IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.6202 of 2010 1. Chandan Prasad Singh S/O Late Siya Ram Singh R/O Vill.- Bariarchak, P.S. Nyagaon, Distt.- Saran 2. Parmanand Singh S/O Late Shyam Narayan Singh R/O Vill.- Kubauli Ram, P.S. Bangara, Distt.- Samastipur 3. Shivanand Dubey S/O Sri Pashupati Nath Dubey R/O Vill.- Hariharpur, Distt.- Bhojpur Versus 1. The State Of Bihar Through The Chief Secretary Government Of Bihar, Main Secretariat, Patna 2. The Principal Secretary Department Of Home, Government Of Bihar, Main Secretariat, Patna 3. The Principal Secretary Department Of Administrative Reforms & Personnel, Government Of Bihar, Main Secretariat, Patna 4. The Principal Secretary, Department Of Finance Government Of Bihar, Main Secretariat, Patna 5. The Additional Director General Of Police (Technical Services & Communication) Government Of Bihar, Main Secretariat, Patna 6. The Inspector General Of Police (Wireless) Bihar Police Radio, Baily Road, Patna 7. The Deputy Secretary Of The Government Department Of Home (Police), Bihar, Main Secretariat, Patna 3/ 13/09/2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 10.12.2009 which denies him consideration for induction in the Bihar Police Radio Service as an ex serviceman under a Circular dated 26.8.1972 providing for certain benefits of promotion for ex serviceman inducted into the police service. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Circular dated 26.8.1972 has been revoked on 10.12.2009 with effect from 2.3.2005. The revocation 2 shall affect those who may have been appointed on or after 2.3.2005. The order itself states that in between the period 26.8.1972 to 2.3.2005 Clause-3 to 6 of the Circular dated 26.8.1972 shall continue to remain operative. Learned counsel for the State raises the objection that the claim is barred by gross delay. He next submits that the Circular dated 26.8.1972 under which the claim of the petitioner is founded, has been revoked on 9.10.2007 by the letter No.3434. Delay, as a relevant factor to deny relief in service claims, has been considered in (1992)3 SCC 136 (Bhoop Singh v. Union of India ) at Paragraphs 7 and 8 as follows:- “7. It is expected of a Government servant who has a legitimate claim to approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a reasonable period, assuming no fixed period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for years. During the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by lateral entry of a person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. Apart from the consequential benefits of reinstatement without actually working, the impact on the administrative set-up and on other employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless the delay is satisfactorily explained and is not 3 attributable to the claimant….” 8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly…... Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampa in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Article 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant of the relief to the petitioner, in the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned counsel for the petitioner. We are further of the view that these circumstances also justify refusal of the relief claimed under Article 136 of the Constitution.” No person has a right to be promoted, but only has a right to be considered for promotion. It is therefore a inchoate right as mere consideration may not necessarily result in promotion. The petitioner applied for such promotion in January, 2009. If the Circular dated 26.8.1972 stood revoked on 9.10.2007 before either his case came to be considered or he represented for promotion, it is not possible for the Court to accept his submission that the right to be considered for promotion under the Circular crystallized on the date of 4 his appointment and any revocation of the same with effect from 2.3.2005 was applicable prospectively only to appointees after 2.3.2005. That there is no vested right to promotion in such circumstances has been held in (2011) 6 SCC 725 (Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P) at paragraph-28 as follows:- “28.........It was observed that for reasons germane to the decision, the Government is entitled to take a decision not to fill up the existing vacancies as on the relevant date. It was also held that when the Government takes a conscious decision and amends the rules, the promotions have to be made in accordance with the rules prevalent at the time when the consideration takes place.” If that were not enough, it is not in controversy that the petitioner has chosen to pursue his relief in January, 2009 when the Circular stood revoked in the year-2007 itself. If any person situated like him has been promoted under the Circular dated 26.8.1972 after its revocation on 9.10.2007 Article-14 does not operate in negativity to direct parity in illegality. If there be any such case, naturally, the respondents are required to act in accordance with law. The writ application is dismissed. KC ( Navin Sinha, J.)