HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (C) N0. 5523 of 2008 PETITIONER : Vijay Mishra S/o Shri Ram Khilawan Mishra, aged about 42 years, President (Chirmiri Press Club) R/o 20 N0. Deman Hill, Chitmiri, Post Office Sonan Soni, District Korea (C.G.) RESPONDENTS :l. State of Chhattisgarh, Through: Secretary, Department of Home, D.K.S.Bhawan, Mantralaya Raipur (C.G.) VERSUS 2, District Magistrate Korea (C.G.) 3. Superintendent ofPolicer Korea (C.G.) SB: Hon’ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Present: Smt. Anju Ahuj a, Advocate for the petitioner: Shri M.P.S.Bhatia, Deputy Government Advocate for the State, ORDER ORAL (Passed on 02” day of September, 2009) . The petitioner, by this petition, seeks to challenge the legality and validity of the order dated 16th July, 2008 (Annexure P/l) passed by the District Magistrate, Korea whereby the renewal of Arms license was rejected. Smt. Ahuja, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has approached earlier this Court impugning the order dated 51h November, 2007 in W.P.(C) Not 2549 of 2008 (Sanjay Mishra & Ot/rem v. State 0f Ch/rattz'sgarh & Others), to whereby without assigning any reason, the Additional District Magistrate, Korea, rejected the application for renewal of the Arms license. 3. This Court, on 7m May, 2008 after hearing learned counsel for the parties, disposed ofthe aforesaid petition observing as under: “In view of the above submissions, this petition is disposed of with a direction to the concerned Additional District Magistrate to decide the application of the petitioners for renewal of their gun license afresh after affording them opportunityof hearing with a reasoned order expeditiously preferably Within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order.” 4. The District Magistrate, pursuant to the order dated 7th May, 2008, passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2549/2008, passed the impugned order in detail, whereby the application of the petitioner for renewal of the Arms license was rej ected. 5. Smt. Ahuja submits that an appeal may not be available to the petitioner as the impugned order was passed pursuant to the direction of this Court. . Shri Bhatia, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents submits that rule 5 of the Arms Rules, 1962 provides for an appeal against the order of the licensing authority or other authority. In case of an order passed by the Distriet/Additional District Magistrate, the Commissioner of the Division shall be the appellate authority. 7. The contention of Smt. Ahuja is noticed to be rejected on a simple ground that there was no such direction by this Court. The direction was only to the effect that a reasoned order may be passed, in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. There is no prohibition as such to approach the appellate authority. The order has been passed in accordance with law and as such, the petitioner ought to have taken recourse to the alternative statutory appellate remedy. 8. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission ano’Ot/ters’, observed that “the remedy provided for in Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an’ adequate or suitable relief \\ ;t” i AIR 1954 SC 207 \\ \3 \ .i‘ \ elsewhere.” The said decision has been referred and followed subsequently in a Catena of decisions that if a relief cannot be granted by the appellate authority! the writ jurisdiction may be invoked. In the present set of facts, all the relief sought for by the petitioner can be granted by the civil Court. . On the question of availability of alternative remedy, the Supreme Court in State OfHP‘ and others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement and another2, observed as under: “17. We shall first deal with the plea regarding alternative remedy as raised by the appellant State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposedlimitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy, it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. 10.Further, applying the said ratio in UP. State Spinning C0. Ltd. vs. R.S.Pandey and another3, the Supreme Court observed as under: “21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karmachari Sangh, it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right 0r obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To the same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad and in Scooters India v. Vijai E.V.Eldred.” g7 11.This Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 2164 of 2008 (S/tivratan Agariya & another Vs. State ofChhattisgarn & others) in para 6 and 7 observed as under: f (2005) 6 scc 499 ‘ J (2005) s scc 264 gb “6. This Court in M/s Thobhani Auto Mobiles VS. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, while dealing with the issue of alternative remedy observed that “normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate, efficacious alternative remedy where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedy before resorting to writ jurisdiction, except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure.” 7‘ Applying the well-settled dicta laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court on the issue of availability of altemative remedy to the facts of the case, this petition is dismissed as not maintainable, as no strong case has been made out for exercise 0f extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioners to take recourse to the altemative statutory forum that may be available to them under the provisions of law. Consequently, interim order passed earlier stands vacated.” 12.Applying the well-settled principles of law on the issue of availability of alternative remedy to the facts of the case, this petition is dismissed as not maintainable as no strong case has been made out for exercise of extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to take recourse to altemative statutory remedy available to him under the provisions of law, if so advised. \ Sdl- iSatish K. Agnihotr‘i Judge t Am it