IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.278 of 2010 1. DIWAN ABSAR HUSAIN KHAN S/O LATE DIWAN KARAMAT HUSAIN KHAN R/O VILL & P.O. BIUR, P.S. CHAINPUR,TOWN &DISTT-KAIMUR Versus 1. THE STATE BANK OF INDIA , CENTRAL OFFICE NARIMAN POINT , MUMBAI THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN 2. THE CHIEF REGIONAL MANAGER, STATE BANK OF INDIA REGION-5, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE,J.C. ROAD, PATNA 3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,(CREDIT) LOCAL HEAD OFFICE, STATE BANK OF INDIA, PATNA 4. THE BRANCH MANAGER, STATE BANK OF INDIA BHABHUA BRANCH, DISTT-ROHTAS(NOW KAIMUR) ----------- 05. 29.04.2011 I.A. No. 2766 of 2011 has been filed seeking relief to amend the writ application challenging the final order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in P.T.O. No. 469 of 1998 on 6.1.2010 during the pendency of the writ application. The Court after hearing the counsel for the parties is satisfied that in the interest of justice and to shorten litigation the I.A. application is fit to be allowed. It is accordingly ordered. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and for respondent State Bank of India. In view of the nature of the order to be passed, the Court does not consider it necessary to take notice of the facts of the case except to the extent necessary for the purposes of the present order. The submission on behalf of the petitioner is that on 12.9.2003 the petitioner asked for a statement of accounts and five specified documents to be furnished to 2 him by the Bank. The Bank on 27.8.2004 sought to deny the same. On 22.9.2004 the Tribunal after hearing the parties directed the Bank to furnish all the documents “required by the defendant in the aforesaid two petitions”. The order sheet further notices that the learned counsel for the Bank has submitted that he will furnish the same. On 1.11.2004 the Tribunal again directed supply of the five specified documents to the petitioner when other documents were supplied. The Bank then filed an application for review on 30.11.2004. The Bank filed an application for recalling the orders dated 29.2.2004 and 1.11.2004. It was again emphasized on part of the petitioner that the 5 documents had not been furnished and it will materially prejudice his case. The Bank took the stand that the documents were not essential. The Tribunal ordered on 25.5.2005 that this issue could not be re- agitated in view of the earlier order dated 22.9.2004 having attained finality directing supply of the five documents. An application was also filed on behalf of the Bank that the documents were not in possession of the Branch of the Bank and documents were not essential for deciding the case. The Tribunal noticed that the Bank did not deny the existence of the documents, but only stated that it was not available in their Branch and therefore it had become necessary to direct discovery of documents. It also noticed 3 in A.I.R. 1988 SC 612 that the party in whose possession the documents may be has a bounden duty to assist the Tribunal in dispensation of justice by producing the same. On 21.1.2008 the Bank submitted before the Tribunal that they were ready and shall be filing the documents in a day or two. Till 3.7.2009 as evident from the order sheet the documents were not supplied. The petitioner filed the writ application on 23.12.2009. The final order dated 6.1.2010 has been passed by the Tribunal during the pendency of the writ petition. Since the final order passed by the tribunal did not take into consideration, the non- compliance of its own orders with regard to the non- furnishing of the five specified documents, there has been miscarriage of justice. The petitioner had contended that in absence of the same his defence shall be materially prejudiced and of which the Tribunal being satisfied had ordered production. The availability of an alternative remedy of Appeal or Review under the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rule 1993 (hereinafter called an DRT Rules) was not an efficacy remedy on account of the error in the decision making process. The petitioner should therefore not be relegated to the alternate remedy. Learned counsel for the Bank submits that on 30.7.2009 the documents had been served on the learned counsel for the petitioner. The very same order notices the 4 objections of the petitioner that it was not the documents asked for. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank in the present petition also does not make any statement that any of the five documents had been filed much less all of them. The Court is therefore satisfied from the records and on the submissions of the parties that the orders of the Tribunal allowing the application of the petitioner calling for five specified documents attained finality. The Tribunal apparently was satisfied of the relevance and importance of the same upholding the plea of the petitioner that he would be materially prejudiced in his defence by absence of the same. The Tribunal also recorded a finding that the Bank did not deny the existence of the documents but only that it was not available at the Branch. The attempt of the Bank to have this order reviewed proved futile. The order passed by the Tribunal with regard to the five documents was meant to be complied with by the Bank. It was not a futile order to be complied with or not at the discretion of the Bank. The hall mark of a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding shall be compliance with the orders of the adjudicatory body. A part of this fairness shall be that the tribunal was required to follow its own orders. It was not open to the Tribunal to follow its own order when it chose to do so and ignore its own orders 5 when it chose to do so. If the Tribunal ignored its own earlier orders, quite obviously relevant materials germane to the controversy were not considered by the Tribunal when the five specified documents allowed to be called for by the Tribunal were not produced. The recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter called the Act) is a special Act providing for expeditious decision of specified financial disputes involving public money. If there is a special law provided with procedures, there is no occasion for the Court to usurp the power of the Act. Section 20 of the Act provides for Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal to be instituted within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order is received by the person concerned. The Section further provides for condonation of delay beyond 45 days for „sufficient cause‟ shown to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal in Section 22 (2) of the Act as the same powers as the Debt Recovery Tribunal including for discovery and production of documents. Rule 5 (A) of the DRT Rules provides for Review Application in case of error apparent on the face of the record to be preferred within 60 days from the date of the order. The Court has already arrived at the finding that the Tribunal did err in ignoring its own orders directing the Bank to supply the five specified 6 documents. There can be no doubt that this was an error apparent on the face of the record. Submissions and counter submissions have been made on the aspect of the time limitation providing for review within 60 days from the date of the order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that every order has to be communicated to the person concerned and that shall be the relevant date for computing limitation. Learned counsel for the Bank submitted that it remains a question of fact when the order was in fact communicated to the petitioner. The final order dated 6.1.2010 having been passed during the pendency of the writ application when the petitioner had approached the Court earlier on matters of procedures and which have remained uncomplied, the issue of limitation in the facts of the cases looses its relevance. In the entirety and the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is satisfied that the petitioner has an alternative efficacy remedy whether in Appeal or Review as he may be advised. Since the writ petition had been filed earlier and the impugned order has been passed during the pendency of the writ petition, the Court considers it proper to observe that, if the petitioner prefers an Appeal or a Review 7 as he may be advised, within a maximum period of 45 days or 60 days as the case may be from today, the same shall be decided by the Appeal/Reviewing authority as the case may be without going into issues of limitation. The writ application is disposed with the aforesaid directions. P.K ( Navin Sinha, J.)