1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR WRIT PETITION NO. 3750 OF 2010 (SURESH GAJANANRAO RAIPURKAR...VS.. SHARAD RAMESH KEDIYA & OTH.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mr.S. Khedkar, Advocate for Petitioner. Mr.R.G.Agrawal, Advocate for Respondents No.1 to 3. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : JANUARY 10, 2011. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. By this petition the petitioner impugns the concurrent judgments passed by both the Courts directing the petitioner to handover the possession of the suit premises to the respondents under the provisions of Section 16(1)(g)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. It is brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court and the first appellate Court had concurrently held that the respondents/ landlords bona fide required the premises for their business. The writ petition filed by the respondents against the findings rendered by the first appellate Court on the issue of 'comparative hardship' was dismissed and the respondents preferred Letters Patent Appeal against the same. The Letters Patent Appeal was partly allowed and the matter was remanded to the first appellate Court to re-decide the issue of comparative hardship. After remand of the matter to the first appellate Court issue of comparative hardship was re- decided by the first appellate Court and on appreciation of 2 the material on record it was held that the hardship which would be suffered by the landlords would be greater in case the decree of eviction is not passed against the petitioner. The judgment passed by the first appellate Court is impugned by the instant petition. Mr. Khedkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the first appellate Court was not justified in holding that the landlords would suffer greater hardship than the tenant, in case the point of comparative hardship was decided against the landlords and the decree of eviction was not passed in their favour. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first appellate Court failed to consider that the respondents had some other space available with them for their business of dealing in plywoods and hence, it was necessary for the first appellate Court to hold that the hardship caused to the tenant would have been greater if the suit was decreed. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada Vs. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 320, in this regard. The learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment passed by the first appellate Court and submitted that the first appellate Court has elaborately discussed the relevant factors while deciding the issue of comparative hardship and the findings recorded by the first appellate Court on the issue of comparative hardship being pure findings of fact, need not be interferred with in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondents sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 3 On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the judgment passed by the first appellate Court, it appears that the first appellate Court did not commit any error in answering the issue of comparative hardship in favour of the respondents. The first appellate Court rightly held that the hardship which would be caused to the landlords would be greater in case the decree of eviction was not passed against the petitioner. The first appellate Court considered the fact that the respondents were dealing in plywood business and had to store plywood of various sizes and other articles and items of glass, sunmica and other ancilliary material. The first appellate Court observed that for running the business of plywood the respondents needed atleast an area of 4000 to 4500 square feet. The only submission made on behalf of the petitioner before the first appellate Court in regard to comparative hardship was that the petitioner would be thrown out on the road and he would lose his bread and butter and source of income in case the decree of eviction was passed against him. The first appellate Court rightly considered the fact that the respondents were comparatively big businessmen coming from a higher strata of the society and they ought to have been permitted to carry on their business in their own premises. The first appellate Court was justified in holding that the petitioner was carrying on business of rubber stamp in his own house before the suit premises was leased out to him. The first appellate Court observed that the area available for the petitioner is 2100 square feet in a double storeyed building and it was not the case of the petitioner that the said premises was not enough for runing his rubber stamp business. The first appellate Court observed that it was not the case of the petitioner that there was heavy competition in his business and he could not 4 have effectively stated that he would be thrown out on the road on his eviction, specially when it was not his case that he had not searched for alternate premises during the pendency of the proceedings. The first appellate Court observed, and rightly so, that the petitioner was running his business for about 10 to 15 years in his own premises and it could not be said that he could not run the said business in his own premises after he was evicted, particularly when there was no material to that effect on record. The ratio laid down in the judgment reported in (2003)2 SCC 320 cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner for seeking the reversal of the findings recorded by the first appellate Court on the issue of comparative hardship. In fact, it is observed in the case reported in (1979) 1 SCC 273 which is considered in the judgment reported in (2003) 2 SCC 320 that the owner of the property cannot be denied eviction and compelled to live poorly merely to enable the tenants to carry on their flourishing business activity at the cost of the landlord. Even otherwise, the issue of comparative hardship has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case and in the instant case, the first appellate Court was justified in holding that the hardship, which would be suffered by the respondents, would have been greater had the decree of eviction not been passed against the petitoiner. Hence, in the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE RR..