1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 1788 OF 2009 M/s. G.S.L. (India) Ltd. ........Petitioners versus The State of Maharashtra & ors ........Respondents. Mr. Ashok M. Saraogi adv. for the Petitioners. Mrs. Revati Mohite Dere adv. for the Respondents. Mrs. S.V. Gajare APP for State CORAM: B. R. GAVAI, J. DATED : 15th February, 2010. P.C.: 1. The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India so also under sec. 482 of Cr.P.C., takes an exception to the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Mumbai dated 16-5-2009 thereby dismissing the revision field by the present petitioner which arose out of the order passed by the learned A.C.M.M. Bellard Pier, Bombay in case No. 1180/S/99 vide which the process was issued by the learned Magistrate against the present petitioner and the respondent nos. 3 and 4. 2. Two grounds are raised by the learned counsel in support of the petition. (i) that though a complaint has been filed for dishonour of the cheque which amounts to Rs.8,44,674/-, in the notice on the basis of which the complaint came to be filed a 2 demand was made for an amount of Rs. 15,89,348/-. (ii) the verification in so far as the allegation against the respondent nos. 2 and 3 is concerned, is mechanical in nature and not answering the requirement of section 141 of N.I.Act. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submitted that the figure of Rs.15,89,348/- in the demand notice was a typographical mistake occurring in the office of the counsel for respondent no.2. It is submitted that however since the cheque amount has been specifically stated in the notice, no prejudice has been caused to the present petitioner. The learned counsel further relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Subramanium Sethuraman Vs. State of Maharashtra & anr. in Cri. Appeal No.1253 of 2002, any interference is not warranted and there is no option than to take the trial to its logical end. 4. In so far as the first contention of the petitioner is concerned the cheque amount has been specifically mentioned in the notice i.e. Rs. 8,44,674/-. Without going into the question as to whether the amount of Rs. 15,89,348/- has been mentioned by a typographical mistake, I find that the said contention would also not be available to the petitioner., The Apex Court in case of Suman Sethi Vs. Ajay K. Churiwal & anr reported in (2000) 2 SCC 380 has observed thus: 3 “7. There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the entire section as a whole and applying common sense, from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in a notice under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque amount. According to Dr. Dhavan the notice of demand should not contain anything more or less than what is due under the cheque. 8. It is a well settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the “said amount” i.e. the cheque amount. If no such demand is made the notice no doubt would fall short of its legal requirement. Where in addition to the “said amount” there is also a claim by way of interest, cost etc. Whether the notice is bad would depend on the language of the notice. If in a notice while giving the break up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, da,ages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and these additional claims would be referable and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonoured cheque, the notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad. 9. This court had occasion to deal with section 138 of the Act in Central Bank of India Vs. Saxons Farms and held that the object of the notice is to give a chance to the drawer f the cheque to rectify his omission. Though in the notice demand for compensation, interest, cost etc, is also made the drawer will be absolved from his liability under section 138 if he makes the payment of the amount covered by the cheque of which he was aware within 125 days from the date of receipt of the notice or before the complaint is filed. 4 10. In Section 138 the legislature clearly stated that for the dishonoured cheque the drawer shall be liable for conviction if the demand is not met within 15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other provision of the Act. If the cheque amount is paid within the above period or before the complaint is filed the legal liability under section 138 will cease and for recovery of other demands as compensation, costs, interest etc., a civil proceeding will lie. Therefore if in a notice any other sum is indicated in addition to the “said amount” the notice cannot be faulted, as stated above.” 5. It can thus clearly be seen that the Apex court in the said case has held that even if any other sum is mentioned in the notice in addition to the amount of the dishonoured cheque, the notice cannot be faulted. The Apex court in clear words has held that the provisions of section 138 are clear and are concerned only with the amount of dishonoured cheque. In the present case the amount of dishonoured cheque has clearly been specified in the notice. It can thus be clearly seen that no prejudice is caused to the petitioner in as much as the petitioner is aware about the amount of the dishonoured cheque. I find that the present case is squarely covered by the law laid down by the Apex court in the aforesaid case. 6. In so far as the second ground raised regarding the verification is concerned, it can be seen that what is required under sec. 141 of N.I.Act is that when an offence is against a company, the names of the persons who were incharge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the company have to be specified. 5 The verification clearly states that accused nos.2 and 3 are responsible to the respondent no.1 in the conduct of business of accused no.1. I therefore find that the averments so as to satisfy the requirements of section 141 have specifically been made in the verification. 7. Apart from that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 in so far as the maintainability of the present petition is concerned are well merited. The Apex court in the case of Subramaium Sethuraman has observed thus : “The next challenge of the learned counsel for the appellant made to the finding of the High Court that once a plea is recorded in a summons case it is not open to the accused person to seek a discharge cannot also be accepted. The case involving a summons case is covered by Chapter XX of the Code which does not contemplates a stage of discharge like section 239 which provides fr a discharge in a warrant case. Therefore in our opinion the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion once the plea of the accused is recorded under section 252 of the Code the procedure contemplated under Chapter XX has to be followed which is to take the trial to its logical conclusion.” 8. In that view of the matter, no merit is found in the present petition. The same is therefore dismissed. 9. Needless to state that the observations made by the revisional court as also by this court are prima facie in nature and 6 the learned trial court would not take into consideration the above observations at the time of trial. (B.R. Gavai, J.)