THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH %10.09.2008 W.P.NO.14000 OF 2001 S.RAJA MOULI PETITIONER And THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & LABOUR COURT, KARIMNAGAR AND ANOTHER. RESPONDENTS W.P.NO.14273 OF 2001 V.V.RAMANA PETITIONER AND THE DEPOT MANAGER, A.P.S.R.T.C. HUZURABAD DEPOT, KARIMNAGAR DISTRICT & ANOTHER. RESPONDENTS. Counsel for the petitioners: SRI T.RAMULU Counsel for the respondents- SMT. P.RAJANI REDDY, STANDING COUNSEL FOR THE CORPORATION. < Gist Ø Head Note. Ø ?Cases Referred: 1. AIR 1975 SC 1900 2. 2008(3) ALT 234 3. W.P.NO.13241/2001 DATED 7.2.2008 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH W.P.NOS.14000 OF 2001 AND 14273 OF 2001 COMMON ORDER Heard both the counsel. 2. Since the issue raised in both the writ petitions is one and the same and the respondents are common, they are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are the workmen and they are working as conductors in the 1st respondent – Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Huzurabad Depot, Karimnagar District (for short ‘the Corporation’). They were removed from service on the alleged ground of committing irregularities in issuing tickets to the passengers. Challenging the same, they raised industrial disputes and by the impugned awards, the said I.Ds. were dismissed and challenging the same, the present writ petitions are filed. 4. W.P.No.14000/2001 is ﬁled against the award passed by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal – cum – Labour Court, Godavrikhani, Karimnagar District in I.D.No.34/1999 dated 9.1.2001. 5. W.P.No.14273/2001 is ﬁled against the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal – cum – Labour Court, Godavarikhani, Karimnagar District in I.D.No.75/1998 dated 14.11.2000. 6. The facts in W.P.No.14000/2001 are that the petitioner was appointed as conductor on 30.9.1978 and on 2.12.1997, a check was conducted and charge sheet was issued and after conducting domestic enquiry, the petitioner was removed from service on 6.4.1998. Similarly, the petitioner in W.P.No.14273/2001, was appointed as conductor on 7.5.1986 and on 28.2.1998, a check was conducted and charge was framed for failing to issue tickets to ten passengers in spite of collecting the fare from them. After conducting domestic enquiry, the petitioner was removed from service on 6.6.1998. Challenging the orders of dismissal, the petitioners ﬁled I.D.Nos.34 of 1999 and 75 of 1998, and by the impugned awards dated 9.1.2001 and 14.11.2000 respectively, the same were dismissed, conﬁrming the orders passed in the departmental proceedings. 7. The learned counsel Sri T.Ramulu appearing for the petitioners in both the writ petitions, mainly contended that though the petitioners disputed the domestic enquiry and the reports thereof, on the ground that the same were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal below without deciding the validity of the domestic enquiry and by mechanically noting the contents of the documents marked on behalf of the Management and without appreciating the evidence on record, conﬁrmed the orders of removal and the same cannot be said to be ‘judicious adjudication’ and hence the matters need to be remanded. He contended that when the petitioners disputed the domestic enquiry, the Tribunal ought to have decided the validity of the domestic enquiry and recorded ﬁnding thereof. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in COOPER ENGINEERING LTD. v. P.P. MUNDHE [1]. He further submitted that the Tribunal shall appreciate the evidence adduced before the disciplinary authority and record ﬁndings based on such evidence. But in the present case, as stated above, by mechanically noting the contents of the documents and without appreciating the evidence adduced before the disciplinary authority, the Tribunal concurring with the ﬁndings of the domestic enquiry, dismissed the industrial disputes. He contended that appreciating the evidence on record is mandatory and in the absence of the same, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has followed the due adjudicatory process. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgments of the learned single Judges of this in P.F.KHAN E.406046 v. DEPOT MANAGER APSRTC[2] a n d K.SHANKARAIAH v. THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT REP. BY ITS PRESIDING OFFICER, KODAVARIKHANI[3]. With these contentions, he sought to remand the matter, for fresh adjudication. 8. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation, supporting the impugned awards, sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 9. In order to consider the above rival contentions, it is necessary to note the respective pleadings of both the writ petitioners in the I.D. and the approach of the Tribunal. 10. The case of the petitioner in W.P.No.14000/2001, as stated in the aﬃdavit ﬁled in support of the writ petition, is that he was appointed as Conductor on 8.10.1978 and that he was removed from service by proceedings dated 6.4.1998 issued by the Depot Manager Huzurabad Depot, Karimnagar District. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was denied reasonable opportunity to participate in the enquiry. The relevant averments made in the aﬃdavit ﬁled in support of the I.D. are extracted as under for better appreciation: “6. The petitioner was removed from service by alighting statement of squad jeep driver. The petitioner has requested to call for the squad jeep driver in the domestic enquiry but the Enquiry Oﬃcer has denied to call him, as a result, the petitioner has lost all the chances to defend the case to enlighten the genuine facts. Hence, the enquiry was conducted formally, which is illegal and baseless to remove the petitioner. 7. In the MTD-43/R (check-sheet) bearing no.1335060, dt.2-12-1997, it was mentioned that the check was exercised from 16.20 hrs. to 16-30 hours. Thus the check was completed within (10) minutes. In these (10) minutes the TTIs failed to conﬁrm the actual facts of the case and there is no question of in subordinate and tearing of checking papers as reported by the TTIs. 8. The petitioner was not supplied the important document of special report written by TTIs against the petitioner addressed to the respondent to defend the case in the enquiry. The TTIs did not ask the petitioner to sign the charge memo and not issued the charge memo on the spot. The petitioner has received the charge memo from his depot supervisors on 6.12.1997. Hence, there is no insubordination against the TTIs. The TTIs have written the illegal charges which were against the principles of natural justice. 9. The Enquiry Oﬃcer has conducted a formal enquiry. He has not allowed to call for the witnesses and defend the case. The Enquiry Oﬃcer has allowed only limited questions to cross-examine the TTIs. and refused to record all the questions at enquiry. 11. The averments of the petitioner in W.P.No.14273/2001 are to the eﬀect that he was appointed as conductor on 7.5.1986 and was removed from service by proceedings dated 6.6.1998. His case is that, to the charge memo he submitted his explanation and without considering the same, he was removed from service. His main grievance among the other grounds is that the domestic enquiry is conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The relevant averments in the I.D. in this regard are extracted as under: 5. ( c ) The petitioner has requested the Enquiry Oﬃcer to call for the Bus Driver and another TTI but the Enquiry Oﬃcer has denied to call them in enquiry. Further, the petitioner was not allowed by the Enquiry Oﬃcer fully to cross-examine the TTI who attended the enquiry and allowed the limited questions and did not give chance to defend the case, hence the enquiry is illegal and against to the natural justice.” 12. From a reading of the above averments made by the petitioners in the petitions ﬁled before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 they have categorically disputed the domestic enquiry conducted by the Corporation on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. A perusal of the impugned award goes to show that the Tribunal has not decided the validity of the domestic enquiry conducted by the Corporation by framing an issue. The Apex Court in the decision reported in COOPER ENGINEERING LTD. v. P.P.MUNDHE (1 supra) held as under: “22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the Labour Court should ﬁrst decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer there will be no diﬃculty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties the question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the Labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceedings to raise the issue. . . . . . 13. From the above judgment of the Apex Court it is clear that the Tribunal shall ﬁrst decide the validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue, to see whether the principles of natural justice has been violated in conducting the said enquiry. In the present case, as per the averments of the petitioners, noted above, they have categorically disputed the validity of the preliminary enquiry on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. From a perusal of the impugned awards, which were passed by the very same oﬃcer, it could be seen that only one issue has been framed as under: Whether the charges against the petitioner are proved, if so, whether the punishment of removal of the petitioner from the service is proportionate to the charges.? 14. Except the above issue, no other issue has been framed and though the petitioners have categorically disputed the validity of the domestic enquiry, no discussion or any ﬁndings, have been recorded with regard to the said averment. Therefore, in light of the judgment of the Apex Court referred to above, the ﬁndings of the enquiry oﬃcer holding the petitioners guilty of the charges, cannot be sustained. 15. From a further perusal of the impugned awards, it reveals that the Presiding Oﬃcer has just noted the contents of the documents and in a cryptic manner, held that the charges are proved and further held that the punishment of removal of the petitioners from service is proportionate to the charges. The mechanical procedure adopted by the Presiding Oﬃcer of the Labour Court, is highly depreciable. In the present case, the petitioner has categorically pleaded violation of the principles of natural justice and there is no discussion or ﬁnding on this aspect and further the petitioners have also raised other contentions to prove their innocence. The Tribunal, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is empowered to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re- instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions as it thinks ﬁt, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any less punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. In order to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act, it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to appreciate the evidence available on record. 16. This court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit as an appellate authority over the ﬁndings of the enquiry oﬃcer and record its own ﬁndings. However, this court can deﬁnitely interfere by way of judicial review, if the ﬁndings recorded are, based on no evidence or if the ﬁndings are perverse that no prudent man would arrive at. Therefore the opportunity of appreciating the evidence available on record, is vested with the Tribunal, as it is a fact ﬁnding authority. The ﬁndings of the Tribunal shall be supported with cogent and convincing reasons and it cannot rely merely on the departmental enquiry and it shall re-evaluate such evidence and record its independent ﬁndings based on evidence, meeting the contentions of the parties. A learned single Judge of this court in the decision reported in P.F.KHAN E.406046 v. DEPOT MANAGER A.P.S.R.T.C (2 supra) considering similar circumstances held as under: “5. In a writ petition ﬁled under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over an award passed by the Labour Court. It is well settled that the Labour Court is the ﬁnal authority, as regards appreciation of the facts in an industrial dispute, before it. Further, the power of the Labour Court in moulding the relief is almost absolute, and except where the award suﬀers from patent illegality or perversity, the High Court cannot interfere with it. 7. An independent and an unbiased adjudication to the matter would take place in such matters, only when they reach a Labour court. Earlier to that for all practical purposes, one of the parties to the dispute assumes the role of an adjudicator. Therefore, heavy burden rests upon the Labour court to examine the matter from all possible angles, to satisfy itself as to whether there existed proper material to sustain the punishment imposed against the workman. The evidence adduced, may be before the disciplinary authority, needs to be appreciated afresh, as though it was adduced before the Labour Court, for the ﬁrst time. Any lapse in this regard would have its own dent into the perfection of the adjudication by the Labour Court. Reproduction of charges or making observations with semantic changes, hardly would justify the role of a Labour Court. Oral evidence, be it on behalf of the petitioner or the 1st respondent was not adduced before the Labour court, obviously, because such a step was taken before the disciplinary authority. Failure on the part of the Labour Court to appreciate the evidence that already formed part of the record, would certainly render the adjudication before it, incomplete.” 17. Another learned single Judge of this court in K.SHANKARAIAH v. THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL – CUM – LABOUR COURT REP. ITS PRESIDING OFFICER (3 supra) held at paragraph no.3 as under: “There is no necessity of going into all the details. The award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Godavarikhani is not in tune with the procedure of adjudication of a dispute between the parties. Though the exhibits as marked before the Labour Court was indicated and content was recorded, there was no evaluation of the evidence and a mechanical award was passed rejecting the claim of the petitioner, simply saying that the charges against the petitioner are proved and the punishment of removal from service is proportionate to that of the charges proved. This practice made by the Labour court is liable to be deprecated. Labour Court is supposed to evaluate the evidence on either side and furnish reasons for coming to the conclusion that the charges are proved or the punishment of removal from service is proportionate to that of the misconduct alleged against the workman. In the instant case, no such attempt was made by the Labour Court. Therefore, the impugned award is not in consonance with the adjudicatory procedure to be adopted by the Labour Court, apart from being arbitrary and illegal; therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.” 18. Therefore, from the above judgments of the Apex Court and this court, it is clear that the Tribunal shall ﬁrst decide the validity of the domestic enquiry and further by re-evaluating the evidence, which was adduced before the disciplinary authority and by giving suﬃcient reasons, has to record ﬁndings thereof and then only it can be said that proper adjudicating procedure has been followed. On the contrary if the Tribunal by not framing appropriate issues and without any discussion on the disputes issues, and only by noting the exhibits marked and the contents therein, holds the workman guilty, it cannot be said that Tribunal has followed the procedure and it is an incomplete exercise in haste and in utter disregard to the fundamental rights of the parties guaranteed under the Constitution of India. 19. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the impugned awards are set aside and the matters are remitted to the Tribunal to dispose of the same afresh within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. AVS --------------------------------------- - 10—09—2008 NOTE: L.R. copy to be marked. B/O [1] AIR 1975 S.C. 1900 [2] 2008(3) ALT 234 [3] W.P.No.13241/2001 dated 7.2.2008