IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.2563 of 2011 Ganesh Ram, s/o- Late Sukhi Ram, r/o- village Shahpur, P.O.- Baulia, P.S.- Nauhatta, District- Rohtas. ………….. Petitioner Versus 1. The Union of India through the Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, New Delhi-110001. 2. The Director General, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), ,Hq. 13, C.G.O. Complex, Lodhi Road, 110003. 3. The Inspector General of Police and Addl. Director General, CISF, 13, C.G.O. Complex, Lodhi Road, 110003. 4. The Senior Commandant, VST PS Unit, Vindhyanagar, P.O.- Vindhyanagar, Distt.- Singrauli, M.P. ……….. Respondents For the petitioner : Mr. Ram Das Singh, Advocate Mr. Pankaj Kumar Jha, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Kalyan Shankar, CGC ----------- 4 19.07.2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent Union of India. Petitioner while serving as Head Constable in Central Industrial Security Force ( for short “CISF) was proceeded against departmentally and punishment in the shape of compulsory retirement from service was inflicted. The proceeding was taken up and the order thereunder was passed in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The order was served on him in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Petitioner has filed the present writ application questioning the sustainability of the aforesaid order as contained in Annexure-1. This Court, having noticed the pleadings made in the writ petition, permitted the parties to make submissions with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court in 2 view of provisions contained under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to paragraph 3 of the writ petition and submitted that since the petitioner is a resident of the State of Bihar and as such this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the application. It is next contended that the respondent No. 2, the Director General, CISF exercises jurisdiction throughout the territory of the country which would entitle the petitioner to file writ petition in any State of the country including the State of Bihar. He relies on the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (i) (2004) 6 S.C.C. 254 (Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. versus Union of India) (ii)(2001) 9 S.C.C. 525 (Dinesh Chandra Gahtori versus Chief of Army Staff). Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that no part, much less essential or integral part of the cause of action has arisen within the State of Bihar and as such this Court would not have territorial jurisdiction in terms of provisions contained under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Article 226(2) of the India reads as under: “226(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within 3 which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.’ It is thus seen that after amendment, a rider has been created on the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs in terms of the provisions contained therein. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The materials facts which are imperative for the petitioner to prove in order to succeed in the proceeding would constitute the cause of action. A fraction of cause of action accruing within the jurisdiction of the Court would give jurisdiction to the Writ Court to entertain the writ petition. The Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd (supra) considered the said aspects of the matter in paragraphs 6 and 7 which are quoted hereinbelow: “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. 7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads thus: 4 “226.(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.’” In the case of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori (supra), on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court noticed that the order passed by the Summary Court Martial was communicated to the wife who resided within the jurisdiction of the Court. It also took into consideration that the matter remained pending with the High Court for about seven (07) years whereafter the order was passed by the High Court of Judicature of Allahabad refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The said order, therefore, was passed on the particular facts of the case. Present case is thus distinguishable. I have perused the contents of the writ petition. Except the averments made in paragraph 3, there is no other assertion with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court. Paragraph 3 of the writ petition reads as under: “3.That, the petitioner is a citizen of India and he has got a right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court for redressal of his grievances, as he is living within territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.” 5 The question is whether the residence of the writ petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction would be a material fact and/or necessary facts which is/are required to be proved in order to succeed at the proceeding. The answer would be no. Mere fact that the writ petitioner resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court would not constitute necessary and/or material facts constituting the cause of action. This Court had an occasion to deal with somewhat identical issue in C.W.J.C. No. 10058 of 2011 (Loknath Singh versus Union of India) wherein on a consideration of a judgment of the Supreme Court, it has been held that mere residence within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court would not constitute integral and/or essential part of the cause of action. This Court, therefore, holds that the present writ petition lodged in this Court would not be maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. The application is dismissed. pkj ( Kishore K. Mandal, J)