CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 1 }: IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH DATE OF DECISION: MARCH 25, 2008 Inderpal Singh and others .....Petitioners VERSUS Manohar Singh ....Respondent CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRESENT: Mr. S. K. Singla, Advocate, for the petitioners. Mr. Arun Palli, Sr.Advocate with Mr.Tushar Sharma, Advocate, for the respondent. **** RANJIT SINGH, J. This revision has been filed by the tenants who have failed before the Appellate Court after succeeding before the Court of Rent Controller. The demised premises were earlier owned by Dalip Singh son of Ram Singh. Inderpal Singh, petitioner No.3, was a tenant at the rate of Rs.600/- per month. The demised premises were purchased by respondent, Manohar Singh from Dalip Singh in the year 1977. Respondent has, thus, sought eviction of the petitioners on the ground of arrears of rent w.e.f. 1.1.1998. The other grounds CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 2 }: pleaded are sub-letting of the basement portion, change of user wherein the petitioners had allegedly started selling spare parts and accessories from the premises though the building was ear marked for the general trade. In addition, the ground of personal necessity of the respondent, who has retired from the Government service on 31.12.1984 is also raised. The petitioners appeared before the Rent Controller and tendered the rent on 2.12.1999, which was accepted by the landlord- respondent under protest. The petitioners also controverted the grounds of eviction as alleged. It is denied if any portion of the building is sub-let. It is further stated that there is no change of user as the petitioners were running the business in the tenanted premises under the name of M/s Lovely Enterprises and this premises was being used for the sale of spare-parts. To controvert the ground of personal necessity, as raised by the respondent, the petitioners have pleaded that respondent retired in the year 1984 i.e. 16 years prior to the institution of the present eviction petition, which would in itself be an indication of the fact that the need as projected is not a bonafide one. As a counter claim, the petitioners had also pleaded that they are ready and willing to pay the rent, which had not been intentionally received by the respondent. The Rent Controller decided the issue regarding arrears of rent in favour of the petitioners by holding that they have made a valid tender. The issue of change of user and contravention of the provisions of Capital of Punjab Development Regulation was also held against the respondent. Even the issue of sub-letting and need CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 3 }: of the same on ground of personal necessity were also decided against the respondent and in favour of the petitioners. The respondent thereafter filed an appeal against the same, which has now been allowed and the judgment of the Rent Controller reversed. Since the main aspect on which the appeal has been allowed in favour of the respondent relates to the issue of personal necessity, the counsel representing the parties have fully concentrated on making their submissions on this aspect. The learned counsel representing the petitioners mainly submits that the reasoning given by the Rent Controller decided in favour of the petitioners has not been attended to by the Appellate Court. The plea further is that the arguments as raised before the Appellate Court have also not been dealt with and the evidence has also been ignored. Counsel has read in extenso the findings returned by the Rent Controller to urge that the same have not been properly appreciated and attended to by the Appellate Court. It was otherwise not disputed that the respondent could seek eviction of the petitioners on the ground of bonafide personal use, even though the demised shop is a non-residential premises. It is also pointed out that the landlord is now 80 years old and would not be in a position to carry on the business in the premises. The counsel also emphasized that though the respondent had retired in the year 1984, but filed this petition in the year 1999, though this ground was available to him ever since the decision in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal and anr. Vs. State of Punjab, 1995 (2) RCR 672 in the year 1995. The evidence as led by the respondent has been CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 4 }: appreciated by the Appellate Court. It is noticed that respondent would have sufficient means to run his own business. It is also noticed that the respondent wanted to start this business as he did not wish to depend upon his three sons. His wife is a retired language teacher and he would required this booth for his use and occupation. On the other hand, the petitioners referred to and relied upon the statement that booth No.205, Motor Market Complex, Manimajra, has been allotted in the name of Daler Kaur wife of the respondent. Anil (RW12), who is running a business in the Motor Market at Manimajra, in Booth No.166 was examined to depose that booth No.205 was lying closed. His evidence was ignored on the ground that he was not produced for cross-examination. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, drawn my attention to the record to indicate that RW 12 did appear for the purpose of cross- examination and indeed was cross-examined on behalf of the respondent. He is, thus, justified in saying that his evidence would have to be taken into consideration. It is, thus, to be appreciated that there is an evidence on record through RW12 that Booth No.205 in the Motor Market, Manimajra, is lying closed. At the same time, petitioner Inderpal, while appearing as a witness, deposed that he did not know if any business is being run in Booth No.205, Motor Market, Manimajra, by the sons of the respondent under the name and style of Inderpal Auto Centre. In this view of the matter, it can be said that the petitioners were unable to establish positively if this booth was lying vacant or was in use by the sons of the respondent. CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 5 }: Even otherwise, it is noticed by the Court that landlord is a best judge of his own requirement and the tenant can not dictate terms to him as to where and how he should conduct his business. Similarly, the age of the respondent can not be a disadvantage to him to start his own business, especially so when it is noticed that at the time of filing of this petition, the respondent was just 73 years old. Mr.Palli, appearing for respondent, is fully justified in submitting that there is no disadvantage under law either for the tenant or the landlord to conduct business and so age of the respondent can not be held against him as a negative factor for him to start business. The submission on the basis of Booth No.205 lying vacant in Motor Market Complex, Manimajra, would also not advance the case of the petitioners much as this booth concededly is not on the name of the respondent but his wife. Even no suggestion was given to the respondent that this booth was lying vacant. There is evidence on record that this booth was being used for running a business by both sons of the respondent. On the basis of judgments, it is submitted that it is not appropriate for the Rent Controller to proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 119, it is held that it is open for the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement is a bonafide when the other conditions of Clause (e) are satisfied and the landlord has shown a prima-facie case. Mr.Palli would also refer to the case of Dattatraya Laxman Kamble Vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 6 }: another, (1999) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1 to say that to appreciate the bonafide requirement of a landlord, the words used in Section are reasonably and bonafide required by the landlord which would indicate that requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. It is further observed that the genuineness of the requirement is not to be tested on a par with dire need of a landlord because the later is much grater need. The counsel accordingly contends that Section would be satisfied if the need is found to be bonafide even if it may not be a dire need. Reference is also made to the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Kamal Vasini Agrawal and another, 2005 (2) RCR (Rent) 404 to say that where alternative accommodation is owned by a husband of a land lady, this can not be considered to be accommodation owned by a land lady as an alternative accommodation. In 2005 (1) PLR 729, this Court took a view that a property acquired by the son of a land lady would not be relevant to determine the necessity of a land lady who wanted the shop for business and her son had acquired a shop during the pendency of the petition of the land lady. This was held not to be an alternative accommodation. Cases were also referred to show that landlord is the best judge of his own requirement and the tenant can not dictate him the way how to live. It is for the landlord to see what accommodation is needed by him or his family. In this regard, reference can be made to Ashwani Kumar and others Vs. Pardeep Kumar and others, 2005 (1) RCR 634 and Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery and Co.,, 2001 RCR 135. Reference is also made to the CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 7 }: case of R.K.Gyanprakash and ors. Vs. Smt.Susheela Devi, 2006 (1) RCR 262 to urge that contention regarding the age to carry out business would not be tenable. Attention is also drawn to the case of Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, 1974 RCR 441 to urge that normally High Court can not interfere with finding of fact in the second appeal and would only correct error of law or mixed question of law and a fact. It is further urged that finding on a question of bonafide requirement is a question of fact and High Court is not competent to interfere in the finding on the facts in second appeal. It is further observed that inferences drawn by lower Appellate Court from basic fact would not alter the character of findings and these would remain findings of fact. Some submissions are made on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent landlord did not specify the nature of business that he wished to start. In Tarsem Lal Vs. Pritam Dass Khullar, 2005 (2) RCR 215, this Court took a view that non-mentioning of the nature of business can not be considered fatal and landlord could consider the feasibility of starting some business when he occupies the shop. As has been observed in this case, it is not for the landlord to give a project report to the tenant about the business he intends to start. The evidence of the respective parties as appreciated by the Appellate Court has sufficiently established the bonafide need of the demised premises by the respondent for starting his own business and thus bonafide need of the landlord is established. The submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that he has an CIVIL REVISION NO.5640 OF 2007 :{ 8 }: alternative accommodation which is lying vacant can not be accepted, the same being not an accommodation belonging to the respondent and, thus, not being alternative accommodation in view of the law laid down in the judgments as noticed above. Even otherwise, the petitioners as tenants can not dictate to the respondent in regard to the manner in which he is to conduct his business and the choice in this regard would be with the landlord. The landlord is not required to show that his requirement is dire and he would succeed by showing that he has satisfied the conditions contained in the Section which would be enough to draw a presumption for his need to be bonafide. The petitioners were not able to create any dent in the evidence led by the respondent- landlord. No case for interference in the present revision, as such, is made out. The same is accordingly dismissed. On request made by counsel for the petitioners, petitioners are granted three months time to hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondent. March 25,2008 ( RANJIT SINGH ) khurmi JUDGE