IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO : 799 of 2009 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 02/12/2004 in WP NO : 4418 OF 1995 on the file of the High Court.) Between: The Depot Manager, APSRTC., Tandur Depot, ranga Reddy District ..... APPELLANT AND 1 The Presiding Officer, AAALabour Court-III, Hyderabad 2 B. Brahmachary H. No. 19-87, Kodandarama Nagar, Near P&T Colony, Gaddiannaram, Hyderabad ..... RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellant: MR.K.MADHAVA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.2: MR.A.K.JAYAPRAKASH RAO The Division Bench of this Court made the following : Judgment follows 2nd page THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL No. 799 of 2009 J U D G M E N T : (Per the Hon’ble Smt. Justice T. Meenakumari) The writ appeal is filed against order dated 02-12-2004 passed in WP.No.4418 of 1993 by the learned single Judge, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that the Labour Court is entitled to exercise its inherent powers to correct the clerical omissions, errors or typographical omissions and that cannot be construed as review by itself. 2. The main writ petition was filed by the APSRTC questioning the order dated 11-8-1993 passed by the Labour Court- III, Hyderabad, in I.A.No. 129 of 1993 in I.D.No. 82 of 1992. 3. It has been argued before us and also before the learned single Judge that it is a case where the second respondent was terminated from service and the second respondent raised Industrial dispute questioning his termination order dated 12-5-1986. After considering the material on record, the Labour Court passed an award and set aside the impugned termination notice and directed to reinstate the second respondent with continuity of service and attendant benefits from the date of application of the award but however the Labour court awarded 1/3rd of backwages from the date of suspension till the date of removal. 4. It has been contended before the learned single Judge that the Labour court has no power whatsoever to amend the award and it amounts to virtually reviewing the award of the Labour Court. The learned Judge after hearing both parties observed that there is a typographical omission, which lead to ambiguity in implementation of the award and it is always open for the Labour Court to correct typographical omissions that cannot be constructed as review by itself. 5. Now the learned standing counsel for the appellant- corporation relied upon a judgment in SANGHAM TAPE CO. V/s. HANS RAJ [1], to substantiate his contention and he argued that when once the award becomes enforceable, the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court becomes functus officio. The learned standing counsel for the appellant-corporation further submitted that when once the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the industrial adjudication, indisputably the provisions of Order-9, Rule-13 thereof would be attracted. But unlike an ordinary civil court, the Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts have limited jurisdiction in that behalf. While an Industrial Court will have jurisdiction to set aside an exparte award but having regard to the provision contained in Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an application therefore must be filed before the expiry of thirty days from the publication thereof. Till then, the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and only upto that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. 6. Having heard the learned standing counsel for the appellant-corporation on the reliance placed hereinabove, it appears that the above decision is applicable when it is an exparte award. But however, in this case, it is not an exparte award and the facts of the above case are not applicable to the facts of this case for the reason that it is not an exparte award, as the Labour Court after hearing both sides clarified the ambiguity stating that it is only a typographical omission, which lead to ambiguity in implementation process. In view of the above, the reliance placed by the learned standing counsel cannot be limited to the extent of saying that the Tribunals or Labour Courts have no jurisdiction to correct award because what was sought to be corrected is to set right the ambiguity in the sentence and that inherent powers can always be exercised by the Labour Court to correct the typographical/clerical omissions. The reliance placed by the learned standing counsel is applicable in case where an Industrial Court will have jurisdiction to set aside an exparte award. But in our opinion, it is a typographical omission. As observed by the learned single Judge that the Labour Court is entitled to exercise inherent powers to correct the clerical omissions, errors or typographical omissions, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge in dismissing the writ petition. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ___________________________ JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI ____________________ JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR 22-6-2009. I s L [1] ) (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases-331