IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.17975 of 2009 1. RAVINDRA KUMAR S/O SRI CHHATTU YADAV R/O VILL.- BHALUHAR, P.S.- AMARPUR, PANCHAYAT- MAHADEOPUR, DISTT.- BANKA Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. THE SECRETARY, PANCHAYAT RAJ BIBHAG, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA 3. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BANKA 4. THE DISTRICT PANCHAYAT RAJ OFFICER, BANKA 5. THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, AMARPUR, BANKA 6. THE SARPANCH, GRAM PANCHAYAT RAJ MAHADEOPUR, BLOCK- AMARPUR, DISTT.- BANKA ----------- 02 11.03.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. The petitioner is aggrieved by the appellate order dated 21.9.2009 of the District Magistrate, terminating his services from the post of Secretary, Gram Kutchery. It is contended that he came to be appointed as such after an advertisement and selection. He completed his training and has been discharging duties since 8.8.2007. One Santosh Kumar Pandey came to this Court seeking appointment as a Secretary, Gram Kutchery, on the basis of his Madhyama qualification. The petitioner came to be terminated by an order dated 3.6.2009 in light thereof without any show-cause notice, when in C.W.J.C. No. 8955 of 2009 preferred by him, this Court declined interference on grounds of 2 availability of alternative remedy of appeal. The submission, therefore, is that there is no illegality in the appointment of the petitioner, much less any allegation of ineligibility to fulfill the qualification, complaint against discharge of his duties so as to justify the termination. Even, if there has been any alleged procedural irregularity in the appointment this Court on equitable considerations may give appropriate direction not to disturb him for which reliance is placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (1) SCC 117 (TEJINDER KOUR AND OTHERS VERSUS LADY CONSTABLE RAJ KUMARI AND OTHERS). The petitioner is stated to have filed a supplementary affidavit on 8.3.2010 which is not available on record. The office is directed to place the original on the record. This Court, therefore, requested the counsel for the State to make available his copy for perusal so as to not hold up the proceedings for that reason. The submission of the petitioner from paragraph-3 of the same is that he had sent his application to the authorities within time under Postal certificate. The appellate order states that the application of the petitioner had not been received within the last date prescribed in the 3 advertisement and, therefore, his name also did not figure at the stage of counselling. It does not appear from the appellate order that the petitioner had taken any defence of having sent his application under Postal certificate before the appellate authority. Even before this Court such an important defence has not been taken in the original writ petition, but appears to have come in a supplementary affidavit. This Court has no hesitation and holding that it is after thought. In any event of the matter, the law stands settled that the defence with regard to the sending of the document by Postal certificate is a rebuttable presumption and no presumptive conclusion applies to such a document as distinct from the document sent by registered post. Even in the supplementary affidavit the petitioner states that he submitted his application on 8.8.2007, that is the date of dispatch shown in the P.U.C. certificate, dispatch of the same does not tantamount to submission in any manner. True it is that the petitioner may not have been heard when the original order of termination dated 3.6.2009 had been passed, but that illegality stood be cured when he has been heard at the 4 appellate stage, more particularly when he does not appear to be having any substantive defence. At this stage to set aside the order on that ground, as urged, and remand it to the original authority, shall be a useless formality, when he has had sufficient opportunity both before the appellate authority and presently before this Court. Conditions in the advertisements are final and conclusive, including any last date for submission of applications. Any last date fixed has to be amended by a proper corrigendum. Acceptance of a single application, after the last date, and consideration of the same violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as if others had known that even after the last date applications would be received they could have likewise applied. In view of the fact that the petitioner’s application has been received after the last date, a burden which the petitioner has been unable to discharge, his appointment becomes clearly contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. To that extent, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. Sympathy or compassion cannot override 5 the law. In the case of Tejinder Kour (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, the Apex Court was considering a challenge to re-assessment of marks of those candidates who were not before the Court on a challenge made by another, when after such re-assessment the Court gave certain directions with regard to those not before it so as to prevent prejudice. The order passed by the Apex Court has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. This Court finds no merit in this application, it is accordingly dismissed. P.K. (Navin Sinha, J.)