IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA RSA No. 338 of 2001 Judgment Reserved on 22.7.2011 Date of Decision 18th August ,2011 ________________________________________________________ Dadh Cooperative Agriculture Services Society ….Appellant. Versus Kishore Chand & others ….Respondents. ________________________________________________________ Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dev Darshan Sud, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes __________________________________________________________ For the Appellant: Mr. Surender Saklani, Advocate. For Respondent No.1: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent Nos. 2 to 4: Mr. P.K. Sharma, Addl. Advocate General with Ms. Shubh Mahajan, Deputy Advocate General. _________________________________________________________________ Dev Darshan Sud, J This is the defendant Dadh Cooperative Agriculture Service Society’s appeal against the judgment and decree of the two Courts below declaring that the respondent/plaintiff is the Secretary of the Society and that the order of dismissal dated 15.2.1987 passed by the defendant and order dated 30.1.1989 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 terminating the services of the respondent passed by the Administrator of the Society is illegal, a decree for mandatory injunction directing this respondent to pay all outstanding salary and benefits w.e.f. 15.2.1987 with all consequential benefits. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed as prayed for. 2. The defendant appealed which was dismissed. Before adverting to the question of law raised herein, I must notice the facts as accepted and proved on record. 3. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the allegations that he was appointed as Secretary of the defendant society on 1.3.1985 and that his services were terminated vide resolution dated 15.2.1987. He pleads that termination was without any reason etc. whereas the defendant has stated that it was for misappropriation of funds. 4. Ext.PW4/C and Ext.D1 is the order dated 15.6.1987 of the Assistant Registrar of the Cooperative Society whereby the termination of the service of the plaintiff was held to be illegal. Review under Section 94 of the H.P. Cooperative Societies Act was preferred by the appellant herein and again by an order dated 25.9.1987 Ext.PW4/B and Ext.D2, it was dismissed and the plaintiff directed to be reinstated. A revision was filed by the appellant before the Additional Registrar, Dharamshala against the order dated 25.9.1987. Vide Ext.PW3/A/Ext.D3 it was held that termination of the services of the plaintiff was illegal and direction was issued to the appellant herein to hold an inquiry against the plaintiff by framing charge sheet and grant proper opportunity to him to defend himself in accordance with law. The case set up is that after this order, a charge sheet was framed 3 but vide order dated 30.1.1989, again the services of the plaintiff were terminated against which an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff/respondent before the Assistant Registrar, who accepted the appeal and set aside the termination order dated 30.1.1989 vide his order dated 13.12.1993. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court settled ten issues. The learned appellate Court has considered these facts as substantiated by the undisputed orders passed by the statutory authorities and proved on record. In these circumstances, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court was upheld as the dispute already stood decided by the statutory authorities under the Act. The objection under Section 92 of the Act raised on behalf of the appellant herein, that no suit is maintainable, was rejected. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that suit was not maintainable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.C. Tiwari vs. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. and others (1997) 5 SCC 125. Learned counsel urges that no Civil Court could take cognizance of the suit as the matter relates to a dispute touching the affairs and business of the Society and therefore, only arbitration proceedings were competent. Before adverting to the decision on this question of law which cannot be faulted with, in the manner as framed, I am amazed to see the catacomb of litigation between the appellant and the plaintiff. Two orders of termination, carried to their logical conclusion in adjudication, set aside by the competent authorities under the Act have admittedly not been challenged by the defendant-appellant. How many times arbitration 4 proceedings are required to be instituted to allow the appellant to raise the same contention time and again? Repeated adjudication would be to encourage litigation ad-infinitum which is against the public policy. It is not that this dispute has been raised for the first time by the plaintiff-respondent but he had valid and subsisting orders from the statutory authorities under the Act directing his reinstatement in service. The adjudication of the questions urged by the appellant in this appeal become purely academic exercise. Moreover, as I have already held that the respondent cannot be given the luxury of litigating and re- litigating over the question again and again having lost before the competent authorities. What the plaintiff seeks is only implementation of the order passed by the statutory authority under the Act. How can this matter be adjudicated by an arbitrator? It is nobody’s case that these orders have not been passed in accordance with law. It is nobody’s case again that these orders have been set aside, varied or modified in appeal etc. To accept the proposition of law in such wide terms as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the suit was incompetent and that what was required was repeated arbitration proceedings, would lead to interminable proceedings. There would be no end. After all litigation has to be put to an end to. What is the dispute in case of an order passed by the statutory authority exercising the powers under the Act? It is only the implementation of the order for which purpose, it cannot be said that matter is arbitrable under Section 92 of the H.P. Cooperative Societies Act. What will those proceedings culminate in? It will only be a reiteration of all that has been said in the 5 orders passed by the competent authority as in implementation subsisting valid orders cannot be set aside. In these circumstances, I do not find any question of law requiring determination in this appeal. It is with anguish I hold that litigation has been kept alive by the respondent in perpetuity, which course of conduct cannot be permitted under law. Surely the legal system cannnot be manipulated in this manner. I therefore find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 7. Submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the plaintiff has been found guilty of defalcation etc. and in these circumstances, he cannot be reinstated. He also submits that an inquiry is contemplated against the respondent. I hold that this appeal is only confined to what was urged on facts in the two Courts below. If the respondent has been found guilty of misappropriation etc. it is but obvious that the legal consequences shall ensue. If any inquiry is contemplated this appeal does not pronounce on the legality or validity of such inquiry which proceedings are independent. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. August 18th, 2011 (Dev Darshan Sud), ms Judge