THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.RAMULU W.P.Nos.13302 & 13322 of 2005 COMMON ORDER: In these two writ petitions, a short but an important question arises as to whether a body registered under A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 can be equated to that of Government as contemplated under Section 36-A of A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, 1864. The brief facts are as under: It appears, petitioners have participated in the auction conducted for two shops for the excise year 1985-86 in Vizianagaram district. Though it was knocked down in their favour, they failed to remit the rentals regularly. As such, the respondent-Excise authorities have made a demand of arrears of rentals and ultimately, the property of the petitioners was attached and sought to be sold in the public auction. The fifth respondent participated in the said auction conducted on 8.2.1990 and has paid 15% of the bid amount, but failed to deposit the balance amount within 30 days from the date of auction. Now the grievance of the petitioners is that since the fifth respondent has not remitted the balance amount of 85% as required under Section 36 of A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, the question of confirming sale in his favour does not arise. The learned Government Pleader Mr.C.Prakash Reddy appearing for fourth respondent strenuously contended that since fifth respondent is a State as contemplated under the Act, there is no necessity of paying the balance amount within 30 days from the date of auction. The learned Standing Counsel Mr.M.Ganga Rao, appearing for fifth respondent also asserted the same position. In this regard, it is necessary to notice Section 36-A of A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, which reads as under: “Certain provisions of Section 36 not to apply to cases of purchase by Government: The provisions of the Third and Fourth clauses of Section 36 shall not apply to cases where immovable property sold under this act is purchased by the Government”. A plain reading of the above section would indicate that clauses 3 and 4 of Section 36 shall not apply to the cases where immovable property sold under the Act is purchased by the Government. The act does not define as to Government. The learned Standing Counsel Mr.M.Ganga Rao further contended that the fifth respondent society is one hundred percent owned and supported by the Government and also manned by the Government officials, therefore it must be equated to that of Government for the purpose of Section 36-A of A .P. Revenue Recovery Act. I am afraid I cannot accede to the submissions made by the learned counsel for fifth respondent society. The learned Government Pleader as well as the learned counsel appearing for fifth respondent society have raised yet another question stating that the writ petition suffers from latches in view of the fact that auction was held on 8.2.1990 and confirmed and the writ petition was filed in the year 2005. In this regard, the learned counsel for petitioner stated that fifth respondent has not deposited the amount as required under Section 36-A within 30 days, but notice was issued on 8.1.2005 stating that even after adjusting the amounts after conducting auction, which was confirmed in favour of fifth respondent, still there are certain arrears to be paid by the petitioner. In view of this, petitioner was under the impression that amount was deposited within 30 days and therefore, the auction was confirmed in favour of fifth respondent. But on enquiries, it was revealed that no such amounts were paid within 30 days nor even as of today, this position is not disputed by the respondents. Therefore, the question of latches as raised by the respondents cannot be taken into consideration. The writ petition does not suffer from any latches. In support of their case, the learned counsel for petitioners relied upon the judgment in V.PADMANABHAN NAIR v. KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD[1], wherein it was held that whether it be Electricity Board or the Food Corporation or Urban Development Corporation or any of that category, may be an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, it nevertheless would not answer the description of Government as understood in law and as it is understood in the context of Section 80 C.P.C. Likewise, in KAMTA PRASAD SINGH v. THE REGIONAL MANAGER, FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA[2], the Patna High Court held that the fact that the capital of a Corporation was provided by the Central Government or that its working was supervised or directions were issued by the Central Government, does not make it a Government within the meaning of Section 80. Although the expression ‘Government’ has not been defined in Code, it cannot include a ‘Corporation’ constituted under an Act of Parliament. Thus, looking from any angle, the fifth respondent society, which is registered under Societies Registration Act, cannot be equated to that of Government to say that limitation of 30 days for the purpose of depositing the balance amount in the case on hand is not applicable. Since the fifth respondent has not deposited the amount within 30 days as required under Section 36-A of A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, it cannot have the benefit of Section 36-A, therefore the sale conducted on 8.2.1990 and confirmed vide proceedings dated 27.1.1997 stands nullified. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. However, this will not preclude the respondents 1 to 4 to work out their remedies as per law. No order as to costs. ______________ C.V.RAMULU, J Date: 27.10.2010 DA THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.RAMULU W.P.Nos.13302 & 13322 of 2005 27.10.2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.RAMULU W.P.Nos.13302 & 13322 of 2005 Date: 27th October, 2010 Between: Pudi Suryanarayana .. Petitioner in W.P.No.13302 of 2005 Tentu Benarjee .. Petitioner in W.P.No.13322 of 2005 And The District Collector, Vizianagaram and others. .. Respondents [1] AIR 1989 Kerala 86 [2] AIR 1974 Patna 376 (V.61, C.104)