IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NOS : 1776 AND 28108 of 1996 WRIT PETITION NO : 1776 of 1996 Between: The General Manager (Personnel), The Singareni Collieries Co Ltd., Kothagudem. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad. 2 The President S.C.M.K. Sangh (BMS), Quarter No.A/D-68, Ramakrishnapur, Adilabad District. ..RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:SMT V.UMADEVI Counsel for the Respondents: W.P.No.28108 of 1996: Between: The Singareni Collieries Coal Mines Karmik Sangh (BMS) Ramakrishnapur - 504 301 Adilabad Dist rep.by its President T.Umakar, R/o.Kothagudem ..... PETITIONER AND 1 Industrial Tribunal – I, Hyderabad 2 General Manager (Personnel) M/s Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd., PO. Kothagudem, - 507 101 Badrachalam Road Station (Sc.Rly) Khammam Dist RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.G.VIDYASAGAR Counsel for respondent No.1:None appeared Counsel for respondent No.2: SMT. V.UMADEVI The Court made the following : COMMON ORDER: These two writ petitions are filed questioning common award dated 19-08-1995 in I.D.No.23 of 1993 of the Industrial Tribunal-I (for short “the Industrial Tribunal”), Hyderabad. For convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in W.P.No.28108 of 1996. The petitioner is a recognized Workers’ Union of M/s Singareni Collieries Company Limited (respondent No.2). Respondent No.2 declared lockout from the second shift of 24-10-1991 to the third shift of 26-10-1991. Consequent on the said declaration, wages were not paid to the workmen working in Srirampur, Ramakrishnapur, Mandamarri and Bellampalli area mines. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute, which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of Sections 10(1) (d) and 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”). The reference to the Industrial Tribunal reads as under: “Whether the lockout declared by the management of M/s S.C.Co.Ltd., Srirampur, Ramakrishnapur, Mandamarri and Bellampalli, District Adilabad, A.P., from 2nd shift of 24-10-1991 to 3rd shift of 26-10-1991 as a sequel to mass casual leave by the Executives is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workmen affected by the said lockout are entitled to?” Before the Industrial Tribunal evidence, both oral and documentary, was adduced. On behalf of the petitioner, W.W.1 was examined and on behalf of respondent No.2, M.Ws.1 to 3 were examined. Ex.W1 was marked on behalf of the petitioner and Exs.M1 to M103/A were marked on behalf of respondent No.2-management. On consideration of the evidence on record, and the provisions of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal held that declaration of lockout by respondent No.2 on 24-10-1991 is not in conformity with the provisions of Sections 22 and 23 of the Act. However, the Industrial Tribunal held that respondent No.2 was justified in declaring lockout in view of the mass casual leave submitted by the statutory staff on account of the panic created due to the brutal attack on M.W.1 on 24-10-1991 and that the management had no alternative, other than declaring lockout due to the absence of the statutory staff. The Industrial Tribunal further held that as the workmen were not responsible for the lockout by the management, they are entitled to the wages. While Sri G.Vidyasagar, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.28108 of 1996, questioned the reasoning of the Industrial Tribunal that the management was justified in declaring lockout, Smt V.Umadevi, learned counsel representing respondent No.2 in W.P.No.28108 of 1996 and the petitioner in W.P.No.1776 of 1996, submitted that the Industrial Tribunal, having held that the management was justified in declaring lockout, committed a serious jurisdictional error in directing payment of wages to the workmen. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The facts, which are undisputed, are that Sri M.Vasant Kumar, Colliery Manager-M.W.1 was attacked by four unknown persons on 24-10-1991 at about 12 noon while he was checking stock register in pit stores. As such attacks have taken place earlier, wherein the employees of respondent No.2 were targeted, the Executives and Officers of Srirampur, Ramakrishnapur, Mandamarri and Bellampalli areas abstained from duties by availing mass casual leave. Immediately thereafter respondent No.2 declared lockout from the second shift of 24-10-1991 to the third shift of 26-10-1991. Admittedly, respondent No.2 has not made any allegation of involvement of any of the workmen in the attack on the Colliery Manager. On these admitted facts, the issue that falls for consideration is whether the lockout declared by respondent No.2 is in conformity with the provisions of the Act or not. Sections 2(l) and 2(q) of the Act, which define lockout and strike respectively, read as under: “2(l) ‘lock-out’, means the temporary closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ and number of persons employed by him.” 2(q) ‘strike’ means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so employed, to continue to work or to accept employment.” Chapter V of the Act deals with strikes and lockouts. Section 22 of the Act prohibits strikes and lockouts unless the conditions stipulated therein are satisfied. Section 23 imposes general prohibition of strikes and lockouts. Section 24 of the Act declares a strike or a lockout as illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of Section 22 or Section 23 or it is continued in contravention of an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 10 or sub-section (4-A) of Section 10-A of the Act. For convenience, Sections 22 and 23 of the Act are reproduced herein below. “Section 22: Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs:- (1) No person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike in breach of contract- (a) without giving to the employer notice of strike, as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before striking; or (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or (d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. (2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen- (a) without giving them notice of lock-out as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before locking-out; or (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or (d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. (3) The notice of lock-out or strike under this Section shall not be necessary, where there is already in existence of a strike or, as the case may be, lock-out in the public utility service, but the employer shall send intimation of such lock-out or strike on the day on which it is declared, to such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government either generally or for a particular area or for a particular class of public utility services. (4) The notice of strike referred to in sub-section (1) shall be given by such number of persons to such person or persons and in such manner as may be prescribed. (5) The notice of lock-out referred to in sub-section (2) shall be given in such manner as may be prescribed. (6) If on any day an employer receives from any persons employed by him any such notices as are referred to in sub-section (1) or give to any persons employed by him any such notices as are referred to in sub-section (2), he shall within five days thereof report to the appropriate Government or to such authority as that Government may prescribe, the number of such notices received or given on that day. Section 23. General prohibition of strikes and lock- outs:- No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-out- (a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings; (b) during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings (bb) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings, where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A) of Section 10-A; or (c) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award.” The learned counsel for respondent No.2 has not disputed that the requirements of a lockout under Section 22(2) were not satisfied. She, however, stated that in the present case, Section 22(3) gets attracted, for the reason that no separate notice for lockout was required as a strike was already in existence. She argued that as the Officers and Executives went on strike on 24-10-1991, there was no need for respondent No.2-management to comply with the requirements of Section 22(2) of the Act. I am not in agreement with this contention of the learned counsel. Under Section 22(3) of the Act, the requirement of notice of lockout is done away with where there is already in existence of a strike and in such a case, the employer shall send an intimation of lockout or strike on the day on which it is declared, to such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government either generally or for a particular area or for a particular class of public utility services. The expression “strike” in sub- section (3) of Section 22 shall be understood not only from the definition under Section 2(q) of the Act, but also in the light of the provisions of Sections 22(1) and 24(1) of the Act. It is not in dispute that before the Officers and Executives went on strike on 24-10-1991, they have not given respondent No.2 notice of strike as envisaged in Section 22(1) of the Act. Such a strike is declared as illegal under Section 24(1) of the Act. Therefore, in order to attract the provisions of Section 22(3), the management must prove that the strike, which was already in existence, is a strike, which conforms to the provisions of the Act and is not an illegal strike on account of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 22(1) of the Act. Therefore, the lockout, which is declared by the management in the instant case, on the purported ground of existence of strike, is not a legal and valid lockout under the provisions of the Act. I find the finding of the Industrial Tribunal on this issue correct. But, in my considered view, having held so, there is no warrant for the Industrial Tribunal to hold that the management was justified in declaring lockout. Even assuming that there were compelling circumstances for respondent No.2- management to close the Collieries, that by itself would not lend any legality to such closure and clothe such closure with the status of lockout under the provisions of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal committed a serious error in giving such a finding. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri v. Rajamanikkam and others[1], on which the Industrial Tribunal placed reliance, has no application to the facts of the present case. As could be seen from the facts narrated by the Industrial Tribunal, in the said case, decided by the Supreme Court, the lockout declared was on account of assault of the Estate Manager by some of the workmen, leading to hospitalization of the Manager and closing down of the Industry. In the instant case, as already noted, there is not even a whisper of the allegation that the workmen were responsible for the attack on the Colliery Manager. Hence, the said judgment of the Supreme Court has no relevance in deciding the case on hand by the Industrial Tribunal. When once it is found that the lockout declared by respondent No.2 is illegal, and the workmen were not responsible there for, it automatically follows that the workmen are entitled to payment of wages for the period of closure. For the above-mentioned reasons, W.P.No.28108 of 1996 is allowed. The finding of the Industrial Tribunal that respondent No.2- management was justified in declaring lockout is set aside. W.P. No.1776 of 1996 is dismissed. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Dated 4th December, 2008 vrn [1] 1960 (II) LLJ 275 (SC)