c^s^> IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR (CHHATTISGARHl CIVIL REVISION 3^1 /2003 ,f/PETITIONERS PLAINTIFFS \°?-;0^" ^•^' ,<^ ;t..--- mEaPONDENT iNDANT .s^-' ^ .••' .^s>9" e^y" ''^^ 1. K.D.SINGH Aged about 51 years S/o Harnath singh By caste Kshertriya, Agriculturist and Ex- Sarpanch, Gram panchayat Bortalab 2. Dhanraj aged about45 years S/o Karu by caste Kalaar Both R/o Village Bortalab Tahsil Dongargarh Distt. Rajnandgaon VERSUS ^ '/ MUKESH KUMAR aged about 42 years S/o Kundanlal ujbane R/o Village Bortalab Tah Dongargarh Distt. Rajnandgaon CIVIL REVISION UNDER SECTION 115 OFCODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE1908 •^ HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BltASPUR (CHHATTiSGARH) Civi! Revision No.318 of 2003 K.D. Singh and another - Versus - Mukesh Kumar (H 1 - POST FOR ORDER ON 22nd MARCH, 2004 Sd/- L.C.BHADOO Judge ^zz^.ii. ^.^.zsof •^-' HiGH COURT OF JUDiCATURE AT BILASPUR (CHHATTiSGARHJ Cjvii Revision No.318 of2003 K.D. Singh and another - Versus - Mukesh Kumar Present: - Shri Parag Kotecha, Advocate: Shri Prafull Bharat, Advocate: For the petitioners For the respondent vA Before: Hon'bEe Shri Justice L.C. Bhadoo ORDER (Passed on 22nd Mareh, 2004) 1. The petitioners have preferred this civil revision under Sectton 115 of the Code of Civii Procedure, 1908, being aggrieved by the appe!)ate judgment and decree dated 08.09,2003 passed by the 1 Additional Sessions Jiiidge, Rajnandgaon, in Civil Appeai No.30-A/2002, whereby the learned appeliate Court reversed the finding of the trial Court and dfemissed the suitiOf the respondent for malicious prosecution on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. 2. Relevant facts for the disposa! of this revision are that in the year 1990, the pond of Viliage: Bortalab was constructed and in the year 1992 the resporadent herein who was the Panch at the relevant time made a complaint to the Coiiector, Rajnandgaon, regarding the irreguiarities committed by! the petitioners herein in the construction of the viliage pond. Petitioner No»1| was theSarpanch of the vi!!age and petitioner No.2 was working as a Mate at the relevant time. !t was a!so published in the daily newspaper 'Savera SanRef in its edition-dated 27.07.1992 under the caption "Irregularities in preparatipn of Muster Roll". Based on that comptaint of the respondent herein a casa was registered agalnst the petitioners at the Police Station: Dongargarh, for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 409, 467 & 468 regd with Section 34 of the I.P.C. and during the investigation, the petitionersjwere arrested and they were sent to jail a!so. After completion of the investigation, the Poiice Station: Dongargarh filed charge sheet againstthe petitioner^ in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1rt Class, Dongargarh, for the commissio^ <j>f the 4^ aforementioned offences and a crimina! case was registered at number t 361/92. After hearing the arguments on the charge, the petitioners were discharged vide order dated 30 August, 1995 by the learned Judiciai Magistrate against which the State preferred a criminal revision which was registered and numbered as 135/95. The said crimina! revision was dismissed on 30.04.1997 by the 2 Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon. Based on that, the petitioners herein filed a civi! suit on 18.10.1997 for malicious prosecution against the respondent for financial loss, mental agony and physical suffering to the tune of Rs.30,000/-. The triai Court decreed the suit to the tune of Rs.18,000/-. Being aggrieved by the above judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, the respondent herein preferred an appeal and the learned Additiona! District Judge ailowed the appea! and reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. : 3. ! have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The main point raised by the peiitioners herein in this revislon reiates to interpretation ofArticSe 74 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963, vvhich reads thus, "74. For compensation for a maiicious prosecution. Period of limitation: Oneyear. Starting point of limitation: When the piaintiff is acquitted orthe prosecution is otherwise terminated." 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the finding of the appellate Court is iiiegal because the petitioners herein were dlscharged by fhe trial Court on 30.08.95 against which the State preferred crimina! reyision and that criminai revision was dismissed on 30.04.97, therefore, the limitation commenced only from the date of the judgment of the revisional Court i.e. 30.04.97. He placed reliance on the judgment of a Fuil Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Soora Kulasekara Chetty and another v. Thoiasingam ChetSy reported in AIR 1938 IViadras 349. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that;as per fhe provisions of Article 74 of the Limitation Act, starting point of the timitation was the date of discharge i.e. 30.08.95, not the date of disposa] of the revision. He placed reiiance on the judgments in the cases of Bhaskar Narhar Deshmukh v. Kisanial Sadasukhdas and another reported;in AIR 1968 Bombay 21; Madho Lal v. 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'LUJO^ jeq^o jo luieicituoo jo IBSSILUSIP 'eBjByosipepniou! yoiq/A esi/iusiDO jo [efflnboe 'e'i sBuipssoojd leujuuuo eL|i jo UOIIBUIIUJSI ifi spoiu 34} sjg^sj }i )nq 'uo!ie}jui[| jo Buiyeis jo ssodjnd Q\Q m^ ynoo ieuoisiAS.1 jo e}B||edde y> lueuuBpnf sq} spn|oui }OU S80R 8|311JV ®!4li0 SUOISIAOjd 04} 'spjom .i94}o Ui -eseo leuiujus e p ssBeis iuejsyip }ou SJB sSuipsssojd jo uoiieuiiuje} esi/uusyio jo |eB!nboe sqi •spoo sjnpsoojcj leuiuuuo sqi p suoisiAojd sqi jepun sBuipseoojd IBUIUUIJO sijl io Suiddojp jo luieidtuoo 94} y) |essiaisip jo eBjeLiosip •s'\ leftinboe ueqi ssiAiusyio peieujujje} si Buipssoojd leujLuuo 841 jo psninboe si pssnose 84) ueifM jgqiie suesiu }Bt(} 'peieuiLUJSi ssiMjeqio si uoiinoesojd eiji jo |BB!nboe yi 8}5p 94} UIOJ^ 33U9LUUU03 |[!M eLUi} SL|I )eqi SABS qaiqM 'pv uoiieiiuji-i SLJ} ^0 ^i eiojlJV y> suoisiAojd eqi otui )joo| eM 11 'siusuiBpnf eAoqe w^ yi tqBi) ©qiui 8 ,;|eH|nboe isuieBe uoisiAaj jo IBSSILUSIP iuo^ }ou pue ynoo |eui ui iBBinboe LUOJ^ um ||i siuii,, ^64} plSLj ynoo qBiH peqeqEiiv 84} '(ejcins) |B^ oypei^ p aseo eqi ui 'A|jB|ituis ,,'paddojp SJSM Aeq} U©L|MAep 041 uo psieuiuijei s6uipeeoojd - sBuipssoojd 941 y> uoiienuguoa se ps}B8ji sq IOUUBO uojBed jssiojd - pesnooe isuieBe sBuipseoojd p 8uiddo.tp }suie6B lueuieidiuos Aq psiy uojiiied }ss}0jd sseo leuiujijo u|,, •sSuipeesojd ieuiLUuo 04} y) uoiteuiujjs; p 9}ep 94} luoj.} soueiuLuoo [|IM uoiieiiaiii ^o poued eq} 'uoiinsosojd snoioiieiu jo^ ssBeLuep joj iins leLj) P|SL| ynoo tjGiH essuQ sqi '(ejdns) npeqejBQ ejpusBop p sseo sqt ui •,,uo!ie}!Ui!j ^o pousd eqi pusdsns 'sjoisjeq} 'iouueo }i pue asea eq} ui pspjoosj leBinboe IBUI.BUO stji p psye 34} qiiM Aewe op 01 pies sq }ouue3 |Bsdde SJSLU V,, IBljt p|94 SBM }[ •,,uo!tet!Uji| p pousd pusdsns iou p|noo leedde p Buijy ojsiAI - ynoo IBU} Aq |eninboe p siep LUOJJ unj 0} ueBsq UO!}E}!UI!| jo SLUII,, }BU} pisq ynoQ I!B!J-| Aeqiuog 34} jo L{ousg UOISIAIO e '(ejdns) jeqjBN jBSfSByi p 8SB3 ai(i ui SBSJsqAA 'UOISIASJ eq} p9|y pue uoipiAuoo jieqi Buunoss 0} M81A B L|}IM 9dS}S jeqijn^ sjoo} iueuie|diuo3 sy) esneosq 'sejeyosip ^o eiep 941 uo psieuiLuje} iou peq s6u!p9eoojd eq} leq} pisq 'ijnoo 4611-1 sejpeiflj SLj} jo qousg ||nj siji '(ejdns) Ausqo Bje>|9se|n>j EJOOS p sseo 94} u| z ' • j.6 BSSUQ QZ6 i- yiV u! pepodsj sjayio pue ejied fejeBun 'f- sjsijio pue npeqe.ieo eJpusBop '.^pQ peqeqejiv gget ^ terminated otherwise. Acquittal means either by the trial Court or if there is conviction by the triai Court then acqujttal by the appellate Court passed in appeal or revision. in case where-the acquittal has been ordered by the trial Court and the compfainant file any revision or appeal, that cannot effect ihe order of acquittal already passed. It will remain an order of acquittal till the acquitta! is converted into an order of sentence. As per the iaw of jimitation, once the iimitation starts no subsequent event can suspend the commencement of the limitation. Therefore, as per Article 74 of the Limitation Act, once the limitation starts from the date of acquittal or discharge or termination of the proceedings otherwise, then filing of any revision or appeal against that order does not suspend the limitation which already commenced. !n the circumstances, in my opinion, the visw taken by the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts is correct. 9. Therefore, in view of the above, in the present matter, the limitation started on 30th August, 1995, and the suitwas filed on 18th October, 1997. In the circumstances, the suit was time barred as it was filed after the expiry of the iimitation of one year from the date of discharge. 10.1n the result, the learned appellate Court has not committed any illegality or material irregularity in passing the impugned judgment and decree and dismissing the suit ofthe petitioners being time barred. Therefore, the revision is without merit and the same is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed. Sd/- L.C.BHADOO Judge ~^F^ .KWf