IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE THIRTIETH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Civil Revision Petition No.4143 of 2009 Between: Cheekoti Madhusudhan .. Petitioner AND Sallarama Sanjeevareddy .. Respondent Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying to set aside the order dated 15-06-2009 in I.A. No.893 of 2008 in O.S. No.179 of 2004 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge at Siddipet, Medak District. The petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the petition and the grounds filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of Sri G. Anandam, Advocate for the petitioner and of Sri S.A. Razak, Advocate for the respondent, the Court made the following: ORDER: This revision is directed against the order, dated 15-06-2009 in I.A. No.893 of 2008 in O.S. No.179 of 2004 of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Siddipet. The petition was filed by the defendant under Order VIII Rule 1A (3) and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to receive the documents filed along with the petition after condoning the delay and though the documents were available with the defendant since before the suit, they were filed along with the application four years after the suit and three years after the written statement claiming the documents to have been misplaced in the meanwhile, which allegation was disputed by the plaintiff, who also referred to the absence of any reference to these documents in the written statement. The plaintiff also claimed the defendant to have not explained where the documents were kept and how they were traced and with what efforts. Originally, the trial Court passed an order dismissing the application on 23-01- 2009 on the ground that the written statement did not refer to the circumstances now claimed or the documents. In C.R.P. No. 428 of 2009 against the said order, Hon’ble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan by the order, dated 23-03-2009 referred to the request to receive the lodging charges payment receipt No.173, dated 11-07-2003 with departure date 15-07-2003 issued by Apsara Lodge, Kolkatta, cash payment bill for purchase of rakhies at Calcutta, dated 13-07-2003 and medical prescriptions dated 14-07-2003 at Calcutta. The learned Judge noted that the documents were undoubtedly available with the defendant even before the suit was filed and the documents were ultimately filed into Court only four years after the suit and three years after the written statement, trying to explain the delay on the ground that the documents were misplaced. The learned Judge also noted the contentions of the plaintiff about the absence of any reference to these documents in the written statement and also the absence of any reference to the absence of the defendant at Siddipet during the relevant time. The learned Judge also observed that the trial Court upheld the objections of the plaintiff mainly on the ground of absence of any plea in the written statement. The learned Judge after referring to the contentions of the learned counsel and the precedents relied on by them, further referred to the decision in D.V. Muralikrishna Rao v. Ch. Gopala Rao[1], wherein it was pointed out that pleadings are not supposed to state about matters which constitute evidence. The learned Judge also referred to Rajah R.V.G.K. Ranga Rao and another v. Nizams Sugars Limited[2], wherein it was held that if reasons were explained and the Court was satisfied that there was some valid reason for non-production of the documents, then the Court could receive the documents and the fundamental principle is that a party should be permitted to let in all possible evidence which is relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the matter in controversy before the Court. Accordingly, the learned Judge observed that as to whether the defendant did not execute the document, whether he was not in Siddipet but was in Calcutta and whether he fell sick there, etc., are all matters of evidence, for which there is a plea in the form of denial of execution of the promissory note in question. The learned Judge, therefore, positively concluded that the Court below erred in rejecting receipt of documents on the ground that there was no plea in this regard, due to which the order of the trial Court must be set aside. The learned Judge still remitted the matter back while setting aside the order to decide the question on the aspect as to whether the defendant was justified in producing the documents in 2008 and whether the reasons given by him constituted valid reasons for failure to produce the documents earlier. Thus, what was left to the trial Court for determination was only the question on the justification for belated production of the documents but not the ground that there was no plea relating to the documents in the written statement. After remand, the trial Court passed the impugned order on perusing the record again referring to Order VI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and opining that the defendant never pleaded these aspects in the written statement and the trial Court further opined that no valid reason was given for not filing the documents earlier except stating that the documents were not traced. It also noted that P.W.1 was not cross-examined on these aspects. The trial Court further referred to Order VIII Rule 1A of the Code of Civil Procedure about the necessity to produce any documents in the possession and power of the defendant in support of the defendant along with a list when written statement is presented. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the petition again on the same grounds that there was no pleading and that the documents were not produced within the time permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure, while, of course, incidentally referring to the contention of the defendant being not convincing and acceptable. It based its conclusion on the final observation made that the question of receiving a document in the absence of a plea did not arise. It is against this order that the civil revision petition is filed contending that the impugned order is not only contrary to the spirit of the statutory provision but also contrary to the orders in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009. The revision petitioner claimed that he explained sufficient cause for non-production of the documents earlier. Sri G. Anandam, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri S.A. Razak, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff are heard and Sri Razak relied on three precedents on this aspect. The point for consideration is whether the impugned order is in violation of the orders of this Court in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009 and is also without appreciation of the sufficient cause furnished by the defendant for non-production of the documents earlier ? Point: Out of the three precedents relied on by Sri S.A. Razak, learned counsel for the plaintiff, the first is Chairman-cum- Managing Director, New India Assurance Company Ltd., v. Rabi Narayan Chhotrai[3], wherein it was held that a bald, mechanical, routine denial of the liability is not sufficient and some material or basis has to be indicated when denial is made or dispute is raised. In Dr. B.L. Anand v. Jaffar Hussain[4], it was held by this Court that a question, which is not specifically put forth but yet covered by an issue by implication, would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it, if the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial and if it is satisfactorily proved by an evidence. The importance of pleadings was, of course, emphasized and in that case, the Division Bench opined the situation to be not presenting an extreme case where the defendant can be permitted to surprise the plaintiff without a proper plea. Similarly, in Kadavandi Krishna Chari v. Diocese of Guntur Society[5], the learned Judge held that without raising any specific plea in the written statement and without making any attempt to see that an issue is raised and having slept over the matter till the matter had reached the stage of arguments, a technical objection on the validity of the quit notice could not have been raised. The learned Judge referred to the salutary provisions of Order VIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this regard. While it is true that the need for a specific plea, the requirement of having some material or basis for raising such a plea and the necessity to be vigilant and specific in the pleadings, are very important, in the present case, there was a specific plea even in the original written statement that the borrowal and execution of the promissory note are specifically denied. It was with reference to the said specific plea that the learned Judge found in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009 that “The petitioner herein has pleaded that he had not executed the suit document. As to whether he did not execute the suit document on the ground that he was not in Siddipet, but had gone to Calcutta and he had fallen sick there at, are all matters of evidence for which there is a plea in the form of a denial of execution of the promissory note in question. The Court below has erred in rejecting receipt of the documents on the ground that there was no plea in this regard. The order of the Court below must, therefore, be set aside.” The said finding of the learned Judge in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009 had become final and the trial Court cannot reopen the said finding and again reject the request of the defendant primarily on the ground that the document cannot be received in the absence of a plea. The learned Judge remitted the matter back to the trial Court solely for a finding on the justification for the belated production of documents and for nothing more and the trial Court could not have reopened even the questions which have been determined by this Court. Coming to the reasons given for the delay in the production of the documents, the affidavit of the defendant in support of the petition clearly claimed that these documents could not be traced earlier in spite of his best efforts and for that reason he could not produce them along with the written statement or earlier. In the counter affidavit of the plaintiff, though the plaintiff questioned about the absence of details as to where these documents were kept for all these years and when they were traced, the defendant could not have given such details, as he would not have faced the difficulty in tracing the documents, if he readily knew where he kept the documents earlier. In any view, as observed by the learned Judge in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009, the fundamental principle is that a party should be permitted to let in all possible evidence which is relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the matter in controversy before the Court and it is well settled that in appreciating whether there was some sufficient or valid reason for the belated production of documents, the Court will invariably be liberal as the object of any rule of procedure is to ultimately advance the cause of substantial justice. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from the infirmity of violating the positive directions of this Court in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009 and ignoring the binding findings of this Court in the said order. The impugned order, in effect and substance, is reiteration of the earlier order, dated 23-01-2009, which was set aside by this Court in C.R.P. No.428 of 2009. In so far as the reasons for the delay in production of the documents are concerned, the trial Court dismissed the same in a solitary sentence without attributing any valid reasons for disbelieving the statement of the defendant on oath. Under the circumstances, the impugned order has to be interfered with and set aside and the petition in question has to be allowed. In the result, the impugned order, dated 15-06-2009 in I.A. No.893 of 2008 in O.S. No.179 of 2004 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Siddipet is set aside and the said I.A. No.893 of 2008 is allowed without costs and the civil revision petition is accordingly allowed without costs. Sri S.A. Razak, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the matter is being protracted by the defendant on some pretext or the other and requested for a direction to the trial Court to expedite the disposal of the matter. Sri G. Anandam, learned counsel for the revision petitioner has no objection for fixing a reasonable time limit for the purpose. Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit on merits in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and any observations made in this order shall not have any effect on the determination of the suit on merits. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 30-04-2010 Svv [1] 2006 (4) ALD 788 [2] 2004 (1) ALD 387 [3] AIR 1997 ORISSA 40 [4] 1998 (6) ALT 770 (D.B.) [5] 2003 (4) ALT 743