C.W.P.No.6283 of 1986 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision : 08.02.2011 C.W.P.No.6283 of 1986 Chhota Singh etc. …Petitioners Versus The Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, …Respondents Punjab, Chandigarh and another. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Present : Mr. R.K.S.Brar, Advocate, for the petitioners. Mr. Amarjit Markan, Advocate, for respondent No.2. HEMANT GUPTA, J. (ORAL) Challenge in the present writ petition is to an order passed by the learned Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, on 04.06.1986, exercising the powers of the Director under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Vide the aforesaid order, the petition filed by respondent No.2 was accepted and the matter was remanded to the Consolidation Officer for making necessary corrections in the record pertaining to the claim of respondent No.2. It is the case of the petitioners that the consolidation of holdings took place in Village Togewal. In the year 1977, repartition was effected and the petitioners were put into possession of the land falling to 1 C.W.P.No.6283 of 1986 their shares. Respondent No.2 filed objections against the order of repartition. The said objections to the order of repartition were dismissed on 21.09.1978, while accepting some of the objections. An appeal was filed by respondent No.2 before the Settlement Commissioner, Consolidation of Holdings, under Section 21 (3) of the Act. Such appeal was dismissed on 23.11.1978. Respondent No.2 filed an appeal before the Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings. The said appeal was dismissed on 15.01.1981. Thereafter, another petition was filed under Section 42 of the Act by respondent No.2, which was also dismissed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, by passing a detailed speaking order on 24.10.1985. Though the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, has dismissed the appeal against the order passed by the Settlement Officer and also a petition under Section 42 of the Act, respondent No.2 again filed a petition under Section 42 of the Act, in which the order impugned in the present writ petition has been passed with direction to the Consolidation Officer to make necessary corrections in the record. The writ petition came up for motion hearing before this Court on 20.11.1986, when this Court ordered that the proceedings may continue before the Consolidation Officer, but the possession be not given to the respondent in pursuance of the order passed. Subsequently, the writ petition was admitted, but the said interim order was not varied. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the order impugned in the present writ petition (Annexure P-5) has the affect of review of the order earlier passed in an appeal on 15.01.1981 and also in a petition under Section 42 of the Act on 24.10.1985. Such order could not be passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, 2 C.W.P.No.6283 of 1986 as the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, has no power to review the order passed by it. Reliance is placed upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Deep Chand Vs. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Jullundur and another, 1964 PLR 318. It is the stand of respondent No.2 in the written statement that the relief claimed in the two petitions is different, therefore, the Additional Director was competent to pass an order, which is impugned in the present writ petition. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that the order passed by the learned Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, on 04.06.1986 is without jurisdiction. Respondent No.2 has initially filed an appeal, which was decided by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings on 15.01.1981. Thereafter, he filed a petition under Section 42 of the Act raising almost the same plea as has been raised in the present petition. Even after some of the pleas have not been raised, but it is not open to respondent No.2 to raise all pleas, as has been raised in the alleged second petition before the Additional Director in the first petition under Section 42 of the Act. Since, the said petition has been dismissed by the Additional Director on 24.10.1985, the second petition under Section 42 of the Act was not maintainable, as it has the affect of review of the earlier order passed by the learned Additional Director. Full Bench of this Court in Deep Chand’s case (supra) has held to the following effect: “8. The contention that power to recall an erroneous order is distinct and different from power of review and is, therefore, inherent in every quasi-judicial tribunal is supported neither by 3 C.W.P.No.6283 of 1986 statute nor by any recognized principle or precedent, and indeed the different appears to be too tenuous to form the basis of a sound argument. In the absence of statute, persuasive principle or binding authority I am, as at present advised, unable to persuade myself to sustain the bald contention, for, in my view, power to recall an order like the one before us is only another name for the power to review it, and, therefore, cannot be claimed as a separate and distinct jurisdiction as suggested. xxx xxx xxx 14. To concede such a wide power of review would, in my opinion, introduce into judicial and quasi judicial decisions, disconcerting element of permanent uncertainty and unpredictability tending to give an impression of quasi judicial lawlessness, which I cannot persuade myself to uphold. If Courts do not possess such a wide and sweeping power, it is difficult to accede such a wide power in statutory judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals. xxx xxx xxx 16. In the light of the foregoing discussion, in my opinion, the Additional Director was not competent to recall or review his orders on the merit in the case in hand and I would answer the question accordingly. ….” Following the aforesaid judgment, another Division Bench of this Court in Maharani Deepinder Kaur and others Vs. U.T.Chandigarh etc. 1996 (3) PLJ 598 has held to the following effect: “10. …..that power of review is not an inherent power, but like the power of appeal must be conferred by law or by necessary implication. In this regard, a reference may be made to three decisions; one by the Full Bench of this Court in Deep Chand and another Vs. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Jullundur and another (1964) 66 PLR 318; 4 C.W.P.No.6283 of 1986 and the two by the Apex Court in Patel Narshi Thakarshi and others Vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 and Dr. Kashinath Jalmi and another Vs. The Speaker and others, JT 1993 (3) SC 594. In Deep Chand’s case (supra), it has been held that unless specifically conferred by the statute, the Judicial and Quasi-judicial Tribunals do not possess any wider or more extensive inherent power than the Courts and thus, are not empowered to recall or review their earlier erroneous and unjust orders whenever it is discovered that the error was due to their own mistaken view on the merits of the controversy. …..” In view of the aforesaid judgments, the order passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, on 04.06.1986 has the effect of review of the order passed earlier on 15.01.1981 and 24.10.1985. The Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, has no such power to review the order already passed. Thus, the aforesaid order is without jurisdiction and, thus, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the present petition is allowed. The order passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, on 04.06.1986 is set aside. (HEMANT GUPTA) JUDGE 08.02.2011 Vimal 5