CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH -- CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 Date of decision: 28.01.2011 Balram and otherss ........ Petitioners Versus U T, Chandigarh and others .......Respondent(s) Coram: Hon'ble Ms Justice Nirmaljit Kaur -.- Present: Mr. Suveer Sheokand, Advocate for the petitioners Mr. P K Khindria, Advocate for UT, Chandigarh None for respondents No. 2 and 3 -.- 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgement should be reported in the Digest? Nirmaljit Kaur, J. (Oral) This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR No. 208 dated 26.11.2009 under Section 323, 506, 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 307 IPC added later on, Police Station Sector 14, Chandigarh (Annexure P-1) which was got registered by respondent No. 2 - complainant against the present petitioners on the basis of the compromise dated 08.09.2010 arrived at between the parties. Copy of the same has been placed on record as Annexure P2. In the present case, the aforesaid FIR was registered on the statement of respondents No. 2, who is brother of injured-respondent No. 3 CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 2 against the petitioners with the allegations that they scuffled with his brother-respondent No.3. They gave a danda blow on the head of respondent No. 3 and also gave fist and slap blows. Subsequently, section 307 IPC was also added. However, the matter is stated to have been compromised vide compromise deed dated 08.09.2010. In order to verify the authenticity of the said compromise, this Court vide order dated 29.09.2010, directed the parties to appear before the trial Court. The Trial Court was also directed to record a finding whether any volunteered compromise has been arrived at between the parties. Report in that regard was also called for. In pursuance to the same, vide letter dated 16.10.2010, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh has submitted its report, stating therein, that the complainant, injured and the accused have entered into the compromise voluntarily and have decided not to proceed further with the present case. In Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others reported as 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, the Larger Bench of our own High Court has held that the High Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences, notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C in order to prevent abuse of the process any Court or to secure the ends of justice. In Kulwinder Singh's case, the Larger Bench has also been observed:- “The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 3 enhances the social amity and reduced friction, then it truly is finest hour of justice. Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the court exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rules to prescribe the exercise of such power.” The Apex Court in the case of 'Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab' reported as (2008)4 SCC 582 emphasised in para No. 6 as follows:- “6. We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.” No doubt, the present case is registered under Section 307 IPC and the Court would not have normally accepted the compromise, however, if one goes by the peculiar facts of the present case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the petitioners to cause such grievous injury and Section 307 IPC is not made out. Further, as per the counsel, there was no previous enmity between the parties and the fight took place all of a sudden on the spur of the moment. CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 4 The FIR reads as under :- “Statement of Bittu son of Brigepal, resident of 2860, Sector 20-C, Chandigarh, aged 27 years. Stated that I am resident of the above said address and works as loader at Chandigarh Airport. On 26.11.09 at about 9 pm after hearing the noise of some quarrel, I reached in front of house No. 2854 where Balram son of Dharampal, resident of 2856 Sector 20-C, Chandigarh, aged about 42 years and his maternal nephew Ravi son of Suresh Kumar resident of House No. 2796 Sector 20-C, Chandigarh aged about 21 years were scuffling with my brother Vinod. Later on Sunny and Monu came to the spot, I also tried to rescue my brother but they did not accede. Ravi gave a danda blow in the head of my brother and they gave fist and slap blows and ran away after making him unconscious and while leaving they stated that Vinod you are saved today but will kill you in future Statement is heard which is correct.” It is evident from the above that there was no determination on the part of the accused. After giving a danda blow, the accused persons seems to have fled away from the place of occurrence. As such, the intention is not evident from the said FIR. The weapon used is Danda. The parties are neighbours. It was an outcome of a sudden fight. Thus, Section 307 IPC is not made out. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of B S Joshi and others v. State of Haryana & anr. reported as 2003 (2) RCR (Criminal)888, in para 6 and 11, held as under:- “6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 749], this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 5 exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. 11. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [(1988) 1 SCC 692], it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. Thus, taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, wherein, Section 307 IPC is not made out, the matter has been compromised and the parties are neighbours, there is no impediment in the way of this Court to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C and accept the compromise for quashing of the present FIR and subsequent proceedings arising out of the same in view of the above settled proposition of law. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 208 CRM No. M 26868 of 2010 6 dated 26.11.2009 under Section 323, 506, 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 307 IPC added later on, Police Station Sector 14, Chandigarh (Annexure P-1) and subsequent proceedings arising out of the same are hereby quashed. Allowed in the aforesaid terms. (Nirmaljit Kaur) Judge 28.01.2011 mohan