HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.GOPAL REDDY DT. 11-2-2010 S.A.Nos.1131, 1170, 1171 and 1182 of 2009 SA No.1131/2009: Sri Venkateswara New Cloth Market, a firm represented by its Partner Nakkina Vara Prasad …Appellant V. 1. M. Ganadhar and others. ..Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.GOPAL REDDY S.A.Nos.1131, 1170, 1171 and 1182 of 2009 COMMON JUDGMENT: Since the point involved in all these second appeals is one and the same, they are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. These four-second appeals, by one and the same plaintiff in OS No.37, 35, 36, and 38 of 2002 on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, are directed against the judgments and decrees of the Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry dt. 6-8-2009 passed in AS Nos.226, 227, 229 and 228 of 2007 respectively, whereby learned Judge allowed the appeals filed by the respective defendants in the above suits setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by the 1 Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry dt. 3-11-2007 in OS Nos.37, 35, 36 and 38 of 2002 respectively directing the respective defendants to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit schedule premises; to pay arrears of rent with subsequent interest and to pay future profits to be determined by way of separate application, and dismissed the suits filed by the appellant-plaintiff herein in all the second appeals. For the sake of convenience, the appellant-plaintiff in all the second appeals will be hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiff-firm”. The respondent-defendant-Korlepara Someswara Rao in all the appeals is the landlord of the plaintiff-firm (hereinafter referred to as “the paramount title holder”. The the respondents-defendants other than the paramount title holder are the sub-tenants of the plaintiff-firm (hereinafter referred to “defendants-sub-tenants”) The plaintiff-firm in all the suits filed before the trial court is the tenant of the respective suit schedule premises. The plaintiff-firm is a statutory tenant of the suit schedule premises and the lease in between the plaintiff-firm and the paramount title holder is governed by Andhra Pradesh (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,1960 (for short “the Rent Control Act”). The predecessors of the partners of the plaintiff-firm originally took the building for a period of 25 years under a lease deed dt. 17-9-1975, which permits the original lessees to sub-let the schedule property after construction of the shopping complex on their own expenses and to sub-lease the shop rooms in favour of third parties. The original lessees entered into a partnership under the name and style of plaintiff--Sri Venkateswara New Cloth Market, which was re- constituted from time to time after the death of original lessees, and last such partnership was on 5-4-1999 and it was registered. The plaintiff-firm leased out the respective suit schedule premises to the defendants-(sub-tenants) and the same was governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The defendants (sub-tenants) were irregular in payment of rents and have committed default in paying the rents and on the ill advise of the paramount title holder, the defendants (sub- tenants) have stopped the paying rentals to the plaintiff-firm, in spite the plaintiff-firm informing about subsisting of tenancy in between the plaintiff-firm and the paramount title holder and the same has not been determined as per the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The plaintiff-firm got issued notices under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,1982 by determining the tenancy calling upon the respective defendants (sub-tenants) to vacate and deliver vacant possession. The respective defendants (sub-tenants) gave replies with false allegations and filed caveats. The defendants, who are the sub-tenants of the plaintiff-firm, filed written statements while admitting the tenancy and quantum of rent denied the other allegations made in the plaint, and contended that they received notices from the paramount title holder informing them that the lease between the defendants (sub-tenants) and the plaintiff-firm will be determined by midnight of 30-4-2001 and they have to vacate the premises as the lease between the principal tenant ie., the plaintiff-firm and the paramount title holder falls under the Transfer of Property Act,1882. On exchange of notices and according to the advise of the elders, the lease between the plaintiff-firm and the paramount title holder and sub-tenants was determined by 30-4-2001 and on 1-5-2001 the defendants (sub-tenants) entered into lease agreements afresh with the paramount title holder for the purpose of carrying on their business on a monthly rent and the same was reduced into writing under registered lease deeds dt. 31-12-2001. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff- firm and the defendants (sub-tenants), therefore, the plaintiff-firm has no right to issue notices under Sec., 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882 as he is not a landlord by then and the paramount title holder is the landlord of the premises. The paramount title holder filed separate written statements admitting the lease deed executed for a period of 25 years between him and the plaintiff-firm and the said lease was expired as it was terminated by him on 30-4-2001 by issuing a quit notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882. He was inducted into possession by one of the managing partners of the plaintiff-firm ie., Smt. M. Somaraju and as such the plaintiff-firm cannot maintain the suit represented by Nakkina Vara Prasad, as the other Managing Partners of the plaintiff-firm already effected delivery of premises to him and on such delivery, he entered into agreements with the defendants (sub-tenants), as such, the plaintiff-firm has no right to file the suits as he cannot be called as a landlord either under the Transfer of Property Act,1882 or under the Rent Control Act. On the above pleadings, the trial court framed issues and additional issues in all the original suits separately. Evidence was adduced separately in all the original suits. The trial court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties decreed the suits by separate judgments dt. 3-1-2007. Aggrieved by the judgments, the defendants-(sub-tenants) filed appeals before the Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional District Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry. The lower appellate court framed similar points for consideration in all the appeals. One of such points in AS No.226/2007 are: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for eviction and recovery of arrears with interest and future profits from the defendants 1and 2? 2. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is sustainable or not is to be seen in this appeal? The lower appellate court after re-appreciating the evidence made available on record while allowing the appeals observed that after completion of 25 years period governed by registered lease deed dt.17-9-1975 (Ex.B-7 in OS No.36/2002), the paramount title holder issued a legal notice dt. 19-3-2001 terminating the lease of the original lessees by 30-4-2001 and also sought for eviction of all the sub-tenants including the plaintiff-firm. Under the threat of eviction from the paramount title holder, the sub-lessees at the intervention of elders attorned their tenancy to the paramount title holder and entered into fresh registered lease agreements with him with effect from 1-5-2001 and started paying rents to the paramount title holder from 1-5-2001. Further, the trial court has not considered the relationship between the paramount title holder and the principal tenant i.e., plaintiff-firm is not governed by the Act and the petition seeking for deposit of rents is still pending before the Rent Controller. In the absence of any final conclusion about their landlord and tenant relationship, it cannot be considered that principal tenant’s tenancy ie., plaintiff’s firm tenancy, as governed by the Rent Control Act. A copy of the caveat petition filed by the principal tenant (plaintiff-firm) under Ex.A-12 in OS No.36/2002) clearly discloses that principal tenant has filed the caveat petition in his individual capacity only and not in the capacity of the partner of the firm, it shows he has no authority from the other partners of the firm, on the date of filing of the caveat. Even, if it is construed that the defendants (sub-tenants) are continuing as the tenants of the principal tenant ie., plaintiff firm, they are continuing against the will of the paramount title holder, and as such the principal tenant ie, plaintiff-firm has to be treated as trespasser of the property. As per Ex.B-7 lease deed dt.17-9-1975 marked in OS No.36/2002 the lessees are four individuals. A close perusal of Ex.B-7 would show that none of the original lessess under Ex.B-7 are the partners in the plaintiff-firm. Ex.A-1 is the original Form-C certificate of plaintiff’s firm, and Ex.A-2 is the partnership deed dt. 5-4-1999. They are much subsequent to Ex.B-7 lease deed, which came into effect from 1975. The plaintiff-firm failed to prove that the firm is the original lessee under Ex.B-7. The plaintiff-firm has not filed any record from 1975 to show that original lessees under Ex.B-7 are the original partners in the plaintiff-firm. The judgment of the Supreme Court in VASHU DEO V. BAL KISHAN[1], on which much reliance is placed by the plaintiff applies only when the plaintiff-firm is the original lessee under Ex.B-7 and lease is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act. When such proof is lacking in this case, the plaintiff-firm should fail in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in D.SATYANARAYANA V. P. JAGADISH[2] and accordingly held that the attornment made by the defendants (sub-tenants) to the paramount title holder under the threat of eviction is legally valid. The lower appellate court rejected the contention of the plaintiff-firm that the original lessees under the paramount title holder admitted him as a tenant in his pleadings and evidence since the suit is filed against the sub-tenant only and no relief is sought by the plaintiff-firm against the paramount title holder, who got himself impleaded as party to the suit at a subsequent period of time. Further, the principal tenant ie., plaintiff-firm failed to examine any other partner except himself to show that the partnership is not dissolved. When the paramount title holder adduced sufficient evidence to show that partnership stood dissolved by way of filing Exs.B-4 to B-6, it is incumbent on the part of the plaintiff-firm to examine any other partner about re-constitution of the firm, for which he is a managing partner. In the absence of the same, the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff-firm in all the appeals strenuously contends that when the lower appellate court failed to consider the entire evidence including the evidence of D.W.2, particularly admissions made by her in her cross-examination, the finding of the lower appellate court cannot be sustainable. In the absence of any eviction order passed by the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be ceased between the plaintiff-firm and the paramount title holder and the surrender as pleaded by D.W.2 whose evidence in the cross- examination is not supported the case of the plaintiff-firm, itself is a substantial question of law to be decided in the second appeals. I do not see any merit in the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. The Supreme Court in D.SATYANARAYANA (2 supra), on which much reliance was placed by the lower appellate Court, held that the general rule is that the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of the landlord ie., lessor, but it is held that the said rule does not apply when the tenant is under the threat of eviction by person claiming paramount title attorning tenancy. The Supreme Court in para 4 observed that “it is open to the tenant even without surrendering possession to show that since the date of the tenancy, the title of the landlord came to an end or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned to the paramount title-holder. In the cases at hand, it is not in dispute Korlepally Someswara Rao is the paramount title holder. Threat of eviction under Ex.B-2-office copy of notice (marked in OS No.36/2002) is not disputed by the parties. The plaintiff-firm failed to prove that the original lessees under Ex.B-7-lease deed are the partners of the plaintiff-firm and after reconstitution of the firm, he is the managing partner of the firm and is entitled to be in possession. When paramount title holder though denied tenancy, he pleaded that on issuance of notice for eviction on expiry of lease period after 25 years, the original lessees entered into contracts with him. In the notice issued by the plaintiff-firm to the paramount title holder prior to the suit discloses that the plaintiff contended that the heirs of the original lessees entered into a contract with the paramount title holder. Once the plaintiff-firm admitted that the original lessees under the paramount title holder are different from the plaintiff and when there is positive evidence adduced by D-2- paramount title holder, partnership stood dissolved by Exs.B-4 to B-6, the burden is on the plaintiff-firm to examine any other partner to prove reconstitution of the firm. It is emphatically contended that D.W.2 in the cross-examination has not supported the claim of paramount title holder, but D.W.2 in her affidavit in lieu of chief examination categorically stated that she is the managing partner of the plaintiff firm and Nakkina Vara Prasad who represented the plaintiff is another Managing Partner of the plaintiff-firm. The property was taken on lease about 30 yeas back. After reconstitution of the firm from time to time, herself and Nakkina Vara Prasad remained as Managing Partners. After expiry of the lease period of 25 years, the paramount title holder issued a notice terminating their tenancy, and the same was informed to her by Nakkina Vara Prasad. In order to avoid disputes and in view of her old age, she handed over the tenancy of the plaint schedule property to K. Someswara Rao, which was taken from their sub- tenants, by attorning their tenancies in favour of the Paramount title holder. After making attornment in the year 2001, the plaintiff-firm has no tenant and landlord relationship with the paramount title holder, who subsequently informed her that he executed lease deeds in favour of the sub-tenants. In her cross-examination, no doubt D.W.2 admitted that her sons are looking after those affairs and they used to collect the rents. She does not know who is the owner of the shopping complex. She did not receive any notice from K. Someswara Rao. No suggestion was made to her on behalf of the plaintiff that she was never be the managing partner of the firm along with Nakkina Vara Prasad-P.W.1. In view of the same, the lower appellant court rightly held that the plaintiff-firm failed to establish re-constitution of the firm on dissolution under Exs.B-4 to B-6 and it is authorized to maintain the suits on behalf of the firm for eviction of the sub-tenants on issuance of notice. Once it is admitted that the lease in favour of plaintiff-firm is terminated from 30-04-2001 by issuing quit notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act, the tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor has since come to an end and he is attorned the tenancy to the paramount title holder under the threat of eviction and can put up such defence either to an action for rent or to a suit in ejectment. The findings recorded by the lower appellant court, while reversing the findings of the trial court, are based on appreciation of evidence and cogent reasons were assigned for coming to such conclusion by applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in D.ATYANARAYANA (2 supra) where the Supreme Court referred its earlier judgment in MANGAT RAM v SARDAR MEHARBAN SINGH (AIR 1987 SC 1656) wherein it was observed “The estoppel contemplated by S.116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the tenancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor has since come to an end. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgments passed by the lower appellate Court allowing the appeals and dismissing the suits filed by the appellant/plaintiff—firm, do not suffer from any manifest illegality which give rise to question of law, much less substantial question of law, for consideration in the second appeals and they are accordingly dismissed at the admission stage. No costs. _______________ A. GOPAL REDDY, J Date:11-2-2010 Kmr/Murthy [1] 2002(1) RCJ 107=(2002) 2 SCC 50 [2] AIR 1987 SC 2192