IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU Writ Petition No.14591 of 2007 Between 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government, Panchayat Raj & Rural Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad 2. The Engineer-in-Chief, Panchayat Raj Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad … Petitioners and D.Satyanarayana, Deputy Executive Engineer, Chinthalapudi, West Godavari district … Respondent Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of "Writ of Certiorari" calling for the records relating to the orders of the Hon'ble A.P. Admiministrative Tribunal, Hyderabad passed in O.A.No.2263 of 2006 dated 29.11.2006 as being erroneous, illegal and unreasonable and quash the same and pass such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioners: GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR SERVICES II Counsel for the Respondent: Smt. S.NANDA The Court made the following: Oral Order: (per D.S.R.Varma, J.) Heard the learned Government Pleader for Services-II appearing for petitioners and Smt. S.Nanda, learned Counsel appearing for respondent. 2. Challenging the order, dated 29-11-2006, passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for brevity ‘the Tribunal’) in disposing of the application O.A.No.2263 of 2006, filed by the applicant, the respondents have filed the present writ petition. 3. The petitioners herein are respondents 1 and 2, and the respondent is applicant in the O.A., before the Tribunal. 4. For the sake of convenience, in this order, the parties herein are referred to as per their array in the O.A. 5. The facts, which are not in dispute, are that the applicant was involved in a criminal case (C.C.No.16 of 1998) and was tried for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Sections 13(2) and 15 read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120 I.P.C. A charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge’s Court for ACB Cases, Visakhapatnam. After full trial, he was acquitted by the Special Judge, by judgment, dated 11-02-2003. 6. Now, the question that had arisen is as to whether the Disciplinary Authority has to reinstate the applicant after his acquittal in the criminal case? 7. The Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the judgment of acquittal, ordered reinstatement of the applicant, but having regard to the gravity of the charges levelled against him and the nature of acquittal that was recorded by the Special Judge, specifically stated in Memo No.399/VS.1/A2/03-2, dated 10-02- 2004, that “Government after careful examination hereby order that the Accused Officers Sri D.Satyanarayana, Deputy Executive Engineer and Sri V.V.Ramana, Assistant Executive Engineer deserve no consideration for treatment of suspension period as duty in terms of Sub-Rule 7 of FR 54_B read with G.O.Ms.No.214 Fin. & Plt. (FW-FR-II) Dept., dt.22.12.97.” 8. Consequent upon the said provisional decision, a notice in Memo No.399/Vig.II/A2/03-9, dated 25-02-2006, was issued by respondent No.1 not to treat the period of suspension as duty since the case against the applicant was acquitted because the witness turned hostile. 9. From the above, it appears that the Government, while considering the aspect as to how the period of suspension is to be treated, had taken into account the nature of acquittal. Obviously, the judgment of acquittal was recorded by the criminal Court owing to the fact that the witness turned hostile and consequently, the prosecution could not establish the case against the applicant and therefore, the Government was of the provisional view that the acquittal though appears to be on merits, in fact, it is owing to the incapability of the criminal Court in owing to the merits of the case and recorded its view on merits. 10. We are not readily expressing our view that in cases where the order of acquittal was ordered in consequence of the fact that the witnesses turned hostile. 11. In fact, trial in criminal cases shall mean that any order of acquittal normally shall be in two occasions -- firstly, even after the full trial i.e., after examining the witnesses of both the parties, if it is found by the trial Court that the prosecution had failed in establishing the guilt on the part of the accused, secondly in cases where the witnesses turned hostile forcing the Court to put on record its view that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt on the part of the accused owing to the fact that the witnesses turned hostile. There is certainly any amount of difference between these two kinds of trial and the standards are also different. 12. That apart, even assuming for a moment that the acquittal was clean or honourable, such expression has its own connotation depending upon the facts and circumstances, or gravity or nature of the charge levelled against the incumbent. In such cases, even assuming that the acquittal is capable of being termed as ‘honourable acquittal’, still, if the Department is not convinced with such an acquittal, or for that matter, some times, if the Department took a decision about the continuance of such an employee basing on the nature of work that is being undertaken or entrusted to him, it cannot be precluded from proceeding with the departmental enquiry. It is not essential in all cases that ‘honourable acquittal’ should necessarily have its possible conclusion by way of dropping of the charges levelled against the incumbent departmentally and lifting the suspension along with the reinstatement and also treating the period of suspension totally as ‘on duty’. 13. As already pointed out, much depends upon the wisdom, discretion, nature of the charges levelled against the incumbent, his work that is to be performed as a Government Servant, the public faith etc., as to whether it is expedient to proceed with the departmental enquiry or not. There is no definite measure or scale as to under what circumstances precisely the departmental enquiry in such cases has to be initiated or to be dropped. 14. Notwithstanding the above all, the limited questions that are involved in this case are -- as to whether the impugned notice through memo, dated 25-02-2006, had any basis; or the Government, while issuing the impugned notice, had applied its mind and as to whether there are justifiable reasons or not. 15. Insofar as the application of mind is concerned, the memo, dated 10-02-2004 and the impugned notice through memo, dated 25-02-2006, would only show that there is absolute application of mind. But, as far as its justification part is concerned, this Court is not prepared to express its view as of now, owing to the fact that the applicant was requested to make a representation on the provisional decision of the Government viz., not to treat the period of suspension as ‘on duty’ within 15 days. 16. The learned Government Pleader for Services-II appearing for petitioners-respondents, however, at this juncture, had pointed out that the impugned notice through memo, dated 25- 02-2006, though not necessary to be issued, still, in order to meet the ends of justice, particularly to meet the requirement of the concept of audi alteram partem, has been issued to the applicant. 17. In view of the said request by the Government, we do not feel that all is end of the road so far as the applicant is concerned. We only hope that as and when a representation, as requested by the Government itself, is made by the applicant, appropriate decision be taken, taking stock of the entire situation on record, if necessary, as required by the Government, after giving an opportunity of ‘personal hearing’ to the applicant. 18. In view of the above and in view of the observations made by the Tribunal at para-10 of the impugned order, we are of the view that the Tribunal went wrong in pre-concluding the issue on its own when an opportunity was accorded to the applicant to make a representation. We are of the further view that in such cases, the Tribunal need not express its view at that stage and ought to have accepted with the opportunity already accorded by the Government to the applicant. Therefore, the observations made in para-10 of the impugned order of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside. 19. We are making it clear that by setting aside the observations made in para-10 of the impugned order of the Tribunal, we only mean that those observations are not called for at this juncture. 20. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition is allowed, at the stage of admission. ___________________ JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA ___________________ JUSTICE K.C.BHANU 18th February, 2008. Ak To 1. 2 CCs to the Government Pleader for Services-II, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad. 2. 2 CD copies