IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE PRESENT THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI DEVINEDER GUPTA THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. SUDERSHAN REDDY THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE C.V. RAMULU AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. SESHASAYANA REDDY Writ Petition No.14939 of 2004 Between Bhimidipati Annapoorna Bhavani, W/o Late Sri Satyanarayana Murthy, R/o 7-2-13, Nageswara Rao Street, Ramaraopeta, Kakinada, East Godavari district, Andhra Pradesh. …..PETITIONER And 1. The Land Acquisition Officer, Yeluru Reservoir Project, Peddapuram, East Godavari district, Andhra Pradesh. 2. The District Collector, East Godavari district at Kakinada. 3. The Secretary to the Govt of A.P., Revenue Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad. 4. The Secretary, Irrigation & Command Area Development Department, Govt of AP, Hyderabad. 5. The Chief Engineer, V.Y.P.P. Unit, Dowlaiswaram, East Godavari district (RRs 4 and 5 are impleaded suo motu by order dated 21-9-2004 in WP 14939 of 2004) …Respondents Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the High Court may be pleased to issue an order, direction, or a writ, more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus to call for records and remarks from the respondents herein regarding non-payment of compensation for the lands of the petitioner situated in survey Nos.308, 314, 315, 403 and 410 in J.Annavaram village, acquired under Yeleru Reservoir project under Award No.19 of 1988, dt 15-10-1998 and Award No.4 of 1990, dt.15-2-1990 in spite of the directions of the High Court to the concerned authorities to pay compensation amount of Rs.35,000/- per acre in S.Nos.403, 410 of J.Annavaram village in OP No.24 of 1992 in its judgment dated 7-2-2003 in AS No.1722 of 2000 on the file of the High Court and an amount of Rs.30,000/- per acre in S.No.308, 314 and 315 of J.Annavaram village in OP No.280 of 1990 in its judgment dated 14-03-2003 in As No.1760 of 2000 on the file of the High Court and failure of payment to the petitioner even though she filed execution petitions E.P.Nos.104 of 2000 in OP No.280 of 1990 and EP No.105 of 2000 in OP No.24 of 1992 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Peddapuram, East Godavari district (2) Not allowing the petitioner to participate in the bidding on her own, resulting in petitioner’s not being able to obtain the just compensation due to her in spite of completion of the judicial process at both the lower court and the High Court, (3) to direct all the concerned authorities to hand over the declared compensation amounts to the petitioner including additional payment of 30% solatium and 12% additional market value as solatium has not been paid in time to enable the petitioner to live in this materialistic world peacefully due to old age. JUDGMENT: (Per the HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI DEVINDER GUPTA) Reference to the Larger Bench is on the question of correctness of decision of Full Bench of this Court in VEMULA PRABHAKAR AND OTHERS v. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND R.D.O., PEDDAPALLI, KARIMNAGAR AND ANOTHER. The Full Bench in the aforesaid decision held that no writ can be issued for implementing the awards passed by the Civil Courts in land acquisition proceedings taken out under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) on the ground that an alternate and efficacious remedy of seeking execution of the award as a decree of Civil Court in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is available under the Act. While holding so, the Full Bench expressly overruled the decisions of this Court in SUR REDDY v. THE SPL. DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LA), MEDAK, BILLA LINGA REDDY v. R.D.O., B. GOVINDA REDDY v. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER-CUM-L.A.O. and K. MURALIDHAR REDDY AND OTHERS v. THE SPECIAL DY. COLLECTOR, L.A. UNIT, GADWAL AND OTHERS. Facts giving rise to the reference to Larger Bench are that a letter received from one Smt. Bhamidipati Annapoorna Bhavani dated 9.8.2004 was taken on judicial side as Taken up Writ Petition by the 1st Division Bench. In the letter, she made grievance that pursuant to proceedings taken out under the provisions of the Act, she was deprived of her land to the extent of Ac.4.95 cts situated in J. Annavaram village, East Godavari District, for the purpose of Yeleru Project in the year 1987. The Land Acquisition Collector had passed awards on 15.10.1988 and 15.2.1990 in respect of the lands acquired in the village by offering paltry sum as compensation against which reference was sought to Civil Court. The amount of compensation was thus determined by the Civil Court on 11.4.1999 in O.P.Nos.280 of 1990 and 24 of 1992. Against the awards of the reference Court, appeals were preferred by the State Government to the High Court and then to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court thus settled the amount of compensation finally. The grievance, which the petitioner made, is that though the compensation payable to her had finally been settled, the State Government had failed to deposit the amount of compensation. Thus, she was driven to seek execution of the award in order to realise the amount of compensation. During execution, all sorts of frivolous objections were raised on behalf of the State Government thereby depriving her the fruits of the award. She being an old lady of 92 years has not yet seen the colour of the money even after seventeen years from the date when she was deprived of the land. She has been of deprivation of her land. She has been unable to realise the money awarded under the awards because of frivolous objections being raised by the State Government to the execution of the awards. On notice being issued, the Division Bench called upon the respondents to furnish information as to what the State Government is proposed to do as regards payment of compensation in cases where compensation had finally been settled and in which no appeals were pending. This information was sought since number of such matters had come to the notice of the Court in which for years together even after final determination of the amount of compensation, payable as per law, the State Government had not bothered to deposit the amount of compensation to enable the persons, who had been deprived of their property, to take benefit of the amount. The Bench also noticed that the dockets of almost all Courts dealing with land acquisition matters throughout the State was heavy, more particularly, due to execution proceedings pending. The Bench also noticed that for one reason or the other, execution petitions were not being allowed to proceed thereby the persons whose lands were acquired for public cause were being deprived of their legitimate amount of compensation determined by the Civil Courts. In some cases, even coercive steps were ordered attaching the property of the State Government. After the attachment was ordered in the execution proceedings, even at the stage of sale, objections are being filed on behalf of the State that the properties are not liable for attachment. Thus executing courts’ attention is diverted for deciding such objections resulting in unnecessary wastage of precious time of the Courts. On the other hand, execution petition can be got disposed of easily by depositing the amount by the State. In the aforementioned background, information was furnished by the respondents which discloses that about 1654 awards had been passed by the Land Acquisition Collectors from time to time in almost all the districts of the State with respect to the special projects for which land to the extent of Ac.57,467.94 had been acquired. The total amount of compensation payable for the acquired land is Rs.215,03,66,251.00. Even out of this amount of compensation, only 1/4th amount has so far been deposited and the balance of Rs.160,56,06,276.00 still remains to be deposited. Amount of compensation referred to is only towards the costs of land acquired for special projects and not for the house sites. Insofar as land acquired for the purpose of house sites are concerned, as many as 445 awards were passed by the Land Acquisition Collectors throughout the State involving land to the extent of Ac.11,923.25. The amount of compensation required to be deposited is about Rs.20,74,91,655.00. State Government had deposited only Rs.8,47,47,648. The balance amount of Rs.11,94,02,618.00 is yet to be deposited. It was brought to the notice of the Bench that the figures furnished were of those cases where the amount of compensation had finally been settled. The cases where compensation had not yet been finally settled had not been taken into consideration while furnishing the said information. If all such cases been taken into consideration, the amount required to be deposited by the State would go beyond the figures furnished. When the case was taken up for consideration, attention of the reference bench was drawn to the Full Bench decision of this Court in VEMULA PRABHAKAR AND OTHERS v. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND R.D.O., PEDDAPALLI, KARIMNAGAR AND ANOTHER (supra) which had held that no writ would be issued to the State directing it to make payment of the amount of compensation. The only remedy of the claimants would be to work out their remedies by taking out execution proceedings in Civil Courts seeking execution of the awards. As such, the claimants are driven to file execution petitions. Having gone through the Full Bench decision of this Court in Vemula Prabhakar’s case, the Reference Bench was of the view that the said decision requires reconsideration and that is how the present reference was made to the Larger Bench. We hard learned Advocate General who has very ably put forth before us various decisions having relevance. We will first refer to various decisions of this Court dealing with the issue. In K. Muralidhar Reddy’s case the facts were that the land of the petitioners therein was acquired for the purpose of constructing Earth Dam PJP Left Bank of Nandimalla village, Gadwal. Section 4(1) notification was issued on 26.9.1981 and award was passed on 31.8.1982. On reference, the Civil Court passed award on 26.4.1990 enhancing compensation. The State carried the matter in appeal to the High Court wherein no stay was granted as regards payment of compensation. The claimants filed execution petition for realisation of compensation amount and obtained order of attachment of movable properties belonging to the respondents therein. The learned single Judge noticed that the Civil Courts are placed in helpless situation when the respondents are seeking time repeatedly on one pretext or the other taking inconsistent pleas before it, that the appeals are pending before the High Court and sufficient amounts are not available to discharge the obligation. It was also noticed that the authorities were adopting various methods of pick and choose in paying compensation. In W.A.No.1044 of 1988 this Court had given direction to the respondents to make payments strictly in accordance with the seniority, that is to say, the persons whose OPs are disposed of earlier should be paid earlier. In this background, it was held that it was not open for the respondents to say that alternate remedy was available to the petitioners by filing execution proceedings and they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. Where there is no stay as regards payment of compensation, it is not open to the respondents to excuse themselves from making payment on the pretext that appeals are pending before the High Court. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in THE COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR GENERAL v. K.S. JGANNATHAN and noticing that even after twelve years the legitimate compensation to which the claimants were entitled, if denied would cause injustice to the claimants, learned single Judge held that mere pendency of appeals or availability of alternative remedy in execution proceedings cannot be a ground for the respondents to excuse themselves in discharging their obligation, which they are bound to discharge and the writ Court is competent to direct the respondents to act upon and pay the compensation to the claimants. In Billa Linga Reddy’s case, the writ petition was filed seeking directions to the State to pay compensation in accordance with the award of the reference Court. In this case, notification under section 4(1) was issued followed by declaration under section 6(1) of the Act in 1977. Collector made his award on 15.1.1979 determining the compensation and on reference, the Civil Court passed award on 24.12.1983 enhancing the amount of compensation. When compensation amount was not paid writ petition was filed in which a preliminary objection was raised by the learned Government Pleader that since judgment had been rendered by the reference Court, the remedy available to the petitioners was to seek execution of the award by initiating proceedings before the executing Court and the petitioners cannot be permitted to resort to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable. Learned single Judge taking note of the facts of the case and the nature of objection, held that the objection might be tenable so far as ordinary suits are concerned, but in a case where the property of a person is deprived for public purpose, the same can be done only through due process of law and not otherwise. After 44th Constitution Amendment Act, 1976 which had come into effect from 20.6.1979, such right was transformed as a constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Constitution. The object and intendment of the Amendment Act is to see that the person deprived of his property for public purpose should be paid money at the earliest possible time so as to rehabilitate himself somewhere else. If this was not done, certainly due process of law is violated. Due process of law is not to be taken just as a technical observation of the rules or procedure but should be taken to effectively compensate the person. It can be done by determining and paying the compensation amount at the earliest possible time, more so, when prices have been raising leaps and bounds. In this background, it was held that it was permissible for such a person to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court and it was also permissible for this Court to issue appropriate directions in such cases. I n Sur Reddy’s case, a learned single Judge of this Court held that alternative remedy by way of execution proceedings is not an absolute bar in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this case, possession of the land had been taken in the year 1982 after notification under section 4(1) was issued on 13.7.1982 dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Award came to be passed on 19.12.1985 and the reference Court answered the reference on 31.7.1989. Appeal was preferred by the State Government, which was dismissed on 21.1.1994. Compensation was not paid to the persons who had been deprived of the property. When the petitioners approached this Court by filing writ petition, they were faced with an objection raised on behalf of the State Government about the maintainability of such a petition in view of the alternative remedy available to the petitioner for due execution of the award. Learned single Judge held that mere existence of alternate remedy does not deter the Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to extend its protective umbrella to a citizen and see that his just claims are not defeated by technicalities. Though the learned single Judge took a different view that execution proceedings contemplated for execution of decrees of Civil Court is not a remedy provided under the Act but assumed that, even if such an execution petition is maintainable, it was not an effective and efficacious remedy, as, it is a time consuming process. It was held that the High Court has ample power to exercise its plenary jurisdiction to compel the State authorities to act in accordance with law and pay award amount. Writ petition was thus held to be maintainable. In B. Govinda Reddy’s case writ petition was filed fifteen years after the claimants were deprived of their possession and no compensation was paid to them. Though possession was taken on 1.12.1981 for the public purpose, notification under section 4(1) of the Act published only on 5.3.1992. The Collector passed award on 30.9.1993. Reference was answered by the reference Court on 29.1.1996. Claimants had taken out execution proceedings and the executing court had also issued orders attaching the immovable property of the State Government in April, 1997. Thus, when compensation was not forthcoming, writ petitions were filed, which were opposed by the learned Government Pleader taking preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the petition. Learned single Judge took note of the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in KASANI SUBBAMMA v.THE GOVERNMENT OF A.P wherein compensation had not been paid even after a lapse of more than 11 years after passing of the award by the reference Court. The decision in Billa Linga Reddy’s case (supra) was also referred where compensation was not paid for more than twelve years after deprivation of the property. Besides taking note of certain other decisions of the Supreme Court, learned single Judge held that the High Court can always issue appropriate writs or direction compelling the State and its instrumentalities to act in accordance with law. The Court can always issue such directions whenever and wherever interests of justice require issuance of such directions and the fact that the petitioners had already availed the remedy available to them in law by filing execution petitions may not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue directions to the respondents to deposit the amount of compensation determined. The learned single Judge, however, put a word of caution that the High Court cannot be allowed to be converted into an executing court for implementation of the awards and decrees passed by reference court under the Act. The jurisdiction and power conferred upon the Court under Article 226 is required to be exercised only where the interest of justice requires and it is not as if the High Court would entertain writ petition to implement and execute any and every order and decree passed by Court of competent Civil jurisdiction. The decree holders have necessarily to resort to the execution proceedings and get the decrees executed in accordance with law. The High Court would normally insist the decree holders to exhaust the alternative remedy available under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Act. It was further held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 does not issue writs as a matter of course. Existence of alternative and efficacious statutory remedy is one of the considerations that would always be taken into consideration by the Court. But the fact that there is alternative and effective remedy available does not operate as a bar in whatsoever manner and affect the jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Though before the Full Bench in Vemula Prabhakar’s case (supra) decisions of this Court in Billa Ranga Reddy’s case, Sur Reddy’s case, B. Govinda Reddy’s case and Muralidhar Reddy’s case were referred to, the Full Bench only dealt with the decision in Linga Reddy’s case and Muralidhar Reddy’s case. While holding that the judgment in Linga Reddy’s case did not lay down the correct law, the Full Bench also expressly overruled Muralidhar Reddy’s case and other judgments taking the same view, but without referring to the reasons which were assigned in those cases. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that though B. Govinda Reddy’s case was referred to by the Full Bench in para 2 of its Judgment, which had exhaustively dealt with the question and gave cogent reasons for entertaining a writ petition in cases where interest of justice requires notwithstanding that an alternative remedy is available under the Act, the Full Bench has not considered and dealt with the said decision. The question to be answered by the Full Bench was only about the maintainability of the writ petition as also the desirability of issuing writ to direct the Government to make payment. Whether or not powers of contempt could not be exercised by the High Court in the event of the State Government not complying with the direction to deposit the amount was not the subject matter referred for decision. However, the Full Bench dealt with that aspect more in coming to the conclusion. The Full Bench rightly in para 4 of its judgment noted the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in WHIRLPOOL CORPN. V. REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS on the question of maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 by the High Court when alternative remedy is available to the petition which has not been exhausted, saying that a writ in the nature of mandamus will be subject to exercise of sound judicial discretion. The Full Bench noticed that the general rule is that a writ of mandamus would not ordinarily be issued when there exists an adequate and efficacious remedy in respect of the same subject matter. Mandamus is important public law remedy and does not generally supersede legal remedies. But alternative remedy must be efficacious to accomplish the same purpose wherefor mandamus is sought for and must be equally convenient, beneficial and effective. Thus, it was held that there cannot be any doubt that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of writ petition. It was also held by the Full Bench on reference being made to the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S. RASHID & SON v. I.T.I. COMMISSION and C.A. ABRAHAM v. I.T. OFFICER AND CHAMPALAL v. I.T. COMMISSIONER, W.B. that where the party has effective alternative remedy and he does not avail such remedy, the High Court require a strong case to be made out for entertaining a writ petition for issuance of appropriate directions. The Full Bench thereafter made reference to the provisions of Section 11, 12, 26, 28, 28-A, 31 and 53 of the Act and thus concluded that the State is liable to pay the amount of compensation determined to those who have been deprived of their property either from its consolidated fund or from any other fund and for the said purpose even coercive steps by way of attachment and sale of the Government property can be taken and such property need not be confined only belonging to the office of the Collector (Land Acquisition). It was held that the award of the Civil Court is deemed to be decree, which has to be executed in the same manner as a decree of the Court, therefore, the alternative remedy provided under the Act to execute the award was effective and adequate. Ultimately it was concluded that writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking execution of the award made pursuant to reference under Section 18 of the Act, would not be maintainable and thus proceeded to hold that the decisions of this court in Linga Reddy’s case and other judgments taking similar view do not lay down the correct law and thus overruled the same. Full Bench made reference to a decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTEHERS v. ANIL CHANDRA CHOWDHURY. Incidentally, one of the members of the Full Bench of this Court in Vemula Prabhakar’s case was a member constituting the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court which has taken the correct view and which is in consonance with the law laid down in Whirlpool’s case, but assigned its own reasons in not following the ratio therein. The Full Bench also noticed the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.26368 of 1996 decided on 27.2.2001 holding that