IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.16211 of 2010 ASHOK KUMAR MAHTO, S/O- DEVNANDAN PRASAD MAHTO, RESIDENT OF BRAHAMSTHAN, POLICE STATION- K. NAGAR, DISTRICT- PURNEA :----PETITIONER. Versus 1.THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY-CUM-CHAIRMAN OF BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA. 2. THE BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, UDYOG BHAVAN, EAST GANDHI MAIDAN, PATNA-4 THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR. 3. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, UDYOG BHAVAN EAST GANDHI MAIDAN, PATNA-4. 4. THE SECRETARY, BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, UDYOG BHAVAN EAST GANDHI MAIDAN, PATNA-4 5. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, UDYOG BHAVAN, EAST GANDHI MAIDAN, PATNA-4. :--- RESPONDENTS. ----------- For the petitioner : Mr. Ranjan Kumar Singh, Advocate. For the BIADA : Mr. Lalit Kishore, Senior Advocate. ====== 04. 01.10.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the “BIADA”), who prayed for time to file counter affidavit so as to refute the prayer made in the writ petition by placing on record documents in support of the impugned order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 terminating the service contract of the petitioner in the light of the provisions contained in Clause 1.6(b) of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (Financial, Service and Technical) Regulations, 2007(hereinafter referred to as the “Service Regulation”), Appellate order dated 18.1.2010, Annexure-1, affirming the termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2, such prayer is being refused in view of the settled legal position that the impugned orders should speak for itself and may not be 2 supported with the aid of materials relied in the counter affidavit. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Mahendra Singh Gill Versus Election Commission of India, reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851. 2. Petitioner was appointed as Area-in-Charge (Executive) under contract dated 16.2.2008, Annexure-9 by the BIADA has filed this writ application assailing the order dated 16.10.2008, Annexure-2, whereunder his service contract has been terminated with reference to Clause-1.6 (b) of the Service Regulation with effect from 31.10.2008 on the ground that his service is no longer required by the BIADA. Petitioner is further aggrieved by the office order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6, whereunder his representation addressed to the Hon’ble Chief Minister against the impugned termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 has been rejected stating that discharge of duties by the petitioner is not satisfactory for achieving speedy industrialization by BIADA. Petitioner is also aggrieved by the appellate order dated 18.1.2010, Annexure-1, whereunder his appeal filed against the termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 has been rejected. 3. Perusal of the impugned termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 would indicate that the same has been passed by the Secretary, BIADA under the orders of the Managing Director with reference to Clause 1.6(b) of the Service Regulation. Clause 1.6 (b) of the Service Regulation empower the Managing Director to terminate the service 3 contract of the employee before expiry of the term of the contract. The Order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 further indicate that the service contract of the petitioner is being terminated on the ground that the service of the petitioner and five others named in the order is no longer required. The Order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6 rejecting the representation filed by the petitioner before Hon’ble Chief Minister against the Termination Order dated 30.10.2008, however, indicates that his service contract was terminated for the reason that service rendered by the petitioner is not satisfactory for achieving speedy industrialization by BIADA. The appellate order dated 18.1.2010, Annexure-1, indicates that service contract of the petitioner has been terminated with reference to Clause- 7 of the agreement, which empower the second party to the contract (BIADA) to terminate the service contract of the employee on the grounds that there is no need or on account of abolition of post or due to the closure of the project warranting such termination. 4. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that perusal of the termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 indicates that the same was passed with reference to Clause 1.6(b) of the Service Regulation which empower the Managing Director to terminate the service contract before the expiry of the term of the contract. It is submitted that service contract of the petitioner was terminated by the Managing Director on the ground that the same is not required but others employed along 4 with the petitioner are still continued in the BIADA, the direction to terminate his service along with other five is wholly arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 5. Highlighting the arbitrariness in the termination order petitioner filed representation before the Hon’ble Chief Minister asserting that the statement made in the impugned order that BIADA does not require his service is wholly false which has been disposed of under office order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6 observing that services of the petitioner is not satisfactory for achieving speedy industrialization by BIADA. In view of the different (contradictory) contents of the two orders petitioner challenged the termination order by filing appeal No.07 of 2009 before the Chairman, BIADA in the light of the provisions contained in paragraph-2.8.1(11) of the Service Regulation on the ground that the ground taken in support of the termination order that BIADA does not require the services of the petitioner appears to be incorrect in view of the stand taken by the BIADA itself in the subsequent office order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6 that services of the petitioner is not satisfactory for achieving speedy industrialization by BIADA. The appellate authority without applying its mind to the aforesaid submission raised, dismissed the appeal with reference to Clause-7 of the agreement, which empower the BIADA to terminate the service contract of its employees appointed on contract basis even in the midst of the contract period, in case of no need, abolition of post or closure of project warranting such 5 termination. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the three orders i.e. the termination order dated 30.10.2008, office order dated 3.2.2009 and the appellate order dated 18.1.2010, Annexures-2,6 and 1 on the ground that the authorities of BIADA before terminating the service contract of the petitioner were not sure whether his service is not required by the BIADA as has been stated in the termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 or his service is not satisfactory for achieving speedy industrialization by BIADA as has been stated under office order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6. Termination order passed by the Managing Director was subject to appeal before the Chairman, BIADA in terms of the provisions contained in paragraph-2.8.1(11) of the Service Regulation. As the termination order was appealable in terms of paragraph- 2.8.1(11) of the Service Regulation, it was incumbent upon the Managing Director to have recorded definite reason, which persuaded him to terminate the service contract of the petitioner so as to enable the appellate authority to consider the correctness or otherwise of the reason recorded in support of termination order. In this connection, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee Versus Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984, paragraph-35. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising 6 quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. 7. Counsel for the BIADA has opposed the prayer. He states that petitioner was appointed on contract basis, his contract having been terminated by the Managing Director and his appeal having failed this Court should reject the writ petition as this Court is not competent to set aside the termination order and direct for reinstatement of the petitioner. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the BIADA has relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corpn., Lucknow Versus Chandra Kiran Tyagi, reported in A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244, paragraphs 20,21,23. 8. Having heard counsel for the parties and having appreciated the legal position settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Singh Gill Versus Election Commission of India (Supra) that the administrative orders publicly made should speak for itself and cannot be supported by filing counter affidavit, I hold that the Termination order, passed in the case of the petitioner along with others dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2, order dated 03.02.2009, Annexure-6 and the Appellate order dated 18.01.2010, Annexure-1 is to be considered on the basis of the contents of those order(s) and the same cannot be supported by means of counter affidavit by placing documents on record. As the termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 and the office order dated 3.2.2009, 7 Annexure-6 record different/contradictory reason for terminating the service contract of the petitioner, in as much as the termination order dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 proceeds on the basis that service of the petitioner is no longer required. Office order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6 proceeds on the basis that service rendered by the petitioner is not satisfactory for achieving speedy industrialization by BIADA. In the circumstances there is no difficulty in concluding that the reason for terminating the service contract of the petitioner as indicated in the aforesaid two orders, Annexures-2 and 6 are contrary to each other. Managing Director being the administrative head of BIADA while exercising the administrative power to terminate the service contract of the petitioner was required to have applied his mind and to have recorded definite reason for terminating the service contract of the petitioner. Managing Director having failed to record definite reason for terminating the service contract of the petitioner, there is no difficulty in concluding that order of termination dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this connection, is also made to paragraphs-38, 39 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee(Supra). That being the position, there is no difficulty for this Court in concluding that termination order of the petitioner dated 30.10.2008, Annexure-2 suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and is, accordingly, quashed. Termination order 8 having already been quashed order dated 3.2.2009, Annexure-6 rejecting the representation filed against the termination order is also quashed on the ground that the same suffers from the vice of arbitrariness as has been explained above. Appellate order dated 18.01.2010, Annexure-1 also suffers from the vice of arbitrariness as thereunder the appellate authority has only referred to Clause-7 of the service contract executed by and between the petitioner and BIADA but has not indicated as to how Clause 7 of the service contract is attracted to the case of the petitioner. In the circumstances, appellate order dated 18.01.2010, Annexure-1 is also quashed. A.F.R. Ibrar. ( V.N. Sinha, J )