^..^••^^. .••••'' ^^' ,.«»4»%B"*/ ^••••••""":....,-B^ ,..^--^:r'^^ ........-"••••"" CF0000281873 $'^ M^Rx^j^^-^ CD s» ,.,/,o wtan AMENDED PETITION ^: ^:'^ IN THE M. P. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT JABALPUR WRIT PETITION fS) N0. 257 OF 2005 O. A. N0. 825/1990 APPLICANT RESPONDENTS Vijai Kant Singh Vs. State of M.P. and others DETAILS OF APPLICATION 1. Particulars of the applicant: (i) Name of the applicant (ii) Name of Father (iii) Designation and office in which employed (iv) Office address (v) Address for service of all notices. 2. Particulars of the respondent: Vijai Kant Singh Shri R. J. Singh Forest Ranger, North Surguja Division, AMBIKAPUR, M.P. -do- -do- ^^.. .c^"" -y ^y^ ^"^y L.—-.——.„-.„ 1. State of Madhya Pradesh through Secretary, Forest Department, Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, Vallabh Bhavan, Bhopal. 2. Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal. 3. Conservator of Forest, Ambikapur (Surguja), M.P. 4. State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Secretary, Forest Department, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur. o-^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR S|NGLE_BgNCH : HON'BLE SHRI MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA.J. PETITIONER ^»WH» RESPONDENTS Writ Petition(S) No.25T/200§ Vijai Kant Singh Versus State of M.P. and others FOR PRONOUNCMENT OF ORDER Sd/- Manindra Mohan Shrivastava Jude r'~" \'^fc HIGH COURT OF CHHATT8SGARH : BILASPUR SJNGLi_BENCH_: HON'BLE SHRI IVSANINDRA MOHAN SHR!VASTAVA,J, PETITIONER RESPONDENTS Writ Petition(S) No.257/200S Vijai Kant Singh Versus State of M.P. and others Appearance: Shri V. K. Pandey, counsei for the petitioner. Shri Satish Gupta, Govt. Advocate for the State/respondents. O RD E R, (Passed on -^^rMay, 2010) By this petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a direction to the respondents to grant him confirmation on the post of Deputy Ranger with effect from the date stated in para 6 and also to give him senjorlty from the date of appointment and consequent promotion. The petitioner has aiso prayed that respondents be directed to pay entire consequential benefits with interest @ 18% per annum within the stipulated period. (2) Case ofthe petitioner is that he was initially appointed as Deputy Ranger vide order dated 06-10-1954 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Conser\^tor of Forest, Eastern Circle, Raipur, M.P. He was sent for training in 1957 %tierein he successfuily completed the training in the year 1958. According to the petitioner, though he was not confirmed in the year 1956 soon upon his completion of probation oftvw years, however in the year 1971, the petltjoner was promoted from the post of Deputy Ranger to the Forest Ranger. The petitioner, later on, passed departmental examination offorest Rangers In 1969 and than in the year 1976. A representation was submitted bythe petitioner on 14-08-1984 (Annexure A-lll) wherein he claimed that the petitloner be declared ^ ^. ^h^ ^ -1— ^INIIIIIMIIIN- permanent by including his name in confjrmation order dated 21-09-1978. It is aiso submitted that against a confirmation order of certain Forest Rangers issued on 09-08-1983, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Chief Conser^tor of Forest. The petitioner again submitted a representation to the Chief Conservator of Forest, Bhopal on 12-09-1989. The Chief Conservator of Forest (Administration) taking cognizance of the petitioner's representation and sought ciarification from the Conservator of Forest, Bilaspur. The Conservator of Forest, Bilaspur vide his memo dated 28-11-1989, observed that the petitioner is not to be confirmed as his record was bad. TTie Princlpai Chief Conservator of Forest, according to the petitioner, sought forther information vide his memo dated 21-03-1990, pursuant to which, Conservator of Forest. Bilaspur submitted a detailed reply on 29-03-1990 (Annexure A-VI). tt is submitted that the said communication dated 29-03-1990 revealed that non- confirmation ofthe petitioner resulted in injystice to the petitioner. (3) Submissjon of learned counsel for the petitioner is that petitioner was directly appointed as Deputy Ranger in the year 1954 which was a regular appointment in substantive capacity, therefore, his seniority was tiable to be counted with effect from She initial date of appointment. tt is submitted that in the circumstances when the petitioner's confirmation order was not issued, even after completion of two years of probation, provisions of M.P. Govt. Servants fTemporary and Quasi Permanent Service) Rules, 1969 (For short "the Rules of 1969") became appiicable. As he vras continued in service, he attained the status ofQuasi permanent employee in view ofthe provisions contained in Rule 3 and 3 A of the Rules of 1969. It is also argued that as the petitioner was illegally deprived of confirmation in service, he was not considered for promotion in view of the provisions contained in Rule 17 of the State Forest Services (Recruitment) Rutes, 1977 and number ofjuniors were promoted. ';.>-.. »•- ^ A' -s- bN»N^. (4) Per contra, submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that the jnstant petition suffers from gross delay and laches. The petitioner was appointed as Temporary Deputy Ranger vide order dated 06-10-1954 (Annexure R-1). The petitioner was not confirmed as he was not found frt in the meetjng ofthe screening committee heid on various dates between 02-01-1967 to January, 1971. The case of the petitioner was also considered for confirmation by the committee convened on 07-09-1978, 16-09-1978, 26-06- 1983 and 30-07-1983 but he was not found fit for confirmation, though in view of the provisions contained in Rules of 1969, he attained quasi permanent status on the post of Deputy Ranger. Case of the petitioner was aiso considered for promotion but he was not promoted as he was not found fit. The petitioner was communicated adverse remark from the period 1980 to 1983. A charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 10-11-1982 and after enquiry, punishment of withholding three increments was imposed vide order dated 16- 11-1^6 (Annexure R-2), Submission of tearned counsei for the respondents is that by this petition, the petitioner has wrecked up old stale claims. If he had any grievance with regard to his non-confirmation on the post of Deputy Ranger, he ought to have approached Court of law within a reasonabie tjme. It is further submitted that at the fag-end of his career, the petitioner started making representations and then filed the instant petition and during the pendencyofthe petition, he retired on 31-12-1991. (5) TTie relief claimed by the petitioner is to the effect that the respondents be directed to grant confirmation on the post of Deputy Ranger jmmediately from the date stated in para 6 ofthe petition. Reference to the averments made in para 6 shows that grievance of the petitioner is that though he was appointed as Deputy Ranger on 06-10-1954, yet he was not confirmed in service immediately upon completion of two years of probation even though he -^ ^ ^ IIWIIIIIIIIN- successfully completed training in the year 1958 and passed departmental examination in 1969 and 1976. The petitioner was promoted as Forest Ranger vide order dated 01-01-1971. From this, it is clear that the petitjoner did not take reeourse to any remedy available to him under the iaw with regard to his non- confirmation. It appears that when orders relating to confirmation of Forest Rangers were issued on 09-08-1983, the petitioner claimed that earlier order of confirmation dated 21-09-1978 be modified showing the petitioner as confirmed on the post of Forest Ranger. Tftis is reflected from the petitioner's own representation filed cumulativeiy as Annexure A-lll. Respondents have stated in the return that petitioner's case for confirmation was considered on 07-09- 1978, 16-09-1978, 26-06-1983 and 30-07-1983. but the petitioner was not found fit. From year 1980 to 1983, adverse remark was communicated. On 10" 11-1982, a departmentaj enqujrywas initiated which was finaily cuiminated in jmpositEon of penalty of withholding three increments vide order dated 16-11-1996 (Annexure R-2). Even when the petitioner was considered in the year 1978 and 1983 and not found fit, the petitioner did not take recourse to any remedy available to him under the law. TTius, the petitioner's claim for confirmation on the post of Deputy Ranger from the date upon expiry of two years of probation with reference to his initial date of appointment i.e.06-10- 1954, to say the ieast, is liable to be rejected only on the basis of gross and undue delay anci laches. From the aforestated circumstances, it is revealed that from the beginning to feg-end of his career, the petitioner did not take recourse to remeciy avaiiable to him under the law, in so far as his claim for confirmation on the post of Deputy Ranger is concerned. (6) In the case of Uttaranohal Forest Development Corpn. And another vs. JabarSlngh and others, (2007) 2 SCC 112, it was observed as under: 43. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a deiay of 10 . ^^•^,^ /"^f"'v% \ -5-- ^^s^^ €• \\v years. TTie High Court, in our opinion, was not justifled in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been fiied after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions shouid have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of teches. (7) Further, in the case of New Delhi Munlclpal Counci! v. Pan Singh and others,(2007) 9 SCC 278, the Supreme Court reiterating the principtes relating to interference in cases where petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay as below: 1S. There is another aspect ofthe matter which cannot be tpst sight of The respondents herein filed a wrst petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the eariiest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunai. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the sajd scate of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the wrft petitions could not have been entertained even ifthey are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy2, U.P. Jaf Nlgam v. Jaswant Singl^ and Kamataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappar^-.) (8) In the case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, it has been held as under;- "It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it woutd be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Articie 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and ajjow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward state claims and try to unsettle settied matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismlssed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste oftime ofthe Court. tt clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normat work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as w©llas the appeal." (9) In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union oflndia, (1992) 3 SCC 136, it was held as under: 8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse r©iiefto J '!mS^ j ^ ^ ^ ~:-'^^^-^ ^ -^ the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. TTiis is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be fjjied promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result oftheir earlier petitions being aiiowed. IKN— (10) It appears that when the finaj order was passed in departmental enquiry on 16-11-1996 and the petitioner was nearing his retjrement, he started marking representation. There is, however, one aspect which needs consideration. T^ie petitioner has stated in his rejoinder that he earned "Excellent" grading in 1984, "VeryGood" in 1986, "Excellent" in 1987, "Good" in 1988, "Excelient" in 1989 and "Good" in 1990. From the communications between the office of Conser^tor of Forest, Bilaspur and Chief Conservator of Forest, (AdminEstration), Bhopat, it is reflected that various clarification on the report was sought vide memo dated 21-03-1990. It is to be noted that the departmental enquiry, which was initiated against the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 10-11-1982, remained pending until 16-11-1996. Up tiJi 1983, petitioner's record being bad, he was not found fit. However, from the averments made in the rejoinder, it is found that petitioner ciaims to have earned good and excellent gradings between the period from 1984 to 1990. It has not been stated by the respondents as to whether petitioner's case was considered during this period. As departmental enquiry which was initiated in 1982, ended in 1996, respondents were required to consider the case of the petitioner in the light ofthe punishment imposed. (11) In this view of the matter, respondents may consider the case of the petitioner on the basis of his service records during the period 1984 to 1990. Taking into consideration the effect and impact of the order of penatty dated ;.:^ -7- \\^ 16-11-1996 (Annexure R-2), respondent authorities may take final decision in this matter. (12) Petition is therefore partly aliowed only to the extent of direction as stated above. Sd/- Manindra Mohan Shrivastava Jude