IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CWP No.: 2284 of 2007. Reserved on: 01.09.2008. Decided on: 12.09.2008. Chetru alias Dhan Dev. … … … Petitioner. Versus Director of Consolidation and Another. … … … Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the petitioner: Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, Advocate. For Respondent No.1: Mr. Rajinder Dogra, Additional Advocate General with Mr. Vikas Rathore, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2: Mr. C.N. Singh, Advocate. Rajiv Sharma, Judge: A challenge has been laid by the petitioner to the order passed by the Director of Consolidation, H.P. in case No.49/2006, dated 30.3.2007. The brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner has filed revision petition under Section 54 of the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. - 2 - (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before respondent No.1. The petitioner had primarily raised two grounds in his revision, namely, (a) that he has constructed a house on Khasra No.62 measuring 0-10-0 bighas and some portion of this land was being used as passage and court yard by him and as such it has been wrongly allotted to respondent No.2, and (b) that the land abutting Mandi-Kun road has also not been equally distributed between the parties. During the pendency of the revision petition, respondent No.1 had called for the spot report from the Consolidation Officer, Bilaspur. The Consolidation Officer has submitted the report dated 21.12.2006 to respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 dismissed the revision of the petitioner on 30.3.2007. Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar has strenuously argued that the impugned order Annexure P-3 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He has relied upon the report of the Consolidation Officer, dated 21.12.2006. The learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. C.N. Singh had supported the order dated 30.3.2007. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record carefully. The Consolidation Scheme was prepared during the consolidation proceedings on 25.8.1995. The consolidation proceedings came to an end in the year 1997-98. The petitioner filed a revision petition on the grounds as noticed above on 1.6.2006. Admittedly, the petitioner has not filed any appeal against the consolidation proceedings concluded in the year 1997-98. There is a detailed procedure which is required to be followed during the course of the consolidation proceedings. The affected parties are given opportunities at every stage of the proceedings to file objections. The - 3 - petitioner has not filed any objections. If the petitioner was aggrieved in any manner by the consolidation proceedings, he should have taken recourse to the remedies provided under the statute expeditiously. The present proceedings have been filed on 1.6.2006. The only reason assigned for delay in filing the revision petition by the petitioner is that he came to know about the wrong allotment of 0-10-0 bigha to respondent No.2 in the year 2005 when the respondent No.2 got demarcation of Khasra No.62 carried out. This explanation cannot be accepted. Though the expression “at any time” has been mentioned in Section 54 of the Act, however, the impression “at any time” has to be given pragmatic/reasonable interpretation. The basic objection of the Act is to consolidate the land holdings. Their Lordship of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham versus K. Suresh Reddy and Others (2003) 7 SCC 667 while interpreting Section 50-B(4) of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 have held that expression “at any time” implies within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and has to be construed contextually and reasonably and not in an unguided or arbitrary manner. Their Lordships have held as under:- “Even before the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ appeals, the appellants did not contend that the suo motu power could be exercised even after a long delay of 13- 15 years because of the fraudulent acts of the non-official respondents. The focus of attention before the Division Bench was only on the language of sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act as to whether the suo motu power could be exercised at any time strictly sticking to the language of that sub-section or it could be exercised within reasonable time. - 4 - In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the word “at any time” in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words “at any time” are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words”at any time” in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words “at any time”, the suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could - 5 - be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power “at any time” only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that “at any time” should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, “at any time” must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” The objective of the Act and the proceedings undertaken will be defeated if the parties are permitted to reopen the consolidation proceedings after about 10 years. The Consolidation Scheme prepared under the Act is very important document on the basis of which the consolidation proceedings are carried out and in the present case, the Consolidation Scheme was drawn on 25.8.1995. The parties, after hearing their objections and after carrying out the partition/re-partition, are put in the respective possession of the allotted area and the revenue entries are also made accordingly. It is unbelievable that the petitioner did not know the exact status of Khasra No.62 for 10 long years. The proceedings initiated under Section 54 of the Act were misconceived and suffer from delay and laches. However, in the interest of justice, the matter has also been heard on merits. The petitioner could not substantiate that he has constructed house on Khasra No.62. The area measuring 1-6-8 has been allotted to respondent No.2 out of Khasra No.99 old, 62 new and the said respondent has constructed his - 6 - house and toilet on this land. The Consolidation Officer could recommend/approve the taking back land measuring 0-4-01 from respondent No.2 in favour of the petitioner against the Consolidation Scheme dated 25.8.1995. The Director, Consolidation has rightly ignored the report furnished by the Consolidation Officer, dated 21.12.2006. The Director, Consolidation has recorded a finding that the toilet of respondent is situate in the land measuring 0-4-01 bighas and from this Khasra number there is a path to his house. He has also given a finding that the petitioner does not own any land adjacent to this Khasra number. The Director, Consolidation has given cogent and convincing reasons while dis-agreeing with the report of the Consolidation Officer. He has come to just conclusion that the land could not be allotted to the petitioner from Khasra No.99 old/62 new. There is neither any jurisdictional error nor any procedural irregularity in the order dated 30.3.2007 passed by the Director, Consolidation in case No.49/2006. Consequently, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. No costs. September 12, 2008. (Rajiv Sharma) (sck). Judge.