IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.3539 of 2011 MEENA DEVI, WIFE OF RAM BHAWAN CHAUHAN, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE- BASTA, UNDER THARTHARI BLOCK, P.S.- THARTHARI, DISTRICT- NALANDA. … PETITIONER. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR, 2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, PANCHAYATI RAJ DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA. 3. ANUSHRAWAN PADADHIKARI, PANCHAYATI RAJ DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA. 4. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE-CUM-COLLECTOR, NALANDA AT BIHAR SHARIF. 5. SENIOR INCHARGE OFFICER (PANCHAYATI RAJ), NALANDA COLLECTORATE, BIHAR SHARIF (PANCHAYAT SECTION, NALANDA). 6. SUB-DIVISIONAL OFFICER, HILSA, NALANDA. 7. BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, THARTHARI BLOCK, IN THE DISTRICT OF NALANDA. .. RESPONDENTS. ----------- 2. 01.03.2011. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. The petitioner is the elected Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj, Narayanpur, Block Tharthari , District- Nalanda aggrieved by the order dated 11.02.2011 passed by the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, under Section 18(5) of the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006 unseating her from the post. Learned counsel submits that the allegations related to alleged irregularities in appointment, by not following the reservation roster etc. in appointment of Panchayat teachers, a one solitary transaction. Assuming though not admitting the allegations, the submission is that the charges of a solitary transaction do not fulfill the requirement of abuse of power or misconduct as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2524 ( Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vrs. State of Punjab) holding at paragraphs 6 and 10 as follows: “6. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge and duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within S.22 of the Act must be clearly made out. 10. The expression ‘abuse of powers’ in the context and setting in which it has been used cannot mean use of power which may appear to be simply unreasonable or inappropriate. It implies a wilful abuse or an intentional wrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power or an indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected but it would not be an abuse of power. It must be such an abuse of power which would render a Councillor unworthy of holding the office of President. Inasmuch as an abuse of power would entail adverse civil consequences, the expression has to be narrowly construed. Yet again, the expression employed in S.22 is ‘abuse of his powers or habitual failure to perform his duties.’ The use of plural powers, and the setting of the expression in the framing of S.22 is not without significance. It is suggestive of legislative intent. The phrase ‘abuse of powers’ must take colour from the next following expression ‘or habitual failure to perform duties.’ A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving, dishonesty of intention is ‘abuse of powers’ within the meaning of S.22 of the Act. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision. Learned counsel for the State is unable to satisfy the Court of the legality of the order in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The order dated 11.02.2011 is set aside. The application stands allowed. Ibrar/- ( Navin Sinha, J.)