IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH C.R.No.1509 of 2010 Date of Decision : 24.8.2010 Haryana Roadways, Faridabad ....Petitioner Versus Municipal Corporation, Faridabad and another ...Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MAHESH GROVER .... Present : Mr.Birender Singh Rana, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.Mohnish Sharma, Advocate for Mr.Narender Hooda, Advocate for the respondents. ..... MAHESH GROVER, J. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 26.11.2009 vide which its appeal against the judgment of the learned trial court dated 6.4.2009 has been dismissed solely on the ground of delay. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the delay was not so inordinate which could have prompted the appellate court to decline interference under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He has stated that the petitioner herein is a government body and it is not uncommon that some procedural delay takes place when the process of filing the appeal is resorted to. Reliance has been placed on State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, AIR 1996 SC 1623. C.R.No.1509 of 2010 -2- On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has justified the passing of the order dated 26.11.2009 on the ground that the delay was not explained satisfactorily and, therefore, the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the delay of 60 days is not such inordinate so as to warrant dismissal and to deny substantial right to the appellant. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others (supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows :- “When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file- pushing, and passing-on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression C.R.No.1509 of 2010 -3- “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” Having regard to the aforesaid, the impugned order is set C.R.No.1509 of 2010 -4- aside, the revision stands allowed and the matter is remitted back to the appellate court for decision afresh on the merits of the case. 24.8.2010 (MAHESH GROVER) JUDGE dss