jpc apl106-11.sxw 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 106 OF 2011 Mahesh Thakkar @ Mahes Manubhai Gadhai ... Applicant Versus The State of Maharashtra and another ... Respondents Mr. H. S. Deshpande, for the applicant Mr. J. P. Kharge, APP for the State Mr. A. M. Sarogi, for respondent no.2 CORAM:- A.M. THIPSAY, J. DATED :- 10th August, 2011. ORAL JUDGEMENT: 1. On the basis of the First Information Report lodged by one Rajkumar Anand, the applicant was arrested in CR No. 200 of 2009 of Kandivali Police Station, which was in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The applicant filed an application for bail before the Court of Sessions, Greater Bombay, which was allowed and the applicant was directed to be released on bail. While granting bail to the applicant, the Court of Sessions imposed certain conditions, one of which was regarding the payment of an amount of Rs.40 lakhs to one Hitesh Nandlal Ajmera (respondent no. 2 herein) and an amount of Rs.29 lakhs jpc apl106-11.sxw 2 to the said first informant. The Court of Sessions fixed a date as 22nd December, 2009 as an outer limit for making payments in accordance with the said condition. The applicant did not pay the amounts within the time stipulated by the Court of Sessions and sought extension of time for making the payments, which extension was granted. The applicant, however, paid only an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- to the respondent no.2 within the extended time. The respondent no.2, then, moved the Court of Sessions for cancellation of the bail granted to the applicant, contending that the applicant had failed to comply with the condition on which the bail was granted and, therefore, his bail was liable to be cancelled. The hearing of the application was adjourned from time to time and ultimately, the Court of Sessions cancelled the bail, by its order dated 29th September, 2010. The applicant, being aggrieved by the said order, has approached this Court by filing this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. I have heard Mr. Heard Mr. H.S. Deshpande, the learned advocate for the applicant, Mr. J.P. Kharge, the learned APP for the State and Mr. A.M. Sarogi, the learned advocate for the respondent No.2. 3. A perusal of the order dated 22nd September, 2009, whereby the applicant was granted bail, shows that the applicant himself made a statement before the Court of Sessions that he was ready to repay the jpc apl106-11.sxw 3 entire amount to the aggrieved persons, which includes respondent no.2, within the stipulated period. In fact, Para-1 of the impugned order indicates that it is on this basis that, the prayer for bail was canvassed. The reasoning of the Court of Sessions while releasing the applicant on bail can be seen in para-4 of the said order. It would be proper to reproduce the relevant part of the order, which reads thus: "Moreover, the applicant on his own come before the court that he is ready to pay or deposit the amount received by him by virtue of the above documents to the respective claimants. If it is so in my opinion no prejudice will cause to the prosecution if the applicant is released for time being to make such payment as offered by him to the respective claimants. In view of this I pass the following order." 4. In the operative part of the order, the Court of Sessions stipulated as follows: "If the applicant fails to make the payment as per direction above within stipulated period his bail bond stands cancelled automatically without any further inquiry and he be taken in custody by issuing NBW against him." 5. A reading of the order makes it clear that the bail was granted only on the consideration that the applicant was ready to repay the entire amount to the aggrieved persons. That it was so, is further clear from the fact that the Court stipulated that the bail order would stand cancelled automatically on failure of the applicant to make the payment as directed in the said order. jpc apl106-11.sxw 4 6. While cancelling the bail, the Court of Sessions observed as follows: "The applicant states that despite the said extension being granted by this Hon'ble Court, till date, the accused have failed and neglected to make the payment and the same clearly shows that the applicant is also trying to play with this Hon'ble Court. 7. Thus, it becomes quite clear that the bail, that was initially granted to the applicant, was without considering the merits of the matter and based only on the assurance of the applicant that he would repay the amount to the aggrieved parties. That the applicant was entitled to be released on bail on the merits of the matter (without the requirement to repay the amounts) was neither canvassed before the Court nor was considered by the Court. 8. The fact, however, remains that the Court did not consider this aspect because, it was the applicant who offered to pay the amount. This assurance or this offer on the part of the applicant to repay the entire amount to the aggrieved person was felt as sufficient justification by the Court for releasing him on bail. 9. The contention of the applicant, today, is that the applicant's bail could not have been cancelled because of the failure to comply with the direction to repay the amount to the aggrieved persons within stipulated period. Mr.Deshpande, the leaned advocate for the applicant, jpc apl106-11.sxw 5 has relied upon the following decisions of the High Courts and also the Supreme Court: i. Sohanlal Juneja Vs. State of Panjab, reported in 2007 Cri. L.J. 303; ii. Darshan Singh Vs.State of Rajasthan, reported in 1993 Cri. L.J. 1973; iii. Vipin Mehra and another Vs. State, reported in 2004 Cri. L.J.NOC.51(Delhi); iv. Glaskasden Grace and others Vs. Inspector of Police and another, reported in (2009) 12 Supreme Court Cases 769 v. Sandeep Jain Vs. National Capital Territory of Delhi, reported in AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 714; AND vi. Biman Chatterjee Vs. Sanchita Chatterjee and another, reported in 2004 Cri. L.J. 1451 . I have carefully gone though these reported decisions. 10. The contention of Mr. Sarogi, the learned advocate for the respondent no.2, is that none of the decisions are applicable to the facts of the present case. According to him, none of these decisions deal with a situation where a party has, by making an offer before the court, has invited a favourale order. He submits that it was the applicant, who induced, in a way, the Court, to pass an order for bail by making a statement that he would repay the amount to the aggrieved persons and it is because of such assurance, bail came to be jpc apl106-11.sxw 6 granted to the applicant. Mr. Sarogi submitted that in such a situation, the applicant cannot contend that his bail is not liable to be cancelled though he failed to pay the amount as per the directions of the Court. 11. I have considered the matter. It is a fact that in none of the authorities cited by Mr. Deshpande, there exists a case where a party had made a representation before the Court that he would repay the amount involved in the case and the bail came to be granted on the basis of such assurance or representation. The authorities, except one, which I shall discuss latter, deal with the cases where the Courts, on their own, had imposed conditions upon the arrested persons, requiring them to deposit or pay certain amount to the aggrieved persons as a condition of bail / anticipatory bail. The Courts had then cancelled the bail so granted, only on the ground that those conditions were not fulfilled or those directions were not complied with. It is in such cases, it was held that the bail could not be cancelled (only) on the basis of such a condition not having been fulfilled; and rather, such onerous and unreasonable condition should not have been imposed at all. It is not necessary to discuss the facts of each and every decision cited by Mr. Deshpande, except making this general observation. 12. The only case, which needs to be specifically discussed is the jpc apl106-11.sxw 7 decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Biman Chatterjee Vs. Sanchita Chatterjee and another, reported in 2004 Cri. L.J. 1451. In that case, bail was granted to the appellant therein by the Magistrate after noticing that there was possibility of compromise between the parties. The respondent before the Supreme Court - wife of the appellant - later on, made an application to the Magistrate stating that the appellant – husband - had not co-operated in the compromise talks. On this, the learned Magistrate cancelled the bail. The revision filed before the High Court by the appellant was allowed and the High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for re-hearing. After remand, the Magistrate rejected the application for cancellation of bail. Against the said order, the wife preferred a Misc. Petition before the High Court of Zarkhand contending that the very basis of grant of bail by the trial Court was the compromise between the parties, and that therefore the husband had lost his right to continue on bail. The High Court allowed the said petition, holding, inter alia, that the husband had not appeared before the High Court, in spite of service, and that, that showed that he was not willing to abide by the terms of the compromise, which was the basis for grant of bail by the trial Court. The husband – appellant - had, thereafter, approached the Supreme Court of India. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India, while jpc apl106-11.sxw 8 allowing the Appeal, made some observations on which heavy reliance has been placed by Mr. Deshpande. His emphasis was on the following observations : "............................ in our opinion, the courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the Court.” (Para 7 of the reported Judgment). 13. According to Mr. Deshpande, these observations make it clear that failure to keep up the promise made to the Court would not by itself result in cancellation of bail granted to an accused on the basis of his promise. In my opinion, this decision of the Supreme Court of India does not assist the applicant. The aforesaid observations cannot be read in isolation and what was immediately thereafter observed by the Supreme Court of India needs to be kept in mind. It was observed : “Here we hasten to observe first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise.” (Para 7 of the reported Judgment) (Emphasis supplied). 14. Undoubtedly, it was also observed further in the same para : “That apart non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. the grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code is governed by the provisions of Chapter XXXII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the jpc apl106-11.sxw 9 basis of an assurance of compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise." 15. Thus, in the first place, Their Lordships have made it clear that, factually, that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties, was not indicated in the said case. In the second place, Their Lordships have disapproved even the grant of bail on the basis of an assurance of compromise. It is not that Their Lordships have only disapproved cancellation of bail for violation of the terms of such compromise, but have indicated that such compromise should not be the basis even for grant of bail. 16. These observations do not help the applicant, in as much as, they would indicate that the applicant should not have been released on bail at all only on the basis of his assurance to pay the entire amount involved in the crime to the aggrieved persons. These observations cannot be used to suggest that only the cancellation of bail was not proper, but the grant thereof was proper. 17. The question that is required to be determined in this case is, whether a party, who obtains favourable orders from the Court by voluntarily making a statement : and on the strength of that statement, can be, later on, heard to say that he should not be made to face the consequence of the failure to abide by the directions, declared in the order itself. It is quite possible that in cases of the offences relating to jpc apl106-11.sxw 10 property, that an accused is offering to repay the loss allegedly caused to the aggrieved person, would weigh very heavily with the Court for grant of bail. If an accused offers to the Court that he would repay such amount and thereby prevents examination of the bail application on merits and secures bail only on this ground, he cannot, later on, say that such a condition, namely- 'to repay the amount within the stipulated time' should not have been imposed at all by the Court. The decisions, on which the reliance has been placed by Mr. Deshpande, only indicate that such onerous condition should not be imposed by the Court while releasing a person on bail and that the person is entitled to have his prayer for bail decided on merits. In the present case, the merits were not examined because the applicant offered to pay the amount to the aggrieved persons. Why the applicant offered to pay, is quite obvious. Even if one may not go to the extent of saying that the offer was a result of the applicant’s own assessment of the merits of his application, the fact remains that the bail came to be granted only because of the said offer. 18. Even later, the applicant did not challenge the condition imposed by the Court for obvious reasons. It is because the applicant very well knew that the bail was granted only because of that assurance. The applicant himself had decided not to urge for bail by saying that it jpc apl106-11.sxw 11 would not be possible for him to abide by such condition, and had not attempted to show to the Court that he was still entitled for bail. The subsequent conduct of the applicant is also very significant. He sought extension of time to repay the amount. At that time, he did not canvass before the Court that such a condition ought not to have been imposed upon him at all, while releasing him on bail. In the authorities cited by Mr. Deshpande, the conditions had been imposed by the Court on their own and the arrested persons had challenged the very imposition of such conditions. That is not the case here. 19. In my opinion, since the applicant secured bail by making a statement that he would be paying the amount to the aggrieved persons, the conditions imposed by the Court for his release on bail were proper. In fact, they were based on the submissions made by the applicant himself. The order granting bail itself stipulates that the bail would automatically stand cancelled on the failure to abide by the conditions. This order was not only not challenged by the applicant, but he further confirmed the correctness of the order by repeating his assurance by filing an application for extension of time to repay the amount. In fact, the Court, even though had stipulated that the bail order would stand cancelled automatically, still, allowed the applicant to show cause against the proposed cancellation of bail. At that time jpc apl106-11.sxw 12 also, the applicant does not appear to have claimed that the condition to repay the amount ought not to have been imposed by the Court or that in any event, on his failure to comply with the conditions, the bail could not be cancelled. 20. Since the applicant had not urged any point in support of his bail application and had secured bail only on the strength of an assurance that he would repay the entire amount to the aggrieved persons, the cancellation of bail would be a natural consequence of his failure to abide by the said direction. It is pertinent to note that the applicant never pleaded before this Court that he was prevented from complying with the conditions imposed by the Court for certain reasons or circumstances beyond his control, but, the only contention that is advanced is on the basis of a claim that the legal position is ‘that violation or breach of such condition cannot result in cancellation of bail’. There is no merit in this submission. The applicant having secured bail only on the basis of his offer to pay the amounts to the aggrieved persons cannot claim that the condition on which bail was granted was bad, and that breach thereof should not result in cancellation of bail. Even if the release on bail solely on such assurance is to be held improper, the fact remains that the applicant cannot derive any benefit from the part of the order which releases him on bail and criticize the jpc apl106-11.sxw 13 other part, which stipulates that it shall be cancelled in the event of his failure to comply with the conditions. The cancellation is a part of the order granting bail itself. 22. The application, therefore, fails. 23. It is, however, clarified that in the event of his arrest and detention in custody, the applicant shall not be precluded from making a fresh application for bail, which application, needless to say, shall be considered on merits by the Court. 24. The application is dismissed. (A.M. THIPSAY, J.)