IN THB HIGH G@0BI_ OP_JBBIGASBBE'AI BI£ASPre:(;eBtg3"EFS6A%') iEIT PB'ErCTON So.Q.J-02-w^sse^ \, ./'^ ^ ^'^^' ^J^-1" Dataraa Banjare, son-of late ^.••^Hakeahed Banjare, aged atiout ..^s^r N-^/years, oeciipatj.ons ex.Paneii^-at .^•^ I<ispeetor (Paneaayat & Saaaj Sewa ianghataa ) .Tanpat Panefiayat, PatiiarJLa, Bist: Bilaspur, residen-fc of GMagTaJpara, Aaarsia ehowk, Bllaspar (Gnhati'isgarn). ^'" ' ^ Terstis BESPCSN3SHTS: •A' ». 1. Tiae State of GQaatiliisgara; 'Eteougia: Ihe Seeretary, Panenayafc Soeial Welfare BepaT'fcneB-fc, B.K.Bnawan, Ral-pQr (e.6). 2. Welfare , Paneaayat Soetal' ,, Baipur (C.6). 3._«Teint Birector, Zilla Paacaayat, Mlaspur~(C.5). 4. GfliefEzecutiye Officer, Janpat Panciaayal; and S^fclal Welfare Bepartmeat, Pat.flariayBis^Silaspur (0.5.) VSS7 VBSSn.QS OTBER 'ABTIGfiE 2S6/g27(W F0E_-ISSBABeE;^ 0F_t B I_T 1!G@8WSSWXWGP:^SSS:S. HIGH COURT OFCHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR DB: Hon'bleShri Justicel.M. Quddusiand Hon'ble Shri Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra \^ •-k —^ ^ Writ PetitiortNo.2102 of 2003 Dataram Banjare versus The State of Chhattisgarh and others ORDER FOR CONSIQERATtQN ,:\-:Sd//-;'.';'../..:...', prashantKuinar Mishra :- ll'; .Judge ':. ;1:,,: ::. ! \!A t Hon'ble Shri I.M. Quddusi. J.: ^ 'if^f Sd/- I.M.Quddusi "Judge A "SS31 Postforotr -o'T-2011 sd//- ....^ Judge \1 ^ :)lf' ..-.•.•f.h, ^•^^!S^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR D.B.: Hon'bleShriJustice I.M.Quddusiand Hon'ble ShriJusticePrashant Kumar Mishra Petitioner Respondents Writ Petition No.2102 of 2003 Dataram Banjare versus The State of Chhattisgarh and others Present: Ms. Sharmila Singhai, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Vinay Harit, Deputy Advocate General for the State/respondents No.1to3. None for respondent No.4. Writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India ORDER (Passedon o^ - Ot-2011) Per Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.: In this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the legality, validity and propriety 6f the order passed by the Commissioner, Panchayat and Social Welfare Department, Bhopal on 9-6-2000 (Annexure P-7) and the order passed by the State Administratrve Tribunal, Raipur (henceforth 'the Tribunal') on 18-7-2002 in Original Application No.270/2002 (Annexure P-8) as also to claim reinstatement in service with all benefits. • 2. The originalapplication was preferred before the Tribunal to seek quashment of Annexure' P-7 dated 9-6-2000, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service on account of his conviction ^ !i!^I;:ili1:' .......... ^ 9S ili1,, : .:aB®-.1 :il^!;-:^;i'i^:i^^ s ";^;'- {, ff ..-y --S- V/', •V by the Special Court, Raipur by judgment dated 24-4-2000 for having committedoffences under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. At the relevant time, i.e., 12-8- 1986, the petitioner was working as Panchayat Inspector at Block Gourella, District Bilaspur when he was trapped by the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta Office, a complaint was lodged against him by one Jagatlal for demanding Rs.150/- as bribe for submitting enquiry report in the matter concerning fishing right on a village tank on which Jagatlal was daiming such right. After the successful trap, the matter was investigated and a charge-sheet was fled and ultimately the petitionerwas convicted by the Special Judge (P.C.Act) vide his judgment dated 24-4-2000 passed in Special Case No.59/1991 (Annexure P-4). After his conviction, the State Government passed the impugned order of termination on 9-6-2000 (Annexure P-7),which was challenged before the Tribunal in O.A.No.270/2002, which was dismissed on 18-7-2002 (Annexure P-8). ' 3. The original application was preferred on the ground that the petitioner has preferredan appeal and thejail sentence awarded to him has been suspended, therefore, he is entitled for reinstatement as long as the appeal is pending. The Tribunal, after placing reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Administration), Madras vs. S. Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3-SCC 377 dismissed the original c^ application. l^ ^ 1 \ 4. During pendency of this writ petition, the criminal appeal preferred by the petitioner in the High Court bearing Criminal Appeal No.1175/2000 has been allowed by judgment dated 14-1-2011 which has been placed on record by the petitioner along with an application dated 7-3-2011 for taking document on record. The High Court, by the said judgment has acquitted the petitioner of all the charges while setting aside the judgmentof conviction dated 24-4- 2000 passed by the Special Judge (P.C.Act), Raipur. • 5. In view of the above subsequent development and relying on the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court, Ms. Sharmila Singhai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has argued that since very basis ofthe order of termination being not in existence as a result of the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and the petitioner deserves to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. 6. On the other hand, Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 3 has argued that challenge in thewrit petition was made to theorder passed by the Tribunal and the acquittal in criminal case was never in consideration before the Tribunal, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal cannot be faulted with. 7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length ahd have perused the record including the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court on 14-1-2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 1175/2000. ^w Blii:ir;i!" h. 8. Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 3 is not in a position to inform as to whether the matter has been taken up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing special leave petition to challenge the judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner. However, at the same time, it is also to be seen that the petitioner, after his acquittal, has not approached the State Government for reconsideration/review of the earlier order of termination. 9. In Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Administration), Madras vs. S. Nagoor Meera (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when an employee is convicted and as a consequence of conviction he is terminated from service, he cannot be reinstated during pendency of appeal and that appropriate course would be to approach the State Government for reconsideration/review of the order of termination if the conviction is sybsequently set aside and the person concerned is acquitted of the charges. In Basanti Prasad vs. Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and others, (2009) 6 SCC 791, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that as a natural corollary of the petitioner having been acquitted of the charges the request of the petitioner requires to be redressed by the employer and since that was not done, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe further that the writ Court ought to have exercised its extra-ordinary jurisdiction ~ by commanding the respondents to redress the grievance of the appellant. However, in view of the long pendency ;k*'of the litigation as also on account of death of the employee and b (,9- A' Gopal taking into consideration the fact that the widow was litigating before the Court, it was directed that the order terminating services of the appellant's husband (in that case) requires to be set aside without any back wages and the widow would be entitled to get pension. 10. In the present case, the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been decided by the High Court merely four months back, i.e., on 14-1-2011 and after the said judgment, the petitioner has not approached the State Government, therefore, in the facts and circumstances ofthe case, the instant writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the State Government that if the petitioner prefers a representation within a period of two weeks from the dateof this order, the State Government shall objectively consider and decide therepresentation by a reasoned order within a period of eight weeks thereafter. There shall be no ordec.^ to costs. Sd/- \' I.M. Quddusi x\ Judge Sd//- PrashantKumar Mishra Judgc ^ "V