HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Civil Revision Petition No.4279 of 2005 Date: 22-3-2013 Between Smt. D.Yashodamma and 5 others … Petitioners/Appellants and State of Andhra Pradesh, Through Spl. Tahsildar … Respondent/Respondent HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Civil Revision Petition No.4279 of 2005 Order: The revision petitioners are the appellants in L.R.A.No.30 of 1995 before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy. The appeal was laid under Section 20(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (the Act, for short), to set aside the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy, dated 26-7-1995 in C.C.No.579/Z/75. The finding of the Land Reforms Tribunal that the 2nd appellant/2nd petitioner herein held land in an extent equivalent to 2.0168 S.H. (Standard Holding, for short) and that he is entitled to one Standard Holding only and that he possessed surplus land to an extent of 1.0168 Standard Holding, which is liable for surrender, was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants preferred the present revision. 2. The facts that led to filing this revision are as under: (a) One late Narsa Reddy is the husband of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the illatom son-in-law of the 1st petitioner. Late Narsa Reddy possessed Ac.100-52 cents at Hoti (K) Village, Zaheerabad Mandal, Medak District. Narsa Reddy died in 1959. (b) After the Act came into force, the 1st petitioner filed declaration in C.C.No.579/Z/75 before the Land Reforms Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy. Inter alia, the 1st petitioner claimed that the 2nd petitioner is illatom son-in- law and that he was entitled to one Standard Holding apart from one Standard Holding to which the 1st petitioner as the widow of Narsa Reddy was entitled to. The Land Reforms Tribunal, which is the Primary Authority, passed orders on 13-02-1976 allotting one Standard Holding to the 1st petitioner and declared that the 1st petitioner was surplus holder of 1.0168 Standard Holding. Her claim that the 2nd petitioner, as the illatom son-in-law, was entitled to one Standard Holding was not accepted by the Primary Authority. 3. The 1st petitioner consequently preferred an appeal in L.R.A.No.55 of 1976 before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy. Through orders dated 28-7-1976, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the order dated 13-02-1976 passed by the Primary Authority and directed the Primary Authority to issue notice to the 2nd petitioner herein directing him to file a declaration in respect of the properties as provided by Section 8(2) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal further held that the 1st petitioner was not entitled to any property at all and that she was not entitled to file any declaration under the Act. 4. Consequent upon the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, the 2nd petitioner was directed to file a declaration under Section 8 of the Act. The 2nd petitioner thereafter filed his declaration. However, the 1st petitioner herein preferred C.R.P.No.1825 of 1976 before this Court assailing the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal in L.R.A.No.55 of 1976, dated 13-02-1976. C.R.P.No.1825 of 1976 was subsequently disposed of. The 2nd petitioner did not appear before the Primary Authority despite notice although he filed a declaration as directed by the Primary Authority. Considering the material available on record, the Primary Authority (Land Reforms Tribunal) found that the 2nd petitioenr has been in possession of 2.0168 Standard Holding and that he thus was in excessive possession of 1.0168 Standard Holding, which is liable for surrender to the Government. This order of the Primary Authority was challenged in L.R.A.No.30 of 1995. The Appellate Tribunal through judgment dated 31-12-2002 held that the order in L.R.A.No.55 of 1976, dated 28-7- 1976, was binding against the petitioners and operates as res judicata against the 1st petitioner, so much so, the 1st petitioner is not entitled to claim one Standard Holding apart from one Standard Holding by the 2nd petitioner. The Appellate Tribunal consequently held that the 2nd petitioner alone was entitled to one Standard Holding only and dismissed the appeal. 5. Sri V.L.N.G.K.Murthy, learned Counsel for the revision petitioners, contended that the adoption deed of the illatom son-in-law allotted one share to late Narsa Reddy and one share to the illatom son-in-law, who is the 2nd petitioner herein. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent-State, however, placed reliance upon G.NARAYANAPPA v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P.[1]. The Supreme Court observed in that case that illatom son-in-law cannot be equated to the natural son and would take what is conveyed to him and not otherwise. If the adoption deed conferred rights upon the 2nd petitioner, he acquires the same subject to the terms of the Act. I am afraid that the illatom son-in-law cannot claim a separate Standard Holding when the separate holding is alloted to the owner of the property, and vice- versa. 6. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners pointed out that it is not only the illatom son-in-law of Narsa Reddy but the widow of Narsa Reddy also filed the appeal in L.R.A.No.30 of 1995 and the present revision. It is his further contention that the orders in C.R.P.No.1825 of 1976 do not bind the 2nd petitioner as the 2nd petitioner was not a party to the said revision petition. He also contended that the dismissal of C.R.P.No.1825 of 1976 is that the 1st petitioner herein was not a surplus holder of agricultural land. It may however be noticed that the orders in the revision admittedly were passed before the 2nd petitioner came on record. I therefore consider that the orders in the former appeal in L.R.A.No.55 of 1976 operate as res judicata as against the 2nd petitioner as the 1st petitioner as well as the 2nd petitioner herein are claiming through Narsa Reddy and when the earlier revision was dismissed on merits and the Appellate Authority from which the revision was laid held that the 2nd petitioner was the sole owner of the properties became confirmed by the dismissal of the revision. 7. In that view of the matter, the impugned order by the Appellate Tribunal is perfectly justified in holding that the 2nd petitioner alone is the owner of the property and he is the excess holder of 1.0168 Standard Holding, which is liable to be surrendered to the Government. I therefore see no merits in this revision. There are no grounds to interfere with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal. The revision consequently is dismissed confirming the order of the Appellate Tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs. ___________________ K.G.SHANKAR, J. 22nd March, 2013. Ak HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Civil Revision Petition No.4279 of 2005 (P.D. Order) 22nd March, 2013. (Ak) [1] (1992) 1 SCC 197