IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT APPEAL NO.569 OF 2011 DATED:26.7.2011 Between: K. Subbarayudu … Appellant And The Government of Andhra Pradesh Rep. by its Secretary, Law Department Secretariat, Hyderabad and others … Respondents THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT APPEAL NO.569 OF 2011 JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Nisar Ahmad Kakru) The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Government Pleader for three years with effect from 16-12-2004 which period was over by 15-12-2007. He was allowed to continue until order of his reappointment dated 19-2-2009 for a period of three years or till termination by the Government. Having completed six years five months, his services came to be terminated vide order dated 17-5-2011 inter alia on the ground that maximum period of six years provided for two terms had already expired. Much emphasis is laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on instruction 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 (for short, ‘the Instructions’), which provides continuation of a Law Officer ordinarily for a period of three years who can be considered for a second term also and in exceptional case for a third term too. Relying on the said instruction, learned counsel for the appellant contended that his second term has to be reckoned from the date of his reappointment. If that would be so, his continuation beyond three years in terms of his first appointment order would be without any sanction of law. Argument suggests an effort to stretch the contention without any basis. We say so because the appellant has been allowed to continue in pursuance of his first engagement. It was further argued by the learned counsel that the reappointment order confers a right of continuation on the appellant for a further period of three years which would prevent the Government from terminating his services unless completion of the said period. The argument needs to be appreciated in the light of instruction 9 of the Instructions, which may be reproduced for facility of reference; “9. Termination of Service: Notwithstanding anything containing in instruction 8, either the Government or the Law Officer may terminate the engagement with one month’s notice: Provided that the Government may terminate the engagement by paying one month honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice.” The instruction reproduced aforementioned empowers the Government to terminate the engagement any time with one month’s notice notwithstanding instruction 8, and if the termination is by the Government, it has to pay one month’s honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice which has been paid to the appellant as is evident from paragraph 5 of the impugned order itself, making it manifestly clear that apart from other reasoning the Government has exercised its power under instruction 9. More so, the order of reappointment of the appellant provides very specifically that it has to be in force for three years or till the termination by the Government. The condition so stipulated in the order was not challenged by the appellant at any point of time and fact of the matter is that it was accepted by him, therefore he cannot turn around now after having derived the benefit out of the order. Viewed from any angle, interference with the impugned order is uncalled for. Dismissed. VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J NISAR AHMAD KAKRU, CJ 26-7-2011 B. Narsinga Rao