1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 3253 OF 1991 Mohan Jagannath Salunke Age major, Occ. Service, R/o. Kandhari, Tq. Amalner, District Jalgaon ...Petitioner Versus 1. The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad Jalgaon 2 The Commissioner, Nashik Division Nashik. 3 The State of Maharashtra Through Government Pleader High Court of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad ...Respondents ..... Mrs. M.A.Kulkarni, advocate for the petitioner Mr. V.G. Godbharle, A.G.P. for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. ..... CORAM: S.S. SHINDE, J. DATED: 8TH JANUARY, 2010 JUDGMENT:- 1 This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29.3.1988, passed by the respondent No.1, which is confirmed by order dated 2 17.6.1991, by respondent No.2. 2 The brief facts of the case, are as under;- The petitioner was appointed as primary teacher in the school under the control of respondent No.1 for temporary period, on 1.7.1986. He was again continued by giving fresh orders on 21.12.1986 and on 21.7.1987. The said appointment letters have prescribed the period for which the petitioner was appointed. The said appointments were under the authority given to the Zilla Parishad dated 9.12.1983. The Zilla Parishad was authorized to make temporary appointments for a period not exceeding one year. Therefore, the respondent No.1 appointed the petitioner temporarily and continued him for one year. It is further case of the petitioner that respondent No.3 set up a Regional Selection Board w.e.f. 18.2.1988 in pursuance of Ordinance Maharashtra Public Service (Subordinate) Selection Board (Repeal) Act, 1983. Due to setting up the said Board, respondent No.3 expressed necessity to regularize the appointments made between the period from 18.6.1983 to 17.2.1988 and hence, respondent No.3 directed respondent No.1 not to give technical breaks in the services of such employees who were in service on 17.2.1988. 3 On 29.3.1988, the services of the petitioner were terminated by respondent No.1 on the ground that a criminal case was lodged against the petitioner and by exercising the powers given under the Government Circular dated 24.11.1987, as the petitioner was appointed for the period of one year or less than one year. It is the case of the petitioner that, as per the relevant Rules, services of the petitioner should not have been terminated and he should have been suspended. 3 Being aggrieved by the said order of termination of his service, the petitioner preferred appeal before respondent No.2 and the said appeal came to be dismissed on 17.6.1991. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 17.6.1991, confirming the order dated 29.3.1988, this petition is filed by the petitioner. 4 Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that false criminal case under Section 306 and 498-A of I.P.C. was initiated against the petitioner. He was subsequently acquitted in the said case on 22.8.1989 on the ground that there is no evidence against the petitioner. On the contrary, the petitioner treated his wife with love and affection. It is further argued that circular dated 24.11.1987 is unconstitutional, as is against the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that if the servant working under the Government of Maharashtra, under relevant Rule, if he 4 involved in the criminal case, then he is to be suspended and not terminated. According to the learned counsel, the Circular dated 24.11.1987 is arbitrary. It is further argued that the petitioner has worked for more than 240 days and he has acquired the status of permanent employee. According to the learned counsel in view of circular dated 11.4.1988, the petitioner is appointed prior to 17.1.1988 and his services are to be regularized and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner's services were for one year. It is further submitted that due to circular dated 24.11.1987, discriminatory treatment is given to the civil servants and Zilla Parishad servants and the said classification is unreasonable. Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.2 failed to examine the above aspects and rejected the case of the petitioner herein. Learned counsel further invited my attention to the grounds taken in the petition and submitted that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 5 Though the respondent No.1 is duly served, none appears for respondent No.1 when the matter is called out for hearing. Learned A.G.P. appeared for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and submitted that this writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 29.3.1988 passed by respondent No.1 which is confirmed by order dated 17.6.1991 passed by respondent No.2 and validity and legality of the circular dated 24.11.1987 is not in question in this petition. Therefore, learned A.G.P. would submit that as long as the circular dated 24.11.1987 is in force, 5 the said has rightly been applied in the case of the petitioner. Learned A.G.P. supported the impugned order passed by the authorities and submitted that the petition is devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 5 I have heard learned learned counsel for the petitioner at length. I have also perused the annexures to the petition and more particularly the letters issued to the petitioner from time to time. On perusal of the appointment letters at Exh. “A’ and “B”, it clearly appears that the petitioner was appointed on temporary posts for a particular period. The instructions issued by the deputy Secretary of Government, Rural Development Department to all Chief Executive Officers of the Zilla Parishads, dated 11.4.1988, are only to the extent that no technical breaks should be given to those teachers, who were working between the period from 18.6.1983 to 17.2.1988. These letters do not say that the petitioner and other similarly situated person, who are appointed or worked between the period from 18.6.1983 to 17.2.1988 be granted permanency or regularized in the service. The said letter only mentions that it is under consideration of the Government to regularize the services of the teachers, who are appointed between the period from 18.6.1983 to 17.2.1988. Therefore, reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the circular to contend that the services of the petitioner were regularized and same are of permanent in nature, is wholly misplaced. In fact, the nature of services of the petitioner 6 were on temporary basis on the date on which the alleged incident took place and a criminal case was registered against the petitioner in the month of March, 1988, the order passed by the authorities terminating the services of the petitioner was on the footing that the petitioner was temporarily employed for a specified period. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that on the date on which the impugned order dated 29.3.1988 came to be passed, the petitioner was permanent employee or his services were regularized so as to apply procedure which is applicable in case of permanent employee of the State Government. The authorities have rightly applied the circular dated 24.11.1987 in the present case. Nature of services of the petitioner on the relevant date was temporary and his case was yet to be considered by the Government for permanency or regularization. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that while terminating the services of the petitioner on 29.4.1988 on the ground that criminal case was lodged against him, Government circular dated 24.11.1987 should not have been applied, is required to be rejected. 6 The next contention of the petitioner that he should have been placed under suspension treating him as regular employee of the respondent, is wholly unsustainable. Therefore, the circular dated 24.11.1987, which is annexed at Exh. “E’ of the compilation of the writ petition is squarely applicable in the case of the petitioner. Clause “A” of the said circular clearly shows that if the employee appointed for 7 one year or for the period less than one year, then he should not be suspended but his services should be terminated. Therefore, on careful perusal of Exh “E” it seems that, the case of the petitioner falls under the said circular and the authorities have rightly terminated the services of the petitioner instead of placing him under suspension. Therefore, viewed from any angle, no case is made out for interference in the impugned order. Hence, writ petition is devoid of merits and thus the same is dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. 7 In view of dismissal of writ petition, civil application Nos. 789 of 2006 and civil application Nos. 5050 of 2009, with prayers that the writ petition be fixed for final hearing, do not survive and the same stand disposed of accordingly. *****