THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH S.A.NO.1068 OF 2008 JUDGMENT Heard both the counsel. 2. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 19.8.2004 passed by the court of II Additional District Judge, Ongole in A.S.No.153/2001 in dismissing the appeal and thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 20.7.2001 passed by the court of Senior Civil Judge, Kandukur in O.S.No.22/1996, in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for declaring of right and title and for consequential injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession, the unsuccessful 1st defendant before both the courts below, filed the present second appeal. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as per their array in the original suit. 4. The plaint schedule property is situate within the limits of Pamur Grama panchayat, Prakasam Registration District – Kanigiri Sub Registration – Pamur Revenue Mandal – Pamur village, consisting of north to south 48 years and east to west 5 ½ yards of site bounded by: East: House wall of Banala Bhagavan (he purchased the said site from Muppasani Gopala Krishnaiah). South: Road. West: Muppasani Somaiah’s vacant place. North: Compound wall of Yelusuri Satyanarayana (he purchased the said site from Krishna Murty and Krishna Murthy purchased from Pesla Mohan Rao). Including the tilted house having door no.2-65 in the schedule property. 5. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit schedule property belong to his father Pesala Narasimham of Pamur village and his father is having seven sons viz., Hariyanarayan, Someswara Rao (D-1), Subba Rao, Krishna Murthy, Mohan Ra (D-2), Satyanarayana, Lakshminarayana (plaintiff) and one daughter by name Satyavathi. Prior to 1965, the eldest son, Harinarayan, divided from the joint family of Narasimham and took away his share and on 20.8.1965, the second son i.e., the 1st defendant, divided from the rest of the joint family and agreed to take an amount of Rs.5,000/- towards his share and on the same day, he took Rs.3,000/- and executed a relinquishment deed and subsequently, on 9.2.1966 he received the remaining amount of Rs.2,000/- and endorsed the same on the relinquishment deed and in the year 1968, he executed a registered relinquishment deed. In the year 1973, Narasimham, excluding the first son and the second son (D-1), divided the joint family property and a separate list was prepared for each of their respective shares and each one got equal shares over the joint family property and since then they are in separate possession and enjoyment. In the year 1976 Narasimham died and on 27.4.1979 the wife of Narasimham, Subamma, the plaintiff, D-2 and other brothers, who were divided in the year 1973, rationed the share of Narasimham and obtained parikattu and subsequently the plaintiff paid stamp duty in respect of his share. In the said partition (parikattu), it was specifically mentioned that the suit schedule property fell to the share of the plaintiff, which is shown as item no.2 in ‘F’ marked property. In the year 1987, the plaintiff constructed a titled house, which was approved by the Gram Panchayat authorities and the name of the plaintiff was also mutated in the panchayat records in respect of the schedule house and since then the plaintiff has been paying house tax and the said house was allotted D.No.2/65 and electricity service connection bearing no.1202 was also given in the name of the plaintiff. The plaintiff let the house to one Jaya Ramireddy and later in the year 1990, it was let out to one Peramaa Srinivasachari and he was collecting the rent. The Gram Panchayt authorities also issued a certificate in respect of the schedule property. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff is that as he is in possession and enjoyment of the property over and above the statutory period, he perfected the title by adverse possession, besides his original title. While so, on coming to know about the order of attachment of his property in O.S.No.76/87 on the file of Principal District Munsif Court, Kavali by the defendants alleging that the property belonged to the 1st defendant, he filed I.A.No.238/88 in O.S.No.76/87 and when the said I.A. was dismissed for default, he filed C.M.A.No.10/94 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Kavali and when the same also met with the same fate, he preferred revision before the High Court. The plaintiff also learnt that the 1st defendant filed R.C.C.No.1/94 on the file of Munsif Court, Kanigiri alleging that the plaint schedule property belong to him and that he let out to one Peramunuri Srinivschari and the same is pending. Hence, the case of the plaintiff is that he is under the suspicion that the defendants colluded to grab the property illegally and unlawfully. Therefore, he filed the suit for declaration and for consequential injunction. 6. Defendants 2 and 3 were set ex parte. 7. The 1st defendant filed written statement and while admitting that the plaint schedule property is one of the items of the joint family and that he got divided in the year 1963 by executing a relinquishment deed and that in the year 1973 there was a partition; further stated that when there was a proposal for partition, on the request, he went to Pamuru and his father in the capacity of manager of the joint family, sent for six note books by allotting properties for each sharer over movable and immovable properties and that after he mentioned the suit schedule property in the note book of the plaintiff, other brothers objected and to resolve the dispute, his father arranged to give the schedule property to him for a value at which it was purchased and the said fact was mentioned in the account book of his father and since the other brothers agreed, the entry in the note book of the plaintiff was not struck of. After the death of his father in the year 1976, he demanded a written document from the plaintiff and other brothers, though the other brothers agreed, the plaintiff did not agree and when the plaintiff attempted to sell the property, he obtained a registered document from the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff instituted criminal cases and they ended in dismissal. As he is indebted to D-3 under a promissory note, he filed suit in O.S.No.76/1987. After referring to the petitions filed by the plaintiff, the 1st defendant further stated that he is not aware of the document dated 27.4.1979. With these averments inter alia, he sought for dismissal of the suit. 8. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the partition document dated 27.4.1979 is true and valid? 2. Whether the plaintiff’s father arranged sale of the plaint schedule properties to the defendants and whether the said sale is true? 3. Whether the decision in O.S.No.76/1987 I.A.No.173/87 operates as resjudicata? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and injunction? 5. To what relief? 9. In support of the case of the plaintiff, he got examined himself as P.W.1 and also got examined P.Ws.2 and 3 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-14. On behalf of the defendants, the 1st defendant was examined as D.W.1 and he got marked Exs.B-1 to B-18. 10. Appreciating the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, the trial court decreed the suit as prayed for and the in the appeal filed by the defendants, in A.S.No.153/2001 on the file of II Additional District Judge, Ongole, the judgment and decree of the trial court was confirmed by judgment and decree dated 19.8.2004. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees of both the courts below in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for declaration and injunction, the 1st defendant filed the present second appeal. 11. In the second appeal, the following grounds were sought to be raised: 1. Whether the judgment of the appellate court below without framing any points for consideration is legally sustainable under Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. 2. Whether Ex.A-3 partition deed is admissible into evidence for want of registration in compliance under Sec.17(1) of the Indian Registration Act? 3. Whether Ex.A-1 partition deed in the note book is admissible into evidence for want of stamp duty in compliance under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act and registration and in compliance under Section 17(1) of Indian Registration Act? 4. Whether for non-production of the note book of the father containing the details of partition having possession there of, an adverse inference is to be drawn against the plaintiff under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act? 5. Whether the suit is maintainable when the alternative remedy under Order 38 Rule 8 and Order 21, Rule 58 of C.P.C. is available? 6. Whether the appellate court below misread, misinterpreted and ignored the evidence available on record? 12. In order to consider whether the above grounds would constitute substantial questions of law and whether the concurrent findings of both the courts below warrants any interference, it is necessary to note the case of both the parties and the evidence available on record. 13. There is no dispute with regard to the relationship between the parties and certain facts are admitted by both the parties. It is admitted that the suit schedule property is one of the items of the joint family properties, that the 1st defendant relinquished his right in the suit schedule property by executing a registered relinquishment deed dated 20.8.1965, marked as Ex.A-2 and there was a partition in the year 1973. Before proceedings, it is pertinent to note the objection raised by the counsel for the appeallant with regard to the admissibility of the partition deed executed in the year 1973. The factum of partition is admitted by both the parties and no objection with regard to its admissibility was raised and the trial court did not also formulate any issue. Therefore, even in the absence of Ex.A-1, the factum of partition was admitted by both the parties and hence admitted case need not be proved. Therefore, the objection in this regard cannot be sustained. 14. Till the aspect of partition and the relinquishment of the right of the 1st defendant in the suit schedule property by virtue of Ex.A-12, there is no dispute. The case of the plaintiff is that in the year 1973 the suit schedule property was divided among his father i.e., Narasimha and other brother excluding the first brother and the 1st defendant, who were separated in the years 1965 and 1968 respectively and after the death of his father in the year 1976, on 27.4.1979 his share was divided by plaintiff and his mother and the other brothers, excluding 1st defendant and the said partition it was categorically mentioned that the suit schedule property fell to the share of the plaintiff and further the plaintiff also paid necessary stamp duty and it was marked as Ex.A-3. On the other hand the case of the 1st defendant is that in the partition, which took place in the year 1973, the allotment of plaint schedule to the plaintiff was objected by other brothers and, therefore, his father proposed to the sell the said property to him on payment of the value, at which it was purchased and further the 3rd defendant executed a sale deed in his father. It is further stated that at the time of partition, his father gave six note books for allotment of their shares and though the allotment of share in respect of the suit schedule property was entered in the book of the plaintiff, it was not struck off. The 1st defendant has not produced any documentary evidence in support of his case and though he stated that he obtained a registered sale deed in his favour, no such deed was produced before the court and he produced Ex.B-13, an agreement of sale said to have executed by his other brothers except the plaintiff. The version of the 1st defendant is contradictory. Because he stated that he obtained registered sale deed, but he filed agreement of sale and he also did not take any steps for specific performance of the sale against the other defendants. Further when the suit schedule property belong to the joint family and when he has no right, as he relinquished the joint property, there is no justification in obtaining agreement of sale from other brothers, except the plaintiff. Further, the defendants 2 and 3 set ex party and he also did not choose to examine them to prove his case. Therefore, the courts below rightly disbelieved his case. 15. As noted above, the case of the plaintiff is that he got the suit schedule property by virtue of the partition under Ex.A-3, which is a registered document, after the death of his father and in the said document it is categorically stated that the suit schedule property fell to his share ad that he constructed a tiled house in the said land and it was approved by the gram panchayat and electricity connection was also given in his name and that he also paid property tax. The plaintiff got marked Exs.A-4 to A-11. Based on these facts and circumstances and the evidence available on record, both the courts below found that the plaintiff proved his case. 16. Though the defendant no.1 contended that he purchased the suit schedule property from 2nd defendant he has not produced any such document and he produced Ex.B-13, which is an agreement of sale executed by his brother except the plaintiff. It is to be noticed that admitted the plaintiff is also having share in the suit schedule property, but he has not a party to the execution of Ex.B-13 and further the said agreement of sale was said to be have been executed on 24.1.1984, but the defendant has not taken any steps for obtaining any registered sale deed. Further, the other defendants were set ex parte and they were not examined to support his case. 17. The next aspect is that the case of the 1st defendant is that during 1973 when the other brothers did not agree for giving the suit schedule property to the plaintiff, his father in order to resolve the dispute arranged to give the property to him at the value it was purchased and the same was also mentioned in the account book of his father. But the said book was produced and the other brothers were also not examined to prove this aspect. 18. The other claim of the defendant is that he leased out the suit schedule property to one P.Srinivasulu on rent and that as he failed to pay the rent, he filed R.C.C.No.1/1994. First of all the 1st defendant shall prove that he constructed the house. He did not place any evidence in this regard. Therefore it is clear that the 1st defendant failed to substantiate his case and on the other hand the plaintiff proved his case with specific evidence, both oral and documentary. 19. The other contention sought to be raised by the 1st defendant is that as the I.As. filed in I.A.No.173/87 in O.S.No.76/1987 and C.M.A.No.10/1994 and C.R.P.No.490/1995 were dismissed, the judgment thereof, would operate as resjudicata. This contention, has no legs to stand, since the said cases were dismissed for default and both the courts rightly recorded finding in this regard. 20. The next contention is since there is alternative remedy by way of claim petition under Order 21, Rule 58, the plaintiff ought to have availed remedy under the said provision in O.S.No.76/1987. Considering Order 21, Rule 58, the courts below rightly held that the claim proceedings are not conclusive and the suit can be brought and further the suit is the only remedy available to the plaintiff. 21. The other grievance of the 1st defendant in this appeal is that the lower appellate court has not framed specific issue for consideration and hence the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is not in conformity with Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. A perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, I am of the considered view, that the lower appellate court by re-appreciating the entire evidence and the material available on record and by dealing with all the issues which are at controversy, dismissed the appeal and hence non-framing of issues for consideration, will not vitiate the judgment. A Division Bench of this court in ALI MOHAMMOD v. SPL. COURT UNDER A.P. LAND GRABBING (PROHIBITION) ACT[1], considering Order 41, Rule 31 of C.P.C. held as under: “9. The idea behind Order 41 Rule 31 code of Civil Procedure is that the Court while passing the judgment shall apply its mind to the evidence made available on record and secondly, whether both the parties did understand on what point they have to submit their case. While in some cases the Courts have held that non-compliance of anyone of the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. vitiates the proceedings but in some cases the courts have taken the view that non-compliance of anyone of the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. does not vitiate the proceedings. The purpose of framing the points for consideration by the lower appellate Court is to clear up the pleading and focus the attention of the Court and of the parties on the specific and rival contentions which arise for determination. Time and again it is said that it is not necessary that the judgment should record all the facts in detail and should deal mechanically with all points. It would be sufficient if the court renders its independent judgment. 10. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court reflects application of mind on its part and failure to frame points for consideration at best can be said to be only a technical defect or a procedural irregularity which can be cured if the judgment is in substantial compliance of all other requirements. In other words, it is desirable that the first appellate Court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., but if there is any slight deviation that itself is not a ground to hold that the judgment is vitiated.” 22. Following the above judgment of the Division Bench of this court, another co-ordinate Division Bench of this court in GORRELLA DURGA VARAPRASADA RAO v. INDUKURI RAM RAJU (2 supra) answered the reference as under: “8. In the light of the judgments cited, and in view of the discussions hereinabove, we hold that the judgment VIYYAPU DANAYYA v. PEETHALA APPA RAO (1997(3) ALT 266) does not lay down the correct law and the correct position may be summarized as follows: Even without framing specific points for determination, if the appellate court in its judgment deals with all the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal and gives decision on those grounds with reasons that would be sufficient compliance of Order 41 rule 31.” 23. Another learned single Judge of this court in the decision reported in CHALLA CHINNA SUBBA REDDY vs. CHALLA PEDDA MUNAIAH (DIED)[2] held that “It is true that the Supreme Court and this Court held that, if, from a perusal of the judgment rendered by lower appellate court, it is evident that the Court had bestowed its attention on all the points of controversy; failure to frame individual points cannot be treated, as fatal.” 24. Considering the above facts and circumstances, I am of the considered that the both the courts below considering the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, by recording concurrent findings of fact, decreed the suit and the questions raised by the appellants in this appeal are all pure questions of fact and they do not constitute substantial questions of law for interference of this court under Section 100 C.P.C. Hence, the second appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed at the stage of admission. AVS ------------------------------ 19-02-2010 [1] 2000(4) ALT 673 [2] 2007(1) ALT 770