^/ IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARHATBILASPUR Second Appeal Wo., APPELLANT : Appellant/ Defendasit ./200 Versus - RESPONDENT "^ ^y .^\^p ^•^'^ Guixiaiimal Chopda^ S/o Late Kanwarlal Chopda, Ageci about 60 years, Occupatioti- Businesssnaii, R/o Sadar Bazar, Rajnandgaon, Tah^il & Di^tarict ~ Rajuaiidgaon. Dr. Narejadra Kusnar Goxidhi., S/ o Late Madan Molian Gaiidhi, Aged about 40 years, Occiipation - Doctor, R/o Near Old Police Station, Tah»il8& Di»trict-Rajnaadgaon. ^ SECOND APPEAL USDBR SECTION 100 OF THE CODE ^ OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 1908. •^,^ HI6H COURT OF CHHATTIS^ARH. BILASPUR SECOND A??€ALN0. 26 OF 2005 6UMANMAL CHOPM vs. DR.NARENDR^ KUMAR ^NDHI Shri Rajeev Shrivastava and Shri LS-Sahu, counsel for the appellant, Shri Anand Shukla, counsel for the respondent on Caveat No. 69/2004. ORAL ORDER (30.8.2005) Sunil Kumar Sinha. J. Shri Rajeev Shrivastava and Shri I.S.Sahu, counsel for the appellant. Shri Anand Shukla, counsel for the respondent on Caveat No. 69/2004. Heard Shri Rajeev Shrivastava, counsel for the <xppell<xnt on question of admission. This oppeal has been directed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.8.2004, passed in civil appeal No. 14-^/2002, arising out of the judgment and decree dated 24.10.2002 passed in C.S.No. 10-A/1998 by the Civil Judge Class-I, Link Court, Dongargarh, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnoindgaon. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit of eviction and arrears of rent in relation to a non residential ^ ^ n_ l|l|Sj|@!^^| 81 ^^ <-'1-^ accommodation on the ground of bonafide requirement, described under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation ControJ Act. 1961 (for short the Act'). It was contended by the plaintiff that the rented premises qwen to the defendant for non resendaitial purpose, was required bonafide by the landford for extension of his Nursing Home, situated near the rented premises. It was further contended that the plaintiff was having no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation for such on extension in the city or township concerned, and his requirement was bonafide. The defendant filed his written statement, denyin9 the contentions of the plaintiff. Alongwith the denial of grounds of bonafide requirement/the defendant also raised a plea regarding denial of the title of the plaintiff, sosying that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property ond he cannot claim for a decree of eviction as he would not be a landlord within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the aforesaid Act. Learned trial Court framed various issues in this case and after recording the evidence of the parties, decreed the suit of plaintiff on both the grounds, i.e, on the ground of bonafide requirement and also on the ground of denial of title by the defendant. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, passed by the trial Court, the defendant filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the tenant and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. It is against this judgment cuid decree passed by the lower appellate Court, the tenant has filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. C-33 c^ Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Courts below committed an error of law by holding that the rented premises was bonafidely required by the lomdlord and the requirement under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was not proved in this case. He further submits that the decree for eviction on the ground of denial of title of the landlord was also not just and proper. The findings of both the Courts on both points are perverse. I have heard learned counset for the appellant at length and have also perused the records of the Courts below. Undisputedly, the findings in relation to bonafide requirement and denial of title of the landlord are the findings of facts and the same have been concurrently recorded by the two Courts below. Unless a perversity in these findings are pointed out by the appellant, the same are not to be interfered by this Court under Section 100 of the C.P.C. A bare perusal of Seciton 100 of the C.P.C. makes it clear that the scope and exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substdntial questions of law, framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial questions of law framed at -the later stage after recording reasons for the same, This makes it clear that the existence of substantial question of law is sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Secti^n 100 of the C.P.C. cnd unless such questions of bw are inyolved, om appeal under Section 100 of the CP.C. would not be entertained by the High Court. (Please see (2004) Vol. V SCC 762 - Thiaoarei.ian and others -vs- Shri Venwooala Swamv B. Koli ond others) wy c^ As to which would constitute a substantial question of law, it has been observed by the Apex Court that " a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substoaitial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matt-er. It will. therefore, depend on the facts ound circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substontial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis". (Please see ^(WJ^ ^ SCC 179 - 5o/^wA Hazari -w- Purushottam Tiwari fDeceased) bv L.Rs.) If you examine the case of the appeliant, on the above principles, it would appear that the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below are purely a finding of fact ond no interference would be possible in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, vested under Section 100 of the CP.C. I do not find any force in the arguments advonced by learned counsel for theappellant The appeal does not involve ony <^3 •^" ^iaiiwis^ substantial question of law dnd the same is dismissed summarily at the motion stage itself. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is ready and willing to vacate the premises, but he has some personal difficulties. therefore, a time of about 1 year may be granted to him, so that the eviction may not cause ony inconvenience to him. This prctyer made by learned counsel for the appellant for 1 year is vehemently opposed by the counsel for respondent who is appearing on Caveat before this Court, However, he fairly agrees for a period of 6 months from todoy and submits that if the appellant retains the possession for a further period of 6 months from today, he will have no objection. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the prGE/er of counsel for the appellant for 6 months is allowed^, being not objected by the counsel for the respondent^and it is directed that the appellant may retain the possession of the disputed premises for a period of 6 months from today and he shall hondover the vacant possession of the premises to the respondent on 1 of March 2006 subject to the conditions that he will poy the rent for this pen'od at the admitted rate and he will fulfill the other obligations under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The appeal stands disposed of. No costs. Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge sumta