HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD C.R.P.No.5299 of 2009 Date: 12-07-2010 Between: Mr. Mohammed Munawar Sultan and another ………….. Petitioners and Sreedhar Reddy and others ………. Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD C.R.P.No.5299 of 2009 ORDER: The impugned order was passed by the Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy in O.S.No.16 of 2006 on 29-09-2009, holding that the agreement of sale, dated 23-06-2005, is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. 2. In the impugned order, it was noted that in the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale and for delivery of possession, at the stage of recording the evidence of DW-1 on behalf of defendants 2 to 4, some documents were attempted to be marked, which was objected to by the plaintiffs contending that the agreements of sale were unregistered and insufficiently stamped and hence are inadmissible in evidence even for a collateral purpose. While it is contended by the learned counsel for defendants 2 to 4 that the documents are sought to be admitted into evidence only for a collateral purpose and no stamp duty is required to be paid, the learned District Judge observed that the difficulty in marking the documents is not with regard to contravening the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908, but contravening the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The learned District Judge referred to, in this regard, the decision reported in SARDAR DARSHSAN SINGH v. SARDAR RAM SINGH AND ANOTHER [1], under Article 6 of Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act, and also referred to the other precedents of this Court relied on by defendants 2 to 4 about the admissibility of documents which are allegedly insufficiently stamped or unregistered. The learned District Judge was of the opinion that in view of the documents in question being insufficiently stamped, they cannot be received even for a collateral purpose under Section 35 of the Stamp Act and again observed that if the defendants intended to get the documents marked in this case, they have to pay proper stamp duty on documents and then only they can be received in evidence. 3. The aggrieved defendants 3 and 4 are before this Court with this Revision contending that defendants 2 to 4 came on record on being impleaded at their request as the agreement of sale in their favour was suppressed by the plaintiffs while seeking specific performance. The agreements of sale are liable to be stamped under Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act with Rs.100/- and they were accordingly engrossed on the stamp paper. Consequently they are not liable for any stamp duty and penalty and hence the Revision Petitioners sought for reversal of the order in question. 4. Sri M. Basith Ali Yavar, learned counsel for the Revision Petitioners and Sri V. Sudhakar Reddy, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs are heard. 5. The point for consideration is whether the agreements of sale, dated 23-06-2005 and the supplementary agreement of sale, dated 16-01-2006 relied on by the Revision Petitioners are liable for any stamp duty and penalty and are inadmissible in evidence? 6. The copies of the agreements of sale, dated 23-06-2005 and the supplementary agreement of sale, dated 16-01- 2006 are made available by the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioners and the property covered by the first agreement of sale is agricultural land along with a school building and bungalow covered by a compound wall, whereas the second agreement of sale covers agricultural land only and the supplementary agreement of sale is again in respect of the property covered by the first agreement of sale. None of these three agreements relate to construction of a house or building or a multi-unit house or building or unit of apartment/flat/portion of a multi-storied building or for development/sale of any other immovable property within the meaning of Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act. The language of the provision more particularly with reference to not only the description of the instrument, but also proper stamp duty payable, makes it clear that the stamp duty is payable on the market value or the estimated cost of the proposed construction/development of the property and it is the element of construction or development of a property that brings an agreement or memorandum of an agreement within the ambit of Article 6(B) and otherwise it falls within the ambit of Article 6(A). The plain reading of the language of the agreements of sale in question does not appear to involve any element of construction or development of the properties agreed to be sold thereunder and therefore, these agreements are liable to be stamped ex facie under Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act. Any such agreement exceeding the value of Rs.50,000/- is liable to be stamped with Rs.100/- and these three agreements in question appear from the copies produced before this Court to have been inscribed on stamp papers of value of Rs.100/- . Therefore, the documents could not have been considered as insufficiently stamped. 7. The impugned order, while referring to Section 35 of the Stamp Act, did not elaborate as to how these agreements of sale could have been brought within the scope of Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act to consider them to be insufficiently stamped, and as such classification appears to have no factual basis, the documents have to be first concluded to be not liable for any stamp duty and penalty. 8. The learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs, Sri V. Sudhakar Reddy, strenuously contended that the documents are also inadmissible for any purposes for want of registration as the documents are compulsorily registerable under Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act. The learned counsel referred to a decision reported in RAGHUNATH v. KEDARNATH [2], wherein the Apex Court held that the documents, of which registration is necessary under the Registration Act, if not registered, are not admissible as evidence of any transaction affecting any immovable property comprising therein, and do not affect any such immovable property. The principle that such unregistered documents cannot be admissible in evidence affecting any immovable property covered by them is unexceptionable. But Section 49 of the Registration Act itself provides in the proviso that such an unregistered document can be, among other things, admitted into evidence in respect of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument etc. 9. The learned counsel also relied on the decision reported i n K.R. SUBBARAYA MUDALIAR v. TIRUMALA TIRUPATHI DEVASTHANAM [3], wherein also a learned Judge of this Court held that a document falling under Section 49 of the Registration Act is inadmissible in evidence of any transaction affecting any immovable property, while the learned Judge also recognized that an unregistered document is admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose to show the nature and character of the possession of the person, but not to prove the very transaction itself. Therefore, when a document liable for registration, but not registered, is sought to be tendered in evidence, the question for determination would be whether it is sought to be introduced into evidence for proving the transaction itself or for collateral purpose. 10. The impugned order shows that on this question also the parties are at controversy. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs before the trial Court appears to have canvassed the purpose of admission of documents into evidence to be for a primary purpose, while the learned counsel for defendants 2 to 4 before the trial Court appears to have contended that they are not seeking any relief of specific performance based on the agreements of sale nor they are seeking any enforcement of rights under the agreements of sale in this suit due to which these documents can be admitted into evidence as being for a collateral purpose of showing the disentitlement of the plaintiffs for specific performance. The learned District Judge had not expressed any opinion on the said question, but concluded that the documents are liable for proper stamp duty and thereafter only, they can be received in evidence. He was referring to the inadmissibility of these documents even for a collateral purpose unless such stamp duty is paid. So that question needs to be determined by the learned District Judge as to whether the agreements of sale, which are compulsorily registerable but not registered, are being attempted by defendants 2 to 4 to be admitted into evidence for a collateral purpose or for the purpose of proving the transactions themselves. It is not appropriate for this Court to express any advance opinion on the same, which question has to be left for determination by the trial Court itself. 11. Therefore, it is concluded that the two agreements of sale, dated 23-06-2005 and the supplemental agreement of sale, dated 16-01-2006 are properly stamped and are not liable for any stamp duty and penalty and accordingly the order, dated 29-09-2009 in O.S.No.16 of 2009 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, is set aside. It is for the trial Court to determine as to whether these three agreements of sale, which are compulsorily registerable but not registered, are being attempted to be admitted into evidence for a collateral purpose which alone is permissible under Section 49 of the Registration Act and it shall, accordingly, determine the said question in accordance with law on merits before admitting or not admitting these documents into evidence. 12. The Civil Revision Petition is ordered accordingly. No order as to costs. ___________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 12-07-2010 YCR [1] 2004 (6) ALT 217 [2] AIR 1969 SC 1316 [3] 2004 (5) ALD 322