IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. RSA No.: 71 of 1996. Decided on: 18.07.2008. Smt. Bagan Devi & Others. … … Appellants. Versus Shri Karnail Singh and Other. … … Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellants: Mr. Praneet Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate. Rajiv Sharma, Judge: A challenge has been laid by way of this regular second appeal to the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge (2), Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No.94-K/94 dated 13.12.1995. The brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this regular second appeal are that the appellants-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs for convenience sake) had filed a suit for possession. The bone of contention before the learned trial Court was whether the parties are still governed by agricultural custom in the matter of alienation by way of Will or that the custom has been abrogated by Hindu Succession Act. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit on 11.10.1993. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge (2), Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? No. - 2 - Kangra against the judgment and decree dated 11.10.1993 passed by the learned trial Court. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on 13.12.1995. Hence, this regular second appeal by the plaintiffs. The regular second appeal was admitted by this Court on 19.4.1996 on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the provisions of Hindu Succession Act can be made applicable to the property of a person governed by customary law of Kangra? 2. Whether the rule of law laid down in the judgment reported in 1992 Volume I, Shimla Law Cases, page 402 (Kartari Devi vs. Tota Ram) is correct or need to be reviewed? Mr. Praneet Gupta has strenuously argued that the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Mr. Ajay Sharma has supported the judgments rendered by both the courts below. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. The substantial questions of law raised by the plaintiffs in the present appeal are no more res-integra in view of the definite pronouncement of law by the Division Bench of this Court in “Tek Chand and another versus Mool Raj and others, 1997 (2), Hindu Law Reporter, 306” . Their Lordships have held as under:- “A combined reading of sections 4 and 30 clearly shows that a male member of Mitakshara coparcenary is entitled to dispose of by Will or other testamentary disposition his interest in the coparcenary property notwithstanding any customary law or any other law to the contrary. The Explanation to section 30 is of great - 3 - significance. It abrogated the rule of Mitakshara law and lays down in explicit terms that the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary property is deemed to be a property capable of being disposed of by Will notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of the Act or any other law for the time being in force. The words “any other law for the time being in force” would undoubtedly include customary law. In the light of the aforesaid rulings, if the provisions of section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act are looked into, it is clear that the legislature had intended and brought about a change in the right of a male member of Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary viz-a-viz disposition of property by Will or other testament. The language is so specific that a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary can dispose of his interest in the coparcenary property by a Will or other testamentary disposition notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or any other law for the time being in force. If a member of Mitakshara coparcenary can dispose of his interest by a Will, a fortiori, the last male holder who has no other coparcener to share the property with him, is entitled to dispose of the same by a testament. In fact the Supreme Court has held clearly in Smt. Dipo’s case that the character of the property in the hands of a such last male holder is non-ancestral and hence the restriction imposed by the customary law against alienation of ancestral property will not apply to such non- ancestral property. Consequently, the provisions of section 30 are automatically applicable to such male Hindu.” Since the law on the issues has already been settled by a Division Bench of this Court, there is no substantial question of law involved in this second appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs. July 18, 2008. (Rajiv Sharma) (sck). Judge.