IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR géx M/s. Paposa Engineering Works, Bhilai, Through Proprietor - Sumser Singh, S/o. La amn Sin, Aged abouT 54 year, PIQT No.100, Indusfr'ial EsTaTe Bhilai, Disfr‘ict Durg (C.6.) Smfe of ChhaTTisgarh, Through the Secrefary, Department of Industries, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur. The Director of Industries, Life Insurance Campus, Pondori, Raipur (C.G.) The Chief Managing Director, District Vyapar & Udyog Kendra, Durg (C.G.) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA WRIT PETITION £C) Nag ! /2008 PETITIONER I te Ch gh s VERSUS K HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR $7 WRIT PETITION (C) No. 5031 ofzoos ' . ‘1 , I 7- V I PETITIONER : M/s. Paposa Engineering Works, Bhilai. VERSUS - " RESPONDENTS State of Chhattlsgarh & Others WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA SB Hon’ble Shrl Satlsh K Agnlhotrl, J V Present: Shrl Arjun YadaV Advocate for the petltloner Shrl P K Bhadurl Panel Lawyer for the State/respondents ‘ ORDER ORAL (Passed on 18‘ day of November, 2010) 1. By-this netition; the petitioner impugns the first order dated 26.11.2002 (Annexure P/3), passed by the General Manager, District Commerce & Industries Center, Durg, Whereunder ‘it is hrovided that pursuant to the lease: deed dated 12.03.1981; i executed on 03.04.1981, the petitioner was required to commence the productlon on the plot granted under the lease deed w1th1n a I ' period of one year as per clause 3 and 18 of the lease deed Thereaner a notlce was 1ssued but nothlng could happen and accordingly, the lease deed granted 1n favour of the petltioner for allotment of the plot for Industrial purpose, was cancelled.’ Thereagainst, the petitioner preferred an appeal t0 the State Government. The State Govemment, by order dated 112.6.2007 (Annexure P/2),‘ confirming the findings recorded by the respondent No. ‘3, dismissed the appeal. The petitioner again moved an application for reconsideration of the ‘order dated 12.6.2007 but the same was also rejected on 02.02.2008 (Annexure P/l) by the State Government statinggthat the petitioner may; ‘approach the appropriate forum/Court. Thus, this petition (E3 impugning the orders dated 26.11.2002 (Annexure P/3),’ gg 12.06.2007 (Annexure P/2) and 02.02.2008 (Annexure P/l), on several grounds. The impugned orders are based on the lease deed dated 03.04.1981 but the petitioner has failed to produce a copy of the lease deed, except the amendment to the lease deed dated 31.03.2000 (Annexure P/4), wherunder in para 4, 4(a) to 4G) have been added. It appears that there was no change in clause 3 and 18 of the original lease deed executed on 03.04.198 l. The Supreme Court, in Rani Laxmibai Kshetrz‘ya Gramz'n Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor & Others] , observed as under “8. . .It is too well settled that the petitioner who approaches the court invoking the extraordinary urisdiction of the court under Article 226 must fully aver and establish his rights flowing from he bundle of facts thereby ‘ requiring the res ondent to indicate its stand either by denial or y positive assertions. But in the absence of ny averments in the writ petition or even in the. rejoinder-affidavit, it is not permissible for a ourt to arrlve at a conclus1on on a factual position merely on the basis of submissions ade in the course of hearing.” 4. In VKMajotra v. Union oflndid '& Othersz, the Supreme Court observed as under: “8...The writ courts wou be well avised to decide the etitions on the oints raised in the etition an if in a rare case eeping in view the acts and circumstances of the case any additional points are to be raised then the concerned and affected parties should be ut to notice on the additional points to satis the i principles of natural ‘ustice. Parties cannot be taken by surprise. e le'ave the. discussion here.” 5. In B.S.N.Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. & 0thers3, it was observed as under: “37. Before we emar upon the res ectiv contentions made before us on the sai issue, ; l (.1998) 7 scc 469 . 2 (2003) 8 Scc 40 3 (2006) 11 scc 54s 2 : j t a c m ld d bk e we may notice that althou the point was urged during hearing before e High Court, th first respondent in Its writ a‘ plication did not raise any plea in that behal . The High Court was not correct in allowing the first responden to raise the said contention. (See Chlmajirao Kanhojirao Shirke V. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd., SCC at p.625.)” 6. Further, in Raj Kuma'r Soni & Another v. State of UK, the Supreme Court he as under: ld “l 1....It is a fundamental principle of law that a person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands and must make a full and complete disclosure of facts to the Court. Parties are not entitled to choose their own facts to put forward before the Court. The foundational facts are required to be pleaded enabling the Court to scrutinise the nature and content of the right alleged to have been violated by the authority.” :/\;¢:\_..A m Despite several opportunities granted to the petitioner to file original lease deed executed on 03.04.1981 to adjudicate upon the dispute as the original lease deed is the basis of the entire dispute, the petitioner failed to supply a copy of the same. Thus, for want of ' most important and‘ relevant material, it is not possibe to adjudicate upon the dispute as even otherwise, the [finding of facts have been recorded by the first authority and thereafter confirmed by the State overnment. Aplying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the case and for the reasons ’stated hereinabove, the writ petition is d dismisse. f QSatish K. Agnihotri Judge f\% i, Sd/- t /; " ,,‘\ e t : l G p