IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.5433 of 2010 Ashok Singh, son of Harbansh Singh, resident of village- Bairahiya, P.S. Dhaka, District- East Champaran. ... Petitioner. Versus The State of Bihar: ... Opp. Party. ----------- 02- 16.02.2010 Heard Mr. Anil Kumar for the petitioner, and Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhaya, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the order dated 21.7.2009, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Motihari, in Session Trial No.121 of 2004 (The State of Bihar Vs. Ajay Sah and others), whereby he has summoned the present petitioner to stand his trial, inter alia, under section 364A/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It appears that a first information report was lodged against certain named persons for abduction of the informant’s son aged fifteen years, and was registered as Dhaka P.S. Case No.100 2 of 2003, dated 31.8.2003 (Annexure-1), under section 364(A) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was not named in the F.I.R. After the trial commenced, materials came on record implicating the petitioner. The informant filed an application under section 319 of the Cr.P.C., praying therein that, in view of the materials which have come on record during the course of trial, the petitioner should be summoned to stand his trial, which has been allowed by the impugned order. 3. It appears to us on a perusal of the materials on record that there are circumstances on record in justification of the order summoning the petitioner to stand his trial. We do not find any error in the impugned order. This course is sanctioned by the provisions of section 319 of the Cr.P.C. 4. I must deal with the two judgments relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner. He has first of all relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Michael Machado and another Vs. Central Bureau of investigation and another, reported in (2000)3 S.C.C. 262, wherein the Supreme Court 3 came to the conclusion that an order under section 319 of the Cr.P.C. was based on mere suspicion, and there was very slender material on record to summon the newly-added accused persons. The trial had made substantial headway and as many as 49 witnesses had been examined, out of whom only three had deposed on the basis of which the learned trial court had summoned the appellants to trial. The Supreme Court considered that the step to summon the newly- added accused persons was belated and the depositions of the three prosecution witnesses were substantially in the realm of suspicion and was described by the Supreme Court as ‘slender materials’. The position in fact is fundamentally different in the present case. No such delay has taken place, nor far too many witnesses have been examined, nor the materials which have come on record during the course of trial can be described as slender. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Krishnappa Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2004)7 S.C.C. 792. 4 That was a case where the prosecution at an early stage was quashed by the High Court against the appellant. After the trial had made substantial headway and was approaching closure, some material came on record which was taken by the Supreme Court to be one of instigation attributable to the appellant. The trial court refused to summon the appellant but was set aside by the superior court. The Supreme Court did not agree with the order summoning the appellant. It is evident that the same on facts stood on a fundamentally different footing and, therefore, is of no help to the petitioner. 6. There is no merit in this application. It is accordingly rejected. (S K Katriar, J.) S.K.Pathak/