THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.2603 OF 2011 DATED 14TH DECEMBER, 2011 BETWEEN Indrakaran Sita Rami Reddy and others. …Petitioners And Mohammad Ayub Khan and others. …Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.2603 OF 2011 ORDER: The learned Junior Civil Judge, Gajwel, dismissed I.A.No.277 of 2009 in O.S.No.79 of 2009 by order dated 21.01.2010. Therein, the plaintiff had sought a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property till the disposal of the suit. In appeal, the learned VI Additional District Judge at Siddipet, Medak District, by order dated 30.03.2011 reversed the decision of the trial Court and granted a temporary injunction as prayed for. Aggrieved thereby, defendants 1, 3 and 4 in the suit are in revision before this Court. Operation of the order under revision was stayed by this Court on 18.07.2011. Heard Sri M.Rajamalla Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Venkatesh Deshpande, learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff in the suit. Respondents 2 and 3 herein, being defendants 2 and 5, are shown as not necessary parties to this Civil Revision Petition. Parties shall be referred to as arrayed before the trial Court. It was the case of the plaintiff that he was the absolute owner and possessor of the suit schedule property, being an extent of Ac.1.12 gutnas situated in Survey No.202 of Kallakal Village, Toopran Mandal, Medak District. He claimed to have purchased the same under a registered sale deed bearing document No.457/2008 dated 25.02.2008 from one Yousuf Bee and seven others for valuable consideration. According to him, the husband of Yousuf Bee, the father of the other vendors, namely, Molla Fakheer Ahmed @ Fakhir Mohammad @ Shaik Fakruddin was the owner of the suit schedule property and after he died intestate on 15.04.1996, his vendors succeeded to the property. He alleged that the defendants without having any interest in the suit schedule property interfered with his possession during May and June, 2009 constraining him to file the suit, O.S.No.79 of 2009, for a permanent injunction against the defendants. Pending the suit, he sought a temporary injunction against them. Contesting these averments, the defendants stated that the suit schedule property originally belonged to one Gudu Saheb, the father of Fakheer Ahmed, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff’s vendors. According to them, their grandfather Narsa Reddy acquired the suit land more than 120 years ago and constructed a house in a portion of the land over 100 years back. This house was stated to be still in existence. They claimed that defendants 3 and 4 were residing in the said house which bore Door No.3-39. A portion of this house was said to have been demolished and reconstructed. Defendant 5 was stated to have constructed a new building one year ago by removing the old house constructed by Narsa Reddy. They therefore asserted that they were in possession and enjoyment by constructing houses in an area of 35 guntas and claimed to be residing there. They also averred that apart from their houses, there were about 18 other houses existing in the suit schedule property belonging to different persons. C.C. roads were said to be in existence in the suit land. They alleged that the plaintiff, concealing these facts, filed the application for temporary injunction with false allegations and accordingly prayed for its dismissal. The plaintiff relied on Exs.A.1 to A.10 while the defendants marked Exs.B.1 to B.18 in support of their respective cases. The trial Court held against the plaintiff on the ground that he failed to file the original registered sale deed under which he purchased the suit schedule property from Yousuf Bee and seven others. Further, as the plaintiff also failed to file any document to show his possession over the suit schedule property, the trial Court opined that he had failed to establish a prima facie case that he was in possession of the suit schedule property and accordingly held him disentitled to a temporary injunction. The appellate Court, on the other hand, was inclined to accept the sale transaction in favour of the plaintiff as he produced the original registered sale deed in the Court. A copy of this registered sale deed was in fact marked as Ex.A.1 before the trial Court. The appellate Court took into account the fact that the pahani for the year 2006-07 (Ex.A.7) showed ‘Molla Fakheer Ahmed’ as the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. As the plaintiff claimed to have purchased the suit schedule property from the legal heirs of Molla Fakheer Ahmed in the year 2008, the appellate Court applied the principle that ‘possession follows title’ and concluded that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and that he was in possession of the suit schedule property. Holding that the balance of convenience was also in his favour and irreparable loss would be caused if injunction was not granted, the appellate Court held him entitled to the relief of temporary injunction. Grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion by the Court. While exercising such discretion, the Court normally applies the following tests: (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before which that uncertainty could be resolved. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his being prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he cannot be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against the other and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies [HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. v. SRIMAN NARAYAN[1]]. Applying the above principles to the case on hand, it is seen that the plaintiff claimed that the suit schedule property was a vacant land and except for documents showing the possession of his predecessor- in-title, he had no document evidencing his own possession. It is no doubt true that generally the Court would presume that ‘possession would follow title’ but such a presumption is rebuttable. The documents placed on record by the defendants therefore had to be examined by the Courts below to see whether this presumption stood rebutted on facts. The pahanies filed by the defendants, namely, Exs.B.3 to B.7 reflected that though Molla Fakheer Mohammad was shown as the pattadar, I.Ramakrishna Reddy S/o Narsa Reddy and others were shown to be in possession. Pertinent to note, I.Ramakrishna Reddy is no other than the father of the first and second defendants. The other defendants are also related to him as evidenced by the common family name. These pahanies pertained to the years 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1993-94. There is no explanation from the plaintiff as to how these persons were divested of their possession. The appellate Court placed heavy reliance upon Ex.A.7, the pahani for the year 2006-07. This pahani showed the name of Molla Fakheer Mohammad as the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. When it is the admitted case of the parties that Molla Fakheer Mohammad died as long back as on 15.04.1996, the entries in this pahani were obviously incorrect. Apart from this, the statement given by two of the vendors of the plaintiff, marked as Ex.B.9, demonstrated that they admitted the existence of houses in the suit schedule property which were constructed 100 years ago. They further admitted that they did not know how these houses had been constructed and that they had not seen the land since their childhood. That apart, the certificate issued by the Panchayat Secretary, Kallakal, dated 13.08.2009 (Ex.B.8) indicated that the 23 houses detailed therein were situated in Survey No.202 of the village. The panchanama (Ex.B.10) dated 30.05.2009 also evidenced the existence of constructions made by various persons, including the defendants, in this land. The veracity of these documents is attacked by Sri Venkatesh Deshpande, learned counsel, but unless they are shown to be incorrect, they inevitably cast a cloud on the plaintiff’s claims. This is further compounded by the fact that the defendants adduced in evidence photographs along with their negatives, Exs.B.11 to B.18, which showed the existence of houses in the suit schedule property. These photographs were not doubted by the appellate Court. On the other hand, the appellate Court unequivocally observed that ‘these photos go to show the existence of some houses in the suit land’. Having stated so, it is inexplicable as to how the appellate Court applied the presumption that ‘possession would follow title’ and concluded that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case that he was in possession. The documents referred to supra clearly establish that this rebuttable presumption had no role to play on facts in the present case and that there was every reason to doubt the plaintiff’s claim that the suit schedule property was a vacant land. The possession of others, including the defendants, over the suit schedule property reflected in the revenue records right from 1988-89 onwards stood fortified by the supporting documents, Exs.B.8 and B.10, and clearly showed that the balance of convenience was in favour of the defendants and not the plaintiff. In such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff utterly failed in establishing a prima facie case that he was in possession of the suit schedule property and that the balance of convenience was in his favour. The appellate Court therefore ought not to have granted the relief of temporary injunction in his favour. The order and decree dated 30.03.2011 passed by the learned VI Additional District Judge, Siddipet, Medak District, in C.M.A.No.5 of 2010 is accordingly set aside. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. ____________________ SANJAY KUMAR, J. 14TH DECEMBER, 2011. VGSR [1] (2002) 5 SCC 760