Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) Date of decision : December 16, 2010 Baljit Singh ....Appellant versus Charanjit Kaur ....Respondent Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice L.N. Mittal Present : Mr. S.S.Dinarpur, Advocate, for the appellant L.N. Mittal, J. (Oral) CM No. 14323.C of 2010 Allowed as prayed for. RSA No. 4800 of 2010 Defendant Baljit Singh having remained unsuccessful in both the courts below has filed the instant second appeal. Respondent-plaintiff Charanjit Kaur filed suit against defendant-appellant for possession of suit land by specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 28.11.2001. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant agreed to sell suit property to the plaintiff for Rs 16,53,136.50 and received Rs 3 lacs as earnest money and executed the aforesaid agreement. Sale deed was to be executed upto 10.5.2002, but date for execution of the sale deed was extended to 30.5.2002 and then to 19.8.2002 Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -2- by making endorsements on the back of the agreement. Accordingly on 19.8.2002, the plaintiff after intimating the defendant went to the office of Sub Registrar for getting sale deed executed in terms of the agreement to sell but the defendant did not turn up. The defendant admitted execution of the agreement and receipt of Rs 3 lacs as earnest money. However, defendant denied that date for execution of the sale deed was extended mutually or on account of illness of the defendant's wife. On the other hand, it was pleaded that the plaintiff could not get the sale deed executed as she could not arrange balance sale consideration inspite of getting date extended twice. Defendant was always ready and willing to execute the sale deed in terms of the agreement. He also remained present in the office of Sub Registrar to execute the sale deed. However, plaintiff told the defendant on telephone that the plaintiff's husband had gone to Dehradun to arrange money but the plaintiff did not turn up. Thus, the earnest money stood forfeited. During the pendency of the suit, parties allegedly effected written compromise dated 14.6.2004, according to which defendant agreed to execute the sale deed on receiving additional consideration of Rs 2 lacs i.e. 15,53,137/- in addition to the earnest money. Sale deed was to be executed on 30.7.2004. The said compromise was produced in trial court by the defendant himself. However, the sale deed could not be executed and registered as per said compromise. Defendant moved application on 25.8.2004 for rejecting written compromise dated 14.6.2004 alleging that the said compromise could not be acted upon. On the other hand, the plaintiff on 19.10.2004, besides filing Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -3- reply to the aforesaid application of the defendant, also moved an application for recording the aforesaid compromise and for decreeing the suit accordingly under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short CPC). Said application of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendant alleging that the compromise was effected under pressure of some persons. However, defendant admitted his signatures on the written compromise. Learned trial court framed following issues for disposal of aforesaid application of the plaintiff :- “1. Whether the compromise dated 14.6.2004 entered between the parties was obtained under pressure forcibly as alleged ? OPD 2. Relief.” Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri vide judgment and decree dated 28.5.2009 held that valid compromise dated 14.6.2004 has been effected between the parties and the same is binding on the parties. Accordingly suit was decreed in terms of the said compromise. First appeal preferred by the defendant stands dismissed by learned District Judge, Yamuna Nagar vide judgment and decree dated 28.9.2010. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the instant second appeal. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently and emphatically contended that compromise in question has not been signed by the plaintiff herself and therefore, mandatory requirement of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC that Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -4- there should be compromise in writing and signed by the parties has not been complied with. It was also contended that statements of the parties regarding compromise were also not recorded and for this reason also, the compromise is not valid. Reliance in support of these contentions has been placed on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jiveshwardas (D) through L.Rs. and Ors versus Smt. Jagrani and Anr., 2003(4) RCR (Civil) 606, and judgment of this Court in Central Bank of India versus Sewa Singh, 1997(1) RCR (Civil) 474. I have carefully considered the aforesaid contentions but find no merit therein. It is admitted factual position that compromise dated 14.6.2004 has been signed by the defendant and has also been signed by counsel for both the parties but not signed by the plaintiff herself. The defendant in his reply to plaintiff's application for recording the compromise alleged that compromise was obtained under pressure of some persons. However, this plea of the defendant-appellant has been rightly discarded by the courts below because the defendant did not even name the persons who allegedly pressurized him to effect compromise. Moreover, the defendant earlier moved application on 25.8.2004 for rejecting the application on the ground that it could not be acted upon. In that application, the defendant did not even remotely allege that the compromise was effected under pressure of some persons. Moreover, the defendant had himself produced the aforesaid written compromise in the trial court. If the compromise had been obtained under pressure, the defendant would not have produced the said compromise in the court. In addition to it, the compromise has also been signed by counsel for both the parties. If the compromise had been Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -5- entered into by the defendant under pressure, it would not have been signed by his counsel. For all these reasons, the version of the defendant that compromise was obtained under pressure is patently untenable and has been rightly negatived by the courts below. As regards contention of the counsel for the appellant that compromise has not been signed by the plaintiff herself and that statements of parties regarding the compromise were not recorded and therefore, the compromise is vitiated, this contention also cannot be accepted. As noticed hereinbefore, the compromise has been signed by the counsel for the plaintiff and therefore, absence of the signatures of the plaintiff herself on the compromise does not invalidate the compromise. Moreover, the plaintiff herself asserted and admitted the aforesaid compromise. The compromise could be invalidated if it had been signed by neither the plaintiff nor her counsel and the plaintiff had disputed the same. When the plaintiff is admitting the compromise, and the compromise has also been signed by her counsel, the compromise is not vitiated. It may be added that under Order 3 Rule 1 CPC, any appearance, application or act required to be made or done by a party in the court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law, be made or done by the party in person or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Consequently, signature of plaintiff's counsel on the compromise is sufficient compliance of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC in view of provision of Order 3 Rule 1 CPC. Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jineshwardas (supra) rather goes against the contention of counsel for the appellant. In that case, statements of counsel for the parties Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -6- were recorded but there was no written compromise on record. It was held that compromise decree was not vitiated. This judgment has two consequences. Firstly, statement of counsel and not of the party in person is sufficient for a valid compromise. Secondly both written compromise as well as statement of the parties are not required for valid compromise. Either statement of parties regarding compromise or written compromise is sufficient. Consequently in the instant case, there was valid compromise between the parties which was signed by the defendant and also by counsel for the parties. Judgment of this Court in the case of Central Bank of India (supra) also does not help the appellant because in that case, there was no written compromise at all and there was statement of the defendant that the suit be decreed with simple interest. It was observed as a word of caution in the said judgment that the court while recording statements of the counsel for the parties should take due care in the eventuality of some offer given by one party and the said offer being being accepted by the opposite party. In that event, statements of both the parties should be recorded and singed by the parties and their counsel. Thus, there was no written compromise produced in the court in that case. On the contrary, an offer was made by the defendant partly accepting the claim of the plaintiff. In this situation, the aforesaid observation by way of caution was made. It has not been laid down that there should be written compromise and also statements of the parties should be recorded regarding the compromise in order to constitute a valid compromise. It is not requirement of law as contained in Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no illegality or perversity in the Regular Second Appeal No. 4800 of 2010(O&M) -7- judgments of the courts below warranting interference in second appeal. On the contrary, the compromise has been rightly recorded and suit has been rightly decreed in terms of compromise. The entire litigation is result of dishonesty of the defendant. He entered into agreement and then resiled from it. Readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is proved from the fact that suit was filed even before the extended date of execution of the sale deed. Even during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff agreed to pay additional excess amount of Rs 2 lacs to the defendant by way of compromise, but even thereafter, the defendant after initially entering into compromise turned dishonest and resiled from the compromise. There is no merit in the instant second appeal. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for determination in the instant second appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed in limine. ( L.N. Mittal ) December 16, 2010 Judge 'dalbir'