VE & PSR, JJ.R W.P.No. 19390 of 2006 O r d e r: (Per P. Swaroop Reddy, J.) This writ petition is filed by the State against order of the learned A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A.No. 1262 of 2003. 2. The facts relevant are as follows: The respondent herein,who filed the O.A., was working as Record Assistant in Rangaraya Medical College, Kakinada. He was involved in Cr.No. 158 of 1993 of I Town Police Station (L&O) Kakinada registered for the offences under sections 147,148,149,448,341 and307IPC and sections 3 and 5 of Explosives Substances Act, in connection with an incident that has taken place on14.11.1993, during which the present respondent and others have allegedly attacked the neighbours with petrol bombs and other arms. During the course of investigation, the respondent was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and therefore, he was placed under suspension. Vide S.C.No. 324 of 1995 of III Additional Sessions Judge, Kakinada, the respondent was convicted along with others and sentenced to various terms of imprisonments under different sections of law. The respondent, herein, who was A-4 was convicted to under go rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offense under section 3 of Explosive Substances Act read with 149 IPC and to pay fine of Rs.500.00 for the offense under section 323 read with 149 IPC and simple imprisonment for one year for the offenceundersections148 and 448IPC. Later he filed Crl.A.No.24 of 1997 before the High Court, in which the conviction of the respondent was confirmed the conviction of the respondent for the offence under section 323 IPC and the fine of Rs.500.00. On account of the conviction and remand, the respondent was kept under suspension and the period of suspension he retired from service. 3. The Respondent filed O.A.No. 9600 of 2001 before the learned A.P. Administrative Tribunal seeing relief of regularisation of period of suspension from 24.4.1993 till his retirement on 30-9-2000 and for payment retirement benefits. The said O.A., was disposed of directing the applicant therein (the present respondent) to file a representation ventilating his grievance within one week and further directing the government to pass appropriate orders thereon within six weeks with regard to the regularization of service during the period of suspension. In pursuance of that directions the government passed G.O.Ms.No.24 dated:14.2.2003. Aggrieved the said G.O.Ms.No.24, the respondent herein filed O.A.No. 1262 of 2003, which was allowed by the Tribunal by setting aside "G.O.Ms.No. 24 and directing the Government to to regularize the period of suspension in respect of the applicant treating the period of suspension in respect of the applicant as spent on duty and to draw and pay all the consequential benefits including the increments to the respondent (applicant)." As against the same the present writ petition is filed by the Government. 4. The contention of the learned Government Pleader appearing for the petitioner herein is that as the conviction of the respondent was confirmed and the offence for which he was convicted involved mural turpitude, though he was acquitted of certain offences, he was convicted for the offence under section 323 IPC and was sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500.00. As such the action taken by the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.24 is perfectly in order and the learned Tribunal erred in setting aside the said governmental order. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-applicant is that the major offences for which the petitioner was convicted were set aside and he was convicted only for the offence under section 323 IPC and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500.00 only, the tribunal had rightly allowed the O.A. 6. Now the point for consideration is whether there are any grounds for allowing the writ petition. 7. The learned Tribunal in paragraph-8 of its order observed " the extracts of the counter affidavit above clearly show that the respondents themselves considered that the applicant was implicated in a criminal case by his neighbours. The remaining offence committed by the applicant was only causing simple hurt to a neighbour, as a result of burning of fire crackers. Firstly, such an offence cannot be considered to be one involving moral turpitude. Secondly,the respondents themselves agree that the applicant was implicated in a criminal case. Therefore, though initially the suspension was mandatory in view of the fact that the applicant was arrested and, therefore, the suspension could not have been termed as wholly unjustified at that point of time, the subsequent events as well as the averment of the third respondent itself that the applicant was implicated in a criminal case would render the action of the respondents in placing the applicant under suspension, as unnecessary and, therefore, by implication, unjustifiable in hindsight. Since the impugned proceedings have been passed after a lot of water has been flown under the bridge, the respondents ought to have kept in mind the fact that though the suespension was initially mandated by the rules, it cannot be said to be entirely justified. In those circumstances, the respondents ought to have treated the period of suspension in respect of the applicant as duty and allowed him the necessary pay and allowances for the said period." 8. We feel that this observation of the learned Tribunal is erroneous, in view of the facts of the case. The facts show that the respondent was involved in a serious offence of rioting and attacked neighbours with explosive substance. He was initially convicted for the offences under sections 323 read with 149 IPCand 148,448 IPC and also for the offence under section 3 of the explosive Substances Act read with S. 149 IPC and was convicted to rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under section 3 of Explosive Substances Act read with 149 IPC; to pay fine of RS.500.00 for the offence under section 323 read with 149 IPC and simple imprisonment for one year for the offence under section 148 and 448 IPC. During the course of appeal the main accused A-1 died; as such by some account of default, the petitioner was given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the major offenses under section 3 of Explosives Substance Act and S. 148, 448 red with 149 IPC. But, there is no dispute about his participation in the offence and his conviction for the offence under section 323 IPC alone would show the said fact. Merely because, the "word" implicated was loosely used in the counter filed on behalf of the respondents (the present petitioners), it cannot be treated that the respondent was falsely implicated, particularly, in view of the fact that the conviction was confirmed and the incident was accepted. 9. The observation of the learned Tribunal that the offence cannot be said to be one involving moral turpitude cannot also be accepted, as it is a case of attacking neighbours with deadly weapons like explosives, that, too, on account of a trivial incident of a dispute that arose on account of firing of crackers on Deepavali day. The fact that the respondent herein and 5 - 6 others attacked the entire family in a group by using deadly weapons can by no stretch of imagination be said to be one not involving moral turpitude. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent-applicant relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana1, where the person was convicted for an offence under section 294 IPC and sentenced to pay fine of RS.20.00 in a petty case. It was held that the offence is involving any moral turpitude. But a reading of the above judgment shows that the fact leading to the offence were not at all available. What all available was of the accused pleading guilty for the offence under section 294 IPC and of his paying fine of Rs.20.00. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that mere conviction for the offence under section 294 IPC and plea of guilty without there being no material with regard to the nature of allegations,no finding can be given to say that the offence was not one involving moral turpitude. Thus, the above decision is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case, where the entire record is available to show that he was involved in a serious offence and, in fact, he was initially convicted by the learned Sessions Judge for two serious offences, apart from one for which he conviction was confirmed. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on a decision of the Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. R.S. Naik2 contending that in a case where on account of pendency of criminal proceedings, the individual was initially suspended and when he was permitted to retire, the authorities are bound to treat the period of suspension as on duty regulating the benefits accrued from his service and that the period of suspension cannot be treated as suspension. In the above decision there is reference to Rule 101 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules and the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent could not bring to our notice any similar provision in the A.P. Civil Service Rules or any other relevant Rules. As such we are not inclined to rely on this judgment of Karnataka High Court. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent also relied on the decision of Allahabad High Court in Mritunjai Singh v. State of UP3, wherein it was held that an increment falling during the suspension period,which should be added to subsistence allowed. But this is not the substantial question involved in the present case. The Allahabad High Court discussed that for release of increments is subject to certain facts and no material is available in the present case to apply the above facts to the facts of the case on hand. 13. B.D. Gupta v. State of Haryana4 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the order if an order affects the employee financially, it must be passed after objective consideration and assessment of all relevant facts and after giving him full opportunity to make out his case. This case is also not applicable to the facts of the present case, in view of the fact that the petitioner has been activity following and participating in all the proceedings and has been filing OAs., from time to time challenging the orders passed against him. In all the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the learned tribunal in O.A.No. 1262 of 2003 erroneous and it is accordingly liable to be set aside. 14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed by setting aside the order passed by the learned A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A. 1262 of 2003 and by affirming G.O.Ms.No.24, HM & FW (K1) Department dated:14.2.2003. In the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs. ________________ V. ESWARAIAH, J. July 29, 2009. *BVS ______________________ P. SWAROOP REDDY, J. 11996 (4) SCC 17 21983 (3) SLR 285 31971SLR 523 4AIR 1972 SC 2472