( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 3660 OF 1996 Kinetic Engineering Ltd., .. Petitioner Nagar-Dhond Road, Ahmednagar, (Through its General Manager) Shri Ramesh Jankiram Kabra, Age. 54 years, Occ. Service, R/o. Station Road, Ahmednagar. Versus 1. Shri Mukund Govind Phadnis .. Respondents Age about 27 years, Occ. Service, R/o. c/o. S.G. Patil, Kedgaon Deviche, Ahmednagar. 2. Shri S.G. Kadam Member, Industrial Court, Seth Suratsing Bhavan, Savedi Road, Ahmednagar. Shri V.S. Bedre, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri Y.R. Marlapalle h/f. Shri T.K. Prabhakaran, Advocate for respondent No.1. CORAM : P.R. BORKAR,J. DATED : 24.09.2009 ( 2 ) ORAL JUDGMENT :- 1. By this writ petition, the employer is challenging the judgment and order passed by the Member, Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, in Complaint U.L.P. No. 279 of 1992, decided on 13.09.1995, whereby the complaint was allowed and it was declared that the present petitioner had indulged in unfair labour practice under Item 9, Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short “M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act”) and the petitioner should cease and desist from engaging in such unfair labour practices permanently. It was further directed to make the complainant /respondent No.1 permanent as Helper and provide him status and privilege of permanency and all consequential benefits from the date of the order. 2. As per the documents produced on record by both sides, respondent No.1 had rendered services with the petitioner company from 13.11.1984 for six months, then from 14.05.1987 to 14.12.1987, 01.08.1988 to 28.02.1989, ( 3 ) 07.09.1989 to 07.03.1990, 24.10.1990 to 30.04.1991 and 09.03.1992 to 11.07.1992. He filed complaint in the Court on 17.06.1992. The Industrial Court has come to a conclusion that the breaks were given without their being justifiable reasons. The persons who were junior to respondent No.1 were made permanent. Waiting list was not properly maintained, in as much as the number of respondent No.1 was shown to be 62028 below Exh.C-7/2; whereas as per Exh. C-7/1 produced by respondent No.1, it is 5002222. In-fact, both were copies of same document; one is given to respondent No.1 and other retained by the petitioner/employer. So, ultimately it came to a conclusion that there was unfair labour practice under Item 9 Schedule 4 of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act. 3. One of the basic question raised before this Court is that as per order dated 14.07.1992, the employment of respondent No.1 was terminated w.e.f. 14.07.1992 itself and he was informed that his name was entered in the waiting list maintained by the company under Clause 4(d). The learned advocate for respondent No.1 bought to my notice that before said order was passed, he had made application Exh U-2 before the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court passed the ( 4 ) order as below :- “It is ordered that respondent shall not terminate the complainant from his services except through due process of law till complaint is heard and finally decided.” . He argued that in-spite of this order by the Industrial Court, the termination order is passed. However, it is passed on same date i.e. 14.07.1992. Now it is admitted position that said order of termination was never challenged till this day before the Industrial Court or the Labour Court. There is admission to that effect in the deposition of respondent No.1 recorded on 23.01.1995. He has specifically stated that he received letter dated 14.07.1992 by registered post. He had not made complaint before the Labour Court in respect of said letter. He has not taken up any proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour nor he filed any complaint in the Labour Court/Industrial Court challenging the termination order dated 14.07.1992. There is nothing on record to show that after 14.07.1992 the respondent No.1 ever continued in the employment of the petitioner. The learned advocate for the petitioner made statement that after 14.07.1992, respondent No.1 was not in employment. ( 5 ) 4. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no question of permanency arises unless respondent No.1 is reinstated by the order of the Court or the Tribunal. So, the Member, Industrial Court ought to have inquired into this question about continuance of respondent No.1 in the employment, when it passed order on 13.09.1995. In view of above, the order of the Industrial Court remains paper order in absence of any proceeding for reinstatement on setting aside termination order dated 14.07.1992. The order of the Industrial Court has become nullity in absence of proceeding for setting aside termination order dated 14.07.1992. The Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the termination and it could have been done by filing proceedings in Labour Court under the M.R.T.P. and P.U.L.P Act or the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. With these observations, this writ petition is disposed of. Rule discharged. [P.R. BORKAR,J.] snk/2009/SEP09/wp3660.96