*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY +W.P.No.14077 of 2007 % 01.12.2009 #Smt. Santosh Varma ..Petitioner Vs. $ The Greater Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad Rep. by its and another. ..Respondents. !Counsel for the petitioner : Sri P. Srinivas ^Counsel for the Respondents : Standing Counsel for Municipal Corporation Sri A. Ravinder Reddy for R-2 <Gist : >Head Note: ?Cases Referred: THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY Writ Petition No.14077 of 2009 ORDER: This Writ Petition is filed challenging the proceedings, dated 11.04.2007, issued by the erstwhile Uppal Kalan Municipality in favour of the 2nd respondent, through which, permission was accorded for construction upon plot Nos.5 and 6, carved out of survey Nos.19 and 20 of Habsiguda Village. The municipality has since been merged in the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, the 1st respondent herein. The petitioner states that, she purchased an extent of 4153 square yards of land in survey Nos.19 and 20 of Habsiguda Village, through sale deed, dated 10.06.1963. A declaration, as required under Section 6 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, is said to have been filed before the Special Officer and Competent Authority. An extent of 2698 square meters is said to have been found in excess and that the application of the municipality for exemption is pending before the Government. The 2nd respondent approached the 1st respondent with an application to grant permission to construct over 3403 square yards of land. She pleaded that the petitioner through her General Power of Attorney, by name, P.Sheshu Babu, conveyed the property in the year 1983. On examination of the same, the 1st respondent accorded permission on 11.04.2007. The petitioner contends that the 2nd respondent did not deny any title for the land and without verifying the same, the 1st respondent accorded permission. She states that the so-called regularization of the registered sale deed through endorsement referable to Section 42 of the Indian Stamp Act is untenable in law and that the Municipality violated Section 209 of the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act’), while according permission. The Deputy Commissioner of the 1st respondent-Corporation filed a counter-affidavit. It is stated that if there existed any title dispute between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the 2nd respondent, on the other, they have to resolve it, by approaching a civil Court and that the Corporation, or its predecessor do not have the power to resolve such disputes. He stated that the various facts pleaded by the petitioner are not within the knowledge of the Corporation and that the permission was accorded to the 2nd respondent in accordance with law. In her counter-affidavit, the 2nd respondent stated that the General Power of Attorney of the petitioner, who was constituted under registered document, dated 29.06.1982, conveyed the property by executing the relevant documents and possession was also delivered. The allegations as to forgery or illegality about the conveyance are denied. It is also alleged that the petitioner did not take any steps, as long as her GPA was alive. Heard Sri P.Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation and Sri A.Ravinder Reddy, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. The petitioner takes exception to the permission accorded by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd respondent. It is urged that the 1st respondent did not verify the existence of perfect title in the 2nd respondent before the permission was accorded. Section 209 of the Act placed an obligation on the 1st respondent to satisfy itself about the existence of title in favour of the applicant before permission is accorded. However, the level and extent of satisfaction would depend upon the facts of the relevant case. It cannot be said that a permission cannot be accorded, unless there existed a registered sale deed in favour of the applicant. For instance, if the property is devolved upon an applicant by way of succession, or a new house is sought to be constructed in the place of old one, the applicant cannot be expected to be in possession of a sale deed, or a registered document. Even where the title is claimed on the basis of transfer, there may be instances, where the applicant acquires valuable rights, though the perfect transfer in accordance with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, may not have taken place. In such cases, the resistance offered by the person in whom the prior title vested assumes significance. The acts and omissions referable to the owner become relevant. Further, mere grant of permission by a local authority does not amount to conferment of title. De hors the permission accorded in favour of a person, an aggrieved individual can approach a Court of law and assert title, apart from claiming the ancillary or consequential reliefs. The effort is only to drive home the point that the verification of title by a local authority before an applicant is accorded permission, cannot be equated to an exercise undertaken by a Court of law, in a suit for declaration of title. Even now, the petitioner can approach a civil Court and claim necessary reliefs, vis-à-vis the 2nd respondent. An occasion would arise for both the parties to put forward their respective contentions. Hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to work out her remedies in a civil Court. It is made clear that the permission accorded in favour of the 2nd respondent does not have any bearing upon the title, and it is subject to the outcome of the suit, in case the petitioner institutes the same. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. Dt.01-12-2009. GJ