MC 820/2009 BEFORE HON’BLE MRS JUSTICE ANIMA HAZARIKA MC No.820/2009 In MFA No. /2008 This application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitatio n Act, 1963 for condoning the delay of 152 days in preferring the Miscellaneous First Appeal. Heard Mr. SS Sharma, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the appli cant. Also heard Mr. MH Rajbarbhuiyan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1/claimant as well as Mr. K Das, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2. In order to explain the delay in preferring the appeal, it has b een averred at paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition as follows: 3. That the petitioner begs to state that the period of lim itation for filing the appeal is 60 days and as such the appeal under normal cir cumstances ought to have been filed on or before 27-06-08, but before taking a d ecision to file the appeal, the petitioner wanted to be sure as to whether any s ubstantial question of law is involved or not, and as to whether allowance paid to the deceased could be treated as a part of the salary to determine compensati on and as to whether such assessment could be challenged in appeal and that such pleas, would be regarded as a pleas involving substantial question of law. This decision had to be taken on various levels, so the petitioner could not have av oided the procedural formalities, and there is delay of 152 days in filing the a ppeal. 4. That the petitioner submits that in order to take decisi on as to whether an appeal is to be filed or not, the files are required to be c ollected from dealing advocate at Nagaon and then is processed from the policy i ssuing Branch to Divisional Office and then to the Regional Office, who also req uires legal opinion from the company’s Advocate before coming to a decision and consequently, it is quite natural that considerable time is spent in movement of the file from one table to another and that from one office to another and in t aking the decision thereon. Again the advocate required at least 5-6 days time t o prepare the memo of appeal, stay petition and the instant condonation petition and as such, there has been a delay in filing the appeal and the same is now re quired to be condoned. The reasons for delay, as mentioned above, could not have been avoided in view of the circumstances narrated above. Hence, inspite of bes t efforts made by the company, the appeal could not be filed within time. A bare perusal of the above quoted averments reveal that the pre sent application for condonation of delay has been filed in a very cryptic and c asual manner without explaining the delay as required under the law of limitatio n. Not to speak of day to day delay, there is no explanation showing sufficient cause as envisaged in Section 5 of the Limitation Act for causing the delay of 152 days in preferring the appeal except the decision as to whether an appeal is to be filed or not, the files are required to be collected from dealing advo cate at Nagaon and considerable time spent in movement of the files from one tab le to another etc. Mr. Sharma, learned Sr. counsel has, however, urged that when a company is an applicant for condonation of delay, it represents collective cause , the file is to move from one table to another, opinion at various stages is ne cessary and therefore, in such a case, certain amounts of latitude is permissibl e, so that the term sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Act receive a libe ral construction, more so, when the delay is not intentional. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by respondent No.1/cl aimant contending inter alia therein that 60 days period of limitation is provid ed under the law in filing an appeal which is sufficient time meant for completi ng the required formalities after award having passed for challenging the same. Mr. Rajbarbhuiyan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1/claimant, therefore, has vehemently objected in condoning the delay of 152 day s. The term sufficient cause is not defined under Section 2 of th e Limitation Act, but by the same, it means and so far has been construed as bey ond control of the party seeking indulgence for extension of period of limitatio n. But from a bare perusal of Section 5 of the Act and its preamble, it manifest that the Act is an exhaustive code governing the law of limitation in respect o f matters specially dealt with by it. The courts are not permitted to travel bey ond the provisions of the Act or to supplement them. Though it is correct that n o hard and fast time can be drawn as to what is meant by sufficient cause in a given case, where sufficient cause shown or not, depend upon the fact of the ca se. In the instant case, sufficient cause is missing. I have given my anxious consideration to the submission of the l earned counsel of both sides. On careful consideration of the statements made in the condonation petition, I am unable to give any credence to the explanations put forward by the applicant. The applicant has failed to explain the delay of 1 52 days in preferring the appeal by sufficient cause . This application is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Consequently, the connected unnumbered Miscellaneous First Appea l also stands dismissed.