t IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF CHHATISGARH AT BILASPUR W.P.Na"'2001 PETITIONER ..'y.-' ,/Af// : i/^1^/ <? ^ .'y"'.fn.'^y *' A •*. tf ..•<>" .••" ^,^' <-• '•^.^' RESJ&NDENX Steel Authority of India Limited A Company constituted and Regis- tered under Companies Act, 1956 having its Head Office af Lodhi Road, NewDelhi, through its Managing Director, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, Distt. Durg (C.G) VERSUS :l.Sartaj Gera, S/o Shri B.S.Gera R/o- 21/11, Nehru Nagar, (East) BhilaiNagar, Dist. Durg (C.G.) 2-Second Additional District Judge, Durg, Distt. Durg (Chhattisgarh) 3.Estate Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, Dist. Durg (Chhattisgarh) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 /227 OF THE CONSTITUTIONOFINDIA: /^- HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION No. 2630 OF 2001 PETITIONER RESPONDENTS Steel Authority of India Limited Versus SartaJ Gera and another SINGLE BENCH:- Hon. Shri N.K. Aganval, J PRESENT:- Dr. N.K. Shukla, Sr. Adv. with Ku. Ritu Mishra, Adv. for the petitioner. Shri Arjun Yadav, Adv. for respondent no. 1. Shri B.D. Guru. and Shri Varundra Mishra, Advocates for respondent No. 3. ORAL ORDER (22-1-2010) 1. The instant petition is directed against the order dated 9- 10-2001 passed by IInd Additional District Judge, Durg in Misc. Appeal No. 4/99 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1 was allowed holding the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupations) Act, 1971 (briefly, "the Act") inapplicable in the facts of the present case. ^- 2. Indisputably, the petitioner - Company is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) with its head ofBce at New DeUai and functioning at Bhilai under the name and style Steel Authority of India Limited, Bhilai Steeal Plant; is owner of the disputed premises; the Disputed premises was given to respondent No. 1 on a monthly licence fee of Rs. 100/- for a period of one year, which was subsequently extended for 5 years on certain conditions, and the said period is over. 3. As per the petitioner, the licence was expired on 17-7-1994 and as such, the respondent was required to vacate the said premises immediately but did not vacate and remained in its unauthorized occupation; also encroached upon additional area measuring 330.84 sq. ft., and therefore, the respondent No. 1 vide order dated 6-3-2009 was directed by the Estate Officer, Bhilai to vacate the same and also to pay past and future damages. The appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1 against the said order was allowed by the impugned order. 4. Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Sr. Advocate, appearing for the petitioner woiild submits that leamed Court below has erred in allowing the appeal by holding that "unauthorized licensee" does not come within the purview of word "unauthorized occupant" and also the words "occupant" and "allottee" are not one and the same. 5. Per contra, Shri Arjun Yadav, leamed counsel for the respondent No. 1 would submit that learned Coiirt below has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned order. 6. I have heard leamed counsel for both the parties and perused the order impugned. 7. Before appreciating the contentions raised by the parties, it would be appropriate to go through the relevant provisions contained in the Act. Section 2(fb) defines "temporary occupation" and 2(g) defines "unauthorized occupation": ,». "2(fb). "temporary occupation", in relation to any public premises, means occupation by any person on the basis of an order of allotment made under the authority of the Central Government, a State Government, the Government of a Union Territory or a statutory authority for a total period (including the extended period, if any) which is less than thirty days. (g) "Unauthorised occupation", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person ^..3 of the public premises after the authority (whefher by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. 8. As per the above referred definition, "temporary occupation" in relation to any public premises means occupation by any person on the basis of an order of allotment made under fhe authority of the Centa'al Government, a State Govemment, the Government of a Union Territory or a statutory authority for a total period (including extended period, if any) which is less than 30 years and "unauthorized occupation ineans the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of fhe public preraises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other inode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. 9. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid definitions would reveal that a person shall be deeined to be in unauthorized occupation of a public premises where he has before or after commencement of the Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise then under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant or by any other mode of transfer, and includes continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. 10. The word "possession" connotes one single terminus, viz. the point of time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from the point of tiine when a persons enters into possession or occupies SFS33*' c.;- the preraises and continues until he leaves the premises. Therefore, the word "occupation" has a vide connotation and it includes in its ambit possession as licensee and therefore, the word "unaufhorized occupation" includes in its ambit unauthorized licensee also. In the same manner word allottee would mean a person who is in occupation of a premises by allotment, means by legal means, and therefore, the distinction drawn betwe^n the words by the Court below is totally unwarranted and uncaUed for and the provisions of fhe Act are squarely appUcable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. For the foregoing the order passed by the Court below cannot be sustained, thesame deserves to be and is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted balck to the Court below to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law on its ownmerit. The Cburt betow is expected to decide the appeal expeditiously, The parties shall maintain status quo with regard to possession of disputed premises for a period of two months from. today. The respondent No. 1 is free to apply before the trial Court for interiin relief during the pendency ofappeal. Sd/- N.K. Agarwal Judge