id string | kind string | title string | measured list | result string | status string | page string | log_leaf int64 | doi string | scripts unknown | date timestamp[s] | claim string | check string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SM-016 | paper | Toxic-release reports are due 1 July, with a statutory fine of up to $71,545 for each day late. A thousand plants filed more than a year late for 2019, and 61 of them appear in any EPCRA 313 case opened since | [
"2026-10-03T00:00:00"
] | 473,709 TRI forms for 2019–2024: 16,522 postmarked after 1 July, 5,964 more than a year late. For 2019, 61 of 1,003 facilities more than a year late appear in any EPCRA 313 case opened since; EPA's formal 313 actions 52, 51, 41, then 16 (FY2025) and 14 (FY2026). 22 federal facilities late for 2023, exempt by statute. L... | Published 2026-10-04; questions for EPA prepared, not yet sent | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-016.html | 9,276 | 10.5281/zenodo.23130553 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-016" | null | null | null |
SM-015 | paper | Certificate Transparency’s new tiled logs publish in seconds. The old ones take up to an hour, and the browsers’ own log lists are the slowest part | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00",
"2026-10-03T00:00:00"
] | All 64 logs measured (61 of Chrome's 64, plus Cloudflare's three Raio shards from Apple's list) inside their MMD: 43 tiled logs within 5.7 s (median 0.2 s); 21 RFC 6962 logs 10 s to 61 min (Cloudflare Nimbus 46 and 61 min). Chrome policy caps RFC 6962 MMD at 4 h while log_list.json declares 86,400 s for all 21; four Tr... | Sent to Apple and Chrome 2026-10-03, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-015.html | 9,259 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123269 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-015" | null | null | null |
SM-012 | paper | Certificate authorities get 92 days to file their audits. Most file in the last week, one in eleven files late, and Windows still trusts a root whose last audit ended in 2019 | [
"2026-10-03T00:00:00"
] | 108 of 119 current CA audit statements dated inside the CCADB's 92-day window (34 in the last ten days, 10 on the last three), 11 past it, 7 with nothing on file. Roots with newest audit over 15 months old: Mozilla 0 of 172, Chrome 0 of 101, Apple 6 of 144, Microsoft 24 of 331, oldest Certinomis (December 2019). | Sent to CCADB and Microsoft 2026-10-03, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-012.html | 9,258 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123265 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-012" | null | null | null |
SM-011 | paper | Firefox’s revocation list is months behind the biggest certificate logs. One in eleven top sites, mozilla.org included, gets no revocation check at all | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | Reader 112 days behind Xenon2026h2, 1.66 billion entries unread. 68 of 726 top-1,000 certificates not covered; 346 of 3,792 in the top 5,000. 57 of the 68 (299 of 346 in the top 5,000) were issued by Google Trust Services, 37.7% of its top-1,000 certificates. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-011.html | 9,253 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123261 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-011" | null | null | null |
SM-010 | paper | Hugging Face says every file goes through its malware scanner. Nothing over 2 GB does, and the badge says safe anyway | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 2,539 of 2,551 files under 2 GiB scanned; 0 of 487 at 2 GiB or more. 476 of those show “safe”. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-010.html | 9,257 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123005 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-010" | null | null | null |
SM-009 | paper | Firefox promised a list of every revoked certificate. A third of the ones revoked on day one aren’t on it, and it no longer asks anyone else | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 427 of 465 current revocations on the list. Revoked within 24 hours of issuance: 37 of 108 missing, for up to 28 days. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-009.html | 9,256 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123001 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-009" | null | null | null |
SM-008 | paper | A federal directive says CISA rates every CVE. Since March, it has rated almost no Linux kernel bugs | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 1,731 of 1,731 exploited CVEs rated. 1 of 158 sampled kernel CVEs since March. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-008.html | 9,255 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122997 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-008" | null | null | null |
SM-007 | paper | Docker promised signed attestations for every Official Image. The attestations arrived; the signatures didn't | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 7,368 of 7,372 Linux images carry attestations. 0 of 45 sampled are signed. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-007.html | 9,254 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122993 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-007" | null | null | null |
SM-006 | paper | x402 payments on Base fell by three-quarters in two months, and the same two operators still send most of them | [
"2026-08-05T00:00:00",
"2026-10-01T00:00:00"
] | 234,490 payments a day in August, 63,003 on 1 October. Two wallet groups sent about 80% on both days. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-006.html | 9,240 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122988 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-006" | null | null | null |
SM-005 | paper | Meta's whitepaper says its private-AI log refreshes every 3 hours. Since January it's been every 6 | [
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Lists every 6 hours, not 3. New software entries in 37 of 70 weeks. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-005.html | 9,239 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122986 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-005" | null | null | null |
SM-004 | paper | We tried to catch whisper.online's ledger out. It passed every test, and we found it sending us ten copies of everything | [
"2026-09-12T00:00:00",
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Every check passed. A fix took duplicate updates from about ten per change to one. | Confirmed by operator | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-004.html | 9,238 | 10.5281/zenodo.23071390 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-004" | null | null | null |
SM-003 | paper | Wild SBOMs was billed as the work of many developers. Nearly half came from one robot | [
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Nearly half came from one automated run in 2022. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-003.html | 9,237 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123301 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-003" | null | null | null |
SM-002 | paper | The dataset behind 39 studies of Claude Code can see 1 in 11 of its pull requests | [
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Its search catches about 1 in 11, and an unusual slice of them. | Sent, response pending | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-002.html | 9,236 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123115 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-002" | null | null | null |
SM-001 | paper | Google's Pixel ledger promised every release. January went missing, and stayed missing for eight months | [
"2026-09-15T00:00:00",
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | The January 2026 release was missing. Google added it. | Confirmed, fixed | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-001.html | 9,235 | 10.5281/zenodo.23070510 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-001" | null | null | null |
NULL-001 | claim held | null | null | 27 of 28 match the v-prefixed release tag. The recovery image's commit is on usbarmory/armory-ums master, but no 0.1.0 tag exists there or in any fork. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/armored-witness-firmware.py"
] | 2026-09-30T00:00:00 | Every entry in the Armored Witness production firmware log names the source it was built from | Each of the 28 entries' commit_fingerprint compared with the commit its tag points to on GitHub (script) |
NULL-002 | claim held | null | null | 150 of 150 retrievable and consistent. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/plexi_coverage.py"
] | 2026-09-30T00:00:00 | Cloudflare's Plexi auditor has verified every WhatsApp key-transparency (v2) epoch from 722,677 to its reported last verified epoch | 150 epochs drawn uniformly from 722,677 to 1,297,263, each audit fetched and its epoch, namespace and digest checked (script). Audit signatures not checked here. |
NULL-003 | claim held | null | null | Every repository has at least 50 stars, a cut the paper doesn't state; that is 4.3% of matching repositories. Python and TypeScript lead on both sides of it, and no owner holds more than 1%. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/mcp_star_floor.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | A Large-Scale Dataset of MCP Implementations on GitHub (MSR '26) describes real-world MCP development | Their released data and code, and GitHub's counts of matching repositories above and below the code's 50-star minimum (script) |
NULL-004 | claim held | null | null | 17.9% of uploads carry an attestation (95%: 15.1–20.8%). Of the files still on PyPI, 20.5%, which is also a floor on Trusted Publishing. 178 of 179 come from GitHub. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/pypi_attest.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | PyPI: “17% of all uploads to PyPI in the last year included an attestation”, and more than 20% came via Trusted Publishing (2025 in review) | 1,000 file uploads drawn from PyPI’s own changelog across 2025 (50 random three-day stretches, 20 files each), each looked up in PyPI’s Integrity API (script) |
NULL-005 | claim held | null | null | 418 of 10,402 (4.02%) to the end of August. Of the 135 whose name is tied to a verified domain, 116 stayed with that domain’s owner. 283 of the 418 are named after a GitHub account, where the registry checks no domain at all. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/mcp_endpoint_redirects.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | Same Name, Different Server (arXiv 2609.14119): 4.2% of multi-version servers in the official MCP registry moved their endpoint to a different host while keeping their name, which the registry “cannot distinguish” from a takeover | Every version in the registry from its public API, comparing each server’s endpoint hosts between consecutive versions (script) |
NULL-006 | claim held | null | null | 0 of 150 CVE records and 0 of 150 OSV files carry credits; all 150 CVE records carry metrics and problemTypes. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/github_cve_credits.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | Never Emitted (arXiv 2609.33099): GitHub shows who reported each vulnerability on its advisory but leaves that credit out of the CVE record and its OSV file | The newest 150 GitHub-assigned CVEs whose advisory credits someone, each CVE record read from CVE Services and each OSV file from GitHub’s advisory database (script) |
NULL-007 | claim held | null | null | 599 of 600 attested; every CI attestation carries a Sigstore transparency-log entry. The exception: ht 2.1.0’s two Monterey bottles, built 24 April 2024 and still served, which neither signer attests. Reported as homebrew-core#314985. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/homebrew_bottle_attestations.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Homebrew: homebrew-core uses Sigstore “to cryptographically attest to all bottles built in the official Homebrew CI” (2024) | 600 bottle files drawn at random from formulae.brew.sh in two independent samples, each looked up in GitHub’s attestation API under homebrew-core’s CI and Homebrew’s backfill signer (script) |
NULL-008 | claim held | null | null | 163 of 163 within one business day. 68 had been analysed before they reached the catalogue; the other 95 took a median of 19.5 hours. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/nvd_kev_enrichment.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | NIST NVD: for CVEs in CISA’s known-exploited catalogue, “our goal is to enrich these within one business day of receipt” (from 15 April 2026) | Every one of the 163 catalogue entries added since 15 April, timed from the later of catalogue addition and NVD publication to NIST’s first analysis in NVD’s own change history (script) |
NULL-009 | claim held | null | null | 408 of 408 carry both; 12 of 12 signatures verify, all from the release identity Kubernetes documents. Certificate chain and transparency-log entries not checked here. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/kubernetes_signatures.py",
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/kubernetes_signatures_verify.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Kubernetes: “The Kubernetes release process signs all binary artifacts (tarballs, SPDX files, standalone binaries) by using cosign’s keyless signing.” | Every standalone binary in the latest patch of each minor version from 1.26 to 1.37 (408 files) checked for its .sig and .cert, and one kubectl signature per version verified with our own code (presence, verification) |
NULL-010 | claim held | null | null | 515 epochs, 4 July to 2 October: median interval 4.00 hours; longest 38.1 hours (27–28 September), inside the 72-hour limit. Two epoch numbers at the start of the window aren’t visible, probably expired from the search index. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/proton_kt_epochs.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Proton Mail key transparency: “Normally a ProtonKT epoch should be published every 4 hours. The maximum publishing interval is 72 hours” (whitepaper, p. 14) | Every epoch certificate Proton logged to Certificate Transparency since July, found through Cert Spotter; each certificate’s name encodes its epoch number and issue time (script) |
NULL-011 | claim held | null | null | 64 of 64 inside the promise. Tiled: all 43 within 6 seconds, most within 1. Classic: DigiCert 10 seconds, Google and Sectigo 1 to 2 minutes, TrustAsia 2.5 minutes, Cloudflare’s Nimbus 46 and 61 minutes, the only logs that publish a new tree head less often than every minute. The 24-hour figure Firefox’s revocation filt... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/ct_merge_delays.py",
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/ct_merge_delays_tiles.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Every Certificate Transparency log promises a maximum merge delay: 24 hours for the classic logs, 60 seconds for the tiled ones (the mmd field of the Google and Apple log lists; RFC 6962 §3) | A fresh certificate submitted to each of the 64 usable or qualified logs that will take a current certificate (our own chain, SM-009’s certificates with their CCADB intermediates, and entries harvested from 2027h2 and 2028 tiled logs), each log then polled on its own thread until it served the entry: an inclusion proof... |
NULL-015 | claim held | null | null | 24 reports carry a Next-update date, none past it without a CA update; no root-program or community question has waited over 7 days for a CA reply. One open report is Microsoft PKI Services filing an incident for missing its own seven-day update on another. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/ccadb_incident_cadence.py"
] | 2026-10-03T00:00:00 | CCADB incident-report rules: open reports “MUST be updated: on or before the ‘Next update’ date in the Whiteboard field”; CA Owners “MUST respond within 7 days” to comments and questions | Every open [ca-compliance] bug in Bugzilla's CA Program (92): Next-update date, assignee, every comment with author and time; run twice the same day |
NULL-014 | claim held | null | null | 15,982 subscriber CRLs: median 3 hours old, 99% under a day; median validity 7.0 days, 90th percentile 9.96 against a 10-day cap. No TLS CRL stale or expired. Five over seven days old are non-TLS CAs carrying a server-authentication bit; one real: Brazil’s ITI (Microsoft-trusted only) serves an EV CRL with nextUpdate 2... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/crl_freshness.py"
] | 2026-10-03T00:00:00 | CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements 4.9.7: a CA issuing subscriber certificates “MUST update and publish a new CRL at least every seven (7) days”; CRL profile: nextUpdate “at most 10 days after the thisUpdate” for CRLs covering subscriber certificates | Every CRL URL the CCADB lists for its 2,206 not-revoked TLS-capable intermediates (16,141 distinct URLs, 62 CA owners), fetched and parsed; 1,500 re-fetched an hour later |
NULL-013 | claim held | null | null | Every Actions-generated attestation is in the log: 161 of 161 found on Rekor at the stated index. The other 227 bundles are GitHub’s own release attestations, which come with immutable releases: signed by GitHub’s certificate authority with a one-year certificate, timestamped by GitHub, and in no public log. GitHub’s r... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/github_attestations/collect.py",
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/github_attestations/verify_rekor.py"
] | 2026-10-03T00:00:00 | GitHub: “Public repositories that generate artifact attestations use the Sigstore Public Good Instance. A copy of the generated Sigstore bundle is stored with GitHub and is also written to an immutable transparency log that is publicly readable on the internet.” | The latest release of each of the 1,000 most-starred repositories pushed since September; every attestation GitHub holds for their assets (388 bundles from 63 repositories), each bundle’s transparency-log entry looked up on the public Rekor instance by index |
NULL-012 | claim held | null | null | 457 are unreproducible. 128 were there before the gate; 231 replaced a version that was already unreproducible, which the rule allows; 76 carry a public release-team hint; 10 got their verdict after crossing. The last 12, all petsc, are the gate working: britney flagged them in June, the release manager judged them ren... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/debian_reproducible_gate.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Debian release team: “Since yesterday, we have enabled our migration software to block migration of new packages that can’t be reproduced or existing packages (in testing) that regress in reproducibility” (debian-devel-announce, 10 May 2026) | Every binary in testing with a rebuild verdict on reproduce.debian.net (36,003), split by what changed since the gate, scored with britney’s own per-binary regression rule, and the remainder crossed with the release team’s public hints and each package’s migration date (script) |
Second Measurements
Public claims about logs, datasets and software supply chains, recomputed by a different path than the one that produced them. One row per check: what was claimed, how we re-measured it, what we found, and what the other party said.
Papers and evidence: https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/ · Scripts: https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements
What is in it
measurements.jsonl has one row per check.
| field | meaning |
|---|---|
id |
SM-NNN for a published paper, NULL-NNN for a check where the claim held |
kind |
paper or claim held |
title / claim |
the headline (papers) or the claim as the organisation stated it (nulls) |
check |
what was recomputed, from which public data (nulls) |
result |
the number we got |
status |
where the finding stands with the other party (papers) |
measured / date |
when the check ran |
page |
the paper or the row on the site |
log_leaf |
the leaf in the Markovian transparency log that holds the page's sha256 |
doi |
Zenodo DOI where one exists |
scripts |
the code that produced the result |
files/ mirrors the GitHub repository at upload time: per-paper scripts, the saved source pages each exhibit was read from, SHA256SUMS and retrieved_at for every exhibit, the log receipt for each page, the AIDev paper map, and the scheduled rechecks.
How a row is pinned
Each paper's sha256 sits in a transparency log cosigned by independent witnesses (https://log.markovianprotocol.com) and anchored to Bitcoin with OpenTimestamps. The receipt files in files/ carry the leaf index and inclusion-proof URL.
How we work
The claim is quoted verbatim from the organisation's own page. The condition that would kill the finding is stated before measuring. Only public endpoints are used, with code written from the specification rather than the operator's tooling. Each check is rerun on a different day before publication. The organisation gets the evidence and specific questions before or at publication, and its reply is printed on the page. Claims that held are listed too.
Paper text is CC BY 4.0. Code in files/ is MIT.
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