IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. F.A.O No.825 of 2009 Date of Decision: 19.08.2009 The Punjab Cooperative Supply & Marketing Federation Limited and anr. ....Appellants Versus M/s Bharat Cotton and General Mills and others ...Respondents CORAM : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Nirmaljit Kaur Present:- Ms. Deepali Puri, Advocate for the appellants. ***** 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? ** NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. (Oral) The present appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 18-09-2008 passed by Additional District Judge, Mansa, dismissing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the award dated 31-03-2005. The said application was dismissed on the ground of limitation for having filed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 beyond the period of limitation. The said application was filed after a delay of 5 months and 27 days. Learned counsel for the appellants states that the delay of 5 months and 27 days occurred due to the delay in obtaining reports from various officials for making calculations to challenge the award. Be that as it may, I find no merit in the said argument raised by learned counsel for the appellants, in as much as, the issue with respect to F.A.O No.825 of 2009 -2- limitation for filing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled as Union of India vs. M/s Popular Construction Co. 2002 (1) RCR 124, holding as follows : “ As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are `but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). On our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase `but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.” In view of the well settled proposition of law, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is, accordingly dismissed. (NIRMALJIT KAUR) 19.08.2009 JUDGE gurpreet