t' HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH_: BILASPUR Writ PetitiQn(L) No. 4559 of 2006 Petitioners 1. State of Chhattisgarh, tbrough Secretaiy, Tribal aad . Scheduled Caste Welfare Department, Mautralaya Bhawaa, Raipur, Chliattisgarh. 2. Block Development Of&cer, Tribal Block, Pendrei (now Chief Executive Officer, Jaapad Panchayat Pcndra), Distnct Bilaspur, Chliattisgarh Versus Respondents 1. Rajesh Kuinar Kashyap, S/o Shri Loinesh Ram, R/o Patganva, via-Pendra., District Bflaspur Chhattisgarh. 2. Presiding Ofiicer, Labour Court, Bilaspur (C.G.) WRIT PETITON UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONST1TUTION OF INDIA. . (SB: Hon^ile Shri Satish K. Agnihotri J.) Shri M. P. S. Bhatia, Depuly Govt. Advocate for the petitioners. Shri S. P. Kssle, Advocate for fhe icspondent No.l. ORDER (Passed on this 24th Day ofMarch, 2009) 1. The petitioner impugas the order dated 8.5.1996 (Aiuiexure P/l), passed by the Labour Court, BUaspur iu Case No. 11/I.D.A./92 (Ref.) (Rajesh Kumar Kashyap Vs. Vikas Khaiid Adhikari). 2. The brieffacts, in nutshell, are that. oa a reference made by fb.e Deputy Labour Coiainissiouer, Raipur by order dated 28.1.1992, fhe Case No. 11/I.D.A./92 (Ref) was registered iu the Labour Court, Bilaspur. The respondent No. l (Rajesh Kuiuar Kashyap) filed Uis stateuient of claim in fhe Labour Court, Bilaspur. It was aven-ed fhat he was appointed on fhe post of driver on 12.7.1989. Even after rendermg satisfactory services, wifhout any show cause notice and wifhout coinpliauce of fhe provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Y' Disputes Act, 1947 he was terminated fi-oiu. seryice on 8.4.1990. After issuiug notice and after affordiug an opportunily to lead oral and- dociuaentary evidences, fhe Labour Court by iinpugned order dated 8.5.1996 aflowed fhe appUcation filed by fhe respoadent No.l and directed reiustatement of fhe respondent No. 1 wifhiu one monfh with full back wages. The petitioners have filed ttus petition atter a period of raore thau 10 yeara Ironi the date of the oider passed by the Labour Court. TIiere is no explauation or justification for such iuordiuate delay and belated approach of fhe petitioners. In para 4 offhe writ petition fhe petitioners have stated as under: "That fhe delay cause in the uistant petition is due to official procediires required iu obtaining fhe saaction of fhe ;ovenunent for filting a case before the Hon'ble Court. That the saactioa was grauted on 13.2.2006 after which fhe Officer-In-Charge of fhe case was appoiated. That fhe delay caused is due to boiia-fide reasons aad fhere is no lualice. Therefore, it is prayed that the case be heard on zuerits." The impugned award was passed on 8.5.1996. The petitioners have filed this petition on 22.8.2006 i.e. after a period ofin.ore thaa ten years aad thj-ee inonfhs. Leamed coTinsel appearmg for fhe petitioner subruits fhat about ten years was taken in obtaming . of&cial sanctiou, which could be obtained on 13.2.2006. The explanation oflered by fhe petitioners appears to have beea subinitted in. a niost casual maaner, which is far from the satisfaction. In fact, there is no explauation for such a long iaordinate delay. 5. In U. P. Jal Nigaaa and another vs. Jasbwant Slngh aad aaother1 fhe Supreine Cozirt observed fhat *The question of delay and laches has been examaied by this Court io. a series of decisions and laches aad delay has been considered to be au iuiportaiit factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 offhe Constitution." 6. Hon'ble Supreme Court ia Tridip Kuinar Diagal and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others2, where tbe appellants took 559 days in approaching £he Court, causiag unexplained and iuordinate delay, it was observed fhat "We are uiiable to uphold fhe conteution. It is no doiibt true fhat fhere can be no waiver offundaruental right. Butwhile exercising discretionai5r jurisdiction uiider Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes iato account certain fa.ctors and one ofsuch considerations is delay and laches on ttie part of the appUcan.t in approaching a writ court. It is weU settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refasiae reliefs under Ardcle 32 or 226 offhe Constitution is "^ that the petitioner is guflty ofdelay and laches."v'~^, 7. In Tridlp Kumar Dingal and others (supra) fhe Hon'ble Supreiae Court also observed, as under; "57. If fhe petitioner waats to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he shouM coine to the Court at fhe earUest reasonably possible opportuzuty. Inoidiaate delay in majang the niotion for a writ will indeed be a good grouad for refasing to exercise such discretionaiy jurisdiction. The underiyiug object of fhis principle is not to exicourage agitation of stale claims aad exhuiue raatters which have {(2006) 11 SCC464} {(2009) 1 SCC768} alrcady been disposed of or settled or where the ri^hts of fbird paraes have accrued ia fhe niearituae (vMe State of M.P. v BhaUal Bhai, Moon Mflls Ltd. v. Industrial Court aad Bhoop Singli v. Union oflndia). This prmciple applies even in case of aa infriugeiaent of fiuidamental right (vide TUokchaad Motichaad v. H.B.Muiishi, Durga Prashad v. Chief ControUer of Iiaports & Exports and Rabiadranah Bose v. Uiiion oflndia). 8. It was furfher observed in Tridip Kumar Dingal and others (supra) that "There is no upper lunit and there fa no lower 1imit as to when a person caa approach a court. The question is one of discretion aad has to be decided on fhe basis offacts before fhe cburt dependiag on aad varying irom case to case. It wfll depend upon what ftie breach of fundaraental right and the . remedy claiined are and when and how the delay arose." 9. In Yuaus (Baboobhai) A Hamtd Padvehar v. State of Maharashtra3 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed fhat "Delay or laclies is one of the factors which is to be bome ia uaiad by the High Court when fhey exercise fbeir discretioiiary powers. In au appropriate case fhe High Court inay refuse to irivoke its extraordinary powers if fhere is such negl^ence or omissiou on the part of the appUcaut to assert his right as takeu iu conjunction with fhe lapse of tmie and ofher circunistances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. 10. InR.Il. Bose Vs. Union of ludia4 , relied on in Yunus (supra) it was observed that no reUef can be given to the petitloner who without any reasonable explaDation approaches fhe Court after inordiaate delay. 3 (JT 2009 (3) SC 487) < ^IR 1970 SC 470) ^:.^-^.,.,- //' 11, 12. 13. 14. In State of M.P. Vs. Nandlal8 , reUed on m Yunus (supra), it was stated that the H^h Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist fb.e'tardy aad the iadolent or fhe acquiescent aud the lefhargic. If fhere is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner aad such delay is riot satislactorily explaiaed, tfae High Court inay decline to iatervene aad grant relief iu exercise of its writ jurisdictioii. It was also observed fhat it'writjurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it niay have fhe effect of inflictnig not only hardship and uiconvenience but also iujustice on third parties, When writ jurisdiction is iavoked, ruiexplained delay coupled with the creation of fhud party rights in fhe ineaatiine is au important tactor which also weighs with the High Court in decidiag whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. This Court, on 30.8.2006 while issuiag notice to fhe respondent No.l/eniployee, stayed the effect aud operatiou of the impugned order subject to coinpUaace of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. If the petition is considered on inerits at fhis tixne, it wiU gravely prejudice fhe right offhe respondent No.l/employee. In view of fhe foregoiag, fhe petition deserves to be and is disinissed. The interun order passed on 30.8.2006 stands vacated. In the facts of fhe case, there shall be no order asto costs. .Thakur Sd/- Satish K. AgniJiotri Judge (AJR 1987 SC 251) L