1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR ### S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4504/2005 ### Ravi Kumar Garg Vs. The Appellate Rent Tribunal & Ors. ### Date of Order :- 07.08.2009 HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S.CHAUHAN Mr.M.F. Baig, for the petitioner. Mr.J.P. Goyal, for the respondents. ### Aggrieved by the orders dated 16.08.2004 and 04.02.2005, the petitioner has challenged both the orders before this Court. In a nutshell the facts of the case are that the respondent No.3, Ramraj Lal let out a shop to the petitioner in the year 1990 for a monthly rent of Rs.100/-. Till November, 1992 the petitioner regularly paid the rent to the respondent No.3. Since the petitioner defaulted in payment of rent, therefore, the respondent No.3 moved an application under Section 13(3) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ('The Old Act', for short) for determining the amount to be paid to him from 01.12.1991. Without considering the material facts of the case vide order dated 22.09.1994 the 2 learned Magistrate determined the rent at the rate of Rs.700/- per month w.e.f. 01.12.1991. In the year 2001, the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 ('The New Act', for short) was enacted. It came into force from 21.03.2003. To get the benefits of the New Act, the respondent No.3 moved an application before the Rent Tribunal under Section 6 of the New Act for revision of the rent. The petitioner filed his reply. But without considering the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the New Act, the learned Tribunal increased the rent from Rs.700/- per mensem to Rs.1409/-per mensem vide order dated 16.08.2004. Aggrieved by the order dated 16.08.2004, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal. But the same was dismissed on 4.02.2005. Hence, this petition before this Court. According to Mr. M.F. Baig, the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the rent was determined under the Old Act, the same could not be revised under the New Act. Therefore, the respondent No.3 was not justified in filing an application under the New Act. Although this issue was raised before the learned Tribunal and the learned Appellate Court, the same has been rejected. Secondly, initially, according to Section 6(b) of the New Act, the rent could be revised only upto 7.5%. However, in 2006, the said Section was amended; after the amendment, the rent can be increased only by 5%. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the rent could not have been increased beyond 5%. 3 On the other hand, Mr. J.P. Goyal, the learned counsel for the respondent No.3, has contended that there is no prohibition in the New Act which bars the filing of a fresh application for revision of rent, even if the rent had been determined earlier under the Old Act. Therefore, this Court cannot possibly read a bar in the statute. In case, the Court is permitted to read the bar, the Court would be amending the Act. No Court can legislate and amend an Act. Secondly, since 7.5% was reduced to 5% in the year 2006 i.e. much after the decision of the learned Tribunal, and of the Appellate Court, the benefit of the amendment cannot be given retrospective effect. Hence, he has supported the impugned orders. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders. It is, indeed, settled that in case a bar does not exist in the law, this Court cannot insert a bar in the statute. Neither Section 6, nor Section 7 of the New Act prohibit the landlord from filing a fresh application for revision of the rent. Therefore, such a bar, as pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot be read in Sections 6 and Section 7 of the New Act. In case, this Court were to read a prohibition, this Court would be amending the provisions of law. It is equally well settled that Courts cannot legislate. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any basis. 4 Admittedly, 7.5% was reduced to 5% in the year 2006. Admittedly, impugned orders were passed prior to 2006. Therefore, the amendment carried out in 2006 cannot be given a retrospective effect. Hence, the petitioner is not justified in claiming that the rent could be increased only by 5%, and not by 7.5%. Afterall when the impugned orders were passed, the law permitted the rent to be revised upto 7.5%. Therefore, even the second contention raised by the learned counsel is without any merit. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is devoid of any merit. It is, hereby, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. (R.S.CHAUHAN)J. Manoj Solanki