LWS lgAi/OE In the MJJ‘. state mministraztive Tribuna1,JABm(M.?.) 0.A. m@_/£71999. Baldau Prasad Dubey @ Baldeo Prasad Dubey, ears, R/O Sarsiwan, ?ost‘ Sarsiwm'x, Téahsil .Applicantw S O Shri Badri Prasad Dubey, aged zaba‘ut 39 Bilaigarh , Dist rict aaipurém .P .) Versus Responcmmsrl. The State sf iuaa'dhye:‘ Pradesh Tnmugh Secrtrkax‘yHribal, ’Harijan és; Ba Cicwwd Classes $elf51‘e Depézr‘cmam‘.) Evxamrala‘ya, Bhopal UmP.) 2. The mate of Madhya Erades’n ‘l‘nmugh Secretarywqmol Elducatien) iviantralaya, Bhgpaumy.) 3. The District Drganiser, The Tribal Welf54‘x‘e Bepartment, for Cbllector, iga-igarhumP .) 4. Tn'e Dy Dirscterk‘Education) Education @istri ct , man agQnunQlRaiWr) (The Then 3ishrict Education Of£icer) / Api;lication U/S 19 ‘of the Adrninistr3‘tive Tribunals mt, 198,5(Act No. 13 af 1985) Ds‘t i.” aslls ?‘aE-€icufars of th ’0‘; llcatlcn £‘h‘e 4111:;vlicéant: ('W i) Name: Baldau Frasad Dubey @ Baldeo Prasad Dubey. §nri Badri i~r&sad Dubey. Abcu't 39 Years” Name of £atner: ll ) \ iii) Age. iv) Paxticulars Dasign&tion & of Office Govt Ssalox'u Primary Kaianwiiaigarn) Scheol, where he was enploy ed.TanSil Mahsamund, District RaipurUmP.) zNqw gut gji affice: Ag. in Cau se—T it}. e.’ ‘3 ”Address for service Q‘f N3tic£35o J;r @ W AITQ$GARH : BILASPUR ) NO.1841I2005 Baldau Pmsad Dubey @ Baldeo Prasad Dubey Versus RESPONDguTS The Sate t of Madhya Pradesh and others Sigle Bwch: Hqnbh $Li M n ’ h aninm Mom! shfivasmva. J. Present: - hr s. P. Shana. osel for me paiitionor. Shr Ajit Singh, Pa'nel Lawyer fot the statelrespondenB. R (Pa n i of September, 201 0) By s petition, the petihfoner a thi ssails Iegality and validity of otdet dated 284 nnexure by hic ‘ 7-02-19 (A A-6). wh.,appointment of the petitioner has been canoelled. c the present case are that the petih'oner wa si ida ordet‘.dated.»06-02-1984 (Annexure A. gned order was passed on 27-02-1984 nnex — ntt of the petitioner was canoelled on the ongmat mark-sheet rt was found that the be In the name of Baldeo Prasad Dubey whereas mark-sheet has een sued In the name of Baidau Dubey The ptie that he is one. and the same person and correct na Batda Prasd Dubey Finally. when gnevance of the petlttoner was not redred the Instan sse t petrbon has been med 3) l oner" argued that correct name of me h J's clear from eartier appointment order issued y t PaentwRaigarh .on,17-01-19& (Annexure A- b he Tribal WetfareDerml HIGH COURT W CHH WRIT PETITION (S APPLICANT Si n cun i O ssed o ths “Hay (2) Facts neessary for decision, of s appointed as Asshnt Teacher V ‘4 5). However. soon thereafter, y impu (Aure AS) by which appoimen > ground that upon veritieatlon from the ' apporntment order has en issued b Is etionr made representationsstating hrs me is u a = ( Learned Mcounse for the petih p9§ti°netisBaIdautPrasad Dubey whic 2). Learned oounselfor the petitioneritefexredtp experieme oenificate (Annexum N3 & A-4) to submitthat Baldeo Prasad Dubey and Baldau Prasad Dubey are one and the same person and his sewices havenbeen tetminated in anarbihary manner without making proper enquiry and vermcation wim regardto the identity of the petitioner. He submits that several representations were made, but the same failed to evoke any response. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order of cancellation of appointment is violative of petitioner's fundamental right as the same has been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice. Other submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the appointment order, name has been wrongly recorded as Baldeo Prasad Dubey in place of Baldau Prasad Dubey and the respondents ought to have held proper enquiry and verification in this regard. He submit mat it was none of the fault of the petitioner, if wrong name was mentioned in me order of, appointment and it is not a case of fraud or misrepresentation by the petitioner. and therefore. the respondents ought to have reinstated the petitioner in service after making proper verification. Leamed counsel for the petitioner, in order to support his submissionplaeed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shravan Kumar Jha and Others vs. Stem of Bitter and Others, 1991 Suppl. (1) SOC 330 (DB). Jaswant Singh and Others vs. State ofMP. and Others. (2002) 9 Scc Z00. State of Bitter and omers vs. Krishna Paswan and another. (2008), ’13 soc 502 and state aruanarasnua a auras 3 . vs. Reshme Remeslr Meher and Another; (20,08) 5 Supreme 70-Day 224. (4) On the other hand. learned counsel for the respondents began his submission with strong objection with regard to maintainability of the instant petih'on by submitting that though cancellation of order of appoinhnent was issued on 27-02-1984 (Annexure Av6). the instant peo'tion has been med alter inordinate and unexplained delay of .15 years. He submits that in the absenee of @ there being any Wm explanatian on record. this pemion is liable to be dismissed only on ma ground of delay and laches. He further submit mat the petitioner chimed appointmentJn me name of Baldeo Prasad Dubey and on the basis of cettiticates of experience(Annexure A-3 & A-4). he was given appointment but at the time ofvven'hoation of his mark-sheet tot the purposes of verifying his qualification. it was revealed that the mark-sheet was issued in the name of Baldau Dubey. In view of the ,above discrepancy, services of the t petitioner were terminated. He, further submits» that inrthe eariier appointment order issued by the Department of TribaiWeifare. Raiarh on 17-01-1983 (Annexure A-2), name has been shown as Batdau Prasad Dubey S/o Badri Prasad Dubey. «resident of Baikunthpur. Raigarh whereas from subsequent order of appointment in the Department of $chool Education issued on 0&024984, the ’ person who: has: been appointed, is Batdeo Pmsad Dubey, resident of Vitlage & Post Sarsiwa: (Bilaigarh). it is further submitted that on the face of it. the discrepancy is apparentand it was the duty of the pewoner to submit proper experience cem'hcate in correct name. if he claimed that his correct name was Baidau and not Baldeo, thus. correct experience cerwicate ought to be submitted within the time sh‘pulated. Leamedrcounsel for the respondents submitted that canoellation of appointment otder of the petitioner heif was based on his own fault? (5) Beforeenterin'g into then'1erits of the case, specific objection raised by the ‘3 learned counsel for the respondents wihregard totdelay. in filing the instant petition, needs to beconsidered. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that at the time when the instant petitionwas med before the Tribunal, an application for condonation of delay in tiling thepetitipnwas aiso med. He further submiued that since the case involves violau'on of his fundamental right. delay would not come in the way of granting relief.,if otherwise on merit. heats entitied to such relief. Another submission is that cancellation of appolntmgnt order is continuing cause of action until he was re-in I led in sen/ice. lherefote. question of delay l would not come in the way. in older to buttress his submission, teamed counsel for the peitioner; placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Coon in the case of State of MP. vs. Bani Singh &,Another. ”90 (Suppl) SGC, 738, Krishna Naraln Shiv Pyare Dixit vs. State of M.P., 1985 M.P.L J. 343., From the enh‘re pleading made in the pou‘tionas also from the application for condonation of delay. it is clear that there, is no explanation as to why the ’ petitioner remained indolent and did not take recourse to, the remedy available under the law. From perusal ofthepetition, it is found that after cancellation of appointment order. the petitioner submitt d .a representation on 03-01-1994 as indicated on the tirst page, but on the second page date has been written as 03- 01-1984. which is apparently incorrect. as the appointment order was cancelled vide order dated 27-02-1984. Second representation tiled as Annexure A-lO was preferred in the month of October, 1994 and third representah‘on Annexure A-11 was preferred in the year 1995. Memo dated 18:09-1990 (Annexure A-9) shows - that metapetitioner's representation Was forwarded to the District Education Ofhcer, Mahasamund by the then sate Minister for necessary acu‘on. There is nothing on record to show that on those representab'ons. any order has been . passed by me respondents. Thus from the records. it was found mat from year ‘ 1984 to 1995. tltoughrepresentations were made by the pedtioner but the petitioner did not approach any Court of law except tiling the instant petition before the state Administrative Tribunal. which was functioning during that ,1 period. lt is too well settled that merely because. representations have been made that by iself, without there being any‘oircumstance justifying condonation of delay, would not constitute satisfactory explanation for delay. lt is to be noted that the present petition has been flied after 15 years of the issuance of tho cancellation of order of appointment. (6) Submission of Ieamed counsel for the petitioner is that cancellation of . appointment gave .him continuing wusetof action, cannot be accepted. Action of cancellation of appointment is one time action and cannot be said to be a continuing muse of action. Petib‘oner's submission regarding violanon of his fundamental right is based on the allegah'on that before issuing order of cancellation of his appointment, opponunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner resulting in violation of Article 14 of the Conetiluuon of India. Even such a ground could not be allowed,,to be agitated after such a long delay of 15 years. ‘ Though. this Courthas ample jurisdicbonto condone me delay of long period. what is required to be established by die petiioner is that delay is properly expiained. All thatthe petih‘oner has stated in the application for condonation of delay is that since it involves violation of fundamental right, this is a case of continuous wrong. delay deserves to be condoned. Therefore, l am of the considered opinion that there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay caused in tiling the instant petition. Reliance on the decision ofme supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Ban] Singh and another (supra) 's misplaced. The same is not applicable to. thefactual situation as obtaining in the present case. ln that case, screeningcommiltee had considered the case in 19794960 and the petition was nled before the stet’e Adminishative Tribunal in the year 1986 i.e. 3 after six years. The Tribunal had considered the aspea of delay and held that from the year 1980-86. tepresentah'on was pending and one representation was accepted and situau‘ons remained the same in the year 1982when setaction of the respondent therein was made with efect from 4‘“ March, 1982. In those circumshnces, the Supreme Court was not inclined to interfere win! the findings of the Tribunal. Situation in me present. case is entirely different. The inshnt 6 petition has been filed aftef 15 years and except that oerhin repmsenmtions wera made. the petitioner could not place on recovd material development on the part, of the respondents on the represenhtion of the petitioner. which may be taken as juslincation by the pelilioner to wai for such a longperiod before tiling of he instant petition. (7) The following ate senled ptinoiples as laid down in various deoisions: ln the use of Utteranohal Forest DevelopmentCorpn. And another vs. Jabar Singh and others. (2007) 2 SOC 112, it was observed as under: 43. The termination order was made in the ear 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly tiled in the year aner a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion. was not justined in entertaining the writ petib'on on the ground that the petition has been tiled after a dela of 1O years and that the writ petitions should have been dism seed by the High Court on the ground of ‘Iaches. Further, in the case of New DelhlMunlcIpaI Council v. Pan Slngh and othersJzwH QASWCCZIB, the Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to interference in oases where petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay as below: of. The 16 There esondents Is another her aspect led ot a the rit mauer tition which afte17 cannot yes. be tost Theyd 31 ht rp ein ti w pe r. ar % x did not claim p Kamamke Power CorpnLtd. v. K. The P) M In the case of P. s. Sadasivaswainy vsTState of Tami! Nadu, (1 975) 1 scc 152. it has been held as under:~ a o yR $ 7 ‘ "it is not that there i6 any period of limihtion fat me Coutts to exercise their powers under Anicle 226 nor is It tha there can never be a case whete the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passagejof a oertainiength of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226m me case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who sand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale clalms and ty to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should. therefore‘ have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of me Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also iw normal work. We consider that. the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition aswell as the appeal.“ ln the case of Bhoop Singh v. Unlon of India, (1992) 3 scc 138, it was held as under: B. There is another aspect of the matter. inordinate and unexplained delay or lashes is by half a ground to retuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his daim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justitied in ach'ng on thatbelief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be hlled promptly. A person cannot be pennitted to challenge me termination of his servioe after a period of twenty-two years. without any cogent explanation for the inordinate deiay. merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. (8) In view of the aforeGaid. authoritative, judicial pronouncement of the Supreme, Court invthe matter oftenieminingpetitions nled aher inordinate and unexplained delay. I am not inclipned to entertain this petition and thispetition is liable to be dismissed only onythée ground ofvdelay and lashes. Therefore, there is no need for thisCourt to enter into the meris of the case. (9) The petih‘on is accordingly dismissed. No orders as to cost , Sd/- Manindra M°han S / / . hrivastav’a"; Judge