:1: IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL CIVIL CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND SECOND SECOND APPEAL NO. 33 OF 2008 APPEAL NO. 33 OF 2008 APPEAL NO. 33 OF 2008 Vimal Ramesh Jadhav. ... Appellant. V/s. Narayan Yeshwant Patil (since deceased by his heirs) Rukmini w/o. Narayan Patil & Ors. ... Respondents. Ms. Manisha Shekhar i/b. J. Shekhar & Co. for the Appellant. None for the Respondents. CORAM CORAM CORAM : A.S. OKA, J. : A.S. OKA, J. : A.S. OKA, J. DATE DATE DATE : 26TH FEBRUARY, 2008. : 26TH FEBRUARY, 2008. : 26TH FEBRUARY, 2008. P.C. P.C. P.C. : : : . Heard Advocate for the Appellant. The Appeal is filed by the Original Plaintiff. 2. According to the case of the Appellant, the Respondents who were involved in money lending business got a sale deed executed from the Appellant on 2nd May 1979. It is the case of the Appellant is that her date of birth as reflected in the register of births is 20th September 1963 and therefore, the alleged sale deed was got executed when the Appellant was a minor. The Second submission of the Appellant is that the sale deed was illegal and void. The subject matter of the sale deed was already mortgaged in favour of a co-operative society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The third contention was that the transfer was :2: hit by the provisions of Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. The Trial Court decreed the suit. However, Trial Court held that the suit transaction was of outright sale as averred by the Respondents. The Trial Court negatived the challenge on the ground of bar of the Section 48 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 as well as the bar of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. However, the Trial Court accepted the case that the sale deed was executed during the minority of the Appellant. Therefore, the Trial Court proceeded to pass a decree for possession. The only ground on which the Appellate Court has interfered is that the Appellant has not established that she was a minor on the date of execution of the sale deed. 3. The submission of the learned Advocate for the Appellant is that the extract of register of births shows that the date of birth is 20th September 1963 which was conclusive and only on the basis of purported admissions of the Appellant, the Appellate Court could not have discarded the case of the Appellant that she was born on 20th September 1963. Inviting my attention to the findings recorded by the Trial Court, she pointed out that even the Trial Court accepted that at the time of the execution of the sale deed, there was already a charge created in favour of a co-operative society. Therefore, it was submitted that in view of Section 48 of the said :3: Act of 1960, the sale deed is void. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions. According to the case of the Appellant, her date of birth is 20th September 1963. The Appellate Court referred to her cross-examination in which she stated that she married in the year 1972. If her date of birth was 20th September 1963, then obviously, the Appellant got married when she was only 9 years old. The Appellate Court referred to the statement on oath of the Appellant. According to her, she was 15 years old at the time of the execution of the sale deed. The sale deed discloses her age as 22 years. The suit was filed in the year 1987 wherein her age is disclosed as 25 years. Considering the aforesaid factual aspects, the Appellate Court has rightly disbelieved the case of the Appellant that she was born on 20th September 1963 and therefore, as on 2nd May 1979, she was a minor. In so far as the second submission is concerned, the Trial Court has rightly relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Narayan Kisan Gade v/s. Macchindranath Kundalik Tarade (1994 Mh.L.J. 558) and held that the Appellant who has herself executed the sale deed cannot question the sale deed on the ground of bar of Section 48 of the said Act of 1960. 5. No substantial question of law arises. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE