IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.8297 of 2002 VIVEKANAND MISHRA Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Mohan Prasad. Mr. Subodh Kumar. For the State : Mr. Prabhat Kumar Singh. ----- 4/ 29.01.2009 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has filed I.A. no. 397/2009 on 21.01.2009 after serving a copy of the same on the counsel for the State which is acknowledged on behalf of the respondents. The same is not available on the record. The Court, therefore, requested the counsel for the petitioner to make his office copy of the same available to this Court for perusal and on the basis of which the matter is being decided so as not to hold up proceedings for the said reason. The Office is, therefore, directed to place the I.A. application no. 397/2009 on the record. Let the copy placed before the Court on behalf of the petitioner of I.A. no. 397/2009 be also retained on the record. The petitioner was proceeded with in a departmental proceeding on two charges by a charge-sheet dated 31.10.1990. He submitted his reply when the 2 enquiry report dated 13.11.2001 followed exonerating him of both the charges. Thereafter on 11.03.2002, the disciplinary authority sent the matter back to the enquiry officer for a fresh finding on the materials collected during the enquiry. The enquiry officer then submitted a fresh ex-parte report of guilt on 8.8.2002 recommending recovery against the petitioner. This has led to the impugned order of punishment dated 17.08.2002 at annexure-14 in I.A. no. 397/2009. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I.A. no. 397/09 is allowed and the challenge to the order dated 17.08.2002 shall form part of the original pleadings and the writ application. The law with regard to the conduct of departmental proceeding stands well cordified by repeated judgments of this Court as also the Supreme Court and there is little scope for any fresh interpretation in the matter. Once an enquiry is completed and a report is submitted, the disciplinary authority is required to issue a second show cause notice and then proceed to take a final decision. However, if the enquiry report is one of exoneration, the disciplinary authority still has the right to either accept it or to reject it. If he accepts the report of 3 exoneration, nothing more need be done. If he proposes to differ with the report of exoneration, he is required to tentatively set out the grounds of exoneration along with the prima facie recording of the reasons why the disciplinary authority was not in agreement with it with an opportunity to the delinquent to represent against the same and only thereafter can the final order be passed. The disciplinary authority is required to either accept the report or to reject the report. If he rejects the report, a fresh further enquiry has to follow if he is not issuing a fresh show cause of difference of opinion to the delinquent. If a fresh enquiry or further enquiry is to be held either by the same enquiry officer or by any other enquiry officer, the petitioner obviously will have to be given an opportunity to meet the occasion where he is to be deprived of the earlier report of exoneration. The enquiry officer cannot adopt nevel method of a nature neither accepting the report or rejecting the same by merely requiring the disciplinary authority to act in a manner till he submits a report to the liking of the disciplinary authority. That is exactly what has happened in the present case. For the aforesaid reason, this Court finds it difficult to sustain the order of punishment dated 17.08.2002. It is, accordingly, set aside. 4 The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh in accordance with law from the stage of submission of the enquiry report dated 13.11.2001. The fact of the matter is that the departmental proceeding has commenced in 1990 remains inconclusive till date. Let the departmental proceedings be, therefore, completed in accordance with law within a maximum period of four months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order, provided the petitioner himself cooperates in which event alone the time frame will apply. S.B.P. (Navin Sinha, J.)