IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA SLA No.73 of 2010 Lallan Prasad Singh Versus The State Of Bihar & Ors ----------- 4/ 11.8.2011 Heard Shri Tej Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner in the present application by which the petitioner, who was the complainant of Complaint Case no. 176 C of 1999 (Tr. No. 407 of 2010), has sought special leave of the court to appeal against the judgment of acquittal passed by Shri Vijay Kishore Choudhary, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Hilsa on 24th May, 2010 by which respondent nos. 2 to 5 were acquitted of charge under sections 147, 323, 452, 380/34 IPC. It was a case instituted on a petition of complaint and the accusation was that respondents no. 2 to 5 trespassed into the premises, i.e., the house and its Sahan, being variously armed and started abusing the complainant and when he objected to being abused, the accused persons assaulted him. Some specific allegations were made. It was stated that respondent Ravindra Paswan, who was having a country made gun, fired whereas respondent Harikishun caught hold of the complainant and assaulted him with fists and slaps, as a result of which many injuries appeared on the person of the present applicant. All accused persons, thereafter, went inside the house of the complainant and picked up different properties, like, utensils and box, which was containing ornaments and other properties. 2 After usual enquiry and order of summoning, respondents appeared and the case went to trial. Witnesses came to support the allegations. The court below was of the view that witnesses were all interested and further that there was a dispute for the title and possession over the property, which was the place of occurrence and, it was admitted by the complainant in his evidence that he had lost the title suit. The contention before me was that after having lost the title suit, the decree was appealed against and that was reversed. It was contended further that the enmity which was also admitted on account of the lodging of a case of arson for the date of occurrence 29.3.1999, the trial had also ended in acquittal of present applicant and others and, as such, the defence version which was accepted by the trial court as the probable version, probably, appears misleading him into erring while acquitting the respondents. The onus of proof is always on the prosecution which varies vastly from the burden of proof which is on the defence. It is the well known principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution has, on the one hand, to establish each ingredient of an offence by admissible, acceptable evidence, as in judging the probability in respect of the defence version, the courts have simply to see that if the defence has succeeded in probabilizing even a single fact out of many facts, then the very probability of existence of that fact creates a dent in the prosecution case and on that account, the defence gets acquittal. 3 Here in the present case, the trial magistrate has given reason which appears very much convincing for rejecting the prosecution case. He has noted that if the arson had already occurred on 29.3.1999 and the FIR had also been lodged, then it could be a probability that in order to creating a defence the present applicant and others could have filed a complaint preponing the date of occurrence to 28.3.1999. I see the probability very much in favour of the defence and I uphold the view, which has been taken by the learned trial magistrate. Having regard to the discussions made by the trial judge, I am of the view that the present application seeking special leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal is of no merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Anil/ ( Dharnidhar Jha, J.)