IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.3266 of 2005 SITA RAM SINGH & ORS Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 4. 2.5.2008 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, Learned counsel for Respondent No.6 pre-emptor and learned Standing Counsel No.3 (Ceiling ) for the State. The petitioners have come to this court against the order dated 1.11.2004 passed by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna in Board Case No. 99 and 100 of 2003. By the aforesaid impugned order, the Board of Revenue has upheld the order of the appellate authority in a case under Section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms ( Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. The matter was earlier remanded by the Board of Revenue in an earlier revision to decide the question as to whether the order dated 12.11.1983 is executable in favour of the pre-emptor even though there is no material available on record for condoning such delay. On remand the DCLR by his order dated 5.10.2001 dismissed the preemptor’s case on the ground that the form for execution of the order dated 12.11.1983 has been passed after lapse of nearly 14 years on 30.9.1997 and, therefore, it is time barred according to Section 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said order was challenged by Respondent No.6 in Ceiling Appeal Case No. 58 of 2001 and the Addl. Collector, Chapra by his order dated 11.2.2003 held that on the basis of the record, the proceeding for execution of the order was started by the petitioners on 1.7.1991, which is well within the period of 12 years after passing the 2 order dated 12.11.1983 in the pre-emption case. The said order has been upheld by the Addl. Member, Board of Revenue. Learned counsel for the petitioners assails the impugned order of the Addl. Member, Board of Revenue stating that the form for registration of the land in question in his favour having been filed by Respondent No.6 on 30.9.1997, the same was clearly beyond the period of 12 years of limitation as prescribed under Section 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was further submitted by learned counsel that in terms of the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Narayan Mahto .v. The State of Bihar and ors: 1989 PLJR 958, the authorities have no power to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Act. In the said decision in paragraph nos. 3 and 4 it has been held as follows: “3. The Act is a special statute, prescribing limitation for making an application for pre-emption, appeal against order granting or refusing to grant pre-emption or revision against the appellate order. Such period prescribed in the special statute with respect to the jurisdiction of Tribunals or deemed courts of limited jurisdiction are not governed by section 5 of the Limitation Act. “4. Notwithstanding the nature of the proceedings contemplated under the Act, the authorities deciding at the original level, appellate level or revisional level are not courts as contemplated in Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Unless they are courts, as contemplated therein, the inherent jurisdiction of the court shall not vest in them to condone delay.” On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners. Even if it is assumed that Section 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies in the present matter, the finding of fact recorded by the appellate court and upheld by the last court of facts, the Board of Revenue, is that a proceeding for execution of the order was 3 started by the petitioners on 1.7.1991 well within the period of 12 years after passing of the order dated 12.11.1983 and thus, there would be no occasion for exercising any power for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act. For the said reason the case of Narayan Mahto (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners cannot assist him. Moreover, the said decision has been rendered in the context of period of three months’ limitation prescribed for filing a pre-emption application by the Ceiling Act. The admitted position is that there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Act with respect to execution of the order and thus, the law laid down in the said case regarding the period of limitation being prescribed cannot have any application in the present case. However, the attention of this Court has also been drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Choudhary .v. Alliance Agro Inudstries (P) Ltd. And ors. : 1991 (1) P.L.J.R. (S.C.) 3, in paragraph no.2 of which it has been held as follows: “We are of the opinion that Section 29 of the Limitation Act applies to the facts and circumstances of this case and that it is now for the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms and the Collector under the Act to consider whether the delay in filing the proceeding should be condoned. Thereafter, the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms and the Collector, under the Act will dispose of the case on the remaining points in accordance with law.” . Although the said decision being cryptic one but in the Headnotes it is stated that it was in the context of an application for pre- emption under Section 16 (3) read with Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing an application beyond the period of three months prescribed by the Act. The said decision itself by implication overrules the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the 4 case of Narayan Mahto (supra). In any view of the matter in the facts of this case, no question of applicability of the provisions for condonation of delay arises since a clear finding has been recorded by the appellate authority and the revisional authority that the application for execution of the order itself had been filed well within the period of limitation. Thus, there is no merit in the present writ application and it is, accordingly, dismissed. VPS (Ramesh Kumar Datta,J.)