IN THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SECOND APPEAL N0. 3U OF 2010 (S.B.) APEELLANT ^^--'Dwarika S/o Prerulal Kandra, aged <"" 1EFENDANT N0.1 about 44 years, R/o Village Rajim, Police \^ ..-,.•»•••' Station Rajim,Tahsil Rajim, District A W •presi**"- "".....••i-^T'to" 8aWi-—a"Z.-\'!~ RESPONDENTS 'PLAINTIFF Raipur (C.G.). VERSUS \.^ Jhaduram Sahu S/o Chunnu Sahu, aged about 70 years, R/o Rajim, Tahsil Rajim, Disfa-ict Raipur (C.G.). QBFENDANT N0.2 2. The State of Chhattisgarh, Through : CoUector, Raipur (C.G.). SECOND APPEAL UNDER SECTION '100 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 m HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR S.A.No. 365 of 2010 APPELLANT Defendant No.l RESPONDENTS PIaintiff APPELLANT Defendant No.l RESPONDENTS Plaintiff APPELLANT Defendant No.l RESPONDENTS Plaintiff APPELLANT Defendant No.l RESPONDENTS Plaintiff Mahetaru @ Mehataru VERSUS Jhaduram Sahu & another S.A.No. 366 of 2010 Dwarika VERSUS Jhaduram Sahu & another S-A.No. 367 of 2010 Babulal 3?ERSUS Jhaduram Sahu & anolher S.A.No. 368 of 2010 Jeevan Lal VERSUS Jhaduram Sahu & another SECOND APPEAL UNDER SECTION 100 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (SB: Hon'ble Mr. N.K. Asarwal, J.) Present : Shri Malay Kumar Bhaduri, Advocate for the appellant. Shri Raja Sharma, Advocate for respondent No. 1. Shri Vinod Tekam, Pane] Lawyer for the State. ORDER (Passed on 15.02.2011) 1. By this common order, S.A. Nos. 365/10,366/10,367/10 & 368/10 are being disposed ofasthe common facts & issues are involved in all the appeals. !: ^r;^^. .'" /•P:!~v'i,i 'i. / fe. ^..t These appeals have been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions oflaw: "Whether the first appellate court was justified in rejecting the appellant's application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and consequently dismissing the appeal." Facts in nutshell, necessary to decide these appeals are that : the respondent No. 1/plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant for relief of declaration of title aad possession over the suit property. The suit was decreed by the trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 01.10.2009. The appellants herein filed appeals along with an application for condonation of delay under Order 41 Rule 3(A)(i) of CPC inter alia on the ground that the appeal could not be filed within the period of limitation specified therefor due the their illness. The prayer was opposed. The court below vide impugned order, dismissed the applications and consequently appeals were also dismissed. Hence these Second Appeals. • Shri MK Bhaduri, leamed counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the order passed by the appellate court rejecting the appellant's application for condonation of delay is perverse. The appellants were ill. Immediately after coming to know about the judgment and decree passed by the trial court they applied for the certified copy ofthe judgment and decree on 18.02.2010 with the help oftheir Advocates. Certified copy was \/ 7. received on 24.02.2010 and thereafter the appeals were prepared and filed on 06.03.2010. Thus, the delay occurred in filing the appeals was neither intentional nor deliberate. By placing reliance upon the judgment of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy he would submit that' approach of court should be liberal while dealing with application for condonation of delay. On the other hand, Shri Raja Sharma, leamed counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 vehemently argued that the appellants utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the appeals and therefore, the court below has rightly dismissed the appeals as time barred. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and perused the order impugned. 8. Pursuant to notice issued by the executing court, the appellants appeared before the trial court on 10.02.10; applied for certified copy on 18.02.10 and filed the appeals on 06.03.10. Thus, the delay occurred cannot be said to be intentional or deliberate. ^ 9. The Supceme Court in case ofN. Balakrishnan (Supra) has held in para 13 to i 15asuader: "13. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to se that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object ofproviding a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal ' 1998 SAR(Civil) 739 .,p!aasiss^ / £'v~^/s f & "S<I^X/ '~-<.:^1^ - ^-rf '"^.^•.~-.-'!-;^y' remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the remedy vested time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit. finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period oftime. 14. A court knows that refusal of condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal constmction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shankuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 15. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concemed. That alone is not enough to tum down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration ^ !<&.' 1 : ''4^ / ^'^ /-' '<VM^' to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be bome in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It. would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant fhe court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 10. In view of above, the delay occurred in filing the appeals before the First Appellate Court appears to be bonafide and order of rejection of application by the First Appellate Court is not proper. 11. In view of above, in the considered opinion of this court the first appellate court was not justified in rejecting the appellant s application for condonation of delay in filing the appeals and the substantial question oflaw formulated is answered accordingly. 12. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the appeals are allowed. The order dated 30.09.2010 passed by the first appellate court is hereby set aside. Application for condonation of delay in filing the appeals deserves to be and is hereby allowed and consequently delay is condoned. The matters are remitted back to the first appellatecourt for hearing and deciding the appeals on its own merits in accordance with law expeditiously. No order asto costs. r ..-s.:. ' '-.-^ fl \A.. "'0 ..• '^C3s-l;11 -^' ^^ 13. Parties are directed to appear before the court below on 28.03.2011. 14. Record oftrial court as well as first appellate court be sent back to the first appellate court forthwith. _ 15. Decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- N.K. Agarwal Judge Sahu