IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.302 of 2008 SHEO SHANKAR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (BIHAR)LTD. Versus SHRI MAHENDRA PD. SINGH & ORS ----------- For the appellant : Mr.Satyabir Bharti, Advocate. For the respondent-State : Mr.Shashi Bhushan Kumar, SC 16 For the respondents no.1 & 2: Mr. N.C.Ganguli, Advocate. -------- P R E S E N T Hon'ble the Chief Justice & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kishore K. Mandal ---- Dated, the 3rd July, 2008. We heard the counsel for the parties. 2. The counsel for the appellant submitted that claim of differential minimum wages could not have been adjudicated in the proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, `the Act‟), as the claim concerning disputed wages has not been determined by any court earlier. He would submit that proceedings u/s 33C (2) are in the nature of execution proceedings. He heavily placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal Singh, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58. 3. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents no.1 and 2 submitted that Section 33C (2) of the Act does not debar the - 2 - determination of claim of differential minimum wages. He referred to the bare provision contained in sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Act and a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s Anand Oil Industries Vs. Labour Court, Hyederabad and others, reported in AIR 1979 Andhra Pradesh 182. 4. Section 33C(2) of the Act reads thus: “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months. Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.” 5. Legal position is no more res integra that the proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Act are in the nature of execution proceeding. It is also true, and, that has been consistently held, that right to money or benefit which is sought to be claimed under Section 33C (2) of the Act must be an existing one and must arise in course of and in relation to relationship between the industrial workman and the employer. In our view, however, claim of - 3 - differential in minimum wages falls within the expression „right to money or benefit‟ which can always be claimed in the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act. A Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court had occasion to deal with this aspect. The following paragraphs of the said report may be reproduced by us which read thus: “47. It was also not contended before us that there is anything in S.33-C(2) which by itself debars an employee from filing a petition claiming a minimum wage. There is no provision either in the Industrial Disputes Act or in the Minimum Wages Act which specifically prohibits a Labour Court from entertaining a petition under S.33-C(2) in respect of a claim for minimum wage. As already noticed the contention was merely that the Industrial Disputes Act was a general law and that S.33-C(2) being a provision of a general law is excluded by the Minimum Wages Act which creates the right as well as the forum for the enforcement of that right. We may therefore examine how far this basic assumption of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Industrial Disputes Act is a general enactment is correct and then proceed to consider how far the Minimum Wages Act while creating a right to a minimum wage also prescribes a forum for the enforcement of that right and as such excludes the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S.33-C(2) to entertain a petition for minimum wage. 48. The Industrial Disputes Act does not deal with all disputes. It deals only with disputes of workmen and employers as defined therein. They must be industrial disputes. Even in this limited sphere it is not every dispute of - 4 - every individual workman that is entertainable under the Said Act. By virtue of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, disputes raised by individual workman relating to dismissal, removal or retrenchment from service only are deemed to be industrial disputes. Any other dispute raised by an individual workman is not deemed to be an industrial disputes. Unless claims of individual workman other than those referred to under S.2-A are sponsored by union of workmen or substantial members of workmen, it cannot be deemed to be an industrial dispute. Further under S.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claims made by workmen that are entertainable against their employers are claims with respect to existing rights based on a settlement, award, or Chap.V-A or Chap.V-B are conferred by a statute. Any other right to which a workman or class of workmen may be entitled but which does not constitute an industrial dispute can be adjudicated only by a Civil Court. It is only industrial disputes that can be adjudicated under the Industrial Disputes Act and the existing rights referred to above that are entertainable under S.33-C of the said Act. Thus the Industrial Disputes Act itself is not a general enactment as is commonly understood. In a sense the Industrial Disputes Act itself is a special enactment applicable to certain class of employers and workmen and certain classes of disputes. Consequently the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court created for the adjudication of those disputes cannot be regarded as Courts of general jurisdiction they are Tribunals conferred with special jurisdiction with regard to matters specified under the said enactment. So also, the Minimum Wages Act deals with specific rights created under that Act. They are special enactments relating to certain class of employees and certain class of employments or - 5 - establishments. The Minimum Wages Act also creates a special forum for certain matters covered by S.20 of the Act but it does not bar the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain claims covered by the Minimum Wages Act. S.33- C(2) may be wide enough to include claims of workmen in respect of rights conferred under various enactments. May be, certain matters entertainable under S.20 of the Minimum Wages Act may be entertained under S.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act also. But on account of that fact the Industrial Disputes Act as a whole or S.33-C(2) of the Act in particular does not become a general law in relation to the Minimum Wages Act. Though the Industrial Disputes Act is in certain respects wider in its scope and ambit than the Minimum Wages Act both the enactments nonetheless are special enactments. As the Industrial Disputes Act is thus not a general enactment the principle generalia specialibus non derogant cannot apply. 81. The Labour Court has also jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 33-C(2) for the minimum wage due to an employee under the Minimum Wages Act. The existence of any other remedy for determination and recovery of minimum wage or minimum bonus does not bar the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain a petition under S.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the course of such determination, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide all questions incidental thereto and award such amount as the employee is found entitled to. The mere denial of the statutory right or any objection on the part of the employer to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain such a petition is, therefore, untenable. No writ of prohibition or any other direction restraining the Labour Court from proceeding with the petition - 6 - under S.33-C(2) can therefore be issued.” 6. We concur with the aforesaid view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the backdrop of this legal position, it cannot be said that claim of differential in minimum wages could not have been claimed in the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 7. LPA does not deserve to be admitted. It is dismissed in limine. R.M. Lodha, CJ Kishore K. Mandal, J. Sunil