IN THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR (C.G.) Second Aooeal No. ?>7 of 2011 APPELLANTS/ Defendants /~ ^ ^ ,.5^> ^* ^/^y^ 2., ^f-y^-^ ^yx^ \^--^ VERSUS RESPONDENTS/ cPlaintiff :1. Defendant no. 3 2. Vikram, S/o Bhagwan Das, aged about 38 years, Caste-Satnami, R/o Village-Kumrada, Tahsil- Dongargaon, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.) Bhagwan Das, mother of Sukhwati, aged about 58 years, Caste-Satnami, R/o Village- Kumrada, Tahsil-Dongargaon, District-Rajnandgaon (C.G.) Bhagoli Ram, S/o Khorbahra Ram, aged about 47 years, Caste-Satnami, R/o Ranitalab, Tahsil & District-Rajnandgaon (C.G.) State of Chhattisgarh Through : the Collector, Rajnandgaon (C. Q.) SECOND APPEAL UNDER SECTION 100 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 1908 L^. HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SECOND APPEAL No. 37 OF 2011 APPBLLANTS RESPONDENTS Vikram and another Versus Bhagoli Ram and another ^ SB:- HON'BLE SHM N.K. AGARWAL, J PRESENT:- Shri H.S. Patel, Advocate, for the appellants. Shri Vinod Tekam, Panel Lawyer, for the State. O R A L Q R D ER (7-3-2011) 1. The instant defendant's second appeal assails the judgment and decree dated 27-10-2010 passed by the Additional District Judge (FTC), Rajnandgaon in Civil Appeal No. 6-A/2009. Facts of the case in brief are as under:- 2. The suit filed by respondent No. 1 (henceforth 'the plaintiff) seeking relief of declaration, possession and injunction was decreed in part by the trial court inter alia finding: the suit property is self-earned property of Budhram; the plaintiff is his sister's son; defendant Vikram is son of Sukhbati i.e. one of the wives of Budhram from her first husband; the respondents have failed to prove will dated 20-12-1989; the plaintiff and defendant Vikram both being legal representatives of late Budhram are entitled to inherit the suit property. 3. The first appellate court allowed plaintiffs entire claim holding defendant No. 1 being son of Sukhbati from her first husband is not entitled to inherit the suit property. 4. Shri H.S. Patel, learned counsel for the appellant would submit, the appellant No 1 is near relative of deceased Sukhbati and is entitled for share in the suit property and ^^ ^^-... ^-.v' ^ ' ' the finding recorded by the first appellate is contrary to the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (briefly 'the Act'). 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 6. As per Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father- in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre- deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband. 7. The obj'ect of Section 15(2) is to ensure that a property left by a female Hindu does not loose the real source the deceased female had inherited the property. One has no option to hold that son or daughter (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) of such Hindu female will mean son or daughter begotten by a Hindu female from the husband, whose property she had inherited and not the son or daughter whom she had begotten from the husband other than the one whose property she had inherited. 8. The Supreme Court in case of Bhagat Ram -v- Teja Singh reported in AIR 2002 SC 1 taking into consideration the reasons given by the Joint Committee in Clause 17 of the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954 had explained the provisions contained in Section 15(2) ofthe Act in para 12 and 13 of itsjudgment as under:- "12. We do not think that the law laid downby the learned Single _Judge in the aboyesaid decision is correct. Even'if the female Hindu who is having a limited ownership becomes full owner by virfue of Section 14(1) bf the Act, the ryles of'succession given under sub-sectiqn (2) qf Section IS^can be^applied. In fact, the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954~as originally introduced in the Rajya Sabha did not c^ontain any clause corresporiding to sub-section (2) of Section 15. It came fo be incorporated on the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament. The reaspn given by the Joint Committee is found in clause 17 6f the Bill, which reads as follows: ./ \ "While revising the order of succession ainong the heirs to a Hindu female, the Joint Committee have provided that, properties inherited by her from her father reverts to the family of the father in the absence of issue and similarly property inherited from her husband or father-in-law reverts to the heirs of the husband in the absence of issue. In the opinion of the Joint Committee such a provision would prevent properties passing into the hands of persons to whom justice would demand they should not pass." 13. The source from which she inherits the property is always imgortant and that would govern the situation. Othenvise persons who are not eyen remotely related t6 the persqn who originally held. the property would acquire rights" to inherit that pi-operty. That would defeat the intent and purpose of sub- sectipn (2) of Section 15, "whlch gives a special pattern of succession.9? 9. Taking into consideration the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the above referred case and the fact that the appellant No. 1 is not son of Sukhbati from deceased Budhram, in my considered opinion, the respondent No. 1 will not get any^ share in the suit property. 10. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, no substantial question of law arises for determination of this Court in this appeal. 11. This court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without there being any substantial question of law involved in the appeal. Existence of substantial question of law is the sine-qua-non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant failed to point out any substantial question of law which may arise for determination in the case. In the absence of any substantial question of law arises for determination of this Court, this Court has no option but to dismiss the appeal. 12. Therefore, the appeal being devoid of substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 13. No order as to costs. Sd/- N.K. Agarwal Judge | p/-