IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD SATURDAY, THE TWENTY NINETH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN Present HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3566 of 2011 Between: Myakala Ramulaiah .. Petitioner AND Myakala Narsamma & 3 others .. Respondents The Court made the following: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3566 of 2011 ORDER: Heard Sri K. Sreenivas, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri S. Ganesh, learned counsel representing Sri M.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the 4th respondent. The other respondents did not enter appearance. 2. The civil revision petition is directed against the order in I.A.No.665 of 2009 in O.S.No.6 of 2008, on the file of the Junior Civil Judge’s Court, at Kalwakurthy, dated 24.06.2011, by which the request for condonation of delay of 31 days in filing a petition for review of judgment was negatived. 3. O.S.No.6 of 2008, on the file of the Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Kalwakurthy, was disposed of by the judgment and decree, dated 08.06.2009, and the revision petitioner claims to have applied for a certified copy on 15.07.2009. The revision petitioner claimed to have failed to approach his counsel for noting the status of the case, as he resides in his village and his counsel resides in Hyderabad and as he also fell ill due to jaundice since 15.07.2009, he claimed to have approached his counsel on 07.09.2009 and to have been advised to file a review petition. He also stated that he took some time to arrange the required funds and consequently, a delay of 31 days occurred in presenting the review petition. 4. In the counter affidavit of respondents 3 and 4 to that petition, it was contended that the allegations of the revision petitioner are false and the revision petitioner knew fully well about the result of the suit and his claims about sickness and paucity of funds are false. 5. The trial Court, in the impugned order, observed that the revision petitioner did not establish any sufficient ground to condone the delay, as illness or poverty could not have been sufficient causes within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless it was proved that the revision petitioner was disabled from attending to any work due to the sickness. The trial Court also noted that the Court conducted a full-fledged trial and disposed of the suit on merits and any contention that the Court proceeded on a wrong proposition of law cannot be the subject of a review, though it may be the subject of an appeal through a higher Court. Therefore, the petition was dismissed without costs. 6. The revision petitioner contends herein that the existence of sufficient cause should have been construed liberally and an opportunity should have been given to contest the matter on merits. The revision petitioner also contended that the trial Court passed an order on merits on the review petition itself, while observing about the absence of any ground for review which is impermissible and which is an excess in exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, the revision petitioner desired the impugned order to be reversed. 7. The point for consideration is whether the impugned order needs to be interfered with herein. 8. The request of the revision petitioner for condonation of delay in I.A.No.665 of 2009 does not appear to have been accompanied with any affidavit or certificate from any of the quacks, who allegedly treated the revision petitioner from 15.07.2009 to 07.09.2009. While the judgment in the suit was delivered on 08.06.2009 and the revision petitioner was represented by a counsel in the suit and he was not claimed to be disabled by any sickness till 15.07.2009, the absence of taking any steps between 08.06.2009 and 15.07.2009 to get appropriate advice from the counsel does not present presence of any diligence for the revision petitioner in pursuing his case and none of the relatives, who arranged any hand loan for the revision petitioner to file the review petition, also corroborated the revision petitioner by giving any affidavit in support of the claim. Though existence of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is normally open to liberal interpretation, it cannot be a case of total absence of sufficient cause which does not deserve condonation under the provision. Respondents 3 and 4, in their counter affidavit, had specifically denied the factual allegations of the revision petitioner and contended that the counsel regularly attends the trial Court on every Thursday and that the revision petitioner knew full well about the judgment and decree since the date of the judgment and decree. The alleged suffering of the revision petitioner with jaundice and the treatment for the same was also specifically denied on oath and in the face of the conflicting allegations on oath against oath, the claims of the revision petitioner could not have been taken at their face value by the trial Court in the absence of the revision petitioner opting to produce any oral or documentary evidence before the trial Court. The impugned order and the grounds of revision do not suggest that the trial Court did not give any opportunity to the revision petitioner to produce any such material to support his case about existence of sufficient cause. 9. It is true that in dealing with this petition, the trial Court had also expressed its view on the maintainability or otherwise of a petition for review which might not be appropriate, but as the revision petitioner failed for want of proof of sufficient cause but not on other grounds, no expression of opinion need be made on the same. 10. Sri K. Sreenivas, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, however, brought to notice that valuable rights in immovable property are involved in the suit and any deprivation of all remedies for the revision petitioner will lead to grave unjustice. While the revision petitioner prosecuting the petition for review and the petition for condonation of delay in filing the petition for review cannot be considered improper or unreasonable ex facie, the revision petitioner, if he so desires and if he is so advised, can always prefer an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree and if any delay in preferring the same is involved, the revision petitioner can always rely upon the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to explain at least the period for which he was prosecuting the petitions for review and condonation of delay before the trial Court and this Court. 11. Accordingly, the civil revision petition fails and is, accordingly, disposed of without costs subject to the above observations. ___________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 29th October, 2011 KL HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3566 of 2011 Date: 29th October, 2011 KL