HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr.A. No. : 451 of 2003 Decided on: 8.7.2010 State of H.P. ……… Appellant. Versus Baljit Singh ………Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr.Justice V.K. Ahuja, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the appellant: Mr.J.S. Guleria, Assistant Advocate General. For the respondent: Mr.Anoop Rattan, Advocate. V.K. Ahuja, J.(Oral): This is an appeal filed by the appellant under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment of the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., dated 28.2.2003, vide which the respondent was acquitted of the charge framed against him under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that a complaint was lodged by Shri Gurbachan Singh, Fruit Vendor, that he was going back from Chintpurni to his house at Amb on 29.2.1999, at about 1.30 p.m. At the relevant time, the respondent was reversing his Jeep No.HR-04-6986 in a rash or negligent manner and resultantly, the left leg of the complainant came under the left tyre of the Jeep. He was taken to CHC, Chintpurni where his statement under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, on which a case was registered and after investigation, the challan was filed ___________________________________________ Whether reporters of local newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. - 2 - against the respondent. The respondent was tried under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Sections 184/187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He was acquitted for the offence under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but was convicted under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act to pay a fine of Rs.200/- and imprisonment till the rising of the Court. 3. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal passed under the aforementioned Sections, the State has filed the present appeal while no appeal was filed by the respondent against his conviction under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 4. On appraisal of the evidence led by the prosecution, it is clear that they had examined five witnesses to substantiate their case. PW-1 Gurbachan Singh has stated that when he was going on foot to Bus Stand, Chintpurni, near the Hotel of Kaku, one Jeep came from behind and hit him and resultantly he fell down and tyre of the Jeep crossed over his left leg. The owner of the Hotel took him out from under the Jeep and he became unconscious. He stated that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the respondent. He admitted that the Jeep was going from Bharwain side to Chintpurni, while he was coming from Chintpurni side towards Bharwain. He denied if he was walking on the wrong side at the time of the accident and started crossing the road without seeing on both sides of the road. However, PW-4 Rakesh Kumar, who was sitting in the Jeep, had admitted that the Jeep was being reversed by the respondent in normal speed. He admitted that the Jeep was - 3 - being reversed on the right side while PW-1 was crossing the road on the wrong side. Thus, the possibility that the accident took place when the complainant was crossing the road from the left side of the Jeep cannot be ruled out and the respondent may not have been able to see him from the driver’s seat i.e. from the right side of the Jeep. PW-3 Shyam Lal had not supported the prosecution story and was declared as hostile. 5. Thus, from the perusal of the evidence, it is clear that the possibility that there was only error of judgment and not that the respondent was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently cannot be ruled out. The possibility also cannot be ruled out that, while the complainant PW-1 Gurbachan was crossing the road holding a big basket on his head, he tried to cross the road without seeing on both sides of the road. The learned trial Court had concluded that two versions emerge from the evidence and accordingly, the version favourable to the accused was relied upon. In case two versions were possible from the prosecution evidence, as has come up on the record, it cannot be said that since the learned trial Court had relied upon the first version favourable to the accused, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court cannot be termed as perverse. It may be that other view could have also been taken by the learned trial Court, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the view taken by the leaned trial Court was perverse and as such the final findings recorded by the learned trial Court leading to the acquittal of the respondent do not call for an interference by this Court. - 4 - 6. In view of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. The bail bonds furnished by the respondent shall stand discharged. July 8, 2010. (V.K. Ahuja), (TILAK) Judge