1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.1654 OF 2009 Head Master, Jaibhavani Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Rajewadi, Tq. Majalgaon, District Beed & another. .. Petitioners Versus Maroti s/o Goroba Vitekar, Age: 30 years, Occ: Nil, R/o. Nakalgaon, Post Belora, Tq. Majalgaon Dist. Beed and another. .. Respondents ... Mr. S.S. Thombre, Advocate for the petitioners. Respondent No. 1 served (Absent). Mr. N.H. Borade, A.G.P. for respondent No. 2. ... CORAM : K.K. TATED, J. DATE : 20th JULY, 2009. PER COURT : 1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned A.G.P. for respondent No. 2. Though respondent No. 1 is duly served, no one appeared on his behalf when the matter was called out for hearing. Rule made returnable forthwith. With 2 the consent of both the parties, matter is taken up for final hearing at the stage of admission. 2. In this petition, the petitioners challenges the order dated 22-12-2008 passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Aurangabad in Misc. Application No. 29/2007. Respondent No. 1 filed appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act and also preferred Misc. Application No. 29/2007 for condonation of delay of 117 days in preferring the said appeal. 3. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners state that the Tribunal erred in observing in Para 6 that " respondents are not serious to object for condonation of delay." It is the case of the petitioners that in fact, they filed affidavit in reply and opposed the said application seriously. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners further submitted that there are serious allegations 3 against respondent No.1. Not only that, he is retired from the service. 4. In any case, respondent No. 1 in his application, explained the delay of 117 days in preferring the said appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. The Apex Court in the matter of N. Balkrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 S.C.C. 123 observed that where a court condones delay in positive exercise of discretion, superior court and more particularly the revisional court should not normally disturb the same. Para 11, 12 and 13 of the said judgment read as under. "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such 4 legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in 5 approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a 6 salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not find any merits in this Writ Petition and same is summarily dismissed. Rule discharged. [ K.K. TATED, J.] sut/JUL09/wp1654.09