IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No 6766 of 2010 1. RINA DAS D/O SHRI VIJAY KUMAR DAS R/O VILL MOTIHARA, P.S. KISHANGANJ, DISTT-KISHANGANJ 2. PRIYANKA KUMARI D/O AWADHESH KUMAR DUTTA R/O VILL /MOH MOTIHARA, P.S.಄KISHANGANJ 3. NAKUL KUMAR DAS S/O ADHAR CHANDRA DAS R/O VILL /MOH MOTIHARA, P.S.಄KISHANGANJ Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT BIHAR , PATNA 3. THE DIRECTOR, PRIMARY EDUCATION BIHAR, PATNA 4. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION KISHANGANJ 5. THE MEMBER , DISTRICT TEACHERS EMPLOYMENT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL KISHANGANJ 6. THE BLOCK EDUCATON AND EXTENSION OFFICER KISHANGANJ, DISTT- KISHANGANJ 7. THE MUKHIYA , GRAM PANCHAYAT HALAMALA, BLOCK & DISTT-KISHANGANJ 8. PANCHAYAT SECRETARY , GRAM PANCHAYAT HALAMALA, BLOCK AND DISTT-KISHANGANJ 9. MD. SHOYAB ALAM S/O LATE ASAMATULLA VILL SAROGORA, P.O.BELWA, P.S.KISHANGANJ, DISTT-KISHANGANJ ----------- 2 23.08.2010 The petitioners challenge the order dated 14.01.2010 passed in Appeal No 283 of 2009 by the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunal, Kishanganj. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the State. Petitioners urge three grounds for challenging this order. Firstly, the appellant before the Tribunal was not an applicant for appointment. He was merely a busy body whose application could not be considered by the Tribunal. Secondly, the Tribunal could not have entertained the complaint with regard to appointment of Shiksha Mitra which was done way back in the year, 2002-2005 which appeal was being filed for the first time on 20.02.2009 that is seven years or four years after the appointments and thirdly, the Tribunal could not entertain and decide the appeal without notice to the petitioners, who were necessary parties 2 and whose appointments were challenged. Having considered the matter, in my view, the writ petition must succeed on all three counts. Firstly, it must be noticed that the Tribunal is a creature of Statute and is an appellate authority. It has no inherent jurisdiction to decide issues. It has to decide lis inter party. It cannot become an institution for deciding cases in public interest without the party having an interest in the matter. Here, as apparent from the order of the Tribunal itself, the appellant, before the Tribunal, had no interest in the matter. He had neither sought the appointment nor would be benefited in any manner by getting the petitioners removed. He had merely turned up after half a decade before the Tribunal and raise a sort of public grievance in regard to what had happened half a decade or more back. In my view, such a complaint is not entertainable by the Tribunal. On the second issue, I may only note that after such a long delay, the Tribunal should not have entertained the matter. Petitioners were appointed Shiksha Mitra whose appointment was contractual and renewed from time to time and ultimately were regularised as Panchayat Teachers. After 2006, the post of Shiksha Mitra became defunct after several renewals and absorption. Complaint not having been made earlier, as envisaged to this notification, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint at this point of time. This question has been settled by this Court in the case of Alok Kumar and Others –Versus- State of Bihar & Others, 2009 (2) PLJR 929. Therefore, this ground also is sufficient to set aside the order of the Tribunal. Coming to the third point with regard to gross violation of 3 principles of natural justice, the writ petition must succeed. It is the appointment of the petitioners which was directly under challenge and, as such, no order adverse to the petitioners could be passed by the Tribunal without granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Petitioners had to be made party to the appeal. They had to be noticed and after hearing them, an order could be passed. Petitioners were necessary parties. Thus, any order passed in absence of the petitioners and behind their back, would be in gross violation of principles of natural justice and, as such, would be void ab initio. Thus, the writ petition must succeed. The impugned order of the Tribunal, in so far as it relates to the petitioners, is set aside. Petitioners would continue in service and consequential order, as contained in Annexure-5 terminating the services of the petitioners, as issued by the Headmaster of the School concerned is also set aside. Petitioners are directed to be reinstated immediately. They would be deemed to be in continuous service with all consequential benefits. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. M.E.H./ (Navaniti Prasad Singh)