IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.3796 of 2009 Mrs.Sangeeta Kumari Versus The State Of Bihar & Ors ----------- 6 15/07/2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, the State as also for Respondent No.6. The petitioner and Respondent No.6 were applicants for the post of Angan Bari Sevika. The petitioner came to be selected at an Aam Sabha on 16.6.2007. Respondent No.6 raised the objection that the mother-in-law of the petitioner being a Ward Member she was ineligible for appointment under the guidelines of 2006. The objection was upheld by the District Magistrate on 7.12.2007 which has been affirmed in an appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Commissioner on 9.12.2008. In pursuance of the aforesaid orders private Respondent No.6, who was the complainant, has been sent for training on 27.2.2009. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on the relevant date i.e. 16.6.2007 when the petitioner was considered for selection and appointment, her mother-in-law was no more a Ward Member. The meeting of the Aam Sabha was not adjourned on 4.4.2007 and 11.4.2007 by any machinations on the part of the petitioner to enable her 2 mother-in-law‟s tenure to lapse before 16.6.2007. The adjournments were for other procedural reasons. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court in 2010 (3) P.L.J.R. 68 (Sunita Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) that a relative of a Ward Member could not have been disqualified from consideration. It was next submitted that the original merit list prepared on 16.6.2007 was never challenged by Respondent No.6. It was only the consequential appointment that was challenged. Relying on 2010 (2) P.L.J.R. 945 (Smt. Renu Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) it was urged that unless the original selection is challenged, a challenge to the consequential order is irrelevant. Reliance was also placed on 2010 (4) P.L.J.R. (S.C.) 70 (Pyare Mohan Lal vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.) for the same proposition. Learned counsel for the State and for Respondent No.6 contended that the impugned orders of the District Magistrate and the appellate authority are well-reasoned and considered. They disclose the reasons why the authorities were subjectively satisfied that the adjournment of the meetings were not a mere coincidence, but were done in a designed manner to favour the petitioner. It was further urged that any decision by this Court on 6.5.2010 that relatives of 3 Ward Members could not be debarred from consideration was a subsequent event which cannot be relevant for testing the impugned orders based on the facts as may have existed on the date that the actions were done. The order dated 27.2.2009 sending the respondent No.6 for training as a prelude to appointment after the issuance of the impugned orders though brought on record by Respondent No.6 as far back as 4.8.2009 has not been challenged by the petitioner till today. On 18.4.2009 a Bench of this Court had directed the respondents not to hold the selection process till further orders. It may only be noticed that the order dated 27.2.2009 is not the result of any fresh selection process, but emanates from the very same earlier selection process under which the petitioner claims her rights. Angan Bari Sevikas are appointed by the State Government for dissemination of welfare schemes to the downtrodden. They do not hold any post under the Government and do not have the status, obligations or rights of a government servant. The relationship between them and the Government is not that of master and servant, but of a principal and agent. The relationship is therefore essentially contractual. They 4 cannot claim parity in appointment and termination with government servants. The rigours that shall apply to appointment and termination of a government servant shall not apply to Angan Bari Sevikas. To import the process of that relationship and by reliance on those standards of the law in the writ jurisdiction, the Courts may be thrusting upon the principal an agent whom the principal is unwilling to appoint, satisfied that the particular agent was not best suited for the dissemination of its welfare schemes. But, nonetheless, because the principal was the Government and not a private person, there shall be a semblance of a check only to prevent gross arbitrariness, perversity and outright illegality. But for such gross cases, a certain amount of flexibility has to be permitted to the principal in the appointment of the agent. In 2004 (2) P.L.J.R. 833 ( Smt. Sajjan Devi & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. ) A Division Bench of this Court has held that Angan Bari Sevikas cannot claim protection and rights at par with government servants. The only protection available to them was that they could not be condemned unheard. Once they had been heard and the principal desired not to retain them, it was not the domain of the Writ Court to interfere. 5 In (2007)11 SCC 681 (State of Karnataka vs. Ameerbi) it has been held at Paragraph-13 and 15 as follows: “13. Thus the post of Angan Bari Sevika is not a post in the government service and as such the private respondents cannot claim protection under Article-311 of the Constitution of India. 15. Requirement of principle of natural justice has been complied with as they are not in government service, they cannot claim a regular proceeding prior to disengagement or removal by treating the aforesaid act as misconduct…and after giving an opportunity of hearing to them have disengaged them and as such they cannot claim any infirmity in their disengagement on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice. The Supreme Court has also explained in State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi, (2007) 11 SCC 681 that Angan Bari Sevikas do not hold a civil post and are not government servants at paragraph Nos. 13 and 20 as follows: “13. The posts of anganwadi workers are not statutory posts. They have been created in terms of the scheme. It is one thing to say that there exists a relationship of employer and employee by and between the State and anganwadi workers but it is another thing to say that they are holders of civil post. 20. Anganwadi workers, however, do not carry on any function of the State. They do not hold post under a statute. Their posts are not created. Recruitment rules ordinarily applicable to the employees of the State are not applicable in their case. The State is not required to comply with the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No process of selection for the purpose of their 6 appointment within the constitutional scheme exists.” Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules like a Statute. Equally, natural justice is not an unruly horse to run across any terrain. What shall be the connotation of the term „natural justice‟ shall depend on the facts of each case. What has to be demonstrated is the prejudice caused. The petitioner was heard by the District Magistrate after issuance of notice as mentioned in the order dated 7.12.2007 and has also been given a hearing at the appellate stage. Nothing further survives on the issue of natural justice. The next question for consideration by the Court is whether the orders impugned contained reasons or not. If the orders are based on no reasons, they shall suffer from gross illegality and perversity requiring it to be set aside immediately even if the petitioner had been heard. But, if the orders mention a ground, and the ground cannot outright be said to be arbitrary or fanciful, but relevant to the controversy, keeping in mind the nature of the relationship of principal and agent between the parties, the Writ Court shall not go into the sufficiency of reasons to decide if another view on the same facts was possible or not merely because it had the powers of judicial review. In this background the Court shall now 7 proceed to consider the impugned orders. The impugned order dated 7.12.2007 states that the meeting was adjourned on 4.4.2007 as the identity of the dominant caste was not discernible. On 11.4.2007 the meeting was given the nomenclature of a disputed meeting and adjourned without any specific cause. During the latter meeting Respondent No.6 could not be selected when the petitioner had the maximum marks, but was the daughter-in-law of the Ward Commissioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly acknowledged that the membership of her mother-in- law as a Ward Commissioner lapsed after 11.4.2007 and before 16.6.2007. Therefore, the conclusion of the District Magistrate that the meeting was purposefully adjourned on 11.4.2007 to accommodate the petitioner by enabling her in-law‟s term to expire cannot be termed as arbitrary, illegal, perverse or fanciful. There is a reason. The reason is factually supported by subsequent events. The subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate is not baseless but has a logic. Insofar as Angan Bari Sevikas are concerned, the guidelines contain adequate provisions and procedures for protecting their interest. In case of allegations of dereliction in discharge of duties the original order is to be passed by the District Programme 8 Officer after hearing the delinquent. An appeal lies against the same before the District Magistrate and in more than one matter, the State has acknowledged that such orders of the District Magistrate were amenable to challenge in turn before the Commissioner. Explaining the guidelines a Division Bench of this Court has already held that where questions of eligibility for appointment are concerned, it being a more serious matter than dereliction of duty, the original authority to adjudicate the same shall be the District Magistrate appeal against which shall lie before the Commissioner. The guidelines are therefore a complete Code in itself for regulating this relationship between the principal and the agent. The jurisdiction of the Writ Court therefore shall be extremely limited only to the extent as discussed above. In view of the impugned orders having been passed on or before 16.6.2007, any subsequent enunciation by the Court on 6.5.2010 that the relatives of Ward Members were eligible to be considered is also of no importance in the present controversy as the impugned orders will have to be tested in light of the guidelines as they were understood on the date that the impugned actions were done. The Respondent No.6 has not been selected 9 afresh. Her name was in the same merit list in which the petitioner‟s name figured. There was no occasion for the Respondent No.6 to challenge the merit list. Her grievance was that the petitioner was not eligible and therefore she was the only competent person to be appointed. The contention therefore that in absence of a challenge to the merit list, the question raised with regard to the consequent selection of the petitioner alone was not sufficient has no merit and is rejected. It is not in controversy that the action of the official respondents in sending Respondent No.6 for training on 27.2.2009 in pursuance of the selection in the same process has not been challenged by the petitioner. Even if the impugned orders were held to be bad, unreasonable, the development that took place in between by sending the Respondent No.6 for training was not challenged, it is not possible for this Court to hold any illegality in the selection of Respondent No.6. It is therefore held in conclusion that there is no occasion for this Court under Article-226 of the Constitution in exercise of powers its discretionary powers to interfere with the impugned orders. The writ application is dismissed. KC ( Navin Sinha, J.)