IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN Present HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.974 of 2011 Between: Syed Osman Haroon & another .. Appellants AND The Andhra Pradesh Grameena Vikas Bank .. Respondent The Court made the following: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.974 of 2011 JUDGMENT: The second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.17 of 2009, on the file of the District Judge, Mahabubnagar, dated 12.08.2009, by which the judgment and decree in O.S.No.225 of 2007, on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court (Fast Track Court), Mahabubnagar, dated 30.12.2008, granting a preliminary decree in the suit for recovery of Rs.1,42,842/- with future interest at 11.5% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of realization by sale of mortgaged property granting the time for redemption for six months were confirmed. 2. The factual background for the second appeal is that the suit was filed by the plaintiff bank for recovery of Rs.1,42,842/- from both the defendants in the suit alleging that the first defendant was granted cash credit facility of Rs.1,00,000/- for developing his foot wear business on his application, dated 04.04.2000, for which the second defendant stood as a guarantor. The required documents were executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff bank and the loan amount remained unpaid in spite of repeated demands and legal notices. Hence, the suit. Both the defendants resisted the suit in separate written statements denying their liability and contending that revival letters, dated 24.03.2003 and 02.03.2006, were fabricated and created. The correctness of the statement of account was also questioned and the trial Court framed issues about the truth of the revival letters, the correctness of the statement of account and the entitlement of the plaintiff to recover the suit amount. 3. During trial, P.W.1 and D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked. 4. The trial Court rendered its judgment firstly referring to the evidence of P.W.1 rebutting the allegations of the plaintiff and Exs.A-1 to A-13 documents filed by him. The trial Court also referred to the admissions in the cross-examination of the first defendant as D.W.1 about taking the suit loan amount from the plaintiff bank and being due the amount to the bank. The first defendant further admitted that on the date of the filing of the suit, he was due the suit amount and the costs of the suit. D.W.2, the father of D.W.1, was also stated to have admitted the suit claim and hence, on the basis of the said admission, the entitlement of the plaintiff to the suit amount was upheld by the trial Court. In the absence of any evidence for the defendants, the truth of the letters of revival and the correctness of the statement of account were also upheld leading to the preliminary decree granted by the trial Court. 5. In appeal, the learned District Judge had again referred to the rival pleadings and contentions and considered the points about the incorrectness of the statement of account, the non-execution of the revival letters, the entitlement of the plaintiff for a preliminary decree and personal decree and the relief to be granted. The first Appellate Court, after examining the signatures of the defendants on Exs.A-8 and A-9-revival letters with reference to the admitted signatures on Exs.A-1 to A-6, found all the signatures to be similar. The comparison of the signatures leading to the first Appellate Court taking a view about the similarity of the signatures coupled with the evidence of P.W.1 and D.Ws.1 and 2 led the first Appellate Court to conclude that the defendants executed the revival letters. The Appellate Court also noted that D.Ws.1 and 2 did not specifically state in their affidavits in the evidence that Exs.A-8 and A-9 did not contain their signatures. The Appellate Court was also referring to the obligations created by the equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds and absence of any material to show that the extract of the account filed by the plaintiff is not correct. Under the circumstances, the judgment and decree of the trial Court were confirmed in the appeal. 6. The defendants attempt to challenge the said judgment and decree in the second appeal mainly on the ground of the suit being barred by limitation in the absence of any revival letters as mentioned by the plaintiff bank. The bank took the signatures of the appellants on blank papers and the revival letters, dated 24.03.2003 and 02.03.2006, were, hence, not valid letters of revival. The suit filed after seven years from the date of hypothecation is not within time and the substantial question of law arising was stated to be whether the Court below was justified in decreeing the suit in spite of the contention about the revival letters being fabricated. 7. Heard Smt. N. Seetha Laxmi, learned counsel representing Sri V.V. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the appellants and none appeared during hearing on behalf of the respondent bank. 8. The point for consideration at the stage of admission is whether any substantial questions of law are involved in the second appeal to enable the High Court to entertain the second appeal. 9. The question involved, according to the appellants, in the second appeal is the justification for decreeing the suit in spite of the contention of the appellants about the two revival letters being fabricated by the plaintiff bank. 10. In this regard, the evidence of P.W.1, the Bank Manager, about the suit claim and Exs.A-1 to A-13 documents relating to the same practically remained uncontroverted by the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 and P.W.1 positively stated about the execution of Ex.A-8-Revival Letter, dated 24.03.2003, and Ex.A-9- Revival Letter, dated 02.03.2006, by the defendants. The execution of Exs.A-1 to A-5 at the time of taking the loan and Ex.A-6-letter by the second defendant at the same time was not disputed as the transaction of loan itself is admitted as noted by the trial Court. The trial Court basically relied on the admissions of D.Ws.1 and 2 about the liability existing by the date of the suit on the admitted loan transaction. It is true that the trial Court itself did not distinctly and separately deal with the question of both the revival letters being created and fabricated as covered by Issue No.2 in the suit, but the first Appellate Court specifically dealt with that question by framing a specific point for consideration and also noting that D.Ws.1 and 2 did not state in their affidavits filed in chief examination about Exs.A-8 and A-9-Revival Letters not containing their signatures. The first Appellate Court had undertaken a comparison of the signatures of the defendants on the disputed documents, Exs.A-8 and A-9, with the signatures on the admitted documents Exs.A-1 to A-6. Coupled with the similarity of the signatures found by the first Appellate Court in its wisdom and experience, the positive evidence of P.W.1 and the omission in the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 led the first Appellate Court to hold that Exs.A-8 and A-9 were probablised to have been executed by the defendants. It was a finding of fact, pure and simple, which cannot be considered to be beyond the jurisdiction of the first Appellate Court and it is well settled that the first Appellate Court is the final Court of fact finding and the High Court or the Supreme Court rarely interfere with such findings of fact only when such findings appear to be plainly perverse or clearly opposed to the broad human probabilities arising out of the evidence on record. Such a contingency does not appear to arise in the present case and the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below do not appear to involve any questions of law. The very plea now taken in the grounds of the second appeal about the bank taking the signatures of the appellants on blank papers suggesting the probability of the revival letters being brought into existence of such signed papers was neither the specific plea taken in the pleadings and the evidence of the defendants before the trial Court or before the first Appellate Court and even assuming the said plea also to be open for consideration, the conclusions of the first Appellate Court, on comparison of the signatures coupled with the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, are not susceptible to interference on any such question. In the absence of any substantial question that can be formulated by the High Court, Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Order XLII rule 2 thereof bar entertainment of the second appeal. 11. Therefore, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. ___________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 21st November, 2011 KL HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.974 of 2011 Date: 21st November, 2011 KL