CRP 234/2010 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI I have heard Mr. AK Goswami, learned Senior counsel, for the petitioners, and Ms . B Bhuyan, learned Standing Counsel, PWD, appearing on behalf of the opposite p arty Nos. 1 and 2. I have also heard Mr. M Garodia, learned counsel, for the opp osite party Nos. 4 and 5, and Mr. TJ Mahanta, learned counsel, for the opposite party No. 3. 2. The petitioners herein have instituted, as plaintiffs, a suit, which has given rise to Title Suit No. 01/2010, the suit having been instituted, original ly, against the State of Assam, represented by the Secretary to the Government o f Assam, Public Works Department (Roads), and the Executive Engineer, PWD(Roads) , Silapathar, Dhemaji, who are defendant Nos.1 and 2 respectively, and one Lambi t Duwari, a contractor, who has started construction over the land, which the pl aintiffs claim to be their land, the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs being, in ter alia, for declaration of their rights, title and interest over the suit land , recovery of khas possession thereof, a decree for recovery of Rs. 4 lakhs, fo r the damages, permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the said three defen dants from constructing the road and culvert over the suit land and mandatory in junction commanding the said three defendants to remove all the materials, such as, earth, rods, etc, used for construction of the road and the culvert and to f ill up, with earth, the ditches, which have been dug by the said defendants for the purpose of construction of the road and the culvert. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs-petitioners obtained tem porary injunction restraining the three defendants aforementioned from proceedin g with the construction of the road and culvert over the suit land. By filing th eir written statement, the three defendants aforementioned contested the suit, w herein they contended, inter alia, that the names of the plaintiffs have been re corded, in the records of rights, as owner of the suit land, without the knowled ge of the people of the locality concerned, though, a path has been, in reality, in existence for the last 40-50 years, which runs from National Highway No.52 t o End dike via Vijaypur, that the suit land forms part of the existing path and what the defendants aforementioned have started doing is merely convert the pat h into a road. 4. The opposite party Nos.4 and 5 herein have made an application, in the s uit, seeking to be impleaded as defendants in the suit, by contending that they are President and Secretary of a body of persons named and styled as ’Path Nirma n Committee’, the said Committee represents a number of villages, whose resident s have had been in use of the suit land as a path, and any declaration and/or ot her reliefs, which the plaintiffs-petitioners herein have sought for in the sui t, would, if granted, adversely affect the right of use of the path by the resid ents of the said villages. These applicants have, therefore, claimed that they a re necessary parties and that they may be impleaded as defendants in the suit so that the suit can be effectively disposed of. 5. By order, dated 18.06.2010, the learned District Judge, Dhemaji, has all owed the said application, made by the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 herein, with d irection to the plaintiffs-petitioners to implead opposite party Nos.4 and 5 her ein, as defendants, in the suit, with further direction to the plaintiffs-petiti oners to publish a public notice through a daily newspaper, widely circulated in the locality, where the suit land is situated, so as to invite similar interest ed persons to join as defendants either personally or in representative capacity . Aggrieved by the directions so given to them, the plaintiffs-petitioners have impugned the order, dated 18.06.2010, aforementioned, by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Broadly speaking, thus, the questions, which have arisen for determinati on, in the present revision, are: (i) Whether the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 wer e necessary or proper parties so as to enable the Court to pass the impugned ord er and (ii) besides directing the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 to be impleaded as defendants in the suit, whether the learned Court below could have directed publ ication of the notice, in the newspaper, as has been done in the present case? 7. Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-petitioners, Mr. AK Goswami, learn ed Senior counsel, has pointed out that since a plaintiff is dominus litis, it i s for him to decide as to who shall be impleaded as parties. In the present case , points out Mr. Goswami, when the plaintiffs-petitioners have not claimed any relief against anyone, other than the State and the contractor, who had been awa rded the contract to construct a road and a culvert on the suit land, none, othe r than those, who already stood impleaded by the plaintiffs as defendants, could have been directed to be impleaded as defendants in the suit. In other words, a ccording to Mr. Goswami, the litigation is really between the plaintiffs and the State Government inasmuch as the plaintiffs contend that the suit land is their immovable property and the State has started construction of a road and a culve rt on the plaintiffs’ land without any authority of law. In such a case, contend s Mr. Goswami, the impleadment of any outsider, as a party to the suit, would ch ange the nature and character of the suit, which the plaintiffs have instituted, and this is impermissible in law. 8. Though, primarily, it is for the plaintiff, as dominus litis, to decide as to who shall be impleaded as a party in his suit, the fact remains that Sub-R ule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 clearly empowers the Court to either strike out or add parties. When a Court finds that a person has been improperly impleaded, wh ether as a plaintiff or defendant, the Court can direct the name of such a party to be struck out. At the same time, Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 empowers the Court to add a person as a party if it finds that the person is one, who ou ght to have been joined, whether as a plaintiff or as a defendant, or whose pres ence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. Avoida nce of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of empowering the Court to add parties. 9. Thus, a proper party is one, whose presence is necessary for the purpose of effectively and completely adjudicating upon and settling all the questions involved in a suit; whereas a necessary party is one against whom a right to rel ief, in respect of the subject-matter involved in the suit, exists and in whose absence, no effective decree can be passed. (See Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, In-charge, Court of Wards, Bhavawan Estate Vs. Ram a Krishna Narain, reported in AIR 1953 SC 521, and Savita Devi Vs. District Judg e, Gorakhpur and others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 976). 10. To put it a little differently, a ’necessary party’ is a person, who oug ht to have been joined as a party, and in whose absence, no effective decree can be passed at all by the court. If a ’necessary party’ is not impleaded, the sui t itself is liable to be dismissed. A ’proper party’ is a party, who, though not a necessary party, is a person, whose presence would enable the court to comple tely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the s uit, though he need not be a person in favour of, or against whom, the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the cou rt has no jurisdiction to implead him against the wishes of the plaintiff. The f act that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such a person a necess ary party or a proper party to the suit. (See Mumbai International Airport Priva te Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Ltd and others, reporte d in (2010) 7 SCC 417.) 11. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bomba y and others, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524, the Supreme Court has made it clear that though the plaintiff is a ’dominus litis’ , he is not bound to sue every po ssible adverse claimant in the suit and he may choose to implead those persons, as defendants, against whom he wishes to proceed, yet the Court may, at any stag e of a suit, direct addition of a party. The Supreme Court has also clarified, i n Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra), that the Court may, at any stage of the su it, direct addition of a party, as a defendant, even though the plaintiff does n ot think that he has any ’cause of action’ against him inasmuch as Rule 10 speci fically provides that it is open to the Court to add, in a suit, a necessary par ty or a person, whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to ena ble the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all quest ions involved in the suit. 12. Reiterating that the power conferred on the Court by Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to implead a party to a suit or to strike out a p arty to a suit can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the pla intiff or the defendant or on the application of a person, who may not be a part y to the suit, the Supreme Court has pointed out, in Mumbai International Airpor t Private Ltd. (supra), that Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties, at any stage, of a proceeding. 13. Coupled with the above, I may pause here to point out, as indicated in S avita Devi vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others (AIR 1999 SC 976), that tho ugh avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the p ower given to the court to add parties, the fact remains that the main object of Order 1 Rule 10(2) is not really to prevent multiplicity of actions, though it may incidentally have that effect. The main purpose is to ensure that a party, a gainst whom a relief is claimed and in whose absence no effective decree is poss ible to be passed, be impleaded, as a party, for, such a party is a necessary pa rty. This apart, Order 1 Rule 10(2) enables a court to implead, as a proper part y, even that person, whose impleadment is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. This aspect becomes clear if one takes note of the observations ma de in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal -vs- Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay an d others, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524, at para 14, which read as under: 14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicit y of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a pe rson a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on so me of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It i s not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question in volved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which m akes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, mus t be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the ru le between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., wherein after quoting the obser vations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England, that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituent s of the applicants’ rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subje ct matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has sta ted: The test is ’May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect th e intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights’. 14. From the above observations, made in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra), what becomes clear is that the main object of the rule, as regards addition of parties, is not to prevent multiplicity of actions, though it may, incidentally, have that effect. Thus, though addition of parties, necessary or proper, may h ave the desirable effect of preventing multiplicity of proceedings and this may be the desirable consequence, it cannot be regarded as the main objective of add ition of parties. Merely, therefore, that impleadment of a person would prevent multiplicity of proceedings, such a person cannot be impleaded. The person to be joined must be one, whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some o f the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is no t merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involv ed and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. When a right is claimed aga inst him and when it is not possible to pass an effective decree in his absence, he becomes a necessary party. Yet another reason, which may make it necessary t o implead a person, as a party to an action, is that he be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question, wh ich cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. 15. In the light of the position of law with regard to addition of parties i n a suit, when I turn to the factual matrix of the present case, it becomes clea r, as, indeed, has been noted by the learned trial Court, that the opposite part y Nos.4 and 5 had filed their application to be impleaded, as defendants, in the ir capacity as representatives of the residents of 5/6 villages, who have, accor ding to the said application, interest in the suit land inasmuch as opposite par ty Nos.4 and 5 claim that there had been, in existence, a path over the suit lan d for the last 40-50 years and if the plaintiffs do not implead the persons, who claim to have interest in the suit land, the persons, who claim to have been us ing the said land as a path, would be required to bring, collectively or individ ually, separate suit or suits, as the case may be. Similarly, the plaintiffs-pet itioners would be required to bring, collectively or individually, separate suit or suits, as the case may be, against each of those persons, who claim a right to use the suit land or a part thereof as their path, for, such persons would no t be bound by the decree, which may be passed in the present suit, if they are n ot impleaded. In other words, if not made parties to the suit, the plaintiffs m ay have to institute separate suits against each of those persons, who claim to have been using the suit land as indicated hereinbefore, in order to bind them b y the reliefs, which the plaintiffs claim to be entitled to receive. In such a s ituation, the common question, arising for determination in all such suits, wou ld be as to whether there has had been, or not, in existence, a path over the su it land as has been claimed by the defendants, who had already stood impleaded, and also the opposite party Nos.4 and 5, who sought to get themselves impleaded. In order to, therefore, enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudica te upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, it is necessary to have, as parties to the suit, the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 aforementioned and also a ll those persons, who may be claiming interest in the suit land on the ground th at they have had been using the suit land or a part thereof as a path. 16. From the cases set up by the contesting defendants in their written stat ements and by the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 in their application seeking implea dment, it had become clear that any order made, or decree granted, in the suit, including an order of injunction, may have an adverse bearing upon, and cause pr ejudice to, the applicants, who sought to get themselves impleaded. In such a si tuation, one could not have escaped from the conclusion, and it has been rightly concluded by the learned trial Court, that impleadment of the applicants, who c laim to have interest in the suit land as users of the path along with their co- villagers, and also impleadment of all those, who may be having same interest in the suit land, is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and com pletely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. 17. From a bare reading of the reliefs, which the plaintiffs have sought for , it becomes clear that the plaintiffs not only seek temporary injunction restra ining the defendant Nos. 1,2 and 3 from constructing road and culvert over the s uit land and remove all the materials, which the defendants have collected there , but the plaintiffs have also sought for declaration of their rights, title an d interest over the suit land and recovery of khas possession thereof. If the de claration of the rights, title and interest over the suit land is granted, as th e plaintiffs seek, it would amount to denying, without adjudicating upon the rig ht, if any, of those, who claim to have been using the suit land as their path. Similarly, if the khas possession of the suit land, as sought for by the plainti ffs, is handed over to the plaintiffs, it would deny to the persons, such as, th e opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 herein, their right, if any, to use the suit land as their path without according any opportunity of hearing to them. Indeed, whet her the assertions of the opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 and the villagers, whom th ey claim to represent, that they have had been using the suit land, as a path, i s or is not true, is a question, which can be decided, and would be decided, in the suit. This does not, I must hasten to add, mean that the opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 shall be denied their right to be heard before any order is made or dir ection is passed or relief is granted in the suit, which may adversely affect th e interest of the opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 and their co-villagers. When the interest of the opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 and their co-villagers is claimed to be involved in the outcome of the suit and when their presence, in the suit, is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicat e upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, they cannot be said to be not proper parties. 18. Coupled with the above, and as already indicated above, the plaintiffs-p etitioners cannot restrain the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 and persons, similarly situated, from bringing any suit against the plaintiffs-petitioners for declara tion of their rights, title and interest over the suit land, as a path, and also for appropriate injunction. In such circumstances, impleadment of the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 and those, who may be interested in the suit land, as parties to the suit, would help the Court to completely and effectively adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. This would also avoid multiplicit y of proceedings. Situated thus, this Court is of the view that the learned tria l Court, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, did not a ct contrary to law, when it directed the plaintiffs to implead the opposite part y Nos.4 and 5 as defendant Nos.4 and 5 in the suit and also publish a notice as indicated above. 19. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision fails a nd the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 20. The interim directions, passed in this revision, staying further proceed ings of the suit, shall accordingly stand vacated. 21. Send back the LCR.