IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO. 634 OF 2008 Ramchandra Sakharam Kadam..... ...... ......Appellant. V/s Anant Pandurang Mande & Ors. . ...... ......Respondents. Mr.S.M.Kamble, Adv. For the appellant. Mr.Pankaj Das, Adv. For respondent No.1. Mr.Rohan Darandare, Adv. For respondents 2 & 3. CORAM: A.P.DESHPANDE, J. 13th JANUARY, 2009. PC: This second appeal is directed against judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit filed by the present appellant for specific performance of the contract, which is confirmed by dismissal of the appeal by the District Judge. Respondent No.1 alone named Anant Mande executed an agreement of sale in favour of the appellant on 12.7.81. The suit lands were joint family property owned by all the four respondents and the lands were under joint cultivation. The lands were recorded in the revenue records in the name of all the respondents. A suit for specific performance was filed after almost a period of 22 years from the date of execution of the agreement. Suit lands were lands of which title came to be vested i the respondents on account of the fact that they were tenants. The respondents did not have power and authority to transfer the said 1 lands without permission of the Collector by virtue of the provision of section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. None of the defendants filed written statement or entered the witness box. In the above set of facts and circumstances trial court dismissed the suit and the appellate court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial court dismissed the appeal. The grounds on which the suit came to be dismissed are (i) delay in instituting the suit i.e. after lapse of about 22 years from the date of agreement; (ii) inaction on the part of the appellant in pursuing the respondents and/or in obtaining permission of the revenue authorities for transfer of the tenanted lands; (iii) joint ownership of all the respondents over the suit lands which was in joint cultivation of all the respondents and the agreement of sale being executed only by respondent No.1. It is not in dispute that there are no averments in the plaint about the other respondents having agreed and/or consented to respondent No.1 in entering into agreement of sale and (iv) the consideration of the land was fixed at Rs.3500/- way back in the year 1981 when only sum of Rs.1,500/- was paid and the balance seems to have been paid at later point of time. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the suit had been mainly dismissed on the ground that on the date of execution of the agreement the respondent No.1 was minor aged about 16 years. The Courts below have taken the age of the respondent No.1 to be 16 years on the basis of its mention in the cause title of the plaint. The 2 submission of the learned counsel is that the mention of age in the cause title was approximate and without putting the plaintiff on notice about the said ground being relied upon by the Courts below for dismissing the suit. The Courts below could not have dismissed the suit by concluding that the defendant No.1 was minor. Perusal of the memo of appeal reveals that it is not asserted by the appellant that the defendant No.1 was major on the date on which the agreement was entered into. Thus a suit for specific performance has been dismissed on the ground that defendant No.1 was not absolute owner of the property and there were other co-owners who are not signatories to the agreement so also o the ground that the suit land was tenanted land and could not have been transferred without permission of the revenue authorities. It is an additional ground that the executant of the agreement appear to be a minor and hence not competent to enter into a contract in the year 1981. The relief of specific performance is discretionary relief. There is no justification for filing a suit after lapse of 22 years. The only explanation tendered by the appellant is that in the year 2002 when the respondents tried to obstruct the possession of the appellant he could gather their refusal to perform their part of contract under the agreement and hence appellant is justified in filing the suit in the year 2003. Though the limitation would begin from the point of time of obstruction of possession or refusal to perform his part of agreement nonetheless a decree for specific performance would not be readily passed in favour 3 of party who belatedly approaches the Court as in the present case after lapse of 22 years. In the above set of facts though the question of law is raised that the Courts below could not have concluded the age of the defendant No.1 being 16 years nonetheless the said question does not become substantial question on law in the present case for the reason that the decision in the suit does not in any way alter even if a finding on the question raised goes in favour of the appellant. In the result as in my opinion, no substantial question of law emerges in the facts of the present appeal, no case is made out for admission. Hence Appeal is dismissed summarily. 13.01.2009. 4