1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 2892 OF 2009 Dashrat Devki Badiya ] aged 23 years, Occ : Labour ] residing at Model Down, Near Home ] Guard Land & Nehru Park, Seven ] Bungalows, Versova, Mumbai . ] Petitioner Vs 1. The State of Maharashtra ] at the instance of Versova Police ] Station ] 2. Amit Baag Sukumar Baag ] aged about 22 years, Occ : Labour ] 3. Bablu Singh Mangal Singh ] aged about 26 years, Occ : Labour, ] 4. Ranjit Mohan Sardar ] aged about 22 years, Occ : Labour, ] 5. Samar Sukhdev Sardar ] aged about 22 years, Occ : Labour, ] All 2 to 5 residing at Model Town, ] Near Home Guard Land & Nehru Park ] Seven Bungalows, Versova, Mumbai. ] Respondents Mr. Rajendra Rathod for the petitioner Mr. Sandeep D. Kadam i/b Mr. Rahul Dangle for respondent nos. 2 to 5 Mr. A.S. Shitole, APP for the State RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 2 CORAM : D.G. KARNIK, J. DATE : 10th December, 2009 ORAL ORDER: 1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, "the code"'), the petitioner prays for quashing of an F.I.R. bearing C.R. No. 272 of 2009 filed by him against respondent nos. 2 to 5 for an offense punishable under Section 326, 504 read with Section 34 of IPC. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner, who is the original complainant, submits that the petitioner and the accused have settled the disputes and the petitioner (who is hereinafter referred to as "the complainant") has agreed to withdraw the F.I.R. but as the offences are not compoundable, the court may quash the F.I.R. In support , he refers and relies upon the three decisions of the Supreme Court : i. B.S. Joshi and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Another (2003)4 Supreme Court Cases 675 ii. Nikhil Merchant Vs Central Bureau of Investigation (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 677 iii. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs State of Punjab RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 3 (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 582 Learned A.P.P. appearing for the State strongly opposes the prayer and submits that the offences in question are not compoundable and are against the public policy of State. He further submits that not only the petitioner but two other persons were also assaulted by the accused by use of dangerous weapons and they suffered grievous hurt. The complainant alone cannot compound / settle and he has no right to withdraw the F.I.R in respect of an incidence in which two other persons were injured. Therefore the investigation and the prosecution must be allowed to proceed in accordance with law.. 3. On 29th September, 2009, an F.I.R was lodged by the complainant that the accused assaulted him and his two friends with an iron rod and caused them grievous hurt. The accused had thus committed an offense punishable under Section 326 of the I.P.C. and also other offenses as narrated in the complaint. Admittedly, the offense punishable under Section 326 of the I.P.C. is not compoundable even with the permission of the court. As such, it is not possible for the complainant to compound the offense. RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 4 Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relying on the above decisions submitted that though the offense is not compoundable, the court can quash the F.I.R. 4. In the case of B.S. Joshi and Ors (Supra), the Supreme Court quashed the complaint made by a wife for an offense punishable under Section 498-A of the I.P.C though such offense is not compoundable. In paragraph 14 of the decision, the Supreme Court observed that object of introducing Section 498-A in the I.P.C was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of the husband and in view of the fact that there was a compromise between the husband and the wife, it would be counterproductive to continue with the prosecution . The hyper technical view that the offense is not compoundable would be counterproductive and act against the interest of the woman whose interest is to be protected by Section 498-A of the I.P.C. 5. In the case of Nikhil Merchant (Supra), the Supreme Court quashed the complaint made under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of I.P.C. Though offense under Section 420 is compoundable with the permission of the Court, the offenses under Sections 467, 468 and RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 5 471 are not compoundable. They relate to forgery and aggravated forms of forgery for the purpose of cheating etc. 6. In case of Madan Mohan Abbot (Supra), the offense alleged to have been committed was under sections 379, 406, 409 and 418 of the I.P.C. The Supreme Court, on account of compromise between the parties, quashed the complaint by observing as follows: "We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealing between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused..." 7. Where the offense is purely personal - generally cheating of different forms not involving any public policy, the court can quash the proceedings by exercising its inherent power under section 482 of the Code even if the offense is not compoundable. Section 498- A was introduced in the I.P.C. with an object to protect a woman from harassment by her husband or his relatives. The public policy is to resolve the matrimonial dispute and not to protract the matrimonial disputes. By continuing with the prosecution, the RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 6 settlement between husband and wife may be set to a naught. Similarly, in the other two cases also, the offenses related to cheating or aggravated forms of cheating like forgery and disputes arising out of business matters where the aggrieved person is the person cheated. If there is a compromise between the parties, the Court saw no public policy preventing such compromise. 8. The offense in the present case, however, is an offense under Section 326 of the I.P.C. which relates to causing of grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. It cannot be a public policy to permit a person, who causes grievous hurt to others by dangerous weapons or means to win over victims, by lure of money or otherwise, and buy crime. In my view, public policy prohibits compounding of the present offense. 9. There is one more reason for rejecting the petition which is filed by only one of the victims. Two other persons were injured and suffered grievous injuries in the same incidence. As per law, only one F.I.R. could be recorded though more than one persons were injured in the same incidence. Only one of the victims, who had filed the F.I.R. , appears to have compromised with the assailants RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 7 viz. respondent nos. 2 to 5. There is nothing on record to show that all the victims have agreed for a settlement. The F.I.R. being one and indivisible cannot be quashed at the instance of only one of the victims, though he happens to be the one who lodged the F.I.R. 10.On the view I have taken, it is not necessary to refer to the two unreported decisions of this court relies upon by the petitioner and rendered in i] Abdula Dost Mohammed Sunsara Vs The State of Maharashtra and Another in Criminal Writ Petition No. 2690 of 2009 decided on 9th October, 2009 and ii] Mahendra Vakhatchand Gandi Vs The State of Maharashtra in Criminal Application No. 283 of 2009 decided on 3rd April, 2009 as they merely follow the three decisions of the Supreme Court referred to earlier which are distinguishable on facts. 11. For the reasons mentioned above, there is no merit in the petition which is hereby dismissed. (D.G. KARNIK, J.) RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw 8 RMA 12wp2892-09.sxw