IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.4748 of 2006 RAMJEET YADAV, S/o Late Khedu Yadav, Resident of Village-Garhi Bishanpur, P.S. Lakhisarai, District- Lakhisarai. Versus 1.THE STATE OF BIHAR, through the Commissioner- cum-Secretary, Deptt. of Home, Govt. of Bihar, Patna. 2.The Director-General of Police, Bihar, Patna. 3.The Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Purnia Range, Purnia. 4.The Superintendent of Police, Purnia. ----------- 3 16/7/2009 Heard counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the State. The petitioner in this writ application has assailed an order of punishment dated 5.4.2005 pursuant to a departmental proceeding as also the appellate order dated 3.3.2006 as contained in Annexures 7 and 8 respectively. Counsel for the petitioner at the outset while assailing the appellate order as a cryptic non speaking order has referred to his memo of appeal annexed with the supplementary affidavit. He submits that the specific issues raised in the memo of appeal were not considered by the appellate authority and therefore such a bald appellate order cannot be sustained. Counsel for the State, on the other hand, would refer to the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority to contend that since everything was considered by the disciplinary authority then would be no need for the appellate authority to pass an exhaustive order specially when he has only concurred and approved the order of disciplinary authority. In the opinion of this Court such approach of the 2 appellate authority cannot be appreciated because the case of petitioner is that he could not participate in the departmental proceeding and his services were terminated under proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution without holding any disciplinary enquiry. In such a situation if the petitioner for the first time had availed an opportunity at the appellate stage, the appellate authority was definitely required to apply his independent mind to the issues raised by the petitioner in his memo of appeal as was held by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and ntoher Vs. Tulsi Ram Patel reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 wherein an exactly similar circumstance in the cases arising out of proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India it was held that :- “In this connection, it must be remembered that a government servant is not wholly without any opportunity. Rules made under the proviso to Article, 309 or under Acts referable to that Article generally provide for a right of appeal except in those cases where the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is passed by the President or the Governor of a State because they being the highest Constitutional functionaries, there can lie from an order passed by one of them. Thus where the second proviso applies, though there is no prior opportunity to a government servant to defend himself against the charges made against him, he has the opportunity to show in an appeal filed by him that the charges made against him are not true. This would be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of natural justice. In Maneka Gandhi‟s case (AIR 1978 SC 597) and in Liberty Oil Mills V. Union of India 3 (1984) 3 SCC 465: (AIR 1984 SC 1271), the right to make a representation after an action was taken was held to be a sufficient remedy, and an appeal is a much wider and more effective remedy than a right of making a representation.” Even otherwise it is by now well settled that the appellate authority has to pass a reasoned speaking order while disposing of an appeal arising out of a disciplinary proceedings. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of „Ram Chander Vs. Union of India & Ors‟ reported in AIR 1986 SC. 1173. That apart, by now it is well settled that every order passed in a quasi-judicial proceeding/departmental proceeding must be informed by reasons and since the appellate order is a final order on facts, the appellate authority even otherwise is required to pass a reasoned order failing which it would be itself in violation of principles of natural justice as was held by the Apex Court in the case of „S.N.Mukherjee Vs. Union of India‟ reported in AIR 1990 SC page 1984. That being so, this Court must hold the appellate order being a wholly non speaking order and a bald order is a bad order and as such the same as contained in Annexure A to the counter affidavit is hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority, who shall now apply his independent mind to the facts stated in the memo of appeal and pass a fresh reasoned order within a period of six months from the date of 4 receipt/production of a copy of this order. Let it be made clear that this court has expressed no opinion on the merits of the case and that it would be open to the appellate authority to pass an appropriate speaking appellate order in accordance with law. With the aforementioned observations/directions this application to the extent indicated above is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to pass his final order. Abhay Kumar (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)