Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (1) Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 Date of Order: 10.09.2008 Updesh Singh, Platoon Commander ....Appellant Versus State of Punjab and others ..Respondent (2) Regular Second Appeal No.2296 of 1992 Date of Order: 10.09.2008 Updesh Singh, Platoon Commander ....Appellant Versus State of Punjab and others ..Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIVE BHALLA Present: Mr. J.S.Shahpuri, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. H.S.Gill, DAG, Punjab for the respondents. RAJIVE BHALLA, J (Oral). This judgment shall dispose of Regular Second Appeal's Nos.2294 and 2296 of 1992, as identical questions of law and facts arise for consideration. The plaintiff-appellants services were dispensed with on 31.03.1980, while serving as a Platoon Commander in the Punjab Home Guards and Civil Defence, Punjab. The decision to terminate his services was revoked and the appellant was re-appointed on 15.01.1982 at Ropar, but the period from 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982 was treated as leave of the kind due. Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -2- Aggrieved by this order and other matters, the appellant filed a suit for issuance of a mandatory injunction to direct the respondents to treat the period from 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982, as a period spent on duty, and accordingly re-fix his salary. The appellant also prayed that the order dated 19.05.1983 passed by the Battalion Commander, fixing his salary was incorrect as he was entitled to salary at the rate of Rs.725/- w.e.f. 01.06.1979. The appellant also sought payment of his medical bills and travelling allowance. The respondent-State of Punjab opposed the suit by raising an objection that the suit was barred by limitation, the Courts at Rupnagar did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit etc. On merits, it was submitted that the period in dispute could not be treated as period spent on duty, as during this period the appellant was not in service. The pay fixation did not suffer from any error and non-payment of medical and travelling allowance bills was also denied. On the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced, the trial Court framed the following issues:- i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the amount as alleged in the plaint?OPP ii) Whether suit is within time? Onus on parties. Iii) Whether civil Court at Ropar has got no territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter in controversy?OPD iv) Whether plaintiff did not serve a legal and valid notice U/s 80 CPC?OPD v) Whether suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction?OPD vi) Relief. Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -3- After considering the evidence adduced and the arguments addressed, the learned trial Court decreed the suit for recovery of Rs.937.60. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the State of Punjab and as also the appellant filed separate appeals. The first appellate Court accepted the appeal filed by the State of Punjab and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant by holding that the courts at Rupnagar did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was also held that the appellant was not entitled to have his pay re-fixed for the period from 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982. As regards the payments for travelling allowance it was held that payment for these bills had been forfeited by the Accountant General, Punjab. The claim for payment of medical bills was declined as it was held that one of them was submitted after six months and the second bill could not be accepted as it was obtained from a private dispensary. Counsel for the appellant submits that the first appellate Court, has neither adverted to nor decided the arguments addressed by the appellant. The first appellate Court committed an error while holding that courts at Rupnagar did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The fact that the appellant was posted at Rupnagar after reinstatement was ignored. It is further submitted that as the appellant's services were regularised, the period from 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982 could not be treated as leave of the kind due. It is further submitted that the trial Court decreed a sum of Rs.937.60, being the amount due on account of travelling allowance. No reason has been assigned for reversing this part of the judgment. Counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any error of law or of fact. The suit was filed at Rupnagar when the appellant was posted at Abohar. As the appellant was not in service during the period 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982, the appointing Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -4- authority cannot be faulted for treating this period as leave of the kind due. It is further submitted that the claim for medical reimbursement and travelling allowance was rightly reversed by the first appellate court. Counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is erroneous in law and, therefore, raises the following substantial questions of law:- i) Whether the first appellate court could have reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court without assigning any reasons and without adverting to the arguments addressed by counsel for the appellant? ii) Whether the first appellate was right in dismissing the suit for want of territorial jurisdiction. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment. The first appellate court while accepting the appeal filed by the State and dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant did not advert to, much less decide any submission made by counsel for the appellant. The operative part of the judgment appears to be a narrative of the arguments addressed by the counsel for the State and thereafter in a few, incoherent sentences, the appeal filed by the State of Punjab was accepted and that filed by the appellant was dismissed. A judgment records a judicial opinion and must, therefore, necessarily narrate the facts, the issues in dispute, the arguments for and against and thereafter by a discernible process of reasoning the record opinion on each disputed issue. The impugned judgment is unfortunately devoid of any of attributes of a judgment. The first appellate court merely noticed the arguments addressed by counsel for the State of Punjab and thereafter proceeded to Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -5- accept the appeal. It would, therefore, have to be held that the impugned judgment recorded without adverting to or adjudicating the arguments addressed by counsel for the appellant. In view of what has been stated herein above, the first question of law would have to be answered by holding that the first appellate court did not advert to or adjudicate the arguments addressed by the appellant's counsel and before proceeding to reverse the judgment of the trial Court failed to assign any reasons whatsoever for its final conclusion. The second question relates to the first appellate court's finding that the courts at Rupnagar did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This finding is contrary to the record and even has been recorded without assigning cogent reasons. It is not denied that the appellant was reinstated while he was posted at Rupnagar. The order treating the period from 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982 as leave of the kind due came to be passed simultaneously. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly postulates that a suit may be filed before a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action or a part thereof arises. A part of the cause of action, therefore, arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Rupnagar. As regards the second question of law, it is answered by holding that as a part of the cause of action arose at Rupnagar the suit was wrongly dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. The finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the courts at Rupnagar did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit is, therefore, factually and legally incorrect and is therefore, reversed. As regards the manner in which the period from 31.03.1980 to 15.01.1982 was to be treated, suffice it to say that the appointing authority is empowered to pass an order treating this period as leave of the kind due. The appellant was admittedly not in service during this period. The services of the appellant and of other platoon commanders were dispensed Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -6- with but after taking a compassionate view of the matter they were re- appointed. I find no error in the exercise of power by the appointing authority in treating the period of absence as leave of the kind due and thus hold against the appellant. The next submission is that the appellant's pay was wrongly refixed on 19.05.1983, as it was reduced to Rs.700/- per month from Rs.725/- per month. The trial Court decreed this claim by holding that the order was passed without assigning any reason and without affording an opportunity of hearing. It was also held that while crossing the efficiency bar w.e.f 01.06.1979 the appellant's pay was raised from Rs.700/- to Rs.725/- p.m. The first appellate court reversed this finding, but did not assign any reason. The appellant was permitted to cross the efficiency bar w.e.f. 01.06.1979 and his salary was fixed as Rs.725/- p.m. The alleged error that compelled the respondents to rectify the appellant's salary has not been spelt out. The appellant's salary was reduced without any cogent reasons and without any prior notice. Consequently, I have no hesitation in holding that the first appellate court committed an error in reversing the judgment of the trial court on this issue. With respect to the claim for travelling allowance and the medical bills, the trial court dismissed the claim with respect to the medical bills but decreed a sum of Rs. 937.60 relating to travelling allowance. The first appellate court reversed this part of the trial court's order by holding that the bills had been forfeited. No reason was assigned for this forfeiture. The first appellate court recorded the arguments addressed by counsel for the State and thereafter did not assign any reason for reversing the finding recorded by the trial court. I find no reason, whether in the arguments addressed by the counsel for the respondents or the judgment of first appellate court so as to uphold the impugned judgment Regular Second Appeal No.2294 of 1992 -7- In view of what has been stated herein above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. September 10, 2008 (RAJIVE BHALLA) nt JUDGE