THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.18724 of 2003 DATED 18.08.2009 BETWEEN: Podili Lakshminarayana and others … Petitioners AND The Chief Engineer, R&B (Roads), Erramanjil, Hyderabad and others. … Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.18724 of 2003 ORDER: Petitioners who are thirty one in number filed the instant writ petition seeking a writ of Mandamus declaring the action of respondents in not paying compensation to petitioners for their lands allegedly used/acquired for laying the road from Chevitikallu to Vatsavai in Krishna District as arbitrary and illegal, and for consequential direction to pay compensation. In the affidavit filed by sixth petitioner, it is alleged that all the petitioners are marginal farmers entirely depends on the agricultural for a livelihood. Twenty years prior to filing the writ petition, respondents took the lands of petitioners – details of which are mentioned in paragraph 3 of the affidavit – for laying down the road referred to hereinabove. The road is being used by RTC buses. When the compensation was not paid, they got issued notice on 24.03.2009, in vain, and therefore, they filed instant writ petition. Third respondent, namely, Executive Engineer, R&B Department, Vijayawada, filed counter affidavit stating as follows. The Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Ms.No.1547, P.W.D. dated 25.09.2007 accorded administrative sanction for formation of the road under Central Road Fund Schemes (CRF Schemes). After the formation of roads, it was transferred to R&B Department. The compensation could not be paid immediately to the land owners for want of funds under CRF Schemes. Therefore, there was correspondence with the land acquisition officer of Revenue Department. The latter was also requested to inform the funds requires. The writ petition is also opposed contending that the land was utilized for laying road in 1969, petitioners raised dispute only in January, 2003 and therefore, writ petition is barred by limitation. This Court heard learned counsel for petitioner. Placing reliance on interlocutory order passed by this Court in W.P.M.P.No.7724 of 2003 in W.P.No.6624 of 1998 wherein this Court directed the Requisitioning Department to deposit funds for acquiring lands, learned counsel submits that petitioners were marking representations to respondents for payment of compensation, and therefore, delay and laches do not bar petitioners from claiming relief. Learned Government Pleader for R&B Department opposed writ petition. He submits that when the land was taken possession way back in 1969 and the petitioners filed the writ petition in 2003 after lapse of 33 years, and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. There is no dispute that the land was used for laying the road under CRF Scheme in 1969 pursuant to administrative sanction accorded by Government vide G.O.Ms.No.1547 PWD, dated 17.09.1967. Admittedly, petitioner got issued a legal notice only on 24.03.2003 that was after lapse of 33 years. In such case, whether this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of Constitution of India can issue a direction to respondents to acquire the lands? The answer to this question must be in the negative. Supreme Court has laid down that when land of a citizen is used for public purpose and a citizen approaches the Court with a long delay of 20 years, relief should not be granted. Reference may be made to State of Maharashtra v Digambar[1], C.Padma v Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu[2] and Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v Shah Hyder Baig[3]. In State of Maharashtra v Digambar (supra), Supreme Court considered the question of delay. When persons belatedly approach the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking compensation for their land, which was acquired for public purpose, it was held. In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. When such general allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State’s non-compliance with petitioners demands, State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the Governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without his consent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it. (emphasis supplied) In C.Padma v Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, Supreme Court held. …………… It is seen that after the notification in GOR 1392 dated 17-10-1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding had become final, the compensation was paid to the appellants’ father and thereafter the lands stood vested in the State. In terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the Act, the Company had delivered possession subject to the terms and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd., 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted for another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after three decades on the ground that either original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose. (emphasis supplied) I n Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v Shah Hyder Baig, Supreme Court considered the effect of delay in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and held. ………… It is now a well settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law Courts under Artit.226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, ‘delay defects equity’ has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go- bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. (emphasis supplied) As already observed, petitioners have not properly explained huge delay in claiming compensation and if at this point of time, after lapse of about 33 years, a Mandamus is issued it would be travesty of justice. Writ of mandamus should be issued to further a cause and subserve justice and not to subvert it. The writ petition is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. _______________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) 18.08.2009 pln [1] AIR 1995 SC 1991 [2] (1997)2 SCC 627 [3]AIR 2000 SC 671