r ,.-,1w .....-SSS^ - .....J t^ THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR WP No. l360 / 2006 PETITION UNDERArt. 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION Petitioner Deendayal Agrawal, S/o Devilal Agrawal, Aged -15° Years, R/o Vill. Padampur Bargarh Orissa Through General Attorney;- Bajranglal Agrawal, S/o Madan Lal Agrawal, Age - R/o Jai Bajrang Complex, Gudiyari, Raipur (CG) VERSUS Respondents 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through, Collector, Raipur 2. Executive Engineer, Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Shanker Nagar, Raipur (CG) Assailing Order Dated 14/12/05 Passed By The Court Of X ADJ, Raipur, in Execution Case No. 08/05. / 'S'fje ^etition of (petitioner Wost 2Respectfuffy @(joTOet(j i^s ^offows- r ',;,. HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH. BILASPUR W.P.No. 1360/2006 Deendayal Agrawal Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another W.P.No.1361/2006 Bhajanlal Agrawat Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another W.P. No.1362/2006 Vijay Kumar Agrawal Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another W.P.N0.1363/20OT Gopal Das Agrawaf Vs. State of ChhaUsgarh and another Appearance: Shri Raja Sharma, Counsel for the petitioners in all the petitions. Shri Safeh Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the State/respondent No.1 in all the petitions. Shri Sanjay Patel, Counsel for respondent No.2 in all the petitions. ORAL ORDER (05.10.2006i SUNILKUMARSINHA.J. (1) Since common questions have been raised for consideration in alt these Writ Petitions, they are being disposed of by this Common Order. S;^E.B? f^f (2) The brief facts leading to filing of these Writ Petitions are that in a Land Acquisition Case bearing No. 151-A/82 year 1989-90 pending before the Land Acquisition Officer, Raipur, a common award dated 5/8/1991 was passed by him and certain amounts were awarded to the petitioners. Since the petitioners had not accepted the award, passed by the Land Acquisition OfRcer, they filed written applications to the Cpllector requiring the matters to be referred by the Collector for the determination ofthe Court on certain grounds. On this, the matters were referred by the Collector to the District Court, on which, 4 MJCs vide Nos. 8/2005 (Deendayal Agrawal vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another), 9/2005 (Gopal Das Agrawal Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another) 10/2005 (Bhajanlal Agrawal vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another) and 7/2005 (Vijay Kumar Agrawal vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another) were registered and ultimately, all were decided by the Court of X Additional District Judge, Raipur vide separate awards dated 10/5/2005, 12/5/2005, 12/5/2005 and 10/5/2005 respectively. By the aforesaid awards, the learned Additional District Judge enhanced the principte amount of compensation awarded to the petitioners and he also directed for payment of interest as per clause 23 (1-A) and 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in their favour. The operative part i.e. clause 2 of the awards, which is almost common in all the cases, is quoted as under: "\$M^tW ^inqw ^ srRrfNr ST^R^ I^-SF^T •^' ^q^T c^r ^®^|i? si^tP'pm cft erRi-23 (1) (3?) ^ d?H ^rT ^q ^ SlRiRcW 9RI-4 (l) '€[srfE^RT yct)|?H f?)^T % 1^ RtiSr (Pl? 12% ^fc ^ ^ ds-rr 9RT 23 (2) ^ 'g^pftr 30% sffN^RT ^? ^ srfTri^ir ^r ift ffr^ ^hr i" ' ^Ullffl3i>3SK^y-'»J M5 i'ili*'i(«WBiHiSMiMtAUB^^ ^»Ss^ C^-} ^J_^/ ''<< (3) After passing of the aforesaid awards, the matters were put to execution before the said Court and in execution, the petitioners/claimants filed their own calculations in relation to the respective awards passed in their favour and prayed for payment of the awarded amount to them. The calculations filed by the petitioners in their execution cases were opposed by the State. The contention of the petitioners before the Executing Court were that the interest which has been awarded vide clause 2 of the awards u/s 23 (1-A) is the interest from the date of nottfication under Section 4(1) of the said Act till the date of passing of the awards, which means that tilt the date of awards, uttimately passed by the reference Court under Section 18 of the said Act and the petitioners were entitled to get the interest from the date of notification under Section 4(1) till 10/5/2005 and 12/5/2005 i.e. till the date of respecth/e awards, which were passed by the reference Court in theirfavour. (4) This contention was opposed by the State and it was contended that no such interest was awarded by the reference Court and the petitioners are wrongty interpreting clause 2 of the awards and they are wrongly ctaiming interest till the date of passing of the awards by the reference Court because the reference Court has only awarded interest till the date of award passed by the Land Acquisition OfBcer or Collector and not till the date of awards passed by it in reference cases. (5) By the impugned orders dated 14/12/2005, the Executing Court upheld the objections raised by the State and determined that under the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) the power to award interest was till the date of passing of the award of the Collector, therefore, the claimante were not entitled to get the interest beyond that period. Holding so, the Executing Court directed for filing of fresh calculations by the petitioners in their respective Execution Cases filed by them. tt is against these orders, passed by the Executing Court on 14/12/2005; the petitioners have come before this Court in these Writ Petitions. (6) Leamed counsel for the petitioners argues that the word used as "award" in Section 23 (1-A) will also mean as the final award passed by the reference Court under Section 18, therefore, the Executing Court was notjustifled in taking the view that the claimants were only entitled to get the interest till the date of award passed by the Collector. He also argues that a plain reading of clause 2 of the awards would show that the reference Court has awarded interest till fte date of passing o£the reference award. (7) Per Contra leamed Counsel for the respondents oppose these arguments. (8) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records ofthe Writ Petitions. (9) So far as the first argument of learned counsel for the petttioners is concerned, for this, a reference may be made to the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) ofthe said Act. Section 23(1-A) provides that in addition to the market value of the land, as referred to in the eartier part of the Sectlon, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve percent per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 sub-section (1) in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. The placement of this specific provision as sub- section (1-A) in between sub-sec. (1) & p) ofSection 23 cleariy indicates o- that if the market value of a land is determined by the Collector or Land Acquisition OfRcer for the purpose of an award to the claimant, then, it would be incumbent upon the Land Acquisition Officer or Cotleetor to calculate an amount as is specified in this sub-section. When this sub- section specifically says that the amount shall be calculated for the period commencing from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) to the date of award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, which ever is earlier, then, under this mandatory provision, interest beyond the date of award passed by the Collector or beyond taking possession ofthe land which ever is earlier, cannot be granted. (10) The provisions of under S. 23 (1-A) are designed to compensate the ownere of land for the rice in prices duringthe pendency of the land acquisition proceedings. It is a measure to off-set the effecte of inflation and the continuous rice in the value of properties, as the legislature has taken care of these happenings which recurringly occur due to the time consumed in disposal of land acquisition cases,by giving a command. The words used by the Legislature in Section 23 (1-A) ofthe Act like "the award of the Collector" cannot be read in isolation and ff fliey are conjointly read, they would lead to the ctear and unambiguous meaning ttiat the interest which has to be awarded to the ctaimant in addition to tfte market value of the land would be from the period commencing from the date of notification under Section 4(1) to the date of passing of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, which ever is eariier, and not beyond it. Therefore, the first argument advanced by learned counsel for ttie petitioner cannot be accepted and the same is accordingly tumed down. ^ (11) The other argument of tearned counsel for the petitionere that clause 2 of the award of reference Court shovre that the reference Court has awarded interest till the date of passing of the reference award, is totally misconceived. The wordings used by the reference Court in clause 2 of the award are clear and unambiguous. The reference Court has ctearly stated that under the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) in addition to the market value of the tand, the petitioners shalt also be awarded interest form the date of notification under Section 4(1) till the date of award at the rate of 12 percent per annum. After going through the entire award and also after going through the other provisions made in the award, this clause is ctear and unambiguous, in which, interest is awarded till the date of passing of the award by the Collector and it cannot be read that the reference Court has awarded interest till the date ofdecision ofthe reference by it. Rather, it would appear that in fact, the interest which has been awarded under Section 23(1-A) is the interest till the date of award passed by the Collector and the word used like "award" and not saying as "award by the Collector" does not mean that it would be interpreted as the "award" passed by ttie reference Court. (12) For the foregoing reasons, l do not find any merit in these Writ Petitions. All the Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed. (13) The Orders passed by the Executing Court in respective cases are hereby confirmed. (14) No order as to costs . Sd/- SunilKumarSinha Judge shyna ST XI-HC-78 sn^rw R-ii* sbHI'ti *1IHWI Sl>*l|tt» ' TScf •*i|<ii<i<<, aTflwis, Riciiyy ,.U?.:P;.J.^.CI.M< 200 Sii^i'i^siqi (ytgsiyT) RareTHferan^T 13,10.2006 Shri Rqja Shcrma, counsel for the petstioner. Shri Sushi! Dubey, Sovt. Advoeate for the State/ respondent no.l. Shrl Ssnjoy Pstei, counsel for r-espondent No.2. It sppear's thfft due to typo9rcphicai mistaks in line no.2 & 4 of PSPG 10 bf the order dated 05.10.2006. the word "rics" has been whereas it should be "rise". Accordingiy, the seme is corrected. Tlne word rice eomino i" line No.2 <& 4 of para 10 of the order, sh.Ql' be read ss "nse" and ths typogrophics! srrors to this sxtent ors corrscted to which the parties have no obJectiQr!. <fi<iTCT41-i tiiiciTffte^iRi+tiK. ^sil^irgfi^r j3-10--G^ C^A \m\ (3. loe-j- 13-i Sd/- SunUKumarSinha Judge