WP(C) 2868/2007 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE IA ANSARI By its letter, dated 30.05.2007, Department of Revenue and Disaster Mana gement, Government of Assam, requested the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, to ta ke action in terms of the provisions of Rule 116 of the Registration Rules frame d under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (in short, ’the ALRR’) in re spect of 236 Bighas, 3 Kathas and 15 Lechas out of the total land acquired from Beheating Tea Estate, the request for taking action under Rule 116 being made on the ground that out of the said total land acquired from Beheating Tea Estate, land measuring as much as 236 Bighas, 3 Kathas and 15 Lechas is under the occupa tion of people other than Beheating Tea Estate. Based on the letter, dated 30.0 5.2007, aforementioned, Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, issued, on 04.06.2007, a notice, addressed to the present petitioner, as proprietor of the said tea esta te, to show cause as to why the Grant No. 13/176 ORR, made in respect of the sai d 236 Bighas 3 Kathas and 15 Lechas of land, which stand acquired by the Governm ent under Land Acquisition Case Nos. DRA 7/2006 and DRA 12/2006, but is not bein g utilized for cultivation and is in the occupation of people other than the sai d tea estate, be cancelled. With the help of this application made under Articl e 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the legality and v alidity of the notice, dated 04.06.2007, aforementioned and seeks to get the sam e set aside and quashed, the case of the petitioner being, in brief, thus: (i) By a registered Sale Deed, the petitioner’s father, in order to expand t he area of his tea estate, known as Beheating Tea Estate, purchased, during his lifetime, vide registered sale deed, dated 17.10.1969, two plots of land measuri ng, in all, 383 Bighas 4 Kathas 19 Lechas. Upon the purchase, so made, the peti tioner’s father occupied the said land and started tea cultivation thereon. Upo n purchase of the said land and coming into occupation thereof, the predecessor- in-interest of the petitioner and, after his demise, the petitioner planted tea bushes on most part of the land and the remaining part of the land, where tea bu shes were not planted, were being utilized for ancillary purposes. This apart, due to the system of rotational plantation of tea, which the petitioner has been following, certain portions of the land, so purchased, remained vacant; but, at all material times, the entire land was utilized by the said tea estate for tea cultivation and for the purposes ancillary thereto. The land, so purchased, fo rms part of the Lepetkatta Division of the said tea estate. In the year 1976, t he petitioner had surrendered as much as 117 Bighas 4 Kathas 13 Lechas of land o f the said tea estate as ceiling surplus land and the remaining areas have been utilized for rotational plantation of tea by the petitioner. In terms of Rule 4 0A of the Settlement Rules, framed under the ALRR, the settlement-holder of a la nd, who has not been utilizing the land for ordinary cultivation after the date of publication of Original Notification, dated 24.09.1931, but is found to have been utilizing the land for special cultivation, such as, tea, such settlement-h older was liable to pay premium at the rate fixed by the State Government. Acti ng upon the provisions of Rule 40A, the State Government directed the grantees o f the tea estates to produce evidence of such land having been leased out to the m for special cultivation, such as, tea. As most of the grantees were British C ompanies and as they had left during and after the independence, the present own ers of the tea estates could not produce the evidence in respect of any grant/le ase made in their favour. It was, therefore, inferred by the Government that th e land, which were being utilized for special cultivation, such as, tea, had bee n actually settled for ordinary cultivation. The Government, therefore, decided to convert the settlement of such land from ordinary cultivation to settlement for special cultivation and accordingly realized premium from the grantees. Th ereafter, all the grants, having tea plantation, were converted to periodic patt a land. However, for Government’s own convenience, original numbers superimpose d by different periodic patta numbers are maintained. Thus, the entire 383 Bigh as 4 Kathas 19 Lechas of the land, covered by sale deed, dated 17.10.1969, afore mentioned stood already converted into periodic patta land with the petitioner’s name having been recorded, in the Record of Rights, as the pattadar. The petit ioner has been accordingly paying land revenue. (ii) In the year 1994, a group of people, led by one Sri Nandi Nath Hazarika, attempted to trespass into the said land of the petitioner. As the petitioner o ffered stiff resistance, the attempt for trespass failed. However, in the month of May, 1996, they trespassed into a portion of the petitioner’s said land and illegally occupied the same. Because of such illegal occupation by the encroach ers, the petitioner could not utilize the land, which had been so encroached, fo r rotational plantation of tea. Claiming themselves to be the occupiers of the land, which they had so encroached upon, Sri Nandi Nath Hazarika and twenty-two others applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, to grant them ownership r ights over the said land in terms of the provisions of the Assam (Temporary Sett led Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971, on the strength of some Kacha Khatian obtained by them without the knowledge of the petitioner and in collusion with the revenue staff. The application, so made by the said encroachers, gave rise to Tenancy C ase No. 76/87/Pt. On objection being raised by the petitioner to the request fo r settlement, so made, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, vide order , dated 20.08.1997, rejected the said petition for settlement made by Sri Nandi Nath Hazarika and others. The said group of encroachers, then, preferred an app eal before the Assam Board of Revenue against the order, dated 20.08.1997 aforem entioned. This appeal came to be registered as Case No. 182 RA(DIB)/97. By its order, dated 26.05.2000, the Assam Board of Revenue dismissed the said appeal a nd affirmed the order, dated 20.08.1997, aforementioned. While rejecting the ap peal, the Board held that the appellants had failed to establish their claim of having acquired ownership rights over the said land and upheld the petitioner’s contention that the appellants were not tenants within the meaning of the Assam (Temporary Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971. The order, dated 26.05.2000, afore mentioned, passed by the Assam Board of Revenue, remained unchallenged and the s ame has attained finality. With the judgment and order, dated 26.05.2000, havi ng attained finality, the status of those, who had been claiming to be lawful oc cupiers of the land, aforementioned stood belied and the petitioner’s legal poss ession over the land stood confirmed. (iii) In terms of the initiative taken by Reliance Assam Petro-Chemicals Ltd. (in short, ’the REPL’) to set up a gas cracker project, the Government decided t o acquire land for such project. Notifications were accordingly issued under Se ction 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In course of time, the Government decided to acquire, amongst others, the land, which formed part of the said enc roached land. In terms of the requisite notifications, issued in this regard, t wo land acquisition cases, namely, LA Case No. DRA 8/2000 and LA Case No. DRA 17 /2000, in respect of 158B-3K-11L and 228B-2K-18 L of lands respectively, came to be registered. When the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, prepared a list (JIRAT) for surface compensation, the petitioner was surprised to find t hat the said list included the names of the said encroachers. The petitioner, t hen, having obtained ’No Objection Certificate’ from the Deputy Commissioner, Di brugarh, instituted twenty civil suits in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior D ivision, Dibrugarh, along with applications seeking orders of injunction. In al l the suits, injunctions stood granted prohibiting the respondents from making p ayment of compensation as per the said list. (iv) As the REPL backed out of its project of gas cracker, a period of uncert ainty prevailed for some time. Thereafter, the Gas Authority of India Ltd. (in short, ’the GAIL’) decided to set up the said project in collaboration with the Assam Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (in short, the ’AIDC’). Consequen tly, land acquisition processes were initiated afresh and three cases came to be registered in respect of acquisition of the petitioner’s land, these cases bein g L.A. Case No. DRA7/2006, L.A. Case No. DRA11/2006, and L.A. Case No. DRA12/200 6. While L.A. Case No. DRA7/2006 is in respect of 228 Bighas 2 Kathas 18 Lechas of land of village Lepetkatta Kachari Gaon, under Mouza Mancotta Khanikar, L.A. Case No. DRA11/2006 is in respect of 4 Bighas 2 Kathas 7 Lechas of land of vill age Borpathar Kakati Gaon, under mouza Mancotta Khanikar. As far as L.A. Case No . DRA 12/2006 is concerned, it is in respect of the land measuring 152 Bighas 4 Kathas 4 Lechas of land of village Borpathar Kakati Gaon, under Mouza Mancotta K hanikor. Pursuant to the notifications issued under Section 4 of the said Act, the petitioner filed his objections thereto. Thereafter, the revenue authoritie s have made declaration under Section 6 of the said Act acquiring the land. Due to fresh land acquisition proceedings, the petitioner had to amend the plaints in the aforesaid suits. This apart, the tea estate of the petitioner is under m ortgage to the Indian Overseas Bank against the loan facilities availed by the p etitioner. As the land stood acquired by the Government, the petitioner wrote t o the respondent No. 2, namely, Principal Secretary, Government of Assam, Depart ment of Revenue, requesting the latter to make payment of the compensation, for the land acquired, directly to the said bank so as to liquidate the loan of the petitioner. A letter was also written even by the said bank to the respondent N o. 2. If the payment to the bank is not made, the petitioner’s loan account wou ld be treated as NPA and, if it so happens, the future of the petitioner’s tea e state along with the lives of the 800 workers, who entirely depend upon the said tea estate, would be jeopardized. By the impugned notice, dated 04.06.2007, af orementioned, the petitioner has, now, been informed that as the people in occup ation of the land, which stands acquired, are demanding compensation and they ar e the ones, who are in occupation, why the grant of the land made in favour of t he petitioner be not cancelled. 2. I have heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf o f the petitioner, and Ms. H. N. Phukan, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents. 3. Before I come to the merit of the writ petition, it is pertinent to poin t out that it is only respondent No. 3, namely, Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, who has filed affidavit-in-opposition resisting the writ petition. The responde nts’ cases stand, in brief, thus: There is no definite proof of the fact that t he petitioner had paid the premium for conversion of the said grant into periodi c patta land. This apart, as twenty-eight families, belonging to Sonowal Kachar i community, have been occupying the land, in question, since 1960, Kachha Khati an were also issued to them as tenants during the land settlement operation, th ey are the ones, who are still in occupation of the said land and the petitioner has not been utilizing the said land for tea cultivation, the Government is wit hin its powers to cancel the grant made to the petitioner by taking recourse to Rule 116 aforementioned and settle the land in favour of the said twenty-eight f amilies of Sonowal Kachari community. The fact that the tea estate stands mortg aged to Indian Overseas Bank is of no material consequence, for, it is the petit ioner’s responsibility to look after his own tea estate and if the Government do es not give settlement of the said land to the said landless families, it will m ake the said families homeless. As a result of abandoning by the petitioner of his objection in the said civil suits, payments for the JIRAT amount have alread y been made to the said twenty-eight families. Any land, which is not in occupat ion of a settlement-holder or a grantee, the Government has the power to cancel such settlement/grant by taking recourse to Rule 116 aforementioned. The impugn ed order is, thus, legal and valid and, hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. While considering the present writ petition, what needs to be noted is t hat since it is the notice issued under Rule 116 of the Registration Rules, fram ed under the ALRR, 1886, which forms the foundation for issuance of the impugned notice, it is appropriate to take note of these provisions. Rule 116 reads thu s: 116. Power of Deputy Commissioner to order the name of a proprietor, of etc., b e struck out of register. - Whenever it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commis sioner that any person whose name is recorded in the General Registers as propri etor, settlement-holder or manager of an estate is no longer in possession of an y such interest in the estate, the Deputy Commissioner may order the name of suc h person to be struck out from the register: Provided that the Deputy Commissioner shall not strike out the name of a ny recorded proprietor or land-holder, or manager on behalf of a proprietor or l and-holder, without giving him due notice and bearing any objections he may pref er against his name being struck out. 5. A cursory glance at the provisions of Rule 116 reflects as if a Deputy C ommissioner can strike out the name of any recorded proprietor, settlement-holde r or land-holder or manager of an estate from the revenue records if it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that the person, whose name has been reco rded in the General Register as proprietor, settlement-holder or manager of an e state is no longer in possession of any such interest in the estate. What is, ho wever, of utmost importance to note is that the expression ’such interest in the estate’ has been consciously used by the rule-makers in Rule 116. It is a set tled principle of law that every word used in any statute, rules or regulations must be given its ordinary meaning unless the context indicates otherwise. The expression ’such interest in the estate’, if construed property, would obviously mean that the mere fact that a person, who is the proprietor, settlement-holder or manager of an estate, is no longer in possession of such estate, the power, under Rule 116, to strike out the name of such a person from the revenue records cannot be resorted to. What is also necessary for the purpose of enabling a De puty Commissioner to take recourse to Rule 116 and issue notice under the provis o to Rule 116 to the recorded proprietor, settlement-holder or manager is that s uch person, who is the proprietor, settlement-holder or manager of the estate, m ust be shown to have ceased too have interest in the land, which is no longer in possession of the estate. If Rule 116 is interpreted to mean that a lawful own er will lose his right over the land merely by an act of trespass by an encroach er, it would mean that if a person can manage, illegally and by dint of sheer mu scle power, to trespass into a land, such a trespasser would be entitled to sett lement of the land merely because of the fact that the recorded proprietor, sett lement-holder or manager of the estate is not in possession of the estate or par t thereof. Such an interpretation would lead to chaos and lawlessness. An inte rpretation of a provision, contained in an enactment or rule, which can lead to chaos and disorder in the society, must be eschewed by the courts and the courts shall favour that the interpretation, which would help maintain orderliness in the society, for, it is orderliness in the society, which the public interest de mands and needs and not chaos and disorderliness. Viewed thus, it is clear that Rule 116 would be applicable only when a person, who is the proprietor, settlem ent-holder or manager of an estate, abandons his interest, as the proprietor, se ttlement-holder or manager, over such an estate or any part thereof. 6. In the backdrop of the law, as indicated above, when one turns to the fa cts of the present case, it becomes more than abundantly clear that in the case in hand, when the prayer made by the said encroachers to treat them as tenants, within the meaning of the Assam (Temporary Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971, had been rejected and the order stood affirmed in the appeal by the Assam Board of Revenue and when the orders, so passed, have attained finality, it cannot be sai d that the petitioner, as proprietor of the said tea estate, has ceased to have interest over the said land nor can it be said to be a case, where the petitione r, as proprietor or settlement-holder, has ceased to have any interest over the said land, which forms the subject-matter of controversy in this writ petition. This apart, the civil suits are, admittedly, pending and in the civil suits, th e petitioner, as plaintiff, has sought for, inter alia, declaration of his righ ts, title, interest and possession over the suit land, khaas possession thereof by ejecting the defendants and also for permanent injunction restraining the de fendants, their men and agents from trespassing into the suit land in future. 7. In the circumstances, as indicate hereinabove, it cannot be said that th e petitioner has abandoned his interest over the land aforementioned nor the pre sent one is a case, wherein the petitioner can be said to have acquiesced to the rights, if any, of the encroachers. The facts and circumstances, as pointed ou t hereinbefore, do not, therefore, satisfy the conditions precedent for invoking the provisions of Rule 116. 8. The power to issue notice under Rule 116 can be exercised only when the conditions precedent for issuance of such a notice exist. When the respondents are already in the know of the entire affair and when they know that the petitio ner has been claiming and struggling to get vacant possession of the land, in q uestion, it logically follows that the question of invoking the power of the Dep uty Commissioner, under Rule 116, to cancel the petitioner’s status as the settl ement-holder of the said land did not arise at all. If Rule 116 is interpreted t o mean that as soon as a person, (who has been in occupation of a plot of land a s a proprietor, settlement-holder or manager), losses his possession, his name a s proprietor, settlement-holder or manager shall be struck off the revenue reco rds, the logical implication would be that a trespasser or encroacher would be r ewarded by the Government by making settlement of the encroached land in favour of such encroacher even if the proprietor, settlement-holder or manager of the e state keeps crying foul and keeps raising his objection and refuses to acquiesce to such illegal act of the trespass or encroacher. Such an approach would, und oubtedly, diminish the majesty of law, would not serve public interest and would not be in the interest of justice. 9. The enquiry, required to be made in this writ petition, is, if I may poi nt out, of very limited nature. What this Court, in this writ petition, is reall y required to determine is as to whether the petitioner has abandoned his intere st in the land, in question. If the answer to this question is found in the nega tive, there would remain no escape from the conclusion that the directions given , in the present case, to the District Collector, Dibrugarh, to take recourse to the provisions of Rule 116 are wholly illegal and cannot be sustained. It may a lso be pointed out that for the purpose of determining as to whether the respond ents had with them any material whatsoever indicating or reflecting, even faintl y, that the petitioner had abandoned his interest in the land, in question, pres ence of those, in whose favour the direction(s) were given, cannot be regarded a s necessary or even proper parties. 10. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, it logically follows that the letter of the respondent No. 1, namely Commissioner and Secreta ry to the Government of Assam Revenue Department, dated 30.05.2007, aforemention ed requesting the respondent No. 3, namely, Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, to t ake action in the matter under Rule 116, is wholly without jurisdiction and even the notice, dated 04.06.2007, aforementioned is without jurisdiction and needs to be set aside and quashed. 11. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, the impugned notice, dated 04.06.2007, is hereby set aside and quashed. 12. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall sta nd disposed of. 13. No order as to costs.