HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO AND HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR W.A.No.226 of 2002 and W.P.No.2801 of 2001 COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Mr.Justice Sanjay Kumar) The Co-operative Labour Contract Society, Santha Jutur, Nandyal Taluk, Kurnool District, is the appellant in the writ appeal and the petitioner in the writ petition. The appeal arises out of the order dated 29/01/2002 in W.P.No.1170 of 2002 whereby the learned Single Judge directed the society to file an application before the authorities for release of its vehicle and the authorities were directed to pass appropriate orders basing upon the judgment and orders passed by this Court in the earlier rounds of litigation. In the writ petition, W.P.No.2801 of 2009, the society sought a direction to the respondent authorities not to interfere with the transport of finished products of bamboo manufactured by the members of the society and to restrain the authorities from insisting upon permits from the Forest Department for transport of such products. The society also sought damages for the illegal detention of the goods. In W.A.No.634 of 1989, a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 25/03/1991 held as follows: “It is, therefore, clear that by no stretch of imagination finished products like taties, baskets, mats and dollas come within the definition of ‘forest produce’. There is practically no controversy over this well-settled proposition of law and fact that the term ‘forest produce’ does not include the articles which have attained the shape of ‘finished products’ in the hands of the members of the society. Nevertheless, at the same time it is beyond any pale of controversy that bamboo freshly cut or otherwise is a forest produce in every sense of the term. Illicit felling of such forest produce in the reserve forest constitutes an offence within the meaning of Section 44 of the A.P. Forest Act, 1967. If the members of the society have been indulging in illicit felling of the bamboos over and above the quota granted to them, then it is obvious that they will be liable to such action which may be taken by the authorities against them under law.” The Supreme Court, in Suresh Lohia v. State of Maharashtra[1], took the same view and held that where a product was manufactured out of bamboo and is commercially different, it would not fall within the ambit of Forest produce. Therefore, a bamboo mat would be a distinct product from bamboo as such and the action of the respondent authorities in insisting upon forest permits for transport of such finished products made out of bamboo and other forest produce is not sustainable in law. The observations of the Supreme Court in Suresh Lohia (1 supra) in this regard are apposite: “The legislature having defined “forest-produce”, it is not permissible to us to read in the definition something which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is required to be preserved; but, it is not open to us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same. We may also state that according to us the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang case is correct, because though bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally different from forest-produce having a distinct character. May it be stated that where a word or an expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it cannot be determinative. So, what has been stated in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary regarding a ‘produce’ cannot be decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression “forest- produce” as defined in Section 2(4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. That bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us, and rightly.” In the light of the afore-stated pronouncements, there can be no fetters on the lawful powers of the forest authorities to monitor the transport of forest produce i.e., bamboo freshly cut or otherwise which would retain its identity as forest produce in every sense of the term. Therefore, transport of such forest produce would justify the intervention of the forest authorities by insisting upon forest permits. In so far as the interference with finished products made out of such forest produce is concerned, the action of the forest authorities is clearly illegal. It is stated that the society’s vehicle has since been released and thus, no cause survives in the writ appeal. As regards the writ petition, we are of the opinion that the respondent authorities are not legally justified in interfering with or detaining the transport of finished products made out of forest produce such as bamboo, by treating such finished products on par with forest produce. The plea of the society that it is entitled for damages for the illegal detention of such finished products by the forest authorities would normally not be gone into by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of any special circumstances, the remedy of the society for such a relief lies elsewhere. It is therefore left open to the society to invoke such remedies as are available to it in law in so far as its claim for damages is concerned. The Writ Appeal and the Writ Petition are disposed of in terms of the observations afore-stated. There shall be no order as to costs. _________________ B.PRAKASH RAO, J __________________ Date: 08-10-2009 SANJAY KUMAR, J SKM [1] (1996) 10 SCC 397