1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 2087/2011 (Goma G. Bhowate VERSUS Education Officer (Secondary) Z.P. Bhandara & another) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shri S. Borkar, counsel for the petitioner. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : APRIL 29 , 2011 . By this petition, the petitioner impugns the order passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur on 22.02.2011 rejecting an application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. On hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and on perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner. The petitioner was working as a peon with the respondent nos.2 and 3 and his services were terminated by an order dated 05.02.1987. It is necessary to note that in stead of challenging the order of termination before the School Tribunal, the petitioner filed a civil suit before the trial Court on 13.04.1989. An objection as regards to the tenability of the suit was raised by the respondents before the trial Court. However, the suit was decreed and an appeal filed by the respondent nos.2 and 3 against the judgment and decree was allowed. A second appeal filed by the petitioner against the first appellate Court's judgment was, however, dismissed on 10.03.2008. After the second appeal was 2 dismissed on 10.03.2008 on the ground that the suit was not tenable, the petitioner filed an appeal before the School Tribunal on 09.06.2008 along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The Tribunal was justified in holding that there was no proper explanation for the delay caused in filing the civil suit on 13.04.1989 though the order of termination was passed on 05.02.1987. Merely because the limitation to file a civil suit is three years, it cannot be said that the delay in filing the suit on 13.04.1989 is satisfactorily explained. In view of the provisions of Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, an appeal has to be preferred within a period of thirty days from the action of the management terminating the services of the employee. It appears that though the objection as regards to the tenability of the suit was raised in the written statement, the petitioner still pursued the civil suit till his second appeal was dismissed in view of the law laid down by this Court by this Court in the judgment reported in 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597 (St. Ulai High School & another Versus Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh & another). In such circumstances, since the petitioner was approaching the Tribunal after a delay of more than 21 years and since the initial delay of more than 2 years was not satisfactorily explained, the Tribunal rejected the application filed by the petitioner. The Tribunal was justified in relying on the judgment reported in 2011(1) Mh.L.J. 178 (Premlaxmi and Co., Mumbai Versus Ingersoll Rand (India) Ltd., Bangalore & another), in this regard. 3 The submission made on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period spent by the petitioner in bona fide prosecuting the matter before the civil Court/wrong forum ought to have been excluded by the Tribunal is not well founded as the Tribunal has excluded that delay to find that the initial delay of two years has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner and the delay caused in filing the appeal after the dismissal of the second appeal has also not been satisfactorily explained and substantiated by the petitioner by tendering the relevant documents, in that regard. The Tribunal also found that it would not be necessary to exclude the period spent in litigating before the wrong forum if the party does not bona fide approach the wrong forum and approaches the wrong forum without due care and diligence. It appears that the order passed by the Tribunal is extremely just and proper and calls for no interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. There is one more additional reason for not interfering with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. As the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation even if the appeal is entertained by the Tribunal after a period of nearly 25 years from the date of termination, the proceedings in the appeal would be rendered an exercise in futility as the petitioner shall not be able to secure the relief of reinstatement. The petitioner cannot be granted the back wages or the arrears of salary from the date of his termination in the year 1987 till the date of his superannuation even if he is able to prove that the termination is illegal as the management cannot be saddled 4 with the liability of paying the arrears of salary for all these years as it is the petitioner, who approached the wrong forum. Had the petitioner approached the Tribunal at the relevant time in the year 1987, the appeal would have been decided immediately and the management would have been made liable only for paying the back wages for a couple of years. Hence, the entertainment of the appeal would not be fruitful even for the petitioner and the exercise before the Tribunal would be in futility. In the facts and circumstances of the case, any interference with the impugned order would be an abuse of the process of the Court. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE APTE