1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.327 OF 2008 Reshma Anand Koli. ..Petitioner. V/s. The Commissioner of Police, for Greater Mumbai(Hotel Branch) Mumbai & Ors. ..Respondents. Mr.S.K.Shinde a/w. Sagar Kasar for petitioner. Mr.Jasbir Saluja, AGP for respondents. CORAM: A.M.KHANWILKAR,J CORAM: A.M.KHANWILKAR,J CORAM: A.M.KHANWILKAR,J DATE : FEBRUARY 18, 2008. DATE : FEBRUARY 18, 2008. DATE : FEBRUARY 18, 2008. P.C. : P.C. : P.C. : 1. Heard Counsel for the parties. In my opinion, in so far as the grounds on which the impugned action has been taken against the Petitioner that is unquestionable. Indeed, the Petitioner may be justified in contending that the show cause notice refers to diverse aspects, amongst which one of the fact stated is that the action against the Petitioner is proposed under Rule 27 of the Rules for Keeping Places of Public Entertainment framed in 1953. The argument however, clearly overlooks that that is not the only basis, on which the proposed action was taken against the Petitioner. The Show Cause Notice refers to other provisions of the Rules amongst other 2 which would permit the Authority to initiate action of suspending the licence including to cancel the same. In fact, the Show Cause Notice was for initiating action for cancellation of license on the grounds stated in the said notice. 2. Be that as it may, ultimately the Appellate Authority has upheld the Order of the First Authority directing the suspension of the license for a period of 60 days on the ground that the material on record clearly establishes the fact that the Petitioner has persistently breached license conditions on different occasions. Besides, the Petitioner had committed breach of Rule 8(1) of the Rules as well as Rule 8(2) of the Rules, which are independent grounds, on which the action was proposed against the Petitioner. 3. Taking over all view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the grievance of the Petitioner that the Authority exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the suspension of license, which is the Order impugned in the present Writ Petition. In my opinion, the Appellate Authority has justly upheld the Order passed by the First Authority, as there was sufficient material to take action against the Petitioner of directing suspension of the license. 3 4. The next argument canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner is that assuming that the Authority was justified in initiating action of suspension of license-in the fact situation of the present case, however, the material on record would not justify suspension of license for a period of 60 days. According to the Petitioner, this grievance was specifically made before the Appellate Authority and was urged as one of the ground in the memo of Appeal. Notwithstanding that position, the Appellate Authority has made no reference to the said ground or argument though specifically raised; and moreso has not itself examined the appropriateness of the length of suspension period. 5. The learned AGP would stoutly refute the Petitioner’s plea that he had taken such ground in the Memo of Appeal. Be that as it may, the question whether the period of suspension imposed by the First Authority is appropriate or otherwise, is a matter, which ought to be addressed in the first instance by the Appellate Authority, which is the final fact finding authority. The Appeal remedy is provided by the Statute. For that reason, the appropriate course, to my mind, is to keep all questions in 4 respect of the issue of appropriateness of the period of suspension ordered by the first authority open, to be considered by the Appellate authority on its own merits afresh. 6. Accordingly, this Petition succeeds in part to the limited extent that the Petitioner is relegated before the Appellate Authority to forthwith examine the issue as to whether the period of suspension of license of 60 days is excessive or otherwise; and pass suitable orders, as may be advised. As aforesaid, all questions in that behalf are left open. 7. It is made clear that the opinion of both the Authorities below of necessity to take action against the Petitioner is affirmed by this Order and only the question of length of period of suspension of license is the issue, which will have to be considered by the Appellate Authority on its own merits. 8. As the Petitioner has already acted upon the impugned Order and has closed the Restaurant with effect from 13th February, 2008; coupled with the fact that the total period of suspension of the license, as indicated by the first Authority is only 5 60 days, it is imperative that the remanded Appeal is finally decided by the Appellate authority expeditiously and not later than 10 days from today. 9. The Petitioner shall appear before the Appellate Authority on 21st February, 2008 at 11 a.m., on which date the Appellate Authority may either proceed to hear the Petition on the said issue, to be decided in remand proceeding on the same day or so soon thereafter, as may be advised, provided the final order on that issue is passed one way or the other within 10 days from today. 10. Petition disposed off on the above terms. 11. All the concerned to act on the authenticated copy of the order. (A.M.KHANWILKAR,J) (A.M.KHANWILKAR,J) (A.M.KHANWILKAR,J)