IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Crl. M. No.36811-M of 2010 Date of Decision:26.4.2011 Bhupinder Singh @ Bhola .... Petitioner Versus State of Punjab and others .... Respondents CORAM: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Nirmaljit Kaur Present: Mr. K.K. Garg, Advocate for the petitioner. **** 1.Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2.To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? NIRMALJIT KAUR, J.(Oral) The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR No.255 dated 25.9.2010 registered under Sections 307/452/323 IPC at Police Station City Barnala District Barnala, on the basis of compromise. The allegations as alleged in the FIR are serious. The petitioner has committed an offence of having inflicted injuries with sword blow to the complainant as well as upon the back side of head of one Gurcharan Singh. Therefore, it cannot be said that no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. As such, the present petition cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Manoj Sharma vs. State and others (2008) 16 SCC held that certain offences like 302, 395,307 or 304-B IPC cannot be compounded either in the exercise of writ jurisdiction or under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of compromise and and drew the distinction as under: Crl. M. No.36811-M of 2010 -2- “There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395,307 or 304-B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases (like those akin to a civil nature), the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger Bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Cancellor's foot.” It is also well settled proposition of law as held in the case of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2003 SCC 1386 that in rare and exceptional cases, a departure can be made from the the principle laid down and this fact is further elaborated in para 25 of the judgment rendered in the case of Manoj Sharma (Supra) and the same reads thus: “However, in my opinion these judgments cannot be read as Crl. M. No.36811-M of 2010 -3- Euclid's formula since it is well settled that judgments of a court cannot be read mechanically and like a Euclid's theorem vide Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani. In rare and exceptional cases a departure can be made from the principle laid down in the decisions referred to in para 27, as observed in B.S. Joshi case, which has also been followed in other decisions e.g. Nikhil Merchant case. Even in the judgment of this Court in Aravali Golf Club where emphasis has been laid on judicial restraint, it has been mentioned that sometimes judicial activism can be resorted to by the Court where the situation forcefully requires it in the interest of the country or society (vie para 39 of the said judgment). Judicial activism was rightly resorted to by the US Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, Miranda v. Arizona Roe v. Wade, etc. and by Lord Denning in England in several of his decisions.” In order to get over the difficulties and hardship faced by the public, a way was found out by the Court in the cases of B.S. Joshi (Supra), Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052 and Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab 2008(4) S.C. Cases 582. Thus, taking a clue from the same, no doubt this Court has been quashing the FIRs under Section 307 IPC on the basis of the compromise but only on basis of the facts of those particular cases where either the quarrel is between the siblings of the same family or is arising out of the matrimonial dispute or on merits wherein no offence under Section Crl. M. No.36811-M of 2010 -4- 307 IPC is made out. In the present case, none of the aforesaid situation exists. The parties are neither closely related to each other nor is the FIR an outcome of matrimonial dispute. Moreover, from a perusal of the FIR, it cannot be said at this stage that no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. In view of the above, the judicial discretion to quash the FIR on the basis of compromise cannot be exercised in the facts of the present case. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. 26.4.2011 ( NIRMALJIT KAUR ) rajeev JUDGE