IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE THIRTIETH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.771 OF 2010 Between : A.S.Mohammad Shafi ... PETITIONER A N D Gandluri Rama Rangeswar Reddy and others. … RESPONDENTS THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.771 OF 2010 ORDER: This Civil Revision Petition, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’) is directed against the docket order, dated 29.12.2009 in E.P.No.105 of 2008 in O.S.No.235 of 1999 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Tadpatri, whereunder and whereby, the petition, was adjourned to 23.01.2010, for filing market value certificate and paying stamp duty and registration charges. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/judgment debtor No.1 contended that by order, dated 03.12.2009, in E.P.No.105 of 2008 in O.S.No.235 of 1999 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Tadipatri, the court below directed the petitioner to execute a sale deed as per decree, dated 04.04.2000 in favour of respondent No.1 herein / decree holder in terms of the Sale Agreement, dated 04.07.1991 after paying the required stamp duty and registration charges before the Court below by 28.12.2009, failing which the execution petition shall stand dismissed and posted the matter on 28.12.2009, for paying registration charges and stamp duty. 3. The impugned order was passed on 29.12.2009. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under Section 148 CPC, the Court cannot extend time more than thirty days in all and that the subsequent suo motu extending the time is without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court reported in Sheik Peda Nasar Saheb V. Perecherla Nabi Saheb[1], wherein it was held thus: “Under Section 148 CPC where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. The period prescribed under the Section can be extended only during the currency of the previous order. Once an order has become defunct, no question of extending the time made under that order can arise.” There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court with regard to extension of time under Section 148 CPC, during pendency of the previous order. The decision has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason that the order under challenge is passed after 29.12.2009, and it can not be said that the order is not passed during the pendency of the previous order. Because 28.12.2009, happened to be a Public Holiday, an oral request was made on 29.12.2009 by the counsel appearing for respondent No1 for extension of payment of stamp duty and penalty, that was granted. Unless the Market Value Certificate is obtained from the concerned Sub Registrar, it is not possible for estimating the stamp duty and penalty payable on the document. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nau V. Union of India[2]. “The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the Court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the Court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to fully operate. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for the reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the Court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the Court”. 5. Section 148 CPC preserves power in the Court to enlarge time for doing of any act under the Court to do full and complete justice between the parties. For invoking this Section, two conditions must be fulfilled (i) A period must have been fixed or granted by the Court; and (ii) An act must have been prescribed or allowed by the Code. 6. Therefore, from the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be said that the impugned order is passed extending the time during the pendency of the earlier order. Hence, the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmities so as to call for interference by this Court. 7. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________ K.C.BHANU, J MARCH, 30 2011. YVL [1] 1956 ALT 489 [2] 2005(5) SCJ 519