FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 15/2009 [Khanchand Kewalram Chandwani vs. M/s. G.S.Sarda and another] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram appearances, Court's orders or Directions Court's or Judge's Orders. And Registrar's Orders. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM : S.R. DONGAONKAR J. DATED : JULY 24, 2009. Heard Shri Gupta, Advocate, for the petitioner. None appears for respondents. In the order dated 19th June, 2009, this court has observed in para 4, thus- 4. The present case, order dated 20th January, 2008, disobedience whereof is complained of, clearly mentions that the parties have compromised the matter out of Court, the complainant wanted to withdraw the case and therefore, it is dismissed for want of prosecution. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the order of J.M.F.C. (Spl. Court) 138 of N.I. Act, Nagpur, dated 28.1.2008, to contend that the words “compromised the matter out of the court” has crept in due to incorrect appreciation. According to him, the parties i.e. the complainant and the accused had filed a compromise petition before the Court dated 28.1.2008. The accused failed to comply with the obligation contained in that compromise therefore, the action of contempt would lie against the contemner/respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of this Court i.e. 2004 (5) Bom. C.R. 354; Pioneer Sales Agencies (P) Ltd. ..vs... Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. and others, to contend that when there is breach of compromise term, an action for contempt may lie. In my opinion, the observations in that decision are clearly distinguishable. Here is the case where, because of compromise, the net result of the compromise is the acquittal of the accused. It, in my opinion, cannot be treated as decree in terms of compromise, as usually passed by the Civil Courts. The said compromise may be otherwise enforceable at law if the law so permits, but the breach of such terms cannot be enforced by the action like contempt petition. The obligation which culminated in decree in a civil proceeding by way of compromise cannot be compared with the acquittal of the accused resulted out of the compromise between the complainant and the accused. Therefore, in my opinion, the contempt petition has no merit. The same is liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. JUDGE Rvjalit