IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.10884 of 2009 M/S A.M.BROTHERS, GOBIND MITRA ROAD, P.S. PIRBAHORE, DISTRICT PATNA, A PROPRIETORSHIP CONCERN THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR SRI KRISHNA MOHAN PRASAD SON OF LATE HARIHAR PRASAD RESIDENT OF KRISHNA AVENUE, NALA ROAD, OPP. PURIFICATION PLANT, P.S KADAMKUAN, RAJENDRA NAGAR, DISTRICT PATNA. Versus 1. UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVT. OF INDIA, NEW DELHI. 2. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA HAVING ITS CENTRAL OFFICE AT CHANDRA MUKHI NARIMAN POINT, MUMBAI THROUGH ITS EXUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, CHANDRAMUKHI NARIMAN POINT, MUMBAI. 3. BRANCH MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, MURADPUR, POST OFFICE BANKPUR, P.S. PIRBAHORE, DISTRICT PATNA. 4. PRESIDING OFFICER, DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL, 396, EAST BORING CANCAL ROAD, PATNA. ----------- For the Petitioner :- M/S. Arbind Kumar Jha & Harendra Jha. For Respondent nos. 2 & 3 :- Mr. Sharvesh C. Verma. ------- 4 18/01/2010 Order dated 29.06.2009 passed in Execution Case (OA) 12 of 2006 by the Presiding Officer of Debt Recovery Tribunal at Patna is under challenge in the present writ application filed on behalf of the petitioner. The challenge is purely legal, primarily based on the ground whether the Tribunal had necessary jurisdiction to - 2 - entertain a time barred execution case, filed on behalf of the respondent Bank and condone the period of limitation in breach of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Facts are not in dispute in the present writ application which are very limited for the issues raised in the writ application. A cash credit limit of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) was sanctioned in favour of the petitioner by the respondent Bank on 8.4.1981. On default by the petitioner, a demand for a sum of Rs.1,30,000/- and odd was raised on 7.4.1987. Violation thereof led to filing of a money suit which came to be decreed ex parte on 8.6.1992. The said order or decision is Annexure-1 to the writ application. On 22.6.1992 the decree was signed and sealed. No follow up action was taken by the respondent Bank in getting the said decree executed against the petitioner. The petitioner had filed a misc. case challenging the ex parte decree but the same came to be dismissed and the matter rested at that. The respondent Bank suddenly woke up in the year 2006 and taking recourse to Section 31-A of the - 3 - Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 filed Execution case No. 12 of 2006 along with a petition for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Matter was seriously contested by the petitioner on the ground that the execution case was not maintainable as it was hopelessly barred by limitation and there was no condonation permissible under the law as have been laid down by a catena of decisions not only of this High Court but also of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Presiding Officer, however, in his wisdom taking a so called ‘pragmatic approach to the justice oriented process’ condoned the delay and allowed the application. Besides the above reasoning assigned, the Tribunal also relied on a decision rendered in the case of State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others reported in AIR 2005 SC, 2191for doing so. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, challenged the said order duly fortified with several decisions in his support. First submission is that the law being what it is, since the question of limitation goes to the root of the matter it can be raised at any stage before any - 4 - forum including the Hon’ble High Court. In support thereof he relies on the case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Bhatinda District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. reported in (2007)11 SCC, 363. Emphasis is on paragraph 24 of the said decision. Coming to the other issue on the legality of Tribunal entertaining the limitation petition and condoning the delay, the earliest decision on this issue is the decision of a Division Bench rendered in the case of Sri Chandra Mouli Deva Vs. Kumar Binoya Nand Singh reported in AIR 1976, Patna, 208. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said decision categorically lays down that the time prescribed under the Act which is the Limitation Act cannot be extended under any circumstance under section 5 of the Limitation Act because section 5 read with section 3(1) of the Limitation Act categorically lays down that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. In this regard article 136 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act lays down the period of limitation in matters of enforcement of decrees to be 12 - 5 - years. Similar question also became a subject matter of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Pvt. Limited, reported in AIR 1999 SC., 3421. Hon’ble Supreme Court after discussing various facets of the arguments and the law in paragraph 20 of the said decision has affirmed and approved the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Sri Chandra Mouli Deva (Supra). Yet another decision relied upon by the petitioner in support of his argument is the decision rendered in the case of Dr. Chiranji Lal Vs. Hari Das reported in (2005)10 SCC 746. Learned counsel representing the respondent Bank submits that there is no limitation operating against the maintainability of the execution case because the matter has to be considered in its totality keeping the ground reality into consideration. No doubt, the decree in question was signed and sealed on 22.06.1992 but there - 6 - was a misc. case filed by the petitioner. Matter dragged on. All the files and records were tagged along with the said misc. case and thereafter it was dismissed. It was also pleaded in the limitation petition before the Debt Recovery Tribunal that the case record of the case was misplaced in the office of the decree holder i.e. the Bank and it could not be traced out for a long period of time; atleast not till 5.9.2005. Once all the nuts and bolts were put in place, the authorities immediately rushed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, placed all the facts before it. The Tribunal in larger interest as the matter related to recovery of public money of the Bank took the correct decision in this regard. Another submission made at the Bar on behalf of the respondent Bank is that the Debt Recovery Act is a composite Act and the rights and the remedies are prescribed therein. If the petitioner had any grievance against the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the remedy for him is under section 20 of the Act. If that be so, the writ application of the petitioner must be dismissed and he should be relegated to the forum under the Act. - 7 - To the submissions made on behalf of the respondent Bank, this Court has only one thing to observe that there is no bar imposed on the High Court under the Constitution to maintain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order of a Tribunal. If the statutory authority or a quasi judicial authority decides a matter which is in the teeth of law of the land then asking a citizen to pursue the remedy within the frame work of the statute and follow the remedy of appeal or appeals, may be revision, would be a waste of public money and time. For after all framers of the Constitution enacted Article 226 for efficacious remedy to be made available to a citizen may be in a situation of the present kind. In view of plethora of decisions and the ratios laid down in this regard without any ambiguity on this score, this Court has no hesitation in recording that the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna has exceeded its jurisdiction and powers in condoning the delay and entertaining the time barred execution case filed on behalf of the respondent Bank. No amount of pragmatic approach of the Presiding Officer can be a substitute for - 8 - law or the provisions of the Statute on this Court. If the law is un-ambiguous, then its application too has to be so. The petitioner has succeeded in making out a case for interference. The order impugned dated 29.6.2009 is totally beyond jurisdiction, if not in the teeth of the decision not only of this High Court but also of the Apex Court and the same warrants interference. The impugned order dated 29.6.2009 is, therefore, quashed and the writ application is allowed. AMIN (Ajay Kumar Tripathi, J.)