HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH Dated 18-12-2009 S.A. No.999 OF 2009 Between: Mirza Asadullah Baig. Appellant. And: Smt. Sayeda Amena Banu. ….Respondent. HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH S.A. No.999 OF 2009 JUDGMENT: This Second appeal is preferred by the plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment dated 31st August, 2009 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court), Nizamabad in A.S.No.56 of 2004, confirming the judgment and decree dated 16.9.2004 in O.S. No.467 of 2001 passed by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nizamabad. Appellant herein is the defendant and respondent is the plaintiff respectively. The parties will hereinafter be referred to as arrayed before the trial Court for the sake of convenience. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.467 of 2001 before the trial Court seeking eviction of the defendant from the suit schedule property and also for arrears of rent. The trial Court having held that the defendant has failed to establish that there is no such bonafide requirement and in view of bonafide requirement of plaintiff for her own son and even though the defendant having received the notice under Ex.A.3, failed to vacate the premises and he also committed default willfully in payment of rents and the amount of Rs.12,200/- as arrears of rent which was already deposited can be withdrawn by the plaintiff by making proper application and she is not entitled for interest over such arrears of rent, decreed the suit. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant preferred an appeal in A.S.No.56 of 2004 before the lower appellate Court, which on re-appreciation of the evidence on record, dismissed the appeal confirming the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court directing the defendant to pay rent due for the last six months and vacate the premises immediately. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant has preferred the present appeal before this Court. Heard the learned counsel. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant - defendant that the lower appellate Court has failed to consider the fact that the plaintiff has failed to prove her title over the suit schedule property and no document is filed for proving the same. It is further contended that the lower appellate Court has failed to consider that no evidence is produced by the plaintiff to show the bonafide requirement of the suit schedule premises. Apart from that the municipal record filed by the plaintiff does not show that the plaintiff is the owner of the property in question. It is also further contended that as per Section 32 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1950, the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and, therefore, the Courts below are not justified in dismissing the suit and the same deserves interference by this court. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that the defendant is a chronic defaulter in payment of rents and the plaintiff is in bonafide requirement of the suit schedule premises for her son who returned from Gulf country for establishing his business. He further submits that both the Courts below, on proper appreciation of the evidence has given cogent and concurrent findings and, therefore, in exercise of the appellate powers under Sec. 100 of C.P.C., the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contention, reliance is placed on a decision reported in RAMVILAS BAJAJ AND ORS. v. ASHOK KUMAR AND ORS. ([1]). Therefore, the Judgments impugned needs no interference by this Court. Before adverting to the substantial questions of law, be it noted that the scope of this Court under Sec. 100 C.P.C. is quite narrow. Therefore, within the ambit of the appellate jurisdiction of this court under Sec. 100 CPC, let us examine, whether any interference is warranted in respect of the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below. Perused the material available on record. It is not in dispute that the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that the suit is filed by the plaintiff seeking eviction of the defendant from the suit schedule premises inasmuch as the defendant is irregular in payment of rents and also on the ground of bonafide requirement for the son of the plaintiff who returned from Gulf countries and he intends to establish his own business, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking eviction of the defendant. Admittedly, Exs.A.5 and A.6 are the sale deeds and Exs.A.7 to A.23 are the property tax receipts. The evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 is that their mother sold away the property which fell to her share under Exs.A.5 and A.6 sale deeds and it is also evident from the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 that the plaintiff has been making the payment of property tax under Exs.A.7 to A.23 from 1984-85 onwards. On appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, on this aspect, the trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule property. Adverting to the aspect of default in payment of rent from January, 2001 till July, 2001, the record goes to show that on an application filed by the plaintiff in I.A.No.1523 of 2001, the trial Court directed the defendant to deposit the admitted rent in question from January, 2001 to July, 2002 by 12.8.2002, which makes it abundantly clear that the defendant has committed default in payment of rents, as rightly observed by the trial Court and confirmed by the lower appellate court. Coming to aspect of bonafide requirement, the defendant denied the said plea of bonafide requirement in his written statement on the ground that the plaintiff is having other property also. But he did not suggest the said aspect during the course of trial to any witness. Hence, trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff is entitled to seek eviction of the defendant and consequently recover possession of the suit schedule property. The lower appellate court, having considered all these aspects has rightly concurred with the findings recorded by the trial Court. Having gone through the entire material available on record and the findings recorded by both the courts below, I am of the considered view that both the courts below have appreciated the evidence, both oral and documentary, in right perspective and the findings arrived at by both the courts below, do not call for any interference. Consequently, I do not find any question of law much less substantial question of law. However, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant that since the defendant is aged about 75 years and for the last several years, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and since he has been carrying on a petty business out of which he is eking out his livelihood, his immediate eviction may result in severe sufferance and hardship apart from irreparable loss and hence, he prayed to grant two years time to vacate the premises. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that he has no objection to grant a reasonable time for vacating the premises, but however, not such an abnormal time. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view of the duration for which defendant was enjoying the premises and taking into consideration the factum of his business and age, the defendant is permitted to vacate the premises within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, subject to the condition that the defendant shall regularly pay rent till he vacates the premises or six months which ever is earlier. The appeal is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs. ________________________ Justice G.CHANDRAIAH Dated 18-12-2009. Note: CC in one week. BO. Dvs HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH S.A. No.999 OF 2009 Dated 18-12-2009 [1] 2007 (4) ALT 348 (L.B.)