1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR. SECOND APPEAL NO.522 OF 2006. Pramilabai Thakur and anr.. ..vs. Chunnisao Hirasao Kapse & othr. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Office Notes, office Memoranda of Coram Court's or Judge's appearances, Court's orders or directions order and Registrar's order. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= CORAM: C.L.PANGARKAR,J. DATE : 15th April, 2008. 1. Heard Mr.Naidu, Advocate for the appellant and Mr.N.G.Bhamburkar, Advocate for the respondents. 2. This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant/appellant against whom a decree for specific performance has been passed, which is confirmed by the first appellate court. 3. The appellant entered in to a contract of sale of the suit house with the respondents. It was agreed between the parties that the appellant would apply for grant of permission to the Urban Land Ceiling Authority to transfer the property in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs. The respondents were to apply to 2 the Cooperative Society for grant of a loan. It was agreed that the respondents should apply on or before 1st September, 1980 and after sanction of the said loan they were to inform the appellant/defendant of such sanction of the loan. It is not disputed that the appellant was to obtain a permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority for transfer of the property. It is the contention of the plaintiffs/ respondents that the plaintiffs/ respondents were always ready and willing to perform their part of contract. It was the appellant/defendant who was reluctant to perform his part of the contract. 3. The learned judge of the Trial Court, after having considered the evidence found that the respondents/plaintiffs had shown their readiness and willingness throughout. There was an agreement between the parties and the appellant was liable to execute the sale-deed. 4. The First Appellate court also concurred with the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant/defendant. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that in fact the respondents were never ready and willing to perform their part of contract, since they had failed to inform the appellant that they have obtained 3 the loan, and that the loan has been sanctioned. He invited my attention to the condition as mentioned in agreement of sale, which shows that the plaintiffs/respondents were to apply before 1st September, 1980 and that the sale-deed was to be executed within period of fifteen days from the date of sanction of such a loan. He submitted that the plaintiffs did not inform the defendant of loan having been sanctioned and therefore, there was no question of defendant doing anything in the matter. The document Ex.62 clearly goes to show that the respondents/plaintiffs had applied for grant of a loan and the said loan was sanctioned by the Cooperative Society in favour of the plaintiffs w.e.f. 8/1/1981. It may be mentioned that although the loan was sanctioned on 8/1/1981, it is clear from the record that the Urban Land Ceiling Authority had not granted permission in favour of the defendants until 14/2/1981, as such there could be no question of defendant's executing the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs prior to grant of such a permission. Even though the plaintiffs may have actually failed to inform the appellant/defendant of loan having been sanctioned, that would not make any difference. It appears from the record that the plaintiffs have been repeatedly issued notices to the defendant and notice Exh.65 clearly goes to show that it was the defendant who had failed to inform the plaintiff of sanction having been granted and that the 4 plaintiffs had in fact informed the defendant that the loan has been sanctioned in favour of the plaintiffs. The record does not show that the respondents/plaintiffs had ever responded to any of the notices. No copy of notice is filed on record. This clearly indicates that the appellant/ defendant was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. On the other hand, the respondents/plaintiffs had issued notices to the defendant repeatedly, calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed. It is not disputed that the transaction in suit is one of agreement of sale. In view of this, only question that was required to be looked into by the court below was readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs/respondents and I find from the evidence on record that the lower courts have not committed any perversity in appreciation of the evidence. No substantial question of law is involved. The appeal is dismissed in limine. JUDGE chute