‘ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Writ Petition No. 131 of 2001 Sanjeev Kumar Singh 85 others -Versus- Uninn of India 65 othets Post for order on 23%anua1y, 2006. H Sdl- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge 20. 1.2006 ; HIGH COURT OF CHHA’I'I‘ISGARH AT BILASPUR Single Bench: Hon’blc Mr. Justice Sntllh K. Ayihotri. Writ Petition No. 131 of 2001 Pctitioners: 1. Sanjeev Kumar Singh, Son of Sn' Negcshwar Singh, aged about 30 years. 2. Raj Narayan Yadav, Son of Daya Ram Yadav, aged about 31 yeaxs. Vimndra Choudhary, Son of Ramchandta Choudhaxy, aged about 3 1 years. 3. Pmmod Singh, Son of Gojo Singh, aged about 31 years. 5. Jitendra Bahadur Patel, Son of Mewa Ram, aged about 29 years. 6. Shrimm Singh Yadav, Son of Harhangi Singh, aged about 3O years. . 7. Rammj Knmar, Son of Banshila], aged about 29 years. All are residents of Bishmmpur, Tehsil— Surajpm', Dism‘ct- surguja (C.G.). 3. Jawahar Lal Rajwade, Son of Jaimm Rajwade, aged about 26 years, Iesident of village Kumda Basu' Tehsil- Surajpur, District SurguJa (C G) 9. RaJendra Pramd Jaxswa], S/o Shn R C Ja1swa1 aged about 28 yea1s, Resident of Village Karanwa, Surajur, Disint- Surguja (C.G.). Sushil Misha, Son of Nageshwar Mishta, aged about 28 yeaxs, Resident of Ambikapur, Distn'ct— Surguja (C.G.). 10. Vexsus Respondents 1. Union of India, Acting thmugh ' the Secretaxy, Minisny of Coal, New Delhi 2. Chawman, Coal India Lumted Kolkata (West Bengal) Chanman-cum—Managmg Director, South Eastem Goalfields Ltd., Seepat Road, Biiaspur (C. G.). \ Shri Mam'ndra Shrivastava, Senior Advocate with Shri V. K. Pandey, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri Prveen Das, Advocate for the Respondents No. 2, 3 and 4. None for the Respondents No. 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8. O R D E R (9‘3fjanua1y, 2006) The following order of the Court was passed by Satilh K. Ayilmttl, J. 1. The petitioners are residents of villages Kashkela, Lakshmanpur and Kamlapur of District- Smguja. They were holding land’s; descriptions ofwhich are as under:- Name of the Petitioner Place/village Area Khasra No. 1. Sanjeev Kumar Singh Kashkela 405 24971, 250/2(b), 236/2 8n 237 2. Raj Namyan Yadav Lakshmanpur 344 137/7 3. Vilendra Choudhan' Kamlapur 405 1 14 405 506/1, 541/2 8. Jawaharlal Rajwade Kamlapur 4. Pramod Singh Kashkela 405 5] 1, 23/ 1, 358/ 1 &. 253/ 1 5. Jitendra Bahadur Kashkela 405 38/ 2, 43/ 2 Patel 6. Shrimm Singh Kashkela 405 534] 1, 624, 398/ 1, 402/ 1 &. 528/ 1 7. Ramraj Kumar Kamlapur 405 42/2 9. Rajendra Prasad Jaisawal 10. Sushil Mishra Kashkela 405 358/ 2 Kashkela 405 17/ 2 2. The lands of the petitioners, as stated above, wem acquired under the provisions of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (for short ‘the Act, 1957’). The noiihcah'on under the Act, 1957 was published in the Gazette on 21.8.1996 (Annexure P/ 1) whereby land holdings of the petitioners along with other similarly situated persons of concerned villages and other adjoining villages were acquired. Under the Rehabilitation Policy of the then Government of Madhya Pradesh dated 25th September, 1991 (Annexuie R/ 1), one person of the family whose 2/3’d agicultural land was acquired would be eligible for getting employment by the S.E.C.L. on availability basis. The provision of ‘Employment Facility’ under the said policy, is reproduced herein below: “3. EMPLOYMENT FACILITY a) One person of that family, whose residential land and mom than 1/31" land have been acquired will be eligible for getting employment by SECL on f t priority basis. b) One person of each family, whose non-irrigated land more than 3 acres and irrigated land more than 2 acres have been acquired will be eligible for getting employment by SECL on second prioiity basis. c) One person of such family, whose whole agricultural land and] or residential land have been acquired, will be eligible for getting employment by SECL on third priority basis. d) One persons of such family Whose 2/3 agricultural land has been acquired, will be eligible for getting employment by SECL on availability basis. Landless oustees of concerned area, whose essential livelihood have been adected, will be provided training through the medium of self employment plan with the help of the State Govt. SECL will evaluate the need for training of members of ousted families and their 1Iaim'ng shall be ananged by SECL” 3. The pe11'tioners,who are admittedly family members of the land holders’applied for employment as per rehabilitation policy of the State Government for acquisih‘on of their lands under the provisions of the Act, 1957. The petitioners were declined employment on the ground that subsequently by amendment dated 21. 12. 1995 (Annexure R/ 2), the Rehabilitan’on Policy dated 25.9. 1991 has been amended to the extent that a family member, whose residential land and agicultural land, as stated in the policy dated 25.9. 1991, would be eligible for employment only in case they'were holding the land for 20 years continuously and had taken their education there, itself. . Being aggrieved, the petitioners have med this petition under Arn'cle 226/ 227 of the Consn‘tun'on of India seeking a direction against the respondents No. 1 to 6 that the respondents No. 1 to 6 be directed to issue appointment Orders as they have done in ease of the respondents No. 7 and 8. . Shri Manindra Shrivastava, learned Senior counsel with 8111i V. K. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the similarly situated several persons, whose lands were acquired under the same notincan'on and they were the residents of either the same village or other adjoining villages,have been given employments.‘ The Respondents No. 7 and 8 are some of those persons )who were given appointment when their lands were acquired after amendment in the original policy dated 25.9. 1991, issued under the same notihcah'on. It was contended that the policy of the respondcms No. 1 to 6 is discriminatory, albitraxy and unmasonable as the mspondents No. 1 to 6 have applied the principle of pick and choose, in favour of some pemons and have mjccted the claim of the pctitioners without assigning any reason. Leaxned counsel further contonded that the change of policy by amendment dated 21. 12. 1995 is also mbihmy, unmasonahle and unconstitutional. However, there was no challenge to the policy in this petition. . Shri Praveen Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 to 4, per Gonna, categorically admitted that it was true that some of the similarly situated persons, Whose lands had been acquired along with the petitioners had been g ted employment and that was conuary to the amended policy dated 21.12.1995, even then, the petitioners could not be granted the same relief because the peh'tioners are not entitled to the relief of employment nrstly, on account of the amendment in the rehabilitation policy, and secondly, one wrong committed by the respondents could not be allowed to be perpetuated in the case of the petm'‘oners also. . I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records appended to the petition and returns. . Before considering the facts of the case, it is neoessaxy to observe that this Court by order dated 11.11.2005 directed the respondents No. 2 to 4 to hle a chart stating name of the owner of the land, area of the land, date of acquisition of the land, amount of compensation paid, if any, and appoinhnent if any g‘ven to a member of the oustee family. The Respondents No. 2 to 4 despite direcn‘on of this Court failed to me the required chart, indicating @/ facts of the pmsant petitioners as well as other similarly situated persons. The Respondents No. 2 to 4 had not complied with the order and deliberately and intentionally kept the information back on one or other excuse. The conduct of the Iespondents No. 2 to 4 clearly establishes that the respondents No. 2 to 4 have not followed amended mhahilitah'on policy dated 21.12.1995 uniformly and honestly in case of the land holders Whose lands were acquired after 21.12.1995. The Respondents No. 2 to 4 themselves have violated the amended rehabilitation policy. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 to 4 have clearly admitted that some of the simiJarly situated persons have been ganted relief of employment and yant of relief in favour of some similarly situated persons cannot entitle the peh‘tioners to claim the similar relief in the teeth of the amended rehabilitation policy dated 21. 12. 1995. 10. The Supreme Court in Ramana Dayamm Shetty Vs. The International Airport Authority of India 6r. others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 has held as under:- “21. This rule also flows directly hum the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14. It is nnw well settled as a result of the decisions of this Court in E. P. Royappa v. State ofTamil Nadu, (1974) 2 SCR 348 : (AIR 1974 SC 555) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: (AIR 1978 SC 597) that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. lt requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory: it must not be guided by any exnaneous or irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial Of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an I l essential element of equality or nonaarbiuariness is projectad by Article 14 and it must characterize cvexy State action, Whether it be under authority of law or in exemise of executive power Without making of law. The State cannot, therefore act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory... .." 10 The Supreme Court in Nanonal Insurance Co. Ltd. New Delhi Vs. Jugal Kishole and othels (1988) 1 SCC 626 has observed as under: - “10......This Court has consistently emphasized that it is the duty of the party which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be pe 'tted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof. This duty is mater in the case of instrumentalities of the State such as the appellant who are under an obligan'on to act fairly......” _ 11. The Supreme Court in Chandigarh Adminisuation & another Vs. JagjitvSingh & another { (1995 1 Supreme Court Cases 745}, relied on by learned counsel for the Respondents No. ,2 to 4, has held as under:- . “8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the Writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated f t before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the pen'tioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not wananted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent- authority to repeat the iilcgality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionaly power of the High Court cannot be exemised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal] unwarranted onier, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to laW~ indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law- but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a‘basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act] order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discriminah'on. Giving eh‘ect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of hw and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negah'on of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justihed one it can he followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case. But then why examine another person’s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. It is not more appropriate and convenient to examine the enn'tlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his. case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desixable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignoxe the law and the well accepted norms governing the writ jurisdich'on and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is conuary to law or otherwise Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court andA High Courts nor can they be ekvated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi—jud'mial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises).» 12. The Supreme Court in Faridabad Ct. Scan Centre Vs. D.G. Health Services and others { (1997) 7 S.C.C. 752}, cited by learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 to 4, has held as under:- “3. We fail to see how Arn'cle 14 can be attracted in cases where wrong orders are issued in favour of others. Wrong orders cannot be perpetuated with the help of Article 14 on the basis that such wrong orders were earlier passed’ir‘i favour of some other persons and, therefore, there Will be discrimination against others if correct orders are passed against them. In fact, in the case of Union of India (Rly. Board) v. J. V. Subhaiah2 the same learned Judge in his judgment has observed in para 21 that the principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 does not apply when the order relied upon is unsustainable in law and is illegal Such an order cannot form the basis for holding that other employees are discriminated against under Article 14. The benent of the exemption notihcation, in the present case, cannot, therefore, be extended to the petitioner on the ground that such benedt has been wrongly extended to others. With mspect, the decision in Mcdiwcll Hospital! docs not lay down the correct law on this point.” 13. It is well settled pn'nciplc of law that wrong otder cannot be allowed to be perpetuatcd on the gmund of discriminalion in thg touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, in the facts of the presant case where the family member of the oustee landholders’ were given appointment before amendment dated 21. 12. 1995 and there was no condition of pexiod of holding of the land for 20 ycais and education at the same place. Though, validity of the amended pmvision has not been under challenge, but in the present case all of a sudden without establishing any rationale or reasonable nexus to the amendment was sought to be- made in their rehabilitation policy. It is desirable in the interest of justice that the case of the petitioners be also oonsideied by the respondents No. 2 to 4 in accordance with law, particularly in View of the fact that this is a benehcial policy with the welmre purpose of rehabilitation of the oustees with proper source of income and compensation thereof for aciiuisition of land, so that the oustees can live in a dignined manner. 14. For the reasons stated above, the Respondents No. 2 to 4 are directed to consider the cases of the petitioners for grant of employment in lieu of the acquisition of lands, in accordance with law. 15. With the above direction, the petition stands disposed of dually. No order as to costs. ’// Sdl- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge