IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA SECOND APPEAL NO. 83 OF 2008 SMT. TILLOTAMA AHER ... Appellant Versus SHRI. SITARAM WADKAR (DECEASED) THROUGH LR'S ... Respondent Mr. D. Pangam, Advocate for the Appellant. Coram:- N. A. BRITTO, J. Date:- 30th July, 2008 P.C.:- Heard Mr. D. Pangam, learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant. The Appellant is the Plaintiff in R.C.S. No.19/1996. The Plaintiff and the Defendant have their agricultural properties. The Defendant's property is surveyed under No.36/14 and that of the Plaintiff is surveyed under No.36/3. There is a rivulet on the other side of Defendant's property surveyed under No.36/14. The Plaintiff filed the suit for permanent injunction to restrain the Defendant from interfering with the pipeline laid by the Plaintiff to draw water from the said rivulet through the property of the Defendant to irrigate the Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff also claimed a right of way. The learned trial Court by Judgment dated 14-6-2004 dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff, inter alia, observing that:- "Learned Advocate Shri R. Sardessai, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Damodar Vassudev Shirodkar and others v.Smt. Hirabai Vassant Kenkre,1998(1) G.L.T. page 2, argues that in order to claim easementary right through the property of the defendant, it is essential that the right should be exercised peaceably, openly and as of right without interruption for 20 years and in the absence of such a claim, no easementary right can be acquired in terms of Section 15 of Indian Easement Act, 1882. In the case at hand, the plaintiff has not pleaded that she is using the pathway openly, peaceably, and as of right. Also, it is the case of the plaintiff that she started using the pathway since the year 1979, and this suit is filed on 28.10.1996. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is using the pathway for a period of twenty years. Thus it cannot be said that the plaintiff has acquired any easement by prescription". In appeal filed by the Plaintiff, the learned first Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the said pipeline was not laid in the year 1979-1980 as claimed by the Plaintiff, but the dispute between them arose somewhere in December, 1995 just before the filing of the Civil Suit i.e. on or about 28-10-1996. The learned first Appellate Court also observed that the sale deed of the Plaintiff dated 4-5-1979 ought to have mentioned that the previous owner had reserved a right to the Plaintiff in respect of the suit pathway but the sale deed was silent on that aspect. The learned first Appellate Court also observed that the facts stated by the Plaintiff were not pleaded in the plaint inasmuch as there was no pleading that the suit pathway was existed prior to the property was purchased by the Plaintiff. The learned first Appellate Court further observed that there was absolutely no averment as to what kind of rights the Plaintiff was claiming by the suit pathway i.e. whether it is an easement or whether it was an easement by prescription or necessity or whether it was an absolute easement or quasi easement. Learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff submits that in view of Section 13 of the Easements Act, 1882, it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to have pleaded what sort of easement the Plaintiff was claiming over the Defendant's property. Learned Counsel further submits that it could be gathered from the reading of the plaint that the Plaintiff was claiming the right as easement of necessity. These submissions are unacceptable. Courts have always frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence. No amount of evidence can cure the basic defect in pleadings. Pleadings do not only define the issues between the parties for a final decision but also manifest and exert their importance throughout the trial. They show on their face whether a reasonable cause of action or defence is disclosed or not. It was therefore, necessary for the Plaintiff to set out in the plaint what exact right he was claiming through the Defendant's property and in the absence of that no evidence produced by the Plaintiff could be looked into. That was also necessary so that the Defendant could adequately defend the right claimed. The Plaintiff purchased the property by sale deeds dated 25-11-1970 and 18-2-1977 and the Defendant purchased the property subsequently by sale deed dated 4-5-1979. Plaintiff must have been certainly aware that she had no access to the said rivulet. The action of the Plaintiff first to lay a pipeline through Defendant's property and then file a suit for injunction to restrain the Defendant from interfering with the pipeline was to say the least, very high handed. Both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff can have no right as claimed by the Plaintiff over the property of the Defendant. These are concurrent findings of facts rendered by the Courts below on appreciation of the evidence produced. There is no substantial question of law involved in this Second Appeal. The same is hereby dismissed. N. A. BRITTO, J. RD.