( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 2381 OF 2010 Shridhar s/o Gopal Dongre, R/o Kaldev Nimbala, Tal. Omerga, Dist. Osmanabad. PETITIONER VERSUS 1. The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Osmanabad. 2. District Animal Husbandry Officer, Zilla Parishad, Osmanabad, Dist. Osmanabad. RESPONDENTS ..... Mr. A.R. Borulkar, advocate for the petitioner. Mr. K.J. Ghute Patil, advocate for respondents No. 1 and 2. ..... [CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] [DATE : 5th May, 2010] ORAL JUDGEMENT : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner was duly selected in special drive for recruitment of candidates from backward class members. He was appointed as Live Stock Supervisor in Veternary Hospital ( 2 ) at Asta by appointment order dated 31st March, 2003. In routine course, the Zilla Parishad conducted the enquiry with the office of the District Superintendent of Police, Osmanabad in order to ascertain whether the petitioner bore good character and was eligible for appointment. It was reported to the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner was involved in a sessions case for offence of rape and was charged for abetment. A show-cause notice was issued to him by the Animal Husbandry Officer of Zilla Parishad, Osmanabad. The petitioner replied the notice. He pointed out that he was acquitted by the Sessions Court for the alleged offence. The acquittal was rendered on 4th November, 1999 i.e. much prior to the recruitment of the petitioner. Inspite of such explanation submitted by the petitioner, by order dated 16-02-2004, the petitioner was removed from service. The appeal preferred by him has been dismissed by the Divisional Additional Commissioner. Hence the petition. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. The impugned order of termination is stigmatic in nature because the petitioner’s involvement in the criminal case is the reason for which he has been shunted out of ( 3 ) service. The reason given by the respondent No. 1 in the impugned order dated 16-02-2004 is that though the petitioner is acquitted, yet, other two (2) accused persons were absconding and the name of the petitioner was likely to be implicated if futuristic trial was held against those two (2) absconding accused. This kind of reasoning is far fetched. Perusal of the copy of the judgement rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 161/1996 purports to show that the petitioner was acquitted for want of evidence against him. He was charged as a abettor. He was not the main accused. Allegedly, it was a case of gang rape and he was roped in because he was present in the company of the main accused. The impugned order shows that the respondent did not properly appreciate distinction between the concept “acquittal” and “discharge” in a criminal case. It is well settled that an accused can be tried subsequently only if he is discharged for one or another reason. However, in view of section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, principle of “autrefois acquit” is attracted and retrial is impermissible. The hypothetical assumption that the petitioner’s name was likely to be involved in the future and that the absconding accused might have been tried is something which is not a valid ground for removal of the petitioner from service. In this view of the ( 4 ) matter, both the impugned orders are quite unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The Rule is made absolute accordingly. No costs. [V.R. KINGAONKAR] JUDGE NPJ/wp2381-2010