1 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 09.09.2011 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR W.P.(MD).No.10247 of 2011 and M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2011 Mr.C.Sugathan, S/o.K.Chellappan, Head Constable/Driver : Petitioner Vs. 1. The Director General, Central Industrial Security Force, DG Head Quarters, New Delhi-110 011. 2. The Inspector General, CISF Western Sector Head Quarters, Taloja Complex, Navi Mumbai, Mumbai. 3.The Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu. 4.The Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, BIOM, Kirandul, Madhyapradesh. : Respondents PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records relating to the order of the third respondent in his order dated 30.08.2011 and quash the same. For Petitioner : Mr.D.Malaichamy ORDER The impugned order dated 30.08.2011 of the Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, Tirunelveli District, the third respondent herein, directing the petitioner to proceed on regular posting to the CISF Unit, BIOM Kirandul, is assailed on the grounds that as per Rule 72(1)(ii) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001, the Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force unit, Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, Tirunelveli District, is not the competent authority to issue an order of transfer and, therefore, it lacks jurisdiction; that the impugned order is contrary to the Circular No.1 of 2008 issued by the Directorate General, Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2 Block-13, CGO's Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110 003, that no transfer shall be effected not later than 30th April of the year. The impugned order is liable to be set aside on the ground that the third respondent herein has failed to take into consideration the object of Clause 8(a)(1) (vi) of Circular No.1 of 2008 issued by the Directorate General, Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), Block-13, CGO's Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110 003. which permits extension in the present unit for one year, if the ward is studying in 9th or 11th class. It is further submitted that there is no Automic Energy Central School available at the proposed place of transfer. Therefore, shifting the petitioner from Kudankulam to Kirandul would affect the education of the petitioner's daughter. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner being an Asthmatic patient, it would be very difficult for him to work in the proposed place, which is a hill area. 2. Pleadings and material on record disclose that earlier when the petitioner was transferred from KKNPP Kundakulam to CISF Unit ONGC Khandar, he has made a representation for retention stating that his children are studying in 9th and 2nd standards respectively, at DAE Schools and that posting him to CISF Unit ONGC Khandar should be deferred till the end of the academic session i.e., April, 2011, for which, he would remain grateful to the Inspector General, CISF Western Sector Headquarters, Taloja Complex, Navi Mumbai. Considering the request made by the petitioner, he has been retained in Kudankulam and appropriate orders have been issued, cancelling the earlier transfer order. 3. Material on records further discloses that as the petitioner had been completed more than ten years service in DAE Zone, his name has been forwarded for Inter Unit Transfer-2011. Subsequently, under the orders of IG CISF WS Hqrs S.O.No.20/11, dated 13.04.2011 and DIG CISF WZ II S.O.No.12/11, dated 18.04.2011, the petitioner has been transferred to CISF Unit BIOM Kirundal, against which, the petitioner has submitted a representation in February, 2011, for retention in the same unit on the grounds that the education of his daughter would be affected, who by then, had moved on to standard 10th in AECS Kudankulam. Again, citing the education of his daughter, he has sought for retention till April, 2012. 4. Perusal of the letter written by the petitioner dated 26.07.2011 shows that the request of the petitioner for consideration of the posting order upto the end of the academic year i.e., till April, 2012 has been rejected. The relevant portion of the letter dated 26.07.2011 written by the petitioner seeking for personal interview for redressal of the grievance of cancellation of posting on the ground of education, is extracted as follows: "In this regard, I sent a representation addressed to IG/WS for cancellation of posting upto academic year. But the same was rejected by IG/WS. I would like to appear before Hon'ble DG/CISF for redressal of my personal grievances. Hence, it is requested that I may kindly be permitted for personal interview." 5. Admittedly, for the reasons best known to the petitioner, the order dated 13.04.2011 of IG/WS S.O.No.20/11 and the order dated https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 3 18.04.2011 of DIG/WZ-II S.O.No.12/11, and the order of rejection made by IG/WS have not been appended to the typed-set of papers. 6. Though the learned counsel has relied on Rule 72(1)(ii) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 and further, contended that the Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, is not the competent authority to issue the impugned order, pleadings and material on record show that the order of transfer has been issued by the Inspector General, CISF Western Sector Headquarters and the impugned order is only an order, directing the petitioner to proceed on regular posting to the CISF Unit, BIOM Kirandul and hence, the ground of lack of jurisdiction is liable to be rejected. 7. When the petitioner himself is aware of the orders of transfer dated 13.04.2011 and 18.04.2011, the contention to the contrary, as if the Deputy Commandant, CISF Unit, has issued the order, is nothing but a distorted version of facts. 8. The second contention of the petitioner that the Deputy Commandant, CISF Unit, Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, has failed to consider the object in issuing the said circular to protect the education of the children, cannot be countenanced. As stated supra, earlier, when the petitioner's daughter was studying in 9th standard in DAE School and when the petitioner was shifted to CISF Unit ONGC Khandar (Gujarat), the petitioner has made a representation in September, 2010 to the Inspector General, CISF Western Sector Hqrs, Taloja Complex, Navi Mumbai, requesting that posting to CISF Unit may be deferred till the end of the academic year i.e., April, 2011. The relevant portion of the representation made in September, 2010 is extracted hereunder: "However, I expect that I will be relieved if any of my reliever is reported this unit. In the meantime my children are studying in 9th and 2nd standards at DAE Schools and in case of my posting will be carried out suddenly, then their studies will be disturbed. Hence, it is requested that my posting to CISF Unit ONGC Khandar may please be deferred till ending of academic session i.e. April 2011 for which I will remain grateful for your act of kindness in this regard please Sir." 9. Thus, it could be seen that on the very same ground, the petitioner has made a representation in September, 2010 and that the same had been considered by the higher authorities and that the petitioner has been retained in CISF Unit, KKNPP Kudankulam. When the petitioner himself has made a request for retention upto April, 2011, citing the education of his daughter, who has been studying 9th standard, again the same request has been made, while in 2011, he has been shifted to CISF Unit BIOM Kirandul. 10. Clause 8(a)(1)(vi) of Circular No.1 of 2008 of the Directorate General, Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), Block -13, CGO's Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110 003, reads as follows: "Ors will be permitted an extension in his present https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 4 unit for one year if his ward is studying in 9th or 11th class in the current academic year, He/she will not be given extension in the next year on the ground of 2nd ward/wards studying in 9th or 11th class in the subsequent year if the personnel visualizes such a position, he should seek pre-nature transfer to other unit/sector as the case may, so that his ward/wards can as far as possible be located at the place where they can pass their examinations within his prescribed tenure there." 11. The circular speaks only about the standards 9th and 11th and even otherwise, the request of the petitioner for retention made in the year 2011 had already been considered and rejected. Admittedly, the petitioner has not challenged the rejection also. One of the grounds raised is that there is no Atomic Energy Central Higher Secondary School available at the proposed place. Such contention cannot be countenanced by this Court, as an order of transfer is likely to cause some inconvenience and the same is also dealt with in PALANISAMY v. THE GENERAL MANAGER, TAMIL NADU STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION LIMITED, reported in 2005 (4) LW 604. 12. An order of transfer can be interfered only on the following grounds: (i) if it is tainted with mala fide; (ii) if it is in violation of any statutory rules; (iii) if the authority, who has passed the order of transfer, has no jurisdiction to do so. 13. Some of the decisions of the Supreme Court relating to transfer are as follows: (i) In B.VARADA RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 1986 (II) LLJ 516, the Supreme Court has held that it is well understood that transfer of Government servant, who is appointed to a particular cadre of transferable post from one place to another is an ordinary incident of service and therefore, does not result in any alteration of any of the conditions of service of his disadvantage. The Supreme Court declined to accept the case of the petitioner therein, that he should not be transferred. (ii) In Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 532, this Court has held as follows: "In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to interfere with day-to- day transfer orders issued by the government and its https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 5 subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders." (iii) In 1995 (I) LLJ 854 (N.K.SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the correctness of the order, has observed that no roving inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of judicial review of a transfer scrutinized with reference to the private rights of an individual. It was further held that transfer of a Government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career and that assessment of the quality of men is to be made by superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. (iv) IN THE REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT, MADRAS v. VASUDEVAN, A.K. AND OTHERS reported in 1996 MLJ 153, a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the scope of judicial review in matters of transfers of the Government servant to an equivalent post, at paragraph Nos.19 and 36 has held as follows:- “19. The scope of judicial review in matters of transfer of a government servant to an equivalent post without any adverse consequence on the service or career prospects is very limited being confined only to the grounds mala fides and violation of any specific provision or guideline regulating such transfers amounting to arbitrariness. It is also settled law that for the said purpose, no roving inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of judicial review of a transfer scrutinized with reference to the private rights of an individual. In N.K.Singh V. Union of India and others, (1994)6 S.C.C. 98 at 108, their Lordship said: “...Assessment of worth must be left to the bona fide decision of the superiors in service and their honest assessment accepted as a party of service discipline. Transfer of a government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. Several imponderables requiring formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of that hierarchical superiors to make that decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infructuous of any professed nor on or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinized judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising all transfers and the courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated. In the same decision, further down, in paragraph 24, they have said thus: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 6 “...Challenge in courts of a transfer when the career prospects remain unaffected and there is no detriment to the government servant must be eschewed and interference by courts should be rare.... ... ... ....” 36. In this connection, it is also better to remember a decision of this Court reported in Dr.M.Krishnamoorthy v. The State of Madras, (1951) 1 M.L.J. 709: A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 882: 1951 M.W.N. 410. That was a case where the petitioner therein challenged his dismissal. While considering the same, this Court held that the Government or management is entitled to consider the question of inefficiency, insubordination and general reputation of corrupt conduct of a Government servant. As stated earlier, the relationship of Master and Servant is being put an end to by the order of dismissal. When the Government is competent to consider the efficiency and reputation of a Government servant, it is not only for the purpose of taking punitive action, but also to consider whether he should be allowed to continue in a particular place of employment. In the said decision, it was stated thus: “It is however contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is another implied requirement that civil servants in the position of the petitioner can be dismissed or removed only for misconduct and at one stage of the argument he even went to the extent of contending that in the case of a charge like corruption, the petitioner must have beeen convicted by a criminal court for that offence, or, in any event, that this Court must be satisfied in the exercise of criminal appellate jurisdiction so to say, that there was evidence on which a conviction could be supported. We see nothing of this sort laid down in Art.311 or in any other article of the Constitution. It is nowhere stated on what ground a civil servant might be dismissed or removed. One can conceive of a dismissal or removal being justified on grounds of inefficiency, insubordination of (sic) general reputation of corrupt conduct. ... (Italics supplied) An employee is expected to work with all devotion, honestly and integrity. The employer is also entitled to assess the performance of the employee. It cannot be disputed that the employer is entitled to consider the suitability of the person to a post. Similarly the employer is also entitled to consider whether his employee is suitable to work in a particular place or to continue there. If, during the assessment, the employer finds that the work or the performance of the employee is not satisfactory, or in case where the employee, while discharging his duties, has to mingle with the members of the public (in this case, the litigant public), which gives room for complaints in the nature of bad faith, corruption, etc., that will also be an added reason for the employer to find that his staff can discharge his duties in a better way in another place. Such an assessment is not in the nature of any punishment. It is only to avoid or minimise any future complaint or give the employee a better opportunity in a better atmosphere, he is asked to work in a different place, under an order of transfer. Such an order cannot be considered as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 7 a punishment, nor can the same be characterised as a stigma cast on him, as alleged by the petitioner in each one of these writ petitions under consideration.” (v) In Havaldar Charan Singh v. Union of India, reported in 2000 (6) SLR 715, it is held that the transfer of a member of the disciplined force on administrative grounds cannot be interfered with by the Court. (vi) IN PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF U.P AND ANOTHER, reported in 2003 (4) SCC 104, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the scope of Judicial Review in transfer is very limited as it is an incidence of service and normally should not be interfered with by Courts. (vii) In State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, reported in (2004) III LLJ 749 SC, the Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court, which interfered with the order of transfer and in paragraphs 7 and 8 held as follows: "7. It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the courts or tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that courts or tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 8 authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer." (viii) IN STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER v. SIYA RAM AND ANOTHER, reported in 2004(7) SCC 405, the Supreme Court held that no Government servant or employee of the public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. (ix) In J.K.Bansal v. Union of India, reported in AIR 2005 SCW 4079, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the question of transfer and in paragraph 12 held as follows: "12. It will be noticed that these decisions have been rendered in the case of civilian employees or those who are working in Public Sector Undertakings. The scope of interference by courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The Courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made." (x) A Division Bench of this Court while considering the contentions of the petitioner that two children were studying in Class IX and if any transfer is effected that would cause hardship, in PALANISAMY v. THE GENERAL MANAGER, TAMIL NADU STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION LIMITED, reported in 2005 (4) LW 604, at paragraph No.4 has held as follows:- “4.Learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that the transfer order does not contain reasons. This argument is also based on a misconception. A transfer order is a purely administrative order and not a judicial or quasi judicial order. The Writ Petition is dismissed.” (xi) In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. KASHMIR SINGH AND ANOTHER, reported in 2010 (13) SCC 306, the Supreme Court has held as follows:- “12.Transfer ordinarily is an incidence of service, and the courts should be very reluctant to interfere in transfer orders https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 9 as long as they are not clearly illegal. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. The administrative authorities concerned may be of the opinion that more policemen are required in any particular district and/or another range than in another, depending upon their assessment of the law and order situation and/or other considerations. These are purely administrative matters, and it is well settled that courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restrain, vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India. 14. In our opinion, the High Court has taken a totally impractical view of the matter. If the view of the High Court is to