IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (M/S) No. 78 of 2000 Dhaluwala Kushta Sewa Samiti. … Petitioner. Versus Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others … Respondents. Mr. U.K.Uniyal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sandeep Kothari, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Sudhir Kumar, Brief Holder, learned counsel for the respondent no.2, Mr. Lokendra Dobhal, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent no.4,. Date March 28, 2011. Hon’ble B.S.Verma, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 8-9-2000 passed by respondent no. 1 (Annexure-3 to the petition) whereby the Second Appeal filed by respondent no.4 was allowed, the judgment and decree dated 25-2-1994 and 20-6- 1995 were set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-late Bachan Singh was decreed. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that initially the plaintiff Bachan Singh (since deceased) filed a suit for declaration under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (for short the Act) in the court of Assistant Collector, Narendra Nagar (Tehri Garhwal) with the averment that the plaintiff is owner in possession of land in suit measuring 16 Nali, 14 Muthi of Khata No. 138, Plot No. 1/13 since 1940 and that after coming into force of the provisions of the Act on 30-6-1969, he became Bhumidhar of the land in suit and because entries were not correctly made in the record, his rights would be adversely affected. Plaintiff also pleaded that at the time of survey in the year 1986-87, the possession of the plaintiff Bachan Singh was found of more than fifty years. 2 The suit was not contested by Gram Sabha. The State Government resisted the suit by filing its written statement. Learned Assistant Collector after hearing both the parties dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 25-11- 1992. The plaintiff Bachan Singh preferred appeal before the Additional Commissioner. It appears that Bachan Singh died during the pendency of appeal and he was substituted by his legal heir Bhag Singh as appellant in appeal. The learned Additional Commissioner judgment and decree dated 30-8-1993 remanded the suit to the trial court for decision afresh on merits. The trial court ultimately by judgment and decree dated 25-2-1994 dismissed the suit. Aggrieved further, the plaintiff filed appeal before the Additional Commissioner, which too was dismissed by order dated 20-6-1995. The respondent no. 4 thereafter preferred second appeal, which was allowed by judgment and decree dated 8-9-2000, which gave rise to the present writ petition. I have perused the memo of the writ petition as well as the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4. A perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that the plaintiff-respondent no.4 has adduced evidence in support of his claim that the plaintiff has been in possession over the land in suit since 1940. Learned Board of Revenue has also observed that the plaintiff Bachan Singh used to pay the land revenue. It was also observed that in the revenue documents, Bachan Singh is recorded in possession of the land in suit. The learned Board of Revenue also found that the possession of the plaintiff over the land in suit is prior to enforcement of the Act and he has acquired Bhumidhari rights on 28-1-1977. A perusal of the record also reveals that the application of the petitioner for impleadment was allowed by order dated 15-2-1996, but admittedly the plaintiff has not sought any relief against the petitioner. The main ground of challenge raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned trial court has given a 3 categorical finding that the plaintiff has not filed any document to show that the plaintiff is recorded in possession of the land in suit. Learned counsel for the respondent no.4-plaintiff has raised an objection that the petitioner has no locus to challenge the impugned judgment and decree. Learned counsel also submitted that merely because the application for impleadment moved by the petitioner was allowed by the Board of Revenue, no right has accrued to the petitioner to challenge the impugned judgment and decree. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 has vehemently argued that the land in suit does not belong to the petitioner-Leprosy Society and as such the petitioner has no locus to challenge the impugned judgment and decree. I have perused the memo of writ petition but there is no whisper as to how the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree. In the declaratory suit, filed by the original plaintiff Bachan Singh, the plaintiff has not sought any relief against the petitioner. The suit was filed against the State of U.P. and the Gram Sabha under Section 229-B of the Act. From the perusal of the averments made in the counter affidavit, it is obvious that plaintiff Bachan Singh, who was maternal uncle of respondent no.4 was the Sirtan and he had been granted the land in suit by the Zamindar of which he was paying the land revenue to one Juppa Singh Malgujar. It also appears that in the suit, the Patwari concerned has admitted that Bachan Singh was in possession over the land in suit since 1940. It also appears that the plaintiff used to pay electricity bills etc. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner was granted time to file rejoinder affidavit firstly on 30-3-2005, thereafter on 5-7-2005. Again on 4-8-2005, further time was allowed to file rejoinder affidavit and even thereafter on a number of dates, the petitioner was granted time to file rejoinder affidavit, but the petitioner never chose to file rejoinder affidavit in the writ petition. It also appears that the State has not challenged the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Board of Revenue. 4 Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the petitioner has no locus to challenge the impugned judgment and decree, as no relief was sought by the plaintiff Bachan Singh against the petitioner. The impugned judgment and decree does not suffer from any perversity or manifest error of law. The writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed outright. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim order dated 6-12-2000 is vacated. (B.S.Verma, J.) RCP