THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM C.R.P. No. 5108 of 2010 Dated. 17–06-2011 Between: Kovvuri Sitaratnam …Petitioner Vs. Mude Peter …Respondent THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM C.R.P.No. 5108 of 2010 ORAL ORDER: This is a defendant’s revision directed against the order dated 31-08-2010 of the learned III-Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, rejecting the revision petitioner’s objection to the marking of the suit promissory note – Ex.A.1, on the ground that the instrument does not bear the words on demand indicating a linear obligation to pay the amount borrowed. A promissory note is defined in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘the Act’), to mean an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. The statutory illustrations following the definition are: (a) I promise to pay B or order Rs.500. (b) Xxx xxx (c) Xxx xxx (d) I promise to pay B Rs.500 and all other sums which shall be due to him. Clearly, illustration (a) does not contain any words signifying an obligation to pay only ‘on demand’ or ‘order’ as defined in Section 4 of the Act. These are however considered illustrations of a valid promissory note. It is clear, on a true and fair construction of the phraseology of Section 4 of the Act that a promissory note to be such must be an instrument in writing; must not be a bank-note or a currency note; must be signed by the maker of the instrument; must be in respect of a liability to pay a certain sum of money either to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument. It is the last phrase ‘to the bearer of the instrument’ which signifies the negotiability of the instrument and is the core of the definition of the promissory note as a ‘negotiable instrument’. By the order whose revision is sought herein, the learned Senior Civil Judge has held that the suit instrument contains an expression which signifies a promise to repay the debt on the order of the maker (the plaintiff); and that the intention of the executant to repay the amount to a certain person or any person is clearly discernable and therefore the instrument is a promissory note within the meaning of the expression as defined in Section 4 of the Act. Sri T.S. Anand, learned counsel representing Sri J. Sreenivasa Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend, relying on the judgment of a learned Division Bench of this Court in M.D. Nyamathulla v. A. Chitharanjan Reddy[1] that the learned Division Bench has, on an interpretation of provisions of Section 4 of the Act, clearly held that the expression signifying the liability to pay ‘on demand’ is a necessary and non-derogable component of a valid promissory note. This is a contention that does not commend acceptance by this Court either on the phraseology of the definition of a promissory note in Section 4 of the Act or on a true and fair construction of the judgment of this Court in Nyamathulla (supra). The portion of the judgment (paragraph No.13) strenuously relied upon on behalf of the revision petitioner reads: …The expression ‘on demand’ in a promissory note has a technical meaning. It means ‘payable immediately or forthwith’. But every document which contains a promise to pay on demand is not necessarily a promissory note. Where notwithstanding the existence of the words ‘on demand’, the documents did not satisfy the test of negotiability, they were not promissory notes.’ It is a settled principle of construction of precedents that judgments should neither be read as theorems of Euclid or with the same rigor as legislative instruments. Judgments are intended to convey the generic expression of thought in a flowing conversation which constitutes the judgment dealing with the analysis of facts and law and are not intended to lay down a code for all purposes as a law. In this background of principles that should animadvert the construction of the language in a judgment, this Court notices that the judgment in Nyamathulla (supra) proceeded on the core issue before it as to whether the instrument in lis was a ‘promissory note’ or a ‘bond’. It is in that context before it that the learned Division Bench observed that mere existence in an instrument of the expression ‘on demand’ which means ‘payable immediately or forthwith’, every document which contains such promise does not necessarily constitute a promissory note and that a document which does not satisfy the test of negotiability notwithstanding the satisfaction of other indicia of a promissory note, would not constitute a promissory note. In the light of the clear and unambiguous legislative language of Section 4 of the Act defining a promissory note; in the light of the statutory illustrations of Section 4 (a) and (d) of the Act and in the context of facts in which the judgment in Nyamathulla (supra) was delivered and even on a grammatical construction of the extracted portion of the judgment, this Court is unable to infer that the learned Division Bench had ordained that an instrument which does not incorporate the magical expression ‘on demand’ does not constitute a promissory note. On the aforesaid analysis, this Court finds no reason for revisional interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. The revision is without merits and is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. __________________________ JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM Dated: 17-06-2011 Pvks/* [1] 2008 (3) ALD 303 (DB)