HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO C.R.P.Nos. 1490, 1491, 1492, 1493, 1494, 1495, 1496, 1497, 1498, 1499, 1500 and 1501 of 2011 COMMON ORDER: The Petitioners have filed the revision against the orders passed by the Hon’ble Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in CMA No.52 of 2007 dated 25.3.2011 partly allowing the appeal against the proceedings No.MV/47- A/5317/2005, dated 22-12-2006 dated 22.12.2006. In all the appeals, common question is involved as the Petitioners have questioned the proceedings of the Collector under Section 47-A of Indian Stamp Act 1899 and the District Registrar, R&S Department, Hyderabad vide Proceedings No.MV/47- A/5317/2005, dated 22-12-2006. The Petitioners have set up the case as under: The property bearing door No.6-2-12, situated at Lakadikapool, Khairatabad, Hyderabad belong to one Nb. Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung and the property was known as Liyaqat Manzil bearing Bunglow No.1362 (old) and the total extent is 23065 sq yards. Late Nb. Bande Ali during his life time has entered into a hire purchase agreement dated 15.10.1975 for an extent of 15000 sq yards of open land forming part of M.No.6-2-12, situated at Lakadikapool, Khairatabad, Hyderabad in favour of A. Ramaswamy S/o Alagappa, Managing partner, represented by its partnership, the Petitioner No.2 and possession was delivered. 2. Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung and M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation have filed declarations vide C.C. No.E2/4754/76, E2/13102/76, and E2/11338/76 before the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad on 7.9.1976. Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung has appointed M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation represented by Shri A. Ramaswamy, S/o Alagappa as his GPA Holder dated 6.3.1978. The entire sale consideration for the property was Rs.4,50,000/-, which was paid to Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung and he delivered vacant possession of the property to M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation as per hire purchase agreement dated 15.7.1975. A suit was filed bearing O.S. No.1187/93 by Mrs. Vimala Mahmood and others against the legal heirs of Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung for specific performance wherein M/s. Venkateswara Corporation got itself impleaded. The Managing Partner of M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation, Mr. A. Ramaswamy expired on 1.12.1992, and simultaneously Shri R. Venkataramana became Managing Partner of the said firm. 3. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act 1976, in Proceedings C.C. Nos.E2/4754/76, E2/13102/76, and E2/11338/76 had passed orders dated 7.7.1993 holding that, out of the entire property of Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan and in Gulistan in particular, an extent of of 8,869.67 sq. yards (7869.67 sq meters) declared as protected area and 1000 sq meters as retainable area (non-surplus area) under the said Act and the balance area of 8096.33 sq meters as surplus area. Against which, appeals were filed by M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation before the appellate authority i.e. the Commissioner, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad who rejected the appeal as per the order Nos.Hyd/130/97, Hyd/173/97, dated 23.7.1997 without going into the merits and thereby M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation had filed Writ Petition Nos.17319/97, 17325/97 and W.P. No.17920/97 on the file of Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, AP, Hyderabad wherein the said Mrs. Safdarunnisa Begum, W/o Late Mir Bande Ali Khan, Mir Mustafa Ali Khan, S/o Late Mir Bande Ali Khan; Mir Abbas Ali Khan, S/o Late Mir Bande Ali Khan; Mrs. Sayeedunnisa Begum, W/o Mir Murtuza Hussain, represented by GPA Holder Safdarunnisa Begum and Mrs. Batlunnisa Begum, W/o Mir Naqi Hussain represented by GPA Holder Safdarunnisa Begum had filed application to implead themselves vide W.P.M.P. No.450000 of 1998 in W.P. No.17319/97. 4. A compromise was recorded in O.S. No.1187/93 on the file of I Sr. Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad wherein the LRs of Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan agreed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation. Later, an EP No.48/03 was filed for execution of the decree in O.S. No.1187/93 on the file of I Sr. Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The Plaintiffs, their nominees and the Defendants 1 to 5 had agreed in the above said compromise in O.S. No.1187/93 that the entire benefits thereof of the surplus area or non-surplus area in Schedule D shall be enjoyed by M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation i.e. Defendant No.6 alone. 5. The said Writ Petition Nos.17319/97, 17325/97 and 17920/98 were disposed of on 23.11.2001 by the Hon’ble High Court of A.P. with the direction that the matter be remanded back to the Commissioner, Appeals, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad to consider the various objections with regard to computation put forward by the writ petitioners and after which the Commissioner, Appeals, Urban land Ceiling, Hyderabad had vide orders dated 21.12.2002 remanded the matter back to the Special Officer, Competent Authority, Urban land Ceiling, Hyderabad for the purpose of fresh computation. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Land Ceiling, Hyderabad vide his orders dated 24.4.2004 under section 8 (4) of the Act, in C.C. Nos.E2/4754/76 and E2/13102/76 had held that out of the total extent of 16711.04 sq meters in the property known as Gulistan bearing H.No.6-2-12, situated at Lakadi-ka-pool, Khairatabad, Hyderabad, an extent of 15,535.57 sq meters is declared to be retainable land (protected area) and the balance extent of 1175.47 sq meters is held to be surplus area. 6. As per the compromise decree dated 6.12.1999 recorded in O.S. No.1187/93 and the orders in E.P. No.48/2003 dated 25.9.2003 on the file of I Sr. Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the Defendant No.6/Decree Holder M/s. Shree Venkateswara Corporation unto whom the Schedule D Property of extent of 13770 sq yards / 11513.48 sq meters falls, will thereby hold 10,338.01 sq meters of protected area and 1175.47 sq meters of surplus area as defined under the Urban Land Ceiling Act in view of the orders under Section 8 (4) dated 24.4.2004 of the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad in C.C. Nos.E2/4754/76 and E2/13102/76. 7. The Petitioner No.2 had filed EP No.48 of 2003 on the file of I Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad showing the entire sale consideration of Rs.4,50,000/- was paid in respect of Schedule D Property as referred to in the compromise in O.S. No.1187 of 1993 dated 6.12.1999 on the file of I Senior civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The document was kept pending and it was referred to the Collector under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act 1899. The consideration which was shown in the document covered by CRP No.1490/2011 is shown as Rs.39,500/-. As per the market value guidelines, Registrar of the Department, the property was shown as Rs.1,80,28,000/-. The District Collector has passed an order for the payment of the deficit stamp duty, transfer duty and registration confirming the value arrived by the Sub Registrar at Rs.1,80,28,000/- . Being aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioners herein have preferred CMA No.52 of 2007 before the Hon’ble Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the learned Judge has passed an order on 21.3.2011 by falsely allowing the appeal in part reducing the market value of the property at Rs.13,000/- per sq yard. Against which, the present CRP is directed by the Petitioners. 8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has questioned the order passed by the appellate authority by contending that the appellate authority has failed to take into consideration that the document which has been presented for registration is not covered by any layout. There are no amenities provided to the said property. While contending, it is submitted that the Schedule D Property which has been referred is open land and the 12 instruments which have been presented for registration forming part of same door number are not identically located facing the main road. In the context of submission, the learned Counsel has drawn to the notice of the court that the properties covered by CRP No.1498 of 2011; 1496 of 2011; 1500 of 2011; and 1493 of 2011 are facing the road. Rest of the properties covered by CRP No.1490 is 45’ away from the main road. Similarly, the properties covered by CRP No.1499 of 2011 is 70 meters; CRP No.1491 of 2011 is 100 meters; CRP No.1497 of 2011 is 110 meters; CRP No.1501 of 2011 is 100 meters; CRP No.1495 of 2011 is 90 meters; CRP No.1492 of 2011 is 75 meters; CRP No.1494 of 2011 is 90 meters away from the main road. As such, the same market rate cannot be levied for these properties as they are far away from the road. As such, the appellate court has not considered the all the factors while fixing the market value at Rs.13,000/- per sq yard covered by the respective revisions and would have exercised its jurisdiction by reducing the market value by 50%. 9. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended that ULC Act has come into force from 1976, declarations were filed by the Petitioner No.2 as well as the owners and the orders were passed by the Special Officer, Appellate Tribunal, Writ Petitions wherein the matter was remanded and ultimately the orders were passed by the authorities concerned. For the completion of legal process, it took for about 25 years and the Petitioners cannot be said to be at fault as ULC permissions were required for registration of the document. The law prevalent comes in the way for registration of vacant/appurtenant land has to be considered when the document is presented for consideration and it is beyond the control of the Petitioners. In this context, the Petitioners counsel has contended by citing the legal maxim “Use non-cogit ad impossibilia”. The law does not compel the impossible. In the present case as contended by him, the Petitioner No.2 cannot be blamed for non-presentation of the document for registration. As such, it is stated that the value mentioned in the document must be treated as the value by the authorities concerned and the same shall be registered on the value mentioned in the document. That apart, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that the appellate court has failed to take into consideration that the date of presentation of the instrument was 28.7.2004. The observation made by the appellate court that there has been steep increase in the prices of the locality in the year 2006 cannot be the basis and that the appellate court would have further reduced the stamp duty, as post-facto registration cannot be the basis to judge the transactions. It is also contended that the District Collector has observed that the market value of the property is between Rs.20,000 – 40,000/- per sq yard, but there is no iota of evidence placed to treat the market value of the property between Rs.20,000 – 40,000 per sq yard. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioners that under Section 47-A (6), both primary authority and appellate authority failed to consider that there is no material placed before the authority that the property would fetch Rs.30,000 – 40,000/- per sq yard in the open market. The said observation is presumptive in nature not supported by any evidence and the potential commercial value cannot be the basis of determination of market value of the property. It was stated that taking this into consideration, the appellate court would have further reduced the stamp duty atleast by 50% of the value shown in the basic value register. He further argued that the basic value registered cannot be taken as a sole basis for fixing the market value of the property, but they are only the guidelines for the authorities concerned and it has to be the value of the property has to be tested with reference to the respective facts of each case. He contended that the appellate court has committed an error that there is steep raise in the market value of the properties. The post registration value cannot be the basis to observe that there has been rise in the market value of the property. There is no record produced by the Respondent that the value of the property in the open market is about Rs.30,000-40,000 per sq yard. In this context, he argued that all the properties covered by 12 documents are not facing the road, no amenities, lay out to reach the respective properties. As such, the rate per sq yard which will be different for each of the properties covered by the documents. The Collector and the Appellate Court have not considered that the properties which are on the rear side will fetch lesser price compared to road facing properties. The Appellate Court has not considered these factors while exercising jurisdiction in fixing the rate per sq yard in respect of the said properties. He stated that the guidelines fixed by the authorities are not final, but only prima- facie rate prevailing in the said area. It is also open before the registration authorities to prove that the actual market value of the property is less than the value mentioned in the basic value registered. The authorities cannot rely on the guidelines by valuing the property as last word or subject matter. Even the potential value of the land further cannot be the basis for the determination of the market value of the property. 10. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration appearing for the Respondent has contended that the court below has properly exercised its jurisdiction by fixing the rate at Rs.13,000/- per sq yard. It was also contended that the value of the property in the said locality is between Rs.30,000 – 40,000 per sq yard and the appellate court has rightly fixed the value of the property at Rs.13,000/- per sq yard. It was also contended that post facto registration, the instruments were valued at Rs.16,500/- and that the value has increased even after 2004. As such, further reduction of the market value is not warranted for. The learned counsel for the Respondent no doubt contended that the matter was pending before the ULC authorities and that cannot be the basis to judge a transaction when the document was presented for registration only in 2004 and the rate prevalent on the date of registration of the document shall be the basis to apply the market rate. Heard both the sides, Sri R.A.Atchunand for the petitioners and learned Government Pleader for Arbitration. 11. On consideration of submissions and perusal of record, the point, which emerges for consideration is as to whether on the facts and circumstances, what could have been the proper and correct value for the purpose of stamp? 12. As seen from the record that the declarations were filed before the Special Officer and Competent Authority way back in the year 1976 under the ULC Act and orders were passed on 7.7.1996 holding that out of the entire property of Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung, an extent of 8869.67 sq yards (7869.67 sq meters) declared as protected area and 1000 sq meters as retainable area (non-surplus area) under the Act and balance area of 8096.33 sq meters as surplus. Against which the Petitioner carried the matter before the appellate authority i.e. Commissioner, ULC, who rejected the appeal by order dated 23.7.1997 and the Petitioner filed writ petitions which were disposed off on 23.12.2001 by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature with a direction that the matter will be remanded to the Commissioner, ULC to consider the objections with regard to computation and after which, the Commissioner of Appeals, ULC, Hyderabad vide order dated 21.12.2002 remanded the matter to the Special Officer and Competent Authority for the purpose of fresh computation. The Special Officer & Competent Authority vide order dated 24.4.2004 has held that an extent of 16711.04 sq yards in the property bearing No.6-2-12, Lakadikapool, Hyderabad, an extent of 15535.57 sq yards is declared as retainable (protected area) and the balance 1175.47 sq meters is held to be surplus. Meanwhile, a suit bearing O.S. No.1187 of 1993 was filed on the file of I Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad wherein the Petitioner No.2 got itself impleaded in the suit wherein the LRs of Nawab Mir Bande Ali Khan @ Liyaqat Jung agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of Petitioner NO.2. Subsequently, a compromise was recorded on 6.12.1999. In pursuance to the compromise, EP No.48 of 2003 was filed for execution of the registered sale deed. Meanwhile, the orders were passed on 24.4.2004 by the Special Officer. The Petitioner contended that the entire sale consideration was already paid in the year 1975 and due to the pendency of the ULC proceedings, till the clearances were obtained for the property, it could not be registered. 13. The Learned Government Pleader for the Respondent has relied upon a judgment Siddukar Madhukar and another Vs. Govt. of AP, Revenue Department and others reported in 2002 (6) ALT 144 wherein he referred to para 14 of the judgment. He contended that the Petitioner No.2 cannot take advantage of the suit being pending for specific performance not to pay the market value of the property as per the basic value register. The Petitioner cannot take advantage of the pendency of the suit for specific performance. He stated that in view of the judgment, the value of the property on the date of presentation of the document should be taken as the value and it cannot relegate back to the date of agreement of sale. No doubt the contention has been raised before the court. It is not the case of Petitioner No.2 that due to the pendency of suit, he could not have registered the property, but he contended that due to pendency of ULC proceedings for about 25 years, registered sale deeds could not have been executed. In the said judgment, “Para 16. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the opinion that the decision in Sub Registrar’s case (1 supra) does not lay down the correct law and it is overruled accordingly. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the registration authority, in case of dispute as regards the correctness or otherwise of the market value of the land, will have to take recourse to the provisions contained in Section 47-A of the Act. We must also observe that in a given case, the Collector can also take suo motu notice thereof. The Petitioners, therefore, may take recourse to the remedies provided for under the Act. The writ petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations”. As seen from the said observation made by the court, it is for the Petitioner No.2 can take recourse to proceed under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act 1899 and the Collector is competent to take into consideration and determine the market value of the property under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act 1899. The facts of the case stated above are different from the facts of the present case. The Petitioner No.2 has relied upon the legal maxim “It is a maxim of law, recognized and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong, and this maxim, which is based on elementary principle, is fully recognized in the court of law and all equity and indeed admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure”. The Petitioners have relied upon: (1974) 2 SCC, 33 “Special Reference No.1 of 1974” decided on June 5, 1974, Para 15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62 (1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law leg non cogi ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him”. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of god (See Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edition at pp 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Ed. At p. 268) (1987) 4 SCC, 398 Raj Kumar Dey and others Vs. Tarapada Dey and others, Para 6 We have to bear in mind two maxims of equity which are well settled, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit – An act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In Broom’s Legal Maxims, 10th edition. 1939 at page 73 this maxim is explained that this maxim was founded upon justice and good sense; and afforded a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. The above maxim should, however, be applied with caution. The other maxim is lex non cogit ad impossibilia (Broom’s Legal Maxims – page 162) - The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and the administration of it, said Sir W. Scott, with reference to an alleged infraction of the revenue laws, must yield to that to which everything must bend, to necessity; the law, in its most positive and peremptory injunctions, is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of laws must adopt that general exception in the consideration of all particular cases. 14. The Petitioner No.2 cannot be said to have been presented the document for registration till the ULC clearances were given in respect of the said property. As such, the appellate court has failed to consider it that it was impossible for the Petitioners to get the documents registered. It is contended by the Respondent that there has been steep increase in the value of the property in the locality in the year 2006. The learned Counsel for the Respondent brought to the notice of the court that the District Registrar has observed the market value of the property is Rs.20,000 – 40,000/- per sq yard. The said observation is presumptive in nature and not supported by evidence. The potential commercial value cannot be the basis for determination of the market value of the property on the date of registration of the instrument. At the most, the basic value register cannot be taken as a sole basis for fixing the market value of the property, but it is only the guidelines for the authorities concerned and the value of the property has to be taken into consideration with reference to the nature of the property such as location, development, and other factors. All the properties covered by 12 instruments are not facing the main road, no amenities provided, lay out to reach the respective properties, the rate per sq yard will be different for each of the properties covered by the instrument. The properties covered by CRP No.1498 of 2011; 1496 of 2011; 1500 of 2011; and 1493 of 2011 are facing the road. Rest of the properties covered by CRP No.1490 is 45’ away from the main road. Similarly, the properties covered by CRP No.1499 of 2011 is 70 meters; CRP No.1491 of 2011 is 100 meters; CRP No.1497 of 2011 is 110 meters; CRP No.1501 of 2011 is 100 meters; CRP No.1495 of 2011 is 90 meters; CRP No.1492 of 2011 is 75 meters; CRP No.1494 of 2011 is 90 meters away from