IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTYTHIRD DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Criminal Petition No.7868 of 2009 Between: Bondili Mohan Singh and 2 others .. Petitioners AND Bondili Swetha and 2 others .. Respondents ORDER: This Criminal Petition is directed against the further proceedings against the petitioners in DVC.No.1 of 2009 on the ﬁle of II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Nizamabad. The application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (for short “the Act”) by respondents 1 and 2 herein alleged that Bondili Kishore Singh and the 1st respondent were married on 28-01-2007 at which time cash of Rs.4,00,000/-, 10 thulas of gold, one Kg. of silver and other household articles were given as dowry. The parents of the 1st respondent were claimed to have spent Rs.1,00,000/- for the marriage expenses and after a happy marital life for two months at Hyderabad, the petitioners 1 and 2 herein were alleged to have instigated Kishore Singh to demand additional dowry of Rs.2,00,000/- resulting in harassment, beating and abuses by Kishore Singh to the 1st respondent. It is further alleged that the 1st petitioner took the 1st respondent with him to Kurnool and proclaimed that he will not allow her to join his son unless additional dowry is paid. Petitioners 1 and 2 were also alleged to have forced the 1st respondent to remove her pregnancy by way of abortion and to have abused in ﬁlthy language during her stay with them. The 2nd respondent was claimed to have been born out of wedlock on 09-02-2008 and the husband was claimed to be anxious to take them but for the fear of the 1st petitioner. The 1st petitioner was claimed to have found fault with his son for undergoing a second marriage with Preethi and then the husband of the 1st respondent and his second wife were alleged to have committed suicide on 04-01-2009. The 3rd petitioner was claimed to have returned from Australia where he was employed on 07- 01-2009 and to have misbehaved with the 1st respondent. The petitioners 1 to 3 were claimed to be ill-treating her leading her to attempt to commit suicide and ultimately, she was claimed to have been necked out of the shared household on 22-01-2009. The 1st respondent was claimed to have given a public notice in a news paper asking the public not to deal with the family properties and hence, she claimed directions regarding security for her against the petitioners herein, payment of monthly maintenance, compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-, medical expenses and various consequential orders in this regard. The petitioners challenged the proceedings in the Domestic Violence Case contending that the allegations are false and even according to the 1st respondent, she stayed with them only till 22-01-2009 and the alleged acts of domestic violence between 04- 01-2009 and 22-01-2009 are ex facie unnatural, improper and unbelievable. The reliefs could not have been claimed against the parents-in-law, more so, after the death of the husband and any rights can be asserted only in respect of the shared household, if it was the property of the husband and she cannot claim maintenance or compensation from the parents-in-law or at least brother-in-law. The 3rd petitioner is staying in Australia and is no way involved in the matrimonial home and hence, the petitioners desired the further proceedings to be quashed. Heard Sri C. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri S. Ganesh Rao, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 and Sri Rudresh Deshpande, learned counsel representing the learned Public Prosecutor/3rd respondent. The point for consideration is whether the proceedings against the petitioners in the Domestic Violence Case are liable to be quashed? The very allegations in the petition under Section 12 of the Act show that since the marriage of the 1st respondent with Kishore Singh on 28-01-2007 till the arrival of the 3rd petitioner in India on 07-01-2009, the 3rd petitioner had absolutely nothing to do with the marital life of the 1st respondent. The fact that the 3rd petitioner is employed in Australia was stated in the petition itself by the 1st respondent and the allegations against the 3rd petitioner about his misbehaviour with the 1st respondent stating that he would keep her as mistress so that they can live together in Australia, on the face of them appeared quite artiﬁcial and unnatural and the younger brother seeking the company of the widowed wife of his elder brother is an antithesis to the normal social behaviour of any such similarly situated persons. The application never states about any other person being in the knowledge of the alleged misbehaviour of the 3rd petitioner towards her and if the 3rd petitioner rushed to India on hearing about the news of the suicide of his elder brother obviously to lend moral support to his parents and the widowed wife of his brother, he could not have been involved in such vicious allegations without the possibility of any proof. The allegation against the 3rd petitioner also was not veriﬁed by any protection oﬃcer as the 1 st respondent ﬁled the petition under the statute directly before the Magistrate, who took cognizance of the same, and therefore, it is clear that the continuance of further proceedings against the 3rd petitioner will be a travesty of justice. Insofar as the continuance of the proceedings against the petitioners 1 and 2 are concerned, the contention that the death of the husband will have any eﬀect on the maintainability of the Domestic Violence Case needs no consideration as the deﬁnition of an aggrieved person under Section 2 (a) of the Act includes a woman, who has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent with the word “respondent” being deﬁned as any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, under Section 2 (q) of the Act. Therefore, it is clear that the domestic relationship between the aggrieved woman and the adult male person need not be subsisting by the time of making the application under the Act and it may be a relationship, which has been in existence earlier. Insofar as the reliefs claimed in the Domestic Violence Case are concerned, the 1st respondent seeks to have her rights and the rights of her minor son asserted against the movable and immovable properties of the family alleging obviously that her husband also had an interest in such properties. The decision reported in S.R. Batra and another v. Smt. Taruna Batra[1] referred to by the petitioners relates to a situation where the house against which the wife of the deceased son tried to lay a claim under the Act was the exclusive property of the mother-in-law and therefore, it was considered to be not susceptible to be called a shared household within the meaning of 2 (s) of the Act. Herein also, it is for the learned Magistrate, after an enquiry into the merits of the rival contentions and the evidence to be placed before him, to conclude whether the movable and immovable properties against which the respondents seek to claim any relief are such as can be subjected to such reliefs or not and in a summary enquiry under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to consider whether the inherent powers of this Court should be invoked, such a fact ﬁnding job cannot be indulged in. Insofar as the provision for accommodation to the respondents 1 and 2 or the provision of the other minimum amenities including rents or food or clothing etc., the same have to be considered on merits by the learned Magistrate. Insofar as the liability to pay compensation or to be subjected to any protection order are concerned, the same depends upon the ability of the respondents to prove the committal of any acts of domestic violence by the petitioners 1 and 2 against them and insofar as the liability to pay maintenance etc., is concerned, the parties being admittedly Hindus, the rights which ﬂow from the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act do not rule out the possibility of a widowed daughter-in-law claiming maintenance against the father-in-law and under the circumstances, satisfying the requirements of the relevant provisions, the claims made cannot be considered to be outside the legal scope of the special statute. Insofar as the truth or otherwise of the allegations of committal of acts of domestic violence by the petitioners 1 and 2 is concerned, as already stated, fact ﬁnding is not a job of this Court and has to be undertaken by the trial Court on merits. However, it is represented on behalf of the petitioners 1 and 2 by the learned counsel that in view of their age and consequential diﬃculty in attending the Court at Nizamabad on all future dates of hearing travelling from Kurnool, their physical presence may be dispensed with. If the petitioners make an appropriate request to the trial Court, it can be directed to be positively considered by the trial Court. Under the circumstances, the Criminal Petition is allowed in respect of the 3rd petitioner and the further proceedings against him in DVC.No.1 of 2009 on the ﬁle of II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nizamabad, are quashed and the Criminal Petition is dismissed in respect of the petitioners 1 and 2. But, if the petitioners 1 and 2 so desire and are so advised, they can make an appropriate application to the trial Court to dispense with their physical presence on all future dates of hearing except when such presence is absolutely indispensable for the further progress of the case and in the event of such a request being made, the trial Court shall positively consider the same. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 23-11-2011 Ksn [1] AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1118 (1)