HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R. VARMA AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA O.S.A.No.7 of 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT : (per Hon’ble Sri Justice D.S.R.Varma) Heard learned counsel for appellant Company as well as the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal is filed challenging the common order, dated 30.3.2010, passed by the learned single Judge in Application (SR).No.5186 of 2009 in Application No.302 of 2007 in Application No.690 of 2005 in C.S.No.14 of 1958, (along with Application Nos.808 and 862 of 2010 and Application (SR).No.5184 of 2009) dismissing the application filed by the appellant Company seeking vacation of the interim orders, dated 30.4.2007 and 22.6.2007. 3. The genesis of this litigation, initiated by the appellant Company, is the interlocutory order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Application No.302 of 2007 in Application No.690 of 2005 in C.S.No.14 of 1958, 22.6.2007, which reads as under: “No representation for the respondents, as usual consecutively for the third occasion. In the instant application the appellants seeking a direction to the respondents not to grant layout construction premises in not to allow any construction activity to be proceeded with in any parts of the lands covered by Sy.Nos.1, 7, 15 and 57 (including the sub-Division Survey Numbers if any) of Hashmathpet village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (Item No.2 of Schedule-IV-A in C.S.No.14 of 1958) by any person, till 31.08.2007. Petition is ordered accordingly.” 4. The appellant Company, who is not a party to C.S.No.14 of 1958, purchased an extent of about 3,000 square yards of land in Sy.No.1 of Hashmathpet village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Subsequently, it made an application before the respondents i.e., Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (for brevity “the HMDA”) and the revenue authorities as well, seeking permission to make construction in the said land. Pursuant to the said application, the HMDA addressed a letter, dated 22.6.2009, to the appellant Company stating that this Court had passed order, dated 30.4.2007, directing the HMDA not to consider any application of layout etc., and by order, dated 22.6.2007, further directed not to allow any construction activity in the said lands. The appellant Company was further informed that a contempt case in C.C.No.1357 of 2003 also was filed wherein this Court by order, dated 8.1.2009, again directed not to grant any layout /construction permission in the said land and the said orders are still subsisting. Therefore, the appellant Company was advised to approach this Court in order to consider its application seeking permission to raise construction. 5. Having been informed as above, the appellant Company filed the present application seeking vacation of the interim order, dated 22.6.2007, upon which, the learned single Judge passed the impugned order, dated 30.3.2010, rejecting the same. Hence the present appeal. 6. Before dealing with the issue involved, we deem it appropriate to nutshell the background of the litigation. 7. Originally, the Government claimed the entire extent of land covered by Sy.Nos.1, 7, 15 and 57 of Hashmathpet village. Consequently, a civil suit in C.S.No.14 of 1958 was filed and a preliminary decree, dated 28.6.1963, was passed, holding that the properties involved therein are matruka properties belonging to Khurshid Jha Paiga, but not the Government. The matter went upto the Supreme Court, but the contention of the Government was not accepted. As a result thereof, the preliminary decree, dated 28.6.1963, passed in C.S.No.14 of 1958, had become final and, because of various developments, the final decree could not be passed and the proceedings are still pending. The Advocate Receiver also was appointed and the entire property is under the custody of the said Advocate Receiver. 8. Be that as it may, the Advocate Receiver prepared a report, basing on various records, and recorded that the extent of Sy.Nos.1 is Acs.108.12 guntas. Basing on the other material placed by the appellant Company before the Revenue authorities and the Municipal authorities, the pattadar pass books etc., have been issued in its favour, and basing on the said entries in the revenue records, in fact, an application was filed before the HMDA seeking permission to make construction. But, the appellant Company could not get any such permissions because of the interim orders passed by this Court, which are still subsisting. 9. It is the first and foremost contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Company that the extent of land purchased by the appellant is outside the limits of Sy.No.1, which is the subject matter of C.S.No.14 of 1958. In other words, it is his contention that the appellant Company is not claiming any right through any of the parties to the suit and its claim is totally independent, as the property purchased by it falls beyond the extent of Acs.108.12 guntas. 10. It is his further contention that the total extent of Sy.No.1 is Acs.135.00. Therefore, the predecessor of the appellant Company, being not a party to the suit and as the land is outside the limits and extent of Sy.No.1, as mentioned in the Advocate Receiver’s report, the appellant Company has every right independently to claim the properties and the consequential right of making construction over the said land. 11. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Company that the learned single Judge erroneously passed the interim order, dated 22.6.2007, virtually prohibiting the HMDA from giving permissions to layout/raise construction in the said land, not only against the parties to the suit, but also to ‘all persons’. In other words, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Company that any such prohibition can be imposed only against the parties to the suit, but not against all persons. 12. In this back ground, the vacation of the interim order passed by the learned single Judge on 22.6.2007, as sought by the appellant Company, was rejected by another learned single Judge through the impugned order, dated 30.3.2010, in the present application. While rejecting the application, the learned single Judge had taken note of all the contentions raised by the appellant Company and the way in which the claim is being made by it. We do not propose to reiterate the said reasoning given by the learned single Judge in para-9 of the impugned order. 13. However, keeping in view the undisputed factual back ground, it was pointed out by the learned single Judge that there was no prima-facie case established by the appellant Company as to how the predecessors in title were the original owners, particularly when the Government claim the entire extent of land in dispute in Sy.No.1. Therefore, the learned single Judge felt that this controversial aspect cannot be decided in the applications before him and that the appellant Company had failed to establish that the land in question is a patta land and not connected with the subject matter of the property in C.S.No.14 of 1958. 14. In this context, what is to be remembered is, whether the land claimed by the appellant Company in Sy.No.1 of Hashmathpet village is connected or unconnected with the said survey number, cannot be gone into by this Court, at the appellate stage in particular. The other contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant Company is that the appellant Company has no other remedy except to approach this Hon’ble Court by way of filing an application seeking to vacate the interim order, dated 22.6.2007, with the leave of the Court. 15. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on two judgments of the apex Court in SREE JAIN SWETAMBAR TERAPANTHI VID v. PHUNDAN SINGH[1] and RITONA CONSULTANCY PVT. LTD. v. LOHIA JUTE PRESS[2]. 16. We have gone through the said judgments of the apex Court. The judgments of the apex Court speak about the desirability of passing orders on merits, particularly in adversarial litigation and the same are unexceptionable. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Company cannot be countenanced for the reason that the parties in the present application are only the authorities, who rejected to grant permission to raise construction in the said land and the appellant Company is not a party to the suit C.S.No.14 of 1958. Therefore, in strict sense, the present litigation cannot be treated as an adversarial litigation. 18. Further more, even though the interlocutory orders are desirable to be passed on merits, as far as possible, it is to be seen that, in the instant case, such desirability is not existing, for the simple reason that there are several issues, particularly the basic issue of title, which are to be decided. 19. In fact, the proceedings issued by the HMDA itself speaks about the pendency of litigation and the orders of this Court. Therefore, onus is on the appellant Company to prove its prima-facie title. But, in our considered view, the learned single Judge, in the impugned order, dated 30.3.2010, had rightly pointed out that the appellant failed to establish its prima-facie title in order to vacate the interim orders granted earlier. In fact, the learned single Judge also pointed out that no material is available in order to establish the prima-facie case that the entire land in Sy.No.1 of Hashmathpet village does not belong to the Government, but it belongs to the defendants and plaintiffs, who are having shares as per the preliminary decree passed by this Court. 20. Of course, that is not the real controversy, since the appellant Company claims its right independently, dehorse the preliminary decree, dated 28.6.1963, passed by this Court in C.S.No.14 of 1958, as unconnected with the land covered by the said suit. The only basis for the appellant Company to show that the present land claimed by it is not covered by C.S.No.14 of 1958 is the report of the Advocate Receiver. As already pointed out, the report of the Advocate Receiver is not necessarily conclusive. Such a finding has to flow from a competent civil Court, but not from the report of the Advocate Receiver, particularly when the same is a disputed question, which again is yet to be scrutinized by this Court, while passing the final decree. 21. Further more, in our considered view, the learned single Judge is absolutely right in pointing out that if the shareholder, to whom this particular land may be allotted, has to approach the Court for eviction, at a later point of time. 22. Further, the proceedings in the suit C.S.No.14 of 1958 is yet to attain finality and the same is pending since more than five decades. At this point of time, if different individual claims are made and if such claims are considered by the authorities, like the HMDA and grant permissions to make constructions, it would lead to a chaotic situation, at a later point of time. Therefore, in order to avoid such unpleasant, multiplicity and duplicity of litigation, it was rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge that it is not expedient to go into all these questions of fact, while rejecting the application. 23. The other contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant Company that there is no other remedy available to the appellant except to approach this Court to vacate the interim orders, cannot also be countenanced and hence it is always open for the appellant Company to work out its remedies elsewhere, as permissible under law. 24. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any illegality or irrationality in the impugned order, dated 30.3.2010, passed by the learned single Judge, warranting interference by this Court. 25. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs. 26. It is needless to mention that the observations made by the learned single Judge in the impugned order, dated 30.3.2010, shall not be understood as conclusive. _______________________ JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA __________________________ JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA 25.06.2010. Msr HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R. VARMA AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA O.S.A.No.7 of 2010 25.06.2010 (Msr) [1] (1999) 2 SCC 377 [2] (2001) 3 SCC 68