BETORB THE STATEASMINISTBATIVE TRIBUNAL BENCH,RAIPUR (HP) . ^r O.A.No.'^1l,2^— 2000 tL^-C^^^b^L: Eetitloner Respondents K. N. Singh aged 62 years. Son of Shri R. P. Singh Retlred A.s.i. Police Station Chhaowni, Tahsil and Distrlct, Bur-g Versus The State Governraent of Madhya Eradesh thSough s The Secretary, Hbme Department, Bhopal. The District SuperintendeRt of Police, Durg. INi Petition under Section 19 of the Aclmiaistrative Trlbunal Act 1985. : ltilfi(?16i«teftiafls !i!:119 PETITIONER HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR WRITPETITION(Sl N0.3260/2005 K. N. Singh Versus RESPONDENTS State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh and another :<." ii -:ir Sinale Berich: Hon'ble Shri Manindra MohanShrivastava. J. Present:- ShriSomkant Verma, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Arvind Dubey, Panel lawyer forthe State. ORAL ORDER (Passed on this 09th day of March, 2010) With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petition is heard finally. (2) By this petition, the petitioner calted in question the order dated 04-08-1990 (Annexure P-1) by Which the order of recovery @ Rs.300/- per month was passed against the petitioner. (3) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the order of recovery was passed, he submitted a representation and the recovery was continued till 30-12-1992 but the amountwhich has already been recovered, has not been refunded to the petitioner, for which, he again submitted representations but when the same was not decided, he filed original application beforethe Tribunal on 27-04-2000. Learned eounsel for the petitioner submits that the said order of recovery was passed without affording any opportunity of hearing and by the authority which was not appointing authority of the petitioner.It isalso argued that the order of recovery is not a speaking one and does notstate as toyyhy and under which rule.the said order of recovery was passed. The petitioner .preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of PoliGe, Raipur, and thereafter sent reminders and application dated 29-03-1995, 22-08-1995 and 24-06-1996 and then fmally a legal notice though his Advocateon 05-11-1%8. In the meantime, the petitioner •2L- 11 3: !] 1 •iBi;a also retired from service on 30-06-1994. Therepresentations of the petitioner were neither replied nor the amount of recovery already made, has been relunded. (4) Per contra, learned State counset submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder ofnecessary parties. It has been denied that respondents have received any representation from the petitioner and recovery has been made in accordance with law. It has also been submitted that cause of action arose way back on 10-12-1989 and the recovery continued till 30-12-1992 whereas the petitfon has been filed after long and inordinate delay. (5) In my opinion, this petition is tiable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Admittedly, in this case, order of recovery was issued by the respondents on 04-08-"1990. The petitioner does not dispute that the recovery continued till 30-12-1992. Submisston of learned counsel for the petitioner that thereafter he kepton making representations which makes outcase for condonation of delay cannot be accepted. Repeated representationswould not by itself constitute ground forcondonation ofdelay. It has to be decided in each and every case dependingon facts and circumstances as to whether approach was made to the Courtof law promptlywithout undue delay and taches. In the peculiar faets and cireumstances of the present case, it is apparent that the petitioner was indolent in filing Qriginal application before the Tribunal. The petrtioner has stated that even though hesubmitted several representations, respondents have denied receipt of those representations. In any case, if according to the petitioner, respondents did not grant relief to the petitioner, petitioner ought to have approached the Court of law within a reasonable time. It has also to be noted that the petition was filed before the State Administrative Tribunal which prescribed limitation as provided under Section 21 of the Administrath/e Tribunal Act, 1985. Tliough, this Court is not bound bythe period of limitation prescribed in the said Act for entertaining the petitions, yet it is found that the petitioner has no reasonable and plausible explanation for approaching the Court after almost 10 years of the passing ofthe impugned order dated 04-08-1990 (Annexure P-1). illl_@si@^ !S«&1...... ..^.^;^Hai. s^^^SsSKl'As; (6) In the case pf Uttaranchal Forest Developmeht Cprpn. And anofher vs. JabarSinghancfotliers, (2007)2 SCC 112, it was observed as under: 43. The termination Order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitipns were adrnittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Gourt, in our opinion, wras not'-justified in entertainjng the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been^filecl affer a delay of 10 yeara^andJMat the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the HighCourt on the ground of laches. (7) Further.in the case of New Delhi Municipal Councll v. Pan Singh and others,(2007) 9 SCC 278, the Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to jnterference in cases where petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay observed asbelow: 16. There is another aspectof the matter whieh cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They clid not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity Withthe 17 workmen at fhe earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the neference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case •that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were Fecruited after the cyt-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a Ipng time, therefore, the writ petitionscould nothave^beeniehtertairiedevenWtheyaresimilarlysituated.ltistrite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be eXereised in favour of thosewhoappr6achthecQurtafteralocigtime.Delayandlachesare relevant factors for exercise of M|uitable jurisdiction. (See Govt of W.B. v. Tarun K. Ro^, U.P. Jat Nigam v. Jaswant SinghS and Kamataka PawerCorpn. Ltd.v. K. Thangappani.) (8) In view of above, the petition is liable to be dismissed andis accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. __ ,a-»i... Sd/- ManindEa Mohan Shrivastava Judge _