IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Criminal Appeal No.332 of 2008 and Criminal Revision Case No.2118 of 2006 Crl.A. No.332 of 2008: Between: The State of A.P., rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad .. Appellant AND Enugu Malla Reddy and others .. Respondents Crl.R.C. No.2118 of 2006: Between: Enugu Lavanya .. Petitioner AND Enugu Malla Reddy and others .. Respondents COMMON JUDGMENT: The judgment in S.C. No.157 of 2004 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nirmal, dated 20-09-2006 acquitting accused 1 to 3 of the charges under Section 498-A and Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) under Section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure led the State represented by the learned public prosecutor to file Criminal Appeal No.332 of 2008 and the de facto complainant/victim to file Criminal Revision Case No.2118 of 2006 challenging the same. 2. The factual background for the appeal and the revision case is that the Inspector of Police, Mudhole filed the charge sheet against the three accused in crime No.24 of 2003 alleging that on 09-03-2003 at 2 P.M. Enugu Lavanya gave a petition at the police station alleging that at the time of her marriage with the 1st accused four years earlier, Rs.4,00,000/- cash, 12 tulas of gold, a TVS Suzuki motor cycle and other house hold articles were given as dowry and the marital life was peaceful for some time. The accused were claimed to have started harassing her demanding additional dowry and she came away to her parents’ house after the birth of a male child. After one and half years, a panchayat was conducted before village elders— Mohan Reddy, Rolla Ramesh, Vittal Reddy, Murali Manohar Reddy, Gangareddy, Rajendar Reddy, Ramreddy and Gangareddy. The elders arrived at an agreement to pay an additional dowry of Rs.20,000/-, for which the parents of Lavanya agreed and on the promise to make the payment within six months, Lavanya was taken by the accused to their house. After about one and half months, the accused were alleged to have again started harassing Lavanya and at about mid night on 08-03- 2003, the accused were claimed to have beaten her, caused burn injury with a hot iron road on two legs and attempted to commit murder by pouring kerosene and setting fire to her on the next day. She managed to escape from the accused to her parents’ house and gave a report to the police. During investigation, Lavanya was referred to the Government Civil hospital, Mudhole for treatment and the kerosene soaked clothes of Lavanya were seized at her house under a panchanama in the presence of P. Sudhakar Reddy and P. Penta Reddy. The medical officer certified Lavanya to have sustained grievous and simple injuries caused with hot and blunt objects. The accused were arrested and remanded to judicial custody and hence, they were prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498A IPC read with Section 34 IPC. 3. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bhainsa on taking cognizance of the offences in P.R.C. No.41 of 2003, committed the case to the Court of Session after furnishing the copies of documents to the accused on their appearance. The Court of Session made over the case to the trial Court, which framed charges under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC, which the accused denied. During trial, P.Ws.1 to 13 were examined and Exs.P.1 to P.11 and M.Os.1 and 2 were marked. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against them when they were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and they examined D.W.1 in defence. 4. The trial Court rendered the impugned judgment firstly observing that the allegations about the offence under Section 498-A IPC are very bald and no attempt was made to approach the accused through elders or relatives for about one and half years during the alleged living of P.W.1 with her parents. D.W.1, one of the named elders, did not support the prosecution story, but supported the defence version of a demand for divorce by P.W.1 leading to such a panchayat. The version of P.Ws.9 and 10, the alleged elders, was considered not natural or probable when they claimed payment of Rs.20,000/- to the accused to be their verdict. Serious doubts were entertained by the trial Court about the alleged settlement and the ill-treatment of P.W.1 due to demand for additional dowry being not believed in the absence of any reliable and trustworthy material. Coming to the charge under Section 307 IPC, the trial Court found P.W.1 to have not been seen by anybody while leaving the matrimonial home after the incident. Though P.Ws.5, 6 and 8 were noted to have stated about the burn injuries on the legs of P.W.1 seen by them, as they saw such injuries at the house of P.W.2 and as the witnesses did not state about the alleged attempt to set fire to P.W.1 by pouring kerosene, the Court could not place any reliance on them. While considering the evidence of the medical officer and Ex.P.9 certificate issued by him, the doubts about the seizure of M.Os.1 and 2 from P.W.1 weighed with the Court in not acting on the same and the statements in the remand report and the charge sheet about the burn injuries on the earlier day and an attempt to set fire being on the next day were considered by the trial Court to be throwing doubts on the claims of P.W.1 in the evidence about both being on the same day. The trial Court also found that the incident was not complained to anybody till the presentation of Ex.P.1 to the police at 2 P.M. on 09-03-2003 though the incident happened on the earlier mid night. In view of all the said circumstances, the trial Court found the accused not guilty and acquitted them. 5. In Criminal Appeal No.332 of 2008, it was contended that the evidence of P.W.12, the doctor, coupled with Ex.P.9 clearly revealed P.W.1 suffering the injuries, while the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 had a ring of truth. Ex.P.1 report could not have been an encyclopaedia and when P.Ws.5, 6 and 8 also supported P.W.1 about receipt of injuries, the accused could not have been acquitted. 6. In Criminal R.C. No.2118 of 2006, the victim/P.W.1 contended that P.Ws.1 to 13 proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused for physical and mental harassment of P.W.1 for additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/-, the mediation conducted by P.Ws.9 and 10 and the causing of burn injuries and attempting to kill P.W.1 on the night of 08-03-2003. The consistent evidence corroborated by medical evidence and supported by P.Ws.5, 6 and 8 should have led to the conviction of the accused and hence, she also desired the acquittal to be reversed. 7. Sri Rudresh Deshpande, learned counsel representing the learned public prosecutor, Smt. Jamal Hasani, learned counsel representing Sri C. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, learned counsel for the accused are heard. 8. The point for consideration is whether substantial and strong grounds exist for reversal of the acquittal of the accused for either or both the offences ? 9. Point: Concerning the alleged offence under Section 498-A IPC, P.W.1 admitted that giving dowry on demand was not stated in Ex.P.1 or her statement to the police and she also admitted absence of any documentary evidence in support of giving any dowry in kind or in cash including about the purchase of motor cycle for Rs.40,000/-. She further admitted that there was never any report in writing to anybody about any such demand for dowry and she could not even state the source of money for P.W.2 to pay the dowry or meet the marriage expenses. The purpose for which an additional dowry of Rs.20,000/- was demanded, was not known to P.W.1 and admittedly no payment was made even after the panchayat. Even P.W.2, the mother, who admitted like P.W.1 about the marital life being happy initially, stated that she did not state about the presence of anybody else at the time of payment of dowry, which was also not evidenced by any document. She further admitted that they never complained to the police or anybody else earlier about any harassment by the accused in this regard. P.W.3 also stated that specific dates of harassment were not mentioned by him to the police and he does not even know the name of the goldsmith who prepared the ornaments allegedly given at the time of dowry, which is but unnatural. If a pancnayat were held as claimed by the prosecution, the absence of any document evidencing the resolution of the panchayat as admitted by P.W.3 is also not in tune with the ordinary and natural course of human events and neither the mother nor the brother also stated anything about the sources or means for them to make the original payment or the additional payment agreed before the panchayat. P.W.4 to P.W.8 did not state anything on this aspect, while P.W.9 is neither the Sarpanch nor a member of Gram Panchayat nor is related to the parties. He has no lands in Kirgul village and he even refused to answer whether he was convicted in a criminal case. He did not even know whether P.W.1 returned to her parents-in-law’s house after the alleged panchayat and similar was the evidence of P.W.10 who also admitted about the elders not making any attempt to get any account opened for deposit of the additional dowry agreed to be paid. He speaks about P.W.1 being handed over to her parents-in-law and P.W.1 returning to her matrimonial home unlike P.W.9 who stated the same in his chief-examination and claimed ignorance during cross-examination. P.W.10 is also not shown to be in any way connected with the parties and as opposed to this evidence, D.W.1, who was among the elders named by the prosecution and who also, of course, was not related to the parties, stated that the panchayat was about the disputes concerning divorce. He denied any settlement for payment of additional dowry of Rs.20,000/- and thus, the claims about any demand for or payment of dowry at the time of marriage or any demands for additional dowry later or P.W.1 being subjected to any harassment or cruelty in view of the same, cannot be considered to have been probablised beyond all reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The acquittal of the accused by the trial Court on such material in respect of the said offence, therefore, is not capable of interference in appeal or revision. Even if two views are possible on the probabilities arising out of the evidence, when the view taken by the trial Court was one plausible view, the appellate Court cannot substitute the same with its adoption of the second view. 10. Coming to the allegation about the offence under Section 307 IPC, it should first be noted that to make out an offence under that provision, the intention or knowledge in doing any act or the circumstances under which the culpable act is done, should be such that any culmination of the act in death of the victim will make the offender guilty of murder. Even if all the allegations of the prosecution through its witnesses and documents were accepted at face value, the injuries caused to P.W.1 as disclosed by Ex.P.9 medical certificate cannot be considered to disclose such an intention or knowledge or circumstances for any of the accused or the possibility of their being found guilty of murder if the death were to be the result of the injuries. Scratches on the right leg, blisters on the right foot, right toe and left foot and a contusion in the middle of the leg on the person of P.W.1, then aged about 22 or 23 years, and is otherwise hale and healthy, cannot suggest any intention or knowledge on the part of any person causing such injuries about the injuries possibly leading to death of the victim. 11. In so far as the allegation about pouring kerosene on P.W.1 and attempting to set fire to her is concerned, the clothes of P.W.1 said to be soaked with kerosene were not stated by P.W.11, the independent mediator for their seizure, to be so soaked or smelling kerosene, while the other mediator for E.P.7 panchanama was given up. P.W.11 stated that he does not even know where from M.Os.1 and 2 saree and blouse were brought and he did not even observe whether the saree has any stains. Even the investigating officer as P.W.13 did not refer to any smell or presence of kerosene on M.Os.1 and 2 and he admitted that in the remand report of the 3rd accused and in the charge sheet, he mentioned the suffering of injuries by P.W.1 to be on the earlier day and the attempt to kill P.W.1 by pouring kerosene to be on the next day, which he claims to be a mistake. Though the remand report and the charge sheet are not pieces of evidence, the evidence of P.Ws.11 and 13, thus, does not indicate the possibility of such an attempt to kill. Any container with kerosene was not attempted to be seized from the scene and in the earliest version in Ex.P.1, the allegation was that all the three accused attempted to kill P.W.1 by setting fire to her after pouring kerosene, while the allegation in the evidence was specifically against the 1st accused only. If the 2nd and 3rd accused held P.W.1 at that time and the 2nd accused poured kerosene on P.W.1 and the 1st accused lit a match stick, in the ordinary and natural course of human events, P.W.1 would have been burnt and could not have found any physical escape as claimed. The claims of P.Ws.1 to 3 about this attempt to kill P.W.1 by setting fire to her on pouring kerosene, were not corroborated by P.W.4 to P.W.8, while they were not so silent about the injuries received by P.W.1. Therefore, the alleged attempt to kill P.W.1 by the accused cannot be considered to have been probablised in any manner. 12. However, even in the earliest version, it was specifically alleged that the accused heated an iron rod and caused injuries on both the legs with the same, though it is true that it was alleged as a joint effort with no specific overt act being separately alleged against any of the accused. However, the injuries on her person were seen by P.Ws.2 to 8 and on being referred by the police on registration of the crime, by the medical officer. The medical officer deposed as P.W.12 about finding on 09-03-2003 on examination of P.W.1, a contusion in the middle of the left leg, scratches on the right leg and blisters on the left foot, right foot and right toe. The first two injuries were caused by blunt object and the next three by a hot object, while the first injury was grievous and the other injuries were simple. P.W.12, who issued Ex.P.9 medical certificate, was speaking only in discharge of his official duty and cannot be attributed with any interestedness. He claimed that P.W.1 was unable to walk because of injuries 4 and 5 of Ex.P.9 and he made no attempt to bluff about any knowledge of as to how P.W.1 came to the hospital or who accompanied her, etc. A convincing ring of truth echoes in his evidence and it is significant to note that even P.Ws.4 to 8 who turned hostile in not supporting the prosecution version as alleged by it, were corroborating the version about P.W.1 sustaining the injuries. P.W.4 was informed by P.W.1 about the burn injuries, while P.W.5 went to the house of P.W.2 on hearing the cries of P.W.1 and noticed the burn injuries on the legs of P.W.1, which were informed to have been caused at her parents-in-law’s house. P.W.6, who initially claimed total ignorance, also admitted during cross-examination that she found burn injuries on the legs of P.W.1 at the house of P.W.2 along with other villagers. P.W.8 also gave a similar version about finding such burn injuries and P.W.2, the mother, and P.W.3, the brother, of course, were one with P.W.1 in claiming such injuries. P.W.13, the investigating officer, of course, had not noted the injuries found on the person of P.W.1 when Ex.P.1 was presented, but he positively stated about P.W.1 being unable to walk freely and taking the help of her mother at that time. There were, of course, omissions in Exs.P.8 and P.9 about Ex.P.8 not mentioning the name or number of the escort constable or Ex.P.9 not mentioning the name of the patient examined. But the independent evidence of P.Ws.12 and 13 need not be suspected for any such insignificant omissions. 13. P.W.1 was the only person who could have stated about the manner in which she sustained the injuries, when the other evidence referred to above clearly probablises that P.W.1 was leading her matrimonial life in the house of the accused along with her husband and parents-in-law and that after the mid night of 08-03-2003 P.W.1 came from her parents-in-law’s house to her mother’s house with injuries found in Ex.P.9 on her person. No other person or event could have intervened in between, is evident from the evidence on record and if so, the injuries on the person of P.W.1 were probablised by the circumstances to have been possibly caused only when P.W.1 was in the company of accused 1 to 3 in their house. While it is true that the claims of P.W.1 about the demand for additional dowry and harassment in respect of the same or the attempt to kill her by setting fire to her on pouring kerosene, did not inspire confidence, the attempt of the Court should be to separate falsehood from truth and to detect exaggerations to be disbelieved and truthful events to be acted upon. Such segregation is an integral part of the duty to arrive at the truth and the allegations of P.W.1 about the 1st accused putting the heated iron rod on her both legs below the knee, finding corroboration from the proved presence of such injuries on her person and the only possibility of such injuries being suffered at the parents-in-law’s house, should have led to the inevitable conclusion of the 1st accused being responsible for causing such injuries. While the claims of P.W.1 about being held by 2nd and 3rd accused at that time are contrary to the earliest version in Ex.P.1, which did not specify about accused 2 and 3 physically holding her and as accused 2 and 3 were not stated in the evidence to have caused any of the injuries found in Ex.P.9, the 1st accused alone should answer the responsibility for the injuries found in Ex.P.9. The hot iron rod could have been the cause for all the injuries with the heated or cool surface of the rod touching the body of P.W.1 at different places and on a careful and close analysis of the evidence on record, the trial Court could not have, thus, absolved the 1st accused of the responsibility for causing the injuries altogether. To that extent, the appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court appears to be perverse and needs to be interfered with. 14. One grievous injury and four simple injuries appeared to have been caused on the person of P.W.1 with the use of a heated iron rod by the 1st accused and the grievous injury becomes punishable under Section 326 IPC, while the four simple injuries become punishable under Section 324 IPC. The blisters at three places or scratches at one place or the contusion were not on any sensitive or vital parts of the body and are not such as would result in any temporary or permanent disability of any sort. With the treatment for three days as in-patient, P.W.1 was not claimed to be requiring any further treatment for healing of the injuries and the magnitude of the injuries which appeared to have been caused by the 1st accused to his wife as a result of some domestic dispute, which is not presented to the Court in its true form, does not call for imposition of any savage sentence. The 1st accused was not alleged to have had any past criminal record and was a young person in his late 20s by the time of the incident. Taking all these circumstances into account, imposing a punishment of imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC along with fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees five hundred only) and imprisonment for one month on four counts for the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC will meet the needs of justice. In default of payment of fine, he can be subjected to further simple imprisonment for 15 days. 15. In the result, the judgment in S.C. No.157 of 2004 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nirmal, dated 20-09- 2006 is confirmed in respect of accused 1 to 3 being found not guilty of the charges under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC. But the 1st accused is found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 326 and 324 IPC and is convicted of the same under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months and a fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees five hundred only) with default sentence of simple imprisonment for 15 days in respect of the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC and also rigorous imprisonment for one month under four counts of the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and the period of detention or imprisonment, if any, already undergone shall be set off from the sentence of imprisonment under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The sentences of imprisonment shall run consecutively i.e. for a period of three months in total. The 1st accused, who is on bail, shall surrender himself before the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bhainsa, shall pay the fine and undergo the sentence within one month from the date of receipt of this judgment by the committal Court. In default, the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bhainsa shall take steps for execution of the sentence. The criminal appeal and the civil revision case are ordered accordingly. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 04-11-2011 Svv