IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.6723 of 2008 Dhananjay Singh Son of Shri Hit Narayan Singh, resident of village- Samardah, P.S.-Behia, District-Bhojpur. …..Petitioner. Versus 1. The Union of India through the Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Govt. of India, New Delhi. 2. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Marketing Division, Bihar State Office- Eastern Zone through its General Manager, Jai Prakash Dak Bunglow Road, Patna. 3. The Senior Divisional Retail sales Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (MD) Patna Division Office, Maurya Lok Complex, Dak Bunglow Road, Patna-800001. 4. Manish Kumar Son of Surendra Kumar, resident of village and P.O. Koilwar, P.S.-Koilwar, District-Bhojpur. 5. Birendra Singh, son of Late Jagdish Singh, resident of village and P.O. Araila, P.S. Jagdishpur, District-Bhojpur. 6. Mritunjay Kumar Tiwary son of Krishna Kumar Tiwary, resident of village and P.O. Chanwa, P.S. Mufassil, District-Bhojpur. 7. Pawan Dubey son of Sadanand Dubey, resident of village and P.O. Salempur, P.S. Mufassil, District-Bhojpur. 8. Ranjit Singh son of Deo Kishore Singh, resident of village Behra, P.O. Agarsanda, P.S. Mufassil, District-Bhojpur. 9. Ranjan Kumar Beria son of Lat Sant Kumar Beria, Jail Road, Ara, P.S. Nawada, District-Bhojpur. 10. Rajendra Pandey son of Fagu Pandey, resident of village and P.O. and P.S. Behia, District-Bhojpur. 11. Anil Pandey son of Barmeshwar Pandey, resident of village Balua, P.S. Krishnagarh Dewaria, District-Bhojpur. …..Respondents. ----------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Surendra Kr. Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Praveen Prakash, Adv. For the Respondent IOC 1 to 9 : Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Adv. For the Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Chitranjan Sinha, Sr. Adv. : Mr. K.M. Joseph, Adv. ---------- 04. 24.03.2009 Indian Oil Corporation has issued an advertisement inviting tenders for settlement of Kissan Seva Kendra at - 2 - several places, one of the places was Salempur Bazar, Ara in the district of Bhojpur. Petitioner and respondent nos. 4 to 11 applied. Respondent No. 4 was empanelled after interview as the first candidate and subsequently letter of intent was issued in his favour. Petitioner raised objection against selection of respondent no. 4 which was ultimately rejected by the Indian Oil Corporation by their detail communication as contained in Annexure-13 to the interlocutory application. Petitioner being no. 2 empanelled candidate has thus challenged the selection of respondent no. 4, the first empanelled candidate. Respondent No. 4 has appeared and filed a counter- affidavit to which rejoinder has been filed. Indian Oil Corporation has also filed a counter-affidavit to which rejoinder has also been filed. All parties being present and pleadings being completed with consent of all parties. The writ petition has been heard at this stage for its final disposal. Petitioner has raised three contentions. Firstly, Selection Board of the Oil Company acted arbitrarily and unfairly in awarding marks at the time of interview. His - 3 - grievance is to award of marks in relation to experience. His second contention was with regard to number of trees on the land of respondent no. 4 which was not thereon petitioner’s land. His third contention is that respondent no. 4 was disqualified as he had been holding license under the Bihar Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Oil Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1966 which had been cancelled by the Licensing Authority on alleged grounds of malpractice. Fourth ground of challenge was that the land as offered by the respondent no. 4 was not on the basis of valid document and respondent no. 4 in fact, had no title to the leased land in any manner. The respondent no. 4 had wrongly offered the land. Having considered the matter, in my view, writ petition must fail for the reasons to be discussed hereinafter. Firstly, there appears to be still a persisting misconception about jurisdiction of this Court to interfere in such matters under Article 226 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of judicial review has a limited scope when it comes especially to contractual matters. This Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the authorities as if, it were an appellate authority. It is generally on two grounds that - 4 - judicial review is entertained by this Court. It is either for the purposes of a wrong committed in the decision making process but not the decision itself or where the decision is per se arbitrary and unsustainable in law. As would be apparent, the petitioner wanted this Court to sit more as an appellate authority to revise the judgment of the Corporation. That in my view is not this court’s jurisdiction. Coming to the first ground that the petitioner was unfairly and arbitrarily treated in awarding marks in respect of experience. The first thing is, that what are the marks to be awarded is within the confines of jurisdiction of the authority. The Interview Board has discretion to assess and award. This Court can not sit in appeal over the matter unless it is shown that the marks so awarded were so perverse which required judicial intervention of this Court. The facts of the present case, petitioner submits that he had given experience certificate of being a supervisor in a Petroleum dealership of two years, yet he was awarded no marks. To my mind, it makes little difference. Even if for the sake of argument, I accept what petitioner submits and award acting as an appellate authority full four marks on - 5 - this count to the petitioner, still on total petitioner does not surpass respondent no. 4. The results remain unaffected, petitioner remains second empanelled candidate therefore whether or not petitioner’s submission is correct or not, makes little difference to the issue in question. It does not take the case of the petitioner any further. Coming to the second issue of trees, in course of argument, learned counsel accepted that due credit was given to the petitioner for having traceless of land as to that of respondent no. 4 which had trees. This action does not take the case of the petitioner any further. Coming to the third ground, with regard to cancellation of license of respondent no. 4 as a dealer under the Bihar Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Oil Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1966. Suffice to say that a reference to the notice inviting tender would show that the disqualification clause is clearly and specifically worded. It clearly provides that if a person had been a dealer in petroleum product duly appointed by a Oil Company whose agency had been cancelled, such persons are ineligible to apply. On the specific query of the Court whether respondent no. 4 was - 6 - appointed by any Oil Company, the learned counsel for the petitioner accepted that respondent no. 4 was not appointed by any Oil Company, but was independently appointed by the District Transport Officer in his independent capacity. Respondent no. 4 was never an agent or dealer of any Oil Company. The learned counsel wanted this court to go into the intention behind the clause aforesaid. In my view, when the words used are clear and unambiguous the golden rule of interpretation is to read and interpret the words in their plain and simple meaning. The question of referring to intention or other external interpretation aids are to be resorted, where the meaning of the expression is unclear or uncertain. There is no uncertainty or ambiguity and as such nothing more is to be done in the matter. Respondent no. 4 admittedly was not a dealer appointed by any oil company. The case is not covered by the disqualification clause. Now coming to the last submission with regard to the documents of title in respect of land offered. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the documents as submitted by respondent no. 4 are not valid. Firstly, whether - 7 - they are valid or not, whether they are good enough or not, whether they subserve the purpose of the Oil Company or not, the decision which has to be taken by the Oil Company. If they are satisfied then normally a third party intervention can not be permitted. It is for a party to place the document and for the oil company to satisfy itself because he is going to be the dealer of the oil company. The matter being between two of them, a third party can not intervene. However, I must in fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner notice his specific challenge. He submits that the land in question stands in the name of five brothers. He submits as per the revenue record of the State (Khatian) the property appears to be joint family property and there is no partition recorded in the Khatian. The heirs of one of the brother have executed a lease deed in respect of a specified portion of the joint property which authority in law they do not have. Thus submits the learned counsel that the document of lease in favour of respondent no. 4 was an invalid document conferring no title. In my view, the argument is to be noticed only to be rejected. Assuming that the property is joint that itself - 8 - presupposes ownership of everybody in respect of every part of the property till final division is effected. A person has no title to joint family property till it is partitioned. That is a misunderstanding of law. Even without a partition, a co- owner or joint owner has the right, title and interest in the property. If a person accepts a transfer of property in respect of a particular part of a joint family property prior to its partition, he does so on his risk, but there is nothing illegal or unlawful in respect thereof. Here the joint owners have never objected to the said transaction. So, where lessor’s title is not in dispute, the lessor had an individual interest in the property, there being no objection from any of the joint owners and the lessor having right, title and interest in the property, the lease deed executed by them in favour of respondent no. 4 can not by any stretch of imagination held to be a void document. It could be at best be voidable on part of other joint owners, but if that plea is not available, as subsequently document has been filed whereby the joint owners have accepted a partition having taken place and the property being allotted to the share of the lessor. Even these documents are not really necessary to be looked into, - 9 - because even without these documents the deed of lease can not be held to be void for any reason. It is the satisfaction of the Indian Oil Corporation that they are fully satisfied with rights of respondent no. 4. The satisfaction of Indian Oil Corporation can not be substituted by satisfaction of this court much less on the ground as aforesaid. I find no merit in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed and interim order earlier passed is vacated. Vikash/- (Navaniti Prasad Singh, J.)