IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO : 19401 of 1998 Between: Coromandel Fertilizers Limited, Visakapatnam a Company incorporated under Companies Act 1956 having its registered office at Coromandal House, 1-2-10, Sarder Patel Road, P.O. Box No. 1589, Secunderabad- 500 003, Rep by its Secretary Mr. S.Kumarasamy ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal -Cum- Labour Court, Visakhapatnam. 2 Visakhapatnam Contract Labour Union D.No. 33-5-1, Allipuram Visakhapatnam, rep by its General Secratrary. 3 The Additional Secretary to the Government Labour, Employment, Training and Factories (Lab.I) Department. Government Secretariat Hyderabad. 4 The Commissioner of Labour, The State of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to (a) call for the records pertaining to the Award dated March 30, 1998 of the 1st Respondent Viz., the Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam, in I.D.No. 121 of 1994 published by the 3rd respondent herein on June 17, 1998 vide G.O. Rt No. 853 dated May 15, 1998; and (b) Quash the same by the issuance of a Writ, more particularly in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari, or any other appropriate Writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, including the costs of these proceedings to the Petitioner and render justice. Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.C.R.SRIDHARAN Counsel for the Respondent No.: GP FOR LABOUR The Court made the following : THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.19401 of 1998 ORDER: The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam, in its award in I.D.No.121 of 1994 dated 30.3.1998, answered the reference, made to it by the Government, in favour of the workmen declaring that all the 15 workmen in the revised list were direct employees of the management and that they should be absorbed with full benefits like other regular employees in the lowest rung, but with effect from the date of the award. The validity of this Award is questioned in this writ petition as contrary to law and illegal. Elaborate submissions were made both by Sri C.R. Sridharan, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner – employer and Sri G. Vidyasagar, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent – union, including on the existence or otherwise of an industrial dispute, whether the award passed by the Tribunal was within or beyond the scope of the reference, whether the contract between the employer and the contractors was a camouflage necessitating the contract labour being treated as regular employees of the petitioner – company etc. It is, however, unnecessary for this Court to examine all these contentions since the very basis on which the Award, in I.D.121 of 1994, is founded is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union[1] which judgment has since been overruled and has been held no longer to be good law by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd v. National Union Waterfront Workers[2]. Sri G. Vidyasagar, Learned Counsel for the respondent – Union would, however, contend that since the award of the Tribunal was passed on 30.3.1998, much prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd2 dated 30.8.2001, the award of the Tribunal, on the basis of the law as it then stood, cannot be said to suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record necessitating interference in certiorari proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This submission does not merit acceptance for it is well settled that the law laid down by the Supreme Court must be held to be the law from the inception and to relate back from the date on which the Act was brought into force. Judgments of the Supreme Court, unlike statutes, cannot be given prospective application unless specifically held to so apply by the Supreme Court itself. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd.2, overruling the earlier judgment in Air India Statutory Corporation1, is the law governing the field and since the award was passed based on an earlier judgment which has since been overruled, the award suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record requiring it to be quashed. In this context it is useful to note that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Steel Authority of India Ltd2, observed that the judgment in Air India Statutory Authoriy was overruled prospectively and any directions issued by any industrial adjudicator/court, including the High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case, shall hold good and that the same shall not be altered on the basis of the judgment in Steel Authority of India Ltd2 in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final. Since the award, impugned in this writ petition, has not as yet attained finality, the direction given by the Tribunal, based on the earlier judgment in Air India Statutory Authority1, must necessarily be set aside. One other contention urged by Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned counsel for the petitioner, must also be taken note of since it is a question relating the validity of the reference itself. Learned counsel, placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India[3], would submit that the Union of contract labour is not entitled to espouse the cause of contract labour, that any such dispute raised on behalf of such contract labour by a Union of contract labour would not be an ‘industrial dispute’ under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the Tribunal must necessarily decline to answer the reference and, since this question can be adjudicated on the facts on record, it is not necessary that the matter be remanded to the Industrial Tribunal for its consideration afresh. It is necessary to note that in Steel Authority of India Ltd2 the jurisdiction of the State Government to make a reference was under challenge and, on the High Court directing that this question be decided as a preliminary issue, the matter was adjudicated by the Tribunal and thereafter examined by the Supreme Court. In the case on hand this Court, in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been called upon to examine a challenge to the validity of the Award of the Tribunal in I.D.No.121 of 1994 dated 30.3.1998. Admittedly the petitioner has not questioned the validity of the reference nor has any challenge been mounted thereto before this Court independent of the proceedings now before it. As the Industrial Tribunal has framed the question of maintainability of the industrial dispute as one among the issues, and can also decline to answer the reference if it comes to the conclusion that no “industrial dispute” exists, it is wholly inappropriate for this Court to adjudicate this question in certiorari proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and instead this, and other issues, must be left to be examined afresh by the Industrial Tribunal consequent on the Award being quashed as the entire basis of the Award is founded on the judgment in Air India Statutory Corporation1 which has since been overruled. Ends of justice would be met if the Industrial Tribunal is directed to examine all questions, raised both by the petitioner- employer and by the respondent-union, which have been put in issue by the Industrial Tribunal itself in its earlier Award and, on the basis of the material on record, decide these issues and pass an Award afresh. Since the Industrial Tribunal is now required to re-examine all these issues, I refrain from expressing any opinion on any of the contentions advanced before this Court both on behalf of the petitioner – employer and the respondent - Union. Since the dispute is of the year 1994, and more than 14 years have elapsed since then, it is but appropriate that the Industrial Tribunal decides the reference at the earliest, in any event, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is also made clear that, pending re-examination of the aforesaid contentions, and an Award being passed afresh, status-quo with regards the workmen in question shall be maintained by the petitioner herein. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. No order as to costs. ___________ 25-2-2008 asp [1] (1997) 9 SCC 377 [2] (2001) 7 SCC 1 [3] MANU/SC/4245/2006