1 (Apeal 90 of 1991) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 90 OF 1991 Shri Gopala Balu Kamble, ) Aged about 70 years, ) Occupation -Labourer, ) Residing at Tandulwadi, Tal.-Walwa,) District Sangli )...Appellant Versus The State of Maharashtra )...Respondent ----- Mr.Avinash Kamkhedkmar -Amicus Curiae for Appellant Smt.V.R. Bhosale -APP for State ----- CORAM: V.M. KANADE, & A.M. THIPSAY, JJ. DATED: 27th September, 2011 ORAL JUDGMENT [PER: V.M. KANADE J.] 1. Heard. 2. A report has been submitted by Senior Inspector of Kurlap Police Station. 3. The learned APP appearing on behalf of the State 2 (Apeal 90 of 1991) submits that the appellant Gopala Balu Kamble has expired. An inquiry was made by the Senior Inspector of Kurlap Police Station and statements of various persons were recorded and a report is submitted by him in which he has stated that the appellant expired at Mumbai. A separate report has been tendered by Digambar Pradhan, Police Superintendent in his letter dated 29.08.2011 addressed to Assistant Registrar of this Court. From the report, it is apparent that appellant has expired. 4. The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under section 337, 452 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and he was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment for the offence punishable under section 302 of the IPC. He was also cumulatively sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs 1,000/- and, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for further period of three months for the offences punishable under section 337 and 452 of the IPC. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. 5. Since the appellant has expired, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for the aforesaid offence under section 302, 337 and 452 of the IPC stands abated. 3 (Apeal 90 of 1991) However, the question which falls for our consideration is : whether in a case where fine is imposed by the Trial Court, apart from imposing sentence of rigorous imprisonment, then, in such cases, on the death of the appellant, does the appeal abate? 6. In this connection, the Apex Court has in the case of Harnam Singh vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh [(1975) 3 Supreme Court Cases 343] and in the case of State of A.P. vs. S. Narasimha Kumar and Others [(2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 683] considered the legal position on this aspect. The Apex Court in all these cases has held that in a case where fine is imposed by the Trial Court, such an appeal which is filed against the State, would not abate on the death of the Appellant. 7. In this context, it would be relevant to examine section 394 of Cr.P.C. which deals with the provision of abatement of appeal and it reads as under: “394. Abatement of appeals.- (1) Every appeal under section 377 or section 378 shall finally abate on the death of the accused. (2) Every other appeal under this Chapter 4 (Apeal 90 of 1991) (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on the death of the appellate: Provided that where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate.” Perusal of this section, clearly indicates that an exception is carved out in the cases where an appeal is filed from a sentence of fine. Except such an appeal, every other appeal under the Chapter XXIX would abate on the death of the Appellant. Secondly, there is a proviso to sub-clause (2) which stipulates that even in a case where an appeal is filed against conviction and sentence of death or imprisonment and the Appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, a provision is made whereby any of his relative can make an application within a period of 30 days from the date of the death of the Appellant for continuation of the appeal by them and if on such application being made, leave is granted by the Court, then in that event, the appeal 5 (Apeal 90 of 1991) would not abate and the legal representatives would be permitted to continue the said appeal. 8. Perusal of sub-clause (2) clearly reveals that legislature in its wisdom has made an exception in cases of an appeal filed from a sentence of fine. It is obvious that the said exception is made in such a case since even after the death of the Appellant, the State would be entitled to recover that amount from his estate where he has a share in the said property. It is obvious, therefore, that in such cases the appeal would not abate. The Apex Court in the case of Harnam Singh (supra) has observed that even where composite sentence is awarded by the Trial court viz. sentence of imprisonment and fine, even in such cases the appeal would not abate. In this context, it would be relevant to note the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Harnam Singh (supra). Though the said judgment was passed in respect of section 431 of Cr.P.C. of the old Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, the said two sections viz. section 431 of the old Code and 394 of the Code of 1973 are identical. The said judgment in paragraph 9 and 10, it is observed under. “9. Every other appeal under Chapter XXXI, 6 (Apeal 90 of 1991) except an appeal from a sentence of fine, finally abates on the death of the appellant. By “every other appeal” is meant an appeal other than one against an order of acquittal, that is to say, an appeal against an order or conviction. Every appeal against conviction therefore abates on the death of the accused except an appeal from a sentence of fine. An appeal from a sentence of fine is excepted from the all pervasive rule of abatement of criminal appeals for the reason that the fine constitutes a liability on the estate of the deceased and the legal representatives on whom the estate devolves are entitled to ward off that liability. By Section 70 of the Penal Code the fine can be levied at any time within six years after the passing of the sentence and if the offender has been sentenced for a longer period than six years, then at any time previous to the expiration of that period; “ and the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability any property which would , after his death be legally liable for his debts.” The fact that the offender has served the sentence in default of payment of 7 (Apeal 90 of 1991) fine is not a complete answer to the right of the Government to realize the fine because under the proviso to Section 386 (1) (b) of the Code the court can, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, issue a warrant for realizing the fine even if the offender has undergone the whole of the imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The sentence of fine remains outstanding though the right to recover the fine is circumscribed by a sort of a period of limitation prescribed by Section 70, Penal Code. 10. The narrow question which then requires to be considered is whether an appeal from a composite order of sentence combining the substantive imprisonment with fine is for the purposes of Section 431 not an appeal from a sentence of fine. It is true that an appeal from a composite order of sentence is ordinarily directed against both the substantive imprisonment and the fine. But, such an appeal does not for that reason cease to be an appeal from a sentence of fine. It is something more not less that an appeal from a sentence of fine only and it is significant that the 8 (Apeal 90 of 1991) parenthetical clause of Section 431 does not contain the word “only”. To limit the operation of the exception contained in that clause so as to take away from its purview appeals directed both against imprisonment and fine is to read into the clause the word “only” which is not there and which, by no technique of interpretation may be read there. The plain meaning of Section 431 is that every criminal appeal abates on the death of the accused “except an appeal from a sentence of fine.” The section for its application requires that the appeal must be directed to the sentence of fine and not that it must be directed to that sentence only. If by the judgment under appeal a sentence of fine is imposed either singularly or in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment, the appeal against conviction would be an appeal from a sentence of fine within the meaning of Section 431. All that is necessary is that a sentence of fine should have been imposed on the accused and the appeal filed by him should involve the consideration of the validity of that sentence.” 9 (Apeal 90 of 1991) 9. The ratio of this judgment has been followed by the Apex Court recently in the case of State of A.P. vs. S.Narasimha Kumar and Others (supra) and in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment, it is observed as under:- “9. Every other appeal under Chapter XXXI, except an appeal from a sentence of fine finally abates on the death of the appellant. By 'every other appeal' is meant an appeal other than one against an order of acquittal, that is to say, an appeal against an order of conviction. Every appeal against conviction therefore abates on the death of the accused except an appeal from a sentence of fine. An appeal from a sentence of fine is excepted from the all- pervasive rule of abatement of criminal appeals for the reason that the fine constitutes a liability on the estate of the deceased and the legal representatives on whom the estate devolves are entitled to ward off that liability. By Section 70 of the Penal Code the fine can be levied at any time within six years after the passing of the sentence and if the offender has been sentenced for a longer period than 10 (Apeal 90 of 1991) six years, then at any time previous to the expiration of that period; 'and the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts'. The fact that the offender has served the sentence in default of payment of fine is not a complete answer to the right of the Government to realise the fine because under the proviso to Section 386(1) (b) of the Code the court can, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, issue a warrant for realising the fine even if the offender has undergone the whole of the imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The sentence of fine remains outstanding though the right to recover the fine is circumscribed by a sort of a period of limitation prescribed by Section 70, Penal Code. 10. The narrow question which then requires to be considered is whether an appeal from a composite order of sentence combining the substantive imprisonment with fine is for the purposes of Section 431 not an appeal from a sentence of fine. It is true that an appeal from a composite order of sentence is ordinarily 11 (Apeal 90 of 1991) directed against both the substantive imprisonment and the fine. But, such an appeal does not for that reason cease to be an appeal from a sentence of fine. It is something more not less than an appeal from a sentence of fine only and it is significant that the parenthetical clause of Section 431 does not contain the word 'only'. To limit the operation of the exception contained in that clause so as to take away from its purview appeals directed both against imprisonment and fine is to read into the clause the word 'only' which is not there and which, by no technique of interpretation may be read there. The plain meaning of Section 431 is that every criminal appeal abates on the death of the accused except an appeal from a sentence of fine'. The section for its application requires that the appeal must be directed to the sentence of fine and not that it must be directed to that sentence only. If by the judgment under appeal a sentence of fine is imposed either singularly or in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment, the appeal against conviction would be an appeal from a sentence of fine 12 (Apeal 90 of 1991) within the meaning of Section 431. All that is necessary is that a sentence of fine should have been imposed on the accused and the appeal filed by him should involve the consideration of the validity of that sentence.” 10. The Apex Court in the third judgment viz. in the case of Om Prakash vs. State of Haryana and Anr. (supra) has on the different point held that the appeal against the order of imprisonment and sentence would not abate. In the said case, the accused was convicted and was sentenced to suffer R.I. for four months and fine of Rs.2,000/- was imposed and, in default, he was to undergo one month's further R.I. The said accused, however, died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal representatives were brought on record, who continued the appeal and it was observed that this could be done in view of section 393 sub-clause (2) proviso. 11. From the observations which are made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, it is, therefore, a settled position in law that if an appeal is preferred against an order of conviction of the Trial Court and the sentence is either composite sentence of imprisonment and fine or is merely a sentence of fine, in both these 13 (Apeal 90 of 1991) cases the appeal would not abate on the death of the Appellant. 12. The next point which requires to be decided is - who should represent the Appellant in such cases. Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 394 reads as under:- (3) Every other appeal under this Chapter (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on the death of the appellate: Provided that where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate.” From the said proviso, it is obvious that the obligation to file an application for continuation of appeal and for making an application to that effect is cast on the relatives and if no such application is filed by the relatives within the time prescribed by the said proviso, it is obvious that then this Court can decide the appeal by appointing either amicus curiae or an advocate 14 (Apeal 90 of 1991) from the Legal Aid Panel. 13. In the present case since no application has been filed by any of the relatives of the Appellant within the time prescribed under the said proviso, in our view, it would be appropriate if Advocate Kamkhedkar is permitted to make his submissions in respect of the merits of the appeal. 14. We have, therefore, requested Shri Kamkhedkar to appear as amicus curiae. He has taken us through the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court and also the notes of evidence. So far as the sentence of life imprisonment and R.I. for six months is concerned, in view of the death of the Appellant, the said imprisonment abates. So far as the fine of Rs.1,000/- which is imposed by the Trial Court is concerned, in our view, since the main order of imprisonment has abated, it is not necessary to continue the order imposing fine of Rs.1,000/-. The order of fine, therefore, is set aside. Since the sentence of fine is set aside, the appeal would abate in respect of sentence of imprisonment. 15. At this stage, we would like to express our gratitude to Shri Kamkhedkar for having assisted us in 15 (Apeal 90 of 1991) this case. Appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 16. We must add that we have noticed on many occasions on the death of the Appellant, orders of abatement of the appeal are passed even in cases where sentence of fine is imposed by the Trial Court, which is contrary to the provisions of section 394 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It would be, therefore, appropriate if the Registrar General of this Court is directed to circulate copies of this judgment to all the District Courts. (A.M.THIPSAY J.) (V.M. KANADE J.)