factor stringclasses 7
values | metric stringlengths 20 78 | value stringlengths 3 384 | source stringlengths 3 54 | vintage stringlengths 4 21 |
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1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Combined 2026 hyperscaler capex (Alphabet+Amazon+Meta+Microsoft) | ≈$720-745B (GOOGL 195-205 + AMZN ≈220 + META 130-145 + MSFT 175 stated); capex increases reflect component inflation as well as capacity | company guidance | Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Incremental annual AI revenue (industry) | ≈$20-30B (analyst estimate, register's weakest number) | analyst estimate | 2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | AI accelerator refresh / obsolescence clock | ≈2-3 years | industry | 2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Data-centre lease commitments signed but not commenced (off balance sheet) | ≈$662B; larger than the same firms' combined on-BS debt | Moody's | early-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | AI-related debt financing projected through 2030 | ≈$4.1T (within ≈$5.5T total AI capital spend); ≈15% of the corporate-bond universe; >$300B issued in 2026 YTD | JPMorgan | 2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Fed policy rate (the rate-sensitivity lever) | held 3.50-3.75% for 5th consecutive meeting (9-3 vote); median end-2026 3.8% from Jun-2026 SEP | FOMC (Warsh) | 29-Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Market-live tape and financing gradient INVERSION | Meta $589.85 (-8.4% since 21-Jul); Oracle $150.52 (+18.5% since 21-Jul, off BBB- trough ≈$121); Micron $971.66 (-22.6% from $1,255.50 peak, flat vs $970.82 21-Jul); financing gradient inverted on tape | Nasdaq historical | 14-Aug-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Single-counterparty concentration (the structural sub-factor) | Oracle cut to BBB- on customer concentration; OpenAI ≈half of a ≈$638B backlog; circular financing connects exposures | S&P / market | 9-Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Memory-spend crowd-out landing in earnings | IBM -25.21%, worst single day on record, ≈-$68.8B; clients pulled memory/hardware spend forward, deferred software/mainframe/consulting | company pre-announcement | 14-Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Capex aggregate - stated as a RANGE not a point | component guides sum to ≈$720-745B (GOOGL $195-205B; AMZN ≈$220B; META $130-145B; MSFT $175B stated post asset-life extension); reported aggregates track $670-710B | company guidance / press | Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | ① TRIGGER RECALIBRATION - 4 quarters without a cut; focus shifts to Nvidia gap | Q2 prints passed with zero guidance cuts (GOOGL $195-205B, AMZN ≈$220B, META $130-145B, MSFT $175B stated). Trigger failed to fire while financing strain appeared in FCF and debt. The informative signal shifts to 26 Aug 2026: hyperscaler capex vs Nvidia take-rate gap via custom silicon (TPU, Trainium) and AMD | company calls / analyst | Aug-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | PART OF THE RAISE IS PRICE, NOT CAPACITY (Amazon and Microsoft decompositions) | Amazon raised capex to ≈$220B explicitly citing memory chip inflation (Jassy: 'The higher cost of memory is pushing this number up from our prior estimate of about $200 billion'); Microsoft attributes ≈$25B to component pricing; Meta cites memory pricing. A raise driven by factor 4 is cost pass-through, not added convi... | company guidance / calls | Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | DEFLATION - the $20-30B revenue figure is the register's weakest number | Microsoft AI business at a $37B annualised run rate (+123% YoY); Google Cloud +63% YoY to $20.02B in Q1-2026 (+82% Q2); Alphabet describes itself as compute constrained. Company-reported and defined differently from an industry increment, so not a replacement, but the capital-to-revenue gap is probably narrower than $7... | company disclosures | Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Cash generation under the cycle | Amazon TTM free cash flow ≈$1.2B, about -95% YoY, at a firm whose demand is not in question | company disclosure | Q1-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Circular financing (why concentration is not one balance sheet) | labs buy cloud from hyperscalers; hyperscalers and chip vendors hold lab equity; chip vendors invest in the deployers who buy their chips; hyperscalers prepay memory makers years ahead. Oracle is where it surfaced first (named counterparty, public rating), not the only place it sits | author's reading | 21-Jul-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Credit conditions (the deflation) | IG OAS 80 bps (BAMLC0A0CM, up from 74 bps in Jun-2026); HY OAS 2.82% (BAMLH0A0HYM2, up from 2.75% in Jun-2026); stress remains issuer-specific | ICE BofA via FRED | 14-Aug-2026 |
1 Capex vs revenue + credit | Single-campus property reinsurance capacity & TIV limits | multi-gigawatt campuses represent $15-40B+ in Total Insured Value; catastrophe and fire treaty capacity limits act as a structural ceiling on bank debt syndication | Lloyd's / reinsurance circulars | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | PJM data-centre-attributed capacity cost (BRA 26/27 + 27/28) | ≈$13.8B ($7.3B + $6.5B) | PJM market monitor (Monitoring Analytics) | 2025-26 |
2 Grid / power | PJM capacity clearing price, 2026/27 vs 2024/25 | $329.17/MW-day vs $28.92 | PJM BRA | 2025-26 |
2 Grid / power | PJM 2028/29 BRA - the framing shift (price capped, constraint shows as volume) | cleared at the $325/MW-day cap (≈2.5% below prior cap); 6,831 MW SHORT; only 525 MW new generation; collar held it (would have cleared $554.72 / ≈$30B vs $16.4B) | PJM BRA | 14-Jul-2026 |
2 Grid / power | PJM post-auction regulatory expansion (large-load framework) | FERC filings 31 Jul ($20B procurement for generation serving datacentres) and 7 Aug (bring-your-own-power framework for >=50 MW loads post-2027); transforms grid bottleneck into active regulatory rationing | PJM / FERC filings | Aug-2026 |
2 Grid / power | Interconnection-queue dropout at first decision | 28-31% | PJM Reliability Resource Initiative disclosures | Q1/Q2-2026 |
2 Grid / power | Skilled high-voltage electrical labour (the non-tradable constraint) | certified electricians (SOC 47-2111) and line installers (SOC 49-9051) require 4-5 yr apprenticeships; non-tradable human pipeline; wage growth outrunning general ECI; utility commissioning delayed on crew availability | US BLS / DOL RAPIDS | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | Prime movers (the on-site generation queue) | heavy-duty gas turbine slots backlogged 3-5 yrs at GE Vernova, Siemens Energy, MHI; on-site bypass has its own manufacturing queue | GE Vernova / Siemens 10-Q | Jul/Aug-2026 |
2 Grid / power | Turbine hot-section superalloy castings (the prime-mover floor) | single-crystal turbine blades constrained at Howmet Aerospace and Precision Castparts; aviation and power compete for vacuum investment casting capacity | Howmet 10-Q / industry | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | Large power transformer (LPT) lead time | 128 weeks | Wood Mackenzie survey (corrob. DOE/trade press) | Q2-2025 |
2 Grid / power | Generator step-up (GSU) transformer lead time | 144 weeks | Wood Mackenzie survey (corrob. DOE/trade press) | Q2-2025 |
2 Grid / power | Extra-high-voltage transformer lead time | 36-48 months (to ≈60mo extreme) | Wood Mackenzie / US DOE | Q2-2025 |
2 Grid / power | Grid equipment beyond transformers (switchgear, breakers, HVDC) | HV gas-insulated switchgear, SF6-free circuit breakers, and HVDC cables run 3-5 yr lead times (Hitachi Energy, Prysmian, NKT) | OEM order books | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | US data-centre electricity demand | 176 TWh 2023 (≈4.4% of US elec) -> 325-580 TWh (6.7-12%) by 2028 | Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory | 2024 (->2028) |
2 Grid / power | Global data-centre electricity demand | ≈416 TWh 2024 -> ≈946 TWh 2030 (Base); range 669 (Headwinds) to 1,264 (Lift-Off); PUE 1.41 -> ≈1.29 | IEA 'Energy and AI' data annex | 2025 (->2030/35) |
2 Grid / power | Projection-range deflation (the caveat on every figure above) | 2030 projections span ≈200 to ≈8,000 TWh across 100+ studies (≈40x); triangulated 2023 ≈300-380 TWh; widest figures from temporal extrapolation | IEA 4E EDNA (Kamiya & Coroama) | Mar-2025 |
2 Grid / power | AI rack power draw vs conventional | 30-100+ kW vs 7-10 kW | industry | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | Per-query energy - REVISED DOWN | ≈0.24 Wh (Google median Gemini text) / ≈0.34 Wh (OpenAI), vs the widely-cited ≈2.9 Wh; heavy reasoning/multimodal ≈18-40 Wh; agentic use inverts the per-TASK story | Google / OpenAI | 2025 (published 2026) |
2 Grid / power | CORRECTION - Lake Powell minimum power pool (3,490 ft) | breach DEFERRED past 2026: release cut 7.48 -> 6.00 maf; July-2026 Probable Minimum trace projects 3,503.65 ft at 31-Dec-2026 (≈13.7 ft above 3,490 ft power pool). Reclamation traces carry vintage mismatch (Min Jul-2026, Max May-2026; unregulated inflows 36% of average) | US Bureau of Reclamation 24-Month Study (Jul-2026 Min) | Jul-2026 |
2 Grid / power | Water siting as a physical constraint (not an externality) | municipal moratoria and basin allocations remove candidate sites outright; USBR Colorado River shortage guidelines and ADWR groundwater rules cap arid-basin deployment | USBR / ADWR / municipal dockets | May/Aug-2026 |
2 Grid / power | Nuclear baseload & SMR fuel chokepoint (HALEU) | NRC reactor restart licensing takes 3-5 yrs; commercial HALEU (5-20% U-235) enrichment pilot-stage in US (Centrus), historical supply Russia-dominated | US NRC / Centrus Energy 10-Q | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | On-site generation externality ('bring your own power') | Colossus 2, Memphis: 59 unpermitted gas turbines; federal air-permit loophole closed Jan-2026; substation lead times 3-5 yrs drive the bypass | press / EPA | 2026 |
2 Grid / power | Energy-shock feedback into factor 1 | Brent ≈$87 2026 average ($85 Q3, $78 Q4, $69 2027); recovery delayed to early 2027 on Hormuz transit constraints; energy cost moves from tail risk to 2026 baseline friction | EIA STEO | 11-Aug-2026 |
2 Grid / power | Hyperscaler renting OUT OF SHORTAGE (against the glut read) | Alphabet 22 Jul 2026: 'still in a supply-constrained environment', demand outpacing 3 years of rising investment; will expand THIRD-PARTY cloud capacity in Q3 as a bridge while it builds its own = a hyperscaler renting because it cannot build fast enough | company call / CNBC | 22-Jul-2026 |
3 Taiwan leading-edge | TSMC share of leading-edge logic | ≈90% | industry / TSMC | 2026 |
3 Taiwan leading-edge | Advanced packaging (CoWoS) concentration | effectively 100% Taiwan, no second source; leading edge Taiwan-bound through ≈2028-30 | industry | 2026 |
3 Taiwan leading-edge | Substrates (ABF) manufacturing concentration | Ajinomoto Build-up Film substrates for large CoWoS packages concentrated in Japan/Taiwan (Ibiden, Shinko, Unimicron); yield drops non-linearly with package size | Ibiden / Shinko filings | 2026 |
3 Taiwan leading-edge | Specialty EUV photoresists and polymer precursors | >85% of advanced EUV photoresists, PAGs, and fluorinated precursors controlled by Japanese chemical firms (Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, JSR, Shin-Etsu) under METI export regime | Japan METI / company reports | 2026 |
3 Taiwan leading-edge | High-purity quartz (HPQ) crucibles (Spruce Pine single-point-of-failure) | >80-90% of global semiconductor-grade quartz for silicon ingot pulling originates from Spruce Pine, North Carolina (Sibelco, The Quartz Corp) | USGS Mineral Summaries | 2026 |
3 Taiwan leading-edge | Lloyd's JWC listed areas (the trigger's live reading) | Taiwan Strait NOT listed as of JWLA-032/033; that amendment extended the Gulf instead. Baseline hull war ≈0.15-0.25% of hull value; Gulf now ≈1% | Lloyd's Market Association Joint War Committee | 3-Mar-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | DRAM/HBM shortage horizon | to ≈2028; Micron/SK Hynix sold out through 2027-2028; SK Hynix CEO sees tightness extending beyond 2028 to 2030 | earnings / industry | Jul-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Memory incidence INVERSION (trade-press consensus estimates) | HBM takes 23% of DRAM wafers at a 3:1 conversion penalty; HBM ASPs rise moderately (Samsung +8%, SK Hynix +1%, Micron +22%), while traditional DRAM bit revenue surges (Samsung +116%, SK Hynix +78%, Micron +54%); the AI buyer does NOT pay the primary inflation, consumer/PC buyers do | TrendForce / DigiTimes / Counterpoint | Aug-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Automated Test Equipment (ATE) memory test scaling | HBM3e/HBM4 stacks require 4x to 6x the test duration of commodity DRAM across wafer probe and package test; Advantest and Teradyne test slot capacity is an inelastic throughput governor | Advantest / Teradyne 10-Q | 2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Optical transceivers & InP CW laser diodes | scale-out 800G/1.6T networking requires Continuous-Wave InP laser diodes for silicon photonics, concentrated at Coherent, Lumentum, Broadcom | Coherent / Lumentum 10-Q | 2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Strategic equity linkage (① and ④ coupling) | Anthropic Series H ($65B, $965B post-money, 28 May 2026) brought Micron, Samsung, SK Hynix as strategic partners alongside Amazon ($5B); chokepoints and frontier demand become one financing node | company filings / press | 28-May-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Nanya (DRAM) revenue | +583% YoY (Q1, off trough; price-driven, >70% DRAM price spike, not volume) | Nanya Q1-2026 earnings | Q1-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Memory de-cyclicalisation (may cut against the boom-bust read) | supply contracts lengthened to 3-5 years with prepayments up to 30% | SK Hynix / press | Jul-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | SECOND packaging chokepoint (new in v3) | ASE Technology (largest OSAT) raised 2026 capex to $8.5B; critical node for co-packaged optics; distinct from TSMC CoWoS | company / press | 2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | EUV lithography optics | ASML / Zeiss sole-source | industry | 2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | China share of rare-earth refining/separation (historical framing) | China refines most REEs and dominates heavy-REE separation/magnets; earlier editions gave ≈91% refining / ≈60% mining (IEA / Rhodium Group) | IEA / Rhodium Group (historical) | 2024-26 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | China share of magnet-grade REE mining | processing not mining is the structural bottleneck | IEA | 2024-25 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Western magnet alternatives at full production | not expected before 2027 (MP Materials, USA Rare Earth) | industry | 2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | China export-control ladder on materials | gallium/germanium 2023; US-specific Ga/Ge/antimony ban Dec-2024; Apr-2025 per-shipment licensing over 7 medium+heavy REEs and magnets | China MOFCOM | 2023-25 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | EU heavy-REE price (Dy/Tb) vs China, at peak | ≈6x | IEA (European Parliament corrob.) | 2025 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Oct-2025 EXTRATERRITORIAL expansion + the dated trigger | any foreign product with >=0.1% Chinese-origin REE content would need a licence; suspended one year under truce; REVIEWED AROUND NOVEMBER 2026 (v3 states the month: the precise 27 Nov date carried in v2.x was not confirmed at source) | China MOFCOM | 2025-26 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | Helium (Ras Laffan strike) | ≈30% of global semiconductor-grade helium offline, spot +40-100%; restart tied to a ceasefire, LNG repairs up to 5 yrs. Deflation: TSMC reported no notable impact, SK Hynix diversified; hit storage (He-sealed HDDs sold out 2026) not leading-edge output | press / company statements | 28-Feb-2026 |
4 Chokepoints (made + licensed) | SEVERITY SPLIT within factor 4 (do not flatten these) | helium = elastic BUFFER problem (fabs held inventory, TSMC no notable impact, surfaced in storage not leading-edge output) = months. Heavy-REE separation = structural capital-equipment + permitting bottleneck (separation chemistry, environmental consent, no Western magnet capacity before 2027) = multi-year. The license... | author's reading | 21-Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Open-weight frontier datapoint | Kimi K3 (Moonshot), 2.8T MoE, $3/$15 per M tokens; near the top closed tier on one aggregate index while trailing the leading closed model overall; reported to beat Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol in blind front-end coding tests | Moonshot / Axios | 16-Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | MEASUREMENT CAVEAT - least quantified of the six | the stated lens (yield on a deployed megawatt) is NOT directly observable: no firm reports revenue per MW of deployed capacity. Token price index is a stand-in, not a measure. Carried on a directional argument (token prices falling while capital cost per MW rises on components), not a measured ratio | author's reading | 21-Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Frontier token price index | ≈-20% from its May-2026 peak on substitution to cheaper models | Citadel (reported) | Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Industrial policy behind open weights | Xi framed open-weight models as a global public good (World AI Conference) | state media / press | 17-Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | INVERSE-RISK ROW - the shortage and glut co-existence (Micron paradox) | Micron sold out through 2027 but stock closed $971.66 on 14-Aug (-22.6% from $1,255.50 peak); Samsung -33%; SK Hynix -15% broke ADR issue price; IDC projects 2026 smartphone shipments -14% (largest decline on record); Micron exits consumer memory. Shortage tail and glut tail co-exist in the same company | Nasdaq / IDC | 14-Aug-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Inverse row - the FIRST PRICED market response (two-sided, not demand-side) | on the 1 Jul report Meta +≈9%; CoreWeave -≈14% in a session, Nebius -≈17%, both -≈35% over the following month. Meta had contracted ≈$48B from the two (≈$27B Nebius Mar-2026; $35.2B total CoreWeave after an Apr expansion), so a self-supplying Meta WITHDRAWS a buyer and ADDS a seller = reallocation of who sells compute,... | press | Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Inverse row - two constraints on the strong version | Meta's CoreWeave contract reportedly carries a NO-SUBLEASE provision barring resale of rented capacity; and several observers infer the opposite from the same fact, that surplus worth selling implies a market large enough to absorb it (growth, not glut) | press / analyst | Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Inverse row - why not base case | leasing is the ordinary cloud model; capital efficiency, burn mitigation, or demand STRENGTH (Anthropic, short of compute, reportedly proposed it) all fit the same facts; talks preliminary. Counter-indicators: memory sold out and contracted 3-5yr ahead with prepay; PJM cleared 6,831 MW short | author's reading | 21-Jul-2026 |
5 Commoditisation from below | Inverse row - UPGRADE TRIGGER (none present at 15 Aug 2026) | multiple hyperscalers turn net seller; published idle-fleet utilisation confirms sustained low use; HBM contracts renegotiated DOWN; or capex guidance CUT outright | author's trigger | 15-Aug-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | First export control applied to a MODEL, not a chip | BIS 'Is-Informed' letter (no rulemaking required): export licence needed for any foreign person to access Fable 5 / Mythos 5. Models went dark worldwide; trusted-partner carve-out 26 Jun; withdrawal 30 Jun; Fable restored 1 Jul | US Commerce / BIS | 12-Jun-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | Contagion beyond one firm | OpenAI limited the release of GPT-5.6 at the administration's request within days | press | Jun-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | The substitution it generates | Macron (G7): a switch thrown 'from one day to the next' is a reason not to buy US models; spur to sovereign open-weight procurement across the EU, Gulf, Japan | press | Jun-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | Hardware two-stack, blocked at both ends | H200 China sales approved Dec-2025 under a 25% export tax (codified Jan-2026); trade stalled by Mar-2026, US security screening one end, Chinese import restrictions the other | press / policy | 2025-26 |
6 Export-control two-stack | Direction of travel on Chinese models (reported, not yet a rule) | administration reviving restrictions post-Kimi K3: Entity List designations, federal procurement limits, security advisories, liability requirements; deliberately short of an outright ban. Contested internally (David Sacks). Deflation: open weights may make it hard to enforce | Axios (reported) | 20-Jul-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | TRIGGER (new: every factor now carries a falsifier) | a second Is-Informed letter or equivalent against any frontier model; OR Entity List designation reaching a Chinese AI lab; OR a sovereign procurement mandate (EU/Gulf/Japan) requiring locally-hosted weights. Not tripped at 15 Aug 2026 | author's trigger | 15-Aug-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | Governance bloc split | WAICO (China-led, 29 founding states, governance) vs Pax Silica (US-led, launched Dec-2025 with ≈2 dozen, reported 35 by its 2nd summit, supply-chain). Kazakhstan in both | press | Jul-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | State as prospective owner (conceptual) | OpenAI proposed donating 5% of equity (≈$42.6B on an $852B Mar mark) to a US public wealth fund; precedent = 10% US stake in Intel after $8.9B CHIPS. Anthropic states it is not in talks | Financial Times | 2-Jul-2026 |
6 Export-control two-stack | Standards as the real rate-limiter | EU AI Act GPAI enforcement from 2 Aug 2026 (to 3% of global turnover, or an order to restrict/withdraw a model); Annex III high-risk DECOUPLED from the calendar and gated on harmonised CEN-CENELEC standards (up to ≈16 months + 6-month transition) | EU Commission / EUR-Lex | 2026 |
Amplifier (not a factor) | US average effective tariff rate | ≈9.1% (highest since 1946); statutory basis in flux after the 20-Feb-2026 SCOTUS IEEPA ruling, duties replaced same-day under Section 122 | US trade data / SCOTUS | 2026 |
Amplifier (not a factor) | Cooling refrigerant & F-gas quotas (AIM Act / EU F-Gas III) | HFC phasedown quotas increase chiller replacement and chemical top-up expenditure without physically halting thermal management (pricing amplifier) | US EPA / EU Commission | 2026 |
Amplifier (not a factor) | Ratepayer tariff riders and large-load structures | utility large-load demand charges and minimum take-or-pay structures reallocate grid infrastructure costs to hyperscalers (pricing amplifier) | state PUC dockets | 2026 |
Amplifier (not a factor) | Datacentre land and dark-fibre routing premiums | real estate and metro dark-fibre price premiums in tier-1 hubs reallocate capital to secondary regions (pricing amplifier) | industry market reports | 2026 |
The AI Constraint Relay: A Supply and Demand Risk Assessment
A supply-side empirical assessment of the AI compute build-out, tracking moving bottlenecks across power, labour, equipment, upstream materials, and cost incidence.
AI disclosure: the research is the author's; this text was drafted with AI assistance (Anthropic Opus 4.8-5.0 and Google Gemini 3.7) and reviewed by the author. The models, and the conflicts they create, are named in the Conflict of interest and scope section.
- Author: NM AI Research (independent analyst)
- ORCID: 0009-0003-4213-7769
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20586863
- Source and code: https://github.com/NMAIResearch/ai-constraint-relay
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