IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 592 of 2002 Date of Decision 2nd November, 2011 ________________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh ….Appellant Versus Makhan Lal , son of Shyam Lal, resident of Jadhanibag, Tehsil Nirmand, Distt Kullu H.P. ….Respondent. Criminal Appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ________________________________________________________ Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.B. Misra, J. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dev Darshan Sud, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 ________________________________________________________ For the Appellant: Mr. R.K. Sharma, Sr. Additional Advocate General with Mr. Rajinder Dogra, Addl. A.G. For the Respondent: Mr. Rajesh Verma, Advocate. __________________________________________________________________ Dev Darshan Sud, J.(oral) The State appeals against the judgment of the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ani, District Kullu acquitting the respondent for offences under Sections 451 and 326 IPC. 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 5.5.1995 at around 10.30 PM at night when complainant PW1 Ratni Devi was sleeping in her house the accused trespassed and knocked the door. When the complainant inquired as to who was there, he started abusing her. She opened the door whereupon the accused attacked her with a darat (sickle) which he was carrying, due to which assault she received injuries. This incident was witnessed by PW2 Patu Ram and PW3 Shyam Lata from their houses, who also woke up and witnessed the entire incident from their balconies. The learned trial Court acquitted the respondent solely on the ground, that (a) the weapon of offence was not identified by the complainant in Court and (b) there were contradictions in the statements of witnesses as recorded including the contradictions in the evidence of the complainant with that what she had stated in the First Information Report. We have gone through the judgment of the learned trial Court. We do not find any ground having been established on which acquittal has been granted. We advert to the fact that the First Information Report and the evidence of the complainant is at variance. All that we need say is that the statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is not an encyclopedia of facts as held by the Supreme Court in Podda Narayana and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1252 that FIR need not contain full details. It is not necessary to mention every minute detail in FIR. It is not intended to be a detailed document, but only to give substance of allegations. (State of U.P. Vs. Ballabh Das & others, (1985) 3 SCC 703.) 3 3. In Gorle S. Naidu vs. State of A.P. and others, (2003) 12 SCC 449 the Supreme Court interalia holds. “13……. Though the FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopedia of the factors (sic facts) concerning the crime, yet there must be some definite information vis-a-vis the crime…………” (at p.458) 4. To similar effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. and others vs. Tapan Kr. Singh, 2003 Cri. L.J. 2322, holding: “20. It is well settled that a First Information Report is not an encyclopedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eye-witness so as to be able to disclose in great details all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage, it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details, he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the 4 information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the concerned police officer is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can. (at p.2327) We also notice the decision in State of A.P. vs. Golconda Linga Swamy and another, (2004) 6 SCC 522. 5. We need not advert to the principle of law established that the testimony of the victim of assault makes some discrepancy and that it is the best evidence on record unless falsified by his cross examination or other evidence brought on record. (See Appabhai and another Vs. state of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 696) In order to disbelieve an injured witness, who sustained injuries during the occurrence, clear and cogent evidence is necessary to discredit his testimony. (See Mohar and another vs. State of U.P. (2002) 7 SCC 606, State of M.P. vs. Mansingh and others, (2003) 10 SCC 414, Brahm Swaroop and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 288) 6. Lastly we also hold that minor contradictions would not destroy the veracity of the entire evidence. It is the 5 contradiction of the prosecution case which would be primary and deciding factor to reject the testimony of injured witness who was a witness. (See State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Naresh & others (2011) 4 SCC 324.) The minor contradictions are possible as the witnesses do not usually remember all facts as to how the incident occurred. 7. So far as the evidence of two other witnesses is concerned, we find that merely if darat has not been identified by the complainant it does not mean that she was not assaulted. The fact remains that in her testimony in so far as (a) trespass by the accused in her house; (b) accused abused her; (c) assault has not been denied in cross examination. These three facts have also been corroborated by the two witnesses. In these circumstances, minor contradictions which are noticed by the learned trial Court are not such which go to the very root of the case and which would destroy it. 8. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General as also Mr. Rajesh Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, who was appointed as the legal aid counsel to defend the case of the respondent. We find merit in the submissions made by the learned Senior Additional Advocate General and also find that contradictions in the evidence of witnesses do not disprove the main case. We therefore reverse the judgment passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ani, District Kullu which is not based on appreciation of evidence and the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court is perverse. 6 9. Adverting to the question of sentencing under Sections 451 and 326 IPC, we have called report of the Probation Officer. He has recommended the case for the grant of probation. The report states that the respondent is a sociable person who has a son studying in School, two sisters, mother and father. He is cordial, cooperative and does not cause any nuisance to anyone. In these circumstances, we direct that the respondent shall furnish a bond of good behavior to the satisfaction of the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ani, District Kullu on or before 30.4.2012. He shall execute a personal bond in the sum of ` 10,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate. 10. We also direct that the bond shall be valid for a period of one year and during this period, he shall be regularly supervised by the District Welfare Officer-cum-Probation Officer, Kullu. The respondent shall undertake that he shall neither indulge in any anti-social activity, nor shall break the peace or indulge in criminal activities etc. On the breach of any of these conditions as undertaken by the respondent, the bond will be liable to be forfeited and the respondent shall undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay fine of ` 500/-. Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. (R.B. Misra) Judge November 02, 2011 (Dev Darshan Sud), ms Judge