HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No. 8132 of 1999 Between: D.Manilal. ..... PETITIONERS AND Life Insurance Corporation of India, Rep. By its Chairman, Lokpath Buildings, S.D. Road, Secunderabad & others. .....RESPONDENT(S) HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No. 8132 of 1999 ORDER: The order of the first respondent dated 14.01.1999, rejecting the memorial filed by the petitioner, is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. Facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed as a peon in the respondent-Corporation on 11.09.1989; when he was working at the first respondent’s branch office at Miryalguda a sum of Rs.80,224/- was stolen on 22.05.1992; on the theft coming to light an FIR was lodged under Sections 457 and 380 IPC against him and his wife; thereafter, a charge sheet was filed in the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Miryalguda under Sections 457, 380 and 411 IPC; in the meanwhile he was placed under suspension with effect from 23.05.1992 on the ground that he was under detention for more than 48 hours; disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him; an enquiry officer was appointed; charge sheet was issued to him on 24.07.1992 to which he submitted his reply; an enquiry was held; thereafter the third respondent imposed on him the punishment of removal from service by his order dated 03.12.1993; he preferred an appeal to the second respondent who, by order dated 03.02.1994, dismissed the appeal; thereafter the petitioner was acquitted in C.C. No.16 of 1993 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Miryalguda by his order dated 02.04.1998; in as much as the petitioner had already exhausted the remedy of appeal, he filed a memorial before the first respondent on 21.07.1998; and the said memorial was rejected by the Chairman, by his order dated 14.01.1999, resulting in the present writ petition being filed. Sri A. Pulla Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the finding of guilt recorded by the enquiry officer was erroneous. He would submit that both the Branch Manager and the Accountant had deposed in the departmental enquiry that they had handed over the keys of the safe to the petitioner asking him to deposit Rs.80,224/-; they had stated that, while keeping the said sum in the safe, the petitioner had not locked the safe; in the evening, the window had been broken and the said sum of Rs.80,224/- was removed from the safe; and this fact came to light on the next day morning. Learned counsel would submit that the Criminal Court had recorded a finding that, merely by breaking open the window, the petitioner could not have reached the safe and as such could not have removed the said amount of Rs.80,224/-. Sri A.Venkata Ramana, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation, would submit that the findings, recorded by the enquiry officer and the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, are based on the evidence adduced during the course of the departmental enquiry; this Court would not reappreciate the evidence recorded in a departmental enquiry; the petitioner’s subsequent acquittal in a criminal case would have no bearing on his prior conviction in the departmental proceedings; the punishment of removal from service was justified in as much as the charge of theft of Rs.80,224/- was established; and this Court, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not substitute the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority with another. It is evident from the enquiry report dated 23.02.1993 that the theft committed on 22.05.1992 came to light on 23.05.1992; on 22.05.1992, after the cash hours were closed, the cash collected on that day was put in a brief case since the cash box was not functioning properly; the petitioner carried the cash along with the Assistant Administrative Officer to the iron safe; the petitioner had put the brief case in the safe and had failed to lock the safe; the Assistant Administrative Officer, who accompanied the petitioner upto the door of the Branch Manager’s Chamber, went back to issue a receipt to an agent and did not observe whether the safe was properly locked or not; after the office hours on 22.05.1992, the petitioner opened the safe and committed theft of office cash; on 23.05.1992 the sweeper, who came to the office at about 6.00 A.M, saw that the safe was opened and some cash was lying on the floor of the Branch Manager’s room and immediately rushed to the residence of an officer after locking the front door of the office; subsequently they went to the residence of the Assistant Branch Manager and they came to the office and noticed that the safe was opened and some cash was lying in the Branch Manager’s Chamber; they informed the police who came over to the bank and questioned some of the employees; during the course of interrogation it came to light that the petitioner was responsible for the theft; the police authorities, accompanied by two witnesses, went to the residence of the petitioner at a village nearby Miryalguda, and recovered the entire amount less Rs.100/-; and thereafter a case against the petitioner and another was registered in Cr. No. 66 of 1992. The enquiry officer held that the panchanama recorded by the police authorities proved that the amount was recovered from the petitioner at his residence and the same was marked as an exhibit in the enquiry; the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the enquiry established that the petitioner was guilty of the charges; the petitioner did not examine any witnesses in his defence nor did he file any documentary evidence in denial of the charges; and he was given an opportunity to cross-examine all the nine witnesses examined during the course of enquiry. The disciplinary authority, in his order dated 03.12.1993, observed that the evidence on record established the petitioner’s guilt of breaking open the glass window pane of the Branch Manager’s room, opening the iron safe and stealing an amount of Rs.80,224/- belonging to the Corporation; and, therefore, the punishment of removal from service should be imposed on him. The appellate authority, in his order dated 03.02.1994, held that there was adequate evidence on record to show that the petitioner had committed the theft; he had admitted his guilt; and his plea to the contrary was merely an afterthought. In the order under challenge, in this writ petition, the first respondent observed that the presenting officer had produced eleven (11) documents, Exs.1 to 11, out of which Exs.2 to 9 were duly corroborated through oral witnesses; the petitioner did not adduce any evidence to deny the charge nor did he question the authenticity of the documents and depositions of the witnesses; the final conclusion of the disciplinary authority was based on independent evidence led during the departmental enquiry; and his acquittal in the criminal case that too, on the benefit of doubt, would in no way alter the conclusion of the disciplinary authority. It is well settled that this Court in Certiorari proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would neither reappreciate the evidence on record nor would it substitute its views for that of the disciplinary authority as an Appellate Court would do. It is only where the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry are based on no evidence, or are perverse or suffer from similar errors of law apparent on the face of the record, would this Court be justified in interference. In the case on hand the oral and documentary evidence adduced during the course of the enquiry has established the petitioner’s guilt. The petitioner has not chosen to adduce any evidence to the contrary. I see no reason, therefore, to interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. The acquittal in the criminal case is subsequent to the order of the disciplinary authority and that of the appellate authority. If a domestic tribunal has concluded its enquiry and come to a conclusion even before the Criminal Court has passed the judgment, the domestic tribunal’s conclusion is not vitiated by the fact that, on the same facts, the Criminal Court has subsequently acquitted the employee either on a technical ground or on merits. (Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co. v. Labour Court: 1970(1) LLJ 481 (Madras); W.S. Insulator of India v. Mohd. Moosa: 1979 Lab I.C. 102 (Madras). In as much as there was no order prohibiting the departmental enquiry being held, during the pendency of the criminal case, the action of the respondents in holding the departmental enquiry and, thereafter, imposing the punishment cannot be faulted. The petitioner brought the factum of his being acquitted in the criminal case to the notice of the first respondent by way of a memorial. The 1st respondent took note of the petitioner’s acquittal and observed that the final conclusion of the disciplinary authority, about the guilt of the petitioner, was based on the evidence led during the departmental enquiry and his acquittal in the criminal case, that too on the benefit of doubt, could not alter the conclusions of the disciplinary authority. All that the law requires is that the authorities concerned consider the effect of the delinquent employee’s acquittal in a criminal case. (S.K. Ahmed v. Labour Court: 2001 (1) ALD 180). As the first respondent had taken note of the petitioner’s acquittal and had still held that the punishment did not necessitate interference, the impugned order cannot be faulted on this ground also. On the quantum of punishment Sri A. Pulla Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner belongs to a scheduled tribe; he was a young man of 23 years when the incident took place; he is now 40 years old working as a daily wage coolie that too only when work is available; a sympathetic view be taken and he be given an opportunity to serve the respondent-Corporation in as much as his conduct, subsequent to his being removed from service, is without blemish; and there is no other criminal case pending against him. The petitioner has been found guilty of misappropriation of Rs.80,224/-. In the present case the proved act of misconduct is of misappropriation. It cannot, therefore, be said that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, as confirmed in appeal and in the impugned order of the Chairman, is so grossly disproportionate or is such as to shock the conscience of the Court. I see no reason, therefore, to exercise discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the punishment imposed on the petitioner. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the respondents from taking a sympathetic view, if they so choose to do so. The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. RAMESH RANGANATHAN,J Date:24.02.2010 usd