1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA WRIT PETITION NO. 82 OF 2010 1. Smt. Sudhaben Kanubhai Shah, 2. Shri Jatin Shah, 3. Mrs. Shital Shah, 4. Shri Pankaj Shah, 5. Smt. Preeti Shah, All the above are residing at Plot No.1651 Sardar Nagar Road, Near Rupali Circle, Bhavanagar, Gujarat. ... Petitioners versus M/s. Shri Kaustub Shipping Pvt. Ltd., having its registered office at 6, Laxmi Apartments, Yeshwantnagar, Tisk-Ponda, Goa 403 401, Represented herein by its Director Shri Balkrishna G. Kamat. ... Respondent Shri J. E. Coelho Pereira, Senior Advocate with Shri V. Braganza, Advocate for the Petitioners. Shri S. S. Singbal, Advocate for the Respondent. 2 CORAM : N. A. BRITTO, J. DATE : 26TH MARCH, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT Rule. By consent heard forthwith. 2. This Writ Petition is filed by the legal representatives of deceased Defendant No.3 in Special Civil Suit No. 20/2001/A, and is directed against two orders of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Ponda, both dated 18-1-2010. By the first order passed on Exh.17D, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, has refused to recall the Plaintiffs for further cross- examination. By the second order passed on Exh.82D, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division has struck off the written statement filed by the said legal representatives, as the plea taken in the written statement filed by them is contrary to the stand taken earlier by Defendant No.3 who had filed his written statement. 3. There is no dispute that the Plaintiffs had filed the said civil suit against the Defendants for recovery of a sum of Rs.11,98,205.50 along with interest @ 24%. The suit was filed against Defendant No.1, a firm, and Defendant Nos.2 and 3 being its partners. In the written statement filed by Defendant No.3(since deceased) it was admitted that he was the partner of the said firm, Defendant No.1. Later on, the Defendants had filed an application 3 for amendment of the written statement to withdraw the said admission contending that Defendant No.3 was not a partner of the firm, and, which amendment was disallowed by the learned trial Court by Order dated 19-9-2009, which came to be challenged by them before this Court in Writ Petition No.631 of 2009, and ultimately the said Order dated 19-9-2009 was upheld by this Court on 11-12-2009. 4. After having been brought on record, the legal representatives of Defendant No.3, filed a written statement contending that deceased Defendant No.3 was not a partner of the said firm. This was on 22-12-2009 but the Plaintiffs immediately on or about 12-1-2010 objected to the said written statement by application of the same date and sought striking off the written statement filed by the legal representatives of deceased Defendant No.3 which has been allowed by the learned trial Court. In substance, the learned trial Court has disallowed the legal representatives of deceased Defendant No.3, to take a plea in their written statement which is inconsistent with the plea earlier taken by Defendant No.3. 5. Shri J. E. Coelho Pereira, the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners/legal representatives of deceased Defendant No.3 in the said civil suit, has contended that the learned trial Court ought to have allowed the said written statement to be on record and ought to have decided the 4 controversy on the merits of the case. Learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that the learned trial Court by depriving the said legal representatives from filing a written statement has deprived them of the principle of natural justice embedded in the C.P.C. Learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that whether the plea taken by the said legal representatives was appropriate to their character or not as contemplated by sub-rule(2) of Rule 4 of Order 22, C.P.C. was a matter which was required to be determined at the trial. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the very cases which were relied upon before the learned trial Court and which were held by the learned trial Court as not applicable. 6. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division by allowing the application dated 12-1-2010 has disallowed the legal representatives of deceased to take a contrary plea based on a decision of this Court in the case of Manguesh Rajaram Wagle and another v. Suresh D. Naik(2008(2) Bom.C.R. 248) wherein it was stated by this Court that although it is well settled that legal representatives can file a written statement and are entitled to take all defences available to a deceased defendant, they can take a plea appropriate to their character only and not contrary to a plea already taken by the deceased defendant. Although the said decision was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court and its decision is reported in 2010(2) SCC 432, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find fault with the said principle, but on facts 5 found that the legal representatives in that case did not take a contrary plea. That principle is well settled. In Kizhiakalathil Pathan Veetil Thavazhi Karnavan v. Manikat Variath Ukkali Varissiar's son Sankunni and others(AIR 1935 Madras 52) it was stated thus:- “A party who comes into the suit as the legal representative of another party cannot be allowed to depart from or vary or contradict the attitude taken up by the party whose legal representatives he is, it is obvious that if he were permitted to do so, it would be impossible to conduct any litigation where legal representatives come in”. 7. In Babulal N. Shukla v. Jeshankar N. Shukla(AIR 1972 Cal 494) it was held thus: “A legal representative substituted in place of a deceased-defendant cannot be permitted to make out a new case afresh in another written statement at this stage. He has to take up the suit at the stage at which it was left when the original party died and to continue it. The only right he has is to make a defence appropriate to his character as a legal representative of the deceased- defendant. His case is on a different footing than the addition of a new defendant which is governed by O.1, R.10(iv). Therefore, only the order for substitution would be served on the substituted defendant and no fresh writ 6 or summons could be issued for service on the substituted defendant”. 8. In Ramgopal and another v. Khiv Raj and others (AIR 1998 Raj 98) it was also held that:- “The legal representatives, therefore must proceed with the litigation from the stage where death of defendant or plaintiff had taken place. They are legally bound by the pleading of his predecessors in interest in whose place they have been substituted. Hence, the legal representatives substituted under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C. cannot set up a new case. The Petitioners are bound by the proceedings taken so far against the deceased-defendant. They cannot be allowed to file the written statement, the right of which was closed as soon as the ex parte order was passed against the deceased-defendant”. 9. In Gajral v. Sudha(1999(3) SCC 109 the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the view held by the trial Court in the following words: “ The plea taken by the proposed LRs is inconsistent with the plea taken by the deceased Vasantrao. They must proceed with the litigation from the stage where the death of Defendant 1 had taken place. They are bound by the pleadings of their predecessor in whose place 7 they are to be substituted. A legal representative substituted cannot set up a new or individual right. He cannot take up a new and inconsistent plea contrary to the one taken up by the deceased. The proposed LRs stand in the shoes of the deceased defendant and must accept their position adopted by their predecessor”. 10. A contrary plea was bound to further delay the trial of the suit and therefore has been rightly excluded. The only purpose of filing the written statement by the present legal representatives is to undo the admission of Defendant No.3 that he was a partner of the said firm. 11. In Vidyawati v. Man Mohan and others (AIR 1995 SC 1653) the Apex Court referred to the case of Bal Kishan v. Om Parkash(AIR 1986 SC 1952) wherein it was observed that the sub-rule(2) of Rule 4, of Order 22, authorized the legal representative of a deceased defendant to file an additional written statement or statement of objections raising all pleas which the deceased defendant had or could have raised except those which were personal to the deceased defendant or Respondent. In Jagdish Chander Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan(AIR 1972 SC 2526) the Apex Court again observed that the legal representative of the deceased respondent 8 was entitled to make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased respondent. In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased. Indeed this does not prevent the legal representative from setting up also their own independent title, in which case there could be no objection to the Court impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a separate suit for a decision on the title. 12. The cases cited stood on their own facts and it is well settled as observed in Sumtibai & others v. Paras Finance Co. Registered partnership Firm(AIR 2007 SC 3166) quoting State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra(AIR 1968 SC 647) that “a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it”. True, the Apex Court also observed that every party has a right to file a written statement. This is in accordance with natural justice. The C.P.C. is really rules of natural justice which are set out in great and elaborate detail. However, no where it is stated that the legal representatives can take a plea contrary to or inconsistent with, the plea taken by the deceased, whose legal representative they are. 9 13. In the light of the settled law, the legal representatives of the deceased Defendant No.3 were not entitled to take a contrary plea from the one taken by the deceased Defendant No.3 and as the said legal representatives had taken such a plea, exclusion of the said plea by striking it down from the written statement, in my view, could not be faulted, since otherwise such a step would only unnecessarily lengthen and delay the proceedings. 14. The refusal by the learned trial Court in recalling the Plaintiffs for further cross-examination also cannot be faulted. It is not disputed that the Plaintiffs had closed their evidence and not only that Defendant Nos.1 and 2 had started with their evidence through their attorney, and, we are told by learned Counsel that the suit had then proceeded ex-parte. It is not the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiffs and their witnesses were not cross-examined by them. Having cross-examined the Plaintiffs and the witnesses when the Defendant No.3 was alive, the legal representatives of deceased Defendant No.3 cannot have a further opportunity given to them to cross-examine now the Plaintiffs and their witnesses only because Defendant No.3 has expired. They have to proceed further from where they had stopped. 15. In the facts of the case, both the orders cannot be faulted particularly in the light of what the Apex Court has reiterated in Abdul Razak and others v. Manguesh Rajaram Wagle and others((2010) 2 SCC 432) 10 which reads thus:- “Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby”. 16. Consequently, I find there is no merit in this Writ Petition and the same is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. N. A. BRITTO, J. RD