1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 650/2009 (Tarun Kumar Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya VERSUS Smt. Ganga wd/o Prabhudas Madnani & another) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shri J.C. Shukla, counsel for the petitioner. Shri A.S. Jaiswal, counsel for the R-1 & 2. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : JUNE 9, 2009. Heard. Both the Courts have concurrently held that the petitioner was liable to be evicted under Sections 15(1) and 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 as he was a defaulter and the landlady required the premises for her bona fide need. The Courts concurrently found that the petitioner did not produce any evidence on record to show that the rent was regularly paid and had, in fact, admitted in his cross-examination that he had not paid the rent to the landlady. It was also clear from the evidence of the petitioner that in a distress warrant case, he had paid an amount of Rs. 9350/- towards rent for a period from 01.11.2000 to 30.09.2001. The petitioner had further admitted in his evidence that he had not paid the rent from 01.10.2001 till 2 the filing of the suit. The notices issued by the respondent- landlady asking the petitioner to pay the rent were also not complied with. The Courts, therefore, held that the petitioner was a defaulter and was liable to be evicted under the provisions of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1999. It is an admitted fact that notices were issued by the respondent- landlady to the petitioner on 16.10.2001 and 05.03.2003 asking the petitioner to comply with the demand for payment of rent. The record reveals that the notices were not complied with. The first submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the suit filed by the respondent-landlady could not have been entertained in view of the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act of 1999 as a notice of termination of tenancy was issued on 05.03.2003 and the suit was instituted on 02.04.2003, before the expiration of ninety days therefrom, is liable to be rejected as by an earlier notice dated 16.10.2001, the respondent-landlady had asked the petitioner-tenant to pay the arrears of rent. The other submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent cannot take the benefit of the notice dated 16.10.2001 for instituting the suit on 02.04.2003 as the notice did not mention about the termination of the tenancy as required under Section 106(1) 3 of the Transfer of Property Act is also liable to be rejected, as the notice of demand under the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act of 1999 only speaks of the manner of issuance of notice as provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the same is, therefore, referable to the provisions of Section 106(4) which relate to the manner of issuance of notice and not to Section 106(1) thereof which relate to the duration. The notice under Section 15(2) contemplates only a demand of the standard rent or permitted increases and does not contemplate the termination of tenancy by fifteen days notice. Under the provisions of Section 15(2) the notice is, however, required to be served upon the tenant in a manner provided under Section 106(4) of the amended provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. There is, however, no specific reference to Section 106(4) of the Transfer of Property Act in Section 15(2) of the Act of 1999 as though the provisions relating to the manner of service formed a part of Section 106 when the Act of 1999 was enacted, they were specifically made a part of Section 106(4) after the provision was substituted by Act 3 of 2003 with effect from 31.12.2002. Thus, no fault can be found with the judgments of both the Courts holding that the petitioner was a defaulter 4 and was liable to be evicted under Section 15(1) of the Act of 1999. Similarly, the findings recorded by the Courts for passing the eviction order under Section 16(1)(g) of the Act of 1999 being pure findings of facts need no interference. Both the Courts have concurrently found that the respondent- landlady was initially residing with her husband at Indore and as her husband suffered loss in business they had shifted to Nagpur. The Courts found that the respondent no.2 desired to reside in the suit premises for the purpose of education of her children. The Courts also recorded a finding of fact that the respondent-landlady did not have any alternate accommodation for personal use and occupation. The findings recorded by the Courts are based on a proper appreciation of the material evidence on record and cannot be interfered with, in exercise of the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE APTE