HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU Crl.A.No.1774 of 2009 DATED: 21.12.2009 Between:- The State of A.P. rep. By the Public Prosecutor .. Appellant And Totakuri Vijaya Rajeswara Prasad .. Respondent/ Accused JUDGMENT:- This Criminal Appeal is preferred by the State against the Judgment, dated 31-12-2005 delivered in C.C. No. 804 of 2000 by III Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Warangal, whereunder and whereby, the respondent-accused was acquitted of the offence under Section 7(i) and 2(ia)(m) punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short “the Act”). 2. The case of the complainant i.e. the Food Inspector, Warangal, in brief, is that on 16.11.1999, at about 11.00 A.M., he visited the business premises of A1, who is the respondent herein, along with his Attender. On suspicion that 20 sealed packets each weighing one kilogram containing Kishan Annapurna Iodized Salt, which were meant for sale for human consumption, are adulterated, he purchased one packet by paying the price. After dividing the same into 3 equal parts, a sample was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, who in turn sent his report opining that the salt was adulterated as it contains iron filings. Thereafter, the complainant submitted the details of the case to the State Food (Health) Authority seeking written consent to launch prosecution against A1 and A2, who is the nominee of M/s. Super Salt Ltd., Meghnad, After obtaining written consent from the State Food (Health) Authority, the complainant lodged a complaint against the accused before III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Warangal. 3. The case was taken cognizance by the learned Magistrate for the offence Under Section 7(1) and 2(ia)(m) punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. Even though Non-Bailable Warrant was issued against A2, the complainant could not execute the same since long time, as such, the case against A2 was split into C.C. No.16 of 2005. 4. When A1 was examined under Section 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence under Section 7(1) and 2(ia)(m) of the Act, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. To substantiate the charge leveled against A1, who is the respondent herein, the prosecution got examined PWs.1 and 2 and marked Exs.P1 to P31 on his behalf. DW1 was examined and Ex.D1 was got marked on behalf of the defence. 6. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, found the accused not guilty, and accordingly, acquitted him of the charged offence. Challenging the same, the complainant-State has filed the present Criminal Appeal. 7. Now, the point for determination is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the respondent-A1 for the offence Under Section 7(1) and 2(ia)(m) punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act, beyond all reasonable doubt? 8. There is a presumption under law that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. Ordinarily, the appellate Court would be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal not for the reason it has no power to re- appreciate the evidence. Unless the finding of the trial Court is shown to be perverse or contrary to law and not based on evidence, this Court would not interfere with the same. 9. The complainant lifted the sample of food on 16.11.1999 at about 11.00 A.M. after following the due procedure and sent it for analysis to the Public Analyst, who opined that it contained iron filings, and therefore, adulterated. Lifting the sample, sending the same to the Public Analyst after following the due procedure and the report of the Public Analyst are not in dispute. The contention of the respondent-A1 is that he purchased the article of food from A2 under Ex.D1 – bill, and was selling it in the same condition as he purchased it from A2. 10. Section 19(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, reads as under: “A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves: a) that he purchased the article of food i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer. ii) In any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it.” From the above provision, it is clear that the burden rests on the accused to prove that he purchased the article of food from the distributor and the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it. This aspect has been clearly proved by the respondent-A1. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to the decision rendered by this Court in a judgment reported in Food Inspector Vs. Araveti Gopinath[1] wherein it is held to the following effect: “Therefore, from the evidence of PW1 itself it is clear that the accused was selling the coffee powder in the same condition in which it was purchased by him. As the accused produced the bill, notices were sent to the manufacturer but they were returned unserved. So for non-service of the notices on the manufacturer, the accused cannot be mulcted with the responsibility. In view of the provisions of Section 19(2) of the Food Adulteration Act the accused cannot be prosecuted.” 11. The evidence of DW1 is practically remained unchallenged with regard to the warranty. Therefore, from the evidence, it is clear that the respondent-A1 stored the article of food purchased from A2 and he was selling it in the same condition as he purchased from A2. 12. Further, there was delay of one year on the part of the prosecution in lodging the complaint. The article of food can be best used within a period of six months from the date of manufacturing. No doubt, A1 did not avail his right of sending the second sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory conferred under Section 13(2) of the Act, but, at the same time, no useful purpose would be served in making such request by virtue of the delay of nearly one year. Therefore, the trial Court, after elaborate consideration of the evidence on record, rightly acquitted the accused and there are no compelling circumstances or substantial reasons to interfere with the judgment impugned in this appeal. 13. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. ______________ K.C. BHANU, J. 21st December, 2009 bcj [1] 2003(2) ALD (Crl.) 620 (AP)