HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR CRIMINAL PETITION No.11955 of 2010 ORDER:- The point that arises for determination in this petition which is filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) is whether there are sufficient grounds to quash a domestic violence case i.e. DVC No.208 of 2010 filed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short - Act) by the second respondent herein. The said case is now pending on the file of the Court of III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad. 2. The petitioner herein is admittedly the husband of the second respondent and the third respondent who is stated to be aged 18 years now is their daughter. The first respondent instituted the above DVC for various reliefs under the Act on the ground that the petitioner after the marriage subjected her to cruelty and ultimately deserted her and took a second wife and on that premise she claimed various reliefs which can be claimed under the Act. The petitioner has come with this petition for quashing the said case on three grounds. 3. The first ground is that the allegations made in the DVC on merits do not show any cause of action and therefore the said case is liable to be quashed on that ground. There is no force in this contention. A perusal of the petition in the DVC would show that the second respondent made several allegations which actually fit in with the provisions of the said Act for granting the reliefs claimed by her. Thus the merits of the matter have to be decided on evidence by the learned Magistrate after giving sufficient opportunity to the petitioner also. The various contentions raised by the petitioner with regard to the merits of the matter fall within the purview of disputed questions of fact and therefore they have to be decided only by the learned Magistrate and not by this Court in these proceedings. Accordingly this first ground taken by the petitioner is rejected. 4. The second ground urged by the petitioner is that his marriage with the second respondent took place on 26.01.1991 and the third respondent was born on 9th April 1992 and ever since the date of marriage the second respondent has been throughout at fault and not living with him and that she ultimately deserted him in or about the year 1993 and that there is no domestic relationship between him and the second respondent since 1993 and that the Act has no retrospective effect and consequently the DVC should be quashed on that ground. It may be noted that the Act came into force on 26.10.2006 and the plea of the petitioner is that since the second respondent deserted him and as there was no domestic relationship between him and her since 1993, the Act has no application as it has no retrospective effect. It is difficult to accept this contention also of the petitioner for the following reasons. 5. It may be noted that the expression ‘aggrieved person’ is defined by Section 2(a) of the Act and it says that ‘aggrieved person’ means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. Likewise, Section 2(f) of the Act defines the expression ‘domestic relationship’ and it says that a domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. These two definitions would show that the Act has also got application to domestic relationships which were in existence prior to the commencement of the Act. This Court had an occasion to deal with the question whether the Act has got retrospective effect or not in MOHIT YADAM vs. STATE OF A.P.[1]. After considering the provisions of the Act and the legal position governing as to when a statute should be given retrospective effect this Court had categorically held that the Act has got retrospective effect. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not bring to my notice any other authority which is sufficient to ignore the above decision of this Court on the point. It has to be therefore held that the Act has got retrospective effect and consequently this second ground or plea of the petitioner cannot be accepted. It may however be noted that whether the above plea of the petitioner that the second respondent deserted him since 1993 is true or not and if so what is its effect on the merits of the matter has again to be decided by the learned Magistrate and therefore no opinion is expressed on that aspect. 6. The third ground raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in the DVC, the second respondent made a claim for maintenance and other reliefs relating to money and that she can get these reliefs by way of a suit or other proceedings under different enactments before a civil court or criminal court and therefore she cannot maintain an application under the present Act and that amounts to gross abuse of the process of Court. There is no force in this contention also and it cannot be accepted for the following reasons. 7. It may be noted that Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Act provide for grant of various reliefs such as protection orders, residence orders, monetary relief orders, custody orders and compensation orders under the Act to an aggrieved person i.e. a woman. The main scheme of the Act as can be gathered from all its provisions is to provide a speedy relief to an aggrieved person i.e. a woman from oppression at the hands of her husband or her other relatives. It is not necessary to go into other details. 8. It should be noted that Section 12 of the Act says that an aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more of the above reliefs which can be claimed under the Act. Sections 26 and 36 of the Act are now relevant and they read as follows. “26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings:-- (1) Any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. 36. Act not in derogation of any other law:-- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force.” 9. The wording or language of Section 36 which is already extracted supra and which says that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law would clearly show that the aggrieved person/woman may pursue the remedies either under the Act or other remedies available to her under other laws for appropriate reliefs if she is entitled to the same. Further Section 26(3) of the Act is that if an aggrieved person already obtains a relief in other proceedings she should inform the same or take it to the notice of the Magistrate’s Court under the Act so that the said court can consider the same while passing orders on an application of the aggrieved person. In other words it follows that the proceedings under the Act are independent of the proceedings which can be initiated by an aggrieved person under other laws. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued about the constitutional validity of the above provisions of the Act and pointed out that since the said provisions may expose the respondent to two proceedings of the same nature at a time the provisions of the Act to that extent should be held to be constitutionally invalid. It should be noted here that a perusal of the entire pleadings in the criminal petition would show that it is not the case of the petitioner that he already suffered any decree or order from any civil or criminal court with regard to the reliefs claimed in the DVC. In my opinion a court should confine its adjudication to the lis or dispute before it and should not embark upon hypothetical questions raised by a party. As it is not the case of the petitioner that the second respondent already obtained a relief against him which can be granted under the Act it is not proposed to go into the said question or questions as the said controversy is outside the scope of this petition. Hence the above questions are not answered. Accordingly this third contention of the petitioner is also rejected. 11. Thus all the above contentions or grounds raised by the petitioner are rejected and this criminal petition is dismissed. The interim stay granted earlier is vacated. It shall be open for the petitioner to raise all the defences available to him under the Act including the rights of the third respondent who is said to have become a major now before the Magistrate’s court where the case is pending and the said court shall decide the matter in accordance with law. ______________________ N. RAVI SHANKAR, J 06th June 2011 CVRK [1] 2010 CRI.L.J. 3751