Regular Second Appeal No.4276 of 2008 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision:-8.9.2010 Firm M/s N.D.Rice Mills and others ...Appellants Versus Firm M/s Suraj Parkash Surinder Kumar and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR Present:- Mr.V.K.Jain, Senior Advocate with Mr.J.L.Malhotra, Advocate for the appellants. Mr.S.K.Garg Narwana, Advocate for the respondents. M ehinder S ingh S ullar , J . (Oral) As is evident from the record that a Coordinate Bench of this Court (Mahesh Grover, J.), while dismissing this Regular Second Appeal, vide order dated 13.2.2009, inter-alia, observed as under:- “I have thoughtfully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the impugned judgments which reflect that respondent No.1 had produced cogent evidence to establish its case as pleaded by it in its plaint. In the balance sheets of the different years, appellant no.1 had admitted and acknowledged its liability to pay the outstanding amount to respondent no.1. In this view of this categoric admission in the balance sheets, there was little escape from the liability. The balance sheets were corroborated and tallied with the accounts books produced by respondent no.1. These balance sheets were duly proved by PW4-H.C.Jindal, Chartered Accountant. He testified that these balance sheets had been submitted in their office at the asking of M/s N.K.Rice Mills, Nabha. He also identified the signatures of the official and recognized the seal of appellant no.1 on the said documents. In this view of the matter when there was ample evidence in the shape of audited balance sheets duly Regular Second Appeal No.4276 of 2008 2 acknowledged by appellant no.1, the contentions as raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are totally misplaced. That apart, these are the pure findings of fact. No illegality or infirmity has been shown in the impugned judgments which could persuade this Court to describe the findings recorded therein to be perverse so as to warrant interference in this Regular Second Appeal. No substantial question of law arises for determination by this Court. Consequently, this appeal is held to be without any merit and deserves to be dismissed. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the interest component is on the higher side and only 6% interest ought to have been granted and further contended that the matter regarding interest can be sorted out by way of mutual consent. Issue notice of motion to respondent no.1 only to the above limited extent for 21.5.2009.” 2. Consequently, notice of motion to respondent No.1 was issued only to a limited extent of granting the interest. In pursuance of notice, Mr.S.K.Garg Narwana, Advocate appeared on behalf of respondent No.1. 3. In this manner, the only question that requires consideration is as to whether the Courts below could have granted future interest at the more rate of 6% p.a. or not? 4. Section 34 of CPC postulates that “where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, [with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum, as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum], from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.” 5. No doubt, proviso to this Section further posits that “where the Regular Second Appeal No.4276 of 2008 3 liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions.” 6. It is not a matter of dispute that there is no stipulation of contractual rate of interest between the parties. In view of import of main section 34 CPC and in the absence of any stipulation of contractual interest, to my mind, the future interest cannot be granted at a rate exceeding 6% per annum. Meaning thereby, the plaintiff is entitled to future interest at the rate of 6% instead of 8% per annum as granted by the Courts below. 7. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are modified to the extent that the plaintiff is entitled to future interest on the decretal amount at the rate of 6% per annum. Consequently, the present appeal stands disposed of accordingly. (Mehinder Singh Sullar) 8.9.2010 Judge AS