. aagaéxv . .1 ,, g wgwwwamwmk ,1.’ W? IO o..rdnm~cwuo.oa.R ¢§_ .atuacotc:,::,n: _ “axuwrwwou ugug. {o aha-,5. as gag £3 3.5,,mounuqr£13§ guts. Aa. a: :3“ vp,e nan-33,. uteué .5.at.uj-ygv Iou.§la 70H aggugug g A§p¢ sgaws u gut...» §§§ 5i f a3. a wwEdnmg v«Fina» Emu Fug 3333.», v.9 may»; Eng; «.3 _ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILA$PUR Sinqle Bench: Hon’ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava; J. W. P. No.1912I1991 Present: Shri Anil Pandey, counse! for the petitioner. Shri Goutam Khetrapal, counsel for the respondent. o R D E R (ORAL) \ (Passed on 12m of August, 201 0) This petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing iegaiity and validity of order dated 20-08-1989 (Annexure P-31) imposing penaity of dismissal as also order dated 13-10-1989 (Annexure P-39), by which, petitioner's appiication for review of the order of dismissal has been rejected. (2) Case of the petitioner is that While he was working as “Resident Engineer (A.E.E.). a departmental enquiry was opened. Though vide order dated 12-10-1982 (Annexure P-11). he was transferred to Company’s Head Office at Naini, Altahabad. As balance salary and transfer allowance was not paid, he did not proceed on transfer to new place of posting i.e. Naini, Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh and continued to reside at Durg. The charge sheet was sought to be served by way of paper publication placed on record as Annexure P-28. Along with the charge sheet, neither document nor statements of witnesses were supplied to the petitioner. Case of the petitioner is that in fact, ex parte enquiry was held against him, and though, he had submitted reply to the charge sheet. he did not know any thing about the enquiry, until an order of dismissal was PETITIONER: Nikhilesh Banerjee Versus RESPONDE NT: Triveni Structurals Ltd. passed on 20-08-1989 (Annexure P-31). Order recorded that in the departmental enquiry against the petitioner, he was found guilty of charges alleged in the charge sheet and penalty of dismissal from services was imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a representation before the General Manager, who passed the order of dismissal, for review of the order of punishment, vide his representation dated 12-09-1989 (Annexure P—38). However, the same was also rejected vide memo dated 13-1 0-1989 (Annexure P-39). (3) Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, assailing the correctness of the order of punishment and subsequent order of rejection of representation, is that the entire departmental enquiry against the petitioner is vitiated as the charge sheet was sought to be served by paper publication, but the relevant documents and list of witnesses, by which, the prosecution sought to prove the case, were not supplied to the petitioner. it is further submitted that though the petitioner had submitted his reply to the charge sheet vide his letter dated 06-08- 1985 (Annexure P-29), nothing was heard thereafter and the impugned order of penalty was passed by the General Manager. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the enquiry was ex parts, in utter violation of principles of natural justice and before recording a finding of guilt, neither an opportunity to cross- examine the prosecution witnesses, if any, was afforded nor the petitioner was allowed to examine his own defence witnesses. (4) It is next contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed by the General Manager, who has no authority to exercise the powers of disciplinary authority, in view of the provisions contained in the Discipline and Appeal rules applicable in the establishment, placed on record as Annexure P-30. Referring to the schedule appended to the V7“ rules, it is submitted that the Managing Director alone or any other authority empcwered in that behalf, could exercise the powers of disciplinary authority in relation to the petitioner, on the ground that at the time of issuance of charge sheet and imposition of penalty, the petitioner was drawing salary in the pay scale, which is above the grade of Rs.400-950/-. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order of dismissal of his services as also order rejecting his representation are virtually non-speaking, which clearly shows g; that acting in a mechanical and biased manner, the punishment has been it imposed on the petitioner. (5) On the other hand, first and foremost submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction as no part of cause of action within territorial jurisdiction arose. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner was transferred to Naini, U.P. vide order dated 12-10-1982 (Annexure P-11). Referring to Annexure P-13, P-14, and P-15 filed by the petitioner, it is submitted that the petitioner did hand over the charge of his office at Durg, but did not proceed on transfer nor joined at the new place of posting where he was transferred. lt is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner‘s grievance regarding non-supply of list of documents and statement of witnesses is not correct and the same is belied from his own statement in the reply (Annexure P-29) to the charge sheet wherein the petitioner clearly stated that the list of witnesses and documents to support the charges leveiled, have no legal sanctity and are against the principles of natural justice. Further submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that due and proper enquiry was held against the petitioner and in that enquiry, all the charges levelled against the petitioner were found proved. On the basis of the material adduced in the enquiry, the General Manager passed the order of penalty. The other submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that as the petitioner \ g/Q was appointed by the Personal Manager, who ranks below the General Manager, it was within the competence of the General Manager to impose therpenaity. It is aiso submitted that in any case, General Manager is much higher authority, therefore, he is competent to act as a disciplinary authority and impose penalty on the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that notices informing the date of enquiry were also published from time to time in the newspaper but the petitioner did not avail the opportunity, therefore, no grievance can be made on the ground that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity during the course of enquiry. It is submitted that in any case, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief on the alleged ground of non-supply of documents unless the petitioner establishes the prejudice caused to him on account of such non- supply. In support of his arguments, iearned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance in the cases of National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others V. M/s. Haribox Swalram and others, (2004) 9 SCC 786, Manohar La] vs. Union of India & Others, decided by the High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No.1736 of 2001 on 15-12-2004, Kusum lngots & Alioys Limited vs. L!nion of India and Another, reported in JT 2004 (Suppi.1)$C 475, State of TN. vs. Thiru K. V. Peruma and Others, 1996(5) SCC 474 and State of U.P. and Others vs. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, 2002(3) SCC 443 and Aiigarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises Private Limited, 1994 (4) SCC 710. . a (6) I have heard learned counsel for the palties and perused the records. (7) The first question which arises for consideration is whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Respondent in the return has taken a preliminary objection to the effect that the petitioner Vide order dated 12-10-82 was transferred from Khursipar Site, Bhilai to the Head Ofdce at Naini, Allahabad (U.P.). It is stated Va that the departmental enquiry in the present case was carried qut and conducted / at Naini, District Allahabad. The order of dismissai was issued from the Head Office, Naini. The representation made by the petitioner was aiso rejected vide order dated 13-10-1989 at Naini, District Allahabad. From the pieadings on record, the foiiowing factuai scenario emerges:- (A) The petitioner was transferred from Durg to Aiiahabad vide order dated 12-10-82 (Annexure P-11). (B) Annexure P-12 is a Telegram which records that the petitioner .wae informed about his transfer order and was asked to report at Naini, Allahabad, immediately after handing over the charge. (C) Vide Annexure P-13, the petitioner sought payment of salary before leaving. (D) By a telegraphic message Annexure P-1 4, the petitioner was informed that he had handed over the charge and demanded payment of salary before leaving. This was followed by another telegraphic message repeating his request for payment of salary before he could proceed on transfer. (8) From the averments made in the petition, it is clear that the petitioner came to know about the charge sheet through paper publication (Annexure P- 28). The petitioner does not dispute that the order of dismissal was passed at Naini and even order of rejection of his representation was passed at Naini only. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that during the enquiry proceedings, he was stationed at Durg and that the petitioner came to know g about the'charge sheet through paper publication at Durg. The petitioner submitted his reply from Durg and then received impugned orders at Durg while stationed there. a par“: of cause of action arose at Durg‘ and therefore. this High Court would have jurisdiction to’hear the matter. (9) In the case of National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others (supra), issue with regard to territoriai jurisdiction of the High Court came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. That was a case where the petitioner before the High Court, was carrying business at Calcutta. it was urged that the letters were sent by‘the petitioner in that case from Calcutta and reply to those letter were received at Calcutta. lt was submitted before the Court that in View of the fact that the petitioner therein was carrying on business at Calcutta and had sent and received communications at Calcutta, a part of cause of action did accrue in the State of West Bengal, and consequently, the High Court of Calcutta had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Repelling those contentions, respondents therein had submitted that the no part of cause of action accrued in Calcutta. as the textiles mills were situated at Bombay and supply was made at Bombay as also alleged payment was also made at that place. Considering the issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction in the above factual backdrop, the Supreme Court held:- “1 0. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered to issue writs, orders or directions to any Government, authority or person exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Cause of action as understood in the civil proceedings means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. To put it in a different way, it is the bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. In Union of India v. Adani Exporfs Ltdl in the context of clause (2) of Article 226 of the ConStitution, it has been explained that each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexusor relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or disputeinvolved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. A similar question was examined in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Propettiesg. Here certain properties belonging to a company which had its registered office in Calcutta were sought to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban lmprovement Act was served upon the company at Calcutta. The question which arose for consideration was whether the service of notice at the head office of the company at Calcutta could give rise to a cause of action within the State of West Bengal to enable the Calcutta High Court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where challenge to acquisition proceedings conducted in Jaipur was made. lt was held that the entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section ‘1 52 of the Rajasthan Act arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and it was not necessary for the company to plead the service of notice upon them at Calcutta for grant of appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notice issued by the Rajasthan Government under Section 52 of the Act. lt was thus held that the Calcutta High Court hadtno jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.“ (1 O) Relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, High Court of Delhi in the case of Manohar La] (supra). dealt with a similar situation as prevailed in the present case. ln the said case, an order was passed by the Commandant on 27-05-2000 awarding punishment of compulsory retirement m from service. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, an appeai was preferred before the appeHate authority which was decided by the appetiate authority located in Aiiahabad, U.P. by issuing an order from Ailahabad, U.P. The submission which was made before the Court was that the incident, which was the subject-matter of the departmental proceedings initiated, had taken place at Kanpur and the order of punishment was also issued from kanpur followed by appellate order passed by the Appellate Authority at Allahabad. ln these factual premises, it was argued that no part of cause of action arose so as to give territorial jurisdiction to i the Court. The question with regard to territorial jurisdiction was obnsidered in the light of the verdict of the Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Ailoys Limited (supra) wherein it was held- “9. Although in View of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to a writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause(2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of $ection 2O (c) of C.P.C. shall apply to the writ proceedings. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further, it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts are also known as integral facts." (11) The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University (supra) was also relied upon. (1 2) ln the given factual premise, the Court came to the conclusion that as no it i ‘ part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the petition was held not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. Applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court which were relied by the W \5/5 High Court of Delhi in simibr circumstances, l am of the considered opinion that as in the present case, charge sheet was issued from Naini, Allahabad (U.P.), departmentai enquiry was conducted and carried out at Naini, Allahabad (UR), order of dismissal was passed at Naini, Allahabad (U.P.) and even petitioner's application for review was also rejected at Naini, Allahabad (U.P.), therefore, merely because the petitioner resides at Durg and had received communication v at Durg or had sent communication from Durg. it cannot be said a part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. ln view of the aforesaid finding. l do not propose to go into the other issue‘s which have been raised bythe parties. (13) Accordingly, l hold that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. As such, the petition is dismissed as not maintainable. However, it would be open for the petitioner to take recourse to remedy by filing proper petition or take any other remedy availabie to him under the law before the appropriate Court having territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Sd/- Manindra Mohan Shrivastava Judge Turriane