IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.6678 of 2003 Dr. Bhagirath Prasad, Son of late Karu Prasad, Resident of Village Khutaha, P.S. Barahiya, District Monghyr, at present posted as Assistant Director, Kalajar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna (under suspension). ----- Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. 3. The Joint Secretary to the Government, Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. --------- Respondents ----------- 4 19.08.2010 Heard Mr. Dinu Kumar learned counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the State. I.A. No. 6925 of 2010 In this writ application which was filed on 21.7.2003 originally with the following prayer:- “1(a) For quashing part of the notification no. 107(9) dated 5.5.2003 by which proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner with respect to charges. (b) For quashing part of the order by which communication has been made to the petitioner that he will be paid salary after decision in the departmental proceeding for the period of suspension.” the petitioner on 5th August, 2010 has filed this interlocutory application wherein a 2 prayer has been made for amendment of the prayer for quashing the order of punishment contained in memo no. 2152 dated 24.11.2004. In view of the fact that such prayer has been made for quashing an order of punishment after five years and nine months, this Court is not inclined to allow the amendment, which will have an effect of permitting the petitioner to assail a very old order of punishment. If the petitioner had slept over his right by which he was not only demoted but had also undergone the effect of such demotion for a period of five years and nine months and the resultant stoppage of five cumulative increment from 24.11.2004 till date, he cannot now be allowed to challenge such order only on account of the pendency of this writ application. Accordingly, the prayer for amendment in the prayer of the main writ application and challenging the order dated 24.11.2004 is hereby rejected. I.A. No. 6925 of 2010 is accordingly dismissed. 3 Coming to the original prayer in the writ application, this Court would find that by an order dated 5.5.2003, the authorities had initiated a proceeding against the petitioner in terms of an observation made by this Court in the order dated 10.12.1999 in CWJC No. 4777 of 1999. The only plea of the petitioner as against the aforementioned order is that whereas this Court had made observation as with regard to the commencement of enquiry against the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of the order, the authorities had consumed more than three years and six months in initiating such proceeding. First of all, the order of this Court dated 10.12.1999 was not having any preemptory effect that in case the departmental proceeding was not initiated against the petitioner within a period of three months, the charges framed against the petitioner would stand quashed. Once this aspect becomes clear, this Court would find it difficult to quash the order initiating departmental proceeding against the 4 petitioner, specially when the said proceeding has been already concluded and the petitioner has also been punished way back on 24.11.2004, the order which was sought to be challenged by the petitioner by the amendment petition. In this regard, it has to be noted that the same plea was advanced by the petitioner by filing another writ application, CWJC No. 12597 of 2002 while assailing the order of suspension but this Court did not, at that occasion, find any infirmity in the order of suspension on the basis of which the present proceeding was initiated as would be evident from the reading of the impugned order itself. Counsel informs that this court had quashed the order of suspension in CWJC No. 12597 of 2002 by an order dated 17.8.2004 but then it becomes clear that this Court had not found any infirmity in the rest of the order by which it was also clearly indicated that a resolution to draw departmental proceeding was being issued separately. It is this resolution dated 5.5.2003 which has been 5 assailed in this writ application and therefore, even on the ground that this Court in the second writ application filed by the petitioner, CWJC No. 12597 of 2002, did not choose to interfere with the departmental proceeding drawn against the petitioner and had only quashed the order of suspension, would hold that the impugned order issuing notice for drawing departmental proceeding does not suffer from any infirmity. Counsel then would submit that the appointment of Mr. C.K. Anil by the impugned order dated 5.5.2003 would vitiate the same because earlier Mr. C.K. Anil was the person who had asked the petitioner to file show- cause on 15.12.2001. From reading of the said letter of Mr. C.K. Anil dated 15.12.2001, it would be clear that the said person, in capacity of the Additional Secretary of the Department in continuation to the earlier explanation sought from the petitioner on 14.2.2000, had only issued a reminder for submission of explanation by the petitioner and that by itself cannot be demonstrative of the fact of any official bias by Mr. C.K. 6 Anil against the petitioner. The official bias being the weakest bias amongst three types of bias namely pecuniary, personal and official has to be also pleaded and proved with a complete precision and the person against whom such plea of bias is made has to be also impleaded as a party by name. Neither of the two has been done in this case inasmuch as there is no pleading on the issue of malafide or bias of Mr. C.K. Anil nor has he been made party to this writ application therefore, merely because Mr. C.K. Anil was appointed as an enquiry officer would not vitiate the impugned order dated 5.5.2003. Thus for the reasons indicated above, this Court would find no merit in this application and the same is accordingly dismissed. Rsh (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)