IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE NINETEENTH DAY OF November TWO THOUSAND AND TEN PRESENT HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4915 of 2010 Between: A.Srinivasa Rao … Petitioner And N.Satyanarayana and others … Respondents This Court made the following: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4915 OF 2010 ORDER:- The revision is directed against the order in I.A.No.695 of 2010 in O.S.No.11 of 2005 on the file of I Additional District Judge’s Court at Nalgonda, dated 12.08.2010. 2. The application was filed by the 2nd defendant to condone the delay of 18 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree and in the affidavit filed in support of the application, he stated that the delay occurred as he came to know of the ex parte decree only on 16.04.2010 and hence filed the application immediately on 19.04.2010. In the counter filed by the 1st respondent/plaintiff, the claim about the existence of a sufficient reason for condoning the delay was disputed. 3. However, on 12.08.2010, as the 3rd respondent to the application/3rd defendant in the suit reported to be having no counter, the learned Judge recorded that the matter was heard and straight away allowed the petition. 4. The 1st respondent/plaintiff is before this Court with this revision complaining against not recording the submissions made by him. The plaintiff complained that the impugned order is not a speaking order in spite of hearing the arguments advanced by the counsel for the revision petitioner and desired the impugned order to be reversed. 5. Heard Sri A.K.Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri P.Gangaiah Naidu, learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent/2nd defendant. Notice before admission ordered to the 2nd and 3rd respondents was not returned and they did not enter appearance. But as the question in controversy herein is confined only to the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant, the matter is being disposed of on merits with consent. 6. The point for consideration is whether the impugned order is unsustainable in law? 7. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “the Act”) enables admission of any application under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 even after the prescribed period of limitation, if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period of limitation. The applicant satisfying the court about the existence of a sufficient cause for the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation is thus a pre-condition for exercise of the judicial discretion to extend the prescribed period of limitation under Section 5 of the Act. 8. Though Section 5 of the Act has been uniformly interpreted to be susceptible for liberal interpretation regarding the existence of sufficient cause for condoning the delay in order to enable the Court to determine the cause before it on merits rather than on technicalities, any such liberality cannot altogether dispense with the application of mind by the Court about the applicant projecting a sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period of limitation. 9. In the present case, while the applicant alleged a cause to be the reason for the delay, the opposing plaintiff denied the truth or sufficiency of the same and the trial court is duty bound to apply its mind to the rival contentions and come to an appropriate conclusion on the probabilities arising out of the material on record before it. Instead, it straightaway recorded the absence of a counter for a co-defendant and allowed the application after hearing, which is patently a case of failure to apply its mind to the requirements of Section 5 of the Act. The impugned order has to, therefore, be reversed and the matter has to be remitted back for determination on merits. 10. However, such reversal shall have no bearing on the determination of the application on merits and the manner in which the issue of existence of sufficient cause has to be approached by the trial court under Section 5 of the Act liberally, is in no way diluted by the present order. Hence, irrespective of any of the observations made herein, the trial court shall determine the said application on merits in accordance with law. 11. Accordingly, the order in I.A.No.695 of 2010 in O.S.No.11 of 2005 on the file of I Additional District Judge’s Court at Nalgonda, dated 12.08.2010, is set aside and the said I.A.No.695 of 2010 is remitted back to the said court for determination on merits in accordance with law. 12. The Civil Revision Petition is ordered, accordingly, without costs. ______________________ G.BHAVANI PRASAD, J 19th November 2010 lmv