HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. GOPAL REDDY AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU WRIT APPEAL No.293 of 2010 Dated: 31-08-2010 Between: Nawab Behbood Ali Khan …Petitioner AND Union of India, rep. by its Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi & Another Respondents. This Court made the following: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. GOPAL REDDY AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU WRIT APPEAL No.293 of 2010 JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.C.Bhanu) This Writ Appeal is directed against the order, dated 10.12.2009 in W.P.No.13118 of 2009, whereunder and whereby the writ petition filed to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the order, dated 7.9.2008 and the Gazette notification, dated 17.9.2008 insofar as it pertains to nomination of the second respondent under Section 5(1) (F) of the Salar Jung Museum Act, 1961 (Act 26 of 1961) (for short ‘the Act’) published in the Gazette of India, dated 7.11.2008 G.S.R.776(E) of the Salar Jung Museum Board, as illegal and liable to be set aside, was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. 2. The brief facts that are necessary for disposal of the present appeal may be stated as follows: The appellant herein filed a writ petition inter alia alleging that Salar Jung-III died on 2.3.1949 and after his demise, a suit was filed by the maternal uncle of Salar Jung-III for partition of the properties left behind by Salar Jung-III, and that the said suit was ultimately numbered as C.S.No.13 of 1958 on the file of this Court, which ended in compromise. According to the compromise between the plaintiffs and defendants, the defendants 10,11 and 13 are the members of the Salar Jung Family, whereas the other parties of the suit are not members of the family. The defendants 10 to 13 are the maternal grand children of Salar Jung-I and therefore, they are members of the Salar Jung-II family. 3. The appellant stated that he is the maternal grand son of defendant No.10 who died on 10.2.1968 leaving behind his son and three daughters, who were brought on record as his legal representatives as defendants No.155, 156, 157 and 158. Defendant No.157 (mother of appellant) died on 29.3.2006 and immediately, appellant filed application No.779 of 2006 in Application No.151 of 2006 in C.S.No.13 of 1958 to bring him on record as legal representative of defendant No.157 and his application was allowed on 15.3.2007. Therefore, his name has been included in the amended decree of compromise suit. On 24.4.2007 the petitioner was appointed as Joint custodian of the records of the Salar Jung Estate in application No.151 of 2006 in C.S.No.13 of 1958. 4. It is further stated that the name of the second respondent was not found in the compromise decree in C.S.No.13 of 1958. A person, to be nominated under Section 5 (1) (F) of the Act, has to satisfy the Central Government that he is a member of the family of Salar Jung and that can be done only by producing a copy of the compromise decree. Since the name of the second respondent does not find place in the compromise decree in the civil suit, he is ineligible to be considered for nomination. 5. It is further stated that the younger brother of the second respondent is an employee of the Salar Jung Museum and therefore, under Section 8 of the Act, the Central Government has to satisfy itself before nominating any person as a member of the Board that the person has no financial or other interest which is likely to effect prejudicially in exercise of the performance as a member of the Board. Hence, the writ petition. 6. The second respondent filed a detailed counter affidavit stating that his late father Abbas Yar Jung, who was defendant No.10 in C.S.No.13 of 1958, was selected as the first Board member in 1962 and served on the Board till 1997 for a period of thirty five years; that he filed suits in O.S.No.156 of 1980 and 1451 of 1983 on the file of VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for declaration of rights and the same was decreed through a judgment, dated 12.10.2004; that a competent civil Court passed a decree of succession in his favour in order No.1968 of 2009 in the court of the VII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad; that his grand father, who was arrayed as defendant No.10 in C.S.No.13 of 1958 died on 10.1.1968 and was succeeded by his son Abbas Yar Jung (father of the second respondent) who died in December, 2002 leaving behind himself, his brother and three sisters; that under Section 5(1) (F) of the Act, the eligibility for being nominated as a member on the Salar Jung Museum Board is that a person nominated should be a member of the Salar Jung Family, and therefore, there are no grounds to issue a writ of mandamus and prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 7. The learned Single Judge considering the material on record held that as per Section 5(1)(F) of the Act only a member of the family of late Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur shall be appointed to the Board and the second respondent was appointed in that category in the year 1997 and that the petitioner himself admitted that the second respondent is a grand son like him, and that nowhere in the representation, the writ petitioner has stated that the second respondent is either ineligible or has incurred disqualification for the appointment to the Museum, and that except stating that younger brother of the second respondent has been employed, no particulars of the individual, the post or date of appointment have been furnished and therefore, dismissed the writ petition. Challenging the same, the present appeal is filed. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner contended that as per the scheme of the Act, the object of nominating the members to the Salar Jung Museum Board was to nominate a member in pursuance of the decree in O.S.No.13 of 1958 and that the word ‘member of the family’ used in Section 5(1)(F) of the Act must mean only the persons shown in the decree in O.S.No.13 of 1958 and that any member who is not shown in the decree cannot be treated as members of the family; that the Central Government has not applied its mind in terms of Section 8 of the Act so as to say that the brother of the second respondent who was working in the Museum and therefore, it will materially and financially affect the performance of the Board as the second respondent is no other than the brother of an employee and therefore, he prays to set aside the impugned order. 9. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing for the first respondent contended that in terms of Central Act, the second respondent was nominated as a member of the Board as he is a member of the family of Salar Jung-III and therefore, the Central Government has appointed the second respondent as a member in accordance with law and there are no grounds to allow the writ appeal. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent contended that the second respondent is paternal grand son of defendant No.10 in C.S.No.13 of 1958 and after his death, his father was brought on record as a legal heir of defendant No.10 and that the appellant herein is claiming right through the same ancestral of defendant No.10 as the maternal grand son of defendant No.10 and that it is not denied or disputed that the second respondent is the paternal grand son of defendant No.10 and therefore, in such circumstance, he can be termed as a member of the family of Salar Jung and the learned Single Judge of this Court rightly dismissed the writ petition and there are no grounds to interfere with the same. 11. A Board has to be constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of maintaining the Salar Jung Museum and the Salar Jung Library, at Hyderabad. The statement of objects and reasons of the Salar Jung Museum Act, 1961 reads as under: “The Salar Jung Museum, together with the Salar Jung Library, at Hyderabad, was built out of the vast and valuable collections of art objects and manuscripts of the late Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur. The museum has nearly twenty-five thousand art objects of varied nature some of them of outstanding value not to be found anywhere in the world and was administered by the Salar Jung Estate Committee set up by the former Hyderabad Government. The Committee was given additional powers by the Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur (Administration of Aeests) Act, 1950 (XXXVI of 1950). In C.S.No.13 of 1958 of the file of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, a compromise decree to which the Union of India, the State of Andhra Prades, the Salar Jung Estate Committee and all claimants to the late Nawab’s property interested in the subject-matter of the proceedings were parties was passed under which— (a) the claimants have renouned in favour of the Union of India all their right, title and interest in the property of the museum and the library and in a plot of land known as Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur Baradari to be utilized for erecting a new building for the museum; (b) the Salar Jung Estate Committee has agreed to pay a sum of five lakhs of rupees towards meeting a portion of the cost of erecting the new buildings, the balance of cost being met by the Central Government; (c) the museum and the library should always continue to be known as the Salar Jung Museum and the Salar Jung Library respectively, and located at Hyderabad; (d) no article may be removed from the museum except for the purpose of temporary exhibition within India; (e) one or more members of the late Nawab’s family to be selected by the Central Government will have to be nominated to the governing body, committee of management or advisory body, in case any such body is to be constituted for the museum or library. The amount of five lakhs of rupees referred to above has since been received by the Central Government. Having regard to the importance and value of the collections in the museum and to the need for re-organising and developing the museum on modern scientific lines, it is considered that it should be declared to be an institution of national importance under Entry 62 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Bill seeks to give effect to this proposal and makes provision of for the following:-- 1. the establishment of a Board, consisting of eleven persons for the administration of the museum and the vesting in the Board of the property of the museum; (2) transfer of the existing staff to the Board; (3) the issue of directions by Government to the Board in the discharge of its functions, the submission by the Board of annual budget estimates and reports to Government, the deposit of funds in the Reserve Bank, etc., and the annual audit of the accounts of the Board by the Controller and Auditor General.” – Gaz. Of Ind., 5.12.1960, Extra., Pt.II, Section 2, page 800.” 12. So, the statement of objects and reasons would disclose that effective management of the Salar Jung Estate, which is a museum, consists of very rare objects which have outstanding value not to be found anywhere in the world to be governed by the Board of Members. 13. Section 5 deals with composition of the Board. The present dispute in this case is relating to Section 5(1)(F) which reads that ‘a person to be nominated by the Central Government, shall be a member of the family of the late Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur who died on the 2nd day of March, 1949’. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the word “the member of the family of late Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur” must be understood as a member of the family of Nawab Salar Jung as per the decree in O.S.No.13 of 1958. For that, he relied upon the decisions reported in N.Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose and Others[1] and Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala and Others[2] for contextual interpretation of the statute for the purpose for which it was enacted and the object sought to be achieved by enacting the said legislation. There is no dispute about the interpretation of the statute. If a narrow interpretation is to be given that the member of the family of the Salar Jung would mean and include to those who were arrayed as parties to the C.S.No.13 of 1958, the makers of legislation would have been worded differently in Section 5(1)(F) of the Act. The member of the family must mean and include any member of the family of Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur. It cannot be restricted to the persons who were arrayed as parties to C.S.No.13 of 1958. It is not seriously disputed that the second respondent herein is the paternal grand son of defendant No.10 in C.S.No.13 of 1958. Therefore, he can be termed as a member of the family of late Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur. Simply because they were not brought on record after the death of the father of second respondent herein, that does not mean that they ceased to be the members of Salar Jung Bahadur-I. After the death of the father of the second respondent, if they are not brought on record as legal heirs, it cannot be said that they ceased to be the members of the family. Simply because the second respondent has not been brought on record as legal heir of his father nor shown as a party to the suit, that does not mean that he cannot be recognized as a member of the family. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel that the second respondent is not a member of the family is untenable and the learned Single Judge of this Court rightly held that he is entitled to be nominated under Section 5(1)(F) of the Act. 14. The other contention of the learned senior counsel is that when it is clearly asserted that the brother of the second respondent was employed in the Salar Jung Museum, it would affect the rights and duties of the second respondent as a member of the Board under Section 8 of the Act. Section 8 of the Act deals with the duty of the Government to nominate the persons to the Board. The Central Government shall satisfy itself that the person will have no financial or other interest which is likely to affect prejudicially in exercise of the performance of his functions as a member of the Board. In the first instance, the appellant has not furnished the details of the employment of the brother of the second respondent. Even assuming for a moment that the brother of the second respondent is employed in the Museum, in what way the financial or other interests of the Board would likely to affect the performance of the functions of the second respondent as a member of the Board has not been explained. Therefore, in the absence of any such pleading with regard to the employment of the brother of the second respondent, the contention of the learned senior counsel cannot be accepted. Considering the material on record, the learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition and that order needs no interference by this Court. 15. The Writ Appeal is devoid of merits and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. ________________ A. GOPAL REDDY, J. ________________ AUGUST 31, 2010 K.C. BHANU, J. Tsr. [1] 2009(5) ALD 115 (SC) [2] 2009(2) Supreme 529