1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Letters Patent Appeal No.446 of 2010 In Writ Petition No.2323 of 2010 (P) (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. The Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati, and others) And Letters Patent Appeal No.447 of 2010 In Writ Petition No.2195 of 2010 (P) (Smt. Saroj w/o Paramhansingh Thakur and another v. The Divisional Commissioner, Amravati, and others) Office Notes, Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions Court's or Judge's orders and Registrar's order In Letters Patent Appeal No.446 of 2010 in Writ Petition No.2323 of 2010 (P) : Shri Rohit Joshi, Advocate for Appellant. Shri A.M. Deshpande, AGP for Respondent No.1. Shri B.G. Kulkarni, Advocate for Respondent Nos.2 to 5. In Letters Patent Appeal No.447 of 2010 in Writ Petition No.2195 of 2010 (P) : Shri Z.A. Haq, Advocate for Appellants. Shri A.M. Deshpande, AGP for Respondent No.1. Shri Rohit Joshi, Advocate for Respondent No.2. Shri J.T. Laddha, Advocate for Respondent Nos.3 to 6. 2 Coram : D.K. Deshmukh & R.K. Deshpande, JJ. Dated : 16 th September, 2010 P.C. (Per D.K. Deshmukh, J.) : 1. Admit. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. By these appeals, the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 21-7-2010, thereby admitting Writ Petition Nos.2195 and 2323 of 2010, but refusing to grant interim relief, is challenged. 3. The brief facts are that there was a no objection certificate granted by the District Magistrate for setting up a petroleum retail outlet. An application/appeal was made before the Divisional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati, challenging the order granting no objection certificate. The Divisional Commissioner, by his order dated 28-4-2010, set aside that no objection certificate. Being aggrieved, the appellants have filed the above-referred two writ petitions challenging the order of the Divisional Commissioner. 3 4. The principal challenge to the order of the Divisional Commissioner is that the order has been passed without any authority of law. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 does not provide for an appeal against an order granting no objection certificate by the District Magistrate. Perusal of sub-rule (1) of Rule 154 of the said Rules shows that an appeal is provided only “against any order refusing to grant, amend or renew a licence cancelling or suspending a licence”. Thus against an order granting no objection certificate for setting up a petroleum retail outlet, an appeal, prima facie, does not appear to be tenable under Rule 154 of the said Rules. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the provisions of the said Rules and claimed that the order of the Divisional Commissioner can be justified under that provision. However, perusal of that provision, prima facie, shows that even if it is assumed that a no objection certificate granted by the District Magistrate can be cancelled without there being any fresh development or subsequent development, that power is vested 4 with the District Authority and the State Government. The Divisional Commissioner is not a District Authority. So far as the State Government is concerned, neither we have been pointed out any Rule or Act, which empowers the State Government or anybody else, which delegates the power to any authority of the State Government, nor we have been shown any actual delegation of power. Thus it is prima facie clear that the order of the Divisional Commissioner impugned in the petitions is without any authority of law. 6. The learned Single Judge has refused to grant interim relief on the ground that neither the Collector nor the Divisional Commissioner has looked into the opinion given by the Town Planning Authorities. The Collector/District Magistrate had passed an order granting no objection certificate. It was challenged before the Divisional Commissioner, who set aside the said order. We have already held that the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner is, prima facie, without any authority of law. In view of this, the question of taking into consideration the opinion given by the Town Planning Authorities objecting to the use of site for retail petrol outlet does not at all arise. Hence, the 5 reason for refusing to grant interim relief cannot be sustained. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants have stated before us that whatever they will do after this Court grants stay of the order impugned in the petitions, that will be at their own risk and they will not claim any equity on the basis of the interim order at the time of final hearing of the petitions. 8. In our opinion, therefore, the following order would meet the ends of justice. 9. The order impugned in the petitions is modified. The order of the learned Single Judge rejecting the prayer for interim relief is set aside. By way of interim order, the effect, operation and implementation of the order dated 28-4-2010 impugned in the above-referred two petitions, is stayed during the pendency of the said petitions, subject to the conditions that (1) the interim order will enure to the benefits of the appellants, (2) anything that the appellants will do or get pursuant to the interim order shall be subject to the result of the petitions, and (3) anything that the appellants will do will be at their own risk and they will not be 6 entitled to claim any equity on the basis of the interim order at the time of final hearing of the petitions. 10. In view of the above, the appeals stand disposed of. Judge Judge pdl