THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI C.R.P. NO :892 of 2009 Date: BETWEEN: Smt. Habeeb Begum and another. … Petitioners And M/s. Indo Burma Petroleum Co. Ltd., Secunderabad and others. … Respondents THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI C.R.P.No. 892 of 2009 JUDGMENT: This revision petition is directed against the order of the learned V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad made in I.A. No. 1639 of 2007 in O.S. No. 1660 of 1996, dated 11.2.2008. Briefly stated the facts are that the petitioners filed the aforementioned suit against the respondent-defendant company seeking eviction of the respondent-defendant from the petition schedule premises; for arrears of rent, mesne profits and mandatory injunction. While opposing the plaint averments, the respondent filed written statement before the trial Court on 24.6.1968. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners filed I.A. No. 1639 of 2007 under Order XII Rule 6 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. in the said suit seeking to decree the suit in their favour basing on the admission made by the respondent in para-3 of the written statement, which was filed on 24.6.1998. While opposing the said I.A., the respondent filed counter in the said I.A. The trial Court, through the impugned order dismissed the I.A. on the ground that the petitioners can agitate the said contention during the course of trial and they can seek such a relief after completion of full trial and accordingly declined to grant the relief as sought. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners field the present revision. Sri C. Masthan Naidu, learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that the respondent took the suit schedule premises on lease in the year 1967 on a monthly rent of Rs. 350/- for a period of twenty years with an option to renew the same for a further period of twenty years. He would further state that even after expiry of the original period of tenancy and also the renewal period, the respondent has not vacated the premises and on the other hand is enjoying the premises by paying a meagre rent of Rs. 350/- per month. Since the petitioners filed the suit for eviction of the respondent from the suit schedule property and since the respondent is in possession of the entire property even after the expiry of the period of tenancy and in view of the admission made by the respondent in the written statement filed by him on 24.6.1998 about the termination of lease, the trial Court ought to have allowed the present I.A. and passed the decree basing on the said admission. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in UTTAM SINGH DUGAL AND CO. vs. UNION BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS ([1]) and CHARANJIT LAL MEHRA AND OTHERS vs. SMT. KAMAL SAROJ MAHAJAN AND OTHERS([2]). He, therefore, prayed that the revision petition be allowed by setting aside the impugned order. While opposing the said contentions, Sri Deepak Battacharjee, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that the averments made in the written statement cannot be construed as an admission with regard to expiry of the lease. The counter further states that during the pendency of the suit, an application bearing I.A. No. 1461 of 2007 was filed by M/s. Filvel Station, Bahadurpura stating that the property was sold by the land lady to M/s. G.M. Avenues Pvt. Ltd., seeking to implead it as a party to the suit proceedings. Likewise, M/s. G.M. Avenues Pvt. Ltd., also filed an implead application before the trial Court seeking to implead itself as a party to the said proceedings on the ground that the petition schedule premises has been sold by the petitioners to it and it is the owner of the said premises. The respondent further states that it was also permitted by the trial Court to file an additional affidavit to that effect and the same was also filed on 12.3.2008. In the said additional affidavit, the respondent specifically stated that after expiry of the option period on 14.2.2007, the lease has become monthly and no steps have been taken by the petitioner to determine the lease by causing statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even according to the petitioners, the lease expired on 14.2.2007 and therefore the relief sought in the plaint itself has become ifnructuous. Since the tenancy between the petitioner and respondent stood attorned, the petitioners are neither owners nor possessors of the property in question. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. There is no dispute about the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. There is also no dispute about the fact that the respondent has taken lease of an extent of 2500 sq. yards of land equivalent to 22.500 sq. ft. out of the total land of 3600 sq. yards from the petitioners on payment of a monthly rent of Rs. 350/- per month for a period of 20 years with effect from 3.7.1964 and the remaining 1100 sq yards was in occupation of the petitioners. It is also seen from the record that on expiry of the original lease period, the tenancy was continued on monthly basis. However, when the respondent failed to pay the rents regularly and also encroached an area of 1100 sq. yards and constructed a room illegally, the petitioners issued notice dated 12.9.1996 calling upon the respondent to pay the arrears of rent from April, 1996 amounting to Rs. 2450/- and to vacate and handover the petition schedule premises by 4.11.1996 on the ground that they have terminated the tenancy. When the respondent did not vacate the suit schedule premises, the petitioners filed the aforesaid suit in O.S. No 1660/96 seeking eviction of the respondent and for the reliefs as stated supra. On a perusal of the written statement filed by the respondent, it is seen that in the said written statement the respondent did not deny about the issuance of legal notice dated 12.9.1996 by petitioners calling upon it to vacate the petition schedule premises. In fact, in para-3 of the written statement, the respondent clearly stated that in terms of Clause No.9 of the lease deed and in terms of the option period, the lease would expire on 14.2.2007. The petitioners while relying on the aforesaid averment of the respondent, filed the present I.A. for passing a decree in terms of the admission made by the respondent in the said written statement. In Uttam Singh’ case(supra-1), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Apex Court, while dealing with a similar case and in identical circumstances has observed thus: “As to the object of the Order XII, Rule 6 of C.P.C., we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled.” The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy Judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.” In fact, a similar issue has fell for consideration of the Apex Court in Charanjit Lal’s case. In that case, the Apex Court while referring to the judgment of Uttam Singh’s case cited supra, has observed thus: “In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending Rule 6 of Order 12, CPC it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled.” The Supreme Court should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Therefore, in the present case, as appearing to us, there is a clear admission on behalf of the defendnats that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenants, the rent is more than Rs.3500/- and the tenancy is joint and composite one. As such on these admitted facts, tehre is no two opinion in the matter and the view taken by the learned single Judge of the High Court appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere in this Special Leave Petition and the same is dismissed.” Therefore, in the present case, as appearing to us, there is a clear admission on behalf of the defendants that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenants, the rent is more than Rs. 3500/- and the tenancy is joint and composite one. As such on these admitted facts, there is no two opinion in the matter and the view taken by the learned single Judge of the High Court appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere in this Special Leave Petition and the same is dismissed.” Unequivocally, the object of Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment basing on the admission of the defendant. In the instant case, there is a clear admission by the respondent in the written statement about the jural relationship of landlord and tenant and about the expiry of the lease period. Therefore, while keeping in view the object of Order XXII Rule 6 of C.P.C. and the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court cited supra, I deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the trial Court for passing fresh orders in the I.A. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed and the order in I.A. No.1639 of 2007 is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the trial Court for passing appropriate orders afresh. The trial Court shall now hear and dispose of I.A. No.1639 of 2007 as well as the suit in O.S. No. 1660 of 1996, as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order in accordance with law, after giving due opportunity of hearing to both the parties. ___________________ T.MEENA KUMARI,J Date: 3.12.2009 pnb [1] AIR 2000 SC 2740 [2] AIR 2005 SC 2765