^^^^^ Sia£S IN TME HI^H COURT QF ^TUDICATL'RE ATBIl.ASPUR PE?nTIONER: 'Non-applicant) <y \< CIVIL REVISION N0. 1V'^ /2008 ^njj Ambwani, son of Shri Chandulal Ambwani, aged about 30 years, resident of Tenaht of House No.39/315 Kanhe Bada, Tatyapara, Kamasi Para Road, Raipur. \^y. ^sc--'' ^"^^" f^ Vs .pplicant) v^!^k. -•^^•^•••••^} AA 'f^ •^w"'. ^gfnt: Vimla Bai, wJdow of Late Kamlgkar .Rao Waritwar, resiaent df Shukrawari Bazar, Near Sudhiyarj Municipal Hthd i S choo 1, Tehs i I <& Distr ict Rdipur. ' ' PETITION UNDERiSE<£TION~;Z3 ) OF THE IHATTIS6ARH ACCOMO&ATION CONTROL ACT. 1961 II f w «^1.• Smt. Usha Waretwar, Wd/o Late Ashok Waretwar, aged about 50 years R/o ,y Riddhi Siddhi R^sidency, House No. 1 St. './' Xaviers School Road, Avanti Vihar, Raipur C (C.G.) (Daughter inlawofdeceased respondent) %.' • Smt NaUni Waretwar, widow of Late Sharad Waretwar, aged about 43 years, resident ofFlat No.12, Building No. 16, Adjacent K.D.K. Engineering College, Jagnade Chowk, Venkatesh Nagar, Nagpur (MS.) (Daughter in law ofdeceased respondent) 3- • Chandrakant Waretwar, S/o Late Kamlakar Rao Waretwar, aged about 46 years, Resident of Quarter No. 1481, Block No. 2, Kaveri Vihar, Jamnipali, Korba (C.G.j (Son of deceased respondent) th( ^/r^ H 'i8,^as*iscs-. a HIGHCOURT OF CHHATTISGARH: BILASPUR Civil Revision No. 117of 2008 PETITIONER: (Non-applicant) RESPONDENT: (Applicant) -Versus- Anil Ambwani Smt. Vimla Bai (since deceased) through her legal representatives. POSTFOR ORDER ON v^" AUGUST.2011 Sd/- Prashant Kumar Mishra Judge -"<"!: '.'r' .:i^ •;';'^' HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH: BIL.Ai. z^ Civil Revision No.117 of 2008 PETITIONER: (Non-applicant) RESPONDENT: (Applicant) -Versus- Anil Ambwani Smt. Vimla Bai (since deceased) through herlegal representatives. Present: Shri B.P. Sharma, counsel forthe petitioner. Shri Sachin Singh Rajput with Shri Anant Bajpai, counsel for the respondent. ORDER (Passed on 3.^'tt*August, 2011) Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. 1. This civil revision under Section 23-E of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been preferred by the tenant questioning the legality, validity, propriety and correctness of the impugned order of eviction passed against him by the Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur. 2. The respondent landlady preferred an application under Section 23-A of the Act for the petitioner's eviction from the suit premises situated at Shukrawari Bazar within the municipal corporation area of Raipur bearing House No.290/20. The said non residential premiseswas let out to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs.625/- after executing rent note on 1-6-2004 for the period till 30th May, 2005. According to the landlady, tenancy came to an end on 30 May, 2005, as the tenancy was not extended thereafter. However, in spite of repeated oral requests, the tenant failed to vacate the premises even after informing i,that the landlady needs the premises for her personal need. The legal jS ^^ notice dated 2-5-2005 was served on the tenant seeking delivery of vacant possession, however, the tenant did not comply with the request made in the notice. It was stated in the application that the landlady, an old aged widow, needs the premises for the business which will be carried along with her daughter-in-law Smt. Usha Waretwar, widow of late Ashok Waretwar and her grand son and tosatisfy the said need, she has no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in Raipur town. 3. After seeking leave to defend, the tenant filed his reply, inter alia, pleading that he is in possession of the premises since 1983and not from June, 2004 as pleaded by the landlady. It was further stated that the landlady wanted to increase the rent from Rs.625/- to Rs.2,000/-, however, on the tenant's refusal, the instant eviction petition has been preferred only to harass him and that prayer for eviction for the need of someone else is not maintainable. In para-11 of the reply, itwas stated that the landlady's pleading that she needs the premises to carry on the business along with her daughter-in-law and grand son is denied and that she has an alternative accommodation which is available in the same suit premises. It was also stated that her grandson is in Government service, therefore, the need is not bonafide. 4. To substantiate her prayer for eviction, the landlady examssted herself and her witness Laxman Rao Channawar. On the other hand,the tenant examined himself and his witnesses namely, Mohd. Salim, Budhram Nirmalkar and ChandulalAmbwani. The landlady proved the \ rent note dated 1-6-2004 as Ex.-P/1, its reply by the tenant as Ex.-P/2 ""and the legal notice as Ex.-P/3. .,f',f^-.l I 1 ^ ;<s®N|J J. 5. The Rent Controlling Authority had earlier framed the issues and after recording the evidence, has passed the impugned order of eviction, inter alia, holding that the applicant/landlady is entitled to seek eviction as she has proved the need of her daughter-in-law and that to satisfy the said need, she has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in Raipurtown. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the eviction application under Section 23-A of the Act was not maintainable because the need of daughter-in-law is not covered under Section 23-A(b) of the Act. He would further submit that the present application for eviction has not been filed within one year from the date of death of original landlady, therefore, the eviction petition was not maintainable for the need of daughter-in-law and in any case, the daughter-in-law having not been examined, the need is not proved. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the landlady/respondent arguedthat on true eonstructionsof the pleadings made in the eviction application, it would appear that the projected need is for landlady herself and for her daughter-in-law and grandson because in para-11 of the eviction application, it has been pleaded that the landlady needs the premises to carry on business along with her widowed daughter-in-law and grandson and thus, even if the finding has been recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority that the need of daughter-in-law is proved, it was the need of landlady along with daughter-in-lawand grandson which has been proved. He refers to the statement made by the landlady before the \Aent Controlling Authority. 8. Though in the application for eviction, the landlady has stated that she needs the premises for her own need which will be satisfied by opening business along with her daughter-in-law and grandson, yet in her statement, she says that the projected need is for widowed daughter-in- law, her husband (major son ofthe landlady) having died in 1997. Though in a proceeding for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority, a widow is entitled to move an application for evictionand the daughter-in-law of the landlady is a widow and she could have moved an application for eviction, as it has come in the evidenee that the suit house is ancestral property and in that view of the matter, after the death of her husband, the daughter-in-law also becomes a co-owner of the suit accommodation, yet since in the present case, the eviction application was moved by the landlady (mother-in-law of Smt. Usha Waretwar, widow of Ashok Waretwar) and not by her daughter-in-law, this Court shall consider the question as to whether the daughter-in-law would be a person for whose need the non residential accommodation can be got vacated under Section 23-A(b) of the Act or whether the need of the widowed daughter-in-lawwould be treated as the need of the landlady? 9. To consider the question as to whether a widowed daughter-in-law would be covered as a person for whose need the landlady can seek an order ofeviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Act, few provisions of the Act needs to be referred and are reproduced hereunder:- "Section 2 (e) of theAct defines the term "member of the family". '2(e):- "member of the family" in case of any 1 person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, '! ' 1 father, grand father, mother, grand mother, brother, unmarried sister, patemal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow, or brothers son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependent on him.' Section 23-A(b) of the Act, which is in pah materia to the provisions contained inSection12 (1)(f) ofthe Act is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- '23-A(b). that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his businessor that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned: Provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest thereih by transfer, no application for eviction of tenanf of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition.' lO.While considering the issue within thesweepof the above quoted provision, certain decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the similar legislations of the other States needs to be referred. In the matter of Dwarkaprasad V. Niranjan and another , the Supreme Court has observed that ground of eviction has to be liberally construed and a beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. Similarly, in the matter of Kailash Chand and another V. Dharam Das , it has been held that there is always ascope \^for the Court to interpret the law with a pragmatismconsistent with the t4 Supreme Court Cases 549 ?5 SUPREME COURT 2362 demand of varying situations and life is not static and so the law cannot afford to be static. 11.8efore this Court proceeds to decide the question as to whether a widowed daughter-in-law would be coveredas a personfor whose need the landlady can seek an order of eviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Act or as to whether the need of widowed daughter-in-law can be construed as landlady's personal need for continuing or starting his business or as to whether a widowed daughter-in-law being widow ofa major son of the landlady can be held to be covered within the term "major son", this Court shall refer to a few earlier decisions of the Supreme Court dealing withsimilarlegislations ofother States. 12. In the matter of Joginder Pal V. Naval Kishore Behal , while dealing with and interpreting the expression "For his own use" in Section 13 (3) (a)(ii) of the East Punjab UrbanRent Restriction Act, 1949, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning and that the requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself reqyire accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himselfphysically occupy the premises. It has been held'in paras-23 and 31 ofthejudgmentthus:- "23. We are of the opinion that the expression 'for his own use' as occurring in Section 13 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. Theexpression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The \ requirement is not the requirement ofthe landlord alone \ in the sense that the landlord must for himself require •( . : . the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he 1256 ^<^ 11 xisaaSs;i '< must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have found the pari materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependents and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be.obligation ofthe landlord tosettle a personclosely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall withcircumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close inter- relation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid tests to the factsof the present ease it is clear that thetenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who isa chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is notgoingto letout the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the sonwould be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is thelandlord who requires the premises for hisson and in substance the user would be by landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii)oftheAct. 31. We have already noticed that the purpose of the Act is to restrict increase of rent and the evictionof tenants in urbanareas. Still the Legislature has taken care to provide grounds for eviction, one of them being the requirement of the landlord. We have to strike a balance betweenthe need of protecting the tenahts from unjustified evictions and theneed foreviction when ground for eviction is one such as the requirement of the landlord. If we do not meaningfully construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable.arbitrary or as placinguncalled for andunreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to holdand use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own use' in such a way as to deny the landtord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words 'for his V pwn use' in Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) oftheAct." Jryss^. ff .' i ^s^'^-^ (i| ^^^^iS^'.'S 3 13. In the matter of Dwarkaprasad (Supra), while interpreting the word "for occupation by himself inSection 13(1)(g)of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and while holding that the need for settling the landlord's son and younger brothers in business would amount to landlord's own need, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras-15,16 and 18 thus:- "15. A beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. The term "family" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations ofthe head of the family. A Division Bench ofthe Bombay High Court in Kanhaiyalal V. Bapurao {(1989) 1 Al RCJ 161} held that the term "family" must always be liberally and broadlyconstrued so as to includenear relatives ofthe head of the family. It would include not only the members of the landlord's family but also those persons who are dependent on him and whose responsibility he has accepted. 16. A latest decision of thisCourt in Joginder Palv. Naval Kishore Behal {(2002) 5 SCC 397} to which one of us (R.C. Lahoti, J.) was a party takes the same view. In fact, this judgment contains a detailed resume of the entire case-law on this pointand holds that the expression "for his own yse" occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) ofthe East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 has to be liberally construed and should be given a wide and useful meaning rather than a strict and narrow construction. The requirement of a member of the family of the landlord who is dependent on the 1 landlord for purposes of residence or for economic jconsideration can be considered as a requirement of ; the landlord. 10 18. In the case in hand, the landlord is the head ofthe family being the eldest amongst the brothers. All the brothers and sisters including the mother of the landlord live with him as members of the joint Hindu family. TRs his obligation to settle his younger brothers in business as it is hisobligation to settle his children in business. Therefore, he can legitimately seek eviction of a tenant by pleading that he needs the demised premises to settle hisson and hisyounger brothers in business. This being the legal position, the condusion is inevitable i.e. the plaintiff landlord must succeed and a decree for eviction is liable to be passed in his favour for the entire demised premises. Accordingly this appeal isallowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court which has granted only a decree for half portion of the suit premises is hereby modified. The landlord is held entitled to a decree for possession ofthe entire demised premises. The decree for possession passed by the lower appellate court with respect to the entire suit premises is hereby restored. The respondents are granted three month'stime tovacate the suit premises and hand over its peaceful vacant possession to the plaintiff landlord. Parties are left to bear their respective costs." l4.Yet again, in the matter of Kailash Chand and another (Supra),the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while interpreting the word "bonafide requirement of landlord's own occupation" occurred in Section 14 (3)(a)(i) of the H.P.Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, has held in para-25 of the judgment thus:- "25. The expression 'his ownoccupation' as occurringin sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) isnot to -be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. 'His own 11 occupation' does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. The expressions "for his own use" and "for occupation by himself as occurring in two other Rent Control Acts, have come up for the consideration of this Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 and Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan and another, (2003) 4 SCC 549. It was hetd that the requirement of members of family of the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the landlord, is the landlord's own requirement. Regard will be had to the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region to which the landlord belongs, while interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the family members for residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for 'his own occupation'. 15. In Section 23-A(b) of the Act also, the Legislature has used the words "his business", meaning thereby that the accommodation can be got vacated by the landlord for continuing or starting his own business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting the word "his own business" occurring in different States' Legislations in the aforesaid matters, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the need of the widowed daughter-in-law would be the need of the landlady herself and thus, eviction application filed by thelandlady for the need of widowed daughter-in-law was maintainable. le.There is yet another way of dealingwith the case to decide as to whetherthe need ofwidowed daughter-in-law would be covered forfiling application for eviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Act. f .^c ^ ^. 1 ^%s??^%?-> ^^^.'•.5:^ %^^K.^;ffiM ^^.- ^ ^.'^E.'SSSS'S 12 l7.Concededly, a landlord/landlady can seek eviction of a non-residential premises under Section 23-A(b) ofthe Act if the need of his/her major son is proved. The approach for considering whether a widowed daughter-in-law of a major son would be covered within the term "major son" itself in the context and the area of operation in which the legislation in question deals, needs to be guided by principles of interpretation. The words in a statute are to be interpreted or defined in the context in which they are used in the legislation and the same cannot be construed in vacuum. It is true that ordinary rule of construction is toassign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries, but the concept of legislation and the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure from the rule of literal construction. Following commentary from the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by JusticeG.P.Singh(12th Edition, 2010, at page 94-95) dealing with the issue "explanation of the rule of literal construction" would guide this Court to decide the question in hand. "In the statement of the rule "the epithets 'natural', 'ordinary', 'literal', grammatical' and 'popular' are employed almost interchangeably", to convey the same idea. The word 'primary' is also used in the same sense. When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, what is meant is that the words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relatjaft. to the subject-matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in thestatute. BRETT, M.R. called ita "cardinal rule" that "Whenever you have to construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere ordinary general Ineaning of the words, but according to the ordinary 13 ^ meaning of the words as applied to the subject-matter with regard to which they are used". "No word", says PROFESSOR H.A SMITH "has an absolute meaning, for no words can be defined in vacuo, or without reference to some context". According to SUTHERLAND there is a "basic fallacy" in saying "that words have meaning in and of themselves", and "reference to the abstract meaning of words", states CRAIES, "ifthere be any such thing, is oftitle value in interpreting statutes". In the words of JUSTICE HOLMES: "A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged; it is theskin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it isused." Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are "slippery customers". Therefore, in determining the meaning of any word of phrase in a statute the first question to be asked is - "What is the naturalor ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase". The context, as already seen, in the construction of statutes means the statutes as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. The above discussion relating to the meaning of a word or phrase in the constructionof a statute has been approvingly quoted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases." \ 18. In Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation , l^ Lord Greene observed thus:- ,AII ER 995, 998 14 "The first thing one has to do, 1 venture to think, in construing words in a section of an Act of Parliament is not to take those words in vacuo so to