HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.Y. SOMAYAJULU W.P.Nos.12362 of 1985, 3037 & 3507 of 1986 and 286 of 1987 AND W.P.Nos.11823, 11824 & 11829 of 1985 and 3039 of 1986 COMMON ORDER (per Hon’ble Sri Justice B. Prakash Rao): Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes appearing on behalf of the respondents and at their request, the writ petitions themselves are taken up for disposal. Since the issue involved in these writ petitions is one and the same and the parties are also one and the same in all the writ petitions, this common order is being delivered. These matters have been remanded by the Supreme Court, through an order dated 24.08.1994, following the judgment in Raj Sheel and Others v. State of A.P. and others[1] for further consideration and disposal in the light of the observations made therein. In view of the above, it is necessary to look into the observations of the Supreme Court in Raj Sheel’s case, which is extracted as hereunder: “In the appeals before us, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the assumption that the transactions are covered by trade practice and having regard to the nature of the goods it has inferred that what is charged is the price of the bottled beer or of cement packed in gunny bags, and reference has also been made to the Excise Law and the Cement Control Order requiring that the liquor or the cement, as the case may be, must be sold in bottles or in gunny bags respectively. We are constrained to observe that no attempt has been made by the tax authorities to ascertain the facts of each case and to determine what were the actual ingredients of the contract and the intention of the parties. Assumptions have been made when what was required was a detailed investigation into the facts. We have indicated earlier the several possibilities which are open in cases of this kind, and how the ultimate conclusion can be vitally affected by the tests to be applied. Because of the lack of adequate and clear factual material, the High Court also was compelled to proceed on the basis of generalized statements and broad assumptions. We are unable, in the circumstances, to hold that the cases can be regarded as disposed of finally. It is regrettable but the cases must go back for proper findings on facts to be ascertained on fuller investigation.” On perusal of the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that no attempt had been made by the tax authorities to ascertain the facts of each case and to determine what were the actual ingredients of the contract and the intention of the parties. Several possibilities are open in cases of this kind and the ultimate conclusion can be vitally affected by the tests to be applied. Because of the lack of adequate and clear factual material, this Court also was compelled to proceed on the basis of generalized statements and broad assumptions. In the circumstances, the cases cannot be regarded as disposed of finally. It is regrettable but the case must go back for proper findings on facts to be ascertained on fuller investigation. In light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Raj Sheel’s case and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that it is better to remand these matters to the first respondent, who is the competent authority to look into them in detail and pass appropriate orders afresh. Accordingly, W.P.Nos.12362 of 1985, 3037 & 3507 of 1986 and 286 of 1987 are allowed and the impugned orders are aside. The matters are remanded back to the first respondent for further consideration and fresh disposal by considering the observations of the Supreme Court. Further, both the parties are directed to file their written submissions before the first respondent. The first respondent shall pass appropriate orders after giving opportunity to both the parties and after considering their written submissions, if any, as expeditiously as possible. So far as W.P.Nos.11823, 11824 & 11829 of 1985 and 3039 of 1986 are concerned, these writ petitions have been filed against the provisional assessment orders and subsequently, pending these writ petitions final assessment orders came be to passed. Therefore, these writ petitions have become infractuous. Accordingly, W.P.Nos.11823, 11824 & 11829 of 1985 and 3039 of 1986 are dismissed as infractuous. However, the petitioners therein are at liberty to file the appeals against the final assessment orders. No order as to costs. __________________ B. PRAKASH RAO, J __________________ C.Y. SOMAYAJULU, J Date: 24.03.2008 Isn [1] (1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 262