1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.5024 OF 2008 Smt. Komal Rajwani. ` ...Petitioner. Vs. State of Maharashtra. ...Respondent. .... Mr. Ramesh Ramamurthy with Mr.Saikumar Ramamurthy for the Petitioner. Mr. C.R. Sonawane, AGP for Respondent Nos.1 to 3. Mr. A.G. Kothari for Respondent No.4. ..... CORAM : DR.D.Y.CHANDRACHUD, J. October 10, 2008. P.C. The Petitioner was an employee of the Primary Section of a school conducted by the Fourth Respondent. Aggrieved by an order of termination, the Petitioner moved the School Tribunal and the Tribunal by its judgment dated 2nd May 2008 held that it had no jurisdiction. 2. Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private 2 Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, provides that the Act shall apply to all private schools in the State of Maharashtra, whether or not in receipt of grant -in-aid from the State Government. The expression “recognized” is defined in Section 2(21) as follows : “(21) “Recognised” means recognised by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board, or by any officer authorised by him or by any of such Boards.” Under Section 9, a right of appeal is conferred upon an employee of a private school whose services are inter alia terminated. A Division Bench of this Court held in Rita T. Verghese vs. Headmistress, Vidya Mandir English Primary School, 2002(3) Mh. L.J. 57 that in view of the definition of the expression “private school” in clause (20) of Section 2 and the expression “recognized” in clause (21), the provisions of the Act would not govern a school which is recognized by a local authority or by a Municipal Corporation and not by the Director of Education, Divisional Board or the State Board. The same view has been taken by me in the context of an Industrial Training Institute in the case of St. Francis Industrial Training Institute vs. P.J. Jose, 2007(1) Mh. L.J. 570. 3 3. The judgment of the Division Bench in Rita Verghese's case holds thus: “A close reading of section 3(1) with Sections 2(20), 2(21) and 2(24) would show that the Act of 1977 is made applicable to all private schools covered under Sections 2 (20), 2(21) and 2(24) in the State of Maharashtra irrespective of whether these private schools are receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government or not. The expressions “Private school”, “recognised” and “school” are defined and, therefore, the expression “private school” occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 3 has to be read to mean a “private school” occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 3 has to be read to mean a private school (primary school, secondary school, higher secondary school, junior college, education or any other institution by whatever name called) established or administered by the management other than the government or local authority and recognized by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board or by any officer authorised by him or by any such Boards. The private school recognised other than recognised by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board or by an officer authorised by him or by any such Boards is not governed by the Act of 1977. ... The provisions which we have referred above leave no manner of doubt that a private school which is recognised by local authority or for that matter, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay is not covered under the Act of 1977 if it is not recognised by one of the authorities mentioned in Section 2(21) of the Act of 1977.” 4. In the present case, however, the judgment in Rita 4 Verghese's case was sought to be distinguished by contending that the Petitioner was employed in the Primary Section of a school which has both the Primary and the Secondary Sections. It was urged that since the school is recognized by the Director of Education, the Primary Section must be construed to be a part thereof and hence, an appeal filed by a teacher of the Primary Section before the School Tribunal would be maintainable. 5. A reply has been filed by the the Fourth Respondent in these proceedings and a compilation of documents has been placed on record. From the material on record, it emerges that the Primary School has been recognized on 12th February 2005 by the Ulhasnagar Municipal School Board. Approvals for the staff, the staffing pattern and for the number of divisions are all issued by the Municipal School Board. On the other hand, the Secondary School has been recognized by the Deputy Director of Education on 15th February 2008. Assuming that there are Primary and Secondary Sections, as the Petitioner contends, it is evident that both these sections are recognized by different statutory authorities appointed 5 under the legislation governing the primary and secondary sections. The Primary Section is not recognized either by the Director of Education or by the Divisional Board or the State Board. Hence, the Primary Section cannot be regarded as a private school within the meaning of Section 2(20) read with Section 2(21) of the Act. 6. In the affidavit in reply, it has also been stated that there are separate Headmistresses for both the schools. The Primary Section has a separate General Register, Muster Roll and staff and the students of the Primary Section are issued School Leaving Certificates on leaving the School. The qualifications for appointment of the teaching staff in the Primary Section are different from those for the Secondary School. Teachers in a Primary School are required to possess the D.Ed. qualification, whereas teachers in a Secondary School are required to possess the B.Ed. qualification. Be that as it may, the statutory test to determine as to whether a school is a 'private school' within the meaning of the Act is whether the school has been recognized by the Director of Education, the Divisional Board or the State Board and is run by a management other than the 6 Government or a local authority. Admittedly, the Primary Section has not been recognized by any of the aforesaid authorities and would, therefore, not meet the requirement of the definition of the expression “private school” within the meaning of Section 2(20). 7. The School Tribunal therefore, was not in error in holding that it had no jurisdiction. The Petitioner had filed a Writ Petition before the Division Bench, which was disposed of, leaving it open to the Petitioner to espouse the remedy of an appeal before the School Tribunal. The order of the Division Bench, however, kept all issues and contentions that were raised by the Petitioner open to be raised before the School Tribunal. The order of the Division Bench did not, therefore, rule upon the issue of jurisdiction. That issue has now been decided by the Tribunal and as noted earlier, the judgment of the Tribunal is consistent with the judgment of the Division Bench this Court in the case of Rita Verghese. While disposing of this petition, it is clarified that it is open to the Petitioner to take recourse to such remedies as are available in law for challenging the order of termination. This order shall not be construed as expressing any 7 opinion on the merits of the rival contentions between the parties which shall be decided in appropriate proceedings. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. ......