[1] IN THE HIGH COURTOF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION APPEAL NO.82 of 2004 IN WRIT PETITION NO. 1828 OF 2000 Construction Employees Union Mumbai 400 007 ... Appellants. [Orig.Respdt.No.1] Vs. Walchandnagar Industries Ltd., Mumbai 400 034 & anr. ... Respondent. [Orig. petitioner.] Mr. A.Shaikh i/b. Sanjay Udeshi & Co. for the Appellant. Mr. Rahul Nerlekar for the respondent. ALONGWITH APPEAL NO.90 OF 2004 IN WRIT PETITION NO.1828 OF 2000 M/s. Walchandnagar Industries Ltd.,Mumbai ... Appellant [Orig. Petitioner.] Versus [2] Construction Employees’ Union & Anr. ... Respondents. Mr. Rahul Nerlekar for the appellant. Mr. A.Shaikh i/b. Sanjay Udeshi & Co. for the Respondent. CORAM CORAM CORAM : D.K.Deshmukh and : D.K.Deshmukh and : D.K.Deshmukh and A.A.Sayed, A.A.Sayed, A.A.Sayed, JJ. JJ. JJ. DATE DATE DATE : January 19, 2009. : January 19, 2009. : January 19, 2009. P.C. 1. Both these appeals are filed against order, dated 29th August, 2003, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1828 of 2000. Therefore, both the Appeals can be conveniently disposed of by a common order. 2. That order was passed in WP No. 1828 of 2000, which was filed by the Employer Walchand Nagar Industry Ltd. challenging the Award, dated 20th April, 2002 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Mumbai in the matter of general demands, such as wages, dearness allowances etc. By the order impugned in the petition, the learned Single Judge has remanded the proceedings back to the Industrial Court for fresh determination. [3] However, the learned Single Judge has held that the fresh determination made by the Industrial Tribunal shall be applicable from 1st April, 1992. 3. The Union- Construction Employees Union has filed Appeal No. 82 of 2004 challenging the order made by the learned Single Judge of remanding the proceeding back to the Industrial Tribunal; whereas, the employer has filed Appeal No. 90 of 2004, challenging the order of the learned Single Judge directing that the increases awarded by the Industrial Court shall be operated from the 1st April, 1992. 4. So far as the Appeal No..82 of 2004 is concerned, we have heard the learned Counsel on both the sides. The learned Counsel appearing for the employer categorically stated before us that the employer has started implementation of the Award made by the Industrial Tribunal, which was challenged before the learned Single Judge, with effect from 1.6.2000 even during the pendency of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge and that the employer has continued to implement the Award even after it was set aside by the learned Single Judge during the pendency of these Appeals and that the employer would continue to abide by the Award during the pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal. The statement is [4] accepted. The learned Counsel appearing for the Union disputes the correctness of this statement. According to him the entire award has not been implemented by the employer. He, however, states that in case the employer is implementing the entire award, though with effect from 1.6.2000, he will not press his appeal against the order of remand. In view of this statement, in our opinion, the following order would meet the ends of justice. (i) The appeal No. 82 of 2004 is disposed of as not pressed. In case the Union finds that the employer is not implementing the Award of the Tribunal from 1.6.2000 as stated by the employer, in all respects, the Union shall be at liberty to make an application to the Tribunal seeking appropriate directions from the Tribunal to the employer for implementation of the unimplemented part of the Award. In case, such an application is made, the Tribunal shall make appropriate order thereon, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of three months from the date of making such an application, in accordance with law. The Union, before making such an application shall serve a copy of the application on the employer and give due notice [5] to the employer about the date of the filing of such an application. (ii) Since the matter has been pending for a long time and since the revision of wages is sought right from the year 1992, in our opinion, therefore, it would be appropriate to direct the Tribunal to hear and dispose of the proceeding, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of eight months from the date of receipt of the writ of this order. (iii) It is, however, made clear that the payments that are being made by the employer pursuant to the Award, shall be adjustable under the fresh Award that the Tribunal may pass. (iv) While deciding the matter on remand, the Industrial Tribunal shall make its award on the basis of material produced before it without being influenced by the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the remand order. 5. So far as the Appeal No.90 of 2004 is concerned, the challenge is only to that part of the Award where the learned Single Judge has held that the [6] Award made shall start operating from 1st April, 1992. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that though the demand was made in the year 1992, the Union has moved the Conciliation Officer for the first time in the year 1997. The learned Counsel, therefore submitted that there is no justification in making the Award operative from 1st April, 1992. 6. Perusal of the order impugned discloses that the learned Single Judge has also considered that aspect of the matter. He has relied upon the MOU dated 25th July, 1990 wherein it was clearly stated that the settlement to be reached subsequently will be effective from 1st April, 1992. The second aspect taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge is that there is no revision of wages from 1st April, 1992. The learned Single Judge, in our opinion, therefore, rightly held that failure of the Union to approach Conciliation Officer will not be fatal. The learned Counsel submitted that though there has been no revision of wages from 1st April, 1992, because of increase in the consumer prise index, the actual wages received by the employees have increased from 1990. In our opinion that cannot be the reason for denying the operation of the Award from 1st April, 1992. However, that aspect of the matter could be urged by the employer when the Tribunal takes up for consideration [7] the subject as to what should be the increases in the wages from 1st April, 1992. In our opinion, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in this regard is quite reasonable and calls for no interference at the hands of this Court. The appeal (No.90/2004) therefore fails and is consequently dismissed with no order as to the costs. [D.K.Deshmukh, [D.K.Deshmukh, [D.K.Deshmukh, J.] J.] J.] [A.A.Sayed, [A.A.Sayed, [A.A.Sayed, J.] J.] J.]