IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.14789 of 2009 1. BINITA KUMARI W/O SRI ATUL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA VILLAGE + P.O.- MANIKPURA, P.S. + DISTT.- GOPALGANJ VERSUS 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY PERSONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 3. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GOPALGANJ 4. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION GOPALGANJ 5. THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER HATHUA-1, DISTT.- GOPALGANJ 6. THE BLOCK EDUCATION EXTENSION OFFICER HATHUA-1, GOPALGANJ 7. GRAM PANCHAYAT RAJ SAUREJI HASHUA, P.S.- HATHUA, DISTT.- GOPALGANJ THROUGH ITS MUKHIYA 8. THE SECRETARY GRAM PANCHAYAT RAJ, SAUREJI, HATHUA, P.S.- HATHUA, DISTT.- GOPALGANJ 9. THE DISTRICT TEACHERS EMPLOYMENT APPELLATE AUTHORITY GOPALGANJ 10. URVASHI SAH D/O HARI JI SAH VILL.- NAURENIA, P.S.- MIRGANJ, DISTT.- GOPALGANJ WITH CWJC No.14808 of 2009 1. UPENDRA KUMAR S/O SRI JANAKDEO MISHRA VILL- NARAINIA, P.S. NIRGANJ, DISTT. GOPALGANJ Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DEPTT., GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS DEPTT., GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 3. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GOPALGANJ 4. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION GOPALGANJ 5. THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER HATHUA-1, DISTT. GOPALGANJ 6. THE BLOCK EDUCATION EXTENSION OFFICER HATHUA-1, DISTT. GOPALGANJ 7. GRAM PANCHAYAT RAJ SAUREJI, HATHUA, P.S. HATHUA, DISTT. GOPALGANJ 8. THE SECRETARY, GRAM PANCHAYAT RAJ SAUREJI, HATHUA, P.S. HATHUA, DISTT. GOPALGANJ 9. SH. DIGVIJAY KUMAR MISHRA S/O SRI KRISHNA MISHRA VILL- NARAINIA, P.S. MIRGANJ, DISTT. GOPALGANJ - 2 - 10. THE DISTRICT TEACHERS EMPLOYMENT APPELLATE AUTHORITY GOPALGANJ *************************** For the petitioners: Mr. Rajendra Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Onkar Singh For the respondents: Mr. Ashok Kumar Choudhary Mr. Umesh Kumar Mishra 3. 18.02.2010 Heard the counsel for the petitioners and the counsel appearing for the state. In both the writ applications, prayer of the petitioners, is for quashing of orders contained in letter No. 2250 dated 31.08.2009 and in letter No. 2255 dated 03.09.2009 as well as the follow up order dated 07.09.2009. By the impugned order dated 31.08.2009 contained in letter No. 2250, the District Teachers' Employment Appellate Tribunal has reviewed its earlier order dated 14.08.2009 contained in Memo No. 2230 and also mentioned that detailed order will be passed later on. By order dated 03.09.2009, the District Teachers' Employment Appellate Tribunal, Gopalganj has passed a detailed order, altering the earlier order dated 14.08.2009 passed in an appeal preferred by the respondents- Urvashi Shah and Digvijay Mishra. In the light of the orders passed by - 3 - the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 14801 of 2008 and C.W.J.C. No. 16132 of 2008, two appeals were preferred by the respondents for quashing of the order passed by the District Superintendent of Education, Gopalganj, canceling the appointment of respondents. By order dated 14.08.2009, the appellate tribunal had passed an order in favour of the petitioners but that was reviewed by the impugned orders. Petitioners have challenged the impugned order on the ground that it is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction for the reason that District Teachers' Employment Appellate Tribunal, which is a creation of statute, has not been vested with any review jurisdiction under Bihar Panchayat Teachers (Appointment & Service Conditions) Rules, 2008. Rule 18 of 2008 rules, vests the tribunal only with Appellate power. Since it is not vested with review jurisdiction, the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction. Respondents in both the writ applications being represented by Mr. Ashok Choudhary. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in - 4 - ordinary circumstances, any authority or tribunal is debarred from exercising review jurisdiction, in case it is not vested with such power under the statute, but in exceptional circumstance, where there is misrepresentation of facts, suppression of facts or any material due to which the authority would have been misled in deciding the matter and recording findings, order can be reviewed by the Tribunal, even though it is not vested with review jurisdiction. Since present case is an example of suppression of material facts, due to which order had been passed by Tribunal in favour of the petitioner reviewing earlier order. There is no illegality in the order. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on a decision reported in 2010(1) PLJR 499, specially, paragraphs-11, 12 & 13 of the said decision. In paragraphs- 12 & 13 reference of two Supreme Court decisions has been given in the judgment and the finding is that a constitutional , statutory or administrative authority who have to decide a lis have the power to recall their orders and judgments, if they are obtained by fraud, as fraud and - 5 - justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). I find that the judgment which has been relied upon by the respondents, in fact has no application in the facts of present case. The appeal was preferred by the respondents themselves. The question of limitation, if any could have been raised by them. Subsequently, application was filed by respondents, taking new ground for the purposes of review, i.e. ground of limitation. The ground which was taken for reviewing of the order had never been raised by the appellants (respondents). This is not a case, in which petitioners had suppressed any material facts for obtaining order in their favour. There was no suppression of fact, or fraud committed by them, due to which order dated 14.8.2009 could be passed. Accordingly, the issue raised by the petitioners regarding illegality of the order, on account of review of earlier order has got much substance. The respondents had better opportunity for challenging the order dated 14.8.2009 before superior - 6 - forum. Instead of availing that, they filed a review application, for which Tribunal had no jurisdiction. The orders impugned, as such, are fit to be quashed. Both writ applications are allowed. However, in case the private respondents are interested in challenging the order dated 14.8.2009 before an appropriate and superior forum, they have liberty to do so. Counsel for the respondents submits that Respondents have worked for some period but salary was not paid to them. If it is so, they have option to represent their cases before the appropriate forum which will consider it and in case the Respodents have worked, they should be paid. On account of quashing of the impugned orders, petitioners are entitled for their reinstatement with all consequential benefits. Akv/ (Mridula Mishra, J.)