IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.36593 of 2009 1. ARUN LAL 2. Awadhesh Kumar Sinha 3. Indu Devi … … Petitioners Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. Baleshwar Prasad … … Opp. Parties ---------- 3. 19.7.2010 Heard Shri Durgesh Nandan, learned counsel for the petitioners who are accused facing trial in Sessions Trial No. 206/95/113 of 2009 which was pending on 31.8.2009 before Fast Track Court No. II, Nawada. Also heard Shri A. Sharma, learned A.P.P. for the State and Shri Uday Shankar Singh, learned counsel for the informant. There is no dispute about the fact that after close of the prosecution evidence, statements of the present set of petitioners under Sections 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded. Thereafter, many defence witnesses were examined, as may appear from the statement made in a particular paragraph of the present petition and the defence evidence ended on 2.9.2000.The case was fixed for judgment also after hearing the arguments of the sides, but from 2000 the case is still limping on so as not to touching its ultimate end. The trial court has not been able in delivering judgment. It was informed by learned counsel for the petitioners that many dates were fixed for delivery of judgment but no judgment could be delivered and an interlocutory petition dated 20th July, 2009 was filed by the prosecution indicating to the learned trial Judge that some more facts which were 2 mentioned in Exts. 3,3/1 and 3/2 which were letters sent by the lady to her family members were necessary to be brought in evidence of the prosecution and, as such, the petitioners were required to be questioned again under Section 313 Cr. P.C. The impugned order dated 31.8.2009 was the end produce of that petition and the learned trial Judge directed that the petitioners should remain present for being questioned under Section313 Cr. P.C. It was contended that it was yet another attempt by the prosecution to dilate the proceedings and it was a folly on the part of the learned trial Judge that he was acting on the petition noted above filed by the prosecution and, as such, allowing filling in the lacuna which had appeared in the prosecution case. In support of the contention a decision of the Court in Uday Bhanu Sigh Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2004(4) PLJR. 406 has been cited before me. That appeared a case in which some witnesses were required to be recalled for the purposes of being cross-examined and that prayer was rejected under Section 311 Cr. P.C. The order was upheld by this Court pointing out that the trial court could not act under Section 311 Cr. P.C. for filling in lacunae in the prosecution case. As regards Sections 313 and 311 Cr.P.C., the Court finds that there is a vast difference in the scope and ambit of the two provisions. Section 311 Cr. P.C. is a provision which could be utilized by a court at any stage of an inquiry, trial or 3 other proceeding if it appears to it that any person or witness is required to be summoned or any witness who has already been examined is required to be recalled either for being cross- examined or being re-examined. The only condition for the court to act under the provision is that if it is satisfied that the evidence of such a person is essential to the just decision of the case. Section 311 Cr. P.C. is a provision which could be invoked by the trial court so as to aiding in reaching the just decision of the case and as soon as it is found that evidence of any person is essential the court may summon or recall him. So far Section 313 Cr. P.C. is concerned, it is a provision for examining the accused by reading out the gist of the allegation against him to offer a fair trial to him. Our system of administering criminal justice professes fair trial without any prejudice being caused to any party. This is why that the courts have powers to examine any accused at any stage of inquiry or trial on circumstances which may appear against him out of the evidence which might have been received against him in that proceeding. If a particular circumstance has not been put to an accused desiring his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and if the same is used against him, the judgment or the trial based on such unexplained circumstance is vitiated. The only purpose of the provision of Section 313 Cr. P.C. could be that the accused does not have any prejudice in getting a fair trial. As such, the provision of Section 313 Cr. P.C. could never be said 4 to be a provision under which the court could be acting to filling in the lacunae which could be occurring in the prosecution case. The practice which is prevailing in the lower court on use of that particular section is that the accused are generally examined after close of the prosecution case and they are examined with reference to the circumstances which are brought on record by the prosecution through its evidence. As such, there could not be any question that by examining an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the court is filling in the lacunae in the prosecution case rather it is an instrument in aid of doing justice fully and completely in a fair trial without prejudice to the accused. As such, the judgment cited by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners appears of no application under the present facts of the case. I have already discussed the scope of Section 313 Cr. P.C. and I have noted that if the court finds any circumstance which requires an explanation from the accused so as to giving him a fair trial, then, it is the boundant duty of the court under the scheme of our justicing system that it should call an accused for examining him under Section 313 Cr. P.C. to question him on that particular circumstance. The court below was doing that and, as such, I do not find such discharge of its statutory duties as abuse of the process of the court or which could be simply against the provision of law. The Court finds that it was a perfect order which could hardly give rise to any 5 reason for the same being interfered with in the present case. In the result, the petition appears of no merit. It is dismissed. The court below is directed to proceed with the trial and deliver the judgment in four months from the date of receipt of a copy of the present order or the same being produced by the petitioners. While I was hearing the petition I found that the Fast Track courts created for delivery of quick justice appear moving at a snail’s pace. If the evidence was shut down as back as on 2.9.2000 then there could be no reason for any court to sit tight over the matter for ten long years so as not to delivering judgment. The malaise be brought to the notice of the Court on its administrative side. Let the Registrar General of the Court place the present order before the Court on its administrative side so that we could have introspection of ourselves as regards the functioning of the Fast Track Courts. Kanth ( Dharnidhar Jha, J.)