IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO : 17858 of 1998 Between: M.K.Umamaheswaran, S/o.Koteswaran, No.17,Teachers Colony, East Maredpally, Secunderabad. ..... PETITIONER AND4 1 M/s.Union Bank of India, Rep.by its Chairman&Managing Director (Appellate Authority) 239,Vidya Bhavan Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai. 2 General Manager (Personnel)(Disciplinary Authority), 239,Vidya Bhavan Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Aﬃdavit ﬁled herein the High Court will be pleased to to issue a writ,order or direction directing payment of pension and gratuity together with interest at 18% per annum from the date they become due and payable, i.e.,August, 1996, direct payament of sum equivalent to the emoluments of the period of leave accumulated and not availed as on the date of retirement in terms of Rule 38 of UBI Oﬃcers Leave Rules, along with interest at 18% per annum w.e.f.1-8-96 direct payament of compensation for the agony and harassment caused to petitioner in violation of his rights guranteed under part III of the Constitution of India, in terms of the settled law on the subject, and pass Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.A.SITA RAMA RAO Counsel for the Respondent No.: MR.C.R.SRIDHARAN The Court made the following : THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.17858 of 1998 And W.P.M.P.No.24381 of 2006 ORDER: This writ petition is ﬁled by a retired oﬃcer of the Union Bank of India questioning the order of dismissal passed by the 2nd respondent dated 28.11.1996 as conﬁrmed by the order of the 1st respondent dated 31.12.1997. Since the respondents have put in issue the maintainability of the writ petition itself, on the ground that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, it would suﬃce if the facts pleaded with respect to the cause of action are alone taken note of. In his aﬃdavit ﬁled in support of the writ petition, the petitioner submits that, on his retirement, he had settled down at Secunderabad in Andhra Pradesh and that he had earlier rendered 3 years service for the respondents in the regional oﬃce at Hyderabad. In their counter aﬃdavit, the respondents state that the Registered oﬃce of the 1st respondent is at Mumbai, that the articles of charge was served on the petitioner on 3.4.1996 and 6.6.1996 at Mumbai when he was working there as an Assistant General Manager, that the proceedings in the enquiry were held at Mumbai, that the ﬁndings of enquiry oﬃcer were recorded and served on the petitioner at Mumbai, that in reply thereto the petitioner submitted his written submission in Mumbai on 30.7.1996, that the disciplinary authority passed ﬁnal order dated 28.11.1996 in Mumbai, that the petitioner submitted his appeal to the Managing Director/Appellate Authority through post in Mumbai and that the appellate authority had passed the order in appeal at Mumbai on 31.12.1997. According to the respondents, since the oﬃces of both the respondents whose orders are sought to be quashed were at Mumbai, and as no part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner, thereafter, ﬁled an application in W.P.M.P.24781 of 2006 seeking amendment of pleadings incorporating para 31-A therein. The petitioner states that on the basis of the departmental enquiry he was deprived of his pensionary beneﬁts which he was entitled to receive at Secunderabad where he was residing and, therefore, the departmental proceedings assailed in the writ petition had a direct bearing on his pensionary beneﬁts. The petitioner further states that the departmental proceedings were completed during his retirement, that notices sent by the enquiry authority and the disciplinary authority, the order extending the services of the petitioner for the purpose of departmental enquiry, the show cause notice issued by the disciplinary authority in proceedings dated 23.10.1996 and the ﬁnal order of the disciplinary authority were received by him at Secunderabad within the jurisdiction of this Court and that these facts constituted an integral part of the cause of action which had arisen at Secunderabad within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In the counter aﬃdavit ﬁled to the W.P.M.P, the factual averments aforementioned in the proposed para 31-A has not been speciﬁcally controverted by the respondents. I see no reason , therefore, not to allow the application. W.P.M.P.No.24381 of 2006 is allowed and para 31-A is now made part of the aﬃdavit ﬁled in support of the writ petition. The question however, remains whether these facts would suﬃce to constitute a part of the cause of action having arisen within the territorial limits of this Court. Sri A.V.Sesha Sai, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would contend that the petitioner’s legal right has been infringed by the respondents on the order of punishment, and the order rejecting the appeal, being communicated to him within the territorial limits of this Court and that such infringement has resulted in actual injury being caused to him at Secunderabad as it had deprived the petitioner of the pensionary beneﬁts which he was entitled to receive at Secunderabad where he was residing. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra[1], Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd v. Union of India[2], Om Prakash Srivastava v.Union of India [3], Alchemist Limited v. State Bank of Sikkim [4], P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma [5]. He would also rely on a judgment of this Court in A.V.Vinod Kumar v. Executive Committee of the Central Warehousing Corporation, New Delhi[6] and a Division Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in L.V.Veeri Chettiar v. Sales Tax Officer, Mumbai[7]. On the othr hand Sri C.R.Sridharan, learned Counsel for the respondents, would contend that the distinction between right of action and cause of action must be borne in mind and, since no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, even if petitioner’s right of action is held to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, that by itself would not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the writ petition. Learned Counsel would submit that, since the petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the disciplinary/appellate authorities, both of which were passed outside the territorial limits of this Court and, since the enquiry proceedings were held at Mumbai, and the ﬁndings of the enquiry oﬃcer were recorded thereat, all of which had arisen beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court would not entertain the writ petition. Learned Counsel would submit that the mere fact that the order of punishment, or the appellate order, was communicated to the petitioner at Secunderabad did not by itself constitute cause of action justifying invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhageeratha Engg. Ltd.[8], Addl. G.M. Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd v. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde[9] and Alchemist Limited4. It is only if the cause of action, either in whole or in part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, can this Court exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. “Cause of action” is every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiﬀ to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved. (Read v. Brown [10] and State of Madras v. C.P.Agencies[11]). In other words, a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiﬀ a right to relief against the defendant. (State of Rajasthan v Swaika Properties[12] ; Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai[13]; Om Prakash Srivastava3) . It must include some act done by the defendant since, in the absence of such an act, no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. [South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd.[14]; Om Prakash Srivastava3). In a generic and wide sense, (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908), “cause of action” means every fact, which it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment, (Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar[15]; Om Prakash Srivastava3), the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. (Rajasthan High Court Advocates’ Assn. v. Union of India [16]; Om Prakash Srivastava3) . These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiﬀ must fail in his suit. (Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh [17]; Om Prakash Srivastava3). It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiﬀ asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. (Mst. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh[18]; C.P.Agencies11). The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person (Black’s Law Dictionary). In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. (Navinchandra N. Majithia1; Om Prakash Srivastava3). In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.):- “ ‘Cause of action’ has been deﬁned as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiﬀ to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiﬀ his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.” The collocation of the words “cause of action, wholly or in part, arises” seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of Courts. (Navinchandra N. Majithia1). Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered on an interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC apply to writ proceedings also. (Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise[19]; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.2). In order to exercise jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisﬁed, from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action, that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. (Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., [20]). Each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing on the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. (Adani Exports Ltd.20; National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram [21]). Similarly, the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court. (Kusum Ingots & Aloys Ltd2; Eastern Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd v. Coal Controller[22] ). What is necessary to be proved, before the petitioner can obtain a decree, are material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. (Ambica Industries19; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.2). The test is whether a particular fact (s) is (are) of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the lis between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of the cause of action. If it is not, it does not form a part of the cause of action. In determining the question, the substance of the matter and not the form thereof has to be considered. (Alchemist Limited4). High Courts should exercise caution not to transgress into the jurisdiction of other High Courts merely on the ground that some insigniﬁcant event, trivial and unconnected with the cause of action has taken place within the territorial limits of the High Court to which the litigant approaches at his own choice or convenience. (Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu[23] and Navinchandra N. Majithia1). The question whether “cause of action”, either in whole or in part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court must only be decided on the basis of the pleadings. In determining the objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction, the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration, albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it diﬀerently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the writ petition. (Utpal Kumar Basu23). In the absence of an averment that the cause of action, or a part of it, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court the writ petition would be dismissed. (Sarabjit Kaur v. Union of India[24]). Before examining whether the facts pleaded in support of the “cause of action” constitute cause of action in part having arisen within the territorial limits of this Court, it is useful to refer to the judgments relied upon by Sri A.V.Seshasai, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri C.R.Sridharan, Learned Counsel for the Respondents. I n Navinchandra N. Majithia1, the appellant ﬁled a writ petition before the Bombay High Court seeking to quash the FIR/complaint lodged against them in the State of Meghalaya and the writ petition was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. In appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the mere fact that an FIR was registered in a particular State was not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action had arisen even partly within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of another State, that the High Court before which the writ petition is ﬁled must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, which depends upon the facts in each case, that in the present case, a large number of events had taken place in Mumbai in respect of the allegations contained in the FIR registered at Shillong, that if the averments were correct then a major portion of the facts which led to registration of the FIR had taken place at Mumbai and it was therefore not possible to hold that not even a part of the cause of action had arisen at Mumbai so as to deprive the High Court at Mumbai of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd2, the question that arose for consideration was whether the seat of Parliament or the legislature of a State would be a relevant factor for determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant therein was a company registered at Mumbai. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal branch of State Bank of India and a notice was issued for repayment of said loan from Bhopal under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Questioning the vires of the said Act, a writ petition was ﬁled before the Delhi High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed by the Supreme Court. In Om Prakash Srivastava3, a writ petition was ﬁled before the Delhi High Court contending that the appellant was being tried in several cases contrary to the extradition treaty. The appellant had come to India by way of extradition from Singapore and was facing trial in eight cases. He pleaded that he was kept in solitary conﬁnement without proper medical aid in the Central Jail in Uttar Pradesh. The writ petition ﬁled before the Delhi High Court was dismissed holding that the Allahabad High Court would also have jurisdiction to deal with the grievances of the petitioner and can deal with the conditions of prisoners in that State more eﬀectively, though the Delhi High Court may also have jurisdiction. It is in this context that the Supreme Court observed: “…….The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for ﬁling a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court’s jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or thereat thereof……” The Supreme Court further noted that the Delhi High Court had not dealt with the question as to whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition but had merely observed that though it may have jurisdiction, the issues could be more eﬀectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. The Supreme Court held that this was not the correct way to deal with the writ petition and, accordingly, set aside the order of the High Court and remanded the matter for a fresh hearing on merits. In Ambica Industries19, the Supreme Court held that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of a Court, the Court would have jurisdiction in the matter. In Alchemist Limited4, the appellant was a company having its registered oﬃce at Chandigarh. The ﬁrst respondent was the State Bank of Sikkim and the second respondent was the State of Sikkim. The second respondent desired to disinvest 49% of its equity capital to a strategic partner with transfer of management in the ﬁrst respondent- Bank and, for that purpose, issued an advertisement in “Economic Times” inviting oﬀers. The applications were made to the State Bank of Sikkim at its Head oﬃce at Gangtok. The appellant submitted its proposal and negotiations took place therafter. The Chairman and Managing Director of the ﬁrst respondent-Bank visited Chandigarh for further negotiations. The ﬁrst respondent- Bank asked the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.4.50 crores in State Bank of India in a ﬁxed deposit. The ﬁrst respondent-Bank informed the appellant that its proposal was accepted in principle subject to consideration and approval of the Government of Sikkim. The appellant received a communication at Chandigarh from the ﬁrst respondent-Bank informing them that the Government of Sikkim had not approved the proposal. Challenging the said action, a writ petition was ﬁled before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which was dismissed on the ground that the High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as no cause of action had arisen within its limits. It is in this factual context that the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of deciding whether the facts averred by the petitioner-appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one had to consider whether such facts constituted a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action, that, while it was true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, nevertheless it must be a ‘part of cause of action’, nothing else than that. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court was justiﬁed in dismissing the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction. In L.V. Veeri Chettiar 7, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held:- “……Cause of action” has always been understood as referable to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and if a limb of that bundle of facts is available, seen or discernible in one particular place which is a seat of the High Court, then such High Court has the power to exercise all the powers conferred on it under Art.226(1-A) notwithstanding the fact that the authority against whom the ultimate rule has to be issued and whose act has created a cause of action as a whole or in part, is situate outside its territorial limits. The person primarily aﬀected by the respondent issuing the notices from time to time to the petitioners and calling upon them to produce the accounts of their business carried on in the State of Tamil Nadu and again by proposing to assess them to the best of his judgment on the assumption of certain jurisdictional facts, is the addressee of such notice and such aﬀection relates to the bundle of facts in the totality of the lis or proceeding concerned, and such impact necessarily gives rise to a cause of action, though it may be in part. It is established that in ﬁscal laws a proposal to assess forms part and parcel of the machinery of assessment and thus understood, the service of notice to assess and calling upon the petitioner to explain has given rise to a cause of action as is popularly and legally understood and the machinery of assessment has been set in motion and the impact of that motion is felt by the petitioners within the territorial limits of this State. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu………” (emphasis supplied) Likewise, a learned Single Judge of this Court in A.V. Vinod Kumar6, held thus: “…..Admittedly, the petitioner was suspended and charge- sheeted for the misconduct committed by him while he was working as Senior Assistant manager (G), Central Warehousing Corporation, Regional oﬃce at Lucknow. The suspension order was revoked by the 2nd respondent by an order dated 2-4-1987 and the petitioner was directed to report for duty at Central Warehouse, Chandausi. It appears, thereafter, he was transferred as Senior Assistant Manager (G), Central Warehouse, unit-II, Visakhapatnam. The order dated 24-12-1991 passed by the disciplinary authority at New Delhi was communicated to the petitioner while he was working at Central Warehouse Unit- II, Visakhapatnam. Further, he ﬁled an appeal from Visakhapatnam and the same was rejected by