IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION NOTICE OF MOTION NO.1541 OF 2005 IN WEALTH TAX APPEAL LODGING NO.554 OF 2005 The Commissioner of Income Tax. ..Appellant. Vs. M/s. Tracstar Investments Pvt. Ltd. ..Respondent. Mr.P.S.Sahadevan for the Appellant. Ms. Y.D. Ghawale i/by Roys Law Firm for the Respondent. CORAM : F.I. REBELLO & R.S. MOHITE, JJ. DATED : 16TH JANUARY,2008. PC : 1. There is a delay of 86 days in preferring the appeal. There is affidavit in support showing cause, has been filed. 2. Heard parties. Considering the cause shown the same would amount to sufficient cause. Hence, delay condoned. Office to register the appeal. (R.S. MOHITE, J.) (F.I. REBELLO, J.) IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION WEALTH TAX APPEAL LODGING NO.554 OF 2005 The Commissioner of Income Tax. ..Appellant. Vs. M/s. Tracstar Investments Pvt. Ltd. ..Respondent. Mr.P.S.Sahadevan for the Appellant. Ms. Y.D. Ghawale i/by Roys Law Firm for the Respondent. CORAM : F.I. REBELLO & R.S. MOHITE, JJ. DATED : 16TH JANUARY,2008. PC : 1. The revenue has preferred this appeal on the following question of law. (a) The substantial question of law arises in the present appeal is regarding the correct interpretation of Section 2(ea) and other provisions of the Wealth Tax Act 1957 and whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal is right in allowing the appeal of the assessee and excluding the value of the residential flats at NCPA and Embassy Apartments from the purview of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 by not treating them assets. 2. The respondent was in appeal against the order of the A.O. and CIT (A) before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. That appeal along with two other appeals in respect of the very same subject matter have been disposed of by common order dated 13.9.2004. The learned Tribunal in Para-9 of its order noted that the A.O. had recorded a specific finding that the flats were used by the assessee for business meetings. The Tribunal has also noted that the A.O. has granted depreciation in the income tax proceedings for the flats as being used for business purpose by the assessee. The Tribunal noted the finding by the A.O. that assets were not business assets on the evidence that " a mere fact that certain meetings were held does not prove that the house is occupied for the purpose of business or profession". The Tribunal noted the definition of assets under Section 2(ea)(3) and came to the conclusion that there is no requirement that there must be continuous occupation and usage of the premises for the purpose of business and accordingly allowed the appeal. The said order is the subject matter of the present appeal. From the facts as noted by the learned Tribunal there is no dispute that the asset was used "for the purpose of meetings" by the respondent. There is no other material to show that the asset was used for any other purpose. . The second relevant finding of fact is that the A.O. has allowed the depreciation on the basis of the asset being used for the business purpose. 3. The only question which arises is whether the definition requires that the property has to be used continuously for the purpose of business. The Tribunal by considering the provisions and the facts of the case arrived at the conclusion that there is no such requirement. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT, Madras Vs. Ajax Products Ltd. (85 ITR 741) to hold that the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation. . To decide the issue we may reproduce Section 2(ea)(3) which reads as under. "any house which the assessee may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession carried on by him." . It would be clear from the perusal of the provisions that the house must be occupied for the purpose of business or profession, for the relevant assessment year. Does the expression ’use’ is usage for a limited period or continuously is the question. In our opinion, considering the language, on a literal interpretation of the provision or by any other method of interpretation, it is not possible to hold that there must be continuous user considering that the provision is found in a taxing statue. If the intention of the legislature was that there must be continuous user then it ought to have been so described. A reading therefore, of the provisions would result in holding that the premises must be used for the purpose of any business or profession. The other fact is that the premises should not be used for any other purpose. In the absence of any material that the premises was also being used for any other purpose during the same period during the relevant assessment year, it will have to be excluded from the definition of assets. Considering the above finding the appeal must be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. (R.S.MOHITE, J.) (F.I. REBELLO, J.)