THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO.9311 OF 2010 ORDER: Heard Sri P.Srihari, Learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the GHMC. At their request the Writ Petition is disposed of at the stage of admission. The petitioner is a college and its name Board is exhibited on the entrance wall for identification by the students. The grievance of the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent has issued the impugned notice calling upon the petitioner to pay advertisement fee for the year 2009-2010 for having erected the said name board. The petitioner would contend that the name board erected is not a sky sign board or advertisement board and was put up only for the purpose of identification of the college by the students. While Sri P.Srihari, learned counsel for the petitioner, has put forth several contentions, including that the name board put up at the entrance of the college, does not amount to an advertisement enabling respondents 1 and 2 to charge the advertisement fee, I consider it wholly unnecessary to examine any of these contentions as the impugned notice is liable to be set aside on the short ground that the 3rd respondent could not have issued the said notice calling upon the petitioner to pay the advertisement fee demanded through cheques/demand drafts drawn in their favour. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by judgment dated 31.12.2009 in W.P.No.23354 of 2009 and batch, held that the power to demand a fee or tax is specifically vested with the Commissioner or any person authorized by him; such persons are naturally to be the officials of the Corporation itself; notices issued by an agency on behalf of the Corporation is contrary to law; Section 169 requires any amount received by the Corporation towards tax and fee to be credited to the consolidated fund of the Corporation; the permission accorded by the Corporation to collect the fee was totally opposed to the scheme of the Act; and the notice issued to the petitioners, requiring them to pay the fee through cheques/demand drafts in favour of the second respondent, was in clear violation of the specific provisions of the Act. The impugned notice was quashed as it did not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Act. Following the said judgment, the impugned demand notice is quashed as it does not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the first respondent from taking necessary action afresh in accordance with law. The Writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the said circumstances, without costs. ______________________________ (RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J) 23rd April, 2010 MRKR