1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE Writ Petition No.809 of 2007 Mr.Sambhaji Khandu Patil Petitioner Vs. The District Social Welfare Officer and anr. Respondents Mr.M.S.Topkar for petitioner. Mr.S.K.Chinchalikar, AGP for respondents. CORAM: B.H.MARLAPALLE, J. January 22, 2008 P.C. . Heard Mr.Topkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner who had filed Complaint (ULP) No.240 of 1991 before the Court at Kolhapur and claimed that he was illegally terminated from service with effect from 22/8/1991. The Labour Court was pleased to allow the complaint partly as per its judgment and order dated 23/10/2001. The respondents were directed to reinstate the complainant on his original post with continuity of service, but without back-wages. This order passed by the Labour Court was challenged in Revision Application (ULP) No.58 of 2005 and the same came to be allowed by the learned 2 Member of the Industrial Court as per his judgment and order dated 16/12/2006. Hence this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. . As per the petitioner’s own case he was appointed for the first time as a watchman in the Government hostel at Gargoti, Dist.Kolhapur for 29 days in the year 1990 and he continued till 29/8/1991 and thereafter he was not continued. In his complaint the period of his appointment contains 13 different appointment orders and the period mentioned therein was as under: 1) 28/6/1990 to 27/7/1990 2) 29/7/1990 to 26/8/1990 3) 28/8/1990 to 25/9/1990 4) 27/9/1990 to 25/10/1990 5) 26/10/1990 to 24/11/1990 6) 26/11/1990 to 24/12/1990 3 7) 26/12/1990 to 23/1/1991 8) 25/1/1991 to 22/2/1991 9) 24/2/1991 to 24/4/1991 10) 26/3/1991 to 22/4/1991 11) 24/5/1991 to 21/6/1991 12) 24/6/1991 to 22/7/1991 13) 24/7/1991 to 21/8/1991 . The Industrial Court in revision noted that every appointment order was for a fixed period of 29 days and it was very specifically mentioned that on expiry of the 29th day the appointment would stand discontinued. Despite this the learned Judge of the Labour Court held that the respondents were guilty of unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 1 (b) and (f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 in asmuchas discontinuation of the petitioner amounted to retrenchment and there was non-compliance of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. 4 . In revision, the Industrial Court held that there was no termination of service of the complainant and on expiry of the period of 29 days, he was given a fresh appointment order. As per the Industrial Court even otherwise the Labour Court was in error in holding that the non-renewal of the contract of the petitioner could not be said to be an act of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act and it was in fact covered by the exception clause i.e. Section 2(oo) (bb) of the said Act. The Industrial Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh & ors. 1964 (4) SCR 964] 1964 (4) SCR 964] 1964 (4) SCR 964] wherein Their Lordships observed as under: "In our opinion, where a Government servant has no right to a post or a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give, he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status." 5 . Consequently the Industrial Court treated the petitioner to be a back door entrant and by referring to the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & ors. Vs. Umadevi and ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1) (2006) 4 SCC 1) (2006) 4 SCC 1) and also to the earlier decision in AIR 1994 SC 1638, the Industrial Court recorded a finding that non-renewal of the casual and temporary appointment of the petitioner could not be termed as an act of unfair labour practice under any sub-item of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The revision was allowed and the complaint filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed. . The view taken by the Industrial Court in dismissing the complaint and setting aside the judgment and order of the Labour Court cannot be termed as perverse or patently erroneous so as to call for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, this petition must fail at the threshold. The petition is rejected summarily. (B.H.MARL