IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH JUDGMENT Ram Ratan Vijay & Others Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.840/1999) D. B. Civil Special Appeal under Ordinance 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance,1949 against the judgment dated 10-12-1999 of learned Single Judge in SB Civil Writ Petition No.4626/1999. Date of Judgment: July 07, 2008. PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIV KUMAR SHARMA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHESH BHAGWATI Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, for the appellants. Mr. R.P.Agrawal on behalf of Mr.B.P.Agrawal, for the respondents. BY THE COURT:(PER HON'BLE Shiv Kumar Sharma,J.) Heard learned counsel for the parties and scanned the material available on record. 2. It is contended by Mr.Kamlakar Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants were appointed by the State Government through an artificial created agency on the post of Data Entry Operator/ Steno/ Typist/ Steno-Typist and had been working since July/August,1997. When the agreement entered into between the Contractor and State Government came to an end on May 31, 1999 the services of appellants were dispensed with. The State Government entered into fresh agreement with a new Contractor. Assailing the said action of State Government a writ petition was filed before learned Single Judge. The stand taken before learned Single Judge by the State Government was that the appellants could not be treated as employee of State Government since they had been engaged by Contractor. The writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge on the ground that disputed questions of facts were involved in the writ petition and the appellants failed to establish the relationships of employee and employer between the State Government and themselves. 3. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants vociferously criticised the impugned finding and placed reliance on Secretary HSEB Vs. Suresh (1999)3 SCC 601, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated thus:- (Para 15) "Incidentally, the Haryana State Electricity Board in the usual course of business has had to maintain the plant and stations as a licensee within the meaning of the Indian Electricity Act,1910 and the Electricity Supply Act,1948. This maintenance work cannot by any stretch the ascribed to be of a seasonal nature but a continued effort to achieve the purpose of its existence in terms of the statute. The number of employees required for such purpose had been specified in the contract itself and as a matter of fact supervision of the Board as regards the attendance has also not been disputed before the Labour Court. Maintenance of records pertaining to other statutory duties and liabilities has also not been disputed. Documents, as disclosed before the Labour Court (to wit.Exb.M-5) depict the overall control of the working of the contract labour including administrative control being with the Board. We deliberately refrain ourselves from going into the same, since that would be beyond the purview of writ jurisdiction and may amount to an appraisal of evidence but the factum of overall supervision and administration being with the Board and as dealt with by the Labour Court cannot in any way be doubted. It is on this perspective that the High Court also thought it fit to rely on the judgment and record its affirmation to what had been passed by the Labour Court, since no reasonable person could come to a conclusion different upon lifting the veil. In the contextual facts, we also record our concurrence to the observations of the High Court that the finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court cannot otherwise be interfered with while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, unless the same is otherwise perverse or there is existing an error apparent on the face of the record." 4. It is no doubt true that appellants were engaged by a Contractor to work in Transport Department of the State Government, but it cannot be held that the appellants were the employees engaged by the State Government. The engagement of the appellants by the Contractor was a back-door entry and we refrain ourselves to legalise the same. 5. For these reasons, we find no merit in the special appeal and the same accordingly stands dismissed without any order as to costs. (Mahesh Bhagwati),J.(Shiv Kumar Sharma)J. arn/