THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NOS.724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 6195, 6196, 6197, 6198, 6199 AND 6200 OF 2008 DATED NOVEMBER, 2010 BETWEEN Bayer BioSciences Pvt. Ltd. (Formerly Known as ‘Proagro Seed Company Pvt. Ltd.’), a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its Registered Office At 1-2, Community Centre, Aram Bagh, Panchkuian Road, New Delhi – 110 055 And its Corporate Office at # 8-1-39, Qutub Shahi Tombs Road, Tolichowki, Hyderabad – 500 008, represented by its Director, Mr.Mahesh Kumar Giridhar. … Petitioner And The Presiding Officer, Labour Court-I, 2nd Floor, Chandravihar Building, M.J.Road, Nampally, Hyderabad – 500 001. And Another. … Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NOS.724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 6195, 6196, 6197, 6198, 6199 AND 6200 OF 2008 C O M M O N O R D E R Does the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, have the jurisdiction to entertain the subject petitions, I.D.Nos.72 to 80 of 2007, 87 of 2007 and 14 to 19 of 2008, filed under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? This is the short question that falls for consideration in this batch of cases. The petitioners in the above mentioned IDs (arrayed as the second respondent in each of these writ petitions) were employees of Proagro Seed Company Private Limited. A Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) was floated by the said Company on 07.10.2002. Pursuant to this scheme, the petitioners in the IDs were relieved from service in November, 2002. It is an admitted fact that they all received the terminal benefits due to them under the scheme. The subject IDs were filed by them in September, 2007/February, 2008 alleging that all the employees were coerced and forced to sign the documents relating to the VRS. They stated that there were more than 150 employees working in the Company and all the workers from Grade-I to Grade-IV were illegally retrenched under the guise of the VRS. They claimed entitlement to retrenchment compensation and alleged that they were illegally retrenched by introducing a farce VRS. They also attacked the terms and conditions of the VRS and sought a declaration that the same was non est in the eye of law, illegal, unlawful and liable to be set aside. They prayed for a direction to reinstate them in service with full back wages, attendant benefits and continuity of service. The Labour Court ordered notice on the IDs. Pertinent to note, Proagro Seed Company Private Limited was acquired by the Bayer Group and thereafter, upon amalgamation of the Company with Hybrid Rice International Private Limited, a new Company named Bayer Bio Science Private Limited came into existence on 18.12.2006. This new Company was arrayed as the respondent in all the IDs and is presently the petitioner before this Court. It is its case that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the IDs under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, the Act of 1947’), on grounds more than one. According to the petitioner Company, the petitioners in the IDs ceased to be workmen within the meaning of Section-2(s) of the Act of 1947 and therefore had no right to avail the remedy under Section 2-A(2) thereof. Secondly, as the said provision empowered the Labour Court to entertain individual disputes arising out of the termination, retrenchment, dismissal or discharge of an individual workman, the petitioner Company asserted that it had no application to the collective claim put forth by the petitioners in the IDs that their retirement under the VRS amounted to illegal retrenchment. The petitioner Company also pointed out the delay on the part of the petitioners in the IDs in raising the dispute, as they had received the benefits under the VRS long ago. The petitioner Company therefore sought a writ of prohibition in each of these cases to restrain the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, from proceeding further with the subject IDs. This Court by way of interim orders, which were thereafter made absolute, stayed further proceedings in the IDs. The petitioners in the IDs/second respondents in these writ petitions filed individual counters contesting the claim of the petitioner Company that their IDs under Section 2-A(2) of the Act of 1947 would not lie. They reiterated that all the employees of Proagro Seed Company Private Limited were coerced and forced to sign the documents relating to the VRS and that the same amounted to illegal retrenchment. They stated that they had approached the Assistant Commissioner of Labour-Conciliation Officer, aggrieved by the said illegal act of the Company, but they were informed that they could approach the Labour Court as per law for redressal of their grievance. They further claimed that they met with the same response when they approached the Government. They therefore justified the invocation of the powers of the Labour Court under Section 2-A(2) of the Act of 1947. On merits, they contended that the Labour Court had sufficient and ample scope to conduct a trial and enquire into the dispute raised by them under Section 2-A(2) of the Act of 1947 as it was a case of illegal retrenchment. They denied that there was delay on their part and that the dispute was stale. They further stated that the Labour Court had jurisdiction under the said provision to decide whether their termination from service was violative of any provision of law. They assailed the action of the petitioner Company in approaching this Court, alleging that it was done only to subvert the proceedings before the Labour Court and therefore amounted to an abuse of the process of law. They asserted that a writ of prohibition would not lie and prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. A writ of prohibition is essentially of a preventive nature; its proper function being to prevent courts, tribunals or persons exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers from usurping jurisdiction or exercising jurisdiction not vested in them. It therefore seeks to prevent encroachment of jurisdiction and does not deal with a relief from any alleged wrong. In effect, it is not a proceeding between private litigants but is a proceeding between two courts, a superior one and an inferior one, and is the means whereby the superior court exercises its power of superintendence over the inferior court by keeping it within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.73, para 2, pp.10-13). In UNION OF INDIA V/s. UPENDRA SINGH[1], the Supreme Court observed that a writ of prohibition would be issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in UJJAM BAI V/s. U.P.[2], the question whether a Tribunal had jurisdiction would depend not on the truth or the falsehood of the facts into which it had to enquire or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. I n THIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS V/s. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU[3], the Supreme Court, dealing with the scope of a writ of prohibition, stated: “14. On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior court or tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern the exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial discipline of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used “as a cloak of an appeal in disguise”. Lax use of such a power would impair the dignity and integrity of the subordinate court and could also lead to chaotic consequences. It would undermine the confidence of the subordinate court. It was not even argued that there was total lack of jurisdiction in the civil court. It could not be denied that the civil court, before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the maintainability of the suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction. The civil court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred by Section 14 of the said Act or on the principles of res judicata/estoppel. Thus unless there was some very cogent or strong reason the High Court should not have prevented the court of competent jurisdiction from deciding these questions. In other words, the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide these questions. In the impugned judgment no reason, much less a cogent or strong reason, has been given as to why the civil court could not be allowed to decide these questions. The impugned judgment does not state that the civil court had either proceeded to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or that it had acted in violation of the rules of natural justice or that it had proceeded to act under law which was ultra vires or unconstitutional or proceeded to act in contravention of the fundamental rights. The impugned judgment does not indicate as to why the High Court did not consider it expedient to allow the civil court to decide on questions of maintainability of the suit or its own jurisdiction. The impugned judgment does not indicate why the civil court be not allowed to decide whether the suit was barred by virtue of Section 14 of the said Act or on the principles of res judicata/estoppel. To be remembered that no fundamental right is being violated when a court of competent jurisdiction is deciding, rightly or wrongly, matters before it.” The issue before this Court is therefore as to the extent of the Labour Court’s jurisdiction under Section 2-A(2) of the Act of 1947. The provision reads as under: “2-A(1). Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. (2) Notwithstanding anything in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application in the prescribed manner direct to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein; and on receipt of such application the Labour Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter in the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and accordingly all the provisions of this Act, shall apply in relation to such dispute as they apply in relation to any other industrial dispute.” Section 2(k) of the Act of 1947 defines ‘industrial dispute’: “2(k) “industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.” The Supreme Court in CHEMICALS & FIBRES OF INDIA LIMITED V/s. D.G.BHOIR[4], observed that under Section 2(k) it had been held that even where the dispute related to a single workman it was an industrial dispute if it was espoused by the general body of the employees. Before the introduction of Section 2-A, an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated and whose case was not espoused by any labour union or by a substantial number of workmen had no remedy. It was to deal with that contingency that Section 2-A was enacted. The Supreme Court opined that it would be justified in concluding that in enacting Section 2-A, the intention of the legislature was that an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated should be given relief without it being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole body of employees being attracted to that dispute and the dispute becoming a generalised one between the labour on the one hand and the employer on the other. Reference was made by the Supreme Court to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which resulted in the introduction of Section 2-A, which reads as under: “In construing the scope of industrial dispute, courts have taken the view that a dispute between an employer and an individual workman cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by a union or a number of workmen making a common cause with the aggrieved individual workman. In view of this, cases of individual dismissals and discharges cannot be taken up for conciliation or arbitration or referred to adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, unless they are sponsored by a union or a number of workmen. It is now proposed to make the machinery under the Act available in such cases.” In the light of the above judgment, it is clear that it is only to an individual dispute relating to the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination from service of an individual workman that Section 2-A of the Act of 1947 applies. This aspect was further exemplified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in PARADIP PORT TRUST V/s. WORKMEN[5], wherein the Supreme Court observed that prior to the insertion of Section 2-A of the Act of 1947 in the Act by the Amendment Act 35 of 1965, a dispute raised only by a single individual workman did not come under the category of an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k). Left to himself, no remedy was available to such an aggrieved individual workman by means of the machinery provided under the Act for adjudication of his dispute. Such an individual dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a single workman, however, became an industrial dispute only if a substantial body of workmen or a union of workmen espoused his cause. This principle was again reiterated in BALMER LAWRIE WORKERS’ UNION V/s. BALMER LAWRIE AND COMPANY LIMITED[6]: “13. … The oft-repeated grievance voiced by those opposed to the concept of recognised union entitled to represent all workmen was that such a status will concentrate so much power in the hands of the recognised union that it can work to the disadvantage of those not becoming its members as also those opposed to the political or social philosophy of the recognised union and would therefore keep away from it. The chink in the armour appeared when it was found that a workman who is questioning his termination of service, largely a personal punishment and therefore provides a personal cause of action but who was not a member of the recognised union was sought to be thrown out of the court by the representative union appearing to get the petition dismissed on the specious plea that it alone is entitled to represent workmen. The Legislature immediately became aware of the pitfall and remedied the situation by introducing Section 2-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which provides that a workman, who is dismissed, discharged or removed from service or whose service is otherwise terminated can espouse his own cause without the help of a recognised union and yet such a dispute would be an industrial dispute. …” In RAJASTHAN SRTC V/s. KRISHNA KANT[7], the Supreme Court observed: “20. The expression “Industrial Dispute” is defined in Section 2(k) to mean any dispute or difference (i) between employers and employers; (ii) between employers and workmen; and (iii) between workmen and workmen, provided such dispute is connected with the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that a dispute between the employer and an individual workman does not constitute an industrial dispute unless the cause of the workman is espoused by a body of workmen (see Bombay Union of Journalists v. “The Hindu” [AIR 1963 Supreme Court 318]). Of course, where the dispute concerns the body of the workers as a whole or to a section thereof, it is an industrial dispute. It is precisely for this reason that Section 2-A was inserted by Amendment Act 35 of 1965. It says “where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute”. By virtue of this provision, the scope of the concept of industrial dispute has been widened, which now embraces not only Section 2(k) but also Section 2-A. Section 2-A, however, covers only cases of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination otherwise of services of an individual workman and not other matters, which means that — to give an example — if a workman is reduced in rank pursuant to a domestic enquiry, the dispute raised by him does not become an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2-A. (However, if the union or body of workmen espouses his cause, it does become an industrial dispute.) We have given only one instance; there may be many disputes which would not fall within Section 2(k) or Section 2-A. It is obvious that in all such cases, the remedy is only in a civil court or by way of arbitration according to law, if the parties so choose. The machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act for resolution of disputes (in short Sections 10 or 12) does not apply to such a dispute.” In P.VIRUDHACHALAM V/s. LOTUS MILLS[8], the Supreme Court observed that an individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act of 1947, dealing with discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service of an individual workman. Save and except the aforesaid class of disputes, which an individual workman can raise, rest of the industrial disputes including disputes pertaining to illegal lock-out, lay-off and lay-off compensation have to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining and they are disputes of general nature or class disputes wherein an individual workman by himself has no say. In BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. V/s. ANIL[9], the Supreme Court observed: “18. There is one more reason for coming to the above conclusion. There is a difference between an individual dispute which is deemed to be an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the said 1947 Act on the one hand and an industrial dispute espoused by the union in terms of Section 2(l) of the said 1947 Act. An individual dispute which is deemed to be an industrial dispute under Section 2-A concerns discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination whereas an industrial dispute under Section 2(l) covers a wider field. It includes even the question of status. This aspect is very relevant for the purposes of deciding this case. In Radhey Shyam v. State of Haryana (1998) 2 LLJ 1217 (P&H) it has been held after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court that Section 2-A contemplates nothing more than to declare an individual dispute to be an industrial dispute. It does not amend the definition of industrial dispute set out in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [which is similar to Section 2(l) of the said 1947 Act]. Section 2-A does not cover every type of dispute between an individual workman and his employer. Section 2-A enables the individual worker to raise an industrial dispute, notwithstanding, that no other workman or union is a party to the dispute. Section 2-A applies only to disputes relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of an individual workman. It does not cover other kinds of disputes such as bonus, wages, leave facilities, etc. In an unreported judgment in K.DEMUDU V/s. M/S.VISAKHAPATNAM STEEL PLANT, REP. BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER (PERSONNEL) C.APPA RAO, VISAKHAPATNAM[10], a Division Bench of this Court observed: “… The expression “any such workman” appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 2-A makes it clear that an application in relation to the dispute can be filed under sub-section (2) only if the dispute relates to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of his service. This necessarily excludes all other disputes from the purview of Section 2-A. In other words, a workman employed in an industry within the State of Andhra Pradesh, who is aggrieved by the action of the employer in relation to his conditions of service other than dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination of service, cannot make an application under Section 2-A(2). Such workman has to necessarily resort to the procedure prescribed under the Act for reference of the dispute.” It is the contention of the petitioners in the IDs that they were illegally retrenched under the guise of the VRS. They claim that their consent was obtained under coercion and by force and therefore they would have a right to address their grievance in this regard before the Labour Court by invoking Section 2-A(2) of the Act of 1947. On the other hand, the petitioner Company contends that having availed voluntary retirement under a scheme, the petitioners in the IDs are no longer workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act of 1947. Reference is made to the definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act of 1947, which specifically excludes voluntary retirement of the workmen from its ambit. The delay on the part of the petitioners in the IDs in raising the dispute is also pressed into service as a ground to urge that the Labour Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions. Sri C.R.Sridharan, learned counsel for the petitioner Company, while reiterating the above contentions, argued that only an independent dispute pertaining to an individual workman could be made the subject matter of enquiry in a petition filed under Section 2- A(2) of the Act of 1947 and as it was the case of the petitioners in the IDs that all the employees, numbering more than 150, were forced and coerced into accepting the VRS, such a collective dispute could not be made the subject matter of a Section 2-A(2) petition. He relied on case law to support his contentions. Refuting this contention, Sri V.Hari Haran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the IDs/second respondents in the writ petitions, argued that the scope of enquiry by this Court was very limited as the petitioner Company was only seeking interdiction of the proceedings before the Labour Court and no further. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court had the power and jurisdiction to deal with the claim put forth by his clients in the subject IDs. He further submitted that the Labour Court would be empowered to take into account the delay, if any, on the part of his clients and mould the relief accordingly and the same would not have the effect of divesting the Labour Court of its jurisdiction. Learned counsel further submitted that a writ of prohibition was unwarranted on facts. In reply, Sri C.R.Sridharan, learned counsel, submitted that adequate pleadings had not been projected in the subject IDs to demonstrate any coercion on the