1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Letters Patent Appeal No.176 of 2008 In Misc. Civil Application No.778 of 2005 In Writ Petition No.135 of 2005 (Decided) (Chandraprakash Mahaguji Barapatre v. Shivaji Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Gadchiroli, and others) -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-- Office Notes, Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions : Court's or Judge's orders and Registrar's orders. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Shri P.N. Shende, Advocate for Appellant. Shri V.K. Paliwal, Advocate for R- 1. CORAM : A.M. Khanwilkar & R.C. Chavan, JJ. DATE : 6th June, 2008 1. Heard counsel for the appellant. 2. We find no reason to differ with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge, in particular the order passed dismissing the writ petition summarily. 3. Counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Single Judge has not even referred to the primary contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the probation period of the appellant was completed when the order of termination was given effect on 21-3-1997, in which case the Management was obliged to take recourse to appropriate remedy for removing the permanent teacher. We find no merit in the submission. 4. The Tribunal has considered this aspect, amongst other things, in para 13 of its judgment. The view taken by the Tribunal seems to be 2 appropriate and a possible view. 5. We find no reason to accept the argument that the period of probation of the appellant was already completed, as the order of termination was issued by the Head Master on 14-2-1997. The appellant was admittedly appointed on 14-3-1995 on probation for a period of two years, which would have been over only after 14-3-1997. The termination order is in anterior point of time. Besides the order of termination, the Management after due deliberations passed a resolution on 5-1-1997 to terminate the services of the appellant before his probation period was to be complete. The order of termination is admittedly simpliciter termination. There is nothing to indicate that the order would result in punishment imposed upon the appellant. Suffice it to observe that the decision taken by the Management to remove the appellant was a well-formed decision and cannot be termed as arbitrary by any stretch of imagination. In view of this opinion, no further enquiry is necessary. 6. Counsel for the appellant then contends that in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in the case of Progressive Education Society and another v. Rajendra and another, reported in 2008(2) Mh.L.J. 715, the action of removal of appellant cannot be sustained. The argument proceeds on the premise that the adverse remarks against the appellant, if any, were never communicated. Besides this, there is nothing to indicate that the Managing Committee, which passed a resolution on 5-1-1997, was apprised of the material as is required in terms of Rule 15(6) of the Rules. 7. We find no merit in this submission. No grievance was made before the Tribunal that the material placed before the Managing Committee was not in conformity with Rule 15(6) of the Rules. That is a factual matter, which ought to have been agitated before the Tribunal in the first instance. The appellant cannot be permitted to dispute that position for the first time 3 in this appeal. In fact no such grievance was made before the learned Single Judge as well. 8. In our opinion, no interference is warranted. Appeal is dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE pdl