-: 1 :- wp-1321/10 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 1321 OF 2010 1] The State of Maharashtra Through The Secretary to the Govt. of Maharashtra, Revenue and Forests Deptt., Mantralaya, Mumbai 2] The Conservator of Forest, Thane Forest Division, District – Thane. ..Petitioners. Versus 1] Shri. Ramniklal Amrutlal Parekh, 2] Ramanlal Dalsukhbhai Shroff, Through Constituted attorney, Ketan Shamji Gogri, 3B-1, Court Chambers, New Marine Lines, Mumbai – 400 021. ..Respondents. Mr. Sandeep K. Shinde, Addl. G.P. for the Petitioners. Mr. Aspi Chinai, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Chetan Kapadia and Mr. Sanjay Jain i/b Mr. Kalpesh Nansi for the respondents. Coram : RANJIT MORE, J. Date : October 21, 2011. Oral Judgment : 1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, by consent. srp -: 2 :- wp-1321/10 Counsel for the respondents waive service. 3. As short question is involved, Petition is taken up for final disposal forthwith, by consent. 4. By the aforesaid writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners-State seeks to challenge the order dated 23/1/2009 passed by the President of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Mumbai [for short “the MRT”] on the Delay Condonation Application in Forest Appeal No. 28/B/2000. By the said order, the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay of 605 days occurred in filing appeal came to be rejected. The proceeding arises out of an enquiry by the Deputy Collector under Section 6 of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 [for short “the said Act”] to determine whether the land of the respondents is forest land or not. The Deputy Collector, Private Forest (Acquisition), Thane by his order dated 20/11/1998 held that the said land is not “private forest land” and therefore it does not stand to be vested in and acquired by the Government. The Dy. Collector also directed the Forest Department to hand over possession of the said land to the owner of the said land, if at all already taken over by the Forest Department. This order was -: 3 :- wp-1321/10 challenged by the Petitioners-State by filing an appeal before the MRT and since there was delay of 605 days in preferring appeal, the above said application for condonation of delay was preferred, which came to be rejected by the order impugned in the present writ petition on the ground that the petitioners have not satisfactorily explained the delay. 5. Mr. Chinoi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents at the outset challenged authority of MRT to entertain the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay occurred in preferring the appeal under section 15 of the said Act on the ground that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to for the purpose of condonation of delay. Apart from this objection, Mr. Chinoi also opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioners have not given satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay. He accordingly supported the order impugned in the petition. 6. In these circumstances, I called upon Mr. Shinde, learned Additional Government Pleader to make submissions regarding the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appeal filed -: 4 :- wp-1321/10 before MRT challenging the order passed under section 6 of the said Act. Mr. Shinde took me through the relevant provisions of the said Act and submitted that section 6 of the said Act is regulated by Sections 13 to 18 of the said Act. He submitted that section 6, therefore, merely provides finality to the order in the absence of an appeal. He further submitted that section 15 of the said Act specifically provides that provisions of Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the filing of such appeals. He submitted that section 6 of the said Act cannot be said to be a self contained Code. Section 15 would regulate the filing of appeal and applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963. He relied upon the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 to submit that since the provisions of the Limitation Act are not expressly excluded, same are applicable to the appeals filed challenging the order passed under section 6 of the said Act. . Mr. Shinde next submitted that MRT is constituted under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 [for short “MLRC”] and as such once the appeal reaches the MRT, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of MRT in accordance with the provisions of MLRC and Rules -: 5 :- wp-1321/10 framed under the MLRC. In this regard, he relied upon section 315 of MLRC, under which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the appeal and the provisions of sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made applicable to such appeals. He submitted that MRT exercises the appellate jurisdiction under the MLRC, under which it is constituted, and all appeals before it are regulated by the provisions of MLRC and rules framed thereunder. Mr. Shinde also submitted that the petitioners-State has shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing appeal and therefore delay should be condoned. Lastly, he submitted that since the procedure of appeal is subject to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the application of provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 is automatic. On the basis of above submissions, he submitted that the petition deserve to be allowed and MRT be directed to hear the petitioners’ appeal on merits. 7. Mr. Chinoi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, supported the impugned order and submitted that delay of 605 days is not at all explained by the petitioners and therefore no interference in -: 6 :- wp-1321/10 the impugned order is called for. In addition to this, he submitted that section 6 of the said Act is a complete Code in itself. It provides for the entire adjudicatory process in respect of a dispute whether the land in question is forest or not, and therefore order of the Dy. Collector has to be challenged by way of an appeal to be filed under section 6 itself. He submitted that section 15 of the said Act deals with the appeals other than appeals from decisions under section 6 and the provisions of said section, i.e., section 15 cannot be made applicable to the appeal against the order passed under section 6. He submitted that the appeal under section 6 must be filed within the period of 60 days from the date of decision and for this appeal, the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 and especially sub-section (2) of Section 29 thereof cannot be made applicable as applicability of the said section is impliedly excluded. In this regard, he relied upon the Apex Court decisions in (i) Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [(2008) 3 SCC 70] and (ii) Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co [(2001) 8 SCC 470]. 8. In the light of rival submissions made by the learned -: 7 :- wp-1321/10 counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties, following issues fall for my consideration. (i) Whether in view of the provisions of sections 6 and 15 of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975, the statutory powers of MRT to condone the delay in preferring an appeal beyond the period of 60 days is curtailed ? (ii) Whether section 6 of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 is a self-contained Code which bars the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ? (iii) Whether the petitioners have given sufficient reasons to condone the delay of 605 days that has occurred in filing appeal before MRT, challenging the order of Dy. Collector passed under section 6 of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 ? 9. Section 6 of the said Act deals with the settlement of dispute. Under section 6 the Collector is the competent authority to decide the question whether or not any forest is a private forest, or whether or not any private forest or portion -: 8 :- wp-1321/10 thereof has vested in the State Government or whether or not any dwelling house constructed in a forest stands acquired under this Act. The decision of the Collector, subject to appeal to the Tribunal, is final. Section 13 deals with appeals and under the said section, appeal shall lie to the Tribunal against an award of the Collector under section 9 or against any order of the Collector passed under section 11 or 12. Section 15 provides the limitation. Under the said section, appeal other than the appeal filed under section 6, is required to be filed within 60 days from the date of award, or as the case may be order of the Collector and the provisions of sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made applicable to such appeals. Section 18 makes provision of revision to the State Government and such revision is required to be filed within the period of one year from the date of decision. 10. In order to decide the controversy involved in the present petition, the provisions of sections 6 and 15 are required to be interpreted, which read thus : “6. Where any question arises as to whether or not any -: 9 :- wp-1321/10 forest is a private forest, or whether or not any private forest or portion thereof has vested in the State Government or whether or not any dwelling house constructed in a forest stands acquired under this Act, the Collector shall decide the question, and the decision of the Collector shall, subject to the decision of the Tribunal in appeal which may be preferred to the Tribunal within sixty days from the date of the decision of the Collector, or the order of the State Government under section 18, be final.” [emphasis supplied] “15. Save as otherwise provided in section 6, every appeal made under this Act to the Tribunal shall be filed within a period of sixty days from the date of the award, or as the case may be, order, of the Collector. The provisions of sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the filing of such appeal.” [emphasis supplied] 11. Perusal of the above provisions shows that section 6 is a complete Code in itself. Section 6 provides for adjudication of question : Whether or not any forest is a private forest, or Whether or not any private forest or portion thereof has vested in the State Government or Whether or not any dwelling house constructed in a forest stands acquired under this Act. It -: 10 :- wp-1321/10 empowers the Collector to decide such questions. Section 6 itself provides that the order of the Collector can be challenged by way of an appeal before the Tribunal and such appeal is required to be filed within the period of 60 days from the date of order of the Collector. Section 6 further declares that the decision of the Collector, subject to an appeal to the Tribunal or revision under section 18 to the State Government, to be final. Thus, section 6 provides for the entire adjudicatory process in respect of dispute whether or not any forest is a private forest, or whether or not any private forest or portion thereof has vested in the State Government. The decision of the Collector under section 6 has been given finality subject to appeal or revision. The Sixty days period is provided in that section itself for filing an appeal. Thus, order passed under section 6 has to be challenged by way of an appeal to be filed under section 6 itself within 60 days. 12. Under section 13 of the said Act, appeal shall lie to the Tribunal challenging the award or order passed under section 9 or 11 or 12. Section 15 makes the provision of limitation for appeal other than the appeal from the decision under section -: 11 :- wp-1321/10 6. The opening words of section 15 namely “save as otherwise provided in section 6” and the words “such appeals” at the end of section 15, make the position unequivocally clear that the provisions of sections 4, 5, 12, and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are intended to be applied to the appeals arising out of an order passed under section 9 or 11 or 12. In other words, Legislature in its wisdom has not made applicable the provisions of sections 4, 5, 12, and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appeals arising out of an order under section 6. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to make applicable the provisions of section 15 to the appeal arising out of an order passed under section 6 also, the use of the opening words of section 15 namely “save as otherwise provided in section 6” and the words “such appeals” at the end of section 15, was not necessary. Any other interpretation of section 15 will render use of these words useless, redundant and otiose. The Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed the specific limitation for the purpose of an appeal under section 6 of the said Act. The intention of the Legislature to restrict the period to 60 days is further evident from the provisions of section 15. In respect of appeals other than the appeals under section 6, in -: 12 :- wp-1321/10 view of section 15 of the said Act, the Legislature has expressly made the provisions of sections 4, 5, 12 & 14 of the Limitation Act applicable. Thus, even otherwise it is clear that in so far as appeals under section 6 are concerned, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not made applicable by the Legislature consciously and deliberately. The intention to exclude the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 is clearly evident and hence, has to be necessarily implied. Thus, the applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act is necessarily excluded to an appeal under section 6 of the said Act. The above discussion makes it clear that no power is given to MRT to permit the presentation of appeal beyond the period of 60 days. The language employed in sections 6 and 15 of the said Act makes it clear that the Legislature intended that appeal against an order under section 6 has to be filed within 60 days and not beyond that. No power to condone the delay beyond 60 days is given to the Tribunal in so far as appeal under section 6 is concerned. 13. There is no dispute that the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 is a special enactment. In view of the -: 13 :- wp-1321/10 submissions of Mr. Shinde, a reference at this stage is required to be made to the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads thus : “29. Savings. - (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” (3) .... (4) ...” 14. The provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act mandate that in order to attract the applicability of sections 4 to 24 of that Act, two requirements have to be satisfied, namely, (i) there must be a provision for a period of limitation under special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or -: 14 :- wp-1321/10 application; and (ii) the prescription of a period of limitation under special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. If these two requirements are fulfilled, section 29(2) has enunciated the consequences that would follow. These consequences are : (I) Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule; and (ii) For determining a period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for any suit, appeal or application, all the provisions of sections 4 to 24 would apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 15. The provisions of section 29(2) are considered and explained by the Apex Court in 1974(2) SCC 133 [Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain Mishira] and held that even if a special or local law does not exclude sections 4 to 24 by an express reference, the Court can still examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter or scheme of the special law exclude their operation. The Supreme Court held thus : -: 15 :- wp-1321/10 “It is contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is, in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case whether the special law does not exclude the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.” . The Apex Court emphasised that whether sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable is not determined by the terms of those sections but by their applicability or -: 16 :- wp-1321/10 inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. 16. The Apex Court in another decision in 2008 SCC 470 [Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co.,] made following observations : “10. This decision [Vidyacharan Shukla vs. Khubchand Baghel AIR-1964 SC 1099] recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133]. “If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then, the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.” 13. Apart from the language, “express exclusion” may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law: “[E]ven in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would -: 17 :- wp-1321/10 nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.” 17. The Apex Court in a latest decision in 2008 3 SCC 70 [Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors.] held that the High Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India cannot condone the delay if the Statute does not permit the same, as such course of action would render specific provision providing for limitation rather otiose. The relevant observations of the Apex Court, as contained in paragraph nos. 8 and 10 of the said judgment are reproduced below : “8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of -: 18 :- wp-1321/10 communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso, further 30 days’ time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days’ period. 9. .... 10. Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes. It essentially means as adequate or enough. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. In the instant case, the -: 19 :- wp-1321/10 explanation offered for the abnormal delay of nearly 20 months is that the appellant concern was practically closed after 1998 and it was only opened for some short period. From the application for condonation of delay, it appears that the appellant has categorically accepted that on receipt of order the same was immediately handed over to the consultant for filing an appeal. If that is so, the plea that because of lack of experience in business there was delay does not stand to reason. ITC case was rendered taking note of the peculiar background facts of the case. In that case there was no law declared by this Court that even though the statute prescribed a particular period of limitation, this Court can direct condonation. That would render a specific provision providing for limitation rather otiose. In any event, the causes shown for condonation have no acceptable value. In that view of the matter, the appeal deserves to be dismissed which we direct. There will be no order as to costs.” 18. A perusal of the ratios of above decisions of the Apex Court makes it clear that the exclusion of provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to the appeals under