THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.5781 OF 2010 DATED: 19.12.2011 Between: Mandadi Narayana … Petitioner And 1. Joint Collector, Rangareddy District at Hyderabad (A.P.) and 11 others. … Respondents THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.5781 OF 2010 ORDER: This Civil Revision Petition is preferred under Section 91 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short, ‘the Act’) assailing the order dated 30.06.2009 in Appeal Case No.F1/4241/2007 on the file of the Court of the Joint Collector, Rangareddy District/1st respondent herein. The facts, in brief, are as under: The revision petitioner claims to be the protected tenant in respect of Ac.9-14 guntas of dry land situated in Sy.No.5 of Gandiguda Village, Hyderabad West Taluk, Hyderabad District. Alleging that the respondent No.5 herein had illegally occupied the above said land, the writ petitioner approached the District Collector, R.R. District and in pursuance thereof the Mandal Revenue Officer/4th respondent herein issued a notice informing the respondent No.5 herein that his possession over the land in question was illegal. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent No.5 filed W.P.No.8754 of 2005 contending that the petitioner had surrendered his ownership rights accrued under Section 38-E of the Act in favour of one Sriram, the father of the respondents 7 to 12 herein and accepting the same, the respondent No.2 – Additional Revenue Divisional Officer by proceedings dated 1.12.1975 cancelled the petitioner’s Section 38-E Certificate. It was claimed by the 5th respondent herein that he purchased the property in question from the said Sriram through the landholders Ghulam Sadiq Ali Khan and others in the year 1979. Thus it was contended that he was the absolute owner and possessor of the land in question. During the pendency of W.P.No.8754 of 2005, the writ petitioner filed an Appeal on 21.07.2007 before the Joint Collector, Rangareddy District under Section 90 of the Act against the order dated 1.12.1975 passed by the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer. Along with the said Appeal, the petitioner also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of the delay of 660 days in filing the Appeal stating that he came to know about the order dated 1.12.1975 only when the 5th respondent filed W.P.No.8754 of 2005 and that the delay of 660 days from the date of knowledge was neither wilful nor wanton. The respondent No.5 opposed the said application contending that there was inordinate delay of about 31 years and not 660 days as claimed by the appellant. Accepting the plea of the respondent No.5 that there was inordinate delay of 31 years, the Joint Collector by order dated 30.06.2009 dismissed the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay holding that no satisfactory explanation was offered for the said delay. Consequently, the Appeal under Section 90 of the Act was dismissed as barred by limitation. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition under Section 91 of the Act assailing the order of the Joint Collector, dated 30.06.2009. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record. Section 90 of the Act provides for a remedy of appeal and as per Section 93 of the Act such appeal shall be filed within 60 days from the date of the order, against which the appeal or application is filed. In the instant case, the order of the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer cancelling the Section 38E Certificate was passed on 1.12.1975, whereas the appeal was preferred before the Joint Collector on 21.07.2007 i.e., after a period of about 31 years. However the writ petitioner, who claims that he came to know of the order dated 01.12.1975 only when the 5th respondent filed W.P.No.8754 of 2005, contends that the period of limitation for preferring appeal shall be computed from the date of the knowledge. Thus, according to the petitioner, the delay was only 660 days but not 31 years. Even assuming that the delay was 660 days, the question that arises for consideration is whether sufficient cause could be shown by the petitioner for the delay of 660 days i.e., about two years after he came to know about the order dated 1.12.1975. Admittedly the petitioner is not in possession of the land in question. However the petitioner did not give any particulars as to when and how he was dispossessed. Therefore, his plea that he came to know of the order of cancellation only on receipt of the notice in W.P.No.8754 of 2005 does not appear to be bona fide. Even otherwise there is absolutely no satisfactory explanation for not filing the appeal for a period of about two years from the date of knowledge. It is true that a liberal approach shall be adopted while exercising the powers conferred for condonation of delay so as to advance substantial justice to the parties and to decide the lis between the parties on merits. However when the delay is found to be on account of gross negligence or deliberate inaction, the appellate authority cannot be said to have committed any error in declining to condone the delay. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that no sufficient cause could be made out by the petitioner for condonation of even 660 days delay. Hence the impugned order warrants no interference by this Court. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition, which is devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs. ______________ G. ROHINI, J. Dt. 19.12.2011 gbs