1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 564 OF 2008 The National Textile Corporation Ltd. a Public Sector Undertaking, having its regional office at N.T.C. House, 3rd floor, Ballard Estate, Mumbai 400038. ..Applicant. Vs. 1. Shri. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad of Mumbai, Indian inhabitant, residing at A-5, Govindram Society, Azad Apartment, Azad Lane, Andheri (W), Mumbai-400058. 2. Shri.Narendra Bhagwandas Sanghadia of Mumbai, Indian Inhabitant, residing at 1st floor, Hira Kunj, RomNo.11, 28, S.V.Road, Malad (W), Mumbai  400 064. 3. Shri.Rajnikant Vithaldas Divecha ofMumbai, Indian Inhabitant, residing at C-36, ParvatiMansion, Opp.Apsara Cinema, 214 Lamington Road,Mumbai-400007. 4. Shri. Baragu Chandrakant Khakhar of Mumbai, Indian inhabitant, residing at 3rd floor, Khakhar Building, C.P. Tank Road, Mumbai-400 004. 5. Shri. Manoj Pranjivan Divecha of Mumbai, 2 Indian inhabitant, residing at 3rd floor, Pitambar Nivas, 17, 2nd Parsiwada, V.P.Road, Mumbai  400 004. 6. Shri.Sailesh Ramanlal Mahimutra of Mumbai, Indian inhabitant, residing at 25, S.A. Brelvi road, Unique House, 3rd floor, Mumbai 400 001. All of them the present trustees of the Seth Hirachand Rupchand Charities Trust, a Public Charitable Trust, registered under the Mumbai Public Trusts Act, 1950, having its office at 68, Kika Street, Mumbai-400 002. ..Respondents. Mr.E.P. Bharucha, Zubin Kamdin and Arzan Balsara i/by D.H.Shah for the Petitioner. Mr. Rafiq Dada, Sr. Counsel, Ms. Ranjana Parikh, Dr. Virendra Saraf along with Mr. Ameet Hariani, Mr.Ranjit Shetty, Mr. Rishit Badiani, Mr. Avdhoot Prabhu i/by M/s. Hariani & Co. for the Respondent Nos.1,3 and 4. Dr.Virendra Tulzapurkar,Sr. Counsel, Ms.Ranjana Parikh, Dr. Birendra Saraf along with Mr.Ameet Hariani, Mr.RanjitShetty, Mr.Rishit Badiani, Mr. Avdhoot Prabhu i/by M/s.Hariani & Co. for the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6. CORAM : R.S.MOHITE, J. DATE : Reserved on 30/7/2009 Declared on 03/8/2009 3 ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. This is a revision preferred by the applicants who are the original defendants in T.E.& R.Suit No.311/326 of 2001 (and who for the purpose of convenience will hereinafter referred to as the Defendants ). The present respondents were the plaintiffs in the said suit (and for the sake of convenience will be hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs ). The plaintiffs are the trustees of Seth Harichand Rupchand Charities Trust which is entity registered as a public charitable trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act,1950. Based upon the evidence led in the said suit, the suit was decreed by the trial court by judgment and decree dated 5.7.2006. The decree was for eviction of the defendants from the suit property. The said decree came to be challenged by the defendants by filing an appeal being Appeal No.627 of 2006 before the Appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes. That appeal came to be dismissed by a judgment and order 4 dated 14.8.2008 and the Appellate Court was pleased to confirm the decree passed by the trial court. Being aggrieved, the present civil revision application came to be filed by the defendants. 2. The relevant facts of this case are as under. a) That the suit property which was running textile mill situated on the land admeasuring 12118-sq,yards, bearing Plot No.9 in Survey No.73 of Lower Parel Division, N.M. Joshi Marg, Chinchapokli, Mumbai was, prior to 22.7.1907, originally owned by one Shri.Damodardas Tapidas and Shri.Dayabhai Tapidas. b) By an Indenture of Lease dated 11.3.1893, Shri.Damodardas Tapidas and Shri. Dayabhai Tapidas demised the suit land in favour of a company by name Hope Mills Ltd. The demise was for a period of 99 years commencing from 22.10.1891. This lease was to expire by efflux of time on 21.10.1990. This 5 Indenture provided that if within a period of 99 years the said Hope Mills Ltd., their subsidiary, or assignee desired to assign their rights in the demised property, then the said Damodardas Tapidas and Dayabhai Tapidas, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns would enter into an agreement with such intended assignee or new company, for the residue of the unexpired period for the term of 99 years at the same rent and subject to the same terms and conditions including convenant of renewal. c) Under an registered Indenture dated 22.2.1907 subject to the existing lease, the original owners sold, transferred and conveyed the said property in favour of one Harichand Rupchand and Smt.Ratanbai. d) The ownership rights in respect of the suit property, after the demise of Shri. Harichand Rupchand, devolved in accordance with his will and it is not in serious dispute that the land is now 6 vested and owned by a public charitable trust by name Seth Harichand Rupchand Charities Trust (hereinafter referred to as the trust . Of which the plaintiffs are the trustees. The land is shown as property belonging to the trust in Schedule II as well as in the register of properties of the said trust. e) In so far as the lease hold rights are concerned, over a period of time, the lease hold rights passed on from Hope Mills Ltd. to Prospect Mills Ltd., the Diamond Spinning and Weaving Co. Pvt. Ltd. and ultimately under a registered Indenture of Lease dated 25.10.1926 to Toyo Poddar Cotton Mills for the residue of the unexpired term of 99 years beginning from 22.10.1891. The record indicates that a mill was constructed on the demised property some time prior to 1920 and the demised under the Indenture of lease dated 26.10.1926 was made not only in respect of the land but also along with the buildings, 7 structures standing thereon and subject to the conditions in the Indenture of Lease dated 11.3.1893. f) On 25.12.1983, the Parliament enacted the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management ) Act, 1983, by which, it took over the management rights in respect of 13 textile undertakings including a Toyo Poddar Mills , the name of which had by then been changed to Poddar Mills. The management of Poddar Mills was vested in the custodian appointed under the Act. g) As mentioned herein before, the lease granted to Toyo Poddar Mills so expired by efflux of time on 22.10.1990 and the lessees thereafter continued as tenants holding over. h) On 2.12.1994, the trust issued an Advocate s notice to the defendant No.1 terminating its tenancy. 8 i) On 8.9.1995, Parliament enacted the Textile Undertaking (Nationalisation) Act 1995. The said Act was enacted for the acquisition and transfer of the textile undertakings and rights in respect of textile undertakings with a view to augumenting the production and distribution of different varieties of cloth and yarn so as to sub- serve the interests of the general public. The Scheme of the Act was that on the appointed day i.e. On 1.4.1994, the right, title and interest of the owners in respect of thirteen textile undertakings were to stand transferred and to vest absolutely in the Central Government. That, immediately after such vesting, the textile undertaking so vested in the Central Govt. were to stand transferred and vested in the National Textile Corporation which was defendant No.1 in the suit. The Act clarified that term Textile Undertaking would be deemed to include all assets, rights, lease holds, powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and 9 immovable which were, prior to the appointed day of the ownership and possession, power or control of the textile company in relation to the said undertakings. As compensation for the take over of their undertakings, the owners which were specified in the first Schedule were to be paid an amount specified in the said Schedule. The owners of the undertaking Poddar Mills were shown to be Poddar Mills Ltd. and they were paid a fixed statutory compensation of Rs.7,46,30,000/-. In lieu of making such payment by way of compensation, the Act provided that an amount equal to the valuation of the assets of the textile undertaking transferred and vested in the National Textile Corporation under Section 3(2) would be deemed to be the contribution made by the Central Government to the equity capital of the National Textile Corporation and the the National Textile Corporation was required to issue to the Central Government paid up shares in its equity capital having a face value equal to the amount specified 10 in Column-4 of the first Schedule. The Act further provided that, where any liability assumed by the Central Government under the Act was taken over by the National Textile Corporation under Section 27, the Central Government was required to surrender to that Corporation, shares issued to it, having face value equal to the amount to the extent to which the liability had been so taken over by the National Textile Corporation and there upon the share capital of the National Textile Corporation would to the extent of the face value of the share capital so surrendered stands reduced. The Act defined the term owner in wide terms and include the immediate proprietor, lessee or occupier of the textile undertaking taken over under the said Act. j) On 25.31996, there was a bifurcation of the vesting of the 13-mills between two subsidiaries of the National Textile Corporation i.e. NTC(SM) Ltd. and NTC(MN)Ltd. and Poddar Mills was allocated to NTC (MN) Ltd. 11 k) On 31.3.2000, the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 was repealed by the Maharashtra Rent Control, Act, 1999 and by virtue of Section 3(1), the Act was made inapplicable to various legal entities including Public Sector Undertakings and Public Limited Companies having paid up share capital of Rs.1.00 Croree or more . l) On 26.9.2000, the trust issued a notice terminating the statutory tenancy of the defendant No.1. There is no dispute that this notice was received by the defendant No.1 and though it was contended that it also ought to have been served upon the defendant No.2 which was a subsidiary of the company and in which Poddar Mills had been subsequently vested. m) That, ultimately, since the defendants did not handover the vacant possession on 6.12.2002, the plaintiffs filed suit No. T.E.& R. Suit No. 12 311/326/2001 inter-alia praying for a decree directing the defendant No.1 to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the said property and for an order and decree for payment of mesne profits. 3) In the suit, on 25.1.2002, the defendant No.1 filed its written statement contending inter alia that the suit property vested in NTC(NM). In the circumstances, notice was taken out in the suit for impleading NTC (MN) as defendant No.2 and this was allowed by order dated 3.12.2002. NTC (MN) filed a pursis that the written statement filed by the defendant No.1 be treated as its written statement. Ultimately, on the framing of the issues and leading of evidence, the trial court after appreciating the material on record, decreed the plaintiffs suit. The matter was then carried in appeal and as stated aforesaid the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court by its order dated 14.8.2008 dismissed the defendants appeal and 13 confirmed the decree dated 5.8.2006. In such circumstances, the present civil revision application came to be filed on 3.12.2008. Same was admitted and the decree of eviction came to be stayed on condition of deposit of compensation. 4) I have heard both the sides and perused the record. 5) On perusal of the civil revision application, it is seen that three grounds were taken in the revision application. The first ground was that the Rent Act was applicable because the lease hold interest in the suit land vested in the defendants, for and on behalf of the Central Government and that the Central Govt. was effectively the lessee of the premises and would therefore, get protection in view of what was contained in second part of Section 3(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. The second ground as raised in the revision application was that the suit must fail as 14 notice U/s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been given to the defendant No.2 in which the suit property vested. The third ground was that the suit was bad for non joinder of the earlier lessee Poddar Mills Pvt. Limited . 6) At the stage of admission, the counsel stated that though it must be understood that he has not given up any ground he would mainly argue the first ground as raised in the revision. His argument is related to the first ground can be formulated as under. a) That, from the statement of object and reasons of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act,1983 read with the statement of object and reasons for enacting the Textile Undertaking (Nationalization) Act, 1999 it was clear that 1983 Act was enacted because there was mis management of the affairs of the textile undertakings, their financial condition had become 15 wholly unsatisfactory even before the commencement, in January 1982, of the textile strike in Bombay and that after the textile strike their financial condition had further deteriorated. That certain public financial institutions had advanced large sums of money to the companies owning the said undertakings with a view to make the said undertakings viable. That, further investment of very large sums of money was necessary for reorganizing and rehabilitating the said undertakings and thereby to protect the interest of the workmen employed therein and to augment the production and distribution at fair price of different varieties of cloth and yarn so as to sub serve the interest of the general public. The nationalization was subsequently effected in 1995 to ensure the distribution of cloth and yarn to the public at fair price, to protect the interest of the workmen and for reorganizing and rehabilitating the undertakings. It was contended that from these submissions the objects and reasons 16 read with the provisions of the Act it was clear that very large amount of public money was paid out to the owners as specified in 1995 Textile Undertakings (Nationalization) Act, 1995. It was contended that these monies were paid by the Central Government. The majority of shares in the National Textile Corporation were thereafter issued to and owned by the Central Government and thus, though the defendant-companies were Government Companies as well as public sector undertakings, yet they were class apart and of a nature akin to a Government Department. b) That, as the defendants were legal entities akin to a Government Department, they fall within the term  Government as found in the second part of Section 3(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. It may be stated here that the other points were not specifically argued but since it was not specifically given up for the purpose of attending completeness, the same will also be dealt with in 17 later part in this judgment. 7) The reply of the Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs can be summarized as under. a) That, it was an admitted position that the defendants were Government Companies as well as Public Sector Undertakings. That, it was also an admitted position that the defendants were public limited Companies with a paid up share capital of over 1.00 Crore. That, once this was taken to be the admitted position then the defendants were taken out of the purview of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, in view of the provisions contained in Section 13(1)(b) of the said Act. b) That, the share holding of the company was distinct from the company and even assuming that the Central Government held a majority of the shares if not all shares in the defendants company, the company retained its separate 18 identity. In the circumstances, merely because the majority of shares of the defendants company was held by the Central Government, the company could not be said to be legal entity akin to a Government Department. c) That, the matter was no longer res integra and the issue was dealt with and decided by the Apex Court in the judgment of Smt. Leelabai Gajanan Pansare and ors. Vs. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and ors. reported in 2008(6) Supreme 89. In this regard, reliance was placed on the observations made by the Apex Court in Para-47 of the said judgment. d) That, the suit could not said to be bad for want of notice for three reasons which were rightly given by the lower court i.e. i) That it was settled law by the Apex Court that filing of the suit for ejection amounted to a notice for termination. ii) That, it was further well settled 19 law that notice U/s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act could be waived by the lessee and in the present case the defendant No.1 it its written statement had not contended that the notice was required to be given to the defendant No.2 and later, in point of time, when the defendant No.2 had appeared, it has chosen not to file a written statement but merely had adopted the written statement of the defendant No.1. It was thus, contended that the defendant No.2 must be deemed to have waived ground of the suit being bad for want of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. iii) That, on a reading of Section 111(a) of the said Act with Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, it was clear that no notice under Section 106 was required once a tenancy was terminated by efflux of time. 8) I have heard both the sides and perused the record. In my view the revision is required to be dismissed for the following reasons. 20 9) At the outset, for a proper understanding of the contentions, it is necessary to reproduce the Sections 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to act the Rent Act ). The said sections are in the following terms. 3.Exemption-)1) This Act shall not apply- (a) To any premises belonging to the Government or a local authority or apply as against the Government to any tenancy, licence or other like relationship created by a grant from or a licence given by the Government in respect of premises requisitioned or taken on lease or on licence by the Government, including any premises taken on behalf of the Government on the basis of tenancy or of licence or other like relationship by, or in the name of any officer subordinate to the Government authorised in this behalf; but it shall apply in respect of the premises let, or 21 given on licence, to the Government or a local authority or taken on behalf of the Government on such basis by, or in the name of, such officer; b) to any premises let or sub let to banks, or any Public Sector Undertakings or any Corporation established by or under any Central or State Act, or foreign missions, international agencies, multinational companies, and private limited companies and public limited companies having a paid up share capital of rupees one crore or more . 10. Since on behalf of the applicants the contention was that the aforesaid provisions of Section 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) of the Rent Act must be interpreted in the light of the statement and object and other provisions of the Textile Undertaking (Taking over of Management) Act of 1983 and the Textile Undertaking (Nationalization) Act, 1995, at this stage, it would be proper to outline the law relating to the use of Statements 22 and Objects of an enactment as a tool for interpreting the provisions of the said enactment or other enactment. In the case of Kanai Lal Sur Vs.Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in 1957 S.C. 907 the question before the Apex Court was whether a welfare legislation should receive a beneficent construction from the courts and should be given a hypothetical construction on the footing that such a construction was more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act and in Para-6 of the judgment the Apex Court observed as under. . Mr. N.C.Chatterjee, for the appellant, has contended that the object in enacting the relevant Thika Tenancy Act and Ordinances is absolutely clear. It is a piece of welfare legislation and as such its operative provisions should receive a beneficent construction from the courts. If the scheme of the Act and the object underlying it is to afford full protection to the thika tenants, says Mr.Chatterjee, courts should be slow to reach 23 the conclusion that any class of thika tenants are excluded from the benefit of the said Act. In support of his argument Mr.Chatterjee has naturally relied on the observations made by Barons of the Exchequer in Heydon Case. Indeed, these observations have been so frequently cited with aproval by courts administering provisions of welfare enactments that they have now attained the status of a classic on the subject and their validity cannot be challenged. However, in applying these observations to the provisions of any statute, it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must 24 be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the Act purports to remedy and correct . . In the case of Gem Granites Vs, Commissioner of Income Tax T.N. Reported in (2005) 1 S.C.C. 289, the Apex Court considered the relevance of the intention of Parliament and the object of the Statute and observed in Para-15 as under. 25 An argument founded on what is claimed to be the intention of Parliament may have appeal but a court of law has to gather the object of the statue from the language used. What one may believe or think to be the intention of Parliament cannot prevail if the language of the statue does not support that view . . In the case of Rakesh Vij Vs. Dr.Raminder Pal Singh Sethi and others reported in (2005) 8 S.C.C. 504, the question considered by the Apex Court was the relevance of Statement of Objects and Reasons of another enactment while interpreting a different enactment. In this regard in Para Nos. 24 and 25, the Apex Court observed as under. . In our opinion it will not be proper to interpret the provisions of the Chandigarh Extension Act by taking into consideration the Objects and Reasons of another Act and the supposed intention or notions of the law makers. It will be 26 apt to quote here what S.R.Das, J. (as His Lordship then was) said while speaking for a Constitution Bench in Rananjaya Singh Vs. Baijnath Singh (SCR P. 676) . The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their language they work injustice by placing the poorer candidates at a disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament and not to this Court. . This being the position of law, it will not be proper to take into consideration the Statement of Objects and