IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.M.JOSEPH & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.C.HARI RANI FRIDAY, THE 11TH MARCH 2011 / 20TH PHALGUNA 1932 WP(C).No. 14094 of 2010(J) --------------------------------------- PETITIONER(S): ----------------------- M/S. ESSAR TELECOM INFRASTRUCTURE (P) LTD., 36/2624, FIRST FLOOR, CHERAMANGALATH HOUSE, SHENOY ROAD, COCHIN-682 017 REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY MANAGER (LEGAL AND SITE ACQUISITION) MR.BABU PATTATHANAM. BY ADV. SRI.SANTHOSH MATHEW, SRI.SATHISH NINAN, SRI.ARUN THOMAS, SRI.JENNIS STEPHEN. RESPONDENT(S): -------------------------- 1. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. 2. THE ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, A.S.P. OFFICE, ALUVA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 3. THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, VADAKKEKARA POLICE STATION, VADAKKEKKARA P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 4. THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, PUTHENVELIKKARA POLICE STATION, PUTHENVELIKKARA.P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 5. MR. PAULOSE, PAYYAPPILLY, ELANTHIKKARA, PUTHENVELIKKARA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 6. MR. THOMAS, VAZHAPPILLY, ELANTHIKKARA, PUTHENVELIKKARA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. WP(C).No. 14094 of 2010(J) 7. MR. CHAKKAPPAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, ELATHIKKARA, PUTHENVELIKKARA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 8. MR. GEORGE, S/O. GEEVARGHESE, PAYYAPPILLY, ELATHIKKARA, PUTHENVELIKKARA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 9. MR. SUTHAN, S/O. KUMARAN, MANAPPURATH, ELANTHIKKARA, PUTHENVELIKKARA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. 10. PUTHENVELIKKARA GRAMA PANCHAYAT, PUTHENVELIKKARA P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY. R1 TO R4 BY GOVT. PLEADER MR.T.K. VIPINDAS. R5 TO R9 BY ADV. SRI.N.SASI, SRI.P.CHANDRASEKHAR. R10 BY ADV. DR.K.P.SATHEESAN, SRI.K.K.GOPINATHAN NAIR. THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 20/12//2010, ALONG WITH WP(C) NO. 635 OF 2010 AND CONNECTED CASES,THE COURT ON 11/03/2011 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: WP(C).No. 14094 of 2010(J) APPENDIX PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS: EXT.P1: COPY OF THE BUILDING PERMIT NO.A2-4322(1072) DATED 14/01/2010 ISSUED BY 10TH RESPONDENT. EXT.P2: COPY OF THE RECEIPT DATED 12/01/2010 ISSUED BY 10TH RESPONDENT. EXT.P3: COPY OF THE STOP MEMO NO.A2-4322(1072) DATED 09/02/2010 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER. EXT.P4: COPY OF THE STAY ORDER IN I.A.NO.182/2010 IN APPEAL NO.138/2010 PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. EXT.P5: COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 22/02/2010 GIVEN TO THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH RESPONDENTS BY THE PETITIONER AND RECEIPTS DATED 22/02/2010 ISSUED BY THE THIRD AND FOURTH RESPONDENTS. EXT.P6: COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 17/03/2010 IN APPEAL NO.138/2010 OF TRIBUNAL FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. EXT.P7: COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE D.G.P. DATED 01/02/2008 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER. EXT.P8: COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 12/01/2010 IN WP(C) NO. 917/2010 OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT. EXT.P9: COPY OF THE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY SANDEEP SOMAN BEFORE THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER DATED 11/07/2007. EXT.P10: COPY OF THE REPLY GIVEN BY THE INFORMATION OFFICER ON 20/07/2007. EXT.P11: COPY OF THE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY IDEA MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS DATED 08/02/2008. EXT.P12: COPY OF THE REPLY GIVEN BY THE DIRECTORATE OF PANCHAYATS ON 14/02/2008. EXT.P13: COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL REPLY GIVEN BY THE DIRECTORATE OF PANCHAYATS ON 26/03/2008. EXT.P14: COPY OF THE APPENDIX E AND F AND RECEIPT DATED 23/06/2010 ISSUED BY THE PANCHAYAT. (P.T.O.) WP(C).No. 14094 of 2010(J) EXT.P15: COPY OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING THE TELECOMMUNICATION TOWER AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION WORK. RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS: EXT.R10(a): COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PANCHAYAT COMMITTEE DATED 16/02/2010. EXT.R10(b): COPY OF THE NOTICE GIVEN BY THIS RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER DATED 28/04/2010. EXT.R10(c): COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN I.A. NO.602/2010 IN APPEAL NO.432/2010 DATED 14/05/2010. //TRUE COPY// P.S. TO JUDGE rs K.M. JOSEPH & M. C. HARI RANI, JJ. ----------------------------------------- W.P.(C).NOS. 14094/2010 J, 8868/09C, 8837/09Y, 8867/09C, 24384/09P, 7501/09G, 37483/09E, 2450/10E, 14274/10H, 2931/10N, 2916/10L, 13405/10A, 14312/10L, 13407/10A, 13404/10A, 13599/10Y, 3954/10T, 3957/10T, 7312/09H, 8321/09I, 6433/09Y, 14343/10P, 14342/10P, 37212/09V, 13797/10Y, 36041/09A, 35836/09Y, 1790/10W, 14361/10U, 34081/09E, 13122/10M, 14111/10L, , 17009/10A, 14477/10H, 13975/10V, 29499/09F, 14476/10, 29369/09M, 14475/10H, 14092/10J,13919/10L, 13990/10W, 377/10V, 36046/09A, 13925/10M, 15814/10B, 37003/09U, 35482/09E, 13924/10M, 1691/10J, 1693/10J, 1694/10J, 13598/10Y, 30673/09D, 15801/10A, 14107/10K, 13401/10A, 13403/10A, 13406/10A, 28847/10E, 23477/10H, 3868/10G, 20656/10F, 13857/10F, 16048/10E, 24045/10E, 18270/10G, 14793/10Y, 196/10Y, 37030/09W, 27185/10W, 19190/10W, 16587/10W, 16385/10W, 1181/10W, 635/10D, WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 2 14231/10D, 15838/10D, 17539/10N, 6731/10N, 2138/10N, 917/10L, 17007/10A, 31651/09B, 14012/10B, 2358/10T, 1965/10U, 27169/09M, 20930/10M, 14728/10M, 177/10V, 8974/10V, 18575/10V, 21165/10U, 20961/10U, 25156/10T, 25157/10T, 22371/10V, 30720/09H, 18294/10J, 1294/10J, 30082/10I, 14004/10A, 13409/10A, 19347/10P, 19169/10U, 28085/10I, 20098/10J, 3631/10D, 9521/09I, 4036/10D, 4572/10V, 4048/10E, 17469/10G, 25404/10A, 28541/10P, 25417/10B, 31772/09N, 29644/10E, 17510/10K, 26586/10W, 25560/10T, 29476/10H, 24018/10B, 25382/10W, & 30137/10 N ------------------------------------------ Dated this the 11th March, 2011. JUDGMENT K.M. Joseph, J. In these batch of writ petitions certain common questions arise and we deem it appropriate to dispose of the cases by the following common judgment. 2. Petitioners are either service providers or infrastructure WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 3 providers or agreement holders with the infrastructure holders. The controversy arises on account of obstruction to the construction of mobile towers and in many cases, obstruction to construction of towers for their operation and they seek police protection to aid them. 3. This issue had engaged the attention of this Court earlier. Divergent views were expressed by this Court in the decision in Reliance Infocom Ltd. v. Chemanchery Grama Panchayat (2006 (4) KLT 695) (hereinafter referred to as the "Reliance case"), Essar Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Circle Inspector Of Police (2008 (4) KLT 713) and Dishnet Wireless Limited v. Circular Inspector of Police (2009 (1) KHC 781). On noticing the divergent views, a Division Bench of this Court referred the following two questions to the Full Bench: "(1) Whether the construction of a Mobile Base Station by itself will give rise to a dispute of civil nature, merely for the reason that a section of the public apprehends that it may cause some health hazards and whether a larger question of this nature as to whether such Mobile Base Station could cause any health hazards could be decided in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 4 (2) If the petitioners have obtained licence in accordance with the relevant statute in force and when they start functioning of a Mobile Base Station, can anybody cause any physical obstruction to such work, without raising a dispute and seeking remedies available to them under law, and in case, any such physical obstructions is caused, is not the Police bound to act and whether in the absence, this Court could issue necessary directions to the Police.” Subsequently, another Division Bench felt that two more points require consideration by the Full Bench and sought to clarify the following two points : "(1) Whether this Court can exercise the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to the police, as if this Court is hearing a suit for mandatory injunction and whether the objection taken to the same in para 8 of Sadananda Bai's case (supra) and para 8 of Essar Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd's case (supra) is sustainable ? (2) When, for causing obstruction to the construction of a mobile phone tower, the petitioners have an alternative effective remedy of filing a civil suit, is it a proper exercise of discretion by this Court to entertain the Writ Petitions and advise the respondents to invoke the alternative remedies available to them ?” The Full Bench answered the questions in the decision in WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 5 Reliance Telecommunications Ltd. v. S. I. of Police (ILR 2010 (2) Ker. 592) (hereinafter referred to as the Full Bench decision) as follows: "33. Points sought to be clarified as per the reference order dated 24-3-2009 in W.P.(C). No.6433/2009 and connected cases are answered in the above background as follows:The construction of a Mobile Base Station by itself witll not give rise to a dispute purely of civil nature, to be relegated to a civil court, merely for the reason that a section of the public apprehends that it may cause some health hazards. Whether a larger question of this nature, as to whether such Mobile Base Station could cause any health hazard, could be decided in a petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, there cannot be any legal bar to such a course in appropriate cases, where sufficient materials are provided as to the scientific studies and norms/guidelines prescribed by the Government/Licensing authorities in this regard; which situation is conspicuously absent in the instant cases. If the petitioners have obtained all requisite licences/permits in accordance with the relevant statutes/orders/notifications in force and start construction/functioning of a Mobile Base Station, nobody can cause any physical obstruction to such work/operation, but it is open to them for raising a dispute and seek WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 6 remedies available under the law. If the police is alerted as to the threat to the law and order situation and if there is any violation on the part of the Police to discharge the statutory duty in takiang steps to prevent cognizable offence, a Writ of Mandamus is very much liable to be issued granting police protection. 34. Points sought to be clarified as per the reference dated 2-11-2009 in W.P.(C). Nos.24384 & 25157/2009 are answered as follows: (i) In view of the observation in paragraph 8 of Sadananda Bai's case (2008 (3) KLT 542) and similar observations in paragraaph 8 of Essar Telecom's case (2008 (4) KLT 713) holding that this Court is very much having the power to provide the remedy, in case of violation to discharge the duty by the police, further reference doubting the power of this Court under Article 226 is quite unwarranted. In view of the law declared by this Court as stated in the forgoing paragraphs, the observations to the contrary in the above two decisions (Sadananda Bai's case and Essar Telecom's case) are not correct or sustainable. (ii) Relegation to the Civil Court, in the event of forceful obstruction to the construction or energization of Mobile Phone Tower is not an effective alternate remedy and interference by this WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 7 Court, granting `Police protection', invoking the power and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is warranted to advance the course of justice.” The Full Bench also approved the law declared by the decision in Reliance Case and the Dishnet Case. Thereafter, the Full Bench ordered as follows: "36. The next question is whether the merits of each case are to be dealt with or not. Even though we are very much aware of the scope and power under Sec.7 of the Kerala High Court Act, in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court as per the decision in Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. and Others reported in (2006) 6 S.C.C. 258), we find it proper to have the cases considered and decided on merits by the appropriate Court, in the light of the law declared as above.” 4. In many of these cases the matter had engaged the attention of the Full Bench of this Court. We are proceeding to dispose of not only the cases which were listed before the Full Bench, but also other cases, many of them filed subsequent to the decision of the Full Bench. 5. Sri. P. Sathisan, learned counsel for the petitioners in many of these cases would make the following submissions: Under Section 4 WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 8 of the Indian Telegraph Act, a licence has been granted to establish a telegraph, which takes in a mobile business also. He points out that Entry 31 of List I of the 7th Schedule provides for legislative power to Parliament, as hereunder: "Entry 31: Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication." He would submit that it is in the exercise of the legislative power that the Parliament has enacted the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (TRAI Act for short). He would draw our attention to Section 11 of the said Act. He relies further on Section 14 which provides for right of appeal to the appellate authority. He further draws our attention to Se.2 (l) of the Municipality Building Rules where the word "building" is defined. He would canvass, in particular, Rule 141 (8) of the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999. It reads as follows: "141. Submission of application and its disposal.- (8) The Secretary shall, if convinced of the boundaries and ownership of the plot, plans and drawings and genuineness of the certificates, issue permit, not later than 30 days from the date of receipt of the WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 9 application." He would further contend that there is a right of appeal to the Tribunal under Se.276 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Without challenging the permit issued under the Building Rules, it is contended that it is not open to the respondents or their men in these cases to obstruct the petitioners from carrying out the work for which they have taken permit and are otherwise armed with necessary licences under the Central enactment governing the field. He would submit that if the tower is not put up and operated it will affect the quality of the service which would result in the petitioners being liable to pay penalties. He would refer to the Division Bench decision of this Court in Dishnet Wireless Ltd. v. Circle Inspector of Police and Other s (2009 (1) KHC 781) and the unreported judgment of another Division Bench. He also relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench (supra) of this Court and contended that the writ petitions are only to be allowed. He would submit that there is a bar under Se.37 of the TRAI Act to institute a civil suit. He relied further on the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. (2007 (7) SCC 517). 6. Sri. Santhosh Mathew, learned counsel for the petitioners in many of these cases would essentially adopt the arguments of Sri. P. WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 10 Satheesan. He would submit that once permit is obtained under the Building Rules, there is no need for further permission under Se.235 (h). He would refer to the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution. He would further refer to Se.166 of the Panchayat Raj Act and would contend that the local body may not have any further say in the matter once a permit is obtained. He would also refer to Exts.P9 which are questions seeking information under the Right to Information Act and Ext.P10 reply given in W.P.(C) No.10907/2010 to contend that the petitioners have obtained all necessary permissions required as per law. He also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners And Others v. Union of India And Others (2007 (7) SCC 527 (at 547)). He would further refer to Se.256 of the Panchayat Raj Act. He would further point out that writ petitions are pending since 2009. He also referred to the unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in Crl. Appeal 930/2009 and the unreported judgment of the Karnataka High Court MANU/KA/0496/2001 in W.P No.35408/2000 (para 15) and the judgment of this Court in W.A.No.1596/2007. 7. Shri. Philip Mathew, learned counsel for the petitioners in many of these cases would point out that except in some cases no counter affidavit is filed. He would address six points before us. (i). WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 11 Se.232 and Se.233 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act are not applicable in view of Chapter 19 of the Municipal Building Rules. (ii) Se.233 (B) of the Panchayat Raj Act corresponding to Se.450 of the Kerala Municipalities Act provides for exemption from taking permit for installation of machinery. In this regard he relies on clause (a) and (c). (iii) He refers to the heading of Sec.233 and he would contend that it is only in cases where the matter is covered by Se.232 that Se.233 will apply and since there is no notification which requires taking out a licence under Se.232, Se.233 of the Panchayat Raj Act cannot apply. (iv) Sec.4 of the Telegraph Act contains certain safeguards and the Panchayat Raj Act cannot be made applicable in an area held by the Telegraph Act. (v) He would contend that the technological benefit should be made available to the masses and the Court must interpret the provisions of laws in such a manner that the technological advancement are made available to the masses. He would also contend that the workplace used in Se.233 (a) must be given the commonly understood meaning. He would refer to G.P.Singh Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edition Page 158 where the learned Author refers to the importance to be attached to the heading of a section. He would refer to Mimansa Rules of Interpretation (3rd Edition) page 185. He relies on the decision in Vijay v. State of WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 12 Maharashtra (2006 (6) SCC 289). He refers to the provisions of the Dangerous Trades Licensing Rules made under the Panchayat Raj Act particularly the explanatory note. He would contend that no separate form is prescribed under the Municipality Building Rules and he would refer us to Form A to contend that once a permit is acquired there can be no scope for obtaining any other permission. He refers to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bini v. Sundaran K.V. (2008 (1) KHC 209). He would contend that State Government has some power but it may not operate when any collision with the Central Legislation is occasioned. He further submitted that without acquiring land, the rights of the owner cannot be affected and he relied on the judgment in Raju S. Jeth malani v. State of Maharashtra (2005(11) SCC 222) and Nasar v. Malappuram Municipality (2009 (3) KLT 92). He would rely on the decision in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007 (8) SCC 705) to contend that the Apex Court has recognised that right to immovable property, though no longer a fundamental right is a human right. He further relied on the decision in Sivadasan v. Mattannur Municipality (2008 (4) WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 13 KLT 684). 8. Shri. V. G.Arun, learned Counsel appears for the petitioners in a number of writ petitions wherein, the petitioners seek police protection for constructing and operating the mobile towers. He also relied in Entry 31 of list I, which we have already referred to. Besides, he also referred us to Entry 13 of list II. He would refer us to Section 3(1)AA of the Indian Telegraph Act, Section 2 sub-Section (2) of the Wireless Telegraph Act 1933, Sections 4, 7, 19 and 8 of the Telegraph Act, to contend that the matter of establishing the telecommunication tower is governed by the provisions of the Central Enactments. He sought to buttress this position with reference to the provisions of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act (hereinafter referred to as the TRAI Act). He referred us to the provisions of Section 11 besides Section 13 of the Act. He also made available the licence agreement and referred us to various clauses therein in an attempt to contend that the matter engaged the attention of the Licensing WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 14 Authority which has provided for various conditions and, therefore, he would contend that the provisions of The Wireless Telegraphy Act, Telegraph Act and the TRAI Act r/w terms of the licence (agreement) occupy the field and there is no space for the State to legislate as the field is completely occupied. He would also refer us to the third schedule to the Panchayat Raj Act and Section 166 of the same. He also would submit that, having regard to the fact that the new licence condition has been imposed for regulating electro magnetic field, radiation, by way of self-audit and providing for officials to cross-check the same and as under the licence condition, stringent punishment is provided by way of penalty and also if needed, revocation of the licence, all is well. In this regard, he referred us to the communication dated 2.11.2010 addressed by the Government Department to the term "cells". He also relied on the decision in Baijnath Kedia v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1970 (SC) 1436). WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 15 9. Shri. Krishna Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioners appearing in writ petitions wherein, the petitioners are civil contractors, undertaking work of construction of towers, submits that they are only engaged in construction of towers for which they are having Permits. According to him, no other permission is required. He adopts the argument of the other petitioners. 10. Shri. A. Mohamed Mustaque, learned Counsel for the petitioners would raise the following contentions: He appears in the writ petitions wherein the petitioners are infrastructure providers, i.e., the petitioners are engaged in construction of mobile towers. He would broadly contend as follows: There is a social philosophy behind the policy of the Government in the matter of having mobile towers. Secondly, he would delineate on the aspect of a writ of mandamus and when it will be issued. Thirdly, he would contend that no permission is required u/s. 233 of the Panchayat Raj Act or the provisions WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 16 contained the Municipalities Act. Expatiating his contentions, he would refer us to clause 3 at page 55 (compilation No.1). He would contend that there is a universal service obligation, that is to say an obligation to take the mobile telephone to the remote and rural areas through the length and breadth of the country and there is a social philosophy as the framers of the policy have found that reaching this modern means of communication to the far corners, of the country will best promote the development of the people. He referred to Sections 9, 9A, 9C, and 9D of the India Telegraph Act. He would point out the gap between the number of towers required (3,30,000) by 2010 (see page 5 of compilation 1). He would contend that there is need to bear in mind that concept of sustainable development. He would point out that the implementation of the policy being man made, there will be imperfection. He would contend that in fact, there is an increasing awareness and which is being translated to reality also that operators must share towers. He referred us to various material to WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 17 show that the matter of erection of towers is seized of by International Telecommunication Union and also the National Authorities in India, namely the concerned Government Department. He would point out that there is lot of dispute in the matter of allocation of spectrum. He would also rely on literature to contend that it may be necessary to have more base stations (towers) and it would be in the interest of the members of the public themselves. He would also submit that the matter must be treated as occupied field having regard to the central legislation and the conditions of the licence. He also would refer us to the experience in other countries. He would contend that the radiation in the case of a mobile tower is non-ionizing. He referred us to the concepts of wireless networks cellular topography and contended that there is no merit at all in obstructing the construction of the towers. He would contend that ideally when the density of the population increases, there would be a corresponding increase in the number of towers. WPC.NO.14094/10 & CONN.CASES 18 11. Shri A. Mohamed Mustaque would also contend that the petitioners had the liberty and, therefore, there was correspondingly no right for the obstructionists to physically obstruct. He referred us to the decision in Gardon Riots' case. He would submit that the discretion of this Court would be fettered, if there is any established violation of law. Thirdly, he would contend, in regard to Section 233 of the Panchayat Raj Act and the corresponding provisions in the Municipalities Act, that the principle of ejusdem generis, must be applied. He would submit that Section 233 contemplates a quasi-judicial procedure for processing applications seeking permission under the same. He would submit that when the Panchayat Raj Act and the Municipality Act were enacted, the Legislature had before it the Factories Act, 1948, Air Pollution Act, 1981 and the Environmental Protection Act, 1986. He referred us to the definition of "factory" and "machinery" contained in the Factories Act. He does not dispute