IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. CWP No. 8709 of 2010 Date of Decision: May 12, 2010 Rakesh Aggarwal and others ..Petitioners Versus State of Haryana and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. KUMAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JITENDRA CHAUHAN Present: Mr. Ashwani Kumar Chopra, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Shilpa Malhotra, Advocate, for the petitioners. 1. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 2. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? M.M. KUMAR, J. The instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution prays for issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents i.e. State of Haryana, the District Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Sonepat and the Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Town and Country Planning Department, from undertaking any other measure in relation to acquisition proceedings initiated by notification dated 6.5.1982, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, ‘the Act’). A further prayer for quashing notification dated 6.5.1982 (P-1), declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, dated 2.5.1985 (P-2) as well as the award dated 1.5.1987 (P-3 Colly) have also been made. It is admitted position that the petitioners had purchased the land after the pronouncement of award from the erstwhile land owners. CWP No. 8709 of 2010 2. Mr. Ashwani Kumar Chopra, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has raised the following submissions before us. Firstly, he has submitted that there was no vesting of proprietory rights in the State as no rapat roznamcha was entered in the revenue record, which may constitute the basis for the respondent State to claim that they have become owner within the meaning of Section 16 of the Act. In any case, the actual physical possession has never been taken as there is no entry in the revenue record and the petitioners are bona fide purchaser. He has further submitted that no public purpose would survive because the land was acquired for construction of residential sector and half of the land notified under Section 4 of the Act stood released. He has further argued that no development on the site has taken place and the petitioners being the small land owners have raised construction without any objection by the respondents. Lastly, Mr. Chopra has also offered that the petitioners are ready to deposit the development charges as per the requirements of the provisions of Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977, as and when development took place. 3. Having heard the learned counsel we are of the considered view that this petition does not deserve admission and is, thus, liable to be dismissed. It is conceded as a fact that award has been pronounced in respect of the land in dispute on 1.5.1987 and the land has been purchased by the petitioners thereafter in 1997 (P-5). Under the Act such a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge acquisition proceedings. No valid title is conferred by any such sale transaction on the purchaser of the land. The aforesaid view is supported by various Supreme Court judgments rendered in the cases of U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (Pvt.) Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 124; Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., (1996) 7 SCC 426; Ajay Shinghal v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 721; and Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 2 CWP No. 8709 of 2010 698.. 4. In para 3 of U.P. Jal Nigam’s case it has been held to be ‘well settled law that after the notification under Section 4(1) is published in the gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. Likewise, in para 5 of Sneh Prabha’s case (supra) following observations have been made: “5. Thought at first blush, we were inclined to agree with the appellant but on deeper probe, we find that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. It is settled law that any person who purchases land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her own peril. The object of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings points out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to enter upon the land to do preliminaries etc. Therefore, any alienation of land after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, titles and interests in land stands vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute title in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser acquired land, his/her only right would be subject to the provisions of the Act and/or to receive compensation for the land. In a recent judgment, this Court in Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava, (1995) 2 SCC 427, considered the controversy and held that a person who purchases land subsequent 3 CWP No. 8709 of 2010 to the notification is not entitled to alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly conferred that right only on that person whose land was acquired. In other words, the person must be the owner of the land on the date on which notification under Section 4 (1) was published. By necessary implication, the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the policy and became disentitled to the benefit of the Land Policy.” 5. The views expressed in aforesaid judgments has been reiterated by Hon’ble the Supreme Court again in the case of Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (2008) 9 SCC 177. 6. In the present case admittedly land has been purchased by the petitioners after announcement of award. Moreover, CWP No. 3327 of 1987 filed by the erstwhile land owners was dismissed on 3.2.2009. It is no excuse in law that sale transaction would confer proprietary rights on the purchaser because possession of the land was not taken and there is no such entry with revenue record. It may be true that land free from all encumbrances did not vest in the State within the meaning of Section 16 of the Act but it is equally true that land has been notified under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act. It is further conceded that award in respect of this land had been announced and the sale transaction is after that date. Therefore, it follows that no encumbrance on the notified land could have been created and such a transaction is void. 7. As a sequel to the above discussion, we are left with no option except to dismiss the petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. (M.M. KUMAR) JUDGE 4 CWP No. 8709 of 2010 (JITENDRA CHAUHAN) May 12, 2010 JUDGE Pkapoor 5