CWP No. 15162 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH -- CWP No. 15162 of 2010 Date of decision: 25.07.2011 Narata Singh ........ Petitioner Versus Haryana Vidyut Parsaran Nigam Limited .......Respondent Coram: Hon'ble Ms Justice Nirmaljit Kaur -.- Present: Mr. Ram Kumar Malik, Senior Advocate with Ms Renu, Advocate, Advocate for the petitioner Mr. Parveen Gupta for the respondent -.- 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Nirmaljit Kaur, J. The present petition has been filed with a prayer for quashing of the order dated 21.07.2010 (P-9), vide which, the suspension period from 22.07.1994 to 12.03.1997 and termination period from 01.08.1998 to 30.09.2002 was not considered as a duty period for all intents and purposes. The petitioner was suspended on 22.07.1994. He was convicted CWP No. 15162 of 2010 2 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Yamuna Nagar on 01.08.1998. On the basis of conviction alone, his services were terminated on 19.11.1998 with effect from 01.08.1998. Meanwhile, he attained the age of superannuation on 30.09.2002. He filed an appeal against the conviction order and his appeal was allowed on 01.11.2007. The petitioner was acquitted. Thus, the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated. Since, he could not be reinstated on account of his superannuation, he filed representation for release of retiral benefits after treating the period of suspension and termination on duty. When the representation are not decided, he was forced to file Civil Writ Petition No. 615 of 2008 which was disposed of vide order dated 15.10.2008 with the following directions: “Respondents are directed to release to the petitioner all the consequential benefits and retiral benefits, which accrued to the petitioner due to withdrawal of the impugned order (Annexure P2). For the suspension period, the petitioner will be at liberty to file a representation and the appropriate authorities shall pass an order as per law within a period of three months from the date of receiving of a copy of this order. With the above observations and direction,the petition is disposed of.” The respondent, vide order dated 21.07.2010 (P-9), decided the representation of the petitioner by treating the suspension period from 22.07.1994 to 12.03.1997 and termination period 01.08.1998 to 30.09.2002 as leave of kind due instead of treating it as period on duty. Since, the petitioner has no leave of the kind due left, the same was treated as without CWP No. 15162 of 2010 3 pay. Thus, depriving him of counting the said period towards increments and pension. Praying that the petitioner is entitled to the release of full salary for the suspension period in view of his acquittal, reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shashi Kumar v Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another (CWP No. 14375 of 2003, decided on 7th December, 2004) (P5). Para 8 of the said judgment reads as under:- “The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jag Mohan Lal vs. State of Punjab through Secy of Punjab Government, Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part I, it was observed as follows:- “(2) xxx xxx xxx The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing CWP No. 15162 of 2010 4 home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted'. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. It is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clearly in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this; the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious, the criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.” The aforesaid view has also been reiterated in the various CWP No. 15162 of 2010 5 judgments rendered by this Court, including Hukam Singh v. The State of Haryana and another 2001 (2) SCT 696 (P&H), Kanwal Singh v. State of Haryana and another 2010 (3) SCT 464 as well as Ram Dhari v. State of Haryana and others (CWP 2658 of 2010, decided on 05.01.2011). The case in hand is squarely covered by the judgment rendered in the case of Shashi Kumar (supra). In view of the settled proposition of law, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 21.07.2010 (P9) is set aside and the petitioner is also entitled to the grant of fully salary of the suspension period with effect from 22.07.1994 to 12.03.1997 and for the period, i.e. 01.08.1998 to 30.09.2002, the petitioner remained out of service on account of his termination after treating the said period on duty. Allowed in the above terms. (Nirmaljit Kaur) Judge 25.07.2011 mohan