HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL SECOND APPEAL NO. 43 OF 2003 Jogeshwar Prasad & others ……….Appellant. Versus Gabar Singh & others. ……..…Plaintiff/ Respondent. Dated: 5.6.2008 Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Sri L.K. Tewari, counsel for the appellant and Sri Rajendra Dobhal, counsel for the respondent. 2. By the present Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 25.3.2003 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court – I, Pauri Garhwal in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1998 Gabar Singh & others Vs. Jogeshwar Singh and others arising out of the judgment and decree dated 29.7.1998 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Lansdowne, Garhwal in Civil Suit No. 2 of 1996 Gabar Singh Vs. Jogeshwar Prasad. 3. Present Second Appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “A. Whether the order of Commissioner, Kumaon is final and appellate Court has wrongly interpreted the said order in his judgment. B. Whether, the trial court judgment was wrongly set aside by first appellate court. C. Whether, the suit was time barred. D. Whether, the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence.” 2 4. Briefly stated, a suit was filed by the plaintiff / respondent being Civil Suit No. 2 of 1996 Gabar Singh Vs. Jogeshwar Prasad praying to the following effect: “¼v½ fd oknhx.k dks izfroknhx.k ds fo:) LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dh fMdzh nh tk;s fd os Lo;a vFkok vius dkfjUns ds }kjk izfroknhx.k ds xzke dh leLr ljdkjh Hkwfe esa ?kkl] ydM+h ,oa leLr ou iapk;r {ks= fdekM+ ds vUrxZr iu?kV] iM+ko xkspj rFkk jkLrs ds ijEijkxr vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx djus ls oknhx.k dks dHkh u jksdsA ¼c½ oknhx.k dks okn O;; Hkh izfroknhx.k ls fnyok;k tk;A ¼l½ vU; vuqrks"k tks U;k;ksfpr gks vkSj ftls ikus dks oknhx.k vf/kdkjh gksa o ekaxus ls NwV x;k gks og Hkh fnyokus dh d`ik dh tk;AÞ 5. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiffs are resident of Village Masmoli, Patti Bichla, Badalpur, Garhwal and the defendants are resident of Village Kimar, Patti Bichla, Badalpur, District Garhwal. According to the plaintiffs, the entire rights of entire land regarding Gauchar, Panghat, Parao, Ghas, wood and using pathway in the village of the defendants. They are using the same with customary rights from the time immemorial. From 1st December, 1995, the defendants have started interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs and hence the suit was filed. 6. The defendants have filed a written statement denying the plaint averments. It was stated in the written statement that there is forest Panchayat, where the land of the plaintiffs are situated and as such, they have no right to interfere with the land of the defendants. 3 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court has framed the following issues: “1- D;k oknhx.k ds xzke elekSyh ds fuoklhx.k izfroknhx.k ds xzke fdekM+ iV~Vh fcpykcnyiqj x<+oky dh leLr ljdkjh Hkwfe esa ijEijkxr :i ls xkSpj] iu?kV] iM+ko] ?kkl] ydM+h o jkLrs ds vf/kdkj dks iz;ksx djrs jgs gSa\ 2- D;k oknhx.k dks okn izLrqr djus dk okn dkj.k izkIr gS\ 3- D;k oknhx.k ds xkao elekSyh esa 35 o"kZ iwoZ mudk viuk taxy l`ftr fd;k tk pqdk gS vkSj D;k xzke elekSyh ds fuoklhx.k xzke xS.kMh ds taxy esa ls ?kkl] ydM+h o xkSpj dk iz;ksx dj jgs gSa] ;fn gka rks izHkko\ 4- D;k izLrqr okn ewad lgefr ,oa foca/ku ds fl)kUr ls ckf/kr gS tSlk fd tokcnkos dh en la0 14 ls 16 esa vfHkdfFkr gS fd;k x;k gS\ 5- oknhx.k fdl vuqrks"k] ;fn dksbZ gks] rks izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gSa\ 6- D;k okn /kkjk & 11 O;ogkj izfdz;k lafgrk ds vUrxZr ckf/kr gS\ 7- D;k oknh dk okn dkyckf/kr gS\ 8. Towards the documentary evidence, the plaintiffs have filed certified copy of Yaaddast Halat of Village Mauja Masmoli Patti Bichla, Badalpur, Paper No. 9Ga/1, certified copy of the Yaddast Halat of Village Kimar Settlement Paper No. 10Ga/1, Naksha Najri Village Kimar, Patti Bichla, Badalpur Paper No. 25Ka, Certified copy of the inspection report of Village Kimar submitted by Forest Panchayat Officer, Lansdowne Paper No. 39 Ga, certified copy of the order passed by the Van Panchayat Adhikari, Lansdowne Paper No. 38Ga. Towards the oral evidence, Ram Sharan and Kushal Singh have been examined as P.W.1 and P.W.2 respectively. 4 9. Towards the documentary evidence, the defendants have filed copy of the order passed by the Commissioner, Garhwal on approval of the meeting of Van Panchayat Paper No. 33 Ga. Towards the oral evidence, one Mukandi Lal Semwal has been examined as D.W.1. 10. While deciding the issue no. 1 as to whether the plaintiff have been using the customary rights of the defendants’ village, the trial Court has taken into consideration Paper No. 33 Ga order of the Commissioner, order dated 15.6.1964 passed by the Van Panchayat Adhikari. The trial Court has further recorded a finding that if the plaintiffs had any problem with the order of the Commissioner as well as of the Van Panchayat, they should have objected for the same, but he did not file any appeal before any Court, thus, the suit appears to be not maintainable as the plaintiffs have failed to prove his case. This issue has been decided against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants. 11. While deciding the issue no. 2 as to whether the plaintiffs are having reason to file the suit, the trial Court has recorded a finding that since the plaintiffs have not filed any appeal or revision against the order passed by the Commissioner for last 35 year, therefore, they have no reason to file the suit. This issue has been decided in negative. 12. While deciding the issue no. 3, the trial Court has recorded a finding to the following effect: “;g ckr ou iapk;r vf/kdkjh ds vkns’k 38x o 40x ls o dfe’uj ds vkns’k 33x ls Hkh Li"V gS fd oknhx.k dks izfroknhx.k ds taxy esa dqN Hkkx dk gh mi;ksx djus dk vf/kdkj fn;k x;k gSA pwafd mudk elekSyh esa iSarhl o"kZ 5 iwoZ viuk taxy l`ftr fd;k tk pqdk gS vkSj izfroknhx.k ds xokgksa us Hkh bl ckr dks lkfcr fd;k gS fd oknhx.k ds xkao elekSyh esa iSarhl o"kZ iwoZ mudk viuk taxy l`ftr fd;k tk pqdk gS vkSj fookfnr taxy ij oknhx.k dk dksbZ gd gdwd ugha jg x;k gSAÞ 13. With the aforesaid finding, the trial Court has decided the aforesaid issue in affirmative. 14. While deciding the issue no. 4, the trial Court has recorded a finding that the present suit is barred by the principles of estoppel as well as acquiescence. This issue has been decided in affirmative. 15. While deciding the issue no. 7, the trial Court has recorded a finding that the suit of the plaintiffs is time barred and is not maintainable. This issue has been decided in affirmative. 16. While deciding the issue no. 5, the trial Court has recorded a finding that since the suit is barred by the principle of estoppel as well as acquiescence, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief. 17. The trial Court has decided the issue no. 6 in negative. 18. The trial Court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on 29.7.2001. 6 19. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1998 Gabbar Singh and others Vs. Jogeshwar Prasad and others. 20. The appellate Court has allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs by recording a finding that the plaintiffs have been using the customary rights of the defendants’ village from the time immemorial and in the year, 1962-63 a land measuring 14 Acres was declared as Van Panchayat and the plaintiffs have been using the customary rights on the said land and therefore, there is no occasion to make any obstruction. The appellate Court has recorded a finding to the following effect:- “izfroknhx.k tks xzke fdekM+ iV~Vhfcpyk cnyiqj ds fuoklh gSa dk dguk gsS fd oknhx.k xzke fdekM+ dh ljdkjh tehu esa ,sls fdlh ijEijkxr vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx ugha dj jgs Fks blfy, mudk vf/kdkj LoRo lekIr gks pqdk gSA ;g fd izfroknhx.k dh izkFkZuk ij xzke fdekM+ dh ou iapk;r dk xBu gqvk ftls dfe’uj egksn; }kjk vafre :i ls Lohdkj fd;k x;k vkSj ml ou iapk;r dk fuekZ.k gksus ds ckn xzke elekSyh ds fuokfl;ksa dks xzke fdekM+ esa dksbZ ijEijkxr vf/kdkjh ugha fn;k x;k] vr% blfy, Hkh oknhx.k dk okn [kafMr gksus ;ksX; gSA ekSf[kd lk{; ds vykok nksuksa i{kksa us fyf[kr nLrkost dkxt la0 33 x] 38x ,oa 39 x ij fo’okl fd;kA fo}ku voj U;k;ky; us Hkh bUgha nLrkostksa ij fo’okl djds oknhx.k dk okn [kafMr fd;kA vr% gesa vc ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k xzke fdekM+ esa ou iapk;r dk xBu gksus ds ckn Hkh oknhx.k tks xzke elekSyh ds fuoklh gSa ds ijEijkxr vf/kdkj lqjf{kr j[ks x;s gSa vxj muds vf/kdkj lqjf{kr j[ks x;sa gSa rks fuf’pr :i ls mudk okn fMdzh gksus ;ksX; gSA vxj ;g ik;k tkrk gS fd muds dksbZ vf/kdkj lqjf{kr ugha j[ks x;s gSa rks oknhx.k dk okn [kafMr f;k tk ldrk FkkA dkxt la0 33x ou vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr fufeZr 7 fu;eksa ds vuqlkj ml {ks= esas ou iapk;r dk fuekZ.k xfBr djud ds fy, ekaxh xbZ dqN lwpuk,a gSaA bl lwpuk ij ifji= ds [kkuk ua0 11 esa mu lHkh O;fDr;ksa ds uke rFkk irs vafdr djus dk izkfo/kku gS fd ftUgksaus ou iapk;r ds fuekZ.k esa vkifRr mBkbZA blh [kkus esa ;g Hkh izkfo/kku fn;k x;k gS fd mu vkifRr;ksa dk C;kSjk nsa vkSj mudk fuLrkj.k dc gqvk] mldh Hkh vk[;k izLrqr djsaA blh [kkus esa ;g Hkh vafdr fd;k x;k gS fd xzke elekSyh ds fuokfl;ksa }kljk ;gka ij ou iapk;r fuekZ.k ij vkifRr mBkbZ xbZA vkSj mu vkifRr;ksa dk fuLrkj.k fnukad 15-6-1964 dks fd;k x;kA dkxt la0 38 x fnukad 15-6-1964 dks fuLrkfjr vkifRr;ksa ds fo"k; esa ikfjr vkns’k gSa ftlds vUrxZr xzke xq.ksMh ,oa elekSyh ds fuokfl;ksa dh ;g vkifRr Lohdkj dh xbZ gS vkSj muds xzke fdekM+ dh ljdkjh Hkwfe ij ijEijkxr vf/kdkjksa dh Lohdkj dj tkjh j[kus dh laLrqfr dh xbZ gSA laLrqfr dkxt la0 39 x fnukad 8-6-1964 dks fn;k x;k fujh{k.k gSa ftldk ftdz vkns’k fnukad 15-6-1964 esa Hkh fd;k x;k gSA bl fujh{k.k ds nkSjku dsoy ;g ik;k x;k Fkk fd xzke xq.ksMh ,oa elekSyh esa pkjkx.k dh dksbZ txg ou iapk;r dk fuekZ.k djus ds izLrko ds lkFk bu vf/kdkjksa dks bLrseky djus ds fy, NksM+h xbZ gSA vkns’k fnukafdr 15-6-1964 esa Li"V :i ls bl ckr dk mYys[k fd;k x;k gS fd ;g txg tks NksM+h x;h gS og cgqr NksVh gS vkSj bl txg ls xzke elekSyh ;k xq.ksM+h ds xkao okfl;ka ds ijEijkxr vf/kdkjksa dk fuoZgu ugha gks ldrkAÞ 21. On the basis of the aforesaid finding, the appellate Court has held as under: “8- vr% mijksDr foospuk ls ;g ik;k tkrk gS fd xzke fdekM+ esa ou iapk;r dk fuekZ.k Hkh oknhx.k tks xzke elekSyh ds fuoklh gS] xzke fdekM+ esa fLFkr ljdkjh tehu ij muds ijEijkxr vf/kdkj lqjf{kr j[ks x;s vkSj 8 bu vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx oknhx.k vlkZnjkt ls djrs pys vk jgs FksA rn~uqlkj oknhx.k dks lgh :i ls okn nk;j djus dk dkj.k izkIr gqvk vkSj os ekaxs x;s vuqrks"k dks izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh FksAÞ 22. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, the defendants have filed the present appeal. 23. Counsel for the appellant has pointed out the order passed by the Commissioner to the following effect: “dfe’uj lkgc cgknqj bUpktZ dqekÅa fMohtu us rkjh[k 21 ekg Qjojh lu~ 1966 ds jDck tks uRFkh 'kqnk [kljs esa ntZ gS iapk;r ds uke eUtwj Qjek;k x;k gSaA tehu foyk jde dkxtkr esa ejEer dh tkosxhA iapk;r cewftc dk;ns dqekÅa iapk;rh taxysa ds eUtwj dh xbZ gSA vc og cktkCrk dkjZokbZ dj ldrk gSA rk0 20 ekg ekpZ lu~ 1966 bZ0P.S.U.P. 27 Misc. 1955 K.P.F. 12-500. g0,oa eksgj dfe’uj dqekÅaÞ 24. The appellate Court has interpreted the said order in the judgment and it appears from the above that the plaintiffs have been using the customary rights of the defendants’ village from the time immemorial and there appears no infirmity or illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court and the same deserves to be confirmed and there is no requirement of interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I find no substantial question of law in the present second appeal. 25. In H.P. Pyarejan Vs. Dasappa 2006 AIR SCW 715, the Apex Court has observed as under:- “Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with findings of 9 fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re- appreciation of evidence.” 26. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any reason to interfere under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, I do not find any substantial questions of law involved in this Second Appeal and the Second Appeal is concluded by the findings of fact and deserves to be dismissed. 27. Consequently, Second Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. (Rajesh Tandon, J.) 5.6.2008 Rathour