b%k% N IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATI'ISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (227) NO. [2010 wag $§agia ’gmEb‘ IN THE MATTER OF: K, Raj Kumar Poplani, S/o Shri Eshwor Dos Poptoni, Aged about 45 years, R/o lndustrial Ward, P.O. —Dham’rc1ri, District— Dham’rari (C.G.) VERSUS RESPONDENTs No.1 / RESPONDENT NO. 1 .1. The Es’role Officer, South East Railway Management Compound. W.R.S. Colony. Raipur, Chhal’tisgarh RE PONDENT NO.2/ SPONDENT NO. 2 /2. Through Union of Chief’Manager, lndla South East Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata, West Bengal, ‘(r/ WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA w ‘ f , % mmm mfamgz mm mm...w.£..ég9am§w)w 11:1; 200 Wmwwmx mmmm tI SB : Hon’bie 3hri ManinWa MohaShrivas‘iava. J. 29-04-2010 Mr. Ankit Singhal, counse} for the p titioner. Ms. Naushina AIL commel for resp ndems on advance copv Lmc‘ler histructions from Shli Arnit Chauc‘u‘lari‘ stamiing counsel for r spondents. By this petition under Article 227 ‘the caustiiution of India, petitionar has assaikd legahty and validity of arn‘er dated 18/03/20 0 by which the petitioner‘s appeal under Sectian me Act of 1971 ") has been dismissed as barred by 1 1 Leamed counsel foe the petitioner n anes mu Lam 1 J suamissiorls‘ 1 The Lust submission of learned counsei for The petitioner is thati View of the provisions contamed uno‘er Satin; . 9. Sub—Section 2(a), the period of limitation ’s to be reckoned from the date of puoiication 1 r of the order under Sub—Section 1 of Section J r f tne i Act i of m ”71. T it is submitted that though the order was passed by the Estate Officer 22/08/G8, the same was affixed as required by Section 5 of Sub-Section 1. only on Sf 8. He therefore su‘ornits that the period of limitation would commence only from 8/09 '08 and not before that It is submitted that the appeal was initially filed on 12/09/08 befo Judge. Raipiir 'v‘ide its order dated 23/09/08 n A1 9 of the Pubiic Fremise$ Eviction of mmut‘x orizmi occupants) Act, ’i 71 (for shon ;.‘ L-.- £ . L“- iita'tion. the District Judge. Raipur lam later on District r tumed the appeal with liberty to file the s-“ne before the District Judge, Dhamtari wherea er the appeal was presented t on 1.41 "o‘i 3/01: \ l Lueiore C the District Judge, Dhamtari. The second iniission of learned counsel for the petitioner though assuming that there was delay in filii the appeal, as the petitioner had also moved an application under Section 5 of the Liinitatio Act 1963, by way of abundant caution, learned Court below was obliged to consider the sar Learned counsel for the petitioner High Court in the case of Parrna Nand 1988, 264. Submission of learned counsel for 1e respondent is that the perusal of impugned order would show that the District Judge. ipur returned the appeal on 23/08/09 whereafter I [ale n also relied upon the iudgment of Allahabad ‘v’ District Judge. Mirzapur and others niR m ‘ O ’0 e ‘ l n i ‘ ‘ S' s. 1‘ ' WW mMéxf)mé2§% )‘z‘gn mm WW WW §$ "éalaiianm mmmw Lg“ th- appe-‘i was flied before the learned Conn beicw after delav of 20 davs and therefore appear was not fi‘red Within the period of limi mien prescriiaed under fhe Eaw. Et is submi‘aeé that the finding of the leamea' Com below that the appeal was barred by limitatien does not su fer from any error much less an error app arent on the record and iherefore the petition is liable to be dismissed. A pelusal of impugned order shows hat While considering aa to whether the appeal was filed within the per.od of limitation or not, ieameri Conn below has completelv misdirected itself. A bare perusal of Section § of Sub-Section 2(a) shows that the appeal is required to be filed within 12 days h‘om the (late of pubiicetion of the orrier under Sub- Section i or r aoection J. g however. T in the entire order. the learned Coult below while considering the case of the petitioner has computed the period of limitation from the date of passing of the order without takhig into condderation the statutory provisions contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act, 197i. The facts of the case are that initia‘ii} the appeal was filed before the District fudge, Raipur. Later on, the same was remmed and‘presented before the Court below. This aspect was not taken into consideration. MoreovEr, it appears that the petitioner, by way of abundant caution had moved an applicatim under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the appoai. Though the impugned order records that the appeai is barred by limitation, there is nc consideration of petitioner's application for condonation of delay. The order does not reflect that any of the grounds raised by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay were considered. The order does not show that any satisfaction has been recorded fiat the cause shown ior delay is not sufficient. in view of the above discussion, the impugned order cannot he sustained and the same is therefore set aside. Learned Court be. o‘vv shaii reconsider the entire matter afresh, by taking into consideration the statutory provisions contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act and pass appropriate orders in ace ordance with law. Parties shall appeai'b/efore/.—/—s the Additiona‘i Dismct iudge taro), Dimitri-1‘ on ic‘e Max: 2 a W ;