f'|0^_ IN THE HIGH COURTOF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S) N0. ^l /2009 PETITIONER / ..< 6^-^e. ^^y ./' rt'~'•V'P"7 ^y' <-'-' RESPONDENTS Vs K.K. Behar, S/o Late Shri R.K. Behar, aged 59 years, Occupation- Service, Presently Posted as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat- Sharghoda, Distr-ict- Raigarh (C.6.) R/o Block Colony, Sharghoda, District- Raigarh (C.6.) ^ 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Schedule Tribes And Schedule Caste Development Department, &.K.S. Bhawan, Mantralaya, Raipur (C.&.) ^ 2. Collector (Tribal Development Branch), Raigarh (C6) 3. R.H.S. Paikar-a, S/o and age is Not Known to the Petitioner', Occupation- Service, Presently Posted as Chief Executive Officer, Janapad Panchayat- Wadrfnagar, District- Sar9UJC> (C.G.) VIQNI dO NOI±nj.IJ.SN03 3Hi do 9zz a^u-av aaqNnNoiiuad ±iaM AP^ HJGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S) No. 6819 of2009 PETITIONER RESPONDENTS K.K.Behar. VERSUS State ofChhattisgarh & Others. ES,. WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF DMDIA SB: Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Aenihotri, J. Present: Stei Rajeev Shrivastava, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri P.K.Bhaduri, Panel Lawyer for the State/respondents 1 & 2. ORDER (ORAL) (Passed on 20ulday of November, 2009) 1. By this petition, the petitioner impugns the order dated 7 November, 2009 (Annexure P/l) whereby the petitioner, working as ChiefExecutive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Gharghoda, has been transferred to the office of Commissioner, Tribal Welfare Department, Raipur. 2. Shri Shrivastava, leamed counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is going to retire on 30 June, 2010, on attaining the age of superannuation, and as per the policy of the State Govemment, a person who is to retire within a period of two years, may be given posting in his home district. Shri Shrivastava further submits that on this ground alone, the petitioner was earlier traasferred from Lohandiguda, District Bastar to Gharghoda, which falls within his home district. It is further contended that the impugned transfer order has been passed to accommodate the respondent No. 3 at Gharghoda. 3. The contention ofthe petitioner that the impugned transfer order has been passed to accommodate respondent No. 3 at Gharghoda and as such, this is malice in law, is not sustainable. In order to prove malice in law or on facts, the petitioner has to prove fhe allegation of malafide. The allegation is self- same and not supported by any material, whatsoever. 4. It is well-settled that transfer is an incidence of service and it is for the employer to decide asto where a particular officer/employee be posted, Amit keeping in view public interest as well as administrative exigency. This Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer matter except in the cases of proved malafide, non-competence of authority passing the transfer order and not being in confonnity with the rules and regulations. The petitioner/employee cannot be permitted to remain at one place forever. Under the provisions of service rules, employer has all the powers to post an employee at a particular place in view of public interest and administrative exigency. (See E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another1, Union oflndia and another v. Janardhan Debanath & another , State of M.P. and another v. S.S.Kourav and others and Mohd. Masood Ahmadv. State ofU.P. & Others). 5. So far as contention of the petitioner that the impugned transfer order is contrary to the policy ofthe State Govemment is concemed, the policies are mere guidelines and not controlled by statutory provisions. The effect thereof is advisory in character and thereby no legal right is conferred upon the employee. (See: Chief Commercial Manager, South Central Railway, Secundarabad & Others v. G. Ratnam & Ofhers ). 6. The Supreme Court, in Airports Authority oflndia v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey & Others , held that "In a matter of transfer of a govemment employee, scope ofjudicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere wifh an order oftransfer lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer". 7. Even otherwise, there is no challenge to the impugned order on any permissible legal grounds as aforestated, warranting interference. 8. For the reasons as aforestated, the petition is dismissed. Sd/- SatishK.Agnihom Judge ' 1974 (4) SCC 3 2 (2004) 4 SCC 245 3 (1995) 3 SCC 270 "(2007)8SCC150 5 (2007) 8 SCC 212 6 (2009) 8 SCC 337