: 1 : IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.46 OF 1996 Malegaon Education Society’s Sou. R.Z. Kakani Kanya Vidyalaya, Malegaon, Dist. Nashik & Ors. .. Petitioners V/s. Yashodabai Vasantrao Ahir & Anr. .. Respondents Mr. Rajdeep S. Khadapkar for the Petitioners. Mr. R.M. Haridas i/b. Mr. P.N. Joshi for Respondent No.1. Mr. A.P. Vanarse, AGP, for Respondent No.2. CORAM : SMT. NISHITA MHATRE, J. DATED : 2 ND JULY, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. The Writ Petition has been filed against the order dated 7th October, 1995 passed by the School Tribunal, Nasik in Appeal No.47 of 1994. 2. The undisputed facts in the present case are as follows : 3. The Respondent No.1 was employed as a ‘Peon’ on compassionate grounds as her husband who was : 2 : employed with the Petitioners had expired. She was inducted into service on 2nd December, 1991. Her services with the Petitioner-School were terminated on 1st July, 1993. Being aggrieved by the termination of service, the Respondent No.1 had filed Complaint (ULP) No.155 of 1993 before the Labour Court, Nashik under Items 1(a), (b), (d) and (f) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (for short “MRTU & PULP Act”). The Labour Court allowed the application for interim relief by its order dated 6th November, 1993 and the Petitioners were directed to reinstate her or to pay her 75% of her last drawn wages each month. It appears that this order of Labour Court was not obeyed by the Petitioners and therefore she approached the Labour Court again under Section 48 of the MRTU & PULP Act. A review application was filed by the Petitioners contending that the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act were not applicable and that therefore the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try the complaint. The Respondent therefore withdrew her complaint and : 3 : preferred the aforesaid Appeal before the School Tribunal. 4. The Petitioners contested the Appeal by contending that the Government had not granted approval to the appointment of Respondent No.1. It was pointed out that she was found surplus to the needs of the Petitioners and, therefore, the approval which was initially granted was revoked by the Education Officer. Another contention was raised that the Appeal had not been filed within the period of limitation and therefore ought to have been rejected. 5. The School Tribunal has found that the Appeal had been filed within the period of limitation and has therefore entertained the same. With regard to the issue as to whether the Petitioners could refuse to pay salary to the Respondent No.1 on the ground that there was no sanction to the post by the Education Officer, the School Tribunal has held that the Petitioners’ action was illegal. The School Tribunal has further held that the : 4 : Petitioners had incorrectly and illegally refused benefits to the Respondent No.1 which she was entitled to under Section 9(2) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Services) Act, 1977 and Rules 1981 framed thereunder. The School Tribunal held that the services of an employee cannot be terminated only on the ground that the Education Officer has not accorded any approval for her appointment. 6. Mr. Khadapkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioners, raises two points: firstly, that it was only because no approval was granted that it was necessary to terminate the services of Respondent No.1; secondly, that the Education Officer having found the Respondent No.1 to be surplus staff, the School Tribunal could not have directed reinstatement with consequential benefits of Respondent No.1. 7. The first point raised by Mr. Khadapkar is no longer res-integra in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of St. Ulai : 5 : High School & Anr. vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh & Anr. (supra). The Full Bench has categorically held that the refusal of approval or revocation of the approval of an employee cannot lead to the automatic termination of services of that employee. Such a termination from service is illegal. Therefore, this submission of Mr. Khadapkar is untenable. It is now well settled in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of this Court that the services of a teacher cannot be terminated only on the ground that approval to his/her appointment was not accorded by the Education Officer. The Full Bench has held that approval was necessary only for disbursement of the grant to an aided school. 8. The second submission of Mr. Khadapkar, that the Respondent No.1 was surplus to the needs of the Petitioners and therefore Respondent No.1 has been terminated from the services is also unsustainable. Assuming the Education Officer had found the Respondent No.1 to be surplus to the needs of the Petitioners, it was necessary for the Petitioners : 6 : to comply with the Rules framed under the MEPS Act before terminating the services of an employee on the ground of surplusage. Admittedly, this has not been done in the present case. The Petitioners have failed to consider whether there were any employees junior to the Respondent No.1 before terminating her services. Therefore this submission of Mr. Khadapkar is also without merit. 9. The Writ Petition is dismissed. 10. Mr. Khadapkar, clutching at the last straw, submitted that the State Government should be directed to release the grant for payment of back wages of Respondent No.1. 11. The School Tribunal has passed an order directing the Petitioners to reinstate the Respondent No.1 to her original post and to give her benefits of back wages attached to it from the date of her termination of services till she was reinstated. In my opinion, the State Government must consider releasing the grant. This is : 7 : specially so since no other person was appointed to the said post while the Respondent No.1 was out of service. 12. Rule discharged. No orders as to costs.