WP(C) 2775/2009 BEFORE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE T VAIPHEI Heard Mr. MK Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr . DC Chakraborthy, learned CGC for the respondents. This writ petition is directed against the non-payment of back w ages to the petitioner by the respondent authorities following his re-instatemen t to his post on the basis of acquittal order by learned Adhoc Additional Sessio ns Judge, Bongaigaon in the judgment dated 13.12.2004 in connection with Crimin al Appeal No. 14(3) of 2002. The facts giving rise to this writ petition, briefl y stated, are that the petitioner was recruited as Constable in the 118 Batallio n of the CRPF, Patna on 13.08.1999 there after he was posted to Bijni and that w hile he was posted there, he along with five other constables were alleged to h ave assaulted the then Assistant Commandant on 31.08.2002. The learned Chief Jud icial Magistrate-cum- Commandant 118/Bn CRPF, Dhaligaon ,Bongaigaon took cognisa nce of the offence under Section 10(n ) CRPF Act, 1949 against the petitioner an d the five others. After the trial, he along with his colleagues were convicted and sentenced by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to undergo two months of rigorous imprisonment vide the judgment dated 18.09.2002 in case No. 1 of 2002. Following their convictions, the petitioner alongwith his colleagues were dismi ssed from service under section 12(1) of the CRPF Act by the Commandant, 118Bn C RPF by the order dated 09.10.10. The petitioner and his colleagues challenged th e judgment of the conviction before the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Bongaigaon who by the judgment dated 13.12.2004 allowed the appeal and set asid e the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner and his colleagues. Following the acquittal, the petitioner and his colleagues made repr esentations before authority for their re-instatement but to no effect. This pro mpted them to file WP ( C) No. 7800 of 2005 before this Court for appropriate r elief. During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner and his colleagu es were re-instated e to their posts by the order dated 19.01.2006 issued by the DIGP (Legal) Directorate General CRPF vide letter dated 13.02.2006. However, th e period from the date of their dismissal to the date of their re-instatement wa s regularised as duty for all purpose except for back wages on the principle of no work no pay. In the meantime, the writ petition was closed by this Court foll owing the re-instatement of the petitioner and his colleague to their posts but by granting liberty to them to file fresh petition. This is how the writ petitio n came to be filed. As already noticed, the grievance of the petitioner is about the refusal of the respondent authorities for payment of the back wages from th e date of his dismissal from service to the date of re-instatement to his posts. The writ petition is opposed by the respondent authorities by filing the ir affidavit-in-opposition. The main contention of the respondent authorities wh ile contesting the writ petition is that the question of entitlement of the peti tioner to back wages does not and cannot rise when he has been acquitted from th e criminal case only on technical ground by giving the benefit of doubt and not on the ground of his acquittal on merit. Mr. Chakraborthy, the learned counsel f or the respondent authorities has cited a number of decision of the Apex Court, more particularly, Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore -Vs- Superintendent Engineer, Guj arat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and another (1996) 11 SCC 603, Bal dev Singh -Vs- Union of India & Ors (2005) 8SCC 747 and Babu Lal -Vs- Haryana St ate Agricultural Marketing Board, (2009) 4 SCC 287 to contend that mere acquitta l of employees in a criminal case could not automatically entitle him to the sai d claim where he had not worked for the period in question and that the princip le of no work and no pay will apply in this case. On the other hand, Mr. MK Cho udhury, learned senior counsel submit that in terms of FR 54(2), the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances after he has been exonerated following hi s acquittal. According to the learned senior counsel, as the dismissal of the pe titioner was found to be illegal, the petitioner ought to have been deemed to be continue in service so as to enable him to draw full back wages. In support of his contention, he relies the decision of the Apex Court in Mohan Lal -Vs- Manag ement of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 225. In my opinion, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner up on FR 54 (2) for claiming the back wages is entirely misplaced in as much as th is provision is concerned with the course of action to be taken after departmen tal enquiry is completed and not when an employee is prosecuted but is acquitted from the charge framed against him in a criminal proceeding. On reading of FR 5 4, there is no room for doubt that the petitioner, who has been re-instated to his posts following his acquittal in a criminal case, is not entitled to invoke FR 54(3). Similarly, the question on applying FR 54 (3) also does not arise when this is a part of FR 54 which deals with a specific situation after completion of a departmental enquiry. On the other hand, the three decisions of the Apex C ourt cited by the learned counsel for the respondents authorities clinch the is sue against the petitoner. It may be noted that the petitioner was not even ful ly exonerated from the charge but was acquitted by the criminal court by giving him the benefit of doubt. Even assuming without that admitting that the FR is applicable also, once it is found that the petitioner was acquitted on technical ground, his case cannot be covered by the FR$ 54(1) or (2) or (3) as the case m ay be. In Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), the petitioner was dismissed fro m service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement i n an offence under section 302/ 34 of the IPC.The Apex Court held that under suc h circumstances, the petitioner was not entitled to back wages. The Apex Court f urther observed that the question of back wages would be considered only if act ion by way of disciplinary proceeding has been taking against him and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and was terminated from discharging duties . In my judgment, no two facts can be so similar on a question of law. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, this writ petition has no merit and is therefo re, dismissed by directing the parties to bear their respective costs.