^ B, -1 •^, ffc HIGH COURT OF CHHATriSGARH AT BILASPUR Cr.M.P.No.918of2010 Vinod Kumar Singh, Son of Shri Babban Singh, aged about 35 years, Occupation-Sen/ice, Posted at District Treasury OfRce Ambikapur, Resident of Bouripara, Ambikapur, District-Surguja (C.G.) Non-applicants Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh through Poitee Station Ambikapur, Distt.Surguja 2. Cotlector (Treasury Branch) Ambikapur, Distt.Surguja(C.G.) (Petition under Section 482 ofthe Cr.P.C.) (SB: Hon'bte Mr. T.P. Sharma, J.) Present:- Mr.R.KGupta, counsei forthe appiicant. Mr.U.K.S.Chandel, Panel Lav/yerforthe State/respondents. ORAL ORDER (Passed on 6th January, 2011) 1. By this petition under Section 482 of th®Cr.P.C., the appiicant has prayed for quashment of criminal proceedings pending before the Chief Judiclal Magistrate, Ambikapur in Criminal Case No. 1917/09 based on Crime No.271/08 registered at Police Station Ambikapur under Secttons 420,467,468, 471 & 511 read with Section 34 ofthe I.P.c. 2. i have heard learned counsei for the parties and perused the petltion and documents appended thereto. 3. Leamed counsel for the appiicant submits that at the relevant time present applicant was working as Asstetant Programmer in ttie Office of Distrtot Treasury Offrce, Ambikapur. As per case of the pr^ecution, sufficient budget was not availabte to the Offtee of Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Department, Ambikapur for Lsave Travel Concession, but sufficient budget of Rs.1,20,!M)0-Rs.1,21,000 has been shown in ihe budget through Centrai Server. Present applteant was not authorized to operate such system, no password was provided to him, ^ <c.' ^.. ' <- 2.- even he was not authorized to use any password andone Jai Govind Gupta was authorized to make sucfi entr/. On the basis of some departmental inquiry and some assumption that the present applicant was posted along with co-accused A.K. Dubey in the treasury offies and in connivance with A.K.Dubey present applicant has made such entry, prosecution has been launched against the present appiiGant. Leamed counsel further submits that in the absence of any authorizatlon to the applicant, any aliotment of DDOs code or permission to use such e-Kosh to the applicant, any entry even was not possible. The prosecution has coliectsd materiai which only reveals that because the applicant was posted along with A.K-Dubey in distrtet treasury office, therefore, he has forged the Central Server and has made fatee entry. Qniy this witness is not sufficient to prove the offence against the appticant, therefore, continuance of criminal proceedings against the appiicant wouid amount of abuse of the Court. Leamed counsel piaced reliance of the Supreme Court in the matter of R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab . 4.0n the other hand, tearned State counset opposes the petitton and submits thatthe present appllcant was working as Assistant Programmer in the Office of District Treasury, Ambikapur, he was having sufflcfent access on the budgetary aiiocation and e-Kosh system. Even as per his duty, he was required to co-ordinate in monthly accourrtpreparation, treasury prc^ramme preparation and other technical assistance, hs was not stranger to the treasury or system. The aileged offence of faise entry in Central Server system took place on 26.3.2008 and on second day the present applicant has provided print copy of aileged entry. 5. Materiai collected on behaif of the prosecution is sufficieRt against the applicant for accusation and if same is unrebutted.then same would be sufficisnt Tor conwctlon of the applicant for the aforesaid offence. 6. This is a petitfon under Section 482 of the Code for quashment of crimina! proceedings pending in the Court of Chief Judiciai Magistrate, Ambikapur. Power under Section 482 of ihe Code is exceptionai in nature and should be used sparingiy. Whlle desling with exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cixle in the matter of M/s. Zandu v AiK laouSCBBo C5 '^ •^- 'c.1 •2 Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and others v. Md. Sharafui Haqueand others? the Supreme Court has held thus, "8. Exereise of power undsr Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the mie. The Section does not confer any new powere on the High Court. tt only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. it envisag^s three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, nameiy, (i) io give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. tt is neither possibte nor d^irable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of Inherent jurisdiction. No ieglstative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for ail cases ihat may possibly arise. Gourts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provjsions of taw which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by taw. That is the doctrine which flnds expression in the section whteh mereiy recognlzes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absenceof any express provision, as inherent in their constitut'ion, ai! such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principie "quando Isx aliquid alicui concecEt, concedsre videtur etid sine quo res ipsas esse non potesf' (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powere under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingiy, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justifted by the teste specifteally laid down in the section itself. tt ts to be exercised ex debito juslStiae to do real and substantial justice for ihe administration of which alone courts exfst. Airthonty of the court exists for advancement of justtee and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the " AlK 2005 SC 9 ^' '<.. -4-- court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of thecourt to altow any action whteh would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. !n exercise of the powers court wouid be justlfied to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disctosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, tt )s permissible to look into the materiats to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even ifthe allegations are accepted in toto." 7. While dealing with the use of inherent jurisdiction in terms of Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (new Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), the Supreme Court in the matter of R.P.Kapur (supra) has obser/ed relating to third cat^ory of cas^ and observed in para 6 as under- "6.......A thlrd category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may aiso arise. in cases faiiing under this category the aitegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evsdence adduced clearly or manifestiy faits to prove the c'narge. In deating with this ciass of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no iegal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestiy and cleariy inconsistent with the accu^tion made and cases where there is iegai evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the ftinction of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdtetion and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustatned. :;;1. \ —J.'- <--. i • B/- Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S.561-A in the matter of quashing criminai proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial declsions.........." 8. In the present case, investigating offlcer has recorded the evidence of Tirathram Pandey, District Treasury Officer, Ambikapur who has stated detailed procedure and the act attributed to the applieant. Even same thing also finds place in the F.I.R. and if the F.I.R. is admitted in its face value, then same would be sufficient for conviction of the applicant for the aforesaid offence. 9. This is not a case in which the pros®;utionis not able to prove the offence against the accused on the basis of material coiiected on behalf of the prosecution or if the documents coltected on behaif of the prosecution would be considered and admitted in its face vatue, then even the same would be sufficient Tor conviction ofthe appticant. lO.Consequently, continuance of crimlnal proceedings againstthe 8ppit<^nt wouid not be abuse of process of the Court. 1 do not find any case for invoking extraordinary jurisdiction in terms of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The petition is liabte to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- T.P. Sharma Judge