IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY TUESDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF APRIL, TWO THOUSAND TEN WRIT PETITION No.21275 of 2009 Between: Mr.Dasari Padmanabha Naidu and another. … Petitioner And The Sub-Inspector of Police, Yerpedu Police Station, Yerpedu Mandal, Chittoor District and another. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioners: Sri A.Chandraiah Naidu for Sri K.Chaitanya. Counsel for the respondents: AGP for Home for R.1. None for R.2. This Court made the following: ORDER:- This Writ Petition is filed for a Certiorari to quash CrimeNo.80 of 2009 on the file of respondent No.1 Police Station. I have heard Sri A.Chandraiah Naidu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home for respondent No.1. The petitioners are accused in the above mentioned Crime registered on the report filed by respondent No.2. In his report respondent No.2 has stated that he belongs to scheduled case community; that on 14-9-2009 at about 5-30 P.M., while respondent No.2 was going to Gudimallam village, along with one Leela Prakash, after finishing his duty, petitioner No.2 came in an Innova Car in opposite direction, stopped the vehicle, got down from it, and started abusing him by his caste name for not vacating the premises in dispute. It is further alleged that, in the meantime, one Sri Subrahmanyam, companion of petitioner No.2, and two others caught hold of respondent No.2; that the said Subrahmanyam hit respondent No.2 on his head with a stone and thereby caused a bleeding injury; that the remaining two persons allegedly beat respondent No.2 with hands and kicked him with legs; and that they have also beaten Leela Prakash when he came to the rescue of respondent No.2. On the basis of the complaint given by respondent No.2, the aforesaid crime for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 427 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was registered against petitioner No.2. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No.1- Sub-Inspector of Police it is, inter alia, stated that while respondent No.2 has named petitioner No.2 in his complaint, he was arrayed as A.1; and that, later, the witnesses, who were examined during the course of investigation, named petitioner No.1 and, hence, a memo was filed before the learned II Additional District Munsif, Srikalahasti on 15-9-2009 for adding petitioner No.1 as A.2 in the said crime. It is further stated that unless a full-fledged investigation is conducted, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not guilty of the alleged offences. At the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the allegations contained in the FIR are rank falsehood and that in order to take vengeance against the petitioners for civil disputes pending between them and one Shyam Prasad, under whom respondent No.2 is working, the above case was filed with false allegations. After carefully considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at this stage. The law is well settled that where the allegations contained in the complaint disclose commission of an offence, this Court will not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the criminal proceedings. In State of Haryana v Bhajanlal[1], the Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Court’s power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR registered against the respondent, referred to several judicial precedents including those of R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab[2], State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha[3] and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha[4] and ruled that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry into the merits and demerits of the allegations and quash the proceedings without allowing the investigating agency to complete its task. The Supreme Court also identified the cases in which power under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be used for quashing the proceedings. These are: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” In State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo[5] the Supreme Court reviewed various judicial precedents on the subject and laid down the following propositions: “1) The exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. 2) While exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 3) The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which such power can be exercised can be laid down.” Following the aforesaid principles set out in the aforementioned judgments, I am of the opinion that it is not possible for this Court to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR at this stage. The appropriate course would be to allow the Police to investigate into the Crime and submit a charge sheet/report before the jurisdictional Magistrate. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioners are compelled to face ignominy of criminal charge on the basis of the false allegations and threat of arrest. In my opinion, the petitioners are left with adequate remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such as applying for anticipatory bail. The petitioners are given liberty to approach the jurisdictional Court with such an application if they apprehend their arrest. Subject to the above observations, the Writ Petition is dismissed. ------------------------------------ C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J Date:06-4-2010 MNR [1] 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [2] AIR 1960 SC 866 [3] (1980) 1 SCC 554 [4] (1982) 1 SCC 561 [5] (2005) 13 SCC 540