R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 1 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 Date of decision: 17.8. 2009 Jagdish Singh ......Appellant Versus Punjab State Electricity Board and another .......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA Present: Mr.Vijay Sharma ,Advocate, for the appellant. None for the respondents. **** SABINA, J. Plaintiff Jagdish Singh filed a suit for declaration and the same was dismissed by the Senior Sub Judge, Patiala vide judgment and decree dated 10.11.1990. In appeal, the said judgment and decree were upheld by the District Judge, Patiala vide judgment and decree dated 1.12.1995. Hence, the present appeal. Brief facts of the case, as noticed by the lower appellate Court in para Nos. 2 and 3 of its judgment, are as under:- ““2. Brief facts of the case are that Jagdish Singh filed a suit for declaration against the Punjab State Electricity Board (hereinafter called the Board) and the R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 2 Executive Engineer to the effect that office order No.156 CEC dated 31.3.1987 vide which the three increments of the plaintiff were stopped with cumulative effect, is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void, without the jurisdiction, ultra vires, malafide, discriminatory and against the principles of natural justice and that the plaintiff is entitled for all the rights, benefits which he would have drawn or likely to be drawn in future had the impugned order has not been passed and the case set up by the plaintiff is that he was working as J.E.II with the defendants. Defendant No.2 Executive Engineer passed office order No.156/CEC dated 31.3.1987 whereby his three annual grade increments were ordered to be stopped with cumulative effect as the plaintiff alleges that the order has biased on charges which were vague, ambiguous and penalty was imposed upon him after 10 years. The impugned order is null and void. That the plaintiff was not served with any show cause notice before passing of the impugned order and the inquiry Officer has not considered the record and evidence properly. No inquiry report was furnished to the plaintiff. Hence, the impugned order is illegal. 3. Notice of the suit was given to the defendants, who filed written statement and contested the suit on R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 3 various grounds including that the plaintiff was served with charge-sheet for certain lapses vide memo dated 8.9.1977 which was accompanied by the statement of allegations and statement of charges. An inquiry Officer was appointed who could not complete the inquiry against the plaintiff. However, the inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 25.1.1986. The punishing authority after considering the inquiry report passed the impugned order dated 31.3.1987 which is valid and legal. The plaintiff is estopped in filing the present suit on the principles of resjudicata. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial Court:- “1. Whether order dated 31.3.1987 is illegal, null and void etc. as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing this suit on the principles of resjudicata? OPD 3. Relief. ” The substantial question of law involved in this case is “whether the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below are against law and are perverse?” Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below were liable to be set aside as the impugned order had been passed in clear violation of R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 4 principles of natural justice. The inquiry report had not been furnished to the appellant to enable him to submit an effective reply. In fact, no show cause notice was issued to the appellant, after the submission of the inquiry report nor any personal hearing was afforded to the appellant. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B.Karunakar 1994 AIR (SC) 1074, wherein it was held that denial of report of inquiry was a denial of reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee and was a breach of principles of natural justice. The delinquent employee was entitled to a copy of the report even if statutory rules do not permit furnishing of report or are silent on the subject. The relevant paras reads as under:- “29. Hence, it has to be held that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt of innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority take its decision on the charges, is a denial of R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 5 reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 30.iv)In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report in an integral part of the opportunity of defence aginst the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd.Ramzan Khan's case (supra) should apply to the employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceedings or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence, question (iv) is answered accordingly.” In the present case a copy of the Inquiry report was not R.S.A.No. 729 of 1996 6 supplied to the appellant by the punishing authority before passing the punishment order. DW-1 Jagir Singh had admitted in his cross- examination that no show cause notice was served upon the appellant before passing of the impugned order. Since in the present case procedure had been initiated for holding a departmental inquiry against the plaintiff with regard to major punishment, the same had to be followed in accordance with law. However, there is a complete denial of principles of natural justice. Minimum requirement of principles of natural justice is to afford reasonable opportunity to the delinquent official to present his case. The fact that no inquiry report was furnished to the plaintiff nor he was given any show cause notice before passing of the punishment order reveals that the right of the plaintiff had been prejudiced. Hence, the substantial question of law that arises in this appeal is answered in affirmative. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. Suit of the plaintiff is decreed and the impugned order dated 31.3.1987 whereby three increments of the plaintiff were stopped with cumulative effect is set aside. However, the disciplinary authority will be at liberty to proceed with the inquiry afresh from the stage of furnishing of inquiry report to the plaintiff and proceed further in accordance with law. (SABINA) JUDGE August 17, 2009 anita