IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.7671 of 2010 SMT.PRIYADARSHIKA VANITA W/O SRI RAJKUMAR SINGH R/O S.K. 54, K. SECTOR, KANKARBAGH, P.S.PATRAKAR NAGAR, DISTT-PATNA. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 3. STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR, BIHAR EDUCATION PROJECT COUNCIL null BELTRON BHAWAN, SHASTRI NAGAR, PATNA-23 4. PROGRAMME OFFICER, BIHAR EDUCATION PROJECT COUNCIL BELTRON BHAWAN, SHASTRI NAGAR, PATNA-23 5. THE STATE EDUCATION PROJECT COUNCIL BELTRON BHAWAN, SHASTRI NAGAR, PATNA-23, THROUGH ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR 6. THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, BIHAR EDUCATION PROJECT COUNCIL BELTRON BHAWAN, SHASTRI NAGAR, PATNA-23 7. CHIEF ACCOUNT OFFICER BIHAR EDUCATION PROJECT COUNCIL, BELTRON BHAWAN, SHASTRI NAGAR, PATNA-23 ----------- FOR THE PETITIONER : Mr.Devendra Kumar Sinha, Sr.Adv. with Mr.Abhinay Raj,Adv. For the Council : Mr.Lalit Kishore,Sr.Adv. with Mr.Girijesh Kumar,Adv. For the State : Mr.Manoj Priyadarshi,S.C.17 with Mr.Tej Pratap Singh, A.C. to S.C.17 ----------- 3. 24/02/2011 Petitioner has filed this writ application for quashing memo no.2299 dated 12.4.2010, as contained in Annexure-18, by which her contractual appointment has been cancelled. Contention of learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that during the period petitioner was appointed as Accounts Officer under the Bihar Education Project Council, some proceeding was initiated against her, as a result of which she was suspended in 2006. 2 The proceeding remained pending for quite some time. Therefore, she moved this Court through C.W.J.C.No.12020 of 2009 for quashing of the suspension order and the proceeding. The writ application was heard on 14.9.2009 and in view of the delay caused in the proceeding, this Court disposed of the writ application with a direction to the respondents to consider the request of the petitioner to revoke her suspension, decide the proceeding at an early date and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. It was made clear that if the orders are not passed on the representation of the petitioner to revoke the suspension within the stipulated time, the same shall stand revoked on the expiry of the period. Pursuant to the said order of this Court, respondents issued order dated 16.10.2009, as contained in Annexure-14 revoking her suspension and the enquiry officer was directed to supply necessary documents to the petitioner, as required, or allow her to peruse the same. The proceeding remained pending thereafter and as a result of revocation of suspension of the 3 petitioner, she was allowed to work. However, finally, by order dated 12.4.2010, as contained in Annexure-18, in terms of Rule 15(a) of the Rules, with one month notice, her contract of service was cancelled with effect from 11.5.2010. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that while the petitioner was under suspension, her contractual period was extended by another three years with effect from 22.5.2006. He submits that the respondents did not comply with the orders of this Court as passed in her earlier writ application. Documents were not supplied, Principles of Natural Justice were not complied with and final orders in the proceeding were not passed. Still, petitioner’s contract was cancelled by the impugned order, which is contrary to the Service Regulations of the Council as also contrary to the orders of this Court passed earlier. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Council submits that the last extension for three years granted to the different contractual employees, admittedly 4 including the petitioner, with effect from 22.5.2006, as appearing from Annexure-17 itself, ended on 21.5.2009. He submits that the contract of the petitioner was not renewed thereafter and therefore, she could not be treated as working under the Council so as to claim any protection or benefits under the Service Regulations of the Council. He submits that since the proceeding was continuing, petitioner was allowed to work but finally it transpired that since her contractual appointment had already ended, order was issued cancelling her contract in terms of Rule 15(1) of the Service Rules. Since there was no valid contract of appointment of the petitioner subsisting after 21.5.2009, petitioner cannot raise any claim for any non-compliance of Principles of Natural Justice or for conclusion of the proceeding in accordance with law and compliance of the orders of this Court passed earlier. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner, in reply, submits that the moment petitioner was allowed to continue after 21.5.2009, she would be treated as regular 5 employee of the Council and therefore Rules and Regulations of the Council would apply to her and she could always claim infraction of the same in termination of her contract. In this connection, he has relied upon two orders of this Court, copies whereof are Annexures-20 and 21 with the supplementary affidavit. After going through the aforesaid two orders, this Court finds that the same are not of much help to the petitioner. In the first order passed in C.W.J.C.No.3955 of 2003, this Court held that though the Council has obtained the status of State for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution, but the employees working with the Council on contractual basis cannot be treated at par with the State employees. The Court only observed that while dealing with such employees, rights and responsibility of Part III of the Constitution only had to be observed and complied. In the second order passed by this Court in C.W.J.C.No.12690 of 2009, the Court was dealing with cancellation of a contract of an employee of the Council during subsistence of the contract period. 6 This Court held that since letter of appointment showed that the service regulations would apply to the incumbent appointed, it was necessary for the Council to comply with the provisions of the service conditions before terminating her services, which necessarily required holding of regular departmental proceeding in compliance with the Principles of Natural Justice. In the present case, admittedly, period of contract of service of the petitioner had ended on 21.5.2009. There is no letter to show that thereafter her contract was further extended or she was re-employed. The mere fact that she was allowed to continue in service cannot, in the opinion of this Court, grant the petitioner status of a regular employee. It may be that for the purpose of departmental proceeding pending against her, she may have been allowed to continue, to conclude the same in terms of earlier orders of this Court. But it appears that the respondents finally realized that the terms of the contract of the petitioner had already ended and there was no provision to continue her contract for the purpose of finally 7 concluding the proceeding against her. Therefore, by the impugned order, relying upon Rule 15(a) of the Rules, with one month’s notice, contract of the petitioner has been cancelled. This cancellation of contract under Rule 15(a) ends all proceedings against her, whereafter, on the one hand, petitioner cannot claim to continue with the respondents as there is no renewal of contract, on the other, respondents also cannot claim the proceeding against petitioner as pending and continue with the same. In view of impugned Annexure-18, relationship between Council and the petitioner finally stands severed for all purposes. In the circumstances, the writ application is disposed of with no liberty to either party for any action against each other. Pradeep/ ( J. N. Singh,J.)