CRP 171/2011 BEFORE HON BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY The subject matter of challenge in the instant petition is the judgment and orde r dated 5.5.2011 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (FTC) No.2, Ka mrup, Guwahati in Misc. Appeal No.2/2011 dismissing the same preferred by the pr esent petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 7.1.2011 passed by the lear ned trial court in Misc.(J) Case No.42/2010 rejecting an application under secti on 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, hereafter referred to as the ’ Code’) in Title Execution Case No.4/2007. I have heard Mr JC Gour, learned counsel assisted by Mr UB Sarma, Advoca te for the petitioner. Mr CK Sarma Baruah, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr G.Mish ra, Advocate has entered appearance for the respondent through a caveat. The ca veat stands discharged. The facts comprising the background in short, have to be noticed. The present petitioner claims to be a bonafide purchaser of the land in volving the aforementioned execution case having purchased the same from its er stwhile owner vide sale deed No.239 dated 13.3.2006 after due completion of all necessary legal formalities. According to him, his name also stands mutated in r espect thereof. He alleged that on 9.4.2010 while he was in occupation of the su it land, the respondent along with the Civil Nazir and the police force came to oust him therefrom. Necessary queries being made, he came to learn that the res pondent had in the meantime, launched the execution of the decree obtained by hi m in Title Suit No.205/2002 which was instituted against one Rajen Rawat and the erstwhile owners of the land. It transpired further that though the suit was i nitially dismissed by the learned trial court at the instance of the respondent in Title Appeal No.55/2006 filed by him, the same was decreed by the judgment a nd order dated 27.2.2007. The second appeal being RSA No.33/2007 preferred again st the said decree was eventually dismissed by this Court. This decree therefor e, admittedly became final. Situated thus, the petitioner filed an application under section 47 of t he Code read with Order 21 Rules 97,99 and 101 thereof as well as section 151 re gistering his objection to the execution of the decree dated 27.2.2007. Apart fr om contending that he was the bonafide purchaser of the suit land involved for v alue, he pleaded inter alia that as he was not a party in Title Suit No.205/2002 , the decree passed therein was not binding on him. He pointed out as well that meanwhile, the respondent had instituted Title Suit No.68/2009 praying for a d ecree inter alia for cancellation of the sale deed dated 13.3.2006 and that the same was pending. According to him, therefore the decree was not executable a gainst him and sought interference of the executing court in his favour. The respondent in his written objection dismissed the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and not only cited the bar of doctrine of lis pende ns as contained in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882, he also q uestioned the right of the petitioner to resist the process of execution in the face of finality of the decree dated 27.2.2011. By order dated 7.1.2011 the lea rned executing court having rejected, the petitioner’s application, Misc appeal No.2/2011 was preferred by him against the same. The learned lower appellate cou rt by the impugned judgment and order has dismissed the same. Mr Gour has emphatically argued that the decree dated 27.2.2007 in the a ttending facts and circumstances is not binding on the petitioner and therefore , the impugned order is liable to be interfered with on this count alone. As th e petitioner is a bonafide purchaser of the land involved for value without any notice of the earlier sale transaction in favour of the respondent, according to him, the doctrine of lis pendens was not attracted. Mr Gaur has therefore urge d that as admittedly as on date, the petitioner is in physical possession of th e land, the decree is inexecutable against him and thus if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would result in irreparable loss and prejudice to him. Mr CK Sarma Baruah, Senior Advocate for the respondent reiterated the o bjection taken by him before the learned executing court and to reinforce the s ame placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Sanjay Verma vs. Manik Ro y and others (2006) 13 SCC 608. The pleadings available on record and the arguments advanced have been d uly considered. Some admitted facts need be recapitulated. (1) The land involved had been purchased by the respondent from its erstwhi le owner, the proforma defendants in Title suit No.205/2002 through their attorn ey Rajen Rawat vide registered sale deed No.3537 dated 28.5.2002. (2) Title Suit No.205/2002 was instituted by the respondent against Sri Raj en Rawat and the owners of the land, (proforma defendants therein) praying for a decree for delivery of possession of the land purchased by him vide sale deed N o.3537 dated 28.5.2002. The petitioner admittedly was not a party to the said su it. (3) The suit filed by the respondent i.e. T.S. No.205/2002 was decreed for d elivery of possession on 27.2.2007 by the judgment and order of the same date pa ssed in Title Appeal No.55/2006. This decree was confirmed by this Court in RSA No.33/2005 and has remained unchallenged till date. (4) The petitioner claims to have purchased the same land from the owner the reof i.e. proforma defendant in Title suit No.205/2002 vide sale deed No.239 dat ed 13.3.2006 which, as per record was during the pendency of Title Suit No.205/ 2002. (5) Title Suit No.68/2009 has been instituted by the respondent praying for a decree amongst others for cancellation of the sale deed of the petitioner. On being queried by this Court, Mr Gour has submitted that as on date, no step h as been taken by the petitioner to have the sale deed No.3537 dated 28.5.2002 of the respondent cancelled by any appropriate legal forum. In this view of the m atter, having regard to the unassailed judgment and order dated 27.2.2007 rende red in Title Appeal No.55/2006, the respondent’s claim for recovery of possessio n of the land involved has legal sanction. Noticeably, the purchase of the same land by the petitioner herei n had been at a point of time when Title Suit No.205/2002 was pending involving the same. The Apex Court in Sanjay Verma(Supra) while dwelling on the scope and ambit of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882 had observed that the principles contained therein are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice and rests upon the equitable and just foundation that it would be impo ssible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations ar e permitted to prevail. While reiterating that a transferee pendente lite is bo und by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit, their Lordships pr opounded that the principle of Lis Pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transf er of Property Act,1882 being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. It was observed that the underlying object of sectio n 52 is to exempt a litigating party from taking notice of a title acquired d uring the pendency of the litigation and it postulates a condition that the alie nation would in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the perm ission of the court. Judged by the above pronouncement of the Apex Court on the doctrine of lis pendens, it is apparent in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the petitioner’s resistance to the execution of the decree passed in Title Appeal No.55/2006 does not stand further judicial scrutiny. The challenge to the i mpugned order lacks in substance. The petition is dismissed. No costs.