IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH:: HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT:: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY S.A.Nos. 941 of 2002 & 30 of 2003 S.A.No.941 OF 2002 N.Pitchaiah (died) Per LRs Smt.Nuthakki Yelesamma and others …Appellants A n d P.Narasimha Reddy ..Respondent A N D S.A.No.30 OF 2003 Between: N.Pitchaiah (died) Per LRs Smt.Nuthakki Yelesamma and others …Appellants A n d P.Narasimha Reddy and others ..Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY S.A.Nos. 941 of 2002 & 30 of 2003 COMMON JUDGMENT: These two appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 25.10.2000, on the file of the IV-Additional District Judge, Guntur, whereunder both the appeals were dismissed, confirming the common judgment dated 30.07.1998 in O.S.No.441 of 1983 and O.S.No.219 of 1994, on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur. 2. As both the appeals arise out of the common judgment, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Heard the leaned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents in both the matters. Perused the record. 4. O.S.No.441 of 1983 was filed by Nuthakki Pitchayya (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) 2nd appellant in A.S.No.112 of 1998, against Pamulapati Narasimha Reddy (hereinafter referred to as defendant) for permanent injunction restraining the respondent in the second appeal from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and for a declaration of title and for delivery of vacant possession. O.S.No.219 of 1994 was filed by Pamulapati Narasimha Reddy, defendant in O.S.No.441 of 1983 and respondent in A.S.No.112 of 1998 against Nuthakki Pitchaiah, who is appellant in A.S.No.111 of 1998, and others for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and from encroaching upon the plaint schedule property. The plaint schedule premises comprises two items i.e., item No. 1 Ac.4-79 cents in patta 311 D.No.230/B and Ac.1-00 out of Ac.1-79 cents in patta No.8 D.No.230/C, both situate in Nidamarru village. According to Nuthakki Pitchayya, plaintiff in O.S.No.441 of 1983, the suit land originally belonged to one Chebrolu John, who executed the Will bequeathing the plaint schedule property to his wife Suvartha giving her life interest with vested remainder to his daughter Chandrahasa. The said Chandrahasa took a probate from District Court, Guntur in O.S.No.7 of 1920. On her death, her children sold the suit property to Bhatraju Narasimha Rao on 29.05.1968 from whom the plaintiff purchased under an agreement of sale dated 12.12.1980, which was followed up by a registered sale deed dated 24.06.1981 for a consideration of Rs.12,500/-. Ever since the purchase, the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. One of the creditors of Suvartha filed a suit and obtained a decree and brought the suit property to sale and it was purchased by Pamulapati Subba Reddy in a Court auction sale held on 1937. Subba Reddy purchased only the life interest of Suvartha in the property but he in turn sold the property to the vendor of the defendant. The defendant cannot, therefore, claim any rights more than the life estate holder. After the death of the life estate holder, the continuance of defendant in the suit property is that of a trespasser. The defendant has not prescribed any adverse title to the plaintiff or his vendor. Bhatraju Narasimha Rao sold away, in the same survey number, one acre of land each to Prathipati Subba Rao and Mandepudi Yesobu on 24.06.1991 and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands. An extent of one acre out of Ac.3-79 cents purchased by the plaintiff is not fit for cultivation. The plaintiff raised blackgram and redgram crops in the remaining extent of Ac.2-79 cents. A week prior to the suit, the defendant attempted to dispossess the plaintiff forcibly from the suit land. Hence, the suit. 5. Pamulapati Narasimha Reddy, the defendant, filed written statement contending that the suit land was purchased by Pamulapati Subba Reddy in the Court auction sale in E.P.No, 101 of 1937 in S.C.No.1666 of 1933 on 03.05.1937, on the file of District Munsif, Guntur and on his death, the land devolved on Pamulapati Sambi Reddy. The defendant purchased the said land from Sambi Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 24.10.1966 for a consideration of Rs.4,790/- and since then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the said property. The defendant further pleads that he purchased Ac.1-00 out of Ac.4-79 cents in D.No.230/C under an agreement of sale dated 20.08.1967 for Rs.2,000/- from Shaikh Meera Saheb and others and obtained delivery of possession and subsequently obtained a registered sale deed dated 19.06.1968. The defendant alleges that Bhatraju Narasimha Rao, the alleged vendor of the plaintiff, was strong opponent of the defendant and, therefore, he set up the plaintiff against the defendant with concocted documents. The defendant would contend that the plaintiff never had any title or possession over the suit property. 6. On the strength of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: i) Whether the defendant has purchased the rights of life estate holder from his vendor? ii) If so what is its effect? iii) Whether the defendant has perfected his title by adverse possession? iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration and possession of the suit property? v) To what relief? 7. Subsequently, Bhatraju Narasimha Rao filed O.S.No.219 of 1994 against Nuthakki Pitchayya and others for a permanent injunction. The averments in the pleadings of both sides in the said suit are similar to those in the earlier suit O.S.No.441 of 1983. The trial Court framed the following issues: i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for? ii) To what relief? 8. On a joint memo filed by both parties for clubbing the suits, common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.441 of 1983. 9. During trial, P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-30 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff and D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-90 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 10. On a consideration of the evidence available on record, the trial Court held that the plaintiff i.e., Nuthakki Pitchayya is not entitled for declaration of title or for recovery of possession or permanent injunction prayed for. Consequently, Pamulapati Narasimha Reddy, the defendant in O.S.No.441 of 1983 and who is plaintiff in O.S.No.219 of 1994, is held entitled for the relief of permanent injunction. Accordingly, the suit O.S.No.441 of 1983 was dismissed, while the suit O.S.No.219 of 1994 was decreed. Aggrieved by the same, Nuthakki Pitchayya, the plaintiff in O.S.No.441 of 1983, filed A.S.No.111 of 1998 and Nuthakki Pitchayya and others, who are defendants in O.S.No.219 of 1994 filed A.S.No.112 of 1998. 11. By the impugned judgment, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed both the appeals. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeals are filed. 12. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that even according to the defendant he was in possession of the property in his own right as owner thereof and, therefore, the question of his perfecting title by adverse possession does not arise. According to him, the question as to whether the defendant perfected his title by adverse possession is a substantial question of law. 13. In S.A.No.941 of 2002, which arises from the main suit O.S.No.441 of 1983, the substantial question of law raised in the grounds of appeal is whether the property in which a person has life estate can be bought in a Court auction sale and whether the Court below committed error in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff though he was in possession of the property and the defendant was never in possession thereof. In S.A.No.30 of 2003, arising from O.S.No.219 of 1994 also, same questions are raised in the grounds of appeal. However, at the time of admission of S.A.No.941 of 2002 the Court admitted the second appeal on the following question: “Whether the respondent would have purchased the suit property from Suvartha who enjoyed only life interest in the property under a Will executed by the original owners.” Thus, it can be seen that in neither of the grounds of appeal the appellant raised any substantial question of law pertaining to the aspect of adverse possession. The trial Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, held that the defendant has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than 12 years prior to filing of the suit O.S.No.441 of 1983 and thus perfected his title by adverse possession. The Appellate Court, on re- appraisal of the evidence, confirmed the said finding holding that the defendant clearly established his plea of adverse possession against the plaintiff. The question as to who among the rival claimants was in possession of the property and whether or not the defendant perfected his title by adverse possession are purely questions of fact regarding which the Courts below have recorded findings based on due appreciation of the evidence available on record. It is not the plea of the appellants that the said findings are perverse or that they are based on no evidence or vitiated by any other fact. 14. In HEMAJI WAGHAJI JAT V. BHIKHABHAI KHENGAR- BHAI HARIJAN AND OTHERS[1], the Apex Court held as under: “The appellant aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned District Judge preferred an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court. In the impugned judgment, it has been held that the appellate Court continues to be the final court on facts and law. The second appeal to the High Court lies only when there is substantial question of law. The High Court relied on Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [(2001)3 SCC 179: AIR 2001 SC 965]. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: “15….The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal before the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 15. I n BHOLARAM V. AMIRCHAND[2] a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated the statement of law as under: “The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the Courts below are perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the Courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 16. I n THIAGARAJAN V. SRI VENUGOPALASWAMY B.KOIL[3], the Apex Court held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The court observed that: “to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible”. 17. The Apex Court again reminded the High Courts in COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS & CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS V. P.SHANMUGAMA[4] that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 18. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF KERALA V. MOHD.KUNHI[5] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Apex Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 19. In MADHAVAN NAIR V. BHASKAR PILLAI[6], the Apex Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Apex Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 20. In HARJEET SINGH V.AMRIK SINGH[7], the Apex Court with anguish has observed that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the appellate Court. In the above case, the findings of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. The Apex Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. 21. In H.P.PYAREJAN V. DASAPPA[8], the Apex Court observed as follows: “it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 CPC (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the Courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re-appreciation of evidence.” 22. In view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, it must be held that the scope of interference by the High Court in a second appeal, particularly after the amendment of Section 100 CPC is very very limited and is confined only to cases where a substantial question of law arises. The concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts below cannot be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC nor can the High Court correct any errors of law or the erroneous findings of the appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one. In the present case, the question as to whether or not the defendant has perfected his title by adverse possession is purely a question of fact on which concurrent finding has been recorded by the Courts below on due appreciation of evidence and in the second appeal, this Court cannot embark upon re-appreciation of the said evidence. 23. In the circumstances, it is held that as no question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for consideration. There are no merits in both the second appeals. 24. In the result, both the second appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ____________________ G.V.SEETHAPATHY, J 09th August, 2011 Lrkm. [1] (2009) 16 SCC 517 [2] (1981) 2 SCC 414 [3] (2004) 5 SCC 762 [4] (2005) 9 SCC 232 [5] (2005) 10 SCC 139 [6] (2005) 10 SCC 553 [7] (2005) 12 SCC 270 [8] (2006) 2 SCC 496