CR No.4541 of 2009 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH Civil Revision No. 4541 of 2009 Date of Decision: November 17, 2009 Union of India and Others ...........Petitioners Versus Surinder Pal Sood ..........Respondent Coram: Hon'ble Mrs.Justice Sabina Present: Mr.Kamal Sehgal, Advocate for the petitioners. None for the respondent -- Sabina, J. (oral) This revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is for setting aside order dated 6.3.2009 (Annexure P6) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Patiala as the same is in violation of Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the recovery of a sum of Rs.16234/- from the General Provident Fund (Account No. 202314K) of the plaintiff on his retirement by the 2nd defendant is illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and that the plaintiff is entitled to the said amount along with commercial interest from the effective date till the actual realization, and mandatory injunction directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiff, the said amount of Rs.16234/- alongwith commercial interest @18% p.a.from the effective date to the date of actual realization.A preliminary issue was framed as to whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Vide the impugned order, the application for treating the point of jurisdiction as preliminary issue was disposed of CR No.4541 of 2009 2 and it was held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in view of the formation of the Administrative Tribunal Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the matter in dispute was barred. The trial Court had erred in holding that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to decide the matter. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners, I am of the opinion that the instant petition deserves to be allowed. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985 as amended by The Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 2006 (1 of 2007) (for short `the Act) reads as under:- “28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.- On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post,[no court except- (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have], or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters” CR No.4541 of 2009 3 In S.P.Sampath Kumar vs. Union of India 1987 AIR (SC) 386, it has been held as under:- “8. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in service matters and its propriety as also validity have thus to be examined in the background indicated above. We have already seen that judicial review by this Court is left wholly unaffected and thus there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought for determination or rectification. Thus exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicial review. This Court in Minerva Mills' case did not point out that “ effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review” can be made by Parliament. Thus, it is possible to set up an alternative institution in place of the High Court for providing juridical review. The debates and deliberations spread over almost two decades for exploring ways and means for relieving the High Courts of the load of backlog of cases and for assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interest of the public servants as also the country cannot be lost sight of while considering this aspect. It has not been disputed before us- and perhaps could not have been- that the Tribunal under the scheme of the Act would take over a part of the existing backlog and a share of the normal load of the High Courts., The Tribunal has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court in the scheme of administration of justice. To provide the Tribunal as an additional forum from where parties could go to the High Court would certainly have been a retrograde step CR No.4541 of 2009 4 considering the situation and circumstances to meet which the innovation has been brought about. Thus barring of the jurisdiction of the High Court can indeed not be a valid ground of attack. 9. What, however, has to be kept in view is that the Tribunal should be a real substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de-jure but in content and de facto. As was pointed out in Minerva's Mills, the alternative arrangement has to be effective and efficient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limitations. Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Article 15 bars discrimination on grounds of religion, race caste sex or place of birth. The touch-stone of equality enshrined in Article 14 is the greatest of guarantees for the citizen. Centering around these articles in the Constitution a service jurisprudence has already grown in this country. Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act all the powers of the Courts except those of this Court in regard to matters specified therein vest in the Tribunal-either Central or State. Thus, the Tribunal is the substitute of the High Court and is entitled to exercise the powers thereof. In L.Chandra Kumar vs. The Union of India and others 1997(2)Recent Services Judgments 467, it has been held as under:- “93. It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by them leaves much to be desired. CR No.4541 of 2009 5 Moreover,the remedy provided in parent statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with decision of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a First Appellate Court. We have already emphasized the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts re able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K.Jain's case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunals on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, he pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. 94. We may add here that under the existing system, direct appeals have been provided from the decisions of all Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In view CR No.4541 of 2009 6 of our above-mentioned observations, this situation will also stand modified. In the view that we have taken, an appeal from the decision of Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.” A perusal of the said judgments leads to the inference that the decision of the Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal can be challenged by the aggrieved party before the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. But this does not lead to the inference that the Civil Court has got the jurisdiction in the matters which are to be dealt with by the Central Administrative Tribunals. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the matter in dispute was barred. Accordingly, this revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 6.3.2009 (Annexure P6) is set aside. Consequently, the plaint is ordered to be returned to the plaintiff to be presented before the Court of competent jurisdiction, if so advised. ( Sabina ) Judge November 17, 2009 arya CR No.4541 of 2009 7