1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Second Appeal No. 147/2010 (Kawadu Chintaman Raut VERSUS Kashinath Ghularam Jiddewar thr. Power of Attorney holder Shri Sheshrao Ghularamji Jiddewar) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shri Anand Deshpande h/f Shri F.T. Mirza, counsel for the appellant. Shri H.D. Dangre, counsel for the respondent. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : JULY 1, 2010 . Heard. The appellant is the original defendant. A suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff for eviction and possession of the suit property. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was his tenant and the tenancy of the defendant was validly terminated by a notice dated 17.08.2005. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant had illegally made material alterations in the suit property which adversely affected the value of the suit property. According to the plaintiff, the defendant-tenant was a habitual defaulter and the landlord also required the suit premises for his bona fide occupation. The defendant denied 2 the claim of the plaintiff and also denied that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The defendant pleaded that he had purchased the suit property from one Shri Shukla in the year 1992. It was also pleaded that the notice dated 17.08.2005 was not in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant denied that the defendant had materially altered the suit premises and was a habitual defaulter. It was denied by the defendant that the plaintiff bona fide required the suit premises for his use. The trial Court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, came to a conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and the defendant was a tenant thereof. The trial Court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant was a habitual defaulter. The trial Court, however, held that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the defendant had made material alterations in the building and the plaintiff- landlord required the suit premises for his bona fide occupation. The trial Court, however, dismissed the suit on the ground that the notice issued by the plaintiff was not in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 3 The first appellate Court maintained the findings recorded by the trial Court in regard to the material alterations made by the tenant and also in regard to the bona fide need of the landlord to use the suit premises. The first appellate Court held that the tenant was a habitual defaulter. As there were counter appeals by the parties, the appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed and the appeal filed by the landlord was allowed and the finding, on the point of habitual default by the tenant, was reversed by the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court held that the notice dated 17.08.2005 was clearly in accordance with the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first appellate Court, held that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property as in the Civil Suit No.71/2002, the plaintiff was declared to be the owner of the suit property and the defendant had failed to produce the registered sale-deed on record to prove his ownership though he had alleged that he had purchased the suit property in the year 1992 from one Shri Shukla. 4 The findings recorded by the first appellate Court are pure findings of facts based on a proper appreciation of the material evidence on record. They do not give rise to any substantial question of law. The second appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE APTE