HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.CHANDRA KUMAR Crl.P.No.6220 of 20008 Dt: 30-04-2010 Between M. Venkatesh and others ………… Petitioners And Smt. Maraboina Manjula @ Kavita and others ………. Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.CHANDRA KUMAR Crl.P.No.6220 of 2008 ORDER: This Criminal Petition has been filed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in D.V.C.No.14 of 2008 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nizamabad. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The first respondent herein is the wife of the first petitioner herein and the second respondent herein is their daughter. The marriage of the first petitioner and the first respondent was performed on 03-04-2002. At the time of marriage an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- cash as dowry, two tulas of gold, silver and other household articles were presented. Though they lived happily for sometime, subsequently the petitioners started demanding the first respondent to bring additional dowry of Rs.50,000/-. Ultimately, the first respondent had lodged a police complaint on 23-02-2005 resulting in registration of a case in Crime No.42 of 2005 for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of IPC against the her husband and his family members i.e., petitioners 1 to 5 herein. The said case was subsequently registered as C.C.No.143 of 2006 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (Special Mobile Court). Nizamabad and the same is pending for trial. 3. The respondents 1 and 2 herein have also filed M.C.No.18 of 2005 and that an amount of Rs.500/- each was granted to them. It is also alleged that even after passing the orders in maintenance case, the petitioners are not paying the maintenance amount. It is alleged that the petitioners are troubling respondents 1 and 2, and the parents of the first respondent in one way or the other and making telephone calls threatening them to withdraw the criminal case filed under Section 498-A of IPC. They are also threatening that they would perform second marriage to the first petitioner. The telephone numbers, through which the phone calls are alleged to have been made, are mentioned in the petition. It is also alleged that the first petitioner had sent letters with obscene words to the first respondent. 4. The first respondent inter alia seeking certain reliefs i.e., injunction restraining the petitioners from alienating certain properties and a direction to the petitioners to pay Rs.10,000/- each to the respondents 1 and 2 towards monthly maintenance and an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- towards compensation for causing mental and physical torture etc., filed Domestic Violence Case against the petitioners. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the first respondent, with a view to harass all the family members of the first petitioner, filed this petition and no specific allegations have been made against each of the petitioners. It is also submitted that the definition of respondent, as defined under Section 2 (q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the Act’), envisages that a complaint under the said Act is maintainable only against any adult male person who is, or has been, in domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and therefore, the complaint against petitioners 3 and 6 is not maintainable. His further submission is that since the reliefs claimed by the respondents are mainly against the first petitioner, the proceedings in respect of the other petitioners are not maintainable. In support of his contention, he has relied on MOHAMMAD MAQEENUDDIN AHMED v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [1]. 6. The learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 submits that the definition under Section 2 (q) of the Act has been explained by a Divisions Bench of this Court in AFZALUNNISA BEGUM v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [2] and in view of the same, respondents 3 and 6 cannot take shelter under the said definition. It is also his submission that except the relief claimed under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Act, the respondents are entitled to seek other reliefs against all other petitioners. It is also his submission that pendency of a case under Section 498-A of IPC is not a ground to quash the proceedings. His further submission is that the questions of fact whether the property is the joint family property or not cannot be gone into in these proceedings. 7. In the light of the rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration are: 1. Whether only adult male persons can be shown as respondents under Section 2 (q) of the Act; and 2. Whether the respondents 1 and 2 can claim the reliefs against all the petitioners? 8. It is not in dispute that the first petitioner is the husband, second petitioner is the father-in-law, third petitioner is the mother-in- law and sixth petitioner is the sister-in-law of the first respondent. The second petitioner is the father, third petitioner is the mother and petitioners 4 and 5 are the brothers of the first petitioner. The seventh petitioner is an elderly person related to both the parties. Pendency of a case under Section 498-A of IPC and awarding of maintenance etc. are not in dispute. I n AFZALUNNISA BEGUM’s case (2 supra), this Court held that: “The definition of 'respondent' as defined under Section 2 (q) of the Act would clearly go to show that any adult male person can only be shown as respondent when the aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act. But the proviso, which has an expanded meaning, says that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner. The proviso deals with complaint against two categories of persons i.e., (1) a relative of the husband or (2) the male partner. If we restrict the meaning only to the male persons, a relative of the husband will become redundant. Further "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.” In view of the categorical finding of the Division Bench of this Court in the above referred decision, it is clear that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this point. 9. In AFZALUNNISA BEGUM’s case (2 supra), it was further held that: “The aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under Section 12 of the Act. It is the duty of the Protection Officer appointed under Section 8 to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions; to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate; to make an application in such form and in such manner as prescribed to the Magistrate and to ensure that the aggrieved person is provided legal aid under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 for availing the reliefs etc. Section 19 of the Act provides for disposal of applications made under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 by the Magistrate. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 19, the Magistrate can pass any order against a female person other than the orders under Clause (b). Whereas proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 19 puts a bar on the power of the Magistrate for passing an order against any person who is a woman under Section 19(1)(b). In other words, except residence order under Section 19(1)(b), it is competent for the Magistrate to pass orders against the relatives of the husband including a female person under Section 19(1)(c) i.e., restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides. If the property stands in the name of in-laws of the aggrieved" person divided among the joint family and a portion of which is in occupation of the respondent, the person in whose name the property stands i.e., the relatives of the respondent can also be restrained from dispossessing the person aggrieved or entering any portion of the shared household where the aggrieved person resides. Further under Sub-section (8) of Section 19, if an aggrieved person was provided with residential house towards her Stridhan, which is in occupation of the relatives of the husband, the Magistrate can direct the respondent including the female relative of the husband for return of the possession of Stridhan property or valuable security, namely, gold jewellery etc., which was in possession of the female member of the husband. Section 21 of the Act deals with grant of temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specifies necessary arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent. For instance, if the children are under the custody of mother-in-law of an aggrieved person, if we give a restricted meaning to Section 2(q), no such order can be passed for giving temporary custody of the child against a female relative of the husband i.e., father, mother who are residing jointly.” 10. Reliance is placed on KOTHAMASU NAGAVENKATA SURESH BABU v. KOTHAMASU SUNEETHA AND OTHERS [3], wherein it was held that: “The legal scenario presents the scope for multifariousness in reliefs and proceedings concerning the same rights and liabilities arising out of relationship by matrimony or by blood or by adoption and the grievance herein is against simultaneous prosecution of different proceedings in respect of the same sequence of events, but the same does not appear impermissible in law.” 11. I n K. RAMARAJU v. K.LAKSHMI PRATIMA AND ANOTHER [4], the petitioner therein contended that the DVC Act, 2005 is not applicable in case where the alleged offences took place prior to the date of coming into force of the said Act. The said contention was not accepted. 12. In MOHAMMAD MAQEENUDDIN AHMED’s case (1 supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the DVC was filed in 2006 and there was a partition on 03-09-2004 and the petitioners 2 to 11 therein were found to be living separately after the partition and in the above circumstances, it was held that they were no way concerned with the happenings between the first petitioner and the daughter of the second respondent (wife and husband) therein. From the facts of that case, it is clear that the same is distinguishable from the facts of the present case and hence not applicable. 13. In view of the above discussion, I hold that there are no grounds to quash the proceedings against the petitioners. 14. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. _____________________ B.CHANDRA KUMAR, J Date: 30-04-2010 YCR [1] 2007 (2) ALD 248 [2] 2009 92) ALD (Crl.) 155 (AP) [3] 2009 92) ALD (Crl.) 972 (AP) [4] 208 (2) ALD (Crl.) 1 (AP)