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string
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string
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dictator_game
Dictator game
social_preferences
one-shot unilateral allocation
Engel (2011) 'Dictator games: a meta study', Experimental Economics 14:583-610
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 10, "unit": "dollars transferred out of a $10 endowment" }
[ { "condition_id": "single", "label": "single decision", "prompt": "You are taking part in an economics experiment. You have been given $10. You may transfer any amount from $0 to $10 to another participant, who cannot respond and cannot affect your payoff. You keep whatever you do not transfer. How many...
{ "single": { "mean": 2.83, "sd": 2.6, "confidence": "medium", "note": "Meta-analytic mean share is ~28% of the stake; individual-level dispersion varies widely across subject pools, so treat sd as approximate." } }
null
bimodal — mass at $0 and at half the stake
The canonical other-regarding-preference measure. A simulated population that gives the 'fair' 50% is reproducing a norm, not the human distribution.
ultimatum_offer
Ultimatum game — proposer offer
social_preferences
one-shot bargaining, proposer role
Oosterbeek, Sloof & van de Kuilen (2004) 'Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments', Experimental Economics 7:171-188; Camerer (2003)
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 10, "unit": "dollars offered out of a $10 pie" }
[ { "condition_id": "proposer", "label": "proposer", "prompt": "You are the proposer. You and one other participant will split $10. You propose how much of the $10 the other person receives. If they accept, you both get the proposed split; if they reject, neither of you gets anything. How many dollars do ...
{ "proposer": { "mean": 4, "sd": 1.3, "confidence": "medium-high", "note": "Meta-analytic mean offer is ~40% of the pie, with a strong mode at 50%." } }
null
unimodal with a spike at 50%
Offers cluster at the equal split; very low offers are rare because proposers anticipate rejection.
ultimatum_reject_low
Ultimatum game — rejection of a low offer
social_preferences
one-shot bargaining, responder role
Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory; Oosterbeek et al. (2004)
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = reject, 0 = accept" }
[ { "condition_id": "low_offer", "label": "offer of $2 out of $10", "prompt": "You are the responder. The proposer offers you $2 out of $10 and keeps $8. If you accept, you get $2 and they get $8. If you reject, neither of you gets anything. Answer 1 if you reject the offer, 0 if you accept it." } ]
{ "low_offer": { "mean": 0.5, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "Rejection probability for offers at or below 20% of the pie is roughly 40-60%; it rises steeply as the offer falls." } }
null
null
Human responders punish unfairness at a material cost to themselves. Populations that never reject are behaving like pure payoff maximisers.
public_goods_oneshot
Public goods game — one shot
social_preferences
linear voluntary contribution mechanism, one-shot
Ledyard (1995) in Kagel & Roth (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics; Chaudhuri (2011) 'Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments', Experimental Economics 14:47-83
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 10, "unit": "tokens contributed out of 10" }
[ { "condition_id": "oneshot", "label": "one-shot, 4 players, MPCR 0.4", "prompt": "You are in a group of 4 people. Each person receives 10 tokens. Any token you put into a common pool is multiplied by 1.6 and then split equally among the 4 members. Tokens you keep are worth 1 point each to you. This is a...
{ "oneshot": { "mean": 4.5, "sd": 2.6, "confidence": "medium", "note": "One-shot contributions typically run 40-60% of the endowment; individual-level spread is large." } }
null
null
Contributions start well above the Nash prediction of zero. Free-riding is a minority behaviour, not the modal one.
public_goods_decay
Public goods game — decay across rounds
social_preferences
repeated voluntary contribution, partners condition
Ledyard (1995); Chaudhuri (2011); Isaac & Walker (1988)
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 10, "unit": "tokens contributed out of 10" }
[ { "condition_id": "round_1", "label": "round 1 of 10", "prompt": "You are in a group of 4 people and will play 10 rounds with the same people. Each round every person receives 10 tokens; tokens placed in a common pool are multiplied by 1.6 and split equally among the 4 members. This is round 1. How many...
{ "round_1": { "mean": 4.5, "sd": 2.6, "confidence": "medium", "note": "" }, "round_10": { "mean": 1.8, "sd": 2, "confidence": "medium", "note": "" } }
{ "a": "round_1", "b": "round_10", "mean_diff": 2.7, "cohen_d": 1.1, "confidence": "medium-high", "source": "Ledyard (1995); Chaudhuri (2011)", "note": "The decay of cooperation without punishment or communication is one of the most robust regularities in experimental economics." }
null
A population that holds contributions flat across rounds is missing the entire dynamics of conditional cooperation.
trust_game_send
Trust game — amount sent
social_preferences
one-shot investment game, trustor role
Johnson & Mislin (2011) 'Trust games: a meta-analysis', Journal of Economic Psychology 32:865-889
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 10, "unit": "dollars sent out of $10 (tripled before transfer)" }
[ { "condition_id": "trustor", "label": "trustor", "prompt": "You are given $10 and paired with a stranger. You may send any amount from $0 to $10. Any amount you send is tripled by the experimenter and given to the stranger, who then decides how much, if anything, to send back to you. How many dollars do...
{ "trustor": { "mean": 5, "sd": 2.7, "confidence": "medium", "note": "Meta-analytic mean send is ~50% of the endowment." } }
null
null
Sending is positive in nearly every subject pool, but far from the payoff-maximising 100%.
trust_game_return
Trust game — amount returned
social_preferences
one-shot investment game, trustee role
Johnson & Mislin (2011)
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 18, "unit": "dollars returned out of $18 available" }
[ { "condition_id": "trustee", "label": "trustee", "prompt": "A stranger was given $10 and sent you $6. The experimenter tripled it, so you have $18. You may send back any amount from $0 to $18 to the stranger. How many dollars do you send back? Answer with a single number." } ]
{ "trustee": { "mean": 6.5, "sd": 4, "confidence": "approximate", "note": "Meta-analytic 'trustworthiness' is ~0.37 of the amount available; values here are approximate and sensitive to the amount sent." } }
null
null
Reciprocity, not pure self-interest: trustees typically return enough to make sending worthwhile.
prisoners_dilemma
Prisoner's dilemma — one shot
social_preferences
one-shot 2x2 symmetric game
Sally (1995) 'Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas', Rationality and Society 7:58-92
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = cooperate, 0 = defect" }
[ { "condition_id": "oneshot", "label": "one-shot, anonymous, no communication", "prompt": "You and one other person each choose to cooperate or defect, simultaneously and anonymously. You will never meet again. If both cooperate, each gets $6. If both defect, each gets $2. If you cooperate and the other ...
{ "oneshot": { "mean": 0.47000000000000003, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "Meta-analytic cooperation in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma is ~45-50%; it collapses toward 0 with experience and rises with communication." } }
null
null
Cooperation in the one-shot game is the benchmark case where a purely rational population and a human population diverge most sharply.
asch_conformity
Asch line-judgement conformity
social_influence
unambiguous perceptual judgement under group pressure
Asch (1951, 1955); Bond & Smith (1996) 'Culture and conformity', Psychological Bulletin 119:111-137
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = conform to the group's wrong answer, 0 = give the correct answer" }
[ { "condition_id": "critical", "label": "critical trial, unanimous wrong majority", "prompt": "You are judging which of three comparison lines matches a standard line in length. The correct match is obvious and you are confident about it. Six other participants answer before you and all six give the same...
{ "critical": { "mean": 0.32, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "~32% of critical trials draw a conforming response in the classic setting; roughly 75% of participants conform at least once and ~25% never do." } }
null
null
The cleanest available test of whether a simulated subject is willing to contradict an unambiguous fact under social pressure.
anchoring
Anchoring — comparative anchor then estimate
heuristics_biases
anchoring-and-adjustment
Jacowitz & Kahneman (1995) 'Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks', Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21:1161-1166; Tversky & Kahneman (1974)
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 100, "unit": "estimated percentage of African countries in the UN" }
[ { "condition_id": "high", "label": "high anchor (65%)", "prompt": "Is the percentage of African countries in the United Nations more or less than 65%? Now estimate, as accurately as you can, the actual percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Answer with a single number between 0 and 100."...
{}
{ "a": "high", "b": "low", "mean_diff": 20, "cohen_d": 0.9, "confidence": "approximate", "source": "Jacowitz & Kahneman (1995)", "note": "Absolute estimates are item-specific, so only the contrast is anchored here; the high-low gap is typically 15-25 percentage points." }
null
Deliberately has no level anchor: the point of this protocol is the contrast, not the absolute estimate. This is the pattern to use whenever only an effect size is trustworthy.
asian_disease
Asian disease problem — risky-choice framing
heuristics_biases
gain vs. loss frame, logically equivalent options
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) 'The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice', Science 211:453-458
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = choose the sure option, 0 = choose the risky option" }
[ { "condition_id": "gain", "label": "gain frame (lives saved)", "prompt": "Imagine the US is preparing for an unusual disease expected to kill 600 people. Two programmes are proposed. If programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If programme B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600...
{ "gain": { "mean": 0.72, "sd": null, "confidence": "high", "note": "" }, "loss": { "mean": 0.22, "sd": null, "confidence": "high", "note": "" } }
{ "a": "gain", "b": "loss", "mean_diff": 0.5, "cohen_d": 1, "confidence": "high", "source": "Tversky & Kahneman (1981)", "note": "Options A/C and B/D are formally identical; only the description differs." }
null
One of the most replicated effects in the literature. A population that is frame-invariant here is not behaving like a human sample.
endowment_effect
Endowment effect — WTA vs. WTP
heuristics_biases
buyer vs. seller valuation of the same object
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1990) 'Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem', Journal of Political Economy 98:1325-1348
{ "type": "numeric", "min": 0, "max": 10, "unit": "dollars" }
[ { "condition_id": "wtp", "label": "buyer — maximum willingness to pay", "prompt": "A coffee mug is for sale in the experiment. You do not own one. What is the largest amount, from $0 to $10, that you would be willing to pay to buy this mug? Answer with a single number." }, { "condition_id": "wta...
{ "wtp": { "mean": 3, "sd": 1.5, "confidence": "approximate", "note": "" }, "wta": { "mean": 6.5, "sd": 2, "confidence": "approximate", "note": "" } }
{ "a": "wta", "b": "wtp", "mean_diff": 3.5, "cohen_d": 0.8, "confidence": "approximate", "source": "Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1990); Horowitz & McConnell (2002) meta-analysis", "note": "The WTA/WTP ratio is typically 2-3; absolute dollar values depend on the object and the subject pool." }
null
Ownership alone shifts valuation. A population that quotes the same number in both roles is treating this as a pure valuation problem.
crt_batball
Cognitive reflection — bat and ball
heuristics_biases
intuitive-but-wrong vs. reflective answer
Frederick (2005) 'Cognitive reflection and decision making', Journal of Economic Perspectives 19:25-42
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = reflective correct answer (5 cents), 0 = intuitive wrong answer (10 cents)" }
[ { "condition_id": "batball", "label": "bat and ball", "prompt": "A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? Answer 1 if your answer is 5 cents (correct), 0 if your answer is 10 cents." } ]
{ "batball": { "mean": 0.4, "sd": null, "confidence": "approximate", "note": "Correct rates on the bat-and-ball item run roughly 30-50% in student samples and lower in general-population samples." } }
null
null
Scored as a binary here so that no free-text grading is needed. If you want the full 3-item CRT, run it as three binary protocols.
conjunction_fallacy
Conjunction fallacy — Linda problem
heuristics_biases
representativeness vs. the conjunction rule
Tversky & Kahneman (1983) 'Extensional versus intuitive reasoning', Psychological Review 90:293-315
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = choose the conjunction, 0 = choose the single (logically correct) option" }
[ { "condition_id": "between", "label": "between-subjects, ranking removed", "prompt": "Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and she participated in anti-nuclear demonstr...
{ "between": { "mean": 0.8, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "Roughly 80-90% choose the conjunction in the standard version; rates fall with transparent wording or within-subjects designs." } }
null
null
Choosing the conjunction violates the conjunction rule. This is the classic case where a well-aligned model looks *worse* than a human sample.
wason_selection
Wason selection task — abstract vs. deontic
reasoning
conditional-reasoning / cheater-detection
Wason (1968); Cosmides & Tooby (1992) 'Cognitive adaptations for social exchange', Cognition 31:187-276
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = exactly the two cards that can falsify the rule, 0 = any other selection" }
[ { "condition_id": "abstract", "label": "abstract rule (D / K / 3 / 7)", "prompt": "Four cards are on a table, showing D, K, 3 and 7. Every card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. The rule is: if a card has a D on one side, then it has a 3 on the other side. You may turn over only the ca...
{ "abstract": { "mean": 0.15, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium-high", "note": "" }, "deontic": { "mean": 0.7000000000000001, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "" } }
{ "a": "deontic", "b": "abstract", "mean_diff": 0.55, "cohen_d": 1.2, "confidence": "medium-high", "source": "Cosmides & Tooby (1992); Wason (1968)", "note": "The content effect is large: the same logical form is easy when framed as cheater detection and hard when framed abstractly." }
null
The correct answers are stated in the prompts, so this measures whether the population's *selection* matches human selection, not whether it can solve the logic.
bystander_effect
Bystander effect — alone vs. in a group
social_influence
diffusion of responsibility
Darley & Latané (1968) 'Bystander intervention in emergencies', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8:377-383; Latané & Nida (1981)
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = help, 0 = do not help" }
[ { "condition_id": "alone", "label": "participant alone", "prompt": "You are alone in a room filling out a questionnaire. You hear someone in the next room fall, cry out in pain and groan. No one else is present. Answer 1 if you would go to help, 0 if you would not." }, { "condition_id": "group",...
{ "alone": { "mean": 0.75, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "" }, "group": { "mean": 0.35000000000000003, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium", "note": "" } }
{ "a": "alone", "b": "group", "mean_diff": 0.4, "cohen_d": 0.85, "confidence": "medium", "source": "Darley & Latané (1968); Latané & Nida (1981)", "note": "Meta-analytic effect is moderate and smaller than textbook accounts suggest, but consistently present." }
null
A simulated population that helps at the same rate in both conditions shows no diffusion of responsibility at all.
trolley_dilemma
Trolley problem — switch vs. footbridge
moral_judgment
sacrificial moral dilemmas, means vs. side-effect
Foot (1967); Thomson (1985) 'The trolley problem', Yale Law Journal 94:1395-1415; large-N replications (e.g. Hauser et al. 2007)
{ "type": "binary", "min": 0, "max": 1, "unit": "1 = act to save the five, 0 = do nothing" }
[ { "condition_id": "switch", "label": "switch (impersonal)", "prompt": "A runaway trolley is heading for five people who will be killed if it continues. You are standing next to a switch. If you pull it, the trolley diverts to a side track where it will kill one person instead. Answer 1 if you pull the s...
{ "switch": { "mean": 0.85, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium-high", "note": "" }, "footbridge": { "mean": 0.25, "sd": null, "confidence": "medium-high", "note": "" } }
{ "a": "switch", "b": "footbridge", "mean_diff": 0.6, "cohen_d": 1.3, "confidence": "medium-high", "source": "Thomson (1985); Hauser et al. (2007)", "note": "Both dilemmas sacrifice one to save five; the personal/impersonal contrast drives a very large difference in responding." }
null
The two dilemmas are consequentially identical. A population that gives the same answer to both is doing utilitarian arithmetic, not reproducing human moral judgement.

Silicon Subjects

A protocol suite for auditing LLM-simulated subject populations.

17 classic experimental paradigms from behavioural economics and psychology — dictator game, ultimatum game, public goods, trust game, prisoner's dilemma, Asch conformity, anchoring, risky-choice framing, endowment effect, CRT, conjunction fallacy, Wason selection, bystander intervention, trolley dilemmas — each paired with human anchor statistics from the published literature, split along the three axes a simulated population has to reproduce.

Companion lab: Silicon Subjects Lab (Space)


The problem

Simulated populations are now a standard instrument: run an LLM through a classic experiment, read off the mean, compare with the human result. The check that gets performed is almost always mean-only.

That check cannot see the two failures that matter most:

  • Dispersion collapse. A population can report the right mean while every simulated subject gives essentially the same answer. Human samples are noisy; a degenerate one has no variance to reason about, and any subgroup analysis on it is meaningless.
  • Effect-sign and effect-size error. A population can reproduce the overall level while reversing the treatment contrast, or while inflating it threefold. A mean check run separately per condition will not notice unless the contrast itself is scored.

This suite anchors all three axes separately.


The three axes

axis anchor rule
location human mean and sd per condition SMD = (mean_sim − mean_human) / sd_human; score = max(0, 1 − |SMD| / 1.5)
dispersion human sd per condition ratio = sd_sim / sd_human; score = max(0, 1 − |ln ratio| / ln 2.5)
effect direction and magnitude of the treatment contrast wrong sign scores 0; otherwise the log-ratio rule above

Per-protocol score = 0.4 × worst axis + 0.6 × mean of axes, so one collapsed axis cannot be averaged away. Suite score = 0.3 × worst protocol + 0.7 × mean over protocols. Verdict: ≥ 75 usable as a pilot signal, 50–75 directional only, < 50 not usable.

No significance tests: with 500 simulated subjects a trivial difference is "significant", and with 20 nothing is significant. The axes report how far off the population is, on interpretable scales.


Schema — protocols

field type notes
protocol_id string e.g. dictator_game
name string human-readable name
domain string social_preferences · heuristics_biases · social_influence · reasoning · moral_judgment
paradigm string experimental paradigm
source string the literature the anchors come from
response object {type: "numeric"|"binary", min, max, unit}
conditions list {condition_id, label, prompt} — the prompt is ready to send
anchors object {condition_id: {mean, sd?, confidence, note}} — sd may be null and is then derived
effect object | null {a, b, mean_diff, cohen_d?, confidence, source, note}
shape string | null known distributional feature, e.g. bimodality
notes string what a mismatch on this protocol means

16 protocols carry level anchors; 7 carry a treatment-effect anchor. anchoring carries only an effect anchor — absolute estimates there are item-specific, so the suite anchors the contrast and leaves the level unscored. That is the intended pattern whenever only an effect size is trustworthy.


Usage

from datasets import load_dataset

protocols = load_dataset("NoahIsARider/SiliconSubjects", "protocols", split="train")
p = protocols[0]
print(p["protocol_id"], p["conditions"][0]["prompt"])

Score a population you have already run:

from silab import load_protocols, protocol_index, score_protocol, aggregate
from silab.scoring import aggregate

P = protocol_index()
result = score_protocol(
    P["dictator_game"],
    {"single": [0, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1, 10, 0, 5, 3]},   # your simulated responses
)
print(result["overall"], result["verdict"]["label"])
print(result["axes"]["dispersion"]["items"])

The scoring engine lives in the companion Space repository and has no dependencies beyond the standard library.


How to read the anchors

Anchors are literature aggregates, not raw subject-level data. They come from the meta-analyses and landmark studies cited in each source field. Experimental results move with subject pool, stake size, framing and procedure — a dictator-game mean of 28% is a summary of hundreds of treatments, not a prediction for any one of them.

Each anchor carries a confidence field (high / medium-high / medium / approximate) and a note. Check the cited source before you lean on an individual number. The suite is designed so you can drop an anchor you do not trust: remove it from anchors and that axis simply stops being scored.

Intended use

  • Auditing a simulated population before using it as a pilot or as a manipulation check
  • Comparing candidate models on behavioural fidelity rather than task accuracy
  • Reporting the limitations of a simulation-based study honestly

Not intended for

  • Claiming an LLM "has" a bias or preference. A match here is a distributional similarity, not a mechanistic claim.
  • Replacing human subjects in any applied or policy setting.

Reproducing

python scripts/build_protocols.py

License

Data: CC BY 4.0. Code: MIT.

Author

Fangyanuo Zhou (NoahIsARider)

Citation

@misc{zhou2026siliconsubjects,
  title        = {Silicon Subjects: A Protocol Suite for Auditing LLM-Simulated
                  Subject Populations on Location, Dispersion and Effect},
  author       = {Zhou, Fangyanuo},
  year         = {2026},
  publisher    = {Hugging Face},
  howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/NoahIsARider/SiliconSubjects}}
}
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