IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT PETITION NO : 1976 of 2009 Between: 1 Chinna Ramulu, S/o. late Narasaiah, Hindu, R/o. H.No. 8-2-293/A/122F, Krishna Nagar Colony, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. 2 Tulasamma, W/o. Chinna Ramulu, Hindu, R/o. H.No. 8-2-293/A/122F, Krishna Nagar Colony, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. ..... PETITIONER(S) AND 1 Rakesh Mallik,' S/o. S.C. Mallik, R/o. Domalguda, Hyderabad. 2 Smt. Rima Mallik, W/o. Rakesh Mallik, R/o. Domalguda, Hyderabad. 3 The Registrar of the Special Court Under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) At, 1982. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to to issue order or direction one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for the records in L.G.A. No. 6/2008 on the file of the Special Court under the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and quash the same and pass Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.V.RAJAGOPAL REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.: MR.C.B.RAM MOHAN REDDY The Court made the following : Form-NIC-OGS/WP{SPJS} HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH AND HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR W.P.No.1976 of 2009 ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Vilas V. Afzulpurkar) The petitioners have questioned the order of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, Hyderabad, (for brevity ‘the Special Court’) in L.G.A.No.6 of 2008, dated 22-12-2008. By the aforesaid order, the Special Court has set aside the order of the Special Tribunal-cum-Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, dated 10-12-2007, where under I.A.No.2797 of 2007 in L.G.O.P.No.940 of 1990, filed by the petitioners herein, was allowed by dismissing L.G.O.P.No.940 of 1990 filed by the contesting respondents herein. 2. The facts of the case, to the extent necessary, for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition, are as follows: The vendor of the respondent G.T.K. Rangacharyulu is said to have purchased plot No.51 in Sy.No.129/101, Shaikpet village, Hyderabad, admeasuring 500 square yards, equivalent to 418 square meters, under a registered sale deed dated 16-07-1968. The said Rangacharyulu filed L.G.C.No.940 of 1990 against the petitioners herein. The main defence of the petitioners was that the land in dispute actually bears Sy.No.129/102 and the respondents being purchasers thereof from the original pattadar Smt. Rasool bee. The petitioners also claim that a house number is allotted to the room situated in the said land bearing M.C.H.No.293/A/122/F and that they are paying house tax and water charges etc. In the land grabbing case, L.G.C.No.940 of 1990, filed by the vendor of the contesting respondents 1 and 2 herein, the petition schedule property is described with reference to the plot and survey number in column 10 of the concise statement, the boundaries are mentioned under column No.12 and in column No.14, it is described as a house including 7 mulgies which are unauthorizedly constructed over the aforesaid land. The Special Tribunal under its order, dated 28-06-2002, allowed the said L.G.O.P.No.940 of 1990 declaring the petitioners herein as land grabbers. Against which, the petitioners filed appeal L.G.A.No.13 of 2002. By order of the Special Court, dated 07-01- 2004, the said appeal was allowed and L.G.O.P. was remanded to consider and deal with all issues independently. Thereafter, the Special Court once again considered L.G.O.P. holding that identity of lands claimed by the petitioners and that of the respondents as not established and accordingly, dismissed L.G.O.P. by order dated 19- 08-2004. Meanwhile the respondents 1 and 2 herein purchased scheduled property from Rangacharyulu under a registered sale deed, dated 30-12-1982. They, along with Rangacharyulu, preferred an appeal L.G.A.No.2 of 2005 before the Special Court against the dismissal of L.G.O.P. by the Special Tribunal under order dated 19- 08-2004, referred to above. The Special Court, in the said appeal found that the verification report under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the Act, was not called for and the same being held mandatory, in view of the Division Bench decision reported in SHALIVAHANA BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. SRI GANAPATHY COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY AND OTHERS[1], the order of the Special Tribunal was set aside and the Special Tribunal was directed to decide the case afresh on merits after giving opportunity to both sides to adduce evidence, if any, and by complying with mandatory requirement of Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules. Thereafter, on 12-06-2007, the Mandal Revenue Officer submitted a verification report under Rule 6 and based thereon, the petitioners herein filed I.A.No.2797 of 2007 to reject L.G.O.P.No.940 of 1990 on the strength of the said report of M.R.O. The said application was considered by the Special Tribunal under it’s order dated 10-12-2007. The said I.A. was allowed and L.G.O.P. was rejected primarily based upon the said report of the M.R.O. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents 1 and 2 herein preferred appeal in L.G.A.No.6 of 2008 before the Special Court. By the impugned order 22-12-2008, the Special Court has allowed the appeal on finding that the Special Tribunal has not followed the earlier direction in L.G.A.No.2 of 2005, dated 06-11-2006 and instead of considering and deciding the L.G.O.P., on merits, on all the issues, has erred in disposing of the L.G.O.P., only on the ground of the report of the M.R.O. Questioning the same, the petitioners have approached this Court by this writ petition. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Sri V. Rajagopal Reddy, and the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 Sri C.B. Ram Mohan Reddy. We have also perused the various orders passed in this case at different stages, as mentioned above. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the M.R.O’s. report, submitted under Rule 6 of the Rules, conclusively establishes that the land as claimed by the contesting respondents in the above L.G.O.P. is different and distinct and in fact, as per the M.R.O., no such land exists in the revenue records. The learned counsel also alleged that the respondents 1 and 2 having claimed in the above land grabbing case that the schedule property comprises of 7 mulgies, the very land grabbing case is not maintainable in view of decision of this Court in MOHAMMAD VIJAHATH HUSSAIN @ FASI v. SPECIAL COURT UNDER A.P. LAND GRABBING (PROHIBITION) ACT, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER[2]. Based on the above decision, learned counsel contends that the ratio of the aforesaid decision clearly holds that the Special Court has no jurisdiction to entertain petition in respect of house property and as such the very land grabbing case as filed by the respondents is liable to be rejected. He further contends that the M.R.O. has found under Rule 6 of the Rules under his report that the property in dispute does not belong to the petitioners herein in the land grabbing case (respondents 1 and 2 herein), but in fact, belongs to the Government and thereby he reported that the respondents 1 and 2 herein do not have any locus standi to question the unauthorized occupation by the petitioners herein. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that in view of the said report, the very cognizance of the land grabbing case could not be taken up by the Special Tribunal. 5. Sri C.B. Ram Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, submits that they had no opportunity to contest the report of the M.R.O. and it is not as if that whatever is stated in the said report is sacrosanct as to result into judgment of the Special Tribunal itself. Secondly, the Special Tribunal ought not to have disposed of the land grabbing case only on the said ground, without considering the entire case on merits, as directed by the Special Court by its order in L.G.A.No.2 of 2005, dated 06-11-2006. According to the learned counsel, the question of locus standi of the respondents 1 and 2 in initiating proceedings under the L.G.O.P.No.940 of 1990 has to be answered with reference to the evidence on record. 6. We have earnestly considered the aforesaid submissions so far as the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner viz., the maintainability of L.G.O.P. based upon the decision of this Court in Mohd. Vajahath Hussain’s case (2 supra) is concerned, it is evident that no such ground was raised at any of the stages when this matter was agitated either before the Tribunal or before the Special Court on earlier occasions. From the opening paragraphs, above, it is evident that at least on three occasions, the matter was heard by the Special Tribunal as well as by the Special Court during the earlier rounds and finally, it was directed that the Special Tribunal to decide O.P. afresh on all issues. Further, the impugned order is not based on said ground. It is necessary to notice the direction of the Special Court in L.G.A.No.2 of 2005, dated 06-11-2006, which is extracted below: “Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and we hereby set aside the impugned order and decree and remit the same to the Special Tribunal, for disposal afresh, on merits, giving opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence, if any, and by complying the mandatory requirements of Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules framed under the Act. Since the matter was remanded once before, the lower court may dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of six months, from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.” 7. Contrary to the above direction, the Special Tribunal has entertained the application of the petitioners in I.A.No.2797 of 2007 and rejected the L.G.O.P. merely based upon the verification report of the M.R.O. 8. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the said order of the Special Tribunal was rightly set aside by the Special Court and the same is justified at least for two reasons viz., 1) The direction of the Special Court extracted above, had to be followed by the Special Tribunal by deciding the L.G.O.P. on merits on all the issues on the basis of evidence on record. 2) The verification report of the M.R.O. by itself is not decisive and is not as if that the Special Tribunal or the Special Court would merely follow report and reject the L.G.O.P. without giving the opportunity to the aggrieved party to contest the said report. 9. In fact, in Shalivahana Builders’ case (1 supra), the Division Bench has considered the necessity of obtaining verification report under Rule 6 of the Rules, in the following manner: “In order to decide as to whether the application filed prima facie is frivolous or vexatious and in order to enable the Special Court to form its opinion the Court may look into the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area since such report essentially contains the details of the correctness of the statements made in the application and the facts relating to ownership, actual possession and user of the land concerned, etc. It is in this background the verification of application and submission of the report by the Mandal Revenue Officer or the authorized officer, as the case may be, are to be considered as mandatory requirements.” 10. Further, in the Full Bench decision in MOHD. SIDDIQ ALI KHAN AND OTHERS v. SHAHSUN FINANCE LIMITED, CHENNAI AND ANOTHER[3], it is significant to notice the following observations: “The report cannot be equated to that of any evidence or collection of material. Therefore, taking into consideration the verification report submitted by the Mandal Revenue Officer would not amount to relying upon any evidence produced by the parties even before taking cognizance of the case. The verification report may render valuable assistance to the Court for the purposes of taking cognizance of a case. The report merely provides inputs enabling the Special Court to apply its mind to the fact situation for the purposes of taking cognizance of the case.” 11. The report of the M.R.O. is merely a verification report and is not a decision on title of either of the parties. We find that the said report, which is produced by the writ petitioner along with the writ petition, is like a judgment given by the M.R.O. himself, on the competing title of the petitioners and the respondents in the L.G.O.P. The Special Tribunal committed serious error in merely following the said report and ignoring the entire evidence on record. The said verification report, therefore, merely assists the Special Tribunal and the Special Court in coming to the conclusion as to whether the cognizance deserves to be taken in a given case and as such the said report cannot be equated to the finding of title of either of the parties. 12. In view of the above, therefore, we are of the opinion that the Special Court was right and justified in setting aside the order of the Special Tribunal and remitting the L.G.O.P. No.940 of 1990 to the Special Tribunal with a direction to dispose of the said O.P. afresh by giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence, if any, as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. We are, therefore, of the view that the said order of the Special Court does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction nor is otherwise perverse warranting interference with the same under Certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. 13. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. _________________________ JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH _____________________________ JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR February, 2009 Kvr [1] 2003 (2) A.L.T. 511 [2] 2007 (5) A.L.D. 6 (D.B.) [3] 2005 (2) ALD 675 (FB)