IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.53986 of 2007 1. Shailesh Kumar S/o Late Rajeswar Prasad. Residing at House No. 24, 1st Floor, 2nd Cross, Choutiya Block, Banglore- 560032. 2. Sapan Kumar S/o Late Rajeshwar Prasad. 3. Smt. Amrita W/o Sapan Kumar. Both are residing at Platinanum City, C-402, H.M.T. Road, Near to I.T.T. R.T.T. Office, Payeenia, Banglore-560022. 4. Santosh Kumar S/o Late Rajeswar Prasad. 5. Smt. Rachna Kr, W/o Santosh Kumar Both are residing at Jagtaran Kutir, Shukla Colony, P.O.- Hinoo, P.S.- Dorenda, District & Town- Ranchi. 6. Bijay Srivastava S/o Sri S.P.Srivastava. 7. Smt. Pramila Srivastava W/o Bijay Srivastava Both residing at Flat No. 30, Block No. 6. C.I.T. Bulding, Kakurgachhi, Kolkata. 8. Saket Kumar Verma S/o Late Jager Nath Prasad Verma 9. Smt. Rani @ Manjula Verma W/o Saket Kumar Verma Both are residing at Chaupar House, Sahu Pokhar, Opp. To Prabhat Cenama, Muzaffarpur, Bihar. --------------------Petitioners Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. Smt. Sangita Kumari W/o Shailesh Kumar. Residing with her father Shri S.N.P. Verma, at Flat No. 401 and 402, Quality Paradise, Ara Garden Road, Baily Road, P.S. Danapur, District- Patna. -----------------Opposite Parties. ----------- 03. 19.03.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2. The present application has been filed for quashing the order dated 08.12.2005 and the entire prosecution passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna, in Complaint Case No. 3111( C) 2005 whereby cognizance has been taken under Sections 498(A) and 406 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2 There are nine petitioners in this petition of which petitioner No.1 is the husband of the complainant, Petitioners No. 2 and 4 are the brothers of the husband of the complainant, whereas Petitioners No. 3 and 5 are the wives of the brothers of husband of the complainant. Petitioners No. 6 and 8 are the brothers-in-laws of the husband of the complainant, Petitioners No. 7 and 9 are the sisters of the husband of the complainant. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioners that the present complaint being Complaint Case No. 3111 (C ) 05 was filed on 20.10.2005 (Annexure-4 to the present quashing application) in which the allegations of torture and demand of dowry have been levelled against these petitioners. The learned Court below in pursuance to the aforesaid complaint examined witnesses including complainant on solemn affirmation and found prima facie case against all the nine accused persons under Sections 498(A) and 406 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act vide order dated 08.12.2005 which is the impugned order. Subsequently a compromise petition was filed in complaint case No. 3111(C) 2005 on 07.02.2007 with the signatures of both sides along with the signature of their respective Advocates. In the said compromise petition, the detail terms of compromise was fixed but no order could be 3 passed till date. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since 498 (A) is non-compoundable hence no order has been passed. But no document has been brought on record to suggest that no order has been passed on compromise petition since the offences U/S 498A I.P.C. are non-compoundable. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to Annexure-2, which is a compromise petition, filed in Maintenance Case No. 18(M) of 2006 filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. Consequently the Maintenance Case No. 18(M) of 2006 was withdrawn by the wife and agreed for disposal of the same as per the compromise petition and thereafter the final order was passed on 19.07.2007(which is also part of Annexure-2) by the learned Court of Additional Family Court, Patna disposing of Maintenance Case No. 18(M) of 2006 in terms of the compromise petition with a direction to give all the maintenance amount deposited in the Court by the husband to the wife. In the Matrimonial Case No. 56 of 2007 vide order dated 27.09.2007 passed by Mr. Nisha Nath Ojha, Principle Judge, Patna, the matrimonial tie between the husband Shailesh Kumar and the wife Smt. Sangita Kumari was dissolved with consent under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act. It appears from the records that in complaint 4 Case No. 3111(C )of 2005, no order of compromise was passed though both the compromise orders in the maintenance case vide Annexure-2 and in Divorce Case vide Annexure-3 were passed in 2007 whereas cognizance has been taken in Complaint Case No. 3111(C) 2005 on 08.12.2005. Hence this much is apparent that both sides knew about the cognizance order passed in complaint case and after that both sides settled the maintenance case as well as the matrimonial case before the learned Court below and they intended to compromise the criminal case also, which culminated into filing of compromise petition in complaint case as contained in Annexure-1. Counsel for the O.P. No. 2 has submitted that in view of the order dated 19.07.2007 contained in Annexure-2, the wife has to be paid the maintenance amount deposited in the Court. I make it clear that the amount of maintenance deposited by the husband in the Court if not paid till today, it should be paid to the wife forthwith. The other contention of the learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 is that he is not aware about the present stage of the criminal case though it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that after cognizance no progress has been made in the complaint case. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case I find no justification in continuation of the present 5 complaint case in view of the fact that the matrimonial case as well as the maintenance case have been compromised and the compromise petition was filed in the present complaint case vide Annexure-1. So far as apprehension of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the matter under Section 498A I.P.C. is non compoundable, that apprehension appears to be bonafide as offence under Section 498A I.P.C. is not compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. but in the case of B.S. Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 2003(4) S.C.C. 675 it has been made clear that where the wife has parted company with the husband and the marriage has been dissolved with the consent of the parties and the complainant is not supporting the prosecution allegation in such eventuality quashing the prosecution under Section 498A I.P.C. in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may not be treated as permitting the parties to compound non- compoundable offences, which is in the following words:- “there is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. 6 The hypertechnical view would be counterproductive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code” It is well settled law in the case of Madhu Limaye versus The State of Maharashtra reported in 1977(4) SCC 551 that for the purpose of securing of ends of justice interference by the High Court in exercise of power under section 482 Cr. P.C. are not fettered and considering the Madhu Limaye case the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi(Supra) held as follows : “it is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of 7 each case whether to exercise or not such a power” In the case of B.S. Joshi(Supra) while considering the case of State of Karnataka versus Muniswamy and others reported in 1977(2) SCC 699 it has been held as follows : “In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that 8 salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. There may be many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her husband and his other family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly parted company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on the earlier marriage having been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences ? The answer clearly has to be in “negative”. It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for any 9 valid reasons including lack of bona fides” In the case of B.S. Joshi(Supra) while considering the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. and the ratio laid down in case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others versus Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre reported in 1988(1) SCC 692 Hon’ble Supreme Court opined as such : “In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings” Hence, from the conclusion arrived at in the case of B.S. Joshi(Supra) it is quite clear that the High Court in exercise of its inherent power can quash criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or the complaint and the bar of Section 320 of Cr. P.C. does not limit or effect the powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 10 The other purpose of quashing of present prosecution case is in the interest of justice in view of the fact that the matrimonial case has been decided and the marriage has been dissolved by mutual consent whereas the maintenance case has also been disposed of on the basis of compromise and thirdly that both sides agreed to compromise the present complaint also by settling their differences on certain terms and conditions hence no useful purpose will be served in continuation of the present proceeding. Hence continuance of present proceeding will amount to abuse of process of the Court as it will not allow both sides to settle early in their respective lives and considering such a situation the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed his view in the case of J.V. Rao Vs. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors reported in 2000(3) SCC 693 in following words : “There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their 11 being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts” In the case of Ruchi Agrawal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal reported in 2005(3) SCC 299 the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that in case the marriage was dissolved with consent of the parties under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and maintenance case was also withdrawn but the wife was pursuing the criminal case under Section 498A I.P.C. and other Sections the conduct of such complainant is only a wish of the wife to harass the husband. Such conduct of wife amounts to abuse of the process of the Court, which has been described as follows : “7. It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance with the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better 12 known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the abovementioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her stridhan properties. We find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted, thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr. P.C. proceeding were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a 13 statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we can not now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents. 9. In view of the abovesaid subsequent events and the conduct of the appellant, it would be an abuse of the process of the Court if the criminal proceedings from which this appeal arises is allowed to continue. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion to do complete justice, we should while dismissing this appeal also quash the proceedings arising from criminal case Cr. No. 224 of 2003 registered in Police Station Bilaspur(District Rampur) filed under Sections 498-A, 323 and 506 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the respondents herein. It is ordered accordingly. The appeal is disposed of. ” 14 In view of the settled principles as discussed above, the provisions under Section 320 Cr.P.C. can not be an embargo in the way of exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing a proceeding under Section 498A I.P.C. as the ends of justice are higher than ends of law. In view of the fact that the maintenance case has been disposed of on the basis of the compromise and the marriage has been dissolved with consent of the parties under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act vide Annexures 2 and 3 respectively and the compromise has also been filed with consent of both sides in the present complaint case but no order has been passed, perhaps, in view of embargo under Section 320 of Cr.P.C., no useful purpose will be served in allowing to continue such a prosecution. Hence, in the interest of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and also to allow both sides to settle in their respective life as early as possible, the cognizance order dated 08.12.2005 passed by the S.D.J.M. Patna, in Complaint Case No. 3111(C) 2005 is hereby quashed. It is made clear that this order will be made effective only when the husband petitioner No. 1 will submit a draft of Rs. 25,000/- before the learned Court below which will be paid to the complainant and this amount will be apart from the other terms of compromise which has already been settled between the parties. It is expected that Rs. 25,000/- 15 will be paid by the petitioner within a period of four months from today. It is made further clear that the learned Court below will make sure that the other terms of compromise should be complied with by the parties if not already complied with. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this application stands allowed. Shageer (Dinesh Kumar Singh, J)