1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2456 OF 2009 Borroughs Wellcome (I) Ltd., Staff & Workers Union and ors. .... Petitioners vs Borroughs Wellcome (I) Ltd. & ors. .... Respondents Mr.Kiran Bapat i/by Mr.Avinash Fatangare for the petitioners. Mrs. N. R. Patankar for respondents 1 to 3. CORAM: ANOOP V. MOHTA, J. DATE : 15th March, 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT : Rule, returnable forthwith. 2 Heard finally. 3 The petitioners had invoked Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and thereby challenge is made to the judgment and order dated 11.12.2007 passed in Revision Application (ULP) No.34 of 2006, whereby the judgment and order dated 6.10.2005 passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.541/1997 was quashed and set aside by granting the declaration of unfair labour practice and directing the respondents to give wages and other financial benefits to complainant no.2 by considering her date of birth as 16.5.1944. 4 The revisional power under Section 44 of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 is quite limited and it is basically the power of judicial superintendence. Therefore, 2 unless a case is made out of perversity, normally there is no question of interfering with the findings so arrived at by the Labour Court, based upon the material available, but the Revisional Court found that the order is perverse and accordingly dismissed the complaint and reversed the order. 5 There is no serious dispute that petitioner no.2 joined the service of respondent no.1/company on 31.05.1960. She was confirmed on 1.10.1960. Pursuance to the Notice in respect of the Provident Fund on the Notice Board in the year 1989, petitioner no.2 pointed out the wrong date of birth as recorded in the record. Accordingly, on 14.10.1989, made representation to respondent no.1 asking them to correct the date of birth as 12.11.1944 instead of 12.11.1937 and supported by affidavit read with her marriage certificate. There was written communication thereafter received by petitioner no.2. 6 On 4.7.1997, the respondents again raised the issue as that of approaching the date of retirement. The respondent unable to correct the date of birth and thereby intimated that she was going to retire on 30.11.1997. 7 Therefore, filed a complaint under the Act on 12.11.1997. The parties led the evidence accordingly. By order dated 6.10.2005 the learned Labour Court allowed the said complaint by holding her date of birth as referred above. 8 The respondent/company, therefore, preferred Revision in question. The learned Revisional Court reversed the order as referred above. 9 Without going much into the details, rival submissions as raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this matter requires reconsideration from the Industrial Court for the following reasons: (1) There is clear finding with regard to the date of birth i.e. 12.11.1944. The 3 Revisional Court has reversed the same. (2) The basic aspect which, in my view, is relevant is the year 1944 and not of 1937. The discrepancy appears to be of the date as well as of the month. The submission is that having once unable to prove the date as claimed, the finding so recorded by the Labour Court is perverse is not correct as the management/respondent-company brought on record by the School Leaving Certificate themselves. Therefore, the burden was upon them to prove the same to support their case and their action of appointment as well as the date of retirement, based upon the date of birth as on 12.11.1937 on record. (3) The Industrial Court, in revision, however, considering both these documents and material as well as the evidence which gives findings in favour of the complainant, on the re-appreciation of the same and maintaining the date of birth as 12-11-1937 though there is clear findings given with regard to the year 1944, in my view, need to be reconsidered by the Industrial Court again by giving full opportunity to both the parties. The difference of the year, in my view, goes to the root of the matter. However, that is subject to the proof and the evidence. There is a reason for quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Revisional Court by re-appreciating the evidence by stating it to be perverse specially to reconsider the documents placed on record and the submissions with regard to the date of birth in the School Certificate, the issuance of school certificate; the Baptism certificate and the date of joining of the service, based upon the date of birth on record and the fact that the petitioner raised this objection in the year 1989 and not at the fag end of the retirement i.e. In 1997, I am inclined to quash this order with a direction to the Industrial Court to decide the revision 4 again within four months. 10 Resultantly, the Petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. The learned Industrial Court to decide the revision afresh by giving full opportunity to both the parties preferably within six months. 11 No costs. 12 The learned counsel for respondents seeks stay of this judgment and order. The judgment and order is accordingly stayed for four weeks. (ANOOP V. MOHTA, J.)