IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM WRIT PETITION NO : 13434 of 2009 Between: Aakella Srinivas Rao S/o.late A.V.Sharma, R/o.12-11-163, Namala Gundu, Seetafalmandi, Secunderabad. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh, High Court Building, Hyderabad, represented by its Secretary. 2 Disciplinary Committee No.4 of Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh, High Court Building, Hyderabad. 3 D.B.Krishna Murthy Plot No.202, Kubera Towers, A-Block, Tirumalgerry, Secunderabad. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to to issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ order or orders or direction to quash the proceedings of the 1st Respondent dated 19.4.2009, communicated to the petitioner on 18.6.2009 whereby the complaint filed by the 3rd respondent U/s. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 has been referred to the 2nd resposndent Committee for enquiry and pass. Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.V.SRINIVAS Counsel for the Respondent No.: MRS.S.NANDA The Court made the following : ORAL ORDER: Couched as a writ of Certiorari, this writ of Prohibition is directed against the proceedings of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh (the 1st respondent), dated 19-4-2009 recording a prima facie satisfaction that the 3rd respondent’s complaint of misconduct by the petitioner ought to be registered as complaint Case No. 69 of 2009; and referring to the Disciplinary Committee No. IV of the 1st respondent for disposal under Section 35 (1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’). The petitioner is a legal professional enrolled with the 1st respondent. The 3rd respondent lodged a complaint with the 1st respondent under Section 35 of the Act, alleging misconduct by the petitioner in collecting an amount of Rs. 6,50,000/- from the said respondent on the pretext that the amount was towards Court fee for filing a proceeding for probate of a Will. In respect of the same alleged transaction, the 3rd respondent filed O.S.No. 137 of 2007 on the file of the III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. The suit was decreed on 2-6-2008 for an amount of Rs.8,50,958/- in favour of the 3rd respondent-plaintiff and against the petitioner-defendant. Thereagainst, the petitioner preferred an appeal to this Court in CCCA No. 222 of 2008 wherein an interim order dated 23-10-2008 is stated to have been passed staying the decree and judgment of the Civil Court on certain conditions (which are not relevant for the purpose of this writ petition). According to the petitioner, the judgment of the Civil Court dated 2-6-2008 in O.S.No. 137 of 2007 is the material basis of the 3rd respondent’s complaint to the 1st respondent, alleging professional misconduct on the part of the petitioner. To impeach the proceedings dated 19-4-2009 of the 1st respondent, Sri V.Srinivas, the learned counsel for the petitioner would urge two principal contentions; (a) that no reasons are assigned for recording of the prima facie satisfaction by the 1st respondent for taking cognizance of the complaint of the 3rd respondent; and (b) that since an appeal is pending before this Court in CCCA No. 222 of 2008 against the judgment and decree in O.S.No. 137 of 2007; and is a continuation of the suit proceedings; the suit judgment and decree would eventually merge in the judgment and decree which might be eventually passed by this Court in CCCA No. 222 of 2008; and since a stay of the judgment and decree was granted by this Court by way of an interim order in CCCA No. 222 of 2008, the 1st respondent ought not to have taken cognizance of the 3rd respondent’s complaint on the basis of the judgment and decree in O.S.No. 137 of 2007. None of the above contentions commend acceptance by this Court. Section 35 (1) of the Act; which is the provision relevant for the purpose of this case, reads: 35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct. (1) where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. The impugned proceedings of the 1st respondent records as under: “Whereas a complaint dt. 22-09-2008 filed against the Respondent, a copy of which was already sent to you, had been considered by the Bar Council on 19-04-2009 along with the comments of the respondent and had reason to believe that there is a prima facie case that the Respondent-Advocate has been guilty of mis-conduct and resolved to regi9ster the same as Complint Case No. 69 of 2009 (S.R.No. 95/2008) and that this case is referred to Disciplinary Committee No. IV of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh for disposal under Section 35 (1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (extracted to the extent relevant).” It is not the petitioner’s case that the 1st respondent suffers an inherent lack of jurisdiction to initiate proceedings on reaching a prima facie satisfaction as to the need for proceeding further on the complaint of a citizen against a legal professional. The 1st respondent in the impugned order has recorded that it is prima facie satisfied that the complaint needs to be investigated. This satisfaction in the considered view of this Court, is adequate to justify proceeding further in the matter under the provisions of Section 35 of the Act. A detailed raft of reasons for arriving at the satisfaction need not be recorded. It is required to be noticed that the regulation of the conduct of legal professionals is entrusted to the Bar Council, under the provisions of the Act. The provisions of Section 35 do not mandate an obligation on the 1st respondent to record detailed reasons even for initiating an enquiry on a complaint of misconduct against a legal professional. The initiation of proceedings; and referring the issue to a Disciplinary Committee of the 1st respondent for enquiry, per se, does not prejudice the petitioner who is admittedly demonstrably subject to the disciplinary control of the 1st respondent. On this analysis, the impugned order is not in transgression of the provisions of Section 35 of the Act. Regarding contention No. (b), it must be held that this contention is equally without merit or force. The impugned proceeding does not refer or allude to the fact that the prima facie satisfaction to proceed further under the provisions of Section 35 of the Act has been arrived at by the 1st respondent on the basis of the judgment and decree of the Civil Court in O.S.No. 137 of 2007. It may be that the 3rd respondent’s complaint refers to the judgment and decree in O.S.No. 137 of 2007 one of the bases of his complaint or the substratum of the allegation of misconduct against the petitioner. That itself would not render the 1st respondent’s taking cognizance of the complaint against the petitioner, invalid. It is always open to the petitioner to urge in the inquiry proper that the judgment and decree ought not to be relied upon as a substantive evidence in considering the complaint of the 3rd respondent. These are matters for forensic debate before the 1st respondent or the appropriate disciplinary body constituted by the 1st respondent to go into the complaint of the 3rd respondent against the petitioner. No advance ruling or analysis of the legal position is either warranted or appropriate in the circumstances. A 3rd contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri V.Srinivas is that since the factual substratum of the civil proceedings instituted by the 3rd respondent against the petitioner in O.S.No. 137 of 2007 (which is pending consideration in CCCA No. 222 of 2008 before this Court) is the same as in the complaint lodged by the 3rd respondent against the petitioner before the 1st respondent, the matter is conceptually similar to simultaneous proceedings against an alleged misdemeanant in a criminal proceeding and in disciplinary proceedings before an employer. The analogy may be approximate but may not be apposite. It requires to be noticed that the civil proceedings instituted against the petitioner by the 3rd respondent is for recovery of the pecuniary loss caused by the unlawful demand and collection by the petitioner of an amount not professionally due either towards fee or towards Court fee, as the case may be. Recompense for the alleged pecuniary loss suffered by the 3rd respondent, on account of the unlawful misconduct of the petitioner is the subject matter and the reason for the civil proceedings. Disciplinary regulation of the petitioner’s conduct for the injury suffered by the 3rd respondent on account of the alleged professional misconduct of the petitioner is the subject matter and trajectory of the complaint preferred by the 3rd respondent against the petitioner before the 1st respondent. These are insular proceedings whose purpose and outcomes are dissimilar. In the facts and circumstances and on this contextual analysis, no case is made out for interdicting the proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent against the petitioner on the complaint of the 3rd respondent. There are no merits. The writ petition is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. ________________________ GODA RAGHURAM, J 7th July, 2009. GRR