{1} IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD FIRST APPEAL NO.37 OF 2000 Mangalbai w/o Badrinath Dhole Age-25 years, Occ-Agril and Household, R/o Tembhapuri, Tq-Gangapur Dist-Aurangabad APPELLANT VERSUS 1. The State of Maharashtra Through Collector, Aurangabad 2. The Executive Engineer (MIW) Aurangabad RESPONDENTS ....... Mr. S.K.Adkine, Advocate for appellant Mr. B.V.Wagh, AGP for respondent State ....... [CORAM : A.V.POTDAR, J.] DATE: 9th April 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. By the present first appeal, the appellant, original claimant in Land Acquisition Reference No.474/1996, has assailed the judgment and order dated 08.07.1999 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad. By the said order, the learned trial court has dismissed the claim of the appellant, as the same {2} was not filed within limitation. 2. Present first appeal was admitted on 04.04.2003 and since then the same was waiting for its turn for final hearing. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned AGP for respondent Sate. 4. During the course of submissions, my attention is drawn towards the finding recorded at issue no. 2 by the lower court, which finds place in para 5 of the impugned judgment and order. It is observed by the lower court that in view of the facts stated in para 1 of claim petition that the appellant has received the notice u/s 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 15 th January 1996 and the claim petition is filed on 27 th February 1996 and hence the same is not within the period of limitation and on that ground learned trial court came to the conclusion that as the reference is not within limitation, the same is dismissed. 5. On perusal of the reference, in para 1 it is specifically pleaded by the appellant that the date of publication of the notice u/s 4 of the Act was 03.03.1994, notification u/s 6 was published on 02.03.1995 and notice u/s 12 (2) of the Act was published on 12.12.1995 and received by the petitioner on 15.01.1996 and immediately on the next day he withdrawn the payment under protest. {3} 6. In this connection, it is necessary to refer the exact text of section 18 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, which reads as follows : “18. (1) ....... (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award or the amendment is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made - (a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award or the amendment within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award or the amendment. (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award or the amendment, whichever period shall first expire. (3) .... “ 7. On bare perusal of section 18 (2) of the Act it is clear that the case of the appellant covers u/s 18 (2) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. The question for determination before this Court is as to when the period of limitation starts or how to compute the period of limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that as the reference was referred by the Special Land {4} Acquisition Officer to the Reference Court, it is to be held that the same is within the period of limitation. I am not in agreement with this submission, as to decide as to whether the reference is within limitation or not, is the prerogative of the Reference Court. In this connection, observations of this Court in the judgment reported in 2006 (3) Mh.L.J. in the matter of “Shantaram Ganesh Shenoy V/s Special Land Acquisition Officer” are material. In paragraphs No.8 to 12 and 14 it is observed in the said judgment thus- 8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. A reference will have to be made to the decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 9 S.C.C. page 414 (Officer on Special Duty & Another Vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal & Others). The Apex Court in the said decision held that in view of specific limitation provided in proviso to Section 18(2) of the said Act of 1894, sub section 2 of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub section 2 of section 18. The Apex court held that the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer is not a court and he acts as a statutory authority. Therefore, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of period prescribed under the proviso to sub section 2 of section 18 of the said Act of 1894. 9. My attention has also been invited to the decision of the Apex Court reported in (1995) 3 S.C.C. page 330 (State of Punjab Vs.Satinder Bir Singh). In paragraph No.8 of the said decision the Apex Court has held thus : "8. The question then is whether the notice {5} under section 12(2) is a valid notice. From a conjoint reading of sections 11 and 12, it is clear that notice is only an intimation of making of the Award requiring the owner or person interested to receive compensation awarded under section 11. On receipt of the notice, if the person interested receives compensation without protest, obviously no reference need be made. The determination of compensation becomes final and binds the parties. When he receives the compensation under protest as under section 31 of the Act, the need contemplated to make the application for reference under section 18(1) would arise. At that juncture, it will be open to the person interested either to make an inspection of the award which was conclusive between him and the Collector by operation of sub-section (1) of section 12, or seek a certified copy of the award from the Collector and the contents. Thereon he could make necessary objection for the determination inter alia, of compensation for the land. It is not necessary that the notice should contain all the details of the award including his consideration and its manner of determination of the compensation as opined by the learned Judge of the High Court. It is not incumbent that the person interested should immediately make the reference application on his receiving compensation under section 31 In other words receipt of the amount and making the reference application are not simultaneous. The statutory operation of limitation mentioned by section 18(2) does not depend on the ministerial act of communication of notice in any particular form when the Act or Rules has not prescribed any form. The limitation begins to operate from the moment the notice under section 12(2) is received or as envisaged by section 18(2)." (Emphasis supplied) {6} 10. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Laxmibai Narayan Patil and another vs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 2 Mh.L.J. page 353 relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Apex court held that time runs from the date of receipt of notice under section 12(2) and once notice is received, the recipient must be fixed with the knowledge. This Court held that the date of receipt of certified copy has no relevance. 11. The Full Bench of this Court in a decision reported in 2002 (5) Bombay cases reporter page 347 (Suresh Marutrao Jadhav Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another) relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in a case of Satinder Bir Singh (supra) held that the Special Land Acquisition Officer is not a court and he acts as a statutory authority under section 18(1) of the said Act of 1894. 12. In view of what has been held by the Apex Court and this Court, it is obvious that in a case where notice under section 12(2) of the said Act of 1894 is duly served on the claimant,the limitation starts running from the date of service of notice. The time required for obtaining certified copy of the Award cannot be excluded while computing stipulated period of limitation of 42 days which is provided under clause (b )of the proviso to the sub section 2 of Section 18 of the said Act of 1894. Therefore, even assuming that the Appellant had filed certified copy of the Award on record, the time required for obtaining certified copy cannot be excluded while computing the limitation of 42 days as provided under the statute. Thus, no fault can be found with the finding recorded by the Reference Court when it was held that the application for reference was not filed within the stipulated period of limitation. 14. Thus, the law laid down by the Apex Court is {7} that the reference court being the Tribunal of special jurisdiction, it is the duty of the reference court to examine whether the reference made to it by the Collector complies with the essential requirements provided under section 18 of the said Act of 1894. The Apex Court held that only if the conditions stipulated under section 18 are complied with, the reference court gets jurisdiction to hear the reference. If this is the position of law, it is the duty of the reference court to apply its mind to the question whether the application for reference was filed within stipulated period of limitation. The reference court has jurisdiction to decide whether the reference application was made within limitation. Making an application for reference within the time stipulated by law is a sine qua non for a valid reference. It is not necessary to decide the question whether the State Government can challenge the order of making reference by preferring a revision Application under Section 18(3) of the said Act of 1894. Even assuming that the State Government could have challenged the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer by preferring revision application and even if such revision application was not filed, that will not take away the jurisdiction of the reference court to perform its duty to examine whether the reference made by the Collector complies with the requirement of the statute. The reference Court gets jurisdiction to decide a reference under Section 18 on merits provided an Application for reference is filed within the limitation provided by statute. If the reference is not validly made,the reference Court does not get jurisdiction to decide the reference. In my view, there is no merit in the second contention raised by Shri Patil ” 9. In view of the above observations in the reported judgment, it is clear that the period of limitation would start from the date of receipt of notice u/s 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act {8} 1894. Admittedly, notice u/s 12 (2) of the said Act was received by the appellant on 15.01.1996 and hence, 42 days to be counted from 15.01.1996, which came to an end on 26th February 1996, while, admittedly reference petition was filed on 27.02.1996. 10. Strictly speaking, the land reference was not filed within limitation and if it is so, though not happily worded yet the reference court cannot be faulted with when it came to the conclusion that the land reference is not within the period of limitation and answered issue no.2 accordingly. 11. Once, it is held that the land reference is not within the limitation, then it is not necessary to consider other evidence, which was lead before the Reference Court. Considering this aspect, no interference is required in the judgment impugned in the First Appeal. 12. In the result, the First Appeal, which is sans merits, stands dismissed with no order as to costs. [A.V.POTDAR, J.] drp/B10/fa37-00