Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) 1 ` In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) Date of decision: 4.8.2011 Komal Jain ......Petitioner Versus Amit Jain and others .......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA Present: Mr.S.S.Narula, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr.Madan Pal, Advocate for respondents No.1 to 4. Mr.G.S.Brar, AAG, Punjab. **** SABINA, J. Petitioner Komal Jain was married to respondent No.1 Amit Jain on 6.12.2004 at Jaipur. The case of the petitioner, as per the FIR in question lodged by her, was that she had been maltreated on account of demand of dowry and had been thrown out of the matrimonial home along with his minor son on 25.7.2006. FIR No.185 dated 27.10.2010 was lodged at Police Station Haibowal Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) 2 under Sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC for short), 1860. After presentation of challan, trial Court framed the charges against the respondents under Sections 406, 498-A IPC and under Section 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (the Act for short). Aggrieved by the said order, respondents preferred a revision petition and the learned Additional Sessions Judge partly accepted the petition and ordered that the charge could only have been framed against the respondents under Section 406/ 498-AIPC and could not be framed under Section 4 and 6 of the Act for want of sanction. Hence, the present petition by the complainant Komal Jain. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the charge could have been framed under Section 4 and 6 of the Act as no sanction was required from the District Magistrate in view of the amendment of the Act. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on Harinder Kaur and others vs. State of Punjab, 1989, Crl.L.J.1932, wherein, in para 5, it was held as under:- “From the above facts, it is clear that the challenge to the part of the charges framed with respect to offences under Section 4 of the Act, sanction of the District Magistrate is not necessary to enable the trial Court to take cognizance, as the Act has been substantially amended by the Amending Act of 1984 by which no such sanction is required. This objection is, therefore, not tenable.” Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that the sanction qua prosecution was necessary before charge could be framed against an accused under Sections 4 Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) 3 and 6 of the Act. In support of his argument, learned counsel has placed reliance on Pirthi Chand and others vs. Des Raj Bansal 1990 (3) RCR (Criminal) 270, wherein, in para 4, it was held as under:- "The next contention is that no permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained under Section 8-A as amended by the Dowry Prohibition ( Punjab Amendment) Act, 1976. Reliance was placed on Deepak Kumar and another v. State of Punjab, 1989 (1) CLR 575 in which it was held that sanction of the District Magistrate was a condition precedent for the institution of the complaint in so far as the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 are concerned. The reply of Shri Jhanji, on the other hand, is two-fold. In the first instance, it is pointed out that it has not been shown that the aforesaid Punjab amendment was extended and made application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. In the absence of such extension the Punjab Amendment was not applicable in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and secondly reference has been made to Harinder Kaur and others vs. State of Punjab, 1989 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 583: 1989 (1) CLJ (C.Cr. & Rev.)231. A learned single judge of this Court took the view that there had been substantial amendments carried out in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 since 1984 and therefore, the Punjab Amending Act adding Section 8-A had ceased to be applicable. I regret my inability to agree with that view. Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) 4 Unless the amendment made by the Punjab Act is undone either expressly or by necessary application the amendment holds the field and prior sanction of the District Magistrate is necessary. However, as it has not been shown that the aforesaid Punjab Amendment had been extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the absence of sanction cannot stand in the way. Learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that a general and vague allegation had been made regarding alleged entrustment of the dowry articles to all the seven accused, Four of the accused had not been summoned by the Court. The allegation being common to all seven and four persons having been dropped it could not be said whether allegation could survive against the remaining accused. The persons who have not been summoned are two brothers of the husband and their wives. The persons summoned are the husband and both his parents. It follow that on the basis of the preliminary evidence produced before the Magistrate, he found a prima facie case, only against the persons summoned. It does not mean that the magistrate had either to summon all the seven or dismiss the complaint against all the seven. The contention is altogether untenable." Learned counsel has further placed reliance on Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and others vs. State of Bihar and another (1997) 10 Supreme Court Cases, 524, wherein, in para 2, it was held as Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) 5 under:- “The limited question on which the notice was issued is to the effect whether previous sanction is required to be taken from the appropriate authority before taking cognizance for offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. It appears that under amendment in the Bihar Act IV of 1976, a proviso has been added under which it is necessary that previous sanction of the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may, by general or special order, specify in that behalf, should be obtained before initiating any prosecution under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Such amendment was given effect to from 20.1.1976. The prosecution having been launched under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act along with other offences on 2.3.1994, such proseution under the Dowry Prohibition Act without sanction is not permissible. Cognizance of offences under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is, therefore, quashed. It will, however, be open to the respondents to initiate proceedings under the said provision after taking appropriate sanction. So far as cognizance of other offences is concerned, namely, Sections 323, 34, 387, 498-A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, there is nothing on record to hold that cognizance was without jurisdiction. This appeal is accordingly disposed of.” Thus, in view of the judgment passed by this Court in Crl.Rev.No. 3000 of 2010 (O&M) 6 Pirthi Chand's case (supra), wherein, the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner was duly considered, there is no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. Since no sanction for prosecution under the Act had been obtained in this case, the impugned order does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. (SABINA) JUDGE August 04, 2011 anita