:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE SECOND APPEAL NO.82 OF 2008 SECOND APPEAL NO.82 OF 2008 SECOND APPEAL NO.82 OF 2008 Shri Vithal Jijaram Pawar ...Appellant. v. Smt. Jijabai Yashwant Sandbhor & Ors. ...Respondents. Mrs.Shubhangi Deshmukh , adv. for the Appellant. Mr.Prathamesh Bhargude i/by S.B.Deshmukh , advs. for the Respondent No.1. CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. DATE: 22nd September, 2008. DATE: 22nd September, 2008. DATE: 22nd September, 2008. P.C. P.C. P.C. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the Parties. 2. The appellant before this Court is the original plaintiff. To state in brief, it is the case of the plaintiff/appellant that his father Jijaram had executed sale deed of the suit land in favour of the defendant no.1 Jijabai on 25-4-1967 for a consideration of Rs.1500/-. There was an agreement of re-conveyance for a consideration of Rs.1500/-. Father of the plaintiff died in 1975. Plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant no.1 on 23-9-1989 to execute a re-conveyance deed as per the said agreement but she refused. Therefore, he filed regular civil suit no.109 of 1990 in the Court of Joint Civil Judge Junior Division, Khed, District Pune for specific performance of the contract. The defendant no.1 contested the suit mainly on the :2: ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court, however, found that the suit was within limitation and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant no.1 preferred Civil Appeal No.439 of 1999. That appeal was allowed. The appellate Court came to conclusion that the suit was barred by the limitation. In the result, the appeal came to be allowed and suit was dismissed. Hence, the original plaintiff has preferred the second appeal. 3. Admittedly, the agreement for the re-conveyance was executed on 25th April, 1967 that is the day on which the sale deed was executed by the father of the plaintiff in favour of the defendant no.1. No specific period was mentioned in the agreement for re-conveyance for that purpose. Therefore, under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, for a suit for specific performance of the contract, period of limitation would be three years and when no such date for performance is fixed, the period begins to run from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Evidence of the plaintiff shows that his father had been to the defendant no.1 number of times with a request to execute reconveyance deed and she had refused. He himself was also with his father when the defendant no.1 had refused to execute the reconveyance deed in 1974. His father died in 1975. From this it is clear that the period of limitation would begin to run from the date when the :3: defendant no.1 had first refused to execute the reconveyance deed as per the agreement. In view of the admissions given by the plaintiff, refusal was lying prior to 1975, when his father had died. Suit was filed in 1990, i.e., about 15 years after the death of his father. Plaintiff contended that period of limitation would begin to run from the date of notice issued on 23-9-1989. Taking into consideration the facts this contention could not be accepted. The Appellate Court was right in holding that suit was barred by the limitation. There is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. 4. In the result, appeal stands dismissed. (J.H.BHATIA,J.) (J.H.BHATIA,J.) (J.H.BHATIA,J.)