f RES;0NDENT$ No.1/ IgEsRONDENT-NQ. 1 1 The Estate Officer South East Railway Management Compound WRS. Colony, R‘afiiur, Cftha’ffisga’r Unon of India, Through Chief Manager, South East Railway, Molkerta » West Bengal f WRIT PETITION UNQER ARTICLE§€§7 QE THE CON§T!TQ!ION OF INDIA oRESPQNDENJ' NO 2/ {gESPONDENT NQ 2 ~-. h i , IN THE MATI'ER OF: Singia %em2h PEy-TIONER/ Q’PPELLANT 'mit Kashyop, W’la" S/O Shri Arun Kashyap, Aged about 29 years, O R/o Industrial Word, P.O. —Dhomtori, Distric’r- Dhomtari (C.G.) VER$US m'm Wm twgagszmg;) m W SB : Hon’ble Shri Manindra Mohan 5. 29=G4n291 9 My. Ankit Singhal, counsel fox' the pethioner. Ms. Naushina AIL counsel for respon Shli Amit Chaudhari, staniiing counsei for re By this petition, under Article 227 of ‘1e comitutian of Enriia, petitioner has assaiied iegality and validity af order dateé 18l03/20l by which the petitionefs appeal under Section 9 of the Fu‘ollc Premises (Eviction of mlautho ized occupanm) Act, 1971 (for shon " the Act of 197' l “J has been &ismissed as banal by limi u'on. s two fold submissions. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in ‘ew ex" the provisiens contained under Section 9, Sub-Section 2(a), the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of publication of the order under Sub-Section 1 of Section 5 o the Act of i971. the order was passed by the Estate Officer on Section 5 of Sub-Section 1, only on 8/O9 .hrivastava, J. oems on advance copy under instructions from ncients. Lem-r165; camsel far the petitianer it is submitted that though 2/08/08, the same was affixed as required by He therefore submits that the period of limitation would commence only Rom 81’091’0 and not before that. It is su‘omitted that the appeal was initially filed on 12/09/03 before Judge, Raipur vide its order dated 23/09/08 r‘ before the District Judge, Dhamtari whereafie the appeal was presented on 24/69/08 before the District Judge, Dhamtal'i. The second su‘ mission of learned counsel for the petitioner though assuming that there was delay in filing ‘1e appeal, as the petitioner had also moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation ct, l9o’3, by way of abundant cannon, learned Court below was obiiged to consider the same, Learned counsel for the petitioner 1 High Court in the case of Farina Nand Singh 1988, 264. Submission of learned counsel for tli respondent is that the perusal of impugned order wouid Show that the Disn-iet Judge, Raiptirreturned the appeal on 231’03/09 Whereafter [we en Kn\ a’a W, onion—e WW3? mmnww emote“ District Judge, Raipur but later on District d the appeal With "oerty to File the same also relied upon the judgment of Aliahaba Vs. District Judge, Mirzapur and others, AIR a s m ‘ e z I' 1-“ e e d . “saw, Wm, fm am m 3)..R9§ I“ 200 the appeal was filed before the learned Cou below ter deay of 20 days and irere appea; Wfs eat tiled within the period of limit an prescibed uner te la‘vl. I It Is submitted that the hndmg 0t the learned Court elow the appea was barred by lmntan oes not suffer &on1 any error much less an error ap nt on the record and erefore the petition is liable to be dismissed A perusal of impugned order shows t while considering ae to whether the appeal } t was 'filed within the eriod of limitation not, learned Court below has completely misdirected itself. A bare perusal of Section of sub-Section 2(a) shows that the appea is required to be filed within 12 days, &on th date of publition of the order under Sub- tire order, te learned Cou below While considering the case of the petitioner has co ted the period of limitation fro the dat of passing of the order withut taking into cons ation the statutory provisions contained in Swtion 9 of Sub-Sectio 2 (a of the Ac, 1971 The facts of the ease are that initially appeal was med before the District Judge, Raipur. Later on, the same was returned and nted before the Court below. This aspect was not taken into consideration Moreov it appears that the petitioner, by way of abtmda'nt caution, had moved an application imder Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the appea . Though the impugned order records that the appeal is barred by limitation, there is no onsideration of petitioner‘s application for condonation of delay. The order does not r fleet that any of the grounds raised by the petitioner 'm the application for condonation o delay were considered. The order does not Show that any satisfaction has been recorded th the cause shown for delay is not sufficient. In View of the above discussion, the ugned order cannot be sustained and the same is therefore set aside. Learned Court belo shall reconsider the entire matter afresh, by taking into consideration the statutory provisio contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act and pass appropriate orders in accor ice with law. i’aities shall appear before e Additional District Judge (are), Dham ‘ on 10L” May,g /,./»r‘/ Sdi‘ gnrwés taVa 1 e ca Section l of Section 5. However, in the @ W @3? rt af l hefo z F r d h b - l tm d p e th p .o' l ‘ i h rt m u m e o i r n ) t e ese e I p e