Datasets:
protocol_id string | name string | domain string | paradigm string | source string | response dict | conditions list | anchors unknown | effect dict | shape string | notes string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
dictator_game | Dictator game | social_preferences | one-shot unilateral allocation | Engel (2011) 'Dictator games: a meta study', Experimental Economics 14:583-610 | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 10,
"unit": "dollars transferred out of a $10 endowment"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "single",
"label": "single decision",
"prompt": "You are taking part in an economics experiment. You have been given $10. You may transfer any amount from $0 to $10 to another participant, who cannot respond and cannot affect your payoff. You keep whatever you do not transfer. How many... | {
"single": {
"mean": 2.83,
"sd": 2.6,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "Meta-analytic mean share is ~28% of the stake; individual-level dispersion varies widely across subject pools, so treat sd as approximate."
}
} | null | bimodal — mass at $0 and at half the stake | The canonical other-regarding-preference measure. A simulated population that gives the 'fair' 50% is reproducing a norm, not the human distribution. |
ultimatum_offer | Ultimatum game — proposer offer | social_preferences | one-shot bargaining, proposer role | Oosterbeek, Sloof & van de Kuilen (2004) 'Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments', Experimental Economics 7:171-188; Camerer (2003) | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 10,
"unit": "dollars offered out of a $10 pie"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "proposer",
"label": "proposer",
"prompt": "You are the proposer. You and one other participant will split $10. You propose how much of the $10 the other person receives. If they accept, you both get the proposed split; if they reject, neither of you gets anything. How many dollars do ... | {
"proposer": {
"mean": 4,
"sd": 1.3,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"note": "Meta-analytic mean offer is ~40% of the pie, with a strong mode at 50%."
}
} | null | unimodal with a spike at 50% | Offers cluster at the equal split; very low offers are rare because proposers anticipate rejection. |
ultimatum_reject_low | Ultimatum game — rejection of a low offer | social_preferences | one-shot bargaining, responder role | Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory; Oosterbeek et al. (2004) | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = reject, 0 = accept"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "low_offer",
"label": "offer of $2 out of $10",
"prompt": "You are the responder. The proposer offers you $2 out of $10 and keeps $8. If you accept, you get $2 and they get $8. If you reject, neither of you gets anything. Answer 1 if you reject the offer, 0 if you accept it."
}
] | {
"low_offer": {
"mean": 0.5,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "Rejection probability for offers at or below 20% of the pie is roughly 40-60%; it rises steeply as the offer falls."
}
} | null | null | Human responders punish unfairness at a material cost to themselves. Populations that never reject are behaving like pure payoff maximisers. |
public_goods_oneshot | Public goods game — one shot | social_preferences | linear voluntary contribution mechanism, one-shot | Ledyard (1995) in Kagel & Roth (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics; Chaudhuri (2011) 'Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments', Experimental Economics 14:47-83 | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 10,
"unit": "tokens contributed out of 10"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "oneshot",
"label": "one-shot, 4 players, MPCR 0.4",
"prompt": "You are in a group of 4 people. Each person receives 10 tokens. Any token you put into a common pool is multiplied by 1.6 and then split equally among the 4 members. Tokens you keep are worth 1 point each to you. This is a... | {
"oneshot": {
"mean": 4.5,
"sd": 2.6,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "One-shot contributions typically run 40-60% of the endowment; individual-level spread is large."
}
} | null | null | Contributions start well above the Nash prediction of zero. Free-riding is a minority behaviour, not the modal one. |
public_goods_decay | Public goods game — decay across rounds | social_preferences | repeated voluntary contribution, partners condition | Ledyard (1995); Chaudhuri (2011); Isaac & Walker (1988) | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 10,
"unit": "tokens contributed out of 10"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "round_1",
"label": "round 1 of 10",
"prompt": "You are in a group of 4 people and will play 10 rounds with the same people. Each round every person receives 10 tokens; tokens placed in a common pool are multiplied by 1.6 and split equally among the 4 members. This is round 1. How many... | {
"round_1": {
"mean": 4.5,
"sd": 2.6,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": ""
},
"round_10": {
"mean": 1.8,
"sd": 2,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": ""
}
} | {
"a": "round_1",
"b": "round_10",
"mean_diff": 2.7,
"cohen_d": 1.1,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"source": "Ledyard (1995); Chaudhuri (2011)",
"note": "The decay of cooperation without punishment or communication is one of the most robust regularities in experimental economics."
} | null | A population that holds contributions flat across rounds is missing the entire dynamics of conditional cooperation. |
trust_game_send | Trust game — amount sent | social_preferences | one-shot investment game, trustor role | Johnson & Mislin (2011) 'Trust games: a meta-analysis', Journal of Economic Psychology 32:865-889 | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 10,
"unit": "dollars sent out of $10 (tripled before transfer)"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "trustor",
"label": "trustor",
"prompt": "You are given $10 and paired with a stranger. You may send any amount from $0 to $10. Any amount you send is tripled by the experimenter and given to the stranger, who then decides how much, if anything, to send back to you. How many dollars do... | {
"trustor": {
"mean": 5,
"sd": 2.7,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "Meta-analytic mean send is ~50% of the endowment."
}
} | null | null | Sending is positive in nearly every subject pool, but far from the payoff-maximising 100%. |
trust_game_return | Trust game — amount returned | social_preferences | one-shot investment game, trustee role | Johnson & Mislin (2011) | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 18,
"unit": "dollars returned out of $18 available"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "trustee",
"label": "trustee",
"prompt": "A stranger was given $10 and sent you $6. The experimenter tripled it, so you have $18. You may send back any amount from $0 to $18 to the stranger. How many dollars do you send back? Answer with a single number."
}
] | {
"trustee": {
"mean": 6.5,
"sd": 4,
"confidence": "approximate",
"note": "Meta-analytic 'trustworthiness' is ~0.37 of the amount available; values here are approximate and sensitive to the amount sent."
}
} | null | null | Reciprocity, not pure self-interest: trustees typically return enough to make sending worthwhile. |
prisoners_dilemma | Prisoner's dilemma — one shot | social_preferences | one-shot 2x2 symmetric game | Sally (1995) 'Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas', Rationality and Society 7:58-92 | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = cooperate, 0 = defect"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "oneshot",
"label": "one-shot, anonymous, no communication",
"prompt": "You and one other person each choose to cooperate or defect, simultaneously and anonymously. You will never meet again. If both cooperate, each gets $6. If both defect, each gets $2. If you cooperate and the other ... | {
"oneshot": {
"mean": 0.47000000000000003,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "Meta-analytic cooperation in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma is ~45-50%; it collapses toward 0 with experience and rises with communication."
}
} | null | null | Cooperation in the one-shot game is the benchmark case where a purely rational population and a human population diverge most sharply. |
asch_conformity | Asch line-judgement conformity | social_influence | unambiguous perceptual judgement under group pressure | Asch (1951, 1955); Bond & Smith (1996) 'Culture and conformity', Psychological Bulletin 119:111-137 | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = conform to the group's wrong answer, 0 = give the correct answer"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "critical",
"label": "critical trial, unanimous wrong majority",
"prompt": "You are judging which of three comparison lines matches a standard line in length. The correct match is obvious and you are confident about it. Six other participants answer before you and all six give the same... | {
"critical": {
"mean": 0.32,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "~32% of critical trials draw a conforming response in the classic setting; roughly 75% of participants conform at least once and ~25% never do."
}
} | null | null | The cleanest available test of whether a simulated subject is willing to contradict an unambiguous fact under social pressure. |
anchoring | Anchoring — comparative anchor then estimate | heuristics_biases | anchoring-and-adjustment | Jacowitz & Kahneman (1995) 'Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks', Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21:1161-1166; Tversky & Kahneman (1974) | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 100,
"unit": "estimated percentage of African countries in the UN"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "high",
"label": "high anchor (65%)",
"prompt": "Is the percentage of African countries in the United Nations more or less than 65%? Now estimate, as accurately as you can, the actual percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Answer with a single number between 0 and 100."... | {} | {
"a": "high",
"b": "low",
"mean_diff": 20,
"cohen_d": 0.9,
"confidence": "approximate",
"source": "Jacowitz & Kahneman (1995)",
"note": "Absolute estimates are item-specific, so only the contrast is anchored here; the high-low gap is typically 15-25 percentage points."
} | null | Deliberately has no level anchor: the point of this protocol is the contrast, not the absolute estimate. This is the pattern to use whenever only an effect size is trustworthy. |
asian_disease | Asian disease problem — risky-choice framing | heuristics_biases | gain vs. loss frame, logically equivalent options | Tversky & Kahneman (1981) 'The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice', Science 211:453-458 | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = choose the sure option, 0 = choose the risky option"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "gain",
"label": "gain frame (lives saved)",
"prompt": "Imagine the US is preparing for an unusual disease expected to kill 600 people. Two programmes are proposed. If programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If programme B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600... | {
"gain": {
"mean": 0.72,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "high",
"note": ""
},
"loss": {
"mean": 0.22,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "high",
"note": ""
}
} | {
"a": "gain",
"b": "loss",
"mean_diff": 0.5,
"cohen_d": 1,
"confidence": "high",
"source": "Tversky & Kahneman (1981)",
"note": "Options A/C and B/D are formally identical; only the description differs."
} | null | One of the most replicated effects in the literature. A population that is frame-invariant here is not behaving like a human sample. |
endowment_effect | Endowment effect — WTA vs. WTP | heuristics_biases | buyer vs. seller valuation of the same object | Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1990) 'Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem', Journal of Political Economy 98:1325-1348 | {
"type": "numeric",
"min": 0,
"max": 10,
"unit": "dollars"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "wtp",
"label": "buyer — maximum willingness to pay",
"prompt": "A coffee mug is for sale in the experiment. You do not own one. What is the largest amount, from $0 to $10, that you would be willing to pay to buy this mug? Answer with a single number."
},
{
"condition_id": "wta... | {
"wtp": {
"mean": 3,
"sd": 1.5,
"confidence": "approximate",
"note": ""
},
"wta": {
"mean": 6.5,
"sd": 2,
"confidence": "approximate",
"note": ""
}
} | {
"a": "wta",
"b": "wtp",
"mean_diff": 3.5,
"cohen_d": 0.8,
"confidence": "approximate",
"source": "Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1990); Horowitz & McConnell (2002) meta-analysis",
"note": "The WTA/WTP ratio is typically 2-3; absolute dollar values depend on the object and the subject pool."
} | null | Ownership alone shifts valuation. A population that quotes the same number in both roles is treating this as a pure valuation problem. |
crt_batball | Cognitive reflection — bat and ball | heuristics_biases | intuitive-but-wrong vs. reflective answer | Frederick (2005) 'Cognitive reflection and decision making', Journal of Economic Perspectives 19:25-42 | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = reflective correct answer (5 cents), 0 = intuitive wrong answer (10 cents)"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "batball",
"label": "bat and ball",
"prompt": "A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? Answer 1 if your answer is 5 cents (correct), 0 if your answer is 10 cents."
}
] | {
"batball": {
"mean": 0.4,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "approximate",
"note": "Correct rates on the bat-and-ball item run roughly 30-50% in student samples and lower in general-population samples."
}
} | null | null | Scored as a binary here so that no free-text grading is needed. If you want the full 3-item CRT, run it as three binary protocols. |
conjunction_fallacy | Conjunction fallacy — Linda problem | heuristics_biases | representativeness vs. the conjunction rule | Tversky & Kahneman (1983) 'Extensional versus intuitive reasoning', Psychological Review 90:293-315 | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = choose the conjunction, 0 = choose the single (logically correct) option"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "between",
"label": "between-subjects, ranking removed",
"prompt": "Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and she participated in anti-nuclear demonstr... | {
"between": {
"mean": 0.8,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": "Roughly 80-90% choose the conjunction in the standard version; rates fall with transparent wording or within-subjects designs."
}
} | null | null | Choosing the conjunction violates the conjunction rule. This is the classic case where a well-aligned model looks *worse* than a human sample. |
wason_selection | Wason selection task — abstract vs. deontic | reasoning | conditional-reasoning / cheater-detection | Wason (1968); Cosmides & Tooby (1992) 'Cognitive adaptations for social exchange', Cognition 31:187-276 | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = exactly the two cards that can falsify the rule, 0 = any other selection"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "abstract",
"label": "abstract rule (D / K / 3 / 7)",
"prompt": "Four cards are on a table, showing D, K, 3 and 7. Every card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. The rule is: if a card has a D on one side, then it has a 3 on the other side. You may turn over only the ca... | {
"abstract": {
"mean": 0.15,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"note": ""
},
"deontic": {
"mean": 0.7000000000000001,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": ""
}
} | {
"a": "deontic",
"b": "abstract",
"mean_diff": 0.55,
"cohen_d": 1.2,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"source": "Cosmides & Tooby (1992); Wason (1968)",
"note": "The content effect is large: the same logical form is easy when framed as cheater detection and hard when framed abstractly."
} | null | The correct answers are stated in the prompts, so this measures whether the population's *selection* matches human selection, not whether it can solve the logic. |
bystander_effect | Bystander effect — alone vs. in a group | social_influence | diffusion of responsibility | Darley & Latané (1968) 'Bystander intervention in emergencies', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8:377-383; Latané & Nida (1981) | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = help, 0 = do not help"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "alone",
"label": "participant alone",
"prompt": "You are alone in a room filling out a questionnaire. You hear someone in the next room fall, cry out in pain and groan. No one else is present. Answer 1 if you would go to help, 0 if you would not."
},
{
"condition_id": "group",... | {
"alone": {
"mean": 0.75,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": ""
},
"group": {
"mean": 0.35000000000000003,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium",
"note": ""
}
} | {
"a": "alone",
"b": "group",
"mean_diff": 0.4,
"cohen_d": 0.85,
"confidence": "medium",
"source": "Darley & Latané (1968); Latané & Nida (1981)",
"note": "Meta-analytic effect is moderate and smaller than textbook accounts suggest, but consistently present."
} | null | A simulated population that helps at the same rate in both conditions shows no diffusion of responsibility at all. |
trolley_dilemma | Trolley problem — switch vs. footbridge | moral_judgment | sacrificial moral dilemmas, means vs. side-effect | Foot (1967); Thomson (1985) 'The trolley problem', Yale Law Journal 94:1395-1415; large-N replications (e.g. Hauser et al. 2007) | {
"type": "binary",
"min": 0,
"max": 1,
"unit": "1 = act to save the five, 0 = do nothing"
} | [
{
"condition_id": "switch",
"label": "switch (impersonal)",
"prompt": "A runaway trolley is heading for five people who will be killed if it continues. You are standing next to a switch. If you pull it, the trolley diverts to a side track where it will kill one person instead. Answer 1 if you pull the s... | {
"switch": {
"mean": 0.85,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"note": ""
},
"footbridge": {
"mean": 0.25,
"sd": null,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"note": ""
}
} | {
"a": "switch",
"b": "footbridge",
"mean_diff": 0.6,
"cohen_d": 1.3,
"confidence": "medium-high",
"source": "Thomson (1985); Hauser et al. (2007)",
"note": "Both dilemmas sacrifice one to save five; the personal/impersonal contrast drives a very large difference in responding."
} | null | The two dilemmas are consequentially identical. A population that gives the same answer to both is doing utilitarian arithmetic, not reproducing human moral judgement. |
Silicon Subjects
A protocol suite for auditing LLM-simulated subject populations.
17 classic experimental paradigms from behavioural economics and psychology — dictator game, ultimatum game, public goods, trust game, prisoner's dilemma, Asch conformity, anchoring, risky-choice framing, endowment effect, CRT, conjunction fallacy, Wason selection, bystander intervention, trolley dilemmas — each paired with human anchor statistics from the published literature, split along the three axes a simulated population has to reproduce.
Companion lab: Silicon Subjects Lab (Space)
The problem
Simulated populations are now a standard instrument: run an LLM through a classic experiment, read off the mean, compare with the human result. The check that gets performed is almost always mean-only.
That check cannot see the two failures that matter most:
- Dispersion collapse. A population can report the right mean while every simulated subject gives essentially the same answer. Human samples are noisy; a degenerate one has no variance to reason about, and any subgroup analysis on it is meaningless.
- Effect-sign and effect-size error. A population can reproduce the overall level while reversing the treatment contrast, or while inflating it threefold. A mean check run separately per condition will not notice unless the contrast itself is scored.
This suite anchors all three axes separately.
The three axes
| axis | anchor | rule |
|---|---|---|
| location | human mean and sd per condition | SMD = (mean_sim − mean_human) / sd_human; score = max(0, 1 − |SMD| / 1.5) |
| dispersion | human sd per condition | ratio = sd_sim / sd_human; score = max(0, 1 − |ln ratio| / ln 2.5) |
| effect | direction and magnitude of the treatment contrast | wrong sign scores 0; otherwise the log-ratio rule above |
Per-protocol score = 0.4 × worst axis + 0.6 × mean of axes, so one collapsed axis
cannot be averaged away. Suite score = 0.3 × worst protocol + 0.7 × mean over protocols. Verdict: ≥ 75 usable as a pilot signal, 50–75 directional only,
< 50 not usable.
No significance tests: with 500 simulated subjects a trivial difference is "significant", and with 20 nothing is significant. The axes report how far off the population is, on interpretable scales.
Schema — protocols
| field | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
protocol_id |
string | e.g. dictator_game |
name |
string | human-readable name |
domain |
string | social_preferences · heuristics_biases · social_influence · reasoning · moral_judgment |
paradigm |
string | experimental paradigm |
source |
string | the literature the anchors come from |
response |
object | {type: "numeric"|"binary", min, max, unit} |
conditions |
list | {condition_id, label, prompt} — the prompt is ready to send |
anchors |
object | {condition_id: {mean, sd?, confidence, note}} — sd may be null and is then derived |
effect |
object | null | {a, b, mean_diff, cohen_d?, confidence, source, note} |
shape |
string | null | known distributional feature, e.g. bimodality |
notes |
string | what a mismatch on this protocol means |
16 protocols carry level anchors; 7 carry a treatment-effect anchor. anchoring
carries only an effect anchor — absolute estimates there are item-specific, so the
suite anchors the contrast and leaves the level unscored. That is the intended pattern
whenever only an effect size is trustworthy.
Usage
from datasets import load_dataset
protocols = load_dataset("NoahIsARider/SiliconSubjects", "protocols", split="train")
p = protocols[0]
print(p["protocol_id"], p["conditions"][0]["prompt"])
Score a population you have already run:
from silab import load_protocols, protocol_index, score_protocol, aggregate
from silab.scoring import aggregate
P = protocol_index()
result = score_protocol(
P["dictator_game"],
{"single": [0, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1, 10, 0, 5, 3]}, # your simulated responses
)
print(result["overall"], result["verdict"]["label"])
print(result["axes"]["dispersion"]["items"])
The scoring engine lives in the companion Space repository and has no dependencies beyond the standard library.
How to read the anchors
Anchors are literature aggregates, not raw subject-level data. They come from the
meta-analyses and landmark studies cited in each source field. Experimental results
move with subject pool, stake size, framing and procedure — a dictator-game mean of
28% is a summary of hundreds of treatments, not a prediction for any one of them.
Each anchor carries a confidence field (high / medium-high / medium / approximate) and a
note. Check the cited source before you lean on an individual number. The suite is
designed so you can drop an anchor you do not trust: remove it from anchors and that
axis simply stops being scored.
Intended use
- Auditing a simulated population before using it as a pilot or as a manipulation check
- Comparing candidate models on behavioural fidelity rather than task accuracy
- Reporting the limitations of a simulation-based study honestly
Not intended for
- Claiming an LLM "has" a bias or preference. A match here is a distributional similarity, not a mechanistic claim.
- Replacing human subjects in any applied or policy setting.
Reproducing
python scripts/build_protocols.py
License
Data: CC BY 4.0. Code: MIT.
Author
Fangyanuo Zhou (NoahIsARider)
Citation
@misc{zhou2026siliconsubjects,
title = {Silicon Subjects: A Protocol Suite for Auditing LLM-Simulated
Subject Populations on Location, Dispersion and Effect},
author = {Zhou, Fangyanuo},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Hugging Face},
howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/NoahIsARider/SiliconSubjects}}
}
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