IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO:25243 of 2008 Between: The Depot Manager, APSRTC, Uravakonda Depot, Uravakonda, Anantapur District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 S. Subhan S/o. Musthafa C/o. 11-1-190, Aravinda Nagar, Ananthapur. 2 The Chairman cum Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Anantapur. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:SMT.W.V.S.RAJESWARI The Court made the following : ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a writ of certiorari to quash award, dated 30.12.2006 passed by the Chairman-cum-Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Anantapur (for short ‘the Industrial Tribunal’) in I.D.No.192 of 2004. By the said award, the Industrial Tribunal reinstated respondent No.1 into the services of the petitioner – Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’) along with 50% back wages and continuity of service. At the hearing, Smt. W.V.S.Rajeswari, learned counsel for the petitioner Corporation submitted that the Corporation partly implemented the award by reinstating respondent No.1 and the back wages awarded by the Industrial Tribunal have not been paid. The award was passed as far back as 30.12.2006. Almost two years elapsed since then. The petitioner failed to assign any reasons whatsoever for the inordinate delay in approaching this Court to question the award. Though the Constitution does not prescribe the limitation in express terms for entertaining the writ petitions, by preponderance of judicial opinion, the law is well settled that the Constitutional Courts do not entertain stale petitions and reasonable time limit is required to be read into Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If belated writ petitions, such as the present one, are entertained, settled rights of the parties get unsettled. As the petitioner failed to offer any reasons whatsoever for not filing this writ petition for almost two years, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition at this length of time. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of laches without going into the merits of the case. As a sequel to dismissal of main petition, WPMP.No.32974 of 2008 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 18th NOVEMBER, 2008. Kvni In Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd[1] the privy council held as under: “Now, the doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Moon Mills Ltd., v. M.R. Meher[2] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service[3]. I n Karnataka Power Corporation Limited and another v. K.Thangappan and another[4] the Supreme Court held as under: “Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports[5]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” [1] (1874) 5 PC 221 [2] AIR 1967 SC 1450 [3] AIR 1969 SC 329 [4] (2006) 4 SCC 322 [5] (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769