THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION No.3707 OF 2009 ORDER : This writ petition is filed seeking a declaration that the order passed by the 1st respondent herein vide G.O.Ms.No.128, Municipal Administration and Urban Development (Elec.II) Department, dated 18.02.2009, thereby removing the petitioner from the office of the Mayor in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 679-B of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (for short, ‘the HMC Act’), as arbitrary and illegal. The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, are as under : The petitioner herein was elected as the Mayor of the Nellore Municipal Corporation and she assumed charge on 5.10.2005. A show-cause notice dated 13.06.2008 was issued by the 1st respondent calling upon the petitioner to show-cause within seven days as to why she should not be removed from the office of the Mayor under Section 679-B of the HMC Act read with Section 14 of the A.P. Municipal Corporations Act, 1994, alleging that her acts and omissions mentioned therein were in violation of the provisions of the Act. The petitioner submitted her explanation dated 16.6.2008 denying the allegations made in the show-cause notice. She also filed W.P.No.12813 of 2008 seeking a declaration that the action of the Government in initiating proceedings to remove her from the office of the Mayor was illegal. A further declaration was also sought that Section 679-B of the HMC Act was illegal and unconstitutional. The said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 7.11.2008 with directions/observations as under : “In the circumstances, we are of the view that since the impugned action is only at a show cause, we refrain from going into such correctness or otherwise nature of the impugned action or any allegation or counter allegations made. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances, we deem it more appropriate to direct that the petitioner shall be given a fresh liberty of filing explanation to the said show cause notice including on the aforesaid reports dated 31.3.2008 and 20.5.2008. The respondent No.1 is directed to furnish copies of the said reports within a period of two weeks from today, and on receipt thereof, the petitioner shall file the necessary explanation within a period of two weeks thereof. On receipt of explanation, it shall be open for the respondent No.1 to pass appropriate orders, on merits and in accordance with law.” Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition to Appeal (Civil) No.29002 of 2008 before the Supreme Court and the same was disposed of by order dated 15.11.2008 directing the authority to consider the objections and take appropriate decision untrammelled by the observations made earlier. The petitioner was also granted liberty to file objections within a period of four weeks. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted her explanation dated 9.1.2009 denying all the charges levelled against her and also stating that the proposed action of removal based upon non-existing grounds was arbitrary and illegal. It was also contended that since no notice or opportunity was given to her in the two enquiries said to have been conducted by the Joint Director of Municipal Administration, the enquiry reports were nonest in the eye of law and could not have formed the basis for the proposed action of removal. Thereafter, the petitioner was called upon to appear for personal hearing on 29.01.2009 at 3.00 p.m. in the Chambers of the Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development. Accordingly, the petitioner attended the personal hearing on 29.01.2009 and thereafter the impugned order of removal dated 18.02.2009 came to be passed by the 1st respondent – Principal Secretary, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department – holding that the charges 4 to 8 were established. However the charges 1 to 3 were held not proved having regard to the explanation submitted by the petitioner. The impugned order of removal dated 18.02.2009 is under challenge in this writ petition primarily on the ground that the same was in violation of the principles of natural justice since the relevant records requisitioned by the petitioner which were absolutely necessary to furnish an exhaustive reply to the show-cause notice were not furnished. It is pleaded in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that during the personal hearing held on 29.01.2009 the petitioner had orally requested the authority to furnish the relevant records to enable her to give an exhaustive and effective reply and the said request was also recorded in the proceedings sheet. The details of the records required by her were also mentioned in her letter dated 31.01.2009 followed by another letter dated 7.2.2009. However her request was ignored and the impugned order of removal was passed unilaterally. It is contended that in view of the non-furnishing of relevant records which are necessary for submitting an exhaustive reply to the allegations levelled in the show-cause notice, the impugned order suffered from the vice of arbitrariness apart from being violative of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, whereas the petitioner was heard by the Secretary to the Municipal Administration in the personal hearing held on 29.01.2009, the impugned order of removal was passed by the Principal Secretary to Municipal Administration and thus the opportunity of personal hearing was rendered an empty formality. The petitioner also contended that the impugned order is unsustainable even on merits since the findings recorded on charges 4 to 8 were erroneous and not supported by any material available on record. It is contended that the 1st respondent failed to consider the explanation submitted by the petitioner in proper perspective and the impugned order was passed mechanically without application of mind to the relevant statutory provisions. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent, it is stated that on the basis of the complaint dated 1.11.2006 received from the Deputy Mayor and other independent Corporators as well as another complaint dated 28.7.2007 received from the Local M.L.A., alleging misuse and abuse of power by the petitioner, the Government by order dated 3.8.2007 directed the Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration to depute a Senior Regional Director-cum- Appellate Authority to visit Nellore Municipal Corporation to review the functioning of the Corporation. Accordingly, an enquiry was conducted and a report dated 31.03.2008 was submitted to the Government on 19.04.2008. In the meanwhile, since two more complaints dated 11.2.2008 and 23.04.2008 were received, by memo dated 5.5.2008 the Government had again directed to review the functioning of the Corporation by a Senior Officer. Accordingly the Joint Director from the office of the Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration conducted an enquiry and submitted a detailed report dated 20.05.2008 which revealed that several allegations made against the petitioner were correct. After examining the said enquiry reports, the Government decided to proceed further and accordingly the show-cause notice dated 13.6.2008 was issued proposing removal under Section 679-B of the HMC Act read with Section 14 of the A.P. Municipal Corporations Act, 1994. Challenging the said show-cause notice, the petitioner filed W.P.No.12853 of 2008 and after the said writ petition was disposed of in terms of the directions of this Court the copies of the enquiry reports dated 31.03.2008 and 20.05.2008 were furnished to the petitioner vide Memo dated 20.11.2008. Having received the same, the petitioner submitted a representation requesting to permit her to inspect the concerned records and gave a list of 22 records referred to in the enquiry reports. Accordingly, the copies of the said records were furnished to the petitioner on 6.12.2008 by the Commissioner, Nellore Municipal Corporation. In the meanwhile, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court of India by filing a Special Leave Petition and the same was disposed of by order dated 5.12.2008 granting liberty to file objections within a period of four weeks. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation on 09.01.2009 making her submissions on each allegation made in the show-cause notice. She also made a request to grant personal hearing while reserving her right to submit an exhaustive and effective reply alleging lack of proper recorded material expected to receive from the authorities. Thereafter, by Memo dated 23.01.2009 the petitioner was informed that the personal hearing will be held on 29.01.2009 at 3.00 p.m. in the Chambers of the Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department. That apart, by Memo dated 24.01.2009 the petitioner was requested to specify the records required at the time of personal hearing scheduled on 29.01.2009. Though the petitioner attended the personal hearing on 29.01.2009, she failed to specify the records required by her. Hence, the explanation offered by the petitioner with reference to the allegations made against her was examined in the light of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the relevant records of the Corporation and the impugned order of removal was passed assigning the reasons therefor. The claim of the petitioner that during the course of personal hearing the Secretary to Government had orally instructed her to submit a requisition letter for furnishing the documents required by her has been specifically denied and it is stated that the proceedings were concluded in the personal hearing held on 29.01.2009 and the same was recorded by the Secretary, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, in the presence of the petitioner. Thus, the allegation made by the petitioner that the impugned order was in violation of the principles of natural justice was denied and it is contended that the subsequent letters addressed by the petitioner dated 31.01.2009 and 7.2.2009 were only an after- thought to delay the proceedings. The further allegation made by the petitioner that the impugned order was passed without application of mind to the relevant records and without properly considering the explanation submitted by her was also denied and it was contended that the material on record established that the omissions / lapses on the part of the petitioner had adversely affected the functioning of the administration of the Corporation and hampered the progress of many developmental works which was in total violation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and therefore the impugned order of removal was in accordance with law. It was also explained in the counter-affidavit that the Secretary, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, who heard the matter on 29.01.2009 at length, recorded her findings at paras 106, 107 and 108 of the Note File and having considered the same the Government took a decision at paras 110, 111 and 112 of the Note File. Thereafter, since she went on leave, the Principal Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, was entrusted to discharge the functions of the Secretary, vide G.O.Rt.No.685, dated 7.2.2009. Accordingly, the impugned proceedings were issued by the Principal Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, communicating the decision of the Government to the petitioner. Hence, the allegation of the petitioner that the matter was heard by the Secretary to Government, whereas the impugned order was passed by the Principal Secretary to Government, was absolutely incorrect and without any basis. It is also explained in the counter-affidavit that the impugned order dated 18.2.2009 was published in the Extraordinary Gazette on 19.2.2009 and thereafter in terms of Section 91 of the HMC Act, the Deputy Mayor had assumed the charge as Mayor on 21.01.2009. It is also stated that the Election Authority and Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration, Hyderabad, reported to the State Election Commission about the casual vacancy caused by virtue of the removal of the petitioner as Mayor and pursuant thereto the State Election Commission in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 9, 10 and 90 of the HMC Act, read with Section 14 of the A.P. Municipal Corporations Act, 1994 and Rule 3 of A.P. Municipal Corporations (Conduct of Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor) Rules, 2005 (for short, ‘Rules, 2005’) issued Election Notification dated 24.2.2009 directing the District Collector to conduct election to the casual vacancy in the office of the Mayor by issuing a Notice in Form-II calling for a Special Meeting on or before 27.02.2009 and the date and time of meeting for the election of the Mayor was scheduled as 3.3.2009 at 11.00 a.m. A separate counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent Corporation on the same lines. The Corporators of Ward Nos.35 and 41 got themselves impleaded as respondents 3 and 4 and filed their respective counter- affidavits denying the allegations made by the petitioner and justifying the impugned order of removal. I have heard the learned Counsel for both the parties in detail. At the outset, the learned Government Pleader for Municipal Administration raised an objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition contending that since the election process to fill-up the casual vacancy of Mayor has already commenced, this Court normally would not entertain any writ petition exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission, the learned Government Pleader relied upon the decisions in ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. ASHOK KUMAR[1] and MJ. VEERAMANI AND OTEHRS v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P.[2]. There can be no dispute about the ratio laid down in the above decisions that once the election process has started, no writ petition can be maintained questioning the election which may have the effect of interrupting the election process. However the said principle is not attracted to the instant case since the petitioner herein is challenging the order of her removal from the office passed in exercise of statutory powers. The election is sought to be held for filling-up the vacancy arose consequent to the order of removal which is under challenge in this writ petition. The election as such is not questioned in this writ petition but the issue that requires consideration is whether the impugned order of removal suffered from any patent illegality or irregularity warranting interference by this Court. The mere fact that the election process consequent to the impugned order has commenced does not come in the way to consider the said question in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition is rejected. Coming to the merits of the case, it is necessary to notice Section 679-B of the HMC Act which runs as under : “679B Government's power to remove Mayor or Deputy Mayor (1) The Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, remove the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor who, in their opinion willfully omits or refuses to carry out or disobeys the provisions of this Act or any rules, bye-laws, regulations or lawful orders issued thereunder or abuses his position of the powers vested in him. (2) The Government shall when they propose to remove the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor under sub- section (1), give the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor concerned an opportunity for explanation, and the notification issued under the said sub-section shall contain a statement of the reasons of the Government for the action taken. (3) Any person removed under sub-section(1) from the office of Mayor or from the office of Deputy Mayor shall not be eligible for election to either of the said offices until the date on which notice of the next ordinary elections to the Corporation is published in the prescribed manner.” On a plain reading of the above provision, it is clear that the power conferred thereunder can be exercised if the Government is the opinion that the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor had willfully omitted or refused to carry out or disobeyed the provisions of the HMC Act or the Rules made thereunder or abused his possession of power vested in him. It is also clear that before exercising such power an opportunity shall be provided to the Mayor concerned to submit his/her explanation against the proposed action. In the instant case, admittedly a show-cause notice was issued on 13.6.2008 enumerating altogether eight charges. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner submitted her explanation. However, it is alleged by the petitioner that since the recorded material on the basis of which proceedings for removal were initiated were not made available to her, she was unable to submit exhaustive and effective reply. So far as the said allegation is concerned, it is pleaded by the respondents that in compliance with the order of this Court in W.P.No.12853 of 2008 the copies of enquiry reports dated 31.3.2008 and 25.2.2008 were furnished to the petitioner on 20.11.2008. Thereafter, copies of 22 documents sought by the petitioner were also furnished to her on 6.12.2008. Though the said fact is not disputed, it is claimed by the petitioner that at the time of personal hearing on 29.01.2009 she asked for certain other documents and a list of the said documents was also furnished to the respondents on 31.01.2009 and 7.2.2009 and that the respondents failed to comply with the said request. However the version of the petitioner could not be substantiated by any supporting material. On the other hand the proceedings of personal hearing recorded by the Secretary to Government, M.A. & U.D. Dept., dated 29.01.2009, which were also signed by the petitioner, revealed that the hearing was concluded on that day. There was no mention about the request said to have been made by the petitioner for further documents much less the liberty granted to her to furnish the list of such documents subsequently. It is true that in the Memo dated 24.01.2009 the petitioner was requested to specify the records required by her at the time of personal hearing scheduled on 29.01.2009. However, it is apparent that the petitioner did not specify the further records required by her at the time of personal hearing. Thus it is clear that the two lists given by the petitioner on 31.01.2009 and 07.02.2009 i.e., after the conclusion of the personal hearing, specifying certain records required by her were only an after- thought to make out a case that the respondents failed to comply with her request to furnish certain relevant records. In the circumstances, the allegation that the respondents failed to furnish the documents required by the petitioner is unfounded and cannot be accepted. So far as the further allegation of the petitioner that personal hearing was conducted by the Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department, whereas the impugned order was passed by the Principal Secretary, M.A. & U.D. Department and thus the opportunity of personal hearing was rendered an empty formality is concerned, in the counter-affidavit it is explained that the matter was heard by the Secretary, M.A. & U.D. Department on 29.01.2009 and after hearing the matter at length findings were recorded by the Secretary at Paras 106, 107and 108 of the note file. Thereafter the Government considered the entire matter and took a decision at Paras 110,111 & 112 of the note file. However, since the Secretary went on leave, the Principal Secretary to Government, MA & UD Department, who was entrusted the functions of the Secretary vide G.O.Rt.No.685, dated 7.2.2009 communicated the decision to the Government to the petitioner under the impugned order. On a careful perusal of the note file placed before this Court, the version of the respondents is found to be correct. Since the decision was taken by the Secretary, MA & UD Department, as reflected from paras 106, 107 and 108 of the note file, the impugned order cannot be held to be vitiated merely on the ground that the said decision was communicated by the Principal Secretary. Then the only other question that requires consideration is whether the findings recorded by the respondents on the charges levelled against the petitioner are liable to be interfered by this Court on any ground whatsoever. As noticed above, though eight charges were framed against the petitioner, charges 1 to 3 were held to be not established. The remaining five charges i.e., Charges 4 to 8 run as under : “4. The Mayor herself prepared subjects for the Council Meeting instead of Secretary, which is irregular, thereby contravened Section 88 (i) of HMC Act. 5. On the request of Sri K. Sudhakar on 22.01.2007, the Mayor has given in anticipation approval in file ROC.NO.4446/2006/G1 pertaining to conversion of residential area into commercial area, without the recommendation of the office. Generally, in anticipation orders will be obtained in emergency circumstances only. There is no provision in the HMC Act for approval of subjects by the Mayor in anticipation of the General Body Council Meeting. Further the issue of change of and use is not at all an urgent issue. This clearly shows that she has abused her official power which led to dislocation of administration. 6. The Mayor has adjourned the urgent meeting on 31.01.2008 on the ground that the Commissioner has not attended the meeting, though the In-charge Commissioner has attended the meeting. As the council Meetings are not taking place regularly and periodically, the development is hampered due to willful act of the Mayor. 7. That the Mayor has approved two identical subjects at S.No.14 & 20 in the Agenda of the Council Meeting held on 08.10.2007, relating to conversion of land use from residential use to commercial use, in anticipation of the approval of the Council, thereby abused and misused her official position, by acting as per will and wishes ignoring the statutory provisions. 8. Though it has been brought to the notice of the Mayor that 49 important subjects to be transacted by the Council are pending for disposal by the Council, she has not taken action to convene Council meetings for dispatch of business from time to time. This clearly establishes her failure in discharging her legitimate duties as development is held up for want of council resolutions.” The explanation of the petitioner for the said charges runs as under : “On allegation No.4 she has submitted that the subjects for Council meeting are prepared by the Secretary and approved by the Commissioner only and the same is placed before the Mayor for agenda circulation after Commissioner’s approval. As Mayor she has the authority to sign the agenda notice. On allegation No.5 she has submitted that, as Mayor she has the power to give in-anticipation approvals for important matters. With regard to the file ROC.No.4446/2006/G1 pertaining to the conversion of the residential area into commercial area that belongs to Sri K.Sudhakar as mentioned in the show- cause notice, she has made in-anticipation approval in consideration of the request from the public. On several occasions keeping in mind the urgency involved, as a Mayor interested in the welfare and well-being of the residents of the Corporation, she has given in-anticipation sanctions and the same was ratified by the Council. On allegation No.6 she has submitted that, for the meeting on 31.01.2008, except the in-charge Commissioner, all other departmental heads, officers and staff of the Municipal Corporation purposefully abstained from the meeting. Majority Corporators, who have attended the meeting, objected to the absence of the officers and demanded the adjournment, as they could not get any answers to their queries of public interest. At the meeting, she cannot ignore the majority members opinion. Hence, she has adjourned the above said meeting and clearly recorded the reasons for the adjournment in the minutes. On allegation No.7 she has submitted that, as mentioned in the answer to Charge No.5, giving in- anticipation approval is a prerogative of the Mayor. The Act clearly vests this power with the Mayor. Moreover, these two subjects were finally approved by the Council when they were placed before it. The Council has not objected for the same. If there is no objection from the council, it is construed that the subjects are in the interest of the Corporation. On allegation No.8 she has submitted that, there is no stipulation of time limit for council meetings and number of subjects for each meeting. Council