:1: :1: :1: srp. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 4145 OF 2007. WRIT PETITION NO. 4145 OF 2007. WRIT PETITION NO. 4145 OF 2007. Madhav Parsharam Kale. ..Petitioner. V E R S U S Bank of Maharashtra & Others. ..Respondents. --- Mr. A. M. Joshi for the petitioner. CORAM: S.B.MHASE & A.A.KUMBHAKONI, JJ. CORAM: S.B.MHASE & A.A.KUMBHAKONI, JJ. CORAM: S.B.MHASE & A.A.KUMBHAKONI, JJ. DATE : April 28, 2008. DATE : April 28, 2008. DATE : April 28, 2008. P.C. P.C. P.C. . Heard Mr. A.M.Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner. He submits that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the Appellate Authority that the petitioner is responsible for the manipulation in the Challans are not correct. It is contended that charges have not been proved and the evidence is not sufficient for the said purpose. He tried to read some portion from the evidence in support of these contentions. 2. We find that sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence is not a ground to be considered in such a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Evidence supporting charges and findings is there. We can only look into the correctness of findings, if any perversity in the findings is pointed out. Such :2: :2: :2: perversity contemplates that absolutely there is no evidence and still the finding is recorded and/or evidence, though does not exist, has been read by the Enquiry Officer as if it exists and findings on that basis are recorded. No such perversity has been pointed out to us. In this regard we may rely on the following observations of the Supreme Court made in the judgment delivered in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council Apparel Export Promotion Council Apparel Export Promotion Council v/s. A. K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759, v/s. A. K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759, v/s. A. K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759, which read thus:- "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its :3: :3: :3: own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Singe Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v/s. Evans observed: "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court." 17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." 3. What we find is that the Bank has already taken a sympathetic view of the petitioner and has passed impugned order of compulsory retirement in-stead of an :4: :4: :4: order of dismissal when the misconduct of defalcation causing loss to the bank has been proved. Not only that, the Appellate Authority in its order has considered each and every ground raised by the petitioner and on the basis of the evidence which is very much on record has rejected the said grounds. The public money has been defalcated. In entertaining this petition our sympathy will be misplaced. We refrain ourselves from entertaining the petition. Therefore, petition is hereby rejected. (A.A.KUMBHAKONI, J.) (S.B.MHASE, J.) (A.A.KUMBHAKONI, J.) (S.B.MHASE, J.) (A.A.KUMBHAKONI, J.) (S.B.MHASE, J.) :2008/aak/..