IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.4938 of 2007 Shrikant Singh son of Shri Ram Eqbnal Singh, Resident of Village- Saphi, police Station- Turkaulia, District- East Champaran --- Petitioner. Versus 1. The State of Bihar 2. The District Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari 3. The Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Motihari, East Champaran 4. Ramnath Singh, son of Late Ram Prasad Singh, Resident of Village- Saphi, Police Station- Tuyrkauli, District- East Champaran ---- Respondents. ------- 5. 4.2.2009 Heard Mr. Raghib Hasan for the petitioner, Mr. Mithilesh Kumar Upadhya, learned Standing Counsel No.2(Ceiling), for respondent nos. 1 to 3, and Mr. Mukesh Sinha for respondent no.4 (Ramnath Singh). This writ petition is directed against the following orders: (i) dated 16.3.2007 (Annexure-5), passed by the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Sadar, Motihari, East Champaran, in Land Ceiling Case No. 05/06-07 (Ramnath Singh Vrs. Shri Kant Singh) and (ii) dated 16.3.2007 (Annexure-5/1), passed by the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Sadar, Motihari, East Champaran, in Land Ceiling Case No. 06/06-07. The two orders have been passed in two different proceedings under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereby the wives of the 2 pre-emptor and the purchaser have been added as a co-applicant and opposite party respectively. The purchaser is the petitioner against the order directing addition of parties. According to the writ petition, the petitioner purchased 10 dhurs of land of Plot no. 1204, appertaining to Khata No.155, situate at Village Saphi, Police Station- Turkaulia, District- West Champaran, from Ranjit Singh. The petitioner conveyed the same by a registered deed of gift executed on 13.10.2006, and registered on 13.11.2006 (Annexure-1), in favour of his wife. Respondent no.4 herein filed an application under section 16(3) of the Act claiming pre-emption with respect to the land purchased by the petitioner. The application under section 16(3) of the Act was filed after the deed of gift was executed but before the same was registered. The same has been registered as Land Ceiling Case No. 05/06-07. In view of the deed of gift, the petitioner filed two applications on 16.1.2007. It was prayed in one application that the pre-emptors’s wife may be impleaded as a co-applicant in the application under section 16(3), and it was prayed in the second application that the purchaser’s wife may be impleaded as opposite party. Both the applications have been allowed by the impugned order. In another set of transactions, the petitioner purchased one Katha and 8 ½ dhurs of plot no.1204, appertaining to Khata No.155, from the said Ranjit Singh. The purchaser (the petitioner herein) transferred the said land by deed of gift said to have been executed on 13.11.2006 (Annexure-2), and perhaps registered at a 3 later date in favour of his wife (Lilawati Devi). Respondent no.4 herein (the pre-emptor) filed an application under section 16(3) of the Act, claiming right of pre-emption with respect to the said land covering area of 1 Katha and 8 ½ dhurs. The same has been registered as Case No. 06/06-07. Similarly, the pre-emptor (respondent no.4 herein) filed two applications in this proceeding also. He prayed in one application that the pre-emptor’s wife may be impleaded as a co-applicant, and the donee may be impleaded as opposite party. Both the applications have been allowed by the order dated 16.3.2007, and impugned herein. Learned counsel for respondent no.4 raises a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this writ petition and submits that a single writ petition challenging two orders in different proceedings is not maintainable. It appears to me that the petitioner would have been well advised to file separate writ petitions. However, the objection has come to our notice at the time of final disposal of the writ petition and, therefore, I am inclined to over-rule the preliminary objection on the ground of expediency. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the application under section 16(3) of the Act seeks pre-emption with respect to gifted land which is beyond the purview of section 16(3) of the Act. In other words, in his submission, a pre-emption application is not maintainable with respect to gifted lands. He relies on the following reported judgments: 4 (i) 1999 (2) P.L.J.R.(S.C.) 73, Shri Gokul Mahto vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (ii) 1985 B.B..C.J.597, Dhanik Lal Mahto & Ors. Vrs. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue & Ors. (iii)1986 P.L.J.R 763, Upendra Mishra and another Vs. Smt. Inchan Mishra and another. He submits in the same vein that if the land has been gifted before the application under section 16(3) of the Act is filed then the same is not maintainable. He relies on the judgment reported in 1976 B.B.C.J. 649, The Hindustan Steel Limited Vs. State of Orissa and Others. Learned counsel for respondent no.4 (the pre-emptor) submits that the petitioner filed his application under section 16(3) of the Act before the deeds of gift were registered. Therefore, in his submission, the bar engrafted in the explanation to section 16 of the Act, that a gifted land is beyond the scope of section 16(3) of the Act, is not applicable to the present case, because the pre-emptor had filed his pre-emption application before the deed of gift was registered. He relies on the judgment reported in 1999(2) P.L.J.R. 52, Nbijan Mian and Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. He also submits that, even if his application to implead as parties were barred by limitation, section 5 of the Limitation Act is available to him. He relies on the judgment reported in 1984 P.L.J.R. 128 (Paragraph 13), Ram Roop Yadav Vs. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue and others. 5 We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It is evident that the main matter is still pending before the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector and, therefore, it would be not appropriate for this Court to express its views on the merits of the matter. I, therefore, leave it to the parties to raise the aforesaid contentions before the learned authorities under the Act. Suffice it to state that impleading a person as a party has nothing to do with the merits of the matter. The courts have generally adopted a liberal approach in impleading a person as a party so that the order is passed in his presence. The same approach is adopted by the courts in matters relating to substitution and equally in matters relating to amendment of pleadings. An order allowing amendment of pleadings does not mean that the relief to that extent has been allowed. The only legal implication is that the parties would be in position to adduce evidence on that aspect also. It will, therefore, be open to the parties to raise all contentions available to them in law before the authorities under the Act, and also the issue whether or not the parties so impleaded by the impugned orders are necessary parties or proper parties. In other words, the fact that the wives of both the pre- emptor and the purchaser have been impleaded as parties will not preclude them from raising appropriate questions of fact and law available to them, whether or not they ought to have been impleaded as parties. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of. This order 6 should not be taken to be an expression of the views of this Court either way on the merits of the matter or on the validity of the impugned order. Vinay/ ( S. K. Katriar , J.)