IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 07.01.2010 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL Rev.Application Nos.137 to 139 of 2008 in C.R.P. NPD Nos.1095 to 1097 of 2004 M. Jagadeesan .... Petitioner in all Rev.Applns. Vs K.Selvam ....Respondent in Rev.Appln.137/08 M.Srinivasan ....Respondent in Rev.Appln.138/08 S.Sivanesan ....Respondent in Rev.Appln.139/08 Common Prayer: Review Applications filed under Section 114 of Civil Procedure Code against the order dated 12.02.2008 in C.R.P. (NPD) Nos.1095 to 1097 of 2004. For Petitioner : Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan in all Rev.Applns. Senior Counsel for Mr.G.Kathirvelu For Respondents : Mrs.R.T.Shyamala in all Rev.Applns. C O M M O N O R D E R The applicant/petitioner in the Civil Revision Petitions has filed these Review Applications before this Court praying for the review of the order dated 12.02.2008 made in C.R.P. NPD Nos.1095 to 1097 of 2004 and resultantly to revise the orders so passed therein. 2. The learned counsel for the review applicant/petitioner urges before this Court that the review applications have been filed before this Court on admitted facts and only Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the T.N. Act 18 of 1960 is applicable to the facts of the present case and Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is not applicable and that apart Section 10(4) of the T.N. Act 18 of 1960 has no application to the employees mentioned in the G.O.MS.No.3440,(Home) dated 27th October 1960 (Published in Fort St. George, Gazette dated 9th November 1960 Part II Section 2 at page 692) and the notification " All Departments of the State and Central Government in the State shall be deemed to be engaged in essential services for the purpose of Sub Section (4) of Section 10 of the Act" applies to Departments who are tenants and not to its Employees and as a matter of fact the revision petitioner/landlord is in occupation of the first floor for the purpose of residence and the ground floor is sought for a non residential purpose and therefore only Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is applicable and not Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and therefore there is an 'Error Apparent on the Face of Record' and if a landlord resides in one portion then Section 10(3)(a) (iii) is only applicable and not Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. 3. Expatiating his submissions, the learned counsel for the review applicant/revision petitioner submits that 'A Mistake Apparent from the record'' also includes an obvious error of law and to lend support to his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court M.K.VENKATACHALAM, I.T.O. AND ANOTHER Vs. BOMBAY DYEING AND MFG. CO. LTD., AIR 1958 SUPREME COURT 875 at page 880 and 881, wherein at Paragraph No.6 it is held as follows:- "6. It is in the light of this position that the extent of the Income-tax Officer's power under S.35 to rectify mistakes apparent from the record must be determined; and in doing so, the scope and effect of the expression. @ page-SC 880 "mistake apparent from the record" has to be ascertained. At the time when the Income-tax Officer applied his mind to the question of rectifying the alleged mistake, there can be no doubt that he had to read the principal Act as containing the inserted proviso as from 1-4-1952. If that be the true position then the order which he made giving credit to the respondent for Rs.50,603-15-0 is plainly and obviously inconsistent with a specific and clear provision of the statute and that must inevitably be treated as a mistake of law apparent from the record. If a mistake of fact apparent from the record of the assessment order can be rectified under S.35, we see no reason why a mistake of law which is glaring and obvious cannot be similarly rectified. Prima facie it may appear some-what strange that an order which was good and valid when it was made should be treated as patently invalid and wrong by virtue of the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. But such a result is necessarily involved in the legal fiction about the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. If, as a result of the said fiction we must read the subsequently inserted proviso as forming part of S.18A(5) of the principal Act as from 1-4-1952, the conclusion is inescapable that the order in question is inconsistent with the provisions of the said proviso and must be deemed to suffer from a mistake apparent from the record. That is why we think that the Income-tax Officer was justified in the present case in exercising his power under S.35 and rectifying the said mistakes, Incidentally we may mention that in Meka Venkatappavya Vs. Additional Income-tax Officer, Bapatla, 1957-32 ITR 274 : (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 683) (D) the High Court of Andhra has taken the same view." 4. He also cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court M/S. THUNGABHADRA INDUSTRIES LTD. (In all the Appeals) Vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP. BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, ANANTAPUR (In all the Appeals), AIR 1964 SUPREME COURT 1372, wherein at paragraphs 8 and 9 it is held as follows:- "8. Order XLVII R.1(1) of the Civil Procedure Code permits an application for review being filed "from a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred." In the present case, it would be seen, on the date when the application for review was filed the appellant had not filed an appeal to this Court and therefore the terms of O.XLVII R.1(1) did not stand in the way of the petition for review being entertained. Learned counsel for the respondent did not contest this position. Nor could we read the judgment of the High Court as rejecting the petition for review on that ground. The crucial date for determining whether or not the terms of O.XLVII R.1(1) are satisfied is the date when the application for review is filed. If on that date no appeal has been filed it is competent for the Court hearing the petition for review to dispose of the application on the merits notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, subject only to this, that if before the application for review is finally decided the appeal itself has been disposed of, the jurisdiction of the Court hearing the review petition would come to an end." 9.The next question is as regards the effect of the refusal of this Court to condone the delay in filing the petition for special leave. Here again, it was not contended that the refusal of this Court to entertain the petition for special leave on the grounds just now stated was a bar to the jurisdiction or powers of the Court hearing the review petition. This position was not contested by the learned Advocate for the respondent either. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the refusal by this Court to condone the delay in filing the petition for special leave was a circumstances which could either bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the petition for review or even could be a relevant matter to be taken into account in deciding it. If therefore their original order dated September 4, 1959 was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, the failure of the special leave petition to be entertained in this Court in the circumstances in which it occurred, could not be any ground either of itself or taken along with others to reject the application for review." 5. Continuing further, the learned counsel for the review applicant brings it to the notice of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court AJIT KUMAR RATH Vs. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS, AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 85, wherein it is held as follows:- "The provisions of S.22(3) (f) indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a Court under S.114 read with O.47, C.P.C. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in O.47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which states in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression "any other sufficient reason" used in O.47.R.1 means a reason suffciently analogous to those specified in the rule. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment. (Paras 30,31)." 6. In support of the contention that the review applications are maintainable before this Court, the learned counsel for the review applicant/ revision petitioner seeks in aid of the decision T.N.KRISHNAMOORTHY Vs. M/S. JAGAT TEXTILES, REP. BY ITS PARTNER LALJI BHUJPUNIA, MADURAI TOWN, (1981) 1 M.L.J. at pgs.394 and 395 wherein it is held as follows:- "When the High Court has been conferred with powers to entertain a revision under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960 as held in Thirupathi Nadar V. Kandaswami Nadar, (1968) 81 L.W.642, when a Court is invested with powers to adopt the procedure applicable to it, there is necessity for invoking the Code of Civil Procedure. No procedure having been contemplated in the Rules to be adopted by the High Court and when the High Court is a Court of-record the necessary implication is the Court will have to decide the revision petitions by following the Civil Procedure Code. (Para 27) The power of revision conferred under section 25 of the Act XVIII of 1960 is on the High Court and while entertaining the revision it exercises the power of a Court created under the Constitution. It is not a 'persona designata'. When power is conferred on a Court, and no other special procedure is prescribed for disposal of matters under a particular statute, as held in P.N.Thakershi V. Pradyumansinghji AIR 1970 S.C. 1273, by such conferment of power, there is necessary implication that the Code of Civil Procedure, would apply and in turn the power of review would be available to the High Court. (Para.32) 7. That apart on the side of the review applicant/revision petitioner, the decision of this Court THE COLLECTOR OF MADRAS (ACCOMODATION CONTROLLER) Vs. C. LOGESWARA RAO, 1985 T.N.L.J. at pgs.282, 283 is cited before this Court to show that this Court has an inherent power of review to undo the wrong in the course of the administration of justice and the same runs as follows:- "The only contention advanced by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the revision petitioner the Collector of Madras and Accommodation Controller is that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority under the Act are only persona designata, that they are not Courts, that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have no application and they have therefore no right to review their orders. It is needless for the purpose of this case to go into the question. Whether the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are Courts and whether the Code of Civil Procedure as such applies to the proceedings before them. Suffice it to point out that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority empowered to determine question affecting the rights of citizens are certainly judicial bodies and the proceedings before them are undoubtedly of a judicial nature. It is a well settled principle that such judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals adjudicating upon rights of parties must possess inherent powers, apart from the express. Provisions of the law, which are necessary for their existence and for the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon them by laws. Every judicial or quasi-judicial body, in the absence of express provision, must be deemed to possess, as inherent in its very Constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo the wrong in the course of the administration of justice. This is based on the principle embodied in the Maxim. Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit concedere vidatur id quo resipsa esse non protest (when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable). Where an error apparent on the face of the record is committed by a judicial or quasi- judicial authority in the discharge of its functions it must necessarily have the power to rectify, that error and to deny that judicial authority this right to undo the wrong will be self-defeating. Such a rigidity of law, far from advancing the cause of justice will result in perpetration of injustice. It cannot be said that merely because there are no express provisions in the rules framed, Under the Act empowering the Authorities constituted under the Act to review its order in appropriate cases. Such Authorities have no such power to do justice or redress a wrong. The following observation of Mahmood,J., in NARASINGHA DASS V. MUNGAL DUBE (v, Allahabad 163 Full Bench) is worthy of note. "All Courts are not to act upon the Principle that every procedure has to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code. But on the converse Principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle, prohibitions cannot be presumed. Though these observations have been made with reference to courts they apply in equal force to all judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals which are constituted to adjudicate upon valuable rights of citizens. I therefore hold that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authorities under the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act have inherent power to review their own orders with a view to correcting patent or obvious mistakes in order to advance the ends of justice and redress a wrong." 8. Contending contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that both the learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority have recorded a concurrent finding of the fact in the proceedings before them and it cannot be interfered with in revision and now the review applicant/revision petitioner is canvassing the same in review before this Court and in the ground floor, there are 7 shops and room Nos.1, 2 and 7 are vacant and they are in possession of the review applicant/landlord and already when three shops are vacant and in occupation of the review applicant/landlord then Section 10(3)(c) is only applicable and the review applicant/petitioner/landlord is asking the other three shops and after hearing of the revision petitions if the review applicant/revision petitioner come across any decisions/citations and if the review applicant/petitioner is inclined to cite the same before this Court in review applications it cannot be permitted to be done in law and as per Section 25 of T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, there is no provision for filing of a review application and unless there is a specific power under a particular statute to review the order passed, the same cannot be done by a party when other shops are vacant, the review applicant/petitioner cannot claim the shops which are in occupation of the tenants and therefore prays for dismissal of the review applications. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents (in all the revision petitions) cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. S.N. GOYAL, (2008) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 92 at pgs.97, 98 whereby and whereunder it is held that "once an Authority becomes functus officio after finalising its order, it cannot change its decision unless there is a specific power of review and this applies to quasi-judicial authorities also." 10. She also relies on the decision of this Court S.J.S. FERNANDES Vs. V.RANGANAYAKULU CHETTY, 1950 (2) MLJ 445, wherein it is held as follows:- "The Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1949, contains no provision for review. The right to review cannot be invoked under the inherent power of the Court. Such right must be conferred by statute. The Code of Civil Procedure was not intended to be generally applicable to proceedings under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Accordingly the provisions of Order 47, Rule I are not applicable where a revision petition under the Buildings and Lease Control Act has been dismissed." 11. In regard to the plea that a concurrent finding of the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction, the learned counsel for the respondents brings it to the notice of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court M/S. SRI RAJA LAKSHMI DYEING WORKS AND OTHERS Vs. RANGASWAMY CHETTIAR, (1980) 4 SUPREME COURT CASES 259 at pg.260 wherein it is held hereunder:- "Under Section 25 of the T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, the High Court calls for and examines the record of the appellate authority in order "to satisfy itself". The expression "to satisfy itself" conveys the idea that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25 of the High Courts should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 CPC but it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal." 12. On the side of the respondents, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court RAFAT ALI Vs. SUGNI BAI AND OTHERS, (1999) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 133 at pgs. 134 and 135 is cited before this Court wherein it is held as follows:- "(1) It was not open to the High Court to substitute the findings of the lower courts with its own findings while exercising the limited supervisory jurisdiction. When fact-finding courts had found the damage trivial. (2) The appellation "Revision" given to Section 22 makes it unmistakably clear that the power conferred thereunder is revisional which means, it is a power of supervision. It is well-nigh settled that a revision jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters. The power to call for and examine the records is for the purpose of the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality, regularity or propriety" of the order of the lower authority. Even such a widely worded frame of Section 22 may at best indicate that the revisional powers are not so restricted as in other enactments wherein the words are not so widely framed. Nonetheless, they remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction." 13. Continuing further, the learned counsel for the respondents cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, KAILASH CHANDER Vs. OM PRAKASH AND ANOTHER, (2003) 12 SUPREME COURT CASES 728, at pages 730, 731 wherein at paragraph 5 it is observed thus:- "5. This Court proceeded to say further that unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below are wholly perverse and erroneous, which manifestly appear to be unjust, there should be no interference. In the case on hand also the two courts below have appreciated evidence placed on record and on a proper appreciation concluded that the case of sub-letting, as pleaded by the appellant, is proved. In our view, the High Court was not justified in interfering with such concurrent finding. It is not shown on behalf of the respondents herein that the findings recorded by the two courts below were either perverse or not based on evidence. We must also keep in mind that when the appellant established the fact that respondent 2 was carrying on his activities as UTI agent in the part of the premises exclusively by him, it was for the respondent to establish that his possession on that premises was not as a sub-tenant. Merely because respondent 1 is the father of Respondent 2 there cannot be any justification to say that it was not a case of sub-letting." 14. Further more, the learned counsel for the respondents relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court SHANTHI DEVI Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS, (1999) 5 SUPREME COURT CASES 703, wherein it is held as follows:- " That a judgment sought to be reviewed was overruled in another case subsequently is no ground for reviewing the said judgment  The provisions of the Explanation to Or.47 R.1 are applicable by analogy and clearly rule out this type of review proceedings  Held, review petition liable to be dismissed." 15. To support the contention that a Court or Tribunal has no inherent power of review unless the same is vested by statute, the learned counsel for the respondents cites the Full Bench decision B.F.PUSHPALEELA DEVI Vs. STATE OF A.P., Rep. By its SECRETARY , 2002 (3) CTC 513 (FB), wherein it is held that " A Court or Tribunal has no inherent power of review and the powers of review can be exercised only if such power is vested by a statute and further that the error must be one striking on mere look at record and should not require any long drawn process of reasoning on point which conceivably may have two opinions." 16. The review applicant/revision petitioner in the Grounds of Review has taken a plea that his case is under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 18 of 1960 and not under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and this Court proceeded on the basis as if the revision petitioner has rested his case under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and in fact Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 has been added in the R.C.O.P. petition only by means of an abundant caution and moreover the possession is different from occupation and added Panel of Electricity Metres have been located in room Nos.2, 3 and 7 which are used as a lumber room, which is part of residential character, etc., and indeed this Court has committed an error in accepting the contention of the tenants that the landlord can carry on business in room Nos.1, 2 and 7 and also that this Court ought to have held that no preparation at all is needed for starting an electrical business in the petition premises, when the financial position has not been disputed by the tenants. 17. It is the further stand of the review applicant/revision petitioner that unless the petitioner obtain possession of the building, he cannot apply for any license or place order for goods and the very assurance to resign the job by the son of the petitioner is a first step in preparation and the Government Servants are protected from eviction from the residential building and not from the non residential building and the petitioner's son is also a Government Servant, which ought to have been looked into by this Court and moreover no protection is available to another Government Servant in regard to eviction and the