IN THE H‘GH COURT OF CHHATI'ISGARH AT B'LASPUR Qg?é?7 WRIT PETITION (227) NO. /2OIO IN THE MATTER OF: RESPONDENT NO.2/ RESPONDENT NO. 2 / 2. Union of India, Through Chief Manager, South East Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkaia, Wesi Bengai, WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA ufuv PETITIONER/ / , APPELLANT Shiv Naroyon, S/o Ia’re Shri Sadoram Dhimar Aged about 45 years, R/o Industrial Ward, P.O. -Dham1‘ari, District- Dhomtori (C.G.) ., VERsus RESPONDENTS No.1 / RESPDNDENT NO. 1 /, 1. The Esfa’re Officer, South East Roilwcy Management Compound, W.R.S. Colony, Raipur, ChhaHisgarh .~\\ $3 : Ho‘n’ble Shri Manindra Mohan a‘hrivastava, J. 29=§4:291 0 ML Ankit Singhal, counsel for the pet tioner. Ms‘ Naushina Ali, counsel for respom Llems on advance copy under histiuctions from Shli Amit Chaudhari, standing caunsel for res} By this petition, under Article 227 of $he constitution of India, petitioner has assai’ied legality and validity of order dated 18/03/20K by which the petitioner‘s appeai under Section 9 of the Fublic Premises (Eviction of mlautho iondents. ‘ized occupants) Act, 1971 (for short " the Act of 197l") has been dismissed as barred by limitation. s two fo}d submissions. Ihe first submission of learned counsei for the petitioner is that in ’ew of the provisions contained under Section 9, Sub-Section 2(a), the period of limitation is to be reckoned iron} the date of publication of the order under Sub-Section 1 of Section 5 o the Act of 1971. It is submitted that though the order was passed by the Estate Officer on 2/08;’O8, the same was affixed as required by Section 5 of Sub-Section l, only on 8/09 “e Learned counsel for the petitioner r He therefore submits that the period of limitation would commence only &om 8/09/‘0 and not before that. It is submitted that the appeal was initially filed on 12/39/08 before 1e District Judge, Raipur but later on District Judge, Raipur vide its order dated 23/09/0$ the appeai was presented on 24/99/08 before before the District Judge, Dhamtari Whereaft the District Judge, Dhamtari. The second su’ mission of iem‘ned counsel for the petitioner though assmning that there was delay in tiiing he appeai, as the petitioner had also moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation ct, 1963, by way of abundant caution learned Court heiow was obliged to consider the same. l others, AIR ed the appeal with liberty to file the same Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of .i‘diahabad High Court in the case of Parma Nand Singh \ls. Bistrict Judge, Mirzapur and 1988, 264. Submission of learned comrSel for thi respondent is that the perusal of impugned g order wouid show that the District Judge, Raipiir returned the appeal on 7.3i08/09 whereafter . .L u » / r e h- ‘ the appeal was filed befm‘e the learned Court below amn‘ dalay of 20 days and merefm'e appeal was not tiled withirx the period of limitz tion prescrihed under the law. It is submitted that the finding of the learned Court below tha suffer &om any error much iess an error ap liable to be dismissed A pelusal of impugned order shows tl t while considering as to whether the appeal was filed within the period of limitation o' not, learned Coun below nae completely misdirected itself. A bare perusal of Section of Sub-Section 2(a) shows that the appeal is reqiiired to be filed Within 12 days &om the date of publication of the order under Sub- tire order, the learned Court below while the appeai was barred by 1imitation daes not nt on the record and therefore the petition is Section l of Section 5. However, in the considering the case of the petitioner has com uted the period of limitation from the date of passing of die order without taking into consi ration the statutory provisions contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act, l97l The facts of the case are that initially e appeal was filed before the District Judge, Raipur. .Later on, the same was returned and esented before the Court below. This aspect was not taken into coneideration. Moreov it appears that the petitioner, ‘oy way of abundant caution, had moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonedon of delay, if any, in filing the appea t, Though the impugied order records that the appeal is haired by limitation, there is no :onsideration of petitioners application for ddi condor-ration of delay. The order does not reflect that any of the grounds raised by the lpetitiorier in the application for condonation oi” delay were considered "ihe order does not Show that any satisfaction has been recorded th the cause shown for delay is not sufficient In View of the above discussion, the i pugned order cannot be sustained and the same is therefore set aside. Learned Court belo Jr shall reconsider the entire matter ahesh, by taking into consideration the statutory provisions contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Parties shall appear before the Adanommismmudga (arcinhammn‘ on messy, 20w j\ \ t ‘l‘iiahindra Mohair 5dr; shriva‘stava judge naggi- a p ' i e