Company: VEEAW
Filing Date: 2025-04-15
Form Type: 10-K
Source: 0001213900-25-032215
Chunk: 282

Company: VEEA INC.
Filing Date: 2025-04-15
Form: 10-K
Item: Item 1A
Chunk 282
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 the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)   contain provisions that could have the
effect of rendering more difficult, delaying, or preventing an acquisition deemed undesirable by the Board and therefore depress the
trading price of the Common Stock. These provisions could also make it difficult for stockholders to take certain actions, including
electing directors who are not nominated by the current members of the Board or taking other corporate actions, including effecting changes
in Veea’s management. Among other things, the Governing Documents include provisions regarding:

    ●
    providing for a classified
    board of directors with staggered, three-year terms;

    ●
    the ability of the Board
    to issue shares of preferred stock, including “blank check” preferred stock and to determine the price and other terms
    of those shares, including preferences and voting rights, without stockholder approval, which could be used to significantly dilute
    the ownership of a hostile acquirer;

    ●
    Veea’s Charter prohibits
    cumulative voting in the election of directors, which limits the ability of minority stockholders to elect director candidates;

    ●
    the limitation of the liability
    of, and the indemnification of, Veea’s directors and officers;

    ●
    removal of the ability
    of the stockholders to take action by written consent in lieu of a meeting;

    ●
    the requirement that a
    special meeting of stockholders may be called only by or at the direction of the Board, the chairperson of the Board or the chief
    executive officer of Veea, which could delay the ability of stockholders to force consideration of a proposal or to take action,
    including the removal of directors;

    ●
    controlling the procedures
    for the conduct and scheduling of board of directors and stockholder meetings;

    ●
    the ability of the Board
    to amend the bylaws, which may allow the Board to take additional actions to prevent an unsolicited takeover and inhibit the ability
    of an acquirer to amend the bylaws to facilitate an unsolicited takeover attempt; and

    ●
    advance notice procedures
    with which stockholders must comply to nominate candidates to the Board or to propose matters to be acted upon at a stockholders’
    meeting, which could preclude stockholders from bringing matters before annual or special meetings of stockholders and delay changes
    in the Board and also may discourage or deter a potential acquirer from conducting a solicitation of proxies