IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.988 of 2009 ARBIND PRASAD SINGH, Son of Sri Tokhi Yadav, R/o Village – Malichak, P.S. – Rahui, Distt. – Nalanda ……… …………………………………………..Petitioner / Appellant Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR through the State Chief Information Commissioner, Bihar State Information Commission, Soochna Bhawan, 4th Floor, Bailey Road, Patna, 2. The State Information Commission, State Information Commission, Soochna Bhawan, 4th Floor, Bailey Road, Patna, 3. The Secretary, Bihar State Information Commission, Soochna Bhawan, 4th Floor, Bailey Road, Patna, 4. The District Magistrate, Nalanda at Biharsharif, 5. Sri Ganga Paswan, son of Sadhu Paswan, the then Panchayat Secretary, R/o Village – Raitar, P.O. – Raitar, P.S. – Giryag, Distt. – Nalanda, 6. Sri Surendra Krishna Prasad Singh, son of Ram Krishna Prasad Singh, R/o Village – Chauriya, P.O. – Sosandi, P.S. – Harnaut, Distt. – Nalanda ……………….. Respondents / Respondents. ----------- For the Appellant : Mr. Virendra Kuar, Advocate. For the Respondents No.1-3 : Mr. Lalit Kishore,Sr. Advocate, Ms. Shail Kumari, S.C.XXIII & Mr. Binita Singh, Advocate. ------------ PRESENT- THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH KUMAR DATTA O R D E R (04.02.2010) As per Dipak Misra, C.J.- In this intra-court appeal the sustainability of the order dated 16.07.2009 passed by the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 8043 of 2009 whereby he has concurred with the order passed by the State Information Commissioner is called in question. 2. The facts which are requisite to be exposited are that the appellant-petitioner, who was posted as Panchayat 2 Secretary-cum-Public Information Officer, Gram Panchayat Raj Chauriya Harnaut, District – Nalanda received an application from the 6th respondent on 25.02.2008 for providing informations regarding appointment of Shiksha Mitra which was made by the then Mukhiya, the number of forms,mark-sheet of the applicants, roster point and the merit list. That apart the information was asked for proposed and sanctioned amount regarding drainage and the amount that had been expended in certain drainages and installation of hand-pipes. The appellant provided the informations as were available with him to the respondent no. 6. Despite the same, the said respondent made an application before the respondent no. 3, the Secretary, Bihar State Information Commission, Patna stating, inter alia, that the informations had not been supplied to him. On the base of said allegations a notice to show cause was issued to him to which he submitted an explanation in which he had categorically stated that after getting the relevant records from the custody of the 5th respondent, he had given the requisite informations. The 5th respondent submitted an explanation before the 3rd respondent stating that all the records had been handed over to the appellant and, therefore, he could not be blamed for the delay. The respondent no. 3 by order dated 27.04.2009 imposed penalty of Rs. 25,000/- for violation of Section 7(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for brevity `the Act’) to be realised from the appellant. 3 3. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Secretary, Bihar State Information Commission, the present appellant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order passed by the State Information Commissioner in Case No. 8998 of 2008-09. It was contended before the learned single Judge that the appellant-petitioner was not at fault and there were sufficient grounds to come to a conclusion that the delay caused would not have been attributed to appellant. That apart, it was also urged that the order passed by the authority under the Act is not in accord with the procedure and that makes the order vulnerable and ultra vires. 4. The learned single Judge upon perusal of Annexure-6, the order passed by the State Information Commissioner under the Act, did not think it fit to interfere with the same. 5. Mr. Virendra Kuar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant apart from justifying the action of the appellant submitted that the order passed by the State Information Commissioner is not in consonance with Section 20 of the Act and, in fact, does not reflect proper application of mind, therefore, the same is sensitively susceptible. 6. Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned Senior Counsel for the State Information Commissioner defending the order passed by the authority which has been given the stamp of approval by the learned single Judge submitted that the appropriate procedure has been followed by the competent authority 4 before imposing the penalty and when the order indicates some reason it cannot be regarded as indefensible. 7. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar we have bestowed our anxious consideration and carefully perused the order of the State Information Commissioner as well as that of the learned single Judge. 8. The singular submission that has been pyramided by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the order suffers from procedural irregularity and is sans reason, and hence, violative of the principles of natural justice making the order legally unacceptable and pregnable. 9. To appreciate the controversy in a proper perspective we may fruitfully refer to Section 20 of the Act. It reads as under: “20. Penalties.- (1) Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information, it shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is received or information is furnished, so however, the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty- five thousand rupees; Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall be 5 given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him; Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be. (2) Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the service rules applicable to him.” 10. On a scanning of the anatomy of the aforesaid provision it is clear as crystal that the authority under the Act is required to ascribe reasons by dwelling upon the facts and the explanation proffered by the officer, who is going to be visited with the penalty, and then pass the order which should be in accord with the provision. Therefore, a procedural fairplay and ascribing of reason are the mandate of the provision. 11. In this context we think it apt to refer to the decision rendered in Gram Panchayat, Roorki v. Jt. Development Commissioner, (IRD), Punjab & Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 533 6 wherein the Apex Court set aside the order of the High Court which had concurred with the order of the Joint Development Commissioner under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, who had set aside the order of the Collector without giving reasons and without showing how the finding of the Collector was palpably wrong and without examining the contentions canvassed before it. Their Lordships opined that an order has to be a speaking one which would indicate why a finding has been recorded or why a finding recorded by an inferior tribunal is dislodged. A speaking order has to refer to the relevant documents and the stand put forth and then dwell upon the same. That is what is called a fair decision in law which resolves the controversy between the parties. 12. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321 the Apex Court while dealing with the concept of natural justice has held thus: “8. Natural justice is another name of common- sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 9. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice” do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of 7 legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence. xxx xxx xxx xxx 14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression “civil consequences” encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.” 13. In Cyril Lasrado (Dead) by LRS & Ors. v. Juliana Marlia Lasrado & Anr., (2004) 7 SCC 431 the Apex Court while dealing with the necessity for giving reasons has held thus: “11. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court’s judgment not sustainable. 12. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union, (1971) 1 All ER 1148 : (1971) 2 QB 175 : (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA) observed : (All ER p. 8 1154h) “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 ICR 120) it was observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision- taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 14. The said principle has been reiterated in Union of India & Ors. v. Jai Prakash Singh & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 712. 15. In Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 401 the Apex Court has held that reasons are required to be assigned in a case where civil or evil consequences may ensue. In the said case a distinction was drawn between power to deal with a contractual matter and a power of statutory authority to exercise its statutory power in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties. Emphasis was laid on the duty of a statutory authority to give reasons. 9 16. In the case at hand on a close scrutiny of the order impugned it can safely be concluded that it does not meet the requirements of the command contained in Section 20 of the Act. The statutory authority, which has passed the order of penalty of this nature, must bear in mind that the order should contain apposite, cogent and germane reasons and should clearly exposit application of mind. As is evincible the present order does not so reflect. Apart from that the order does not show that the appellant, as an Information Officer, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to furnish informations within the time specified under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act or malafidely denied the request to give informations. The order, if we allow ourselves to say, is cryptic and founded on conjecture. Not for nothing, it has been stated, reason is the heart and soul of the order. It must reflect due application of mind. The order passed by the State Information Commissioner, we are afraid, does not reflect so. Merely stating that the allegations have been established would not suffice the requirements prescribed under the provision for imposition of penalty. It must clearly reveal the reason. That is the duty, nay, obligation of the statutory authority. That having not been done, the order deserves to be lanceted and, accordingly, we so direct. As the order passed by the State Information Commissioner has been affirmed by the learned single Judge, we also set aside the order of the learned single Judge. 10 17. As we have set aside both the orders, the statutory authority shall be well advised to proceed afresh and pass an order keeping in view the command enjoined in Section 20 of the Act. 18. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above without any order as to costs. Patna High Court. The 4th February, 2010. AFR. Dilip. ( Dipak Misra, C.J. ) ( Ramesh Kumar Datta, J. )