1 FA853 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICUATURE AT MUMBAI CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FIRST APPEAL NO. 853 OF 1992 Government of Maharashtra ) Irrigation Department, represented ) by the Executive Engineer, ) Khadakwasla Headworks Division, ) Barney Road, Mangalwar Peth, ) Pune – 11. )... ... Appellant. Versus Atur India Pvt. Limited, ) “Atur Chambers”, 2-A, Moledine ) Road, Pune – 1. )... ... Respondent. Mrs. G. P. Mulekar for the Appellant. Mr. A. V. Anturkar for the Respondent. CORAM : B. H. MARLAPALLE & A. A. SAYED, JJ. DATED : 3RD SEPTEMBER, 2010 & 23RD SEPTEMBER, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT (Per B. H. MARLAPALLE, J.): These appeals filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 2 FA853 (“the Act” for short) arises from Special Civil Suit No. 1257 of 1990 and Misc. Application No. 102 of 1991. The suit was filed for passing decree in terms of the arbitral award dated 14th October, 1990 by the Arbitral Tribunal and the Misc. Application was filed by the State Government for setting aside the Award under Section 30 of the Act. 2. The respondent was awarded contract for construction of Veer Baji Pasalkar Dam at village Warasgaon and on completion the contractor monetarily recovery claimed. As the claims were not met, the contractor approached by its letter dated 6th December, 1988 for appointment of Arbitrators. The Government of Maharashtra through the Irrigation Department, issued a resolution on 20th July, 1989 and referred the following disputes to arbitration by a panel of three arbitrators: (a) Claim arising out of non-waiver of ceiling limit on escalation for Labour and Material components. (b) Claim arising out of non-payment of escalation on Fuels and Lubricants on actual basis, as per Arbitration Award, for the period from 1st January, 1986 onwards. (c) Claim arising out of non-reimbursement of interest paid by them for bridge finance obtained by them on account of non payment of R.A. Bills. 3 FA853 Before the Arbitrators, the Contractors submitted its statement of claim and the Irrigation Department filed its written statement opposing the claim. After hearing the party and by taking into consideration the evidence on record, the arbitrators passed the final award on 14th October, 1990 and submitted to the Court for its Rule and therefore it came to be registered as Special Civil Suit No. 1257 of 1990 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Pune. At the same time the Irrigation Department filed Misc. Application No. 102 of 1991 praying for setting aside the arbitral award. The Learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, heard the parties, considered the award and passed the order dated 24th April, 1992 dismissing the Special Civil Suit No.1257 of 1990 and the Award passed by the Arbitrators on 14th October, 1990 was made rule of the Court whereas Misc. Application No. 102 of 1991 filed by the Irrigation Department was dismissed. 3. It is pertinent to note that in these appeals the challenge to the award passed by the arbitrators is limited only in respect of payment of interest. For ready reference, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the impugned part of the Award in respect of Claim No.3 as under: “7.4 Claim No.3:- Claim on account of non- 4 FA853 reimbursement of interest paid by the claimants on account of nonpayment of R.A. Bills. 7.4.1 It is on record that payments for this work were often held up for want of funds. The two parties have given us a signed statement (C/436 & 437) of the amounts withheld from the period 31.7.85 to 20.4.87. The non- payment of sizeable amount from bills is clearly in violation of provisions in clause 31.2 p. 45 of the Agreement. We accept this claim as tenable and equitable. We do not accept the method of interest at 18 per cent per annum compounded quarterly which the Claimants have reportedly paid to their bankers, and as per statement 1 enclosed have computed interest at simple interest of 18 per cent per annum over the amount retained. We award Rs.10,81,000/- to the Claimants against this claim vide statement 1 enclosed. 8. Interest - 8.1. After hearing the legal arguments of both parties we unanimously find that under Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978, the claim for interest on any amounts due can be allowed by us. All the claims are ascertainable amounts computed on the basis of provisions in the contract for claim No.1 and 2 and on the basis of easily verifiable basic facts for claim No.3. 8.2 We consider a rate of simple interest of 12 percent per annum on the amounts of claim after they became due as reasonable in these cases. 8.3 For claim No.2 and 3 the amount of claim computed quarterly is assumed to have been due from the end of the quarter concerned. The interest for claim 3 is assumed to start from 1.7.87 after allowing for a reasonable time to decide the claim from the end of the period for which the amounts were retained. All interests claims will end on 31.3.90, 13.4.90 being the date on which arguments 5 FA853 were started in this case and is taken as the start of pendente lite period. 8.4 We award by way of interest on the claim No.1 Rs.21,20,000/- as interest on claim as per statement 2 enclosed. 8.5 We award interest on claim No.2 of Rs.3,66,000/- as per statement No.3 enclosed. 8.6 We award interest on claim No.3 of Rs.3,57,000/- as per statement 1 enclosed. 8.7 The abstract of Award with interest- The amounts of main claim together with interest thereon as awarded by us are as under: Main Amount Interest Total Claim No.1 59,77,000 21,20,000 80,97,000 Claim No.2 8,06,000 3,66,000 11,72,000 Claim No.;3 10,81,000 3,57,000 14,38,000 -------------- -------------- -------------- 78,64,000 28,43,000 107,07,000 ====== ====== ===== 8.9 No pendente lite interest can be awarded by the Arbitrators under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code as they are not “Courts” as decided in the Code. 8.10 We award interest on the total amount of claim of Rs.72.07 lakhs (107.07 less advance adjusted) at 18 per cent per annum from 16.11.90 (leaving a reasonable period of about one month for the respondents to make payment to the Claimants) to the date of realisation of the amount or the date of obtaining decree for the amount from the concerned court whichever is earlier.” 6 FA853 4. Mrs. Mulekar, the learned AGP has placed before us the amount awarded as per the following table: Sr. No Claim Main Amount Pre reference interest @ 12% p.a. Period of Interest @ 12% p.a. Total Amount 1 Escalation for labour and material component 59,77,000 A 21,20,000 B 1.7.1987 to 31.3.1990 80,97,000 C 2 Escalation for Fuel and Lubricant 8,06,000 P 3,66,000 Q 1.7.1987 to 31.3.1990 11,72,000 R 3 Interest on delayed payment of R.A. Bills 10,81,000 X 18% p.a. 3,57,000 Y 1.7.1987 to 31.3.1990 14,38,000 Z Total 78,64,000 28,43,000 107,07,000 The main amount of Rs.59,77,000/- (A) under the head of Escalation for labour and material component and Rs.8,06,000/- (P) under the head of Escalation for Fuel and Lubricant granted by the Arbitrators have not been challenged before us and what is challenged is only the interest components. It is evident that the interest component is under four different forms, namely, (a) Interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on the R.A. Bills paid belatedly which is Rs.10,81,000/-; (b) Interest at the rate of 12% p.a. for the period from 1.7.1987 to 31.3.1990 on Claim Nos.1 and 2; (c) Interest at the rate of 12% p.a. on the interest amount of Rs.10,81,000/- for the period from 7 FA853 1.7.1987 to 31.3.1990 and (d) Interest at the rate of 18% p.a. for the post award period as well as on the amount of interest for delayed payment. The total amount of the award on Claim No.3 thus came to Rs.107,07,000/-. Out of the same, by way of advance a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- was paid to the Contractor in March, 1989. From the balance amount of Rs.72,07,000/- of the Award amount an amount of Rs.32,83,000/- has been paid to the Contractor on 18th April, 1991. Thus leaving the disputed amount at Rs.39,24,000/- which has been deposited with the trial Court on 19th October, 1991. We must note at this stage an amount of Rs.21,20,006/- (B) and Rs.3,66,000/- (Q) has been granted by way of interest on claim No.1 and claim No.2, respectively. 5. Mrs. Mulekar, the learned AGP raised the following objections to the impugned Award to the extent of the interest component: (1) The Contractor was not entitled for interest on the R.A. Bills, released late by few days. (2) Even otherwise granting simple interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on the R.A. Bills was illegal. 8 FA853 (3) Interest at the rate of 12% p.a. for the pre-reference period has not been provided for in the contract terms on the amounts at claims No.1 and 2 and thus the Arbitrators misconducted themselves and in support of this argument she has relied upon Clause 34 of the Contract. (4) Interest on interest could not have been awarded and this is also a misconduct by the Arbitrators, in as much as interest at the rate of 12% per annum for the period from 1st July, 1987 to 31st March, 1990 has been awarded on the interest amount of Rs.10,81,000/. (5) The interest at 18% p.a. for the post award period is unjust, illegal and unreasonable. 6. While elaborating her arguments Mrs. Mulekar submitted that the Contract did not provide for payment of interest on the R.A. Bills on the grounds that the said payment was released belatedly. No such claim was ever made by the Contractor. The Contractor did not point out that on account of R.A.Bills being released belatedly it had to obtain a bridge loan and paid interest to the bankers on such an amount. She further submitted that the reliance of the Arbitrators on Clause 31.2 in granting interest on the R.A. Bills was a blatant error 9 FA853 thus amounting to misconduct. She further submitted that even otherwise interest at the rate of 18 % per annum was exorbitant and there is no justification given as to why the Arbitrators thought it fit to grant simple interest at this high rate, more so, when there was no evidence before the Arbitrators regarding the rate of interest charged by the banks on the lendings at the relevant time. Regarding the simple interest at the rate of 12% p.a. for the pre-reference period on claim Nos.1 and 2, Mrs. Mulekar while pointing to clause 34 of the Contract also submitted that no notice was issued by the Contractor as required under Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978. She also contended that the claimant had not claimed and Claim No.3 did not contemplate payment of interest for the pre-reference period on claim Nos.1 and 2 i.e. the amounts (B) and (Q). Regarding interest on interest i.e. Rs.3,57,000/- (Y) charged on interest amount of Rs.10,81,000/- (X), it was submitted that the law does not permit the Arbitrators to allow interest on interest and therefore the Arbitrators misconducted themselves. She referred, in this regard, to the scheme of Section 3(3) (c) of the Interest Act. In support of these contentions, the learned AGP placed reliance on the following decisions: 10 FA853 (1) State of Rajasthan v/s Ferro Concrete Constructions Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 12 SCC page 1; (2) Superintending Engineer (Irrigation) Balimela & Ors. v/s B. Subba Reddy, 1999 (4) SCC 423; (3) Durga Ramprasad v/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1995) 1 SCC 418; (4) Madnani Construction Pvt. Ltd. v/s Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 549; (5) State of Haryana & Ors. v/s S. A. Arora & Co., (2010) 3 SCC 690; (6) Sudhir Brothers v/s Delhi Development Authority, (1996) 1 SCC 32. 7. Mr. Anturkar, the learned Counsel for the Contractor on the other hand while opposing the challenge to the award, fairly conceded that the interest at 12% p.a. for the period from 1st July, 1987 to 31st March, 1990 was not payable on the interest amount of Rs.10,81,000/- (X) and thus the amount of Rs.3,57,000/-(Y) was not payable to the Contractor. We are, therefore, required to examine whether the Arbitrators misconducted themselves in awarding interest at the rate of 11 FA853 18% p.a. on the belated R.A. Bills i.e. Rs.10,81,000/- (X), interest at the rate of 12% p.a. for the pre-reference period on Claim Nos.1 and 2 i.e. Rs.21,20,000/- + Rs.3,66,000/- (B) and (Q) and interest at 18% for the post award period. 8. The award passed by the Arbitrators is not liable to be set aside under Section 30 of the Act except on the grounds set out therein and the said Section reads as under: “30. Grounds for setting aside award.- An Award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Sec.35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.” The challenge before us to the Arbitrator's award dated 14th October, 1990 is only under clause (a) of Section 30 of the Act. 9. It was submitted by Mr. Anturkar that under Section 30(a) of the 12 FA853 Act, the scope for interference in the Arbitrator's award is very limited. The Arbitrators are selected by the parties and the term “misconducted” has a limited connotation and an error per se cannot be termed as a misconduct. While examining the challenge to the award of the Arbitrators in an Appeal filed under Section 39 of the Act, the power of the appellate court cannot be equated with the power available under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An error simplicitor in the arbitral award can be no reason for interference by the appellate court in the same unless it is demonstrated that the error was blatant. If in the written statement opposing the claim before the Arbitrators the appellant had not relied upon Clause 34 of the Contract or did not refer to Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act and the requirement of issuance of notice to claim interest under the said Act, it would not be permissible for the appellant to contend that awarding interest on the R.A. Bills was a misconduct so as to warrant setting aside the award on that count. The issues which were not taken up to oppose the Claim before the Arbitrators cannot be allowed to be agitated either before the Court or in an appeal before us so as to prove the allegation of misconduct on the part of the Arbitrators. If the Arbitrators have relied upon Clause 31.2 of the Contract and also the 13 FA853 period of delay caused in releasing the R. A. Bills for awarding interest on the said amount, it would not amount to misconduct, even if it is assumed and without accepting the same that it was an error. Mr. Anturkar relied upon the following proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court, in the case of State of Rajasthan v/s Puri Construction Co. Ltd. & Anr., (1994) 6 SCC 485: “An erroneous decision of a court of law is open to judicial review by way of appeal or revision in accordance with the provisions of law. Similarly, an award rendered by an arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the arbitrator is a judge by choice of the parties, and more often than not, a person with little or no legal background, the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration by way of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award in the Arbitration Act. Over the decades, judicial decisions have indicated the parameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the courts have disfavoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and fact on the score of mis-appreciation and misreading of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to reserve the award as far as possible. As a reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of “legal misconduct” of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of 14 FA853 a fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is necessary, however, to put a note of caution that in the anxiety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the court should not reappraise the evidence intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out that the conclusion drawn from some facts, by the arbitrator is, according to the understanding of the court, erroneous. Such exercise of power which can be exercised by an appellate court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is alien to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award under the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with the award based on erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In ultimate analysis, it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous finding easily demonstrable from the materials on record and application of principle of law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous.” “Even if it is assumed that on the materials on record, a different view could ;have been taken and the arbitrators have failed to consider the documents and materials on record in their proper perspective, the award is not liable to be struck down in view of the judicial decisions referred to hereinbefore. Error apparent on the face of the record does not mean that on closer scrutiny of the import of documents and materials on record, the finding made by the arbitrator may be held to be erroneous. Judicial decision over the decades have indicated that an error of law or fact committed by an arbitrator by itself does not constitute misconduct warranting interference with the award.” 15 FA853 10. In the case of Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v/s. Progressive Writers and Publishers (2009) 5 SCC 678, the Supreme Court while reiterating the above stated legal position held that the Award of the Arbitrators is ordinarily final and the Courts hearing applications under Section 30 of the Act do not exercise any appellate jurisdiction. Reappraisal of evidence by the Court is impermissible. Interpretation of the contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine. Even in a case where the award contained reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the Court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or award is based on wrong proposition of law. 11. On the backdrop of the above legal position regarding the powers of the Court to interfere with an award under Section 30 of the Act, let us consider the challenge raised by the State Government to the award of interest on the delayed release of R. A. bills, interest granted on Claim Nos.1 and 2 for the pre-reference period and interest awarded at 18%. So far as the amount of interest on the delayed release of R. A. 16 FA853 Bills i.e. Rs.10,81,000/- (X) is concerned, we have noted that there was sufficient material place before the Arbitrators to support that the Contractor had taken bridge loans from time to time by way of Cash Credit Limit or bridge finances. The letters dated 29th January, 1985 and 13th February, 1985 addressed by the United Commercial Bank to the Contractor do go to show that the Bank had sanctioned temporary facility by way of bridge finance to the Contractor. Initially, it was an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- and subsequently as per the letter dated 13th February, 1985 the additional facility of Rs.15,00,000/- was also sanctioned. There is also a letter from the very same Bank to point out that the interest payable on the lendings was varying and it was even above 18%. In its Statement of Claim submitted before the Arbitrators, the Contractor had claimed compound interest which has been turned down by arbitrators and they have granted the simple interest. We, therefore, do not find any error, which could be called as a blatant error, in the award passed by the Tribunal granting simple interest at 18% on the delayed release of R. A. Bills. 12. As Statement of Claim was submitted by the Contractor before the Arbitrators and there were three annexures i.e. Annexure I to III 17 FA853 attached thereto. Annexure I was the calculation for the interest payable at 18% on the escalation amount on labour and material component, Annexure II was the calculation of interest payable on the escalation for fuel and lubricant, and Annexure III was the calculation of interest on interest. As noted earlier, the Arbitral Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.21,20,000/- (B) by way of interest at 12% p.a. on the amount of Rs.59,77,000/-, which was claimed by way of escalation for labour and material component. An amount of Rs.3,66,000/- (C) has been granted by way of interest at 12% on claim of escalation for fuel and lubricant i.e. Rs.8,06,000/-. The Arbitrators in Clause 8.1 of the Award referred to Section 3 of the Interest Act and held that the claim for interest on any amount due can be allowed by them so long as the claims are ascertainable and proceeded to grant interest on Claim Nos.1 and 2 for the period from 1st July, 1987 to 31st March, 1990 i.e. pre-reference period. Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act reads as under: “3. Power of Court to allow interest.- (1) In any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person 18 FA853 making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say,- (a) . . . . . . . . . . (b) if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, then, from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings: