IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION NO : 24134 of 2004 Between: The Co-Operative Labour Contract Society, Santha Jutur, Nandyal (Taluk) Kurnool District, rep. by its incharge president Smt. B. Tulasamma, Daughter in Law of B. Rami Reddy, 38 years, R/o. Santhajutur, Nandyal, Kurnool District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 Govt of A.P., rep. by its Prl. Secretary, Forest Department, Secretariat, Hyd. 2 The Chief Conservator of Forest, Hyderabad. 3 The Divisional Forest Officer, Giddalur. 4 The Forest Range Officer, ongole. .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Aﬃdavit ﬁled herein the High Court will be pleased to Issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus; i) to direct the respondents 3 to 5 to release the lorry bearing Registration No. AP-04-T-5014 with articles at Once; ii) To direct the respondents to pay to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- for the illegal detention of the lorry from 17.12.2004 deliberately and maliciously; and iii) to direct the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to take disciplinary action against the respondents 3 to 5 for their gross misconduct; and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems ﬁt and proper in the circumstances of the case. Counsel for the Petitioner: MR. VIJAYAKUAR REDDY for MR.E.AYYAPU REDDY Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR FORESTS The Court made the following Order: THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.24134 of 2004 ORDER: The Cooperative Labour Contract Society, Santhu Jutur, Nandyal Taluk, Kurnool District, ﬁled instant writ petition seeking following reliefs. (i) to direct respondent Nos.3 to 5 to release the lorry bearing Registration No.AP-04-T-5014 with articles at once; (ii) to direct the respondents to pay to petitioner society a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- for the illegal detention of the lorry from 17.12.2004 deliberately and maliciously; and (iii) to direct respondent Nos.1 and 2 to take disciplinary action against the respondent Nos.3 to 5 for their gross misconduct. In the aﬃdavit accompanying the writ petition, the president of petitioner society stated as follows. The members of petitioner society are traditional artisans. They prepared bamboo articles like tadikalu, thatties, ponakalu, jallalu, bandi savarulu, baskets etc., of different varieties. They purchased bamboo from various depots of forest department for the said purpose. On 16.12.2004 they engaged lorry bearing No.AP04 T 5014 to transport ﬁnished bamboo products to Chilakaluripet. When the lorry was passing through Ongole, respondent Nos.4 and 5 detained the vehicle, without preparing a panchanama contrary to Section 44 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 (the Act, for brevity). The members of petitioner society met respondent Nos.3 to 5 through their counsel for release of the vehicle and bamboo products, in vain. Therefore, they are before this Court. This Court heard learned counsel the petitioner society and learned Government Pleader for Forests. Placing reliance on an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Divisional Forest Oﬃcer v Cooperative Labour Contract Society (W.A.No.634 of 1989 dated 25.03.1991), learned counsel for petitioner society submits that the ﬁnished bamboo products do not come within the deﬁnition of ‘forest produce’ as deﬁned under Section 2(g) of the Act. The view canvassed by learned counsel for petitioner society is supported by the decision of a Division Bench of Bombay High Court at Nagpur in State of Maharastra v Suresh Rameswar Das Lohia[1] wherein the question whether man-made products of bamboo are within deﬁnition ‘forest produce’ as deﬁned in Section 2(4) of the Indian Forests Act, 1927 (Central Act) was considered. Deviating from the view taken by Gujarath High Court in Fatesang Gimba Vasava v State of Gujarat [2] Bombay High Court laid down as under. …..According to us, the purport of the deﬁnition clause is quite wider and it includes natural produce and the product prepared out of such produce with a human mechanism. Gujarat High Court considers chips prepared out of bamboo as a forest produce. Chips according to us could not be held to be a natural produce. Certainly it involves a human agency. The matting, supdas, or toplas prepared out of bamboo chips might have commercially diﬀerent utility. However, we do not hold such articles ultimately prepared and known as ﬁnished goods loses its identity as held by Gujarat High Court. The ﬁnished product would be deﬁnitely identiﬁed with its source which has been used as a raw material. We, therefore, ﬁnd ourselves diﬃcult to render agreement with a view as expressed by Gujarat High Court in a case cited supra (AIR 1987 Guj 9). The decision of Bombay High Court was appealed before the Supreme Court in Suresh Lohia v State of Maharashtra[3]. The Supreme Court did not agree with Bombay High Court and approved the decision of Gujarath High Court in Fatesang Gimba Vasava (supra). Relevant observations made by the Supreme Court are as follows. The legislature having deﬁned “forest-produce”, it is not permissible to us to read in the deﬁnition something which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is required to be preserved; but, it is not open to us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the deﬁnition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same. We may also state that according to us the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang case is correct, because though bamboo as a whole is forest- produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally diﬀerent is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The deﬁnition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally diﬀerent from forest-produce having a distinct character. May it be stated that where a word or an expression is deﬁned by the legislature, courts have to look to that deﬁnition; the general understanding of it cannot be determinative. So, what has been stated in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary regarding a ‘produce’ cannot be decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially diﬀerent from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression “forest-produce” as deﬁned in Section 2(4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. That bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us, and rightly. The Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.634 of 1989 dated 25.03.1991 laid down as under. It is, therefore, clear that by no stretch of imagination ﬁnished products like taties, baskets, mats and dollas come within the deﬁnition of ‘forest produce’. There is practically no controversy over this well-settled proposition of law and fact that the term ‘forest produce’ does not include the articles which have attained the shape of ‘ﬁnished products’ in the hands of the members of the society. Nevertheless, at the same time it is beyond any pale of controversy that bamboo freshly cut or otherwise is a forest produce in every sense of the term. Illicit felling of such forest produce in the reserve forest constitutes an oﬀence within the meaning of Section 44 of the A.P. Forest Act, 1967. If the members of the society have been indulging in illicit felling of the bamboos over and above the quota granted to them, then it is obvious that they will be liable to such action which may be taken by the authorities against them under law. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, the impugned action is unsustainable. Seizure of the lorry and ﬁnished products belonging to the members of petitioner society is illegal. The petitioner society also prayed for damages in a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- for illegal detention of the lorry from 17.12.2004. It is not often that this Court can exercise power to award damages while exercising power of judicial review. The public law remedy for damages for constitutional tort is available only when the fundamental right to life and liberty is violated by the State or State agencies. (See Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited v Ananta Bhattacharjee[4], K.P. Hussain Reddy v Executive Engineer, M.I. Division, Nandyal[5], Rabindra Nath Ghosal v University of Calcutta[6] and Sube Singh v State of Haryana[7]) The right of the members of petitioner society is a fundamental right referring to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, damages for constitutional tort is not enforceable in writ petition. It shall be open to petitioner society to avail other remedy under law. Insofar as other relief sought by petitioner society for taking disciplinary action against respondent Nos.3 to 5 is concerned, it is for ﬁrst respondent to look into the matter and issue necessary guidelines so that such laches are kept to minimum. In the result, for the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed in part in respect of relief (i). No costs. _____________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) 11th November, 2008 GHN To 1 Govt of A.P., rep. by its Prl. Secretary, Forest Department, Secretariat, Hyd. 2 The Chief Conservator of Forest, Hyderabad. 3 The Divisional Forest Officer, Giddalur. 4 The Forest Range Officer, ongole. 5 2CCs to GP for Forests 6 2CD copies Form-NIC-OGS/WP{JGK} as held by the Supreme Court in D. K. Basu v. State of W.B.[8] [1] 1993 Crl.L.J. 1557 [2] AIR 1987 Guj 9 [3] (1996) 10 SCC 397 [4] (2004) 6 SCC 213 [5] 2003 (1) ALD 435 [6] (2002) 7 SCC 478 [7] (2006) 3 SCC 178 [8] AIR 1997 SC 610