IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.4227 of 2008 M/S SHANKAR SAH Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- For the petitioner : Mr.S.K.P.Sinha, Advocate For the respondents : Mr. Siddhartha Prasad, Junior counsel to Additional Advocate General-IX ------ P R E S E N T Hon'ble the Chief Justice & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dr. Ravi Ranjan ------ Dated, the 8th August, 2008 The petitioner seeks to impugn the order of assessment dated 31st of May, 2004 passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 19 of the Bihar Finance Act. That the said order is appealable under Section 45 of that Act is not disputed by the counsel. However, relying upon a decision of this court in the case of Bihar Plastic Industries Limited V. State of Bihar & others, [2000] 117 STC 346, the counsel would submit that the reopening of the assessment order dated 25th September, 2001 was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the petitioner instead of pursuing the remedy of appeal provided under Section 45 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 has directly approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. We are afraid, the decision in the case of Bihar Plastic Industries Limited cannot be applied to the present case. In Bihar Plastic Industries Limited, the notice of re-assessment was challenged - 2 - on the ground that it did not contain purpose and provision under which the action was contemplated and since the entire reassessment was founded on the notice without jurisdiction, the petitioner in that case also challenged the reassessment order. However, upon careful perusal of the present writ petition, we find that there is no challenge to the notice for reopening the assessment order dated 25th of September, 2001. The notice issued to the petitioner under Section 19 has not even been produced along with the writ petition. No infirmity, thus, could be pointed out in the initiation of the proceeding under Section 19. 3. Reassessment order having been passed by the competent authority, we find no justifiable ground in bypassing the statutory remedy of appeal. Merely because the petitioner is required to deposit 20 per cent of the tax liability under Section 45(3), the remedy of appeal cannot be said to be inefficient. 4. Writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. This will, however, not preclude the petitioner in pursuing the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 45. If by this time, the appeal has become time barred, which it has, it is for the petitioner to make out a case for condonation of delay before the appellate authority. R.M. Lodha, CJ Dr. Ravi Ranjan, J. Sunil