1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 2114/1993 Umakant R. Wadnerkar ..vs.. The State of Maharashtra, thr. Secretary and 4 Ors. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's Orders or Court's or Judge's Orders directions and Registrar's orders. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. P. N. Chandurkar, Senior Advocate for the petitioner. Ms. K. S. Joshi, A.G.P. for respondent nos. 1 to 3. Mr. C. S. Kaptan, Advocate for respondent nos. 4 and 5. CORAM: ANOOP V. MOHTA AND C. L. PANGARKAR, JJ. DATED : 23 rd September, 2008 1. The petitioner has restricted his prayer to the extent of prayer clauses (iii) and (iii)(a), which are as under:- “(iii) to direct the respondents 1 to 3 to pay the arrears of salary from 19th March, 1993 onwards to date as Principal of Gram Sevak Training Centre, Amravati and (iii) (a) To direct the respondents 1 to 5 to grant arrears of salaries, allowances & arrears increases in both on the basis of revised pay scale which were revised from time to time for a period 2 of 2 years, 3 months & 14 days that is from 19/3/1993 to 3/7/1995 with interest at 9% per annum, as he has been denied his rightful position....” 2. The reason for the above restriction is that though initially the prayer was made for approval to the appointment pursuance to this letter of appointment dated 19.03.1993 as the petitioner was never allowed to work and as averred restrained from working as Principal. Subsequently, the said appointment itself has been approved by respondents no. 1,2, 3 and 5 and allowed him to resume his duties from 04.09.1995. The petitioner, therefore, prayed that he should be paid arrears of salary for a period of 2 years 3 months and 14 days i.e. from the date of alleged appointment i.e. 19.03.1993 to 03.07.1995 with interests. 3. The basic challenge is; having once appointed by respondent-Committee and not allowed him to work on 3 the said post; he is entitled to all those benefits as the respondent-Management now granted approval for the first time and allowed the petitioner to resume his duties. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents basically contended strongly that the constitution of the committee itself was in question at the relevant time. The selection was not by the duly constituted Committee of the Society. Therefore, any appointment as made by the Chairman of the Selection Committee is not binding and cannot be given effect to unless the Management approved the same. It appears that at the relevant time, there was dispute going on between two groups of the Management. There was no authority to issue any order of appointment except by approval of the Executive Council of the Society. The Executive Council of the Society never permitted and accorded approval to the appointment of the petitioner. 4 The so called appointment was not a collective decision of the Society. In the said appointment itself it is mentioned that the the appointment order is subject to approval of the competent Authority. There is nothing on record that the competent Authority had granted approval to the said appointment, at the relevant time. 5. The petitioner has duly resumed the duty, because the Management approved and now allowed him to work. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the society could have cancelled the said order itself. The approval, therefore, cannot be the reason to grant such prayer as made. The petitioner, admittedly, did not work as appointed. The aspect of internal management dispute, considering the averments made in the submissions filed by the respondent, cannot be gone into to grant the relief as claimed by the petitioner. The necessity to pass the order allowing the petitioner to resume duty from July- 5 1995 that itself demonstrates that there was basic problem about the constitution of the Committee including the power of appointing Officer to select and appoint the petitioner. 6. Taking all these into account, we see there is no case made out to grant any such relief. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE JUDGE kahale