THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY Writ Petition Nos.32435 & 32436 of 2010 COMMON ORDER: The 2nd respondent instituted the proceedings under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (for short ‘the Act’), against the petitioner, before the 1st respondent. It claimed the relief of registration of a particular trade mark, in its favour from the year 2001. However, by filing an interlocutory applications, the 2nd respondent sought the registration of trade mark, with effect from 23-04-1960. The fact pleaded by the 2nd respondent was that, in a deed of dissolution of the partnership firm, it was mentioned that the trade mark was being used from the year 1960. The petitioner opposed the application by raising several grounds. Through orders dated 17-09-2009, the 1st respondent allowed the applications. The same is challenged in these writ petitions. The petitioner contends that there was absolutely no basis for the 2nd respondent in claiming registration of the trade mark from the year 1960. According to it, in the deed of partnership itself, there was no mention as such, of the trade mark, and the deed of dissolution, which was brought into existence, subsequent to the institution of proceedings; cannot constitute the basis. The 2nd respondent filed counter-affidavits, opposing the writ petitions. Objection is raised as to the very maintainability of the writ petitions. According to them, the petitioner has an alternative remedy, by way of an appeal, before the Appellate Authority. On merits also, it is urged that the claim was based upon adequate material, and that the petitioner did not choose to advance arguments in the application. Heard Sri G. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. Hemaprakasa Rao, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. Arguments are advanced by both the parties, touching on the merits of the matter. Serious objection is raised by the 2nd respondent, as to the maintainability of the writ petitions. It is not in dispute that the Act provides for an appeal before the Appellate Authority against an order passed by the primary authority. If the petitioner is so advised, it can file an appeal against the order dated 17-09-2009, passed by the 1st respondent. Since it has been prosecuting the remedies before this Court, the petitioner can be extended the facility of presenting the appeal, within a reasonable time. Hence, the writ petitions are disposed of, leaving it open to the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal against the order dated 17-09- 2009, passed by the 1st respondent. If the appeal is presented within a period of four weeks from today, it shall be entertained, without raising any objection as to limitation. Further proceedings before the 1st respondent shall stand stayed, for a period of six weeks. The future course thereafter, would depend upon the nature of the orders, that may be passed by the Appellate Authority. There shall be no order as to costs. _______________________ L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. Dt.28-02-2011. KO