IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA SECOND APPEAL NO. 49 OF 2008 MANGUESH RAGHUVIR BANDODKAR ... Appellant Versus MISS. INEZ LUDOVINA DA COSTA ... Respondent Mr. A. D. Bhobe, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. A. F. Diniz, Advocate for the respondent. Coram:- C. L. PANGARKAR, J. Date:- 26th March, 2009 P.C. Heard. This Second appeal is preferred by the original defendant. The respondent/plaintiff had instituted a suit for mandatory injunction. 2. A few facts may be stated thus: One Anthony D'costa was the original owner of the suit premises. The plaintiff is his heir. The original owner of the suit premises had let out the suit premises to the defendant/appellant by agreement dated 15.02.1970. The agreement was reduced to writing. It is stated that the premises were let out for running a ice factory. It is the contention of the plaintiff/respondent that since some six months prior to the institution of the suit, the defendant had fixed precast cement grills on the western and southern western side of the verandah and put a sliding door to the side of the verandah. Further it is the contention of the plaintiff that in the month of August 1994, the defendant erected a R.C.C. platform supported by six cement pillars. The plaintiff submitted that all the constructions were carried out by the defendant without the consent of the landlord and therefore they seek demolition of the construction. 3. The defendant had resisted the suit and contended that he had not carried out any construction. It is the contention of the defendant that the said platform was in existence since the said platform was utilised for loading the ice. 4. The learned Judge of the Trial Court found that all the construction that was made by the defendant was not unauthorised and the defendant was within his rights for using the premises. Holding so, the learned Judge of the Trial Court dismissed the suit. 5. The plaintiff preferred the appeal and that appeal has been allowed. The Appellate Court has held that the defendant has carried out the construction in August 1994, without the consent of the landlord/plaintiff. The learned Judge, therefore, passed a decree directing the removal of the R.C.C. construction with pillars which support the said platform. Being aggrieved by that, this Second appeal has been preferred. 6. The main contention of the counsel for the appellant is that there was a written agreement between the parties by which, the appellant/defendant had a right to make construction in the premises and the learned Judge of the Appellate Court has ignored the terms of the agreement. He contended that had he considered Clause 8 of the agreement, he would not have decreed the suit. According to him Clause 8 of the agreement is clear in authorising the defendant to make the construction but the plaintiff is not supposed to make good the expenses incurred by him. Mr. Diniz on the otherhand submitted that the written agreement had come to an end after three years of its execution. He submitted that the agreement had come to an end in the year 1973 and the plaintiff/defendant cannot make use of any of the terms of the agreement between the parties. 7. It is obvious that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant has come to an end and as a result of that, it is also clear that none of the parties can in fact, enforce any of the terms of the agreement. The defendant could not make any construction under any of the terms of the agreement of lease. The defendant becomes a tenant holding over under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act or where Rent Law is applicable, he becomes a statutory tenant. It is held in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 414 that a statutory tenant has no right to enforce the terms of agreement after the expiry of agreement. We have therefore to see whether such construction was made within those three years when the agreement was subsisting. It is found by Appellate Court that construction is made in 1994. There is nothing to show that the finding that is arrived at by the Appellate Court is perverse. Unless perversity is shown, the said finding cannot be disturbed. Since the construction is made by the defendant in the year 1994 as a statutory tenant, it is deemed to be unauthorised. 8. The submission of the learned counsel that the Court should admit the appeal since the Appellate Court has not interpreted clause 8 of the agreement cannot be accepted. Shri Bhobe has relied on a decision in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1652 wherein it is held that misconstruction of a document itself is a substantial question of law. There is no dispute about that. Here the question of interpretation does not arise as the agreement of lease has expired and defendant is statutory tenant. There is no question of enforcement of agreement. The decision therefore, has no bearing in the case on hand. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended before me that the suit for demolition of certain construction could not have been filed without there being a suit for eviction. The submission is not correct. He has a right certainly to sue if any unauthorised construction is made in the property owned by him, leaving aside the relief of eviction. I do not find any question of law involved in the appeal. There is no substance in the appeal and it is dismissed in limini. C. L. PANGARKAR, J. lh/.