1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR ORDER S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.5007/2008 {Smt. Paramjeet Kaur & Others Versus Rohitash Kumar & Others} Date of Order :: 11th December, 2008 PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN Mr. Ram Sharan Sharma for the appellants BY THE COURT: Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 2. The legal heirs of deceased Harvendra Singh have preferred this appeal for enhancement of the amount of compensation in respect of his death on 12th April, 2004 arising out of use of motor vehicle and being aggrieved with the impugned award dated 7th March, 2007 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Fast Track), Kotputli, whereby the learned Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs. 3,79,000/- with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of claim application i.e. 5th July, 2004 in their favour as under: Rs. 3,36,000/- for loss of income Rs. 5000/- for funeral expenses Rs. 10,000/- for loss of consortium to wife 2 Rs. 20,000/- for deprivation of love and affection to children Rs. 3,000/- for loss of estate Rs. 5,000/- for transportation 3. The only submission of learned counsel for the appellant is in respect of multiplier adopted by the learned Tribunal while calculating the amount of compensation. It is contended that in the claim application the age of deceased was mentioned as 40 years, but it was wrongly determined as 45 years by the learned Tribunal. It is further contended that even if the age of deceased is determined as 45 years, then at-least the multiplier of 15 ought to have been applied in place of 14 as per Second Schedule. He, therefore, contended that amount of compensation may be enhanced accordingly. 4. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and examined the impugned award in the light of the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. 5. So far as determination of age of deceased is concerned, the learned Tribunal has considered the oral and documentary evidence including he postmortem report and inquest 3 report, wherein the age of deceased was mentioned as 45 years and, accordingly, the Tribunal recorded a finding that deceased was 45 years of age at the time of accident. I do not find any illegality in the finding of the learned Tribunal in this regard. So far as multiplier of 14 adopted by the learned Tribunal is concerned, I find that as per Second Schedule appended with Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the multiplier of 15 is applied, where the age of victim is above 40 years but not exceeding 45 years and multiplier of 14 is applied where the age of victim is above 45 years but not exceeding 50 years. The learned Tribunal after recording the age of deceased as 45 years applied the multiplier of 14 and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 3,36,000/- under the head of loss of income. In my view the Tribunal was fully justified in applying the multiplier of 14 in the facts and circumstances of the present case and I do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The Tribunal has further awarded the compensation under different heads as mentioned above and has awarded total compensation of Rs. 3,79,000/- for death of Harvendra Singh in 4 favour of claimants, which in my view, appears to be just, fair and reasonable looking to the age and income of the deceased. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC Versus Mahadeva Shetty and Another {(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 197} has held that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be “just” and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of “just” compensation which is the pivotal consideration. The expression “just” denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Para 15 of the judgment is as under: “It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which to it appears to be 'just'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance 5 to the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for the mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has be to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a wind fall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses 6 and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non- arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just.” 7. In view of above discussion, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed in limine. (NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN),J. DK