IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.27 of 2003 Date of decision : May 24, 2010 Jagjit Kumar Soni …Petitioner. Versus Punjab Wakf Board …Respondent. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanjay Dutt Vasudeva, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Javed Khan, Advocate. Surjit Singh, J (Oral) This petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31st March, 2002, passed by learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, exercising the powers of Presiding Officer, Wakf Tribunal, whereby suit filed by Punjab Wakf Board (respondent herein) for permanent prohibitory injunction as also for mandatory injunction, instituted against the defendant-petitioner, has been decreed. 2. Suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendant-petitioner from raising any construction on vacant site where there existed a Mosque, which had been given under a licence to the defendant-petitioner and also for Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? …2… mandatory injunction directing him to demolish the construction, which he may happen to raise. It was stated that there existed a Mosque by the side of road in Nurpur Town. That Mosque was in a dilapidated condition and collapsed. Defendant-petitioner was granted a licence in the year 1982, in respect of the site of that Mosque, with an understanding that he will not be raising any construction thereon, as it was un-islamic to use the Mosque property for a purpose other than Mosque. It was pleaded that in violation of the terms of the licence, defendant-petitioner had started collecting material on the site for construction of some shops and his act was not only contrary to the terms and conditions of the licence but also un-islamic. Suit was initially filed in the Civil Court at Nurpur, but with the constitution of Wakf Tribunal it was transferred to that Tribunal. 3. Defendant-petitioner contested the suit. He admitted that he was a licencee under the plaintiff- respondent and licence Ex. PW-2/D had been executed on 12th July, 1982. He, however, pleaded that he had been permitted to raise construction on the site and that he had commenced the construction in the year 1986, which was completed in 1995. Various objections were also raised. 4. Civil Court framed a number of issues based on the pleadings of the parties. The Wakf Tribunal, to which the case was transferred, decided all the issues in favour of …3… plaintiff-respondent. It was held that the defendant- petitioner had started raising construction on the site, in violation of the terms and conditions of licence and, therefore, plaintiff-respondent was entitled to the decree asked for by it. Consequently, decree of permanent prohibitory injunction as also mandatory injunction was passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 6. An application, under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been moved seeking leave of the Court for leading additional evidence. Evidence, which is sought to be adduced additionally, consists of papers, regarding sanction of electricity connection and the bills regarding payment of electricity charges. All these papers are irrelevant for deciding the present lis, for the simple reason that these papers pertain to an electricity connection sanctioned in favour of the wife of the petitioner, in respect of her residential premises. Licence was granted in favour of the petitioner and not his wife. Also, it is not the case of the petitioner that he has constructed a house on the property, in question. His plea is that he has constructed a hotel. Otherwise also, the papers indicate that the connection has been sanctioned in favour of the wife of the petitioner and it cannot be said that the papers pertain to the structure allegedly raised by the petitioner on the suit site, because as …4… per licence deed Ex. PW-2/D, it is he and not his wife who is the licencee and, therefore, the presumption is that the papers do not pertain to the structure allegedly raised by the petitioner on the suit site. 7. Coming to the merits of the case. A bare look at licence Ex. PW-2/D suggests that licence was revocable by service of fifteen days notice. Had it been a licence, permitting the petitioner to raise construction on the suit site, then the licence could not have been made revocable. Whenever a licencee is permitted to raise construction on the licenced property, such a licence becomes irrevocable, in view of the provision of Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1982. Otherwise also, raising commercial structure, in the form of shops or hotel, on the site of Mosque is un- islamic and the licence deed categorically recites that the site is not to be used for un-islamic purpose. Since the licence was revocable by service of fifteen days notice, the presumption is that the petitioner was not permitted to raise any construction of permanent nature. For the foregoing reasons, I see no merit in the petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. May 24, 2010(sd) ( Surjit Singh ), J