IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.3698 of 2002 1. Shankar Dayal Singh, Son of Late Sheogahan Singh. 2. Pramod Kumar Singh, Son of Late Namdhari Singh. 3. Achhay Lal Singh, Son of Sri Nanhu Singh. 4. Ram Brat Singh, Son of Late Ram Raj Singh. 5. Nathun Singh, Son of Sri Dhuman Singh. All are resident of Village-Dharahara, P.O.-Turiganj, P.S.-Krishna Braham, District-Buxar. .................................. Petitioners Versus 1. The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust, through its Chairman, Vidyapati Marg, P.S.-Kotwali, District-Patna. 2. Sri Ram Kripal Yadav, Chairman, Bihar State Board of Religious Trust, Vidyapati Marg, P.S.-Kotwali, District-Patna. 3. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dumaraon. 4. Laxman Singh, Son of Ganga Bishun Singh. 5. Yadunath Singh, son of Late Ram Bachan Singh. 6. Sheo Vakil Singh, Son of Late Ram Dhani Singh. 7. Bhagwan Singh, Son of Late Mutan Singh. 8. Shiv Autar Singh, Son of Late Samahut Singh. All Respondents No. 5 to 9 are resident of Village-Dharahara, P.O.- Turiganj, P.S.-Krishna Braham, District-Buxar. ................................. Respondents. With CWJC No. 10536 of 2002 Brij Lal Agrawal, Son of Kunj Lal Agrawal, resident of Arya Samaj Road, P.O. and P.S.-Raxaul, District-East Champaran, Ex. Member of Raxaul, Dharmshala. ........................................ Petitioner Versus 1. The Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Vidyapati Marg, Patna, through its Chairman. 2. The Special Officer, Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Vidyapati Marg, Patna. 3. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Raxaul, District-East Champaran. 4. The Project Officer, Raxaul, District East Champaran. ................................. Respondent 1st set. 5. Surendra Prasad Gupta, Son of Late Binda Lal, resident of Mohalla Katra, Chapra Town, P.O.-Chapra, P.S.-Bhagwan Bazar, District-Saran. ................................ Respondent 2nd set ........................................... Respondents -------- 11 27/4/2009 Heard counsel for the parties. In both the cases counsel for the respondents had raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ application in view of section 55 of the Bihar Hindu Religious 2 Trust Act which reads as follows:- “55.Orders of District Judge to be appealable to the High Court- (1) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against every order passed by the District Judge under this Act. (2)No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.” Counsel for the Board had, in fact, also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court on the same statute, namely, Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, in the case of ‘Sarv Mangal Devi Trust & Ors. Vs. Bihar State Board of Religious Trust & Ors’ reported in 2007 (2) PLJR 469 wherein this Court has held as follows:- “From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that against every order passed by the District Judge, which would obviously include an order passed by him under section 32 (3) of the Act, an appeal shall lie unless otherwise provided in the Act. The use of the expression “unless otherwise provided” in the context would mean that beside the remedy under section 55 any other remedy is provided under the scheme of the Act. Nothing has been pointed out to show that any other remedy is provided under the Act, against the order of the District Judge. In the face of it, I am of the opinion that an appeal would lie against the order passed by the District Judge.” Counsel for the petitioners, however, had placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ‘Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai‟, reported in AIR 1987 SC 203 and also in the case of „Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & Ors‟, reported in 2003 (6) SCC 675. This Court would find that whereas judgment of Sarv Mangal Devi (Supra) is with regard to the same statute and the 3 same provision of law, the case of Aundal Ammal (Supra) was one under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, wherein the relevant provision was under section 18 (5) of the Act laying down that the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law except as provided in section 20 of the Act. There being thus special scheme under the aforementioned Kerala Act, this Court would fail to understand as to how same would be applicable to the provisions of the present Act. In the opinion of this Court the Apex Court in the case of Aundal Ammal (Supra) had merely gone to examine the scope of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also Article 226 of the Constitution and had in no way gone to hold that the order which has been given statutory finality cannot be made subject matter of appeal if provided under the statute. Here in this case the Legislature in its wisdom has made all the orders passed by the District Judge appealable before the High Court and, therefore, it would be very difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Choubey that merely because the order which has been made appealable before this Court is a final order would not allow this Court to entertain an appeal and against such order can be only a writ petition. Other judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ‘Surya Dev Rai’ (Supra) again is related to the scope of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure vis-à-vis scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. There also the 4 Apex Court had gone to consider and decide that if an aggrieved person is completely deprived of any remedy of judicial review, having lost in the hands of original and the appellate authority, remedy under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India would be available on the ground of gross failure of justice occasioned on him. Considering this aspect the Apex Court in the aforesaid case had held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was always in addition to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it and curtailment of the revisional jurisdiction by amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure would not take away the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ to the Civil Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai (Supra) had itself observed also that there was an original forum and the appellate forum and the order of the appellate forum was supposed to become final and the Apex Court had in that context had held that the doors of the High Court could not been shut under Article 227 of the Constitution. That however is not the case here. Here remedy has been provided under section 55 of the Act by way of an appeal against every order passed by the District Judge. The appeal again has to be heard by the High Court and therefore there would be no prejudice to the person aggrieved by order of the District Judge. In the opinion of this Court jurisdiction of this Court 5 in the appellate side will always be larger than in a writ jurisdiction as the remedy of ‘appeal’ by itself would vest power for appreciation both on facts and law. That being so, this Court must hold that both the writ applications are not maintainable and following the ratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sarv Mangal Devi (Supra) these two writ applications are dismissed, but as the petitioners had filed these two writ applications way back in the month of March, 2002/September, 2002, this Court would give leave to them to file an appeal in terms of section 55 of the Act within a period of two months from today and for the period of this two months the interim order passed in their favour shall continue and shall cease to operate after expiry of the period of two months, by which time the petitioners may approach this Court on appellate side for the similar interim order. With the aforesaid observations and directions both the writ petitions are dismissed. Abhay Kumar (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)