1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.8298 OF 2009 Kamal w/o Chhagan Netkar, age: 48 years, Occ: Nil, R/o Maharana Pratap Housing Society, Near Milind Nagar, Chalisgaon, Tq.Chalisgaon, District Jalgaon. Petitioner Versus The Manager, Dalit Mitra Bapuji Diwan Chavan Vidyarthi Vastigruh, Chalisgaon, District Jalgaon. Respondent Mr. S.P.Tiwari, advocate for the petitioner. Mr. S.R.Patil, advocate for the Respondent CORAM: R. K. DESHPANDE, J. DATE : 21 st July, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT: 1 This writ petition challenges the order dated 29.06.2009, passed by the Member, Industrial Court, Jalgaon in Application Misc. ULP No.02 of 2006 filed by the petitioner. The application was filed seeking condonation of delay caused in filing the Complaint under Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. 2 The notice in this matter was issued on 09.12.2009. In response to the same, learned Counsel Shri S.R.Patil appears for the Respondent. Parties agree that the matter can be disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 2 Hence, Rule, made returnable forthwith and heard finally by consent of the parties. 3 The Labour Court had passed an award in Reference IDA No.24 of 1997 on 05.01.2000. By this award, the petitioner was reinstated in service with 50% of back wages. The award was published on 05.03.2000 as per the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The relevant provision i.e. Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is reproduced below: 19 Period of Operation of settlements and awards :- (1) ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... (2) ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... (3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Provided that the appropriate Government reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit: Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit, so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. (4) ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... (5) ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... (6) ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... (7) ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 4 The perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the award remains in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the 3 award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A, an award becomes enforceable from the date of its publication under Section 17. Thus, in this case, the award becomes enforceable on 05.03.2000. The second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 19 reproduced above, empowers the appropriate Government to extend the period of operation of award, before its expiry, by further period not exceeding one year at a time and such extension shall not exceed three years from the date on which the award came into operation. It is not the case of the petitioner that the award was extended in terms of second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 19. The award, therefore, no longer remains in operation after expiry of period of one year from 05.03.2000. 5 The application for condonation of delay was filed, which is permissible under Section 28 (1) of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971, which prescribe the period of limitation of 90 days from the date of occurrence of unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court has rejected the claim of the petitioner for condonation of delay and paragraph no.8 of the said order, which is relevant, is reproduced below: “From the application of the applicant it is seen that no specific period of delay is explained in the application. In the application it is stated that the Ld. Labour Court has passed an Award in Ref.IDA No.24/1997 on 5.1.2000. She has requested from time to time to the respondent for compliance of the Award but no steps have been taken by the respondent. The applicant has not led any evidence in support of her application for condonation of delay. The reasons stated by the applicant are not specific reasons as to why the delay has been caused. From the record it appears that the Award is passed on 5.1.2000 in Ref.IDA No. 24/1997. This Award was published on 5.3.2000 as stated by the applicant in pursis marked as Exh.U-11 and this case is filed on 25.4.2006. So it is clear that there is delay of near about 6 years. But the applicant has not explained why she was silent for about 6 years. No any documentary evidence is placed on record in respect of reasons but in 4 casual manner she has simply stated in para no.2 that she was requested orally and by way of written application for compliance of award but no documentary evidence is placed on record, therefore, there is no justifiable reasons to condone the delay.” 6 The bare perusal of the aforesaid finding recorded by the Industrial Court shows that the Industrial Court has exercised discretion in rejecting the application for condonation of delay for the reasons which are stated in the order. The exercise of discretion by the Industrial Court cannot be said to be arbitrary or perverse. Apart from this, the period of operation of award has expired and hence no fault can be found with the order passed by the Industrial Court. 7 Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of George Thomas Vs. Bombay Tyres International Ltd., reported in 1996 LawSuit (Bom) 632, wherein delay was condoned. The perusal of paragraph 8 of this judgment indicates that in the facts and circumstances of that case, the Court was satisfied that sufficient cause was made out and as such, delay was condoned. It cannot be said that any law is laid down in paragraph 8 of the said judgment. The contention, in that regard, therefore, cannot be accepted. 8 In the result, there is no substance in the petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs. (R. K. DESHPANDE) JUDGE ******* adb/wp829809