THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED C.M.A.No.667 of 2005 JUDGMENT The appellant-insurance company filed this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short ‘the Act’) against the order dated 23.07.2003, passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Warangal-I (for short ‘the Commissioner’) in W.C.No.2 of 2000 filed by respondent Nos.1 to 4-dependants claiming compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-for the death of the deceased Lakavath Mangilal occurred on 30.12.1999 at 10.30 PM., during the course of his employment due to turning turtle of the tractor and trailer bearing No.AP-36U 1969/1970, driven by him. Respondent No.5-employer filed counter admitting the death of the deceased workman during the course of his employment. The appellant-insurer filed counter denying the averments made in the claim petition. By the award impugned, the Commissioner awarded a sum of Rs.2,15,282/-towards compensation with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the accident i.e., 30.12.1999 till the date of deposit by the appellant and the 5th respondent. Disputing the liability, the appellant filed the present appeal. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 4-claimants. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the Commissioner erred in considering the FIR-Ex.A1 and in fastening liability on the appellant as the deceased workman died while returning after the treatment of his sister-in-law, but not during the course of his employment. He further contended that as the employer filed counter admitting the relationship with the deceased workman, the appellant is not liable to pay compensation. He relied upon the decision reported in RANGA COTTON GINNING MILLS v. GINJUPALLI RATNA KUMARI[1] wherein it was held as under: “Appeal against the order of Commissioner-Appellate jurisdiction of High Court-High Court can interfere only when a question of law is involved-Findings of facts can be interfered only when they are based on no evidence-In the instant case the finding of the Commissioner that the deceased was a workman under the appellant is based on evidence and hence not liable to be interfered’. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 4-dependants submitted that as P.Ws.1 and 2 stated in their evidence that when the deceased workman was transporting the paddy bags to Kesamudram Market, P.W.2, who was suffering from severe stomachache, was also shifted along with the paddy bags and after unloading those bags, while returning, the tractor- trailer turned turtle and the accident occurred, these findings of facts need not be interfered with by this Court and that the dependants of the deceased workman need not prove the relationship of employer- employee. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of this Court in P. GALIREDDY v. CHINNA RAMASWAMY GOUD[2], wherein it was held as under: “ I have perused the award of the Commissioner. The contentions, which are raised before this Court, were already raised before the Commissioner and they were answered by the Commissioner in the negative. There is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. It is settled law that in an appeal filed under Section 30 of the Act, the High Court should not interfere with the award passed by the authority when there is no question of law involved. In Ranga Cotton Mills v. G. Ratna Kumar, 1997(4) ALD 383, this Court held that a High Court can interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the primary authority only when the same is based on no evidence or insufficient evidence. In this case, it is not the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the findings of the Commissioner are not based on evidence. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. He also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. ISLAVATH CHINNAMMA[3], wherein it was held as under: “The only basis for the appellant, in urging that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving by the deceased, is, the FIR in Cr.No.193 of 1998, which was marked as Ex.A1. It may be true that the informant, or the recording police official may have stated that the accident had occurred, on account of the negligent driving, on the part of the deceased. However, it must not be forgotten that the contents of FIR cannot be treated as conclusive proof of such aspects. The relevance of FIR in the claim petitions filed under the Act, is virtually limited to see whether the accident and the death or injuries have taken place, at all. Beyond that, it cannot be taken use of, to affix or apportion the liability in causing the accident. Further, if the appellant intended that the contents of the FIR must be taken into account, even as per the general principles of evidence, it must have examined the person, who gave the First Information Report, or the official, who prepared the FIR. Without taking such steps, the appellant cannot insist that the contents of the FIR must be treated as conclusive proof. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in AKULA SURYANARAYANA @ SURIBABU v. PEDDIBOINA VENKATA MOHAN @ MOHANRAO[4] wherein it was held as under: “Workmen’s Compensation Act being a social and beneficial legislation, workman need not prove existence of relationship of employer and employee beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. 5. There is no dispute as regards the compensation awarded by the Commissioner. The dispute is with regard to fastening the liability on the appellant. A perusal of FIR-Ex.A1 shows that when the daughter-in-law of the complaint i.e., P.W.2 was suffering from stomachache, his younger son i.e., the deceased, who was working on the tractor-trailer bearing No. AP 36 U 1969/1970, took her in the said tractor to Kesamudram Hospital on the night of 30.12.1999. The complainant, his son-in-law by name Vankdoth Pool Singh and two others were also accompanied him in the tractor. After completion of treatment, when all of them were returning in the said tractor-trailer, at about 10.30 PM, the deceased drove it in a rash and negligent manner, due to which, it turned turtle, thereby his son and his son-in-law died on the spot and himself and others sustained injuries. In Column No.15 of Ex- A2-inquest panchanama also, it was mentioned that the deceased was taking her sister-in-law to the hospital at Kesamudram on the said tractor-trailer and while returning, the deceased drove it in a rash and negligent manner, due to which deceased as well as Mr. Vankdoth Pool Singh died. Except the self-serving testimony of P.Ws 1 and 2, in Exs.A1 and A2, it was nowhere stated about transporting of paddy and unloading the same in the market at Kesamudram. From this, it is clear that the death of the deceased occurred not during the course of his employment, but for his own purpose, he drove the vehicle in question at the time of accident. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the Commissioner without considering all these facts fastened the liability both on the appellant-insurance company and the owner of the crime vehicle. Therefore, the appellant is exonerated from its liability to pay compensation to the dependants and the owner of the crime vehicle is liable to pay compensation. As the appellant has already deposited the entire compensation, it can recover the same from the owner of the tractor-trailer. 7. In view of the above, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed, setting aside the order impugned to the extent indicated above. No costs. _____________________ GHULAM MOHAMMED, J Date:17.02.2011 sj [1] 1997(4) ALD 383 [2] 2001(1) ALD 171 [3] 2006(4) ALT 698 [4] 2005(3) ALT 33