IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN Present HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.346 of 2010 Between: Jangiti Balram & another .. Appellants AND Buddidi Yadagiri .. Respondent The Court made the following Order: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.346 of 2010 JUDGMENT: The Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.25 of 2008, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Bhongir, dated 21.01.2010, by which the judgment and decree in O.S.No.74 of 2005, on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Bhongir, dated 04.11.2008, were confirmed. 2. The parties are referred to herein as they are arrayed in the suit. 3. The factual background for the Second Appeal is that the plaintiff filed the suit seeking a permanent injunction against the two defendants in respect of Ac. 3.00 guntas in S.No.151/E of Rusthapuram village at Thurkapally Mandal, Nalgonda District. The plaintiff claimed to have acquired the schedule property from the Government under the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, and to be in physical possession and enjoyment having been issued a pattadar pass book and title deed and having been entered as the pattadar and possessor in the pahanies. He claimed to be raising dry crops and to have obtained an agricultural loan from the State Bank of India, Thurkapally. The alleged attempts by the defendants to interfere with his possession and enjoyment were claimed to be the basis for his suit. The defendants 1 and 2 contended that the father of the plaintiff and others filed a case against J.Harihar Rao and others before the Land Reforms Tribunal which was disposed of on 27.11.1980 holding that the disputed Ac. 6.00 guntas in S.No.154 was purchased by the father of the plaintiff and the order did not disclose any assignment of Ac. 3.00 guntas of surplus land in S.No.151 to the father of the plaintiff or the plaintiff. The entire extent in S.No.151 admeasuring Ac. 18.11 guntas belonged to Jangiti Yadagiri Rao and two others, having devolved on them from their ancestors out of which they sold Ac. 5.00 guntas to Macha Narsimha and Ac. 3.00 guntas to Neela Nandam. The sales were upheld by the Land Reforms Tribunal and the first defendant and the sons of the second defendant were in possession of Ac.5.10 guntas of land on the west of the road in S.No.151. The defendants, therefore, claimed that the Land Reforms Proceedings evidently show the plaintiff to be having no interest or possession in S.No.151 in any manner and to have obtained the pattadar passbook and title deed in collusion with the Revenue Officials. As the defendants are co-owners and the boundaries of the suit property were not supported by any documentary evidence, the defendant claimed the plaintiff to be not entitled to any permanent injunction. 4. On such conflicting pleadings, the trial Court framed issues about the possession and the right for a permanent injunction of the plaintiff and examined P.Ws.1 to 4 and D.W.1 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-22 and B-1 to B-17 during the trial. 5. The trial Court rendered its judgment on 04.11.2008 referring to the rival contentions and evidence and observing that Ex.A-1-pattadar passbook, Exs.A-2 to A-15-Pahanies showing the possession of the earlier pattadars and then the plaintiff, Ex.A-16-Paisal Patti showing the plaintiff as one of the beneficiaries, Ex.A-17-Land Ceiling Certificate issued to the plaintiff, Ex.A-18-copy of the appeal filed by the plaintiff before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Exs.A-19 and A-20-Pahanies showing the possession of the plaintiff, Ex.A-21-letter issued by the State Bank of India, Thurkapally Branch, and Ex.A-22-true copy of the title deed corroborated the claims of the plaintiff apart from the oral evidence of P.Ws.2 to 4 supporting the plaintiff examined as P.W.1. The trial Court also noted that the boundaries claimed by the plaintiff were not discredited by having any Advocate Commissioner appointed at the instance of the defendants and the defendants took contrary stands in their written statement and in the cross-examination of P.W.1. The trial Court referred to the first defendant’s evidence as D.W.1 in extenso and the documents Exs.B-1 to B-17 and found that he admitted that Ex.B-17-letter, dated 20.08.2007, itself mentioned the plaintiff to be in possession of the same land in S.No.151. The trial Court also noted that the defendants did not explain whether in pursuance of Exs.B-11 and B-12-reports, the pattas of the plaintiff or other beneficiaries were ever cancelled by the concerned authorities. The trial Court also observed that Exs.B-15 and B-16-Pahanies also showed the plaintiff as the pattadar and Dharavat Nandya and others as the possessors which run counter to the claims of the defendants in the written statement. The trial Court consequently concluded that the evidence for the plaintiff stood unrebutted by the defendants, observing that statutory records maintained have to be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Therefore, based on the said public records, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs. 6. It was in the first appeal preferred by the defendants against the said judgment and decree that the First Appellate Court delivered the impugned judgment again referring to the rival contentions and evidence. The First Appellate Court also found that there was litigation before the Revenue officials between the parties, but in none of the proceedings, the patta issued in favour of the plaintiff was questioned. The First Appellate Court also observed that the plaintiff’s possession of the suit property was evident from his documents, while the defendants who contend the boundaries of the property to be incorrect did not substantiate their case in the evidence of D.W.1. Noting that till the patta certificates are cancelled, they are in force, in the absence of any other oral evidence to support D.W.1, it held that the possession of the plaintiff cannot be doubted and he is entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendants. Consequently, the trial Court’s judgment and decree were confirmed. 7. The defendants are, hence, before this Court with this Second Appeal contending that the impugned judgment is opposed to law and evidence and the proceedings of the Land Reforms Tribunal were not appropriately looked into by the Courts below. The lower Courts did not even verify the boundaries of the property or the contents of the revenue records and the appellants contended that the patta certificate, etc., were fake and bogus. They pleaded that three substantial questions of law arise in the Second Appeal about the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal which are admitted, the fake and bogus pattas which could not have been given any weight and the disentitlement to any injunction in the absence of prima facie establishment of the possession in the suit property or its boundaries. 8. Sri T. Amarnath Goud, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri K. Someshwara Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff are heard at the stage of admission. 9. The point for consideration is whether any substantial questions of law are involved in the Second Appeal deserving its consideration by this Court? 10. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Order XLII Rule 2 thereof make it clear that for entertaining any Second Appeal, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and it should formulate that substantial question of law involved on which alone the parties will be heard. Any other ground in the appeal cannot be urged during hearing without the leave of the Court and, therefore, it is evident that the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for entertainment of a Second Appeal and the Apex Court had time and again deprecated the High Courts entertaining Second Appeals as a matter of course without involvement of such substantial questions of law. 11. The facts of the present case examined in that background do not appear to disclose any such substantial questions of law that arise for consideration herein. The suit is for a permanent injunction simpliciter and has to be essentially adjudicated on the probable lawful possession of the suit property by the date of the suit and any question of title may arise only for incidental determination in such a suit for an injunction. Neither the trial Court nor the First Appellate Court had gone into the question of title in depth nor made any incidental determination of such question of title. The judgment of the trial Court, accepting the corroboration afforded to the plaintiff examined as P.W.1, from the oral evidence of P.Ws.2 to 4 and Exs.A-1 to A-22, had its reasoning based mainly on the possession of land in S.No.151 with the plaintiff by the date of the suit, prima facie probablised by such evidence. The rejection of the claims of the defendants to the contrary was with reference to the inconsistency between their pleadings and evidence in that regard apart from the absence of any corroboration for the interested claims of the first defendant as D.W.1 whose documents themselves made a reference to the possession of the plaintiff, at least subsequently in Ex.B-17. It was on the balance of probabilities that the trial Court arrived at a conclusion in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of the prima facie evidence of possession afforded by the entries in the revenue records. While coming to such a conclusion, the trial Court did not in any manner doubt or reject any connected proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal to consider whether any such admitted facts were ignored. It is no doubt true that the defendants claimed the pattadar passbook, title deed, etc., in favour of the plaintiff to be false or bogus or collusive or manipulated, but it was a finding of fact by both the Courts below that there were no proceedings cancelling either the patta or the entries in favour of the plaintiff in the revenue records under any due procedure. In the absence of any evidence and proof concerning the irregularity or illegality in the patta or other entries in favour of the plaintiff, the trial and the First Appellate Courts giving weight to the revenue records is based on the evidence on facts and not on any issues of law. It is the perception of the defendants that the plaintiff failed to prima facie establish his rightful possession in the suit property or that there is any ambiguity about the boundaries of the property claimed. But the Courts below differing with such perception cannot be considered to be raising any question of law, leave alone a substantial question. 12. Under the circumstances, the Second Appeal cannot be considered to be involving any substantial question of law which can be formulated, heard and decided. 13. Sri T. Amarnath Goud, learned counsel for the appellants brought to notice the claims of the defendants specified in the affidavit in support of S.A.M.P.No.844 of 2010 about not only the background for the litigation, but also about the entire land of Jangiti Yadagiri Rao being under the custody of Nalgonda District Cooperative Bank as a security, the acquisition of a part of the land of Jangiti Bhaskar Rao and others by the State Government, the possession of Macha Narsimha and others over portions of the lands and the pendency of W.P.Nos.3976, 3977 and 4044 of 2010 between Nalgonda District Cooperative Central Bank Limited and Dharavath Nandya and others claiming to be in possession and occupation of the property. It is not necessary in this Second Appeal to go into these allegations or questions of fact because firstly, none of the persons referred to in the said affidavit as claiming or having an interest in the said property are parties to this litigation and as an injunction does not run with the land and has no bearing on the rights and interests of any such third parties, while as already stated, neither the trial Court nor the First Appellate Court has made even an attempt to make any incidental determination of the question of title over the suit property in these proceedings. In any view, it can be made clear that the judgments herein did not indulge in any determination of the question of title over the subject property concerning which the parties or any others are at liberty to pursue their remedies available to them under law and it can be further made clear that any legal or other proceedings between the third parties are no way prejudiced by the determination of this suit. 14. Subject to the above observations, the Second Appeal has to, therefore, fail and is, accordingly, dismissed without costs. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 21st January, 2011 KL HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.346 of 2010 Date: 21st January, 2011 KL