[-1-] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLN.NO.2405 OF 2007 IN APPEAL NO. OF 2007 The State of Maharashtra ..Applicant Vs. Subhash Bhimrao Shelke and Ors. ..Respondents ... Mr.Y.M.Nakhwa APP for Applicant-State Mr.P.G.Chavan Advocate for the Respondent No.1 Mr.Umesh Mankapure Advocate for Respondent No.2 Mr.N.J.Patil Advocate for Respondent No.3 ... CORAM: SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J. CORAM: SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J. CORAM: SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J. DATE : FEBRUARY 18, 2008 DATE : FEBRUARY 18, 2008 DATE : FEBRUARY 18, 2008 P.C. P.C. P.C. 1. The State of Maharshtra has filed this applciation for leave to file appeal against the judgment and order dated 3.4.2007 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate F.C. Kavathe-Mahakal, Dist. Sangli in RCC No. 54 of 2001. By the said judgment and order, the Respondents-accused were acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 r.w. 34 of IPC. 2. The prosecution case briefly stated is as under: [-2-] . The complainant was working as Co-Operative Officer (Milk). He took over as Liquidator from the previous Liquidator. On going through all the documents belonging to the society in question, he found that the former Liquidator i.e. Respondent No.1, the Government Approved Valuer i.e. Respondent No.2 and purchaser of the property i.e. Respondent No.3 in furtherance of their common intention disposed of the property of the society and cheated the State. The property in question is house property bearing House No.295 and land Gat No. 408. 3. I have heard the learned APP for the Applicant-State and the learned Advocate for the Respondent-accused. I have perused the evidence produced before me and the impugned judgment and order. 4. The learned APP submitted that the said property was sold for Rs.81,000/- whereas the actual market value of the property was Rs.2 lakhs. The learned APP further submitted that as per Rule 91 Sub-Rule 14 of the Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies Rules, the Liquidator shall not exercise [-3-] such power without prior approval of the Sub-Registrar. However, on perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 Jaidevo Gavli who was serving as an Officer of the Milk Society, it is seen that Respondent No.1 had given the proposal to their office for permission to sell the property of the said Milk Society and as per that proposal, he was permitted to sell the property of the society. Thus, on perusal of the evidence of this witness and other evidence on record, it is clear that the Liquidator i.e. Respondent No.1 with prior approval of the Registrar, took the steps to sell the immovable property of the said Society and he has not violated any direction of law. From the evidence on record including that of P.W.1 Jaideo Gavli, it is seen that the Respondent-accused no.1 published public notice in daily newspaper "Rastra-Shakti". P.W.2 Annappa Handiphode who is the main complainant, has admitted that daily newspaper "Rastra-Shakti" is circulated in entire Sangli District and it is famous local newspaper. Moreover, P.W.3 Dattatraya Kulkarni himself was the Registrar. He has deposed that he had issued letter to Respondent No.1 to take steps to sell the property belonging to the Society and accordingly, [-4-] accused no.1 had sold it and reported to his office. P.W.3 Kulkarni has also deposed that the Liquidator (Respondent No.1) had sold the property of the society by calling for tenders. During his cross-examination, this witness has admitted that the accused had followed all the procedure to sell the property and also called the tenders by publishing notice in daily newspaper "Rastra-Shakti". P.W.3 Kulkarni has clearly admitted that it is the duty of the Liquidator to sell the property for the maximum amount and that accused no.1 had taken care to get maximum price of the property in question. From the evidence on record especially that of P.W.3 Kulkarni, it is seen that tenders were opened in the District Dairy Development Office in the presence of persons who submitted their tenders and tender of Respondent No.3-accused No.3 was found to be the highest. If the tender of Respondent No.3 was found of the highest amount, he would be entitled to get the tender and no fault can be found with the Respondent No.1-accused No.1 for selling the property to him. Thus, it is seen that accused no.1 followed proper procedure and has thereafter disposed of the property. [-5-] 5. P.W.2 Annappa has deposed that the Liquidator sold the property of the society for less than the actual value of the property. However, this witness has admitted that he had no knowledge about the valuation of the property of the said society. Admissions of this witness in his cross-examination show that Annappa had no knowledge about the actual market value of the property in dispute. In such circumstances, it was not possible for him to state that the Liquidator sold the property at lesser value than the actual market value. After perusal of the evidence, it is seen that there is no evidence at all to prove that the accused no.1 being a public servant, misappropriated or converted the property to his own use and/or caused the society to suffer by selling the property in violation of the directions. As far as the Respondent No.2 is concerned, there is no evidence at all on record to show that the value of the property made by him, is not correct or that on the say of the Respondent No.1 he sold the property for the value lesser than the market value and accused no.3 purchased the said property at a price less than the actual value and these acts have been done [-6-] by the accused in furtherance of their common intention. The Magistrate has taken into account all these and other aspects and has thereafter acquitted the Respondents-accused. Looking to the evidence on record, the view taken by the Magistrate is a reasonable and possible view. 6. It is well settled that if the view of acquittal could have been reasonably arrived at then the mere circumstance that the appellate Court could have taken a different view, would be no ground to interfere. In this connection, there is no dearth of authorities but to eschew prolixity, I am referring to only two of them i.e. AIR 1971 AIR 1971 AIR 1971 S.C. 66 Khedu Mohton and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar S.C. 66 Khedu Mohton and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar S.C. 66 Khedu Mohton and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and C. Anthony Vs. K.G.Raghavan Nair (2003) 1 SCC and C. Anthony Vs. K.G.Raghavan Nair (2003) 1 SCC and C. Anthony Vs. K.G.Raghavan Nair (2003) 1 SCC 1. 1. 1. In the case of C.Anthony C.Anthony C.Anthony, the Supreme Court has observed that unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse or contrary to the material on record, the High Court cannot in appeal substitute its findings, merely because another contrary opinion was possible on the basis of material on record. As stated earlier, the view taken by the learned Magistrate is a reasonable and possible view, hence, no interference is called for. [-7-] 7. In this view of the matter, application for leave to appeal is rejected. [ SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI, J.]