CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) Date of decision: 5.9.2011 State of Haryana ......Petitioner(s) Versus Kalu Sher Bahadur Singh ......Respondent(s) CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAKESH KUMAR GARG * * * Present: Mr. Ashish Gupta, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana. Rakesh Kumar Garg, J.(Oral) State of Haryana has filed the instant revision petition challenging the impugned order dated 13.6.2011 of Rent Controller, Chandigarh whereby in a petition under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short the 'Act, 1949) filed by the respondent, leave to contest was declined and ejectment of the petitioner was ordered. The respondent filed the instant ejectment application against the petitioner-State under Section 13-B of the Act, 1949 as extended to Chandigarh vide notification dated 9.10.2009 on the averments that he is a Non-Resident Indian and co-owner with his wife and son of SCO No.80- 81, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh vide sale deed/transfer of lease holder rights dated 14.12.2004. The petitioner was a tenant in the demised premises prior to the purchase of said SCO and after the purchase, a rent note dated 3.10.2005 was executed between the parties according to which the lease period expired on 15.4.2010. It was further averred that the rate of rent of the demised premises was ` 63438/- per month payable in advance every month. It was also averred that the respondent along with his family CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 2 had a business of auto parts in Iran for the last several years as they were settled by birth in Iran but due to the prevailing law and order situation it was not possible for the respondent to continue business there and even his brother was killed on 2.7.2008 by terrorists and he also suffered injuries. Thereafter, he along with his family had shifted to India and was presently residing in Chandigarh. The respondent-landlord further averred that the SCO in question was being occupied by different tenants who were all requested to vacate the premises, since he had decided to start his business in the demised premises. Therefore, the respondent has filed ejectment petitions against all the tenants who have refused to vacate the demised premises. The respondent has further averred that he does not own or possess any other commercial premises except the ones mentioned above and that he has neither occupied nor vacated any other commercial property after the commencement of the Rent Act without any sufficient cause. It was also averred that he is an NRI and was issued the passport by the Govt. of India in Iran. With these averments, ejectment of the petitioner was sought. Upon notice, the petitioner-tenant appeared and filed application seeking leave to defend on the ground that the respondent was not covered by the definition of NRI and the requirement of the respondent was not bona fide. While dismissing the application for leave to contest, the Rent Controller found that from the copy of the passport, the respondent has been found to be a Non-Resident Indian and was admittedly, the owner of the demised premises for the last more than 5 years and that he required the premises for his personal use. The petitioner-tenant has failed to make any prima facie case which would entitle him for being granting leave to defend the present petition. CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 3 Challenging the aforesaid order before this Court, counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 13-B inserted in the Act by Punjab Act No.9 of 2001 has been extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by Government of India vide notification dated 9th October, 2009 in exercise of powers conferred by Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 (for short 'the Punab Act'). It is contended that such extension of a Statute by way of an executive action is not permissible. Learned counsel has further submitted that extension of Act No.9 of 2010 to Chandigarh was already challenged in some of the petitions. Noting the aforesaid contention, the following order was passed on 16.8.2011: “Counsel for the petitioner submits that the extension of Act No.9 of 2010 to Chandigarh is already under challenge in some of the petitions i.e. Civil Revision No.4606 of 2011 titled as Raman Deep Singh Vs. Nirmal Singh fixed for 5.9.2011. Notice of motion for 5.9.2011. In the meantime, eviction of the petitioner is stayed from the demised premises subject to payment of arrears of rent within two weeks from today.” Today learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlord has produced before this Court a judgment of this Court passed in CR No.3955 of 2011 (Lalit Kumar Versus Om Parkash Dhiman) decided on 22.6.2011, wherein it has been held as under: “I do not find any merit in the said argument in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Birch and others Vs. Union of India and others AIR 1990 SC 560. In the aforesaid case, Punjab Act No.2 of 1985 inserting Section 13-A in the Act was extended to CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 4 the urban area of Chandigarh by Government of India vide notification dated 15.12.1986 purportedly in exercise of powers conferred under Section 87 of the Punjab Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the impugned notification is intra vires of Section 87 of the Punjab Act. The Court has considered the scope of Section 89, which gives limited powers to the Central Government to adapt existing laws within a period of two years, whereas under Section 87 of the Act, Central Government could extend to Union Territory any law in force in any part of India. In the aforesaid judgment, the constitutional validity of Section 87 was also challenged, which was negated relying upon the judgment in Delhi Laws Act case, AIR 1951 SC 332. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Since the extension of the provisions of Punjab Act No.2 of 1985 to Chandigarh by way of an executive action has been upheld in the aforesaid judgment, therefore, for the same reason, the extension of Punjab Act No.9 of 2001 by way of notification by the Central Government to the urban area of Chandigarh cannot be said to be illegal in any manner.” Further, a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.15378 of 2011 (Asha Chawla and others v. Union of India and others) decided on 23.8.2011 has held as under: “As regards the validity of impugned notification, extending the Punjab Act to Union Territory, Chandigarh, the contention has to be negatived in view of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Birch and others V. Union of India and others AIR CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 5 1990 SC 560, upholding notification extending the 1985 amendment of the State of Punjab to the Union Territory, Chandigarh. Reliance by learned counsel on observations in para 31 of the said judgment is untenable. The extended provision will not be in conflict with any existing provision. Reliance on judgment in Vasu Dev Singh and others V. Union of India and others (2006) 12 SCC 753 is also misplaced, as therein the issue was not of extension of any State legislation but of exercise of legislative power by the Executive, which is not the position in the present case.” Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-State could not dispute the law laid down by this Court as aforesaid. In view of the aforesaid authoritatively law laid down by this Court, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not sustainable. Faced with this situation, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-State has made an effort to challenge the impugned order on the ground that the petitioner cannot be held to be an NRI as admittedly he was settled in Iran by birth and has not even disclosed the birth place of his father. The argument as raised is noticed only to be rejected as admittedly, the respondent is holding an Indian passport. No other point was raised. Dismissed. September 5, 2011 (RAKESH KUMAR GARG) ps JUDGE CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 6 “23. But, these niceties apart, we think that Section 87 is quite valid even on the “policy and guideline” theory if one has proper regard to the context of the Act and the object and purpose sought to be achieved by Section 87 of the Act. The judicial decisions referred to above make it clear that it is not necessary that the legislature should “dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s” of its policy. It is sufficient if it gives the broadest indication of a general policy of the legislature. If we bear this in mind and have regard to the history of this type of legislation, there will be no difficulty at all. Section 87, like the provisions of Acts I, II and III, is a provision necessitated by changes resulting in territories coming under the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. There are territories situated in the midst of contiguous territories which have a proper legislature. They are small territories falling under the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament which has hardly sufficient time to look after the details of all their legislative needs and requirements. To require or expect parliament to legislate for them will entail a disproportionate pressure on its legislative schedule. It will also mean the unnecessary utilization of the time of a large number of members of Parliament for, except the few (less than ten) members returned to Parliament from the Union Territory, none also is likely to be interested in such legislation. In such a situation, the most convenient course of legislating for them is the adaptation, by extension, of laws in force in other areas of the country. ….. xxx xxx xxx 27. For the reasons discussed above, we reject the contentions of the petitioners challenging the constitutional validity of Section 87. xxx xxx xxx 31. …. We, therefore, think that since the extension of the 1985 Act only adds provisions in respect of aspects not covered by the 1974 Parliament Act and in a manner not inconsistent therewith, the impugned notification is quite valid and not liable to be struck down. CR No.4893 of 2011 (O&M) 7 xxx xxx xxx 33. xxx xxx xxx (8) Sri Swarup raised a point that if Section 87 is read as empowering the extension of any law at any time, Section 89 which prescribes a maximum time limit of two years within which to adapt existing laws for their application to Chandigarh would become redundant. This argument overlooks a very crucial difference between Sections 87 and 89. This is that, within the period of two years mentioned in Section 89, the Central Government can, while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes therein, including changes by way of repeal or amendment. Bus Section 87, though capable of enforcement indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It can be invoked only to extend laws already in existence to the Union Territory and cannot make any substantial changes therein. The power under Section 89 is limited in time, but extensive in scope while under Section 87 the power is indefinite in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope.”