(1) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2844 OF 2010 Ramesh Popat Patil, Age : 50 years, Occu.: Agriculture, R/o : Bhaler, Tq. & Dist. : Nandurbar .. Applicant VERSUS 1. Bhaskar Bhaidas Patil, Age : 27 years, Occu.: Agriculture, 2. Bhaidas Yadav Patil, Age : 52 years, Occu.: Agriculture, 3. Sunandabai Bhaidas Patil, Age : 45 years, Occu.: Housewife 4. Nitin Bhaidas Patil, Age : 20 years, Occu.: Education All R/o Hirapur, Tq. Parola, Dist. : Jalgaon 5. Nilima Mahendra Patil, Age : 25 years, Occu.: Housewife, R/o : Javkhede, Tq.: Shirpur, Dist. : Dhule 6. State of Maharashtra (Copy served on the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Bench at Aurangabad) .. Respondents ... Mr. Joydeep Chatterji, Advocate for the Applicant Mr. B.R. Kedar, Advocate h/f. Mr. A.K. Tiwari, Advocate for respondent nos. 1 to 5 Mrs. B.R. Khekale, APP for the respondent-State ... (2) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J. DATED : 14TH OCTOBER, 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT:- 1. The Application is filed by original complainant for quashing of the bail order dated 8.7.2010 and 12.7.2010 in Criminal Bail Application no. 104 of 2010 and Criminal Bail Application no. 109 of 2010, rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amalner. 2. By consent of the learned Advocate for the parties and learned APP, Application is being disposed of at the stage of admission. 3. The crucial question to be determined is whether the bail orders rendered by the Sessions Court are perverse and arbitrary or in exercise of discretion not founded on the well settled parameters? 4. Perusal of both the impugned orders go to show that initially four accused persons including (3) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 husband of the deceased Smt. Sushma alias Bhavana had filed Bail Application vide Criminal Bail Application no. 104 of 2010. The investigation had not been completed at that stage nor it is completed till now. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the marriage between respondent no.1 and deceased Sushma alias Bhavana was performed on 20.4.2008. Allegedly she was being subjected to matrimonial cruelty at the hands of the respondent. Initially she had resided with the respondent in the matrimonial home for about 15-20 days and her father took her back to his house in accordance with the custom after such a short stay. Sushma alias Bhavana narrated to him that she was being troubled by the respondents. She stayed with her father for about fortnight and, thereafter, was taken away by the respondent no.1 to his house. The complaints of ill-treatment were repeated by deceased Sushma alias Bhavana on next occasion during her visit to the maternal home. The FIR purports to show that about 10-12 days before the incident, brother of deceased Sushma alias Bhavana visited the house of the (4) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 respondent. He noticed that she was weeping and dis-satisfied. However, in the presence of her in- laws, she could not narrate anything to him. On 29.6.2010 her father was informed that Sushma alias Bhavana was admitted in the hospital. Though he tried to contact the respondent no.1, yet the respondent no.1 did not respond to the telephonic call and, therefore, he alongwith his relatives went to the hospital at Hirapur where dead body of Sushma alias Bhavana was kept in the mortuary. She died due to poisoning. Her father lodged FIR alleging that due to the matrimonial cruelty meted out to her by the respondents no. 1 to 5, deceased Sushma alias Bhavana committed suicide by consuming some insecticide. 5. It is not necessary to elaborately set out the deficiencies found in the impugned orders. Suffice it to say that while dealing with the bail Application (Criminal Bail Application no. 104 of 2010) the learned Sessions Judge, seems to have applied certain yardsticks which are of rather general nature which may befit any such a case. Not (5) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 only that the bail order is cryptic but it does not spell out what was the criterion applied for granting of the bail. The order does not contain any peculiar reasons reflective of the application of judicial mind by the learned Sessions Judge. The material part of the reasoning recorded in paragraph no.4 of the order is as below:- "The complainant is nobody else but father of the victim. The offence alleged to have been committed by the accused/petitioners is within the four corners of their house. Thus, there is no likelihood of having any other witness to the said offence. Similarly, the complainant, being father, is also not likely to be pressurized by the accused/petitioners and, therefore, I am of the opinion that there is no propriety in keeping the accused/petitioners behind the bars." 6. These observations quoted above are like a cap which may befit any head in a similar case. (6) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 The Court is not expected to consider the Bail Application merely by making speaking observations. The Court is expected to make serious attempt to give valid reasons as to why the accused is entitled to seek liberty during pendency of the investigation/trial. In most of the cases, like the present one, the offence is committed within the four corners of the house. Where else is the venue available for the domestic cruelty? Needless to say, the impugned order is rendered without assigning good and valid reasons and that it is reflective of complete absence of the application of judicial mind. 7. The second bail order is rather more arbitrary in nature. The second bail order is rendered after about four days and bail was granted to the husband i.e. the respondent no.1 on the ground of parity. The observations in the earlier bail order weighed with the learned Sessions Judge and he observed that conduct of the respondent no.1 that he had fled away from the hospital where the deceased victim was admitted, could not be a ground (7) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 for rejecting the Application for bail. He observed that even most innocent man flee from the place of offence and simply because the accused, who is husband of the deceased victim, had not been arrested or had gone in hiding, does not necessarily mean that he is involved in the crime. He further observed “in any case, as the offence charged against accused persons is not punishable with death, I am of the opinion that as the co-accused are already released on bail, on a parity, he (husband) is also necessary to be released on bail. So, it is obvious, that the first four accused were released without ascribing any valid reason which is acceptable in the context of settled norms and further the remaining accused i.e. husband (respondent no.1) was given similar treatment without considering his immediate conduct and on wrong presumption that because the offence is not punishable with death, bail could be granted. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the charge levelled against respondents 1 to 5 is for offence under section 306 or 304-B of the I.P.C. besides the (8) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 other penal sections like section 498-A of the I.P.C. The bail cannot be granted just for drop of a hat, where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The learned Sessions Judge completely misunderstood the nature of charge while granting the bail to the respondent no.1. It is unfortunate that such basic principles are overlooked while passing the impugned orders. Needless to say the impugned orders are totally contrary to the settled principles of law regarding the use of discretionary powers to grant bail. 8. The learned Advocate for the respondents no.1 to 5 objected maintainability of the Application. He referred to "Miss R. Shakuntala Vs. Roshanlal Agrawal" (1985 Cri.L.J. 68). A Single Bench of this Court held that when an order is passed by the trial and the High Court is later on approached for the purpose of cancellation of the bail, the basic postulate is that the order was valid when it was passed, but that on account of supervening circumstances it needed to be varied or modified or cancelled. In "Puran V. Rambilas and (9) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 anr." (AIR 2001 SC 2023), the Apex Court observed that where a bail order is rendered in ignorance of the material and is a perverse order, it can be set aside in the exercise of powers available under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In any case, this is a fit case wherein the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also can be invoked. 9. Considering the foregoing discussion, both the impugned orders deserve to be quashed. Hence, the Application is allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. The learned Advocate for the respondents 1 to 5 would submit that atleast for one week the respondents 1 to 5 may be protected and may be granted liberty to file afresh Application for bail before the Court of Sessions. The respondents 1 to 5 may be continued to remain on bail for one week and, thereafter, shall surrender before the Court of Sessions without fail. If they will surrender before the Court of Sessions, and will file afresh bail Application/s, then the learned Sessions Judge shall consider the said Application/s expeditiously (10) CRI.APP. 2844..2010 on their own merits and shall pass de-novo orders based on the material found during the course of investigation and shall ascribe valid reasons for rejecting or granting of the bail. The Application is accordingly disposed of. 10. Parties may act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Court Sheristedar. Sd/- [V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] arp