IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.BASANT & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.CHITAMBARESH MONDAY, THE 19TH DECEMBER 2011 / 28TH AGRAHAYANA 1933 CRL.A.No. 2081 of 2007() ------------------------ SC.118/2007 of ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA. CP.65/2007 of JUDL.MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS COURT, ADOOR .................... APPELLANT(S): -------------- MOHANAN UNNITHAN, C.NO.2171, CENTRAL PRISON, TRIVANDRUM-12. BY ADV. MOHANAN UNNITHAN(PARTY-IN-PRISON) SRI.GRASHIOUS KURIAKOSE RESPONDENT(S): --------------- STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.ROY THOMAS THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19/12/2011, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: R.BASANT & V.CHITAMBARESH, JJ. ------------------------------- Crl. Appeal No. 2081 of 2007 ------------------------------- Dated this the 19th day of December, 2011 J U D G M E N T Basant, J. Do the circumstances relied on by the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused ? Is his claim for the benefit of reasonable doubt legally acceptable ? These questions arise for consideration in this appeal. 2. The appellant faced the charge of matricide. He allegedly was available in the house along with his mother. She suffered a fatal injury on the head. The prosecution alleged that the said injury was inflicted by the appellant with M.O.1 blunt stick which was found near the dead body. The prosecution alleged that the infliction of the injury must have taken place at about 8 p.m. on 30.11.2005. 3. The investigation commenced with the registration of Ext.P1(a) First Information Report on the basis of Ext.P1 FI statement lodged by PW.1 before the police at 12.00 mid night on the night of 30.11.2005. The investigation was completed and final report was filed by PW.11, the Investigating Officer. The 2 learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions after observing all legal formalities. Consequent to the plea of not guilty raised by the appellant in defence of charges levelled against him by the learned Sessions Judge, the prosecution was directed to adduce evidence in support of its case. The prosecution examined PWs.1 to 11 and proved Exts.P1 to P18. M.Os. 1 to 7 were also marked. The accused denied all circumstances which were put to him. He took up a defence of total denial. Before the learned Sessions Judge, it appears that an attempt was made to claim the protection of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code (legal insanity). No defence evidence was adduced. Only Ext.D1, a contradiction was marked in Ext.P1 F.I. Statement. 4. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the charge under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code on the basis of the circumstantial evidence placed before the Court. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to pass the impugned judgment. 3 5. Before us, Sri.Grashious Kuriakose, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Prosecutor have advanced their arguments. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the meagre circumstances relied on by the prosecution have not been established satisfactorily. The circumstances established do not justify a safe inference of guilt against the appellant. In these circumstances, the prosecution must fail, contends the learned counsel for the appellant. At least the benefit of doubt must be conceded to the appellant by this Court, argues the counsel. 7. We have heard both sides. An appellate judgment is and must be read in continuation of the judgment of the trial court. In that view of the matter, we do not deem it necessary to re-narrate the oral and documentary evidence relied on by the parties. Suffice it to say that we have been taken through the oral evidence of PWs. 1 to 11 in detail. We have also been taken through the contents of Exts.P1 to P18 and Ext.D1. The charges framed by the court and the answers given in Section 4 313 Cr.P.C. examination have also been brought to out notice in detail. We shall refer to relevant materials specifically in the course of discussions wherever we think it necessary. 8. The case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. Before proceeding to enumerate the circumstances, we deem it apposite to remind ourselves about the law on the point. The learned counsel for the appellant has brought to out notice the precedents. The law is too well settled. We do not think it necessary to specifically refer to any precedents. We shall remind ourselves of the law and that we think is sufficient. 9. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, the burden continues to be heavily on the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the case of the prosecution against the accused beyond doubt. Each circumstance must be firmly and satisfactorily established. The circumstances proved must form strong links in a strong chain which effectively points to the guilt of the accused and should rule out every reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the accused. 10. To the circumstances relied on by the 5 prosecution now. The prosecution relies upon the following circumstances:- 1) Homicidal death of the deceased. 2) Motive that existed for the appellant to commit the crime against his deceased mother. 3) Only the appellant and the deceased were available in the house at the probable time when death of the deceased must have taken place. ' 4) Evidence of quarrels in the house earlier on that day between the appellant and deceased. 5) The unusual, abnormal and unnatural conduct on the part of the appellant in connection with the death of his mother. 6) Presence of human blood in M.O.2 dhoti of the appellant recovered on the basis of information furnished by him to the police under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 7) The want of any explanation on the part of the appellant about the circumstances under which 6 the deceased suffered injuries. 11. We shall now proceed to consider whether these circumstances have been proved before the learned Sessions Judge and whether the inference of guilt from those circumstances is satisfactory and sustainable. Circumstance No.1 12. That the deceased died of blunt injuries suffered by her with a weapon like M.O.1 which was found inside the house is proved convincingly by the evidence of PW.9 Doctor and Ext.P7 postmortem certificate. There is virtually no dispute on this aspect. This circumstance stands proved beyond the pale of controversy. Circumstance No.2 13. The second circumstance is about the alleged existence of motive. The motive suggested by the prosecution is itself unusual. According to the prosecution, the appellant was working away from his native place. He used to come only very occasionally. He had now given up his employment at such far off place and had come down to live with his mother. His 7 mother in that house which originally belonged to her husband (father of the appellant) was residing along with PW.2, another son. Altogether there were four sons and one daughter. PWs.1 to 3 are the other three sons, the appellant-accused being the fourth. Another sister who is said to be suffering from some physical ailments also resides in a house adjacent to the house where the deceased along with the appellant and PW.2 were residing. It is the fairly specific version of the witnesses at the stage of examination by the police that the deceased entertained a grouse against his mother on the ground that she was showing special affection to PW.2 and not showing such affection to the appellant. This is the alleged motive set up by the prosecution. We find fairly specific version about this motive in Ext.P1 F.I. statement lodged by PW.1 promptly at about mid night on the night of 30.11.2005 - the death having allegedly taken place at about 8.00 pm. and the world having come to know of the condition of the deceased through the mouth of the appellant at about 10.00 pm. In Ext.P1, this alleged motive is specifically stated. However, when it reached the stage of 8 evidence, PWs. 1to 3 did not choose to swim with the prosecution on that aspect. Their mother having already expired, a certain soft corner in the mind of PWs.1 to 3 in favour of their brother is quite reasonable and natural. Be that as it may, witnesses who in the course of investigation spoke to the Investigating Officer about the motive referred above, chose to eat their words and not reveal anything about this stated motive relied on by the prosecution. It is in this context that Ext.D1 was marked by the accused. Ext.D1 is portion of Ext.P1 FI statement in which PW.1 made specific assertions about the motive. 14. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that motive has not been proved by the prosecution. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on various precedents to impress upon us the importance of the proved motive in a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence. The failure of the prosecution to prove motive is a plus point in favour of the accused in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, contends the learned counsel for the appellant with 9 the help of precedents from the Supreme Court. 15. We agree that the prosecution has failed to prove motive in this case. That does not lead us to a conclusion that no motive ever existed and all was well in the relationship between the appellant and his mother. In the light of the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and their transparent attempt to stonewall and not to reveal anything about the said alleged motive, revealed with fair amount of clarity and certainty by Ext.D1 portion of signed Ext.P1 FI statement, we only take the view that the motive has not been proved. But that cannot in the facts and circumstances of this case, be reckoned as any plus point in favour of the appellant. It remains that the prosecution on account of the attitude of non co-operation by PWs 1to 3 was not able to prove before the court the motive which the prosecution initially intended to rely on and establish. We close the discussion on Circumstance No.2 with the above observations. Circumstance No.3 16. Only the appellant, the deceased and PW.2 were 10 residing in the house. The mother was residing there and the evidence of PW.8 and Ext.P6 ownership certificate indicate that the house stood in the name of the deceased father of the appellant. The deceased mother was residing in that house. PW.2 and the appellant were the only ones who were residing along with the deceased at the relevant point of time in that house. PW.2 is employed and he had gone for his employment on that morning at about 10 am. leaving the appellant and the deceased together in the house. The prosecution's case cannot accurately be described as the theory of last seen together. The case of the prosecution is only that the accused and the deceased alone were available in the house at the probable time when the incident must have taken place. This is the third circumstance relied on by the prosecution. We find absolutely nothing to doubt this circumstance relied on by the prosecution. The evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 clearly indicate that the appellant and his deceased mother alone were available in the house, after PW.2 left on that morning in connection with his work. The evidence of PWs. 4 and 5 also lend support to this case of 11 the prosecution that the appellant and the deceased alone were available in the house when PW.2 went out in connection with his work. We have absolutely no doubt left in our mind that the deceased and the appellant were together in the house on that day from morning after PW.2 left for his place of work. 17. About the precise time of death, the prosecution has a case that the deceased must have succumbed to the injuries suffered at about 8.00 pm. This remains in the realm of reasonable inference. In the absence of any witness to the occurrence, the prosecution has not been able to fix the time of the offence precisely. We have gone through the oral evidence of PW.9 and Ext.P7 postmortem certificate. An attempt to fix the specific time through the evidence of PW.9 is not seen undertaken by the prosecution or the defence. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is nothing to specifically indicate that the appellant was present along with the deceased at about 8 pm. when death might have taken place. It is true that the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 only indicate that the deceased and the appellant were 12 together from that morning. The evidence of PWs. 4 and 5, if believed, suggest that between the two who were present in the house during the morning, there was some quarrel and disputes. At any rate, there is no specific evidence to suggest that the appellant was actually present in the house at 8 pm., contends the learned counsel for the appellant. 19. According to us, this circumstance is clearly established and what is established is that the appellant and the deceased were together available in the house on that day. After PW.2 left, there was no other person in the house. We have no evidence about the presence of the appellant and the deceased together in the house at the precise time when death must have taken place. However, the fact remains that the presence of the appellant and the deceased together with no other person in the house is established. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that PWs. 1 and 2 who were both examined on 18.6.2007 on oath in court had stated that they come to know that the accused had gone to the house of PW.3 to have food on that 13 night. The counsel builds up an argument from this to contend that the appellant must have gone to the house of PW.3 at about 8 pm., when the deceased may have suffered the injuries and succumbed to the injuries. PW.3, when he was examined as a witness on 19.6.2007 stated before Court that the appellant had not come to his residence to take his food on that night. Usually he takes his food from the house of PW.3. That is evident. The learned counsel argues that this was an attempt by PW.3 who was tutored to deny the appellant the benefit of the evidence tendered by PWs. 1 and 2 on 18.6.2007. 21. We have seen the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3. We are unable to perceive any reason for PWs. 1 to 3 to give any incorrect/false version against the appellant. We do not, in these circumstances, find any merit in the contentions laboriously advanced before us that the appellant may not have been available at the house of his deceased mother when she may have suffered the injuries at the time when he may have gone to the house of PW.3 to take his food at night. The deceased may have suffered the injury at her house, when the 14 appellant was away from the home. 22. Bottom is knocked out of this theory, when we take note of the circumstance that the appellant has no case what so ever that he happened to be outside the house and that when he came to the house, he found his mother lying with injuries. He had not advanced such a version on the date of the occurrence or specifically during trial. That crucial circumstance according to us, is sufficient to shut out the laborious attempt made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased may have suffered the injuries, when the appellant was temporarily out of his house and when he proceeded to the house of PW.3 to have his food. 23. We are satisfied in these circumstances that Circumstance No.3 has been satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Circumstance No.4 24. The prosecution relies on the oral evidence of PWs. 4 and 5 about some loud conversation between the appellant and the deceased during the day on 30.11.2005. On 15 this aspect, we have only the evidence of PWs. 4 and 5 about their auditory perception of such quarrel. The circumstance is indeed a relevant one. When the appellant and the deceased alone were in the house and the deceased is found dead at the end of the day, the fact that there were quarrels between the appellant and the deceased perceived by the neighbours can certainly be reckoned as relevant. It is in this view of the matter that the prosecution relies on this fourth circumstance. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that PWs. 4 and 5 are not too familiar with the voice of the appellant as to enable them to identify the appellant as the person who was allegedly having an argument/quarrel with his mother. The learned counsel argues that PW.4, a relative, has not been able to authentically assert that it was the voice of the appellant. PW.5, a neighbour, asserted that it was the voice of the appellant. However, in cross examination it is stated that this was an inference made by her and that she made that inference as only the appellant and the deceased were available in the house. We find absolutely no reason to find fault with the 16 court below for having accepted the evidence of PWs. 4 and 5 that there was a quarrel in the house of the deceased on that morning. It is significant that the appellant does not offer any explanation that there was any room for quarrel between the deceased and any other during the day time, when he was present in the house. This fourth circumstance is also thus clearly established. Circumstance No.5 26. The prosecution relies on the abnormal conduct of the appellant. Admittedly it was the appellant who passed on the information to PWs. 1 and 3 over the telephone that his mother was ill. He wanted PWs. 1 and 3 to come to the scene immediately. According to the prosecution, the appellant did not advance a version to PWs. 1 and 3 that his mother, the deceased may have suffered injuries at the hands of any other. The response of the appellant to the situation and the manner in which he conveyed information about the injury suffered by his deceased mother to PWs. 1 and 3, his brothers over the telephone is eloquent, according to us. At the risk of repetition, 17 we note that he did not convey to PWs. 1 to 3 that his mother had suffered the injuries in some manner unknown to him at the hands of any other. 27. We have the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 that the response of the appellant suggested that he had contumacious responsibility for the condition of his mother. He expressed no emotion. He did not take any active part to shift his mother to the hospital. The totality of these circumstances - of the behaviour of the appellant when PWs. 1 to 3 came to the scene suggested to PWs. 1 to 3 that the appellant did have contumacious responsibility for the death of the mother. We repeat that PWs. 1 to 3 are not shown to have any reason to speak falsehood against the appellant. The identical assessment of PWs. 1 to 3 about the responsibility of the appellant for the death of his mother is found to be very acceptable and goes a long way as a circumstance against the appellant. 28. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant, going by the admitted evidence of prosecution witnesses is not a person who overly reacts to such 18 a trauma. Even when his father had expired, he had shown no emotion, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant with the help of the evidence. The counsel relies on the evidence of PWs. 4 and 5 that the appellant was a peculiar person and did not use to enjoy socialisation in life or interact with others as some others would have done. In these circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant argues that it is too much to sail to any inferences against the appellant from such conduct of his. 29. It is of course relevant that the appellant reacted in an emotion-less manner as perceived by PWs. 1 to 3. It is important that in the perception of PWs. 1 to 3, his brothers, the reactions of the appellant suggested his contumacious role. The argument of the learned counsel is that the appellant may not have accompanied the deceased to the hospital as there may not have been sufficient space in the car in which the deceased was shifted to the hospital. No crucial inference against the appellant can in these circumstances be drawn against the appellant for not accompanying his mother to the hospital, 19 contends the learned counsel. To us, what appears to be crucial is that the appellant did not offer any explanation as to how the deceased could have suffered the injuries when all the others came to the scene of the crime. That according to us is the suspicious and artificial behaviour on the part of the appellant which effectively rules out any theory of innocence of the appellant. 30. We hold that this fifth circumstance has been satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Circumstance No.6 31. Suspicions were riveted on the appellant. He was arrested by the Investigating Officer and he was interrogated. In the course of interrogation, he furnished information about the place where he had kept his clothes. Those clothes were recovered under Ext.P2 seizure mahazar by PW.11 in the presence of PW.4. Information about the concealment of Mos. 2 and 3, the clothes of the appellant, is relied on by the prosecution under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The contents of the contemporaneous Ext.P2 seizure mahazar as also oral 20 evidence of PW.4 supports the evidence of PW.11 on this aspect. Ext.P16 chemical examiners report reveals that M.O.2 dhoti worn by the appellant did have human blood on it. No explanation is offered by the appellant for the presence of human blood on his clothes. Before all the others come to the scene, it must be noted that the appellant had changed his clothes. It is such changed clothes which were kept concealed and which had human blood on it. The circumstance is really formidable . We find no reason to disbelieve PW.11 or PW.5 about the recovery of Mos. 2 and 3 under Ext.P2 seizure mahazar. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that blood on M.O.2 dhoti of the appellant is not shown to belong to the blood group of the deceased. Ext.P16 shows that sufficient quantity was not available to identify the blood group. Even if the blood group were ascertained, that (in the absence of a DNA test result) would not have helped the court to positively conclude that the blood on the clothes of the accused was that of the deceased. Presence of human blood on the 21 concealed clothes is proved. 33. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that admittedly the deceased had suffered injuries inside the house. The blood was flowing from the wound. In these circumstances, the presence of some insignificant blood on the clothes of the appellant is not crucial or vital, contends counsel. The fact that he had changed his clothes which had blood marks on it before the others reached the scene of the crime is according to us of vital and crucial significance. We hold that this sixth circumstance has also been proved satisfactorily. Circumstance No.7 34. It is now trite that absence of an explanation on the part of the indictee for the proved circumstances can be reckoned as yet another circumstance in favour of the prosecution. In that view of the matter, the absence of explanation forthcoming from the appellant