1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.448 OF 2008 Vivek Agatrao Garad & Anr. ....Applicants Versus The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ....Respondents. Mr. Gajanan P. Lasure, Advocate for the Applicants Mrs. M. M. Deshmukh, Government Pleader for the Respondents. CORAM : R. V. MORE, J. DATE : 24th JUNE, 2009. P.C. : Rule. By consent, rule made returnable forthwith. 2. Heard Mr. Lasure, learned Counsel for the Applicants and Mrs. Deshmukh for the Respondents. 3. The Revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Barshi in L.A.R.No.88 of 2004 by which the Applicants’ Application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894(hereinafter referred to as “the act”) came to be rejected. 4. The brief facts giving rise to the present Revision are as under :- 1. The land Gut No.73 situated at village-Gaudgaon, Tal.Barshi, District : Solapur belonging to the Applicants was acquired by the Respondent No. 2 for the purpose of Goudgaon Percolation Tank Project. There is no dispute between the parties that the Award was passed on 16th December, 2001. There is further no dispute that the Applicants were not present at the time of passing of the award. It is the contention of the Respondent No.2-Land Acquisition Officer that notice under section 12(2) 2 of the Act was issued to the Applicant on 17th August, 2003. However, it is the contention of the Applicants that the said notice was not received by them. It is the specific case of the Applicants that they came to know about passing of the award on 27th November, 2003, when they were called by the Land Acquisition Officer to receive the amount of compensation and thereafter they filed reference under section 18 of the Act, with the Collector on 6th January, 2004. 2. It appears that the Collector referred this dispute to the court for determination of amount of compensation. The court thereafter, on the basis of the order passed at Exhibit 20, framed preliminary issues regarding limitation. The learned Trial Judge after hearing both the sides came to the conclusion that the Reference is not filed within the period of limitation as contempleted under section 18 sub-section 2 of the Act, and therefore, the same is rejected. 5. Having heard the learned Counsel and having gone through the impugned order, I find merit in the revision. There is no dispute that the Applicants were not present when the award was made by the Respondent- Authority on 16th December, 2001. The Respondent No.2-Authority claimed to have issued notice to the Applicants under section 12(2) of the Act on 17th August, 2003, however, same was not received by the Applicants. I find substance in the case of the Applicants that they got the knowledge of the award for the first time on 27th November, 2003 when they were called upon by the Land Acquisition Officer to collect the amount of compensation for acquisition of their land. This contention of the Applicants is supported by document at Exhibit A on page 12 which is a chart showing the amount of compensation paid to various persons on 27th November, 2003 in which the name of the Applicant No.2 is at Serial No.1. In the above facts and circumstances, we have to see whether reference filed by the Applicants on 6th January, 2004 is within limitation. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 reads as follows: “Provided that every such application shall be made, - 3 (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.” The clause (a) of the proviso applies where the person who has made the application was present or represented before the Collector at the time when award was made. This clause has no application in the present case, since the Applicants were neither present before the Collector nor had they been represented when the award was made. Under clause (b) of the proviso, the application has to be filed within the period of six weeks from receipt of the notice from the Collector under sub-section (2) of section 12 or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. The words “date of the Collector’s award” were interpreted in the judgment of the Apex Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Versus Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, (1962) SCR 676 : A.I.R.1961 Supreme Court 1500. The Apex Court held that the award of the Collector being in the nature of tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance, the making of award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. Consequently, the Apex Court in paragraph 5 held as follows: “Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the 4 award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words “the date of the award” occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.” In paragraph 6 of the above judgment, the Apex Court has further held as follows: “6. There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector, it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement, and award is pronounced and a party is 5 not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actually or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the expression “the date of the award” used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be reasonable to construe the words “from the date of the Collector’s award” used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.” The law laid down by the Apex Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh case, supra, has recently been followed in Purshottambhai Maganbhai Patel and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2005), 7 Supreme Court Cases 431. 6. In the present case, admittedly the Applicants were not before the Collector when the award was made on 16th December, 2001. Consequently, knowledge of making the award can be attributed to the Applicants only when the award came to be communicated either actually or constructively following the law laid down by the Apex Court. The Applicants got notice of the award for the first time on 27th November, 2003 and therefore the period of six weeks under clause (b) of the proviso of section 18 sub-section (2) of the Act would begin to run w.e.f. the date of that knowledge. The reference under section 18 of the Act was made on 6th January, 2004 i.e. within the period of six weeks from the date on which the Applicants got knowledge and in these circumstances, the learned Trial Judge committed an error in rejecting the Petitioner’s reference on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. 7. The impugned order is accordingly quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. The learned Trial Judge is directed to proceed further and decide the reference of the Applicants on merits. Sd/- (R. V. MORE, J.)