^S ^&^^r-'t-^'^ Q IN THB mOH COURTOF CHHATTISGARH AT BUASFUR CivU Revision N0. 3 \ OF 2011 ^sri8 PEyTITIONER/ PLAINTIFF \ \^^y^<^ :<^.. /" .y ,I>"' >*t<1' '^^^ '?!!^"' v' •y RESPONDENTS/ DEFBNDENTS VERSUS Baldev Verma, aged about 47 years, S/o Takhat Ram Verma, Occupation- Agriculture, R/o Village- Mariyatola, P.S.-Bodla, Distt. Kabirdham (C.G.) State of Chhattisgarh through- The Chief Secretary, D.K.S. Bhawan Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) The Secretaiy Agriculture Department, State of Chhattisgarh Raipur, Secretariat, D.K.S. Bhawan Raipur, Histt. Raipur (C.G.) Maharastri Rajya Niyane (Mahamandal Maryadit Shastri Nagar Akola, 44001 (Maharastra) ir CIVIL REVISION UNDBRSECTION 115 OF C.P.C. p- ^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Applicant/ Plaintiff Respondents Defendants CivilRevisionNo. 31 of 2011 Baldev Venna Versus : State ofChhattisgarh & others (•CmLREVISION UNDER SECTION 1133F CPC1 (SB: Hon'ble Mr. N.K. Asarwal, J.) Present : Shri Sunil Sahu, Advocate for the applicant. Shri GD Waswani, Govt. Advocate for the State. QRALORDER (Passedon 22.03.2011) 1. Heard on admission. 2. The legality &nd propriety of order dated 11.01.2011, passed by the District Judge, Kabirdham, is under assail in the instant revision. 3. Facts in brief are : against the judgment and decree dated 01.10.2007, applicant herein filed First Appeal on 23.09.2009 along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation ofdelay in filing the appeal. ? 4. The trial court dismissed the application, consequently appeal was also dismissed. 5. Appeal before the court below was filed almost after a period oftwo years form the date of passing of judgment & decree by the trial court. According to the applicant, he sought opinion of coimsel Shri Avinash_.Mishra regarding filing of appeal who kept the file with him and did not retum the same till 16.09.2009, and fherefore, the 7. delay occurred in filing the appeal is bonafide and deserves to be condoned. It is not in dispute that the applicant did not file any affidayit of the concemed Advocate to show that case file was kept by him for a period of more than two years. No pmdent appellant would wait for two years for filing ofappeal on above ground, inasmuch as, appeal could have been filed after obtaining certified copies from the record of lower court. The reason stated is unbelievable on the face of record. The Supreme Court, in case of the State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others , while dealing Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act, observed in paras 26 to 31 as imder: •-\ 26. The legal position when a question arises under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fairly well-settled. It is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But it may be safely stated that the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in not taking necessary steps, which he could have or should have taken. Here again, what would be such necessary steps will again depend upon the circumstances ofaparticular case and each case will haveto be decided by the courts on the facts and circumstances of the case. Any observation of an illustrative circumstaace or fact will only tend to be a curb on the fre,e exercise ofthe judicial mind by the Court in detemiining whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to "sufficient cause" or not. It is needless to emphasise that courts have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the interest ofjustice. . ,: 27. Mr D. Mukherji, leamed Coimsel for the first respondent, is certa&ly well-founded in his contention that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party is the Govemment. It is no doubt tme that whether it is a Govemment or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itselfmakes any distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same consideration that will be shown by cofirts to a private party when he;claims the protection of .X '• '^. \\ 1972 (l)-SCC 366 f: @ •Y. Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act should also be available to the State. 28. In the case before us, it must be stated in faimess to the leamed Solicitor General that he has not contended that the State must be treated differently. On the other hand, his contention is that the reasons given by the appellant, which, according to him will establish "sufficient cause" have not at all been adverted to, much less, considered by the High Court. In our opinion, the contention ofthe leamed Solicitor General is perfectly justified in the cireumstances of this case. The High Court, certainly, was not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf of the State to explain the delay. But, it was the duty ofthe High Court to have scrutmised the reasons given by the State and considered the same on merits and expressed an opinion, one way or the other. Tliat, unfortunately, is lacking in this case. 29. It has been pomted out by this Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rev/a Coalfields Ltd. as follows: "In construmg Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The fu-st consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the Law of Limitation to to:eat fhe decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalfshoul'd be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been 3 observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan,Section 5 .gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon 'principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to "advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide imputable to the appellant." 30. From the above observations it is clear that the words "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal constmction so as to^advaace substantial justice when no negligence or inaction oj want ofbona fide is imputable to a party. 31. No doubt, Mr D. Mukherji drew our attention to observations at p. 771 to the effect: 8. "The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise ofthe discretionary jurisdiction vested in fhe Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing farther has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone." The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in case of M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam . Sahu 9. Tme it is, the words "sufficient cause" occurring in Section 5 should receive a liberal constmction so as to advance substantial justice but at the same time, it is also thie that the expression "sufficient cause cannot be constmed too liberal. If the word "sufficient cause" is constmed liberally even then it cannot be said that the delay if occurred due to negligence or inaction of a party, or is deliberate, is liable to be condoned. In the instant case, on the face, the applicant failed to demonstrate plausible reasons for condonmg the delay in filing the revision; negligence and inaction on his part is apparent on the face ofrecord. 10. In view of above, I do not fmd any illegality or impropriety in the order passed by the appellate court warranting interference under revisional jurisdiction offhis court. The revision deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No order asto costs. ___ Sd/- .. ?<.K.Agar 3ud&e 2001 (6) SCC 176