THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR WRIT APPEAL No.1734 OF 2003 AND WRIT PETITION No.27467 OF 2003 17.08.2011 Between: Vallala Chandramouli And others …. Appellants AND Government of A.P., rep. by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad And others. … Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR WRIT APPEAL No.1734 OF 2003 AND WRIT PETITION No.27467 OF 2003 JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice V.V.S.Rao) The dispute in these two matters is with regard to the transfer of Ghanapur village from Siddipet Mandal to Thoguta Mandal. The writ appeal arises out of an order of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition No.19469 of 2002 filed by four villagers of Ghanapur declining to interfere with the notification under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Act, 1974 (the Act, for brevity) issued by the Government creating the new Thoguta Mandal by transferring sixteen villages including Ghanapur to the said Mandal. The writ petition is filed by the Gram Panchayat and other villagers assailing the final notification under the Act. The Government of Andhra Pradesh proposed to form new Thoguta Revenue Mandal in the interest of better administration and development of the area. A notification dated 22.04.2002 under Section 3(5) of the Act was issued calling for objections and suggestions so as to reach the office of the Collectorate, Medak District, on or before expiry of ten days from the date of publication of the notification. The schedule appended thereto gave details of the proposed new Mandal and the particulars of villages to be included therein. Ghanapur village from Siddipet Mandal, eight villages from Kondapak Mandal and seven villages from Mirdoddi Mandal were proposed to be included in Thoguta Mandal. The petitioners statedly sent objections on 04.05.2002, 13.05.2002 and 29.08.2002. Their objection was that Ghanapur is nearer to Siddipet, it has bus and auto facility and if the village is transferred to Thoguta Mandal, which is at a distance of 15 kilo meters; the villagers would face inconvenience and that there is no bus and auto facility to Ghanapur to Thoguta. As noticed, on 05.09.2002, the Government issued notification creating the new Revenue Mandal mentioning that the objections and suggestions have been taken into consideration. The said notification vide G.O.Ms.No.538, dated 05.09.2002 is subject matter of the writ appeal. The writ petition is filed by Gram Panchayat challenging final notification raising similar pleas. They also allege that the inclusion of Ghanapur in Thoguta Mandal is not in accordance with the Act; the Government did not consider the resolution of the Gram Panchayat, Ghanapur, and was issued without application of mind; it was a decision for extraneous considerations to please the local M.L.A., and that the Government did not afford a reasonable opportunity as contemplated under the Act and the Rules. The same submissions were also urged before the learned single Judge in the earlier writ petition. It was contended that when Rule 4(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Rules, 1984 (the Rules) mandated thirty days notice for inviting objections and suggestions, granting ten days to make such objections and then issuing final notification under Section 3(1) and (2) of the Act is unsustainable. The submission was not countenanced by the learned single Judge, who observed that the objections raised by the petitioners were taken into consideration by the Government even before the petitioners’ submitted objections on 22.04.2002 and therefore, no prejudice can be said to have caused to the petitioners. It was also observed that when the law does not contemplate personal hearing, it cannot be claimed as a right especially when the constitution of Gram Sabhas is legislative in character as held by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Tehal Singh[1]. The counsel for petitioners has urged the same grounds which were urged before the learned single Judge. These were refuted by the learned Government Pleader for Revenue (General). There is no dispute or denial that Rule 4 of the Rules requires publication of preliminary notification referred to herein, sub-rules (3) or (4) of Rule 3 requires inviting objections or suggestions and a person affected by the proposal to create a new Revenue Village or new Revenue Mandal may within thirty days from the date of publication of the notification under Rule 4(1) communicate objections or suggestions to any of the officers mentioned therein, including the Secretary to Government in the Revenue Department. In this case, while issuing preliminary notification vide Medak District Gazette (Extraordinary) No.17, dated 22.04.2002, the Government required interested persons to make objections on or before expiry of ten days from the date of publication of notification. The notification ex facie is not in accordance with the Rules. The question, therefore, is does it vitiate the final notification challenged in both the matters. While considering the question posed, the Court, as pointed out by the Government Pleader, cannot ignore the subsequent events. The preliminary notification, under Section 3(5) of the Act, was issued on 22.04.2002, followed by the final notification, under Section 3(1) and (2) of the Act, vide G.O.Ms.No.538, dated 05.09.2002. Whatever be the reason yet another final notification under Section 3(1) and (2) of the Act – though it may be superfluous – was issued and published in the Medak District Gazette on 16.08.2003. As a result of the final notification, Ghanapur village was separated from Siddipet Mandal and stood included in Thoguta Mandal. After the issue of notification during the last about nine years, two elections were held to Ghanapur Gram Panchayat as well as Mandal Parishat Territorial Constituency and Mandal Praja Parishat. The proposal and decision of the Government to create a new Thoguta Mandal by carving the area from out of three Mandals, namely, Siddipet, Kondapak and Mirdoddi Mandals in the interest of public administration and development of areas is now fait accompli. These subsequent events are not denied by the petitioners. The extraordinary jurisdiction to judicial review in administrative decisions under Article 226 is a discretionary relief and it is not a matter of course (C.R.Reddy Law College Employees’ Association v Bar Council of India[2]). It is not a right to seek a remedy. Even if there are errors or mistakes in exercise of powers by the public authority, the Court can decline to exercise the jurisdiction. For instance, if the person seeking remedy has not disclosed all the facts and has not approached the Court with clean hands, or abuses the process of the Court or attempts to play fraud on the Court, the Court can always decline the relief. It is also well settled that unless overwhelming public interest requires interference, even if a decision of the public authority suffers from some vice, the Writ Court would not interfere. While granting relief, the Court has also to consider the competing rights between the individual and the society, if greater harm to society occasions, exercise of power is declined. The power is always exercised in furtherance of public interest and not merely for making a legal point. I n Master Marine Services (Private) Limited v Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (Private) Limited[3], this principle was elucidated as follows (para 15). Even when some defect is found in the decision- making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. To the same effect are the following observations in Air India Limited v Cochin International Airport Limited[4] (para 7). Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene. It is not the case of the petitioners that their objections or suggestions are not considered. The final notification which is the subject matter of the writ appeal and a similar notification impugned in the writ petition clearly records that the Government took into consideration the objections and suggestions received form all persons in the area. This statement is not denied by the petitioners. Therefore, though granting of thirty days time to invite objections and suggestions is what is mandated by Rule 4(2) of the Rules and the same does not in any manner vitiate decision making process. Indeed even if there is a violation of principles of natural justice by non- compliance with Section 3(5) read with Rule 4(2), unless and until palpable prejudice is shown, this Court cannot countenance the submission. It may, however, be observed that, when a statute or the Rules made thereunder prescribe the method and manner of performing public functions, all authorities are required to perform such functions only in accordance with the procedure, method and manner laid down in the statute. Any deviation therefrom would result in invalidation. In the result, for the above reasons, we do not find any strong reasons to interfere with the decision of the learned single Judge and also we do not find any merit in the writ petition as well as in writ appeal. The writ appeal and the writ petition are accordingly dismissed. No costs. _______________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) ___________________ (K.G.SHANKAR, J) 17.08.2011 Pln [1] (2002) 2 SCC 7 [2] 2004 (5) ALD 180 (DB) [3] (2005) 6 SCC 138 : AIR 2005 SC 2299 [4] (2000) 2 SCC 617 : AIR 2000 SC 801