IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Criminal Misc. No. M-28775 of 2011 (O&M) Date of Decision : 21.9.2011. Kulwant Singh ...... Petitioner Versus State of Punjab & another ...... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAWAB SINGH Present: Mr. S.S. Khaira, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. J.S. Bhullar, AAG, Punjab. NAWAB SINGH J. By this petition, under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, petitioner seeks quashing of First Information Report No.172 dated October 26th, 2005 under Sections 279 and 304-A of Indian Penal Code registered against him in Police Station Beas, Tehsil Baba Bakala District Amritsar on the ground that he has now compromised the matter with the complainant- 2. The legislature had in its wisdom identified the various offences in which it thought that a resolution of the dispute would be in the interest of the society. The provisions of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure deals with "compounding of offences". It provides two tables, one containing description of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it and the other containing description of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the Court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and none else. Sub-Section (9) of Section 320 of the Code imposes a ban in the following terms: "(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section." 3. While commenting upon Section 320 of the Code, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma vs. State & others 2008 Criminal Misc. No. M-28775 of 2011 (2) (4) RCR(Criminal) 827 has observed vide paragraph No.27 as under:- “Since Section 320 Cr.P.C. has clearly stated which offences are compoundable and which are not, the High Court or even this Court would not ordinarily be justified in doing something indirectly which could not be done directly. Even otherwise, it ordinarily would not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to direct doing something which the Cr.P.C. has expressly prohibited. Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. expressly states that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by that Section. Hence, in my opinion, it would ordinarily not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power to direct compounding of a non- compoundable offence.” 4. It was further observed in paragraph No.33:- “There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395, 307 or 304B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, Criminal Misc. No. M-28775 of 2011 (3) otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.” 5. Admittedly, the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC are non-compoundable. There is no scope for a Court of law permitting the compounding of such offences merely because the parties have decided to compromise the mater on behalf of a dead person. If the plea taken is accepted then the day is not far away when in a murder case complainant or eye witnesses compromising the matter with the accused will start filing petitions under Section 482 of the Code seeking quashing of the FIR on the basis of compromise. The kin of the victim has no right to compound the offences on behalf of the deceased. It is not a case where the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised as the quashing of FIR will not prevent the abuse of process of any Court rather it will be abuse of the provision of Section 482 of the Code itself. 6. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the law enunciated in Manoj Sharma's case (supra), there is no reason to quash the FIR on the basis of compromise. The petition is dismissed. (NAWAB SINGH) JUDGE 21.9.2011. SN