IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.516 of 1998 Judgment reserved on:15.3.2010 Date of decision: 22.3.2010 Paras Ram & Ors. ….. Appellants Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh …. Respondent. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellants : Mr. K.D. Sood, Advocate with Mr. Balwant Singh, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. P.M. Negi, Deputy Advocate General. Kuldip Singh, Judge. The appellants were plaintiffs and have come in second appeal against judgment, decree dated 7.9.1998 passed by learned District Judge, Hamirpur in Civil Appeal No.06 of 1998, partly allowing the appeal against judgment, decree dated 17.10.1997 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, (1) Hamirpur in C.S. No.332 of 1994(RBT). 2. The appellants had filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against respondent regarding land more specifically detailed in plaint on the grounds that land measuring 24 kanals 9 marlas out of suit land was granted as nautor to Jai Ram Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes predecessor-in-interest of Paras Ram by Deputy Commissioner, Kangra in the year 1928. The suit land had never vested in the State Government either in the name of Gram Panchayat under Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short Punjab Act) nor under the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act, 1974 (for short Himachal Act). It has been alleged that the suit land is in possession of the appellants but the revenue entries showing the name of respondent are wrong. In alternative, it is also the case of the appellants that even if, it is assumed that the land had vested with the Panchayat under the Punjab Act but the appellants remained in possession of the suit land which was not objected by Panchayat for more than 12 years, therefore, they have become owners of the suit land and Panchayat ceased to have any title over the suit land, but respondent is threatening to interfere in the possession of the appellants. 3. The respondent contested the suit, in which preliminary objections of maintainability, lack of notice, locus standi, estoppel and non-joinder of necessary parties have been taken. The respondent has pleaded that respondent is owner of the suit land. It has been pleaded that suit land being shamlat has vested with the Panchayat and later on with the State of H.P. free from all encumbrances. 4. The appellants had filed replication, in which they have denied the claim of the respondent and repeated their own case. The suit was decreed on 17.10.1997 by leaned Sub Judge Ist Class and the respondent was restrained from interfering in possession of the 5. appellants over the suit land. In appeal the learned District Judge has held that vestment of the suit land earlier with the Gram Panchayat and later on with the State of Himachal Pradesh under the Punjab Act and under the Himachal Act is out of perview of the Civil Court. The learned District Judge has partly allowed the appeal and restrained the respondent by way of decree of permanent prohibitory injunction not to interfere over the suit land in any manner otherwise in due course of law. 6. The appeal has been admitted on following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the learned District Judge was right in modifying and setting-aside partly the judgment and decree of the trial court and holding that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case on merits and grant the simplicitor decree for injunction? (ii) Whether the learned District Judge has misconstrued the provisions of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act and Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands( Vesting and Utilization) Act and could hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the matter particularly when the land had been granted by way of nautor, the same was in the actual possession of the appellants and the appellants were paying the land revenue thereof? (iii) Whether the authorities cited have been misconstrued particularly in the decision in case Karam Chand v. Kesar Singh 1994(1) CLJ (HP) 407? 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. The aforesaid substantial questions of law are interconnected; therefore, all of them are being taken up collectively. The learned District Judge has recorded a finding that in the present case the suit land is ‘Shamlat Tika’ which clearly falls within the ambit of section 2(g) of the Punjab Act. 8. It is the case of the appellants that there is no specific bar of Civil Court jurisdiction under the Himachal Act as provided in the Punjab Act, Karam Chand v. Kesar Singh and others 1994(1) CLJ (HP) 407 has been relied on behalf of the appellants. In Dalip Singh and others v. State of H.P. and others 1992(1) SLC 320 a learned Single Judge has noticed Ram Singh and others v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan and others (1986) 4 SCC 354; Babu Ram and others v. Gram Sabha Budhavi and another, AIR 1988 SC 1085 and also Gram Panchayat Khunyara v. State of Himachal Pradesh etc. ILR 1978 HP 225 and held that it is apparent from the reading of the Himachal Act, there is an adequate remedy provided for what the Civil Court would normally do in suits, namely, whether particular land has or has not vested in the State Government. 9. The appellants have approached the Civil Court by taking the plea that suit land had never vested in the State government either in the name of Gram Panchayat under the Punjab Act nor under the Himachal Act. The learned Sub Judge under issue No.1 has held that the suit land has been shown to have vested with Panchayat and State of Himachal Pradesh on coming into force of Punjab Act and Himachal Act. The learned Sub Judge has also recorded a finding that this land never vested under the Punjab Act as the same was in the cultivating possession of the plaintiffs and has been assessed to land revenue on or before 1950 and thereby the suit land did not fall under the category ‘Shamlat Deh’. In other words the finding was that since the suit land was not ‘Shamlat Deh’, therefore, it had not vested either under the Punjab Act or under the Himachal Act. 10. In Laxmi Chand and others vs. Gram Panchayat , Kararia and others AIR 1996 SC 523, after noticing various provisions of land Acquisition Act, 1894 it has been held by the Supreme Court that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. In S.Vanathan Muthuraja vs. Ramlingam alias Krishnamurthy Gurukkal and others (1997) 6 SCC 143, the Supreme Court has noticed the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams ( Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 and held that Act provides for the jurisdiction of the tribunals in matters relating thereto and hierarchy of appeals/revisions are provided thereunder giving finality to the orders passed thereunder. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of the suits of civil nature covered under the land reform laws stands excluded giving not only the finality to the decisions of the tribunal but also ensuring disposal of the matters by the tribunal and making the ryotwari patta granted to the tiller of the soil conclusive. The Supreme Court after finding Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 are complete in themselves, held that by necessary implication Civil Court has no jurisdiction on matters covered by these Acts. 11. In Karam Chand (supra) the entries were interpreted by both the Courts below as “the common land of the owners of village Tipri in accordance with their ancestral share” and “possession of land owners”, which was not assailed. It was also found that no mutation of vestment was entered in the name of the village Panchayat and entries continued as before. The mutation under the Himachal Act was attested by presuming the land in dispute as Shamlat. In these circumstances the vestment of land was under Himachal Act and not under Punjab Act therefore, it was held that Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the controversy raised in that litigation. The Section 10 of the Act provides save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, no order made by the Collector, or the State Government or any officer authorized by it, as the case may be, shall be called in question by any court or by any officer or authority. In Dalip Singh ( supra) it has been held that relief of declaration of their rights as owners cannot be gone into in view of the jurisdictional bar created under section 10 of the Act for which appropriate forum would be the Collector. 12. It has not been argued that the land in dispute had not vested under the Punjab Act. It is different matter that according to appellants the land could not have vested under Punjab Act. In Karam Chand ( supra) it was not considered that Himachal Act is complete code and therefore civil court has no jurisdiction to look into the vestment of land under Himachal Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Karam Chand (supra) is not applicable in the present case. The question of vestment of land under the Punjab Act is beyond the jurisdiction of Civil Court as per aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court. The vestment of land in question under the Himachal Act is on the basis of vestment of land under the Punjab Act. The learned District Judge has rightly appreciated the material on record, the aforesaid all substantial questions of law are decided against the appellants. There is no merit in the appeal. 13. No other point was urged. 14. The result of the above discussion, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. March 22, 2010. ( Kuldip Singh ) (sks) Judge.