CIVIL WRIT JURISDICTION CASE No. 6323 OF 1991 ***** ( In the matter of applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India ) ****** SIKANDAR SAH, SON OF NANKU SAH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE RAUNA, POLICE STATION KONCH, DISTRICT GAYA ….……….……...PETITIONERS VERSUS 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE JOINT DIRECTOR, CONSOLIDATION, GAYA 2. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CONSOLIDATION, CENTRAL SCHEME, GAYA 3. THE CONSOLIDATION OFFICE, PARAIYA, DISTRICT GAYA 4. BASHIR AHMAD, SON OF RASOOL MINA, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BAHBALPUR, TOLA KAILASHPUR, GORARU, DISTRICT GAYA …………………………………………………..…………………….RESPONDENTS ******************** P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SMT. SHEEMA ALI KHAN O R D E R Sheema Ali Khan, J. The admitted facts in this case are that Ghussu Mian and Sharafat Hussain had jointly purchased 2 kathas 2 dhurs of land appertaining to C.S. Plot No. 489,. Khata No. 50, situated in village Bahbalpur in the district of Gaya. Sharafat Hussain is said to have sold his share to Umar Hayat on 17.04.1965. Umar Hayat died and was survived by his widow and two daughters. In the mean time, Ghussu Mian sold the entire lands i.e. 2 kathas 2 dhurs to respondent no. 4 through a registered sale deed dated 17.04.1975. The petitioner is the purchaser from the widow 2 and two daughters of Umar Hayat by a registered sale deed dated 16.03.1989. In the revisional survey, the name of Ghussu Mian was recorded which was challenged by this petitioner by filing an application/objection before the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer, on considering all the facts, held that Ghussu Mian did not have the authority to sell the entire lands as he had title only to half of the dispute lands i.e. 1 katha 1 dhur. It would be apparent on perusal of the order sheet that Umar Hayat, Sharafat Hussain and Ghussu Mian were brothers. After the death of Umar Hayat, the property would be divided according to the Muslim Law amongst the heirs of Umar Hayat. The widow would be entitled to two annas share and the two daughters would be entitled to the half of the property. In any event, Ghussu Mian would not be entitled to the entire property of his brother. Thus, the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Gaya have rightly held that the sale deed executed by Ghussu Mian, dated 17.05.1975 for the entire property is partly a void document and he could have only executed the sale deed to the extent of his share. The Director, Consolidation has misdirected himself inasmuch as he has come to a finding that since the sale deed executed on 17.04.1975 was earlier in time, it would be valid as against the sale deed executed on 3 16.03.1989 by the heirs of Umar Hayat. The findings of the Deputy Director, Consolidation cannot be upheld by this Court as it is not based on any legal premises. On behalf of the respondent no. 4, it has been argued that the Deputy Director, Consolidation has rightly observed that the validity of the sale deed cannot be considered by the Consolidation Authorities. I would like to refer the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Gorakh Nath Dube vs. Hari Narain Singh & Others reported in AIR 1973 SC 2451, wherein it has been held by the Supreme Court that while considering the sale deed, it is perfectly acceptable that the Consolidation Authorities may look into the sale deed and if it is found to be void document, it may be set aside. In the case referred to above, the challenge was that one of the parties had sold the lands in excess of his share. The Consolidation Officer held that it is a void document and, therefore, came to a conclusion that the co-sharer could not have sold lands beyond his share. In view of the aforesaid facts, I find that the document (sale deed) dated 17.04.1975 is partly a void document as Ghussu Mian would only be entitled to sell his own share, including what he has inherited on the death of his brother to respondent no. 4. Similarly, the petitioner would also be entitled to transfer his share of lands. 4 In the result, the order of the Joint Director, Consolidation, Gaya dated 31.07.1991 passed in Case No. 348 of 1990 is set aside. This writ application is accordingly allowed in the terms aforesaid. ( Sheema Ali Khan, J. ) PATNA HIGH COURT DATED, THE 16TH SEPTEMBER, 2010 N.A.F.R./ANAND