.4!fsi'1«6: <iE;'^ -<S> HIGH COURT OF CHHATTIseARH AT BILASPUR DIVISION BENCH: HON. MR. DHIRENbRA MISHRA <& HON. MR. R.N. CHANORAKAR. JJ Writ Appeal No. 75 of 2008 Appellant Petitioner Versus Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd., (Balco) Respondent bashrath Singh »!» JU&GMENT FOR CONSIDERATtON •s nii HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.N. CHANDRAKAR 5 CU3^ui-^- s POST FOR JUD6MENT ON 01-09-2009 Sd'- R.N. Chasidi-akar Judge Sd/- Dhirendra Mishra Judge HIGH COURT OF CHHATTIS6ARH AT BILASPUR DIVISION BENCH: HON.MR. bHIREN&RA MISHRA. & HON. MR. R.N. CHANDRAKAR. JJ Writ Appeal No.75 of 2008 (Writ Appeal Under Section 2 (1) of H[gh Cowt of Chhattisqarh (Appeal to Division Bench) Act. 2006 APPELLANT (Petitioner) Vs RESPONbENT Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd., (Balco)^ Star Light Industries, Through; Managing Director, Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. Balconagar Korba, Tahsil and District Korba (CG) Dashrath Singh, S/o Late Bhaddelal, R/o Village-New Risda, Bhadrapara Balco Korba, Tahsil and District Korba(C6) Present: Mr. P.S. Koshy Advocate with Mr. Bhaskar- Pyasi, Advocate for- the appellant. Mr. Sanjay Patel, Advocate for- the respondent. JU&6MENT (Oelivered on o( /09/2009) Dhirendra Mishra, J 1) The appellant has preferred this writ appeal against the order dated 7th April, 2008 (Annexure A-l) passed in W.P (L) No.349 of 2008 whereby learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition of the appellant herein filed against the order dated 13.12.2007 (Annexure A-3) passed by the Industrial Court Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur Bench. 2) For the sake of brevity, the parties to this writ appeal shall be r-eferred hereinafter as per their status before the writ Cour-t. ^3 'aai .-t.'- •t. UO :K %,. •^i -^' 3) Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the respondent was working as Senior Attendant in the petitioner- company. His services were terminated on the ground of misconduct vide order dated 14.8.2004. The respondent challenged the order of termination by filing W.P. No.2473/2005 and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 20.6.2005 with liberty to file appeal before the Labour Court. The respondent moved an application under- Section 31 (3) of the C.&. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for brevity 'Act, 1960') before the Labour Court on 1.5.2006 and the same was dismissed by the Labour Court vide order dated 4.4.2007 (AnnexureA- 2) with a finding that the same has been preferred with a delay of nine months without assigning any appropriate and sufficient reason for the delay. Against the order of the Labour Court the respondent preferred appeal before the Industrial Couct under Section 65 of the Act, 1960. The Industrial Court allowed the appeal vide order dated 13.12.2007 (Annexure A-2) and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for deciding the application filed by the respondent on merits in accordance with law. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Court, the petitioner filed writ petition, which has been dismissed by the impugned order. 4) Mr. Koshy, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner submits that Section 62 of the Act, 1960 does not empower the Labour Court to entertain a claim application beyonS the prescr-ibed period of limitation. After the date on which the respondent's earlier writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn i.e.20.6.2005, there was sufficient period for" the employee to approach the Labour Court under Section 31 (3) of the Act, 1960. However, the v^\ H!!affl a"is»' respondent moved the application before the Labour Court only on 1.5.2006, which was barred by Law of Limitation. The employee also did not file any application for condonation of delay in filing the application under Section 31 (3) of the Act, 1960. It was argued that Legislature in its wisdom has conferred upon the Industrial Court power to condone the delay in filing appeal under Section 65 of the Act, 1960, however, since no such power has been vested upon the Labour' Court under Section 62 of the Act, 1960, it impliedly exclude the power of condonation of delay upon the Labour Court while dealing with an application under Section 31 (3) of the Act, 1960. The provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court as the Labour Court is not a Court for the purposes of applying the provisions of Limitation Act. In support of the argument, learned counsel for the petitioner cited various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Cour-t. 5) On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Patel, learned counsel for the respondent-employee submitted that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition by the well reasoned order and the same does not call for interference. 6) We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have perused the pleadings of respective parties before the writ Court as also the impugned order and the orders passed by both the Industrial Tribunals. 7) After referring various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court on the subject, the learned Single Judge has held that it is settled law that in the case of Industrial Court, r-emanding the matter for fresh decision, this Court, while exercising its extraordinary \^ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court, and accordingly, dismissed the writ petition. 8) In the matter of Damodaran Pillai and others Vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. reported in (2005) 7 SCC 300 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any v^ express provision in the Act, the civil Court cannot condone the delay and for the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Court cannot invoke its inherent powers to condone the delay. Hardshipor injustice cannot be a ground for extending limitation period. 9) Further, in the matter of Raja Ram Maize Products Vs. Industrial Court of M.P. & others reported in (2001) 4 SCC 492 it has been held that under Section 62 of the Act, 1960 the largest period of limitation prescribed is two years and in cases of termination of services and other incidental matterslesser period of limitation has been prescribed. lO)The learned Single Judge has referred Para-29 of the judgment delivered by the Full Bench of M.P. High Court, Jabalpur Bench in the matter of Mohammad Sagir Vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and others reported in 2004 (2) MPHT 179 wherein while dealing w/ith the scope of condonation of delay under the provisions of Section 62 of the Act, 1960 it was observed that the Industrial Relations Act is a benevolent and beneficial statute. A claim of an employee would not be thrown over board only because he had not approached the Labour Court within time. It has been further held that where applicability of Limitation Act has not been expressly excluded, in that /" /,'-"^1::'. \^J/ •^^^^" ^ case the pr-ovision of condonation of delay is applicable in the proceeding before the Labour Court. 11) In the instant case, the respondent had bonafidely impugned the order of termination before the High Court, however", his petition was dismissed as withdrown on 20.6.2005 reserving liberty to the respondent to prefer appeal before the Labour Court. Thereafter, the respondent approached the Labour Court on 1.5.2006. Section 62 (i) (a) of the Act, 1960 provides that proceedings relating to dispute connected with the termination of services of an employee shall commence within a year from the date of termination of the services of the concerned employee. There is no expressprovision in the Act, 1960 that application of the provisions of the Limitation Act are barred or excluded. 12)Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:- "29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for dny suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisionscontained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far- as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 13) In the absence of any expresspower in the Act, 1960, provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply to the proceedfngs before the Labour Court also and therefore, it cannot be said that the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the application under Section 31 (3) of the Act, 1960. The order of the learned Single Judge is based on the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Full Bench of the M.P. High Court, which find reference in the impugned order. 14) Therefore, we are of the opinion that impugned order of the learned Single Judge declining to interfere in the order passed by the Industrial Court, remanding the matter for fresh decision, in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is strictiy in accordance with law and the same does not call for interference. 15) In the result, there is no substance in this writ appeal, the same deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, it is hereby dismissed. No orders as to costs /_ Sd/- • adra Mishra Sd'- R.N. Chandr Judge *A^ Roshan/-