IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TEN PRESENT HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.5295 of 2010 BETWEEN: M/s.Pretty Women rep. by its Proprietrix Smt Ramasundari ..... PETITIONER(S) AND The Commissioner GHMC, GHMC Building Tank Bund, Hyderabad and others .....RESPONDENT(S) HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.5295 of 2010 ORDER: Heard Sri C.N.Moorthy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. At their request the writ petition is being disposed of at the stage of admission. The first petitioner who is carrying on business of apparels and the second petitioner which is a partnership firm carrying on business of readymade garments have questioned the demand notices issued by the third respondent on 18.02.2010 and 23.02.2010 respectively as without jurisdiction. While Sri C.N.Moorthy, learned counsel for the petitioners, has put forth several contentions that the main boards put up outside the petitioners office, do not amount to an advertisement enabling the first respondent to charge a fee etc., I consider it wholly unnecessary to examine any of these contentions as the impugned demand notices dated 18.02.2010 and 23.02.2010 are liable to be set aside on the short ground that the second respondent could not have issued the said notice calling upon the petitioner to pay the advertisement fee demanded through cheques/demand drafts drawn in their favour. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by judgment dated 31.12.2009 in W.P.No.23354 of 2009 and batch, held that the power to demand a fee or tax is specifically vested with the Commissioner of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation or any person authorized by him; such persons must naturally be the officials of the Corporation itself; notices issued by an agency on behalf of the Corporation is contrary to law; Section 169 requires any amount received by the Corporation towards tax and fee to be credited to the consolidated fund of the Corporation; the permission accorded by the Corporation to collect the fee was totally opposed to the scheme of the Act; and the notice issued to the petitioners, requiring them to pay the fee through cheques/demand drafts in favour of the second respondent, was in clear violation of the specific provisions of the Act. The impugned notice was quashed as it did not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Act. Following the said judgment, the impugned demand notices are quashed as they do not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the first respondent from taking necessary action afresh in accordance with law. The Writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the said circumstances, without costs. ______________________________ RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 12th March 2010 CVRK