1 C.R. No. 577 of 2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH --- Civil Revision No. 577 of 2005 Date of Decision: 12.11.2009 Ramesh Kumar Grover --- Petitioner Versus Raj Kumar --- Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL *** PRESENT: Mr. Sanjay Mittal, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Sudhir Mittal, Advocate for the respondent. --- AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J This is plaintiff’s revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for setting aside the order dated 15.12.2004, whereby the trial court has accepted an application moved by the defendant-respondent for leading secondary evidence regarding dissolution deed dated 10.7.1984. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the trial court could not have allowed secondary evidence unless the existence of the original documents and also the requirements of clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “the Act”) were proved by the defendant-respondent. According to the learned counsel, this having not been done and especially when 2 C.R. No. 577 of 2005 the plaintiff-petitioner had seriously disputed the existence of the original document, i.e. the dissolution deed dated 10.7.1984, the impugned order permitting secondary evidence with regard to the dissolution deed was legally unsustainable. In support of the submission, learned counsel placed reliance on two judgments of this Court, in Paramjit Kaur Versus Sat Kartar Singh and another, 1998(1) P.L.R. 804 and Gurdial Kaur Versus Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab, Chandigarh, 2000(1) P.L.R. 156. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supported the impugned order passed by the trial court and submitted that so far as the execution of the dissolution deed is concerned, the same shall be proved by the defendant-respondent at the time of leading secondary evidence. The learned counsel, however, did not seriously dispute that the requirements of clause (a) of Section 65 of the Act shall also be established before secondary evidence is led. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The defendant-respondent wanted to lead secondary evidence regarding dissolution deed of the firm in question. However, the counsel for the defendant-respondent has accepted that at the time of leading secondary evidence, the execution of the dissolution deed dated 10.7.1984 and also the requirements of clause (a) of Section 65 of the Act shall be established. 3 C.R. No. 577 of 2005 In view of the above, the revision petition is disposed of by observing that secondary evidence with regard to dissolution deed dated 10.7.1984 shall be permitted by the trial court on defendant’s establishing the execution thereof and proving other requirements of clause (a) of Section 65 of the Act. Needless to say that if the defendant fails to prove the existence of dissolution deed dated 10.7.1984 or comply with the requirements of clause (a) of Section 65 of the Act, the secondary evidence so permitted by the trial court, with regard to the dissolution deed in question, shall not be allowed to be led and in that eventuality, the application of the defendant for secondary evidence would automatically be deemed to have been rejected. (AJAY KUMAR MITTAL) November 12, 2009 JUDGE *RKMALIK*