IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.124 of 2001 Decided on: May 05, 2008. State of H.P. …..Petitioner. VERSUS Ram Das Kaundal. …..Respondent. Coram The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Deepak Gupta, Judge. The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Kuldip Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner: Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, Dy.A.G. For the Respondent: Respondent in person. Deepak Gupta, Judge (Oral). This petition is directed against the order of the learned H.P.State Administrative Tribunal in OA No.826 of 1997 decided on August 10, 2000 whereby the learned Tribunal has directed the petitioner – State to grant benefit of F.R.22(1)(a)(I) to the respondent from the date he assumed charge as Vigilance Officer with consequential benefits of arrears and fixation of pay. 2. Undisputed facts are that the respondent was working as Superintendent Grade-I in H.P. Public Works Department. It is also not disputed that at the relevant time, the post of Superintendent Grade-I was the only post in the feeder category for the post of 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes …2… Vigilance Officer. Promotion Rules existing at that time read as follows:- “By promotion from the Superintendents Grade-I of Engineer-in-Chief / Chief Engineers / Circle Officers of H.P.PWD / IPH with at least 3 years regular service in the grade.” A plain reading of this Rule makes it clear that only Superintendents Grade-I in the office of Engineer-in-Chief etc. with three years regular service were eligible for promotion to the post of Vigilance Officer. However, though the post of Vigilance Officer was a promotional post, it carried an identical scale of pay as that of Superintendent Grade-I. Both the posts were in the scale of Rs.2200-4000. This created an anomalous situation. Though the petitioner under the Rules was promoted to the post of Vigilance Officer but he was not granted any monetary benefit for the same. He, therefore, filed an Original Application before the Tribunal claiming benefit of FR 22(1)(a)(I). The Original Application was contested by the State and decided in favour of the respondent therein. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. It is not disputed before us that in terms of FR 22(1)(a)(I) in case a person is promoted and his promotion involves the discharge of higher responsibilities and duties then such person is entitled to the benefit of the said rule. The main ground raised on behalf of the State is that since both the posts of Superintendent Grade-I and Vigilance Officer were in the same scale of pay, the provisions of FR 22(1)(a)(I) are not applicable and that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of this rule in view of F.R.22(2)(III) which reads as follows:- …3… “For the purpose of this rule, the appointment shall not be deemed to involve the assumption of duties and responsibilities of greater importance if the post to which it is made is on the same scale of pay as the post, other than a tenure post, which the Government servant holds on a regular basis at the time of his promotion or appointment or on a scale of pay identical therewith.” According to the State, since both the posts of Superintendent Grade-I and Vigilance Officer were in the same grade, presumption is raised that the promotion of the respondent herein did not involve the assumption of duties and responsibilities of greater importance. In our view, this contention is without any force. Every presumption which is raised is a rebuttable presumption and can be rebutted by leading evidence. In the present case, the assumption is rebutted since it was conceded by the learned Additional Advocate General before the learned Tribunal that respondent was discharging duties and responsibilities of greater importance as Vigilance Officer as compared to that of Superintendent Grade-I. 4. In our considered view, since the learned Additional Advocate General had conceded before the learned Tribunal that the duties and responsibilities of a Vigilance Officer were of greater importance than that of Superintendent Grade-I, it does not lie in the mouth of the State to now argue that both the posts had equal responsibilities and duties. We have already held that the presumption raised under FR 22(2) (III) stands rebutted, therefore, …4… the order of the learned Tribunal is correct and calls for no interference. 5. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is rejected. No order as to costs. ( Deepak Gupta ),J. May 05, 2008. ( Kuldip Singh ),J. (soni)