IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND FOUR PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE A.GOPAL REDDY WRIT PETITION NO : 23183 of 1999 Between: G.Rama Sharma S/o G.Dattatreya, aged about 48 years Occ: Advocate, resident of 401, United Enclave, Begumpet, Hyderabad. ..... PETITIONER AND 1. Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Secretary, Department of Legislative Affairs & Justice, Secretariat Hyderabad. 2. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Registrar (Vigilance), Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order or Direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring notification in G.O.Ms.No.55, Law (LA & J. Cts. C1) Department dt. 7-4-1999 issued by the first respondent dismissing the petitioner form judicial service as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of Arts. 14,16 and 311 of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondents 1 and 2 to accept the resignation submitted by the petitioner on 26-10-1996. For the Petitioner:PARTY-IN-PERSON For the Respondent No.1: G.P. for Home (Courts) For the Respondent No.2: MR.C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, Standing Counsel for HC The Court made the following : THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.GOPAL REDDY WP No.23183/1999 ORDER The writ petition was initially heard by learned Division Bench of this court comprising of Honourable Sri Justice S.R.Nayak and Honourable Sri Justice L.Narasimha Reddy and the learned Judges of the Division Bench have gone into the matter in great detail and rendered two separate erudite judgments by elaborately recording two conflicting opinions with regard to the dismissal of a Judicial Officer through G.O.Ms.No.55 Law (LA&J, Cts.CI) Department dt. 7-4-1999. Justice S.R.Nayak after elaborately noticing the facts upheld the dismissal of the petitioner holding that a fair procedure has been followed by the Enquiry Officer while conducting the disciplinary enquiry and findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as accepted by the High Court is based on substantive legal evidence and there is no failure of justice, holding so dismissed the writ petition. But, however dealing with the same question, Justice L.Narasimha Reddy held that there was denial of fair play and Enquiry Officer violated principles of natural justice by not furnishing necessary documents. Further the learned Judge after going through the evidence held that the irregularities as pointed out in the charges cannot be sustainable and findings of the Enquiry Officer cannot be accepted. Consequently, impugned GO dismissing the petitioner from judicial service held to be not sustainable and allowed the writ petition with a direction that since the petitioner had submitted an application for voluntary retirement which was pending by the time the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, it shall be open for the respondents to take such decision as they deem fit on the application submitted with leave and liberty to initiate any proceedings against the petitioners with reference to the allegations made against him, if there is any other independent material. In view of the conflicting opinions on the question raised in the writ petition, the Division Bench directed that the matter has to be referred to another learned Judge and directed the Registry to place the matter before the Honourable the Chief Justice for posting the matter before a third judge for his opinion. In view of placing the matter before the Honourable Chief Justice A.R.Lakshmanan (as he then was) posted the matter before him initially and on his elevation, the Chief Justice directed the matter to be posted before me. In view of the same, I shall now make an endeavour to deal with the matter separately and attempt to determine the controversy independently. The facts in nutshell are as under: The petitioner while serving as Subordinate Judge (now re-designated as Senior Civil Judge), Narasaraopet was served with a charge memo dt. 10- 9-1997 by the Enquiry Officer, namely, V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, who was appointed by the High Court vide its orders dt. 21-3-1997, whereunder High Court ordered to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner in respect of awards passed by him in land acquisition matters relating to acquisition of lands submerged due to construction of Priyadarshini Jurala Project, while working as Subordinate Judge, Gadwal. Before issuance of charge memo, the High Court by its order dt. 21-12-1996 placed the petitioner under suspension in contemplation of the disciplinary enquiry and in public interest with immediate effect, who was at that time on leave. The petitioner received the transfer orders on 9-4-1996 and got relieved at Gadwal on 11-4-1996 and reported for duty at Narasaraopet. While working at Narasaraopet, he applied for leave with effect from 1-8-1996 to 31-8-1996 and subsequently extended the leave upto 31-1- 1997. In the interregnum, the petitioner submitted his resignation to the post on 26-10-1996 when he was on leave. While said resignation was pending consideration of the High Court, the Youth Association of Gadwal addressed a letter/complaint on 12-12-1996 to the Honourable the Chief Justice alleging that certain irregularities have taken place in the matter of awarding compensation to the lands acquired for the market committee of Gadwal. A few days thereafter two learned Judges of this court addressed letter dt. 25-12- 1996 to the Chief Justice stating that they heard and disposed of several land acquisition appeals relating to acquisition of lands for Priyadarshini Jurala Project, construction of camp office of that project in Gadwal Municipality and establishment of Industrial Development area and they noticed certain irregularities committed by the Sub-Judge, Gadwal, who dealt with the matters. In view of the above two letters, the High Court initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and placed him under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed CC (SR) No.77573 of 1996 impleading the Registrar (Vigilance) by name, which lead to issuance of an order dt. 21-3-1997 to the effect that the act of the petitioner in filing contempt case impleading the Registrar (Vigilance) by name will constitute an act of misconduct and enquiry ordered under proceedings dt. 27-12- 1996 will cover this aspect also. On the basis proceedings of the High Court dt. 27-12-1996 and 21-3-1997, the Enquiry Officer framed as many as 28 charges through his proceedings dt. 10-9-1997, which have been extracted in detail in the judgment of Justice S.R.Nayak and I do not propose to reproduce the same once again. Not being satisfied with the explanation dt. 25-9-1997 offered by the petitioner on 26-9-1997, the High Court directed the Enquiry Officer to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer issued summons to Chief Ministerial Officer, Sub-Court, Gadwal, Mr. A.Rajaiah, Subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar who was appointed as the Presenting Officer by the High Court and also to the delinquent Officer fixing the enquiry on 6-12-1997. On 6- 12-1997 Chief Ministerial Officer was examined as P.W.1 and through him Exs.A-1 to A-27 were marked with the consent of the petitioner-delinquent officer. The petitioner in spite of giving an opportunity has not chosen to cross-examine P.W.1. But immediately after evidence of P.W.1 was recorded, he submitted written arguments/additional written statement. Subsequently, the petitioner sent a copy of his transfer order dt. 3-4-1996 transferring him from Gadwal to Narasaraopet, which is marked as Ex.B-1 and a sheet containing news items dt. 25-10-1997 and 18-9-1997 published in A.P. Times and Deccan Chronicle respectively, which was marked as Ex.B-2. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed before him, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dt. 27-1- 1998, whereunder he held that all the charges framed against the petitioner are proved. On receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer, and on independent consideration of the evidence let in the regular departmental enquiry the High Court came to the conclusion that charges 1,12,16, 17 and 24 are not proved against the delinquent officer and as regards other charges, the High Court concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Accordingly, the High Court through its Registrar (Vigilance) issued show cause notice dt. 19-3-1998 to the petitioner-delinquent proposing to impose the penalty of dismissal from service as a disciplinary measure, which was received by the petitioner on 21-3-1998, to which he submitted his reply on 26-3-1998. The High Court on consideration of the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice and not being satisfied with the same, recommended to the Government to impose the penalty of dismissal from service as a disciplinary measure for the proven misconduct. Accepting the recommendation of the High Court, the Government issued G.O. Ms.No.55 dt. 7-4-1999 dismissing the petitioner from service by virtue of the power conferred upon it under cl.(x) of Rule 9 of A.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1963. Questioning the same, the present writ petition has been filed seeking a Writ of Mandamus declaring the notification issued in G.O.Ms.No.55 dt. 7-4-1999 by the Govt., of Andhra Pradesh dismissing the petitioner form judicial service as illegal and for a consequential direction to the Government and High Court to accept the resignation submitted by the petitioner on 26-10-1996 and for appropriate reliefs. The petitioner, appeared party-in-person, argued his case and filed written arguments on 5- 7-2004. The substratum of the submissions made by the petitioner are that the Enquiry Officer who framed 28 charges without mentioning basis for the said charges are vague and do not contain any details of alleged misconduct, collected 22 draft judgments in LAOPs, and formed an opinion after reading the said judgments and submitted a report holding that all 28 charges are proved. None were examined in connection with the charges. Thus, the very framing of charges is without any basis, much less supported by any legally acceptable evidence. The basis for initiation of the enquiry is the purported letter written by the learned Judges of this court dt. 25-12-1996, who heard the appeal AS No.1546/95 arising out of OP No.467/87, apart from letter dt. 12-12-1996 said to have been submitted by Youth Association, Gadwal addressed to the High Court. Non supply of said documents, which is the basis for framing of charges and for enabling the petitioner to submit his explanation will amount to violation of principles of natural justice and entire enquiry is vitiated as held by the Apex Court in STATE OF UP V. SHATRUGHAN LAL. Since the disciplinary authority held that charge Nos.1,12,16, 17 and 24 are not proved and further observed that charge No.24 is repetition of charge No.12, remaining charges relate to fixation of market value of the acquired land by taking into consideration the sale deeds of smaller extents is if erroneous, the same can be corrected in appeal but cannot be subjected to disciplinary action. In the absence of any evidence with regard to extraneous or irrelevant consideration while delivering said judgments, presumption drawn by the Enquiry Officer is nothing but ipsi dixit is erroneous. Mere marking of draft judgments is not sufficient and in the absence of any evidence touching upon the charges, judgments marked as documents does not establish any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the petitioner, and misconduct cannot the presumed as held by the Apex Court in SHER BAHADUR V. UNION OF INDIA. The Enquiry Officer has not collected any statement from any of the claimants nor advocates who appeared in LAOPs or staff of land acquisition officer. When it was brought to the notice in the written arguments that some judgments were upheld by the High Court, the Enquiry Officer stated that the petitioner has not followed settled norms of judicial precedents without specifically quoting the judgments, therefore there is no acceptable evidence to support the said conclusion and the same is perverse. On the date of oral enquiry, the then Superintendent of Court of Subordinate Judge alone was examined as P.W.1 and through him Exs.A-1 to A-27 were marked, is neither competent nor capable of giving evidence touching the integrity and honesty of the petitioner as he was not the Superintendent at the relevant time when the petitioner worked as Subordinate Judge at Gadwal. When the Enquiry Officer admitted that most of the records are not available, framing of charges are biased one, which is contrary to law declared by this court in K.DAVID WILSON V. SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT. The petitioner tried to justify his awarding compensation under Exs.A-1 to A-27 in the light of law declared by the Apex Court in CHIMANLAL V. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,POONA and CHADA DHARMAPAL REDDY V. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER-CUM-LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, MIRYALAGUDA contended that though award consists of large extents, batch of LAOPs numbering 50 to 100 were decided by common order, wherein small extents of individual claimants land form part of acquisition. In view of the same, fixation of compensation on yardage basis of topography, geographical location, potential of the land, and assessment of market value was in consonance with the guidelines laid down by the High Court in LAND ACQAUISITION OFFICER v. CH.PANDARI and VEERABHADRA RAO V. LAO as well as Supreme Court in SMT.LILA GHOSH (D) THR. LR. SHRI TAPAS CHANDRA ROY V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL. In view of the same, findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer as accepted by the High Court that the judgments rendered by the petitioner were for extraneous and irrelevant considerations is not sustainable. Per contra, Sri C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the second respondent- High Court while supporting the disciplinary action initiated against the petitioner reiterated the very same contentions which were raised by him before the Division Bench, which are incorporated in para 4 of the judgment. He further contends that no distinction can be drawn between the judicial and quasi judicial function for initiation of disciplinary proceedings obviously referring to the findings arrived by the learned Judges who rendered separate judgments. When the petitioner received charge memo attributing misconduct, he has not requested for supply of any of the documents for the purpose of preparing effective explanation nor made a request permitting him to go through the said records, it is not open for him to contend that there is violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner who participated in oral enquiry on the notified date when P.W.1 was examined and through him judgments were marked has not even cross-examined him. In spite of indicating to the counsel on either side that the third Judge is not sitting in appeal on either of the judgments, learned Standing Counsel for the second respondent by referring to the findings of one of the learned Judges contends that learned Judge travelled beyond the judicial parameters, which is not the stand taken by the petitioner-delinquent in coming to the conclusion that findings of the enquiry officer is perverse and not sustainable and placed reliance on the judgments cited before the Division Bench. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to have a glance over the parameters of the judicial review in the matter of disciplinary enquiry conducted. The Apex Court in LALIT POPLI V. CANARA BANK after placing reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in B.C. CHATURVEDI V. UNION OF INDIA AND R.S.SAINI V. STATE OF PUNJAB held as under: “WHILE exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority” The Supreme Court in R.S.Saini (11 supra) while considering the scope of interference observed at paras 16 and 17 as follows: “16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings. "17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard." The Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA V. SARDAR BAHADUR held as follows: “ A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings, with the respondent was one which reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. The Supreme Court in GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU V. A. RAJAPANDIAN where the Administrative Tribunal has not found any fault with the proceedings conducted by the inquiring authority, held that it had no jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and set aside the order of dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove the charges. In CHATURVEDI’S case, the Supreme Court exhaustively dealt with the scope of judicial review in departmental proceedings in paras 12 and13, which read as under: ”Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice be complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.” “THE disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 : (AIR 1964 SC 364), this Court held that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. In the light of parameters of judicial review of disciplinary action carved out by the Supreme Court, I have to now deal with the contentions advanced by the petitioner who extensively taken me to the charges and findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer as affirmed by the disciplinary authority, which can be conveniently divided into four categories. 1. Charges 3, 8, 9 , 11, 19, 20, 21,22, 23 and 25 relate to awarding of compensation on yardage basis for the larger extents of land by taking sale deeds of smaller extents in all ranging below 300 sq.yards and in one case it is 50 cents. 2. Charges 7, 10, 13 to 18 relate to the cases where sale deeds of smaller extents were formed basis for fixation of compensation to the large extents acquired. 3. Charges 4, 5 and 6 relate to the cases where uniform rates were awarded to the various categories. 4. Charges 1, 2, 12 and 24 relate to the cases, which were heard, and judgments delivered after transfer orders. The submissions made by the petitioner can be briefly divided into three points: 1. Charges as framed are without any basis and are vague and not supported by legally acceptable evidence. 2. Since basis for initiation of disciplinary proceedings are two letters, one addressed by the learned Judges of this court dt.25-12-1996 and another letter said to have been addressed by the Youth Association, Gadwal to the Honourable Chief Justice, non supply of said documents will amount to violation of principles of natural justice. 3. The allegations levelled against the petitioner relate to his discharge of judicial functions different from quasi judicial functions cannot be termed as misconduct, which are capable of correction on further appeal and do not warrant initiation of disciplinary action. It is appropriate to deal with the third submission firstly and if the same is answered affirmatively, it is unnecessary to go into other submissions. Petitioner relying on the observation made in one of the judgment that High Court in AS No.1546/95 has not attributed any motives against him in enhancing the compensation on yardage basis, would contend that imputing motives to the petitioner in awarding compensation on yardage basis without there being any evidence will amount to sitting in appeal against the judicial order passed by the petitioner and letter so written by the learned Judges cannot form basis for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The above submission made by the petitioner has to be judged in the light of the observations made by the