THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO W.P.NO.312 OF 2003 ORDER: Heard Sri Praveen Kumar, for Sri A.K.Jayaprakash Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the corporation. This writ petition is directed against an award passed on 19.3.2002 by the Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Warangal in ID No. 62 of 2000, which dispute has been raised by the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner has joined the service of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation as a `conductor’ on daily wage basis during May, 1992, and his services have been regularized with effect from 1.7.1997. While he was conducting the bus on the route Mancherial to Kothagudem, the checking officials of the corporation have undertaken a check between Stage No.10 and 9 on 12.4.1999. They have found certain ticket issuing irregularities indulged in by the petitioner and based upon the report of the checking officials, the writ petitioner has been subjected to disciplinary proceedings. The corporation has taken care to examine the checking officials before the Enquiry Officer. Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of the charges laid against him and agreeing with the said report the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of removal against the petitioner on 13.8.1999. Since, he could not secure the relief with the departmental authorities, he raised the industrial dispute. The Labour Court has held that the domestic enquiry has been conducted validly and properly by the corporation. The 1st charge laid against the petitioner is that he has violated the rule viz., issue and start i.e., to issue the tickets to all the passengers in the bus and make necessary entries in the statistical return and then start the bus for its onward journey. The significance of this `issue and start’ rule is that the conductors who run the services will be squarely accountable for the tickets issued or for their failure to issue such tickets. The corporation earns its revenue essentially from the sale of tickets to the commuting passengers. Therefore, the corporation has issued instructions to all its conductors to issue tickets first and enter the data in the statistical return provided to each one of them and then allow the bus to proceed with its onward journey. When once all the passengers are issued tickets and those numbers are entered in the statistical return, the income generated by the sale of tickets can be ensured to reach the coffers of the corporation. But, at the same time, one cannot completely ignore the factors or urgency involved requiring the buses to proceed with the onward journey, for variety of reasons. Sometimes, the bus may be ferrying patients who need urgent medical attention. Sometimes, the buses will be carrying students who need to attend to educational institutions on time. Some other times, the passengers could be employees who need to attend to their offices in time. Therefore, the conductor of a bus would be under pressure to allow the onward journey to be proceeded with while his business of issuing tickets may not have been completed as yet. So therefore de hors these facts and circumstances, as a rule of thumb, one cannot hold the conduct of the conductor in starting the buses without completing the issuance of tickets as a misconduct, at all times. At best, lack of good conduct on the part of the conductors in not completing in quick time the issuance of tickets and making relevant in the statistical return will be a case of technical violation. For such a technical violation, an extreme punishment of removal from service would not be warranted. When we look at the 2nd charge framed against the writ petitioner herein, it itself notices that the petitioner has issued tickets to two passengers but on sighting the ticket checking officials. Even if the said fact is held established, it clearly amounts to issuance of tickets to the passengers and consequently the income from the sale of these two tickets is liable to be accounted for to the corporation. The check has not revealed that there are still any more passengers who were traveling without tickets being issued to them. Even if the allegation leveled against the petitioner forming part of Charge No.2 is held established, at best, it would amount to a possible intent on his part to defraud the corporation by collecting the fares from these two passengers later on without correspondingly issuing to them the tickets. Since such an event, has any way aborted, and the petitioners has already issued two tickets to the passengers, an extremely harsh punishment of removal from service cannot be justified. Therefore, to my mind, the Labour Court has properly assessed the quantum of guilt held established against the petitioner and found that the punishment of removal from service is too excessive and harsh. Hence, it has directed the respondent corporation to appoint the petitioner afresh in regular time scale and that the petitioner would not be entitled for continuity of service benefit or backwages. Regulation 8 of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Conduct, Classification and Appeal) Regulations, 1967 has listed out various punishments that can be imposed against the employees for good and sufficient reasons. Making an appointment afresh is not one of the punishments so listed out. Therefore, to this extent, the award passed by the Labour Court cannot be sustained. While exercising the power available to it under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is entitled to substitute one of the listed out punishments to the one which has been imposed by the disciplinary authority. It cannot invent a new punishment than what has not been provided for by the regulations. The Labour Court is squarely bound and be guided by the Staff Regulations in this regard. Therefore, instead of setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court, which will have a graver impact on the service conditions of the writ petitioner, inasmuch as he cannot continue in service of the corporation as of now, I consider it appropriate to modify the award suitably. While at the same time a balance has got to be struck between the interests of the corporation on the one hand and that of the employee on the other. The employee stood reinstated pursuant to the award passed on 19.3.2002. Between 13.8.1999, the date on which the punishment of removal from service was passed, until March, 2002 he was kept out of employment. If he was denied payment of backwages for this period. That is bound to visit him adversely and that would be also acting as a deterring factor to ensure that the writ petitioner or his likes would not be indulging in a conduct which is likely to cause revenue loss to the corporation. Therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court on 19.3.2002 should be understood as one which directed the respondent corporation to reinstate the writ petitioner into service instead of treating him to have been appointed afresh. Secondly, the writ petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of continuity of service. However, he will not be entitled to be paid any backwages for the interregnum period between 13.8.1999 to 31.3.2002 when he ultimately got reinstated pursuant to the award passed by the Labour Court. It would also be apt to direct the corporation not to treat this period for any other purpose including terminal benefits. However, the writ petitioner shall be treated to have been reinstated duly setting aside the order of removal passed on 13.8.1999. In other words, he would only be entitled for the benefit of continuity of past service. The writ petition is therefore allowed to the extent indicated supra. But, however, without costs. --------------------------------- Nooty Ramamohana Rao, J knk 30th March 2010