IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA Arbitration Appeal Nos.12 & 13 of 2003. Date of decision: 18.9.2008. H.P. University (in both cases) ….Appellant -Versus- 1.Shri Satish Kumar Goel in Arb.Appeal No.12 of 2003 2.M/s.Kundan Lal Hari Lal & Company and another in Arb.Appeal No.13 of 2003. ….Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Deepak Gupta, Judge. The Hon’ble Mr.Justice V.K. Ahuja, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the Appellant: Mr.Vinod Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr.Suneet Goel, Advocate. Deepak Gupta, J. (oral) These two appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment since an identical question of law arises in both the appeals. The short question which arises for decision in these appeals is whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act have been excluded or are not applicable to the proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned District Judge rejected the petition filed by the appellant-H.P. University under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for 2 excluding the time spent in other proceedings only on the ground that aid of Section 14 could not be taken in the proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned District Judge relied upon a judgment delivered by this Court in OSA No.6 of 2002 decided on 17th May, 2002. This Court had been influenced by a judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Popular construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470. However, a perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court in Popular Construction Company reveals that the said judgment dealt with the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act vis-à- vis the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court did not deal with the question as to whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or not. In fact this question is no longer res integra. The Apex Court in two latter judgments has specifically held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to the arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In State of Goa vs. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239, the Apex Court held as follows: “16. But there is no provision made in The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that if any party has bona fidely prosecuted its remedy before the other forum which had no jurisdiction then in that case whether the period spent in prosecuting the remedy bona fidely in that Court can be excluded or not. As per the provision sub-section (3) of Section 34 which prescribes the period of limitation (3 months) for moving the application for setting aside the award before the court then that period of limitation will be applicable and not the period of limitation prescribed in schedule under section 3 of the Limitation 3 Act, 1963. Thus the provision of moving the application prescribed in Limitation Act, shall stand excluded by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 as under this special enactment the period of limitation has already been prescribed. Likewise the period of condonation of delay i.e. 30 days by virtue of proviso. 17. Therefore, by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act what is excluded is the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act & under Section 3 read with Schedule which prescribes the period for moving application. 18. Whenever two enactments are overlapping each other on same area then courts should be cautious in interpreting those provisions. It should not exceed the limit provided by statute. The extent of exclusion is however, really a question of construction of each particular statute & general principles applicable are subordinate to the actual words used by legislature. 19. There is no provision in whole of the Act which prohibit discretion of the court. Under section 14 of the Limitation Act if the party has been bona fidely prosecuting his remedy before the court which has no jurisdiction whether the period spent in that proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996; like section 5, section 8(1), section 9, section 11 sub-section (4), (6), (9) and sub-section (3) of section 14, section 27, sections 34, 36, 37, 39 (2) (4), section 41, sub-section (2) section 42 & 43 and tried to emphasis with reference to the aforesaid sections that the legislature wherever wanted to give power to the Court that has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should lie in the hands of the court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in prosecuting remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same time there is no prohibition incorporated in statute for curtailing the power of the court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act> Much depends upon the words used in statute & not general principles applicable. By virtue of section 43 of the Act of 1996, the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of Limitation Act can only stand excluded to the extent wherever different period has been prescribed under the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there is no reason why Section 14 of Limitation be read in Act of 1996, which will advance the cause of justice. If statute is silent and there is no specific prohibition then statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of justice. Our attention was invited to various decisions of this Court but we shall refer to a few of them which has some relevance. 20 to 24 xxxxxx. 25. Therefore, in the present context also it is very clear to us that there is no two opinion in the matter that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 do not expressly excluded the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The prohibitory provision has to be construed strictly. It is true that the Arbitration 4 and Conciliation Act, 1996 intended to expedite the commercial issue expeditiously. It is also clear in the statement of objects and reasons that in order to recognize economic reforms the settlement of both of domestic & international commercial disputes should be disposed of quickly so that country's economic progress be expedited. The statement of objects and reasons also nowhere indicate that Section 14 of the Limitation act shall be excluded. But on the contrary intendment of legislature is apparent in the present case as Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies the Limitation Act, 1963 as a whole. It is only by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, its operation is excluded to that extent of the area which is covered under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Our attention was also invited to the various decisions of this Court interpreting sub-section 2 of section 29 of Limitation Act with reference to other Acts like The Representation of Peoples Act or the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code where separate period of limitation has been prescribed. We need not over- burden the judgment with reference to those cases because it is very clear to us by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act that the provisions of Limitation Act shall stand excluded in Act of 1996 to the extend area which is covered by the Act of 1996. In the present case under section 34 by virtue of sub-section 3 only the application for filing and setting aside the award a period has been prescribed as 3 months and delay can be condoned to the extent of 30 days To this extent the applicability of section 5 of Limitation will stand excluded but there is no provision in the Act of 1996 which excludes operation of section 14 of the Limitation Act. If two Acts can be read harmoniously without doing violation to the words used therein, then there is no prohibition in doing so.” Similar view has been taken by the Apex court in Union of India vs.Shring Construction Co.(P) Ltd. (2006) 8 SCC 18. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court it is apparent that the petition under Section 14 was maintainable in proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and could not have been rejected only on the ground that it is not maintainable. Therefore, we set-aside the order of the learned District Judge dated 12.6.2003 and remand the case to the learned District Judge who shall now consider the application under Section 14 on its own 5 merits. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned District Judge on 23rd October, 2008. The Registry is directed to ensure that the record of the case is sent immediately so as to reach the learned District Judge well before the next date. ( Deepak Gupta ), J. September 18, 2008 ( V.K. Ahuja ),J. PV