THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY WRIT PETITION Nos.15441 of 2001 & 17954 of of 2002 COMMON ORDER: These two writ petitions are connected with each other. Hence, they are disposed of through a common order. The petitioners in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 are the legal representatives of late Sri Bollaboni Ramaswamy. He held an extent of Ac.1.37 guntas of land in survey Nos.65 and 66 of Uppal Bagath of Uppal Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Since the village was included in the Hyderabad urban agglomeration, Ramaswamy filed a declaration before the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, the second respondent herein, under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short ‘the Act’). After processing the declaration, the second respondent passed an order, dated 24.01.1983, under Section 8 (4) of the Act. He took the view that Ramaswamy held an extent of 6840.76 square yards of land in excess of ceiling limits. Against this order, an appeal was filed under Section 33 of the Act before the Commissioner of Appeals, the first respondent herein. Ramaswamy died on 29.01.1999 when the appeal was pending. Not being aware of this development, the first respondent passed an order, dated 31.07.1993. He allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the second respondent for fresh consideration and disposal. After remand, the second respondent issued notices in the name of Ramaswamy. The second petitioner, one of the sons of Ramaswamy, appeared before the second respondent and informed that Ramaswamy is no more. Legal representatives of the deceased declarant were not brought on record and through an order, dated 25.02.1994, the second respondent decided that an extent of 6840.76 square meters is in excess of ceiling limits. The petitioners in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 state that they came to know about the order, dated 25.02.1994, passed by the second respondent only when some Government Officials visited the land and soon thereafter, they presented the appeal before the first respondent. The appeal was rejected as time barred through orders, dated 26.05.2001. They challenge the order, dated 25.02.1994, passed by the second respondent and the one, dated 26.05.2001, passed by the first respondent. They complain of procedural irregularity as well as, denial of benefit under G.O.Ms.733, dated 31.10.1998. After the land was declared excess, it is said to have handed over to the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA). The land was divided into plots and auction was conducted on 10.12.2001. The petitioners in W.P.No.17954 of 2002 emerged as the highest bidders for two plots, carved out of the land in survey Nos.65 and 66. On coming to know that some disputes are pending in relation to that land and W.P.No.15441 of 2001 was filed, the HUDA issued proceedings, dated 19.07.2002, cancelling the allotment and refunding the amount deposited by the petitioners, together with interest. The proceedings, dated 19.07.2002, are challenged in W.P.No.17954 of 2002. The first petitioner in W.P.No.17954 of 2002 got himself impleaded as the third respondent in W.P.No.15441 of 2001. The second respondent in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 filed a counter- affidavit. It is stated that once the second petitioner had participated in the proceedings and his contentions were taken into account, there was no necessity to bring the legal representatives of the declarant on record. It is stated that the possession of the land was taken and it is vested in the Government. According to the second respondent, the petitioners are not entitled for the benefit under G.O.Ms.No.733, dated 31.10.1988. He attempts to sustain the order passed by him, in all respects. The impleaded party in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 filed a counter- affidavit almost on the same lines. On behalf of HUDA, a counter affidavit is filed in W.P.No.17954 of 2002, narrating the circumstances that led to the cancellation of the allotment in favour of the petitioners therein. Sri K.Raghuveer Reedy, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 submits that though the second respondent was informed that Ramaswamy died in the year 1991, he has not taken any steps to bring the legal representatives of the deceased, on record. He contends that the second petitioner cannot represent the entire estate of late Ramaswamy. The learned counsel further submits that the use of the land is mentioned in the master plan published on 29.09.1980 as agriculture and the second respondent has taken an untenable view of the matter in observing that raising of para grass cannot be treated as agricultural activity. He also submits that the benefit under G.O.Ms.No.733, dated 31.10.1988, was not extended to the petitioners, though the land is within the peripheral area of the Hyderabad urban agglomeration. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 in W.P.No.15441 of 2001, submits that on receipt of the notice, the second petitioner appeared before the second respondent and thereby, the necessity to bring the legal representatives of the deceased declarant on record, is obviated. He submits that in the earlier round of litigation, the first respondent remanded the matter, on a limited question and it is not at all open to the petitioners to urge any aspects, which assumed finality. Sri Shiv Kumar, the learned counsel for the third respondent in W.P.No.15441 of 2001, submits that the land has already vested in the Government and thereafter, transferred to the HUDA and that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the proceedings, which have assumed finality. Sri N.V.Sumanth, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.17954 of 2002 submits that his clients have emerged as the highest bidders and it is not at all open to the HUDA to cancel the allotments on whimsical grounds. He contends that even if any dispute arises vis-à-vis the land, it is for the HUDA to resolve the same or at least to allot alternative plots to the petitioners. The learned Standing Counsel for the HUDA, on the other hand, submits that the necessity to cancel the allotment arose on account of the disputes in relation to the land in question. Learned counsel contends that in all fairness to the petitioners, the amount was refunded, together with accrued interest. In respect of Ac.1.37 guntas of land in survey Nos.65 and 66 of Uppal Bagath of Uppal Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, the original owner, Sri Ramaswamy, filed declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Through an order, dated 24.01.1983, the second respondent determined that the declarant held an extent of 6840.76 square meters in excess of ceiling limits. An appeal was preferred before the first respondent and during the pendency of the appeal, Ramaswamy died. Not being aware of this development, the first respondent passed an order, dated 31.07.1993 in the appeal, and remanded the matter to the second respondent for fresh consideration and disposal with specific reference to the master plan, which was extended to Uppal Bagath on 29.09.1980. The second respondent issued notice of hearing to Ramaswamy. Since he was no more, one of his sons, the second petitioner in W.P.No.15441 of 2001, informed the second respondent that Ramaswamy died in the year 1991. The second respondent did not take any steps to bring the legal representatives on record, except that he substituted name of Ramaswamy with that of the second petitioner, i.e. Bollaboni Amarnath. He, accordingly, proceeded to pass an order, afresh, under Section 8 (4) of the Act on 25.02.1994. The relevant paragraph in the said order reads as under: “In order to afford an opportunity of being heard the case was posted for personal hearing on 15.01.1994. Sri B.Amarnath, son of the declarant was present and informed that the declarant expired in the year 1991. Therefore, his name has been brought on record as L.R.”. The question as to whether it is proper and legal, for an authority to pass an order, determining the holdings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, without bringing the legal representatives of the deceased-declarant on record, was dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER v TEK CHAND DOLWANI[1], which arose under the Evacuee Property Act. It was held that an order passed after the death of an evacuee without bringing his legal representatives on record is a nullity. It may be true that the second petitioner in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 appeared before the second respondent. That was, however, only for the limited purpose of informing the second respondent about the death of Ramaswamy. Neither the second respondent has taken any steps to bring the legal representatives on record nor did he require the second petitioner and others to come on record. The legal representatives of a deceased person derive their own respective rights vis-à-vis the estate of the deceased. Such rights cannot be trampled on the basis of imperfect and half-hearted steps. Therefore, the order, dated 25.02.1994, passed by the second respondent is a nullity in law. It is possible to argue and, in fact, Sri O.Manohar Reddy, argued that if the death of Ramaswamy was to result in abatement of the proceedings, the first consequence was that the appeal preferred by Ramaswamy abated and thereby, the original order passed by the second respondent, dated 24.01.1983, has become final. There would have been some possibility to accept this contention, had it been a case where the possession of the land was taken or other notifications were issued on the strength of the order, dated 24.01.1983. It is not in dispute that the various steps under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act were taken on the basis of the order, dated 25.02.1994. Any steps taken on the basis of the order, which is a nullity, do not give rise to any legal consequences. It is not competent for the second respondent, to resume the proceedings from any stage, in view of the fact that the Act has since been repealed. Even on merits, the view taken by the second respondent is not correct. The land held by late Ramaswamy was not covered by any master plan, as on the date on which the Act came into force. Subsequently, a master plan was published on 29.09.1990 in which Uppal Bagath was also included. The holding of the declarant was to be decided in accordance with the law and facts, that prevailed, as on the date of filing the declaration. As regards subsequent master plan, the second respondent was under obligation to require the declarant to file a fresh declaration. Further, the use as regards the land in survey Nos.65 and 66 was mentioned as agricultural in the subsequent master plan. As long as the land is put to that use, it cannot be treated as vacant, much less, excess land. Even according to the second respondent, the land was being used to grow para grass. He, however, took the view that such an activity is not akin to agriculture. Firstly, the Act does not define agriculture. Secondly, growing of grass is nothing but an agricultural activity. Therefore, the order suffers from factual inaccuracies also. The contention of the petitioners in W.P.No.15441 of 2001 that they are entitled for the benefit under G.O.Ms.No.733, dated 31.10.1988, was denied only on the ground that the land was included in the master plan subsequently. The appellate Court refused to entertain the appeal without even verifying as to whether the petitioners were parties to the order passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, and when it was served upon the petitioners. He did not even take note of the fact that the petitioners were not at all parties to the proceedings. The result would be that the order, dated 25.01.1994, passed under Section 8 (4) of the Act cannot be sustained in law or on facts. The possibility of resuming the proceedings from that stage does not exist, since the Act itself was repealed. The possession of land, even if taken on the basis of a void order cannot be recognized in law. Therefore, W.P.No.15441 of 2001 is allowed and the proceedings challenged therein are set aside. The very basis for passing the order impugned in W.P.No.17954 of 2002 is filing of W.P.No.15441 of 2001. Except that, no other ground was mentioned. Since W.P.No.15441 of 2001 is being allowed, no relief can be granted to the petitioners in W.P.No.17954 of 2002 and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY,J Dt:30.12.2008 Note: L.R. copy to be marked. kdl [1] AIR 1953 SC 298