^ -qpl^tl a»NKSt» 3-5; ^\V^. '©WF!TTS,r'-i^wy _^CA^°.:.^^ •S'dT 3!W •arc"3:' / S3"??T'q?W( ^snwwT" a~a7; ^W!7l4!'l t)|ti<-)f^fSW(f5t?TC ^'afOTsi'^'T HIGH COURT OF flHHATTISGARH AT B1LASPUR te Hon' ble Hon' b!e ^hri R.N. Chandrakar, JJ Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, through its Divisionai Engineer, Shri M.R. Dhruw, son of Shri P.R. Dhruv, aged 55 years, occupation - service, working as Divisioonal Manager, B.S.N.L.i presently posted as Admn. & Legal Officer, GMTD, Bilaspur, resident of BSNL, Coiony, R.K Nagar, Biiaspur (CG). Centrai Excise & Service Tax Tribunal (CESTAT) through its President, West ilock No.2, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. 2. The Commissionei-. Centra! Excise & Custom, Central Avenue Builcfing, Raipur (CG). (Appeal underSection 35 (G) ofthe Central Excise Act, 1944) Present: Shri V.V.S. Murty, Sr. Advocate with Shri V.C. Ottalwar and Shri Raj'eev Shrivastava, counsel for the appeilant. Shri Bhishma Kinger, Standing counsel for Union of india/respondents. Orai Order (Passed on this 6th July, 2009) :—r~—i>nTrrr6m J''T".^l^slB-^-ffVltlSSWS-'VfWI^'fy ^C3 _ r r <:'-~ j ¥si ¥. v§: .^ l'»^ 'Jg""'^ E^Hg^PS ^> -fl";";", ^?TRPT?, P?FW7y wwti aiNi* ^T^'T' -S~ "C-ira; sssr^w(4<*i-t'*l^) T^'iWtifB'a ^- wqf?m;TW:Rfttf fsia VSS^K ^•SffOTSf^; PeLDhiLendra Mishra, J. This appeal has been rf Migam' Limited, a Corporationj 'ax Appellate Tribunal, Princi| -eferred by the appellant - Bharat Sanchar exclusiveiy owned by the Government of India against the order date<|! 21-5-2008 (Annexure P/1) passed in Service Tax Appeai No. 106 ^f 2007 by the Customs, Excise & Ser>/ics pa! Bench, New De!hi. The appelSant has a!so moved an application s.|nder Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing t{iis appeal as ths same has been preferred with delay of 294 days as per cjffice note dated 29-6-2009. Learned Sr. counsel fpr the appellant submits that earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner ^vas dismissed on the ground that the order impugned is appellable under Section 35 (G) of the Centra! Excise Act, 1944 (for short, "the Act, 194f4"). !n the meanwhiie, the appellant also obtained no objection from ths Committee on Dispute and only thereafter this appea! has been preferredj Thus, the delay in preferring the appeal is bona fide and the same deserves to be condoned. It was further argued fhat for fiiing the appea! in the matter of inter departmental dispute, where parties to the appea! are Government organization/instrumentaiiSy, the permlssion is necessary from the Committes on Dispute, constituted as per Direction of the Supreme Court as held in the matter of 011 and Naturai Gas Commission and another vs. Collector of Centrai Excise, 'reported in 1985 Supp (4) SCC 541. Leamed Sr. counse! further argued that if the perioo' of limitation is calculated by excluding the time spent during proceedings before the Committee on Dispute, the instant appeal is within the prescribed period of limitation of 180 days. ii ••'Ti--t~'"'''-"*'-B,a>sa-^'-;?.^''.s"wis^ifit'=*i-!f'si<"'wE*;ii"°i" /y •,-'— '/ "! ;' 'SSaj-a'? 'i-'^-W^ --' / :-XfcHe—' -'^iu^f^^ '®riW"'S,TsP'IWy,'1 ^ ^HT ^~"^'?t. ^Sr^ i WSS] VI^V. { ^tnw'dft'" s~"ri 3 <^f<1?CT^H •HW^"^ f^$t ^f^'^'T^ q?3TfW3ff^?T On the other hand.lejarned the judgment in the counsel for the respondents relied of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo Incpia Private Limited and another, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791 , wherein jt has been held as under" "32. As pointed out eai|lier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G ^nd 35-H makes the position ciear that an appeal and ref^rence to the High Court shouid be made within 180 days opiy from the date pf communication of the decision or order.l In other words, the language used in other provisions m^kes the position ctear that the iegisiature intended the|appellate authority to entertain the appea! by condoning t^e delay only upto 30 days after expiry of 60 days whicil is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appe^l. In the absence of any clause condoning the detay byj showing suffieient cause after the prescribed period, there| is complete exclusion of Section 5 of ths Limitation Act. | The High Court was, therefore, justified In holding that 1'here was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the 'prescribed period of 180 days." ^ '"* ^ & ^^^ Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Hongo India Private Limited (supra), it is evident that an appeal under Section 35-G of the Act, 1944 to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. The period prescribed under Section 35-G of the Act, 1944 for preferring appeal before the High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. According!y, fhe appeal is dismissed as barred by lavi/ of limitation. Sd/- Dhirendra Mishra Judge Sd/- R.N. Chandrakar Judge ^ii K