IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA AND HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION No.14686 of 2009 Between: Palle Balamani. … Petitioner And 1. The Collector and District Magistrate, Medak,Medak District. 2. Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. By its Chief Secretary, General Administration (LAW & Order.II) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad. … Respondents. The Court made the following: HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA AND HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION No.14686 of 2009 ORAL JUDGMENT: - (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar) The detention of the petitioner’s husband by the order of the Collector and District Magistrate, Medak vide proceedings No.C1/52/2009 dated 31.03.2009, in exercise of powers under the A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug- Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, (Act 1 of 1986), confirmed by the Government of A.P. vide G.O.Rt.No.2061 dated 01.05.2009, is under challenge in this writ petition. The proceedings dated 31.03.2009, being the order of detention by the Primary Authority, disclose that the petitioner’s husband was detained, on the basis of six cases involving him, whereby the Detaining Authority came to the conclusion that his actions were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health. Out of the six instances cited as the grounds for detention, two pertain to the year 2006, one pertains to the year 2007, two pertain to the year 2008 and the last pertains to the year 2009, being relatable to the case detected on 18.03.2009 i.e., a mere two weeks before the passing of the detention order. All the instances relate to the possession/transport of illicitly distilled liquor which was unfit for human consumption. Ground No.3, relating to the instance of 2008, deals with a case where the petitioner’s husband was found in possession of I.D.liquor, which was detected in his house and in the scooter parked in front of the house. Ground Nos.4, 5 and 6 also pertain to detection of I.D.Liquor found in the possession of the petitioner’s husband. Sri Prabhakara Reddy, learned counsel, representing Sri Siddaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the order of detention passed by the District Collector, which was thereafter confirmed by the Government, is not sustainable in law, mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it is his case that the instances cited as the grounds of detention are isolated and are not proximate. Secondly, the learned counsel submitted that the brother of the detenue had filed a representation before the District Collector, Medak which was admittedly received on 13.04.2009, but the same was not considered by the authorities thereby rendering the order of detention illegal, being violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Per contra, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, representing the learned Advocate General, submitted that the order of detention by the Primary Authority was passed on 31.03.2009 and as per the provisions of Section 3(3) of Act 1 of 1986, such an order would remain in force only for a period of 12 days unless, in the meantime, it is approved by the Government. She submitted that the Government approved the order of detention dated 31.03.2009, under G.O.Rt.No.1723, General Administration (Law & Order.II) Department dated 08.04.2009. It was only thereafter that the petitioner’s husband’s brother made a representation to the Primary Authority, which bears the stamp of receipt showing the date as 13.04.2009. She would therefore submit that after the approval of the order of detention of the Primary Authority by the Government under Section 3(3) of Act 1 of 1986, the Primary Authority became functus officio and, therefore, the representation made by the petitioner’s husband’s brother to such authority could not be considered by the said authority. She also pointed out that the said representation was not made either to the Advisory Board or to the Government and, therefore, it cannot be contended that the authorities failed to discharge their functions, by ignoring the said representation. She also denied the contention that the instances were not proximate and were isolated. The material on record establishes that the Advisory Board confirmed the detention of the petitioner’s husband by its report dated 28.04.2009 and thereafter, the Government passed orders under Sections 12 r/w 13 of Act 1 of 1986, vide G.O.Rt.No.2061 dated 01.05.2009, confirming the order of detention and directing the petitioner’s husband to be detained for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention. A reading of the impugned G.O. clearly manifests that the Advisory Board, constituted under Section 9 of Act 1 of 1986, reviewed the case on 28.04.2009 and after hearing the detenu, his wife, i.e., the petitioner herein and after perusing the connected records and the representation submitted by the petitioner, the Board came to the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner’s husband. The G.O. further manifests that thereafter, the Government also independently took into consideration the entire material on record as is demonstrated by the language used in the G.O.: - “NOW, THEREFORE, after due consideration of the report of the Advisory Board and the material available on record, Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section-12 read with Section-13 of the said Act, hereby confirm the said Order of Detention, and direct that the detention of Sri Palle Srinivas @ Dabba Srinu, S/o.Ramulu, detenu, be continued for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention, i.e., 02.04.2009.” Sri Prabhakar Reddy, learned counsel, pointed out that the order of detention dated 31.03.2009 permitted the detenue to make a representation to the Detaining Authority, the Advisory Board and also the Government of A.P. He would, therefore, contend that it was open to the petitioner’s husband’s brother to make a representation to the detaining authority, the District Collector, Medak. He submitted that it cannot therefore be contended that the said authority had become functus officio. He placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Balagani Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P[1] in support of his contention that the non-consideration of the representation made by or on behalf of the detenue would render the detention unsustainable in law. However, a perusal of the said judgment would show that in that case, the representation made was placed on the file but was not considered. In those circumstances, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the order of detention was not sustainable in law. The Division Bench further held that the State Government alone, having approved the detention was empowered to revoke the order of detention, having become the detaining authority. The facts in the present case are not similar. The impugned G.O. clearly manifests that the representation made by the petitioner was considered by the Advisory Board, which also gave a personal hearing to both the petitioner and her husband, the detenue. Significant to note, the brother of the detenue did not even chose to appear before the Advisory Board along with the petitioner. Similarly, the G.O. also demonstrates that the Government not only considered the report of the Advisory Board, but independently assessed the material available on record, before coming to the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner’s husband was proper and correct. It is relevant to note that the detenue’s brother addressed his representation dated 13.04.2009 only to the District Collector, Medak and did not even choose to mark copies of the same to the Advisory Board and the Government. This was notwithstanding the Order of detention dated 31.03.2009 specifically stating that a representation could be made to all the three authorities. This representation was received on 13.04.2009 by the Collector’s office, as is evident from the stamp of receipt. Relevant to note, by 13.04.2009, the Government had approved the order of detention dated 31.03.2009, through G.O.Rt.No.1723 dated 08.04.2009. Therefore, the District Collector had become ‘functus officio’ and the Government had become the detaining authority, as per the ratio in Balagani Venkateswara Rao (1 Supra), by the date of receipt of the representation on 13.04.2009. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Sneha Khemka[2] “18. Would that mean, as has been held by the High Court, that a representation made before one authority must also be considered by other authorities? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. If it is to be assumed that the three different authorities before whom the representations are made are required to obtain copies of the representations made to the others; before a representation is considered, the concerned authority will have to make an enquiry from the authorities as to whether a representation had been made to it and if the answer thereof is in the affirmative, to obtain a copy thereof. 19. Once such a enquiry is made and eventually if in the meanwhile an order on such representation has been passed by the concerned authority, the same would also be required to be obtained. Apart from the fact that such procedure is not contemplated, a great delay would ensue thereby which would run counter to the constitutional schemes, as the detenue has a fundamental right to have the same considered and obtain an order on his representation by the appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.” It is also relevant to note that the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of sending representations to various authorities which were not directly or immediately concerned with the detention (Union of India vs. Paul Manickam[3], D.Anuradha vs. Joint Secretary[4]) In the light of the aforestated legal position, the action of the detenue’s brother in sending his representation to the District Collector, Medak after he had become functus officio does not vest him with the right to complain of its non-consideration. Further, it is not the detenue’s brother who is before us, but the detenue’s wife, whose representation was not only considered, she was also given a personal hearing. It is not demonstrated before us that any prejudice was caused to the detenue owing to the non-consideration of this representation. It is not urged before us that this representation contained any new grounds which were not advanced by the petitioner in her representation. Such being the circumstances, we are not inclined to accept the learned counsel’s submission that the non-consideration of this representation would vitiate the detention. It would be a mockery of the constitutional protection afforded by Article 22(5) of the Constitution, if a detenue can take advantage of the non-consideration of one out of several representations made by him or on his behalf and assail the detention on that ground. That would reduce the constitutional values underlying the said protection to a mere tactic to attack and assail the detention. As regards the other ground of attack relating to the proximity of the instances cited as grounds for detention, the order of detention dated 31.03.2009 clearly demonstrates that the first ground of detention pertained to a case detected on 18.03.2009, a mere two weeks prior to the order of detention. The other instances cited pertain to December 2008, October 2008, April 2007, October 2006 and May 2005. It is a settled proposition that once, one of the cases cited as a ground for the detention related to a proximate instance, such as in the present case, the other instances cited form a chain of events clearly demonstrating that the detenue was regularly indulging in activities detrimental to public order. The order of detention cannot therefore be assailed on the ground of the instances being isolated or not being proximate. For the foregoing reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the order of detention passed by the District Collector, Medak, confirmed by the Advisory Board and thereafter, by the Government. The Writ Petition is therefore devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ________________________ JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA _________________________ JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR 14.09.2009. Lmv [1] 1998 CRI.L.J.801 [2] 2004 (1) Supreme 536 [= (2004) 2 SCC 570] [3] (2003) 8 SCC 342. [4] (2006) 5 SCC 142