1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 25 OF 2005. M/s. Maharashtra Agencies & others .....Versus..... Laxmikant Baburao Hajare & another ________________________________________________________________ Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions and Court's or Judge's orders. Registrars orders. Mr. M.M. Agnihotri, Advocate for the appellants, Mr. A.S. Jaiswal, Advocate for respondent No.1. CORAM : S.A. BOBDE & F.M. REIS, JJ. DATED : JULY 10, 2009. This is an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 29.9.2004 allowing the respondent/ landlord’s petition and quashing the order of the Reviewing Authority dated 28.8.1991. The learned Single Judge has thereby restored the order of the Appellate Authority passed in Rent Control Appeal. 2. The respondent landlord applied for permission to terminate the tenancy of the appellants under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. After hearing the parties, the Rent Controller rejected the respondent/landlord’s application. 2 3. In appeal, the Additional District Magistrate permitted the respondent to terminate the appellants’ tenancy on the ground of bona fide need. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants applied for review under Clause 21(2-A) of the Rent Control Order. The Resident Deputy Collector allowed the Review Application and set aside the earlier order permitting termination of tenancy. 4. The respondent who is the landlord challenged the order before the learned Single Judge under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition and as stated earlier, set aside the order passed in Review and restored the earlier order permitting termination of tenancy. The tenants have, therefore, preferred this appeal. 5. The main contention of Shri M.M. Agnihotri, the learned Counsel for the appellants, is that the Additional District Magistrate rightly allowed the Review Application by coming to the conclusion that the respondent had not pleaded the necessary particulars pertaining to the number of premises already owned by him and, therefore, the learned Single Judge was not right in allowing his Writ Petition. 6. The relevant facts in brief are as follows :- 3 The respondent is a Chartered Accountant. The appellants are his tenants in respect of one Block No. 10/2, admeasuring about 1000 sq. ft. in Hajare Chambers, Sitabuldi, Nagpur. The respondent applied for permission to terminate the appellants’ tenancy for the purpose of an independent office so that he could practice his profession as a Chartered Accountant & Tax Consultant. He stated in the application that he does not have any other premises available to him for having an independent office and, therefore, sought permission. In reply, the appellants did not dispute this statement but opposed the application on the ground that a Chartered Accountant does not need an area of 1000 sq. ft. for his office. The respondent deposed about his need in accordance with the pleadings. In cross- examination, he admitted that he owned two other Blocks, being Block Nos. 10 & 11, admeasuring about 100 sq. ft. and stated that he had not started any proceedings against the two tenants of those Blocks. He also stated that except the Block in question occupied by the appellants and two other Blocks, namely, Nos. 10 & 11, he does not own any other property. 7. Shri M.M. Agnihotri, the learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the respondent’s application for permission to terminate his tenancy is liable to be rejected on the sole ground that the respondent has not pleaded the material facts required by Clause 4 13(3)(vi) for such a permission. In short, according to the learned Counsel, the respondent failed to plead the fact that he owned two other Blocks in the building and, therefore, he is not entitled for permission to terminate the tenancy. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether these facts were required to be pleaded for permission to terminate a tenancy under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. Clause 13(3)(vi) reads as follows :- “C.13(3) if after hearing the parties, the Controller is satisfied,-- i. ......... ii. ........ iii. ........ iv. ........ v. ........ vi. that the landlord needs the premises or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation, provided he is not occupying any other premises of his own in the city or town concerned; or vii............ viii........... ix. ............ he shall grant the landlord permission to give notice to determine the lease as required by sub-clause (1).” It is well-settled that pleadings must contain only a statement in a concise form, of the material facts on which the party pleading relies on for his claim. Which facts are material in a particular case 5 depends on the provision of law under which relief is sought. It is a settled law that in order to establish bona fide need, only such facts as are material to make out the ground for bona fide requirement need to be pleaded and not unnecessary details by which the landlords would prove such facts. 8. In Inland Carriers (Bombay) and another .vs. Jamilabegum wd/o Mohammad Ibrahim and others reported in 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 795, this Court observed as under :- “..........The landlord is required to mention the basic and material facts constituting the ground of bona fide requirement in his pleading mainly for two purposes, namely, (1) so that the tenant is not put to prejudice in meeting the case of the landlord and the tenant knows the purpose for which the premises are required by the landlord and extent of the need of the landlord, and (2) that the landlord may not improve upon his case during the course of evidence.” On a plain reading of Clause (vi) supra, it appears that the landlord must plead all the facts pertaining to the premises which he needs for the purpose of bona fide occupation. He must also plead facts in the alternate part of the Clause to the effect that he is not occupying any other premises of his own in the city or town concerned. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, it is the facts pertaining to the 6 proviso which have not been pleaded by the respondent, in that the respondent failed to disclose in his pleading that he owned two other blocks, however, small they might have been. In other words, the learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the landlord must bring to the notice of the Court all such property which he may own in order to establish his bona fide need. 9. Having given anxious consideration to the submission, we are of the view that it cannot be accepted. The proviso to Clause 13(3) (vi) disentitles a landlord to terminate tenancy if he is occupying any other premises of his own in the city or town concerned. Thus, a landlord who is occupying any premises of his own is not entitled to terminate the tenancy. Landlords are not entitled to seek permission to terminate the tenancy if they are occupying any other premises of their own. As a corollary, a landlord who is occupying other premises which are not his own is entitled to seek permission to terminate the tenancy, such as a landlord living in rented premises. The mere fact that a landlord owns other premises does not disentitle him from seeking permission to terminate the tenancy if he is not occupying such premises. In any case, it is obvious, therefore, that it is necessary for a landlord to plead all such material facts to establish his bona fide need and that he is not occupying any other house of his own in the city. We do not, therefore, see any requirement in the 7 landlord to plead facts pertaining to other properties which he may own but is not actually occupying. Needless to say, a tenant is well within his rights to bring facts to the contrary to the notice of the Court and prove that the landlord cannot be granted relief. 10. Shri M.M. Agnihotri, the learned Counsel for the appellants, however, relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai & another .vs. Raghunath Prasad reported in (1981) 3 SCC 103, where the Supreme Court in paragraph No.10 observed as follows :- “..................And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings requires that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction under Section 12(1)(f) the court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issues, namely (i) whether the plaintiff-landlord proves that he bona fide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business, and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned......” In the above observations, the Supreme Court has stated what are the two issues that must be framed. Having regard to the provisions of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, it appears 8 that the issue before the Supreme Court was not one of adequacy of pleadings as is raised before us. As observed earlier, the provision under which permission is sought has a direct bearing on the adequacy of pleadings and under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order with which we are concerned, we are of the view that it is necessary for the landlord to plead and prove that he is not occupying any other premises of his own in the city and it is not necessary for him to plead and prove the number of premises he owns in the city, provided he is not occupying them. This is not to say that tenant is not entitled to prove that the landlord in fact is occupying other premises of his own in the city. 11. From the evidence on record, we find that there is satisfactory and adequate pleading and from the evidence on record, we are of the view that the permission was rightly granted by the Appellate Authority. The respondent admitted that he owns two other Blocks admeasuring about 100 ft. but those Blocks are admittedly occupied by tenants and the respondent stated in his evidence that he has not started proceeding against those two tenants but has chosen to initiate proceedings against the appellants since he requires an area of about 1000 sq. ft. for starting his office. 12. We are, therefore, of the view that the Appellate Authority 9 was not right in reviewing its earlier order. The Writ Petition was thus rightly allowed by the learned Single Judge. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed. 13. At this stage, Shri M.M. Agnihotri, the learned Counsel for the appellants, prays for a stay of this judgment to enable the appellants to approach the Supreme Court. Stay has admittedly been in operation since 5.7.2006. We accordingly stay the effect and operation of our judgment for a period of six weeks. JUDGE JUDGE. J.