IN THE HIGH mUR'I‘ OF Q‘IHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR"(C.Go) WWW—”WW A. 8 ‘ 5 /2003 ”WWBHI$ APPELLANTS s f 1. Smt. Ghasnin Bai w/o late APPLICANTS Bhagwat Pd. Sahua, aged 45 yrs. Basant Ku. Sahu s/c late Bhagwat Pd. Sahuq aged about 20 years. ‘ Ku. Rashmi D/o late Ehagwat Prasad Sahu‘, aged about 18 yrs. 4/. Rajkumar s/o late Bhagwat Pd. Sahu, aged about 14 years. All Resident of Qr. No. A/1527 Kaveri Vihar N.T.P.C. Jamnipali P.O. Darri, Tah. Korbaa Distt. '1 Korba (C.G.) VERW S RESPONDENTS 15 Ravi Ku. Singh S/o Ved Singh NON-APPLICANTS /; Sengar, R/o Batia, P.S.Akaltara, At Present residing at P.H.E. Champa, ’I‘ah. & Distt. Champa- Janjgir (c.G.). (/2.‘ The Néw India Insurance Co.Ltd. Tab. 8; Distt. Bilaspur (G.G.) Dr. T.S. mandei s/o Not known R/o Deewan Auto Mobiles, Station ' Road Champag Tah. 8: Distt. ‘ Janjgir— Champa (C.G.) a APPEAL U/S 173 OF MO‘IOR VEHICLE ACT M ‘ 'W/org/W (:LASM VALue% (WINE m _. 11’3n,tmu/_ o 2 i159 I V/Belng aggrleved by the oraer passed 1n Claim Case e n w” No. 58/2002 on dated 4-7—03 by Ixnd Additlonal Motor Accident Tribunal, Korba (Presiding Officer— Sri N.K / s 1 . £9 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR M. A. N0. 819 of 2003 Appellants Smt. Ghasnin Bai 8L others Versus Respondents Ravi Kumar Singh 85 others APPEAL UNDER SECTION 173 OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 DB: Hon’ble 8hri Justice I. M. Quddusi 86 Hon’ble Shri Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra Shri Dharmesh Shrivastava, Advocate for the appellants. Shri Sri Kumar Agarwal, Senior Advocate with Shri Anand Kumar Gupta, Advocate for the respondent No.2. None for the respondents No. l and 3. ORDER (Oral) ( Passed on this 13m day of April, 201 1 ) Per I. M. Qudclusi, J This appeal has been filed against the impugned order dated '4.7.2003, passed by the Second Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Korba in Claim Case No. 58/2002, dismissing the claim petition as barred by limitation. 2. The, brief facts, in nutshell, are that the appellants had filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Korba on 15.11.2000. The accident had taken place on 30.12.1993. The following facts regarding the accident are given in the instant appeal that the deceased Bhagwat Prasad Sahu was a regular employee of N.T.P.C. and was posted at Jamnipali, Darri. On 30. 12. 1993 when the deceased was riding his motorcycle, bearing registration No. MBR 6097, the @ offending vehicle, bearing registration No. MPL 8098, hit the deceased and his motorcycle due to the rash and negligent driving of the non—applicant No.1 (Ravi Kumar Singh). As a result of this accident Bhagwat Prasad‘Sahu succumbed to the injuries. The claimants, being legal heirs (wife, two sons and one .daughter) of the deceased filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for award of a total compensation of Rs. 22,30,000/- under various heads. The said claim petition No. 58/2002 was dismissed by the impugned order dated 4.7.2003 on the ground of limitation as at the time of accident sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was in existence, which provided as under : “No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.” However, the above quoted provision was repealed w.e.f. 14.11.1994. Now, the question has come before this Court that at this stage when the provisions of subvsection (3) of Section 166 of the Act, 1988 have been omitted w.e.f. 14.11.1994, can this Court in the instant appeal ignore the hurdle of limitation and remit it to the Claims Tribunal for adjudication on merits as there is no limitation prescribed for filing such a claim petition’ Further, a i~\\\\» \ \r» <9 question has also arisen that if no claim petition would have been flled during the existence of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act, 1988 and a claim petition was filed after its repealing i.e. 14.11.1994 when no period of limitation was prescribed for filing such a claim petition, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition and decide the same on merits.’ In the above regard our attention has been drawn towards the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhannalal Vs. D. P. Vijayvargiya and others (1996) 4 SCC 652 in which case the principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court taking the illustrative View in paragraph — 7, the Tribunal was directed to entertain the claim petition. Para 7 of decision is reproduced hereinbeow : “7 In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the amending Act it does not appear that the said sub—section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the amending Act to show that beneflt of deletion of sub— section (3) of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from a Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place tWO years before 14-11-1994 when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been field by the victim or‘the heirs of the victim till 14-11-1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14—1 1—1994 in respect of such accident ? Whether a claim petition filed after 14—11—1994 can be rejected by . @ the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when sub—section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of sub—section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14—11—1994 ? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition Without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub— section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub—section (6) of Section 158 which provides: " 158.(6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the ' same Within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer. " In view of sub-section (6) of Section ,158 of the Act the officer—in-charge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded‘ to the insurer concerned. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub—section (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of the said section by Parliament is not defeated. If a Victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer'claim fOr compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the Victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14—11—1994 in respect of the accident which took place on 4—12-1990, in . View of the amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.” In that case the victim/injured filed a claim petition before the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Badwah for compensation along with an application for condonation of delay on 7.12.1991. The Claims Tribunal Vide order dated 18.11.1993 condoned the delay but the validity of the said order was challenged by the respondent therein in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the High Court by order dated 31.7.1995 set aside the order of the Tribunal saying that in View of the provisions of sub—section (3) of Section 166 of the Act, 1988 the power of condonation by the Tribunal has been 3% Withdrawn and any claim must be filed within the period prescribed therein. The High Court further observed that by prescribing the fixed period for filing the petition for claim the intention was that the ‘sword of liability of paying compensation in respect of accident caused by motor vehicle should not be permitted to hover on the head of the person owning the said vehicle and person driving such vehicle’. It was also pointed out that the position was different under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in which sub—section (3) of section llO-A although prescribed a period of six months for filing an application for compensation from the date of the accident, but vested power in the Tribunal to entertain such application even after the expiry of the said period of six months, if the Tribunal was satisfied that the claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. According to the High Court, as proviso to sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act said that Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months, but not later than twelve'months, any application filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident cannot be entertained as no discretion had been left with the Tribunal to consider the circumstances because of which the application for claim could not be filed within the period of twelve months of the occurrence of the accident. In that decision Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 observed as under : a “8. The matter will be different if any claimant having field a petition for claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High Court, the claimant \7 \rm VV\\s _Krr \ 7 3; does not challenge the same and allows the said judicial order t0 become final. The aforesaid amending Act shall be of no help to such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that principle will not govern cases Where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, the High Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of sub-section (3) of Section 166 should e eende.” Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court. We direct the Tribunal to entertain the petitin for claim filed on behalf of the “9‘ appellant and to dispose of the same as early possible in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.” Since the instant appeal is nding before this Court and pe following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in e case of Dhannalal (supra), and taking into consideration that there is no liitation prescribed for filing the claim m petition after omission of sub—section (3) of Section 166 of the Act, 198, we are bound to allow this appeal in part and remit 8 the matter to the Claims Tribunal for deciding on merits. For the reasons stated herein above, we allow this appeal in part, set—aside the impugned order dated 4.7.2003 and remt i back the matter to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a as well as the Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. No order as to costs. .\ b xtd o as th Thakur @ 10. NeedleSs to mention that the parties shall be allowed to amehd their pleadings, adduce further evidence again in support of their pleadings and may file further documents and get the documents verified etc. Thereafter, the decision shall be made by the Tribunal on merits. 11. The claim petition shall be restored to its original number and award shall be passed in accordance with law. Sd/— Prashant Kumar Mishra Judge 4‘ K