THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE P.DURGA PRASAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1533 OF 2004 ORDER: This appeal at the instance of the State is directed against the acquittal of the accused in S.T.C.No.4 of 2002 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Dhone on 30.06.2003. The respondent herein was prosecuted for the offence under Section 67 of Factories Act read with Sections 14 and 15 of Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (for short ‘Child Labour Act,1986’). According to the prosecution, the Inspector of factories, Kurnool inspected M/s Srinivasa Mineral Industries situated at U.Kothapalli Village of Dhone Mandal on 16.05.2001 at 3.30 P.M. and found that the accused, who is the occupier-cum-Manager of the said industry, contravened the provisions of Section 67 of Factories Act by employing child labours namely Rajani, Munnabi and Ramajanamma and thereby he is liable for punishment under Sections 14 and 15 of Child Labour Act, 1986. The learned Magistrate examined the accused under section 251 Cr.P.C. and the accused pleaded not guilty for the said offence. In order to establish the said charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.7. No oral and documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the accused. The learned Magistrate by taking into consideration of the said oral and documentary evidence acquitted the accused on the ground that taking cognizance of the complaint on 7.05.2002 is beyond the period of limitation. Aggrieved by the said acquittal, the State has filed the present appeal. The Additional Public Prosecutor has pleaded that the limitation has to be counted from the date of commission of offence till the date of filing of the charge sheet and not the date of actual taking cognizance of the offence. He further pleaded that in the present case as the complaint was filed within the period of limitation, the same is not barred by limitation; thereby the finding recorded by the lower Court is liable to be set aside. None appeared on behalf of the respondent. Now, the short point arises for consideration is: Whether the complaint filed against the accused is barred by limitation? P O I N T: Admittedly, the factory of the accused was inspected on 16.05.2001 and the charge sheet was filed on 16.08.2001 and the same was returned with certain objections and the case was taken on file on 07.05.2002. The lower Court by observing that the maximum period prescribed under the Act for taking cognizance is 3 months from the date of commission of offence and as the cognizance was taken beyond the period of 3 months i.e. on 7.05.2002 the complaint is barred by limitation. The lower Court has relied upon a decision rendered in “G.ANJAIAH V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH[1]” and observed that the cognizance has to be taken within the period of limitation from the date of commission of offence. In the above said decision, the accused was prosecuted for the offences under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act. The punishment prescribed for the offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act is imprisonment which may extend to 3 years and for the offence under Section 44 of the said Act the punishment is imprisonment up to 2 years and taking the longer sentence of 3 years, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. for such offences would be 3 years from the date of commission of offence. In the said case as the offence was committed on 14.07.1994 and the cognizance was taken on 20.09.1999, held that the cognizance was taken beyond the period of limitation. In the above said decision the limitation was counted from the date of commission of offence to the date of taking cognizance of the offence by the Court. The Additional Public Prosecutor has pleaded that the limitation has to be taken from the date of commission of offence till the date of filing of the charge sheet. In support of his contention, he relied upon a decision rendered in “APPU RAMANI V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH[2]”. In the above said decision a reference was made to the Division Bench of this Court by a Single Judge of this Court on the controversy as to whether the date of filing of the complaint/charge-sheet in Court has to be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation or whether the date on which cognizance was taken by the Magistrate, has to be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation. The Division Bench of this Court by taking into consideration of the various provisions of the Act and decisions of various Courts has answered the reference as under: “Even if the complaint/charge-sheet is represented after complying with the defects/objections pointed out by the Court within the time granted by the Court and if that date falls beyond the period of limitation, still the Court has to take cognizance of the case by duly taking into account the original date of filing of the complaint/charge-sheet filed in the first instance as the limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. is to be reckoned with reference to the date of filing of the complaint/charge-sheet in the Court in the first instance but not with reference to the date of taking cognizance.” The above said decision of the Division Bench was not taken into consideration in G.Anajaiah’s case (ref. 1 cited above) by the Single Judge of this Court. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. is to be reckoned with reference to the date of filing of the complaint/charge-sheet in the Court in the first instance but not with reference to the date of taking cognizance of the offence. In the present case, the offence alleged to have been committed on 16.05.2001 and charge sheet was filed on 16.08.2001 and it was taken on file on 07.05.2002. The lower Court has observed that the maximum period prescribed under the Act for taking cognizance is 3 months from the date of commission of offence. The respondent herein was prosecuted for contravention of provisions of Section 67 of Factories Act read with 14 and 15 of the Child Labour Act,1986. Section 67 of Factories Act deals with the prohibition of employment of young children. Section 92 of the Factories Act provides General penalty for offences. Section 106 of the Factories Act deals with the limitation of prosecutions. As per Section 106 of the Factories Act no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within 3 months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector. By relying on the said provision, the lower Court has held that the limitation prescribed for filing of complaint is 3 months from the date of commission of offence. The respondent/accused was prosecuted for the offence under Section 67 of Factories Act read with Sections 14 and 15 of the Child Labour Act, 1986. Section 14 of the Child Labour Act, 1986 deals with penalties. As per the above said section, whoever employs any child or permits any child to work in contravention of the provisions of Section 3 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs.10,000/- but which may extend to Rs.20,000/- or with both. Section 15 of the said Act deals with modified application of certain laws in relation to penalties. As per above said section where any person is found guilty and convicted of contravention of any of the provisions mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall be liable to penalties as provided in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of this Act and not under the Acts in which those provisions are contained. As per sub-section (2) the provisions referred to in sub-section (1) are the provisions mentioned below: (a) section 67 of the Factories Act, 1948, (b) section 40 of the Mines Act, 1952 (c) section 109 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 and (d) section 21 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961. Thus, in view of the sections 15 (1) and (2) of the Child Labour Act, 1986, for contravention of Section 67 of the Factories Act, the punishment is only under Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Child Labour Act, but not under the said Factories Act. The punishment prescribed under Section 14 (1) of the Child Labour Act, 1986 is the imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 3 months but which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs.10,000/- but which may extend to Rs.20,000/- or with both. The Child Labour Act does not prescribe any limitation for taking cognizance of the offence. Therefore, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. has to be taken into consideration. As per Section 468 Cr.P.C. the period of limitation shall be (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. In the present case, the maximum punishment prescribed under Section 14 of the Child Labour Act is one year. Therefore, the limitation for taking cognizance is one year. The lower Court has taken into consideration the limitation prescribed under Section 106 of Factories Act. The Limitation prescribed under Section 106 of Factories Act is only applicable for the offences punishable under the said Act. In the present case, the offence committed under Section 67 of the Factories Act is not punishable under the said Act, but is only punishable under Section 14 of the Child Labour Act, 1986. Therefore, taking into consideration of the punishment prescribed under Section 14 (1) of the Child Labour Act 1986, the limitation for taking cognizance is one year. In the case on hand, the offence was committed on 16.05.2001 and the charge sheet was filed on 16.08.2001 and it was taken on file on 07.05.2002. Thus, even if the date of taking the case on file is taken into consideration, it is within the period of one year as prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. If the decision of Division Bench of this Court (ref. 2 cited above) taken into consideration, the period of limitation has to be taken into consideration from the date of commission of offence to the date of filing of the charge sheet. Thus, taking into consideration of both the aspects, it is stated that the taking cognizance of the offence in the present case is within the period of limitation. Therefore, the finding of the lower Court is liable to be set aside. Since the lower Court has not dealt with the matter on merits, it is appropriate to remit back the matter to the lower Court for disposal on merits. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The acquittal of the respondent/accused in S.T.C.No.4 of 2002 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Dhone, is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the lower Court for fresh disposal on merits in accordance with law. _______________________ P.DURGA PRASAD, J 29th October, 2011 Ksp [1] 2000 Crl.L.J. 2568 [2] 1993 ALT (1) 370