( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD SECOND APPEAL NO. 132 OF 1993 Ajitsingh s/o Kabilasingh Since deceased, by L.Rs. Prabjitkaur Ajitsingh, R/o Ajitnagar, Asadullabad, Tq. and District Nanded. APPELLANT VERSUS Nanded Municipal Council, Nanded, through its Chief Officer, Nanded. RESPONDENT ..... Mr. V.D. Patnoorkar, advocate for the appellant. Mr. Murar Deshpande, advocate holding for Mr. S.V. Kurundkar, advocate for the respondent. ..... [CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] [DATE : 10th November, 2009] ORAL JUDGEMENT : 1. Challenge in this appeal is to judgement rendered by learned 4th Additional District Judge, Nanded in an appeal (R.C.A. No. 230/1990). By the impugned judgement, learned Additional District Judge allowed the ( 2 ) appeal and was pleased to set aside injunction decree granted in favour of the appellant (plaintiff). 2. Indisputably, the appellant is owner and possessor of a house property. He allegedly purchased the open plot in 1972 and constructed a house property thereon after obtaining construction permission from Group Gram Panchayat, Nasratpur. His case before the trial Court was that the house property is situated at village Asadullabad, which is not included within jurisdiction of Nanded Municipal Council. However, the Municipal Council attempted to collect house property tax from him as per Income Tax Notice No. 059 dated 02­08­1988. He was not liable to pay the property tax to the Municipal Council. Consequently, he filed suit for declaration that the property tax bill submitted by the Municipal Council is illegal, improper and liable to be quashed. He also sought perpetual injunction restraining the Municipal Council from effecting illegal recovery of the property tax on basis of invalid bill. ( 3 ) 3. The learned Civil Judge (J.D.) decreed the suit whereas the first Appellate Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. Hence, the second appeal. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. While admitting the second appeal, grounds No. II, IV, V, VI, VIII and XIV were considered as substantial questions of law. 6. As a matter of fact, upon hearing learned counsel, the only substantial question of law involved in this second appeal is as follows : “Whether the first Appellate Court committed patent error while reaching conclusion that village Asadullabad is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipal Council and, therefore, the property tax bill could be served on the appellant and he was liable to pay such taxes ?” ( 4 ) 7. There is no dispute about the fact that the appellant is owner of house property, situated in village Asadullabad. What emerges from the record and evidence of the parties is that village Asadullabad was part and parcel of Group Gram Panchayat consisting of in all four villages, namely, Nasratpur, Hapsapur, Jangamwadi and Asadullabad. A copy of the Government Gazette dated 05­01­1961 purports to show that by virtue of notification, the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division was pleased to declare that the above four villages were within the Group Gram Panchayat consisting of the said villages as participants. This notification dated 05­01­1961 purports to show that village Asadullabad was included in the Group Gram Panchayat of Nasratpur and others. What transpires further is that the Divisional Commissioner realized the mistake of including village Asadullabad in the Group Gram Panchayat of four villages. This was because of the fact that there was inclusion of Asadullabad within boundary limits of Nanded Municipal Council. The Divisional Commissioner further noticed that the name of the respondent was shown as the holder of the property. It is further ( 5 ) stated in the Government Notification dated 01­07­1981 (Exh­38) that because village Asadullabad was within the municipal limits since 1344 Fasli (1935 A.D.), it was required to be deleted from the names of villages included in the Group Gram Panchayat as per notification dated 28­12­1962. The entry was rectified by the learned Divisional Commissioner. 8. Clinching question is whether village Asadullabad was within the municipal limits of the respondent No.1 ­ Municipal Council when the impugned demand notice was served on the appellant. It is pertinent to notice that at bottom of the notification dated 01­07­1987, issued by the Divisional Commissioner, reason for deleting name of Asadullabad from the Group Gram Panchayat is indicated as the said village had merged within the limits of Municipal Council since 1344 Fasli. Thus, the purport of subsequent notification (Exh­38) was to rectify the mistake committed by the Divisional Commissioner, Aurangabad while including the village Asadullabad. In the other three Village Panchayats of Nasratpur, etc., there is no limitation ( 6 ) for rectification of such mistake. It appears that the demand notice was served on the appellant because he was liable to pay the municipal tax to the Municipal Council in view of such rectification of the record. 9. The limits of Nanded Municipal Council came to be fixed way back in 1934 Fasli. A copy of relevant Govt. Resolution dated 13­08­1344 Fasli. It is obvious, therefore, that village Asadullabad was part and parcel of the area covered by the Municipal Council. The oral map of Nanded is also placed on record. If this map and the relevant Govt. Resolution issued in 1344 Fasli are read together, it is amply clear that the outer limit of the Municipal Council was extended upto the southern boundary of village Sangvi. It is further quite conspicuous that village Asadullabad is on southern side of village Sangvi. There is a middling yardstick and other properties in between. In fact, the yardstick i.e. the airport comes within boundary limits of Asadullabad. The learned Additional District Judge noticed this old record. It is quite clear, therefore, that there was no need to issue further notification ( 7 ) under the provisions of Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act to include village Asadullabad within municipal limits of Nanded Municipal Council because it was already included in 1935 A.D. The old map and the notification have presumptive value. Considering these aspects, the view taken by the first Appellate cannot be termed as perverse. 10. In the result, I do not find any merit in the appeal. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. 11. In view of dismissal of the second appeal, civil application No. 1085/1993 does not survive and hence, stands dismissed accordingly. [ V.R. KINGAONKAR ] JUDGE NPJ/sa132­405­93