IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH Date of Decision: May 05, 2009 1. Civil Writ Petition No.11247 of 2000 Yadvinder Rana .....PETITIONER(S) VERSUS The State of Haryana & Others .....RESPONDENT(S) . . . CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAI LAMBA PRESENT: - Mr. H.N. Mehtani, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Sunil Nehra, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana, for respondent Nos.1 to 3. Mr. Arvind Seth, Advocate, for respondent Nos.4 and 5. . . . 2. Civil Writ Petition No.11205 of 2000 Gurpreet Singh .....PETITIONER(S) VERSUS The State of Haryana & Others .....RESPONDENT(S) . . . CWP No.11247 of 2000 [2] CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAI LAMBA PRESENT: - None for the petitioner. Mr. Sunil Nehra, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana, for respondent No.1. None for respondent No.2. . . . AJAI LAMBA, J (Oral) This judgment shall dispose of two petitions viz. Civil Writ Petition No.11247 of 2000 and Civil Writ Petition No.11205 of 2000 as they involve similar questions of law and facts. For facts, Civil Writ Petition No.11247 of 2000 is being taken up. The facts in brief are that the petitioner having passed Central Board of Secondary Education Examination from Chandigarh sought admission in Institute of Engineering & Technology, Hisar, in the year 2000-2001. The case of the petitioner was not considered in the category of free seats falling under the category of Children/ legal wards of Haryana Government Employees. Under the circumstances, the petitioner had to pay fees as was required under the payment seats. It is not in dispute that at the point in time when the petitioner sought admission, the case of the petitioner did not fall in the category, under which relief is being claimed, viz. “Appeared/ appearing CWP No.11247 of 2000 [3] from Schools/Colleges/Institutions located in Haryana; Children/ Legal Wards (if parents not alive) of (i) Haryana Government Employees, (ii) Employees of Autonomous Bodies/Board/Corporations of Haryana State, whether posted in or outside Haryana including those on deputation to Government of India or Organisations under the Government of India, irrespective of the location of Schools/ Colleges/ Institutions. It seems that father of the petitioner at the given time, had retired and was a pensioner. The petitioner had passed his Central Board of Secondary Education Examination from Chandigarh, and therefore, was not covered within the scope of the category of free seats for which normal fees was required to be paid which is less than the fees required to be paid for the payment seats. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that during the period earlier to 2000-2001, the eligibility criteria for Haryana Government Employees was different. Even during the subsequent period (subsequent to 2000-2001), the criteria was different. The case of the petitioner, if considered under the eligibility criteria for the subsequent or earlier periods, same would be covered and the petitioner would be required to pay fees under the free seats category. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been CWP No.11247 of 2000 [4] discriminated against and therefore, is entitled to the relief claimed in this petition. It has further been contended that the criteria as prescribed and made applicable to the petitioner is illegal. Learned counsel for the respondent- State contends that the power of amending the condition is with the respondents. An issue similar to the one raised in this petition has been considered by this Court in Daman Deep Singh Makkar & Others vs. State of Punjab through its Secretary to Govt., Punjab & Others, 2000(3) RSJ 241. Learned counsel has further pointed out that the petitioner has not been discriminated against as the same criteria has been made applicable to all the candidates who sought admission in the year 2000-2001. I have heard the learned counsel and gone through the record. So far as the legality of the clause is concerned, reference may be made to the case of Daman Deep Singh Makkar (supra), in particular, Para 22 to 24 which read as under:- “22. The Hon’ble Judges of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Meenal Sharma expressed divergent views as to the validity and constitutionality of a similar provision in regard to notified policy of the State of Haryana for admission to the medical courses in the State of Haryana. Reference was made to 3rd Hon’ble Judge of the Court and the majority view in that case upheld the validity and constitutionality of the provisions of the case. 23. Somewhat similar pleas, as has been raised in the present case, were raised for consideration of their Lordship in that case. However, while rejecting such contentions, it was held by the majority view as under: CWP No.11247 of 2000 [5] “The menace of forged and bogus certificates is widespread and is ever increasing. If that is one of the factors which has been taken into consideration by the respondents while framing the rules for determining eligibility, while keeping in view the basic idea of giving institutional preference, it is not possible to hold that requirement of 3 years continuous study in a recognised institution offends the equality clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Reservation based on the requirement of residence and institutional preference has been recognised by the Apex Court in unequivocal terms in Vasundhra’s case (supra), Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra) and even in Nidamarti Mahesh Kumar’s case (supra). Institutional preference has also been upheld in D.N. Chanchala’s case (supra) where University-wise distribution of seats was held to be not offending Article 14 of the Constitution. In Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra), the Supreme Court clearly opined that it would be legitimate to make reservation on the basis of residence requirement and institutional preference. In Nidamarti Mahesh Kumar’s case (supra) the Supreme Court unequivocally held that it would not be unconstitutional for the State to provide for reservation or preference in respect of a certain percentage of seats in the medical college/colleges in each region in favour of those who have studied in schools or colleges within that region and even if the percentage stipulated by the State Government is on the higher side it would not fall foul of the constitutional mandate of equality. In view of the above discussion, I am in agreement with N.K. Kapoor, J. That the requirement of study as a regular student in an institution recognised in Haryana for 10th, 10+1 and 10+2 classes does not suffer from the vice of discrimination or is arbitrary.” In Meenal Sharma’s case in addition to rejecting the contentions afore-noticed, the Court had quashed part of the corrigendum issued by the State of Haryana to the main prospectus for the year 1993. The candidates who became eligible to take the entrance test because of issuance of corrigendum similarly placed candidates for the subsequent years became ineligible as the State of Haryana withdrew the benefit granted under the corrigendum in the subsequent prospectus issued by it. On query learned counsel for the State of Haryana conceded this position. 24. These restrictions are constitutionally permissible and are held to be valid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Court is unable to trace any vice of arbitrariness in the imposition of amended restriction. The State has a dual purpose behind imposing such restriction, firstly the State was to exclude forged/bogus domicile certificate being used by unscrupulous students, to defeat fair competition and relative merit. Secondly the State wants to encourage the students who study in the rural areas of Punjab for seeking admission to such professional courses. It was specifically contended on behalf of the respondents that prior to imposition of this condition, a number of other students from outside and more particularly from Chandigarh and Haryana used to obtain CWP No.11247 of 2000 [6] domicile certificates and consequently qualify for taking the entrance test. Even candidates from other States could freely come and participate in the State of Punjab. Thus, putting the genuine students belonging to the State of Punjab and residing therein to disadvantageous situation. The State Policy which intends to promote medical education in its rural area can neither be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. The Court is not called upon to travel into the intricacies of administrative decision or validity of the reasoning resulting into decision of the State which is patently valid. In view of the above facts and the enunciated law binding on this Court, I have no hesitation in answering this contention against the petitioners.” Perusal of the above shows that the restrictions as imposed have been held to be constitutionally permissible and valid. There is no vice of arbitrariness in the imposition of the restrictions. It is for the respondents to consider the criteria to be laid down. A particular criteria was laid down under which the petitioner applied for admission. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that his case did not fall within the four corners of the eligibility criteria and therefore, considering the merit of the petitioner, the petitioner was given admission against a payment seat. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been discriminated against, cannot be accepted in so much as all the candidates in the year 2000-2001 were given admission while applying the same criteria. The petitioner cannot plead discrimination in regard to the criteria laid down in the preceding year or CWP No.11247 of 2000 [7] the year subsequent to the year when petitioner sought admission. Discrimination is a practice of treating one person or a group of persons differently from another in an unfair way. It is however the requirement that set of circumstances should be the same to which the person or the group has been differently treated. Those who are similarly circumstanced, are entitled to an equal treatment. It is not the case of the petitioner that candidates who had applied for admission in the year 2000-2001 have been given the benefit of eligibility criteria laid down for the preceding year or the year subsequent to the one when petitioner sought admission. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to distinguish the judgment in the case of Daman Deep Singh Makkar (supra), portion whereof has been extracted above. It is the admitted case that the petitioner completed the course in the year 2004. In view of the above, I find that neither the conditions imposed by the respondents can be said to be invalid, arbitrary or unconstitutional nor even a case of discrimination is made out. The petitions are accordingly dismissed. (AJAI LAMBA) May 05, 2009 JUDGE avin