* THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR + WRIT PETITION NO.4173 OF 2010 % 29th April, 2010. # K.PARTHASARADHI REDDY PETITIONER VS. $ THE HON’BLE SPEAKER, A.P. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, HYDERABAD RESPONDENTS ! Counsel for the Petitioner: PARTY-IN-PERSON ^ Counsel for the respondents : GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR GENERAL ADMINISTRATION ADVOCATE GENERAL < Gist: > Head Note: ? CITATIONS: THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.4173 OF 2010 29th April, 2010. BETWEEN: K.PARTHASARADHI REDDY .. APPELLANT AND THE HON’BLE SPEAKER, A.P. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS .. RESPONDENTS THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.4173 OF 2010 O R D E R: (Per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Nisar Ahmad Kakru) 1. The Public Interest Petition (PIL for short) on hand, reminds us about the recent past, when agitation and demand for separate Telengana in State of Andhra Pradesh had gathered momentum in the shape of demonstrations. It is that time when members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) Andhra Pradesh are said to have submitted their resignations, some for division of State of Andhra Pradesh and creation of a separate State and some for united Andhra Pradesh. As gathered from factual matrix detailed by the petitioner in the Writ Petition, some of the resignations were accepted, some rejected and a few put on hold by the Speaker. The petitioner on the basis of above said factual assertions, seeks disclosure of reasons by the Speaker in support of the rejection of the resignations and a declaration to the effect that the MLAs are not entitled to salary for the period their resignations remained under consideration before the Speaker. He also seeks a direction to compel the Speaker to take a decision in respect of resignations he is seized of. 2. The petitioner has captioned the Writ Petition as a Public Interest Litigation and the involvement of the public interest is stated in paragraph (6) therein, relevant portion whereof may be noticed; “I submit that while rejecting the resignations the Hon’ble Speaker stated that the rejection was due to technical reasons. But the said technical reasons are not revealed or explained. There were wide spread allegations that the MLAs intentionally submitted defective resignations and under the camouflage of resignations, the MLAs are deceiving the people and misleading the people with regard to their real intention due to the public agitations going on in different Regions of the State of A.P. In such a situation it was necessary for the Hon’ble Speaker to divulge the reasons for rejecting the nominations of the MLAs so that the veil is lifted and the real intention of the MLAs comes before the public………” 3 . The above reproduction makes it clear that it was within the knowledge of the petitioner that the resignations were rejected by the Speaker because of technical reasons. Apparently there remains no cause for a public interest litigation. No doubt the strict rule of locus- standi cannot be applied to Public Interest Litigation but that does not absolve a litigant of the obligation cast upon him to show that he is acting bona fide which is sought to be discharged by him with the support of the averment reproduced above, suggesting that he wants to know the technical reasons to reach the real intentions of the MLAs. What bearing technical reasons have on intentions of MLAs. Why this inquisitiveness and what has intention to do with the public interest and what sort of involvement, public interest has in the writ sought, there are no pleadings. Faced with the factual situation, the petitioner claiming to be a lawyer and a business man, appearing in person before us, when asked to explain, could neither refer to any convincing material, nor had any satisfactory answer to the said query. Absence of public interest being manifest there appears no need to put the otherside on notice. Frankly speaking we would have dismissed the writ petition on this ground alone but regard being had to the fact that the writ petitioner has also sought directions to command the Speaker to take a decision on pending resignations and not to pay the MLAs for the period their resignations awaited consideration, we deem it proper to deal with those grounds as well. 4. Proceeding in the direction indicated in the preceding paragraph, the questions those arise out of the pleadings may be summarized; a) Whether resignations were submitted by MLAs? b) Whether resignations submitted by MLAs were partly rejected? c) Whether resignations remained pending for consideration of the Speaker. If answer is in the affirmative are they disentitled to salary? d) Whether some resignations are still awaiting orders of the Speaker? 5. To dwell upon the issues aforementioned, it has to be proved by the petitioner that resignations were submitted and remained pending for some time which were partly accepted and partly rejected. Upon proof of the facts so averred, a question would arise as to whether relief prayed for is available to the petitioner which in our opinion has to be answered in the negative, therefore, it will be an exercise in futility to deliberate upon the facts and we would like to straightway dilate upon the legal issues, of course, on the assumption of correctness of the facts pleaded by the petitioner. 6. Having presumed that the facts stated in the writ petition are correct, it emerges that the resignations were submitted by the MLAs out of which some were rejected. The petitioner is not aggrieved of acceptance of the resignations, so no expression of opinion on that count is called for. He appears to be irked by rejection of resignations and grievance needs to be appreciated in light of the fact that it is not a case where MLAs are alleged to be guilty of betraying their electorate or having embezzled public funds or violating law of the land. What is against them is, that they had written a defective resignation letter. Assuming it to be so, inference that can be drawn is that they had filed defective letters of resignation to render them incapable of implementation. May be with an intention to save the public exchequer from a huge expenditure on elections, or in furtherance of a self serving agenda that is to continue to enjoy the perks of MLAs and let us presume it to be so. Being elected representatives, they have every right to continue until expiry of their term. Their continuation as MLAs is not even alleged to have violated any of the legal rights of the public and same is true in respect of alleged non disclosure of technical reasons relating to rejection of resignations. Analysing from any angle, PIL is not the remedy. 7. Next it was contended that those MLAs who had filed resignations ceased to be the members of the Assembly. To bring home the point, reliance is placed on Article 190 (3) (b) of the Constitution extracted hereunder; “Article 190 (3) If a member of a House of the Legislature of a State – (b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and his resignation is accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, his seat shall thereupon become vacant.” 8. On a bare perusal of sub clause (b), clause (3) it is apparent that seat of a member becomes vacant when his resignation is accepted and the power to accept it is vested by the Constitution in the Speaker. The provision referred above does not envisage depriving a member of his membership, the moment he submits his resignation. Simplifying the problem, it would mean that unless resignation of a member is accepted by the Speaker, he continues to be a member. 9. Adverting to the question of disentitlement of a member to the salary during the period, his resignation remained under consideration before the Speaker, pleadings on the part of the petitioner are absolutely wanting, suggesting a recourse to hit and trial mode by the petitioner, palpably bereft of substance which is evident from failure of the petitioner to bring any provision of the Constitution / Statute / Rules to our notice which would disentitle a member of the Assembly to salary for such period. Examining on the touchstone of constitutional provision, disentitlement to salary cannot be conceived of unless resignation of a member is accepted. 10. This brings us to the prayer of the petitioner to command the Speaker to take a decision on the resignations pending consideration. To appreciate the substance of the direction prayed for, it would be advantageous to reproduce the proviso appended to article 190 (3) (b) hereunder; “Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to in sub-clause (b),if from information received or otherwise and after making such enquiry as he thinks fit, the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, is satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such resignation.” 11. A plain reading of the proviso unveils the scheme of the Constitution, empowering the Speaker to hold an inquiry as to whether resignation is voluntary / genuine. In this behalf it is pertinent to notice that submission of resignations by the MLAs is referable to the turmoil which had plunged the State of Andhra Pradesh into political crises dragging it to the brink of constitutional breakdown, traceable to the Rail / Road blockades, hunger strikes and rallies, leading to the closure of Educational institutions, shops and business establishments, for and against the division of the State. It appears that emotions ruled reason and agitation had become a part of life and the order of the day. We may hasten to add that we have not mentioned these occurrences to suggest that resignations were consequence of disorderly events but to observe that something unusual had happened. Nothing more and nothing less. Have these events played any role in submission of resignations by the MLAs, we choose to refrain from expression of opinion because it is an area to be embarked upon by the Speaker in exercise of jurisdiction vested in him by the Constitution. It is also manifest from proviso to article 190 (3) (b) of the Constitution that if the Speaker is satisfied that resignation is not voluntary or genuine, it becomes imperative for him to reject the resignation. Indeed it is clear from the above said proviso that the Speaker is not subjected to time schedule for purposes of completion of enquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether resignation of MLAs is voluntary or genuine, obviously delay in accepting or rejecting the resignations cannot amount to abuse of power by any stretch of imagination. However, resignations if pending, we hope and trust shall be addressed by due adherence to the mandate of the Constitution. 12. For what is stated above, writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. SANJAY KUMAR,J NISAR AHMAD KAKRU,CJ Dated: 29-4-2010 LR COPY TO BE MARKED: YES NAGESH BABU THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.4173 OF 2010 O R D E R: (Per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Nisar Ahmad Kakru) 29TH April, 2010.