IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 10 OF 2008 SHRI RAMAKANT PARESKAR ... Petitioner Versus STATE ... Respondent Mr. Arun Bras De Sa,Advocate for the applicant. Mr. C.A. Ferriera, Public Prosecutor for the State. Coram:- R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J. Date:- 8th February, 2008 P.C. 1. The petitioner challenges the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Margaon in Criminal Appeal No.57/2007 thereby a criminal appeal, filed against the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Margaon in Criminal Case No.358/S/2003/II dated 30th October, 2007, has been dismissed. The learned Magistrate by his order had convicted the petitioner U/s.279 and 304-A of I.P.C. and he is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 6 months on account of the offence punishable U/s.279 and for one year on account of the offence punishable U/s.304-A of I.P.C. Both the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. 2. The impugned judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is sought to be challenged on 3 grounds; firstly, that the Lower Appellate Court erred in applying the principle of res ipsa locuitur without any basic evidence available about the rashness and negligence in driving of the vehicle by the appellant. secondly, that the Lower Appellate Court failed to consider that the prosecution had not led any evidence as to the point of time the vehicle had developed mechanical defect in relation to the steering rod and thirdly, that the Lower Appellate Court did not analyse the evidence on record in proper prospective. 3. At the outset, it is to be noted that the scope of interference in such matters is very very limited in revisional jurisdiction. Undisputedly, the courts below have considered the entire evidence. There is no jurisdictional error of whatsoever nature disclosed in the impugned judgment. 4. As regards the first two grounds, undisputedly, no such grounds were specifically raised before the Lower Appellate Court. In the absence of those pleas being raised before the Lower Appellate Court, the later had no occasion to deal with the same by analysing the evidence on record. It cannot be disputed that in order to deal with the said pleas, it is necessary to analyse the evidence on record. It was necessary for the appellant to raise those points in the appeal itself. Even otherwise,there is a clear finding about the fact that the vehicle in question was being driven on the wrong side of the road. The Lower Appellate Court is justified in arriving at the finding that it is not merely the speed, that can not be the basic ingredient necessary to decide as to whether the appellant was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle and even if he is found driving the vehicle on wrong side, the same would amount to rash and negligent driving, irrespective of the fact that the vehicle was being driven at low speed. 5. As regards the defect in the steering rod, the evidence on record nowhere discloses that the said defect had developed prior to the accident. Considering the nature of the accident and the consequences of the accident as revealed from the evidence on record, if the Courts below have taken a reasonable view in relation to the alleged technical defect and has held that there is nothing on record to arrive at the conclusion that such defect had developed prior to the accident, no fault can be found with the said finding. In such cases, it cannot be heard to argue that the prosecution ought to have led further evidence in that regard, as regards the time of the development of the damage caused to the steering rod. If at all any such defect had developed prior to the accident, no one had prevented the driver, i.e. the petitioner, from taking appropriate steps either to remedy the same or to stop driving such vehicle. There is no explanation forthcoming from the appellant in that regard. In such circumstances, the prosecution cannot be blamed for not leading any further evidence in that aspect. 6. It is true that in criminal case primarily burden lies upon the prosecution to establish all the ingredients of the offence for which the person is tried, including the case relating to the rash and negligent driving. If the prosecution establishes the fact that the vehicle was being driven on wrong side, the onus would shift upon the accused to establish with cogent evidence that he had reason to drive on wrong side. In case, any mechanical defect develops in the vehicle, certainly, it would be also for the driver to show that such defect had developed at a particular time, because it would be entirely within his knowledge. When the burden regarding rashness and negligence in driving the vehicle by the accused person was fully discharged by respondents, the appellant had not led any evidence to rebut the same. He cannot blame the prosecution for his own fault in failure to lead the required evidence. 7. It was also sought to be argued that there is no evidence to show that the vehicle was actually driven on wrong side. However, it is not in dispute that when the accident occurred the vehicle was found on wrong side of the road. This itself is sufficient to hold that the vehicle was driven on the wrong side. In that regard, no fault can be found with the finding arrived at by the Courts below. 8. As regards the third ground, plain reading of the impugned judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court as well as the judgment of the trial Court disclose that both the Courts have gone through the entire evidence on record and on proper analysis thereof have arrived at a correct finding about negligence and rashness on the part of the appellant in driving the vehicle. Incidentally, it can also be noted that on account of the accident four persons had to loose their lives. The Courts below have not only considered the entire evidence on record but have also considered the relevant law applicable to the facts established and the reported decisions in that regard. Being so, I find no case made out for interference in the impugned judgment in this revision application. Therefore, the revision application fails and is hereby dismissed. R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J. SMA