HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU CRL.PETITION NO.2308 OF 2010 Date:07.04.2010 Between: Jasti Dharma Teja and 3 others …..Petitioners And: The State S.H.O Jubilee Hills P.S, rep. by its PP and another …..Respondents. HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU CRL.PETITION NO.2308 OF 2010 ORDER: 1. The petitioners 1 to 4 are the accused Nos.1 to 4 in Crime No.80 of 2010 of Jubilee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad relating to offences punishable under Section 448, 420 and 506 IPC. The crime was registered on 05.03.2010. In 5 days thereafter, this petition for quashing the said crime is filed on 10.03.2010. 2. Subject-matter of dispute between the parties is house in plot No.1363 in road No.45 of Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. The said property belonged to A-2. A-3 is daughter of A-2. A-1 is husband of A-3 and son-in-law of A-2. A-4 is son of A-2. The 2nd respondent/defacto- complainant claims to have purchased the above property from A-2 under Registered Agreement for Sale-cum-General Power of Attorney vide registered document No.1693/2009 and obtained possession of the same thereunder. It is first grievance of the 2nd respondent that City Financial Consumer Finance Limited approached him stating about the said property being under their mortgage in connection with a loan, and that existence of mortgage and raising of loan by A-1 on the property was deliberately suppressed and not disclosed to him with criminal intention of cheating him. In so far as this part of the complaint is concerned, it is only against A-1 and A-2. It is further alleged by the 2nd respondent that when he took the matter to the notice of A-1 and questioned him about not disclosing the mortgage and taking loan, A-1 admitted his mistake and assured and requested the 2nd respondent to pay instalments to the finance company and A-1 undertook to reimburse instalments paid by the 2nd respondent and that accordingly A-1 had issued a letter addressed to the finance company authorising to collect instalments from the 2nd respondent and to deliver title deeds to the 2nd respondent. 3. Second grievance of the 2nd respondent is that on 4.3.2010 at about 9.00 p.m A-1, A-2 and A-4 along with 50 to 70 antisocial elements came to the property wielding lotties and other weapons and trespassed into his property in his absence and started beating his watchmen Venkateswarulu and Prasada Rao threatening to kill them and that all the culprits forcefully necked those two watchmen out of the house and ransacked movable property and took possession of the same illegally. In so far as this portion of allegations is concerned, it is against A-1, A-2, A-4 and others who accompanied them. Those allegations prima facie attract offences punishable under Sections 448 and 506 IPC against A-1, A-2 and A-4. 4. In so far as A-3 is concerned, there are absolutely no allegations in the First Information Report touching any of the offences under Sections 448, 420 and 506 IPC. It is not known how and why her name came to be mentioned in the registered FIR. The 2nd respondent’s counsel fairly submits that there are no allegations incriminating A-3 in this crime and that therefore, A-3/3rd petitioner is entitled for relief in this petition. 5. Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners during the course of arguments stated that this petition is not pressed in so far as A-2 and A- 4 are concerned. Thus, main controversy in this petition is only with regard to A-1. But, when allegations in F.I.R are taken on their face value, there is prima facie complicity of A-1 in all offences under Sections 448, 420 and 506 IPC for which this crime was registered. It is for the police to investigate and come to a conclusion on truth or otherwise of allegations in the report given by the 2nd respondent. This Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, cannot go into truth or falsity of allegations in the FIR. 6. Both the counsel cited the following reported decisions on scope of enquiry in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C: 1. Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited[1] 2. Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar[2] 3. Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh[3] 4. State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju[4] 5. Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P.[5] 6. Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited[6] 7. I n Indian Oil Corporation (1 supra) the Supreme Court after referring to several previous reported decisions, set out principles relating to exercising of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash complaints and criminal proceedings as follows: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, if warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. The Supreme Court also took notice of growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases, for obvious reason of prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests. 9. I n Mohammed Ibrahim (2 supra), the Supreme Court noted growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused or out of enmity towards the accused or to subject to harassment. At the same time, the Supreme Court also pointed out that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of the criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences even if they also amount to civil disputes. 10. In Devendra (3 supra), the Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C if the allegations made in F.I.R even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence and that in such a situation the superior courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for nothing. As pointed out earlier, allegations in the First Information Report in the case on hand, prima facie attract ingredients of all offences under Sections 448, 420 and 506 IPC for which the crime was registered as against A-1, A-3 and A-4. 11. In Didigam Bikshapathi (5 supra), the Supreme Court cautioned that inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. I n Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited (6 supra) the Supreme Court held that First Information Report, if prima facie discloses commission of a cognisable offence, the High Court ordinarily shall not interfere with investigation. 12. It is contended by the Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners that FIR in this case is on an issue which is purely of civil nature and that it is malafide. Even though the dispute is with regard to house property, allegations in the First Information Report given by the 2nd respondent prima facie disclose ingredients of all the offences for which the crime was registered. It is for the police to come to conclusion after due and proper investigation whether those allegations are true or not. Thus, there are no merits in this petition, except in so far as A-3 is concerned. 13. In the result, the petition is partly allowed quashing F.I.R in Crime No.80 of 2010 of Jubilee Hills Police Station in so far as the 3rd petitiner/A-3 is concerned; and the petition is partly dismissed in so far as the petitioners 1,2 and 4/A-1, A-2 and A-4 are concerned. ____________________________________ SAMUDRALA GOVINDA RAJULU,J. Date:07.04.2010. HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU CRL.PETITION NO.2308 OF 2010 Date: 07.04.2010 Gk. [1] (2006) 6 Supreme Court Cases 736. [2] (2009) 8 Supreme Court Cases 751 [3] (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 495 [4]2006 (2 ALD (Crl.) 594 (SC) [5] 2008 (1) ALD (Crl.) 105 (SC) [6] 2008 (1) ALD (Crl.) 669 (SC).