MACApp. 96/2010 BEFORE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE I. A. ANSARI JUDGMENT & ORDER (oral) 1. Heard Mr. K. K. Bhatra, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. S. B anik, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent. 2. By the award, dated 10.12.2009, passed, in MAC Case No.99 of 2006, by th e learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tinsukia, the Insurer has been directed to pay a sum of Rs.5,90,715/- to the claimant with simple interest at the rate of 6% till realisation thereof. Aggrieved by the award, the Insurer has preferred this appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (her einafter, in short, ’the M.V.Act1’). 3. The principal ground, amongst others, of challenge to the impugned award is that while filing its written statement, in the claim proceeding, the appell ant had also filed a petition, under Section 170 of the M. V. Act, seeking to co ntest the proceeding if the registered owner of the offending vehicle chose not to contest the proceeding. The learned Tribunal did not, however, pass any order on this petition and the registered owner of the said vehicle did not, accordin g to the appellant, contest the proceeding, though he had filed a written statem ent. This has taken away, according to the appellant, the Insurer’s right to con test the proceeding on all those grounds, which were available to the registered owner. 4. While considering the ground of challenge aforementioned, it needs to be noted that the materials produced on record, particularly, cross-examination of the claimant clearly shows that he was not cross-examined at all by the owner o f the vehicle. The entire evidence of the claimant remained, as against the owne r of the vehicle, admitted. Merely because a written statement had been filed by the owner of the vehicle, it could not have been said that the owner had contes ted the proceeding. Filing of a written statement, in a claim proceeding, is mer ely a step towards contesting the claim proceeding, but it does not, in itself, be sufficient to hold that the proceeding has been contested. In such circumstan ces, it was the bounden duty of the learned Tribunal to take a decision as to wh ether the Insurer, which is appellant here, ought, or ought not, to be allowed t o contest the proceeding on all such grounds as were available to the registered owner of the offending vehicle. The learned Tribunal has, however, passed no or der and did not apply its mind to the course of action, which it ought to have a dopted in terms of law. 5. Coupled with the above, it has also been pointed out, on behalf of the a ppellant, that the claim application was under Section 163(A) of the M.V.Act and that such an application under Section 163(A) was not maintainable inasmuch as the claimant claimed that his monthly income was Rs.19,687/- meaning thereby tha t his annual income was Rs.2,36,244/- as against the limited income of Rs.40,000 /-, which is available for an applicant under Section 163(A). While considering this aspect of the case, it needs to be noted that the scheme of compensation, a s embodied in Section 163(A), is available to only persons of limited income gro up of Rs.40,000/- per annum. A person, whose annual income is above Rs.40,000/-, is not entitled to file an application under Section 163(A). Viewed thus, it is clear that the learned Tribunal had the duty to decide as to whether the applic ation, under Section 163(A), was or was not maintainable. 6. Apart from the fact that it is doubtful if the learned Tribunal could, o n its own, treat the claim application as an application made under Section 166, what is important to note is even if it is assumed that the learned Tribunal ha d such a power, there ought to have been appropriate discussion and a finding by the learned Tribunal on the specific issue as to whether the accident had taken place due to fault of the driver of the vehicle or not. This exercise was also not done by the learned Tribunal. In fact, the impugned award shows that the lea rned Tribunal did not, perhaps, under the impression that it was dealing with an application under Section 163(A), try to determine if the accident had taken pl ace due to the fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle or not. 7. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court is of the view that in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, the impugned award cannot be sustained, the same must be set aside and the proce eding shall be remanded to the learned Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law. 8. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal is, partly allo wed. The impugned award, dated 10.12.2009, is hereby set aside and the claim pro ceeding is remanded to the learned Tribunal for disposal of the claim applicatio n, in accordance with law, by taking a decision on the Insurer’s application see king to contest the proceeding on all such ground as were available to the regis tered owner of the offending vehicle and, then, proceed further with the claim p roceeding and dispose of the same in terms of the provisions of law contained in that behalf. 9. In order to avoid unreasonable delay in completion of the proceeding, th e parties to the appeal, who are present in Court, are hereby directed to appear before the learned Tribunal, on 01.6.2011, for further necessary order to be pa ssed by the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal shall expeditiously deal with the claim application and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 10. Before parting with this appeal, it is made clear that it will remain op en to the parties concerned to settle the dispute, with regard to compensation, amicably and in accordance with law. 11. Send forthwith a copy of this order to the learned Member, Motor Acciden t Claims Tribunal, Tinsukia. 12. Bring the above direction to the notice of the Deputy Registrar (Judicia l).