Letters Patent Appeal No.367 OF 2003 ---------- Against the judgment and order dated 25.3.2003 passed by the Hon’ble Singh Judge in CWJC No. 14217 of 2002 --------- Jai Mangal Bhagat, son of Late Yogeshwar Bhagat, resident of Lalpura, P.O. Chakaramdas, P.S. Saraiya, District Muzaffarpur ……….. Appellant Versus 1. The State of Bihar 2. Member Board of Revenue at Old Secretariat, District Patna 3. The Collector, Muzaffarpur at & P.S. and District Muzaffarpur 4. The Deputry Collector, Land Reforms (West), Muzaffarpur 5. Smt.Sumitra DSevi, wife of Raj Mangal Mahto, resident of Lalpura, P.O. Chakaramdas, P.S. Saraiya, District Muzaffarpur 6. Ram Prashan Mahto, son of Late Nathuni Mahto resident of Lalpura, P.O. Chakaramdas, P.S. Saraiya, District Muzaffarpur (Vendor) ………………. Respondents ----------- For the Appellant :- Mr. S.R.C.Pandey, Advocate For the State : - Ms Kumari Amrita, SC (Ceiling) P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR SINGH Navin Sinha & Heard learned Counsel for the appellant and the Dinesh Kumar Singh,JJ. learned Counsel for the State. 2. The appellant made an application for preemption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act1961. The original authority allowed the claim holding that the appellant was a preemptor as the adjoining raiyat. In appeal, the order of the original authority was set aside on the ground that the preemption application was not maintainable as it was filed 2 even before registration of the sale deed was complete. The revision filed by the appellant before the Board of Revenue met the same fate. 3. The same argument as noticed in the impugned order under appeal has been advanced before us with reference to 1968 PLJR 68A (SC) = AIR 1969 SC 244 (Hiralal Agrawal Vrs. Rampadarath Singh & others) 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the sale deed was not registered on the date that the preemption application was made, that is not fatal. No sooner that the sale deed came to be registered the authorities were then required to consider the application in accordance with law. The contention was that even an unregistered sale deed submitted in support of a preemption application was required to be kept pending till it fulfilled the requirements of law. The initial tender of an invalid application fulfilling the statutory requirement was inconsequential. Strong reliance was placed on Para 12 of the judgment of Hiralal Agrawal (Supra) to read that the Supreme Court has held that application for preemption could not be rejected on the ground of absence of registration but the application was required to be considered no sooner that the registration was complete. The Division Bench of this Court has erred in interpreting the judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in 1974 PLJR 360 (Jawahar Lal & others Vs. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna & others). The submission therefore was that the matter may be remanded to the authorities to now decide the preemption application since the registration was now complete. 5. Counsel for the State supported the impugned order to urge that it required no interference. 3 6. The facts of the case noticed in Para 12 of the judgment of Hiralal Agrawal (Supra) was that an application was filed before the Collector which was unregistered. It never came to be recorded/registered as a proper application for preemption and remained pending and by the time it was properly placed before the Collector for consideration in accordance with law registration had taken place. That is the distinguishing factor of the case as distinct from the facts of the case of the appellant. 7. A Division Bench of this Court has already interpreted the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Hiralal Agrawal (Supra) at Para 3 of the judgment in the case of Jawahar Lal (Supra) as follows:- “3. It has been held by the Supreme Court, in (1) Hiralal Agrawal V. Rampadarath Singh (1968 P.L.J.R. 68A= A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 244) that the right of reconveyance under Section 16 of the Act accrues only when the registration of a sale deed is complete, as required by Sections 60 and 61 of the Registration Act, and not before. In other words, the right of reconveyance does not accrue before the sale deed is copied out in the books maintained for the purpose by the registering authority. Following the above decision, the same view has been reiterated by a Bench of this Court, in (2) Kauleshwar Singh V. Parmanand (1972 P.L.J.R. 321= A.I.R. 1972 Patna 407). It may be stated that the same view had been taken in three earlier unreported Bench decisions of this Court, which have been referred to in (2) Kauleshwar Singh’s case. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the application of respondent no. 4 filed before respondent no. 3 was not maintainable and that respondent no. 3 could not have entertained that application, and, consequently, the orders passed by him on the lst of May, 1969 issuing notices to the petitioners and respondent no. 5 and the final order as contained in Annexure “3” allowing the said application were without jurisdiction.” 8. On the face of the reasoning in the aforesaid paragraph interpreting the judgment of the Supreme Court there is no occasion for us to reinterpret the judgment of the Supreme Court. In any event of the matter sitting in coordinate jurisdiction in Division Bench it shall not be 4 our jurisdiction to question the authoritative pronouncement of the earlier Division Bench. 9. The revisional order rightly refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court as aforesaid holding that the Collector was right in rejecting an application for preemption presented even before registration of the sale deed. 10. There is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. (Navin Sinha, J.) (Dinesh Kumar Singh,J.) Patna High Court The 22nd April 2010 Snkumar/- (NAFR)