WP(C) 640/2002 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV) The Union of India represented by the Commandant, 413, Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/O 99 APO has instituted this writ petition challenging the award dated 7.8.2010 passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribun al at Guwahati. By the said award, the learned Tribunal has disposed of as many as six(6) reference cases registered on the basis of separate references made by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). By the aforesaid sep arate references, a common question involving the legality of the termination of the services of the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 had been referred for adjudication b y the learned Tribunal. 2. On receipt of the references and after registration of the cases , notices were issued to the contesting parties. On receipt of the notices issu ed by the learned Tribunal, the Commandant, 413, Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/O 99 A PO as well as the Workmen concerned entered appearance and filed their respectiv e written statements. While the workmen concerned led oral and documentary evide nce, no evidence was led on behalf of the Management. 3. The pleaded case of the workmen was to the effect that they were appointed as Mazdoors in October, 1996 after a due selection process conducted by the Management. They had rendered almost two years of service when they were terminated on and from 1.7.1998. It was the further case of the workmen that dur ing the almost two years of service rendered by them, they had completed 240 day s of continuous service in each calendar year. Accordingly, their termination wh ich was without any show cause notice was contended to be contrary to the provis ions of Section 25F of the Act inasmuch as neither any notice indicating the rea sons for their termination was served on them, nor any wages in lieu of notice h ad been paid to them. Evidence to the above effect was led before the learned Tr ibunal by the workmen which had gone virtually gone unrebutted inasmuch as the M anagement had not cross-examined the witnesses examined on behalf of the workmen or had led any contrary evidence. 4. In the written statement filed by the Management, it was contend ed that the 413, Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/O 99 APO being a defence establishment is not an Industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. Hence, accord ing to the Management, the references made to the learned Tribunal were not main tainable in law. Additionally, it was contended by the Management that the engag ement of the workmen was on entirely fortitous basis and made in exigencies of w ork and termination of services were made when the services of the workmen were no longer required. 5. The learned Tribunal on an elaborate consideration of the cases of the rival parties came to the conclusion that the 413, Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/O 99 APO, though a defence unit, was engaged in the supply of petroleum produ cts to all military units of the North Eastern Region and, therefore, such activ ities are clearly distinguishable from the task of an Army Unit. Accordingly, by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213, the learned Trib unal came to the conclusion that the 413, Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/O 99 APO is a n Industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. The references made un der Section 10 of the Act, therefore, were held to be maintainable. Thereafter, the learned Tribunal recorded the further finding that on the basis of the evide nce adduced by the workmen it has been established that the workmen were engaged in activities which were perennial in nature and further that each one of them had completed more than 240 days of work in a calendar year until they were term inated with effect from 1.7.1998. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in t he case of Common’s India Ltd. Vs. Niranjan Das, reported in AIR 1984 SC 500, th e learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that as no notice or wages in lieu of notice was provided to the workmen, as mandated by Section 25F of the Act, the t ermination of the services of the workmen was illegal. Accordingly, the award in question was passed directing reinstatement of the respondent workmen. 6. I have heard Mr. C. Baruah, learned Central Government Counsel a ppearing for the petitioner and Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned counsel appearing for t he respondent workmen. 7. The main thrust of the argument advanced by Shri Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner, is with regard to the maintainability of the refere nces on the ground that the Platoon, being an Army Unit, would not come within t he meaning of an Industry as defined by Section 2(j) of the Act. In this regar d, Shri Baruah has emphatically submitted that the respondent workmen were emplo yed in the Unit which was engaged in performance of sovereign functions of the S tate and such a Unit cannot be understood to be an Industry within the meaning o f the definition clause contained in the Act. 8. Shri A. Dasgupta, learned counsel for the respondent workmen on the other hand submitted that by virtue of the decision rendered by the Apex Cou rt in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra), the Platoon, though an Ar my Unit, would still come within the meaning of Industry as defined under the Act inasmuch as the said Unit was engaged in purely commercial functions of supp ly of petroleum products. Shri Dasgupta has further pointed out that though the decision in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra) is being considered by a larger Bench, as on date the law laid down in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewe rage Board (supra) holds the field and will bind this Court. According to the le arned counsel, the said law has been correctly applied by the learned Tribunal i n the present case leaving no room for any interference by this Court. 9. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties. In Banga lore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra), it was held that all Government Unit s/ Departments performing the functions which are not essential constitutional f unctions of Government would come within the meaning of the expression Industry as defined by the Act. The following observations contained in para-51 of the Judgment in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra) would elucidate the above view :- 51. Although we are not concerned in this case with those categories of empl oyees who particularly come under departments charged with the responsibility fo r essential constitutional functions of government, it is appropriate to state t hat if there are industrial units severable from the essential functions and pos sess an entity of their own it may be plausible to hold that the employees of th ose units are workmen and those undertakings are industries. A blanket exclusion of every one of the host of employees engaged by government in departments fall ing under general rubrics like, justice, defence, taxation, legislature, may not necessarily be thrown out of the umbrella of the Act. We say no more except to observe that closer exploration, not summary rejection, is necessary. 10. Though, subsequently, in State of U.P. -Vs.- Jai Bir Singh, repo rted in (2005) 5 SCC 1, the above view in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Boar d (supra) was referred to a larger Bench, as on date it is the law laid down in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra) which still holds the field. In that view of the matter, on the facts recorded by the learned Tribunal that the 413, Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/o 99 APO was engaged in purely commercial function s of supply of petroleum products, the further view recorded by the learned Trib unal that the Petroleum Platoon ASC, C/o 99 APO is an industry within the meanin g of the Act cannot be faulted. 11. The finding of the learned Tribunal that the workmen have been e ngaged after due selection; that each of the workmen had completed 240 days of w ork in a calendar year and further that they had been terminated without any not ice or wages in lieu of notice, had not been challenged by the Management either by cross-examining the witnesses examined on behalf of the workmen or by leadin g any contrary evidence. In such a situation, there can be little doubt that the disengagement of the respondent workmen amounts to retrenchment within the mean ing of Section 2(oo) of the Act in which event it was obligatory on the part of the Management to comply with the requirements spelt out by Section 25F of the A ct. The same not having been done, there will be little hesitation for this Cour t to maintain the conclusion of the learned Tribunal that the termination of the workmen is contrary to the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions, this writ petition is found to be without any merit and substance. It is, accordingl y, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.