IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 Date of decision: 11.11.2010 Puran ….. Applicant-appellant versus State of Haryana and others ……Respondents CORAM: Hon’ble Mr.Justice Jasbir Singh Hon’ble Mr.Justice Augustine George Masih Present: Mr.Adish Gupta, Advocate for the appellant(s) Mr.Ram Bilas Gupta, Advocate for the appellant(s) Ms.Shubhra Singh, DAG Haryana Jasbir Singh, J. (Oral) This order will dispose of C.M. Nos.1044 of 2010 in LPA No.378 of 2010, 1047 of 2010 in LPA No.379 of 2010, 3544 of 2010 in LPA No.1170 of 2010, 3553 of 2010 in LPA No.1173 of 2010, 3558 of 2010 in LPA No.1174 of 2010, 3692 of 2010 in LPA No.1216 of 2010 and 3789 of 2010 in LPA No.1258 of 2010, involving similar questions of law and facts. For the purpose of dictating order, facts are being mentioned from C.M. No.1044 of 2010 in LPA No.378 of 2010 It is evident from the records that the respondent-State issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, the Act) on 22.8.1988 to acquire land measuring 132.06 acres, including about two acre land of the applicant-appellant. Thereafter declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued and the award was passed on 30.3.1990. CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 The Land Acquisition Collector assessed compensation for the Chahi land @ ` 3,50,000/- per acre, regarding Gair Mumkin etc., compensation was assessed @ ` 1,50,000/- per acre. Applicant moved an application under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation and vide award dated 14.1.1992, the Additional District Judge awarded compensation at a flat rate of ` 101/- per square yard for the entire land. The applicant was not satisfied, he filed a Regular First Appeal No.3683 of 1992 in this Court and so was done by many other right holders. The State also filed an appeal against enhancement of compensation by the Court below. All those appeals came up for consideration before the learned Single Bench of this Court and vide common judgment dated 24.12.1993, passed in RFA No.1370 of 1992 (Krishan Lal v. State of Haryana and another.), this Court dismissed all the appeals filed by the land owners and also the State of Haryana. Against above said order, some of the land owners went in appeal and vide judgment dated 27.7.2005, passed in LPA No.920 of 1994 titled as Horam v. Haryana State and another, a Division Bench of this Court awarded compensation @ ` 200/- per square yard for the land under acquisition. As per information supplied, State of Haryana went in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed. It is not in dispute that the applicant did not file appeal against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge on 24.12.1993. He kept on sleeping and woke up only when this appeal along with application for condonation of delay was filed on 28.6.2010 i.e. after a period of 5822 days. For condonation of delay, reliance has been placed upon an order passed by this Court in LPA No.261 of 2008 titled as Daya Nand v. Haryana State and another, passed on 5.8.2009 and also on a judgment passed by a learned Single Judge on 14.5.2010 in CM No.5930-CI of 2010 2 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 in RFA No.2291 of 2010 titled as Attar Singh and others v. State of Haryana and another. For condonation of delay, further reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Market Committee, Hodal v. Krishan Murari & others, 1996 SCC (1) 311. Still further, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh & others, Civil Appeal No.2395 of 2008, decided on 9.6.2010. A prayer has been made to condone the delay and to allow appeal in terms of judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court, enhancing compensation vide order dated 27.7.2005. By filing reply to the application, prayer has been opposed wherein it has been stated that such a huge delay cannot be condoned. The applicant is not a poor man, he had withdrawn the compensation awarded to him by the Land Acquisition Collector and further enhanced by the reference court vide order dated 14.1.1992. No explanation whatsoever has been given for condonation of delay, which is claimed only by stating imaginary facts. To say that such a long delay cannot be condoned, reliance has been placed upon judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Smt.Tara Wanti v. State of Haryana, 1994 P.L.J. 495. Counsel for the parties heard. We have seen the application moved by the applicant for condonation of delay of 5822 days in filing the appeal. In the application virtually no ground has been given for condonation of delay. Main averments made in the application reads thus:- “2. That R.F.A.s were decided by learned Single Judge and some of the claimants have filed Letter Patent Appeals whereby market value of the land in LPA No.920 of 1994 3 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 decided on 27.7.2005, market value of the land has been assessed @ ` 200/- per sq. yard. 3. That it is submitted that the appellant is ordinary litigant, whose land was compulsorily acquired by the State of Haryana for the public purpose. Moreover, the Letter Patent Appeal No.256 of 2008 have been entertained by this Hon’ble Court and disposed of on 5.8.2009. In this regard, copies of judgment dated 5.8.2009 is being filed alongwith the present LPA. 4. That it may also be submitted that in RFA No.5217 of 2008 relating to Faridabad and that of the same revenue estate i.e. village Mewla Maharajpur, the delay of 2867 days in filing the appeal stands condoned by this Hon’ble Court on 19.5.2009.” No explanation has been given as to why appeal was not filed in time and what was handicap of the applicant in not filing the appeal? What was the reason which prevented him to file appeal in time? Only reliance has been placed upon the judgments to show that delay was condoned in those particular cases. We have seen the judgments upon which reliance has been placed by the applicant for condonation of delay. In the case of Daya Nand (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has specifically stated that “though strictly speaking there is no sufficient ground for condonation of delay, we consider it appropriate in the interest of justice that the appeal be entertained.” What were the facts which necessitated condonation of delay are not coming forth from the order passed and furthermore, no reference was made to the judgment of a Full Bench in the case of Smt.Tara Wanti (supra), when condoning delay in that case. 4 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 Similarly, in the case of Attar Singh (supra), learned Single Bench of this Court placed reliance upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Market Committee, Hodal (supra) and condoned the delay of 32 days. What were the facts and circumstances of that case, nothing was discussed. In the case of Market Committee, Hodal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by taking note of facts of that case and by noting that there was proper explanation given by the applicant therein for condoning the delay, after an inordinate delay, the delay was condoned. No general principle of law was laid down, the order was passed in the context of facts of that case. Similarly, in the case of Ujagar Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated in general terms that Courts should not be very strict in condoning the delay. The matters be allowed to be heard on merits. In that case, it was specifically noticed that the delay in filing appeal was not huge. As per facts of that case, application for condonation delay for about two months was dismissed by the District Judge, Ludhiana. Thereafter, the applicant therein, under a mistaken belief filed an appeal before this Court, which was dismissed. The delay in filing the appeal before the Supreme Court was also not very long, it was only 258 days in re-filing and 90 days in filing the appeal. It is true, that the Courts are not supposed to be very strict in condoning the delay. The matters are required to be heard on merits. However, in the present case, it appears that applicant was satisfied with the judgment passed by the learned Single Bench in appeal filed by him on 24.12.1993. The land owners, who were not satisfied, filed the appeals in the year 1994, which ultimately, was allowed by this Court in the year 2005. 5 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 Even thereafter, the applicants kept on sleeping and made no attempt to come to this Court. In the application for condonation of delay, virtually no reason has been given to condone such a huge delay. As per admitted facts, the applicant is not a poor person, he has received compensation as granted by the Land Acquisition Collector and thereafter enhanced by the reference Court. No such incapacity has even been alleged in this application. Besides placing reliance upon some orders passed by this Court, as discussed in earlier part of the order, nothing more was said to get concession of condonation of delay. To the contrary, counsel for the respondent-State has placed reliance upon judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.Tara Wanti (supra), wherein the Court was dealing with a similar situation. The applicants therein had claimed condonation of delay on a ground that the appeals filed by the other right holders were pending admitted in this Court. The Full Bench laid down the parameters for condonation of delay by observing as under:- 6. The provisions regarding limitation as codified under the Limitation Act clearly indicate that the said Act is a disabling Act which cannot be strained or stretched beyond the natural meaning of the language used in different sections. The Act being self contained and exhaustive code cannot be permitted to be used to take away from any one which is required to be construed strictly though adopting the approach of leaning its benefit to the claimants. The Supreme Court in Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1245 has held: 6 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 "Limitation Act is a statute of repose and bar of a cause of action in a Court of law, which is otherwise lawful and valid, because of undesirable lapse of time as contained in the Limitation Act, has been made on a well accepted principle of jurisprudence and public policy. .. . . . . . ..'' The rules of limitation are founded on consideration of public policy and the provisions of the Act dealing with the limitation are required to be interpreted with the approach which advances the cause of public policy and not otherwise. The intention of the provisions of the law of limitation is not to give a right where there is none but to impose a bar after the specified period authorising a litigant to enforce his existing right within the period of limitation (See AIR 1968 Allahabad 246). The object of limitation laws is to compel a litigant to be diligent in seeking remedies in a Court of law and put a bar on the stale claims. The interest of the society requires that the party should be put to litigation keeping in view its nature. The law assists the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. It is also acknowledged position of law that law of limitation only bars a remedy and does not take away the rights of the Courts to adjudicate the lis according to law and do not revive the rights of the parties unless permitted under a particular statute. Principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act correspond to Sections 331 and 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 and were first introduced in the Limitation 7 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 Act of 1871 and thereafter repeated again with some modifications of Limitation Act of 1877. The Limitation Act, 1908 extended the principle of the section to applications for leave to appeal and to other applications to which the Act might be made applicable by or under a particular enactment for the time being in force. The section was again amended vide Act No. X of 1922 and keeping in view the long judicial experience and pronouncements made by various Courts, Section 5 has suitably been modified to achieve the objectives vide the provisions of Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963. To attract the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act a Suitor is under an obligation to show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application within the period of limitation prescribed under the said Act or under any other statute governing the filing of the appeals or applications. Even though normally the grounds of sufficient causes have been spelt out by various pronouncements of different High Courts and the Apex Court yet no ground can be held to be generally applicable without exception. The question of existence of sufficient cause is to be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The Courts have found it difficult to generally define precisely the meaning of sufficient cause or sufficient reason. Making such an attempt would amount to crystallised into a rigid definition with judicial discretion which the Legislature has for the best of all reasons left undetermined and unfettered. Sufficient cause within the meaning of the section must be a 8 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section and the test to be applied would be to see as to whether it was a bona fide cause, inasmuch as nothing could be considered to be bona fide which is not done with due care and attention. The person invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for condonation of delay is required to satisfy the Court that he was unable to present his appeal in time on account of some misadventure or incapacity or the circumstances beyond his control or such sufficient cause which bona fide prevented him in filing the appeal within the prescribed limitation. Precisely, the meaning of the word sufficient cause and its scope should not be crystallised by any rigid definition.” As we have discussed earlier, the applicant has failed to put forth any reason which was beyond his control, which prevented him from filing the appeal, in this Court, in time. After dealing with the case law and facts of that case, the Full Bench in the case of Smt.Tara Wanti (supra), finally opined as under:- “12. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the land owners whose land had been acquired by a particular notification cannot seek condonation of undue and unexplained delay on the sole ground that another appeal out of the same acquisition is pending in this court. Similarly application for condonation of delay can also not be dismissed merely on the ground that another appeal out of the same notification had been decided by the higher Court on merits. The application for condonation of delay has to be independently decided 9 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 though the dismissal of another appeal with respect to the same notification may be a circumstance to be taken note of while deciding such application. The judgment of the Division Bench in Raghbir Singh’s case (supra) in so far as it observes that the delay is required to be condoned when other appeals arising out of the same notification were pending for adjudication in this Court cannot be held to be a good law. The said judgment to that extent shall be deemed to have been overruled. 13. In the instant case, the appellant-applicant had sought condonation of delay on the strength of the judgment of Raghbir Singh's case (supra) and non availability of funds. However, at the time of initial hearing in 9-11-1993 the learned counsel for the appellant submitted and the Court noted that, "the other ground of insufficiency of funds is not pressed into service during the course of arguments." Otherwise also the plea regarding non availability of sufficient funds for court-fee and other expenses was without any basis inasmuch as it had been established that after the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, deciding the reference under Section 18 of the Act on 3-10-1981 the enhanced compensation with interest etc. was deposited in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra on 24-10- 1983. Had the appellant been vigilant she could have filed the appeal after the receipts of the compensation deposited in the Court. It is not the case of the appellant that she had not 10 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 received the compensation deposited by the respondents despite the fact that a duty was cast upon her to prove that she was not possessed of sufficient funds required for the purpose of filing the appeal. No useful purpose would be served in sending this matter back to the learned single Judge for decision on merits. The appellant-applicant is proved to have not sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Consequently, Civil Misc. No. 207C of 1993 along with R.F.A. No. 148 of 1993 shall be deemed to have been dismissed.” In the present case also, no sufficient ground worth the name has been forwarded by the applicant for condoning the delay. A similar matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case Mewa Ram (supra). There was delay of about three years in filing the case before the competent Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under:- “3. The learned counsel contends on the strength of the provisions contained in ss. 25 and 28A that the Court should not be unduly technical and deprive the citizens of their legitimate claims. In support of his submission he relies on certain observations made by this Court in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri (dead) by Lrs., [1979] 4 SCC 176 to the effect that plea of limitation by the Government to defeat just claims of citizens should not be countenanced. We are afraid, the contention cannot prevail. 11 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 4. Shri Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioners, with his usual fairness, accepts that s. 28A in terms does not apply to the case of the petitioners for more than one reason. In the first place, they do not belong to that class of society for whose benefit the provision is intended and meant i.e. inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On the contrary, the petitioners belong to an affluent class, and they are not persons who have been deprived of property without payment of compensation. The petitioners had all applied for reference under s.18 of the Act and the civil court by adopting a different basis for computation, namely. treating the land to be potential building site, substantially enhanced the amount of compensation. On appeal there was further enhancement by the High Court. The petitioners have withdrawn large sums of money at each stage. For instance, the petitioner Mewa Ram withdrew on February 6,1976 consequent upon the award of the Land Acquisition Collector Rs.1,19,000, an additional sum of Rs.28,938.20p. On March 23, 1978 after the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, and Rs.2,75, l05.42p. after the judgment of the High Court between December 11, 1981 and February 13, 1982. The judgment of the High Court not having been appealed from has admittedly become final. Evidently, the petitioners felt satisfied with the enhanced amount of 12 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 compensation as awarded by the High Court @ Rs.12.25 per square yard because they did not apply for grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution for more than three years. Merely because this Court in the two cases of Paltu Singh and Nand Kishore enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs.17.50 per square yard, could not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under s. 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Act apart from s. 28A for reopening of an award which has become final and conclusive. No doubt s 28A now provides for the re- determination of the amount of compensation provided the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For such redetermination, the forum is the Collector and the application has to be made before him within thirty days from the date of the award, and the right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under s. 18 of the Act. If these conditions were satisfied, the petitioners could have availed of the remedy provided under s. 28A of the Act. In that event, s. 25 would ensure to their benefit. Any other view would lead to disasterous consequences not intended by the Legislature. 6. The decision in Madras Port Trust's case is clearly distinguishable. The question involved there was as to the right of refund of the amount of wharfage, demurrage and transit charges which admittedly became exigible. The Court granted special leave on the condition that the Madras Port Trust would refund the amount irrespective of the result of the 13 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 appeal. At the hearing the Court declined to go into the question whether the claim of the trader for such refund was barred by s. 1 l() of the Madras Port Trust Act. 1905. and added: "The plea of limitation based on this section is one which the court always looks upon with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority like the Port Trust should, in all morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen." The Court then said: "It is high time that governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. " This is mere expression of a hope and does not lay down any universal rule of application that the Government is prevented from pleading limitation as a bar. On the other hand, the Court itself observed in the Madras Port Trust's case that 'if a government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well-founded it has to be upheld by the Court'. Obviously, the petitioners cannot plead their own laches as a ground sufficient for condonation of delay.” Same is the situation in the present case. The applicant has failed to show any reason for not filing the appeal in time. 14 CM No.1044 of 2010 in/and LPA No.378 of 2010 In view of facts mentioned above, this application is dismissed. Consequently the appeal also failed and is dismissed. (Jasbir Singh) Judge 11.11.2010 (Augustine George Masih) gk Judge 15