HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO.2460 OF 2010 ORDER: Heard Sri A.Chandra Sekhar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. Ramachandra Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and, at their request, the Writ Petition is being disposed of at the stage of admission. The petitioner is aggrieved by the demand notice issued by the third respondent in notice No.2016/AD1/ADVT/GHMC 2009-2010, Sl.No.10078 dated 28.12.2009. The petitioner provides medical services and has put up a name board, styled as “M/s. Medinova Diagnostic Service Limited”, on the wall of its premises. The third respondent, claiming to be the authorized agent of the first respondent, for collection of advertisement fee, issued the impugned notice calling upon the petitioner to pay Rs.17,800/- as advertisement fee. While the impugned notice is under challenge, in this writ petition, on several grounds, it is wholly unnecessary for this Court to examine any of other contentions in as much as the writ petition must be allowed, and the impugned notice set aside, on the ground that the petitioner could not have been called upon by the third respondent to pay the advertisement fee through cheques/demand drafts drawn in their favour. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by judgment dated 31.12.2009 in W.P.No.23354 of 2009 and batch, held that the power to demand a fee or tax is specifically vested with the Commissioner or any person authorized by him; such persons are naturally to be the officials of the Corporation itself; notices issued by an agency on behalf of the Corporation is contrary to law; Section 169 requires any amount received by the Corporation towards tax and fee to be credited to the consolidated fund of the Corporation; the permission accorded by the Corporation to collect the fee was totally opposed to the scheme of the Act; and the notice issued to the petitioner, requiring him to pay the fee through cheques/demand drafts in favour of the third respondent, was in clear violation of the specific provisions of the Act. The impugned notice was quashed as it did not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Act. Following the said judgment, the impugned demand notice is quashed as it does not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the first respondent from taking necessary action in accordance with law. The Writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the circumstances, without costs. (RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J) Date:12.03.2010 usd