Lsp IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL CIVIL CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.417 of 2008 Shri D.B.Waghmare ..Petitioner V/s. Pune Municipal Corporation & ors. ..Respondents Mrs. Anjali S.Ranade for the Petitioner CORAM CORAM CORAM : B.H.MARLAPALLE,J. : B.H.MARLAPALLE,J. : B.H.MARLAPALLE,J. DATED DATED DATED : 7th March, 2008 : 7th March, 2008 : 7th March, 2008 P.C. Heard Mrs. Ranade, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner workman who is aggrieved by the Award passed by the Labour Court at Pune on 29-11-2006 thereby rejecting Reference(IDA)No. 438/2001. 2. On the Petitioner’s approach his demand for reinstatement in the employment of the Respondent Municipal Corporation w.e.f. 15-12-1997 was referred for adjudication in Reference(IDA)No. 438/2001. It was contended that initially the Petitioner was in the employment of Hingne Khurd Grampacnhayat Pune from 1992 onwards and in September 1997 when the said Panchayat area was merged with the Pune Municipal Corporation, he was taken on the rolls of the said Corporation and was illegally discontinued on or about 16-12-1997. As per the Petitioner the said discontinuation was without 2 compliance of the requirements of Section 25 FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in as much as no notice was issued, seniority list was not displayed and retrenchment compensation was not paid. 3. The Respondent Corporation appeared before the Labour Court and by filing its written-statement it opposed the reference. It admitted that for sometime in the month of September to December 1997 the Petitioner was employed in the Health Department as a temporary daily wager and in the said period he had completed 85 days of work prior to the discontinuation on 16-12-1997. It further stated that prior to September 1997 the Petitioner was not in the employment of the Corporation and, therefore, there was no requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. 4. On the application filed by the Petitioner, the Corporation submitted record for September to December 1997. The Petitioner relied upon the Resolution dated 227/26 passed by the Hingne Khurd Village Panchayat on 24-4-1997 and claimed that he was in the employment of said village panchayat as a regular employee and, therefore, he was deemed to have been taken in the employment of the Corporation in such capacity after the said village panchayat area was merged with the Respondent Corporation. A copy of the Resolution dated 3 24-4-1997 was brought on record vide Exhibit 16 before the Labour Court. The said Resolution speaks about the applications received from four persons including the present Petitioner and it was resolved that as and when required they would be employed as temporary mazdoors. Even if this Resolution is read in favour of the workman it would lead to a conclusion that as per the said Resolution, four applications were considered for being engaged as temporary mazdoors. The Corporation was, therefore, right in contending that they were not in the regular employment of the village panchayat and to appoint any employees on the rolls of the village panchayat, sanction of the Village Development Officer or Block Development Officer is necessary. No such evidence was brought on record except an oral statement to say that the Petitioner was employed by the said village panchayat from 1992 onwards. Not a single document was brought on record by the Petitioner to show that he was in the employment of the village panchayat and he was receiving wages either on voucher or on any other registers. The Resolution at Exh. 16 has been considered by the Labour Court and it is held that the said Resolution was only to appoint the applicants as and when required and only as temporary mazdoors. The Resolution implied that prior to 24-4-1997 none of these four applicants were in the employment of the village panchayat. 4 5. Hence, the reasoning set out by the Labour Court in rejecting the reference cannot be termed as perverse or patently erroneous so as to call for interference under the supervisory powers of this Court. Petition is rejected summarily. [B.H.MARLAPALLE,J.] [B.H.MARLAPALLE,J.] [B.H.MARLAPALLE,J.]