1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT NAGPUR S.A.NO.354 of 2006 Shamrao Natthuji Mahure ..vs.. Ramdeobaba Devasthan through its Wahiwatdar – President of Panch Committee – Shri Kisanlal Kruparmaji Paliwal and ors. =-=-=---=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Office Notes, Office Memorandum of Coram appearances, Court's orders or directions & Registrar's orders. Court's or Judges Order =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Mr.R.Sharma Adv. h/f Mr.Anand Parchure for the appellant. Mr.V.M.Deshpande Adv. for the resps. C ORAM : C.L.Pangarkar, J. DATED : 8th April, 2010. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents. 2. This appeal is preferred by the original plaintiff, feeling aggrieved by the two concurrent findings recorded against him. 3. The plaintiff/appellant had instituted a suit for injunction and specific performance of the contract. It was the contention of the appellant that defendant no.1/Trust had entered into a contract of sale of the suit property and they did not perform their part of the contract. It was 2 agreed that the sale-deed would be executed upon grant of permission by the Charity Commissioner. 4. The suit was resisted by the defendants. The learned judge of the trial court found that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the part of the contract and defendants were, in fact, entitled to possession of the property which was taken by the plaintiff in pursuance to the contract. The said findings were challenged before the District Judge. The Additional District, who heard the appeal, found that the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance and therefore, dismissed the appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant submits before me that the plaintiff was, in fact, entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract, in as much as, he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He submits that the defendants should have taken an adequate precaution in seeing that the permission is granted and it was on account of their fault that the permission has been refused. If the permission was refused, the appellant could have preferred an appeal being a person aggrieved. He keeps quiet. 6. In paragraph no.12 of the judgment, the 3 appellate court specifically observes that the Charity Commissioner has refused to grant permission to sell the property and therefore the contract has become unenforceable. When such a permission has been refused by the Charity Commissioner, it is very clear that the contract cannot now be enforced since no property of the Trust can be transferred without the consent of the Charity Commissioner. The courts below have, therefore, rightly dismissed the suit. No other question is urged before me. No substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. It is dismissed. The decree passed by the trial court with regard to delivery of the possession shall stand stayed for a period of eight weeks. JUDGE. chute