HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR CRIMINAL PETITION No.5380 of 2010 ORDER:- The two petitioners herein namely Cherukuri Satyanarayana and Karuturi Syamala Devi are shown as A-2 and A-3 respectively in the FIR in Crime No.107 of 2010 of Vizianagaram I Town Police Station which was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 471, 420 and 468 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. They filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Code), to quash the said FIR. A-1 in the said case is one Boyala Srinivasa Rao of M/s.Ramakrishna Auto Centre. Second respondent Smt.Medepalli Vijaya Lakshmi is the de facto complainant therein. 2. The point that arises for determination in this petition is whether there are grounds to quash the aforesaid FIR. 3. The FIR allegations are these. The de facto complainant owns an extent of about Ac.1-00 of land in Sy.No.72/3 in bit No.1 of Vijayanagaram. The said land originally belonged to one late Smt Tumurothu Nagalakshmi who is the mother of the de facto complainant and initially she purchased it under a sale deed dated 11.03.1946 from one Pentapati Kamaraju and some others. In the said extent A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao is running a business called M/s.Ramakrishna Auto Centre and it is stated that he is running a petrol bunk there. The de facto complainant cancelled that lease with Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and thereafter she also filed a suit O.S.No.29 of 2006 against A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao and others for possession of that land and that suit is pending in the District Court, Vijayanagaram, and it is stated in the FIR that the said court was expected to deliver its judgment in that suit shortly but it is not known what is the result of that suit though we are now in August 2011. The de facto complainant’s plea is that a dispute broke out between her and A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao regarding the above extent of land in question and in that connection A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao on several occasions demanded Rs.15 lakhs towards goodwill for vacating the said extent. She however refused to pay the said amount and consequently A-1 developed grudge against her. 4. It is then stated in the FIR that while matters stood thus she with an intention to develop the above extent, which she says is in her possession, went to the office of the Tahsildar, Vijayanagaram, for mutation of that land in her name. At that time she came to know that the second petitioner Karuturi Syamala Devi also approached that office for mutation of the above land in her name on the plea that she got the said land under a settlement deed dated 30.03.2010. Thereafter she enquired about the said settlement deed in the concerned Sub-Registrar’s office of Vijayanagaram and came to know that the A-2 Cherukuri Satyanarayana executed the said settlement deed in favour of his daughter A-3 Karuturi Syamala Devi. The plea of the de facto complainant in the FIR is that she subsequently came to know from the Sub-Registrar’s office that the said settlement deed was scribed by one document writer of Vijayanagaram by name Baggam Jagadeeswara Rao and when she enquired with him he told her that he scribed the said settlement deed at the instance of A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao. 5. The further version of the de facto complainant in the FIR is that her mother never alienated the above extent of Ac.1-00 of land in favour of anybody at any time and that A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao with a view to grab the land got a forged agreement of sale showing that her mother sold away the property and that A-1 to A- 3 then created the aforesaid settlement deed in favour of A-3 in order to defeat her rights. It also stated in the FIR that on 26.04.2010 A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao again telephoned her and demanded Rs.20 lakhs for settling the dispute arising out of the settlement deed in favour of A-3 and threatened her if the said amount is not paid he would see that the entire extent of Ac.1-00 of land would get buzzed down in litigation courts. Thus the FIR in substance shows that A-1 to A-3 are responsible for creation of a sale agreement showing that the de facto complainant’s mother sold it to the father of A-2 and later on A-2 executed a settlement deed in favour of A-3 to grab the land of de facto complainant. The police registered the said report of the de facto complainant and commenced the investigation. At that stage both the petitioners have come up with this petition. 6. The main plea of the petitioners is that both of them filed a specific performance suit i.e. O.S.No.205 of 2010 for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 05.01.1966 said to have been executed by the mother of the de facto complainant in favour of the father of A-2 and in that suit they relied upon the sale deed executed by A-2’s father and also the execution of the settlement deed in favour of A-3 and the said suit is pending and it was only after institution of the said suit the de facto complainant who is the first defendant in the said suit came up with this false complaint. They then pleaded that the de facto complainant in order to grab money from them filed the above criminal case or gave report to the police and the whole transaction is of a civil nature and therefore the FIR should be quashed. They also stated that the sale agreement executed by the de facto complainant’s mother and also the validity and genuineness of the will deed and the settlement deed relied upon by A-2 and A-3 are already in issue in the aforesaid suit filed by them for specific performance and consequently this criminal complaint or FIR is not maintainable it should be quashed. 7. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the de facto complainant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor argued that the allegations in the FIR do show the offence of creating a false document or false documents and the matter is still pending investigation and consequently this court should not interfere and allow the police to complete the investigation. They also pleaded that it is always open for the petitioners to raise their pleas before the concerned investigating officer and he can consider the same inasmuch as the registration of an FIR need not in every case end up in filing a charge sheet and that the police can also close it in case if their documents are genuine. In the light of the above rival contentions the point has now to be decided. 8. At the very outset it may be noted that A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao has not moved this court for quashing the FIR. It is true that A-2 and A-3 as plaintiffs 1 and 2 filed O.S.No.205 of 2010 against the de facto complainant and her son for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 05.01.1966 said to have been executed by the mother of the de facto complainant in favour of the first petitioner’s father. The agreement of sale is dated 05.01.1966 and the suit for its specific performance has been filed in the year 2010 and it is not known why the father of the first petitioner and the first petitioner himself kept quiet for such a long time without asking for the relief of specific performance of the said agreement. This circumstance has been relied upon by the de facto complainant’s counsel and also the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to show that the matter needs probe by police. Added to this the FIR shows that there are disputes between A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao and the de facto complainant regarding this extent of Ac.1-00 of land and the FIR allegations show that a document writer by name Baggam Jagadeeswara Rao has told the de facto complainant that he scribed the settlement deed in favour of A-2 at the instance of A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao. The earlier suit filed by the de facto complainant for recovery of possession in respect of the very extent against A-1 Boyala Srinivasa Rao is pending and the petitioners have not mentioned anything about that suit and whether the first petitioner is a party to it and whether he is contesting it. Having regard to the fact that the sale agreement said to have been executed by the de facto complainant’s mother of the year 1966 and further because of the delay of more than nearly 40 years in bringing the suit for specific performance and having regard to the allegations made in the FIR I am of the opinion that the police should investigate into the matter as contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. It should be noted that if the agreement of sale dated 05.01.1966 in question is held to be forged one the remaining documents relied upon by petitioners cannot help them but this aspect has to be decided in the first instance by the investigating agency and later on by the court in which the suit of A-1 is pending. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code and contended that since the documents in question are already filed in the civil suit for specific performance brought by the petitioners then that court alone is competent to give a complaint in respect of the offences relating to forgery or creation of false documents and the said offences in such an event are cognizable only on the complaint of that court and police cannot investigate the matter. It may be noted that it is the version of the de facto complainant that the said documents have been forged outside and filed into court i.e. in the civil suit and therefore the learned counsel for the de facto complainant says that the above bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code does not apply and police can investigate the case. 10. It may be noted that in IQBAL SINGH MARWAH vs. MEENAKSHI MARWAH[1] a Full Bench consisting of five judges of the Supreme Court has categorically held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code applies only when a document is tampered with when it is in the custody of the court and not when it is already forged outside and presented in the court. Holding so, it has been held in the above decision that in respect of a document which is filed in the court or tendered in evidence in the court simultaneous proceedings on the criminal case can also be taken out or instituted and in such a case the bar under Section 195(1) (b)(ii) of the Code does not apply. The learned counsel for the de facto complainant relied upon this principle to contend that the investigation should be permitted to go on. In view of the principle laid down in the above Supreme Court judgment it is difficult to accept the above contention of the petitioners’ counsel based upon the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code cannot be upheld. 11. It is represented by the learned counsel for petitioners that the petitioners have also obtained temporary injunction orders from the civil court in which their suit is pending for protection of their possession. That however not a ground to ignore the above legal position stated in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision regarding the investigation in cases like this. 12. To sum up, the allegations in the FIR do disclose the offences of creating false documents. Of-course whether the allegations are true or not have to be decided by the concerned police in the first instance in their investigation. Therefore it is not proper for this court to interfere in the matter at the stage of investigation in a case like this. 13. Accordingly the point is decided in the negative and this criminal petition is dismissed. ______________________ N. RAVI SHANKAR, J 4th August 2011 CVRK [1] 2006(1) ALT (Crl) (SC) 9 = AIR 2005 SC 2119