Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -1- In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. Date of decision:11-3-2008 Piare Lal Charitable Trust Jind. ...Appellant. Versus State of Haryana. ...Respondent. ... Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. C. Puri. ... Present: Mr. R .K. Gupta Advocate for the appellant. Mr. S.K.Jain Advocate and Mr. D.S.Nalwa, AAG Haryana for the State of Haryana. ... K. C. Puri, J. Judgment. In this Regular Second Appeal, the plaintiff has challenged the judgment and decree dated 13.2.1991 passed by Mr.B. S. Sharma, the then Additional District Judge-II, Jind whereby he accepted the appeal filed by the State of Haryana against the judgment and decree dated 13.6.1989 delivered by Mr. G.L.Goyal, the then Senior Sub Judge, Jind. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -2- possession of land in dispute on the ground that the said land is owned by the plaintiff. The defendant through its Irrigation Department has taken forcible and illegal possession of the said land and as such the defendant is a trespasser. On demarcation of land made by the revenue officials, the plaintiff has come to know about illegal and forcible possession of the suit land by the defendant-State. The defendant-State contested the suit of the plaintiff. It pleaded that the land in dispute was acquired by the Erst-while Pepsu Government by the order of His Highness Rajpurmukh for a public purpose namely constructing SDO Colony at Jind for which notifications under Sections 4,6 and 9 were published in the Gazette dated 25.6.1955 and after inviting objections from the interested persons, the said land was acquired and compensation was duly assessed and awarded to the owner which was deposited for payment to the owner in the Government Treasury. The defendant is owner in possession of the suit land and, therefore, the question of forcible possession as a trespasser did not arise. The defendant is not aware of any demarcation got done by the plaintiff because the said demarcation was without any notice to the defendant. When the suit land was acquired, it carried khasra numbers 499 to 503, 513,516 and 517 total measuring 6.06 acres but the plaintiff has no where given in the plaint that killa numbers have been formed in lieu of old khasra numbers and as such the plaint was defective and was liable to be rejected. The Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -3- defendant-State has constructed SDO's Colony for the Irrigation Department and the suit property was in possession of Irrigation Department after the same was acquired. At the time, the suit land was acquired, there was no Trust in the name of Pyare Lal. The land owner was alive and the land was acquired by the then Pepsu Government for a public purpose against compensation and,therefore, the plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit because he has no concern with the alleged Trust. The Irrigation Department had been in possession of suit land and the said possession has ripened into ownership by efflux of time. The land in dispute was acquired from deceased Pyare Lal in his life time and if the said land had been included in the Trust, it was an act beyond the authority of the creator of the Trust as he had no right to include the said land in the Trust. Some other preliminary objections were also taken. From the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:- 1.Whether the suit land is owned by Pyare Lal Charitable Trust?OPP. 2.Whether the defendant is in forcible and illegal possession of the suit land?OPP. 3.Whether the court fee is sufficient?OPP. 4.Whether the suit is within limitation?OPP. 5.Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file the present Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -4- suit?OPP. 6.Whether the Irrigation Department has become owner of the suit land by efflux of time?OPD. 7.Whether a valid notice under section 80 CPC has been served upon the defendant?OPD. 8.Relief. The learned trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff. As a result thereof, vide judgment and decree dated 13.6.1989, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant-State of Haryana filed an appeal which was accepted by Mr. B.S.Sharma, the then Additional District Judge-II, Jind vide judgment and decree dated 13.2.1991. Feeling dis-satisfied with the above-mentioned judgment and decree, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal. I have heard arguments of counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. The following substantial questions of law are formulated:- 1.Whether notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act without description of land vitiates the acquisition ab initio? 2.Whether the first Appellate Court has mis-read and mis- interpreted the evidence on the file for reversing the judgment of the trial Court? Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -5- 3.Whether the Courts below have mis-interpreted and mis- read the evidence regarding the plea of adverse possession and that the State cannot raise the plea of adverse possession? So far as the first question of law is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court in authority reported as The Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Versus Mohd. Shafi, 1992(1) R.R.R 583 has held that in case notification does not give the description of property, in that case, acquisition proceedings are vitiated. So far as the question of law is concerned, there is no dispute with that proposition of law as mentioned above. However, the said authority, relied upon by the counsel for the appellant, shall not apply to the facts of the present case as in the notification, the description of the property has been given. The first Appellate Court has returned a definite finding that the suit property for which possession has been sought by the plaintiff has been acquired by the Government. The submission made by the counsel for the appellant that suit property has not been acquired is without any basis. Otherwise also, the finding of fact that suit property has been acquired is not challengeable in the Second Appeal as finding of fact is not to be interfered with, in view of Section 100 CPC. The first Appellate Court has taken into account the fact that the appellant has moved an appeal for enhancement of compensation and the compensation was enhanced at his instance. So, it cannot be said by Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -6- any stretch of imagination that the land has not been acquired. The notifications Exhibits DW-2/A and DW-2/B dated 25.1.1955 and 28.5.1955 respectively under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act make it crystal clear that suit land has been acquired. Piara Lal, owner of the land, preferred an appeal regarding the quantum of compensation and the Collector re-fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.600/- per Bigha instead of Rs.351/- per Bigha previously allowed. Admittedly, the possession of the suit land has been taken after acquisition. So, mere fact that in notification under Section 4, khasra numbers have not been mentioned does not lead to the conclusion that suit land has not been acquired. As discussed above, in the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, description of the land as well as adjoining khasra numbers have been given. So, once the land has been acquired, the plaintiff has been left with no right in the suit property. It so seems that the plaintiff wants to make capital of the fact that khasra numbers have not been mentioned in the notification under Section 4. The present suit has been filed in the year 1986 i.e after 23 years of the acquisition. No doubt, the Government should normally not take the plea of adverse possession, but, there is no legal bar against the Government to claim the adverse possession. However, since it has been held that acquisition is legal and valid, so the plea of adverse Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -7- possession looses its importance. There is nothing on the file to warrant the conclusion that there is any mis-interpretation and mis-reading of the evidence by the first Appellate Court. The first Appellate Court has given an elaborate judgment to set aside the judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court has not taken into account the fact that the plaintiff has filed an appeal for enhancement of compensation regarding the suit land and the plaintiff is estopped from taking the plea after filing of appeal that the land has not been acquired. So, point Nos.2 and 3, referred to above, stand determined against the appellant. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is without any merit and the same stands dismissed with costs. Decree sheet be prepared and the files of the Courts below be returned after due compliance. March 11,2008. ( K. C. Puri ) Jaggi Judge Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -8- Regular Second Appeal No.830 of 1991. -9-