HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY C.R.P.No.3229 of 2011 Date : 16-9-2011 Between : Yerkala Vijay Kumar and others .. Petitioners and Yerkala Satheesh and others .. Respondents Counsel for petitioners : Sri A. Pulla Reddy Counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3 : Sri J. Venkateshwar Reddy The court made the following: ORDER: This Civil Revision Petition arises out of order dated 14-9-2010 in I.A.No.563/2009 in O.S.No.183/2005 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Bhongir. The petitioners are defendant Nos.1 to 4 in the suit filed by respondent No.1 for partition of the suit schedule properties. Even though the petitioners have entered appearance through a counsel, they were set ex parte by the court below on 28-3-2006. The suit was decreed ex parte and a preliminary decree was passed on 14-3-2007. The petitioners filed I.A.No.563/2009 for condonation of delay of 844 days in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree. In support of their case, the petitioners have stated that there was a settlement arrived at between the parties through the intervention of the elders on account of which they were under the bona fide impression that the suit will be withdrawn by respondent No.1/plaintiff and therefore they did not instruct their counsel to contest the suit. They have further stated that it is only after receiving notices from the court in the application i.e., I.A.No.1297/2007, filed by respondent No.1/plaintiff for appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner that they came to know about the fact that the suit was pursued and an ex parte preliminary decree was passed. The court below having considered the pleas of the parties, dismissed the application while holding that the petitioners/defendant Nos.1 to 4 failed to offer satisfactory explanation for condoning the huge delay of 844 days in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree. At the hearing, Sri A. Pulla Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the lower court has committed a serious error in dismissing the application. He placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy [1] in support of his submission that the applications for condonation of delay shall be considered liberally. Sri J. Venkateshwar Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3, while opposing the above submission submitted that there was utter lack of diligence on the part of the petitioners in pursuing the litigation. He submitted that while the petitioners were set ex parte on 28- 3-2006, the preliminary decree was passed on 14-3-2007; respondent No.1 filed I.A.No.1297/2007 for appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner for dividing the properties by metes and bounds for passing a final decree and that having received the notices, the petitioners again remained ex parte, as a result of which they were set ex parte on 15- 12-2007; that on 13-2-2009 an Advocate-Commissioner was appointed and it is only on 3-7-2009 that the petitioners filed the application for setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree with the delay of 844 days. It is no doubt true that the courts have held that the concept of explaining each day’s delay shall be construed liberally while deciding the applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short "the Act") in order to ensure that the cases are adjudicated on merits in stead of on the basis of ex parte decrees. But, at the same time, the law is equally well settled that a person cannot be subjected to litigation for unending period and that the purpose of the Act is to ensure that the litigation comes to an end within a reasonable period so that the parties are relieved from the strain and stress of litigation. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. A litigant who does not show any diligence in pursuing the litigation, does not deserve the liberal approach of the court while considering his application for condonation of delay. A Division Bench of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. A.Murali Madhava Rao[2], speaking through me, observed as under: “… The plethora of case law suggests seemingly divergent views on the approach the Courts needed to adopt in considering the applications for condonation of delay. The earliest view of insistence on explaining day to day delay has given way to a somewhat liberal approach by the Courts. Similarly, the view that in considering the delay, the Courts should not discriminate between the State and its instrumentalities and the private citizen yielded to the view that the Courts should recognize the inevitable delays occurring in bureaucratic process and that certain amount of latitude within reasonable limits deserves to be shown in favour of the State. (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others[3], G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore[4], State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others[5] and State of U.P. and others v. Harish Chandra and others[6]). In Vedabai Alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others[7] and State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and others[8] the Apex Court made a delicate balance of the two extreme views, namely, strict approach and a too liberal attitude in considering the applications for condonation of delay. In the first mentioned case, it was held that a distinction must be made between the case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days and that in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side is a relevant factor so that the case calls for a more cautious approach, but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and the same deserves a liberal approach. The Supreme Court further held that while no hard and fast rule can be laid down, the Courts should exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause”, the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. The Supreme Court further observed that in exercising their discretion, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. In State of Nagaland (8 supra) the Supreme Court held that “sufficient cause” is a pre-condition for condonation of delay and that in considering the application for condonation of delay what counts is not the length of the delay, but the sufficiency of cause occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Applying the above settled legal principles to the present case, a long delay of 844 days occurred in filing the application for setting aside the exparte decree. Therefore, a strict approach requires to be adopted in examining the application for condonation of delay. Except the ipsi dixit of the petitioners/defendant Nos.1 to 4 that there was a settlement, on account of which they could not contest the suit, no material whatsoever in support thereof has been has been filed by them in the application. Neither the petitioners have examined themselves nor did they examine the so-called elders. The petitioners also failed to show as to why they remained ex parte when notices were served on them in I.A.No.1297/2007. At least after they were set ex parte on 15-12-2007, the petitioners did not file the application within a reasonable time for setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree. They have waited for more than 1½ years thereafter before they filed the application for condonation of huge delay of 844 days to set aside the ex parte preliminary decree. In the light of the above facts, the petitioners miserably failed to offer convincing reasons for condoning such a huge delay. For the above mentioned reasons, the Civil Revision Petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel, C.R.P.M.P.No.4636/2011 is dismissed as infructuous. ________________________ Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy Date : 16-9-2011 AM LR copies to be marked. [1] AIR 1998 S.C. 3222 [2]) 2009(3) ALT 637 (DB) [3] (1987) 2 SCC 107 [4] (1988) 2 SCC 142 [5] (1996) 3 SCC 132 [6] (1996) 9 SCC 309 [7] (2001) 9 SCC 106 [8] (2005) 3 SCC 752