* 1 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO. 470 OF 2007 1. Shri.Rambhau Sahadu Dhurjad 2. Shri.Kashinath Sahadu Dhurjad .........Appellants(Orig.Defds no.3 and 4) V/S. 1. Sindhubai Tukaram Tupe } 2. Leela Tukaram Tupe } 3. Shaila Tukaram Tupe } ..........Resps no.1 to 3/Orig.Plffs. 4. Shri.Bahinaji Anaji Tupe } 5. Shri.Pandurang Bahinaji Tupe } .......Resps. no.4 & 5/Orig.Defds no.1 & 2 6. Mirabai Pandit Devkar } 7. Vimal Nivrutti Sonawane } 8. Kamal Dattu Tajanpure } ......Resps no.6 to 8/Orig.Defds no.5 to 7 9. Balu Pandurang Tupe } 10. Jijabai Pandurang Tupe } 11. Jijabai Bahanu Tupe } 12. Kachru Balwant Tupe } ..........Resps no.9 to 12/Orig.Defds no.8 to 11 -------- Mr.S.M.Gorwadkar, adv. for appellants. Mr.Umesh Mankapure, adv.for respondents no.1 to 3. * 2 * Mr.R.M.Haridas i/by.Mr.P.N.Joshi, adv.for respondents no.5 to 8. CORAM : SMT.R.P.SONDURBALDOTA, J. DATED :7 th OCTOBER, 2009. P.C. : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for partition of joint family properties and separate possession. 3. The appellants are original defendants no.3 and 4 who had been subsequently impleaded to the suit as they had purchased one of the joint family properties during the pendency of the suit. Respondents no.1 to 3 are the original plaintiffs. Respondents no.4 and 5 are original defendants no.1 and 2. Respondents no.6 to 8 are original defendants no.5 to 7. Respondents no.9 to 12 against whom the Second Appeal is dismissed are original defendants no.8 to 11. Respondents no.1 and 2 filed a suit for partition expressing an apprehension therein that respondent no.4 was likely to dispose off the joint family properties, so as to, deprive them of their share in the same. The apprehension turned out to be true. Respondent no.4 sold some of the properties to the appellants and respondents no.11 and 12. Therefore, the plaint came to be amended in order to add the purchasers as parties to the suit. The appellants are purchasers of the * 3 * property being agricultural land at Gat No.249. In their written statement they claimed an equitable relief that the land purchased by them be alloted during the actual partition, by metes and bounds, to respondent no.4, so that the transaction of sale in their favour in not affected. 4. The trial court by its judgment and order dated 26th July 2000, decreed the suit for partition by granting 1/3rd share in all the properties in favour of respondents no.1 to 3. On the claim of the appellants, it gave a finding that the appellants are entitled to equitable relief in allotting the land at Gat No.249 to them, at the time of actual partition, by metes and bounds. The decree of the trial court was challenged by the appellants and respondents no.4 and 5 by filing Civil Appeal No.353 of 2000 in the District Court, Nasik. By the judgment and order dated 11th April, 2009, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal, but, modified the decree to grant share to respondents no.1 to 3 of 1/3rd + 1/15th in the suit properties. It also declared that all the transactions entered into by respondent no.4 in favour of the appellants and respondents no.11 and 12 are illegal having taken place during the pendency of the suit and as such not binding on respondents 1 to 3. 5. In this Second Appeal, the appellants are not joined by respondents no.4 and 5. Therefore, any dispute as regards nature of the properties and respective share of the family members therein is set at rest. The appellants herein who are purchasers pendente lite can have no issue over the same. Their claim lies * 4 * only in equity at the time of division of the property. 6. Mr.Gorwadkar, the learned counsel for the appellants submits relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Khemchand Shankar Choudhary and another V/s. Vishnu Hari Patil and Others reported in AIR 1983 S.C.page 124. that there is no bar for a transferee during pendency of a suit to ask for equitable partition of the land, so that their rights in respect of the land purchased are protected. The proceedings before the Apex Court arose out of rejection of an application by the Collector requesting for equitable distribution of the property by transferee pendente lite on the ground that they have no locus-standi to ask for an equitable allotment under Section 54 of Civil Procedure Code as their names did not figure in the decree. The Apex Court after observing that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, no doubt lays down that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in an immovable property which is the subject matter of the suit from any of the parties to the suit will be bound in so far as that interest is concerned by the proceedings in the suit, held as follows : .“ In the case of transferees pendente lite also, if there is no dispute, the Collector may proceed to make allotment of properties in an equitable manner instead of rejecting their claim for such equitable partition on the ground that they no locus standi. (emphasis supplied) ” 7. It is already seen that in the instant case, there is dispute raised by respondents no.1 to 3 as regards the transactions of sale entered into by * 5 * respondents no.4 and 5 during the pendency of the proceedings. The Appeal court has considered the dispute and held that the transactions of sale are hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the same are not binding on respondents no.1 to 3. It is patent from the record that the appellants were aware of the rights of respondents no.1 to 3. This becomes clear from Clause-24 of the Agreement under which respondents no.4 and 5 have indemnified the appellants against any objections that may be raised by the family members. Despite this awareness, the appellants purchased the land at Gat No.249. They are therefore bound by the decision in the suit. Besides, the right claimed by the appellants is only an equitable right. In the instant case, the equity is clearly in favour of respondents no.1 to 3 who otherwise would be deprived of share in the property at Gat No.249. In these circumstances, there is no error or illegality in the impugned order. No substantial question of law arises for consideration of the court. Hence, the Second Appeal is dismissed. [SMT.R.P.SONDURBALDOTA, J]