IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.164 of 2009 Md.Taiyab Versus The Administrator,Bsrtc & Anr ----------- For the Appellant: Mr. Narendra Thakur, Advocate For the respondents: Mr. P.K. Verma, Mr. S.R. Sharan, Advocates 4 18-3-2009 The petitioner was in the service of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and at the relevant time he was posted as Driver in the Gaya depot. While he was working as a Driver –cum- Conductor in a Deluxe Bus it was alleged that though he was realizing the fare of an adult passenger but was accounting for it as a minor passenger. He was placed under suspension on 12.11.1993. Thereafter, an enquiry to the alleged irregularity was conducted and the misconduct of the petitioner stood proved and on the basis of which the order of dismissal was passed by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner challenged the said order in departmental appeal, which also came to be dismissed. Various contentions were raised by the petitioner - appellant herein and one of the contentions was that during the period of suspension pending enquiry, he was not allowed subsistence allowance. - 2 - As per Rules in force and established procedure one is entitled to subsistence allowance during suspension pending enquiry period only if he is remained in the station. Admittedly, petitioner left the station and therefore, he is not entitled to subsistence allowance. In any event that is not a ground for setting aside the enquiry. It is further contended that a criminal case was pending and that resulted in acquittal and therefore, disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct. In disciplinary proceedings the question is whether the delinquent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his discharge or dismissal from service or a lesser punishment. In criminal proceedings the question is whether any offence as committed under Indian Penal Code or any other penal statute stand proved being the degree of criminal case is very high, sentence should be imposed. The conviction in a criminal case requires a higher standard of proof than required in disciplinary enquiry. The charges levelled in the disciplinary proceedings have to be tested keeping in mind the enforcement of discipline and the level of integrity. In this connection we refer the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena (1997) 1 LLJ 746, - 3 - 752 (SC) and Kusheshwar Dubey vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1988) 2 LLJ 470 (SC). It is also held by the Madras High Court in M.M. Rubber Co. Ltd. vs. S. Natrajan (1985) 2 LLJ 364 that there is an acquittal in criminal proceedings, the disciplinary proceeding is not barred as it has got an independent angle. Here in this case the Enquiry Officer on the basis of evidence adduced during enquiry has found the misconduct of the petitioner proved and the appellate authority has also considered the evidence and findings of the Enquiry Officer as well the disciplinary authority. Admittedly, the delinquent did not appear before the disciplinary authorities despite receipt of notices/communication and the enquiry was conducted exparte. Even though the enquiry was held ex-parte, evidence was adduced in the enquiry to prove the charges levelled against the proceedee. The respondent is a public sector undertaking and large number of similar employees may have involved in such cases. The amount of misappropriation in this particular instance is very meager, however, the misconduct proved affects the integrity of the - 4 - person that even one instance was detected. It is not a ground for a lenience view in any vent. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that previously also punishment were imposed on similar offences against the petitioner. We are of the view that no case was made out by the petitioner – appellant to invoke jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India especially considering the nature of the misconduct committed by him. Considering the fact that misconduct of the petitioner on enquiry has been proved and the petitioner – appellant came to this court against the order of dismissal after long delay, we are of the view that the impugned order is not required to be interfered with. Writ application stands dismissed. Neyaz/- (J.B. Koshy, CJ.) (Dharnidhar Jha, J.)