IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF OCTOBER, TWO THOUSAND NINE HON’BLE SRI ANIL R.DAVE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT APPEAL No.126 of 2003 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against order, dated 27-9-2002 in Writ Petition No.18015 of 1994 on the file of this Court). Between: P.Wilson Mathew. … Appellant. And: The Additional Director General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, NWZ, Hallamajra Chandigrah, U.P., and three others. … Respondents. Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri J.V.Prasad. Counsel for the Respondents: Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar for Sri A.Rajasekhar Reddy, Additional Solicitor General. This Court made the following: JUDGMENT: (per C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J.,) This Writ Appeal arises out of order, dated 27-9- 2002, in Writ Petition No.18015 of 1994, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant. The facts in a nutshell are that the appellant was a Lab Technician in BH-II, CRPF, Hyderabad, at the relevant time. A charge was framed against the appellant to the effect that during June, 1991, he accepted Rs.10,000/- as bribe from Sri A.Niranjan S/o. A.Kistaiah, of Yetam village, Kodair Mandal, Mahabubnagar District, promising that he would secure appointment to the said A.Niranjan as a CRPF Constable. After a detailed enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report, wherein he found the charge as proved. The disciplinary authority-respondent No.4, after considering the enquiry report, passed order dated 19- 10-1993 exonerating the appellant. Respondent No.3 initiated suo motu proceedings by issuing show-cause notice, dated 2-5-1994, to the appellant to show cause as to why the order of the disciplinary authority should not be reversed and the punishment of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay by two increments for a period of two years should not be imposed on him. The appellant submitted his explanation/reply to the said show-cause notice. By order, dated 12-4-1994, respondent No.3 imposed the above proposed penalty on the appellant. The appeal filed by the appellant before respondent No.1 ended in its dismissal, vide: order dated 27-7-1994. The appellant filed Writ Petition No.18015 of 1994, which, as stated above, was dismissed by the learned single Judge. At the hearing, Sri J.V.Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the orders passed by respondents 3 and 1 suffer from patent illegality. The learned counsel submitted that respondent No.3, while reversing the order of the disciplinary authority, failed to discuss the evidence on record and give reasons to impose the above-mentioned penalty. He also submitted that respondent No.1-appellate authority also failed to apply its mind to the facts of the case and the evidence on record and mechanically confirmed the order of respondent No.3. Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel representing the learned Assistant Solicitor General, however, submitted that there is ample evidence on record to show that the appellant was guilty of misconduct and that the charge framed against him was well founded. A perusal of the order passed by respondent No.3 shows that he failed to discuss the material on record, including the oral and documentary evidence. Curiously, respondent No.3 threw the burden on the appellant to prove that he is innocent. In our considered view, when respondent No.3 exercised suo motu powers under Regulation 29 of the extant Regulations in order to examine the correctness or otherwise of the order of the disciplinary authority exonerating the petitioner, it is his bounden duty to refer to and discuss the relevant material to justify his action in arriving at a different conclusion from the one arrived at by the disciplinary authority. By his failure to follow this procedure, he committed a patent error in reversing the order of the disciplinary authority and imposing the penalty referred to above on the appellant. Moreover, the initial burden is on the employer to prove that the employee is guilty of misconduct and respondent No.3 has failed to keep this fundamental principle in view while reversing the order of the disciplinary authority. For the above-mentioned reasons, the order of respondent No.3, as confirmed by the order of respondent No.1, cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, we set aside both the orders, dated 12-4- 1994 and 27-7-1994, passed by respondent Nos.3 and 1 respectively and remand the matter to respondent No.3 for fresh consideration and passing a detailed order after giving the appellant an opportunity of hearing. The Writ Appeal is accordingly allowed. ANIL R. DAVE, CJ., C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Dt.12-10-2009 MNR