* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO +W.A.M.P.No.2220 of 2013 And Review W.A.M.P (SR) No.13316 of 2013 in Writ Appeal No.556 of 2010 % Dated 13-08-2013 W.A.M.P. No.2220 of 2013 # T.D. Dayal …. Third party Petitioner Vs. $ Sri Madupu Harinarayana and six others …. Respondents ! Counsel for the petitioner: Party-in-person ^ Counsel for respondents: G.P. for Revenue Sri Bathula Rajkiran (SC for APHC) <GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? Citations: 1) 1998 (3) An.W.R. 132 (D.B) 2) AIR 1978 SC 1019: (1978) 2 SCC 165 3) AIR 1990 SC 1737: (1990) 2 SCC 533 4) (1999) 3 SCC 616 : AIR 1999 SC 1385 5) AIR 1937 Madras 937 6) AIR 2003 Kar 30 7) AIR 1979 SC 1047 = (1979) 4 SCC 389 8) (1995) 1 SCC 170 9) 2005 (5) ALT 41 (D.B) 10) AIR 2000 SC 1650 11) AIR 1963 SC 1909 12) (2009) 14 SCC 663 13) (2007) 15 SCC 513 14) (1997) 8 SCC 715 15) (2006 (4) ALT 12 (SC) = 2006 (4) SCJ 182 = (2006) 4 SCC 78 16) AIR 1964 SC 1372 17) (2000) 7 SCC 296 18) AIR 1960 SC 137 19) AIR 1980 SC 2041 20) (2009) 10 SCC 464 21) AIR 1980 SC 674 22) (2000) 6 SCC 359 23) (1986) 4 SCC 566 24) (1996) 6 SCC 510 25) (2004) 4 SCC 281 26) 2004 (6) SCC 311 27) (2004) 7 SCC 112 28) (2005) 2 SCC 237 29) (2005) 3 SCC 409 30) (1977) 2 SCC 256 31) (1985) 3 SCC 398 32) (1993) 4 SCC 727 33) (2010) 13 SCC 216 34) (1996) 3 SCC 364 35) (2009) 4 SCC 446 36) (2006) 8 SCC 647 37) (1969) 3 SCC 775 38) (1980) 4 SCC 379 39) (1990) 4 SCC 633 40) (1974) 3 SCC 277 41) (2006) 8 SCC 776 42) (1999) 6 SCC 237 43) (2005) 5 SCC 337 44) 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529 45) AIR 1954 SC 186 46) AIR 1954 SC 10 47) AIR 1967 SC 1 48) 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 49) AIR 1972 SC 858 50) (1988) 3 SCC 26 51) AIR 1988 SC 1883 52) 1913 AC 417 53) AIR 1936 Privy Council 246 54) 1947 CRL.L.J. 868 (ALLAHABAD H.C) 55) 1950 CRL.L.J. 1032 56) 1975 CRL.L.J. 304 57) AIR 1956 Cal 513 : (1956 Cri LJ 1196 58) 1996 Crl.L.J. 2239 59) (2012) 10 SCC 603 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO W.A.M.P.No.2220 of 2013 And Review W.A.M.P (SR) No.13316 of 2013 in Writ Appeal No.556 of 2010 COMMON ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan) Review can be sought not only by those who were parties to the order but even by third parties who are affected by such an order. (P. Neelakanteswaramma v. Uppari Muthamma[1]). Leave as sought for, to file the Review Petition, is therefore granted. The petitioner (who appeared and presented his case before this Court in person) seeks review of the order of this Court dated 19.01.2011, dismissing W.A. No.556 of 2010 as an abuse of process of law with the following directions: “1. the Registry should not accept any case or proceeding, application filed by Sri T.D. Dayal either as a party in person or as a holder of a GPA for third parties; all the District and Subordinate Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh were also directed to abide by this direction; 2. the Security Officer, Incharge of the High Court Security, should not allow Sri T.D.Dayal to enter the High Court premises/precincts and to be stopped and sent away from the entry point itself unless he is specifically summoned by the Court to answer a charge or as a witness; 3. the Registry should communicate a copy of the order forthwith to the Secretary, Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, for taking necessary action as indicated in paragraph 51 of the Judgment. 4. as the appellant and the GPA had filed the case, in gross abuse of the process of Court, both of them were jointly and severally directed to pay Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) as costs within a period of two months to the Member Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Kadapa and, if the amount was not paid, the Member Secretary was directed to execute the order as a decree of the Court by attachment and sale of movable and/or immovable properties of the appellant and/or Sri T.D.Dayal, the GPA holder of the appellant; and 5. the Registry was directed to, suo motu, register a contempt case against Sri T.D.Dayal drawing appropriate charges for making false, unfounded and scurrilous remarks, and attributing prejudice and motives to the Hon’ble Judges of this Court and the Supreme Court.” In W.A. No.556 of 2010, the petitioner herein contended before the Division Bench that he was the General Power of Attorney (GPA) holder of the appellant. In its order in W.A. No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011 the Division Bench examined questions relating to the maintainability of the Writ Petition; the right of a GPA holder to address the Court; and the Court’s response to vexatious and frivolous litigations. The petitioner herein stated before us that he was not questioning the order passed, in W.A. No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, on its merits; and the said order necessitated review in all other aspects. It is, therefore, necessary for us only to examine whether the findings and the conclusions of the Division Bench, in its order in W.A. No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, on (1) right of a GPA holder to address the Court; and (2) the Court’s response to vexatious and frivolous litigations; suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record necessitating review. I. CONCLUSIONS OF THE DIVISION BENCH ON THE RIGHT OF A GPA TO ADDRESS THE COURT: The petitioner contends that the directions to the Registry and to other sub-ordinate Courts not to receive any petition, case or other prosecution filed by him, was undemocratic, contrary to law and in violation of the basic structure of the Constitution of India; the order, faulting him for appearing and pleading before the Court, is in violation of Order III Rules 1 and 2 CPC read with Section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961, and Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India; and the Division Bench failed to note that he had filed an application to appear and plead on behalf of the appellant in the Writ Appeal. Reliance is placed by him on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma[2] and A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta[3]. It is necessary for us, therefore, to briefly note the conclusions of the Division bench on the right of a GPA to address the Court. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar Rastogi2; T.C. Mathai v. District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala[4]; and the High Courts in M. Krishnammal v. T. Balasubramania Pillai[5]; Kota Co-operative Agricultural Bank Limited v. State of Karnataka[6]; and, after referring to the rules made by the High Court, the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, and the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, the Division Bench held that a party to the proceedings can either himself appear as a party-in-person to ventilate his grievance or engage an Advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh (a Statutory professional body constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961); the party to a proceeding may authorize another by giving a Power of Attorney (“PoA” for short) to appear in the case, file affidavits, instruct lawyers and act on his behalf; the GPA holder cannot, however, plead and/or argue for his principal; the petitioner, in this review petition, did not derive any authority under the GPA allegedly executed by the appellant in W.A. No.556 of 2010; and no GPA or a copy thereof was annexed to the Writ Petition or the Writ Appeal. The Division Bench examined the provisions of the Powers-of Attorney Act, 1882, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and observed that the vakalat can be signed and the pleadings verified either by the party or a PoA; as per Rule 33 of the Civil Rules of Practice, when pleadings are verified and signed by a person, under written authority, such document shall be filed with an affidavit by the PoA holder to the effect that such person is a recognized agent of the party as defined in Order III Rule 2 CPC; Rules 30, 33, Form XII (Vakalatnama) and the relevant Rules showed that the pleader or an Advocate, who is given vakalatnama, can only appear in the Court as contemplated under Order III Rule 4 CPC; while a PoA holder can sign and verify the pleadings, sign affidavits, instruct advocates to whom vakalatnama is issued, he cannot even give evidence on behalf of the party to the proceedings who has given him the PoA; Section 303 Cr.P.C read with Section 2(q) thereof showed that a PoA in favour of a person, to act for another in a Court proceeding, cannot be construed as authorizing the holder of the PoA to argue a case in the Court; Order III Rule 1 CPC, which permits appearance or acting in any Court by a PoA, is subject to the provisions of the Advocates Act; a conspectus of Rules 1 and 2 of Order III CPC, Section 2(a) and Sections 29, 30, 33, 34 of the Advocates Act, and Rule 2 of Order III CPC, Section 34 of the Advocates Act and the provisions of the Cr.P.C would show that all the pleadings in a proceeding shall be made by the party in person or by his recognized agent; a party in person, and a recognized agent, have to make an appointment (vakalatnama) duly authorizing the advocate to appear and argue the case; only an advocate, entered on the rolls of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, who has been given vakalat and which has been accepted by such advocate, has the right of audience on behalf of the party, or his recognized agent, who engaged the advocate; Sections 29 and 30 of the Advocates Act make it clear that advocates are the only recognized class of persons entitled to practice law, and such an advocate should have been enrolled as such under the Advocates Act; Section 32 of the Advocates Act empowers the Court to permit any non-advocate to appear in a particular case; this only means that any person has to seek prior permission of the court, to argue a case, if he is not an advocate enrolled under the provisions of the Advocates Act; it is an offence for a non-advocate to practice under the provisions of the Advocates Act; it is only those advocates, whose names are entered in the rolls of the State Bar Council, who have the right to practice in any Court; and, if a person practices in any Court without any such authority, it would amount to an offence under Section 45 of the Advocates Act. II. REVIEW OF AN ORDER PASSED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION: ITS SCOPE: It is in this context that the scope of review of an order, passed in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, needs to be examined. While Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it, it would not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits as that is the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. (Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma[7]; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury[8]; Mudiki Bhimesh Nanda v. Tirupati Urban Development Authority[9]). The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. (Lily Thomas v. Union of India[10]; Mudiki Bhimesh Nanda9). Review literally, and even judicially, means re-examination or re- consideration. The basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet, in the realm of law, Courts lean strongly in favour of the finality of a decision - legally and properly made. Exceptions have been carved out to judicially correct accidental mistakes or errors which result in miscarriage of justice. (P. Neelakanteswaramma1; Shivdeo v. State of Punjab[11]). An application for review would lie, inter alia, when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that, once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Review is not an appeal in disguise. (Inderchand Jain v. Motilal[12]; Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai[13] Lily Thomas10). An error, which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. In the exercise of the review jurisdiction, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter alone can be corrected by the exercise of the review jurisdiction. (Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi[14]; Mudiki Bhimesh Nanda9). An error which is not self evident, and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying exercise of the power of review. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose. (Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik[15]). A review lies only for correction of a patent error. (Thungabhadra Industries v. Govt. of A.P.[16]; Mudiki Bhimesh Nanda9; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban[17]). The error contemplated under the rule is not an error which is to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. (Lily Thomas10). It must be an error which must strike one merely on looking at the record and not one which requires a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (Meera Bhanja8; Mudiki Bhimesh Nanda9; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale[18]). There can be no review unless the Court is satisfied that there exists a material error manifest on the face of the earlier order resulting in miscarriage of justice. (Avtar Singh v. Union of India[19]; P. Neelakanteswaramma1). An error, which necessitates review, should be something more than a mere error and it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. If the error is so apparent that, without further investigation or enquiry, only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the petitioner, a review will lie. If the issue can be decided just by a perusal of the records, and if it is manifest, it can be set right by reviewing the order. If the judgment/order is vitiated by an apparent error or it is a palpable wrong, and if the error is self evident, review is permissible. (S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission[20]). A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case and the finality of the judgment will be reconsidered only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept into by judicial fallibility. (Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor Delhi[21]; Mudiki Bhimesh Nanda9). All the statutory provisions which the petitioner has referred to in the grounds, for seeking review of the order, have been noted and considered by the Division bench in its order in W.A. No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011. As the power of review cannot be exercised to examine the decision, in W.A. No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, on merits which is the province of a Court of appeal, the order of the Division Bench, on the right of a GPA holder to address the Court, does not necessitate being reviewed. III. DISMISSAL OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BY THE SUPREME COURT BY A SPEAKING ORDER: ITS EFFECT: It is also necessary to note that, aggrieved by the order passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, Sri Madupu Harinarayana (the appellant in the said Writ Appeal) filed a petition seeking leave to Appeal and the Supreme Court, in its order in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.6815 of 2011 dated 28.11.2011, observed: “…………Having heard learned counsel for the respondent and since, in our view, the General Power of Attorney holder is not entitled to represent the person aggrieved in accordance with the rules, the special leave petition, as also all the interlocutory applications, are dismissed…..” (emphasis supplied) A petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court may be dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order. If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e. it gives reasons for refusing to grant leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex court of the country. (Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala[22]). As no case has been made out by the petitioner for reviewing the order of the Division Bench; as the Special Leave Petition, preferred against the order of the Division Bench in W.A.No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, was dismissed by a speaking order: and the conclusions of the Supreme Court, in its order in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.6815 of 2011 dated 28.11.2011, would bind this Court; we see no reason to review the order, in W.A.No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, on the question of the rights of the G.P.A. to address the Court or to interfere with direction Nos.1 and 3 noted hereinabove. IV. CONCLUSIONS OF THE DIVISION BENCH ON THE COURT’S RESPONSE TO FRIVOLOUS AND VEXATIOUS LITIGATION: The petitioner would also contend that derogatory remarks, not connected with the decision of the case, were passed against him without giving him an opportunity to explain. It is necessary for us, therefore, to briefly refer to the conclusions of the Division bench on the Court’s response to frivolous and vexatious litigation. The Division Bench noted that, when the Writ Appeal was initially listed on 02.08.2010, the petitioner herein (the alleged GPA holder of the appellant in W.A.No.556 of 2010), was himself arguing the case; when asked how he could appear, he had stated that he had appeared in a number of cases in this Court; the matter was adjourned as he had sought time to place the order of the Supreme Court; when the matter was again listed on 16.08.2010, and having regard to his submission that he had appeared in a number of cases during the last more than twenty years, information was called for from the Registry; the information furnished by the Registry showed that the petitioner herein was a habitual court bird filing all sorts of cases; all of them were vexatious and frivolous; more often than not he had annoyed Judges and had attributed motives to them; and he had filed and argued false, frivolous and vexatious cases. The Division Bench summarized the various cases where the petitioner had appeared, either as a party in person or as a GPA for others, under two separate tables containing details of the case number, the party’s name, the prayer sought for and the result of the cases. It also noted that a suo motu contempt case was initiated (against the petitioner herein) by an earlier Division Bench, in C.C. No.7 of 1996 dated 22.02.1996, wherein his litigation adventures as a GPA was noted and his imprisonment, for a period of three months for contemptuous, unruly conduct and gesticulations made in the Court, was confirmed. After referring to several other orders, the Division Bench observed that it was evident from the nature of cases filed by the petitioner herein, either as a party in person or as a GPA holder of third parties, that all the cases were frivolous; and, on more than one occasion, he had filed cases for the same cause of action even though they were dismissed one after the other; he had attained notoriety in the corridors of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, and was punished for contempt of court. In para 52 of its judgment, the Division bench held:- “…. We are also surprised to notice that, on occasions more than one, this Court directed the Registry not to accept any case filed by Sri T.D.Dayal. But somehow or the other he is being allowed to sneak into the High Court system and file all sorts of cases. Serious attention should be bestowed on this. If there is any lapse, it would be contumacious and liable for contempt. Indeed in W.A.No.999 of 1997, this court even directed the Registry to issue directions to the District/Subordinate Courts not to allow any GPA to argue cases. This direction issued more than a decade ago has been followed more in breach. We can only caution all those concerned in the Registry about this aspect………” (Emphasis supplied) The table, in the order of the Division Bench in W.A.No.556 of 2010 dated 19.01.2011, refers, amongst others, to W.P.M.P. Nos.1056 and 1057 of 1997, filed by the petitioner herein as a party in person, wherein another Division Bench of this Court, by its order dated 24.01.1997, observed: “………..The main writ petition No.19345 of 1995 has already been disposed of with the judgment in Writ Petition No.19609 of 1995 and other petitions. The party in person has already suffered conviction for Contempt of Court for insisting that his petition was not disposed of and that it was still pending. Notwithstanding the above, he has chosen to file further petitions seeking hearing of his writ petition and indulged in abuses to the Hon’ble Judges. A person, who has not learnt the ways of dealing with the Court and making petitions inspite of conviction for contempt, will never learn even if he is convicted over and over again. The Registry of the Court is directed not to entertain any petition filed on his behalf unless specifically ordered by the Court……….” (emphasis supplied). The said table also refers to the order passed in W.A.No.999 of 1997 dated 11.09.1997 wherein the Division Bench of this Court held: “…..The right to represent a litigant, which is recognised for an advocate under Section 30 of the Advocate’s Act, it appears, is sought to be used by the so- called General Power of Attorney holder, one Mr.T.D.Dayal, who has already earned notoriety in filing so called public interest petitions in the Court and already convicted for