MC 1216/2010 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.R. SARMA (Amitava Roy,J) The instant application is u/s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963f(hereinafter for sh ort referred to as the Act) seeking condonation of delay of 12 days in filing th e accompanying appeal against the order dated 21.12.2009 passed by the learned C ivil Judge No.1, Kamrup, Guwahati in Misc.(J) Case No.124/09 arising out of Titl e Suit No.135/09. We have heard Mr. N.C. Das, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. S.S. Barooah, learne d Advocate and Mr. H.L. Maurya, learned counsel for the opposite party. The application discloses that the order impugned in the accompanying appeal was passed on 21.12.2009 and the same was communicated to the applicants over phone immediately thereafter. However, as the winter vacation intervened on and fro m 20.12.2009, a detailed perusal of the order was possible only in the first wee k of January,2010. However, as the responsible officer heading the legal depa rtment of the applicant-company was then abroad attending to some official dutie s, the matter could not be pursued forthwith. The said officer returned only in the middle of February, whereafter, necessary instructions were issued followi ng the required deliberations on 25.02.2010 to their learned counsel at Guwahati to apply for a certified copy of the said order. This was conveyed over phone and the certified copy was thus applied for on 02.03.2010 and the same was suppl ied on 09.03.2010. The learned Senior counsel for the applicant at Guwahati, wa s thereafter requested by a letter on 20.03.2010 to take necessary steps for pre ferring the appeal, which was eventually filed on 08.04.2010. In the meantime, a delay of 12 days had occurred. The prayer for condonation of delay has been seriously resisted by the opposite party by filing a counter. Not only, they have questioned the maintainability o f the appeal on the ground of want of competence of this forum to entertain the same, according to them, the grounds putforth for condonation of delay had been constituted sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. Mr. Das, while abiding by the pleaded averments, as above, has persuasively urge d that having regard to the intervening facts and circumstances, the applicants cannot be attributed in the deliberate inaction, negligence or lapse for the del ay and therefore, in the interest of justice, the same ought to be condoned. To reinforce his plea, Mr. Das has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex C ourt in AIR 1988 SC 897(G. Ramegowda, Major etc., v. The Special Land Acquisitio n Officer, Bangalore), AIR 1996 SC 1623 (State of Haryana, v. Chandra Mani and o thers) and (2005) 3 SCC 752(STATE OF NAGALAND Versus LIPOK AO AND OTHERS). Mr. Maurya per contra has urged that as sufficiency of the cause ought to be dec isive and not the length of delay, having regard to the averments made in the ap plication, the same ought to be rejected. According to him, the applicant demon strates in no uncertain terms a deliberate inaction on the part of the applicant s’ decision entitle them to the benefit of such acknowledgeable relief. We have extended our consideration to the pleadings on record and the submission s made. The reasons cited in the application for condonation of delay can be par aphrases as hereunder: (a) though the applicants were aware of the order dated 21.12.2009 immediately thereafter and were communicated with the comments thereof in the first week of January,2010, steps could not be taken to prefer an appeal against the same as t he Vice President of the Company, Incharge of the legal department thereof was a broad; (b) that the said officer had returned to the country in the middle of the month of February,2010, some time was consumed for the necessary deliberations, wher eafter, instructions were issued on 25.02.2010; (c) the certified copy was applied for on 02.03.2010 and was received on 09.03.2 010; (d) the learned Senior counsel at Guwahati was instructed through a letter dated 20.03.2010 to prefer the appeal which was received by the latter on 25.03.2010; (e) the appeal after the necessary preparation of the papers involved was filed on 09.04.2010. Before we record our response to the grounds offered, we consider it appropriate to deal with the parties cited at the Bar: The Apex Court in G. Ramegowda, Major(Supra), while dwelling on the purport th e expression ’sufficient cause’ as applied in the Act that the same should rece ive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, unless such an approach would expedient for gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the party seeking such a relief. Though a pragmatic view ought to be taken by an Act in interpreting sufficient c ause u/s 5 of the Act was reiterated by the Apex Court in State of Haryana, v. C handra Mani (Supra), Their Lordships in the STATE OF NAGALAND VERSUS LIPOK AO and Others (Supra) obse rved that that in construing the grounds offered for explaining the delay, a Cou rt as not to relegate itself in the position of the suppressing concern and they ought to find the delay said to have listed in the case which he had adduced wh ere the grounds can be regarded in the facts and circumstance of the case as suf ficient. The relief vis-à-vis condonation of delay is a matter of prescription was also underlined. The pronouncements as noticed hereunder, do not, in our estimate to laid-down an inflexible proposition that in and every explanation for condonation of delay o ught to be explained by this Court without indepth scrutiny thereof of its own m erit. In the meaning u/s.5 of the Act relief for condonation of delay is discre tionary in nature but the same having regard to the precondition embodied in Sec tion 5 of the Act cannot be deserved in the attending facts and circumstances, a s well as sufficiency and persuasiveness of the grounds preferred. The ultimate taste appears to be the ascertainment of the conduct of the party seeking the r elief if the explanation demonstrates that the delay was beyond the contrary of the party concerned and not a negligence or her gross negligence, deliberate ina ction and lack of bona fide. Normally, the relief ought not to be denied. The averments made in the application, unequivocally pressings the principal gro und for the delay to be in absence of the Vice President of the company away fro m the country. According to the applicants, the issue placed totally stalemate because of his absence, so much so, that steps in this regard could be taken onl y after his return in the middle of February,2010, which passes our apprehension as to why an issue relatable to a legal proceeding in Court of law was involved such a detach, indifferent and casual attitude could have adopted by the appli cants. Admittedly, it was to their knowledge that the period of limitation in p referring the appeal was 90 days from the date of the passing of the order impug ned. Insipte of that warnings, they choose to be time that too on the ground of absence of an officers of theirs said to be the incharge of their legal departm ent. Further more, even after his return in the middle of February,2010 conspic uously it took almost two months to file the appeal on 09.04.2010. It is reall y unacceptable as to why, even though the applicants were aware of the order of that on the very same date they waited till 2nd of March,2010 applied for a cert ified copy thereof. If really, they were contemplating to prefer an appeal agai nst he same, the materials on record do not disclose any evidence to itself that the matter could not be pursued in any manner whatsoever in absence of the said personnel of the applicants in the country. Having regard to the nature and st atus of the entity that is the applicant-company, tt is really such a state-of-a ffairs is unacceptable. From the averments made in the application, according to us, persistent defaults on the part of the applicants are clearly discernible a t all suggests, we are therefore, unable in the facts and circumstances of the c ase to hold that they were not the guilty of gross negligence, deliberate inacti on, vis-à-vis a legal proceeding. The applicants were expected to be exemplaril y vigilant circumspect, agile, and casual in this matter, which they demonstrabl y have failed to display. In the above facts and circumstances, we are of the unhesitant opinion that it i s not a fit case for condonation of delay as prayed for. We reiterate that the length of delay is not decisive but the conduct and the explanation are. In the present factual premise, we do not consider that the explanation putforth comes within the ambit of sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the L imitation Act, 1963. The decisions of the Apex Court as alluded hereinabove, ar e of no avail to the applicants. This misc. case, therefore, stands rejected. No costs.