/^,-:'^\ •^/^/^- '!^3^^ ^pj^ ?^'D HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR SINGLE^ENCH: HON'BLE SHRLMANINDRA IV10HAN SHRLVASTAVA,J. Writ Petition (Cl N0.5817 of 2008 Petitioner Zila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Jagdalpur Respondents Versus State Information Commission and another / H^ FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF QRDER QN b JViAY, 2QU I SdA 1 [Manindra Mohan Shrivastaval ee ,; ^^*^-\ ;.'^>, -^, ff;1"'1 '• '% HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR Sinale Bench: Hon'ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. Writ Petition (0 N0.5817 of 2008 Petitioner Respondenjs Zila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Jagdalpur Versus State Information Commission and another (Writ Petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India) Present:- Shri Prafull Bharat, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Shyam Tekchandani, counsel for respondent No.1. ORDER (Pronounced on 6 -05-2011 ) By this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to assail the correctness and validity of order dated 26-09-2008 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Chief Information Commissioner, Chhattisgarh Information Commission, Raipur, by which, the petitioner has been directed to provide information as requested by respondent No.2-applicant. 2. The factual matrix of the case giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner is a Co-operative Bank registered under the Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The petitioner is engaged in the business of banking, and at the same, time also deals in sale and purchase of minor forest produce, food grains, fertilizers etc., through its subsidiary societies known as Adim Jati Sewa Sahakari Samiti. Respondent No.2 was terminated from the service of the petitioner on the allegations of embezzlement. On 06-05-2008 (Annexure P-2), the respondent No.2 moved an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (In short "the Act of 2005") and requested to provide certain information as also supply of copies of certain documents. In response, the petitioner sent communication dated 28-05-2008 (Annexure P-3) to respondent No.2 informing '*1> that the desired information could not be disclosed, as the information relates to personal information, confidentiality of which, cannot be disclosed, and therefore, exempted from disclosure under Section 8 ofthe Act of 2005. Thereafter, another application was moved on 13-06-2008 (Annexure P-4) by the respondent No.2 making request for disclosure of the same information as made earlier. In response, the petitioner vide his communication dated 16-06-2008 (Annexure P- 5) intimated to respondent No.2 that, as advised by National State Co-operative Bank Union, the Co-operative Banks are out of the purview of the Act of 2005, and therefore, information sought could not be disclosed. 3. Aggrieved by the rejection of application, respondent No.2 filed an application (Annexure P-6) before the State Information Commission. Upon receipt of the application, a memo dated 28-06-2008 (Annexure P-7) was issued intimating the petitioner that the complaint of respondent No.2 shall be heard through Video Conferencing on 26-09-2008. After hearing the parties through Video Conferencing, the Chief Information Commissioner passed the impugned order on 26-09-2008, directing the petitioner to provide inspection of documents free of cost within 15 days, and thereafter, supply information free of cost up to the cbst of Rs.50/- and information above the cost of Rs.50/-, after receiving the prescribed fee. 4. Impugning the aforesaid order,. learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order passed by the Chief Information Commissioner, Chhattisgarh State Information Commission is in excess of authority and without jurisdiction as the Act of 2005 is not applicable to the Co-operative Banks. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Co-operative Bank is not a 'public authority' as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005. In his submission, Co-operative Bank is registered under the Co-operative Society Act, which is engaged in the business of banking and is not any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted by any other law made by State ;'-. '^ ,8ten"'». j ^.W^J "as^'°" ^^r ^ Legislature or by notification issued or order made by the State Government. He further submits that the petitioner-Co-operative Bank is neither owned nor substantially financed nor controlled by the government. 5. Learned counse] for the petitioner argued that the word 'control' as it occurs in (1) of Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005 would mean deep and pervasive control in order to bring the petitioner within the purview of Public Authority under the Act of 2005. Therefore, it is stated, the petitioner is not a public authority as the State Government does not exercise deep and pervasive control administratively or financially in respect of the petitioner-Bank. It is next contended that the application submitted by the respondent No.2 before the Chief Information Commissioner was misconceived as the respondent No.2, if aggrieved by the order ofthe petitioner, ought to have first exhausted the remedy of appeal and then only, respondent No.1 could be approached in second appeal. It is contended that without exhausting the remedy of First Appeal, the application preferred by respondent No.2, which is nothing but second appeal, was not maintainable under the law. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that otherwise also, information sought by the petitioner is exempted from disdosure in view of the provisions contained in Section 8(j) of the Act of 2005, as the information relates to.personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest. It is then urged that the application of the respondent No.2 before the Chief Information Commissioner was without payment of any fee. It is lastly contended that even if the application (Annexure P-6) submitted by the respondent No.2 before the Chief Information Commissioner is treated as complaint under Section 18 of the Act of 2005, no enquiry contemplated under Section 18(2) of the Act of 2005 has been made and the impugned order has been passed by the Chief Information Commission. In support of his submission, learned counsei for the petitioner placed reliance on the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of S. S. <? s f .'.^ \.^s'' Angadi v. State Chief Information Commissioner, Bangalore & Anr., AIR 2008 Karnataka 149, and the Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd v. The State Information Commissioner, Vidarbha Region, Nagpur & Ors., AIR 2009 Bombay 75. 6. In this writ petition, though notices were served on respondents, respondent No.2 has not appeared but submitted his reply opposing the writ petition, the reply is not however supported by any affidavit. Along with the reply, certain documents have also been submitted by the respondent No.2. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 submitted that in view of the definition of 'Public Authority' under Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005, provisions of the Act of 2005 are applicable in the institution of the petitioner as the Co-operative bank is a body controlled by the State Government because it is subject to regulatory control of the State Government under the provisions of Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. He further submits that the application (Annexure P-6) filed by the respondent No.2 is in the nature of complaint and not an appeal. In his submission, under Section 18 of the Act of 2005, where any person has been refused access to any information requested under the Act, he may submit a complaint and the State Information Commission may enquire into the complaint and pass orders and impose penalty as contemplated under Section 20 of the Act of 2005, and at the same time, may direct the public authority to provide access to the information. 8. Amongst various contentions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, the foremost contention raised by learned counsel that petitioner is not covered by the definition of public authority, raises an important question with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 2005 to the petitioner-Co-operative Bank. In order to answer aforesaid question, it is necessary to examine the "•fe ''si statutory scheme of the Act of 2005, as also the scope and ambit of definition of 'public authority' under Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005, in the light of the legislative intention and object behind the Act of 2005. Preamble to the Act of 2005 shows that it is an enactment to provide for setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of any public authority. The preamble further reads that democracy requires informed citizenry and transparency of information, which are vital to his functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed. The Act of 2005 also seeks to harmonize conflicting interest while preserving the paramountcy ofthe democratic ideal. 9. The Act of 2005 intends to confer right to information to all citizens and provisions have been made under Section 4 of the Act of 2005, creating obligation on the public authorities to maintain all its records in a prescribed manner and publish various information enumerated under Section 4(1 )(b) of the Act of 2005. Duty is cast on the Public Information Officer under Section 7 of the Act of 2005 to provide information within the time stipulated. The Rublic Information Officer is obliged to provide information except those which are exhaustively enumerated in Section 8 of the Act of 2005. In order to ensure effective exercise of right to information, provisions have been made for designation of Public Information Officer. The Act provides remedy of appeal, in case, the information sought is not provided by the public authority. The Information Commission has been vested with the wide powers to hear complaints and impose penalty as envisaged under Section 18/20 of the Act of 2005. /f- /--a'^. 1 ISS2^ 1 '& ~^v-:S-,:-i '^ ^!' 10. Section 2(h) defines "Public Authority", which is extremely relevant for decision of the controversy involved in the petition and the same is reproduced below:- 2. Definitions.- (h) "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted- (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any— (f)body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (//) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; 11. While the definition of public authority begins with "means" to say that the "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, it ends with "includes" and says that it includes any- (/) body owned, controlled or substantiallyfinanced; (ii) non-Government Organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government. The definition is therefore exhaustive and not extensive. (Please see Jagir Singh v. S(a(e ofBihar, (1976) 2 SCC 942). It therefore intends to extend the meaning of the term public authority by including within its sweep, the body owned, controlled or substantially financed; non-Government Organisation substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government. It also takes within its sweep and includes any non-Government Organisation 1 ^iss:l I % ^-...- ./;-;"' .^' %-^S.^ji1^ '•4-^' substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government. 12. Petitioner-Bank is registered under the Co-operative Societies Registration Act and engaged in the business of banking in the name and style as Co-operative Bank. The petitioner certainly is not an authority, body or institution or self Government established or constituted by or under the Constitution, by any other law made by Parliament ; by any other law made by State Legislature; or by notification issued or order made by the Central or State Government. Moreover, there is nothing on record either in the form of admission made by the petitioner or any other material placed by the respondents to come to the conclusion that the petitioner-Co-operative Bank is either owned or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the Central or State Government. The question therefore, which arise for consideration, is whether the petitioner can be said to be a body controlled by the Central or the State Government so as to come within the purview of "public authority" as defined under the Act of 2005. 13. The question which arises for consideration is whether the word "control" mentioned in (i) of Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005 is intended to mean mere regulatory control and not deep and pervasive control. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that control as envisaged in the definition of public authority should be interpreted to mean deep and pervasive in the administrative, financial and functional sphere applying the same test, which is applicable in order to determine whether an authority is a 'state' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He submits that by applying the said test of the deep and pervasive control, the petitioner cannot be said to be controlled by the State Government or Central Government within the meaning of the word "control" as defined under the Right to Information Act and cannot be called as "public •ff authority", as has been-'held by the Bombay High Court in the case of Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd (supra). 14. A definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase, which it defines. (Please see 1986 (3) SCC 7). In the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others, (1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases 424, it was propounded:- "33. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act" 15. The definition of public authority in its first part means any authority or body or institution of self-government. Moreover, the definition further requires such institution of self-governments, such authority or body of self-government to be established or constituted by or under the Constitution, by any other law made by Parliament or any other law made by State Legislature; by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government. In the second part of the definition, which is ihclusive in nature is divided in two parts enumerated in the definition part in (i) & (ii) of Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005. The word "control" is preceded and succeeded by words 'owned' and 'substantially financed', which are strong words. The word "control" is required to be construed not in isolation but along with the other parts of the definition clause. 16. Well settled rule of construction, Noscitur a Sociis propounds that the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. In the case of M. K. Rangnathan vs Government of Madras, AIR 1955 Supreme Court 604, the Supreme Court referred to what was stated by the privy council in the case of Angus Robertson & Others v. George Day, 1879 (5) Appeal Cases 63, that it '^.y is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. 17. In the case of Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. versus Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, (1990) 3 Supreme Court Cases 447, the aforesaid rule of construction was explained in following words :- "12. The principle ofstatutory interpretation bywhich a generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason of its context is well established. In the context with which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the "noscitura sociis" principle. This expression simply means that "the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps." In a subsequent decision in the case of Ahinedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Assn. versus Administrative Officer and Others, (2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 755, the aforesaid rule of construction was applied in construing the words "skilled work", "semi-skilled work" and "unskilled work" in following words: 22. In construing the abovementioned three words which are used in association with each other, the rule of construction noscitur a sociis may be applied. The meaning of each of these words is to be understood by the company it keeps. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. The actual order of these three words in juxtaposition indicates that meaning of one takes colour from the other. The rule is explained differently: "that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it". [See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 8th Edn., Syn. 8, at p. 379.] 18. The word 'control' occurring in (i) of Section 2 (h) of the definition of public authority, is certainly indicative of strong word, and has therefore to be construed /.."^ '•v-, ^ ^^ g ^iuiSa^ | 10 \, 'l- in stronger terms in the light of other words and phrases in the definition clauses, which have been noted hereinabove by applying the rule of Noscitur a Sociis. The word "control" therefore, is to be understood in strong sense to say control of high degree and it does not contemplate a mere regulatory control which otherwise is not deep and pervasive. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner is neither owned nor financed much less substantially financed. Therefore, it has to be examined as to whether the State under the scheme of the Co-operative Societies Act, exercises deep and pervasive control or merely regulates or supervises the functioning of a Co-operative Bank. 19. The Petitioner-Co-operative Bank is a class of a Co-operative Society, which upon constitution declared to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal as provided in Section 31 ofthe Chhattisgarh Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 (In short "the Act"). Chapter-ll of the Act makes provision with regard to registration of co-operative societies. Section 7 of the Act shows that the society, has to propose, its own by-laws, which can be amended, by submitting an application to the Registrar, who may on satisfaction, may register the amendment. Section 12 of the Act confers power on the Registrar to direct amendment of bye-laws in certain contingencies. The State Government is empowered under Section 16(C) of the Act to make scheme of reorganization in the public interest in a case of Co-operative Bank with the prior sanction in writing of the of Reserve Bank of India. Under Section 18 of the Act, Registrar has been empowered to cancel registration of a society. Further, under Section 18(A) of the Act, the Registrar is also empowered to order de-registration of a co-operative society. 20. Chapter-111 of the Act makes provision with regard to eligibility to become a member of the Co-operative Societies, their rights and privileges. In Chapter -V, A'-'A "^,, /'••' .^-^^. ''"^' 'SA ' .'•1 I -te^ 1 ^.. ^y^ ..^ h ':< 11 scheme of Management of Societies under Section 48 of the Act clearly states that the final authority in a society shall vest in the general body of members. The State Government has been conferred general powers to give direction in public interest under Section 49 (C) of the Act. Higher degree of control of the State Government in respect of a Society is provided under Section 49(D), 49(E) and 52 of the Act. The Registrar exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the functioning of a co-operative society and in case of mismanagement, it has the authority to supercede the committee or co-operative society. The Registrar has also been empowered to remove officer of the Co-operative Society in certain circumstances enumerated under Section 55 of the Act. The Registrar has been empowered to determine the terms and conditions of employment in co-operative societies. The Registrar has also been empowered to enforce performance of obligations as provided under Section 56 of the Act and to seize records and possession of records as provided under Section 57 and 57-A of the Act. Chapter VI of the Act makes provision with regard to Audit, Inquiry, Inspection and Supervision, Chapter-VII of the Act makes provision with regard to disputes and arbitration. Chapter VIII of the Act makes provision with regard to liquidation of co- operative societies whereunder the Registrar has been empowered to wind up Co-operative Bank under Section 69-A of the Act. 21. The aforesaid statutory scheme of control by State and its functionaries in the matter of registration, framing and enactment of bye-laws and function of co- operative societies including a co-operative Bank goes to show that the nature of control exercisable by the State and it functionaries in respect of the co-operative societies is regulatoi'y in nature. Therefore, such regulatory nature of control in the absence of there being any other attributes, of deep and pervasive control in administration, financial and functional spheres, leads to the conclusion that the co-operative societies in general and co-operative bank like the petitioner one do •'•SBiS^ASiif! 12 w not come within the control of such degree as is intended under (i) of clause 2(h) of the Act of 2005 defining "public authority". 22. In the case of Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd (supra), similar issue arose for determination as to whether the bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act fall within the meaning of "public authority" under Section 2 (h) of the Act of 2005. Applying the test laid down by the c< Supreme Court in the case of S. S. Rana v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies <S another, (2006) 11 SCC 634 : (2006 AIR SCW 3723) and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (AIR 1981 SC 487) and the statutory seheme of control over a co-operative bank under Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, it has been held that co-operative bank does not come within the purview of "public authority" as defined under Section 2(h) of the Act of 2005. 1 am in 'respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid decision. 24. In the final analysis, 1 have to hold that the petitioner-co-operative bank in the present case, on the basis of the material adduced before this Court in the light of the statutory scheme of Act of 2005 and Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, does not come within the purview of "public authority" as defined under Section 2 (h) of the Act. Consequently, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the petitioner-co-operative bank and the order passed by the Chief Information Commission is in excess of authority under the law. In view of what has been held, it is not necessary for this Court to examine other issues raised by the petitioner. The order ofthe Chief Information Commission dated 26- 09-2008 (Annexure P-1) is hereby set aside. The petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. iMa^^M^Shrivastava| Judge ^-^