THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO WRIT PETITION No.6923 OF 2010 ORAL ORDER: (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice D.S.R.Varma) Heard both sides. 2. This Writ Petition is filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing the respondents to produce Chandragiri Vinayaka, S/o. C.Lakshmaiah, detained in the Central Jail, Charlapally, before this Court, in order to pass an order of release forthwith after declaring the order of detention, passed by the competent authority, as illegal. 3. The order of the first respondent-the Collector & District Magistrate, Chittoor District, and the detaining authority, and the consequential orders of the Advisory Board and the Government approving the action of the District Collector in passing the order of detention are under challenge. 4. As we go by the order of detention, dated 05.03.2010, it appears that the detenu is involved in four offences. 5. The first offence was allegedly committed on 20.07.2009 in Srikalahasti Forest Range. It appears that, on 20.07.2009, in Reserve Forest, Pallam Forest Section, the Forest Officials intercepted four persons in a bullock cart, while they were attempting to smuggle dressed red sandal timber logs. The alleged detenu was caught along with other three accomplices and they were charged for the offences under Sections 20 (1) (c) (ii), (iii), (vi) and (x) and 20 of the A.P. Forest Act, 1967 (for brevity “the Forest Act”), Rule 3 of the A.P. Red Sanders and Sandal Wood Transit Rules, 1969 (for brevity “the Rules”), Sections 379 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity “IPC”), and, in that connection, the detenu was arrested on 10.11.2009 and was remanded to judicial custody till 23.11.2009. 6. The second offence was in the same forest range on 12.10.2009 for the same offences as were mentioned in the first offence and, in that connection, he was arrested on 30.12.2009 and was remanded to judicial custody till 12.01.2010. 7. The third offence was also for the same offences in the same forest range allegedly committed on 15.10.2009 and, in that connection, he was arrested on 30.12.2009 and was remanded to judicial custody for fifteen (15) days till 12.01.2010. 8. The fourth offence was allegedly committed on 24.10.2009 for the same offences in the same forest range and, in that connection, he was arrested on 30.12.2009 and was sent to judicial custody for fourteen (14) days till 18.01.2010. 9. Having taken stock of the whole situation and the frequency of the same offences allegedly committed by the detenu, the detaining authority passed the impugned order. The same was approved by the Advisory Board and the Government as well. Hence, the present Writ Petition. 10. Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner contends; firstly, that the detenu does not fall within the category of ‘Goonda’ as contemplated under Section 2 (g) of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (”for brevity “the P.D. Act”); secondly, the alleged offences do not fall under the clause public order nor there is any specific mention in the order of detention that it would affect the public order. He further contends that there is a difference between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ and the spectrum of public order is narrower than law and order and therefore, public order is to be viewed only in the facts and circumstances of the case and, according to him, in the instant case, the detenu had allegedly involved in four offences, which are similar in nature, in the same area, and the alleged act, even if construed as an offence under the forest laws, the same would not amount to causing violation to the public order. He therefore contends that since the public order is not affected in any manner, even if he is branded as a ‘Goonda’ unless and until he falls within the ambit of explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act (1) of 1986, the order of detention cannot be held to be valid. Thirdly, violation of any forest law does not fall within the prohibited activities under the said Act and therefore, the petitioner cannot be held to be a ‘Goonda”. Therefore, it is his contention that since neither he can be termed as a ‘Goonda’ and his activities amount to having affected the public order as contemplated in explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act, 1986, the detaining authority is not justified in passing the impugned order. 11. In order to substantiate his contentions, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, placed reliance on the decisions reported in Mrs. U.Vijayalakshmi vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another[1], Anakala Maddileti v. Govt. of A.P.,[2] and State of Tamil Nadu and another vs. Kethiyan Perumal[3]. 12. As regards his first contention, it is to be seen that Act (1) of 1986 defines ‘Goonda’ under Section 2 (g) of the Act (1) of 1986 as under. “’Goonda’ means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code;” 13. In this context, it is to be seen that the detenu was held to be involved not only in the forest offences but also alleged to be involved for the offences under Sections 379, 34 and 120-B IPC. In this regard, it is to be further seen that Sections 34 and 120-B IPC do not fall within the ambit of Chapters XVI, XVII and XXII and Section 379 IPC never falls within the scope of Chapter XVII. Therefore, if a person is allegedly involved in any of the offences, referred to above, subject to the other circumstances mentioned in those Chapters, could be termed as ‘Goonda’. In the aforesaid case, he is allegedly involved for the offence under Section 379 IPC, which falls within the ambit of Chapter XVII and therefore, he can be termed as ‘Goonda’, however, subject to the condition that the other circumstances are satisfied. 14. Insofar as second contention that the offences allegedly committed by the detenu do not cause public order, it is apt to look into the explanation to Section 2 of Act (1) of 1986, which reads as under. “For the purpose of this clause public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this cause directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any hard, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave of widespread danger to life or public health”. 15. From the very opening words, it appears that the act on the part of the offender must be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. The explanation further explains the prevention by employing the language that the public order shall be deemed to have affected or likely to be affected adversely in any of the activities of any person or persons may cause directly or indirectly any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity in the general public or endangering the public health. 16. From the above, it is abundantly clear that the same likelihood of endangering the public order or the public life or creates a sense of insecurity among the public or even for that matter a section of the public is centered to term such activity as an activity affecting the public order. 17. The question whether a man has committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order, is one of degree and extent of reach of the act in question on the society. The same principle has been applied by the apex Court in State of U.P. and another vs. Sanjai Pratap Gupta Alias Pappu and others[4]. Learned Senior Counsel, in fact, had placed reliance on the above judgments. 18. Therefore, in view of the ratio laid down by the apex Court, placing reliance on the said judgment in support of the case of the petitioner cannot be sustained. 19. Same is the effect of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Anakala Maddileti vs. Govt. of A.P., (2 supra). Their Lordships pointed out with reference to Section 2 of Act (1) of 1986 and also explanation to Section 2 (a) and 2 (g) of Act (1) of 1986 and observed at para-25 as under. “A reading of the definition assigned to the term ‘goonda’ under Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act would give a meaning that a person either individually or as a member of any gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the Commission of an offence punishable under Chapters XVI or XVII or XXII of the Indian Penal Code, such person is termed as a ‘goonda’. Under Chapter XVI, the offences affecting the human body are enumerated which include culpable homicide, murder, dowry death, hurt, grievous hurt, assault, kidnapping, abduction, rate etc. Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code deals with the offences against property which include theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, criminal breach of trust, cheating, mischief, trespass etc. Chapter XXII of the IPC deals with criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance”. 20. From the above, the view of the apex Court as well as this Court and Madras High Court is uniform to the effect that if an offence under Chapter XVI or XVII or XXII of IPC as termed as ‘Goonda’ and that activity of smuggling in all these cases was treated as an activity effecting substantially the public order. 21. In the instant case also, the alleged detenu was held to have involved in the offences not only under the Forest Act, but also in the offences under Section 379 IPC, which falls under Chapter XVII IPC. It is rather preposterous to say that the alleged activity of smuggling Red Sandal Wood from the forest on the part of the detenu frequently cannot be and shall not be termed as an activity affecting the public order. 22. Sandal Wood, for that matter any kind of wood or property that is being retrieved from the forest, which is useful to the public, and if the same is attempted to be exhibited in any manner would certainly effect the public order, inasmuch as, the same affects not only a particular region of the society but it affects the public order at large and it has the capability of affecting the tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. 23. As was held by the apex Court in State of U.P. and another vs. Sanjai Pratap Gupta Alias Pappu and others (4 supra), we are of the view that the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel are neither useful nor relevant for the purpose of this case and the same cannot be applied in the context of the present facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the decisions rendered by the apex Court time and again and following the same and for the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the impugned orders do not call for any interference by this Court, particularly by issuing a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 24. Accordingly, we find no merits in the Writ Petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 25. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ___________________ JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA ___________________ JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO 20th April 2010 RRB [1] AIR 1994 SC 165 (1) [2] 1999 (5) ALD 258 (DB) [3] 2005 Crl. L. J. 105 [4] (2004) 8 SCC 591