Regular Second Appeal No. 2476 of 1986 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 2476 of 1986 Date of decision: 16.03.2010 Hari Singh ...Appellant Versus Managing Committee, Vishwa Karma Model High School, Rohtak and another ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Mr. H.S. Gill, Senior Advocate with Mr. R.K. Dhiman, Advocate for the appellant. RANJIT SINGH J. The appellant, who was appointed as JBT teacher with the respondent-school, a privately aided school being run by Vishwa Karma Model High School, Rohtak, has filed this Regular Second Appeal to impugn the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court rejecting his challenge to the order of his termination. On 24.05.1983, the services of the appellant were terminated. He impugned the said order on the ground that the Managing Committee could not have competently terminated his service unilaterally. The order was termed as illegal, void and ineffective. It was also pleaded that the appellant was appointed on probation for 2 years and would be deemed to have been confirmed after expiry of 2 years on 06.05.1981. The appellant, accordingly, had pleaded that he could have been terminated only by issuing notice but was terminated without following any procedure or without issuance of any notice. In fact, he would also urge that no reasons Regular Second Appeal No. 2476 of 1986 2 were assigned in the order terminating the services of the appellant, which was also done without holding any inquiry. The suit was contested by the respondent. It was pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the present form as the respondent-Society was registered under the Non-trading Societies Act for purpose of rendering social services. It is also stated that the appellant had appeared in the competitive examination for the post of JBT teacher held by the Haryana Education Board without permission and knowledge of the management. He had been selected and joined the Government Primary School Seharla, District Bhiwani and accordingly his services were dispensed with as no longer required on the ground of retrenchment of staff. The fact of appointment of the appellant on temporary basis is, however, admitted. It is also stated that the notice was received from the appellant after services have been terminated. The right of the Management to terminate/dispense with the services of the appellant is justified. The trial proceeded on the following issues:- 1. Whether the order of termination of the services of the plaintiff is illegal, void etc. as alleged?OPP 2. Relief. The trial Court decreed the suit against which the school Management had filed the appeal. The appellant Court, however, had reversed the finding of the trial Court by giving due consideration to all the submissions made before it. At the outset the counsel for the appellant has conceded before me that the appellant had infact joined the government service and had remained employed there. In this background, it was put to Regular Second Appeal No. 2476 of 1986 3 the counsel, if he would still be interested in prosecuting the appeal. The Counsel, however, would contend that he would have a right to get his determination of his termination order as it will give him some right to claim wages for the period between joining of the service with Government. It was held that the rights of the employee of private institution are governed by the terms of a contract entered into between the parties. The First Appellate Court observed that the suit as constituted was not maintainable as the appellant could have only asked for damages rather than seeking his reinstatement. In this regard, reference has been made to ratio of law laid down in Smt. J. Tiwari versus Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and others AIR 1981 Supreme Court 422. Only submission that is pressed by learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant before me is about the condition of service of the appellant which as per him would be governed by Haryana Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1971 and Rule made pursuant thereto Haryana Aided Schools (Security of Service) Rules, 1974. The counsel would refer to Rule 8 of the rules referred to above to point out that person appointed on a post shall remain on probation for a period of 2 years if appointed by direct recruitment and one year, if appointed otherwise. As per the counsel, having been appointed on 07.05.1979, the period of probation for 2 years would be over on 06.05.1981. The termination of the appellant was ordered on 24.05.1983. Counsel would contend that on completion of 2 years of service, he would be deemed to be confirmed. Still, this period could be extended by passing an order on the expiry of Regular Second Appeal No. 2476 of 1986 4 probation period but this could not be extended beyond 3 years. Accordingly, the counsel contends that the appellant would be deemed to be confirmed at least on completion of 3 years of service on 06.05.1982. The counsel would thus contend that the order of termination could not have been passed in this manner as was done, he being confirmed employee. In support of his submission, counsel has referred to Manohar Lal Khanna versus The State of Punjab and others 1979(3) SLR 167. It is held in this case that where maximum period of probation prescribed in the rules is given then after expiry of period of probation employee shall be deemed to have been confirmed. Counsel would also refer to Shri Manmohan Singh Jaitla versus The Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh and others 1985 (1) SLR 505 to say that if there is mala fide culpable exercise of power then the provisions of the act could not be allowed to be circumvent. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. I am of the considered opinion that the judgment relied upon by the counsel would apply to the facts situation in this case. The clear position that would emerge from this case is that the appellant had applied for job as JBT teacher under the Haryana Education Board without taking permission from the Management. He had been selected and had joined the Government school. His services were simply dispensed with. Nothing is indicated from the record to show that there is any order of confirmation made by the probationary appointment offered and allowed to the appellant. Once he himself had joined the job under the Haryana Education Board and he clearly depicted his intention to sever the relationship of employer or Regular Second Appeal No. 2476 of 1986 5 employee with the respondent-Management. In this background, there is no justification to interfere in the view taken by the appellate Court. Since the appellant had voluntarily gone on to find job or joined other service with Government Board, the substantial question of law has rightly been decided in this case. Dismissed. March 16, 2010 (RANJIT SINGH) rts JUDGE