AJN 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1616 OF 2008 Prakash Ramchandra Kench, Occu: Business, R/at. R-3, Pot No.84, Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth Colony, Gultekadi, Pune – 411 037. ) ) ) ) ) ... Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Maharashtra ) 2. The Senior Inspector, P.S. Swarage, Pune. ) 3. Shirish Prakash Kench, Occ: Service, R/o. 425/84, Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth Colony, Gultekadi, Pune. ) ) ) ) ... Respondents Mr. A.P. Ranade for the petitioner. Mr. V.B. Konde-Deshmukh, A.P.P for the State. Mr. M.K. Kochrekar for respondent 3. CORAM : SMT. RANJANA DESAI & R.G. KETKAR, JJ. DATED : 8TH JULY, 2009. ORAL JUDGMENT :- (Per Smt. Ranjana Desai, J.) AJN 2 1. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed that the investigation and the F.I.R. No.207 of 2008 registered at Swargate Police Station, Pune, be quashed and set aside. 2. The petitioner is the father of respondent 3. He is a senior citizen. The petitioner’s wife met with an accident on 16/11/2004 and succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident. 3. The facts, as disclosed in the petition, are as under: The petitioner’s wife was serving in the Central Bank, Pune. In the year 2001, she took voluntary retirement. Upon retirement, she got retirement benefits. She invested the amount received by her in National Saving Certificates (for short, “the NSCs”) from 25/10/2001 in the names of the petitioner, respondent 3 and other brother of respondent 3. She, by the Will executed by her, AJN 3 bequeathed the flat being R-3 Plot No.84, Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth Colony, Gultekadi, Pune – 411 037, (for convenience, “the said flat”) to the petitioner. 4. On 29/5/2005, respondent 3 got married to one Shweta Prakash Damle. According to the petitioner, after the marriage, respondent 3 with the help of his wife and mother-in-law started harassing the petitioner. On 21/9/2007, the petitioner made a written complaint at the P.S. Maharshi Nagar, Pune and prayed for police protection. According to the petitioner, on 1/10/2007, the wife of respondent 3 lodged a complaint with the P.S. Swargate. The allegation was that the petitioner and his other two brothers and one friend had harassed her. She tried to register false complaint against them for the offence of cruelty and dowry. According to the petitioner, respondent 3 was insisting that the property in question be transferred to his name. The petitioner refused to do so because by the last Will executed by his wife, the said flat is bequeathed to him. According to the AJN 4 petitioner, on 24/9/2007, respondent 3 submitted an application to the City Survey Officer, Pune for registering his own name along with the the names of the petitioner and his elder brother in the property extract by submitting false affidavit and other documents. The petitioner had to approach the City Survey Office to bring the correct facts on record which he did and closed the matter. 5. According to the petitioner, the wife of the petitioner had an overdraft account with the Central Bank, Camp, Pune bearing O.D. Account No.300730. The said overdraft facility was extended by the Central Bank on a condition that the NSCs are pledged with it. Accordingly seven NSCs were pledged with the bank. The said NSCs were kept as collateral securities for the said overdraft account. Admittedly, respondent 3 is the nominee appointed by the wife of petitioner in respect of five out of the seven NSCs. It is the petitioner’s case that after the death of his wife, the Central Bank started insisting that the petitioner should settle the overdraft account by clearing the entire AJN 5 dues. The petitioner approached the bank; cleared the dues by paying an amount of Rs.55,730/- by cheque dated 24/1/2005. On receipt of the entire amount, the Central Bank issued letter dated 24/1/2005 to the petitioner by endorsing the receipt of the said amount and handed over the original NSCs which were pledged with the bank to him. According to the petitioner, thereafter the petitioner was in custody of all the seven NSCs. It is his case that respondent 3 was aware of it. The two NSCs in respect of which the petitioner and his elder son Ashish were the nominees matured. The petitioner’s elder son Ashish encashed them and the said amount is in the custody of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, two of the certificates in which respondent 3 was the nominee were encashed by him, however he did not give the proceeds to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, since he had paid the loan, he was entitled to that amount. Respondent 3, however, avoided to pay the same. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent 3 and his wife started harassing the petitioner alleging that the AJN 6 petitioner had stolen the NSCs of which respondent 3 was the nominee. A theft case was registered against the petitioner by respondent 3 which is the subject matter of this writ petition. The case of the petitioner, in short, is that the complaint is totally false. The petitioner was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court, Pune. 6. Before we proceed to deal with the rival contentions, we must note that we made herculean efforts to settle this dispute. We thought that since this is a dispute between the father and son, it should be amicably settled. We, therefore, by order dated 22/4/2009 issued Rule; stayed the proceedings and appointed Mr. S.G. Deshmukh, advocate as a mediator to mediate between the parties and arrive at an amicable settlement. We are informed that accordingly Mr. Deshmukh had several meetings with the parties. However, the parties apparently did not see reason and no settlement could be arrived at. In the court also, we tried to talk to the petitioner and respondent 3. However, both sides are not AJN 7 willing to settle the matter. Respondent 3 son expressed that he was willing to pay about Rs.5 lakhs to the petitioner as the costs of litigation, which the petitioner says he has incurred without admitting that the petitioner has incurred such huge costs. The claim of the petitioner is that he has incurred costs of about Rs.8 lakhs. Respondent 3’s proposal was that after the death of the petitioner, the said flat should be sold and the sale proceeds should be equally distributed between him and the other brother Ashish, there being no other sharers and the money paid by him to the petitioner as costs could be adjusted from that amount. Respondent 3 stated that as of today, he will surrender the said flat to the petitioner. He stated that the petitioner can stay in that flat till his death and he would pay an amount of Rs.2000/- per month to the petitioner as maintenance. He stated that the said amount was negotiable. Respondent 3 has challenged the Will of his mother. Respondent 3 was willing to withdraw the probate proceedings also. Respondent 3 stated that he will also withdraw the AJN 8 criminal proceedings filed by him provided the petitioner withdraws proceedings filed by him. The petitioner was not willing to consider the distribution of his assets between the two sons equally after his death. According to him, respondent 3 should give an amount of Rs.8 lakhs as expenses allegedly incurred by him for the litigation and he should withdraw unconditionally the probate proceedings and the criminal complaint. It is also necessary to mention that according to the Will made by the petitioner’s wife, the flat is bequeathed to the petitioner. However, she desired that the money should be distributed by mutual agreement between the petitioner and the two sons. As of today, the petitioner is not staying in the said flat. We have already noted that the offer made by respondent 3 that he will leave the said flat and permit the petitioner to stay there has been rejected by the petitioner. We requested the petitioner that in view of his late wife’s desire that money should be distributed by mutual agreement between the petitioner and the two sons, he should forget the past, compromise AJN 9 the dispute and turn a new leaf. But, he was not willing to do so. Admittedly on the basis of some interim order passed by this court, the petitioner has filed a defamation case against respondent 3 in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pune. However, no process is issued on that complaint. The only conclusion which can be drawn from this is that neither the petitioner nor respondent 3 are prepared to settle the dispute. We are unhappy about this. If they chose to wash their dirty linen in public the court cannot help them. Hence, we proceed to pass the order. 7. Since the petitioner is seeking quashing of the F.I.R., it is necessary to note certain material events and dates. The complaint was filed on 3/4/2008. This petition was filed on 29/7/2008. This petition first appeared on board of this court on 11/9/2008. It was adjourned to 18/9/2008 at the request of the petitioner. It again appeared on the board on 18/9/2008. The petitioner’s advocate again made a request and adjourned it to 1/10/2008. It appeared on the board on 16/10/2008 when at the request of the brother of the AJN 10 petitioner, it was adjourned to 21/10/2008. On 21/10/2008, it was adjourned to 12/11/2008. While adjourning the petition, the Division Bench noted as follows. “Though the court is ready to hear the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed for adjournment. Hence, S.O. to 12/11/2008.” 8. Thus, it appears that the petitioner was not willing to go on with the matter. On 23/10/2008, charge-sheet came to be filed. What is important to note is that the petitioner at no point of time, argued the petition and requested the court to stay the proceedings. In fact, he allowed the charge-sheet to be filed on 23/10/2008. It is well settled that once charge-sheet is filed it is very rarely that this court quashes the proceedings. It was argued that this will not come in the way of the petitioner because if after filing of the petition, the matter is not disposed of expeditiously and then charge-sheet is filed, the petitioner could not be made to suffer and in such case this court should quash the charge-sheet if a case is made out. It was suggested that to frustrate the present AJN 11 proceedings, the charge-sheet was filed. This submission is devoid of substance and contrary to facts. It is at the petitioner’s instance that the petition got adjourned all throughout and charge-sheet was filed during the pendency of the petition on 23/10/2008. No request was made for stay of the proceedings. It is not open for the petitioner to contend that the charge-sheet is filed to frustrate the proceedings. 9. We will have to now find out whether after filing of the charge-sheet, we could quash the proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. 1998 (5) Bom. C.R. 426. In that case, the appellants were aggrieved by judgment dated 23/9/1996 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing their writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The appellants sought quashing of the complaint filed against them under Section 7 read with AJN 12 Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It appears that in that case, the charge was framed. The High Court refused to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the appellants should approach respondent 1 therein for discharge under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, “the Code”). The High Court did not approve of the appellants approaching it under the writ jurisdiction when alternative remedy was available to them under the Code. In the facts of that case, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the High Court’s approach was not right. The Supreme Court observed that, no doubt, the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceedings quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. In view of this authoritative pronouncement AJN 13 of the Supreme Court, there can be no doubt about the proposition of law that in exercise of our powers under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 227 of the Constitution, we can quash the proceedings even after the charge is framed. But it is well settled that this power has to be used sparingly. Exercise of this power must necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case. 10. At this stage, we may usefully refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri, AIR 1964 SC 1419. In that case, the Constitution Bench considered when the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available. It is not necessary to go into the facts of that case. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is material. The Supreme Court observed that “the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise AJN 14 thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226 where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy.” 11. We may also refer to the judgment of learned Single Judge of this court in Floyd D. Aguiar . Bronwyn D. Aguiar & Anr, 2007 (1) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 912 where learned Single Judge has considered this aspect in the context of Section 482 of the Code and has followed the above principles. AJN 15 12. At this stage, it is also necessary to note that in its interim order dated 14/1/2009, the Division Bench presided over by Justice Bilal Nazki recorded a prima facie observation that though offence of theft was not made out, the police investigated the case and filed the charge- sheet. It was sought to be argued that it is implicit in the order that proceedings can be quashed even after the charge-sheet is filed. We have already noted that this proposition cannot be disputed by us in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods’ case (supra). The question is whether we should exercise that jurisdiction here. In fact, in our order dated 2/4/2009 we had also at that stage recorded a prima facie opinion that offence of theft was not made out. It is well known that prima facie opinion expressed by the court need not prevail upon it when it passes final orders. Final orders are passed after hearing at length learned counsel appearing for both sides in depth and going through the relevant law and record. AJN 16 13. Basically, we are concerned here with the allegation of theft. The petitioner’s counsel has produced letter dated 23/1/2005 sent by the Central Bank, Pune to the petitioner. The letter inter alia indicates that the petitioner had paid all the dues of the bank and NSCs were forwarded by the Central Bank to the petitioner. Admittedly, therefore, the petitioner was in possession of the NSCs. Out of the seven NSCs, in five NSCs, respondent 3 is the nominee. Two NSCs out of the said five NSCs matured and respondent 3 encashed them. So far as the remaining three NSCs are concerned, he continues to be the nominee. According to the petitioner, since he had paid the bank’s dues, respondent 3 should have paid back the amount received by him to the petitioner. The petitioner’s case is that since he was in possession of the NSCs to the knowledge of respondent 3 he cannot be accused of theft. Whether respondent 3 should have returned the money which was recovered by him after encashing two NSCs or not is a matter which will AJN 17 be decided in the proceedings adopted by the parties against each other. But, prima facie his claim to the NSCs of which he is nominee cannot be called groundless. 14. The case of respondent 3 as stated in the affidavit filed in this court and as told to us by his counsel is that his mother had pledged the NSCs with the Central Bank, however the entire loan was paid from the joint account maintained by him and his father. Subsequently the said NSCs came in his possession as he was nominee thereof. He kept them in the cup-board of his wife in lock and key. He has admitted that out five NSCs two NSCs have been realised by him after maturity. According to respondent 3, as the said NSCs which were exclusively in his possession were missing from his cup-board, he enquired with the petitioner. The petitioner told him that he did not know where they were. He, therefore, applied for duplicate certificates with the Postal Authority. However, the Postal Authority informed him that the said NSCs are lying with the petitioner. According to respondent 3, he AJN 18 was shown a letter addressed by the petitioner to the Postal Authority informing them not to issue any duplicate certificates to him. He has stated that it is in these circumstances that he has lodged the complaint and he had no malafide intention to harass the petitioner. The petitioner is denying this story. We have already noted the gist of the petitioner’s case. 15. Various factual questions arise out of the respective stands of the parties. The question is whether after the NSCs were returned by the Central Bank to the petitioner, those NSCs of which respondent 3 was a nominee were given by the petitioner to respondent 3 or the petitioner kept them with himself. Is it true that the loan was paid out of the joint account of the petitioner and respondent 3 and that is why, and more particularly, because respondent 3 is the nominee of the said NSCs, the petitioner gave them to respondent 3. The said NSCs were to mature in December, 2007. Is it true that respondent 3 had kept them in his wife’s cup-board in lock AJN 19 and key and because, he did not find them he enquired with the petitioner about it and the petitioner told him that he did not know where they were? Is it true that respondent 3, therefore, contacted the Central Bank and the Central Bank told him that they were with the petitioner and the Central Bank showed him a letter addressed by the petitioner to them asking them not to issue duplicate share certificates to him. The relevant letters of the Central Bank will have to be seen to test the version of both sides. It is not possible for us, in our writ jurisdiction, to go into these questions of facts and record a finding that the NSCs continued to remain with the petitioner and they were never entrusted to respondent 3 and his wife. If the evidence discloses that the said NSCs were in the possession of respondent 3 and his wife and they were dishonestly taken out of their possession without their consent, Section 378 of the IPC may be attracted. But if possession of respondent 3 and his wife is not established, Section 378 may not be attracted. AJN 20 16. It was pointed out to us that wife of respondent 3 has, in her statement dated 4/4/2008 recorded by the Swargate Police Station, stated that the petitioner broke open the cup-board and stole the NSCs. However, in the Register of the Swargate Police Station, it is noted that respondent 3’s wife has stated that the petitioner opened the cup-board; that he threatened her and told her that it should not be locked. In our opinion, whether there are any discrepancies in the case of respondent 3, whether respondent 3’s case is true or the petitioner’s case is true can only be decided by the trial court. Looking to the manner in which the petitioner and respondent 3 are fighting each other, we feel that there are undercurrents in this matter. Impact of these undercurrents cannot be gauged by us at this stage. Truth will come out when evidence is led. AJN 21 17. In State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335, the Supreme Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of the guidelines is where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the High Court can quash the proceedings. In Pepsi Food’s case, the High Court had observed that it cannot be said at this stage that the allegations in the complaint were so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there existed no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court was not correct in coming to AJN 22 such a conclusion and in coming to that conclusion it has also foreclosed the matter for the magistrate as well as the magistrate will not give any different conclusion on an application filed under Section 245 of the Code. We, therefore, make it clear that we have not expressed any final opinion on the merits of the case. 18. After hearing counsel for both sides and having perused the complaint and considered the factual background of the case, we merely record our prima facie finding that it is not possible for us to state that if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not constitute any offence against the accused. In the circumstances, it is not possible for us to quash the charge-sheet. Needless to say that if any discharge application is filed by the accused, the concerned court will consider it in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations made by us touching the merits of this case. In the view that we have taken, we AJN 23 dismiss the petition with a fond hope that the petitioner and respondent 3 bury the hatchet and come together. Needless to say that the interim order stands vacated. [SMT. RANJANA DESAI, J.] [R.G. KETKAR, J.]