IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI A N D THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO : 779 of 2009 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 24/07/2008 in WP NO : 5452 OF 2008 on the file of the High Court.) Between: 1 The Government of A.P, Rep.by its Secretary, Irrigation & CAD Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad. 2 The Special Collector (L.A.) G.N.S.S. Galeru Nagari Sujala Sravanthi Sankarapuram, Kadapa, Kadapa Dist 3 The Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) Telugu Ganga Project, Unit-II, Kadapa, Kadapa Dist. …… APPELLANTS AND 1 Raju Penchala Reddy S/o. Narasimha Reddy R/o.Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 2 Nagam Ramachandra Reddy S/o. Yella Reddy R/o.Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 3 Dulla Subba Reddy S/o. Venkataiah R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 4 Patturu Rama Subba Reddy S/o.Sesha Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 5 Nagam Subba Reddy S/o. Yella Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 6 Nagam Yella Reddy S/o. Yella Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 7 Nagam Yella Reddy S/o. Pedda Subba Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 8 Patturu Sesha Reddy S/o. Govinda Reddy, R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 9 Nagam Rama Subba Reddy S/o. Subba Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 10 Darisa Pullaiah S/o. Sesha Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. Paturi Veera Reddy S/o. Sesha Reddy R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. 12 Dulla Gangamma Died her L.R Daughter Dulla Subba Lakshumma R/o. Chenduvoy(V), Atloor(M), Kadapa Dist. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellant:GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION Counsel for the Respondents: MR.Y.VENKATA SATYAM The Division Bench of this Full text of Court made the following : Judgment follows 2nd page THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI A N D THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO : 779 of 2009 J U D G M E N T : (Per the Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meenakumari) The writ appeal is filed against order dated 24-7-2008 passed in WP.No.5452 of 2008 by the learned single Judge, whereby the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition holding that the writ petitioners shall be entitled to interest in terms of the award passed by the Court in LAOP.No. 589 of 2002 on the file of the Court of IV-Additional District Judge, Kadapa, which was referred to Lok Adalat, Kadapa in LAC.No.511 of 2006 on the file of the District Legal Services Authority, Kadapa. 2. The main writ petition was filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 3 to award interest on the market value solatium and additional market value from the date of 4 (1) notification i.e. 02-1-1996 to date of realization instead of from the date of 28-A applications i.e., 07-2-2007 on par with the LAOP.No. 589 of 2002 on the file of the Court of IV Additional District Judge, Kadapa and which was referred to Lok Adalath in LAC.No. 511 of 2006 i.e., dated 12-12-2006 on the file of the District Legal Services Authority, Kadapa, which was enhanced to 80% on the market value fixed by the LAO and pay the same to the petitioners in pursuance of their applications dated 7-2-2007 filed under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 3. When the matter came up for hearing, the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition submitted that the issue involved in the writ appeal is squarely covered by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in WA.Nos.1765 and 1785 of 2008, dated 12-2-2009. 4. It is relevant to extract the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in WA.Nos. 1765 and 1785 of 2008, dated 12-2-2009. WRIT APPEAL Nos.1765 and 1785 of 2008 COMMON JUDGMENT: ( Per Hon’ble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy) These two writ appeals arise out of orders dated 24.07.2008 and 21.07.2008 in WP.Nos.8889 of 2008 and 2183 of 2008 respectively. The facts relevant for disposal of these appeals are stated hereunder: The lands belonging to the respondents were acquired, as they were coming under foreshore submergence of Somasila Project. In respect of the lands of the respondents in WA.No.1765 of 2008, a common notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was published on 22.02.1994 and for the lands of the respondents in WA.No.1785 of 2008, a similar notification was issued on 11.02.1994. Along with the lands of these respondents, lands of others were also acquired under the said two notifications. After following the due procedure, the Land Acquisition Officer (for short, ‘the LAO’) passed two separate awards covering the respondents in each of these writ appeals respectively in the year 1994. Some of the landowners covered by the two notifications sought for reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act for determination of the market value. While in case of the reference pertaining to the acquisition under the notification under which the lands of the respondents in WA.No.1765 of 2008 were acquired, the reference proceedings pending before the Senior Civil Judge, Rajampet, were transferred to Lok Adalath, Kadapa, which enhanced the compensation to 75% over and above the award passed by the LAO by his award dated 23.03.2007. In respect of the notification concerning the respondents in WA.No.1785 of 2008, the District Court, Kadapa, by its award dated 22.05.2002 enhanced the compensation to 100% over and above the market value awarded by the LAO. The respondents in both these writ appeals, who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act, filed their respective applications under Section 28-A for re- determination of compensation in respect of the abovementioned two awards. Appellant No.3 passed awards dated 09.01.2008 and 21.08.2007 in respect of the lands of the respondents in WA.Nos.1765 and 1785 of 2008 respectively by allowing payment of enhanced market value in terms of the abovementioned two awards, but restricted payment of interest at 9% per annum from the dates of filing of their applications under Section 28-A and at 15% per annum after one year and till the date of payment. These two awards were questioned by the respondents in two separate writ petitions, namely; WP.No.8889 of 2008 and 2183 of 2008 to the extent of appellant No.3 disallowing the award of interest to them from the date of taking possession till the date of filing applications under Section 28-A of the Act. After hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions and held that the respondents shall be entitled to interest and other statutory benefits in terms of the awards passed by the Lok Adalath and Civil Court. Assailing these orders, the appellants filed the present writ appeals. At the hearing, learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition has strenuously contended that the learned Single Judge fell into error in allowing the respondents to receive the same benefits as were allowed to the claimants in the two reference cases by the Lok Adalath and the Civil Court. He contended that interest does not form part of compensation payable to the landowner for the land acquired from him in accordance with Section 23 of the Act and that under Section 28-A, the land owners, who did not seek reference, are only entitled to payment of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. According to the learned Government Pleader, the phrase “the amount of compensation” used in Section 28-A does not include interest payable under Section 34 of the Act and that therefore the respondents do not have a vested right in law to claim interest on par with the landowners at whose instance references under Section 18 were made and compensation enhanced. He further contended that if the respondents were aggrieved by the award passed under Section 28- A(2), they are entitled to seek reference under Section 28-A(3) of the Act. Opposing the contentions of the learned Government Pleader, Sri N. Vasudeva Reddy and Sri Y. Venkat Satyam, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the very object of amendment to the Act by introduction of Section 28-A was to provide the same amount of compensation to the landowners, who did not seek reference under Section 18, as was paid to the persons at whose instance references were made to the civil Court and compensation is enhanced. They also contended that the Collector has no discretion to pass an award at variance with the award of the Court. The State is vested with the power of emanating domine to forcibly acquire the private land of any person against his will. The provisions of the Act are held to be ex-proprietary in nature (see Gajjala Narsimha Reddy). The Supreme Court in a catena of judgments held that as the provisions of the Act are ex- proprietary in nature, they are liable to be strictly construed in the matter of acquisition whenever challenge to such acquisition is made by the land owners. While Article 300-A mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property saved by authority of law, second proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution envisages that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to such acquisition of land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The expression ‘estate’ is given a very wider definition in Article 31-A (2) to include any land under ryotwari settlement and any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. Though the right to property was a fundamental right under the Constitution, under the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 it has been deleted from Part- III and included in Chapter IV, which was introduced for the first time by the said Amendment Act whereunder constitution protection has been given to the owner of the property by ensuring that he is not deprived of the property without authority of law. Keeping these constitutional parameters, the submissions of the learned Government Pleader is required to be examined. Act 68 of 1994 introduced several amendments to the Act, which were intended to benefit the landowners. One such amendment was by way of insertion of Section 28-A, which enables the landowners to seek re-determination of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court under Part-III of the Act notwithstanding the fact that they did not seek reference. The statements of objects and reasons for introduction of the said provision is reproduced hereunder: “Considering that the right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act.” In Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumari and others[1] a question arose as to whether in a series of awards passed by the LAO after commencement of the Amendment Act the limitation for seeking re-determination starts running from the date of the first award in the series or he can seek such re-determination on the basis of the subsequent awards. The Himachal Pradesh High Court, relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Babu Ram v. State of U.P.[2] and Union of India v. Karnail Singh[3], held that the limitation starts running from the date of the first award and accordingly dismissed the writ petitions of the landowners. In the civil appeals, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court did not agree with the view expressed in Babu Ram (2 supra) and Karnail Singh (3 supra). The Apex Court considered the objects and reasons underlying the enactment of Section 28-A and held that the said provision was introduced to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act and that this is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek re-determination on the basis of the orders passed for payment of higher compensation by the reference made under Section 18 of the Act. The Supreme Court held: “Section 28-A therefore is in a nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation to the beneficent legislation, the law is well settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28- A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.” The Supreme Court further held that under Section 28-A, a right accrues to a person, whose land is covered by the same notification under Section 4(1), who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector, but had not made an application to him under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for re- determination of the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. It further held that the right to make an application under Section 28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person makes the application is seeking re-determination of the compensation. In Sunder v. Union of India[4] a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, which resolved the conflict between the divergent views expressed in Union of India v. Sri Shri Ram Mehar[5], Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Limited v. State of Kerala[6] and Yadavrao P.Pathade v. State of Maharashtra[7] on the one side and Mir Fazeelath Hussain v. Special Deputy Collector[8] on the other, on the issue whether solatium provided for under Section 23(2) of the Act forms an integral and statutory part of compensation and interest is payable thereon, held as under: “We make it clear that the compensation awarded would include not only the total sum arrived at as per sub-section (1) of Section 23, but the remaining sub-sections thereof as well. It is thus clear from Section 34 that the expression “awarded amount” would mean the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 23, including all the sub- sections thereof.” In Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited v. State of Gujarat[9] the High Court of Gujarat rejected the claim of the landowners for payment of a portion of the interest under Section 34 on the ground that their cross appeals in that regard were rejected as time barred. In that context, the Supreme Court described what an award is. It held that on a conjoined reading of Sections 23 and 26 it is clear that the award, which is deemed to be a decree, is the sum total of conclusions reached by the Courts in determining the compensation under Section 23 of the Act on appreciation of the evidence between the parties. It further held that the costs under Section 27 and the interest under Sections 28 and 34 are added to the compensation amount to make it a consolidated award. On a careful analysis of the Apex Court’s judgments discussed above and on the application of the reasoning contained in various judgments, we have not felt persuaded to accept the rigid and literal construction of the expression “the amount of compensation” occurring in Section 28-A. While it is true that interest payable under Sections 28 and 34 does not form integral part of compensation in stricto senso, nevertheless they form part of a consolidated award as held by the Supreme Court in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited (9 supra). After adding the components of interest to the compensation, the claimants, under the proceedings of reference under Section 18, are paid the amount under the award, which is in a broader sense called compensation, if not, in the strict terms of the word used in Section 23 of the Act. This being so, we do not find any rationale in the appellants seeking to exclude a part of the interest component under Section 34 from the award to be passed by the Collector under Section 28-A while determining the compensation in favour of the persons, who did not seek reference under Section 18, by a narrow and literal interpretation of the expression “the amount of compensation” in Section 28-A. Such a course defeats the very purpose and object for which the said provision is inserted in the Act, namely, to remove the inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land. The learned Government Pleader try to sustain the restriction of payment of interest only to the period from the date of filing of applications on the ground that the respondents not being diligent in seeking reference under Section 18 are not entitled to claim interest. We are afraid such a contention is wholly meritless. Whether they applied for enhancement of compensation or not, the statute conferred a benefit on them for re-determination of compensation on the basis of the award passed by the Court. That being so, no further distinction can be drawn between the persons, who sought for reference and those who have not. Such a distinction can only be termed as purely artificial without any sanction of law. This argument also militates against the purpose for which Section 28-A is introduced, namely, to ensure that the landowners, who have not claimed reference, are equally entitled to the same amount of compensation as those who claimed reference. When a right is vested in the persons, who did not seek reference, to seek re-determination of compensation, notwithstanding the fact that they were not diligent in seeking reference, by the same reason they cannot be deprived of any part of the statutory benefit on the jejune ground of not being diligent in seeking reference. The right to receive interest on compensation is based on denial of right to enjoy the property till such time as compensation amount is paid. This being the philosophy behind such provision, the respondents’ failure to seek reference under Section 18 has no relevance to or bearing on their not seeking reference under Section 18. We therefore reject the first contention of the learned Government Pleader. ADD: As regards the contention of the learned Government Pleader that if the respondents were aggrieved by the award passed under Section 28- A(2), they are entitled to seek reference under Section 28-A(3) of the Act, we have not felt persuaded to accept this contention. The power of this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 is not circumscribed by any restrictions. However, the superior Courts evolved a procedure whereby they ordinarily refuse to entertain the writ petitions filed bypassing an effective alternative remedy. Thus, the bar on the maintainability of writ petitions on the ground of availability of alternative remedy is only a rule of procedure and not an integral part of rule of law. A writ Court can always entertain a writ petition despite availability of an alternative remedy in order to remedy serious injustice caused and constitutional rights are violated. As noted supra, the Constitution vested a fundamental right in the owner of the property to receive compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value on the plea of invalidation of any law if such a law does not make provision for such payment. While on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 28-A as above, the respondents are entitled to receive the interest as awarded by the civil Court and Lok Adalath, denial of such interest, falls foul of Article 300-A of the Constitution. Therefore, when the respondents are denied the right accrued to them both under the Constitution and the express statutory provisions contained under the Act, it will be unjust to drive the respondents to suffer their rigmarole of a reference under Section 30 of the Act. Indeed, in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited (9 supra) while rejecting the contention of the State that the claimants were not entitled to payment of higher interest as their cross objections were rejected on the ground of limitation, the Supreme Court held that the payment of interest is not dependant on any claim by the person whose land has been acquired, that when once the provisions of Section 34 are attracted, it is obligatory for the Collector to pay the interest and that if he fails to do so, the same can be claimed from the Court in proceedings under Section 18 of the Act or even from the appellate Court thereafter. The Supreme Court further held that the procedural hazards cannot come in the way of a substantial right of a citizen under the Act. On such reasoning the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary for the claimant to have filed separate appeals/cross-objections before the High Court for the purposes of claiming interest under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petitions and granting relief to the respondents instead of allowing them to the proceedings of alternative remedy under Section 28- A (3) of the Act. One other reason for us to reject the plea of alternative remedy is that no disputed questions of facts are involved to decide the claims of the respondents. A pure question of interpretation of the provisions of the Act in general and Section 28-A in particular is involved in the cases before us. Therefore, it is more desirable that such questions are decided by a constitutional Court rather than allowing a civil Court to decide the same. We therefore reject this contention of the learned Government Pleader too. For the reasons as above, the writ appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed 5. Following the judgment dated 02-12-2009 passed in WA.Nos. 1765 and 1785 of 2008 by the Division Bench of this Court, this writ appeal fails and accordingly dismissed. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR 16-6-2009. I s L [1] AIR 1995 SC 2259 [2] 1995 AIR SC 65 [3] 1995 (1) SCALE 21 [4] AIR 2001 SC 3516 [5] Air 1973 SC 305 [6] (1991) 1 SCC 195 [7] (1996) 2 SCC 570 [8] (1995) 3 SCC 208 [9] AIR 1991 SC 656