IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE PRESENT HON'BLE SRI DEVINDER GUPTA,THE CHIEF JUSTICE and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE B.SESHASAYANA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO : 11673 of 1994 Between: P.V.Rama Sarma, s/o late P.Brahmananda Rao, Aged about 56 years, R/o Post Office Road, Kamakotinagar, Vijayawada ..... PETITIONER AND 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, General Administration (SC-F), Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad represented by the Chief Secretary. (dismissed for default vide Court order dated 21-9-1999) 2. The Registrar (Administration), High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate order or direction in the nature of a writ calling for the records resulting in G.O.Ms.No.34, General Administration (SC-F) Department, dated 21-1-1994 and quash the same as arbitrary and illegal and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with retrospective effect and grant other ancillary and attendant benefits in the interest of justice. Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. B.NALIN KUMAR Counsel for Respondent No.2: Mr C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy The Court made the following : JUDGMENT: (Per the HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI DEVINDER GUPTA) *** In this Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner (Sri P.V. Rama Sarma), a former District and Sessions Judge, challenges the order passed by the 1st Respondent in G.O.Ms.No.34, General Administration (SC-F) Department dated 21.1.1994, removing him from service with immediate effect, as arbitrary and illegal and seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the same and to reinstate him into service with all consequential benefits. The petitioner was selected as District Munsif by the A.P. Public Service Commission and he joined as such on 2.11.1973. Before appointment in the Judicial Service, the petitioner practised as an advocate at Vijayawada for about 11 years. On 7.2.1984, he assumed charge of District Judge Grade II in Higher Judiciary on appointment to the said cadre by transfer. During the year 1990, the petitioner was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Adilabad on transfer from Hyderabad. By letter-dated 5.6.1990, the petitioner applied for leave and on 11.6.1990, he also submitted a representation to the High Court requesting for his transfer from Adilabad. Leave for 61 days was granted on 14.6.1990. A memorandum was submitted to the Chief Justice on 8.6.1990 along with copy of resolution dated 4.6.1990 by the Bar Association, Adilabad, resolving to abstain the Court of Additional District Judge, Adilabad, presided over by the petitioner, alleging indulgence in corrupt and unfair practices in dispensation of justice, with sworn statements of five advocates appended to the said representation. A complaint was also received from one Smt. T. Elizabeth Victoria Rani, the de facto complainant in C.C.No.1 of 1990, levelling charges against the conduct of the petitioner in having acquitted the accused in S.C.No.57 of 1990 on 8.6.1990. These led the disciplinary committee of the High Court to place the petitioner under suspension pending regular departmental enquiry. By proceedings dated 27.8.1990, the petitioner was placed under suspension pending enquiry into allegations against him. Sri Justice V. Sivaraman Nair was appointed as the Enquiry Judge who by his proceedings dated 5.12.1990 framed eight charges against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation and statement of defence on 23.1.1991. Pursuant to the proceedings of the Disciplinary Committee dated 22.2.1991, the Enquiry Judge by his proceedings dated 27.2.1991 framed an additional charge on which also explanation of the petitioner was called for. The petitioner submitted his additional written statement of defence on 24.4.1991. Disciplinary proceedings thus proceeded and the Enquiry Judge submitted his report. Charges 1 to 8 and the additional charge were held proved against the petitioner, to the extent as indicated in the report of the Enquiry Judge. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court on consideration provisionally accepted the report. The petitioner was furnished with a copy of the same along with a notice to showcause that why the findings be not accepted and punishment of dismissal from service be not imposed. After considering the explanation, the High Court accepted the report of the Enquiry Judge and recommended to the Government of Andhra Pradesh for imposing punishment of removal from service with immediate effect. The Government of Andhra Pradesh passed the impugned order dated 21.1.1994 accepting the recommendations of the High Court and imposing the punishment of removal from service with immediate effect. The order imposing punishment is under challenge by the petitioner in this Writ Petition, inter alia, on the ground that neither the so-called sworn statements of the advocates, nor copies of the orders referred to in the order of suspension, the resolution of the Bar Association, Adilabad, or the complaint of Smt. T. Elizabeth Victoria Rani discloses any misconduct on his part, justifying to place him under suspension and to initiate the disciplinary enquiry against him. The provisions as contained in Annexure VI to Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1964 which mandates conduct of a preliminary enquiry before initiation of a regular departmental enquiry were not complied with; the findings recorded by the Enquiry Judge are perverse, arbitrary and based on no material. The High Court accepted the report of the Enquiry Judge without giving personal hearing and recommended imposition of punishment of removal from service, which is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16, 21, 235 and 311 of the Constitution. The findings recorded by the learned Enquiry Judge which are perverse, arbitrary and based on no material are as a result of misreading of the evidence on record and ignoring relevant and vital evidence adduced on behalf of the defence; it makes no reference or consideration of the evidence produced by the petitioner. The respondents contested the writ petition and filed counter-affidavits. We heard learned counsel for the parties and were taken through the entire material on record. Elaborate submissions were made by the learned counsel for the parties, which we have duly considered and have also gone through the findings recorded by the learned Enquiry Judge. Having carefully gone through the material evidence on record and having considered the submissions made before us, we are of the considered opinion that the findings of guilt arrived at by the Enquiry Judge against the petitioner have been arrived at only upon suspicions and drawing of certain inferences which are not warranted on the material on record. The Enquiry Judge in arriving at his findings completely ignored from consideration the evidence favourable to the petitioner. May be that the petitioner in discharge of his judicial functions might have wrongly applied the law but there is neither any finding nor any evidence that the same was done by the petitioner with improper or corrupt motive or due to extraneous considerations. Facts found against the petitioner and inferences drawn do not amount to misconduct. Wrong conclusions, if any, arrived at by the petitioner in the judicial orders passed by him in exercise of the statutory powers vested in him were subject to judicial supervision in appeal. In the absence of any improper motive or extraneous considerations attributed to the petitioner and duly established in accordance with law, it is rather impossible to sustain the impugned order passed against the petitioner and the same is liable to be set aside. Before proceeding further, we will note down each of the charges framed against the petitioner in the departmental proceedings and the gist of the findings arrived at by the learned Enquiry Judge in respect of each charge. Charge No.1: That he, while working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Adilabad, obtained illegal gratification from the plaintiff in O.S.No.24/84 through her advocate and decreed the suit; and entertained her in chambers while proceedings in connection with the above suit were pending in his Court. Finding: Charge No.1 insofar as it relates to the alleged receipt of illegal gratification by the charged officer from Sri A. Hanumantha Rao on behalf of the plaintiff in O.S.No.24 of 1984 on 14.10.1989 is not proved. Nor was the allegation that he called the plaintiff into his chambers or that he had been visiting the house of that plaintiff been proved. But to the extent of the charged officer being in receipt of amounts in excess of his known sources of income, there are very strong indications. Charge No.2: That he while working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Adilabad, rejected the claim of the petitioner in O.P.No.52 of 1987 on 25.4.1999 without relying on the judgment of the High Court in Appeal No.985 of 1989 presented by him, had subsequently, however, actuated by corrupt motive and extraneous consideration gave favourable judgment in O.P.No.44 of 1986 on 11.5.1990, awarding enhanced compensation of Rs.45,000/- per acre relying on the very judgment of High Court in the said Appeal No.985 of 1989. Finding: Charge No.2 to the extent of judicial dishonesty in awarding widely different rates of compensation in O.P.No.52 of 1987 as against O.P.No.44 of 1986 has not been proved. But here again there is strong circumstances indicating impropriety in the discharge of his judicial functions. The charge as framed is not proved beyond this extent. Charge No.3: That he while working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Adilabad, and acting as Vacation Judge, actuated by corrupt motives, passed order on the last day of Vacation i.e. on 2.6.1990, allowing I.A.No.722 of 1990, filed by the respondent-plaintiff in A.S.No.8 of 1989, though there was no urgency to entertain the same disregarding the Commissioner’s report and also accepted Bank guarantee furnished by the plaintiff-respondent for a lesser amount than the actual value of the felled timber. Finding: Charge No.3 has been proved to the extent of undue anxiety on the part of the charged officer to pass orders in I.A.No.722 of 1990 in A.S.No.8 of 1989 on 2.6.1990 so as to forestall the District Judge who was to function regularly after the summer recess on that date, ordering release of timber insured at Rs.7,00,000/- on furnishing Bank guarantee only for Rs.4,00,000/-. It is also evident that this conduct amounts to gross impropriety on the part of the charged Officer. Charge No.4: That he, while working as Additional Sessions Judge, Adilabad, actuated by corrupt motives, passed orders in the bail applications filed on behalf of the accused in Crime No.71 of 1990 of P.S. Adilabad, giving two separate findings on the same set of facts. Finding: Charge No.4 has been proved to the extent of the charged officer passing orders on applications of accused for bail in the same crime in altogether different manner. But since those orders are judicial orders and there is no evidence of receipt of illegal gratification as an inducement, the charge as framed is not proved. Charge No.5: That he, while holding Full Additional Charge of the post of District and Sessions judge, Adilabad, finalised and forwarded in indecent haste panels for appointment of Additional Public Prosecutor for the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Adilabad and Public Prosecutor for Sessions Court, Adilabad, towards the end of May, 1990, without calling applications from the eligible candidates, apparently to pre-empt the District Judge and with intention to include certain names and with vested interest in particular candidates. Finding: Charge No.5 is proved to the extent of an undue anxiety on the part of the charged officer to send up panels for appointment of Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors in the District and Additional District Court of Adilabad, even though in the former case the then incumbent was to continue till the end of August, 1990, and in the latter, a Special Public Prosecutor had been appointed. It is also proved that the charged officer acted improperly and in haste in eliminating other eligible aspirants without reason. This conduct reveals gross impropriety in the discharge of administrative functions while he was holding charge of the post of district Judge for a short while as Vacation Civil Judge. Charge No.6: That he, as Vacation Civil Judge: (a) Actuated with ulterior motive, took up and ordered number of cheque petitions i.e. I.A.No.645 of 1990 to 661 of 1990 and 663 of 1990 to 666 of 1990 in O.P.Nos.250, 251, 253 to 255, 260, 263 to 268, 270, 290, 292, 293, 320, 322 of 1975 and 47 of 1976, 49/76, and 53 of 1976, respectively, by calling the records thereof from the Additional District Court though they did not warrant any urgency. (b) That even in regular days as Additional District Judge, he used to tease the parties with a view to extract amount by adopting lengthy procedure in disposing of cheque petitions even in matters where the decrees are silent for the payment and the other side reported no objection; and (c) That, he, while working as Additional District Judge, actuated by corrupt motive, passed orders in the cheque petition – I.A.529/90 filed by the claimant No.1 in O.P.No.194/88 for the issue of cheque for the entire amount that fell to her share to keep a part of the amount in Fixed Deposit, though she claimed and is entitled to for the payment of the entire amount that fell to her share; whereas he passed orders in I.A.Nos.645/90 to 661/980 and 663/90 to 666/90 in O.P.Nos.250, 251, 253 to 255, 260, 263 to 268, 270, 290, 292, 293, 320, 322 of 1975 and 47, 49 and 53 of 1976 respectively and I.A.No.462/90 in O.P.485/90, I.A.No.384/90 in O.P.269/88 and IA.490/90 in OP.156/88 and in particular IA.No.98/90 in O.P.No.228/88 for the issue of cheques for the entire decretal amount or the amount that fell to their share as the case may be without imposing conditions. Finding: Charge No.6 has been proved to the extent that the charged officer, in spite of his awareness that he could not have issued cheques for payment of amounts in Court deposit while holding charge of the District Judge as Vacation Civil Judge, advanced cheque applications, allowed them and ordered payment of large amounts of money in applications filed mostly by two advocates, D.W.3 and Sri V. Hanumantha Rao. It is also proved that in doing so he acted discriminatorily. Charge No.7: That he while working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Adilabad, being aware that the advocates decided to boycott the Court from 4.6.1990 onwards acted in a highly improper manner in taking up for trial S.C.No.57/90 on 6.6.1990 and entertaining the accused therein in chamber before trial and in acquitting the said accused later on 8.6.1990, without issuing any summons to the de facto-complainant therein, without taking any evidence and without pursuing for attendance of the witnesses. Finding: Charge No.7 has been proved to the extent that the charged officer acted recklessly in acquitting the accused in S.C.57 of 1990 on 8.6.90 while members of the Bar Association were boy-cotting his Court for the only reason that the Public Prosecutor or Investigating Officer or prosecution witnesses are absent. He knew that summons were not served on the witnesses. In other similar cases, he had adjourned cases due to, and allowed bail to the accused in spite of, absence of counsel. There is no evidence that the charged officer entertained the accused in his chambers on 6.6.1990. Though a judicial order which has been set at naught by the Court, the conduct of the charged officer shows absolute recklessness and impropriety. (emphasis supplied) Charge No.8: That he, by indulging in the above instances in the discharge of his official duties, as alleged in charges 1 to 7 supra, caused embarrassment to his official position and brought derogation to the prestige of his office, constraining the bar Association, Adilabad, pass an unanimous resolution on 4.6.1990, to abstain his Court till he is transferred. Finding: Charge No.8 is proved in that the indiscreet, reckless and improper actions of the charged officer was the prime cause for the passing of Ex.A.2 resolution dated 4.6.1990 of the Bar Association, Adilabad to abstain from his Court. His actions therefore compromised the prestige of the judicial office he was holding. Additional Charges: That he while working as II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, acquired two items of immovable property, i.e. (a) 634 ½ sq. yds. Of house site in Chinakakani village, Mangalagiri Mandal, Guntur district, jointly in the name of his wife and self at a cost of Rs.22,207- 50ps.; and ( b ) 98 sq. yds of site and Daba house built in the year 1987 in Kakamotinagar, Vidyadharapuram, Vijayawada, in the name of his wife, for a sum of Rs.1,60,000/- obtaining permission therefor by furnishing certain sources of income in his application dated 16.2.1987 and 30.1.1987; that he has not mentioned the said sources of income in any of the Property and Relations Statements submitted by him till 9.1.1987, that the said two assets are, therefore, inferred to be disproportionate to the known sources of his income. Finding: The Additional charge is proved in that the charge officer has not been able to prove fully and satisfactorily the sources for the purchase of the two items of immoveable properties in 1987 and 1988 and that he had not disclosed all the particulars of properties and income belonging to him and his wife in the property and relations statements which he had filed. On the basis of disclosures, which he had already made in such statements, it is proved beyond doubt that he had income and assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. Before proceeding further we will notice the extent of the power of judicial review in a writ petition filed under Article 226 in matters arising out of the disciplinary proceedings. It is well-established principle of law that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but is a review of the manner in which decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and to ensure that the conclusions, which the authority has reached, are based on some material on record. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct, the Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer, whether rules of natural justice are complied with; whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and the authority entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. The findings must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of evidence, nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined in the Evidence Act, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. When the authority accepts the evidence and the conclusions receive support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court in exercise of its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court may interfere where the authority has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. These principles are well settled and were reiterated by the Supreme Court in B.C. CHATURVEDI V. UNION OF INDIA. In HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY v. SHASHIKANT S. PATIL also the Supreme Court pointed out the circumstances under which the decision of departmental authorities can be interfered while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, namely, if such an authority has conducted proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be sustained, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK AND OTHERS the extent of power of judicial review was again reiterated by the Supreme Court that the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. Where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, Court or Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings. The scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. Having noted the extent and limit of the Courts’ jurisdiction while exercising the powers of judicial review, what has to be analysed now by us is, whether the findings are based on some material on record or whether it is a case of no evidence or it is only a case of suspicion and inferences, ignoring the evidence favourable to the petitioner. It is important to note that the petitioner was posted as a Judicial Officer at Adilabad and initiation of disciplinary proceedings was as a result of resolution passed by the Bar Association, Adilabad. In the case of a Judicial Officer, parameters, which are required to be taken into consideration, have been subject matter of judicial consideration by the Supreme Court from time to time. In ISHWAR CHAND JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AND ANOTHER, it was held that under the Constitution, the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect Judicial Officers. An honest strict Judicial Officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil Courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders, which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, no judicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. Supreme Court cautioned that, in such like matters, it is imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If Judicial Officers are under constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field, the subordinate Judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant therein was unjustified and the complaints were motivated which did not deserve any credit. Even the Vigilance Judge after holding enquiry did not record any finding that the appellant therein was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. All that was said against the appellant was that he had acted improperly. The Supreme Court also held in that case that if orders are passed without there being any motive, the same