1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.1114 OF 2010 Hirachand Shivaji Varale Age : 42 years, Occ : Agri., R/o Mule Wadi, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. ..Petitioner V/s 1. Narayan Dnyanoba Varale Age : 52 years, Occ : Agri., R/o Mule Wadi, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. 2. State of Maharashtra Through Collector, Collectorate Osmanabad. 3. Tahsildar, Tahsil Office, Osmanabad. 4. Gram Sevak, Mule Wadi, Gram Panchayat, Mule Wadi, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. ..Respondents ......... Mr.Dhananjay Deshpande, advocate for the petitioner. Mr.S.B. Rohile, advocate for respondent no.1. ........ (CORAM : V.R.KINGAONKAR,J.) DATE : 30th June, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and by consent of learned counsel for the parties, this matter is heard and disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 2 2. The petitioner is the original defendant in context of suit bearing R.C.S. No.198/2009. In that suit, respondent no.1 (original plaintiff) filed application for temporary injunction vide Exh-5. The contention of respondent no.1 was that the petitioner was carrying out certain construction, which was likely to encroach over the part of road situated on eastern side of the house property of the respondent no.1 (original plaintiff). The trial Court rejected the application on 21.07.2009 on the basis of material available and after hearing both the sides. It appears that previously the suit (R.C.S. No.18/2003) was filed and injunction application was filed by the respondent no.1. That application was also rejected. It further appears that the Court Commissioner inspected the spot and noticed that allegations about the alleged encroachment were not substantiated. The dismissal of the interim injunction application was challenged by the respondent no.1 by filing Misc.Civil Appeal. In that appeal, the respondent no.1 filed application for interim stay. The learned District Judge, initially directed to maintain status-quo as regards the construction in question. The learned District Judge noticed that no reply was filed by the respondent nos.1 and 2, and therefore, on 05.09.2009 passed the following order : "Heard the ld. counsel for parties. The ld. counsel for the appellant was suggested by this court that in case the 3 appellant is ready to furnish security/surety for construction cost of Rs.2,00,000/- the stay in terms of prayer clause (2) can be granted. The ld. counsel for the appellant agreed. Hence the stay as per prayer clause (2) is granted subject to furnishing of security of Rs. 2,00,000/- (two lakhs) within 15 days from the date of this order." 3. It appears that the respondent no.1 gave another application (Exhibit-48) seeking relief of interim injunction. He s ought review of the earlier order and sought interim relief in terms of prayer clause (3) instead of prayer clause (2), which was granted by the District Judge. The learned District Judge reviewed the order by granting review application and thereafter passed the following order: "In view of order passed below Exh.48, the present stay granted on 5.9.2009 is also granted in terms of prayer clause (3) of the present application till final disposal of appeal." Thus, in effect, the learned District Judge stayed the construction, which was undertaken by the petitioner. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 4 5. It is important to notice that the impugned order dated 16.11.2009 is non-speaking order. Even the reasons stated in the earlier order dated 16.11.2009 are totally cryptic and insufficient. In case of rejection of temporary injunction application, there can not be interim stay. It has no meaning. The aggrieved person can claim injunction or interim injunction as may be found necessary, if the strong prima facie case is made out. Needless to say, the respondent no.1 could have applied for temporary injunction and there was no propriety in granting stay order. The prayers in the application do not show that temporary injunction was sought by the respondent no.1. Still, however, the learned District Judge observed : "It is true that the purpose of making order below Exh.5 was to restrain the respondent from making construction." 6. The above observations of the learned District Judge are totally improper. The earlier order dated 05.09.2009 clearly shows that the stay was granted in terms of prayer clause (2) and that there was no intention to grant interim injunction. The learned District Judge reviewed the earlier order without any substantial reason and though the application is not covered by provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 or Section 114 of Code of Civil Procedure. The 5 approach of the learned District Judge is totally misconceived and improper. The learned District Judge could have pass the appropriate order calling upon the petitioner to execute an undertaking for removal of construction within a period of fortnight in case the suit would be decreed. Any other equitable order could have been passed, including the order of interim injunction, if proper case is made out. The impugned orders go to show absence of proper approach of the learned District Judge as well as non-application of judicial mind. Under these circumstances, it will have to be said that the impugned orders are arbitrary and perverse. 7. In the result, the Petition is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly. No Costs. 8. The respondent no.1 is at liberty to file afresh application seeking proper relief in appeal. Status-quo to be maintained for one week. 9. The parties to act upon copy of this order duly authenticated by the Court Shirestedar. (V.R.KINGAONKAR) JUDGE gas/wp1114.10