*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY +WRIT PETITION Nos.10345 & 10002 of 2005 % Dated: 27-06-2008 # A. Narendraraja … Petitioner (in WP.No.10345 of 2005) L.L. Udayakumar … Petitioner (in WP.No.10002 of 2005) VERSUS $ The Govt., of A.P., Department of Mines and Geology, Rep., by the Secretary Industries and Commerce (Mines-II) Dept., Secretariat, Hyderabad & others. Respondents (in both the writ petitions) ! Counsel for Petitioners : Mr. S.V. Bhatt (in both the writ petitions) ^Counsel for the respondents: GP for Forest. (in both the writ petitions) <GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? Cases referred 1. (1997) 2 SCC 267 2. (2004) 8 SCC 579 3. (2008) 1 SCC 494 4. 1901 AC 495 5. (1987) 1 SCC 213 6. (2003) 2 SCC 111 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF JULY, TWO THOUSAND EIGHT ONLY PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION Nos.10345 and 10002 of 2005 Between: A. Narendraraja … Petitioner (in WP.No.10345 of 2005) L.L. Udayakumar … Petitioner (in WP.No.10002 of 2005) AND The Govt., of A.P., Department of Mines and Geology, Rep., by the Secretary Industries and Commerce (Mines-II) Dept., Secretariat, Hyderabad & others. … Respondents (in both the writ petitions) Counsel for the petitioners : Sri S.V. Bhatt (in both the writ petitions) Counsel for the respondents: GP for Forest (in both the writ petitions) This Court made the following: THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION Nos.10345 and 10002 of 2005 COMMON ORDER:- Since these two writ petitions raised common questions of fact and law, they are heard and being disposed of together by a common order. These two writ petitions are filed feeling aggrieved by separate, but identical orders dated 01.12.2004 passed by respondent No.1, whereby it confirmed the orders passed by respondent No.2 cancelling the quarry leases of the petitioners. The petitioner in WP.No.10345 of 2005 is a transferee of quarry lease in respect of Grey Granite over an extent of 1.093 hectares in Sy.No.104 of Muddanapalle Village, Shanthipuram Mandal, Chittoor District from the original lessee Sri D. Ramana. The original lessee was granted quarry lease for a period of 15 years on 04.05.1993 and the said lease was transferred in favour of the petitioner through proceedings dated 23.01.1999 of respondent No.3. In the case of the petitioner in WP.No.10002 of 2005, he applied for quarry lease of Gray Granite over an extent of 1.093 hectares in Sy.No.104 of Muddanapalle Village, Shanthipuram Mandal, Chittoor District and the lease was granted in his favour by proceedings dated 20.07.1993 of respondent No.3. By proceedings dated 14.10.2003, respondent No.2 cancelled the two mining leases by issuing individual proceedings. Feeling aggrieved by the said orders, the petitioners filed revision petitions before respondent No.1 and the said petitions have been dismissed by confirming the orders of respondent No.2, the petitioners filed these two writ petitions. At the hearing, Sri S.V. Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the orders of respondent Nos.2 and 1 are patently arbitrary and irrational. He also submitted that the mining leases were granted on the basis of the “No Objection Certificate” issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, wherein he stated that the land over which the lease was granted was classified as poramboke covered by Hill’ locks without any forest growth and proceedings dated 05.05.1998 of the Forest Range Officer, Kuppam, wherein he categorically stated that the area in question is classified as ‘Adavi Poramboke’ and is under the control of the Revenue Department. He submitted that respondent Nos.1 and 2 were swayed away by the description of the area as “Adavi Poramboke” in its literal sense without ascertaining whether any forest growth is in existence and the area forms part of a forest. Learned Assistant Government Pleader for Forest tried to sustain the orders of respondent Nos.1 and 2 on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad vs. Union of India and others[1]. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel and perused the record. On behalf of the respondents, respondent No.3 filed a counter-affidavit. However, on 30.04.2008, this Court passed an order in WPMP.No.12378 of 2008 in WP.No.10345 of 2005, wherein while pointing out that respondent Nos.1 and 2 have merely delegated the responsibility to respondent No.3, directed impleadment of Special Chief Secretary, Forest, Environment, Science and Technology and the said respondent was directed to file an affidavit to the effect as to whether the land in Sy.No.104 of Muddanapalle Village, Shanthipuram Mandal, Chittoor District is forest land and the reasons for the decision. In pursuance of the said direction, an affidavit is filed by Smt.Janaki R. Kondapi, Special Chief Secretary to Government, Environment, Forests, Science and Technology Department. She stated in the said affidavit that the land in Sy.No.104 of Muddanapalle Village, Shanthipuram Mandal, Chittoor District is situated 12 Kms away from the reserved forest line of Kangundi Reserved Forest and 5 Kms away from the line of B.M.Konda Reserved Forest as reported by the Forest Range Officer, Kuppam in Rc.No.102/88/L dated 31.01.1989 and according to the said report, the said survey number is classified as “Adavi Poramboke”, that therefore the said land is not part of any notified reserve forest at any time and that the same was recorded as “Adavi Poramboke” in revenue records as per the said report. She, however, justified the cancellation of quarry leases on the ground that since the lands in question are classified as “Adavi Poramboke”, the Judgment of the Supreme Court in T.N.Godarvarman Thirumulkpad (1 supra) is attracted and the said lands come within the purview of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 (for short ‘the Act’). A careful perusal of the orders passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2, which are impugned in these writ petitions and the affidavit of the Special Chief Secretary as discussed above, shows that the Special Chief Secretary has merely reiterated the contents of the said two orders without calling for any fresh report or making any effort to resolve the dispute as to whether the leased area is a forest in its true sense. This affidavit is therefore of no use at all to decide the issue. Both respondent Nos.1 and 2 based their orders on two factors, namely, that the leased area is classified as “Adavi Poramboke” and therefore the same is to be treated as forest land in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the above cited case. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court, while opining that various issues arising in the case before it required an indepth hearing and examination of all the aspects relating to the National Forest Policy, passed interim orders pending hearing of the cases. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that the expression “forest land” occurring in Section 2 of the Act will not only include “forest” as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership. On this premise, the Supreme Court directed that approval of Central Government is required for any non-forest activity within the area of any ‘forest’ and accordingly it directed that all ongoing activity within any forest in any State through out the country, without the prior approval of the Central Government must cease forthwith. Purporting to implement these directions, respondent Nos.1 and 2 treated the leased area as ‘forest’ as the said land was described as “Adavi Poramboke”. Having carefully considered the two orders, I am of the view that respondent Nos.1 and 2 have failed to understood the true purport of the directions given by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, having realized the magnitude and importance of the issue of conservation of forest to preserve and maintain ecological balance, gave a wider meaning to the term “forest land” by holding that the word ‘forest’ shall be understood not only in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record. The petitioners filed “No Objection Certificates” dated 27.02.1989 and 03.04.1993 issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Shanthipuram, wherein it is stated that Sy.No.104 of 81, Muddanapalle Village of Shanthipuram Mandal is a Government land with an extent of Ac.257.19 cents classified as “Adavi Poramboke” covered by rocks. The Divisional Forest Officer, Chittoor (West) Division, Chittoor, in his letter dated 31.01.1989 addressed to the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Ananthapur inter alia stated as under: “The Forest Range Officer, Kuppam has reported that the proposed area is in Sy.No.104 of Muddanapalle Village and is 12 km away from R.F. line of Kangudi R.L. and 5 Kms away from R.F. line of B.M. Konda and there is no tree growth in the above said area and it is covered with full of rocks and boulders. The area is classified as adavi poramboke and belongs to Revenue Department only. In view of the fact that the area is classified as “Adavi Poramboke” and is under the control of the Revenue Department, this department has nothing to do with the quarry in the land in Revenue Porambokes.” The Forest Range Officer, Kuppam in his letter dated 05.05.1998 addressed to the Divisional Forest Officer, Chittoor Division, after inspection made on 25.04.1998, reported what the Divisional Forest Officer, Chittoor stated in his letter dated 31.01.1989 addressed to the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology. Indeed, the Special Chief Secretary in her affidavit clearly relied upon the said report dated 31.01.1989 of the Divisional Forest Officer. In his counter-affidavit, respondent No.3, Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Palamaner, stated that on the request of the petitioners, the Hon’ble Minister for Mines and Geology ordered for inspection and after inspection the authorities reported that there is no growth or any vegetation in about Ac.150.00 of land, which is a potential grant bearing area and further reported that the reason for entering the Sy.No.104 of Muddanapalle as “Adavi Poramboke” is because of the existence of Adavibajanawada village near this survey number. The above-discussed reports, which received affirmation of the Special Chief Secretary and the affidavits of the respondents reveal that the leased area is far away from the reserve forest land, there is no tree growth and the land is full of rocks and boulders. The area is classified as “Adavi Poramboke” and kept under the control of the Revenue Department because of its proximity to the village ‘Adavibajanawada’. In my considered opinion, to fall within the ambit of the orders of the Supreme Court either the land must be a notified forest land or at least recorded as ‘forest’ in the relevant records. While it is the case of the respondents that the leased property is neither notified as a reserve forest nor classified as forest in any record, it is the common case that it is classified as “Adavi Poramboke”. Though the word ‘Adavi’ means forest in Telugu, the land is not merely classified as ‘Adavi’, but the word ‘Poramboke’ is suffixed to the said word, which means a waste land. This word itself suggests that no forest growth exists on the land; otherwise, the land would have been classified as ‘Forest’ and not as forest poraboke. In his counter, as noted above, respondent No.3 himself explained how this word is derived from the name of the village ‘Adavibajanawada’. The law is well settled that the judgments of the Courts cannot be construed as statutes. I n Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited and another vs. N.R. Vairamani and another[2], the Supreme Court held as under: “9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (AII ER p. 14 C-D) "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge…. " 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive…. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. " In a very recent judgment in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra and others[3] the Supreme Court referred to English and Indian case laws including the judgment in Quinn vs. Leathem[4], Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat[5], Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.[6], in reiterating the view in Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited (2 supra). Applying this settled principle of law, the directions of the Supreme Court are required to be understood. In giving these directions, the Supreme Court intended that no part of forest shall be destroyed by using the same for non- forest activity such as running of sawmills and mining of the forest in order to protect the forests from denudation. The Supreme Court found those directions necessary in the interest of protection of existing forests and to save environment and to protect biodiversity. Therefore, the Supreme Court directed that irrespective of the ownership of the forests, all non-forest activities should be stopped. I am at a loss to understand how this judgment can be applied to the cases on hand where admittedly the minimum distance from the reserve forest is 5 kms and there is no tree growth at all with the land being full of rocks and boulders. Nothing is stated either in the impugned orders or in the counter affidavit of respondent No.3 and the affidavit filed by the Special Chief Secretary that the leased area is capable of being developed into forest in future. The photographs filed by the petitioners, which were also referred to in the affidavit, show that the entire area is full of rocks and boulders and mining was already undertaken on the leased area. These photographs clearly support the above-discussed reports of the revenue and forest officials that there is no forest growth on the land in question. While, undoubtedly, there is an urgent need for protecting the forests and saving the environment, the State, however, cannot cause hardship to the persons in whom rights came to be vested by making a pedantic approach by cancellation of the leases. By this action, respondents only stopped generation of revenue both for the petitioners and the State without any prospects of either protecting any forest or developing one in future, because in view of the rocks and boulders, there can be no possibility of any forest being grown and developed in future. Having carefully considered the cases in their entirety, I am completely satisfied that revival of lease deeds does not in any manner lead to either destruction of forest or environmental degradation. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 failed to apply their mind to the ground realities and exhibited a panic approach to cancel the leases in a hurry to purportedly comply with the order of the Supreme Court by thoroughly misconstruing the said order. For the abovementioned reasons, both the writ petitions are allowed and the orders dated 17.10.2003 and 01.12.2004 of respondent Nos.2 and 1 respectively are set aside and the quarry leases of the petitioners stand restored to last till the expiry of the lease periods. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition in the manner indicated above, WPMP.Nos.12984, 12985, 13384 and 13385 of 2005 and 12377 and 12378 of 2008 are disposed of as infructuous. C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Date: 11.07.2008 ES LR copies to be marked. [1] (1997) 2 SCC 267 [2] (2004) 8 SCC 579 [3] (2008) 1 SCC 494 [4] 1901 AC 495 [5] (1987) 1 SCC 213 [6] (2003) 2 SCC 111