IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR. ORDER 14.2.2008. S.B. CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.602/2006 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DALIP SINGH Shri Vinendra Agarwal , for the appellant. Shri Sandeep Mathur, for the respondent. This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act 1973 has been filed by the employer against the award passed by the learned Tribunal dated 12.12.2005. An objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent claimant that the appeal was not accompanied by a certificate issued by the Commissioner that the appellant had deposited the amount of compensation payable under the award. Learned counsel therefore submits that the appeal not being accompanied by the certificate as required by the third proviso to Section 30 of the Act of deposit of the amount payable is not maintainable. It has further been submitted on the basis of the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Rukma Devi reported in 2007 (2) MACD (Raj.) 1211 wherein this court has held that if the amount of compensation awarded and payable under the award is not deposited by the appellant on the day when the appeal was filed and the same was not accompanied with the certificate of depositing the same, the mandate of the proviso to Section 30 is that the appeal shall not lie. It is also held by the Division Bench in the case of Rukma Devi that if the amount is deposited after the expiry of the period of limitation of 60 days, the appeal being not maintainable was liable to be dismissed. Hence this appeal is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand has submitted that the decision of the Commissioner is dated 12.12.2005 and the period of limitation of 60 days was to expire on 10.2.2006. The appeal in the instant case was filed on 19.1.2006 without amount having been deposited and was not accompanied by a certificate of deposit of the amount, issued by the Commissioner. Learned counsel submits that when the defect was pointed out by the Registry to this effect, the matter came up before the court on 30.1.2006 on the defect side and this court passed the following order: “30.1.2006. This application seeking permission to deposit the amount of Rs.1,27,135/-, which has been awarded by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is allowed to be deposited in this court within a period of 10 days by way of D/D drawn in favour of respondent-claimant Shri Jagdish S/o Shri Shrwan Lal Jat and the question as to whether he is entitled to this amount or not will be considered at the time of admission of the appeal. If the amount is deposited in this court, the defect pointed out by the Registry shall be waived. The application accordingly stands allowed and disposed of.” After the aforesaid order was passed the appellant submitted before this court a demand draft bearing NO.337295 issued by the UCCO. Bank, Branch Kishangarh district Ajmer for the amount of Rs.1,27,135/- on 31.1.2006. It is therefore submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that before expiry of the period of limitation of 60 days provided for filing of the appeal, which was due to expire on 10.2.2006, the appellant had deposited the amount of Rs.1.27 lacs before this court. It is thus submitted that the defect which was pointed stood cured. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the requirement of the 3rd proviso to Section 30 is that the appellant shall deposit “the amount payable” under the order appealed against. It has been submitted that the appellant preferred the appeal against the order of the learned Commissioner by which the appellant has been held liable to pay the amount of Rs.2,11,044/- and the appellant has only deposited the amount of compensation of 1.27 lacs and not the amount of Rs.83,909/- awarded by way of interest. It has been submitted that the “amount payable” under the order of the learned Commissioner is the amount of Rs.2,11,044/- and the appellant was required to deposit the entire amount and not merely the amount of Rs.1.27 lacs as awarded as compensation. As such the compliance has not been made. Learned counsel for the appellant in this behalf submitted that the appeal had been filed under Section 30 clause (a) of the Workmen Compensation Act 1923 and therefore as per the proviso the appellant was required to deposit only the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Commissioner. The learned counsel has relied upon two decisions of the Karnataka High Court (i) reported in 1999 (1) LLJ page 74 in the case of Executive Engineer (Electrical), Karnataka Electricity Board, Hubli and Another Vs. Hajarat Ali Mailasab and Another and another decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of M/s.Kap Steel Limited Vs. R.Sasikala reported in 1992 (I) LLJ 61 wherein the Karnataka High Court has taken the view that as per the proviso to Section 30 depositing of the amount of interest or penalty imposed under Section 4A in addition to compensation awarded is not a condition precedent for preferring the appeal under Section 30 of the Act of 1923. I have considered the above submission. The third proviso to Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act 1923 reads as follows : “Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.” The requirement as per the aforesaid provision on its plain reading is that the appellant is required to deposit “the amount payable” under the order appealed against. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is to be accepted that the amount awarded by way of interest under Section 4A of the Act is not required to be deposited and only the amount awarded as compensation is required to be deposited for the maintainability of the appeal under Section 30 legislature could have easily made and provisions to the effect that would have read as “the amount of compensation payable”. The omission of the word 'compensation' in section 30 in which all three words 'compensation', 'interest' and 'penalty' have been used by the legislature goes to show that by using the words amount payable and omission of the words compensation, interest and penalty is deliberate and a restrictive meaning was not intended. Admittedly, so far as the order impugned dated 12.12.2005 is concerned the appellant has been held liable to pay in all the amount of Rs.2,11,0445/- which comprises of two heads of (i) compensation amount of Rs.1,27,135/- and the interest amount of Rs.83,909/-. In my view “the amount payable” is the total amount of Rs.2,11,044/- which was required to be deposited as per the requirement of the third proviso to Section 30 of the Act of 1923 and not merely the amount of compensation. Thus, in the present case, there has not been the compliance of Section 30 (third proviso), hence, the appeal is incompetent. So far as the two decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant of the Karnataka High Court are concerned suffice it to say that in both the aforesaid cases the term “amount payable” has not been considered as to what is the meaning of the said term. In that view of the matter the decision of the Karnataka High court with which respect cannot help the appellant in view of the meaning which has been given to the said provision by this court with particular reference to the term “amount payable” herein above. A perusal of the memo of appeal in the present case goes to show that this appeal has been preferred challenging the decision holding the appellant liable to pay compensation and this appeal is, therefore, one under Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923. There is no challenge to any liability under Section 4A of the Act of 1923. Viewed in the light of the facts of present case, if the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Kap Steel Ltd. case is seen then from para 6 of the report it is clear that it has no application. Para 6 of the judgment in Kap Steel Ltd. case reads as follows:- “6. The learned Counsel for the appellant is right in his submission that as the appeal preferred was only against the interest and penalty imposed under Section 4-A of the Act, the condition of depositing the amount prescribed under the third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act was not attracted as this appeal does not fall under clause (a) of Section 30(1) but falls under clause (aa) of the said section. In the result, we answer the second question as follows:- “Depositing of the amount of interest or penalty imposed under section 4-A of the Act in addition to the compensation awarded or otherwise is not a condition for preferring an appeal under section 30 (1) of the Act.” Similarly, in the case of Executive Engineer (Electrical), Karnataka Electricity Board, Hubli & Another Vs. Hajarat Ali Mailasab and Another (supra) of the Karnataka High Court it was an appeal under Section 30(1)(a) of the Act of 1923. The question as to what is meant by the words “amount payable under the order” in the third proviso to Section 30 which has been dealt with hereinabove has not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge and the question has merely been decided on the basis of the Division Bench decision in Kap Steels Ltd. Case which as has been laid down in para 6 of the said judgment by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was an appeal under Section 30(1)(aa) challenging the imposition of interest and penalty under Section 4-A of the Act. That is not the case in the present appeal which is one under Section 30(1)(a). Hence, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court has no application. In the view of the above, in the light of the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Rukma Devi the deposit which has been made of Rs.1.27 lacs by the appellant does not meet requirement of the third proviso of Section 30 of the Act of 1923 and in view of the fact that the entire amount payable has not been deposited this appeal being one under Section 30-(1)(a) is not competent and the same is not maintainable and consequently the same is dismissed as not maintainable. The stay application is also dismissed. (DALIP SINGH),J. Ramchandrkhatri,PS