1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 807/2011 (Amit Sushil Porwal & another VERSUS Smt. Angha Arun Mhaisalkar & others) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shri Rohit Joshi, counsel for the petitioners. Shri R.D. Bhuibhar, counsel for the R-1. Mrs. K.R. Deshpande, A.G.P. for the R-2 & 3. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : FEBRUARY 17 , 2011 . By this petition, the petitioners impugn the orders passed by the Rent Control Authorities allowing the application filed by the respondent no.1-landlady under Section 42 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and holding that the respondent no.1-landlady was entitled to recover the possession of the premises given on license. The respondent no.1 is the landlady. She had instituted proceedings against the petitioners/licensees under the provisions of Section 42 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 seeking possession from the petitioners of the premises given to them on license by invoking the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 1999. It was the case of the landlady that a Deed of License was executed between the respondent no.1-landlady and the petitioners on 01.03.2000 and the period of license was to expire on 28.02.2002. Since the petitioners did not vacate the premises in spite of the requests by the landlady, the proceedings under Section 42 of the Act of 1999 were instituted. 2 The petitioners/non-applicants denied the claim of the landlady and further denied that there was a written agreement/deed dated 01.03.2000. It was the case of the petitioners that no such deed was executed between the parties on 01.03.2000 and assuming that there was any, the same was bad as it was not registered and the respondent no.1-landlady could not have claimed the possession on the basis of the said deed. The petitioners sought for the dismissal of the proceedings filed by the respondent no.1- landlady. Both the Courts, on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, held that the respondent no.1- landlady was entitled to recover the possession of the premises given on license as the term of license had expired on 28.02.2002. The Courts held that the agreement of license, in writing, between the parties was conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. The findings recorded by both the Courts about the existence of the license and the fact that the writing therein was conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, are pure findings of facts based on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record as also the law laid down by the Courts on the said issue. It is necessary to note that in spite of grant of several opportunities, the petitioners had failed to enter the witness box and tender any evidence, though the petitioners had denied the very existence of the license-deed. In such circumstances, the Courts rightly relied on the evidence of the respondent no.1-landlady to hold that there existed a license-deed between the parties and the term of license expired on 28.02.2002. 3 The only submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the explanation (b) to Section 24(3) of the Act of 1999 cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case as the Act came into force on 31.03.2000 and the license was executed on 01.03.2000, is liable to be rejected for the simple reason that the provisions of Section 24 do not speak of licenses, which are executed after the coming into force of the Act and also relate to the licenses, which are executed prior to the coming into the force of the same. The orders passed by both the Courts are extremely just and proper and call for no interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Shri Joshi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, at this juncture, makes a request on behalf of the petitioners for grant of time of six weeks for vacating the suit premises. Shri Bhuibhar, the learned counsel for the respondent no.1, strongly opposes the said prayer and states that the petitioners have stayed in the premises unauthorizedly for more than eight years and should not be permitted to stay in the premises any longer. However, on consideration of the facts of the case and also the fact that the petitioners have merely sought a period of six weeks to vacate the premises, the petitioners are permitted to vacate the suit premises within a period of six weeks. Order accordingly. JUDGE APTE