THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH W.P.NO.8467 OF 2002 O R D E R Heard both the counsel. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Driver in the respondent – Corporation with effect from 25.7.1988 and while so, he availed leave from 6.8.1996 to 16.8.1996 and sought for further extension of leave from 17.8.1998 for a period of one month, by giving telegram, on the ground that his mother was hospitalized. He was issued charge sheet on 14.10.1996 alleging unauthorized absence and he submitted his explanation and not being satisfied with the same, enquiry was conducted and eventually, he was removed from service by proceedings dated 21.2.1997. The subsequent appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected by the 3rd respondent – Divisional Manager. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed review before the 2nd respondent – Regional Manager and by proceedings No.Peshi/19(48)/97- RM;ADB dated 3.9.1997 the punishment of removal was set aside and the petitioner was reinstated into service afresh and his past service was directed to be taken into account for terminal benefits. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 3. The only ground urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that Regulation 8 of A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1967, contemplates punishments to be imposed on the delinquent employees of the Corporation and the punishment imposed by the 2nd respondent – regional reinstating the petitioner into service afresh is not contemplated under Regulation 8 and hence the same is liable to be set aside. 4. The learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation also conceded that the punishment imposed by the 2nd respondent – Regional Manager is not contemplated under Regulation 8. 5. The issue involved in the present writ petition is squarely covered by a judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in K.C.NARAYANA v. MANAGING DIRETOR, APSRTC, HYD.[1], wherein it was held as under: “15. I am unable to agree with the observations that the appellate authority, in exercise of the powers under Regulation 27, has the discretion to impose even a non- specified penalty provided it falls within the minimum and maximum penalty specified in the regulations. It is well settled that statutory authorities must exercise their powers strictly in accordance with the statute or the statutory rules and that exercise of power contrary thereto would be ultra vires and illegal. Exercise of discretion can only be in accordance with law and unbridled and unfettered discretion would fall foul of the equality clauses under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.. . . “18. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.J.Paul’s case AIR 1999 SC 1994), the earlier judgments of this Court taking a contrary view must be held no longer as good law and as a result the impugned order of the reviewing authority, appointing the petitioner as a conductor afresh, must necessarily be set aside and the matter remanded to the 2nd respondent for his consideration on the question of penalty. 19. The impugned order of the 2nd respondent is, accordingly, set aside and he is directed to examine the records and determine the appropriate punishment to be imposed on the petitioner strictly in accordance with the A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1967, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Needless to state that, since the petitioner has been continuing pursuant to the earlier order of the Reviewing Authority to appoint him afresh as a Conductor, status quo as on today shall continue till final orders are passed by the 2nd respondent on the punishment to be imposed on the petitioner herein.” 6. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the judgment of this court, as the 2nd respondent has imposed punishment on the petitioner which is not contemplated under the APSRTC Regulations, the same is set aside and the matter is remitted back to examine the records and determine the appropriate punishment to be imposed on the petitioner strictly in accordance with the Regulations, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 7. As the petitioner was reinstated and continuing as Driver, status quo as on today shall be continued till the final orders are passed by the 2nd respondent on the punishment to be imposed on the petitioner. 8. No order as to costs. AVS ---------------------------------- 30—06—2011 [1] 2007(5) ALD 416