IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TEN PRESENT HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.981 OF 2010 Between: Gayam Venkat Reddy ..... Appellant And Gaddam Anand & 2 others …Respondents The Court made the following: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.981 OF 2010 JUDGMENT: The Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.15 of 2007, on the file of the II Additional District Judge’s Court, Nalgonda, at Suryapet, dated 08.09.2009. 2. The appellant filed the suit for a permanent injunction against the respondents herein contending that he purchased Acres 2.36 Guntas in S.Nos.319/AA, 336 and 337, situated at Kandibanda village from Nagarapu Janaki Rama Rao and Ravula Kanaiah under an agreement of sale, dated 15.04.1973. He claimed his purchase to have been regularized under the Record of Rights and to have been issued the requisite certificates, pattadar pass books and title deeds and to have also obtained loan from Nagarjuna Grameena Bank. He further claimed his absolute possession and enjoyment to have been interfered with by the defendants without any right and interest and hence, the suit. 3. The defendants resisted the suit contending that it was the mother of the plaintiff that purchased the suit property in 1973 from Nagarapu Janaki Rama Rao and Ravula Kanaiah and who was in possession and enjoyment of the property. The first defendant lost his parents and his grandmother, who is the mother of the plaintiff brought him up. As the plaintiff and his brother did not look after their mother and necked her out of the house, she took shelter in the house of the second defendant who is her 4th son-in-law and the plaintiff’s mother executed a Will on 14.06.1999 bequeathing the property to the first defendant and the wife of the second defendant. After the death of the plaintiff’s mother, the first defendant came into possession of the property and the plaintiff was never in possession of the same. Hence, the defendants desired that the suit be dismissed. 4. After framing the issues on the entitlement of the plaintiff for permanent injunction, the trial Court examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and D.Ws.1 to 4 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-3 and B-1 to B-24 during the trial. 5. The trial Court rendered its judgment on 13.03.2007 referring to the rival contentions and evidence extensively and noting that the plaintiff has to prove his possession and enjoyment of the property on the date of the suit. The plaintiff was noted to have not filed the agreement of sale in his favour or its copy and it was also noted that he has not filed any cist receipts or copies of Pahanies. Ex.A-1-13-B certificate, Ex.A-2-1-A Certificate and Ex.A-3-Mortgage Certificate issued by Nagarjuna Grameena Bank were considered to have not probablised the possession and Exs.B-1 to B-19-Cist Receipts filed by the defendants were considered as showing that the plaintiff’s mother Gayam Venkamma was paying land revenue for the land in S.Nos.336 and 337 between 1978 and 2000. Ex.B-20-Will was also referred to and the corroboration afforded by D.Ws.2 and 3, who are the attestor and scribe of Ex.B-20- Will, was also noted. But, the trial Court held that the genuineness of Ex.B-20-Will need not be concluded in this suit for mere injunction. Ex.B-24-Notice issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Mellacheruvu, was the notice about the direction to the parties to appear before the Mandal Revenue Officer concerning the request for mutation made by the plaintiff and the claims of P.W.1 in the suit were found to be contrary to Ex.B-24-Notice. D.W.4, who is the sister of the plaintiff, was also noted to have deposed about the execution of the Will in favour of herself and the first defendant and notwithstanding the non-acceptance of their evidence by the trial Court, the evidence of P.W.1 was found to have not inspired any confidence in proving his possession and enjoyment by the date of the suit. Consequently, the suit was dismissed with costs. 6. In appeal, the II Additional District Judge, Nalgonda, at Suryapet, rendered his judgment on 08.09.2009 again referring to the rival contentions and the grounds of challenge of the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court also reiterated the principle that it is for the plaintiff to prove the possession by the date of the suit and though Exs.A-1 and A-2-13-B and 1-A Certificates were considered as showing prima facie title of the plaintiff over the property, the possession of the plaintiff was not considered to be probablised by the said documents. Ex.B-24-Notice was considered to be not explained by the plaintiff in any manner, while it clearly showed that Gayam Venkamma was in possession of S.Nos.336 and 337. The documents attempted to be marked as additional evidence in the First Appeal were noted to be filed into Court only on 31.07.2007 much later to the suit and to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer also much later to the suit on 28.01.2004. The claim of the plaintiff was that no property was given to Gayam Venkamma, his mother, but he admitted making an application for mutation in 1998. Hence, the First Appellate Court declined to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal with costs. 7. The challenge in the Second Appeal by the plaintiff is about the Courts below not considering the material on record probablising his possession and not accepting Ex.A-2 and oral evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3. When the truth and genuineness of Ex.B-20-Will was not adjudicated and when there was no independent evidence for the defendants, Ex.B-24-Notice alone could not have been relied on to non-suit the plaintiff. 8. The plaintiff, therefore, claims that substantial questions of law arise in the Second Appeal about the dismissal of the suit and the appeal without considering the absence of proof of documents and without receiving the additional evidence and overlooking the regularization as per statutory procedure in favour of the plaintiff and solely relying on the notices of the Mandal Revenue Officer. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant is heard. 10. The point for consideration is whether any substantial questions of law arise in the Second Appeal? 11. It is well settled under Section 100 and Order 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that a Second Appeal can be considered for admission only if substantial questions of law exist for consideration and the High Court should be satisfied about the involvement of such substantial questions of law in the Second Appeal and should formulate the said substantial questions of law and the Second Appeal can be heard and decided only on such substantial questions of law so formulated, except where the Court considers involvement of any other substantial question of law also during hearing. The Apex Court had deprecated time and again about admission of Second Appeals as a matter of course without involving any substantial questions of law and cautioned against routine entertainment of Second Appeals. 12. With that background, it is seen that the present Second Appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. The suit is for a permanent injunction simpliciter and the trial Court found as a matter of fact that oral evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 said to be the neighbouring cultivators did not inspire confidence and mere obtaining of Ex.A-1-13-B Certificate, Ex.A-2-1-A Certificate and Ex.A-3-Certificate issued by Nagarjuna Grameena Bank will not probablise the possession and enjoyment of the suit property as on the date of the suit in the absence of the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff or any pahanies or any cist receipts. Though the trial Court did not go into the truth and genuineness of Ex.B-20- Will in favour of the first defendant and the second defendant’s wife, it found that Exs.B-1 to B-19-cist receipts spread over the period between 1978 and 2000 were in respect of S.Nos.336 and 337 in the name of Gayam Venkamma, the mother of the plaintiff and if the trial Court acted on the same, the same cannot be considered perverse as it is well settled that payment of tax may afford prima facie proof of possession in the absence of any other evidentiary material. Apart from D.Ws.2 and 3, the attestor and scribe of Ex.B-20 speaking about the due execution of the Ex.B- 20-Will in terms of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, the notice-Ex.B-24 was not claimed by the plaintiff either to have not been so issued or to have been manipulated and if such a notice had been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, which can be presumed, in the ordinary and natural course of human events and official business to have been duly issued by following the prescribed procedure, there can be no explanation about the possession of the property indicated to be with Gayam Venkamma according to Ex.B-24. Apart from the relationship between the parties, the appreciation of oral and documentary evidence by the trial Court concluding the plaintiff to have not probablised his possession and enjoyment by the date of the suit cannot be considered to be divorced from commonsense or reasonableness or to be against broad human probabilities arising out of the evidence on record. 13. Before the First Appellate Court also, the grounds of appeal were mainly directed against the absence of any document for the defendants to prove purchase by Gayam Venkamma or their possession rather than any positive proof afforded by the evidence for the plaintiff. The request for the additional evidence by the plaintiff was not considered by the First Appellate Court on the ground of the documents/pahanies and cist receipts having been issued as per the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer subsequent to the suit and in the light of the documents coming into existence subsequent to the suit dispute, the First Appellate Court cannot be considered wrong in refusing to place any reliance on them. The First Appellate Court noted, apart from other things, the absence of any explanation for Ex.B-24-Notice and the absence of any positive evidence for the plaintiff to prove his possession and enjoyment on the date of the suit. The conclusions of the First Appellate Court were agreeing on questions of fact with the trial Court. 14. The plaintiff even in the Second Appeal raised the questions of unreliability of Ex.B-24-Notice or the absence of proof of their documents by the defendants, but not primarily on the strength of his own version. While the petition for receiving additional evidence filed in the First Appellate Court was justifiably rejected, Exs.A-1 and A3 alone were not shown to be probablising his possession and enjoyment by the date of the suit, more so, in the light of the subsequent notice emanating from the same Revenue Authority in Ex.B-24. If so, no questions of law, leave alone substantial questions of law, can be considered involved in the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal is ex facie incompetent. The concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below do not warrant any re-examination on any sustainable ground or for any valid reason in the Second Appeal. 15. Accoridngly, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 22nd November, 2010 KL HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.981 OF 2010 November 22, 2010. KL