Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -1- IN THE PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AT CHANDIGARH Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) Date of Decision : 11.11.2008 Devinder Singh .......... Petitioners Versus Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana & Ors. ...... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD K. SHARMA Present : Mr. Sunil Chadha, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Harsh Aggarwal, Advocate for the respondents. **** VINOD K. SHARMA, J. (ORAL) The petitioner by way of present revision petition has impugned the order passed by the learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Ludhiana dated 19.7.1990. The petitioner filed an application under Section 14(2) read with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for getting the award filed and for making award dated 25.3.1987 as rule of the Court. The application was registered and the award was filed by the Arbitrator in the Court. Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -2- The respondent No.2 Municipal Corporation filed objections to the award and the matter was fixed for evidence of Municipal Corporation and an issue was framed “whether the award was liable to be set aside or not.” On 17.1.1989, the general attorney of the petitioner suffered a statement that matter has been settled and, therefore, they did not want to press their application moved under Order 14(2) read with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. The application was accordingly dismissed. On 5.6.1989 the petitioner moved another application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for making award the rule of the Court. It was averred that no compromise was arrived at between the parties nor any payment has been made to the petitioner. It was further the case of the petitioner that the fraud was played as the attorney had no authority to withdraw the application. It is also the case of the petitioner that as per the provisions of Arbitration Act the award was either to be set aside or made rule of the Court or at best could be remitted to the Arbitrator for fresh decision. The Court dismissed the application by observing that the application moved by the petitioner for making award the rule of the Court was not pressed. It was also observed that the application made on 5.6.1989 under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act could not be entertained after expiry of 30 days i.e. the period of limitation. Mr. Sunil Chadha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -3- petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sheoramprasad Ram Narayanlal Bania Vs. Gopalprasad Parmeshwardayal Shukla and others AIR 1959 Madhya Pradesh 102 contends that application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act was not necessary for the Court to exercise jurisdiction and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sheoramprasad Ram Narayanlal Bania Vs. Gopalprasad Parmeshwardayal Shukla and others (supra) has been pleased to lay down as under :- “12. However, it appears to us that once the first defendant had moved the Court under S.14 of the Arbitration Act, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to file another application for the same purpose. Nor indeed was it necessary for him to make any application praying that a decree should be passed in terms of the award. After an award is filed under S.14, a party may apply to the Court under S. 15 for its modification or under S. 16 for remitting it to the arbitrators. He may also apply under S. 33 for setting aside the award on any of the grounds mentioned in S.30, Where a Court sees no cause to remit the award or to set it aside, it is bound to pass a decree in terms thereof under S. 17. The jurisdiction of the Court to embody the award in a decree is not, therefore, dependent upon any application by a party that it should be accepted. Its power under Ss.15 to 17 or 30 and 33 is derived from the filing of the award before it under S.14. Therefore, after the award was filed in the lower Court on the Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -4- application of the first defendant, it had the jurisdiction to accept the award and pass a decree in terms thereof, even if the plaintiff had made no application for that purpose.” The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once no ground for setting aside the award was established under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the Court was bound to pass a decree in terms of the award. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of The management of Sayani Talkies, Appellant V. K.A. Ramamurthi, Dy. Commissioner of Labour, Madra (Arbitrator ) and another, Respondents 1975 LAB. I.C. 827, wherein the Madras High has been pleased to lay down a s under :- “6. In that case, the reference to the District Judge, Khandwa, was as arbitrator under Section 19(2) (b) of the Defence of India At, 1939, of a dispute as to compensation for requisitioned property. In Alopi Parshad and Sons V- Union of India, (1960) 2 Andh WR (SC) 46 = (AIR 1960 SC 588) it is observed thus at page 50: “The extent of the jurisdiction of the court to set aside an award on the ground of an error in making the award is well defined. The award of an arbitrator may be set aside on the ground of an error on the face thereof only when in the award or in any document incorporated with it, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrators stating the reasons for his decision, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous”. It would appear from this decision that the civil court is bound to pass a Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -5- decree in terms of the award filed into court under Section 14(2) of the Act, if the award is not vitiated by any of the grounds mentioned in Section 30 of the Act. The appellant in this case has not established any of the grounds mentioned in S.30 to show that the award is not acceptable. As observed by the lower court, the first respondent functioned as arbitrator in an industrial dispute as persona designata and not as a civil court. He was entitled to pass an award for reinstatement, and if that award is not set aside for any of the reasons mentioned in Section 30 of the Act, after it is filed into court, a decree in terms of the award has to follow. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petition was rightly rejected by the lower court.” Mr. Harsh Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, contended that once an application for filing the award was barred by limitation the Court could not entertain the award or adjudicate the same. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Patel Motibhai Naranbhai and another Vs. Dinubhai Motibhai Patel and others 1996(2) S.C.C. 585 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under :- “9. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 14 a duty is cast upon the arbitrator to file the award or cause the award to be filed in the Court at the request of the party to the arbitration agreement or if so directed by the Court. There is no provision which requires the arbitrator to apply to the Court for filing of the award and pass a decree in terms of the award. An application for filing Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -6- the award in Court has to be made within thirty days from the date of service of the notice of making of the award under Article 119 of the Limitation Act. Even if it is held that Article 119 will apply only to an application made by a party and not by the arbitrator, Article 137 will come in the way of the arbitrator's making any application beyond the period of three years from the date of making of the award. xx xx xx xx xx 11. In our view, the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 cannot be allowed to circumvent the law with the help of the Arbitrator and obtain indirectly an order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, which they could not do directly.” The learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munshi Ram Vs. Banwari Lal (deceased) and after his heirs and legal representatives and another A.I.R. 1962 SC 903 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that Court can pass a decree on award in terms of the compromise between the parties. On consideration of the matter, I find no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. In the present case the learned trial Court has not passed any decree in terms of the alleged compromise to attract the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munshi Ram Vs. Banwari Lal (deceased) and after his heirs and legal representatives and another (supra). No reliance also can be placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Patel Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -7- Motibhai Naranbhai and another Vs. Dinubhai Motibhai Patel and others (supra) as in the present case the award has not been filed after the expiry of limitation but the same was filed prior to withdrawal of application moved by the petitioner under Section 14(2) read with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. On filing of award in the Court, it was for the learned trial Court to have issued notice to the parties of filing of the award and thereafter it was open to the respondent to file objections, which in fact was done and an issue was also framed. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the Court to have adjudicated the matter and decided as to whether the award was to be made rule of the Court or was required to be set aside or modified in terms of the compromise entered into between the parties. This legal procedure was not followed. In this situation, the petitioner could have approached the learned trial Court to adjudicate on the award but certainly could not have filed a fresh application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act after withdrawing the earlier application. The learned trial Court was right in holding that the application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, after expiry of limitation, was not competent. There is no error in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court which may call for interference by this Court. Dismissed. However, it shall be open to either of the parties to move the Civil Revision No. 1419 of 1991 (O&M) -8- trial Court for adjudication on the objections filed by the respondents as the Court is bound to take a final decision “as to whether the award is to be made rule of the Court or is to be set aside”. 11.11.2008 ( VINOD K. SHARMA ) 'sp' JUDGE