1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.4836 OF 2009 M.S.R.T.C. ....Petitioner V/s. Bhila R. Wagh ....Respondent Mr.G.S. Hegde for the Petitioner. Mrs.Seema Sarnaik for the Respondent. CORAM : S.J. VAZIFDAR, J. DATE : 12TH JANUARY, 2010. P.C. :- 1. It is only in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case that no interference with the impugned order is warranted. The Labour Court has held that the termination of the Respondent’s services was disproportionate in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I am not inclined to hold that this conclusion is perverse and totally unsustainable. 2. Clause 34 of Schedule-A to Discipline and Appeal Procedure of the Petitioner, reads as under :- “34. Taking an active part in politics or in any political demonstrations or stand for election as a member for election as a Member for a Cantonment Board or Municipal Council, District Board, Zilla Parishad, Taluka Panchayat or Gram-panchayat or Parliament or any Legislative Body without prior permission.” 2 3. The Respondent was employed as a bus conductor with the Petitioner. By a letter dated 8.11.1996, he informed the Petitioner that he intends contesting the election covered by clause 34. He stated that if it was so required, the letter may be treated as one submitting his resignation. By a further letter dated 10.11.1996, the Respondent sought the Petitioner’s permission to contest the election and requested the Petitioner to accept his resignation. 4. The Respondent relied upon a letter dated 14.11.1996 issued by the Petitioner’s Depot Manager stating that the Respondent had resigned and was not in the Petitioner’s services. 5. Mr.Hegde, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted that the Depot Manager did not have authority to issue such a letter. Mr.Hegde submitted that the letter dated 14.11.1996 does not constitute permission to contest the election. That would be a highly technical ground to terminate the Respondent’s services. The Respondent would not have been unjustified in presuming that in view of the resignation having been accepted, there was no further requirement or permission required for contesting the election. 6. The last date for withdrawing the nominations for the said elections was 23.11.1996. In these circumstances and especially in view of the letter dated 14.11.1996 issued by the Depot Manager, the Respondent cannot be faulted under clause 34. Even assuming that the Depot Manager had no authority to issue such a letter, there is nothing to indicate that the letter dated 14.11.1996 was obtained mala-fide by the Respondent. It 3 would then be only a technical lapse for which the Respondent was not at all responsible. It would be unfair to penalize him for the same. 7. It is also pertinent to note that upon an objection being taken by one of the candidates, the Returning Officer held that the Respondent had tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the Petitioner, and the Respondent was no longer in the Petitioner’s services, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the candidate albeit on the ground that no permission was required. These findings do not bind on the Petitioner. They however reflects upon the bona-fides of the Respondent. 8. The Petitioner however relied upon two letters dated 15.11.1996 and 22.11.1996 to contend that the Respondent’s resignation had not been accepted and that he had not been granted permission to contest the election. By the letter dated 15.11.1996, the Petitioner stated that the mere submission of the resignation was not sufficient and that the Respondent would be entitled to contest the election only upon the permission being granted. By the letter dated 22.11.1996, the Petitioner informed the Respondent that as a case was pending against him, his resignation was not accepted. 9. The receipt of these letters dated 15.11.1996 and 22.11.1996 was denied by the Respondent. The Labour Court held that there was no evidence on record which establishes that the said letters were served upon the Respondent. I see no reason to interfere with this finding of fact. 10. Mr.Hegde submitted that in any event, even assuming that the letters dated 15.11.1996 and 22.11.1996 were not received by the Respondent and that the letter dated 14.11.1996 was validly relied upon by 4 the Respondent, it would make no difference as in that event the Respondent must be deemed to have resigned from the Petitioner’s services. 11. That however is a different matter. The same is not the subject matter of the proceedings before me or before the Labour Court. All that I am concerned with presently is the validity of the order of termination based upon clause 34. If the Respondent is deemed to have resigned for any other reason, that is a different matter in respect whereof the parties are always at liberty to adopt proceedings or to act accordingly and on the basis thereof. I express no opinion on that aspect of the matter in this order. 12. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition is dismissed.