IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR w.P.(S)N0. LIN? /2010 PETITIONER Ku.Jyanti Kujur D/o Lat6 Shri 7 \D \4 Mangaru Kujur, Aged about 45 years, Presently working on the' post of Supervisor, Sector — Dumarkachar integrated Child development, Project — Pali, Distt. Korba~(C.G.) VERSUS RESPONDENTS 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through — The Department of Woman and Child Development, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur, Distt.Raipur—(C.GL.) 2. ‘ District Programme Offlcer, Woman and Child Development, Korba, Distt. Korba—(C.G.) 3. The Project Officer, integrated Child Development Project Pali, Distt. Korba—(C.G.) 4. Pratibha Singh Bais Supervisor, Sector Sapalwa Integrated Child / /0 W Developm€nt Project — Pah', Distt. Korba—(C.G.) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AFR R HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S2 NO. 4119 OF 2010 PETITIONER Ku. Jyanti Kujur Versus State of'Chhattisgarh & Others RESPONDENTS Post for pronouncement of the order on 24 a day of January, 2011 Sd/- ' ‘3 Satish K. Agnihotrl I Judge HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S) NO. 41 19 OF 2010 PETITIONER Ku. Jyanti Kujur Versus RESPONDENTS State of Chhattisgarh & Others (Writ petitions under Articie 226 of the Constitution of India) Single Bench : Hon’ble ShriSatish K. Agnihotri, J. Present :— Shri A.N. Pandey. Advocate forthe petitioner. Shri P.K. Bhaduri, Panel Lawyer for the State/ respondents No.1 to 3. Shri Pankaj Shrivastava, Advocate for the respondent No.4. O R D E R (Delivered on this 2L; gay of January, 2011) 1. Chailenge in this petition is to the order dated 15.7.2010, whereby the petitioner, alongwith 111 more officers, has been transferred as Supervisor from Sector Dumarkachar Integrated, Child Development Project — Pali, District Korba, to Project Podi-Uprora, District Korba, .against the post of Assistant Project Officer, on administrative grounds. 2. The indisputable facts, in nutshell, are that the petitioner is working on the post of Supervisor, Sector Dumarkachar Integrated Child‘ Development Project, Pali and she has been transferred to Project Podi-Uprora on administrative grounds. The respondent No.4 working as Supervisor, Sector Sapalwa Integrated Child Development Project- Pali, District Korba, has been transferred in‘ her place in Sector v Dumarkachar, within the same district on her own expenses. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the transfer of'the petitioner is malafide exercise of power, as the same was passed to accommodate the respondent No.4, who has been transferred on her own expenses in place of the petitioner. Shri Pandey, further submits that transfer of the respondent No.4 allegedly ' on her representation to the place of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the service rules. The respondent No.4 has been transferred on probation period within 2 months of herappointment and the petitioner was posted, as a consequence against the post of Assistant Project Officer, Project Podi-Uprora. It is further contended .7 {9 that during probation period, a Supervisor cannot be transferred from once place to another place. 4. On the other hand, Shri Bhaduri, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for ' the State/ respondents No.1 to 3 submits that the petitioner alone has not been chosen for transfer and in the transfer list of 112 employees, almost 50% have been transferred on their own expenses. The transfer is an incidence of service and the petitioner, except the selfsame statement that it was irregular and arbitrary has not produced any documents to establish the allegation of malafide. Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent No.4‘submits that it is not a case of single transfer, 112 employeeSwhave been t. transferred, out of them 50% have been transferred on their request: The petitioner was given only the charge of Dumarkachar on 19.5.2010. The petitioner was originally posted at Tiwarta in Pali Project itself since, 1994. By the instant transfer, the petitioner has been transferred to Podi-Uprora Project, which is only 40-45 km away. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the =\\ pleadings and documents appended thereto, it is established that it is 7 not a single case of transfer. The petitioner was transferred alongwith 111 more officers, wherein 50% persons were transferred on their own expenses, may be on the basis of representations. It is well-settled that transfer is an incidence of service and it is for the employer to decide asto where a particular officer/employee be posted, keeping in view public interest as well as administrative exigency. This Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer matter except in the cases of proved mala fide, non- competence of authority passing the transfer order and not being in conformity with the rules and regulations. 8. The petitioner has failed to establish and prove her contention in reference to malafide exercise of power, except making self same statement. The petitioner/employee cannot be permitted to remain at one place ferever. Under the provisions of service rules, employer r has all the powers to post an employee at a particular place in view of public interest and administrative exigency. (See E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and.another7, Union of India and another v. Janardhan Debanath & anotherz, State of MP. and another v. S.S.Kourav and othersa and Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. & Others"). The Supreme Court, in Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey & Others5, held that “In a matter of transfer of a government employee, scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly, be it at interim stage or 1 1974 (4) scc 3 2 (2004) 4 scc 245 3 (1995) 3 SCC 270 4 (2007) 8 SCC 150 s (2009) 8 SCC 337 final hearing. This is so because the courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer". This Court, in Aalekh Kumar Devta v. State of C.G. & Others6, after reiying on the decisions of the Supreme Court, in Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. South Eastern Railway & Others7, Rajendra Roy v. Union of India & Anotherg, K.Narayanan & Others v. State of Karnataka & Othersg and State of U.P. & Others v. Siyaram & Another” held that the Couns shouid not substitute decisions of the management in case of transfer made on the ground of administrative exigency and public interest, except in the case of proved mala fide in exercise of powers or violation of statutory provisions. 11. Further, the Supreme Court, in Purushottam Kumar Jha v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others", has settled the legal position in reference to allegation of mala fide, observing as under: “23. It is well settled that whenever allegations as to mala fides have been leveled, sufficient particulars and cogent materials making out prima facie case must be set out in the pleadings. Vague allegations or bald assertion that the action taken was mala fide and malicious is not enough. In the absence of material particulars, the court is not expected to make the ‘fishing’ enquiry into the matter. It is equally well established and needs no authority that the burden of proving mala tides is on the is on the person making the allegations and such burden is ‘very heavy’. Malice cannot be inferred or assumed. It has to be remembered that such a charge can easily be “made than made out” and hence it is necessary for the courts J examine it with extreme care, caution and circurnspection. It has been rightly described as ‘the iast refuge of a losing litigant’. (Vide Gulam Musz‘afa v. State of Maharashtra; Ajit Kumar rt’r‘g v. GM (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd)” 6 2005 (2)CGLJ 160 7AIR 1985 sc 482 3 AIR 1993 sc 1236 9 AIR 1994 sc 5'5‘ lo ll (2004) 7 scc 405 (2006) 9 scc 453 12. Having considered the above state facts and the judicial pronouncements, the allegation of petitioner that the impugned order ' is passed to accommodate the respondent No.4 cannot held to be a reason for interference, unless it is proved that the transfer of the petitioner was done in malafide exercise of power. ln the case on hand, the petitioner has failed miserably to establish any malafide and accommodation of the other employee by transfer of the petitioner‘ it cannot be held as a ground for interference with the impugned transfer order. lf accommodation of another employee has been done in exercise of malafide power, in that event‘ alone, the V accommodation of other employee may be a ground for interference by the Court. The averments‘ that the petitioner and the respondent No.4 were on probation and there should not be a transfer for a period of 2 years is rejected,on the simple reason that there is no such condition in the order dated 2.5.2010 (Annexure P-3), whereby the petitioner and respondent No.4 were appointed as Supervisors on temporary basis, on probation of two years. lt is also not a case of the petitioner that the petitioner has been posted against the post, which is not equal to the post of Supervisor and amounts to reduction in“the post or reduction in salary. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the writ petition is dismissed. No order asto costs. / / /’/ Sdl* satish ’ ’ 7i K. AgnihOtr‘ E. Judge ashok