:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 573 OF 1994 The State of Maharashtra Shri F.I. Shaikh, Food Inspector, C/o. Joint Commissioner (Gr.Bombay) Food and Drug Administration, M.S. Bombay. ...Appellant V/s Shri Girishkumar A. Dedhia c/o. M/s Anchor Products, Laxmi Udyog Nagar, L.B.S. Marg, Kanjur Marg (West), Bombay 400 078. ...Respondent. -- Mr. D.P. Adsule, APP for the appellant - State. None for the respondent. -- CORAM: V.M.KANADE,J. DATE: 22nd February, 2005 ORAL ORAL ORAL JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT: 1. The appellant is the original complainant and was working as a Food Inspector at the time when he filed the complaint against the respondent - accused. The appellant is challenging the judgment and order passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 46th Court, Mazgaon, Bombay in C.C. No. 388/S of 1989 dated 29/04/1994 whereby he was pleased to acquit the accused of the offences punishable under section 7(i) read with section 2(ia)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (For short "PFAA") read with sections 16 and 17 of the PFAA. The appellant has preferred :2: this appeal against acquittal against the said judgment and order. 2. The prosecution case in brief was that the accused was engaged in manufacturing hard boiled sugar confectionery. The Complainant - Food Inspector had visited the premises of the accused on 20/10/1986 at 4.00 P.M. and had purchased certain articles after disclosing to the accused his identity and, thereafter, samples of the said articles which were purchased were sent to the Public Analyst who gave an adverse report, stating that the food articles were adulterated. The sanction was obtained by the complainant from the Commissioner to prosecute the accused and, thereafter, a complaint was filed. 3. The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the ground that mandatory provisions of Rules 14 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (For short "the said Rules") have not been followed and that the sanction had not been properly granted by the Commissioner. 4. The learned APP appearing on behalf of the State has taken me through the judgment and order of the Trial Court and the evidence which is brought on :3: record by the complainant. In the present case, the prosecution has examined three witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 - Gajanan Patkar, who is a clerk working in the LHA, P.W. 2 - Fakir Ismail Shaikh, the Food Inspector who had filed the complaint against the accused and P.W. 3 - Atmaram Mane who was a panch witness who had accompanied the Food Inspector. From the evidence of P.W. 3 - Atmaram Mane, it can be seen that he had not supported the case of the prosecution and even then the prosecution has not declared him as hostile witness. P.W. 3 in his evidence has stated that the Food Inspector P.W. 2 had called him in the factory of the accused. He has stated that the sample was taken by the Food Inspector in his presence. He has stated that no labelling and sealing to the sample was done in his presence and that he had only signed the panchanama and other papers at Exhibits P-12, 13, 14 & 15. Since this independent witness has not supported the prosecution case, the question is whether the uncorroborated testimony of the Food Inspector alone would be sufficient for the purpose of proving the case of the prosecution regarding the samples which were taken and sent to the Public Analyst. In any case, it is clear that the samples of the article were not taken in the presence of an independent witness. P.W. 2 in his cross-examination has admitted that :4: after he had put the samples in the polythene bag, he had not put a seal on the mouth of the bag. He has also admitted that the polythene bag was not cleaned in his presence before the samples were taken. Thus, from his evidence, it can be seen that the mandatory provisions of Rules 14 and 16 of the said Rules have not been followed by him. The Trial Court has given clear and cogent reasons in coming to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond the reasonable doubt. Though, in my view, the judgment is not very happily worded and it was the duty of the Trial Court to have appreciated the evidence on record and, thereafter, record the finding, I am satisfied after having seen the evidence on record that the ultimate finding which is recorded by the Trial Court is not perverse or unreasonable. Hence, I do not see any reason to interfere with the said Judgment and Order passed by the Trial Court. 5. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. (V.M. (V.M. (V.M. KANADE, J.) KANADE, J.) KANADE, J.)