IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA SA No.153 of 2003 Triloki Nath Singh, S/o Late Babulal Singh, resident of village- Taraiya Pargana Goa, P.S.-Taraiya, District-Saran. Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellant. Versus 1. Anirudh Singh 2. Jogendra Singh 3. Ramjee Singh All sons of Late Teni Singh, resident of village-Marwa Pargana Goa, P.S.-Mashrakh (P 4. Piyar Chand Singh, S/o Late Ram Roop Singh, resident of village-Marwa Pargana Goa, P.S. Mashrakh (Panapur), P.O. Rampur Rudra, District-Saran. Defendants-Respondents-Respondents. ----------- For the appellant : - Sri Rameshwar Nath Roy, Sr. Advocate. Sri Kapil Deo Singh, Advocate, Sri Vijay Kumar, Advocate. For the respondents: - None. 07/ 20-04-2009 Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. This Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant-appellant challenging the judgments and decree of both the learned courts below. 3. The matter arises out of Title Suit No. 210 of 1995 which was filed by the plaintiff-appellant for declaration that the compromise decree dated 15.09.1994 passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 495 of 1986 was illegal, inoperative, ineffective and not binding upon the plaintiff and the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit property be declared along with a decree of permanent injunction and for other ancillary reliefs. 4. The said suit was dismissed on contest by 2 the learned 4th Subordinate Judge, Chapra vide his judgment and decree dated 31.08.1998. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court the plaintiff–appellant filed Title Appeal No. 80 of 1998 (3 of 1999) which was dismissed on contest by the learned 9th Additional District Judge, Saran vide his judgment and decree dated 5.5.2003. 5. From the arguments as well as the materials on record including the impugned judgments and decree of the learned courts below it is quite apparent that after considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties they came to the conclusion that as the compromise has been accepted by the High Court, a subordinate Court cannot have jurisdiction to say that fraud was played upon the High Court. It was also held that the settled principle of law is that the Court, in which fraud or misrepresentation has been made in obtaining the decree, had the jurisdiction to adjudicate as to whether any fraud etc. was exercised. Hence it was held that the remedy of the suit cannot be used for challenging a compromise which has been entered into before the High Court and only if the High Court would have set aside the compromise decree on the ground of fraud and collusion or would have directed the plaintiff to file a regular suit in that regard, the lower court could have considered the matter. Hence it was held that the said court or the trial court cannot legally 3 have jurisdiction for setting aside a compromise decree passed in a Second Appeal by the High Court without any permission from the High Court. This Court does not find any error in the impugned judgments and decree of the learned courts below nor does it find any substantial question of law involved in the instant Second Appeal which is accordingly, dismissed at this stage of hearing under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. S.Sb/- (S.N. Hussain, J.)