RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) Date of Decision: 09.11.2010. Labh Singh and others .....Appellants Versus State of Punjab and others ……Respondents Coram:- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE L. N. MITTAL. Present: Mr.Tribhawan Singla, Advocate for the appellants. L. N. MITTAL, J (ORAL) CM No.12489-C of 2010 For reasons mentioned in the application which is accompanied by affidavit, delay of 21 days in refiling the appeal is condoned. CM No.12490-C of 2010 This is application for bringing on record legal representatives of Jaggar Singh-plaintiff No.1 since deceased. It is alleged that three sons and a daughter of Jaggar Singh mentioned in paragraph 2 of the application are his only legal heirs. The application is accompanied by affidavit. Accordingly, the application is allowed, subject to all just exceptions and persons mentioned in paragraph 2 of the application are ordered to be brought on record as legal representatives of Jaggar Singh-plaintiff No.1 since deceased for the purpose of this appeal. They have been arrayed as appellants No.1 and 2 and proforma respondent Nos.3 and 4 in the memo of parties. RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) -2- Main Appeal. Plaintiffs, who were successful in the trial Court, but have been non-suited by the lower appellate Court, have come up by way of instant second appeal. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaration that they are owners in possession of the suit land measuring 23 kanals and that the defendants i.e State of Punjab and the Collector have no concern therewith. The plaintiffs also sought declaration that their predecessor Bachan Singh, in whose hands the suit land was declared surplus under the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (in short, the Pepsu Act), was not divested of ownership of the surplus area till enforcement of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1973 (in short, the Punjab Act) and, therefore, Bachan Singh was entitled to select permissible area for himself as well as for his adult sons in view of Section 4 read with Section 5(i) of the Punjab Act and that the surplus land had not been utilized till then and, therefore, the entire proceedings of declaring the suit land as surplus are null and void and without jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also sought entitlement to get mutation of ownership of the suit land sanctioned in their favour. The plaintiffs also claimed permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking forcible possession of the suit land and from interfering in possession of the plaintiffs thereon. The plaintiffs alleged that plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 are sons of Bachan Singh whereas plaintiffs No.4 and 5 are sons of Gurnam Singh since deceased son of Bachan Singh, and plaintiff Nos.6 and 7 (who are sons of plaintiff No.2) are legal heirs of Chand Singh since deceased another son of Bachan Singh. The plaintiffs are thus legal RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) -3- heirs of Bachan Singh, who was owner of the suit land and other land. During life time of Bachan Singh, surplus proceedings under the Pepsu Act were initiated. Bachan Singh was not divested of ownership of the area declared surplus under the Pepsu Act, till enforcement of the Punjab Act. The suit land declared surplus was also never utilized till then. Consequently, Bachan Singh became entitled to select permissible area for himself as well as for his five adult sons i.e one unit each, on commencement of the Punjab Act. Bachan Singh remained owner in possession of the suit land till his death and on his death, his five sons inherited the same and now plaintiffs are owners in possession thereof. Defendants have no concern therewith. The defendants controverted the plaint allegations and inter alia pleaded that in surplus proceedings under the Pepsu Act, suit land was declared surplus vide order dated 06.09.1962. Said proceedings continued under the Punjab Act and possession of suit land measuring 22 kanals 10 marlas was taken on 10.10.1974 and mutation No.3444 dated 20.09.1974 was also sanctioned in favour of defendant No.1-State of Punjab. Defendants are owners of the suit land. Plaintiffs are cultivating the same illegally. Eviction proceedings have been initiated against them. Various other pleas were also raised. Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Barnala vide judgment and decree dated 23.07.2009 decreed the plaintiffs' suit. However, first appeal preferred by the defendants has been allowed by learned Additional District Judge, Barnala vide judgment and decree dated 07.06.2010 and thereby the suit filed by the RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) -4- plaintiffs stands dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, plaintiffs have preferred the instant second appeal. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the case file. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that Bachan Singh was never divested of ownership of the suit land till enforcement of the Punjab Act and, therefore, Bachan Singh was entitled to make fresh selection of permissible area under the Punjab Act and all the proceedings under the Pepsu Act and the Punjab Act are null and void and plaintiffs continued to be owners in possession of the suit land. I have carefully considered the aforesaid contention, but find no merit therein. Bachan Singh was party to the proceedings in which order dated 06.09.1962 declaring the suit land as surplus under the Pepsu Act was passed. The said order was never challenged and attained finality. The instant suit challenging the same was filed on 04.10.2005 i.e 43 years after the passing of the order. Even possession of the suit land was taken vide report dated 10.10.1974 and mutation was also sanctioned on 20.09.1974. The instant suit was filed almost 31 years thereafter. It is thus manifest that the instant suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Orders and proceedings taken under the Pepsu Act and the Punjab Act even if assumed to be null and void for the sake of argument could be challenged within limitation period of three years, but the instant suit has been filed more than three decades and four decades after the proceedings/orders had been passed. The suit has, therefore, been rightly held to be hopelessly barred by limitation by the lower RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) -5- appellate Court. Learned counsel for the appellants also contended that the plaintiffs have come on the basis of title. By jugglery of language, suit which is hopelessly barred by limitation cannot be brought within limitation. The plaintiffs can claim title only if the orders and proceedings under the Pepsu Act and the Punjab Act are set aside by holding the same to be null and void. In effect the instant suit is to challenge the said proceedings and orders and in fact even the plaintiffs have expressly challenged the same, but the suit to challenge the same is hopelessly barred by limitation. In addition to the aforesaid, even jurisdiction of the Civil Court to challenge the aforesaid proceedings/orders passed under the Pepsu Act and the Punjab Act is barred. Section 47 of the Pepsu Act bars jurisdiction of Civil Court to challenge any order made by the authorities under the Pepsu Act or to adjudicate upon any matter required to be dealt with by the authorities under the Pepsu Act. Similarly, Section 21 of the Punjab Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to challenge the validity of any proceedings or order taken or made under the Punjab Act. Lower Appellate Court has thus rightly held that even jurisdiction of the Civil Court to challenge the surplus proceedings/orders is barred. Even possession of the suit land was taken on 10.10.1974 vide report Rojnamcha of even date which has been produced in evidence. Consequently, if the plaintiffs again took possession of the suit land, it cannot be said that they continued to be owners in possession of the suit land. They had to challenge the surplus proceedings and orders within limitation period which they did RSA No.4141 of 2010 (O & M) -6- not do. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for determination in the instant second appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed in limine. 09.11.2010. ( L. N. MITTAL ) A. Kaundal JUDGE