THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO APPEAL SUIT No.1293 of 1986 Dated: .08.2010 Between: Gogikar Kishanji, And others. ….Appellants And Thakur Kala Bai, And others. …Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO APPEAL SUIT No.1293 of 1986 JUDGMENT: The first appellant (hereafter referred to as plaintiff) is the plaintiff in O.S.No.245 of 1978 (hereafter called, declaration suit). By impugned judgment the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nalgonda (now Senior Civil Judge) dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for declaration of title and possession of plaint B schedule property. The suit was tried along with O.S.No.65 of 1976 (hereafter called, possession suit) and O.S.No.53 of 1979 (hereafter called, partition suit) filed by one or the other legal heirs of Thakur Devi Singh. The plaintiff filed the suit based on a sale deed executed by successors of Thakur Devi Singh on account of non-redemption of mortgage which was earlier executed in respect of the suit schedule property allegedly covering a rice mill and considerable extent of land appurtenant thereto. The brief background of the case is as follows. Thakur Devi Singh was a landlord. He was also a businessman and arrack contractor. He acquired quite a few properties. Ratna Bai is the daughter of late Thakur Hari Singh, who was the adoptive father of Thakur Devi Singh. Thakur Devi Singh had a daughter and a son through his wife Kalavathi Bai. Among others, Thakur Devi Singh also owned land admeasuring Acs.10.29 cents in survey Nos.1247 and 1248 including rice mill thereon bearing No.6-1/62-A (A schedule property). The property was situated at Panagal Village of Ramagiri locality in Nalgonda including an extent of Ac.0.10 guntas in survey No.1247 and Ac.1.30 guntas in survey No.1248 (B schedule property). Thakur Devi Singh mortgaged B schedule property under registered document dated 21.11.1963 in favour of Gogikar Kishanji. This included the rice mill building. He died in September 1966 leaving behind his wife, daughter and a son. In 1976 his minor son and minor daughter represented by Thakur Hari Dayal Singh filed O.S.No.65 of 1976 for recovery of possession of different properties. The suit was filed against the sister of Thakur Devi Singh and others. In the said suit they also impeached the partition deed dated 17.03.1967 between Ratna Bai and Kala Bai as not binding on them. Sometime thereafter, wife, daughter and son of late Thakur Devi Singh conveyed mortgaged property under registered document dated 05.02.1977 for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/- because they could not redeem the mortgage. Based on the said document, Kishanji (first appellant herein) filed a declaration suit in respect of B schedule property and for a consequential injunction. While the suit was pending, in 1979 the sister of late Thakur Devi Singh, namely, Ratna Bai instituted O.S.No.53 of 1979 for partition of the properties including A and B schedule properties. As noticed, all the suits were tried together and evidence was recorded in O.S.No.53 of 1979. In Kishanji’s declaration suit the defence of the legal heirs of late Thakur Devi Singh as well as those who are arrayed as defendants in the suit because they were in possession of the A schedule property is as follows. Kalavathi Bai, the widow of Thakur Devi Singh, as defendant No.1, admitted the mortgage of rice mill bearing No.6-1/62- A. She alleged that the actual property mortgaged was 220’ X 60’ admeasuring 1467 square yards. The allegation that the land appurtenant thereto in B schedule was also part of the mortgage was denied. The allegation that the land in survey Nos.1247 and 1248 including building was handed over possession by Thakur Devi Singh was denied. According to her, there was no intention between the parties to create any right in favour of Kishanji mortgaging the entire agricultural property in survey Nos.1247 and 1248. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 also filed separate written statement supporting defendant No.1. They further alleged that the repeal of Sections 47 and 48 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (Tenancy Act, for brevity), has no effect, and that the entire property was not handed over possession to the mortgagee. It was also stated that a part of the property was acquired by the State Government for laying railway track, and that they sold the land to different plot owners for construction of houses. Defendant No.8 while denying the title of Thakur Devi Singh set up a Will allegedly executed by Thakur Hari Singh on 14.11.1931 and claimed exclusive rights over the property. Based on the pleadings in all the three suits, the trial Court framed as many as twenty one issues. Issues 6, 14, 15 and 18 are relevant insofar as the declaration suit is concerned. They are as follows. 6. Whether the plaintiff (in OS 245/78 and D5 in OS.53/79) acquired title to the suit rice mill under registered sale deed executed by D-1 to D-3 and whether it binds the plaintiffs? 14. Whether the plaintiff in O.S.245/78 acquired possession plaint B schedule land under the mortgage deed executed by late Thakur Devi Singh? 15. Alternatively whether the plaintiff in O.S.245/78 acquired title to the plaint B schedule property by adverse possession? 18. Whether the plaintiff (in O.S.245/78) is entitled to the relief of perpetual injunction? In the joint trial conducted, Ratna Bai (defendant No.7), who had filed the partition suit, deposed as P.W.1. The plaintiff, Kishanji, gave evidence as D.W.7. D.Ws.1 to 6 and 8 to 10 were also examined. As many as 47 documents in A series and 269 documents in B series were marked. Insofar as the issues relevant to O.S.No.245 of 1978 are concerned, the findings recorded by the trial Court are as follows. On issue No.6 it was found that the plaintiff acquired title to rice mill situated in 1500 square yards out of land comprised in survey Nos.1247 and 1248, and that the same is binding on the legal heirs of late Thakur Devi Singh. The finding on issue Nos.14 and 15 is that the possession of Kishanji was permissive possession after deletion of Section 47 of the Tenancy Act, but he cannot be deemed to be in adverse possession of mortgaged lands, and that the plaintiff is not entitled for perpetual injunction in respect of the property. The suit was accordingly dismissed. Counsel for the appellants submits that the defendants having admitted execution of mortgage deed Ex.B221, dated 21.11.1963 as well as sale deed Ex.B222 dated 05.02.1977 are bound by the documents, and therefore, the Court below erred in dismissing the suit. He points out that as Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act were in force in 1963 it was not mentioned in Ex.B222 that the property sold is the rice mill along with entire agricultural land in survey Nos.1247 and 1248. He also relies on the plan attached to Ex.B222 in support of the contention. Nextly, he contends that after deletion of Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act with effect from 18.03.1969 possession of the plaintiff became valid, and adverse to that of the mortgager, and therefore, on issue Nos.14 and 15 the trial Court ought to have held in favour of the plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal the seventh respondent died and her legal heir has come on record. He alone opposed the appeal and none appeared for others. The party-in-person, who is the son of the seventh defendant, submits that Thakur Devi Singh had no right and title to suit schedule property to execute mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. He also submits that the sale deed Ex.B222 executed by defendant Nos.1 to 3 in favour of the plaintiff is not valid and binding on Ratna Bai or her legal representatives. Before taking up other points for consideration, here it is necessary to mention that Ratna Bai filed O.S.No.53 of 1979 for partition. The same was dismissed. She then filed A.S.No.1729 of 1986 before this Court. The son and daughter of Thakur Devi Singh (who are defendant Nos.2 and 3 in the present proceedings) filed A.S.No.1671 of 1997. During the pendency, it appears, Ratna Bai died and legal representatives were not brought on record. Such applications were filed with delay of 2964 days. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed those applications on 19.06.2000. As a result of this, the cause of Ratna Bai or her legal representatives does not survive. Therefore, the issue raised by the party-in-person that he was adopted by his grandfather, and that Thakur Devi Singh had no title to the petition schedule property stands concluded and it cannot be reagitated by him. The first point for consideration that arises in this appeal is whether Thakur Devi Singh mortgaged under Ex.B221 the land and the rice mill thereon. The submission made is that though the land was also mortgaged, in view of Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act, the same was not specifically mentioned, but all along the plaintiff alone has been in possession and enjoyment of the land. Section 47 of the Tenancy Act prohibits permanent alienation or any other transfer of agricultural land without the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. The same reads as under. 47. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any decree or order of a Court, no permanent alienation and no other transfer of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. Provided that the Tahsildar may declare a permanent alienation or any other transfer of agricultural land to be valid if the permanent alienation or transfer took place before the commencement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1954 and possession of the land transferred was given to the vendee before such commencement if application for sanction is made within one year after such commencement. (2) Applications for such previous sanction shall be made and disposed of in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. It is admitted case that in respect of the land, which is now mentioned in plaint A schedule, there were tenants. When the tenants are in possession, it is quite improbable that Thakur Devi Singh would have mortgaged the property in favour of the plaintiff. Secondly, the transaction is covered by a registered document Ex.B221. What is the property that is mortgaged has to be determined with reference to the document, and no oral evidence is permissible. Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, bars any party to the proceedings to let in oral evidence in respect of a transaction, which is covered by a document and/or a registered document. This is not one case, which falls within any of the exceptions therein. A perusal of Ex.B221 would show that what was mortgaged was 1500 square yards and the rice mill situated thereon. The plea of the plaintiff that though the entire extent of land mortgaged was not mentioned therein, by reason of Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act, he has been in actual possession of the property, cannot be accepted. It is admitted case that after death of Thakur Devi Singh his legal representatives, defendant Nos.1 to 3, could not redeem the property. They, therefore, executed registered sale deed Ex.B222, dated 05.02.1977, for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/-. This also does not support the plea of the plaintiff that plaint A and B schedule properties were mortgaged and subsequently sold to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the submission cannot be countenanced. The second point is with regard to adverse possession. Alternatively, the plaintiff pleads that the entire extent of property is in his possession from 1961, and therefore, he has perfected his title by adverse possession. The Counsel submits that Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was deleted with effect from 18.03.1969, that thereafter the plaintiff’s possession became valid, and therefore, being open and hostile possession the plaintiff has perfected his title by adverse possession. This submission cannot be accepted. The plaintiff relied on Exs.B1 to B3, Khasra pahanies for the years 1964-1965 and 1954- 1955, and Exs.B5 to B22, which are certified copies of pahanies for various years, and the land revenue receipts from 1961 to 1963, Exs.B27 to B59. This documentary evidence is not of much help to the plaintiff for two reasons. Even according to him, Exs.B221 and 222 do not mention the entire property of plaint A and B schedule property along with rice mill. Therefore, the revenue receipts and pahanies, at best, may on probabilities support the plea of possession but not title. Secondly, it is now well settled that the plea of adverse possession is not available to a person who is inducted into possession under a contract, be it agreement of sale or be it usufructory mortgage. A reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad v Ram Ekbal Rai[1], Mohan Lal v Mirza Abdul Gaffar[2], Karnataka Board of Wakf v Government of India[3] and Hemaji Waghaji Jat v Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan[4]. In Ambika Prasad, Supreme Court considered presumption of continuity of possession. It was held that The presumption of future continuance is noticed in Illustration (d) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognised both in India, see Anangamanjari Chowdhrani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrani, 14 Ind App 101 at p. 110 (PC), and England, see Bristow v. Cormican (1878) 3AC 641 at pp. 669, 670 Doe v. Young (1845) 8 QB 63: 115 ER 798. The broad observation in Manmatha Nath v. Girish Chandra Roy, 38 Cal WN 763 at p. 770; (AIR 1934 Cal 707 at p. 708) and Hemendra Nath v. Jnanendra Prasanna, 40 Cal WN 115 at p. 117: (AIR 1935 Cal 702 at p. 704), that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances. As per the above ratio, if it is shown that a person is in possession of a thing at a given point of time, unless contrary exists, it is always presumed that within reasonable proximate time such person continues to hold the thing forwards and backwards. In Mohan Lal, the appellant came into possession of the suit lands pursuant to agreement of sale, dated 08.03.1956, after paying part consideration. Subsequently, Mirza Abdul Gaffar purchased the land by sale deed, dated 23.03.1960. In the meanwhile, the appellant’s suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed. In the suit filed by respondent for possession, the appellant raised a plea of adverse possession and also contented that he is entitled to retain possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The plea of adverse possession and part performance was not accepted by Supreme Court and it was held as under (Paras 4 and 5). As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription 'nec vi nec clam nec precario'. Since the appellant's claims is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant. … The question then is whether he is entitled to retain possession under Section 53-A. It is an admitted fact that suit for specific performance had been dismissed and became final. Then the question is whether he is entitled to retain possession under the agreement. Once he lost his right under the agreement by dismissal of the suit, it would be inconsistent and incompatible with his right to remain in possession under the agreement. Even otherwise, a transferee can avail of Section 53-A only as a shield but not as a sword. It contemplates that where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, he would be entitled to retain possession and to continue in possession which he has already received from the transferor so long as he is willing to perform his part of contract. Agreement does not create title on interest in the property. Since the agreement had met with dismissal of the suit his willingness to perform his part of the contract does not arise. In Karnataka Board of Wakf, Supreme Court following Mohan Lal held that a person who obtains possession under agreement of sale cannot take a plea of adverse possession, as it would be inconsistent with the plea of coming into possession under the agreement. In this case allegedly the plaintiff is in possession of suit schedule properties under Exs.B221 and 222, and therefore, the said possession is permissive possession and not adverse possession. The trial Court considering the aspect rightly decided the issue against the plaintiff though it was held that the plaintiff acquired title to suit rice mill under registered sale deed - Ex.B222. In the result, for the above reasons, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. __________________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) .08.2010 vs [1] AIR 1966 SC 605 [2] (1996) 1 SCC 639 : AIR 1996 SC 910 [3] (2004) 10 SCC 779 [4] 2008 (6) ALD 121 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 103