C.W.P. No. 14661 of 2000 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Writ Petition No. 14661 of 2000 Date of decision: August 2, 2010 Jagir Singh -----Petitioner Versus The Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited and others. ---Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. KUMAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.N. JINDAL Present: None 1. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 2. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? A.N. JINDAL, J. Jagir Singh petitioner has sought quashing of the order dated 25.8.2000 passed by the Managing Director, Markfed awarding penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments and recovery of loss along with interest. He has also sought directions to declare Rule 14(i) of the Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Common Cadre Rules, 1990 being ultra vires of the Constitution of India. In the year 1995, the petitioner along with S.C. Kaura, Branch Officer was deputed for joint protection/ procurement by the Markfed of two Mills i.e. M/s Aggarwal Rice Mills and M/s S.K. Rice Mills, both situated in District Ludhiana, but on account of the shortage of super fine paddy to the tune of Rs. 3,94,938/- caused by the petitioner and S.C. Kaura they were charge-sheeted and regular inquiry was held. Mulakh Raj Enquiry Officer, vide his enquiry report dated 26.4.2000 recorded negligence of the petitioner and S.C. C.W.P. No. 14661 of 2000 -2- Kaura and observed that they had failed to discharge their duties diligently and thereby causing loss to the institution in connivance with the millers. Ultimately, the petitioner was imposed penalty vide order dated 25.8.2000 passed by the Managing Director, Markfed. Findings of the enquiry have been recorded after following due procedure and appreciating the evidence on record in order to substantiate the imputations. The petitioner was awarded penalty after providing him due opportunity and petitioner also duly responded to the same while filing reply/ representation in that regard. Having scrutinized the record, it transpires that the enquiry report as well as the impugned order are shorn of any such defect or irregularity. No allegations of bias or prejudice have been levelled against the Enquiry Officer or the Appellate Authority, therefore, the same could not be condemned merely for the reason that they being the part of hierarchy of the Tribunals under the rules were competent to hear the appeal. The disciplinary proceedings had concluded against the petitioner with imposition of small punishment. As regards the quantum of penalty, it appears to be quite meager as compared to the fault committed by him. Even otherwise, the court should normally not interfere with the punishment unless it is shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in case of Union of India and another vs. S.S. Ahluwalia, 2007 (4) S.C.T. 83 wherein it was observed that the Court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved. In such a case the Court is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment. In an appropriate case, in order to avoid delay the court can itself impose lesser penalty. In the instant case, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is too small to be interfered with. The documents Annexures P-15 to 19 which have been C.W.P. No. 14661 of 2000 -3- placed on record do not rescue of the petitioner because punishment inflicted after regular departmental inquiry is on account of misconduct of negligence and connivance with the rice millers. Merely because a part of recovery has been made from the rice millers or otherwise would not exonerate the petitioner from his misconduct. Insofar as provisions of Rule 14 (i) vesting the power of hearing of appeal with the Board of Directors against the decision of the Managing Director cannot be regarded arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Board of Directors would not necessarily hear the appeal in the presence of the Managing Director. Therefore, there would not be any violation of principle of natural justice or reasonable suspicion of bias, which may persuade us to conclude that the provisions of Rule 14 (i) does not answer the Constitutional mandate of Article 14. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. (M.M. KUMAR) (A.N. JINDAL) JUDGE JUDGE August 2, 2010 Atul