IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 58 OF 1991 LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 58 OF 1991 LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 58 OF 1991 IN IN IN FIRST APPEAL NO. 135 OF 1976 FIRST APPEAL NO. 135 OF 1976 FIRST APPEAL NO. 135 OF 1976 Kundalika Vithoba Kadam since deceased by his heirs and legal representatives 1A. Smt.Parvatibai Kundalika Kadam since deceased by her heirs Krishna Kundalika Kadam & Ors. ...Appellants (heirs of orig. Defendant No.1) V/s. Lalbhai Rahim Shaikh (Sutar) since deceased by heirs and legal representatives: Husenbi Mard Lalbhai Shaikh (Sutar) & Ors. ...Respondents (heirs of orig. Plaintiff and Defendant No.2) Mr.Madhav Jamdar for the Appellants. Mr.R.G. Ketkar for Respondent Nos.1d, 1e, 1b(a) to 1b(c), 1c(a) to 1c(i). CORAM : D.K. DESHMUKH & CORAM : D.K. DESHMUKH & CORAM : D.K. DESHMUKH & V.M. KANADE, JJ. V.M. KANADE, JJ. V.M. KANADE, JJ. DATED : JANUARY 17, 2008 DATED : JANUARY 17, 2008 DATED : JANUARY 17, 2008 P.C. :- P.C. :- P.C. :- 1. By this appeal, the original defendant no.1 challenges the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 5th February, 1990 in First Appeal - 2 - No.135/76. Suit was filed by the original plaintiff for accounts of the partnership firm. Therefore, preliminary decree has been passed by the trial Court. That decree was challenged in first appeal. That appeal has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the order which is impugned in the appeal. 2. The moot question that arose for consideration was that whether the firm was dissolved in the year 1953 by notice at Exhibit-1A. The trial Court held that the 1953 notice does not result in dissolution of the firm and the dissolution of the firm was brought about by notice issued in 1971. The contention of the defendant no.1 was that the dissolution of the firm was brought about in the year 1953 and the plaintiff did not file a suit within three years from that date and therefore, the suit is barred by law of limitation. Both the courts below, who have given concurrent findings, held that notice of 1953 was not the notice of dissolution of firm but was the proposal given by defendant no.1. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted - 3 - before us that we should construe that notice of the year 1953 as a notice dissolving the firm. According to him, because in the notice it is stated that a notice is being given for accounts, it amounts to a notice dissolving the firm. 4. We have heard the learned for the parties. We have gone through the record. We find that the moot question that arose for consideration was, whether dissolution of the firm was brought about by the notice issued in the year 1953. Two courts belows viz. trial court and the learned Single Judge read the notice and have come to the conclusion that, by that notice, the dissolution of the firm was not brought about. We have also gone through the finding of facts recorded by both the courts below. Admittedly, the defendant no.1 has not entered the witness box. In our opinion, where the two courts below have accepted a particular construction of the document, unless the court hearing LPA comes to the conclusion that the construction placed by two courts below is impossible construction, Letters Patent Court will not be justified in disturbing that finding. - 4 - After going through the notice, we find that the meaning that has been attached to the word in the notice of 1953 by the two courts below is a possible and acceptable construction and therefore, in our opinion, it will not be within our jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge impugned in this appeal. 5. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. 6. At this stage, a request is made for stay of the execution for a period of eight weeks. What is impugned is the preliminary decree for accounts. In our opinion, it will not be in the interest of justice to stay the final decree proceedings. It is obvious that in eight weeks, final decree is not likely to be passed. Therefore, in our opinion, the request cannot be granted. It is rejected. (D.K. DESHMUKH, J.) (D.K. DESHMUKH, J.) (D.K. DESHMUKH, J.) (V.M. KANADE, J.) (V.M. KANADE, J.) (V.M. KANADE, J.)