^ IN THE HIGH CQUR^OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVIEW PETITION N0. ^4 /2010 ^ (Arising out of order dtd 12.09.2008 passed in Writ Petition (S) No. 3714/2008 by Single Bench of this Court presided over by Hon'ble Shri Satish KumarAgnihotri, J.) APPLICANT /c ;fi. ••" i.KSS""' .9 ...^•'^cf- NON APPLICANTS ^Sas Dineshwar Prasad Chandrakar, aged about 65 years, Son of late Shri Makhan Lal Chandrakar, Retired Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Dargaon, District Durg (C.G.) VERSUS 1) TheState Government of Chhattisgarh, Through the Secretary School Education Department Ministry, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) 2) Samtohagiya Sanyukta Sanchalak, Kosh, Lekha and Pension, Raipur 4G.G.) 3) District Education Officer, Durg (C.G.) -APPLICATION FOR REVIEWING/ RECALLING OF ORDER DTD. 12.09.2008 PASSED IN WRITPETITION (S) N0. 3714/2008 The applicant named above beg to submitsas under 1>;;: •"*.„. '^ AP^ •Sf-^lt, HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR APPLICANT REVIEWPETITION No.540F2010 : Dineshwar Prasad Chandrakar VERSUS NON-APPLICANTS : The State Govemment of Chhattisgarh & Others. APPLICATION FOR REVIEWING / RECALLING QF QK DER DATI: 11 12.09.2008 PASSED IN WRIT PETITION (S) N0. 3714/2008 SB: Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Aenihotri, J. Present: Shri Anup Majumdar, Advocate for the applicant. Shri N.N.Roy, Panel Lawyer for the State. QRDER(ORAL) (Passed on 31st day of August, 2010) 1. The review petitioner (writ petitioner) seeks review of' the orclt.'r dated 12.09.2008 passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3714/200K ri] the ground that the other reliefsought for by the petitioner could iinl be pointed out by the counsel ofthe review petitioner, thereforc. llic same could not be adjudicated. Thus, the present review petition. II is admitted case that the order sought to be reviewed was passed 011 the points raised by the petitioner. The learned counsel appearin^ for the petitioner had given up other points and contested the oiily point of direction to deduct a sum ofRs. 4590/- as excess paynifiil made to the petitioner. 2. The order sought to be reviewed was passed on 12.09.2008. 'I'IIL' petitioner has thereafter noticed the alleged error after 572 days. 'l'lic petitioner ought to have approached this Court within a prescribcd limitation period 30 days. The petitioner filed review petition 011 7.5.2010 with a' delay of 572, alongwith I.A.No.l, application I'or condonation ofdelay. The reasOns stated therein is tllat the petitioiin ^T ,.^^^ 's^saSSS., B '&'^ '"^?-.-s?ffl T>9 could not understand the puqsort ofthe order passed by this CDIII'I and acted as advised by the counsel arid continued to makc representations, before the authorities. The petitioner came to know that one ofthe relief sought by him vvus not adjudicated, but the present review petition was filed after ;i delay of 572 days. Thus, petition is barred by limitation and llic petitioner has not shown any cause for condonation of delay. The reasons stated in the petition cannot be held as sufficient reasi)iis for condonation of delay. This review petition is hopelessly barrcd by time. The Supreme Court in R.B.Ramlingam v. R.B.Bhvaneswiiri observed as under: "6...........It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each and eveiy judgment cited before us for the simple reason that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The lest of "sufficient cause" is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of .limitation has left the concept of "sufficient cause" delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the court a well-intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the court as such. 7. For the aforestated reasons, we hold that in each and every case the court has to examine whether delay in filing the special leave petition stands properly explained. This is the basic (2009) 2 SCC 689 '^S-SSs, i \ 6. test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition. In exercise of discretion under Article 136 to decide whether delay should be condoned or not, this Court is not bound by considerations applicable to an appellate court but nonetheless general principles which would weigh with the appellate court in determining sufficient cause can be the guiding factor/ guideline. Tlierefore, it caiinot be stated as a proposition per se that the prosecution of review proceedings would not be a sufficient cause at all for the purposes of Section 5 of the LimitationAct, 1963. . In view ofthe above, the review petition is dismissed on the graiiiiil of delay.No orderasto costs. CM_ Satish K. Agnihotri . Jiidge Ashok