IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD THURSDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4584 of 2010 BETWEEN Nandyala Rama Krishna Reddy. ... PETITIONER AND M/s. Khammam Granites Pvt. Ltd. ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Petitioner : MR. V. RAMAKRISHNA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent: MR. C.R. SRIDHARAN The Court made the following: ORDER: This revision is at the instance of the plaintiff, who has filed a suit O.S.No.139 of 2009 for mandatory and perpetual injunction against the defendant. 2. For better appreciation of the controversy, the prayer in the suit is appropriate to be extracted: a) to direct the defendant company to issue permits by receiving royalty as agreed to enable the plaintiff to supply the raw material to the industries of plaintiff by granting mandatory injunction. b) to restrain the defendant company, its employees, servants, subordinates, agents and all other persons claiming through it from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property in any manner. c) to award costs of the suit; and d) to grant any other relief or reliefs for which the Hon’ble court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice. Along with the said suit, an application for temporary injunction being I.A.No.606 of 2009 was moved by the plaintiff seeking to restrain the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment over the petition schedule property. 3. The defendant contested the suit by contending that the Government of Andhra Pradesh granted mining lease dated 31.01.1997 with effect from 29.12.1996, in their favour for a period of 15 years, valid up to 28.12.2011. The defendant claimed that while they were in enjoyment of the said leased property, the petitioner approached and offered to obtain a licence. Accordingly, the defendant executed a licence in his favour under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allegedly in the year 2004 on the terms and conditions agreed to by the parties. The said MOU, which was initially for a period of two years, is said to have expired on 31.05.2009. Thereafter, the defendant terminated the said MOU and the plaintiff is said to have taken away all the heavy machinery from the leased land but left certain tools therein. It is in those circumstances that the defendant claimed to have issued a legal notice dated 05.06.2009 to the plaintiff requiring him to take away the tools lying on the leased premises. However, the petitioner/plaintiff filed the present suit for mandatory and perpetual injunction on or about 08.06.2009 and obtained temporary injunction. 4. The aforesaid application for temporary injunction was contested by the defendant and the trial Court under its order dated 01.06.2010 came to the conclusion that the notice issue by the defendant marked as Ex.A1, referred to above, admits the possession of the plaintiff and consequently, granted injunction. On appeal being C.M.A.No.14 of 2010, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the license, as claimed by the plaintiff, admittedly, was not extended beyond 31.05.2009 and even otherwise, the said document is neither produced nor marked. The lease, admittedly, being in favour of the defendant, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that there is neither any prima facie case nor any balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff and consequently, it has vacated the injunction by allowing the appeal by judgment dated 10.08.2010, which is questioned in this revision. 5. While admitting this revision petition, this Court by order dated 08.10.2010 granted interim suspension for a limited period and the same continued till further order was passed by this Court on 09.11.2010, by which both the parties were restrained from operating the quarry and the revision itself was directed to be listed for hearing. After several adjournments, the revision petition is being heard and disposed of by this order. 6. Heard both sides. 7. First and foremost, I am unable to see any case made out by the petitioner/plaintiff to substantiate either prima facie case or balance of convenience. Even as per the plaint allegations, the arrangement under which the petitioner/plaintiff claimed to be a licensee is not produced before the Courts below. Further, the defendant being the admitted lessee under the Government of Andhra Pradesh and there being a prohibition under clause (5) of Ex.R2 - agreement from subletting or otherwise assigning or parting with the possession of the leased property operating against the defendant, the alleged lease or for that matter the license or the claim for being in exclusive possession by the petitioner/plaintiff, appears to be clearly opposed to Ex.R2, as above. Even otherwise and even assuming that there was a subsisting MOU in favour of petitioner and further assuming that the same has been breached by the defendant, in my opinion the only remedy for the petitioner is to seek damages. The relief prayed for in the suit shows that the petitioner is seeking enforcement of the said MOU under the guise of a suit for mandatory and perpetual injunction. 8. As mentioned above, in the absence of any prima facie case showing any legal right in favour of the petitioner, as against the admitted right of the defendant as lessee under the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the grant of injunction in favour of the petitioner by the trial Court was itself erroneous. The lower appellate Court was justified in vacating the same and I see no error committed by the lower appellate Court warranting any correction under revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The balance of convenience, undoubtedly, is against the petitioner, as there is no documentary or other evidence in his favour to support his claim for temporary injunction. The revision, being, therefore, clearly devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed. The civil revision petition is accordingly dismissed. However, as requested by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the trial Court is directed to determine the suit expeditiously within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner undertakes to cooperate with the trial Court. There shall be no order as to costs. ____________________ VILAS V. AFULPURKAR, J February 24, 2011 DSK