IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.1750 of 2007 1. Om Prakash Keshari. 2. Jay Prakash Keshari. Both sons of Sri Suraj Kumar Keshari @ Suraj Prasad Keshari, resident of Waliganj, Ahirpurwa, P.S. Ara Town, District- Bhojpur at Ara. ..... Petitioners. Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. Collector, Bhojpur at Ara. 3. Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara. 4. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar Ara, District- Bhojpur. 5. Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Sadar Ara, District- Bhojpur. 6. Anchal Adhikari, Sadar Ara, District- Bhojpur. 7. Sri Vishwanath Prasad, Son of Late Mungeri Lal Sah, resident of Mohalla- Devi Asthan, Ara, P.S. Ara Town, District- Bhojpur. ...... Respondents. ----------- 02- 13.1.2009 Heard Mr. Markandey Singh for the petitioners, Mr. Rajeev Kumar Singh, learned junior counsel to Government Advocate No.6 for respondent nos.1 to 6, and Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur for respondent no.7. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 15.11.2006 (Annexure-4), passed by the learned Additional Collector, Bhojpur, in Misc. Case No.40 of 2006-07 (Vishwanath Prasad Vs. Omprakash Kesari and others), whereby he has directed that the name of the petitioner before him (respondent no.7 herein) be inducted in the 2 Government records as a settlee in terms of Section 23 of the Bihar Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). 2. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, in view of the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, the learned Additional Collector has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The jurisdiction has exclusively been conferred on the Collector of the district. He next submits that the appeal had been preferred beyond time. There is no order condoning the delay in filing the appeal. He lastly submits that the findings recorded by the learned Additional Collector are perverse and bear no resemblance to the materials on record. The learned Government Counsel, and learned counsel for respondent no.7 have in their separate sets of submissions, supported the impugned order. 3. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The petitioners herein claim settlement of the shop in question on the basis of an agreement which has been rejected by the learned 3 appellate authority. The relevant finding is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “ ,d rjg ls okLrfodrk dks fNikdj vkSj iziap ds rgr viuk uke ljdkjh dkxtkr es ntZ djkus dh ps"Vk dh gS tks mfpr ugh dgk tk ldrk@ foxr rhu o"kksZa ls nqdku [kkyh gS ftldh pkHkh Jh fo’oukFk izlkn ds ikl gS@ bl rjg ls ds’kjh cU/kqvksa dk dksbZ Hkh dCtk ml tehu ij ugha jg x;k gS@ ,Slh fLFkfr es nqdkunkjksa dks ljdkjh lwph esa ds’kjh ds uke vafdr jguk mfpr ,oa fof/kxr ugha gS@ vko’;drk gS fd muds uke dkV dj Jh fo’oukFk izlkn oYn Lo0 eqaxsjh yky lkg dk uke ntZ fd;k tk;@“ It is thus evident that the learned appellate authority has found that the petitioners herein had manipulated the Government records to falsely show settlement of the Government shop in their names. It is not possible for this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction and on the basis of affidavits to take a different view on facts. Furthermore, as it prima-facie appears, the petitioners seem to be guilty of interpolation in Government records. Law is well settled that discretionary, prerogative writ jurisdiction is never exercised in favour of persons who have no respect for authority, no 4 respect for the established procedure, and engage themselves in illegal acts like forgery. 4. I must also deal with the other two submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, namely, the Additional Collector has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and the appeal was barred by limitation. Law is well settled that if an order is correct on merits, it is open to the writ court to adopt it as its own order ignoring the issues of jurisdiction, limitation etc. I am in this connection reminded of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Swalleh and others Vs. Third Addl. District Judge, Meerut and another, reported in (1988)1 S.C.C. 40. The same related to a proceeding under the U.P. Urban Builidngs (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Proceedings were taken under that Act and certain orders were passed by the appropriate authorities. The aggrieved party preferred appeal before the learned District Judge who disposed of the matter on merits. The Allahabad High Court in writ jurisdiction came to the conclusion that there is no provision for appeal under the Act, and the District Judge is no authority 5 thereunder. The order of the learned District Judge was, therefore, without jurisdiction. However, the Allahabad High Court found the order of the learned District Judge to be correct on merits and, therefore, in exercise of its discretionary, prerogative writ jurisdiction, adopted the same as its own order. The Supreme Court in the reported judgment upheld that of the Allahabad High Court. I had the occasion to apply the same in the case of Sri Prakash Singh and anothers Vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 2002 (1) P.J.J.R. 650. 5. I have found hereinabove that the learned authority has passed a correct order and we agree with him for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition. Therefore, I ignore the issue of jurisdiction and limitation. This Court adopts the order of the learned appellate authority as its own. 6. I do not find any merit in this writ petition and is accordingly dismissed. It goes without saying that it will be open to the petitioners to institute a civil suit in a court of competent jurisdiction for adjudication of their right, title and 6 interest. It equally goes without saying that the suit, if instituted, shall be disposed of on merits and in accordance with law, ignoring the findings of the revenue authorities and the observations made in this judgment. (S K Katriar, J.) S.K.Pathak/