IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. RSA 48 of 1998. Date of decision March 20, 2009. Sant Ram ….Appellant. Versus Sh. Tulsi (dead) through LRs. Smt. Kansu & others ..Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dev Darshan Sud, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the appellant Sh. G.D.Verma, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Romesh Verma, Advocate. For the respondents Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate. Dev Darshan Sud, J. (Oral). This is the defendant’s appeal against the judgment and decree of the two Courts below decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for permanent prohibitory injunction on the allegations in the plaint that the plaintiff- respondent is the owner in possession of the suit land and that the order passed under Section 54 of the Himachal Pradesh Holdings (Consolidation and Fragmentation) Act, 1971 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’) Ex.P-3 directing an area of 1 bigha 6 biswas to be given to the defendant is against law. On the settled issues and especially issue No. 4 which was as to whether the order of the Assistant Director of 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers are allowed to see the judgment? Yes. - 2 - Consolidation (Ex. P-3) passed under Section 54 of the Act is illegal and void, the learned trial Court held that it was not passed in accordance with law. It was a terse one line order which neither considered the facts, the submissions made nor the reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at. It could not be described as adjudicatory by any stretch of imagination. The learned trial Court also placed reliance on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jita Singh and others v. The State of Punjab and others, AIR 1972 Punjab and Haryana 281 holding therein that two orders passed in favour of the plaintiff/ respondents could not have been ignored by the Additional Director of Consolidation. In the appeal preferred by the appellants/defendants, the learned District Judge also holds that Ex.P-3 does not decide any controversy but is merely judgmental, terse, without reasons or any other supportive material on record. The defendant is now in appeal. This appeal was admitted on 18.3.1998 on three questions of law, namely: 1. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to find fault with orders as passed by Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, H.P. in the exercise of powers under Section 54 of HP Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 dated 17.6.1988? 2. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of orders passed by the Consolidation Officer, Settlement - 3 - Officer and by the Additional Director (Consolidation)? 4. Whether the courts below have assumed jurisdiction which was not lawfully vested in them and injustice has been caused? All these three questions touch upon the jurisdiction of the civil Court to deal with cases decided / settled under the Act. Learned senior counsel Sh. G.D.Verma, appearing for the appellant submits that the entire proceedings were without jurisdiction and the courts below did not consider the clear statutory bar created by Section 57 of the Act ousting jurisdiction of the civil Court(s). He submits that Section 57 of the Act is clear and admits of no two interpretations. It is mandatory and bars suits or other proceedings challenging any dispute arising out of consolidation proceedings etc. This provision may be considered in detail. It reads: “ 57. Jurisdiction of civil court barred as regards matters arising under this Act.- No person shall institute any suit or other proceedings in any civil court with respect to any matter arising out of the consolidation proceedings or with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application can be filed under the provisions of this Act.” Learned Senior Counsel submits that the statutory intent being clear and manifest in the statute itself, both the Courts below lacked inherent jurisdiction in - 4 - entertaining the suit. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ishwar Dass and another v. Mansha Ram and others , Latest HLJ 2005 (HP) 548 holding that Section 171 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act barred jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with cases which were entirely within the domain of the revenue Court as provided therein. He also places reliance on the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Saran and others v. Mehar Singh and others, 1977 Punjab Law Journal 393 and Maya Devi v. Om Parkash (deceased) and others, 1988 Punjab Law Journal 242 interpreting the provisions of Section 44 and 21 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act holding that civil Courts have no jurisdiction in cases covered by that Act. Learned Senior counsel submits that the judgment and decree of the Courts below are null and void as the courts lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the case. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents Sh. Bhupinder Gupta submits that jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not barred. He submits that the decision of this Court in Shri Lajpat Rai (deceased) through his LRs. Smt.Maya Devi and others v. Smt. Taro Devi and others , 1999 (1) S.L.J. 511, has interpreted the provisions of Section 57 of the Act holding that suit for declaration of title or injunction is neither ousted nor barred irrespective of the bar enacted. This Court while deciding Lajpat Rai’s case - 5 - supra relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vankamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Scetharamaratna Ranganayakamma, (1997) 5 SCC 460 and S. Vanthan Muthuraja v. Ramalingam alias Krishnamurthy Gurukkal and others, (1997) 6 SCC 143. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice ruled: “…9. In Srinivasan and others vs. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami Pattavaithalai, Tiruchirapalli District by its Executive Officer at Pattavaithalai Devassthanam and others, 1998-2 L.W. 189, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, to which I was a party also while dealing with such a special enactment as the one in force in this State and reviewing the entire up to date case law on the subject including the latest pronouncements of the apex Court Court expressed a similar as held by the Full Bench of this Court in 1991 (1) Sim. L.C. 223 that jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a Civil Suit for declaration of title and injunction is neither ousted nor barred by the orders passed by the statutory authorities constituted under the special enactments.” 10. Consequently, the view taken by the Courts below that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted in the matters of the nature and that there was no impediment to proceed with the trial of the suit and adjudicate the issues and grant relief, cannot be said to be bad in law. On the other hand, the said view taken by the Courts below is in quite - 6 - conformity with the binding legal position. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants to the contrary, therefore, fails and shall stand rejected.” There is one more reason to hold that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was not barred in this case. It is by now well settled that where the provisions of a particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, jurisdiction of the civil court would not be barred. In State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead) by LRs. and Others , (2000) 3 SCC 689, the Supreme Court held: “5. “The normal rule of law is that civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try a civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a - 7 - party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : (AIR 1969 SC 78), it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special Tribunals jurisdiction of the civil Courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.” At this juncture, Ex.P-3 may be considered. The operative part of Ex.P-3 reads: “2. I have heard the argument of Sh. Sant Ram applicant with his counsel Sh. D.S.Katwal and Tulsi Ram Sunder and Rattan Lal respondent to the length and also perused the record carefully. Rattan Lal represent Sh. Chet Ram. From the perusal of the record it is clear that Sh. Sant Ram applicant was allotted 1b – 6b ordinary area less and 1b-3b standard area less during consolidation. The deficiency is too much and this deficiency is required to be made good. Therefore, the following amendments are hereby ordered...” A bare reading of this order shows that besides expressing an opinion, there is nothing on record to show as to what was the reasoning, the - 8 - material relied upon, the arguments advanced which prompted the Assistant Director to have passed the order which is termed as a judgment. This order/ judgment under no circumstances can be considered either to be reasoned or a judgment in accordance with or in consonance with the principles applicable for adjudication of disputes or the principles of natural justice, or complying with the statutory requirements. In a constitutional system of governance, reasons are not left to the realm of conjecture or guess work but have to be indicated with certainty and sufficiency on record. The law does not require volume or quantity but quality of reasoning is the sine qua non of fair adjudication. The order reproduced clearly shows that it lacks everything except the opinion expressed. Merely adding a line or two in the order stating that the parties have been heard and the record has been consulted does not render the order a judgment in accordance with law. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on two other judgments of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani, (2003) 7 SCC 350 and Swamy Atmananda and others v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and others, (2005) 10 SCC 51 laying down the principles ousting jurisdiction of the civil Courts. These need not be considered in detail as I have already held that the Assistant Director acted without jurisdiction. - 9 - One other point has been urged by learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellants and that is that the judgment does not comply with the mandatory requirements of furnishing reasons on each of the issues as held by this Court in Sushil Kumar v. Jagdish Ram, Latest HLJ 2002 (HP) 267, following the judgment of this Court in Om Prakash and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 2001 HP 18. I cannot persuade myself to hold that this principle can be invoked in the present proceedings. The Courts below have clearly come to the finding that the order Ex.P-3 is anything but compliance with the principles of fair adjudication or the principles of natural justice. The reasons stated by the courts below are sound and cannot be disputed. In these circumstances, all the three questions are decided against the respondents and the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. March 20, 2009 (PC). (Dev Darshan Sud), J.