IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU WRIT APPEAL NO : 166 of 2002 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated ______ in WP NO : 5031 OF 1993 on the file of the High Court.) Between: D.Jagga Raju S/o Subba Raju R/o. Bhimavaram, West Godavari District ..... APPELLANT AND 1 Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Jeevan Prakash Machilipatnam 2 Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, South Central Zonal Office, Saifabad Hyderabad 500 463 .....RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Appellant:MR.B.ADINARAYANA RAO Counsel for the Respondent No.: MR.P.NAGESWAR SREE The Court made the following : THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU WRIT APPEAL NO : 166 of 2002 JUDGMENT: (PER SRI JUSTICE K C BHANU) 1. Aggrieved by the orders dated 27.09.2001 in W P No. 5031 of 1993, the present appeal is filed. The appellant/petitioner vide orders dated 11.6.1991 was imposed with the penalty of ‘bringing his basic pay to the minimum of the grade applicable to Assistant’s cadre under Regulation 39 (1) (d) of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. 2. The brief facts that are necessary for disposal of the writ petition may be stated as follows. 3. The writ petitioner while working as Cashier in Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short LIC) stated to have committed an illegality in not accounting the amount collected from the policy holder. Thereupon, charge sheet dated 4.1.1990 has been issued to him, for which an explanation was given by the petitioner. Not satisfied with the explanation, regular departmental enquiry was ordered. The enquiry officer, after conducting regular enquiry, came to the conclusion that the writ petitioner was guilty of the charges leveled against him. Accepting the enquiry officer’s report, a show cause notice was issued to the writ petitioner, for which reply was submitted. Thereupon, the disciplinary authority passed the final order imposing the punishment. On appeal to the Zonal Manager, the same was rejected. Challenging the said orders, the petitioner filed W P No. 5031 of 1993 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Hence, the appeal. 4. Mr B Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the disciplinary authority did not give any good and sufficient reasons and therefore the same is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that, even the Appellate Authority also without giving any reasons rejected the appeal, which is contrary to Regulation 46 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, therefore, prays to set aside the impugned judgment. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents contended that the enquiry report and the show cause notice issued to the appellant clearly disclose about the illegality committed by him and that after considering the enquiry report, the appellant was imposed with proportionate punishment, therefore the punishment order does not require any interference by this Court. 6. There cannot be any dispute that right to reason is indispensable part of sound judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. The affected party must know for what reason the case went against him. As seen, the order of the disciplinary authority does not contain any reasons at all. Admittedly, Rule 46 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 requires good and sufficient reasons to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. But the impugned order does not contain such reasons except stating that in the facts and circumstances of the matter, the penalty has been imposed. Similarly, the Appellate Authority has not considered the appeal independently. As the Appellate Authority is the final authority with regard to the appreciation of evidence, it should have considered the appeal and ought to have given good and sufficient reasons for accepting or rejecting the enquiry officer’s report. The Appellate Authority observed that all the statements are of repetitive in nature, except the few points. Even those two points, there was no reference in the disciplinary authority order and they do not contain any reasons at all. 7. On this aspect, the learned counsel for appellant/petitioner relied upon a decision of this Court in W.P No. 18778 of 2005 dated 11.7.2006. The relevant portion reads as under; It is necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer. (Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi[1] I n State of Rajasthan v. M.C. Saxena[2], the Supreme Court held thus:- “………..It is well settled that the Disciplinary Authority can disagree with the findings arrived at by the enquiring officer and act upon his own conclusion, but the only requirement is that the said Disciplinary Authority must record reasons for his disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. If the Disciplinary Authority gives reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring officer then the Court cannot interfere with those findings unless it comes to the conclusion that no reasonable man can come to the said finding…..” In Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana[3], the Supreme Court held thus:- “………The law is well settled. The disciplinary authority on receiving the report of the enquiry officer may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the latter. In case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and then to record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry and report…….” (emphasis supplied) The requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. Recording of reasons by an authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision- making. The requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. (S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India[4]). Reasons are the live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before the Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. (Cyril Lasrado v. Juliana Maria Lasrado[5]) The impugned order of punishment is bereft of reasons. The order in G.O.Ms.No.2 dated 8.1.2002 is liable to be quashed on the grounds that (1) the petitioner was not put on notice prior to the disciplinary authority deciding to differ with the findings of the enquiry officer and (2) the order of the disciplinary authority, imposing on the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service, is bereft of reasons. The A.P.A.T in its order in O.A.1508 of 2002 dated 25.5.2005 did not consider these aspects and its order, therefore, must also be set aside. Needless to state that this order shall not preclude the respondents from taking further action against the petitioner in accordance with law. 8. Following the above decision, which would clearly disclose that the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, we find that absolutely there are no such reasons in the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well by the appellate authority and the same are liable to be set aside. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the learned single Judge dated 27.9.2001 is hereby set aside, and consequently, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority dated 11.6.1991 and appellate authority dated 18.2.1993 are set aside and the writ appeal is allowed. No costs. _______________ B PRAKASH RAO,J ____________ K C BHANU, J DATE: 9.9.2009 TVK THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU WRIT APPEAL NO : 166 of 2002 DATE:9.9.2009 [1] (1977) 1 SCC 472) [2] (1998) 3 SCC 385 [3] (1999) 5 SCC 762 [4] (1990) 4 SCC 594 [5] (2004) 7 SCC 431