THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.21013 of 2001 ORDER: The Electricity Boards across the country have been conferred monopoly with the hope that they would effectively generate and distribute the power supply to the satisfaction of the consumer without any profit motive. Experience has only shown that generation was far below than the demand. In the ordinary course, when situations of that nature arise, introspection will be made and methods would be invented to avoid any inconvenience to the consumer. However, with each spell of acute shortage of power, the Electricity Boards, particularly in the State of Andhra Pradesh, have stood to benefit by levying penalty on excessive consumption. As though it is not sufficient, surcharge is levied on the delayed payment by stretching the logic beyond even absurd levels. The petitioner is a HT consumer and was released power supply in March 1987 with CMD at 125 KVA. Hardly within one month, power cuts were imposed to the extent of 85% of the recorded maximum demand or contracted demand, whichever is less. The petitioner was levied a sum of Rs.30,000/- and Rs.1,15,000/- towards penalty for the months of April and May, 1987 respectively. The Penalty levied for the month of April 1987 was paid. However, as regards the penalty of Rs.1,15,000/-, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.No.8068 of 1987. Several contentions, such as that the figures mentioned by the respondents were not accurate, the entitlement of the petitioner for 25% subsidy was not extended etc., were raised. The writ petition was disposed of on 19.06.1987 directing restoration of power supply, on payment of Rs.30,000/- and leaving it open to the petitioner to make a representation to the respondents narrating its grievance. The respondents, in turn, were required to take necessary action on the representation, as they deem fit. The petitioners submitted a representation, dated 26.07.1987, and made a deposit of Rs.30,000/-. Power supply was restored, but nothing was forthcoming as to the grievance of the petitioner, almost for six years. Being in need of clearance certificate, the petitioner paid the balance of penalty also. Ultimately, it was only on 14.09.2001 that the Chief Engineer, A.P.Transco, respondent No.2 herein, rejected the representation of the petitioner. This, in turn, was followed by levy of surcharge of a sum of Rs.1,69,026/- under different heads, upon the penalty of Rs.96,679/- up to 25.09.1993. The petitioner feels aggrieved by the levy of surcharge. It contends that there was absolutely no basis for the respondents to levy surcharge, whatever may have been the justification for imposing the penalty. On behalf of the respondents, a counter-affidavit is filed. It is stated that the imposition of penalty was upheld by referring to the relevant facts and that the surcharge is payable under specific provisions, which were upheld by the Courts. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. There is some dispute as to whether the petitioner has crossed the restrictions imposed on power consumption at all. However, it is too late in the day for this Court to address that question. The period for which the penalty was levied is relatively less and at any rate, the petitioner itself was reconciled to the imposition of penalty and accordingly paid it. The narrow controversy is about the levy of surcharge on the belated payment of the penalty. It is no doubt true that the respondents are empowered to levy surcharge almost in the form of penal interest, on the amounts, which remain unpaid during the pendency of proceedings before a Court of law. Viewed in this context, the present levy could have been justified, had it been for the period covering pendency of proceedings before this Court. In the instant case, the petitioner approached this Court at the earliest, by filing W.P.No.8068 of 1987, feeling aggrieved by the penalty levied for the month of May, 1987. The writ petition was disposed of at the stage of admission, itself with certain directions. The entire matter was left to be determined and decided by the respondents themselves on a representation that may be made by the petitioner. Therefore, the ball fell squarely within the court of the respondents to decide the issue. It is rather astonishing to note that respondent No.2, whose function is to adjudicate the claims of this nature has taken 14 years, to give a reply to the petitioner stating that he does not find any basis to interfere with the imposition of penalty against the petitioner. If the delay did not result in penal consequences vis-à-vis the petitioner, there would not have been any grievance about it. The provision that enables the respondents to levy surcharge on delayed payment appears to have become handy for them. Fortunately, in this case, the petitioner realized the imminent danger resulting from the inaction on the part of respondent No.2 and volunteered to pay the balance of penalty in the year 1993. It took respondent No.2 six years thereafter to give his verdict. The only reason that appears to have prompted him even to pass that order was to levy surcharge. The approach of the Chief Engineer on adjudication was in no way different from functioning of their organization, in generation and supply of power. This Court takes serious exception to the attitude exhibited by the respondents towards their consumers and virtually treating them as their enemies. They do not appear to be conscious of the fact that their survival depends upon the well-being of the consumers. It is very much doubtful or at least debatable as to whether the respondents can levy surcharge for the period during which the proceedings were pending before the departmental authorities, in contradistinction to Courts. At any rate, two months time was more than sufficient for respondent No.2 to consider the representation made by the petitioner, particularly when the dispute was not adversarial in nature. Every aspect of the matter was within the know of the respondents and virtually their word was final. Therefore, they cannot be permitted to levy surcharge for a period exceeding two months from the date on which the representation was made by the petitioner, to respondent No.2. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is modified to the extent that the respondents shall be entitled to levy surcharge on the amount of Rs.96,679/- for a period of two months from 26.07.1987, on which date the representation is said to have been made by the petitioner. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY,J Dt:23.03.2010. Note: L.R. copy to be marked. kdl