THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO.28937 OF 2011 ORDER: The order of the 1st respondent, in Appeal No.7 of 2011 dated 19.9.2011, whereby the petitioner’s appeal was rejected on the ground that it was barred by limitation, is under challenge in this Writ Petition as being arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner would submit that one Sri S. Ramaiah was issued a ryotwari patta on 6.12.1980 for an extent of Ac.9-00 out of Ac.40-00 in Sy.No.246 situated at Tiruchanoor village, Tirupati Mandal, Chittoor District by the Inam Deputy Tahsildar; after the death of Sri S.Ramaiah, his sons succeeded him; later they sold the land to the petitioner who paid the entire sale consideration, and presented two different sale deeds of Ac.1-00 each before the 2nd respondent for registration, duly complying with the requirements including payment of stamp duty of Rs.2,73,150/-; the 2nd respondent, by order dated 18.6.2011, refused to register the document, and kept the document pending insisting that the petitioner obtain and produce a no objection certificate from the revenue authorities; the petitioner approached his vendors who informed him that, though they had filed an application to the Joint Collector for grant of a no objection certificate, the said certificate was neither issued nor were any orders passed on their representation; thereafter he preferred an appeal to the 1st respondent against the order of the 2nd respondent with a delay of six days in preferring the appeal; and he had also filed an application seeking condonation of delay of six days in preferring the appeal. The 1st respondent, by the impugned order dated 19.9.2011, refused to condone the delay of six days in preferring the appeal holding that the appeal was preferred under Section 72(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short the “Act’) after a lapse of 30 days from the date of the order of refusal passed by the Sub-Registrar. Aggrieved thereby the present Writ Petition. Sri Babuji Tenneti, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, since Section 72(1) of the Registration Act does not prohibit condonation of delay, the 1st respondent was not justified in refusing to entertain the appeal merely on the ground that the appeal was presented six days after the period of limitation prescribed under Section 72(1) of the Act. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue (Andhra & Rayalaseema areas) would submit that, in the absence of any specific provision conferring power on the 1st respondent to condone the delay, the 1st respondent did not have jurisdiction to condone the delay even if it be merely for six days. Section 72(1) of the Act reads as under: “72. Appeal to Registrar from orders of Sub-Registrar refusing registration on grounds other than denial of execution:- (1) Except where the refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against an order of Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whether the registration of such document is compulsory or optional) to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate, if presented to such Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order; and the Registrar may reverse or alter such order” It is evident that, under Section 72(1) of the Act, an appeal is required to be presented to the Registrar against the order of the Sub-Registrar within 30 days from the date of the order. In the present case, the appeal was preferred 36 days after the order was passed by the 2nd respondent i.e., the appeal was preferred six days beyond the 30 days period of limitation prescribed, under Section 72(1) of the Act, for preferring the appeal. When a special limitation for the purpose of appeal is prescribed, the power of the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands curtailed and excluded. It is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if, on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be implied. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are, necessarily, excluded then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. (Union of India v. Popular Construction Company[1]; Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand baghel[2]; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra[3]; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India[4]). In the case on hand all that Section 72(1) of the Act provides is for a period of 30 days to prefer an appeal. Section 72(1) does not provide, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the said time limit cannot be extended beyond the prescribed time limit of 30 days. In the absence of any prohibition, the provisions of the Limitation Act would come to aid, and the appellate authority would have the discretion, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, to entertain an application for condonation of delay, and to condone the delay. The impugned proceedings of the 1st respondent is set aside. The 1st respondent shall consider the application filed by the petitioner to condone the delay in preferring the appeal in terms of the observations made hereinabove, and pass orders thereupon within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. ___________ 16-11-2011 asp [1] AIR 2001 SC 4010 [2] AIR 1964 SC 1099 [3] (1974) 2 SCC 133 [4] 2009(6) ALD 315