WP(C) 6278/2007 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B.K. SHARMA The petitioner, Chairman of the particular Samabai Samiti, isaggrieved by the order cancelling PDS sub-wholesale license as per clause 15 (1) of the A ssam Public Distribution of Articles Order, 1982. The brief fact leading to fili ng of the instant writ petition is that the petitioner society was issued with s how cause notice dated 26.09.07 (Annexure-III) asking to show cause as to why th e license issued in its favour should not be cancelled and/or suspended. The all egations made in the show cause notice are as follows: 1. By making sub-allocation of APL rice and levy Suger amongst the Agents o f your Society for the month of May’ 2007 without observing any norms, you have willfully violated the fundamentals of equitable distribution. 2. By not displaying the lists of BPL and AAY beneficiaries conspienfusly i n the Society, you have violated the provisions of Clause -5 (II) of the Annexur e to the PDS (Control) Order, 2001 as amended. 3. By realizing Rs. 12/- in excess in per qtl. BPL rice for the agents with out any authority and without issuing any Cash Memo, you have willfully and clea rly violated the provisions of clause -19 of the APDA Order, 1982 as well as Cla use -5 (I) of the Annexe to the PDS (Control) Order, 2001 as amended. In reply to the aforesaid show cause notice, the petitioner society repr esented by the Secretary submitted its reply vide Anenxure-4 dated 04.10.07. The charge was replied as follows: 1. That as regard the statement made in para-1, I am sure that the fold ite ms are distributed in proper way to the agents of the Samitttee. Because as per regular supplies, Government has allotted 400 quintal APL Rice for the month of February, 2007 and March, 2007 to the Samittee. But surprisingly in the month of April, 2007 and May, 2007 only 100 quintals of rice have been allotted. So it i s very difficult to distribute equally amongst the 62 Agents of the samittee and it is also mentioned that there was no any norms regarding distribution of the rice for that month. On the other hand, I would like to inform you that regardin g sugar out of 160 quintal only 70 quintal have been allotted by the Tinsukia wh ole sale Consumer Co-operative Societies Ltd. So, it was very difficult to distr ibute the less quantity of sugar and at that time no any norms was fixed. That as regards the statement made in pagraraph-2 the norms of the beneficiaries for BPL and AAY have already been hanged in the notice Board and the names are still hanged in the notice Board. The earlier Deputy Commissioner of Tinsukia al so visited the Samabai Samittee and found the list in the notice board. That as regards the statement made in paragraph- 3 the Samabai Samittee is to g et Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) only from the Government for transportati on of Antodaya Rice. The economic conditions of the Samittee has been worsen day by day and the Samabai Samittee is to pay the Bank Commission for Bank Draft. A s such the executive Committee of the Samittee decided t realizing the amount fr om the agents. It may be mentioned here that at present there are four employees of the Samittee and for the salary of these four employees and the office expen ses are provided from the Samabai Samittee . After the aforesaid show cause notice and reply thereof, the authority p assed the impugned order dated 29.11.07 (Annexure-5) cancelling the PDS sub-whol e license issued to the society in exercise of the power conferred under clause 15 (1) of the APDA Order, 1982. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the in stant writ petition. The respondents have filed their counter affidavit denying the pleas and contentions raised in the writ petition. According to the respondents, the peti tioner society having violated the terms and conditions of the license as well a s the provisions of the APDA Order 1982, their license has rightly been cancelle d. I have heard Mr. D.C. Mahanta, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. P. Ta lukdar, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Ms. R. Chokraborty, learne d Addl. Sr. G.A. alongwith Mr. J. Sarmah, learned State counsel. Mr. Mahanta has emphasized on the principles of natural justice and reasonable opportunity of b eing heard. Placing reliance on two decisions of this Court reported in (2003) 3 GLR 257 (Nurul Islam Laskar vs. State of Assam and others) and (1983) 1 GLR 37 7 (Suresh Chandra Deka vs. State of Assam and others), he submits that the respo ndents could not have cancelled the license by a stroke of pen without providing reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner society. Opposing the aforesaid submissions made, Ms. R. Chokraborty, learned Sta te counsel submits that since the petitioner society has admitted in its show ca use reply the charges levelled against it, the authority has rightly passed the impugned order. Upon a reference to the records produced, she submits that when the petitioner itself has admitted the fact in its show cause reply, same amount s to admission of guilt. The three allegations made against the petitioner society have been note d above. The fact of realizing the excess amount from the agents and that too wi thout issuing any receipts was admitted by the petitioner. Reply to the charge N o. 3 has been quoted above. On being pointed out to the same Mr. Mahanta, learne d counsel for the petitioner has referred to paragraph- 11 of the affidavit in o pposition in which the respondents have admitted about non-payment of transporta tion charges to the petitioner society. In the aforesaid paragraph although the respondents have admitted that G ovt. has not made available fund to pay the transportation charge but has stated that non receipt of such transportation charge cannot be the reasons for indul ging in malpractice. If the petitioner society has not been paid the transportation charge, t heir remedy lies elsewhere and not by charging extra amount from the agents and that too without issuing any receipts thereof. The records produced by the learned State counsel has clearly revealed t he fact of petitioner society charging extra amount beyond the price fixed. Cla use 19 of the APDA Order, 1982 mandates that no appointed dealer will sell or of fer to sell any category of notified articles at a price higher than the fixed b y the licensing authority. Even otherwise also the petitioner society is not em powered to charge extra amount than the price fixed from the agents. In the show cause reply the petitioner society did not deny that aspect of the matter. Thei r only plea was that since the transportation charge was not paid by the Govt., the society for the purpose of running its day to day affairs had to charge more amount. Non payment of transportation charge can not give license to the petiti oner society to indulge in malpractice and to violate the terms and conditions o f the license as well as the provisions of APDA order 1982. The petitioner havin g admitted the fact of allegations of charge No. 3, same amounts to admission of guilt. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Channbasappa Basappa H appali vs. The State of Mysore reported in AIR 1972 SC 32, there is no distincti on between the admission of facts and admission of guilt. When the facts are adm itted there is admission of guilt. As in the said case, in the instant case also Mr. Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner society although had admitted the facts, but did not admit its guilt. According to him, extra amount was realized not as a malpractice but to meet the exigencie s as per the resolution adopted by the executive body of the society. Such plea is wholly untenable. If the petitioner society was not paid transportation charg e, their remedy was elsewhere and not taking recourse to some kind of extortion charging more amount than the fixed price and that too without giving any receip t thereof. Even if it is held that the petitioner is justified for their action as regards the charge No. 1 and 2, but having regard the gravity of the charge No. 3, it cannot be said that the authority acted beyond its jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order dated 29.11.07. Even in respect of charge Nos. 1 and 2, the authority found that there was no satisfactory explanation. The records produced by the learned State counsel fully support the action of the respondents. The decision on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance are not at all applicable to the facts of the case. In Narul Islam Las kar (supra), this court found fault in cancellation of the license when it came on record that particular license was cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner takin g into account some extraneous materials not available in the impugned order. I t was found that the order was passed on conjectures and surmises. Similarly in Suresh Chandra Deka (supra) it was found that the impugned order was passed with out complying with the principles of natural justice. It was held that the reaso nable opportunity must be given before passing such an order. Same is not the ca se in hand. The petitioner was provided with opportunity of being heard. The abo ve referred show cause notice was issued to it in response to which the society also submitted its reply. What emerged thereafter, has been noted above. Even if any concession is granted in favour of the petitioner as regards the violation of the principles of natural justice, the petitioner cannot improve its case. As noted above, the particular fact which needless to say, amounts to admission of guilt, has been admitted by the petitioner. During the course of hearing, it was submitted that the particular licen se is required to be renewed from time to time. It is not known as to whether ev en otherwise also the terms of license would have expired. Irrespective of the i mpugned order, it will be open for the petitioner to approach the authority for renew of the license. In the event of making such prayer, the authority will be within its competence and jurisdiction to take a decision in the matter in accor dance with law. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is dismissed le aving the parties to bear their own costs.