IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.46944 of 2007 1. MD. Nehal sonof Late Md. Wali 2. Jasia Khatoon wife of Md. Nehal 3. Md. Belal son of Md. Nehal Versus 1. STATE OF BIHAR 2. Shagufta Yasmeen wife of Md. Belal ----------- 4 09/02/2009 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, for the state and for opposite party no. 2. Complaint case no. 3584-C of 2006 was filed by opposite party no. 2 under section 498-A, 323 and 406/34 of the Indian Penal Code and section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act in which cognizance has been taken under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners, who are father-in-law, mother-in-law and the husband himself. Allegation has been made of harassment and alleged torture for the purposes of dowry. Opposite Party No. 2 was an educated lady having done her M.A. in Philosophy while petitioner no. 3 is stated to be employed in the Saudi Arabia. There are no heinous allegations in the complaint. The marriage is stated to have been solemnised in December, 2001. One male child was born out of the wed lock. The parties maintained the formalities of husband and wife but with physical distance. A joint petition has been filed on behalf of the parties today. They admit their incompatibility and state that they have compromised the matter amongst themselves and have decided to partways. Petitioner no. 3 has further agreed to pay Rs.2000/- (Rupees two thousand) per month for the maintenance of the child and shall continue to do so till the child attain the age of seven years, that - 2 - the petitioner no. 3 shall make no claim to the child till he attains the age of 18 years, that the parties have, therefore, agreed for a peaceful separation and that opposite party no. 2 has received all her dues and articles including the dower and maintenance for Iddat period to her satisfaction, she is no more desirous of pursuing the litigation and wanted to live in peace and that the compromise was bonafide and without any un-due pressure, coercion and misrepresentation. Learned counsel for both sides stand by the terms of the compromise during the course of their submissions. In the facts and circumstances of the case where two adults unable to live together have peacefully decided to partways, bring an end to the litigation between them and have chosen to start their life afresh, the duty of this Court shall be to assist them in the same rather than obstruct from their desire to start a new life. No useful purpose shall be served by allowing the prosecution to continue when opposite party no. 2 has herself stated that she wants to lead a peaceful life. This Court can do no better than to quote from paragraphs 13 to 15 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in AIR 2003, S.C., 1386: 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao V. L.H.V. Prasad and others [(2000) 3 S.C.C., 693] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial dispute by the Courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly extent which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also - 3 - involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about re-oproachment are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts. 14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interest of woman and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent woman from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code. “ In the result, the entire proceedings against the petitioners in complaint case no. 3584-C of 2006 including the order of cognizance dated 4.6.2007 pending in the court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna are quashed. This application stands allowed. (Navin Sinha, J.) AMIN