1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR Imran & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.328/2009) Date of Order :- 21th October, 2009 HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S.CHAUHAN Mr.Anil Jain, for the petitioners. Mr.Javed Chaudhary, Public Prosecutor. Mr.Manoj Avasthi, for the respondent. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 26.11.2008 passed by the Sessions Judge, Dholpur whereby the learned Judge has quashed and set aside the order dated 06.05.2008 passed by the Judicial Magistrate No.2, Dholpur. Vide order dated 06.05.2008, the learned Magistrate had dropped the proceeding against the accused-petitioners on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Anil Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that the complainant, Smt. Reshma, and her father have not uttered a single word about the commission of the offence under Section 498A and 406 IPC as having taken place in Dholpur. According to both of them, all the acts of cruelty were committed in Agra. Moreover, according to Section 177 Cr.P.C., the ordinary place of trial shall be the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed. In the present case, since the offence has been committed in Agra and has not been committed at Dholpur., therefore, the court of Dholpur does not have the territorial jurisdiction. In order to buttress his contentions, he has relied upon the case of Dinesh Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [2006(1)Cr.L.R. 2 (Raj.) 822]. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was justified in dropping the proceeding on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. However, the learned Judge has erred in relying upon the statements of Pappan and Munna Khan. According to the learned counsel, Munna Khan is not even related to the complainant. Therefore, his statement is untrustworthy. On the the hand, Mr. Javed Chaudhary, the learned public prosecutor, has contended that the prosecution case is not limited only to the statement of the complainant, or the statement of her father. In fact, the prosecution case would equally rely on the testimonies of Pappan and Munna Khan. Pappan happens to be the real brother of the complainant, Reshma. In his statement, given under Section 161 Cr.P.C., he clearly states that at his marriage, Imran, accused- petitioner No.1, had come to attend the marriage. Since Pappan was given a motorcycle in his marriage, Imran too demanded that a motorcycle be given to him. The said demand was made at Dholpur. Therefore, part of the offence was committed at Dholpur. According to Section 178 Cr.P.C., in case part of the offence is committed at one locality, and the part of the offence is committed at another locality, then the court having jurisdiction of either of these localities would have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Similarly according to the statement of Munna Khan, Imran did make a demand for dowry at Dholpur. Therefore, the learned public prosecutor has supported the impugned order. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 3 Section 177 Cr.P.C. does contain the general principle that every offence shall ordinarily be tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the offence is said to have been committed. Yet, the said Section is subject to certain well known exceptions. These exceptions have been detailed out in Sections 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183 & 184 Cr.P.C.. According to Section 178(b), where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area, it may be tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Thus, if part of the offence were committed at Dholpur, then the court at Dholpur would have the jurisdiction to try the case. It is, indeed, a settled principle of law that the prosecution case has to be looked at holistically and not in a piecemeal manner. Therefore, the prosecution case cannot be limited only to the statement of the complainant, or statement of her father. If there are other witnesses who state that a demand was made in Dholpur, then their statements would also have to be considered while deciding the issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction. In the present case, Pappan, who happens to be the complainant's real brother, clearly states that during his marriage, held at Dholpur, Imran had demanded a motorcycle. This statement is further corroborated by the statement of Munna Khan. Although Munna Khan is not related to the complainant, but the fact remains that he is an independent witness, and has corroborated the statement of Pappan. Therefore, his statement does not dilute the story of the prosecution. In fact, it is strengthen the entire case of the prosecution that part of the offence was committed at Dholpur. The learned Judge has considered both these statements to conclude, and in the opinion of this Court rightly so, that part of the offence did occur in Dholpur. Therefore, in light of Section 178(b) Cr.P.C., the Court at 4 Dholpur would certainly have the territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. The learned counsel has relied upon the case of Dinesh Kumar Sharma (supra). However, in that case there was not a single incident or event or act narrated by any of the witnesses of the prosecution showing that any act of cruelty was committed in Jaipur. In that particular case, all the acts of cruelty and all the act of criminal breach of trust were committed at Gwalior. Therefore, this Court had held that the Courts at Jaipur do not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case at Jaipur. Therefore, the case of Dinesh Kumar Sharma (supra) is distinguishable from the present case on the basis of factual matrix. Hence, the case does not help the petitioners. In this view of the matter, there is neither any illegality, nor any perversity in the impugned judgment. Hence, the petition is devoid of any merit. It is, hereby, dismissed. (R.S.CHAUHAN)J. Manoj Solanki-