Appellant : Ashok Kumar Sharma, S/Q §ate Pawari Kumar, aged abou{ 37 years, R10 Adarsh Nagan Mmda Nagar Chowk, Burg Dist‘t. Burg (CG). Versus 1. Bhiiai Steel Piant, Bhilai Thmugh its Managing Director, Bhiiai Nagar, Burg Di$frict Dm’g (PG! Pre3§d§ng Offécerl’Cemm§s;§5iwer (WC Act) Labour Court, Durg (CG). APPEAL UNDER SECTION 30 OF WORKMEN‘S COMPENSATION ACT 1923 {$B: Han'bie Mr. MK EgarwaE JJ RespondEnm h). \uw Present : Shri Devesh Verma Advocate for anpPlmni' Shri Gautam Bhaduh, Advocate for‘reugpénéient No. 1. , 0mm (Passed on 16‘“ day ofApm, 2mm This is claimant’s appeai under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; 1923 (for short ‘the Aot‘) again$t the order daied 11.09.2002, pa3$ed by the Co'mrniosio.er for Workmen’s; Compensation, Labour Court, Burg: in case No. 105/WC Act/Fetal. The facts in brief are as under : On 09.11.1996, while returning home after completing his duty. Pawan Kumar $narma (oinoe deoeaeed) feii down on the road and died of heart attack. 4. The appellants preferred an application under Section 22 of the Act claiming Rs. 1,29,000;’- as compensation for the death of deceased, which according to the appeiiants, occurred in an 1 §GH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT 51LA$PU MA No. 887 of 2002 H R accident whichaarise out of and during the ccmrse (3f emptoyment. The Commissioner for Workmen‘s Compensation, after appreciating the evidence on record, held neither the deceased was on duty at the time when he suffered heart attack nor there is any casual connection between the heart attack suffered and the nature of employment, and dismissed the petitien. Shri Devesh Verma, teamed counsel appearing for the appellant by referring circular dated 25.99.1984 issued by the \respondent, would submit that vide above circular the Workmen’s Compensation benefits have been extended to injury caeee resutting in death or permanent/temporary disablement when the injury is sustained during journey from residence to the place of work and back within one hour of the start or end of duty houre provided that the accident takes piace on the normal rout of journey to the piace of work. Shri Verma would further contend that the death occurred ‘wae due to atreee and strain of work and therefore, the Commissioner has iliegally dismissed the claim petition On the other hand, Shri Gautam Bhaduri, learned couneet appearing for the respondent No. 1 would contend that even assuming deceased died of heart attack during the course of employment, the appeliant failed to prove any casual connection between the heart attack suffered by the deceased and nature of employment by ieading cogent and ciinching evidence therefor and therefore, the Commissioner has rightly dismissed the application and the same deserves to he Lioheid. t\ c ! have heard the counsel appearing for tha partieg, perused, ihe order impugned and records of the Gems bemw. On 25.032008, the appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantia! question of iaw: ‘Whether in View of circular dated 2569.19.84 issued by the Steel Authority of lnclia Limited (Bhilei Steel Plant) No. M&R—7Q/84, it is a fit case where the matter ehould be remanded to the Commissioner far Workmen‘s Compensatien fer recording a finding in the light ofthe eaid circular as to whether death of Pavan Kumar Sharma had occurred due to an accident arieing out of and in the ceurse of employment” The fact that vide circular dated 25.09.1984-Workmen'e Compensation benefits have been extended by the respondent to injury cases resulting in death or permanent/temporary disablement when the injury is euetained during journey frem' residence to the place of work and back Within one heur of the start or end of duty hours is now not in dispute. Shri Bhaduri submits that above circular is applicabie to the respendent. Now it is also not in dispute that the deceased suffered heart attack while he was on duty in terms of above circular. The question falls for consideration of this court is whether any casual connection betWeen the death of deceased and his employment has been established by the appeilant or not a. If the workmen dies a natural death because at the disease which he was suffering or white suffering from a particular disease he dies of that disease as a result of In$ @ wear and tear of the empmyment, no §iabmty wewd he fixed upon the employer. But if the emplaymen’c is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death, or if the death was due to not oniy the disease but aieo the disease coupled with the employment, then it can be eaid that the death arose out of the empioyment and the empioyer wouid be liable. i’ ‘ 12‘ The Supreme Court in case of Maokinnon Mackenzie 8: Cot {P) Ltd. v. lbrahim Mohd. lssak1 held in para 5 of its judgment as under : “5. To some within the Aot the iniury by acoident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words ‘in the course of employment' mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidentai to it’. The words ‘arising out of employment” are understood to mean that ‘during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered’. ln other words there must be a casual relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression ‘arising out of employment’ is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such — to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. if by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises “out of employment. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act." , I 1969 (2) scc 607 5 @ 13. This court in caISer of $mt. Hu$na Khatoon & Other$ v. MI$ Urmi!a Tmnspert Ccmpany2 has ham in para 9 & 19 cf Rs judgment as under : “9. Oniy because a person dies 0f heart attack, the same does not give rise to automatic presumption that the same was by way of accident. A person may be sufrering from a heart disease although he may not be aware of the same. Medicai opinion wiii be of relevance providing guidance to court in this behalf. Neither such material has been produced nor any Doctor has been examined to establish that the death was caused by the reason of failure oi heart was because of stress and strain of work. Stress and strain resuiting in a sudden heart failure in a case of present nature would not be presumed, No legal fiction therefore can be raised; As a person suffering from a heart disease may not be aware thereof, medical opinion therefore would be of relevance. 10. The Supreme Court, in the matter of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti vi Prabhakar Maruti Garvaii And'Another; in para 36 heid that only because the cause of death was due to heart attack, the same by itself may not be a ground to arrive at a conclusion that an accident had occurred resulting in injury. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held in para 38 that “unless evidence is brought on record to elaborate that the death by way of cardiac arrest has occurred because of stress or strain, the Commissioner would not have jurisdiction to grant damages .................. " 14. By applying the aforesaid legal proposition of law in the facts. and circumstance of the present case, it is crystal oiear that the appellant failed to prove deceased died of the heart attack, suffered due to stress and strain of the work, Nothing hes been brought on record to suggest casual connection between the death of deceased and nature of employment. Even Doctor has not been examined to prove the cause of heart attack. 2 2009 (2) CGLJ 478 in View 0f abové, even if it is heid that the deceased suffered. heart attack during the course of employment, the same wilt net help the appeHant as the appetlant has failed to prove any casual connection between the heart attack and nature of employment. 16. For the forgoing, the appeal being devoid of substance is liable to and is hereby dismissed. No order asto costs. Sahu Sd/- N.K. Agarwal Judge “rt;