1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD. SECOND APPEAL No. 536 OF 2010 Limchand S/o Chima Jadhav .. APPELLANT VERSUS Mulchand S/o Kesu @ Keshya Jadhav ...RESPONDENT ... Shri P.F. Patni , Advocate for the appellant CORAM : S.V. GANGAPURWALA, J. DATE : 15th November, 2010. PER COURT : This is defendants Second Appeal. The present respondent had filed a suit for possession in respect of the property Gut No. 17 Admeasuring 1 Hector. It is the case of the plaintiff that he is adoptive son of Kesu Jadhav. The suit property was the self acquired property of Kesu Jadhav and he being the adoptive son, is the only legal heir entitled for possession of the said property and the defendant has illegally dispossessed him in the year 2004. 2 2. The present appellant /defendant contended that, plaintiff is not the son of deceased Kesu, and the said property was given to present appellant by way of partition, after having blended it in joint family property. The Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. In appeal the lower Appellate Court by allowing the appeal decreed the suit and directed the present appellant to hand over the possession of the suit property. The defendant has assailed the said Judgment in the present Second Appeal. 3. Shri Patni, learned Counsel for the appellant canvassed following propositions. i] The alleged adoption is invalid in view of Section 10(1) (iv) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, in as much as age of the plaintiff was more than 15 years, on the date of adoption. According to Shri Patni, the parties are not governed by the Bombay School and are governed by Mitakshara, no custom is proved by the plaintiff, in absence of such proof of custom the above said adoption is not valid. Shri Patni, 3 relied on the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of ‘Nemichand Shantilal Patni V/s. Basantabai, reported in AIR 1994 Bombay 234’ ii] Deceased Kesu had blended this property in a joint family and thereafter had partitioned the said property. The long standing mutation entry to that effect proves the said fact and the said revenue entry is not challenged. 4. Regarding the first contention of Shri Patni, learned Counsel for the appellant that the parties would not be governed by Bombay School but by Mitakshara law, the same is not correct proposition. In the light of the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in a case of ‘Anirudh Jagdeorao V/s. Babarao Irbaji and others, reported in 1983, Mh.L.J., 379’. The Full Bench of this Court by referring to the seven Judges Judgment of the Hyderabad High Court had held that in Marathawada region which was part of the earst-while State of Hyderabad, the parties were governed by Vyavaharo Mayukha school of law and 4 were not governed by Mitakshara law. The Full Bench has specifically held that amongst Hindus in Marathwada region, the custom was prevalent that even the child above 15 years could be adopted, even married person could be adopted. In the light of the Judgment of the Full Bench, the Judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court the case of ‘Nemichand Shantilal Patni V/s. Basantabai’, referred supra relied by Shri Patni, Advocate cannot said to be precedent. Though the Judgment of Full Bench of this Court was quoted in the Judgment of Ld. Single Judge in “ Nemichand Shantilal Patni V/s. Basantabai” referred supra, the same has not been discussed in the whole Judgment by the learned Single Judge. I am bound by the Judgment of Full Bench in a case of Anirudh Jagdeorao V/s. Babarao Irbaji and others’ referred supra. It is undisputed that the parties are Hindus and are residing in Marathwada region. 5. Regarding the second submission about the suit property being blended with the joint family property, the same is without any pleading, in as much as there is no pleading that 5 there was an existence of joint family. The suit property admittedly is the self acquired property of deceased Kesu. The partition can only be amongst the co-sharers. In the light of the same, it cannot be held that the deceased Kesu had partitioned the said property in favour of the appellant who admittedly was not a co-sharer. Once it is held that the plaintiff was the adoptive son, and the property was the self acquired property of deceased Kesu. The plaintiff would be entitled for the said property. 6. In the light of the same, no substantial question of law arises. As such, Second Appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. [S.V. GANGAPURWALA] JUDGE SDM*536.10SA/151110