Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Criminal Revision No.676 of 2000 Date of Decision: 6 - 3 - 2009 Partap Singh .....Petitioner v. Jai Lal and others .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA *** Present: Mr.N.K.Sanghi, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.S.S.Mor, Sr. DAG, Haryana. *** KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. (ORAL) In the present case, Partap Singh had lodged a report to SHO, Police Station Siwani. The said report is Ex.PE. It was stated by Partap Singh that he is a resident of village Nandha and doing agriculture work. He had three sisters, namely, Santra, Khazani and Sumitra. All three sisters were married in village Mandholi Khurd. Santra was married to Amar Singh, Khazani was married to Jai Lal and Sumitra was married to Rattan Singh respectively. Santra was allegedly killed after 8/9 years of her marriage but due to relationship no body was informed by the complainant. Khazani sister of the complainant gave birth to no child. Jai Lal and Amar Singh used to taunt her and say that she has given birth to no child and their Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [2] house will remain locked for ever. Some time Amar Singh used to tell Jai Lal that he should also marry like him so that he is able to rear a child. 2-3 days ago, complainant had come to the village of the accused and Khazani told him that her husband and elder brother of her husband had taunted her. He made his sister understand that accused will not repeat that conduct. It is stated that his sister could not tolerate the behaviour of the accused and had committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene on 9.7.1998. A message was sent to the complainant that father-in-law of Khazani is seriously ill. He came in a jeep to Mandholi Khurd where he learnt that his sister had committed suicide due to conduct of Amar Singh and Jai Lal. He also learnt that his sister had been cremated. The statement was made by Partap Singh on 10.7.1998 on the basis of which formal FIR Ex.PD was registered. Matter was investigated. Report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted. Respondents-accused were charged for the offence under 306 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC. The trial Court had acquitted Jai Lal and Amar Singh. No appeal against acquittal has been filed by the State. The present revision petition has been preferred by the complainant against acquittal. Before evidence is to be appreciated, this Court cannot lose sight of two facts that the marriage of Jai Lal with Khazani was 27/28 years old. The ground that she had not given the birth to a child and, therefore, she committed suicide, whether was due to abetment on the part of the accused, is to be considered on the basis of oral testimony of Partap Singh PW-6. No presumption to prosecution under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is available. PW1 Constable Virshakti Singh had prepared the scaled site plan and proved the same as Ex.PA. PW-2 Bhagtu Ram, Patwari had also Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [3] prepared the site plan Ex.Pb. PW-3 Galla Ram MHC had tendered affidavit Ex.PC to prove the link evidence. PW-4 Bholla Ram, Photographer proved photographs Exs.P5 to P8 and their negatives Exs.P1 to P4. PW-5 Subhash Chander, SI/SHO had recorded the formal FIR and after completion of investigation submitted report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Partap Singh PW- 6 is the complainant. PW-7 Constable Joginder Singh had tendered his affidavit in evidence. PW-8 Dilbag Singh Constable had carried the special report. PW-9 Balbir Singh is another brother of deceased Khazani. PW-10 Babu Lal SI had recorded the statement Ex.PE, on the basis of which formal FIR was recorded. He is also the Investigating Officer. After conclusion of prosecution evidence, statement of Jai Lal was recorded. He stated that his wife had died a natural death. Amar Singh stated that after the death of his wife, Partap Singh wanted to get him married with his other sister. On his refusal, he got annoyed. In defence PW-1 Zile Singh was examined. He stated that he is the driver of jeep and on the asking of Jai Lal, he had gone to village of the complainant to inform Partap Singh and in his presence dead body was cremated. DW-2 Jagwanti had stated that Khazani was his niece. She was married to Jai Lal. Sumitra sister of Khazani was married to Rattan who is brother of Jai Lal. She further stated that deceased never complained against Jai Lal and Amar Singh. She further stated that Ganja, Dhoopa and another person had gone to inform Partap Singh. She further stated that she was never told by Khazani that Jai Lal wanted to perform another marriage. Counsel for the complainant-petitioner has based his arguments on photographs Exs.P5 to P8 and the oral testimonies of Partap Singh PW-6 and PW-9 Balbir Singh. Therefore, it will be necessary to notice their Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [4] deposition in Court. Partap Singh has reiterated the version what has been stated by him in the FIR. Khazani had committed suicide on 9.7.1998. It has come in the evidence of Partap Singh that on 9.7.1998 Ganja son of Parmeshwari had informed him. He stated that he visited the house of accused and there were about 20/30 persons present there. Balbir Singh PW-9 had never accompanied him. He returned to his village at 3.00 A.M. Thereafter, he went to Hisar on 10.7'.1998 at 8.00 A.M. On that day, he had not gone to the village. On 10.7.1998 at about 8.00 A.M., he started for Siwani for lodging the report to the police. Balbir Singh PW-9 had no personal knowledge regarding the harassment to the deceased or regarding the occurrence. He has stated, what was conveyed to him, by PW-6 Partap Singh. The learned trial Court took into consideration that Khazani was married with Jai Lal 28 years ago. Her another sister Sumitra was married to Rattan Singh. It was stated that Sumitra had given birth to a child after 15/16 years of marriage. PW-9 Balbir Singh admitted that their relatives Suresh, Mamta and Parmeshwari were also married in village Mandholi Khurd. In the present Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act is not attracted, as marriage is more than 7 years old. Partap Singh in the present case seems to be an interested witness. Even if, it is believed that 2/3 days ago information was conveyed to him that there was some quarrel, there was sufficient time for cooling off the temper. What happened on the day of occurrence is not known? It was 28 years old marriage. No child was bornto deceased and as per testimony of DW-2 Jagwanti, her niece Khazani was living happily with the accused-respondent. Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [5] The findings of the trial Court cannot be held to be perverse. It is well settled law that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. It was held in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707 Mahendra Partap Singh vs. Sarju Singh and another, relying upon D.Stephens vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196, as under: “only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [6] caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [7] by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352), Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: “This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when “there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.” In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [8] try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = (AIR 1968 SC 707) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal Crl.Rev.No.676 of 2000 [9] on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. “In other words” said this Court, “the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 444. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. Taking into consideration findings of the trial Court and facts and circumstances of the case as noticed above, I find no reason to interfere and set aside acquittal of the accused-respondent especially when no State appeal has been filed. No case for exercising revisional jurisdiction is made out. Hence, the present revision petition is dismissed. ( KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA ) March 6, 2009. JUDGE RC