IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.33876 of 2008 Alakhdev Singh, son of Late Sohan Singh, village Barakala, PS Kothi, District Gaya – Petitioner. Vs. 1) The State of Bihar, 2) Naresh Singh, 3) Jogendra Singh, 4) Amrendra Singh, 5) Balendra Singh, all sons of Jagat Singh, village Barakala, PS Kothi, District Gaya – Opp. Parties. 5 8.7.2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the counsel appearing on behalf of the State. The petitioner is aggrieved by order, dated 10.9.2007 passed by the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Sherghati in Case No. 392/2007 whereby a proceeding under section 144 of the Cr. P.C. has been initiated and later converted into a proceeding under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The case of the petitioner shortly stated is that the lands in question belonged to Late Durga Singh who was recorded as Damayani raiyat in the survey khatiyan. After his death the descendants came into possession over the lands in question. There was a partition between Kali Singh, Shambhu Singh and Durga Singh which was effected about eighty years ago. It is claimed that the petitioner by virtue of the said partition came into possession of the lands in question. Petitioner is the heirs of Durga Singh whereas opposite parties 2 to 5 are heirs of Kali Singh. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that on two earlier occasions a proceeding under section 144 of the Cr. P. C. was initiated. One was disposed of on 9.1.2007 vide Annexure 7 2 wherein it has been found that there was no need to initiate 145 Cr. P.C. proceeding, as in the facts it would be proper to initiate a proceeding under section 107 of the Cr.P.C. against both the parties. The second proceeding was disposed of on 10.4.2007 wherein the court came to the finding that the petitioner was in possession of the lands in question and as such dropped the proceeding. The 3rd proceeding has been initiated vide the impugned order which is challenged on the ground, that repeated proceedings for the same cause of action cannot be initiated. It is submitted that once there was a finding that the petitioner was in possession of the land, there is no occasion to initiate a proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C. to decide the possession of the parties. At this juncture this court would also like to refer to the order passed in LPA No. 981/1996. This matter arose out of a consolidation proceeding between the petitioner and the opposite parties. The revisional court held that the opposite parties along with the petitioner were in possession over the lands in question. This order has been set aside by the L.P.A. court stating therein “that in those circumstances we allow the appeal and set aside the order impugned but at the same time set aside that portion portion of the order of the revisional authority which suggests that the writ petitioners and the appellants are jointly entitled to the land in question and the matter is remitted back to the consolidation officer for taking evidence and thereupon to determine whether until the date of publication of the register of land under section 9 3 of the Act, the three persons named in the Khewat and their descendents remained joint in respect of the land dealt with by the Khewat.” Thus from order passed in the letters patent appeal it is clear that both parties were recorded in joint possession. This part of the order has been set aside. Coming to the case of the opposite parties, it is claimed that the opposite parties have been in possession and have 1/3rd share in the lands in question. It is their case that the petitioner is disturbing their possession and, therefore, the proceedings under sections 144 and 145 of the Cr.P.C. are justified. Opposite parties 2 to 5 also claim that the petitioner cannot take any advantage of the order passed under section 144 of the Cr.P.C. holding that the petitioner is in possession, as the validity of such order is limited to a time frame. The question of disturbance or for that matter dispossession can be raised and agitated, as and when the occasion arises and, therefore, converting a 144 proceeding into one under section 145 Cr. P.C. is justified. This court obviously finds that the proceeding under section 145 which has been initiated by the impugned order is in accordance with law. However, while parting with the order, I would like to emphasize on the fact that since the question of deciding the possession, keeping in mind the title, has to be decided by the consolidation officer as directed by this court vide order, dated 11.10.2006, the petitioner should move the consolidation officer 4 who should decide the matter expeditiously. Pendency of land dispute lead to several problems which can be avoided if the matters are taken up with seriousness and disposed of expeditiously. The petitioner and the opposite parties are given liberty to produce a copy of this order before the concerned Consolidation Officer who will then pass orders expeditiously. Both the parties should cooperate in the matter as normally it will be the order of the consolidation authorities which will be binding on them with respect to title and possession of the land in question. This application stands disposed of with the aforesaid observations. haque ( Sheema Ali Khan, J.)