1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2366 OF 1999 IN SECOND APPEAL NO. 4886 OF 1998 Rameshkumar Bhogilal Shaha ....Applicant. Versus Kisanrao Limbaji Kadam and others ....Respondents. Shri. V.S. Bedre, Advocate for the appellant. Shri. A.S. Shelke, Advocate for the respondents 1 and 1-J. CORAM : P.R. BORKAR, J. DATE : 22nd JUNE, 2009 PER COURT : 1. Heard Shri. V.S. Bedre, Advocate for the appellant and Shri. A.S. Shelke, Advocate for the respondents Nos. 1 to 1-J. 2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 1460 days in filing the second appeal. The original suit was for setting aside the will executed by the appellant (minor) after he attended the majority. The suit was dismissed. As against the same, the first appeal was filed in the 2 District Court, Beed. Said appeal came to be dismissed on 26.10.1993 and as against the same, the second appeal is sought to be filed with this application for condonation of delay. 3. In the application, it is stated that due to financial difficulties, the appellant was required to go to Nasik and was serving there. So there was no communication with the advocate holding the matter in District Court, Beed. It is further stated in para 6 that just prior to filing of the application for condonation of delay in February 1998, the applicant happened to go to Tahsil Office, Beed and at that time, he learned about the decision of the District Court in first appeal. 4. The learned Advocate Shri. A.S. Shelke for respondents vehemently opposed the application. According to him, the application is false, it only shows that after filing appeal in District Court, the appellant was not attentive towards the appeal, he never went to his advocate. 5. It may be noted that the appeal was filed in the year 1984. So from October 1993 till beginning of 1998 there is no attempt to meet the advocate. There is enormous delay. It is not case of the applicant that he went to meet advocate and there he learnt about the decision of the first appeal and immediately thereafter he made arrangement for financial assistance. He went to Tahsil office for some other work. That shows that 3 there was no necessary diligence as stated in the application. It cannot be said that it is a sufficient case for condoning the delay. I am referring to para No. 22 and 23 of the Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project and another, reported in 2008 (6) ALL M.R. 954. 22. Statues of Limitation are sometimes described as "statues of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This Court in Rajnder Singh and others Vs. Santa Singh and others [(1973) 2 SSC 705] has observed : "the object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches". In Motichand Vs. Munshi [(1969) 2 SCR 824], this Court observed that this principle is based on the maxim "interest republicae ut sit finis litum, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. It needs to restatement at our hands that the object for fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the law come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 23. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statues. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the 4 case may be, should not be be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit which otherwise not entitled in law in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 6. Considering the purpose of limitation for filing an appeal, in my opinion, reasons given in the application cannot be said to be sufficient. Hence, the application is rejected. [ P.R. BORKAR ] Judge ssc/ca2366.99