IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.9004 of 2002 RAM BARAN SINGH, Son of late Jaga Singh, resident of Village-Chadhna Tola, Barkunha, Post-Turki, P.S. Kurhani, District-Muzaffarpur. Versus 1.THE STATE OF BIHAR 2.The Director, Primary Education Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. 3.The Commissioner, Tirhut Division, Muzaffarpur. 4.The District Superintendent of Education, Muzaffarpur. 5.The Incharge Headmaster, Primary School, Rampurmani harijan Tola, Sakara, District Muzaffarpur. ----------- 4 06.07.2010 Heard Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and counsel for the State. Prayer of the petitioner in this writ application reads as follows:- “That this is an application for issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ direction(s) for quashing the order as contained in Memo No.16 dated 5.1.2002, issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Muzaffarpur, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been removed from service from the post of Assistant Teacher on the ground of producing/ submitting fake certificate of Matriculation and Teachers Training at the time of appointment. And further for quashing the order dated 18.6.2002 passed by the Commissioner in service Appeal No.1/2002 by which the order of removal dated 5.1.2002 has been affirm/upheld. And further for direction to the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with al service benefits And/or for grant of any appropriate reliefs to the petitioner for which he may be found entitled in the eye of law.” Mr. Singh, while assailing the aforementioned prayer, has submitted that in absence of proper departmental enquiry the allegation against the petitioner of obtaining appointment on the 2 basis of a forged matriculation certificate and marks sheet cannot be sustained. He has also invited attention of this Court towards paragraph 29 of the writ application wherein it has been claimed by the petitioner that having failed in 1970 annual matriculation examination, had appeared in the supplementary examination of the same year, i.e, 1970 and thereafter he was declared to have been passed. Mr. Singh would submit that this aspect of the matter has, in fact, not been taken into consideration by the authorities in the impugned order. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioner is not very sure of his own case, inasmuch as, when the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner he in his reply had initially stated before the authority that he had passed the qualifying matriculation examination in the year 1971 by appearing as a private candidate in the year 1971 matriculation examination. In fact he had also produced such certificate of 1971 matriculation examination, as is evident from the impugned order. Thereafter when the said certificate as also marks sheet was sent for verification to the Bihar School Examination Board, it had declared the said certification to be forged. Thereafter, the petitioner was given another opportunity to explain his conduct, whereafter he had taken an altogether different stand by claiming that the issue relating to the allegation of his forged certificate was politically motivated and infact was initiated in view of a question raised by a member of Legislative Assembly. 3 In fact, his one of such explanation goes to show that the matriculation certificate was not in his own custody because he had claimed there was outbreak of fire in his house some time in the year 1998 and all his certificates were burnt in the said fire. To prove this aspect he has also enclosed a copy of First Information Report relating to the aforesaid alleged incident of fire. It is in this background that one has to examine the findings of the authority, the District Education Establishment Committee, which after making enquiry from the concerned authority had found the matriculation certification of the petitioner of the year 1971 and the training certificate of the year 1973 to be forged by recording the following reasons:- “bl dk;kZy; ds i=kad 999 fnukad 4&9&2001 }kjk lfpo] fcgkj fon~;ky; ijh{kk lfefr] fcgkj] iVuk dks Jh flag }kjk izLrqr muds ek/;fed ijh{kk izek.k i= o"kZ 1971 dzekad 206 izek.k i= la[;k 3101 ,oa f”{kd izf”{k.k ijh{kk 1973 ds mRrh.kZrk izek.k i= la[;k 486523 dk lR;kiu gsrq fucaf/kr Mkd ls Hkstk x;k A Jh lS;n cdkyr gqlSu] vij lfpo @fuxjkuh@ fcgkj fon~;ky; ijh{kk lfefr] iVuk ds izkIr i= la[;k izs0 630 fnukad 29&9&2001 }kjk Jh flag }kjk izLrqr nksuksa gh izek.k i= QthZ crk;k x;k A tkWp ds dze esa ;g Hkh ik;k x;k fd Jh jkeoj.k flag fcgkj fon~;ky; ijh{kk lfefr] iVuk }kjk o"kZ 1970 okf"kZd ijh{kk vuqRrh.kZ gS ftldk jkSy dksM vkthtiqj dzekad 144 vad i= la0 vkbZ0 ,e0 90 ,Q0 29824 gS A” The aforementioned conclusion having been based on an authentic material and in fact in the light of the explanation earliar taken by the petitioner, this Court would not find any flaw 4 in the resultant decision taken by the District Education Establishment Committee which has also been affirmed in the order of the Divisional Commissioner while rejecting appeal of the petitioner. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no full fledged departmental enquiry with regard to forgery in the marks sheet, stands settled by the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of „Rita Mishra & Ors Vs. Director, Primary Education, Bihar & Ors’ reported in 1987 P.L.J.R. 1090. In fact such disputed question of fact with regard to forgery in the marks sheet cannot be gone into in a writ jurisdiction, inasmuch as, the Full Bench in the case of Rita Mishra (Supra) had considered this aspect in the following terms:- “Now once it is so that even a calculated and designed suppression of material facts in the writ jurisdiction would non-suit the petitioners then it seems the more so that where the stand of the respondents State is that the claim is based on a punishable crime like forgery or fraud, the lis cannot be gone into in the writ jurisdiction. To conclude on the procedural aspect, it appears to me that where the basic and material facts are categorically controverted and traversed, the exercise of the writ jurisdiction would be inapt and doubly so no mandamus can possibly issue on such a slippery base. Equally where the petitioners do not come to the portals of the writ Court with clean hands, they must be relegated to their ordinary remedies by way of civil suits.” The conclusion arrived at by the Full Bench in paragraph 45, in fact, also completely covers the case in hand of the petitioner wherein following conclusion nos. 1 and 2 would apply with full force in the present case of the petitioner :- 5 “(1)Where the letter of appointment is a forged one and the appointee is either a party or a privy thereto, then no substantive right to salary can accrue therefrom. (2)Where the letter of appointment is forged, but the appointee is neither a party nor a privy to the same, even then, no substantive right to statutory salary can arise from a document which is non est or a nullity. It is neither necessary nor desirable to pronounce on the aspect, whether a civil suit for compensation under section 70 of the Contract Act for services rendered not gratuitously or any other analogous law would be successfully maintainable.” That being so, this Court is satisfied that there is no infirmity in the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service as also affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Thus for the reasons indicated above, this writ application must be held to be devoid of any merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. There, would be, however, no order as to costs. Abhay Kumar ( Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)