IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Crl.Revision No. 699 of 2007 Date of Decision: 26.2.2008 Hanuman and others. ....... Petitioners through Shri G.S.Gandhi, Advocate. Versus State of Haryana and others. ....... Respondent no.1 through Shri Amit Khatkar, Assistant Advocate General. Respondent no.4 through Shri B.K.Bagri, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MAHESH GROVER .... 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? .... Mahesh Grover,J. Although the petitioners initially filed a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing F.I.R.No.56 dated 21.5.2006 registered against them under Sections 452, 436, 34 of the I.P.C. at Police Station Kasola, District Rewari and order dated 4.1.2007 vide which the learned Sessions Judge, Rewari framed the charge against them in the aforesaid offence, yet, on an application moved on their behalf, it was permitted to be converted into a Criminal Revision directed against the framing of charge. Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -2- .... However, while assailing the order framing of the charge against the petitioners, learned counsel for the petitioners referred more to the arguments for quashing of the F.I.R. than confining himself to the challenge to that order which apparently was within the scope of the Criminal Revision after the necessary amendment had been carried out. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the F.I.R. is an abuse of the process of the Court and the same was a counter-blast to F.I.R.No.45 dated 24.4.2006 registered under Section 307 of the I.P.C. in which six persons were arrayed as accused including the husband of the complainant, namely, Raj Singh. He then contended that the present F.I.R. has been lodged belatedly as the incident took place on 13.5.2006 and it was registered on 21.5.2006. He strenuously argued that the F.I.R. had been lodged at the instance of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and the matter was specifically brought to the notice of the senior officers of the Police Department by virtue of Annexure P5, but no action was taken which has resulted in the present proceedings. If the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners are briefly summoned up, then they pertain to the challenge to the registration of the F.I.R. on the grounds which have been enumerated above. As noticed above, the charge in the case has already been framed on account of which the present petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was misconceived and, therefore, it was subsequently converted into a Criminal Revision on an application moved by the petitioners. Therefore, Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -3- .... all the challenges made on account of tardy and tainted investigation and the F.I.R. being an abuse of the process of law and being a counter-blast to an earlier F.I.R. got registered by the petitioners, as also the F.I.R. being delayed, are not sustainable at this stage of the proceedings. In so far as the challenge to the order of framing of the charge is concerned , learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Section 240(2) of the Cr.P.C. and argued that the impugned order is completely against the said provisions of law as the accused persons were not made to understand the charge against them. He contended that each and every charge should have been read out to them and after making them understand a question should have been put to them as to whether they plead guilty of the offence charged or claim to be tried. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Khedu Mohton and others Versus State of Bihar, AIR 1971 S.C. 66; Thulia Kali Versus The State of T.N., AIR 1973 S.C. 501; M/S Pepsi Foods Ltd. Versus Special Judicial Magistrate, 1997 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 761 (S.C.); Minu Kumari and anr. Versus State of Bihar and ors., 2006(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 271 (S.C.); Dilawar Singh Versus State of Delhi, JT 2007(10) S.C. 585 and G.Nanjegowda Versus State of Karnataka, 2004(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 106 (Karnataka). On the other hand, learned counsel for the State contended that the charge having been framed, eight witnesses have already been examined out of thirteen or fourteen witnesses and the next date of trial is fixed on 20.2.2008. He then contended that the matter regarding delay in lodging of Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -4- .... the F.I.R. and the same being a counter-blast to the earlier proceedings can always be agitated before the trial Court, which can establish the veracity of these allegations to give the benefit to the petitioners in case they are able to substantiate the same. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on Harbans Kaur and another Versus State of Haryana, (2005) 9 S.C.C. 195 and Manjula Sinha Versus State of U.P. & Ors., JT 2007(9) S.C. 326. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. In so far as the quashing of the F.I.R. in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, the law is settled and the observations of the Courts in various pronouncements are enlightening on the subject. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment in Manjula Sinha's case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:- “8. Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (iA) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -5- .... procedure can provide for all cases that may possible arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest: (when the law gives a person anything it give shim that without which it can not exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -6- .... injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. [ See Janta Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary, JT 1992(5) SC 213 : 1992(4) SCC 305 and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) V. State of Bihar, 1964(2) SCR 336].” Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -7- .... Therefore, the circumstances of the case have to be examined in the back-drop of the above quoted observations. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners has been that it was a case where there was a rivalry between the parties which was reflected from the earlier F.I.R. and the police was trying to help the complainants in achieving their designs to implicate the petitioners which was actually carried out by lodging of the present F.I.R. and then carrying out a tardy investigation. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was animosity and, therefore, the petitioners have been implicated is again a double-edged sword. It is quite possible that the present F.I.R. which discloses commission of a cognizance offence may actually have taken place as an old enmity between the petitioners and the complainants could have provided an impetus to the former to commit the offence. In any eventuality, it is a settled principle of law that once the F.I.R. discloses a cognizance offence, the same ought not to be quashed. Besides, the charge has already been framed in this case and the trial has progressed considerably as eight out of total fourteen to fifteen witnesses, have already been examined. In so far as the charge is concerned, a perusal of Annexure P10 shows that it does not contravene the provisions of Section 240 of the Cr.P.C. The charge sheet, Annexure P10, is reproduced below:- Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -8- .... “IN THE COURT OF R.C. BANSAL, SESSIONS JUDGE, REWARI. Sessions Case No.51 of 2006 Date of Instt: 4.12.2006 Date of Charge: 4.1.2007 State Vs. 1. Hanuman son of Pahlad, aged 32 years son of Ghisa Ram. 2. Azad Singh, aged 22 years son of Sahab Singh son of Ishwar Singh son of Hansa. 3. Mahipal, aged 25 years, son of Banwari son of Ishwar Singh, all residents of village Bakhapur, Tehsil and District Rewari. ......Accused. Case F.I.R.No.56 dated 27.5.2006 Under Sections 452/ 436/ 34 IPC Police Station: Kasola. CHARGE SHEET I, R.C.Bansal, Sessions Judge, Rewari, do hereby charge you the above named accused as under:- Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -9- .... FIRSTLY That on the intervening night of 13.5.2006 in the area of village Bakhapur, you all in furtherance of your common intention, committed house trespass, in the house of Suman for committing some mis-chief and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 452 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this court. SECONDLY: That on the same date, time and place, you all in furtherance of your common intention committed mischief by setting the hut of Suman Devi wife of Raj Singh, used for dwelling purpose, on fire and thereby you committed an offence punishable under Section 436 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this court. And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court on the aforesaid charges. January 04,2007 Sd/-Sessions Judge, Rewari Certified that the contents of the charge sheet have been read over and explained to the accused in simple Hindi, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. R.O.& A.C. Sd/- Sessions Judge, Rewari. Sd/- Mahipal Crl.Revision No.699 of 2007 -10- .... Sd/- Hanuman Sd/-Azad.” A perusal of the above reproduced charge sheet (Annexure P10) goes to show that after the relevant material was put to the accused persons, i.e., the petitioners, they were made to understand the same. Thereafter, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the same and claimed trial. Thus, the ingredients of Section 240 of the Cr.P.C. as well as the requirement of the law stood complied with. In any eventuality, the test to be applied in all such like cases is to see whether it has resulted in any prejudice being caused to the petitioners. The learned counsel for the petitioners could not show any such prejudice having been caused to the petitioners. Thus, keeping in view the fact that the procedure under Section 240 of the Cr.P.C. having been substantially complied with and in the absence of any prejudice being shown to have been caused to the petitioners, I do not find any merit in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. February 26,2008 ( Mahesh Grover ) “SCM” Judge