1 17.10-cp IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY. APPELLATE JURISDICTION. CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 17 OF 2010 Deepak Fertilisers And Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. ... Petitioner. V/s. Vitol S.A. and others. ... Respondents. Navrose Seervai, Senior Advocate with Parag Kabade i/b. M/s. Doijode Associate for the petitioner. Pembhani Thakkar with Javed Gaya i/b. Chambers of Javed Gaya for respondent No.1. CORAM: R.M.BORDE, J. RESERVED ON: 29th November 2011. PRONOUNCED ON: 09th December 2011. P.C. : In this contempt petition, the contempt petitioner is alleging willful disobedience of the order passed by Sixth Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune on 2nd May 2008. By virtue of the interim order passed by the Pune Court, parties to the litigation were directed to maintain status-quo in the matter till the next date. The order of status-quo passed on 2nd May 2008 was continued until the Court directed return of plaint by virtue of order dated 1st July 2008. 2 17.10-cp 2. It is not necessary to go into the factual details of the litigation between the parties. Suffice it to say that a Special Civil Suit No.312/2008 was presented by the petitioner/ original plaintiff before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune on 8th February 2008 seeking declaration that there is no concluded contract arrived at between the petitioner and respondent No.1 and also for permanent injunction restraining respondent No.1 from invoking the terms and conditions of the alleged concluded contract and enforcing the same and from claiming damages from the petitioner. The respondent No.1 entered appearance and objected to the jurisdiction of the Court by presenting application on 24th March 2008. Since time was required for disposal of the application, a request was made by the plaintiff to the Court to grant interim order, as such trial Court directed the parties to maintain status-quo by virtue of the order passed on 2nd May 2008. 3. The application tendered by respondent No.1 objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court was allowed by the trial Court and it was held that the suit presented by the petitioner is not tenable and the plaint was directed to be returned to the plaintiff/ petitioner herein for presentation before the appropriate Court. 4. It is contended that on 3rd August 2007, the contempt petitioner received a letter from the advocate of respondent No.1 informing him that respondent No.1 has filed claim against the petitioner in the London Court. The petitioner caused appearance in the claim filed by respondent No.1 and objected to the jurisdiction of the London Court to entertain the claim. Mr.Justice Steel of the London Court dismissed petitioner’s objection to the jurisdiction and 3 17.10-cp further refused to grant leave to the petitioner to appeal to the Court of appeal and imposed cost of £ 15,000 on the petitioner. The petitioner came to know of the decree passed by the London Court allowing the claim raised by respondent No.1, only on 1st June 2008. It is disclosed in the letter issued by respondent to the petitioner that the order has been passed by the London Court on 21st May 2008. It is, thus, contended that although the respondents were aware of the order of status-quo passed by the Pune Court, they still persisted to prosecute the suit before the London Court and, thus, violated the order passed by the competent Court willfully and deliberately. 5. The counsel for respondent No.1 has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the contempt petition. It is contended that the ex parte decree was passed by the London Court on 21st May 2008 whereas the contempt petition is presented on 26th June 2009 i.e. beyond the period of limitation. It is contended that in view of section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Court shall not initiate any proceeding for contempt after expiry of period of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. It is urged that in the instant matter, the petitioner came to know of the proceeding initiated in London Court by respondent No.1 on 3rd August 2007. The petitioner also objected to the jurisdiction of the London Court which was turned down and, thereafter, the petitioner willingly opted not to participate in the proceeding. It is contended that on 19th May 2008 the respondent filed skeletal arguments and also posted copy thereof by email to the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner was aware of the presentation of the skeletal arguments filed by the respondent before the London Court on 19th May 2008. The petitioner cannot be 4 17.10-cp permitted to contend that they came to know of the decree passed by the London Court only on 1st July 2008 and the limitation starts running from that date. 6. The counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549 and contended that the period of one year would commence from the date on which commission of contempt came to the knowledge of the petitioner. In paragraph Nos.41 and 42 of the judgment, the Apex Court has observed thus: 41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court a contemnor cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in case of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemnor 5 17.10-cp would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (2000) 3 SCC 171, to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate- General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would 6 17.10-cp harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution. The Apex Court observed that in a case where gross of contempt successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with section 129 and/or article 214, such a rigid interpretation, therefore, must be avoided. 7. In the instant matter, there is no allegation that any fraud is committed by the contemnor in withholding the order from the petitioner. The petitioner was aware of the proceeding presented in the London Court way back since 3rd August 2007. The contempt petitioner also objected to the jurisdiction of the London Court and failed to bring home his contention. Having lost before the London Court in objecting to the entertainability of the claim, the contempt petitioner presented suit before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune. The Civil Judge also held that the Court does not have jurisdiction and, as such, directed return of plaint by an order dated 1st July 2008. In these circumstances, the petitioner cannot be permitted to make grievance that he was not aware of the proceeding before the London Court and the contemnor has successfully and fraudulently avoided to bring to the notice of the petitioner the judgment passed by the London Court. It was open for the petitioner to participate in the proceeding before the London Court and keep track of the proceeding. The reliance placed on the judgment of the Apex Court by the contempt petitioner is, therefore, misplaced. 7 17.10-cp 8. Even otherwise, in the instant matter, since the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune has held that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit and directed return of plaint, this Court need not take cognizance of this contempt petition presented by the petitioner. The contempt petition is devoid of any substance and stands dismissed. (R.M.BORDE, J.)