AP^ ^ HIGH COURt OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPU±<: Applicant Non-appjicants AppUcant Non-aBDlicants M.C.C.NO. 526 OF 2007 Versus M/s Bharat Peta-oleum CorporatiA Limited Khatanand alias K. Anand Saraf, Son of Late Shri Tularam Saraf. And M.C.C.NO. 533 OF 2007 Versus M/ s Antulal and Sons Khatanand alias K. Anand Saraf ORDER POST ON I?FEBftUARY y^S<- Sd/- Bbirendra Mishra Judge ^ •af. HIGH COURTOF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR M.C.C.NO. 526 OF2007 -<; ^ And M.C.C.NO. 533 OF 2007 Present: Mr. Manindra Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate with Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, Advocate for the applicants; Mr. O.P. Yadav, Advocate for respondents No. 1 85 3. Mr. D.P. Saraf, resppndent No.2, present inperson. Applicant M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited through its Chairman, Bharat Bhawan, 4 and 6, Kareem Bhai Road, Bellad Estate, Mumbai 400 001. Versus Non-applicants 1. Khatanand alias K. Anand Saraf, Son ofLate Shri TularamSaraf. 2. Dharam Prakash Saraf, Son of Shri Khatanand Saraf. 3. Satya Prakash Saraf, Son of Shri Khatanand Saraf. Present address QfRespondentNo. 2 and 3 Quarter No.E-22, 15, Block Korba, District Korba (Chhattisgarh). All residents of Kilaward, Juna Bilaspur, Tehsit and Dista-ict Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) i .ApBlicant M/s Antulal and Sons Dealer, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited at Tifra, Bilaspur, Tahsil and Districf Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) Versus Non-appUcants 1. Khatanand alias K. Anand Saraf, Son ofLate ShriTularam Saraf. 2. Dharam Prakash Saraf, Son of Shri Khatanand Saraf. ••\ '• 3. Satya Prakash Saraf, Son of Shri Khatanand Saraf. Present address of Non-Applicants No. 2 and 3 Quarter No.E-22, 15, Block Korba, District Korb& (ChhattSgarh):. AU residents of Kilaward', Juna Bilaspyr, Tehsil and District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) . 4. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited through its Chairman, Bharat Bhawan, 4 and 6, Kareem Bhai Road, Bellad Estate.Mumbai 400 001. ^e ORDER (Passed on|S'T''ebruary 2008) Dhirendra Mishra, J By this common orderM.C.C.No. 526/07 and M.C.C.No. 533/07 filed by the applicants for grant of additional time of one year for handingover vacant possession of the suit land to the non-applicants, are being disposed ofas this Court vide judgment and decree dated 7th August 2007 dismissing Secpnd Appeal No. 16/2006 haddirectedthe applicant ofM.C.C. No.526/07 to hand over vacant possession ofthe suit land within a period of sfac months and the applicant of M.C.C.No. 533/07 is operating the retail outlet frpm the suit land as agent of Bharat Pefa-oleum Corporation. 2. It has been averred in the petition that theland for establishing new retail outlet has already been chosen anid lease agreement has been executed with the owner oftheland. 'No Obje^ction Certificate' for i establishuig retail outlet at new site has been Obtamed and approval from the Department of Explosive, Agra has also been taken for construction of retail outlet at new site. Tenders for construction of eivil work of resitement have already been finalized, the same has been sent for approval and approval is expected by the first week of Deceniber 2007. After getting approval the cdnstruction work shall be cotnmenced forthwith. The time required for consfa-uction and ;1 installment of the petrpl pump/retail outlet has been detailed in paragraph-8 of the petition arid aGcordingly, extension of additional period of one year for resiteinent of the present petrol pump has been prayed for. The applicants have also annexed the documents to demonsfrate that the applicants/judgment debtor have pemmenced the work of resitement and have already initiated" necessaiy' steps for the same. : •^ •'. . • . . . , . .'•':•• 3. The non-applicants in their rep\y hswe not specilically disputed , the claim of the applicants that they have already coinmenced the work of construction of retail outlet at new site and that they have initiated various steps necessary for ,the same. However, they have taken an objection that sufficient time was allowed to the applicants emd the decree cannot be modified. It has been further objected that there is no provision in the Code pf Civil Procedure (for brevity *the Code') of filing such application for extension of time for vacating the. "-• premises and both these applications are not maintainable for want ol specific provisions urider the Code. The Court becoines ^/unctus officio after final adjudication of the secorid appeal and the only remedy available to the applicants was to prefer an appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The provisions ofOrder 47 ofSection 151 ofthe Code are not applicable in the present case as the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code can be exercised only iri the pending matters and not in a decided Suit. Varioys other objections have been taken by the npn-appliGants in their ^reply, however, the same being unnecessary and out of context, are not conSidered. 4. The shortquestionforconsiderationoftheinstantapplica.tions is - (i) whether the instant applications fpr extension of time to vacate the suit landare maintainable?, and (ul'whether the reasons assigned by the applicants for grant of one year's further time for handing over possessionofthe suitland, arejustified? | 5. In .the matters of Mahanth Ram. Dcls Vs. Ganaa Das1 the appeal preferred by the plaintiff was decided in his favour on the condition that he paid the court-fee on the amended relief of possession of the property ihvolved in the suit and the plaintiff was granted three months' time to pay the court-fee for the trial CQUrt as also for the High Court. It was further obseryed that if the amount is ii not paid withittthe time given, the appeal shallstand dismissed and if the court-fee is paid within time, the appeal will be allowed with cost and the suit of the plaintiff will stand decreed with cost. Since the appellant was not able to fmd money, he filed an applicadon for extension of time for paying the balance of the court-fee and fhe same was rejected with an observation that the proper remedy wa&jevigw. Thereafter, a petition under Section 151 read with Order 47^Rule 1 of the Code wasagain filed assighing the reason for not beingable to pay the deficit Gourt-fee within the period allowed. However, the above petition was also dismissed with an pbservation that thesaid application did not fall within the Order 47 Rule 1 Qf the Code and Section 148 or 149 ofthe Code apply only to the cases, which were not finally disposed of, and time could be exfended only before the final order was actually made. The request to extend the time under the inherent powers ofthe Court was also rejected for the same reason. L. The Hon'ble Supreme Coyrt allowing the civil appeal of the plaintiff/appellant in paragraph-5 of the judgment observed that "Section 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired and Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the tiffle had not actually expired. That, the application was filed in the yacation when a Diyision Bench was not sitting, should have been considered in dealing with it even on July 13, 1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the originaljudgment, would have operated from July 8, 1954. How yndesirable it is fo fix time peremptQrily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders tum out, often enough to be iriexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put theniselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, cbmpletely estop a Court from taking note ofevents and circumstances which happen within the time fixed." Later 6n, it has further observed thus; "we are of the opinion that in fhis ease the Court could have exercised its powers lirst on July 13, 1954, when the pedtion filed within tiine was before it, and again under the exercise of its inherent powers, when the two petitiohs under S. 151 ofthe Code were filed. If fhe High Court had felt disposed to take action on any pfthese occasions, Ss. 148 and 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable sympathy, but to whose aid it erroneously felt unable to come". - ^ .•S-'-'-N--^ 6. In the matter of SIanohcir LctlChopra Vs. Rdi Beiheidur Rcio Raia Seth Hiralal2 eonsidering the,scope of Section 151 of the Code, it has been held that "Section 151 itself says that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to liait or otherwise affect the inhererit power 6f the Court to make orders necessary for the eftds 6f justice. In the fact of sueh a clear statement, it is not possible t6 hold that the provisions of the Code Gontrol the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do jusdce between the parties before it". 7. In the matter of M/s Jtam Chand^nd Sons Sugar Mills Private Ltd Barabanki (U.P.) V. KanhafialQlBhargava and others 3 also it has been held that "the inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Civil Procedure Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or conies into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary iniplication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary iniplieation that no power shaU be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of S. 151 of the Code, they do not control the uridoubted power of the Court conferred under S. 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court". 8. In the latest judgment in the matter of Shwtfina Corporatwn of Jndta_Ltd. Vs. MachCtdo Brothers and others* the Hon'ble ' Supreme Court referring to the judgment rendered in Ram Chand's case (supra) with approval, has observed that "if there is no specific provision which prohibits grant of relief soughtin an application filed under Section 151 of the Code, the Courts have all necessary powers under Section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent - abuse of process of the Court". C»j~— 9. InthematterofJVationuIJnstituteofMentalffealth&JWeuro Sciences Vs. C. Pctranieshwara5 rfeferring to the judgment delivered in the case of Manohar Lal Choprait has been held that "the inherent '- jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provisiori should normally be regarded as exhaustive". 3. AIR 1966 S.G. 1899 4. (2004) 11 SCC 168 5. 2005(2) SCCD 665 •paxg amp sip uiq^iA uaddaq qoiqAi saouB^smnOjio pue s^usAa jo s^ou Sup^Bi uiojj ijno^ B dotss ^p^aidmoo 'jSAaMoq 'IQU op Aqj, "^Bpp PIOAB pus .ispjo ui saApsiioq^ ^nd }q§im S^ITB§F}H Ajo^np ;Bip os 'msjojjSi m 'aousssa lii 'SJB '^uo^duiajad qgnoq:( 's-iapjo ^Jnpaoojd ^q^ (m) (t •p9JldX3 &pV3Jf3 ^awfyas^ vpiivit&.-uo avap sq^ mojj ps^jado SABq pinoA 'luauiSpnf [BHiSuo atp ^q psxg amp aip jo Aiidxs .laije passBd q8no4) 'iuauiXBd joj suip Smpusixs jspjo sqj, •psjidxa XnerttOB ^ou psq amp aip uaqM '^LreoiiddB stp ^q ps^OAm sq pinoo^OV 3q"t jo 6t'T 38 gfrl suoposg ^q^ (n) •psjidxa s^q psxg pouad jBuiSuo aip ji uaAS'aiur) jo uoisus^xs SMOIFB 'smjsi m 'g^^ uopoag •IOB ire guTop joj atap jBinopjBd v paxrj .^uo^dmsjsd pvvf. 41 qSnoqi USAS auip 3Lp sgjBiua 01 sssijaAod 4ou si ^.inoo i[3tH stp }sqi (T) -:jspun SB pazuemuins aq Aem ijnoQ smsjdng 3iq<uoH sip Aq UAOp pre] ABJ jo ssidpuud sip 's^usuiSpnC aAoq'e aqijo ASIA ui •T:^ •^sAep Q£puoXaq suip pua^xs o^ jaAod lua-isqui aA^q p]noA i-inoQ sq: 'A(jed"Bjo JQJIUOO sip puo^sq SJB siuaAa -lo s^sixa asnBO ^uapigns s.oqAV ^Bq^i.resui 01 UAOp psaj aq o^ saAjasap 'SJOJSJSLR 'g^T uopoag •sopsnfjo ajnirej a^ouio.id di ^ou si SpoQ sip jo loafqo aqj, •sopsnfjp sjnirej oi^unoure pjnoA sXBp 0£ puoAaq uoisus^xa jo yiBjS-viovi ajaqA sss^o Au^ui aq ireo ajaqi,, ^Bip ppq uasq ssq 41 [B.idns)svg Utoy i(}uvi.{vp\[ jo jsn^ui sip ui "(uamSpnf sq^ 01 Suu-ojsy "aSuip jo uopou^ssj: qons ou SBA ajaip '^usuipuauiB sjopg '^o^ ui s&sp o£ psaoxa f.ou nBqs pouad sip ^BVft sapiAojd ^usuipuainB aqj. "spoo aq^ Aq p3AOi[B jo psquosajd IOB ^UB jo guiop sq^ joj ^jnoo aip ^Cq p3-}UBjS jo paxg uaaq SABq Aem^Bip aiup agjBius o^ ^jnoo atp jo jaAod 3tp s^oajjB g^'[ uopoag ui apBui viavapuause 3W» reV PP^ ussq s^q ii 'spoo ai^ jo g^T uopoag jo A)ipnBA ^uopnipsuoo aqi q^TM SuTieap anqA gio?pur fo UOIUQ 'SA "P'W tiwvj, 'uoftoioossv •i'sg ay.isaoapy^uta^ns jo janBtu stp ui •QT •n' 1 \ (iv) that the inherent powers cannot be exercised, if its exercise is inGonsistent with, or coines info confliet with, any other express provisions of the Code and if there is specific provision which prohibits grant of relief sought in an applicadon filed under Section 151 of the Code, the Courts have all the necessary powers under Section 151 of the Code td make a suitable order to prevent abuse of process of the Court. (v) that the object of amendment of Section 148 of the Code that period for doing an act prescribed or allowed by the Court, shall not exceed 30 days, is not to promote the failure of justiee and the same is to be read down t6 mean that where sufficient cause exists or eYents are beyond control of a party, the Coyrt would have inherent power to extendjtiine beyondSO days. ' 12. In the present case, the applicants/judginent debtor were directed to hand over vacant possession of the syit land within a period ofsix months from the date ofpassing of the judgment Ss decree i.e. 7th August 2007 tp the non-applicants. From perusal of the averments in the petitions and the documents annexed therewith, it is observed that the applicants/judgment debtor after dismissal of their appeal commeneed necessary steps for resitement of the present refail Qutlet, they have already entered mtQ a lease agreement for the new site and requisite 'No Qbjection Certificate'from the Collector and approval from the Department of Explosive, Agra have already been obtained for construction bf the new retail outlet at new site; ,Even the tenders for construction havebeenfinalized. However, it has been averi-ed that certain other formalities required t6 be fulfilled, are time- consuming and in these circumstarices, it has been prayed. that additional time of one year may be granted for handing over possession of the suit land. 13. Citing judgment in the matter of Oepot SuDerintendent H.P. Corpn. Ltd. SsAnr. vs. KolhcipurAgri, Marl^Commtt..KolHcmur7 it was submitted by leamedcourisel forthsappEcahtsthafu-1:the 7. J.T. 2007(9) SC 577 s"-' IN::'C identical case the Hon'ble Supreme Courtdismissing appeal of the oil corapany vide order dated 20th June 2007 extended the time for handing over the yacant possession up to the end of June 2009. However, it is orally submitted that, m all likelihood, resitement of the retail outletmaybe completed by the end ofJune 2008. ? • '' ' 14. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the HonT^le Supreme Court in the above cited judgments, considering that the public utility service petrol pump is being operated from the suit land, the applicafions for extension of time for vacating thesuit land deserve to be allowed. Aceordingly, the applications are allowed and sbc months' time allowed to the applieant/judgmfint debtor vide jydginent & decree dated 7th August 2007 passed in Second Appeal No; 16/06, is further extended up to 31st August 2008. The applicants tp file ari undertaking iri that regard wittlin a period 6f two weeks from today. If the undertaking is not filed, the period extended shall not be opei-ative. Sd/- Bbirendra Mishra Judge /' .-*1'