IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.6377 of 2000 JAI NARAIN CHAUDHARY Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 04- 23.9.2008 Heard Mr. Yugal Kishore for the petitioner, Mr. Amarendra Kumar, learned junior counsel to Government Pleader No.11 for respondent nos.1 and 2, Mr. Tej Bahadur Singh for respondent nos.3 to 5 (Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board), and Mr. Subodh Kumar Jha for respondent no.6 (Nand Kishore Jha). This writ petition is directed against the order dated 16.5.2000 (Annexure-5), passed by respondent no.2 (The Special Director, Secondary Education, Bihar, Patna), in Appeal No.2/98, passed in terms of Section 24 of the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board Ordinance, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the “Ordinance”), whereby he has set aside the order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3), and the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1). By the said order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3), the Chairman of the Board had held that he has no power to review his own order, and by the said order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1), passed by the Chairman of the Board, whereby the names of six persons mentioned therein including the 2 present petitioner was approved as teacher in Kishori Primary –cum- Middle Sanskrit School, Lekuna, Saharsa. 2. A brief statement of facts is essential for the disposal of the writ petition. The school was perhaps founded in 1978. By the aforesaid Ordinance, a large number of Sanskrit schools in the State of Bihar were recognised as Non-Government schools for payment of grants. There was perhaps a complaint that the school in question was a non-existent school leading to an enquiry. The enquiry was conducted by the Regional Deputy Director, Koshi Division, Saharsa who submitted his report dated 17.2.1988 (Annexure-2), whereby he found that the school was functional and also stated that the six teachers mentioned therein including the petitioner herein were working in the school. On the basis of the materials on record including the said enquiry report, the Chairman of the Board passed the aforesaid order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1), whereby the services of the six school teachers mentioned therein including the petitioner herein were approved with effect from 1.1.1985, subject to the condition that the concerned school shall submit the relevant 3 records before the Board to examine the issue relating to the date from which the salary would be paid to them. The net result of Annexures 2 and 1 appears to be that respondent nos.6 herein was not taken to be a teacher of the school. It further appears that no appeal in terms of Section 24 of the said Ordinance 1981, was preferred against the enquiry report dated 17.2.1988 (Annexure-2), or against the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1). Respondent no.6 herein preferred a review application before the Chairman of the Board for review of the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1), which was rejected by the order bearing Memo No.11, dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3). Aggrieved by this order, respondent no.6 preferred an appeal in terms of section 24 of the 1981 Ordinance before the State Government which has been allowed by the impugned order and the aforesaid order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3), and the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1), have been set aside. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no appeal was preferred against the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1) and has, therefore, attained finality. Secondly, 4 the Chairman had rightly passed the order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3), whereby he has held that he has no power of review under the Act. He also submits that the review application was confined to the order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3), and, therefore, setting aside the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1) was all the more erroneous in law. He lastly submits that it has been held by this Court in the judgment reported in 1988 P.L.J.R. 866 (Chandra Nath Thakur Vs. Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board and others) that in view of the provisions of the Act, a writ petition against an order of dismissal is not maintainable. 4. Learned counsel for respondent no.6 has submitted that the impugned order is correct in law. He also submits that the writ petition itself discloses that the petitioner had submitted his resignation and, therefore, he cannot escape the same. He lastly submits that the impugned order has been passed in the interest of justice and, therefore, this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction may not set aside the same. 5. Learned counsel for respondent nos.3 to 5 has placed certain portions of the 5 writ petition in an effort to establish that the petitioner had submitted his resignation before the Managing Committee and, therefore, on his own showing he ceases to be a teacher of the school. 6. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It appears to us that the over-arching fact in the present proceeding is that the order dated 31.5.1988 (Annexure-1) was passed by the Chairman of the Board, approving the services of the six school teachers mentioned therein including the petitioner. The same does not include the name of respondent no.6. The same was passed in pursuance of the detailed enquiry conducted by the State Government and the report is dated 17.2.1988. Annexure-1 was entirely based on Annexure-2. No appeal was filed against Annexure-2 and, therefore, the same attained finality. 7. Law is well settled that an authority created by an Act of the legislature has to function within the four corners of the Act. Its powers, duties, and functions have to be clearly specified therein which fully 6 controls the authority concerned. Law is equally well settled that power of review has to be conferred by specific terms of the Statute or by necessary intendment. It appears to me that no such power has been conferred on the Chairman of the Board to exercise the power of review, neither in specific terms nor by necessary intendment. In that view of the matter, the order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3), whereby the Chairman dismissed the review application preferred by respondent no.6 herein on the ground that the same is not maintainable because of complete absence of jurisdiction, cannot be faulted. 8. It is manifest on a plain reading of the impugned order that it was confined to the order dated 6.1.1998 (Annexure-3). Apart from the question that the same was a perfectly just and legal order, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to travel beyond the pleadings of the parties and the issue raised before him, namely, whether or not the Chairman had the power of review, the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction. Once it has been found that the Chairman had no power of review, he has no power to set aside the order which had 7 attained finality, and had also not been challenged before the appellate authority. It is further noticeable that Annexure-1 was passed on 31.5.1988, and the Chairman has disposed of the review application on 6.1.1998. Therefore, even if respondent no.6 had preferred appeal before the State Government challenging the validity of Annexure-1, he was bound in law to explain the enormous delay in preferring the appeal. 9. I must consider one more aspect of the matter canvassed by learned counsel for the respondents. It appears that during the pendency of the proceeding before the Special Director, respondent no.6 and the petitioner herein had filed a joint application, whereby respondent no.6 whose appeal it was, seeking permission to withdraw the same, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties as indicated therein. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that, in implementation of the same, the petitioner had submitted his resignation letter before the Managing Committee. The contention is stated only to be rejected. It would be an extra-ordinary situation that employees would be permitted to compromise their issues relating to their services, including 8 terms and conditions of employment, mutual compromise. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Managing Committee was a party to the same. Thirdly, the same was never approved by the appellate authority, the appeal was not permitted to be withdrawn on that ground, and the learned appellate authority had proceeded to pass the impugned order on merits. Therefore, even if any step was taken in pursuance of Annexure-4, the same is not worthy of notice by this Court. 10. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 16.5.2000 (Annexure-5) is set aside. (S K Katriar, J.) S.K.Pathak/