IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.12647 of 2008 Between: Vasamsetti Venkata Rao & another. ..... Petitioners AND The Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District & Others. .....Respondents Counsel for the petitioners: Sri M. Lakshmana Sarma Counsel for respondents 1&3: GP for Cooperation Counsel for respondent No.2: Sri N. Siva Reddy The Court made the following: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.12647 of 2008 ORDER: At the interlocutory stage, the Writ Petition is taken up for hearing and disposal with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. This Writ Petition is filed for setting aside order dated 04.06.2008 in O.A.No.115 of 2006 of respondent No.3, whereby it has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners under Section 76(1) of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (for short, “the Act”) against the award passed by respondent No.1 under Section 62 of the Act in favour of respondent No.2. The facts in brief are as follows: The petitioners have borrowed loan from respondent No.2. As they committed default in repayment of the loan amount, respondent No.2 initially applied for a certificate under Section 71 of the Act before respondent No.1. A certificate was accordingly issued by respondent No.1, which was challenged by the petitioners by filing O.A.No.139 of 2004 before respondent No.3 Tribunal. The said appeal was allowed by order dated 05.07.2005 by setting aside the certificate on the short ground that the procedure under Section 71 of the Act was not followed by respondent No.1 before issuing the certificate and accordingly the matter was remanded to respondent No.1 for fresh disposal. Thereafter, respondent No.2 has withdrawn from the proceedings under Section 71 and raised a dispute under Section 61 of the Act, which was referred to an arbitrator by the Registrar under Section 62 of the Act. The petitioners contested the proceedings before respondent No.1, who passed an award in favour of respondent No.2. The petitioners questioned the said award by filing an appeal before respondent No.3. The main ground on which the award was challenged by the petitioners before respondent No.3 was that respondent No.2, having invoked the remedy under Section 71 of the Act and suffered an order of remand from respondent No.3, is estopped from withdrawing the said proceedings and raising a dispute before the arbitrator. This plea was rejected by respondent No.3. At the hearing, Sri M. Lakshmana Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners, had advanced his contention based on the above plea and submitted that the scope under Section 71 is wider in terms of availability of opportunity to the petitioners and that such an opportunity is denied by respondent No.2 by availing the remedy of arbitration. In my opinion, this submission is without any substance. It is not in dispute that respondent No.2 had two remedies available to it for recovery of the amount, (1) under Section 71 of the Act, it can apply for a certificate and recover the amount on the strength of such certificate, and (2) by raising a dispute under Section 71 and getting the same resolved through arbitration under Section 62 of the Act. Even though respondent No.2 has taken recourse to the first mentioned remedy initially, after the certificate obtained by it was set aside by respondent No.3 and the matter was remanded for fresh disposal, it has withdrawn from Section 71 proceedings and raised a dispute before the arbitrator. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the action of respondent No.2 in first invoking the remedy under Section 71 estops it from availing another remedy is wholly without any merit. When two remedies are available, it is permissible for a party to avail either of those remedies. Therefore, the question of estopple does not arise. The doctrine of estopple cannot be pressed into service in such a situation. It is not as if, respondent No.2 failed in obtaining a certificate under Section 71 of the Act and thereafter invoked the other remedy. After invoking the first remedy, respondent No.2 has chosen to avail another remedy before the former proceedings were finally adjudicated. Such a course, in my opinion, is certainly permissible. Even if the scope of proceedings under Sections 61 and 62 is narrower than that under Section 71, there is no obligation on the part of respondent No.2 to avail a remedy, which gives wider scope to the petitioners to contest their case. As regards the submission of the learned counsel that the direction of respondent No.3 to dispose of the proceedings under Section 71 afresh binds respondent Nos.1 and 2, I do not find any substance in this submission either. The direction was given by the Tribunal only in the context of remanding the matter while setting aside the certificate issued by respondent No.1 on the ground of failure to follow proper procedure envisaged under Section 71 of the Act. Such a direction cannot be construed as preventing the petitioners from availing a remedy different from the one which was already invoked by them. On the above premises, I do not find any merit in this Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the Writ Petition, WPMP No.16294 of 2008 and WVMP.No.3517 of 2008 are also dismissed. ____________________________ C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Date: 24.03.2011 ES