IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Writ Petition 1C! No. g2§ L of 2011 PETITIONER: Mojjam Rahmani, ‘ S/o M. Alimuddin, Aged about 29 ‘years, Occupation: Self Employed, R/o Quarter No.1E, Street No.83, HSCL Colony, Sector 6, Bhilai Nagar, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. - Versus — RESPONDENTS: 1. Union of India, Through the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi. Directorate General, 3, Employment and Training, l Ministry of Labour, Government of lndia, New Delhi. National Council for Vocational Training, Through its Secretary Ministry of Labour, Government of lndia, New Delhi. State Council for Vocational i1 Training, Maharashtra State, Through its Secretary, 3, Mahapalika Marg, Tapal Peti No.10036, Mumbai, Maharashtra. Railway Recruitment Board, Bilaspur, Besides GMs Office, South East Central Railway, Head Quarter Complex, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. WRIT PETITION UNDER.ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA EOR ISSUANCE OF APPROPRIATE WRITIWRITS DIRECTIONS ETC. IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS ‘\i‘ \‘1/ V. é #P£ 9’3 /L/’ ~Il- H HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (C) No. 5251 of2011 PETITIONER z Mojjam Rahmani. VERSUS RESPONDENTS : Union of India & Others. \, Post for pronouncement ofjudgment & order on l .ltfa‘ay of December, 201 1. ( ox: ( sd/. Satish K. K. Agnihotn‘ Judge HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (C) N0. 5251 0f 2011 Mojjam Rahmani. VERSUS Union of India & Others. I I I I RESPONDENTS I 1 I WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA SB: Hon’ble Shri Satish K. AgnihotriJ J. Shri Rajeev Shrivastava, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri S.K.Tiwari, Standing Counsel for the Union of India/respondent No. 1 and 2. Present: (Passed on l LITday of December, 201 1) By this petition, the petitioner seeks a direction to the respondent No. 3 for issuing National Trade Certificate to the petitioner for the Trade of Electrician. 2. The facts, in brief, as projected by the petitioners are that the petitioner, after passing Higher Secondary Examination, was admitted to Industrial Training Institute (for short ‘the ITI’) at Belganga Nagar, Tahsil Chalisgaon, District Jalgaon, Maharashtra. The training was conducted as per the Training Manual for ITIs and Centres, prepared by the Directorate General of Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour, Government of India i.e. the respondent No. 2. As per the Training Manual, on the basis of various recommendations from time to time, the National Council for Vocational Training (for short ‘the NCVT’) was constituted which is the prime body for controlling and regulating the training programme. The petitioner successfully completed the training ED programme held between August, 2001 and July, 2003, and thereafter passed the Trade Test conducted by the NCVT. A provisional certificate to this effect was issued in the year 2003. However, till date, the petitoiner has not been issued the National Trade Certificate as prescribed under para 33 (b) read with para 33 (c) of the Manual of the NCVT. 3. Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has A not been issued National Trade Certificate due to which, the petitioner could not secure job in Delhi Metro, though the petitioner has'succeSsiiIlly passed the competitive examination for the post of Assistant Loco Pilot, held in the month of February, 2011. The petitioner made an application on 08.08.2011 to the respondent No. 2 (Annexure P/2) requesting to issue the National Trade Certificate, however, the petitioner has not received any response in this regard from the respondent No. 2. Thus, the respondent authorities may be directed to issue the certificate, as aforestated, as expeditiously as possible, as in absence of the certificate, the candidature of the petitioner for the post of Assistant Loco Pilot would not be considered. 4. On the other hand, Shri Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India/respondent No. 1 and 2 submits that this petition is not maintainable as the cause of action has arisen in the State of Maharashtra, thus, this Court may not be appropriate forum for issuance of a direction to the respondent authorities. 5. Shri Shrivastava next submits that though, the petitioner has persued his I.T.I. training in the State of Maharashtra, but as the /ipetitioner‘is the resident of District Durg, Chhattisgarh, thus, this ‘ \ 31 petition is maintainable before this Court. Under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories Within which the cause of action, wholly, or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, may issue directions/orders or writs to any Government, authority or person. In support of his contention, Shri Shrivastava relies on a decision of Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R.K.Mishra, Commissioner oflncome Tax & Others] and Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union oflndia & 0thers2. The petitioner relies 'on para 33 of the NCVT manual which prescribes for issuance of National Trade Certificate. However, the petitioner has not tiled a copy of the NCVT manual alongwith this petition. The petitioner has persued his trained in the State of Maharashtra. None of the respondents belong to the State of Chhattisgarh. Even, the petitioner has failed to establish asto how cause of action arises to file petition, before this Court. The petitioner has also not arrayed ITI, Belganganagar, as the party respondent, from where, the petitioner has completed his training. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, reads as under: Additional “226. (2) The power conferred by clause (l) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Govemment, authority or person ‘ may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” l 2 (20 10) 1 scc 4(57 (2001.) 2 scc 294 8. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union aflndia3, the Supreme Court observed as under: “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defmed in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. 'Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. 7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads thus: “226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may‘ also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 8. Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises. Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction (a)-(b) * * (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” i 3 (2004) 6 SCC 254 9. Although in View of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 10. Keeping in View the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. 11. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh4 it was held: (IA pp. 157-58) “The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” 12. This Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission V. Utpal Kumar Basu5 held that the question as to whether the Court has a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. 13. This Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission case held that all necessary facts must form an integral 4 (1887-88) 1’5 LA. 156 5 (1994) 4 sccvn ‘ \ part of the cause of action. It was observed: (SCC p. 719, para 8) “So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action.” 14 In State of Rajasthan V Swazka Properties th1s Court opined that mere serv1ce of a notice would not glve rlse to any cause of action unless service of notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The ,said decision has also been noticed in Oil and Natural Gas Commzsszon Thls Court held (SCC p 223 para 8) “The answer to the question whether serv1ce of notice is an integral part of the cause of action Within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action.” 15. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engg. Enterprises (P) Ltd. 7 this Court lamented: (SCC p. 71 1, para 2) “2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exerCised . jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse ofjurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation (1985) 2 SCC 217 (1994) 4 SCC 710 filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.” 16. In Union 0f India V Adani Exports Ltd.8 it was held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. 17. Recently, in National Textile Carpn. Ltd. V: Haribox Swalram 9 a Division Bench of this Court held: (SCC p. 797, para 12.1) “12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.” l8. The 'facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.” “9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which 8 (2002) 1 scc’ 5_67 9 (2004) 9 scc’ 7’86 9. In Rajendran Chingaravelul the Supreme Court held as under: the cause of action aris‘es wholly or in part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction.” i i 10. In Rajasthan High Court Advocates AssociationZ, the High Court observed as under: “17. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in “cause of action”. It has to be len to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises.” 10 ll. In Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise , the Supreme Court observed as under: “17. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also Clause (2) of Article 226 thereof, the High v Court would exercise its discretionary jurisdiction as also power to issue writ of certiorari in respect of the x orders passed by the subordinate courts within its territorial jurisdiction or if any cause of action has arisen therewithin but the same tests carmot be applied when I 10 (2007) 6 scc ‘769 the appellate court exercises a jurisdiction over a tribunal situated in more than one State. In such a situation, in our opinion, the High Court situated in the State where the first court is located should be considered to be the appropriate Appellate Authority. The Code of Civil Procedure did not contemplate such a situation. It provides for jurisdiction of each court. Even a District Judge must exercise its jurisdiction only within the territorial limits of a State. It is inconceivable under the Code of Civil Procedure that the jurisdiction of the District Court would be exercisable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the district, save and except in such matters Where the law specifically provides therefor. 40. Although in View of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action, as what is necessary to be proved, before the petitioner can obtain a decree, is material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 41. Keeping in view the expression “cause of action” used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction thereof accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine offorum conveniens may also have to be considered.” l2. In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. A.P.Agencies, Salem”, the Supreme Court observed as under: i ll (1.989) 2 scc‘163 10 “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken With the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved Would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintif .” l3. In Laxman Prasad v. Prodigy Electronics Ltd. & Another”, the Supreme Court observed as under: “29. According to the appellant, since the terms and conditions in the agreement have to be interpreted in accordance with the laws of Hong Kong, no court in any country other than a court in Hong Kong shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, petition, application or any other proceeding. The submission of the respondent Company, on the other hand, is that what was agreed upon was not territorial jurisdiction of a court but applicability of laws. Clause 18 deals with the second eventuality and declares that terms and conditions of the agreement would be interpreted in accordance with the laws ofHong Kong. , 30. We fmd considerable force in the submission of the leamed counsel for the respondent Company. In our View, “cause of action” and “applicability of I 12 (2008) 1 scc618 t “l 11 j/[Q law” are two distinct, different and independent things and one cannot be conmsed with the other. The expression “cause of action” has not been defined in the Code. It is, however, settled law that every suit presupposes the existence of a cause of action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint has to be rej ected [Rule 11(a) of Order 7]. Stated simply, “cause of action” means a right to sue. It consists of material facts which are imperative for the plaintiff to allege and prove to succeed in the suit. The classic definition of the expression (“cause of action”) is found in the observations of Lord Brett in Cooke v. Gill. His Lordship stated: “Cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment ofthe court. 31. In A.B.C. Laminates (Pvt) Ltd. v. A.P,Agencies, this Court said: “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to‘prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved -would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintif ." 12 (emphasis supplied) 32. Now, Sections 16 to 20 of the Code deal with territorial jurisdiction of a court (place of suing). Whereas Sections 16 to 18 relate to immovable property, suits for compensation for wrongs to persons or movables have been dealt with under Section 19. Section 20 of the Code is a residuary provision and covers all cases not falling under Sections 16 to 19. 33. The relevant part of Section 20 reads thus: “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside 0r cause 0f action arises—Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a court Within the local limits of whose jurisdiction (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily' resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; 01‘ (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” (emphasis supplied) 46. Territorial jurisdiction of a court, when the plaintiff intends to invoke jurisdiction of any court in India, has to be ascertained on the basis of the principles laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. Since a part of “cause of action” has arisen within the local limits of Delhi as averred in the plaint by the plaintiff Company, the question has to be considered on the basis of such averment. Since it is alleged that the appellant-defendant had committed 13 breach of agreement by using trade mark/trade name in Trade Fair, 2005 in Delhi, a part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi. The'plaintiff Company, in the circumstances, could have tiled a suit in Delhi. So far as applicability of law is concerned, obviously as and when the suit will come up for hearing, the Court will interpret the clause and take an appropriate decision in accordance With law. It has, however, nothing to do with the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. 47. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in rejecting the application and in overruling preliminary objection. Since prima facie the plaint disclosed a cause of action’as also territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the High Court rightly rejected both the contentions and no error was committed by