Crl.A. 144/2002 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.R.SARMA Ranjan Gogoi, J The two accused/ appellants who have been convicted under Sectio n 302 IPC by the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup in Sessions Case No. 78(K)/98 an d have been sentenced to undergo R.I. for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,0 00/- each, in default, to suffer R.I. for one month more have preferred this app eal. 2. The short case of the proseuction is that at about 11.40 a.m. of 6.12.94 P.W.2, Abul Ali lodged an FIR in the Chaygaon Police Station alleging t hat at about 9.30/ 10 a.m. of the same day i.e. 6.12.94 while the younger brothe r of the first informant one Md. Faizulla Haque was going along the public road, the accused/ appellants called him inside their house and hacked him to death w ith a sharp weapon. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR lodged, Chhaygaon P.S. Case No . 175/94 under Section 302/34 IPC was registered. The case was duly investigated , in the course of which, inquest was held on the dead body which was also sent for post mortem examination. The statements of persons acquainted with the offen ce alleged were recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. At the conclusion of the investigation, chargesheet under Section 302 IPC was su bmitted against both the accused/ appellants. The offence alleged being exclusiv ely triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Judicial Magistrate by order d ated 30.4.98 committed the case for trial to the Court of Sessions at Kamrup, Gu wahati. In the Trial Court charge under Section 302/34 IPC was framed against bo th the accused/ appellants to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tr ied. In the course of the trial 15 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. N o defence evidence was led. However, the statements of both the accused/ appella nts were recorded under Section 313 CrPC. The prosecution also proved a large nu mber of documents including the inquest report, post mortem report and a seizure list. Thereafter, by the impugned judgment and order, the accused/ appellants h ave been convicted and sentenced as aforesaid giving rise to the present appeal. 4. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellants had raised a plea that on the date of commission of the alleged offence the accused/appell ant No.1 was a juvenile within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. In support, the learned counsel for the appellants had placed before the Court a c ertificate dated 3.6.98 issued by the Headmaster of the Govt. Aided Simina Ancha lik High School recording the date of birth of the appellant No.1 as 31.12.78. T he aforesaid plea was not taken by the accused/ appellant No.1 at any stage duri ng the trial of the case and, in fact, in the statement recorded under Section 3 13 CrPC on 22.6.2001, the accused/ appellant No.1 had given his age as 30 years. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court by an order dated 17.12.20 08 had directed the learned District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup to hold an enquiry in the matter and, thereafter, determine the age of the accused/ appellant No.1 . Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the Court, the matter was enquired into by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup and a report dated 20.3.2009 was s ubmitted to this Court. We have perused the said report wherefrom it appears tha t in the enquiry held an employee of the school had appeared before the learned District & Sessions Judge along with the admission register of the school in ori ginal. The aforesaid admission register showed the name of the accused/ appellan t No.1 at serial No. 79 and his date of admission in the Simina Anchalik High Sc hool as 12.8.93. Apart from the fact that the admission register discloses two e ntries against the same serial number i.e. 79, the details of the school in whic h the accused/ appellant No.1 had earlier studied and the details of the transfe r certificate are not recorded in the admission register. In such circumstances, the learned District & Sessions Judge was of the view that the date of birth of the accused/ appellant No.1 as recorded in the admission register i.e. 31.12.78 did not reveal any acceptable basis. The copy of the extract of the admission r egister which has been furnished along with the report has been perused by us an d it is our considered view that the conclusion reached by the learned District & Sessions Judge is fully justified. We have also considered the requirement of sending the matter once again back to the learned District & Sessions Judge for holding a medical test to determine the age of the accused/ appellant No.1. Howe ver, as the ossification test is at best an approximate test for determining the age of a person, we are of the view that no useful purpose would be served by s ubjecting the accused/ appellant No.1 to any such test. Instead, we are of the v iew that on the basis of the materials available, as disclosed in the report of the learned District & Sessions Judge, the dispute with regard to the age of the accused/ appellant No.1 should be closed by holding that the materials on recor d do not permit a conclusion to be reached that the accused/ appellant No.1 was a juvenile on the date of occurrence of the incident i.e. 6.12.94. 5. Having answered the above issue in the manner indicated, the Cou rt will now be required to decide the matter on merits. 6. It has already been stated by us that in the present case the pr osecution had examined 15 witnesses. Of the said witnesses, P.W.5 is the doctor who had performed the post mortem on the deceased whereas P.W.14 and 15 are poli ce officers who were associated with the investigation of the case at different points of time. Of the remaining 12 witnesses, except P.W.4 and P.W.7, the evide nce tendered by the other witnesses is hear-say evidence. All the aforesaid witn esses (except P.W.4 and P.W.7) had stated that on being informed of the incident or having come to know of the same they had gone to the house of the accused/ a ppellants where they found the dead body of Faizulla Haque lying in a pool of bl ood. The said witnesses in unison have also stated that at the place of occurren ce they were informed by the other villagers present that it is the accused/ app ellants who had committed the crime. The evidence of the witnesses (except P.W.4 and P.W.7), therefore, will not assist the prosecution in any manner. The Court , therefore, does not consider it necessary to recite in details the evidence of the said witnesses. 7. This will bring the Court to a consideration of the evidence of P.W.4 and 7 to determine what are the circumstances that have been proved by the evidence of the said witnesses and whether the said circumstances sufficiently incriminate the accused/ appellants and warrant a conclusion that the accused/ a ppellants should be held liable for the offence alleged. The very fact that the Court is proceeding to cull out the relevant circumstances from the evidence of P.W.4 and 7 would make it clear that the prosecution did not succeed in examinin g any eye witness to the occurrence. P.W.4, Harmuj Ali had deposed that at abou t 8 a.m. of the date of occurrence he had gone to his paddy field. On the way h e met the deceased Fajulla Haque. He also saw both the accused/ appellants. Acco rding to P.W.4, the accused persons had called the deceased to their house from the road on the plea of giving tuition to the accused Amjad Ali. According to P. W.4, he had seen the deceased going towards the house of the accused/ appellants . P.W.4 has further deposed that, thereafter, he came to his field and on return ing home he came to know of the incident and, thereafter, went to the house of t he accused/ appellants. P.W.4 has specifically deposed that he was informed by P .W.2 that the accused/ appellants had killed the deceased. It is the further evi dence of P.W.4 that on coming to the house of the accused/ appellant he found th e deceased lying near a table. The only circumstance that incriminates the accus ed/ appellants on the basis of the evidence tendered by P.W.4 is that, according to this witness, he had seen the deceased going towards the house of the accuse d/ appellants. 8. P.W.7, Jiarul Hoque in his deposition had stated that in the mor ning of the day of occurrence he had gone to the house of the accused/ appellant No.1 Amjad Ali. According to P.W.7, the sister of accused Amjad Ali, one Monoro ma Begum was his classmate and together they were doing arithmetic as there was an examination in the afternoon. P.W.7 has further deposed that while he was in the house of the accused/appellants, accused Amjad Ali followed by the deceased came to the house and entered the room where P.W. 7 along with Monorama Begum we re studying. P.W.7 has also deposed that upon entering the room accused Amjad Al i asked him (P.W.7) and his sister to go to another room. Thereafter, according to P.W.7, he came back home and on returning home he heard ’hulla’. Coming out h e had heard that Amjad Ali had assaulted the deceased. From the evidence of P.W. 7, it transpires that there are two houses in between the house of the witness ( P.W.7) and the house of the accused. The evidence of P.W.7, therefore, discloses that the accused/ appellant No.1 and the deceased had come to the house of the accused/ appellants and, thereafter, accused Amjad had asked the witness (P.W.7) to go to another room. Thereafter, P.W.7 came back home and soon thereafter he heard that the deceased had been assaulted by the accused Amjad Ali. 9. The law relating to proof by means of circumstantial evidence ne ed not detain the Court in view of the settled principle that the circumstances that incriminate and implicate the accused with the crime must not only be prove d and established by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence adduced but su ch circumstances pieced together must give rise to a complete chain of events wh ich point to only one conclusion and no other conclusion, namely, that it is the accused and nobody else who had committed the crime. Only if the evidence on re cord is capable of giving rise to such a satisfaction in the Court that convicti on on the basis of circumstantial evidence should be made. 10. In the present case, the circumstances that have been proved by the prosecution against the accused/ appellants have already been noticed. While there can be no doubt that the presence of the deceased in the house of the acc used/ appellants and recovery of his dead body in the said house shortly thereaf ter would be a strong incriminating circumstance against the accused/ appellants , the question that has to be determined is whether on the basis of the said cir cumstance alone the necessary conclusion i.e. that it is the accused/ appellants and nobody else who could have committed the crime can be reached by the Court. The process by which the Court has to reach its conclusion on the basis of circ umstantial evidence must naturally leave no room for doubt and where such a doub t can legitimately arise the accused would be entitled to the benefit of the sam e. This is why, perhaps, repeatedly the Courts have emphasized that the circumst ances established by the prosecution must be pieced together by the Court to det ermine whether a complete chain of events is established that point to only one conclusion, namely, the guilt of the accused. 11. Applying the above principle to the present case, we are of the view that though the circumstances proved against the accused/ appellants by the prosecution in the present case may be incriminating by itself, the same do not conclusively give rise to the only conclusion that would be necessary to be rea ched by the Court before determining the culpability of the accused. The presenc e of the deceased in the house of the accused must necessarily be in close proxi mity of time when the death had occurred so as to leave no room for any speculat ion that some person other than the accused could have committed the crime. In t he present case, the evidence of P.W.7 does not at all indicate the time lag bet ween his departure from the house of the accused and the ’hulla’ heard by him wh ich had prompted him to come out of his house whereupon, according to P.W.7, he came to know that the accused had assaulted the deceased. 12. Consequently, we are of the view that the circumstances establis hed by the prosecution in the present case fall short of the required standards by which the culpability of the accused/ appellants has to be judged. Rather, we are of the view that the said circumstances are capable of giving rise to a rea sonable doubt with regard to the culpability of the accused/ appellants. Consequ ently, we are unable to affirm the conviction of the accused/ appellants recorde d by the learned Trial Court. 13. The judgment and order dated 22.1.2002 passed by the learned Ses sions Judge, Kamrup in Sessions Case No. 78(K)/98 is, therefore, set aside. Both the accused/ appellants are acquitted on the benefit of doubt. The accused/ app ellant No.1 who had been denied bail by this Court be released forthwith. As the accused/ appellant No.2 is presently on bail, her bail bond shall stand dischar ged. 14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed as indicated above.