IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.15282 of 2001 RAM NIWASH SINGH s/o late Raj KumarcSingh, resident of village- Kandharpur, P.S. Sandesh, district- Bhojpur, at present posted as Sub Inspector of police, Garhwa, District-Garhwa. Versus 1.THE STATE OF BIHAR . 2. Director General-cum Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, Old Secretariat, Patna. 3.Inspector General of Police, Darbhanga ,Zone Darbhanga, PS. Darbhanga, District- Darbhanga. 4. Deputy Inspect or General of Police, Darbhanga Range, Darbhanga, P.S., Darbhanga, District- Darbhanga. 5. Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga, P.S. Darbhanga, District- Darbhanga. 6. Sri Tohid Parwez, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga(conducting officer of the proceeding) P.S. Darbhanga, District- Darbhanga. ----------- For the Petitioner: Mr. Ram Bhupendra Narain Singh For the State :S.C.VI. 4 10.12.2010 By the impugned order, the petitioner, who was, at that time, Sub inspector of Police at Darbhanga challenges the order passed by Superintendent of Police in a departmental proceeding no.75 of 1998 being order dated 1.10.1999, which was affirmed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Darbhanga Zone, Darbhanga by his order dated 15.11.2000.By the aforesaid order, the petitioner has been inflicted punishment of stoppage of increment for six months without cumulative effect, an imposition of black mark. Further it was ordered that during suspension period he would not be entitled to anything except suspension allowance. It has been further ordered that the period of suspension would be treated as half earned leave period. Separate counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of Superintendent of Police and Deputy Inspector General of Police. - 2 - Hard the parties. The petitioner has raised primarily two contentions, firstly he submits that the Superintendent of Police has no authority to inflict punishment of the nature, as above, who was Sub Inspector of Police and secondly that the order, as passed in the departmental proceeding, stands vitiated for total denial of principle of natural justice. In support thereof, petitioner relied on Rule 825(d) of the Bihar Police Manual to show that the Superintendent of Police had no authority to impose punishment on Sub Inspector of Police. Having considered the matter, to appreciate the first point, it is relevant to refer to Rule 825(d) of the Bihar Police Manual : “825(d) : A Superintendent may impose on any police officer subordinate to him and of and below the rank of Sub Inspector any or more of the punishments in rule 824 except dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement in the case of Sub- Inspector or Assistant Sub-Inspector. It shall be kept in mind that if any enquiry has been initiated by the District Magistrate, a report of the result shall be sent to him for information. If required, the file of departmental proceeding shall also be sent with it.” A reference to the said rule would show that except for dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement in the case of Sub inspector or Assistant Sub Inspector, all other punishments can be inflicted by the Superintendent of Police . Though the wording of provision is not happy, the meaning is clear. Thus, the first contention, as raised on behalf of the petitioner, cannot be sustained. Now we come to the second contention with regard to denial of principle of natural justice. In the writ petition, petitioner has - 3 - specially pleaded that initially he was put under suspension and on revocation of suspension, he was transferred to another district, while the proceedings were pending at Darbhanga. The petitioner has given a representation clearly stating that in his absence, his lawyer may be noticed and heard in the matter . Nothing was done and suddenly he was visited with the order. He thus pleaded that once witnesses were to be examined, he was not informed. He was neither given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and in fact witnesses were not examined . To this, the counter affidavit on behalf of Deputy Inspector General of Police is that these facts relate to the Superintendent of Police and as such he is not competent to comment. This is unfortunate in as much as if one looks to memo of appeal filed before Deputy Inspector General of Police, this is a ground for attacking the order of Superintendent of Police. It is thus evident that Deputy Inspector General of Police did not even apply his mind to the grounds taken in appeal in deciding the appeal and dismissed the appeal merely holding that having examined the record he had no reason to interfere with the order. This shows total non application of mind. This Court can only remind that Deputy Inspector of Police was exercising appellate jurisdiction as quasi judicial authority. He had responsibility to act judicially and not mechanically. This itself vitiates the appellate order. Now we come to the counter affidavit of Superintendent of Police. In reply to para 11 of the Writ petition in which clear facts - 4 - with regard to denial of natural justice has been pleaded. The reply in the counter affidavit is a bald statement that principles of natural justice were complied with. There is no specific denial of the fact that no date was communicated, witnesses were not examined much less brought to be cross examined. In the counter affidavit, no records have been produced in support of the bald assertion of compliance of natural justice. There is no statement as to how principle of natural of justice was complied with. Thus, in opinion of this Court, the counter affidavit of Superintendent of Police cannot be relied on for any purpose. The manner in which pleadings are there in the counter affidavit only would show that there was in fact nothing available on record which could deny the positive assertion of the petitioner. Thus, it is found that even the Superintendent of police acted in most mechanical manner and not as quasi judicial authority, as is expected to act. Thus, the original order of punishment, as aforesaid, also cannot be sustained. It is void for non compliance of principle of natural justice. Thus, both the orders of the Superintendent of Police imposing punishment, as contained in Annexure 6, being dated 1.10.1999 as also the appellate order of Deputy Inspector General of Police dated 15.11.2000, as contained in Annexure 9, are set aside. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. singh (Navaniti Prasad Singh,J)