IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY MONDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF NOVEMBER, TWO THOUSAND EIGHT ONLY WRIT PETITION No.27741 of 1995 Between: Shaw Wallace and Company Limited, Malkajgiri, Hyderabad, reptd., by its Deputy General Manager (Works). … Petitioner And Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad, Chandravihar, Exhibition Grounds Road, Hyderabad and another. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioner: Sri Vedula Srinivas. Counsel for the respondents: Sri Ravindra Bharati for R.2. This Court made the following: ORDER:- This Writ Petition is filed for a Writ of Certiorari to quash award dated 15-5-1995 in I.D.No.475 of 1993 passed by respondent No.1. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Sri Ravindra Bharati, learned counsel for respondent No.2. Respondent No.2, who was a workman in the petitioner-Company, has raised an industrial dispute before respondent No.1, which was taken on file and registered as I.D.No.475 of 1993. He challenged therein his discontinuance from service as Helper. The petitioner-Company contended before respondent No.1 that respondent No.2 joined in it as a casual labour on 8-10-1988; that he was not a permanent workman; and that he was provided with work as and when there was necessity and paid daily wages. The petitioner further pleaded that respondent No.2 did not work for 240 days or more in the year preceding 6-10-1991; that he quarreled with the permanent workmen due to personal reasons and stopped attending the work; that he again approached the management in September, 1992 with a request to re-engage him; that he worked for three days after his re-engagement on 9-9-1992; and that thereafter he stopped attending the work. The petitioner, therefore, pleaded that respondent No.2 is not entitled to any relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”). Before respondent No.1, respondent No.2 was examined as WW.1 and marked exhibits W.1 to W.8. As the counsel for the petitioner-Company was continuously absent from 4-5-1995, the evidence was closed. In its award respondent No.1 held that the evidence adduced by respondent No.2 clearly established that the petitioner failed to follow the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and that, consequently, the retrenchment of respondent No.2 was illegal. On that premise, respondent No.1 directed the petitioner to reinstate respondent No.2 with continuity of service and back wages. At the hearing, Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that respondent No.1 was not justified in rendering the finding that the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. He also submitted that even if such a finding is sustainable, respondent No.1 ought not to have ordered for reinstatement of respondent No.2, because the industry itself was closed from the year 1995 consequent on imposition of prohibition. Sri Ravindra Bharati, learned counsel for respondent No.2, however, opposed the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and sought to sustain the award passed by respondent No.1. It is an admitted fact that respondent No.2 has adduced both oral and documentary evidence in support of his plea that he had put in 240 days of continuous service and, hence, the provisions of Section 25-F are attracted. The petitioner failed to adduce any contra evidence or produce material, such as muster rolls and other registers, to conclusively prove its stand that respondent No.2 had not put in 240 days of continuous service as a workman to attract the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. In this admitted facts-situation, I do not find any error in the conclusion arrived at by respondent No.1 that the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act by failing either to issue notice or pay wages in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation. With regard to the relief granted by respondent No.1 for reinstatement of respondent No.2, I am of the view that such a direction vitally affects the interest of the petitioner. It is not in dispute that in the year 1995 the industry was closed and it could be reopened only in September, 1997. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that at the time of closure of the industry following the prohibition, all the workmen were retrenched under Section 25-O of the Act after duly settling their accounts; and after resumption of its activities, the petitioner engaged a different set of workmen, which may have included some of the earlier workmen. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 has not denied this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. He, however, pointed out that some of the workmen, who were juniors to respondent No.2, were re-engaged and that, therefore, respondent No.2 is also entitled to reinstatement. In my considered view, this aspect need not be gone into because whether respondent No.2 is entitled to the benefit of Section 25- H or not does not fall for consideration within the limited scope of the present Writ Petition, which is confined only to the legality or otherwise of the award passed by respondent No.1. Even in the face of the finding of the Labour Court that the retrenchment is illegal, the Courts always have discretion either to order for reinstatement or provide for reasonable compensation to the workman in lieu of reinstatement. The Supreme Court in Sher Bahadur Vs. Union of India[1] and Haryana Urban Development Authority Vs. Om Pal[2] directed payment of reasonable compensation to the workmen who were illegally retrenched in lieu of reinstatement. Taking into consideration the facts situation in which the petitioner was placed, I am of the view that interests of justice would be met if respondent No.2 is paid reasonable compensation in lieu of reinstatement. As respondent No.2 worked for a period of three years, I find it reasonable to direct the petitioner to pay respondent No.2 the amount equivalent to three years wages last drawn by him in lieu of his reinstatement. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is partly allowed by modifying the award of respondent No.1 to the above extent. The petitioner shall pay the above-mentioned amount to respondent No.2 within a period of two months from today. This order, however, does not preclude respondent No.2 to agitate his rights under Section 25-H of the Act before appropriate Forum. ------------------------------------ C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J Date:24-11-2008 MNR [1]) (2002) 7 SCC 142 [2] ) 2007 (3) Supreme 497