IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.679 of 2010 1. JAI GOVIND SHARMA S/O LATE DHANUSHDHARI MEHTA R/O BHIKHANPUR P.S.- KOTWALI IN THE DISTRICT OF BHAGALPUR, PROPRIETOR, M/S GRADUATE ENGINEERS, BHAGALPUR Versus 1. THE STATE OF BANK OF INDIA, BHAGALPUR BRANCH THROUGH ITS BRANCH MANAGER, DISTT.- BHAGALPUR 2. BRANCH MANAGER, STATE BANK OF INDIA, BHAGALPUR BRANCH, DISTT.- BHAGALPUR ----------- 3 4.2.2010 A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent- Bank. By the counter affidavit, it has been brought to the notice of the Court that Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bihar, Patna has finally disposed of the case on 21.12.2009 being P.T.No.33 of 1998. A perusal of the said order not only discloses a sorry state of affairs but affirms what the writ petitioner has stated in the writ petition. Till then the paper / documents, which the writ petitioner was demanding to defend himself before the Tribunal, had not been given to him and the Tribunal proceeded for hearing of the case and its disposal without the records being there before it except what was filed in the Tribunal but not the original records from which these transferred proceedings emanated. This is distressing state of affairs. Even a party, who is in debt , by law, he is entitled to a fair hearing and a fair trial that is a rule of law. Anxiety to dispose of the case does not mean that disposal has to be made at the cost of justice. Indeed it is often said that justice delayed is justice denied but let us not forget equally well accepted principle that justice hurried is justice burried, which is clearly exemplified by this case. 2 A perusal of the order would show that it is only paper formality that has been completed to hold petitioner liable for payment of dues. That order itself notes that even at the stage of final hearing, learned counsel for the Bank clearly stated that certain documents are lying with the learned Civil Court, yet in hurry to dispose of the matter,the Tribunal heard and passed final order. One thing that has clearly emerged itself is that neither the Tribunal nor the party had before them the original records of the Civil Court. The defendant being the writ petitioner, who was demanding documents ,which were never supplied to him, the tribunal should not forget that its duty is not merely to recover the dues but its duty first is to do justice amongst the parties and if dues are found recoverable, recover the same. The order again shows that even though merely there is a reference to the defence of the defendant, there is no consideration because the evidence is that what the defendant wanted was lying buried in the Civil Court records, which the Tribunal ought to have been made available to the petitioner but in anxiety to dispose of the case. It did not think it proper to do so; that is not a legal justification. One another aspect I may note that the writ petitioner, as evident from the order of the Tribunal itself, had filed a counter case in the Civil Court being Title Suit no.156 of 1985 but the said counter case raising a counter claim. The Tribunal never bothered to call for even though the law now obliges the two to be tried together and they had to be transferred to Debt Recovery Tribunal. I assume that Debt Recovery Tribunal was aware of its legal obligation. All 3 these clearly shows that the order of the Tribunal, which has been passed in undue haste and without following the procedure in law and gross impropriatory , it cannot be sustained. It is set aside as such. The Tribunal is directed to re-hear the matter de novo and proceed in accordance with law. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. Singh (Navaniti Prasad Singh, J.)