IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH WRIT APPEAL No.1506 of 2008 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 02/09/2008 in WP No.22958 OF 2007 on the file of the High Court.) Between: 1 Ch.Veerabhadreswara Rao, S/o.Kumara Swamy, R/o.Mori Village, Sakhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District. 2 K.Dhanalakshmeswara Rao, S/o.Venkata Ratnam, R/o. Mori Village, Sakhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District. 3 B.V.Srinivasa Rao, S/o.Venkata Subba Rao, R/o.Gandhinagar Village, Sakhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District. 4 P.K.Gavarraju, S/o.Chitti Kotaiah, R/o.Jagannapeta Village, Mamidikuduru Mandal, East Godavari District. 5 M.S.Prakasa Rao, S/o.Bulimacharaiah, R/o. Mori Village, Sakhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District. 6 B.Ch.Satyanarayana, S/o.Subba Rao, R/o. Mori Village, Sakhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District. 7 A.R.L.Prasad, S/o.Venkata Rao, R/o.Gandhinagar Village, Sakhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District. 8 B.Subrahmanyam, S/o.Basava Raju, R/o.Bandaru Lanka Village, Amalapuram Rural Mandal, East Godavari District. ..... APPELLANT(S) AND 1 The Govt.of Andhra Pradesh, rep.by its Principal Secretary, Industries and Commerce (Handlooms and Textiles), Secretariat, Hyderabad. 2 The Commissioner and Director of Handlooms and Textiles and Development Commissioner for Appeal Export Parks, Andhra Pradesh, 4th Floor, Sri B.R.K.R.Bhavan, Near Tank Bund, Hyderabad. 3 The Assistant Director of Handlooms and Textiles, Kakinada, East Godavari District. 4 The Mori Handlooms Weavers Cooperative Production and Sale Society Limited, No.B-262, Mori Sankhinetipalli Mandal, East Godavari District, rep.by its Chairperson. .....RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Appellants : MR.A.V.SESHA SAI Counsel for the Respondent No.1 to 3 : GP FOR INDUSTRIES & COMMERCE Counsel for the Respondent No.4 : Smt. BOBBA VIJAYALAKSHMI The Court made the following : THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH WRIT APPEAL No.1506 of 2008 ORAL JUDGMENT : (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice D.S.R.Varma) Heard Sri A.V.Sesha Sai, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, learned Government Pleader for Industries, appearing for the first and third respondents and Smt. Bobba Vijayalakshmi, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent-Co-operative Society. 2. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order, dated 02-09-2008, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, dismissing the writ petition W.P.No.22958 of 2007. 3. Appellants are petitioners and respondents are respondents in the writ petition. 4. For the sake of convenience, in this judgment, the parties will be referred to as per their array in the writ petition. 5. The first petitioner is a member of the fourth respondent Society; whereas the other petitioners are its employees. On the basis of a complaint made by the President of the Society, the Commissioner and Director of Handlooms and Textiles, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the second respondent herein, ordered statutory enquiry, under Section 51 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for brevity “the Act”), into the constitution, working and financial position of the fourth respondent-society for the period from 1995-96 to February, 2003. Consequently, an enquiry was conducted and a report, dated 14-05-2004, was submitted to the effect that the first petitioner, who was the Ex-President of the Society, with the help of the staff of the Society had misappropriated a considerable amount in two exhibition sales. Basing on the said report, the Assistant Director of Handlooms and textiles, Kakinada, East Godavari District, the third respondent, being the authority appointed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, initiated surcharge proceedings, under Section 60 of the Act, and issued a notice, dated 17-06-2005, to all the petitioners calling upon them to show cause as to why a sum of Rs.6,87,186/- should not be recovered from them. The petitioners have submitted their explanation and the Enquiry Officer, who conducted enquiry, under Section 51 of the Act, and submitted report, dated 14-05-2004, was examined as P.W.1 on behalf of the authorities. At the relevant point of time, the said Enquiry Officer was working as the Deputy Director of Handlooms and Textiles (presently working as the Joint Director of Handlooms and Textiles) and whereas the officer, who was directed to conduct the surcharge proceedings, under Section 60 (1) of the Act, was a Assistant Director of Handlooms and Textiles. 6. It seems, an objection has been taken by the petitioners by way of a representation, dated 01-04-2007, to the second respondent, requesting to appoint an officer higher in rank to P.W.1, to conduct the surcharge proceedings. In other words, it is the grievance of the petitioners that the authority to conduct surcharge proceedings is an officer inferior in rank to P.W.1. Therefore, the third respondent, who is the authority under Section 60 (1) of the Act may not fairly conduct the surcharge proceedings, particularly when a senior officer has been examined as P.W.1. Therefore, there is every likelihood of the authority, who conducts the surcharge proceedings, getting biased and there is every reason for the petitioners to have apprehension that injustice may cause to them. Therefore, a preliminary objection was taken to appoint an officer higher in rank to conduct the surcharge proceedings under Section 60 (1) of the Act than that of the authority, who conducted the enquiry under Section 51 of the Act. Since the said objection was negated, the present writ petition came to be filed and the learned single Judge did not accept the said contention of the petitioners and eventually, through the impugned order, dated 02-09-2008, dismissed the writ petition. Hence the present writ appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners heavily relied on a judgment of this Court in M.KOTESWARA RAO v. SENIOR MANAGER (GHAT), APSRTC[1], wherein a learned single Judge, after referring to various decisions of the apex Court, had formulated certain principles, which are in the nature of guidelines. Though all of them are not relevant, the relevant are extracted hereunder: “1. Every Judge, authority, arbitrator, or a body or person having power to decide, disputed questions of law and facts shall display fairplay inaction. 2. The bias need not be established as a fact. It is sufficient if there was real likelihood bias or bonafide suspicion of bias or there was substantial possibility of bias. 3. The measuring rod of actual bias or real likelihood of bias is that a reasonable and fair-minded person adequately appraised of all relevant facts might reasonably and bonafidely think that there was real likelihood of bias and that bias cannot be inferred on vague suspicions of whimsical, cupious and unreasonable person. 4. Bias may be apparent or inherent in the proceedings and there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy that there was a real likelihood of bias. 5. Bias may arise under various circumstances viz., pecuniary, non-pecuniary, affinity, consanguinity, friendship or hostility, subordinate status etc., and the same may be personal or departmental or administrative or objectional.” 8. In the case on hand, the likelihood of bias on the part of the third respondent, who was directed to conduct surcharge proceedings, is the only question that is involved. 9. On this issue, in M.KOTESWARA RAO’s case (1 supra) the learned single Judge had relied on some judgments of the apex Court -- MANAK LAL v. Dr.PREM CHAND[2], ASHOK KUMAR YADAV v. STATE OF HARYANA[3] and INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA v. K.D.BALI[4]. 10. All the above said decisions, in one way or the other, touches upon the aspect of bias or likelihood of bias in various kinds of proceedings. No doubt, the principles laid down in those decisions are unexceptionable, but, strictly basing on the facts and circumstances, the same cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. Furthermore, the undisputed principle is that the apprehension of bias or likelihood of bias should be eliminated from the minds of the litigating parties notwithstanding the nature of the dispute or litigation. 11. In the instant case, it is to be seen that both the proceedings under Section 51 of the Act as well as the proceedings under Section 60 (1) of the Act, in fact, were directed to be initiated by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, who is actually the competent authority. In other words, the Registrar can either suo motu cause an enquiry or authorize any officer of his choice to conduct the proceedings on his behalf. 12. If understood rightly, any proceedings initiated or conducted, either under Section 51 or under Section 60 (1) of the Act, should be treated as the proceedings initiated/conducted by the Registrar himself, or they should be construed as the proceedings conducted by an officer authorized by the Registrar on his behalf. Therefore, both the officers, who conduct the proceedings under Section 51 and under Section 60 (1) of the Act, are subordinates to the Registrar, the competent authority. Therefore, any omission or commission in the administrative action should be attributable only to the Registrar, but not to the other authorities, who are only instrumental in the process of enquiry, at different stages, may be under Section 51 or under Section 60 (1) of the Act. 13. Nextly, it is to be seen that, no doubt, P.W.1 is a superior officer, but, on administrative side, as was noticed by the learned single Judge, he has no administrative control over the functioning of the third respondent, who is the authority to conduct surcharge proceedings, as directed by the Registrar. 14. From a bare reading of Section 51 and sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Act, it can be seen that it is the Registrar, who has the authority to authorize any officer of his choice to go into the enquiry or consequential proceedings. 15. It is to be further seen that though P.W.1 is senior in rank, he is not a superior officer in administration to the third respondent i.e., the authority under Section 60 (1) of the Act. Therefore, neither there is any affinity, in any manner, whatsoever, nor there is any need for the said authority to get influenced or biased by the mere presence of his superior officer before him, that too, in the capacity of a witness. The duty of the superior officer would come to an end after his statement is recorded and he was cross-examined by the other side. After the said exercise is over, there will be cessation of relationship, for all purposes, between the superior officer and the subordinate officer. 16. It is further brought to the notice of this Court that the said superior officer was already examined in chief and also cross-examined by the petitioners. Therefore, after cross-examination, the presence of P.W.1 had become totally irrelevant and his presence is not required for any other purpose. Mere presence of the superior officer in the capacity of a witness cannot be termed as a source for likelihood of bias in the surcharge proceedings, particularly as was recorded by the learned single Judge that the said superior officer has no administrative control whatsoever on the authority under Section 60 (1) of the Act. Mere superiority in the rank, by itself, cannot and shall not, in normal course, generate a sense of insecurity or a feeling that the officer, who is inferior in rank, would get biased while performing his duties. 17. As pointed out earlier, there must be a true and apparent reason to have the feeling that the authority would get biased. Every apprehension cannot be translated into a reason for entertaining a doubt regarding fairplay in the proceedings. Such a doubt should be true and bonafide, as was pointed out by the learned Single Judge in M.KOTESWARA RAO’s case (1 supra). 18. In the instant case, there is no such strong reason for the petitioners to apprehend that there will be bias. Even if there is any reason, the petitioners are under obligation to demonstrate the same from the proceedings. But, no such attempt had been made in that direction. Therefore, it is rather unfair on the part of the petitioners to raise the ground of bias, at this stage, particularly after having participated in the proceedings and cross-examined the said superior officer. 19. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order, dated 02-09-2008, of the learned single Judge and consequently, the Writ Appeal is lack of merits and is liable to be dismissed, as devoid of merits. 20. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed, at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs. ________________________ JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA __________________________ JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH 24-11-2008. Msr. THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH WRIT APPEAL No.1506 of 2008 24-11-2008 (Msr) [1] 1997 (3) ALD 491 [2] AIR 1975 SC 425 [3] AIR 1987 SC 454 [4] AIR 1988 SC 1099