THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION Nos.17425, 17592, 17595, 17596, 17598, 17599, 17600, 17602, 17607, 17608, 17610, 17612, 17613, 17614, 17616, 17617, 17618, 17619, 17620, 17621, 17622, 17623, 17626, 17629, 17630, 17631, 17635, 17636, 17637, 17639, 17640, 17645, 17647, 17648, 17649, 17650, 17657, 17661, 17662, 17923, 17924, 17939 and 18054 OF 2009 Dated: 30 .12.2009 Between The Patancheru Municipality, Medak District, Rep. by its Commissioner, Now presently Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Circle-XII. … Petitioner And D. Balraj … Respondent THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION Nos.17425, 17592, 17595, 17596, 17598, 17599, 17600, 17602, 17607, 17608, 17610, 17612, 17613, 17614, 17616, 17617, 17618, 17619, 17620, 17621, 17622, 17623, 17626, 17629, 17630, 17631, 17635, 17636, 17637, 17639, 17640, 17645, 17647, 17648, 17649, 17650, 17657, 17661, 17662, 17923, 17924, 17939 and 18054 OF 2009 COMMON ORDER: All these writ petitions are filed by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation aggrieved by the awards passed by the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad directing reinstatement of the respondents herein with continuity of service. Though separate awards have been passed by the Labour Court, since the respondents in all the writ petitions are similarly situated and common question of fact and law arise for consideration, all these writ petitions are heard together and decided by this common order. The respondents in these writ petitions were initially appointed as NMRs in the erstwhile Gram Panchayats situated in Medak District. It is not in dispute that the said Gram Panchayats were converted into Municipality vide G.O.Ms.No.579, M.A., dated 9.6.2005. After conversion of Gram Panchayat into Municipality, the services of the respondents were taken over by the Municipality and they were continued as NMRs. Alleging that from March, 2006 they were not allowed to discharge the duties, the respondents raised disputes before the Labour Court under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘I.D. Act’). It was contended before the Labour Court that the impugned termination without one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof was arbitrary and in violation of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. It was also contended that the impugned termination was illegal since no retrenchment compensation was paid as provided under the I.D. Act and at any rate the retrenchment itself was contrary to law since no seniority list as such was maintained by the Municipality. It is to be noticed that vide G.O.Ms.No.260, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department (Elec.II), dated 16.04.2007, the Patancheru Municipality was abolished and the same was merged into Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. In the circumstances, the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (writ petitioner) filed counter-affidavits before the Labour Court contending that since there was no appointment at all, the Municipality/Corporation was not obligated to comply with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also contended that in view of the ban in force on appointment of NMRs/Temporary daily-wage employees under the Act 2 of 1994, the question of continuing the petitioners does not arise at all. After hearing both the parties, the Labour Court, by separate awards while setting aside the termination, directed reinstatement with continuity of service. However, the back-wages and attendant benefits were rejected. Challenging the said awards passed by the Labour Court, these writ petitions are filed by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (for short, ‘Corporation’). I have heard the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Corporation in all the writ petitions as well as the learned counsel appearing for the respondents (hereinafter referred to as ‘workmen’). The learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation vehemently contended that the impugned awards which were passed by the Labour Court without taking into consideration the specific contentions raised on behalf of the Corporation that the I.D. Act itself was not applicable since the Municipality was not an industry are illegal and the awards are liable to be set aside on that ground alone. It is further contended that the burden of proof is on the workmen to show that they fall within the definition of the “workman” under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act and since in the present case the workmen failed to discharge the burden placed on them, the Labour Court ought not to have granted any relief. In support of the said submission, the learned Standing Counsel placed reliance upon RAJASTHAN STATE GANGANAGAR S. MILLS LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN[1]. While relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M.D., KARNATAKA HANDLOOM DEV. CORPN. LTD. v. MAHADEVA LAXMAN RAVAL[2], the learned Standing Counsel further contended that the disengagement of the workmen was nothing but termination simplicitor and did not amount to retrenchment and therefore the same cannot be held to be illegal for non-compliance with Section 25- F of the I.D. Act. It is also contended that since the respondents were appointed purely on contractual basis and they were fully aware of the nature of their employment, they did not have any right to regular or permanent appointment as held by the Supreme Court in SECY., STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UMADEVI (3)[3] and ACCOUNTS OFFICER (A&I), A.P. SRTC v. P. CHANDRA SEKHARA RAO[4]. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court on appreciation of the evidence available on record warrant no interference and the impugned awards granting the relief only to the extent of reinstatement cannot be held to be unjustified on any ground whatsoever. It is to be noticed that admittedly there was no appointment order nor there was any order in writing terminating the services of the respondents/workmen. However, the fact that the respondents/workmen worked for about 14 years and that they were paid salaries directly by the Municipality till their services were disengaged is not in dispute. The specific case of the respondents in their counter-affidavit that sufficient work is available and that the respondents are continuing in service even as on today through outsourcing agencies could not be disputed by the Corporation. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the Municipality is not an “industry” and therefore the Labour Court ought to have dismissed the industrial disputes as not maintainable cannot be accepted having regard to the ratio laid down by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY & SEWERAGE BOARD v. A. RAJAPPA[5]. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, it is to be noticed that the workmen who raised the disputes got themselves examined as W.W.1 in each case. On behalf of the Corporation M.W.1 was examined and Acquittance Registers and Attendance Registers were marked as Exs.M-2 & M-3 respectively through M.W.1. On appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by both the parties, the Labour Court recorded a finding that the termination of the services of the petitioners therein who had put in more than 14 years of service without issuing any notice was contrary to law. The Labour Court also found that the workmen/respondents herein worked for not less than one year under the Municipality and thus they were entitled to one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or in the alternative they must be paid wages in lieu of such notice. Admittedly neither such notice was issued nor they were paid the wages in lieu of notice. In the circumstances, the Labour Court held that the termination of the respondents was bad and accordingly set aside the same. As could be seen from the impugned awards, the findings were recorded on appreciation of the evidence on record and cogent reasons were assigned by the Labour Court in support of the conclusions. It is not a case where the Labour Court failed to take into consideration any material evidence nor can it be said that the Tribunal misread the evidence available on record. Since the findings so recorded are not vitiated by perversity or want of evidence, this Court, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not re-examine the question of adequacy or inadequacy of the material placed before the Labour Court. The law is well-settled that even where two views are possible on the same evidence, this Court does not substitute its opinion to that of the Labour Court when the findings of the Labour Court are found to be based on the evidence available on record. Hence, I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court. So far as the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the burden of proof is on the workmen to establish that they worked for 240 days is concerned, it is true that it was so held by the Supreme Court in RANGE FOREST OFFICER v. S.T. HADIMANI[6]. However, this is a case where both the parties let in evidence and M.W.1 who was examined on behalf of the Management\Municipality admitted in his evidence that the workmen were appointed by the Collector under Ex.M-1 proceedings, that they were working under the direct control of the Municipality till their termination and that they were also paid the salaries from the office of the Gram Panchayat and the Municipality. M.W.1 also produced bunch of Acquittance Registers marked as Exs.M-2 and M-3 which contained the particulars of salary paid to the workmen. The above evidence being sufficient to hold that the respondents herein worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding their termination, the Labour Court had rightly recorded a finding in favour of the workmen. Once the evidence is let in on behalf of both the parties, it is open to the Court/Tribunal to record findings on appreciation of the entire evidence available on record and at that stage it is not necessary to insist upon the theory of burden of proof. M.W.1 in his evidence also admitted the fact that there was no prior notice as required under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. From the above evidence, since it was clear that there was employer and employee relationship between the Municipality/management and the workmen and that they worked for more than 240 days preceding their termination and more particularly their termination was not in accordance with Section 25-F, the impugned awards directing reinstatement with continuity of service cannot be held to be arbitrary or illegal on any ground whatsoever. It is also relevant to notice that the respondents were denied back-wages and attendant benefits in the facts and circumstances of the cases. The two decisions cited by the learned Standing Counsel namely UMADEVI (3)’S case (3 supra) and P. CHANDRA SEKHARA RAO’S case (4 supra) in which the Supreme Court was dealing with regularization of the services of the workmen who were appointed on temporary basis have no application at all to the instant cases since the petitioners raised the industrial disputes aggrieved by the termination of the services and the relief sought by them was only continuation of their service but not regularization. For the aforesaid reasons, all the Writ Petitions are devoid of any merit and the same are accordingly dismissed. No costs. ____________ G. ROHINI, J. Date:30.12.2009 gbs [1] (2004) 8 SCC 161 [2] AIR 2007 SC 631 [3] (2006) 4 SCC 1 [4] (2006) 7 SCC 488 [5] AIR 1978 SC 969 = (1978) 2 SCC 213 [6] (2002) 3 SCC 25