HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.12404 of 2000 ORDER: The petitioner joined the respondent-Corporation as a Junior Steno in February, 1986. He was promoted as a Senior Steno in February, 1988. He passed his M.Com., P.G.Diploma in Journalism, P.G.Diploma in Personnel Management, Diploma in Secretarial Practice in addition to possessing Shorthand higher and Typewriting higher. It is his grievance that, while he was entitled to be promoted as a Personal Assistant on completion of two years of service as a Senior Steno in the year 1990 (01.02.1990), he was subsequently promoted with effect from 01.02.1991. The rules, which then governed promotion to the post of Personal Assistant, prescribed that a person, who was a graduate and possessed additional qualifications of typewriting (higher), shorthand (higher) and a Diploma in Secretarial Practice, would be entitled for promotion to the said post on completion of two years of service as a Senior Steno. Those who possessed the qualification of graduation with typewriting (higher) and shorthand (higher), but without a Diploma in Secretarial Practice, were eligible to be promoted as Personal Assistants on completion of three years of service. The petitioner would contend that, while all his colleagues were promoted as Personal Assistants on completion of two years of service as Senior Stenos based on the Diploma in Secretarial Practice awarded by the Datamatics Institute of Management, Hyderabad, the petitioner was not extended the said benefit though he obtained a similar diploma from the very same institute, and was promoted only a year thereafter i.e. on completion of three years of service as a Senior Steno. In the counter affidavit, the respondent would submit that the Corporation had addressed a letter to the State Board of Technical Education seeking a clarification on the Diploma in Secretarial Practice issued by the Datamatics Institute of Management, Hyderabad, and was informed by letter dated 18.03.1997 that the said diploma was not recognized by the State Board of Technical Education; the Board of Directors of the respondent-Corporation in its meeting held on 25.05.2000, while disposing of the petitioner’s appeal, upheld the decision of Vice Chairman and Managing Director dated 28.02.1995 that the Diploma in Secretarial Practice obtained from the Datamatics Institute of Management, which was not affiliated to any University/recognized body, could not be made the basis for promotion and, since the petitioner had obtained the Diploma from the said institute, he was not entitled for promotion on the basis of the said diploma. The Board also noted that the criteria of insisting on a diploma being obtained from a recognised body had been uniformly followed since then. Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would question the denial of promotion to the petitioner as a Personal Assistant, with effect from 01.02.1990, on two grounds. Firstly, on the date when the petitioner was eligible for promotion, the extant rules did not require a diploma to be awarded by a recognised institute; and, secondly, all others, similarly situated as the petitioner, were extended the benefit of promotion as Personal Assistants on the basis of the very same Diploma in Secretarial Practice obtained from the Datamatics Institute of Management. On the other hand, Sri N.Subba Reddy, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation, would submit that a Diploma in Secretarial Practice awarded only by a recognized institution could be accepted; the mere fact that the rules did not specifically stipulate that a Diploma from a Recognized Institution alone would be accepted did not mean that a diploma issued by a “shop” or a “fly by night” institution necessitated acceptance for promotion as Personal Assistant; the mere fact certain others were promoted, either before or when the petitioner was eligible, did not confer any right on him to claim promotion as the illegality committed earlier cannot be perpetuated; the Corporation had been following this criteria ever since February, 1991; and had uniformly insisted on a Diploma from a Recognized Institution being obtained for being considered for promotion as a Personal Assistant on completion of two years of service as a Senior Stenographer. The contention that an ex post facto rule/instruction cannot be relied upon to deny promotion to the petitioner which he was entitled prior thereto, does not, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, merit acceptance. While persons who possess a bachelor degree with the qualification of typewriting (higher) and shorthand (higher) were entitled for promotion as Personal Assistants on completion of three years of service as a Senior Steno, the concession of one year service was given to those who, in additional to the above qualifications, possessed the qualification of a Diploma in Secretarial Practice. As a Diploma in Secretarial Practice awarded by a “shop” or a “bogus institution” or a “fly by night operator” or an institute not of requisite standard would not amount to a valid diploma, the Corporation would be well within its rights to promote only those who had obtained such a Diploma from a University or an institute affiliated to/recognized by the Board of Technical Education of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It is not even the petitioner’s case that the Datamatics Institute of Management, from where he obtained the Diploma in Secretarial Practice, was recognized prior to 1997 and was de- recognised thereafter. The letter addressed to the respondent- Corporation by the Secretary, State Board of Technical Education, Hyderabad, dated 18.03.1997 indicates that the said institute was never recognized by the State Board of Technical Education, and the respondent-Corporation was, therefore, justified in not extending the benefit of reduction of one year service for promotion to the post of Personal Assistant on the basis of the Diploma awarded by such an unrecognised institute. The first contention must, therefore, fail. On the plea of discrimination, it is not in dispute that several persons, both before, and around the time the petitioner was eligible for promotion, were extended the benefit of promotion based on the said diploma. The names of such persons, though mentioned in the writ affidavit, are not disputed in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. The contention urged by Sri N.Subba Reddy, Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent- Corporation, is that, even assuming that such persons were in fact promoted, it does not confer on the petitioner a right to claim a similar benefit since an earlier illegal act would not justify the Corporation resorting to another. I n Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh[1], the Supreme Court held :- “………We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal / unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again. The illegal / unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act / order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. It is not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the Court nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises)……..” It is necessary to note that all those persons who were given the benefit of promotion, based on the Diploma issued by the Datamatics Institute of Management, have not been arrayed as respondents in the Writ Petition and, in their absence, an enquiry as to the illegality of such promotion ought not to be gone into. Suffice to observe that the mere fact that such persons were promoted would not justify the plea of discrimination, nor for a claim that the petitioner be extended a similar benefit, since no mandamus can be issued to perpetuate an illegality. On both grounds, the relief as sought for cannot be granted. The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. RAMESH RANGANATHAN,J Date:26.08.2010 usd [1] AIR 1995 SC 705