HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.9279 of 1996 Dated: 02 .03.2007 Between: B.Parvathamma .. Petitioner And A.P.State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Rep by Chairman, & another. .. Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO.9279 OF 1996 ORDER: This writ petition is filed questioning the order of the Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (respondent No.1) in R.O.C.No.1033/SC/95-96 dated 22.11.1995 whereby it has terminated the services of the petitioner. In the proceedings of the first respondent dated 3.11.1993 the petitioner was appointed as a Part-time Sweeper on a monthly wage of Rs.250/- per month to work in the District Forum, Nalgonda. Subsequently, the President of the first respondent in its proceedings dated 13.7.1995 appointed the petitioner as Full- time Sweeper-cum-Chowkidar carrying the time scale of pay or Rs.1375-2375 with effect from 1.7.1995. However, the petitioner’s services were discontinued by the first respondent through his order dated 22.11.1995 which is assailed in this writ petition. This Court while admitting the writ petition, suspended the impugned proceedings in W.P.M.P.No.11411 of 1996 on 26.4.1996. As the said order was allegedly violated, C.C.No.574 of 1997 was filed by the petitioner. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it was stated that in obedience to the interim order dated 26.4.1996, the petitioner was appointed again by proceedings dated 11.4.1997. Recording the said submission the contempt case was closed. The Registrar of the first respondent filed counter affidavit. It is averred in the counter affidavit that since the services of the employees of respondents 1 and 2 are governed by State and Subordinate Service Rules and the respondents 1 and 2 function as State Government offices with Ex-officio Secretary to the Government, Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad acting as head of the department, the petitioner cannot maintain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further averred in the counter affidavit that the government permitted the first respondent to convert the Part-time Sweeper post into Full Time Sweeper- cum-Chowkidar vide G.O.Ms.No.221 Food and Civil Supplies (CSIII) Department dated 28.4.1995 giving regular pay and allowances as per rules; that Part-time Sweeper post is converted into Fulltime Sweeper post involving the duties of guarding valuables and important case files during nights; that as the post of Fulltime Sweeper-cum-Chowkidar not only involves the duty of sweeping the premises of the District Forum, Nalgonda but also guarding the properties and files of the first respondent during nights, the first respondent felt that it is not possible to convert a female Part-time Sweeper into a Full-time Sweeper-cum- Chowkidar and direct her to discharge the duties of a Chowkidar during nights. It was pleaded that for the said reason the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 22.11.1995. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Civil Supplies. Learned government Pleader reiterated the submissions made in the counter affidavit. He submitted that as the post held by the petitioner falls under State and Subordinate Services Rules with the Commissioner of Civil of Supplies and Ex-officio Secretary to Government functioning as the head of the department, it shall be held that the petitioner is employed in connection with the services of the State. He therefore, submits that the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to approach the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. Though this argument looks attractive at the first blush, I find myself in disagreement with the same. Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 which confers jurisdiction on the Administrative Tribunals in the State to the extent it is relevant reads as under: “15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals:- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court [***]23) in relation to – (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State; (b) all service matters concerning a person [not being a person referred to in clause (c) of this sub- section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14) appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the State Government; (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation [or society] or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment. (2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporations [or societies] controlled or owned by the State Government: Provided that if the State Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations [or societies].” State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions are envisaged under Section 9(b) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (for short ‘the Act’) and the said Commission is established by the Government of Andhra Pradesh with the prior approval of the Central Government. While the composition of the state commission is governed by Section 16 of the Act, the salary and other allowances and terms and conditions of the President and Members of the said commissions are governed by the A.P. State Consumer Protection Rules 1987 made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Act. However, the appointment and payment of salaries of the ministerial and other members of staff of the first respondent are not governed by the A.P. State Consumer Protection Rules, nor the Learned Government Pleader brought to my notice existence of any other rules covering these employees. It is evident from the record of this case that it is the President of the first respondent who appointed the petitioner and it is he who removed her as well. The learned Government Pleader failed to show any rules to the effect that the ministerial and other staff appointed by the first respondent and working in it are controlled by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies or that he is designated as Head of the Department. Had that been so the petitioner would have been appointed by the Commissioner and also removed by him. From the mere fact that the State Government would have sanctioned the post to enable running of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum it cannot be assumed that the employees of the Commission automatically come under the direct control of any of the state government departments nor can the first respondent be treated as a part of the state government. The first respondent is created by virtue of the statutory provisions and being a quasi-judicial authority headed by a former High Court Judge, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the first respondent is a part of the State government department and that the petitioner was the state government employee. On a careful reading of Section 15 (1), I am of the considered view that the employees of the A.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum do not fall within any of the clauses of Section 15(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act because they do not belong to any civil service of the State nor she holds any civil post under the State. It is only the service matters which pertain to the service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post or a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment are alone amenable for the jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal. As the petitioner does not belong to any civil service of the State nor she holds any civil post under the State or local or other authority or Corporation or other body controlled or owned by the State Government, Section 15 is not attracted to her case. Even if the provisions of State and Subordinate Service Rules are made applicable to the petitioner, that by itself is not a determinative factor to hold that the petitioner belongs to a service falling within the provisions of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. So long as the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of Section 15 (1)(a) to (c) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, he cannot be non-suited and forced to approach the A.P. Administrative Tribunal. I am therefore, of the view that the petitioner is entitled to maintain the present writ petition for the relief sought for by her. As regards the reason for discontinuance of the petitioner, the impugned order merely reads as under: “The President, A.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission is pleased to issue the following discontinuation order to come into force with immediate effect. The services of Smt.B.Parvathamma, Sweeper- cum-Chowkidar who was appointed on temporary basis in the District Forum Nalgonda are hereby discontinued with immediate effect.” As evident from the afore-extracted order, the first respondent failed to give any reason whatsoever in terminating the services of the petitioner. Though in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent, the petitioner’s termination is sought to be justified on the ground that since the post of Sweeper is converted into Full-time Sweeper-cum-Chowkidar involving guard duties the first respondent held that the petitioner being a woman is not suited for the said post. Undoubtedly, the order terminating the petitioner’s services involves adverse civil consequences to the petitioner and therefore, it should conform to the principles of Natural justice. One of the facets of principles of Natural justice is that the order should be a speaking order. I n COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BOMBAY v GORDHANDAS BHANJI[1] the Supreme Court held that public orders, publicly made cannot be construed in the light of explanation subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in MOHINDER SINGH GILL AND ANOTHER v THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS[2]. This view is being reiterated from time to time. The so called justification which is appearing in the counter affidavit to terminate the services of the petitioner are singularly absent in the order terminating the petitioner’s service. Therefore, this justification which is sought to be given in the counter affidavit for the first time cannot be countenanced. Assuming that the petitioner’s services were terminated for the reasons put forth in the counter affidavit, the same cannot be sustained. Indeed, after the conversion of the Part-time Sweeper post into Full-time Sweeper-cum-Chowkidar, the President of the first respondent appointed the petitioner as Full time Sweeper- cum-Chowkidar in proceedings R.O.C.No.848/Sc/95-96 dated 13.7.1995. Had the first respondent found that the petitioner being a woman was not suited to hold the post of Sweeper-cum- Chowkidar, there would have been no reason for the first respondent to appoint her in the first place and then terminate her services within a few months later. Therefore, the justification which is offered in the counter to terminate the petitioner’s services cannot be accepted. The logical conclusion of the preceding discussion shall be that the termination of the petitioner is unlawful. The petitioner is entitled to continue in the post till her services are lawfully terminated by the respondent by following due procedure. For the reasons aforesaid the writ petition shall succeed. Since the petitioner is continuing in the post of Sweeper-cum- Chowkidar pending writ petition, the respondents are directed to continue the petitioner in the said post. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. ___________________________ C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J DT: .03.2007 Mdaa/Es [1] AIR (39) 1952 SC 16 [2] AIR 1978 SC 851