THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.780 OF 2005 JUDGMENT: The acquittal of both the accused in C.C.No.156 of 1999 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Rajam, by the judgment dated 28.03.2002 in respect of offences punishable under Sections 16 (1) (a) (i), 7 (i) and 2 (ia) (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 {“the Act” for brevity}, led the State to prefer this appeal through the learned Public Prosecutor. The factual background for the appeal is that the Food Inspector (Divisional), Srikakulam District, along with attender by name B.Polayya, inspected the shop of the accused on 26.11.1998 at 3 pm and suspecting the quality of Badam Milk kept in glass bottles for sale, purchased three {3} bottles of the same for Rs.66/- and obtained a cash receipt on paying the price. After serving Form VI notice on the first accused informing that the samples would be sent for analysis, he sealed the samples as per the prescribed procedure and obtained a signature of the first accused on the paper slips affixed to the bottles. The proceedings were conducted under a mediators report in the presence of mediators and the Public Analyst, after analysis, opined the Badam Milk to be deficient in fat content and solids not fat and therefore, adulterated. On receipt of the Analyst Report, the Food Inspector obtained orders from the Director of institute of Preventive Medicine and filed a complaint. After taking cognizance of the offence and after appearance of the accused, copies of documents were furnished to the accused. The accused were examined under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 {“Cr.P.C.” for brevity}, when they denied the offence and during the trial, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.P1 to P24 were marked. No material objects were marked. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against them, when they were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and they had no defence evidence. The trial Court rendered the impugned judgment, firstly opining that P.W.1, the Food Inspector, was competent to collect the samples from the shop of the accused, having territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the shop of the accused is located, as seen from Ex.P16, the order of appointment of P.W.1 by the Government empowering him to collect samples from the entire Srikakulam District. While the Food Inspector was thus held competent, requisite training for him having been presumed, the visit of P.W.1, the Food Inspector, to the shop of the accused and his purchase of the samples and the further proceedings conducted by him before the mediators were also believed by the trial Court with reference to the relevant documents and the trial Court, notwithstanding the mediators being not too independent, accepted the version of P.W.1 relying on a decision of the Apex Court making it appropriate to accept even the solitary testimony of the Food Inspector in such cases. The trial Court concluded that the Food Inspector followed the prescribed procedure including Rule 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 {“the Rules” for brevity}. However, the trial Court found that the Public Analyst never opined that the sample analyzed was injurious to health and unfit for human consumption only on proof of which the accused could have been convicted for the alleged offences. The trial Court also found that the sample lifted on 26.11.1998, was sent to the Public Analyst on 27.11.1998 and the Analyst signed his report on 06.01.1999. It is also observed that the report received by the Director of institute of Preventive Medicine on 07.01.1999 was within forty {40} days and not in violation of Rule 13 (2) of the Rules. The trial Court also observed that the case was filed against the accused on 14.07.1999 and notice under Section 13 (2) of the Act was obtained from the Director, Local Health Authority, on 19.07.1999 and the notices were received by the first and second accused respectively on 22.07.1999 and 21.07.1999. The trial Court, therefore, felt that it was the accused that did not avail the opportunity to send the second sample to the Central Food Laboratory. The trial Court also dealt with the defence under Section 20 of the Act raised by the accused and repelled the contention that Ex.P14-Sanction Order was not disclosing the application of mind by the Sanctioning Authority. Thus, while all other contentions of the accused were rejected, only on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the article of food is injurious to health, the trial Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Consequently, the accused were acquitted. The grounds of appeal questioned the said judgment contending that merely because the Analyst Report did not indicate that the sample was injurious to health, the accused could not have been acquitted. Heard Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing the learned Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State and Sri K.Purushotham, learned counsel representing the respondents- accused. The point for consideration is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of either or both the accused for the alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused were prosecuted for alleged offences punishable under Sections 16 (1) (a) (i), 7 (i) read with Section 2 (ia) (m) of the Act 1954. Section 2 (ia) (m) of the Act makes an article of food deemed to be adulterated, if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not render it injurious to health provided that where the quality or purity of the article, being primary food, has fallen below the prescribed standards or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability, in either case, solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency, then such article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this sub clause. The explanation to the provision also makes it clear that where two or more articles of food are mixed together and the resultant article of food is sold, stored or distributed under a name, which denotes the ingredients thereof and is not injurious to health, then such resultant article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this clause. The primary food again is defined in Section 2 (xii-a) as any article of food being a produce of agriculture or horticulture in its natural form. The article of food, which is involved herein, is Badam Milk, which is obviously a mixture of the two ingredients indicated in its name both of which are primary food within the meaning of the definition under the Statute and it is not indicated from the material on record that any other substances have been added to this mixture of two primary foods and therefore, such a mixture, if it is not injurious to health, may not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of Section 2 (ia) (m) of the Act. At any rate, the quality or purity of the article falling below the prescribed standards or its constituents being present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability in respect of such primary foods has to be attributed to the involvement of human agency to deem it to be adulterated under this provision and the material on record may not disclose the positive involvement of any human agency resulting in the variability in quantities of constituents of articles of food or absence of prescribed standards in the food. While Section 7 (i) of the Act prohibits manufacture of or sale or storage or sale or distribution or any adulterated food, Section 16 (1) (a) (i) makes such storage or sale or distribution or manufacture for sale of an adulterated food punishable if the adulteration was within the meaning of Section 2 (ia) (m) or also within the meaning of clause (ix) of that provision making the article misbranded. Such an offence, therefore, has to necessarily satisfy the ingredients of all the three provisions and when the article involved appears to be a mixture of primary foods, the article of food being injurious to health will have to be established for claiming it to be adulterated within the meaning of the penal provision and otherwise any variability in the standards or constituents may not make it adulteration. Therefore, if the factual conclusions of the trial Court borne out by the oral and documentary evidence on record are correct about the article of food being stated no where to be injurious to health or at any rate not fit for human consumption, more particularly in Ex.P10-Report of the Public Analyst, the trial Court giving benefit of doubt to the accused may not be open to interference in the appeal. Criminal liability being what it is, the provisions are to be construed strictly but not liberally. If a construction in favour of the innocence of the accused is reasonably possible, the same has to be adopted. In view of the settled principles of interpretation of statutes in such matters, the benefit of reasonable doubt being given to the accused in the present case by the trial Court is not open for interference in this appeal and the grounds of appeal also did not challenge the conclusion that the Analysis Report did not indicate that the sample was injurious to health. Therefore, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. ___________________ (G.BHAVANI PRASAD, J) 2nd December 2009 RRB