date: 2025-06-25
Form Type: F-1/A
Source: 0001213900-25-057444
Chunk: 72

Company: K-TECH SOLUTIONS CO LTD
Filing Date: 2025-06-25
Form: F-1/A
Chunk 72
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 Shares. Based on our dual -classvoting structure, holders of Class A Shares will be entitled to one (1) vote per share in respect of matters requiring the votes of shareholders, while holders of Class B Shares will be entitled to ten (10) votes per share. Due to the disparate voting powers associated with our two classes of ordinary shares, our Controlling Shareholders will beneficially own 91.9% of the aggregate voting power of our Company immediately following the completion of this Offering, assuming that the underwriters do not exercise their over -allotmentoption. The interests of our Controlling Shareholders may not coincide with your interests, and it may make decisions with which you disagree, including decisions on important topics such as the composition of the board of directors, compensation, management succession, and our business and financial strategy. To the extent that the interests of our Controlling Shareholders differ from your interests, you may be disadvantaged by any action that they may seek to pursue. This concentrated control could also discourage others from pursuing any potential merger, takeover or other change of control transactions, which could have the effect of depriving the holders of our Class A Shares of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium over the prevailing market price. We cannot predict the effect our dual-class structure may have on the market price of our Class A Shares. We cannot predict whether our dual -classstructure will result in a lower or more volatile market price of our Class A Shares, adverse publicity or other adverse consequences. For example, certain index providers have announced and implemented restrictions on including companies with multiple -classshare structures in certain of their indices. In July 2017, FTSE Russell announced that it would require new constituents of its indices to have greater than 5% of the company’s voting rights in the hands of public stockholders, and S&P Dow Jones announced that it would no longer admit companies with multiple -classshare structures to certain of its indices. Affected indices include the Russell 2000 and the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600, which together make up the S&P Composite 1500. Also in 2017, MSCI, a leading stock index provider, opened public consultations on its treatment of no -voteand multi -classstructures and temporarily barred new multi -classlistings from certain of its indices; however, in October 2018, MSCI announced its decision to include equity securities “with unequal voting structures” in its indices and to launch