IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA C.R. No.187 of 2009 1. Prabandh Kumar Pandey, son of late Beyasmani pandey. 2. Sheo Dulari Devi, wife of Om Prakash Mishra, 3. Raj Kumari Devi, wife of Purshottam Mishra, 4. Ragini Pandey, Minor daughter of late Beyas Mani Pandey, under the guardianship of Prabandh Kumar Pandey (petitioner no.1). All are resident of Village-Choda Pakari, P.S. Inarwa, District- West Champaran. …..Defendants/Appellants….Petitioners. Versus 1. Jagdish Prasad, son of late Kamla Prasad, 2. Mohan Prasad, son of late Kamla Prasad, 3. Ram Babu Prasad, son of late Kamla Prasad. 4. Sheo Shankar Prasad, son of late Kamla Prasad. 5. Kumari Veena Gupta, daughter of late Kamla Prasad. All are residents of village- Sikta, P.O. & P.S. Sikta, District- West Champaran. ….Plaintiffs/Respondents…Opp. Parties. ----------- 05- 15.11.2011 Heard Mr. Ram Kishan Prasad for the petitioners. This civil revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure raises a grievance with respect to the order dated 26.2.2001, passed by the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Court, Bettiah in Misc. Case No.12 of 1997, whereby he has rejected the present petitioners’ application under Order 9, rule 13, read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein prayer was made to set aside the ex-parte order dated 28.2.1997, passed in Title Suit No.75 of 1987. 2 2. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The opposite parties herein had instituted the aforesaid suit for the reliefs prayed for in the plaint. The defendants (the petitioners herein) entered appearance through counsel and filed duly executed Vakalatnama. In spite of repeated opportunities, he did not file written statement in the suit. The suit was thereafter disposed of on the basis of the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs by the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 28.2.1997. The defendants (petitioners herein) thereafter filed the aforesaid Misc. Case No.12 of 1997, for recall of the judgment in the suit which has been rejected by the impugned order. The learned trial court has held that it is not an ex-parte judgment and decree because the defendants had entered appearance through counsel and filed duly executed Vakalatnama. Secondly, in spite of repeated opportunities, the defendants did not file written statement nor they cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiffs. 3. It is, therefore, quite clear to us from a perusal of the impugned order and the materials on record that it was a case of purposive negligence on the part of the 3 defendants to harass the plaintiffs. Secondly, law is well settled that court should be very circumspect in recalling an order for rehearing of the case, because it sets at naught the entire effort made till then to dispose of the lis between the parties. No premium can be put on the negligence of the plaintiffs. 4. The following portion of the book by Fali S. Nariman, entitled India’s legal system: Can it be saved”, is also relevant in the present context: “More than one hundred years ago, a law member in the Government of India (Hobhouse) recorded in a minute dated 5 September 1872 (on the Bill leading to the Privy Council Appeal Act,1874) the following observations: In considering what limit should be assigned to the power of appealing, our leading maxim is, that it is the interest of the commonwealth to have and end of law suits. No man has a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes. The State’s duty is discharged when it has provided such a reasonable amount of attention and skill and honesty as will satisfy reasonable men that their causes have been decided, erroneously or otherwise, on the merits, and according to the best a ability of the judge, and so will prevent them from feeling that resentment of sheer injustice which drives people to take the law into their hands and to wage private war. Upon this principle all laws place some limits to litigation. And so have we placed limits to the power of appealing. Pithily put, and elegantly phrased. The portion about no man having a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wished was quoted by Justice Gajendragadkar (who later became Chief Justice of India) in one of the early reports of the Law Commission of India, 4 but despite what was so wisely said by Mr. Hobhouse and again by Chief Justice Gajendrgadkar, our laws continue to provide(by way of appeals, reviews and revisions) unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get private affairs ultimately settled. For instance, we have now abolished second appeals, and yet lawyers go on arguing endlessly about the maintainability of intra- court appeals under special laws.” 5. It is difficult to recall the judgment in question and rehear the matter also in view of growing pendency in courts in India. I am reminded of the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Bibek Debroy in his book entitled “In the Dock: Absurdities of Indian Law‟, that the pending litigations in this country without any addition thereto, will take 324 years for disposal. These observations were made more than two decades ago, and the situation has further deteriorated. One Judge perhaps of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in one of his speeches recently has made observations that it will now take 350 years or so to dispose of the pending cases. 6. This civil revision application is dismissed. (S K Katriar, J.) S.K.Pathak/