AFR X HIGH COURT OF CHHAT'I‘ISGARH AT BILASPUR WR lit Petition No. 1043 of 1988 South Eastem Coalfields Limited —Versus— Presiding (micer, C.G,I.'I‘. Jabalpur and others Post for order on 4‘ + flanualy, 2006, Sdl- Satish K. Agnihotri VVJUd9§ 7, 3. 1 . 2006 / HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Writ Patition No. 1043 of 1988 Petitioner South Eastern CoaHields Limited, Through, General Manager, SECL, Korba. Versus Respondents 1. Presiding Oflcer, Centml Government Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur. 2. Chhattisgarh Khadan Karkhana Mazdoor Union, Bankimongra, District Bilaspur (C.G.). 3. Union of India, Through: Secretaly, Ministxy of Labour, Govt. of India, New Delhi. Single Bench : Hon’ble Mr. Jusm'ce Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Mr. P. S. Koshy, Advocate for the petitioner. Miss Sharmila Singhai, Advocate for the Respondent No.2. ORDER (Lifhmlary, 2006) The following order of the Court was passed by Satish K. Agihotri J. 1. The present petitionfiled under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner seeks quashing of the notincah'on dated 12.7. 1985 (Annexure - F) issued by the Central Government and the award dated 12.10.1987 (Annexure — I) passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur (for short ‘CGI’I‘? in con/LC/ (R)/ (59)/ of 1985. QI The undisputed facts are that the petitioner, South Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. is a company registered under the Companies Act and came into existence on 1.11.1986. Prior to that it was a part of another company called Western Coal Fields Ltd. with its headquarters at Nagpur. Mud pellets (Gotas) are used to reduce the effect and impact of the blast of dynamite used in mines. Initially this mud pellets (gotas) were pumhascd by the management or persons employed for pmparing the same. The CGI’I‘, Jabalpur, in an application med under Section 33—0 (2) of the Industn'al Disputss Act, 1947 (for short ‘I.D.A.’) tiled by one Smt. 8hankar Bai and 9 others, decided on 20.8.1979 that the Gotamakers are entitled to wage group-I given to piece rated workers. Some differences arose while implementing the said order of the CGET. The dispute led to the mutual settlement between the Union and the Management dated 20. 1.1981 (Annexme—A) in conciliation. The terms of settlement were as under:~ “Tenns ofSeiilement: 1. Agreed that all persons barring one, namely Jhz‘ngal who has died, shall be taken on Company’s roll with edect from 1.1. 1981 subject to their passing the medioalfitness test. 2. The management would provide job of clay-cartridge makers to all of them in theffrst instance, but in case any one of them is found surplus to their requirement in this regard, he or she wilt be provided altemative job. 3. Agreed that work load of these clay cartridge makers shall be 1 000 cartridges of 9”x1 1/2” per workman for 8 Hours work for which they shall be paid group I wages along with other benefits as per Nalional Coal Wage Agreement-II. It is Jilrther‘ agreed that if out put of any one falls short of the work norm as fixed above, the wages willbe reduced proportionately. Likewise, if the outpui is more than what has been prescribed as minimum the wages will be proportionately increased 4. Agreed that the management shall provide the required material, ile. Clay/sand, water and coal at the workplace and the cartridge will be loaded/supplied by the workers as per existing practice‘s. While wages of these 9 regularised persons named below will be regulated as per this settlement with ejj‘ectfrom 1. 1.1981, they or their legal heir will be paid a sum of Rs 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) to be distributed equally, within one month in nil! and final settlement of all their , jg /" A!“ claims, far ihg period up to 31.12.80, Neither me union nor the persons concerned in the dispute shall have any other claim against the management towards anews of wages or any other account up to 31.12.1980 and they accept the amount in hill and‘final satisfaction of all their daims against the managemempn‘or to 1‘1. 1981. Name ofthe persons. Shankar Bai W/ o Bhaktu. Rameswar W/o Deo Prasad Budhwara Bai W/o Nandlal. Ram Mat Bai W/ o Itwar. Mangn'al S/ o Santosht Teja Bat W/ o Sitaram Dams Bai W/ o Ramadhin Sohan Bat W/ o Dhamidhar. Agarsa Bat W/ o Punimrn 4. A dispute with regard to the interpretah’on of Item-4 of the settlement dated 20.1.1981 arose between the parties, as according to the Workers, the management was not complying with the provisions of the settlement. The dispute was accordingly referred to the Central Government. The Central Govt. vide older dated 12th July, 1985 (Annexure F) in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub- section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the said dispute for adjudicau‘on to the C.G.I.T., Jabalpur, as under:— “Whether according to the term of item No.4 of the setttement dated 20. 1.1 981 between the management of Western Coalfietds Ltd, Korba and the Chhattisgarh Khadan Karkhana Mazdoor Union, Banktmongra signed before the RLC(C), Jabalpur, the management has to provide earth, water etc: at the workspot ? Ifso, to what relief the workmen Gotamalcers is entitled to ?" mmwwwstosh‘ The respondent No.2 tiled statement of case before CGIT, accordingly on 27.7. 1985. The C.G.I.T. after having considered and examined the case of both the parties, answemd the refemnce as unden~ “That according 10 item'No.4 of the settlement dated 21.1.1981 proceedings. ” Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed this petition praying for quashing of the notmcation dated 12.7.1985 (Annexure '— F) issued by the Cenn‘al Government and the award dated 12. 10.1987 (Aunexure - I) passed by the CGI’I‘, Jabalpur. Shri P. S. Koshy, leamed counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the hndings of the Tribunal were in contmvention to sand, water and coal at the Work place to the workers, as per terms of settlement dated ’ 20.1.1981. KEV It was next contended that the mfemnce by the Central Govt. to the C.G.I.T. was bad because under section 36—A ofthe I.D.A. if any doubt or diniculty an'se as to the interpletation. of any provision or wold of provisions the matter may be referred to the Labour Court only for the interpretation of the provisions. The Ieference in impugned award, does not require intelpretation but requires adjudication of the dispute which cannot be done under the provisions of Section 36-A of the I.D.A. The Inference was not industrial dispute and as such the Tribunal ought to have confined to the interpretation only, not granting any relief to the workers. Learned counsel, relied on decision of Supreme Comt in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Vs. Their Workmen 1 . Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the requirement under the said settlement was to provide coal/sand at the workplace, which clearly meant that the management was either required to provide sand or clay to the workers at their place. The finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the management was required to provide clay] sand at the work place was contrary to the terms of the agreement. The Tribunal’s direction to pay three hours overtime as the workers spent four hours in excess to the normal working hours in order to make clay is without any basis and contrary to the terms of the settlement. Clay is'nothing but stiff viscous earth. The workers were provided earth which is clay when earth is tenacious and impervious in very tine articles. 10. Miss Sharmila Singhai, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.2, per contra, submitted that this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction would not entertain this writ petition to upset 1(1967 II LLJ 423) the mmings of factS recotded by the Tribunal. Learned counsel further submitted that C.G.I.T. has examined in detail evidences and documents produced by the management as well as workers Union] Respondent No2 and had rightly come to the conclusion that the management was not supplying clay to the workers on their place of work as required under the terms of the settlement. Clay is the basic raw maten'al for making pellets/gotas. For want of supply of clay, the workers had to spend more than four hours in preparing the clay as a result, production of pellets] gotas reduced. Under the terms of the settlement the workers were required to produce 1000 cartridge of 9" x 11/2” per workman for 8 hours work but due to preparation of clay the workmen could not devote more than four hours time for manufacturing pellets] gotas. The workers had suffered due to non— supply of clay at the work spot and as such the Tribunal was right and justified in directing the respondents to pay three hours overtime as per day wages calculated on the basis of payment paid to the workers per 8 working hours a day. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. It is evident that the petitioner was not supplying clay/sand as required under the terms of the settlement dated 20. 1. 1981. Even if it is presumed that the petitioner was required to supply clay/sand meaning thereby either clay or sand, workmen were not supplied sand in place of clay, the workmen were supplied earth which is diderent from clay. 12. The Tribunal hasn'ghtly deiined the clay and distinguished the same from earth. The finding of\facts recorded by the Tribunal is just and u —\ \ proper and based on evidence and does not warrant interference 1'11 this petition. l3. 1' Cloth and General Mills Company, Ltd. (Supra) has held as under: ( 2(2005) 8 sec. 242, SAIR 1987 s.c. 117) Rex 3(2004) 3 s.c.c. 553, 4A1R 1998 s.c. 1990, V x 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Delh , ' we V gm 15. Leanmd counscl for the petitioner relied on decisions of the Supreme Court in Sanjana M. Wig (Ms) Vs, Hindustan Petroleum Cotporation Ltd.2, ABL lntemau'onal Ltd. and another Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and others3,Mr. Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni etc.4and Chandavarkar Sita Rama Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Gurnam5. 16. In Mr. Rena Diego’s case (supla), the Supleme Court held that : (I n /. According to us, the High Court has tmversed far beyond the limit of its supexvisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution when. m i the learned single Judge reversed the decree of eviction which was based on findings of facts arrived at by the fact-finding authority upon the evidence on record. It would have been well for the High Court to remind itself that it was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but a supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 which obliges the High Court to connne to the scrutiny of records and proceedings of the lower tribunal. By relying on fresh materials which wele not before the tribunal, the High Court should not have disturbed findings of facts in exercise of such supervisory jurisdicn'on. It is now well nigh settled that power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence which cannot be used to upset conclusions of facts, however erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. Way back in 1954, a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Waryarn Singh Vs. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, has pointed out that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 should be exercised “most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of '41 their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” 10 inconsistency in the conduct of the judgment-debtor in resisting the suit. Yet all thase am fqr the Court’s hnding facts and if such fact- finding bodies have acted properly in law and if the findings cpuld not be descn'bed as perverse in lawv in the sense that no reasonable person pmnerly instructed in law could have come to such a fmding, such nndmgs should not be interfexed with within the exemise of the jurisdiction by the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.” 18. It is well settled principle of law that the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should ren‘ain itself &om setting aside or ignoring the findings of facts if there was suiiicient evidence and cogent reasons to justify its conclusion. 19. For the reasons stated above, the pen'tion is dismissed. No order as to costs. a i 3di- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge