IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (Cr.) No. 265 of 2011 ------- Dinabandhu Sethi @ D. Sethi … Petitioner -Versus- State represented through the Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) Chaibasa ..... Respondent With W.P. (Cr.) No. 222 of 2012 ------- Rakesh Narayan Jha … Petitioner -Versus- State represented through the Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) Chaibasa ..... Respondent ------- CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE H.C.MISHRA ------- For the Petitioners : : M/s. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate For the Respondents : : M/s. Prabhash Kumar, Advocate ------- 9/ 16.01.2015 In both these cases same point of law is involved and as such they are being taken up together and disposed of by this common order. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the State. 3. In W.P. (Cr.) No. 265 of 2011, the petitioner Dinabandhu Sethi @ D. Sethi, has prayed for an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the entire criminal proceeding initiated against him, in Complaint Case being C/7 Case No. 20 of 2011, including the order dated 10.02.2011 passed therein, by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa, whereby cognizance has been taken against him for the offence under Sections 23/ 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, (herein after referred to as the Act). Similarly in W.P.(Cr.) No. 222 of 2012, the petitioner Rakesh Narayan Jha, has prayed for an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the entire criminal proceeding initiated against him in Complaint Case being C/7 Case No. 98 of 2012, including the order dated 03.04.2012 passed therein, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa, whereby cognizance has been taken against him for the offence under Sections 23 / 24 of the Act. 4. The facts of the case lie in a short compass. The Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) Chaibasa, who is the Inspector under the Provisions of Section 28 of the Act, made inspection in the two iron ore mines managed by the Steel Authority of India Limited and found certain irregularities in both the mines. Accordingly, the complaint cases for the offences under Sections 23 & 24 of the Act were filed by the Inspector in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa, which were registered as C/7 Case No. 20 of 2011 & C/7 Case No. 98 of 2012. In C/7 Case No. 20 of 2011 only the petitioner -2- Dinabandhu Sethi @ D. Sethi has been arrayed as an accused being the General Manager of the concerned mines, and in C/7 Case No. 98 of 2012 only the petitioner Rakesh Narayan Jha has been arrayed as an accused being the General Manager of the concerned mines. On the basis of the complaint petitions, by the impugned orders, cognizance has been taken against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 23 & 24 of the Act. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken a short point challenging the criminal proceedings against them. It is submitted that Section 25 of the Act relates to the offences by companies and according to this provision, the company as well as every person in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the commission of the offence, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It is thus, submitted that the petitioners could not be made accused in the case without arraying the company as an accused in the case and accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding is absolutely vitiated. 6. In this connection learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661, wherein where, the Apex Court was considering the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is in pari materia to the provisions under Section 25 of the present Act. In the said case the Apex Court has laid down the law as follows:- 58 : Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. -------. 59 : In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V.Parekh which is a three-Judge Bench decision. ---------- . Laying the law as aforesaid, the criminal proceeding against the concerned accused had been quashed by the Apex Court in the said case. -3- 7. Placing reliance on the decision, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that it is a fit case for quashing the criminal proceeding against the petitioners also, in as much as, the company, i.e., Steel Authority of India Limited has not been made accused in the case and only the petitioners have been made accused, being the General Managers of the concerned mines, run by the company. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the prayer, submitting that the allegations made in the complaint petition clearly make out the offence against the petitioners and accordingly, there is no illegality in the impugned orders taking cognizance against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 23 & 24 of the Act. 9. After having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, I find that in the present case both the mines were being operated by the Steel Authority of India Limited, but the said company has not been made accused in the case and only the General Managers of the concerned mines have been made accused. Relevant portion of Section 25 of the Act lays down as follows :- 25. Offences by companies.- (1) If the person committing an offence under this Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the commission of the offence shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly; Similarly, relevant portion of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, reads as follows:- 141. Offences by companies.- (1) If the person committing an offence under Sec. 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: 10. Thus from a bare perusal of both these provisions it is apparent that both these provisions are in pari materia and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has clearly laid down that only when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. It has also been held that arraigning of the company as an accused is imperative and the other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability. In my considered view, the facts of the present case are fully covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Aneeta Hada's case (supra). -4- 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I find and hold, that the petitioners could not be made accused in the case in absence of the company; namely, the Steel Authority of India Limited, and accordingly, the criminal proceeding against the petitioners, including the order taking cognizance against them, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 12. Accordingly, the criminal proceeding against the petitioner Dinabandhu Sethi @ D. Sethi in C/7 Case No. 20 of 2011, including the order dated 10.02.2011 passed therein by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa, as also criminal proceeding against the petitioner Rakesh Narayan Jha in C/7 Case No. 98 of 2012, including the order dated 03.04.2012 passed therein by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa, taking cognizance for the offence against these petitioners under Sections 23/ 24 of the Act, are hereby, quashed. 13. Both these applications, are accordingly, allowed. (H.C.Mishra, J.) D.S.