IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CWP (T) No.5807/2008 Decided on:14.7.2010 _____________________________________________ Joginder Singh. ….Petitioner. Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others. …Respondents. ________________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the petitioner : Mr. J.R. Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. R.K. Bawa, Advocate General with Mr. Vikas Rathore, Dy. A.G. and Mr. R.P. Singh, Asstt. A.G. _____________________________________________________ Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral). Petitioner was appointed as Instructor, Motor Mechanic and Driving on contract basis for a period of 89 days with effect from 14.10.1998 to 10.1.1999. The contractual appointment of the petitioner was renewed for another 89 days with effect from 18.1.1999 to 16.4.1999. Thereafter his engagement was to cease automatically. There was a specific stipulation in the office order dated 16.1.1999 that the petitioner will not claim or right for regularization of services on the basis of his engagement. Petitioner apprehending that the respondents may not renew his contract beyond 16.4.1999 approached the learned erstwhile 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The learned Tribunal granted the interim relief to the petitioner on 16.4.1999 whereby he was permitted to work in the same capacity at the same place where he was working, if the post was lying vacant and no one had joined there either on regular appointment or by transfer. The interim order passed by the Tribunal was against the well settled principles of service jurisprudence. The learned Tribunal had not taken into consideration that the appointment of the petitioner was for a period of 89 days only. Petitioner has accepted all the terms and conditions as per his engagement made on 14.10.1098 and thereafter vide office order dated 16.1.1999. The Courts cannot direct the employer to renew or continue the contract. The contract is a bilateral act. The persons appointed on contract basis has no indefeasible right to continue beyond the period stipulated in the contract. In the instant case, the appointment of the petitioner itself was the termination letter. He had to cease to work beyond 16.4.1999 automatically. Mr. J.R. Thakur has strenuously argued that the direction be issued to the respondents to regularize the services of his clients. The Court is of the considered opinion that no direction can be issued to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization even though he had been continuing on the basis of the interim order passed by the Tribunal. The experience gained by the petitioner, on the basis of the interim order, cannot be counted for the purpose of continuity in service and seniority. The person, who 3 has been appointed for 89 days, has no right to seek direction to the respondents to regularize his services. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others versus Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 have held that the persons appointed on contract do not have any right to regular or permanent public employment. It has further been held that temporary, contractual, casual, ad hoc or daily wage public employment must be deemed to be accepted by the employee concerned fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. Their Lordships have held as under: “45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the 4 exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” No other point was urged. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. (Rajiv Sharma), Judge 14.7.2010 *awasthi*