:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT WRIT WRIT PETITION NO.3125 OF 2008 PETITION NO.3125 OF 2008 PETITION NO.3125 OF 2008 Prakash Balaram Nichani ..Petitioner V/s Mohandas Parshuram Ahuja ..Respondent Mr. G.S. Godbole i/b M/s DivekAar and Co. for the petitioner Mr. Chirag Balsara i/b M/s Daru Shah and Co. for for respondent CORAM CORAM CORAM : A.A. SAYED, J. : A.A. SAYED, J. : A.A. SAYED, J. DATE DATE DATE : 4th JULY, 2008 : 4th JULY, 2008 : 4th JULY, 2008 P.C. 1. Rule. By consent rule is made returnable forthwith and heard finally. 2. The City Civil Court, Mumbai by its order dated 8th April, 2008 has rejected leave to the petitioner-plaintiff under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to omit the relief of specific performance in respect of the agreement in question from the purview of the suit. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed the present petition. 3. The subject-matter of the suit filed by the :2: petitioner is a joint venture agreement dated 10-8-1994 ("the said agreement" for short) entered into between the petitioner, who is developer and the respondent, who is the owner of the suit property. According to the petitioner the respondent is trying to wriggle out of his commitments under the said agreement which necessitated the filing of the suit. 4. The main prayers in the plaint read thus:- "(a) that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant leave to the Plaintiff under Order 11, Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to omit the relief of specific performance of the Agreement dated 10.8.1994, being Exhibit ’D’ to the plaint from the purview of the present suit; (b) that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the Agreement dated 10th August,1994, being Exhibit ’D’ to the Plaint is subsists and binding on the Defendant; (c) that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the Plaintiff alone has a right to prosecute suit No.5750 of 1994 pending in this Hon’ble Court; (d) That by permanent injunction this Hon’ble Court be pleased to restrain the Defendant from disturbing the possession of the Plaintiff of the suit property. (e) That by permanent order of injunction this Hon’ble Court be pleased to restrain the Defendant from committing breach of Joint Venture Agreement dated 10th August, 1994 and/or creating any third party rights in :3: respect of the suit property. 5. The petitioner has averred in the plaint that he reserves his right to claim specific performance of the said agreement at an appropriate time. According to the petitioner he is entitled to enforce a negative covenant contained in clause 27 of the said agreement without seeking specific performance of the said agreement. The said clause 27 provides that under any circumstances the agreement shall not be revoked by either party. 6. The petitioner accordingly applied to the Trial Court to seek leave under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for permission to omit the claim relating to specific performance of the agreement from the purview of the suit which was rejected by the impugned order. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the Order 2 Rule 2(3) of C.P.C., submitted that the petitioner is entitled to be granted leave to omit any relief in the suit and the Trial Court had erred in rejecting the leave. The :4: learned Counsel argued that the petitioner is entitled to seek a declaration that the said agreement is valid, subsisting and binding on the respondent, in view of the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent and apprehension of the petitioner that the respondent may commit breach of the said agreement. Relying upon section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the learned Counsel for the pointed out that the Court is not precluded from granting an injunction to perform negative agreement and therefore, such leave as sought by the petitioner, can be granted. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that by granting leave no substantial right of the respondent is affected and that the granting of leave is not an adjudicating process and it is in the form of intimation to the Court that the plaintiff is reserving his right to file a suit in respect of some reliefs which is permissible in law. The learned Counsel relied on the case of Canning Canning Canning Mitra Mitra Mitra Phoenix Ltd. V. M/s Popular Constructions, Phoenix Ltd. V. M/s Popular Constructions, Phoenix Ltd. V. M/s Popular Constructions, reported in 1994 Mh.L.J. 812 and submitted that leave of the Court under Order 2, Rule 2 (3) of :5: Cr.P.C. can be sought and urged that the petition be allowed and the impugned order be set aside. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand, submitted that in filing the suit what the petitioner is in fact seeking is specific performance of the said agreement without a specific prayer in that behalf. The learned Counsel, in support of his contention, has taken me through the various clauses of the said agreement. The learned Counsel relying upon the decisions in the cases of (1) Deva Ram V. Ishwar Chand Deva Ram V. Ishwar Chand Deva Ram V. Ishwar Chand, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 733 and (2) SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. V. SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. V. SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. V. World World World Tankar Carrier Corporation Tankar Carrier Corporation Tankar Carrier Corporation, reported in AIR 2000 Bombay 34, submitted that the petitioner cannot split up his claim so as to omit part of the claim and if the cause of action is the same, the petitioner is required to place all his claims in one suit. The learned Counsel submitted that the respondent cannot be vexed by two separate suits in respect of the same cause of action. The learned Counsel further submitted that the use of the words "shall" in the sub-rules of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC indicates that the provisions are mandatory and the :6: suit has to be framed so as to afford ground for a final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent a further litigation. He therefore, urged that no case of interference has been made out by the petitioner and submitted that leave has been rightly refused by the Trial Court. 10. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. At the outset it would be necessary to examine the agreement dated 10th August 1994 which is the subject matter of the suit. The agreement is titled as a joint venture agreement and the petitioner is described in the agreement as the developer and the respondent as the owner. One of the recitals of the agreement reads thus:- "AND WHEREAS the Owner has approached the Developer for development of the said property more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder written on joint venture basis by virtue of which the owner will make the said property available for development at the agreed land cost of Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lacs only) and the Developer will provide the necessary funds for the development of the said property and also for incidental work connected with Development obtaining of TDR etc. in the manner and other terms and conditions herein below contained." Clause 3 of the agreement reads thus:- :7: "In the event of the plans not being sanctioned on this plot of land, the Developer will obtain the T.D.R. available on the said land will and sell jointly the said T.D.R. to the intending purchaser/buyer as at present the said land is Reserved for Municipal retail Market and Municipal Staff quarters." Clause 6 reads thus:- "Upon execution of these presents, the Owner has permitted the Developer to enter upon the property with an irrevocable Licence and authority to obtain necessary permission, N.O.C. from the concerned authorities and/or to get the Plans sanctioned, obtain I.O.D. Commencement Certificate from the concerned authorities and/or to apply to the corporation for acquisition of the Reserved property to grant TDR in lieu of compensation." Clause 7 reads thus:- "The Developer is entitled to commence the work of construction of buildings with the permission of the concerned authorities." Clause 8 reads thus:- "The Owner shall be entitled to receive Rs. 9 Lacs (Rupees Nine Lakhs Only) without interest as and by way of costs of the land after completion of the project or obtaining TDR." Clause No. 11 reads thus:- "The price of the land agreed to be given to the Owner and the moneys expended by the Developer, shall be deducted from the total gross sale process of flats, garages, shops and or sale of TDR and after deducting the such amount payable to the owner and the amount expended by the Developer balance amount will be shared by the parties in equal proportion." :8: Clause 19 provides for execution of irrevocable power of attorney by the Owner in favour of the developer. Clause 27, which is the principal clause relied upon by the petitioner for seeking leave under Order 2 Rule 2, reads thus:- " 27. The agreement shall be subject to usual force, measures, causes and circumstances beyond the control of the Owner and Developer and under any circumstances the agreement shall not be revoked by either party" 11. The averments in the plaint disclose that the dispute between the parties started after the respondent alongwith the petitioner filed a suit being Suit No.5750 of 1994 against one Mohan Chug, D.M. Builders and one Manjit Singh in the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay, for an injunction restraining them from entering upon or remaining upon or committing any other acts of trespass on the suit property, wherein an injunction was obtained. As the petitioner apprehended that the respondent wanted to wriggle out the said agreement, the petitioner asked the respondent to change the advocate as he wanted an advocate of his choice in the said suit No. 5750 of 1994, which the respondent did not agree. :9: 12. According to the petitioner he is in possession of the suit property and he has done the work of earth filling in the suit property and also got the barbed wire fencing done around the suit property. He has obtained electric supply and employed armed security persons to protect and safeguard the property and as such taken steps and has incurred expenses. After the execution of the said agreement an irrevocable power of attorney was also executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioner. 13. It is also averred in para 11 of the plaint that the plaintiff has taken aforesaid steps and now he wants to wriggle out of the said agreement and wants to create third party rights in respect of the suit property and wants to sell the suit property and/or to have the suit property developed by some other developer and in any event he is out to commit breach of the said agreement. In para 13 of the plaint it is averred as follows:- ".....the plaintiff is entitled to enforce the negative covenant contained in clause 27 of the said Agreement without seeking specific performance of the said Agreement. The plaintiff reserves his right to :10: claim specific performance at an appropriate time and seeks leave of the Hon’ble Court under Order 11, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure in that behalf". 14. As reproduced in para 4 above, Clause (b) of the prayer clause of the plaint seeks a declaration that the said agreement dated 10th August, 1994 is existing and binding on the respondent. Prayer (d) seeks permanent injunction for protection of the petitioner’s possession of the suit property and to restrain the respondent from disturbing his possession Prayer (e) seeks a permanent order of injunction from restraining the respondent from committing breach of the said agreement and/or creating third party rights in respect of the suit property. 15. The above discussion pertains to the factual aspect of the matter. Let us now examine the legal provisions. Order 2, Rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are relevant in the present case and are reproduced hereunder:- "1-Frame Frame Frame of suit. of suit. of suit.- Every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them. :11: 2. Suit to include the whole claim.- Suit to include the whole claim.- Suit to include the whole claim.- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.- Relinquishment of part of claim.- Relinquishment of part of claim.- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several Omission to sue for one of several Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.- reliefs.- reliefs.- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation.- For the purpose of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action. Illustration.- A lets a house to B at a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200/-. The rent for the whole of the year 1905, 1906 and 1907 is due and unpaid. A sues B in 1908 only for the rent due for 1906. A shall not afterwards sue B for the rent due for 1905 or 1907. 16. The above provisions thus provide that once the plaintiff comes to Court to redress any grievance of existing cause of action he is required to include the whole claim pertaining to that cause of action. If he gives up some part of the claim based on the :12: said cause of action or omits to sue in connection with the same he cannot subsequently seek any relief based on the same cause of action. Insofar as sub-rule 3 of Rule 2 is concerned it lays down that if the cause of action is same and if in the earlier suit the plaintiff has not sought any reliefs available to him on the basis of that cause of action, the reliefs which he failed to seek in that suit cannot be subsequently prayed, except with the leave of the Court. Order 2 Rule 2 sub-rule 3 thus requires that the cause of action in the earlier suit must be the same on which the subsequent suit is based. In other words, there must be identity of cause of action in both the suits to attract the bar of order 2 Rule 2 sub-rule 3. The salutary principles behind order 2 rule 2 is that defendant should not be vexed time and again for the same cause of action by splitting claim of reliefs in successive litigations. It is therefore provided that the plaintiff must not abandon any part of the claim without leave of the Court and must claim the whole reliefs available to him in respect of the same cause of action. He will thereafter be precluded from doing so in any subsequent litigation he may commence :13: if he has not obtained prior permission of the court. This principle was elucidated by the the Apex Court in the case of Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair V. Narayan Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair V. Narayan Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair V. Narayan Nair Nair Nair & Others, & Others, & Others, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 277 as also in the case of M/s Bengal Waterproof Ltd. V. M/s M/s Bengal Waterproof Ltd. V. M/s M/s Bengal Waterproof Ltd. V. M/s Bombay Bombay Bombay Waterproof Mfg.. Co., Waterproof Mfg.. Co., Waterproof Mfg.. Co., reported in AIR 1997 S.C. 1398 17. In this regard reference may also be made to section 11 of the Code and in particular explanation IV to the said section. The said Section 11 and explanation IV is reproduced hereunder:- "11- Res judicata.- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court." " Explanation.-IV. Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." 18. Both Order 2 Rule 2 and section 11 are thus primarily based on the principle that there should be :14: conclusiveness of judgment, which in turn is based on the maxim "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una at eadem cause" (no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause of action) and that multiplicity of suits should be avoided. 19. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in case of Gurubux Singh V.Bhoorlal, Gurubux Singh V.Bhoorlal, Gurubux Singh V.Bhoorlal, AIR 1964 SC 1810 which dealing with Order 2 rule 2(3), has laid down as under:- "In order that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (1) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar." 20. In K.S. Bhoopathy V. Kokil K.S. Bhoopathy V. Kokil K.S. Bhoopathy V. Kokil, AIR 2000 S.C. 213, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- :15: "The Court has to discharge the duty mandated under the provisions of Code on taking into consideration all relevant aspects of the matter including the desirability of permitting the party to start a fresh round of litigation on the same cause of action." It must however be mentioned that in the above matter, the Court was dealing with the issue whether the plaintiff can be permitted to withdraw the suit with leave to file a fresh suit under the provisions of Order 23 of CPC. 21. Thus on going through the averments in the plaint and reading the entire plaint as a whole and considering the over all factual aspect of the matter as well as the position of law as discussed above, I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioner is substantially seeking specific performance of the agreement in question, though in a circuitous manner. In my view the petitioner cannot pick out any clause from the said agreement and reserve his right to bring a fresh suit for reliefs based on that clause. The reliance by the petitioner on section 42 of Specific Relief Act, which deals with injunction to perform negative agreement, is misplaced inasmuch as :16: section 42 deals with the cases and circumstance wherein the Court is unable to compel the specific perform of the affirmative agreement, which is not the case in the present matter. 22. It is interesting to note that in the instant case, nowhere in the body of the plaint there is any explanation given as to what necessitated the splitting of the reliefs so as to seek leave under order 2 rule 2. Thus, apart from the reasons mentioned above, in absence of reasons or explanation on record for splitting the reliefs, no leave can be granted to the petitioner. It is required to be noted that the evidence in the present suit as well as in the proposed suit for which leave is sought, would have been no different. The question, however remains as to why the petitioner wants to reserve his right to file a separate suit for specific performance. The answer, seemingly lies in fact that the petitioner wants to avoid payment of ad valorem Court fees as provided under Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. Here, reference may be made to the decision in the case of Shamsher Singh V. Rajinder Prashad, Shamsher Singh V. Rajinder Prashad, Shamsher Singh V. Rajinder Prashad, AIR 1973 S.C. 2384 wherein it was held by the Apex Court :17: that mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the reliefs asked for and that the Court fee would be decided accordingly. 23. The granting of leave under Order 2 Rule 2 in cases such as the present one could perhaps set an incorrect precedent, inasmuch as in every such suit, instead of seeking prayer for specific performance, the plaintiffs would only seek a prayer for a declaration that the agreement is subsisting and binding and the plaintiffs would thus avoid the payment of proper Court fees. This would lead to nothing but a revenue loss which has a direct correlation with the costs of administration of civil justice. 24. The argument of the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that seeking of leave under Order 2 Rule 2 is only in the form of intimation to the Court and that leave has to be granted as a matter of course, does not appeal to me in the least. If that be the case, there would be no necessity of any provision for seeking leave of the Court. The word :18: ’leave’ necessarily means that the plaintiff is required to seek ’permission’ of the the court to split the reliefs in respect of the same cause of action. Such permission may be granted by the Court only after it is ’satisfied’ that a case for granting leave is made out. While considering whether leave under order 2 rule 2 ought to granted to the plaintiff or not, the Court is required to keep in mind the object of the legislature in enacting provisions of Order 2 Rule 1 also, which provides for bringing finality to the dispute and to prevent further litigation as far as practicable. The provisions in Order 2 Rule 2(3) for grant of leave is thus an exception to the general principle of law that multiplicity of suits should be avoided. It is a prayer for concession from the Court. The grant of leave is thus at the discretion of the Court and the Court will exercise such discretion with required caution and circumspection. The Court is to keep in mind the wastage of public time of Courts which is more relevant in the present scenario in view of