IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.415 of 2008 DEBENDRA NARAYAN THAKUR, son of late Tek Narayan Thakur, resident of Vill. Raje Manigachhi, PS Manigachhi, District Darbhanga …….. Petitioner Versus 1. THE UNION OF INDIA through the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, Department of Road Transport and Highways, New Delhi 2. The Project Director, National High ways Authority of India, NH 57, Jhanjharpur, District Madhubani 3. The State of Bihar 4. The Collector, Darbhanga 5. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Darbhanga 6. M/s Madhu Kon Project Limited, Manigachhi Camp through Construction Manager, Site Office – NH 57, 82.5 km. Sakri, Pin -847239 …….. Respondents ----------- 05- 20.3.2009 Heard Mr. Basant Kumar Choudhary for the petitioner, Dr. Ratan Kumar for respondent no.1, Mr. Ram Balak Mahto for respondent nos.2, and Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned AAG III for respondent nos. 3 to 5. We have not felt the necessity of issuing notice to respondent no.6 in view of the nature of the order that I am going to pass. The petitioner challenges the order bearing notice no.1439, dated 28.9.2007 (Annexure 8), issued under the signature of Land Acquisition Officer, Darbhanga, whereby he has overruled the petitioner’s objection dated 3.7.2007 (Annexure 7), and has decided to proceed with acquisition of the land in question for broadening of national highway no.57, from 0.000 km to310.00 (Muzaffarpur- Purnea Khand). 2. A brief statement of facts essential for disposal of the writ petition may be indicated. In order to facilitate construction/broadening of national highways traversing more than one State, the Parliament placed on the statute book the National - 2 - Highways Act 1956 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’). The Government of Bihar issued notification in terms of Section 3A of the Act, which was published in the official gazette of the Government of India on 13.7.2005 (Annexure 1), notifying its intention to widen national highway no.57, from 0.000 km to 310.00 km (Muzaffarpur- Purnea Section). The same was revised by notification published in the gazette extra-ordinary of the Government of India dated 25.5.2007 (Annexure 5). The notifications incorporated the lands proposed to be acquired including that of the petitioner. His land bears Khesra no.899 (old), equivalent to 1808 (new), and covers a total area of 12 kathas 18 dhurs with a pond therein. The petitioner submitted his objection in terms of Section 3C of the Act on 3.7.2007 (Annexure 7). Finding no response to his objection, he preferred the present writ petition which was lodged in this Court on 3.1.2008. This has been followed by counter affidavits of respondent no.2 and respondent nos. 3 to 5. It is common cause in the two sets of the counter affidavits that the objections were thoughtfully considered and have been rejected. It is further stated therein that only one-third of the pond is sought to be acquired. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the pond is being used by the family which has a temple by its side and widening of the national highway will reduce the utility of the pond. He further submits that it is also contrary to the ecological concerns of the Government of India and the State of Bihar. He lastly submits that this - 3 - can be easily avoided by realigning the national highway which will have to be done marginally. 4. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 has supported the impugned action and submits that the petitioner raises an exaggerated grievance that the whole of the pond is being acquired. The correct position is that only one-third of the pond had been acquired. He next submits that this is a project which is being carried out throughout the length and breadth of the country and, if such an objection as has been raised in the present case were upheld, completion of national highways which is of high public and national importance, would never be achieved. He next submits that the project has been evolved after exhaustive local survey made by specialized agencies, and it is not possible to alter the same at the behest of one individual. He lastly submits that in view of the terms of Section 3C read with Section 3A of the Act, the scope of objection(s) is very limited and is confined to the purpose(s) mentioned in Section 3 of the Act. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Competent Authority v. Bangalore Jute Factory and others reported in 2005(13) SCC 477 = 2006(1) PLJR (SC) 217 (para 9). 5. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondent nos. 3 to 5, has supported the impugned action, and has adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent no.2. He has added to the same by submitting that it is not possible to uphold the objections of such local nature confined to an individual at the cost of enormous public interest. He also submits that the scheme in this - 4 - part of the country is one of widening of the existing road. It is not a case where the highway is being laid out for the first time that it may be possible to accommodate individuals. The existing road is functional for a long time which is sought to be broadened and, therefore, question of realignment of the highway does not arise. He also submits that the Courts are always reluctant to interfere with determination of public interest, and preparation of such technical reports are substantially within the jurisdiction of the concerned authorities. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Pubjab vs. Gurdial Singh reported in (1980) 2 SCC 471 (paragraph 8). He also submits that the Courts are always reluctant to interfere with the development work undertaken by the Government and governmental agencies. He relies on the judgment of this Court in R K Tiwary v. State of Bihar reported in 2004(2) PLJR 206. 6. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It appears that there are ample materials on record including the gazette notification that the scheme in this part of the country, namely, national highway no.57, covering the length of 0.000 km to 310.00 km (Muzaffarpur- Purnea Khand), is to broaden the existing road. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondents are right in their submission that it is difficult to provide a fresh alignment to the existing road. It will result in enormous problems of unmanageable magnitude. If such individual interest were to be taken care of, a project of this magnitude covering the entire length and breadth of the country, will remain incomplete. - 5 - 7. It further appears from the materials on record that preparation of the scheme was entrusted to a specialized agency which made the survey, conducted local inspection, and prepared the feasibility/project report. It is, therefore, difficult for the parties to interfere with the same at this stage, not even the Courts. Learned AAG is, therefore, right in placing relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Pubjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra), paragraph 8 of which is relevant and reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference :- “8. First, what are the facts? A grain market was the public purpose for which government wanted land to be acquired. Perfectly valid. Which land was to be taken? This power to select is left to the responsible discretion of government under the Act, subject to Articles 14, 19 and 31 (then). The Court is handcuffed in this jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a foolish choice. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court lock-jawed save where power has been polluted by oblique ends or is otherwise void on well established grounds. The constitutional balance cannot be upset.” 8. The counter affidavit of respondent no.2 was sworn on 5.5.2008, and that of respondent nos. 3 to 5 was sworn on 25.3.2008. In view of the statements made in two sets of the counter affidavits indicating the position obtaining then, it is evident that the lands have already been acquired and the project has made substantial headway, apart from the progress made since then. The parties are faced with the Fait Accompli in a situation where, I am in no doubt, the authorities have acted well within the four corners of the Act, is a fully bona fide act, and in public interest. Learned AAG is right in placing reliance on - 6 - the judgment of this Court in Kaushal Kishore v. Union of India, reported in 2000(2) PLJR 475. 9. The Courts have always been reluctant to interfere with development work. The following portion of the judgment of this Court in Ranjit Kumar Tiwary vs. State of Bihar (supra), is relevant and reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference :- “7. The respondent authorities have rightly concluded that the project is in public interest and will benefit more than 100 persons at the present stage and is covered by the provisions of section 4 of the Act. In that view of the matter, the very basis of the petitioner’s case that it was only for the benefit of respondent no.7 goes. When the sub-stratum has gone where is the question of super-structure. Law is well settled that courts are always reluctant to interfere with development projects. The legislature in its wisdom has vested the jurisdiction in the authorities under the Act to determine “Public interest” and this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the exercise of that judgment unless it is shown to be palpably illegal. The petitioner has not been able to make out any such case. This Court is convinced that acquisition of lands is for a public purpose. The scheme which would benefit more than 100 persons today may benefit many more persons in future.” 10. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not feel the necessity of examining the contentions advanced by learned counsel for respondent no.2 as to the scope of the objection available to the petitioner in terms of Section 3C, read with Section 3A, of the Act. 11. In the result, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ( S K Katriar ) mrl - 7 -