IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.486 of 2007 Shyam Babu @ Shyam Babu Yadav, son of Raghunandan Gope, resident of Mohalla-Durukhigali, P.O. Bankipur, P.S. Pirbahore, District- Patna --- Petitioner. Versus 1.The State of Bihar through Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bihar Patna 2.Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bihar, New Secretariat Patna 3. Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Budh Marg, Patha through its Chairman. 4.Managing Director, Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Budh Marg Patna. 5.Secretary-cum-Chief Vigilance Officer, Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd., Budh Marg,Patna -------- Respondents. ---------- 4. 16.10.2008 Heard Mr. Deo Kumar Prasad Sinha for the petitioner, and Mr. Rajesh Prasad Choudhary for respondent nos. 3 to 5. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 13.12.2006 (Annexure-12), passed by the learned appellate authority, whereby the appeal preferred by the present petitioner has been rejected and the order of punishment dated 20.9.2006 (Annexure-10) has been up-held. Copies of the writ petition were served on learned counsel for respondent nos. 3 to 5 on 21.12.2006, whereafter it was laid before the Bench on 9.8.2007 and 17.9.2008, giving the indulgence to the answering respondents to file their counter affidavit but the time has not been utilised for the purpose. We are left with no option but to dispose of the writ petition in the absence of the counter 2 affidavit, and on the basis of the oral submissions of learned counsel. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank has also raised the preliminary objection that the petitioner has rushed to this Court without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal. 2. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It appears that the petitioner is an employee of the Bank. Charge-sheet was submitted against him for illegal/irregular disbursement of loan. Learned Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 21.1.2006 (Annexure 8), whereby the petitioner was exonerated. The conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh }kjk lefiZr lQkbZ ,oa iwoZ lapkyu ink0 }kjk lefiZr vf/kxe rFkk LFkkuh; iqfyl }kjk lefiZr vuqla/kku çfrosnu ds lkFk gh cSad dk mij esa of.kZr ifji= ds leh{kksijkUr vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ds fo:) vkjksi dk dksbZ Hkh fcUnq fl) ugha ik;k x;kA lEcaf/kr _.k&forj.k esa lHkh xM+cfM+;kWa “kk[kk çca/kd ds rkyesy ls gqvk gS rFkk vkjksiksa dh ifjf/k esa vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh dks ykus ,oa viuh lqj{kk dh n`f’V ls “kk[kk çca/kd us vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh dks Q¡lkus dh Ñfr dh x;h gSA “kk[kk çca/kd ls vuqnku dh jkf”k rFkk v|ru lwn dh jkf”k dh olwyh fd;k tkuk cSad fgr esa gksxk lkFk gh lEcaf/kr Mhyj rFkk ,tsUV dks cSad dh dkyh lwph esa ntZ dj cSad ls dkjksckj cUn djus ij çfrcU/k yxkuk mfpr gksxkA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh fdlh Hkh Lrj ij nks’kh ugha ik;s x;s gSa blfy, bUgsa vkjksiksa ls eqDr djus dh vuq”kalk gSA” 3. The petitioner thereafter received communication dated 6.7.2006( Annexure-9), from the learned disciplinary authority, whereby a copy of the enquiry report was forwarded to him and he was called upon to show-cause to the same. It appears that the 3 petitioner had, perhaps, submitted his cause, and on a consideration of the materials on record the Managing Director of the respondent Bank being the disciplinary authority, passed the order of punishment whereby the petitioner has been given the punishment of censure and has also been deprived of his salary except the suspension allowance for the period of suspension. The petitioners’ appeal has been rejected by a laconic order dated 13.12.2006 (Annexure-12). The entire order is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “funsZ”kkuqlkj mi;qZDr fo’k;d ds laca/k esa dguk gS fd vkids }kjk dh xbZ vfiy dks leh{kksijkUr vLohÑr fd;k tkrk gSA” 4. It is thus evident that the learned Enquiry Officer found in favour of the petitioner and held that he was not at all responsible for the disbursement of the loan in question and it was a case of false implication. Law is well settled that in a situation like the present one, it is open to the learned disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the learned Enquiry Officer, record his reasons for disagreement which has to be communicated to the delinquent employee for his comments. It is manifest from a perusal of the show-cause notice dated 6.7. 2006 (Annexure-9) that the learned disciplinary authority did not comply with the mandatory requirement of law and simply forwarded a copy of the Enquiry report and called upon him to show-cause. Learned counsel for the petitioner is right in his submission that he had nothing to answer in a situation like present one, where the entire finding of the learned Enquiry Officer is in his favour and has exonerated him. Had the 4 learned disciplinary authority recorded reasons for disagreement, the petitioner would have been in a position to show-cause with respect to the adverse circumstances. Therefore, the communication dated 2.12.2005 (Annexure-4) falls short of the mandatory requirement of law and renders the order of punishment bad in law. 5. The appellate order is equally un-worthy and fit to be set aside. Law is well settled that it is the bounden duty of the learned disciplinary authority to examine all issues of facts and law raised in the memorandum of appeal and come to independent findings of facts. Learned appellate authority has not assigned any reason whatsoever while rejecting the appeal. Law is well settled that every quasi-judicial authority is bound to assign reasons in support of its order. Supreme Court has held as follows in the case of the Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vrs. The Union of India and another, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1785:- “Before we part with this appeal, we must express our regret at the manner in which the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India disposed of the proceedings before them. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai V. Testeels Ltd., C.A. No.245 of 1970 decided on 17.12.1975 (SC). But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the 5 demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated 8th December, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated 4th June, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alterma partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The Government of India also failed to give any reasons in support of its order rejecting the revision application. But we may presume that in rejecting the revision application, it adopted the same reason which prevailed with the Collector. The reason given by the Collector was, as already pointed out, hardly satisfactory and it would, therefore, have been better if the Government of India had given proper and adequate reasons dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants while rejecting the revision application. We hope and trust that in future the Customs Authorities will be more careful in adjudicating upon the proceedings which come before them and pass properly reasoned orders, so that those who are affected by such orders are assured that their case has received proper consideration at the hands of the Customs authorities and the validity of the adjudication made by the Customs authorities can also be satisfactorily tested in a superior tribunal or court. 6 In fact, it would be desirable that in cases arising under Customs and Excise laws an independent quasi- judicial tribunal, like the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, is set up which would finally dispose of appeals and revision applications under these laws instead of leaving the determination of such appeals and revision applications to the Government of India. An independent quasi-judicial tribunal would definitely inspire greater confidence in the public mind.” It has been held as follows by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of The Manager, Govt. Branch Press and another Vrs. D.B. Belliappa reported in A.I.R.1979 S.C. 429: “The giving of reasons”, as Lord Denning put it in Breen V. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971)1 All ER 1148”is one of the fundamentals of good administration” and, to recall the words of this Court in Khudi Ram V. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCR 832 at p.845 AIR 1975 SC 550 at p 558) in a Government of laws “ there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability.” The executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on, reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomized in Arts. 14 & 16 (1).” 6. In the result, the order of punishment and the appellate order are hereby set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled to differential amount of salary for the period of suspension. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Vinay/ ( S. K. Katriar , J.)