THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO.1696 OF 2000 ORDER: The order of termination dated 01.02.1991 is the subject matter of challenge in this Writ Petition, filed in the year 2000, as being arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner was selected as an Apprentice Development Officer for rural areas by the Divisional Office of the LIC in its proceedings dated 06.04.1998. After completion of training, he was appointed as a Probationary Development Officer with effect from 01.02.1989, and was posted at Palakole Branch in West Godavari District. Subsequently, by proceedings dated 13.03.1990, his probation was extended for one year i.e. from 01.02.1990 to 31.01.1991. The petitioner would contend that there were no reasons to extend his probation; he had performed exceedingly well in his job; he was subjected to harassment and ill treatment by the authorities of the second respondent; no co-operation was extended to him by the officers in the second respondent branch; and in a moment of despair and frustration, he was driven to the extreme step of resigning from the post of Probationary Development Officer. It is his case that he was terminated vide proceedings dated 01.02.1991 and, without the said order being served, the second respondent had endorsed thereon as “REFUSED”. The petitioner would further assert that, in response to his representation, dated 01.04.1999, the first respondent did not furnish any reply necessitating his having to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated that Regulation 14 (1) of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 {“the Regulations” for brevity}, required a fresh appointee to be placed on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment; and Regulation 14 (3) enabled the appointing authority to extend or reduce the period of probation at its discretion. Reference is also made to Clause 10 (i) of the Appointment Order, whereby Probationary Development Officers, such as the petitioner, were required to complete a minimum new business of Rs.35 lakhs etc. The respondents would assert that the petitioner failed in discharging his duties as a Probationary Development Officer and his performance, both in the original period of probation, and in the extended period of probation, was wholly unsatisfactory necessitating the Corporation to issue orders dated 31.01.1991 terminating his services. The respondents would further assert that, when the Branch Manager sought to serve the order of termination, the petitioner orally refused to take the same and, thereafter, he submitted his resignation at 4 pm on 31.01.1991 and sent a telegram, which was received by the first respondent on 01.02.1991 informing that he had resigned his job. While the petitioner would dispute service of a copy of order of termination of probation dated 01.02.1991, and would submit that he had sought to resign from the post in a moment of despair and frustration, it must not be lost sight of that the petitioner kept quiet for more than eight {8} years thereafter, till he submitted a representation dated 01.04.1999. The long and inordinate silence on the part of the petitioner, in questioning the order of termination of probation and in submitting a representation withdrawing his resignation, would support the averments in the counter affidavit that the petitioner had refused to receive the copy of order of termination dated 31.01.1991, had left the office and had, thereafter, sent a telegram intimating his resignation from service. The delay of more than eight {8} years, since the petitioner’s probation was terminated on 31.01.1991 and the petitioner’s resignation vide telegram dated 01.02.1991 till he submitted a representation dated 01.04.1999, has not been explained. This Court would not lend a helping hand to the indolent and the lethargic {See State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal[1]}. As the Writ Petition has been filed belatedly after a lapse of nearly nine {9} years after the termination of probation, I see no reason to exercise discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the Writ Petition. On the grounds of delay and latches, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. _______________________ (RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J) 5th August 2010 RRB [1] AIR 1987 SC 251