c^ Co'o' IN THE HIGH COURTOF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR (C.G.) W.P. (S)No.'33.2- / 2011 PETITIONER Smt Sushila Minj ^'llS S/o Shri Leos Minj Working as Principal, Government Higher Secondaiy School, Barion, Block - Rajpur, Distt. Surguja (CG) RESPONDENT(S) ^^ ^cy ff\ \v ^y/ <>..•' .^' r-'- A' / VERSUS : 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Secretary Tribal Welfare Development Department D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (CG) 2. Asstt. Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, Kanker Distt. Kanker (CG) ^^•e. srr^ //• ^' ^ ..:^ WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA H1GH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR PETmONER WRIT PETITION (-S) No. 932 of2Ql1 Smt. Sushila Minj. RESPONDENTS VERSUS State ofChhattisgarh & Anotfaer. WRIT_PEirnONUNDERARTICLE.226 OF llffi CONSIITUTION QF DMDIA SB: Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Aenihotri, J. Present: Shri P.S.Koshy, Advocate for the petitioner. Sliri Sushil Dubey, Govemment Advocate forthe State/ respondents. ORDERfORAL) (Passed on l7tn day of Febmary, 2011) 1. By this petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 28.01.2011 (Annexure P/l) and iurther, to direct ths respondent autfaorities not to execute the order oftransferdated 28.01.2011 passed by the respondent No. 1 whereby the petitioner, working as Principal, Govemment Higher Secondary School, Bariyo, Develppmenf Block Rajpur, District Surguja, has been transfaTed to Kanker, on the option of Assitant Commissioner, Tribal Development, Kanker, on administrative grounds. 2. Shri Koshy, leamed counsel aypearmg, for the petitioner suhmits that Ihe impugned transfer order has been passed wilhin a period of six months as earlier, vide order dated 15.7.2010, the petitioner was transferred from Govanment Girls Hi^ier Secondary School, Dharamjaigarh, Distriet Raigarh to Govemment Higher Secondary School, Bariyo, Development Block Rajpw, District Surguja. Shri Koshy further submits that the impugned transter is in violation of the policy of the State. He next "J""^'^ .,«" M .^" 6. suhmite that the studies ofthe children ofthe petitioner would be adversely aftected if the petitioner is compelled to join the new place ofposting as Ae children are residing with the petitioner and the husband oflfae petitioner is residine at Korba. Heard leamed counsel appearing for the petitioner, perused the pleadings and documents appendedthereto. On perusal ofthe pleadings, it is evident that on earlier occasions, the petitioner was transferred and posted within the Raigarh didrict by order dated 13.01.2010 and 20.01.2010. Thersafter, the petitioner was transferred to Surguja District vide order dalted 15.7.2010 and later on, vide order dated 28.01.2011, the petitioner has been transferred to the offiee ofthe Assistant Commissioner, Trihal Development, Kanker. Thus, in no way, it can be held as frequent transfer. It is well-settled fhat transfer is an incidence of service and it is for the employer to decide asto where a particular ofBceri'employee be posted, keeping in view public interest as well as admtmstrative exigency. This Court has limited.jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer matter except in the cases of proved mala fide, non- competence ofauthority passingthe transfer order and not being in conformity with the mles and regulations. The petttioner has failed to establish and prove his contentions, except making selfiame statement. The petitioner/employee eannot be pennitted to remain at one place forever. Under the provisions of serviee roles, employer has'all the powers to post an emplpyee at a particular plaee in view ofpublic interest and admuristrative erigency. (See E.P.Royappa v. State ofTamilNadu and another^, Union oflndia and another v. Janardhwi Debanafh & another^, State ofM.P. and another v. S.S.Kourav and others^ and Mohd. MasoodAhmadv. StateofU.P. &0thers4). 7. The Supreme Court, in Airports Authority oflndia v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey & Others , held that "In a matter of transfer of a govemment employee, scope ofjudieial reviewis limited andthe Hi^i Court would not interfere with an order offransfer li^rtly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because tiie eourts do not substitute their own decision in the matter offiransfCT". 8. Even otherwise, fhere is no challenge to the impugned order on any permissible legal grounds as aforestated, warranting mterference. 9. For the reasons as aforestated, the petition is dismissed. No order astocosts. ~—~ Satish K. Agnihotri Judge ^mit '1974(4)SCC3 2(2004)4SCC245 3 (1995) 3 SCC 270 • 4(2007)8SCC150 5 (2009) 8 SCC 337