x @ t..,. .....•' IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH ATBILASPUR Q CIVIL REVISIONNO. @gij^' i3j§ ^^Nti^ ^^ ^^^; /2007 UNDER SECTION 115 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 1908 DEFENDANTS APPLICANTS /" 1. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH THROUGH DISTRICT MAGISTRATE KORBA (CG) ^2. THE TAHSILDAR, KATGHORA, DISTRICT: KORBA (CG) VERSUS PLAINTIFFS: NON-APPLICANTS '.^ '^' ^ Qy>^ y^'..-- ft<-;'%"" ,:J^g^ ^s&^" ^;,^"" <v-' ^l. JOTKUNWAR S/0 BUDHESHWAR DAS AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS SURAJ BAI D/0 BUDHESHWAR DAS AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS BOTH R/0 GOPALPUR, TAHSIL: KATGHORA, DISTRICT: KORBA (CG) "a^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Civil Revision No. 59 of 2007 Defendants Applicants Plaintiffs Non-applicants State of Chhattisgarh and another. Versus Jot Kunwar and another. UNDER SECTION 115 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL, 1908 S.B. : HON'BLE SHRI N.K. AGARWAL, J PRESENT:- Shri G.D.Vaswani, G.A. with Shri Sanjeev Kr. Agrawal, P.L. for the State/applicants. Shri Vinay Pandey, counsel for the respondents. ORAL ORDER (06.09-2011) The legality and propriety ofthe order dated 19.12.2006 passed in M.C.A. No. 14/2006 by the Additional District Judge, Korba i§under assail in the instant revision. 2, Facts of the case in brief are as under: (i) The applicants' application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 06.05.2006. The applicants applied for certified copy of order dated 06.05.2006 on 11.05.2006. The certified copy was delivered on 18.05.2006. Thereafter, a permission to file miscellaneous appeal against the above order was granted' by the Collector vide its order dated 15.07.2006 and after receiving the file by the %i|, . I ^./ ....^""~ concerned advocate, the appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. by the applicants along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was filed before the 1st Additional District Judge, Korba on 30.07.2006. (ii) The learned first appellate Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the applicants failed to explain the delay between 16.07.2006 and 30.07.2006. Hence, this revision. 3. Shri G.D.Vaswani, learned G.A. for the State/applicants, would submsit: after permission was granted by the Collector, the matter has to go before the concerned Department and the concerned Department sent the file to the Government Advocate for filing appeal accordingly. Thereafter, the appeal was preferred and filed in the Court and this procedure took some time and the delay of 15 days occurred for the above is unintentional and bona fide, and therefore, the application filed by the applicants ought to have been allowed by the trial court. But the first appellate Court committed material jurisdictional irregularity in dismissing the above application. 4. On the other hand, Shri Vinay Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the order impugned and submitte'd that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned first appellate Court has rightly dismissed ~^'»,s3-^V <.,...&. ""^•. '^ ^',-/ \^f the application for condonation delay and consequently dismissed the appeal. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order impugned. 5. The main thrust of the first appellate Court in dismissing the applicants? application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was that when the Collector has granted permission to file an appeal on 15.07.2006, therefore, the appeal ought to have been filed on 16.07.2006 but the same has been filed on 30.07.2006 without explaining the delay. It is a matter of common knowledge that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for conslderable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. Ifthe appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, (2005) 3 SCC 752 has held in paragraphs 8, 9 and 15 as under: "8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (AIR 1998 SC 3222) it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has' to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975 (2) SCC 840) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned." 15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table ,and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 6. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the first appellate Court dismissed the condonation application on the ground that the applicants failed to explain the delay between 16.07.2006 and 30.07.2006 as according to the first appellate Court the appeal ought to have been filed on 16.07.2006 since permission'by the Collector was granted on 15.07.2006. ^ The first appellate Court failed to consider the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred hereinabove and thereby committed material irregularity in dismissing the condonation application filed by the applicants. 7. For the foregoing, revision is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The application filed by the applicants/State under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed. The matter is remitted to the first appellate Court to decide the appeal on its own merits in accordance with law. 8. No order as to costs. Sd/- N. K. Agarwal Judge