1.wp.4417-09 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.4417 OF 2009 Sarika Machindra Nalwade @ Sarika Ambadas Pawar. ..Petitioner. Versus The Chairman, Vidyarthi Hitwardhak Mandal and 3 others. ..Respondents. ... Mr.Sureshkmar J. Panicker, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.A.P. Vanarase, AGP, for respondent Nos.3 & 4. Mr.Shantaram L. Shelke, Head Master – Respondent No.2 is present in Court. ... CORAM : SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI,JJ DATED : 23rd JULY, 2009. P.C. :- 1. The petitioner was working as a Junior Clerk with respondent No.1. It is her case that she came to be terminated on 1.1.2008 hence, she preferred an Appeal before the School Tribunal on 14.1.2009. As there was delay in preferring an Appeal, an application for condonation of delay was preferred. The said application came to be rejected by order dated 21st April, 2009. Being aggrieved thereby, this Petition has been preferred. 2. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the School Tribunal has not considered the case-law which have been cited by him, properly, and had the said decisions been considered in their proper perspective, the delay 1.wp.4417-09 2 would have been condoned. The petitioner has placed reliance on the following authorities : 1. (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123 N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy 2. 1999(2) ALL MR 507 Sonerao s/o. Sadashivrao Patil & Anr. Vs. Godawaribai w/o. Laxmansing Gahirewar & Ors. 3. AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Katiji & Ors. 3. In N.Balkrishnan (supra) reliance is placed on para-9 of the said decision wherein it is stated that - “Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory”. 4. In this decision, it is clearly stated that the length of delay is of no consequence but acceptability of the explanation is only the criterion. In the light of this decision, it would be relevant to refer to the explanation given by the petitioner. The explanation given by the petitioner is that she came to be terminated on 1.1.2008 hence she gave a letter to the Education Inspector expressing her grievance. It is her case that thereafter she corresponded with various authorities in relation to her termination and only when she found that no 1.wp.4417-09 3 action is being taken, she had filed appeal. On perusal of the application for condonation of delay, I find that, it is stated that she came to be terminated on 1.1.2008. Thereafter she gave a letter to Education Inspector on 14.5.2008 expressing her grievance. Thereafter she was awaiting some action from the Education Inspector in this regard, but, she did not get any response. According to Section 9(2) of the M.E.P.S. Act, 1977, an appeal is to be preferred within 30 days from the date of receipt of the termination order. According to the legal provisions, the appellant is expected to have filed the appeal on or before 30.1.2008. However, the first correspondence which has been referred to by the petitioner is with the Education Inspector which is dated 14.5.2008. All the letters on which she has placed reliance are after this date. She has not given any explanation for the period from 30.1.2008 to 14.5.2008. As far as this period is concerned, it has remained totally unexplained. The petitioner has given no reason why she did not file appeal or take any steps within the said period much less any sufficient reason. 5. From the record the case of the petitioner appears to be that from 14.5.2008 onwards she started writing letters to various authorities, such as, Education Inspector, Head Master etc. In my view this can not be considered as a sufficient reason to condone the delay. I am fortified in taking this view by a recent judgment in the case of Bina Manohar Dudani Vs. Major Charanjitlal Verma (Retd.) reported in 2007(5) ALL MR 381 wherein it is observed that : “the period of limitation cannot be saved by any correspondence made to the defendants by the granting authority. Hence, reliance upon a 1.wp.4417-09 4 letter addressed to appellant by Army Welfare Housing Organization is entirely misplaced and the suit is barred by law of limitation.” 6. Thus, looking to the explanation offered by the petitioner it appears to be an afterthought. It is seen that there is no just and sufficient reason given by her and the explanation given by the petitioner is not acceptable. 7. In the second decision on which reliance is placed i.e. Sonerao Patil (supra) it has been observed in para-12 that length of the delay is not material, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. I have already observed in the above para that the explanation which has been given by the petitioner is not acceptable. Hence, both these decisions infact are of no help to the petitioner. 8. Reliance is also placed on a decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag & anr.Vs. Katiji & Ors. (supra). As far as this decision is concerned, the delay was occasioned by the State and not by a private litigant and in view of the facts of that case the observations have been made therein. Moreover, the two later decisions of the Supreme Court on the point of delay make it clear that length of delay does not matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criteria. Sometimes delay of shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas, in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. From the above decisions it becomes clear that the applicant must give sufficient reasons for explaining the delay. It must be shown to the Court as to why the applicant could not approach the Court in a given time period and that the reasons which 1.wp.4417-09 5 prevented her from pursuing legal remedy were totally beyond her control. 9. In view of the above decisions and the reasons mentioned by the petitioner for condonation of delay, which reasons have been made only from 14.5.2000 onwards, it cannot, in the present facts and circumstances, be said to be good and sufficient. 10. The Tribunal in its order dated 21.4.2009 has rightly observed that the petitioner has failed to show any good and sufficient reasons to condone the delay. No case is made out for interference in the order of the Tribunal. Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. [SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J.]