IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA SA No.293 of 2009 1. Dhanbarti Kuer , wife of Late Jaipal Yadav , E/o village Tarar Tola Imamganj, P.O.Tarar, P.S. Daudnagar, Dist. Aurangabad. 2. Keshia Devi @ Keshari Devi, D/o Late Jaipal Yadav W/o Sri Kameshwar Yadav, R/o village & P.O. Ram Nagar, P.S. Obra, Dist. Aurangabad at present village Tarar Tola Imamganj, P.O. Tarar, P.S. Daudnagar, Dist. Aurangabad….. Plaintiff appellants. Versus 1. Ramashray Yadav 2. Duehdshwar Yadav sons of Late Sita Yadav 3. Dinesh Yadav, 4. Umesh yadav sons of Ramashray yadav 5. Upendra yadav 6. Fulendra Yadav 7. Ram Prakash all miknor sons of Dudheshwar Yadav through and under the Guardianship of their father Dudheshwar Yadav 8. Muna 9. Ajit Kumar both minor sons of Dudheshwar Yadav through and under the guardianship of their father Dudheshwar Yadav, all R/o village Tarar Tola, Imamganj, P.O.Tarar, P.S. Daudnagar, Dist.Aurangabad ……Defendant- Respondents. 8 15.09.2011 Heard learned counsel for the appellants. This second appeal has been filed against the judgement and decree dated 13.4.2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, F.T.C No.1, Aurangabad in Title Appeal No. 54/3/2007/2008 whereby the judgment and decree dated 25.5.2007 passed by the Sub-judge-3 Aurangabad, in Title Partition Suit No. 76/78 of 1996/1999 has been affirmed. The plaintiffs are widow and daughter of Jaipal Yadav, who was admittedly one of the three sons of Bhuneshwar Yadav and thus a co-sharer in the family property. The plaintiffs have come out with the case that Jaipal Yadav died in the year 1958 leaving behind the plaintiff as his only heirs and they were entitled to have their share in the joint family property in view of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act 2 1956. The defendants who are the brother and descendents of the deceased brother of Jaipal Yadav did not deny the status of the plaintiffs but they have pleaded in their written statement specifically that Jaipal Yadav did not die in the year 1958 as asserted by the plaintiffs but he died in the year 1936. Thus the core issue between the parties was the year of the death of the Jaipal Yadav. Both parties have led their specific evidence on that issue and after consideration of the pleadings, evidence and submissions of the parties both the courts below have come to concurrent finding of fact that the case set up by the plaintiffs regarding 1958 being the year of death of Jaipal Yadav was not correct. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that the defendants relied upon a death certificate which has been exhibited as Ext. D in the suit in order to establish 1936 as the year of death of Jaipal Yadav, but the said document was forged and fabricated document and at least a judicial notice should have been taken of the fact that Patna Municipal Corporation was not in existence in the year 1936 which authority has purportedly issued that certificate. Emphasising further this submission the learned counsel has stated that both the courts below should have taken notice of this fact that Patna Municipal Corporation came in existence in the year 1952 and earlier there was Patna City Municipality and, therefore, Ext.D was not a valid and genuine document and the reliance upon the same by both the courts below has vitiated their judgments. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel that there are only two cases before the court regarding the death of Jaipal Yadav , the first one as pleaded by the 3 plaintiffs to be of the year 1958 and the other one has pleaded by the defendant to be of the year 1936 and in case of failure of the defendants to establish their case regarding the death of Jaipal Yadav in the year 1936, there was no option before the court except accepting the case of the plaintiffs that Jaipal Yadav died in the year 1958. On these basis the learned counsel has submitted that substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this appeal. There is no dispute that the plaintiffs have come out with the case that Jaipal Yadav died in the year 1958 which fact has been specifically denied by the defendants with further pleading that Jaipal Yadav died in the year 1936. In this view of the matter, even if, the defendants failed to establish their own assertion of death to be the year 1936 still it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff’s case, in that circumstance should be taken to have been established and the suit should have been straight-away decreed. It is well settled that the plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs and the failure or weakness of the defendants in proving their case cannot give any aid to the plaintiff. In view of the specific denial by the defendants regarding the assertion of the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to establish their own case as pleaded. The plaintiffs have led their evidence in support of their case but both the courts below have disbelieved and not relied upon the evidence of the plaintiffs. It could not be pointed out that there is any defect in the appreciation of evidence by the courts below and the findings are perverse. In the second appellate jurisdiction reappraisal of evidence is not permissible and the findings of facts even if erroneous 4 are normally binding upon the second appellate court unless found to be perverse. In view of the current finding of fact by both the courts below that Jaipal Yadav had not died in the year 1958, there is no scope for interference in the finding by this Court. There is no substantial question of law arising for consideration in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. M. Rahman/ (V. Nath, J)