THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH WRIT PETITION NO.12475 of 2009 ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed) This petition is filed seeking a writ of certiorari, calling for record relating to the proceedings No.RDE (HCS) No.2/2009- Estt. Dated 15-5-2009 issued by the respondent – High Court of Andhra Pradesh and quashing the same as arbitrary and illegal. 2. The petitioner while working as steno-typist in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Narsapur, is stated to have made a complaint to the effect that the Subordinate Judge (Presiding Officer) caught hold of her and dragged her into the toilet of his chambers and ravished her and that the officer consoled her by promising to marry her after his promotion as Additional District Judge. It is stated that due to certain developments in the year 1996, the petitioner attempted to commit suicide and basing on the suicide note, a criminal case was registered against the Presiding Officer and the petitioner, who is a victim, had deposed as PW-1 and he was tried in Sessions Case No.228 of 2001 on the file of III Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, for the offence punishable under Sections 417 and 376 of Indian Penal Code and the petitioner, who is a victim, had deposed as PW-1 and ultimately, he was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment on two counts. He preferred an appeal vide Crl.A.No.979 of 2002 before the High Court challenging his conviction and sentence. In the appeal, the offence under Section 417 of Indian Penal Code was permitted to be compounded and the appeal was therefore heard against the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court for the offence under Section 376 IPC. The High Court acquitted the officer of the offence under Section 376 IPC in its judgment dated 14-3-2008, but made certain observations regarding the conduct of the petitioner herein during the discharge of official duties. The said observations of the High Court in its judgment in Crl.A.No.979 of 2002 dated 14-3-2008 form the basis for initiating the departmental proceedings under Rule 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CC&A) Rules, 1991 (for short ‘the Rules’), which is challenged in this writ petition. 3. Heard Ms. Uma Devi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Ms. M.Bhaskara Lakshmi, learned standing counsel for respondent – High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that deposition of the petitioner in the criminal case cannot be the basis for initiation of disciplinary proceedings under Rule 20 of the Rules. She further contended that the charge sheet was issued for an incident that occurred in the year 1994 i.e. after 15 years and thus, there is inordinate delay and the petitioner will be put to serious prejudice in defending her case, therefore the charge sheet has to be quashed. Learned counsel further contended that the deposition/evidence given by a witness in a criminal trial cannot be used against such witness in any proceedings. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in BIJLANI Vs. UNION OF INDIA [1], S.K.RAMULU Vs. REGIONAL MANAGER, APSRTC, NALGONDA[2], B.C.CHATURVEDI Vs. UNION OF INDIA [3], and STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS. BANI SINGH [4]. 6. Learned standing counsel for the respondent contended that pursuant to the observations made in the judgment rendered on 14-3-2008 in the criminal appeal filed by the Presiding Officer, the departmental proceedings are initiated vide Order dated 15-5-2009, therefore there is no delay muchless inordinate delay. She relied upon the decision in STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. BANI SINGH (4 supra) and contended that the delay has to be considered with reference to facts of each case. 7. Having heard either side and having perused the petition averments and the charge-sheet, it is seen that the departmental proceedings are initiated on the basis of the deposition, and the observations made by the High Court in Crl.A.No.979 of 2002 in its judgment dated 14-3-2008, which read as follows: “19. It is admitted fact that PW-1 was a post-graduate and was aged 26 years as on the date of her joining as Steno-Typist in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Narsapur. It is her version that the accused ravished her for the first time in October, 1994 against her will and subsequently promised her to marry which he failed to fulfil. It is admitted by her that she had intercourse with the appellant/accused on various occasions at various places. For better appreciation, I may refer the relevant portion of the cross-examination of PW-1 in her own words and it is thus: “ …. He had sexual intercourse with me for more than 10 times. I did not find any salient physical features on his person. A week day after the commission of the 1st rape, he has committed the 2nd rape on me. I did not give any transfer application in writing to the accused. Witness adds that I orally requested him to forward my application. I did not request even our union leaders to make some efforts for my transfer from Narsapur to some other place while the accused was working as Sub Judge, there…” Her version of the accused committing rape on her for the first time in October, 1994 is contradicted by her own statement which formed the basis for registering a case in Crime No.96 of 1996. The relevant portion of her statement has been extracted supra. She voluntarily made a statement that her physical union with the appellant/accused is subsequent to his promise to marry after getting promotion as Additional District Judge. Indisputably, the appellant/accused is a married man and father of two children. This fact is very much within the knowledge of PW-1. Her version that the appellant/accused ravished her in the toilet in the month of October, 1994 proved to be highly doubtful by her own statement, certified copy of which has been exhibited as Ex.D-1. Had there been any incidents in October and November, 1994, she should have definitely stated those incidents in Ex.D-2 statement which happens to be the virgin version of her affair with the appellant/accused. In short, her version about the first incident of rape bristles with improbabilities, improvements and exaggerations. I have gone through the bunch of letters, which have been marked as Ex.P-1. The text of the letters indicates that they traveled beyond the relationship of the Officer and the Steno-Typist. Their conduct is condemnable. Both are to be held responsible for overstepping their official association. It is not a case to pardon the act of the victim – PW-1 and fasten criminal liability on the appellant/accused. Certain admissions made by PW-1 in cross-examination suggest that both of them accommodative to each other. For better appreciation, I may refer the evidence of PW-1 in her own words and it is thus: “… The accused used to visit me at Bheemavaram once in a month or once in two months, after he transferred to Visakhapatnam. We used to treat him as our family member. My brother did not object for our privacy or for the visits of the accused. I did not send Laxmipathi to Visakhapatnam when the accused stopped to visit me since January, 1996…” This statement creates a doubt on her version that she was subjected to sexual intercourse in spite of her resistance. The conduct of PW-1 in continuing her association with the appellant/accused even after his transfer from Narsapur to Visakhapatnam in April, 1995 for a period of about an year clearly suggests that her questionable relationship with appellant/accused at any rate is not against her will. Therefore, the evidence brought on record is wholly insufficient to conclude that PW-1 was not a consenting party. The convicting recorded by the trial court for the offence under Section 376 IPC is vitiated by non-consideration of material evidence and relevant factors emerging from the prosecution evidence and therefore, the same cannot be sustained.” 8. The observations of the criminal charges are that the petitioner and the Presiding Officer travelled beyond the relationship of the Officer and the Steno-Typist; their conduct is condemnable, both are to be held responsible for overstepping their official association, both are mutually accommodative to each other and it is not a case to pardon the act of the victim – PW-1 and fasten criminal liability on the appellant/accused. Thus, the petitioner and the Presiding Officer have crossed their limits in the office premises and during the official discharge of duties and on this premise, the disciplinary enquiry is sought to be initiated pursuant to the said observations of this Court in Crl.A.No.979 of 2002 in its judgment dated 14-3-2008. Thus, petitioner has already been issued charge sheet in view of the conduct as recorded in the judgment in the criminal appeal filed by the Presiding Officer. Apart from that, the petitioner’s contention that the evidence given by the petitioner in the criminal case cannot be used against her, cannot be accepted in view of the observations of the High Court in the judgment in the criminal appeal that the petitioner and Presiding Officer have overstepped their official association and both of them are accommodative to each other and thus deprecated their conduct and that the enquiry is based on deposition as well as the observations in the said judgment of High Court, which were not expunge by the Apex Court. Coming to the aspect of delay, the observations are made in Crl.A.No.979 of 2002 vide judgment dated 14-3-2008 and the enquiry is initiated vide order dated 15-5-2009 on the basis of said observations and thus, there is no delay. 9. Apart from the above, the deposition in S.C.No.228 of 2001 on the file of III Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, is also made the basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings. The judgment in S.C.No.228 of 2001 was subjected to appeal before the High Court in Crl.A.No.979 of 2002 and the deposition of the petitioner as PW-1 in the criminal case was under consideration by the High Court and the conduct of the petitioner was highlighted and deprecated in the judgment in the said criminal appeal. Thus, the High Court could not initiate disciplinary enquiry at the earliest time and after the judgment in the criminal appeal, the High Court had initiated the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner and also the Presiding Officer. 10. Having regard to the circumstances under which the charge-sheet came to be issued, we do not find any jurisdictional error in issuing charge-sheet against the petitioner and further, the scope of certiorari jurisdiction is narrow and limited. 11. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. ____________________ GHULAM MOHAMMED, J. ______________ G.CHANDRAIAH, J 13th July, 2010. bsc [1] (2006) 5 SCC 88 [2] 2001 (4) ALD 535 [3] (1995) 6 SCC 749 [4] 1990 Suppl (1) SCC 738