LPA 466/2010 Page 1 of 5 59 $~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + LPA 466/2010 DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Appellant Through: Mr. P.K. Mittal, Advocate. versus GAURAV KUKREJA ..... Respondent Through: None. % Date of Decision: 15th July, 2010 CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN 1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? MANMOHAN, J (Oral) CM APPL. 12121/2010 Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Accordingly, application stands disposed of. LPA 466/2010 Page 2 of 5 CM APPL. 12120/2010 This is an application for condonation of delay of 41 days in filing the appeal. For the reasons stated in the application, delay of 41 days in filing the appeal is condoned. Accordingly, application stands disposed of. LPA 466/2010 & CM 12119/2010 1. The present Letters Patent appeal has been filed by the Delhi Development Authority challenging the judgment dated 06th January, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 7608/2009. 2. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the present case are that Plot No. N-73, Panchsheel Cooperative House Building Society Limited was sub-leased by Delhi Development Authority in the name of Sh. Jan Talwar. On 12th June, 1986, Sh. Jan Talwar executed General Power of Attorney in favour of respondent’s father and an agreement to sell in favour of respondent’s mother. 3. In the year, 1989, a Civil Suit being CS(OS) 2777/1989 was filed for Specific Performance of the aforesaid agreement to sell by the respondent and his father against Sh. Jan Talwar and respondent’s mother. The aforesaid suit was decreed on a compromise application. LPA 466/2010 Page 3 of 5 4. The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has observed as under:- “11. In the Suit for specific performance filed by the petitioner as well as the father Sh. Jan Talwar was arrayed as defendant no.1and Mrs. Raymen Kukreja, mother of the petitioner, was arrayed as defendant no.2. As per the judgment of this Court dated 30.03.2001, defendant no.1 Sh. Jan Talwar stopped appearing in the matter and on 18.07.1991 he was proceeded ex parte. Defendant no.2, mother of the petitioner, did not contest the suit and on the basis of an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 C.P.C. suit was decreed. As per the judgment, defendant no.2 that is the mother of the petitioner in whose favour Agreement to Sell was executed by Sh. Jan Talwar had no objection if the sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioner herein. Similar, no objection was also granted by plaintiff no.2 that is the father of the petitioner, the General Power of Attorney holder of Sh. Jan Talwar. The effect of this statement would be that the mother of the petitioner in whose favour the agreement to sell was executed by Sh. Jan Talwar as well as the father of the petitioner in whose favour a General Power of Attorney was executed, both had no objection to the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner herein. A decree for specific performance has been passed in favour of the petitioner herein. Based on the decree passed by the Delhi High Court the case of the petitioner is on a higher footing than any General Power of Attorney holder as per Clause 13 (a) of the conversion policy. The decree passed by the High Court would also show that there is no dispute between Sh. Jan Talwar and the mother and father of the petitioner as well as the petitioner and his parents. Thus, in view of the decree passed, the aim and object of the policy for conversion as well as the condition of Clause 13(a) would stand satisfied. Taking into consideration that correspondence between the petitioner and DDA has been exchanged at the given address, supporting affidavit to the writ petition also shows the address of the petitioner to be N-73, Panchsheel Enclave, New Delhi, condition (b) of Clause 13 also stands satisfied. In view of the decree LPA 466/2010 Page 4 of 5 passed, sub-clause (c) of Clause 13 would not be applicable to the facts of this case. 12. Petitioner has filed copies of the Registered Agreement to Sell dated 10.06.1986 as well as registered General Power of Attorney dated 10.06.1986 executed by the original owner in favour of the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner is not a stranger to the transaction being the son of the purchasers and had filed a suit for specific performance, which has been decreed in his favour. Accordingly, present petition is allowed. DDA is directed to consider the application of the petitioner for conversion of property bearing No. N-73, Panchsheel Enclave, New Delhi, from lease hold to free hold within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order.” 5. Mr. P.K. Mittal, learned counsel for appellant submitted that learned Single Judge had failed to appreciate that the respondent did not have clear title to the property in question as no sale deed was ever executed in respondent’s favour. He pointed out that there was a revenue loss to the Government inasmuch as neither the sale deed was registered on payment of stamp duty nor unearned increase was paid to the Delhi Development Authority. 6. Admittedly, under the scheme for conversion floated by Delhi Development Authority, it was not mandatory for an applicant to be the owner of a property by virtue of a registered sale deed. Even a power of attorney holder could apply for conversion of property from lease hold to free hold. Moreover, there is no time limit within which an LPA 466/2010 Page 5 of 5 applicant has to get his Court decree executed. In the present case, respondent could certainly be taken to be a power of attorney holder and thus fully entitled to apply for conversion. 7. In our opinion, if the appellant has come up with the beneficial scheme which does not require an applicant to be an owner of the property by way of a registered sale deed, Delhi Development Authority cannot insist that respondent should first pay stamp duty and unearned increase before applying for conversion. Accordingly, the present appeal and application being devoid of merit are dismissed in limine but with no order as to costs. MANMOHAN, J CHIEF JUSTICE JULY 15, 2010 js