IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CR. WJC No.1000 of 2007 RAMJEE PRASAD RAHUL Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 5 18.12.2008 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ application against the order dated 22.9.2003 passed in Cr. Appeal No.50/03 by Sessions Judge, Samastipur, challenging the order dated 9.5.2003 passed by the A.C.J.M., Rosera in Bibhutipur P.S. Case No.63 of 2000 under section 302 of the I.P.C. and section 25 of the Arms Act, holding the appeal to be not maintainable under section 52 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Juvenile Act,2000) . The appellate court was of the view that an appeal would lie under Juvenile Act,2000 only against order passed by competent authority which is Board and not A.C.J.M., Rosera. 3. The petitioner lodged Bibhutipur P.S. Case No.63/2000 under section 302 of the I.P.C. and section 25 of the Arms Act, against one Navin Kumar Thakur and others. 4. The A.C.J.M., Rosera by order dated 9.5.2003 declared Respondent No.4 to be juvenile. 5. The petitioner who is the informant of the aforesaid case filed an Appeal before the Sessions Judge, Samastipur, challenging the order dated 9.5.2003 passed by the A.C.J.M., Rosera holding Navin Kumar Thakur as juvenile. The appeal was filed under section 52 of the Act. 2 6. The learned appellate court was of the view that an appeal under section 52 of the Juvenile Act,2000 is maintainable only against order passed by the competent authority under the Act. He observed that competent authority has been defined under section 2 (g) of the Act. According to section 2(g) of the Act a Board is competent authority to pass orders determining whether accused is juvenile or not. The Board is constituted under section 4 of the Act. He thus held that A.C.J.M., Rosera, not being the Board was not empowered to pass order determining whether the accused is a juvenile or not. As such, no appeal would lie against order passed by him under the Act. 7. The petitioner submits that the order of the appellate court is erroneous and the appeal was very much maintainable under section 52 of the Juvenile Act,2000. 8. The State has filed supplementary counter affidavit annexing the letter contained in Annexure-A, received from the Registrar (Administration), Civil Court, Samastipur, stating that in the year,2003 A.C.J.M. was authorized to dispose of matter relating to juvenile. 9. The High Court has superintendence over the functioning of the Subordinate courts. It can assign cases to one or the other courts of competent jurisdiction, if the same is not in conflict with any statutory provision. The constitution and formation of Board took some time, though the Act came into existence in 2000. It was only after orders passed in a P.I.L. that Boards were 3 constituted in only 9 of the districts to start with in late 2003 and 2004 Boards were generally constituted at Centres which were formed Divisional Headquarters. The Board functioning in such Divisional Headquarters handled matter covered under Juvenile Act,2000 of courts in the Division. However, in order to tide over the matter and with a view to give effect to the Act, the High Court authorized, as in past, the A.C.J.M. in the district to discharge the function of Board in the mean time as visualized in section 4 of the Act 10. Similarly the Jharkhand High Court also authorized A.C.J.M. of different districts to discharge the function of Board. It would be relevant to state that Jharkhand High Court in case of Abhishek Kumar Singh vrs. the State of Jharkhand and others reported in 2003 (1) Cr.L.J. 142 upheld the authorization and empowerment of A.C.J.M. to discharge the function of juvenile Board till its constitution. 11. It would appear from Annexure-A, a letter addressed by Registrar, Civil Court, Samastipur, to S.P., Samastipur, that a Board under section 4 of the Act was not in existence in the year,2003 and A.C.J.M., Samastipur district was authorized to discharge the function of the Board. 12. In view of the aforesaid circumstances this Court is of the view that an appeal was duly maintainable against order passed by A.C.J.M. who was authorized to discharge the function of Board under the Act. Thus, the impugned order passed 4 by Sessions Judge, Samastipur, holding the appeal to be not maintainable is set aside and the matter is remitted back to him to hear the matter afresh on merit , if it is so pressed. Anilksinha (Samarendra Pratap Singh,J.)