IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.SIRI JAGAN THURSDAY, THE 26TH NOVEMBER 2009 / 5TH AGRAHAYANA 1931 WP(C).No. 34020 of 2009() ------------------------- PETITIONER(S): --------------- THE SECRETARY, KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, VYDYUTHI BHAVANAM, PATTOM, TRIVANDRUM. BY ADV. SRI.N.N.SUGUNAPALAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE SRI.S.SUJIN RESPONDENT(S): --------------- 1. SMT. ELSY PAUL, W/O. LATE M.V.PAUL, MULAVARIKKAPALLIPADAM, P.O.ATHIYODI, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT. 2. THE DISTRICT LABOUR OFFICER, KOZHIKODE. (CONTROLLING AUTHORITY UNDER THE PAYAMENT OF GRATUITY ACT 1972) 3. THE REGIONAL JOINT LABOUR COMMISSIONER KOZHIKODE (THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY UNDER THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972) GOVT. PLEADER SRI. K.C. SANTHOSH KUMAR. THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 26/11/2009, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: S. Siri Jagan, J. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= W. P (C) No. 34020 of 2009 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Dated this, the 26th November, 2009. J U D G M E N T The petitioner in this writ petition is the Kerala State Electricity Board. They are challenging Exts.P6 and P7 orders of the controlling authority and the appellate authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The 1st respondent herein, namely, the widow of a retired employee of the Kerala State Electricity Board, filed an application for balance gratuity payable to her late husband under the Payment of Gratuity Act. That application itself was filed on the basis of a judgment of this Court holding that employees of the Kerala State Electricity Board are entitled to full amount of gratuity as calculated under the Payment of Gratuity Act. That application was filed belatedly by about 5 years. But the controlling authority chose to condone the delay in filing the same and to allow the gratuity application filed by the 1st respondent based on a Division Bench decision of this Court holding that the Payment of Gratuity Act is applicable to employees of the Board. 2. Ext. P6 order is dated 28-6-2005. The petitioner filed the appeal against that order in 2007 along with a petition to condone delay. That was dismissed by the appellate authority refusing to condone delay in filing the same. That order is dated 25-11-2008. The petitioner has filed this writ petition, after a period of one year, challenging that order, on the ground that the 1st respondent is guilty of unexplained delay and laches and the Controlling Authority ought not to have therefore condoned the delay. 3. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for W.P.C. No. 34020/09 -: 2 :- the petitioner. 4. Fist of all, it ill fits the petitioner who themselves are guilty of laches not only in filing the appeal before the appellate authority late, but also in challenging the order of the appellate authority before this Court, to contend that the 1st respondent was guilty of delay and laches in filing the gratuity claim. In any event, under the proviso to Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the appellate authority has power to condone delay only up to 60 days. Section 7(7) reads thus: “7. Determination of the amount of gratuity:- xx xx xx (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.” It is settled law that when the statute prescribes an upper time limit for condonation of delay, this Court cannot, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, enlarge that period and condone the delay. 5. In Commissioner of Sales-tax, U.P. v. Parson Tools and W.P.C. No. 34020/09 -: 3 :- Plants, Kanpur, (1995) 35 STC 413, the Supreme Court held thus: “Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum only up to a specified time limit and no further then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation an application filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.” Relying on the said decision, this Court has, in Asst. Commr. of Central Excise v. Krishna Poduval, 2005(4) KLT 947, held thus in paragraph 7: “At the outset we may state that in so far as the respondents have not taken up the original orders imposing penalty in appeals before the appellate authority within the maximum period prescribed under Section 85(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 they cannot get the appeal revived and heard on merits by resorting to the discretionary remedy before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once the period of limitation has run itself out and the appellate authority does not have power to condone the delay in filing the appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed under the Act, the remedies of the appellants come to an end just like in the case of a time barred suit and the respondents cannot, by invoking the discretionary remedy under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, resurrect their unenforceable cause of action and require this Court to consider their contentions against the original orders on merit. That would amount to defeating the very law of limitation which we are not expected to do under Art. 226. If we are to entertain the contentions of the respondents on merits, that would amount to negating the law of limitation which we have no jurisdiction to do under Article 226 and which may even lead no anomalous results. We are not satisfied that the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is so wide as to resurrect a cause of action which has become unenforceable on account of the law of limitation. Further, we are of the firm opinion that the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be W.P.C. No. 34020/09 -: 4 :- invoked against express statutory provisions, however harsh the effect of the provisions may be on an assessee or litigant.” The ratio of those decisions apply on all fours to the facts of this case. In the above circumstances, this writ petition is without any merit and accordingly the same is dismissed. Sd/- S. Siri Jagan, Judge. Tds/ [True copy] P.S to Judge.