THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.17815 of 2000 November 25, 2010 Between: P.Laxmaiah, S/o.Mallaiah … Petitioner And The Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Parkal Depot, Warangal District And another ... Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.17815 of 2000 ORDER: The writ petition is filed against the award of the Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, Warangal, in I.D.No.260 of 1995, dated 21.12.1999 insofar as the same denied the back wages and the benefit of service for the period of suspension. In this Certiorari proceedings, the plea is improper exercise of discretion under Section 11A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act). The undisputed brief background facts are as follows. The petitioner was appointed as conductor in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (RTC). At the relevant time, he was posted at Parkal depot. On 04.7.1995 when he was conducting bus No.APZ 2369, check was conducted between stages 5 and 4 on Nizampally route. Based on the check report, domestic enquiry was initiated into two charges, namely, (i) the petitioner failed to comply with the rule ‘issue and start’, and (ii) he failed to issue tickets to three passengers even though he collected fare from them. The charges were held to be proved by the Enquiry Officer. This resulted in an order of removal dated 15.11.1995 against which the petitioner filed Industrial Dispute case under Section 2A(2) of ID Act. The learned Tribunal framed three points, namely, (1) Whether the petitioner was given fair and reasonable opportunity during the domestic enquiry? (2) Whether the charges framed against the petitioner are proved, according to law and material on record? And (3) Whether the punishment imposed against the petitioner in domestic enquiry is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner in the given facts of the matter? After perusing the record, the learned Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry was held, according to law, giving fair and reasonable opportunity to workman. However, on the second point, learned Tribunal recorded a finding that though the petitioner failed to issue tickets to three passengers he did not collect any fare from them. In exercise of powers under Section 11A of ID Act, having come to conclusion that the punishment of removal is shockingly disproportionate to the charges, the learned Tribunal modified the punishment directing stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. The petitioner was directed to be reinstated with back wages for the period of suspension and without the benefit of reckoning the service during the period of suspension till reinstatement for terminal benefits. The Counsel for petitioner vehemently contends that when the charge No.2 was not proved denial of back wages and benefit of service is illegal and arbitrary. Per contra, Ms.K.Vijaya, representing the Standing Counsel for RTC, submits that when there is no error apparent on the face of record, the award cannot be interfered with. It is now well settled that an award of Industrial Tribunal cannot be interfered with unless there is grave error apparent on the face of record. In Syed Yakoob v Radhakrishnan[1], the Supreme Court held that a Writ of Certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals when such Tribunals passed orders without jurisdiction and also passed orders in excess of jurisdiction and failed to exercise such jurisdiction. While observing that in exercising Certiorari jurisdiction, the Court is not entitled to act as an appellate Court, it was held that Writ of Certiorari cannot be issued unless the Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, the Tribunal decides the question without giving opportunity of being heard to the party effected by the order or whether the procedure adopted by the Tribunal would opposed to principles of natural justice. The principle that the findings of fact reached by the inferior Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in Writ proceedings was reaffirmed and it was held that only when there is error or law apparent on the face of the record, the Court can interfere in such matters. The relevant passage is as under. ….An error or law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said findings are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. The Supreme Court also considered the question as to what is error law apparent on the face of record. It was held: It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record…. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. In H.P.Gandhi v Gopi Nath[2], after referring to Syed Yakoob it was held: Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision, but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of face. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court, Judicial review is not appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself. In The Depot Manager, APSRTC v P.Gangarajulu[3], challenge was to the award of the Labour Court. Upholding the order of removal of A.P.S.R.T.C., the same was reversed by the learned Single Judge. Before the Division Bench the plea was improper exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction. Countenancing the submission, the Division Bench held as under. If the materials are not taken into consideration and the evidence is not properly appreciated by the Labour Court, the same is liable to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But in the process, this Court cannot substitute its own opinion and arrive at a finding after going into the evidence. The only proper course would be to direct the Labour Court to consider all the materials available on record and appreciate the evidence properly and in accordance with law. This Court makes an enquiry whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusions of the Labour Court. If the evidence and material is available and the same is not taken into consideration by the Labour Court, a Writ of Certiorari would have to be issued quashing the Award but the same has to be remitted back to the concerned Labour Court for proper adjudication according to law. Any other approach would amount to this Court converting itself into a Court of Appeal and would be compelled to enter into impermissible areas and of considering the question of sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a finding of fact arrived at by a competent Labour Court. I n P.Maheswar Rao v Presiding officer, Labour Court[4], the scope of judicial review in relation to the awards of the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts was explained as follows. It is quite often reiterated by the Apex Court and the High Courts that the High Courts, while reviewing the awards of the Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts, cannot go into the question of adequacy or inadequacy, sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which the charges are held to have been proved, and if they find that the findings are grounded on some substantial acceptable evidence, the findings cannot be upset. The High Courts in exercise of their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot reappreciate evidence and record a finding on a question of fact different from the one recorded by the Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts even in a case where two views are possible from the same evidence. Reappraisal of evidence is the power of the Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts, and not of the High Courts. In State of U.P. v Johri Mal[5], the Supreme Court laid down that though reappreciation of facts is not permissible in a petition for judicial review, the Court to a limited extent scrutinise the facts to see whether decision making process is in accordance with law. The relevant observations are apposite: It is well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review the court is more concerned with the decision-making process than the merit of the decision itself. In doing so, it is often argued by the defender of an impugned decision that the court is not competent to exercise its power when there are serious disputed questions of facts; when the decision of the Tribunal or the decision of the fact-finding body or the arbitrator is given finality by the statute which governs a given situation or which, by nature of the activity the decision-maker’s opinion on facts is final. But while examining and scrutinizing the decision-making process it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise the decision cannot be tested under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. How far the court of judicial review can reappreciate the findings of facts depends on the ground of judicial review. For example, if a decision is challenged as irrational, it would be well-nigh impossible to record a finding whether a decision is rational or irrational without first evaluating the facts of the case and coming to a plausible conclusion and then testing the decision of the authority on the touchstone of the tests laid down by the court with special reference to a given case. This position is well settled in the Indian administrative law. Therefore, to a limited extent of scrutinising the decision-making process, it is always open to the court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision-maker. (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it may be taken as well settled that a writ Court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own opinion for the opinion of Inferior Tribunal even if it is satisfied that the decision is wrong. It is also well settled that the writ Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and every wrong order cannot be quashed by issuing certiorari. In the absence of any fundamental flaws, the Court cannot exercise certiorari jurisdiction. The plea of the petitioner that charge No.2 was not proved cannot be accepted. Charge No.2 had two limbs, namely, (i) that the workman collected fare from three passengers; and (ii) he did not issue tickets to them. Insofar as first limb is concerned, the learned Tribunal found that, ‘the petitioner has not collected fare from the passengers’. But a clear finding was recorded that the petitioner did not follow ‘issue and start’ rule. That itself is sufficient to attract equitable misconduct warranting disciplinary action. Keeping this in view, the learned Tribunal exercised sound discretion under Section 11A of ID Act and that there is no grave error apparent on the face of record. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. _______________ (V.V.S.RAO,J) November 25, 2010. YS [1] AIR 1964 SC 477 [2] (1992) 2 SCC Supp. 312 [3] 1996 (1) ALT 32 (DB) [4] 1997(1) ALT 326 [5] (2004) 4 SCC 714 = 2004 AIR SCW 3888