IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.2524 of 2005 BRINDA PATHAK, S/O LATE SHEOPUJAN PATHAK, RETD. ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, AT PRESENT RESIDING AT E/1 ANAND VILLA APARTMENT, AASHIYANA NAGAR ROAD, P.S. SHASTRI NAGAR, PATNA – 25 ..............PETITIONER Versus 1. THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA THROUGH THEIR REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT, PATNA 2. STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THEIR CHIEF SECRETARY, DEPT. OF PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA ….. RESPONDENTS. ---------- For the Petitioner:- Mr Madan Mohan Prasad, Mr Manindra Kumar and Mr Anurag Pandey, Advocates. For the High Court:-Mr Tara Kant Jha, Sr. Advocate and Mr Amish Kumar, Advocate. For the State:- Mr Arup Ch. Chongdar, A.C. to AAG-II. ---------- 15. 15.05.2009. Heard the parties. Petitioner superannuated as an Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad. He is aggrieved by and has challenged the communication made by the Registrar General of Patna High Court to the District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad dated 29.01.2005, contained in Annexure-1, whereby the District & Sessions Judge was communicated regarding result of the departmental proceeding initiated against Sri Brinda Pathak, the 2 petitioner. The communication discloses that the communication was as per direction of the Court of the fact that the charges have been proved against the petitioner after considering the entire materials on record and the show cause filed by him and the Court had taken a decision that since he had already superannuated, deduction to the extent of 5% be made from his pension as per the provisions of Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `the Rules’). Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised four grounds to challenge the decision or communication contained in Annexure-1. Firstly, it has been submitted that the charges found proved against the petitioner as contained in Annexure-2 would show that both the charges related to passing of discriminatory and improper judicial orders and, only on that basis, the petitioner was charged that he had committed judicial impropriety and shown lack of integrity and committed an act unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, no person or authority can frame such charges on the basis of errors in judicial orders because in that even the provisions of Contempt 3 of Courts Act and Judicial Officer’s Protection Act, 1850 would come to the help of the concerned Judicial Officer. In support of those propositions, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rachapudi Subba Rao Vs. The Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, {1981 BBCJ (SC) 39}. We have gone through the aforesaid judgment and find that provisions of the aforesaid Acts were invoked to protect a Judicial Officer from scurrilous and defamatory allegation made by a litigant of a proceeding in which the Judicial Officer had passed judicial orders. We find the facts of this case entirely different. The Contempt of Courts Act contains several exceptions including one in Section 6 which provides that complaint against the Presiding Officers of Subordinate Courts when may not amount to contempt. The High Court has constitutional obligation to supervise the Subordinate Courts under its jurisdiction and we find that the plea advanced on behalf of the petitioner, noticed above, if accepted, will come directly in the way of constitutional obligation upon the High Court to maintain purity in the administration of justice, 4 particularly by the Subordinate Courts. Hence, the first plea is found to be without any substance. Secondly, it has been submitted that punishment under Rule 43(b) of the Rules can be inflicted only by formal order of punishment by the State Government and, hence, enforcing deduction of 5% from the pension of the petitioner without such order by the State Government is contrary to the provisions of the Rules. The impugned communication, contained in Annexure-1, does not refer to any order by the State Government. A supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court, Respondent No. 1, gives a fair account of decision taken by the Standing Committee of the Court on the basis of departmental proceeding against the petitioner, but it shows that the High Court had taken a decision, which was only recommending in nature, and admittedly a final and formal order had to be passed by the State Government. From the materials on record it is clear that no such order has yet been passed by the State Government. In that view of the matter if any of the authorities have made deduction from the 5 pension of the petitioner on the basis of Annexure-1 then such action must be treated to be contrary to law. So deduction made from the pension of the petitioner should be restored to him without any delay. There is no scope for the State Government not to take a final decision in the matter once the High Court has taken a decision and conveyed its recommendation, as is apparent from the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 1. The writ petition has remained pending for about three years. The State should have fulfilled its obligation and passed appropriate order in accordance with law upon the recommendation of the High Court much earlier. In the facts of the case the State Government is directed to pass appropriate order in accordance with law at the earliest and, in any case, within one month from today. It may be recorded here in fairness to counsel for the petitioner that he had advanced some other submissions including a submission that Bihar Public Service Commissioner was not consulted in the matter, but those points have not been pressed seriously, as it has 6 been conceded that consultation with the Commission is only directory in such matters. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. dk ( Shiva Kirti Singh, ACJ ) ( Dr. Ravi Ranjan, J )