6W5?“ §§We gamh EN 253% E£GE {ZGERT 8F J€EEC$TERE A? EELé§§PER 7574 wag? wigmz‘; rm. 9—0;? mag EEETETEC‘E??? : Bhim E3rasa£i Tonéia 53/‘0 Lama fhn %anwar Smgh Tomisi é‘xge a3mu€ 5S9 Dim y€=am Pos‘t—Sugqhwwoz ‘ Sm? 'ai 19gan£ii13ir3§3a$§3m ICfG"? VERégx {’1‘} Staie {If C?§1Hr‘tisgarh, iEuraugh Swemty, Depw‘mmm‘: E—bme \ (Poh’ce‘) Raipw‘ (CG). Supafmtmclmt Of poiioe Bgiasgmr 31w Biia$pur {CC: Supezmtenéat Of Peiioe Ssa‘gga Eissit: Sargm'a {C G.) \// KNEE? ?ETE'§EQN BIA 22$i227 OF TEE- CONSITETUTEQ"? G? “ 1L MW HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH '. BILASPUR WRIT PETITION NO. 3742 OF 2003 PETITIONER Bhim Prasad Tonde Versus RESPONDENTS State of Chhattisgar & Others h (Writ Petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India) Single Bench : Hon’ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Present :— Shri Awadh Tripathi, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri P.K.Bhaduri, Panel Lawyer for the State/respondents. ORDER (ORAL) g“ (Passed on this 27‘“ day of April, 201 1) 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By this petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the impugned order dated 23.10.2003 (Annexure P—1) passed by ethe‘ Superintendent of Police, District Surguja, by which the petitioner was denied the payment of salary for the period from 16.10.1991 to 18.06.1992 on the ground of unauthorized absence. 3. The indisputable facts, in brief, as projected by the petitioner, are that the’petitioner working as Sub Inspector, was posted at Surguja, since 11.08.1886. Thereafter, on his request, he was attached to the office of Superintendent of Police w.e.f. 15.08.1991 and hejoined the duty on 27.09.1991. Thereafter, by order dated 19.08.1997, a formal transfer order was issued. The period of attachment of the petitioner at Bilaspur was treated by Superintendent of Police, Surguja, as absence from his duties for the period from November, 1991 to July, 1992. 4. According to the petitioner, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 19.06.1992, which was revoked subsequently on 30.06.1992. The petitioner challenged the denial of salary for the period from November‘ 1991 to July, 1992 in this Court in W.P.No.2156/2003. The petition was disposed of by order dated 30.07.2003 (Annexure P-11) with a direction to the competent authority that, if a representation was made by the petitioner, the same shali be decided, within a period of three months form the date of receipt of the representation, in accordance with law. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner subggits'that pursuant to the representation dated 05.08.2003 (Annexure P-12) the Superintendent of Police, Surguja, without assigning reasons passed the impugned order denying the salary from 23.1 1.1991 to 18.06.1992. Thus, this petition. Notice was issued to the respondents on 21.04.2004. The respondent State faiied to flle its response for more than seven years, till date. Thus, the matter is taken up for consideration. The Court was taken through the impugned order which does not disclose the reasons for denial of pay and allowances, except on the basis of a report submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, the impugned order was passed. lt is well settled principle of law that if the impugned order visit/5 with civil consequences, the same cannot be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing and further‘without recording reasons for taking a particular decision. The Supreme Court, in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan1, observed as under: 1 (2010) 9 SCC 496 , 3 23. In Union of India v. Mohan La/ Capoor this Court while dealing with the question of selection under the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations held that the expression “reasons for the proposed supersession” should not be mere rubber-stamp reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied to the subject-matter for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context would mean the link between materials which are considered and the conclusions which are reached. Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two (see SCC pp. 853—54, paras 27-28 : AIR pp. 97—98, paras 27—28). :éW 8. Further, it was observed as under: 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions if such decisions affect anyone preju’dicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise 'of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even- by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-'udicial o inions these days can e as different as the judges and authorities who deiiver them. Aii these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the reievant factors have been objectively considered. This is im ortant for sustaining the litigants’ aith in the justice delivery system. (j) insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) lf a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then It is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to prInCIples of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succrnct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated With a valid decision—making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision—making not onl makes the judges and decision- ma ers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor32.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain33 EHRR at 562 para 29 and Anya v. university or Oxford34, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) ln all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in settin up precedents for the future. There ore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”. 5 g< 9. in East Coast Railway v. Mahadev Appa Raoz, the Supreme Court observed as under: 23. Arbitrariness in the making of an order by an authority can manifest itself in different forms. Non-application of mind by the authority making the order is only one of them. Every order passed by a public authority must disclose due and proper application of mind by the person making the order. This ma be evident from the order itself ort e record contemporaneously maintained. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind by the authority making the order. And disclosure is best done by recording the pass reasons the order that in question. led the authority Absence to of fax ’x reasons either in the order passed by the authority or in the record contemporaneously maintained is*~ clearly suggestive of the order being arbitrary hence legally unsustainable. 10. The Supreme Court, in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi3, observed as under: 21. Thus it is settled law that the reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the order to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. It also excludes the chances to reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious decision or conclusion. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion/decision reached. The order when it affects the right of a citizen or a person, irrespective of the fact, whether it is quasi-judicial or administrative fair play requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons. The recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned consciously applied its mind to the facts on record. It also aids the appellate or revisional authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Artlcle 226 or the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 to see whether the authority concerned acted fairly and ‘justly to mete out justice to the aggrieved person. 2 (2010) 7 SCC 678, 3 (1991) 2 scc 716 ’ Ashok 11. Admittedly, no reasons have been recorded by the respondent No.3, while denying the payment of pay and allowances. 12. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the case on hand, the impugned order dated 23.10.2003 (Annexure P/1) is quashed. Liberty is reserved to the respondent No.3 to consider the case of the petitioner afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing and pass the order in accordance with law. 13. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed. No order asto costs.