RV NO'; ^iC^f^O^ t\s^. ^^6:j/G-2a?0/X^' B/C.G./05/ AS SFECIriEO 11,13CHEDULE & OFTHECOURTFEESACT187a IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR CHHATTISGARH W.P. (U N0 ^^ /2010 PETITIONER: .v-S^S"- fe-<^?;:;-?^i' RESPONDENTS: State of Chhattisgarh, Through: Research Officer, Mini Mata Bango, Quality Control Unit, Janjgir, District: Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) . VERSUS 1. Chhedilal Gada, S/o - Ramnath Gada, Village - Bhanwarmal, Post - Rohda, Tahsil - Champa, District: Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 2. The Labour Court, Bilaspur (C.G.) ^ WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA —fi^-—_. 91 y ^ /^w HIGH_COURT_OF£HHATnSGARH : BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (L) N0.6645 OF 2010 PETITIONER State of Chhattisgarh RESPONDENTS Versus Chhedilal Gada & Another (Writ Petition underArticle 226/227 ofthe Constitution of India) Single Bench ; Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Present:- Shri Y.S. Thakur, Dy. Adv. General and Shri A.V. Sridhar, Panel Lawyer for the State/petitioner. Shri S.P. Kale, Advocate for the respondent No.1. ORDER(ORAL) (Passed on this 17th day ofJanuary, 2011) 1. Heard learned counsel fbr the parties. 2. The petitioner-State challenges the legality and validity of the award dated 5-6-2010, passed by the Labour Court, Bilaspur, in Case No. 76/IDA/09(Ref), whereby, the Labour Court, held that the retrenchment of the respondent No.1 was ordered withaut complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes -Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act, 1947'). 3. The Court below has categorically recorded that the respondent No.1 had worked for more than 240 days in the preceding year as required under Section 25-B of the Act, 1947. Thereafter, the employer was under an obligation to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947 which was not done in the case. Accordingly, an order of reinstatement without backwages was passed. 4. Contention of Shri Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the State/petitioner, that since the respondent No.1 was a casual labour and, as such, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1937 was not applicable, was considered by the Court below. The Labour Court has come to a clear conclusion that the respondent No.1, being a workman, was in a continuous service for more than 240 days in the preceding year and, as such, provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947 are applicable. There is no dispute that there was no compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. 5. The further contention of Shri Thakur that the claim of the respondent No.1 was belated as the cause of action arose in the year 1996 and "after 14 years, the respondent No.1 had approached the Labour Court for settlement of the dispute, deserves to be rejected, as it' well settled law that in case of the industrial disputes, no limitation is applicable. 6. This Court, in Ram Kumar Suryvanshi v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others , while considering the question of delay, observed that prejudice has also to be considered particularly in the fact that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicabte to the provisions of theAct, 1947. 7. In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & Anothei^, the Supreme Court observed as under: "10....the provisions of Article 137 ofthe Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tnbunal, Labour Court, or Board, dealing with the case can approphately mould the relief by declining to grant > back wages to the workman till the date he ra/sed the demand regarding his illegal retrenchmenV termination or dismissal. The court may a/so in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full backwages.." 8. This dictum was followed subsequently in Gurmail Singh v. Principal, Govf. College of Education & Others and S.M. Nilajkar & Others v. Te/ecom Disthct Manager, Karnataka . 9. It is a trite law that the High Court, in exercise of its Jurisdiction for issue of writ of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would not convert itself into a couft of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. 12006LT(CG) 135 2(1999).6SC82 3 (2000) 9 SCC 496 4 (2003) 4 SCC 27 »Hf '•^ '"-^ "-, ^t"^^' ^. M •^, Gowri 10. In the case on hand, no jurisdictional error, infirmity or irregularity has been pointed out. Thus, this Court, in exercise of its power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order, which is legal, just and proper. (See Abdul Razak (D) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle & Others and Shalini Shyam Shetty & Another v. Raj'ehdra Shankar PatiF). 11. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the case, no interference is warranted. Thus, the petition is meritless and is dismissed. No order asto costs. Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge s 201 OAIRSCW 1414 6 (2010)83cc 329