*THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G. BIKSHAPATHY and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE P.S.NARAYANA +WRIT APPEAL NO : 1512 of 2004 % 7-12-2004 # S.K.Mahaboob Ali .. Appellant Vs. $ The Director General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Block No.1, CGO complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi and two others ..Respondents <GIST: >HEAD NOTE: ! Counsel for appellant : Mr.V.Jagapathi ^ Counsel for respondents : Mr.A.Rajasekhar Reddy, Standing Counsel for Central Government ?CASES REFERRED 2001(9) SCC 525 2 AIR 2004 S.C. 2321 3 (2003) 7 SCC 410 4 1953 S.C.R. 1145 5 1954 S.C.R. 738 6 AIR 191 S.C. 532 7 AIR 1963 S.C. 1124 8 AIR 1967 Bombay 355 (DB) 9 AIR 1971 Madras 155 (DB) 10 AIR 1983 Calcutta 253 11 AIR 1977 Kerala 4 12 2001(2) ALT 603 (DB) 13 AIR 1985 S.C. 1289 14 (1994) 4 SCC 711 15 (1994) 4 SCC 710 16 2002(1) SCC 567 17 JT 2004(4) SC 508 18 AIR 1980 Bombay 341 (DB) 19 AIR 1980 Karnataka 92 (FB) 20 AIR 1986 S.C. 468 21 1976 Crl.L.J. 1648 (FB) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND FOUR PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G. BIKSHAPATHY and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE P.S.NARAYANA WRIT APPEAL NO : 1512 of 2004 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 16/08/2004 in WP NO : 27485 OF 2003 on the file of the High Court.) Between: S.K. Mahaboob Ali, (Force No. 830761756) S/o. Shaik Mohd. Saheb, Aged 38 years, Ex-CRPF Constable, R/o. Nandyal, Kurnool District. ..... APPELLANT AND 1 The Director General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Block No. 1, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi. 2 The Inspector General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Special Sector, Old Secretariat, Block No. 11, Civil Lines, Delhi - 54. 3 Addl. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Group Centre, A.B.Road, Shivpuri, Madhya Pradesh. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellant:MR.V.JAGAPATHI Counsel for the Respondent No.: MR.ARAJASHEKAR REDDY (SC FOR CG) The Court made the following : ORDER: (per P.S.Narayana.,J) Heard the Counsel on record. The core question argued in elaboration by both the Counsel, Counsel for appellant/writ petitioner and the Standing Counsel for Central Government at the stage of admission of this Writ Appeal is the question whether the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has jurisdiction to entertain Writ Petition. Incidentally, the merits and demerits of the matter also had been touched by the respective Counsel. The Counsel for appellant contended that since part of cause of action arose at Kurnool District in State of Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition and dismissal of the same on the ground of maintainability cannot be sustained and hence the Writ Petition may have to be remitted back to the learned Single Judge to decide the matter afresh on merits. Strong reliance was placed on DINESH CHANDRA GAHTORI Vs. CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF and the learned Counsel also made an attempt to distinguish the decision in KUSUM INGOTS & ALLOYS LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA on facts. On the contrary, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel while controverting the same however would maintain that there is no factual foundation even relating to the part of the cause of action. The Counsel also would maintain that in the light of the specific stand taken in the counter affidavit the learned Judge arrived at the correct conclusion relating to the maintainability of the Writ Petition and dismissed the Writ Petition as not maintainable. The Counsel also pointed out that neither the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition nor the reply affidavit had explained anything in this regard on the aspect of want of jurisdiction though the same was specifically pleaded in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. The learned Counsel further submitted that as far as the retiral benefits are concerned, the same are being processed. The brief facts of the case which led to the filing of the present Writ Appeal are as hereunder : The appellant/petitioner filed Writ Petition praying for a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of certiorari calling for records from the file of the 3rd respondent relating to order No.P.XII- 22-23/2002, Estt-I, dated 24-6-2003 confirming the removal order No.P.VIII-10/2000 EC-II dated 26-10-2002 of the 4th respondent and quash the same by declaring it as arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the principles of natural justice and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith with all other consequential benefits, monetary and otherwise and pass such other order or orders as the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. By order dated 16-8-2004 the learned single Judge dismissed the same on the ground that the Writ Petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not maintainable. The petitioner/appellant is a resident of Nandyal village and town of Kurnool District of Andhra Pradesh State and he enrolled as a General Duty Constable in Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on 10-6-1993 and after completion of initial training for a period of one year, he was posted to No.76 Battalion in Srinagar area in February 1995 and worked there till March 1997. Thereafter he was shifted to various units in C.R.P.F. and finally he was posted to Group Centre, C.R.P.F., Shivpuri of Madhya Pradesh State in the year 1998. On to the allegation that the petitioner/appellant had committed the offence of misconduct and disobedience while he was on duty from 10-6- 2000 to 16-6-2000 in relation to recruitment of Constables, a Departmental enquiry was ordered by the Additional Director General of Police, Group Centre, C.R.P.F., Shivpuri of Madhya Pradesh State. A charge sheet dated 17-8-2000 was issued to the appellant/petitioner and also three others and after calling for explanation and after conducting enquiry in State of Madhya Pradesh it was held that the charge of misconduct was proved and Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.R.P.F., Group Centre A.B., Road, Shivpuri, Madhya Pradesh had passed an order dated 26-10- 2002 removing the appellant/petitioner from service and the said order was questioned by way of Appeal which appears to have ended in dismissal. The competency of the Appellate Authority to entertain the Appeal also had been raised as a ground of attack. It is pertinent to note that at para-16 of the counter affidavit on the aspect of jurisdiction it was specifically averred : “….. As regards jurisdiction of the Court it is stated that the official records of the case are available with Group Centre, CRPF, Shivpuri but the jurisdiction of this case does not fall within the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. The petitioner had committed an offence as a member of the Armed Force while functioning as Constable (GD) in Group Centre, CRPF, Shivpuri located in Madhya Pradesh. Hence the jurisdiction of the Court comes in the region of Madhya Pradesh where cause of action occurred. It is brought to the kind notice of Hon’ble Court that a Writ Petition No.18045/2000 filed by Shri Firoj Ahmed of Group Centre, CRPF, Bhopal (M.P.) in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on the grounds that the petitioner is a resident of Uttar Pradesh but the order of dismissal was passed by the ADIGP, GC, CRPF, Bhopal (M.P.) has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Court on 17- 4-2000 for want of jurisdiction. Similarly, the Hon’ble M.P. High Court at Gwalior bench in Writ Petition No.83/97 in respect of Mohinder Singh Vs. UOI has also dismissed the petition for want of territorial jurisdiction and for not filing appeal within time limit. Hence the present Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad filed by petitioner who committed an offence in Shivpuri (Madhya Pradesh) should have been filed petition in Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior bench, Gwalior and not in Andhra Pradesh High Court. The petitioner has also not availed the opportunity of revision petition to the IGP, Special Sector, CRPF under rule 29 of CRPF Rules 1955 before filing the present Writ Petition. Hence, his Writ Petition liable to be dismissed at initial stage of hearing itself for want of territorial jurisdiction”. Despite the specific stand taken in the counter affidavit though a reply affidavit was filed, no serious attempt was made on the part of the appellant/writ petitioner either to controvert or to explain the same. When the question of maintainability of the Writ Petition is raised, it is needless to say that the same may have to be decided at the threshold without touching the other merits and demerits of the matter. I n NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA Vs. GANGA ENTERPRISES the Apex Court held that the question whether the writ petition was maintainable in a claim arising out of breach of contract should have been answered first by the High Court as it would go to the root of the matter. In the present case, the learned Judge after recording reasons in detail came to the conclusion that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has no jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition merely because it is contended that the order was communicated to the appellant/writ petitioner at Nandyal, Kurnool District when the whole proceedings had taken place in the State of Madhya Pradesh and especially in the absence of the factual foundation explaining at least arising the part of cause of action either in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition or in the reply affidavit. Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with Power of High Courts to issue certain writs and Article 226 Clause (2) reads as hereunder : “The power conferred by Cl. (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” Clause (1A) which had been inserted by Constitution 15th (Amendment Act) 1963 had been renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd Amendment Act) 1976. The very Clause (1A) was inserted by the Constitution 15th (Amendment Act) 1963 in the light of the view expressed by the Apex Court in ELECTION COMMISSION Vs. SAKA VENKATA , RASHID Vs. I.T. COMMISSIONER , KHAJOOR SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA and COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Vs. E.I. COMMERCIAL CO. wherein it was held that it was location or residence of the respondent which gave territorial jurisdiction to a High Court under Article 226, the situs of the cause of action being immaterial for this purpose. The object of introducing Clause (1A) by Constitution (15th Amendment Act) 1963 was to provide that the High Courts within limits of which the cause of action may arise wholly or in part also would have jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition under Article 226 against the Union of India or any other body which was located at Delhi. In DAMOMAL RAISINGHANI Vs. UNION OF INDIA a Division Bench of Bombay High Court while dealing with Article 226 Clause (1-A) and the expression territorial jurisdiction of High Court at para-5 held : “The next contention of Mr.Vaidya is that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this petition because the impugned order has been made by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the Court. It is the argument of Mr.Vaidya that the third respondent’s office is in Jaisalmer House, New Delhi. The third respondent therefore is not an authority located in the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. This Court therefore has no jurisdiction to quash that order. It is indeed true that the office of the third respondent is located in New Delhi and in that sense the third respondent is not a person residing within the territory in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. Article 226 has however been recently amended and clause (1-A) has been added to Article 226 after clause (1). It is in the following terms : “The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such powers, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”. The question that arises is whether the cause of action for the exercise of the power invoked by the petitioner arose wholly or in part within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. The petitioner, as it appears, was a resident of Ullasnagar, a place situated in the District of Thana of Maharashtra State. The impugned order itself shows that the case was heard in Bombay. It is indeed true that the order on the face of it does not show the place where it was made. Even assuming that this order was made by the third respondent in New Delhi, there can hardly be any doubt that the effect of this order fell on the petitioner at Ullasnagar where he resides. It is also not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. Though in different context, the question arose as to the place where the cause of action would arise, the question was considered by a Division Bench of which I was a member in W.W.Joshi Vs. State of Bombay, 61 Bombay L.R. 829 (AIR 1959 Bom. 363). A civil servant was removed from service and the question arose as to where the cause of action to get quashed the order of the removal from service arose, and it was held that the cause of action would arise at the place where the order of termination of service was made and also at the place where the consequences fell on the servant. In view of this decision, there can hardly be any doubt that the place where the consequences of the order fell on the petitioner would be a place where at least the cause of action in part would arise. No good ground is shown to us by Mr.Vaidya to differ from the view taken by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. The second ground also should fail.” In VEERI CHETTIAR Vs. S.T. OFFICER, BOMBAY a Division Bench of Madras High Court while dealing with cause of action in the context of Article 226(1-A) of the Constitution of India held at para 8 as hereunder : “One other incidental contention is that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ because no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. We do not agree. Under Article 226(1-A) of the Constitution of India, the High Court has the power to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person provided the cause of action for the issuance of such a rule under Article 226(1-A) wholly or in part, arises, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. What then is the cause of action that is referred to in this sub-clause of Article 226 of the Constitution ? “Cause of action” has always been understood as referable to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and if a limb of that bundle of facts is available, seen or discernible in one particular place which is a seat of the High Court, then such High Court has the power to exercise all the powers conferred on it under Article 226(1-A) notwithstanding the fact that the authority against whom the ultimate rule has to be issued and whose act has created a cause of action as a whole or in part, is situate outside its territorial limits. The person primarily affected by the respondent issuing the notices from time to time to the petitioners and calling upon them to produce the accounts of their business carried on in the State of Tamil Nadu and again by proposing to assess them to the best of his judgment on the assumption relief certain jurisdictional facts, is the addressee of such notice and such affection relates to the bundle of facts in the totality of the lis or proceeding concerned, and such impact necessarily gives rise to a cause of action, though it may be in part. It is established that in fiscal laws a proposal to assess forms part and parcel of the machinery of assessment and thus understood, the service of notice to assess and calling upon the petitioner to explain has given rise to a cause of action as is popularly and legally understood and the machinery of assessment has been set in motion and the impact of that motion is felt by the petitioners within the territorial limits of this State. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu.” In INDUSTRIAL FUEL MARKETING CO. Vs. UNION OF INDIA a learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court at para-15 observed : “Before proceeding to decide upon the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the parties it is necessary to deal with and dispose of the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents as to the maintainability of the instant writ petition in this forum. In deciding this question it is apposite to refer to the provisions of Article 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution which run as follows : 1. Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. 2. The power conferred by Cl.(1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”. It appears from the aforesaid provisions that every High Court can issue writs in the nature of mandamus or of certiorari or of quo warranto etc., to any person or authority including in any appropriate case on Government within the territories in relation to which such High Court exercises jurisdiction. Thus the writs can be issued by the High Court to any person or authority or Government when such person, authority or Government is either resident or located within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Secondly, sub-art. (2) of the said Article also empowers the High Court to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person when the cause of action either wholly or in part arises within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction. In the instant case the impugned criminal proceedings which have been challenged in the writ petition has undoubtedly been started or commenced outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the action taken by the respondent No.3 in interfering with the rights of the petitioners to win and remove the sludge/slurry, that is, the coal wastes coming out of the limits of the washeries belonging to the respondent No.3 also took place outside the territorial limits of this Court. No part either of the cause of action nor the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. So under sub-art.(2) of the Article 226 of the Constitution this application cannot be maintained in this jurisdiction. The other preliminary objection on behalf of the respondent No.3 that the application will fail as it involves disputed questions of fact cannot be sustained as, in my view, the principle issue and/or questions that have been raised in this writ petition involves substantial questions of law necessitating the issuance of the Rule and the determination of those questions by this writ Court. For determining these questions it is not necessary to launch into a detail investigation of facts though, of course some investigation into facts are necessary for this purpose. But merely on this plea it will be unjust and unfair to dismiss this application on this preliminary ground. I therefore, cannot uphold the contention made on behalf of the respondent No.3 on this score and in my view this writ application is maintainable. As regards the question whether the respondent No.3 against whom the writs have been prayed for is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as required under sub-article (1) of Article 226, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent No.3 has got its office at 15, Park Street within the jurisdiction of this Court and as such this writ application is maintainable. It has been stated in para 7 of the affidavit in reply sworn on behalf of the petitioners on 12th Feb., 1982 that the administrative office of the Finance Department as well as office of the Managing Director of the respondent No.3 are situated at 15, Park St. Calcutta. It has also been stated that the law office of the respondent No.3 is also situated at 15, Park St. Calcutta. This statement in the affidavit-in-reply of the petitioner clearly goes to show that the respondent No.3 have some of its office located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In these circumstances it will not be just and proper to reject this writ application as not maintainable on this preliminary ground. I am, therefore, constrained to hold in favour of the petitioner on this issue”. In M.G. GEORGE Vs. ASST. DIRECTOR, S.I. BUREAU a learned single Judge of Kerala High Court on this aspect held : “What is contended for on behalf of the respondents by Sri Prabhakaran, learned Counsel for the Central Government is that it cannot be said that in this case the cause of action wholly or in part arises in any place in the jurisdiction of this Court. On the other hand, Sri Abraham Vakkanal, learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that as the petitioner has received the amount due to him consequent on the impugned order, in Kerala State it has to be said that part of the cause of action has arisen here and therefore this Court could well proceed with the O.P. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions reported in Dammomal Kausomal Raisinghani v. Union of India (AIR 1967 Bom. 355); W.W.Joshi V. State of Bombay (AIR 1959 Bom. 363) and Veeri Chettiar v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay (AIR 1971 Mad 155). In all these cases the order impugned though passed outside the jurisdiction of the particular court concerned, was served on the petitioners in these cases in a place within the jurisdiction of the courts in which the writ petitions had been filed. Therefore the effect of the order by Governmental authority fell on the petitioners at places where the Courts had jurisdiction. On the basis of that fact the courts held in these cases that they can exercise jurisdiction in respect of such matters as part of the cause of action had arisen within the territories