1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR SECOND APPEAL NO.409/2011 NARSINGH S/O PIRAJI JADHAO ..VS.. SMT. HIRABAI W/O KASARIMAL SAHU AND ANOTHER Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders Court's or Judge's orders or directions and Registrar's orders. Shri Sanjeev Deshpande advocate for appellant CORAM : A.B. CHAUDHARI, J. DATED : 17.10.2011. Heard Shri Deshpande, learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant has challenged the concurrent findings of facts in the present appeal. Mr. Deshpande, however, contended that substantial question of law arises in this matter, inasmuch as the document Exhibit 31 dated 12.5.1937 if read carefully, it shows that under the said gift deed what was gifted to the plaintiff was a super-structure over the land and not the land. According to him, therefore, plaintiff's claim for title is in respect of the movable property only, since the superstructure is a movable property. Said structure not being an immovable property the suit ought to have been instituted within a period of three years. I have heard learned counsel for the 2 appellant and gone impugned judgments and decree passed by the courts below which they decided on the finding that the appellant/defendant was not claiming any ownership over the suit property in any manner whatsoever. Appellant/defendant had set out a defence that he has been in possession, which is an adverse possession. Both the courts below have concurrently found that the defendant was in possession for a long time, but that did not assume the character of adverse possession as understood in law. I have checked up the findings recorded by the courts below on the question of adverse possession and I find that there is no mistake in applying the principles in relations to adverse possession. As to the contention raised by Mr. Deshpande about the nature of the property, I find that admittedly the house occupied by the appellant/defendant stands on the land and the said superstructure is attached to the land, in that context therefore, it is a immovable property and that being so, the submission will have to be turned down. At any rate the said submission about the nature of property movable or immovable was never made in the 3 trial court or in the lower appellate court and therefore, it is not possible for this court to enter into a new arena in that view of the matter. I do not find that there arises any substantial question of law for consideration in this second appeal. The Second appeal No.409/2011 is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE SMP