W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 1 of 28 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI Judgment reserved on : 02.09.2008 + Judgment delivered on: 18.09.2008 % (1) W.P. (C) No. 9664/2007 Salahuddin Qureshi ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (2) W.P. (C) No. 9680/2007 Farid Qureshi ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (3) W.P. (C) No. 9681/2007 Kunta Devi ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 2 of 28 (4) W.P. (C) No. 9683/2007 Shahbuddin Qureshi ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (5) W.P. (C) No. 9684/2007 Anupam Dhir ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (6) W.P. (C) No. 4664/2008 Deputy Warden of Fisheries, Gujarat fishereies Central Co-op Association Ltd ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (7) W.P. (C) No. 6217/2008 Mrs. F.C.Batra ...Petitioner W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 3 of 28 Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (8) W.P. (C) No. 2830/2008 Sunil Kumar ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (9) W.P. (C) No2831/2008 Vishwa Lochan Madan ...Petitioner Through: In person versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (10) W.P. (C) No. 2832/2008 Fariduddin Qureshi ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 4 of 28 Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (11) W.P. (C) No. 2833/2008 M/s. G.K & Company ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (12) W.P. (C) No. 2835/2008 Smt. Kanchan Rajpal ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (13) W.P. (C) No.2836/2008 Gopal Krishan Dhir ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 5 of 28 (14) W.P. (C) No.3727/2008 Raj Kumar ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (15) W.P. (C) No. 3729/2008 Rajan Bhatia ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. (16) W.P. (C) No. 3914/2008 Inderjeet Singh Chadha ...Petitioner Through: Mr. Vishwa Lochan Madan, Advocate versus NDMC ...Respondent Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Ms. Kanika Agnihotri and Ms. Sidhi Arora, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 6 of 28 1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes 3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes in the Digest? VIPIN SANGHI, J. 1. In this batch of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a short and interesting question of law has been raised by the petitioners. The contention of the petitioners is that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 (P.P Act) does not apply to the premises belonging to the New Delhi Municipal Council (the Municipal Council), as such premises do not fall within the definition of “public premises” contained in Section 2 (e) of the P.P Act. It is urged that, consequently, the Estate Officer of the respondent Municipal Council has no jurisdiction to proceed to either evict the petitioners, who are occupying premises belonging to the Municipal Council, or to levy damages upon them by resort to the P.P. Act. 2. The petitioners have filed these petitions on account of issuance of orders of cancellation of the respective allotments made to them in Gole Market. In these cancellation orders the respondent Municipal Council has threatened the petitioners with action under Section 5 & 7 of the P.P Act. By orders passed in these petitions, the W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 7 of 28 proceedings before the Estate Officer in each of these cases have been permitted to go on. However, the Estate Officer has been restrained from passing final orders. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners have raised various other issues to impugn the cancellation of allotment. However, in case this Court comes to the conclusion that the P.P Act is applicable in respect of the premises belonging to the Municipal Council, and, therefore, the Estate Officer has jurisdiction, all other contentions could be raised by the petitioners before the Estate Officer. Consequently, the parties have neither addressed any other arguments in relation to the impugned cancellation orders, nor are being presently considered in this judgment. 3. Before articulating the submission of the petitioners in support of the aforesaid contention, it is necessary to take limited note of the transition of the relevant law. Earlier it was the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, which was made applicable to New Delhi. The New Delhi area was being administered by the New Delhi Municipal Committee (the NDMC) under the Punjab Municipal Act 1911. Chapter IX A was introduced into the Constitution of India by the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 w.e.f. 01.06.1993. This chapter deals with municipalities. The provisions of Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act 1992 were brought into force with effect from 1st June, 1993 and the laws governing municipalities all over the country W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 8 of 28 had to be harmonized in consonance with the provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution by 31st May, 1994. Consequently, an Ordinance was promulgated on 25th May, 1994 incorporating the Municipal Council. Due to increase in population and more areas falling in its jurisdiction, the Parliament considered it necessary to form the Municipal Council for New Delhi. The Parliament passed the New Delhi Municipal Council Bill and the same received the assent of the President on 14.07.1994. It came into force as the New Delhi Municipal Council Act 1994 (44 of 1994). In the aforesaid background the said Act 44 of 1994 was deemed to have come into force on 25.05.1994 by virtue of Section 1 (3) thereof. Consequently, from 25.05.1994 it is the Municipal Council and not the NDMC which has been in existence. The NDMC ceased to exist upon the constitution of Municipal Council w.e.f. 25.05.1994, by virtue of Section 416 of Act 44 of 1994. By that provision the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, as applicable to New Delhi ceased to have effect within New Delhi. 4. Soon after the enactment of Act 44 of 1994, the Parliament amended the P.P Act. Amongst the various amendments, one of the amendment was in relation to Section 2(e)(3) wherein the words “National Capital Territory of Delhi” were substituted for the words “Union Territory of Delhi” w.e.f. 01.06.1994. Clause (iii) was added to Section 2(e)(3) whereby any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 9 of 28 Government of any Union Territory was included within the ambit of “public premises” in the NCT of Delhi. The definition of the term “public premises” contained in the P.P Act, in relation to the National Capital Territory of Delhi after the aforesaid amendment reads as follows: “2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) …………………………….. (b) …………………………….. (c) …………………………….. (d) …………………………….. (e) "public premises" means-- (1) …………………………….. (2) …………………………….. (3) in relation to the [National Capital Territory of Delhi], - (i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee, (ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority;] [and] (iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or an behalf of any State Government or any Union Territory.” 5. The definition of the expression “Public Premises” is relevant, since it is only in respect of “Public Premises” that the Estate Officer has the jurisdiction to issue a notice to show cause against eviction under Section 4; to pass an eviction order under Section 5; or, impose W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 10 of 28 damages against the unauthorized occupants under Section 7 of the P.P. Act. 6. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. V.C. Madan is that even though the P.P Act was amended on 01.06.1994, that is after the formation of the Municipal Council and cessation of the NDMC, the Parliament continued to use the expression “Municipal Committee” and did not use or include the expression “Municipal Council” in Clause (i) of Section 2(e)(3) of the P.P Act. Since the NDMC had ceased to exist, and the Municipal Council had taken over from the NDMC, the omission to include the expression “Municipal Council” in addition to, or in substitution of “Municipal Committee” in Section 2(e)(3)(i) at the time of amendment of the P.P Act on 01.06.1994 results in ousting the premises belonging to the Municipal Council from within the definition of “Public Premises” under the P.P Act. Merely because the premises belonging the NDMC fell within the definition of “public premises” prior to the date of enforcement of Act 44 of 1994, it is argued that it does not follow that the premises belonging to the Municipal Council would get covered by the said definition as its successor organization. Learned counsel submits that even if the omission to include the premises belonging to “Municipal Council” within the definition of “public premises” is a case of casus omissus on the part of the legislature, the Court cannot, by resort to a process of interpretation supply the omission. He submits that it is the duty of W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 11 of 28 the Court to interpret the laws on the assumption that the Legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court should adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the Legislature. If there is a defect or omission in the words used by the Legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court would not add words to a Statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal meaning produces a intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of Act or add or amend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are there. For this proposition he relies on the Supreme Court decisions in AIR 2001 SC 2699 Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors. and AIR 1992 SC 96 Union of India v. Devki Nandan Aggarwal. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the use of the expression “means” while defining the expression “public premises” shows that the definition is exhaustive of what the said expression means, and nothing more can be added to it. He also submits that if there is any ambiguity in a statute which contains provisions which are penal in nature, or which subject the citizens of taxation, the same should be construed strictly against the State and in favour of the citizens. The purpose of the P.P. Act is to deprive the citizens of their right to contest eviction or levy of damages under the general civil law by subjecting them to a summary procedure. Therefore, the provisions of the P.P. Act should be strictly construed against the State and in favour of the subjects. W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 12 of 28 7. In response, learned counsel for the respondent Municipal Council, Ms. Madhu Tewatia, submits that the P.P Act does not contain a definition of the expression “Municipal Committee”. The expression “Municipal Committee” is, therefore, to be understood as it is used in the common parlance. For this proposition she relies on S. Samuel, M.D.Harrisons Malayalam & Anr. V. UOI & Others (2004) 1 SCC 256, which refers to principles of Statutory Interpretations by Justice G.P.Singh 8th Edition page 279. She advocates the use of a contextual interpretation of the expression “any municipal committee or notified area committee” as used in clause (i) of Section 2(e)(3) of the P.P Act and relies on Reserve Bank of India V. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.Ltd & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424 for that purpose. By placing reliance on the meanings ascribed the terms “Municipal” and “Committee” in dictionaries and on various decisions it is submitted that a “Municipal Committee” has to be understood as an institution constituted for the purpose of administering the local self- government in a defined area. Learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to various provisions of Act 44 of 1994 to submit that the Municipal Council is an institution of local self-government. It is argued that under Clause 2(ii) of Section 2(e) of the P.P Act, any corporation established by or under a Central Act the premises belonging, or taken on lease by or on behalf of any corporation established by or under a Central Act or owned or controlled by the Central Government is also defined to mean a public premises. However, from this category an W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 13 of 28 exception has been carved out in respect of a company defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act or a local authority. “Local authority” is not defined in the P.P Act. However, it is defined in the General Clauses Act to mean a “Municipal Committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund”. Consequently the premises belonging to a local municipal self-government organization such as the New Delhi Municipal Council is excluded by Clause 2(ii) from within the meaning of public premises. However, the Parliament, in relation to National Capital Territory of Delhi, has specifically included premises belonging to Municipal Corporation of Delhi or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee within the meaning of public premises. 8. The purpose of enacting the P.P. Act as stated in its Objects and Reasons is to provide a speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorized occupants of public premises. Definition of the expression “public premises” shows that the Parliament has given a very wide definition to the said expression. It covers within its sweep premises not only belonging to, but taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of Central Government. It also includes premises placed by the Central Government under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of the Secretariat of either House of W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 14 of 28 Parliament. Premises belonging to, taken on lease by or on behalf of a company wherein the Central Government is having 51% or more paid up share capital or a subsidiary thereof is also included within the meaning of public premises. Premises belonging to any corporation established by or under the Central Government which is owned or controlled by the Central Government is also covered by the said definition. From this category, a company defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act is excluded, since it is already covered under the immediately preceding category of companies wherein the Central Government has paid up capital of 51% or more. Premises belonging to a “local authority” are excluded from the aforesaid clause pertaining to Corporation. From the definition of the term “Local Authority” aforesaid, it is clear that premises belonging to a Municipality is not covered by Clause (2) of Section 2(e) within the meaning of a “public premises”. However, in respect of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, a specific provision has been made to say that any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or any Municipal Committee or Notified Area Committee shall be a “public premises”. The words “Municipal Committee” or “Notified Area Committee” are preceded by “or any”. If the expression “Municipal Committee” as used in the aforesaid provision only referred to NDMC, the said expression would not have been preceded by the word “any”. The use of the expression “any” before the expression “Municipal Committee or notified area committee” itself shows that the expression “Municipal W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 15 of 28 Committee” and “Notified Area Committee” have been used generally and the P.P Act itself postulates that there can be a plurality of Municipal Committee and Notified Area Committee in the NCT of Delhi. If the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that “Municipal Committee” only refers to the erstwhile New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) as it existed under the Punjab Municipal Act as extended to New Delhi, and that it does not include the Municipal Council, it would mean that the expression “any Municipal Committee or notified area committee” is a surplusage. It is not the case of the petitioner that there is any other body in NCT of Delhi, (apart from the Delhi Municipal Corporation, the Municipal Council and the Cantonment Board), which could be said to be a Municipal Committee within the meaning of that term as used in Section 2(e)(3)(i). It is the generally accepted principle of interpretation that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature. Words in a statute cannot be read as inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute (See Aswini Kumar Ghose V. Arbinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369). It is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application (See Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of U.P, AIR 1953 SC 394). The Court always presumes that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 16 of 28 statute should have effect (See J.K.Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co.Ltd V. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 1170). The Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain (See Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co. V. Vandry, AIR 1920 PC 181). The construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons (See Ghanshyamdas V. Regional Assistant Commercial, Sales Tax, AIR 1964 SL 766). 9. It is also a settled principle of judicial interpretation that when more than one expressions are used, the general words must be interpreted in the light of the specific words used in the same provision (see Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edition 2004 by Justice G.P. Singh, page 415 under the heading “Noscitur A Sociis”). The general words “Municipal Committee” or “Notified Area Committee” would, therefore, have to be understood in the light of the earlier used specific expression “Municipal Corporation of Delhi”. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi is undoubtedly a municipality, i.e. an institution constituted for self local government of the area falling within its jurisdiction. “Municipal Committee” and “Notified Area Committee” would also have to be seen in that light. The Parliament, while generally excluding “local authorities” from the application of the P.P Act, in relation to the NCT of Delhi (of which New Delhi area is a part), specifically made the P.P Act applicable to premises belonging to W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 17 of 28 the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and “any Municipal Committee or notified area committee”. This is clearly indicative of the intention of the Parliament not to exclude all local authorities from the application of the Act. In the context in which the expression “any Municipal Committee……” have been used, it also appears that the said expression would cover a municipality, which includes the Municipal Council. Why is it that the Parliament decided that, in respect of NCT of Delhi, the premises belonging to the Delhi Municipal Corporation or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee should be included within the ambit of “Public Premises”? The answer is that these are local self governmental bodies and it is in the larger public interest and in the interest of their efficient functioning that these bodies should be in a position to evict the unauthorized occupants and recover damages from them in relation to premises belonging to them in an expeditious manner by resort to a summary procedure. Viewed in this light, it is difficult to accept that the Municipal Council, which is also a Municipality like the MCD, should be left out of the ambit of the P.P Act. In Reserve Bank of India (supra), the Supreme Court observed “37. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 18 of 28 know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the Court construed the expression 'Prize Chit' in Srinivasa and we find no reason to depart from the Court's construction.” 10. Various State enactments dealing with the subject to eviction of unauthorized occupants have been produced by the petitioners. Pertinently, practically all of them have made the State enactments applicable to the local authorities within the States. There is no reason to exclude the Municipal Council from the applicability of the P.P. Act by an indirect and inferential manner of interpretation, and by ignoring the meaning of the terms and expressions used in the Statute. 11. Article 243P of the Constitution, inter alia, defines “Municipality” to mean “an institution of self-government constituted under Article 243Q”. Article 243Q states that there shall be W.P.(C) No.9664/2007 Page 19 of 28 constituted in every State, inter alia, “a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area” and “a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area”. Therefore, both a Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation are municipalities, constituted as institutions of self-government. The character and attributes of a Municipal Corporation and a Municipal Council are the same, and both are Municipalities, but the Constitution, for the purpose of distinguishing a larger municipality from a smaller one calls the former a Municipal Corporation and the