^^lttt6/° ^ BEPORE 1'T-IS H»P<STM'E ADMNI-STBATIX^ TRIBUNJ^&JABALPUP. Original ^pllcatlcn 'U'^U Gf 1998S« APPLIC.MTT $ Qlleep Ram Peon , District Zndustrles^Ambi^auar Distt*Sarguja (?•©) f RESPONI:Bm'lS £ .1) Ihe state of K^P^ through-the Secrefcary^ Ctemiriercial and Znd,ustries Department^Vallafch^aia^an^aapaKMP) .2) CoEnmissloner o.€ IndustriesCSstablisSi. aient S©11)of M»P^Phopal 3) General Manager^Histrict IndusfcrleB Q^nfcre^Aubii^apu.r Qistt^Sarguja(MP) I2ETVO:L3 OP APKLZCATIOH A-!P-^ \ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARIL: BILASPUR SINGLE BENCH : HON'BLE SHM MANINDRA MOHAN SHMVASTAVA.J. Writ Petition (Sl No. 1706/2005 PETITIONER Dileep Ram, Peon RESPONDENTS Versus State of Madhya Pradesh (now C.G.) and others Appearance: Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Pragya Singh, counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Satish Gupta, Govt. Advocate for the State. ORAL- ORDER (Passedon3.3.2010) 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner aggrieved on account of order dated 30th April, 1998 (Annexure A-3) by which the respondents cancelled earlier order of extension dated 31st October, 1996 regarding extension of ser^ice and granted reappointment to the petitioner in respect of the period from 7.11.1996tm30.4.1998. 2. Case of the petitioner is that while continuing in ser^ice as Peon in the Department of Commerce & Industries, petitioner retired w.e.f. 3.4.1996 upon attaining the superannuation age of 60 years, Thereafter, the respondents considered the case of the petitioner for extension and vide order dated 31st October 1996 (Annexure A-l), petitioner was granted extension of service for a period of 2 years. The petitioner pursuant to that order continued in ser^ice and finally vide order dated 30.4.1998 he was retired w.e.f. 30.4.1998 in view of extension of seryice of 2 years earlier granted. However, the petitioner was kept deprived of benefit of extension of service. He preferred representation on 4.5.1998 (Annexure A-4) stating that as the extension of service was granted vide order dated 31st October 1996, he was entitled to continue for a period of 2 years w.e.f. 31st October, 1996 and -2- ^ therefore his retirement w.e.f. 30.4.1998 amounts to termination from servrice which is illegal. Petitioner therefore claimed that he should be treated as having retired from service w.e.f. 7.11.1998 in view of the order dated 31st October 1996. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was granted extension of service vide order dated 31st October 1996 (Annexure A-l). Petitioner was therefore entitled to continue in service for a period of 2 years w.e.f. 31st October, 1996 and thus he was entitled to continue in ser^ice with all benefits. His submission is that action of the respondents in canceling earlier order of extension dated 31.10.1996, as is reHected from order dated 30.4.1998 (Annexure R-2), is illegal, arbitrary and in utter violation of principle of natural justice. It is urged that once such extension has been granted, in the absence it being contrary to the relevant policy relating to extension of sen/rice, could not have been recalled and the petitioner was entitled to reap the benefits of order dated 31st October, 1996. His further submission is that even if order dated 30.4.1998 (Annexure A-3) is taken into consideration, he has been treated as having retired and therefore he could not be treated as having been reappointed. Learned counsel argued that under any circumstance, the order of recovery from the petitioner is wholly unsustainable in law inasmuch as the petitioner is entitled to remuneration in respect of period during which he has worked. The order of extension was not an outcome of any fraud or misrepresentation on his part. As such, even if the order of extension is withdrawn and instead reappointment is given, petitioner would be entitled to retain the salary in respect of the period during which he has worked. 4. Per contra, referring to the averments made in the return, learned counsel for the State/respondents submits that petitioner was not entitled to extension of ser^ice in view of Govt. policy dated 31st October, 1986 (Annexure R-l) inasmuch as under Clause 5 thereof, it has been clearly stipulated that no extension/reappointment would be granted after 60 years of age. In exceptional cases, if it is found that continuance of Government servant in technical field is necessary in public interest, such extension/reappointment could be granted after r-'-— -3- getting orders from the Cabinet of Ministers. His further submission is that petitioner was not entitled to extension of servrice and therefore, the respondents are fully justified in withdrawing the order of extension. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the record. 6. It is not disputed that the petitioner was working on the post of Peon in the Department of Commerce & Industries and his age of retirement was 60 on the date he attained age of superannuation on 30.4.1996. True it is that the respondents had initially conferred the benefit of extension to the petitioner by issuing an order on 31st October, 1996 (Annexure A-l), I am unable to accept the submission that the petitioner could be granted extension of ser^ice in exercise of discretion under the policy dated 31st October, 1986 (Annexure R-l). In my opinion, the Government policy of extension/reappointment was clear and there was no discretion left to the authorities in case a Government ser^ant attains the age of 60 years. In the present case, as the age of superannuation itself was 60 years, petitioner was not entitled to benefit of extension/reappointment in servrice. Moreover, under Clause 5 of the aforesaid Circular, extension in exceptional case could be granted only to those Government employees who were working on the technical post and not othenvise and that too after getting approval of the Cabinet of Ministers. 7. In this case respondents initially granted extension of service to the petitioner, but later on, cancelled the earlier order and passed a fresh order on 30.4.1998 (Annexure R-2) by which the earlier order of extension of service was changed to an order of reappointment. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order and action of retiring the petitioner from 30.4.1998 is bad and the order of extension of service could not be cancelled treating the same into reappointment as the same was in violation of principle of natural justice, cannot be accepted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. Normally, before an action resulting in adverse civil consequences is passed, the person effected is entitled to -4- ^^" Ko an opportunity of hearing. However, when such action is called in question in the Court on such a ground, in exceptional cases, the Court may not be inclined to grant relief only on the ground ofviolation of principle of natural justice. One of such situation is that in case of forgone conclusion where no other conclusion is possible, no relief may be granted only on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice. Since in the present case, I find that the Circular on the face of it did not meant to extend any benefit of extension or reappointment to those who had completed 60 years of service, in my considered opinion, present is not a case where the petitioner may be granted benefit on account ofviolation of principle of natural justice. In the case of Suraj Prakash Chouhan Vs« State of Madhya Pradesh and another (W.P.(S) No.364/05), decided on 20.1.2010, this Court held as under: (<(8) It is well settled that before a person is subjected to an adverse action which involves civil consequences, it must proceed an opportunity of hearing as no one can be condemned unheard. This universal principal of general application however admits of few exceptions and one of them is where on admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and it would be only an empty formality or where the conclusion is foregone and no other conclusion is possible on an admitted facts, interference may not be warranted only on the ground that the order was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing. (9) In the case of State of M.P. and others Vs. Shyama Pardhi and others, (1996) 7 Supreme Court Cases 118, appointment of the respondent was cancelled on the ground that even though she was not possessed required qualification, she was wrongly selected and sent for training but later on her ser^ices were terminated as it was found that the selection was illegal. It created as an admitted position that the respondent was not possessed of necessary qualification. Challenge to the order of termination by ...^" "••^ -5- ^<NN> canceling the order of appointment on the ground fhat the same was done without any opportunity of hearing, and therefore, violative of principles of natural justice was negatived on the ground that the initial selection itself was per se illegal, and therefore, later appointments were also in violation of statutory rules. (10) In the case of Aligarh Muslim University and Others Versus Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 Supreme Court Cases 529, Hon'ble Supreme Court has applied the principle that where on the admitted or indisputable facts or where only one view is possible, no relief could be granted only because opportunity of hearing was not afforded. (11) In the case of State of Manipur & others vs. Y. Tokan Singh & Others, 2007 AIR SCW 1995, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where the facts are admitted, principles of natural justice are not required to be applied, particularly, when the same would result in futility. Further relied upon the decision in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. Ajay Kumar Das and Others, (2002) 4 SCC 503, it was obser^ed that if the appointment orders are a nullity, the question of observance of principles of natural justice would not arise. (12) What is discernible from the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court is that the principles of natural justice are not unruly horse. The principle of natural justice is required to be applied with, having regard to the fact situation evident therein. Thus, the principle of natural justice may not require to be followed in case where the conclusion on admitted facts is foregone and no other conclusion is possible.^ 8. From the above discussion, I am unable to accept petitioner's submission that under the policy, he was entitled to extension of ser^ice and withdrawal of extension of ser^ice and conversion of the same into reappointment was illegal or unsustainable in law. However, as far as payment of salary to the petitioner in -6- bl<^ Q/ respect of period during which he worked after attaining the age of superannuation is concerned, the same could not be recovered from the petitioner. It is not a case where the petitioner procured the order of extension of service by any fraud or misrepresentation. Respondent Authorities initially decided to grant the petitioner extension of servrice. Petitioner was allowed to continue in service and thereafter vide order dated 30.4.1998, petitioner was retired by treating period subsequent to his original date of superannuation as reappointment instead of extension in servrice. This was not the fault of the petitioner. Moreover, as the petitioner worked during this period, he is entitled to remuneration for the work done during the said period and no recovery could be made from the petitioner. 9. Last contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the order dated 31st October, 1996 (Annexure A-l) he was entitled to continue in servrice for a period of 2 years from the date of the said order cannot be accepted. Whether it a case of extension or reappointment, it was to take effect from the date of superannuation and not from in the subsequent date on which such benefit of extension/reappointinent was granted. In view of finding which I have recorded that the said policy was not applicable to the case of the petitioner because he had othenvise attained the age of 60 years, the said benefit of continuance in servrice till 30th October, 1998 could also not be claimed as of right. 10. In the result, the order and action of the respondents in so far as recovery of Rs.12,154/- is concerned is declared illegal. If such recovery has already been made, the same shall be refunded to the petitioner with interest at the rate prevalent, within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 11. Petition is accordingly partly allowed. Sinha Sd/- Manindra Mohan Shrivastava Jude