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Review this Python code for security issues: def get_user(username): import sqlite3 conn = sqlite3.connect('users.db') cursor = conn.cursor() query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '" + username + "'" cursor.execute(query) return cursor.fetchone()
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection", "location": "Line 5 β€” string concatenation used to build SQL query with unsanitized user input `username`", "remediation": "Use parameterized queries (prepared statements). Replace the query with: `query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?'` and call `cursor.execute(...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import subprocess app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/ping') def ping(): host = request.args.get('host') result = subprocess.check_output('ping -c 1 ' + host, shell=True) return result
{ "vulnerability_type": "Command Injection", "location": "Line 8 β€” user-controlled `host` parameter directly concatenated into a shell command with `shell=True`", "remediation": "Avoid `shell=True`. Use a list of arguments and validate/whitelist input: `subprocess.check_output(['ping', '-c', '1', host])`. Also va...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, render_template_string app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/greet') def greet(): name = request.args.get('name', '') return render_template_string('<h1>Hello, ' + name + '!</h1>')
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)", "location": "Line 8 β€” unsanitized user input `name` is directly embedded into HTML returned to the browser", "remediation": "Use Jinja2 template auto-escaping. Pass `name` as a template variable: `render_template_string('<h1>Hello, {{ name }}!</h1>', name=name...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, session app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/transfer', methods=['POST']) def transfer(): amount = request.form['amount'] to_account = request.form['to_account'] # perform transfer without any token check do_transfer(session[...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "location": "Lines 6-10 β€” the `/transfer` POST endpoint performs a sensitive action without verifying a CSRF token", "remediation": "Implement CSRF token validation using a library such as `flask-wtf`. Generate a unique token per session, embed it in fo...
Review this Python code for security issues: import os from flask import Flask, request, send_file app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/download') def download(): filename = request.args.get('file') return send_file('/var/www/files/' + filename)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Path Traversal", "location": "Line 9 β€” user-supplied `filename` is concatenated directly to a base path without sanitization, allowing `../../etc/passwd` style traversal", "remediation": "Use `os.path.basename(filename)` to strip directory components, then use `os.path.abspath` and verify...
Review this Python code for security issues: import pickle from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/load', methods=['POST']) def load_data(): data = request.data obj = pickle.loads(data) return str(obj)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Deserialization", "location": "Line 9 β€” `pickle.loads()` is called on untrusted user-supplied bytes, which can execute arbitrary code during deserialization", "remediation": "Never deserialize untrusted data with `pickle`. Use a safe data format like JSON (`json.loads`) or a sche...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import yaml app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/config', methods=['POST']) def load_config(): config_data = request.data config = yaml.load(config_data) return str(config)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Deserialization / Code Execution via YAML", "location": "Line 9 β€” `yaml.load()` without a safe Loader can execute arbitrary Python objects embedded in malicious YAML input", "remediation": "Replace `yaml.load(config_data)` with `yaml.safe_load(config_data)`. The `safe_load` funct...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, redirect app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/redirect') def do_redirect(): url = request.args.get('next') return redirect(url)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Open Redirect", "location": "Line 7 β€” the `next` parameter is used directly as the redirect target without validation, allowing redirection to arbitrary external URLs", "remediation": "Validate the redirect target against an allowlist of trusted URLs or domains. Use `urllib.parse.urlparse...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import subprocess app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/convert') def convert(): filename = request.args.get('file') os.system('convert ' + filename + ' output.png') return 'Done'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Command Injection", "location": "Line 9 β€” `os.system` is called with unsanitized user input `filename` concatenated into the shell command string", "remediation": "Replace `os.system` with `subprocess.run(['convert', filename, 'output.png'])` using a list (no shell interpolation). Additio...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, make_response app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/setlang') def set_language(): lang = request.args.get('lang', 'en') resp = make_response('Language set') resp.set_cookie('lang', lang) return resp
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cookie Injection / Missing Secure Cookie Flags", "location": "Line 9 β€” the cookie is set with user-controlled content without `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, or `SameSite` flags", "remediation": "Set cookies with security flags: `resp.set_cookie('lang', lang, httponly=True, secure=True, samesite='S...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/eval') def run_expr(): expr = request.args.get('expr') result = eval(expr) return str(result)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Remote Code Execution (RCE) via eval()", "location": "Line 7 β€” `eval()` executes arbitrary Python expressions provided by the user via the `expr` query parameter", "remediation": "Never use `eval()` or `exec()` on user input. If mathematical expression evaluation is needed, use a safe lib...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/search') def search(): term = request.args.get('q') import re results = db.execute(f"SELECT * FROM products WHERE name LIKE '%{term}%'") return str(results.fetchall())
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection", "location": "Line 8 β€” f-string interpolation embeds the unescaped `term` variable directly into the SQL query", "remediation": "Use a parameterized query: `db.execute(\"SELECT * FROM products WHERE name LIKE ?\", (f'%{term}%',))`. This ensures the database driver handles e...
Review this Python code for security issues: import hashlib from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/login', methods=['POST']) def login(): password = request.form['password'] hashed = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest() user = db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE password...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Weak Password Hashing (Use of MD5)", "location": "Line 9 β€” MD5 is used to hash passwords; it is cryptographically broken and susceptible to rainbow table and brute-force attacks", "remediation": "Replace MD5 with `bcrypt`, `argon2`, or `scrypt`. Use the `bcrypt` library: `bcrypt.hashpw(pa...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, session app = Flask(__name__) app.secret_key = 'secret' @app.route('/admin') def admin(): if session.get('role') == 'admin': return render_admin() return 'Forbidden', 403
{ "vulnerability_type": "Hardcoded Secret Key / Weak Session Security", "location": "Line 3 β€” `app.secret_key` is set to a hardcoded, trivially guessable string `'secret'`, compromising all session tokens", "remediation": "Generate a strong random secret key and load it from an environment variable: `app.secret_k...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/upload', methods=['POST']) def upload(): f = request.files['file'] f.save('/var/www/uploads/' + f.filename) return 'Uploaded'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Unrestricted File Upload / Path Traversal", "location": "Line 8 β€” `f.filename` is used directly without sanitization, allowing directory traversal or upload of malicious file types (e.g., `.py`, `.php`)", "remediation": "Use `werkzeug.utils.secure_filename(f.filename)` to sanitize the fil...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request from lxml import etree app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/parse', methods=['POST']) def parse_xml(): xml_data = request.data parser = etree.XMLParser() tree = etree.fromstring(xml_data, parser) return tree.find('name').text
{ "vulnerability_type": "XML External Entity (XXE) Injection", "location": "Lines 8-9 β€” the XML parser is configured without disabling external entity resolution, allowing attackers to read local files or trigger SSRF via DOCTYPE declarations", "remediation": "Disable external entity processing: `parser = etree.X...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import requests as http app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/fetch') def fetch_url(): url = request.args.get('url') resp = http.get(url) return resp.text
{ "vulnerability_type": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "location": "Line 8 β€” the `url` parameter is user-controlled and passed directly to `requests.get()`, allowing requests to internal services, metadata endpoints, or localhost", "remediation": "Validate `url` against an allowlist of permitted domains. U...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/log') def log_action(): user = request.args.get('user') with open('app.log', 'a') as f: f.write(f'User {user} accessed the page\n') return 'Logged'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Log Injection", "location": "Line 8 β€” unsanitized `user` input is written directly to log files; an attacker can inject newlines to forge log entries", "remediation": "Sanitize log entries by stripping or escaping newline characters: `user = user.replace('\\n', '').replace('\\r', '')`. Us...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/render') def render(): template = request.args.get('template') from jinja2 import Environment env = Environment() return env.from_string(template).render()
{ "vulnerability_type": "Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)", "location": "Lines 7-9 β€” user-supplied `template` string is compiled and rendered directly by Jinja2, allowing arbitrary Python code execution via expressions like `{{ ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__() }}`", "remediation": "Never render user-...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/user/<int:user_id>') def get_user_data(user_id): current_user = get_current_user() user = db.get_user(user_id) return jsonify(user.to_dict())
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)", "location": "Lines 6-8 β€” the endpoint returns data for any `user_id` without verifying that the requesting user is authorized to access that record", "remediation": "Add an authorization check before returning data: `if current_user.id != user_id ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask app = Flask(__name__) DB_PASSWORD = 'SuperSecret123' API_KEY = 'sk-prod-abc123xyz' @app.route('/') def index(): return 'Hello'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Hardcoded Credentials / Secrets in Source Code", "location": "Lines 4-5 β€” database password and API key are hardcoded as plaintext string literals in the source file", "remediation": "Store secrets in environment variables or a secrets manager (e.g., AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault)....
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import re app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/validate') def validate_email(): email = request.args.get('email', '') pattern = r'^([a-zA-Z0-9]+)*@[a-zA-Z0-9]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$' if re.match(pattern, email): return 'Valid' ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)", "location": "Line 8 β€” the regex pattern `^([a-zA-Z0-9]+)*@...` contains a nested quantifier `(group)+*` which causes catastrophic backtracking on crafted inputs", "remediation": "Rewrite the regex to avoid nested quantifiers: `r'^[a-zA-Z0-9._...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/debug') def debug(): import traceback, sys return jsonify({ 'env': dict(os.environ), 'traceback': traceback.format_exc() })
{ "vulnerability_type": "Sensitive Data Exposure / Information Disclosure", "location": "Lines 7-9 β€” the `/debug` endpoint exposes all environment variables (including secrets) and stack traces to any unauthenticated caller", "remediation": "Remove or restrict the debug endpoint entirely in production. If needed ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/query') def query_mongo(): username = request.args.get('user') result = db.users.find({'username': username, 'active': True}) return str(list(result))
{ "vulnerability_type": "NoSQL Injection", "location": "Line 7 β€” `username` is inserted directly into a MongoDB query dict; an attacker can pass a JSON object (e.g., `{\"$gt\": \"\"}`) to manipulate the query logic", "remediation": "Validate that `username` is a plain string before querying: `if not isinstance(us...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, session app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/reset', methods=['POST']) def reset_password(): token = request.form.get('token') stored_token = get_reset_token(request.form.get('email')) if token == stored_token: update_pas...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Timing Attack on Token Comparison", "location": "Line 8 β€” `token == stored_token` uses a non-constant-time string comparison, allowing timing-based enumeration of valid reset tokens", "remediation": "Use `hmac.compare_digest(token, stored_token)` for constant-time comparison. Additionally...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/import', methods=['POST']) def import_module(): mod_name = request.form.get('module') mod = __import__(mod_name) result = mod.run() return str(result)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Remote Code Execution via Dynamic Import", "location": "Line 7 β€” `__import__()` is called with a user-supplied module name, allowing an attacker to import and execute arbitrary installed Python modules (e.g., `os`, `subprocess`)", "remediation": "Never import modules based on user input. ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/data') def get_data(): response = make_response(jsonify({'secret': 'data'})) response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = '*' response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'tr...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Misconfigured CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing)", "location": "Lines 7-8 β€” setting `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` together with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` is invalid per the spec and, in some browsers/configs, may allow credential-bearing cross-origin requests from any si...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/execute', methods=['POST']) def execute_code(): code = request.form.get('code') exec(code) return 'Executed'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Remote Code Execution via exec()", "location": "Line 7 β€” `exec()` executes arbitrary Python code supplied by the user, allowing complete server compromise", "remediation": "`exec()` must never be called on user-supplied input. Remove this endpoint entirely. If sandboxed code execution is ...
Review this Python code for security issues: import sqlite3 from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/delete', methods=['POST']) def delete_record(): record_id = request.form.get('id') conn = sqlite3.connect('data.db') conn.execute("DELETE FROM records WHERE id = " + record_id) ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection", "location": "Line 9 β€” `record_id` from user input is concatenated directly into a DELETE statement without sanitization", "remediation": "Use a parameterized query: `conn.execute('DELETE FROM records WHERE id = ?', (record_id,))`. Also validate that `record_id` is a valid ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/headers') def show_headers(): user_agent = request.headers.get('User-Agent') return f'<html><body>Your agent: {user_agent}</body></html>'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTTP Header Reflection", "location": "Line 7 β€” the `User-Agent` HTTP header is reflected into the HTML response without escaping, allowing header-based XSS", "remediation": "Escape the output using `markupsafe.escape(user_agent)` before embedding it in HTML,...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import ldap app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/login', methods=['POST']) def ldap_login(): user = request.form['username'] password = request.form['password'] conn = ldap.initialize('ldap://corp.local') conn.simple_bind_s(f'...
{ "vulnerability_type": "LDAP Injection", "location": "Line 11 β€” `user` is interpolated directly into an LDAP distinguished name string without escaping, allowing DN injection attacks", "remediation": "Escape user input using `ldap.dn.escape_dn_chars(user)` before constructing the DN. Validate the username to onl...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/profile') def profile(): user_id = request.cookies.get('user_id') user = db.get_user(user_id) return render_profile(user)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Authentication via Unverified Cookie", "location": "Lines 6-7 β€” `user_id` is read directly from a cookie with no signature or integrity verification, allowing attackers to forge arbitrary user IDs", "remediation": "Use Flask's signed session cookies (`session['user_id']`) which a...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/status') def status(): ip = request.args.get('ip') result = os.popen(f'nmap -sV {ip}').read() return result
{ "vulnerability_type": "Command Injection via os.popen()", "location": "Line 7 β€” `os.popen()` is called with user-controlled `ip` embedded in a shell command; `;`, `&&`, `|` can chain arbitrary commands", "remediation": "Use `subprocess.run(['nmap', '-sV', ip], capture_output=True, text=True)` without `shell=Tru...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, session, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/logout') def logout(): session.clear() return redirect('/') @app.route('/admin') def admin(): return 'Admin panel'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Missing Authentication on Sensitive Endpoint", "location": "Lines 10-11 β€” the `/admin` route has no authentication or authorization check; any user (or anonymous visitor) can access it", "remediation": "Add an authentication decorator: check `session.get('user_id')` and `session.get('role...
Review this Python code for security issues: import random from flask import Flask app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/token') def generate_token(): token = str(random.randint(100000, 999999)) return token
{ "vulnerability_type": "Use of Cryptographically Weak PRNG for Security Token", "location": "Line 7 β€” `random.randint` uses a predictable Mersenne Twister PRNG; tokens generated this way can be predicted or brute-forced", "remediation": "Use the `secrets` module: `token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)`. The `secrets...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/update', methods=['POST']) def update_user(): data = request.json user_id = data.get('user_id') updates = data.get('updates') db.users.update_one({'_id': user_id}, {'$set': upd...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Mass Assignment / MongoDB Operator Injection", "location": "Line 9 β€” the `updates` dict from user input is passed directly to `$set`; an attacker can overwrite any field (e.g., `role`, `is_admin`) or inject MongoDB update operators", "remediation": "Define a strict allowlist of updatable ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request from jinja2 import Template app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/report') def report(): name = request.args.get('name') t = Template('Hello ' + name + '!') return t.render()
{ "vulnerability_type": "Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)", "location": "Line 8 β€” user-supplied `name` is concatenated into a Jinja2 `Template` source string before compilation, allowing injection of template directives", "remediation": "Pass `name` as a variable to a static template string: `t = Template('H...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api', methods=['POST']) def api(): content_type = request.content_type raw = request.data if 'xml' in content_type: data = parse_xml(raw) # uses lxml without disabling entities re...
{ "vulnerability_type": "XML External Entity (XXE) Injection", "location": "Line 9 β€” `parse_xml` uses lxml without disabling external entity resolution; attacker can include a `<!DOCTYPE>` with an entity referencing `/etc/passwd` or internal URLs", "remediation": "In `parse_xml`, use: `etree.XMLParser(resolve_ent...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/search') def search(): q = request.args.get('q', '') results = [item for item in catalog if q in item['name']] return render_template('results.html', q=q, results=results)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) β€” Reflected", "location": "Line 8 β€” the raw query string `q` is passed to the template; if the template outputs `{{ q | safe }}` or uses `Markup(q)`, the input is rendered unescaped", "remediation": "Ensure the template renders `q` without the `| safe` filter: `...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, session app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/2fa', methods=['POST']) def verify_2fa(): code = request.form.get('code') if session.get('2fa_code') == code: session['authenticated'] = True return redirect('/dashboard')
{ "vulnerability_type": "Timing Attack and Missing Rate Limiting on 2FA", "location": "Line 7 β€” non-constant-time comparison for the OTP code, and no rate limiting allows unlimited brute-force of the 6-digit code (1,000,000 possibilities)", "remediation": "Use `hmac.compare_digest` for constant-time comparison. I...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/env') def show_env(): import os key = request.args.get('key') value = os.environ.get(key, 'Not found') return value
{ "vulnerability_type": "Sensitive Data Exposure via Environment Variable Leakage", "location": "Lines 7-8 β€” an attacker can query any environment variable by name (e.g., `?key=DATABASE_URL`, `?key=SECRET_KEY`) exposing secrets", "remediation": "Remove this endpoint entirely. If environment inspection is needed f...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/proxy') def proxy(): url = request.args.get('url') import urllib.request with urllib.request.urlopen(url) as resp: return resp.read()
{ "vulnerability_type": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "location": "Lines 7-8 β€” `urllib.request.urlopen` is called with a fully user-controlled URL, allowing access to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and localhost", "remediation": "Validate the URL scheme (allow only `https`)...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/setcookie') def setcookie(): user = request.args.get('user') from flask import make_response resp = make_response('OK') resp.set_cookie('user', user, expires=None) return resp
{ "vulnerability_type": "Session Fixation / Missing Secure Cookie Attributes", "location": "Line 9 β€” cookie is set without `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, or `SameSite` attributes; `expires=None` makes it a session cookie that can be manipulated", "remediation": "Set security flags: `resp.set_cookie('user', user, httponly=...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/comments', methods=['POST']) def post_comment(): body = request.form.get('body') db.execute('INSERT INTO comments (body) VALUES (?)', (body,)) return redirect('/comments') @app.route('/comment...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting (Stored XSS)", "location": "Line 12 β€” comment bodies retrieved from the database are interpolated directly into the HTML response without escaping, executing any stored scripts", "remediation": "Escape output using `markupsafe.escape(c[0])` before inserting int...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/run_report') def run_report(): report_type = request.args.get('type') path = f'/reports/{report_type}.py' with open(path) as f: exec(f.read()) return 'Done'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Path Traversal + Remote Code Execution", "location": "Lines 7-9 β€” `report_type` is used in a path without sanitization (traversal via `../../`) and the file contents are executed with `exec()`, enabling arbitrary code execution", "remediation": "Use `os.path.basename(report_type)` to stri...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy app = Flask(__name__) db = SQLAlchemy(app) @app.route('/users') def list_users(): name_filter = request.args.get('name', '') users = db.engine.execute(f'SELECT * FROM user WHERE name LIKE "%{n...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection via SQLAlchemy raw query", "location": "Line 9 β€” an f-string embeds `name_filter` directly into a raw SQL string passed to `db.engine.execute()`", "remediation": "Use SQLAlchemy ORM queries: `User.query.filter(User.name.like(f'%{name_filter}%')).all()` β€” SQLAlchemy parameter...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/image') def serve_image(): name = request.args.get('name') with open(f'static/images/{name}', 'rb') as f: return f.read()
{ "vulnerability_type": "Path Traversal", "location": "Line 7 β€” `name` is used in a file open call without sanitization; `../../etc/passwd` or similar traversal strings can read arbitrary files", "remediation": "Sanitize with `os.path.basename(name)` and verify the resolved absolute path is within the intended di...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/order', methods=['POST']) def place_order(): data = request.json price = data.get('price') # client-supplied price item = data.get('item') create_order(item, price) return...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Business Logic Flaw β€” Client-Side Price Manipulation", "location": "Line 7 β€” the price is taken from the client request body rather than looked up server-side, allowing an attacker to set an arbitrary price (e.g., 0 or negative)", "remediation": "Never trust client-supplied pricing. Look ...
Review this Python code for security issues: import flask from flask import request app = flask.Flask(__name__) @app.route('/graphql', methods=['POST']) def graphql(): query = request.json.get('query') depth = get_query_depth(query) result = schema.execute(query) return flask.jsonify(result.data)
{ "vulnerability_type": "GraphQL β€” Missing Depth Limiting / Introspection Abuse", "location": "Lines 7-9 β€” query depth is computed but never enforced; introspection is also likely enabled in production, exposing the full schema", "remediation": "Enforce a maximum query depth (e.g., 5) and reject queries exceeding...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/upload', methods=['POST']) def upload(): f = request.files['file'] if f.filename.endswith('.jpg') or f.filename.endswith('.png'): f.save('/var/www/uploads/' + f.filename) return 'OK'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insufficient File Type Validation (MIME Sniffing Bypass)", "location": "Lines 7-8 β€” file type is validated only by extension check on the filename, which can be bypassed by naming a PHP/Python script `shell.php.jpg`", "remediation": "Validate file type by inspecting magic bytes using the ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, make_response app = Flask(__name__) @app.after_request def add_headers(response): return response @app.route('/') def index(): return '<html><body>Welcome</body></html>'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Missing Security Headers", "location": "Lines 4-6 β€” the `after_request` hook adds no security headers; responses lack `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`", "remediation": "Add security headers in the `after_request` hook: `re...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import re app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/lookup') def lookup(): domain = request.args.get('domain') import socket ip = socket.gethostbyname(domain) return ip
{ "vulnerability_type": "DNS Rebinding / SSRF via DNS Resolution", "location": "Lines 8-9 β€” `socket.gethostbyname()` resolves an attacker-controlled domain; combined with DNS rebinding, this can bypass IP allowlists and reach internal services", "remediation": "After resolving the hostname, check that the resolve...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/v1/admin/users', methods=['DELETE']) def delete_all_users(): db.execute('DELETE FROM users') return jsonify({'deleted': True})
{ "vulnerability_type": "Missing Authentication / Unauthorized Destructive Operation", "location": "Lines 4-7 β€” the endpoint performs a bulk delete of all users with no authentication, authorization, or CSRF protection", "remediation": "Require admin authentication (verify JWT or session), add CSRF token validati...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/reflect') def reflect(): callback = request.args.get('callback', 'callback') data = '{"user": "alice"}' return f'{callback}({data})'
{ "vulnerability_type": "JSONP Injection / XSS via Callback Parameter", "location": "Line 7 β€” the `callback` parameter is directly interpolated into the response without validation; an attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript as the callback name", "remediation": "Validate `callback` strictly against an alphanume...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, session, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/change_email', methods=['POST']) def change_email(): new_email = request.form.get('email') user_id = session.get('user_id') db.update_user_email(user_id, new_email) return 'Email u...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "location": "Lines 5-9 β€” the email-change endpoint has no CSRF token check; a malicious site can silently change a logged-in user's email via a crafted POST request", "remediation": "Generate and validate a CSRF token per session. Use `flask-wtf`'s `CSR...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/lookup') def db_lookup(): table = request.args.get('table') column = request.args.get('column') value = request.args.get('value') result = db.execute(f'SELECT * FROM {table} WHERE {column} ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection via Dynamic Table/Column Names", "location": "Line 8 β€” `table` and `column` are user-controlled and interpolated directly into the SQL query; parameterized queries cannot protect identifiers (table/column names), only values", "remediation": "Validate `table` and `column` ag...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request from cryptography.fernet import Fernet app = Flask(__name__) KEY = b'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=' @app.route('/encrypt') def encrypt(): data = request.args.get('data').encode() f = Fernet(KEY) return f.encrypt(...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Hardcoded Weak Encryption Key", "location": "Line 5 β€” the Fernet encryption key is hardcoded as a trivially guessable all-zero value, rendering all encrypted data decryptable by anyone", "remediation": "Generate a strong random key using `Fernet.generate_key()` at deployment time, store i...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/items') def get_items(): limit = request.args.get('limit', 100) offset = request.args.get('offset', 0) items = db.execute(f'SELECT * FROM items LIMIT {limit} OFFSET {offset}') return st...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection + Resource Exhaustion", "location": "Line 8 β€” `limit` and `offset` are interpolated into SQL without sanitization (injection) and without upper-bound enforcement (DoS via `LIMIT 999999999`)", "remediation": "Use parameterized queries for the values and validate that `limit` ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/render') def render_page(): page = request.args.get('page', 'home') with open(f'templates/{page}.html') as f: return f.read()
{ "vulnerability_type": "Path Traversal / Local File Inclusion", "location": "Line 7 β€” `page` is embedded in a file path without sanitization, allowing `../../etc/passwd` to be read from disk", "remediation": "Validate `page` against an explicit allowlist of permitted page names: `PAGES = {'home', 'about', 'conta...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/token', methods=['POST']) def get_token(): username = request.form['username'] password = request.form['password'] user = db.query_one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND pas...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Token Generation + Plaintext Password Storage", "location": "Line 9 β€” the token is simply the user's database ID (guessable); and the password is likely stored/compared in plaintext since no hashing is applied", "remediation": "Store passwords hashed with `bcrypt`. Issue tokens u...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/preview') def preview(): html = request.args.get('html', '') return f'<html><body>{html}</body></html>'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) β€” Direct HTML Injection", "location": "Line 6 β€” raw HTML from the query string is embedded directly in the response body; attackers can inject `<script>` tags or event handlers", "remediation": "Escape user-supplied HTML using `markupsafe.escape(html)` before em...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request import zipfile, io app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/unzip', methods=['POST']) def unzip(): f = request.files['archive'] z = zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(f.read())) z.extractall('/var/www/uploads/') return 'Extracted'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Zip Slip (Path Traversal via Archive Extraction)", "location": "Line 9 β€” `extractall()` is called without checking member paths; a crafted zip containing entries like `../../etc/cron.d/backdoor` can write files outside the target directory", "remediation": "Validate each archive member pa...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/user', methods=['PUT']) def update_user(): data = request.json user = User(**data) # maps all JSON keys to model fields db.session.merge(user) db.session.commit() return 'Updated'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Mass Assignment", "location": "Line 7 β€” `User(**data)` maps all JSON fields directly to model attributes; an attacker can set privileged fields like `is_admin=true` or `role='superuser'`", "remediation": "Accept only an explicit allowlist of fields: `allowed = ['name', 'email']; safe_data...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/login', methods=['POST']) def login(): username = request.form.get('username') password = request.form.get('password') user = db.get_user(username) if user and user.password == password: ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Plaintext Password Comparison", "location": "Line 9 β€” passwords are compared in plaintext, meaning they are stored unhashed in the database; a breach exposes all user passwords immediately", "remediation": "Hash passwords at registration using `bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), bcrypt.gens...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.errorhandler(500) def handle_error(e): return str(e), 500 @app.route('/divide') def divide(): a = int(request.args.get('a', 1)) b = int(request.args.get('b', 1)) return str(a / b)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Sensitive Information Disclosure via Error Messages", "location": "Line 6 β€” the 500 error handler returns the full exception string `str(e)` to the client, leaking internal details like stack traces, file paths, and library versions", "remediation": "Return a generic error message to clie...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request from functools import wraps app = Flask(__name__) def require_auth(f): @wraps(f) def decorated(*args, **kwargs): token = request.headers.get('Authorization') if token: return f(*args, **kwargs) re...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insufficient Authentication β€” Token Presence Without Validation", "location": "Line 9 β€” the decorator only checks that the `Authorization` header is non-empty; any non-empty string (including `'invalid'`) grants access", "remediation": "Validate the token cryptographically: decode and ver...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/hash') def hash_data(): data = request.args.get('data', '') import hashlib return hashlib.sha1(data.encode()).hexdigest()
{ "vulnerability_type": "Use of Weak Hash Function (SHA-1) for Security Purposes", "location": "Line 7 β€” SHA-1 is used for hashing; it is cryptographically broken and should not be used for security-sensitive operations such as password hashing, token signing, or integrity verification", "remediation": "For non-p...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api') def api(): key = request.args.get('api_key') if key == 'hardcoded-api-key-123': return get_sensitive_data() return 'Forbidden', 403
{ "vulnerability_type": "Hardcoded API Key in Source Code", "location": "Line 7 β€” the API key is hardcoded as a plaintext string literal, making it trivially discoverable in version control or decompiled binaries", "remediation": "Load API keys from environment variables: `VALID_KEY = os.environ.get('API_KEY')`. ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/send_email', methods=['POST']) def send_email(): to = request.form.get('to') subject = request.form.get('subject') body = request.form.get('body') import smtplib server = smtplib.SMTP('...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Email Header Injection", "location": "Line 11 β€” `subject` and `body` are interpolated directly into the raw SMTP message; newline characters in `subject` can inject additional headers (e.g., `Bcc:`, `From:`)", "remediation": "Strip newline characters from `subject`: `subject = subject.rep...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/calc') def calc(): a = request.args.get('a', '0') b = request.args.get('b', '0') result = eval(f'{a} + {b}') return str(result)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Remote Code Execution via eval()", "location": "Line 8 β€” `eval()` is called on a string built from user-supplied `a` and `b` values; injecting `__import__('os').system('id')` in either parameter executes shell commands", "remediation": "Parse `a` and `b` as floats before arithmetic: `resu...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify import jwt app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/verify') def verify_token(): token = request.headers.get('Authorization') payload = jwt.decode(token, options={'verify_signature': False}) return jsonify(payload)
{ "vulnerability_type": "JWT Signature Verification Disabled", "location": "Line 8 β€” `verify_signature: False` disables JWT signature validation entirely; any attacker-crafted token with arbitrary claims will be accepted", "remediation": "Always verify the JWT signature: `payload = jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, a...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/webhook', methods=['POST']) def webhook(): event = request.json.get('event') user_id = request.json.get('user_id') if event == 'payment_success': upgrade_user(user_id) return 'OK'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Missing Webhook Signature Verification", "location": "Lines 5-10 β€” the webhook endpoint processes events without verifying the request comes from the legitimate payment provider; any caller can trigger `upgrade_user()`", "remediation": "Verify the webhook signature provided in the request...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, session app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/login', methods=['POST']) def login(): username = request.form['username'] user = authenticate(username, request.form['password']) if user: session['user'] = user.to_dict() ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Session Fixation", "location": "Lines 8-9 β€” after successful login, the session ID is not regenerated; an attacker who pre-set a session cookie can hijack the authenticated session", "remediation": "Regenerate the session after login: in Flask, call `session.clear()` before setting new se...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/v1/items', methods=['GET']) def get_items(): items = db.execute('SELECT * FROM items').fetchall() return str(items) @app.route('/api/v1/items/<id>', methods=['DELETE']) def delete_item(id): ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection via URL Path Parameter", "location": "Line 11 β€” the `id` URL parameter is interpolated into a DELETE query with an f-string; crafted values can drop tables or exfiltrate data", "remediation": "Use a parameterized query: `db.execute('DELETE FROM items WHERE id=?', (id,))`. Ad...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/jobs', methods=['POST']) def run_job(): job_name = request.form.get('job') schedule = request.form.get('schedule') os.system(f'crontab -l | echo "{schedule} /jobs/{job_name}" | crontab -') ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Command Injection via Crontab Manipulation", "location": "Line 8 β€” both `schedule` and `job_name` are user-controlled and embedded in a shell command; an attacker can inject arbitrary cron entries or shell commands", "remediation": "Never construct cron entries from user input via shell c...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/search', methods=['POST']) def search_es(): query = request.json.get('query') result = es.search(index='users', body={ 'query': {'match': {'name': query}} }) return str(result)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Elasticsearch Injection / Denial of Service", "location": "Lines 6-9 β€” the raw `query` value is inserted into an Elasticsearch query body; an attacker can craft a deeply nested or computationally expensive query causing DoS", "remediation": "Validate `query` as a plain string with a maxim...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/file') def read_file(): path = request.args.get('path') try: with open(path) as f: return f.read() except Exception as e: return str(e)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Path Traversal + Information Disclosure via Exception", "location": "Lines 7-10 β€” arbitrary file paths are accepted and read; exceptions reveal the full server path and file system structure to the caller", "remediation": "Reject the request if `path` is not within a safe base directory (...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/encode') def encode(): data = request.args.get('data') import base64 encoded = base64.b64encode(data.encode()).decode() return f'<p>Encoded: {encoded}</p>'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) β€” Base64 is Not Sanitization", "location": "Line 8 β€” `encoded` is embedded in HTML output; while base64 seems safe, the surrounding HTML context means if the encoding logic is bypassed or `data` is reflected elsewhere unencoded, XSS is possible. Additionally, the ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/config') def show_config(): return { 'db_host': app.config['DB_HOST'], 'db_user': app.config['DB_USER'], 'db_pass': app.config['DB_PASS'], 'secret_key': app.secret_key ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Sensitive Configuration Exposure", "location": "Lines 6-11 β€” the endpoint returns database credentials and the application secret key in plaintext to any caller without authentication", "remediation": "Remove this endpoint entirely or restrict it to authenticated administrators. Never exp...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/xslt', methods=['POST']) def transform(): xml = request.data xslt_str = request.headers.get('X-XSLT') from lxml import etree xslt_doc = etree.fromstring(xslt_str.encode()) transform = e...
{ "vulnerability_type": "XSLT Injection β€” Remote Code Execution", "location": "Lines 7-10 β€” user-supplied XSLT is compiled and applied; XSLT can include `<xsl:value-of select=\"document('/etc/passwd')\"/>` or use extension functions to execute shell commands", "remediation": "Never accept user-supplied XSLT. Use ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/forgot', methods=['POST']) def forgot_password(): email = request.form.get('email') user = db.get_by_email(email) if user: send_reset_email(email) return 'Reset email sent' ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "User Enumeration via Differential Response", "location": "Lines 10-11 β€” the endpoint returns different responses depending on whether the email exists, allowing attackers to enumerate valid accounts", "remediation": "Return the same response regardless of whether the email exists: `return...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/v1/invoice/<invoice_id>') def get_invoice(invoice_id): invoice = Invoice.query.get(invoice_id) return jsonify(invoice.serialize())
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) / Broken Object Level Authorization", "location": "Lines 5-7 β€” the invoice is fetched by ID without verifying the requesting user owns or is authorized to access it", "remediation": "Add ownership check: `if invoice.user_id != current_user.id: abort...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask app = Flask(__name__) app.config['DEBUG'] = True app.config['TESTING'] = True @app.route('/') def index(): return 'Production app'
{ "vulnerability_type": "Debug Mode Enabled in Production", "location": "Lines 3-4 β€” `DEBUG=True` and `TESTING=True` are set; debug mode exposes an interactive Werkzeug console (allows remote code execution) and detailed tracebacks to any visitor", "remediation": "Set `DEBUG` and `TESTING` to `False` in productio...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/transfer', methods=['POST']) def bank_transfer(): data = request.json amount = data['amount'] to = data['to_account'] from_account = data['from_account'] # client-supplied execute_...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Broken Function Level Authorization β€” Client-Supplied Source Account", "location": "Line 9 β€” the source account is taken from the client request; an attacker can specify any `from_account` to transfer funds from accounts they don't own", "remediation": "Derive `from_account` from the auth...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/v1/users', methods=['GET']) def list_users(): page = int(request.args.get('page', 1)) per_page = int(request.args.get('per_page', 10)) users = User.query.paginate(page, per_page, False) ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Missing Authentication + Data Overexposure", "location": "Lines 4-9 β€” the user list endpoint has no authentication check, and `serialize()` may expose sensitive fields (password hashes, emails, roles) for all users", "remediation": "Require authentication and admin role before listing use...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/callback') def oauth_callback(): code = request.args.get('code') state = request.args.get('state') # No state validation token = exchange_code_for_token(code) session['token'] = token ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "OAuth CSRF β€” Missing State Parameter Validation", "location": "Lines 7-10 β€” the `state` parameter is received but never validated against a session-stored value; this allows CSRF attacks that force a victim to link their account to an attacker's OAuth token", "remediation": "Generate a ra...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/search') def search(): q = request.args.get('q', '') conn = get_db() cur = conn.cursor() cur.execute("SELECT id, title FROM articles WHERE title LIKE '%" + q + "%'") return jsonify(...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection via LIKE clause", "location": "Line 9 β€” `q` is concatenated inside a LIKE expression without parameterization; an attacker can break out of the string and inject arbitrary SQL", "remediation": "Use a parameterized query: `cur.execute(\"SELECT id, title FROM articles WHERE ti...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/graphql', methods=['POST']) def graphql_endpoint(): query = request.json.get('query', '') variables = request.json.get('variables', {}) # No query complexity or depth limit result = schema....
{ "vulnerability_type": "GraphQL Denial of Service β€” Unbounded Query Complexity", "location": "Lines 8-9 β€” there is no complexity or depth limit on GraphQL queries; an attacker can submit deeply nested or circular queries that exhaust server resources", "remediation": "Integrate `graphql-core` with a complexity a...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/admin/delete_user', methods=['POST']) def delete_user(): user_id = request.form.get('user_id') if request.form.get('confirm') == 'yes': db.delete_user(user_id) return redirect('/admin/u...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) on Admin Destructive Action", "location": "Lines 4-9 β€” the delete action lacks a CSRF token; a malicious page with a hidden form can delete any user account by tricking an admin into visiting it", "remediation": "Add CSRF token validation using `flask-wtf...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/run', methods=['POST']) def run_command(): cmd = request.json.get('command') allowed = ['ls', 'pwd', 'whoami'] if cmd.split()[0] in allowed: result = subprocess.check_outpu...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Command Injection via Argument Injection despite Allowlist", "location": "Lines 7-9 β€” only the first token is checked against the allowlist, but `shell=True` allows argument injection; e.g., `whoami && cat /etc/passwd` passes the check but executes two commands", "remediation": "Check the...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/notes') def notes(): user_id = request.args.get('user_id') notes = Note.query.filter_by(user_id=user_id).all() return jsonify([n.serialize() for n in notes])
{ "vulnerability_type": "Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA / IDOR)", "location": "Lines 5-7 β€” `user_id` from the query string is trusted without verifying it matches the authenticated user; anyone can read another user's notes by changing the parameter", "remediation": "Use the authenticated user's ID from ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/process', methods=['POST']) def process(): data = request.data import marshal obj = marshal.loads(data) return str(obj)
{ "vulnerability_type": "Insecure Deserialization via marshal", "location": "Line 8 β€” `marshal.loads()` deserializes arbitrary bytecode from user input; crafted payloads can execute arbitrary code or crash the interpreter", "remediation": "Never deserialize untrusted data using `marshal`, `pickle`, or `shelve`. U...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request, jsonify from flask_jwt_extended import create_access_token app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/login', methods=['POST']) def login(): username = request.json.get('username') password = request.json.get('password') if username ==...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Hardcoded Default Credentials", "location": "Line 9 β€” the application accepts `admin`/`admin` as valid credentials hardcoded in source; this is a well-known default that attackers try first", "remediation": "Store credentials in the database, hashed with `bcrypt`. Remove all hardcoded cre...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/v1/export') def export_data(): fmt = request.args.get('format', 'json') data = db.get_all_records() if fmt == 'json': return jsonify(data) elif fmt == 'csv': return gene...
{ "vulnerability_type": "CSV Injection (Formula Injection)", "location": "Line 10 β€” if `generate_csv(data)` does not escape cell values, database content beginning with `=`, `+`, `-`, or `@` will be interpreted as formulas when opened in spreadsheet software", "remediation": "Sanitize all cell values in `generate...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/rpc', methods=['POST']) def rpc(): method = request.json.get('method') params = request.json.get('params', {}) func = globals().get(method) if func: return str(func(**params)) r...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Function Dispatch", "location": "Lines 7-10 β€” `globals().get(method)` allows callers to invoke any globally-accessible function by name, including dangerous builtins accessible through `globals()`", "remediation": "Define an explicit allowlist of per...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/login', methods=['POST']) def login(): username = request.form['username'] password = request.form['password'] user = db.execute('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?', (username,)).fetchone() ...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Open Redirect via `next` Parameter After Login", "location": "Line 11 β€” the `next` redirect target is taken from the query string without validation; an attacker can set `?next=https://evil.com` to redirect the user after login", "remediation": "Validate the `next` URL to ensure it is a r...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/api/v1/password', methods=['PUT']) def change_password(): user_id = request.json.get('user_id') new_password = request.json.get('new_password') db.update_password(user_id, new_password) ret...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Missing Current Password Verification + IDOR on Password Change", "location": "Lines 5-8 β€” the endpoint changes the password for any `user_id` from the request without requiring the current password, and without verifying the caller owns that account", "remediation": "Require the current ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy app = Flask(__name__) db = SQLAlchemy(app) @app.route('/report') def generate_report(): start = request.args.get('start') end = request.args.get('end') sql = f"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE c...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SQL Injection via Date Parameters", "location": "Line 10 β€” `start` and `end` date strings are embedded directly in SQL with f-strings; an attacker can close the string and inject arbitrary SQL", "remediation": "Use SQLAlchemy text with bind parameters: `db.engine.execute(text(\"SELECT * F...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/notify', methods=['POST']) def notify(): phone = request.form.get('phone') message = request.form.get('message') client = TwilioClient(ACCOUNT_SID, AUTH_TOKEN) client.messages.create(to=pho...
{ "vulnerability_type": "SMS Flooding / Smishing Enablement (Missing Rate Limiting and Input Validation)", "location": "Lines 5-9 β€” any caller can send arbitrary SMS messages to any phone number with arbitrary content and no rate limiting; this enables SMS flooding and smishing attacks", "remediation": "Add rate ...
Review this Python code for security issues: from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/upload_avatar', methods=['POST']) def upload_avatar(): img = request.files['image'] filename = img.filename img.save(f'/var/www/html/avatars/{filename}') return f'<img src="/avatars/{filena...
{ "vulnerability_type": "Stored XSS + Unrestricted File Upload + Path Traversal", "location": "Lines 6-9 β€” filename is unsanitized (traversal), saved to the web root (executable if server runs scripts), and reflected into HTML (XSS via crafted filename like `<script>alert(1)</script>.jpg`)", "remediation": "Use `...
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