CRP 350/2011 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY The superintending jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitut ion of India is sought to be invoked to set at naught the order dated 19.05.2011 passed by the learned Munsiff No.2, Kamrup, Guwahati in Title Execution Case No .3/99 directing the petitioner-judgment debtor to hand over the possession of th e land mentioned therein within a period of one month failing which the opposite party-decree holder was permitted to execute the decree therefor as rendered in Title Suit No.2/1991 between the parties. I have heard Mr. B.K. Bhagawati, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.R. De y, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate for the opp osite party who have entered through a caveat. The caveat stands discharged. The factual backdrop in short, needs to be outlined. The opposite party as plai ntiff instituted Title Suit No.2/1991 in the Court of the Sadar Munsiff No.2, Gu wahati against the petitioner praying for a decree inter alia for declaration of their right title interest in the suit land described in the schedule to the pl aint as well as for vacant khas possession thereof by evicting him. The suit land was described in the plaint as hereinbelow- A plot of land measuring 2(two) kathas of land in K.Patta No.206 of Dag No.1021 of village Maidam under Beltola Mouza within the district of Kamrup which is bo unded by North : Road. South: Land of Harendra Das (Boro) East : Land of Harendra Das (Boro) West : Road. The petitioner entered appearance in the suit and contested the same with full m ight. The learned trial Court however by judgment dated 17.12.94 and decree date d 20.12.94 decreed the suit. Thereby, the right, title interest of the opposite party in the suit land was declared and they were also held entitled to the rec overy of the khas possession thereof. The petitioner was also restrained by a d ecree of permanent injunction from interfering with the possession of the suit l and by the opposite party-plaintiffs. The petitioner unsuccessfully preferred Title Appeal No.1/1995 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division No.1, Kamrup. The learned lower Appellate Court by the judgment and order dated 03.02.1999 sustained the decree, whereafte r, the petitioner abandoned the pursuit. Admittedly, the decree as on date has attained finality. Thereafter, the opposite party-decree holder instituted Title Ex. No.3/1999 in t he Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division No.2, Guwahati. The process was resist ed by the petitioner-judgment debtor, so much so, that the execution of the decr ee was rendered impracticable on the ground of lack of identify of the suit land vis-à-vis the decree passed. The execution case was once closed on the basis o f the report of the bailiff of the court that the decretal land was not identifi able. However at the intervention of this Court the matter was re-opened. Last ly, the Commissioner appointed for the purpose of surveying the land for identif ication submitted a report on 17.12.2010, which indicated that the land covered by Dag No.1021 K.P. Patta No.206 which meanwhile had been converted to new Dag N os.895,896, 897 and 898 was different from the land in occupation of the petitio ner-judgment debtor and in fact was possessed by others. The Commissioner opin ed that on the basis of the boundaries of the suit land as provided in the plain t and in the decree the plot in occupation of the petitioner-judgment debtor cou ld be identified. The learned lower Court while analyzing the findings in the report amongst other s noted that whereas therein the eastern boundary of the land was shown to be in occupation of the petitioner-judgment debtor, in the decree as well as in the s chedule to the plaint it was indicated to be occupied by Harendra Boro. The lea rned trial Court on the basis of the materials available on record ascertained t hat the petitioner was the son of Harendra Boro and therefore for all practical purposes therefore there was no anomaly in the identity of the person occupying the land situated to the east of the suit land. In the above view of the matter , the plea of the petitioner-judgment debtor that the suit land was not identifi able on the ground of irreconcilable Dag and Patta number was rejected and the o perative direction as above was issued. Mr. Bhagawati has emphatically argued that as on the basis of the contemporaneo us materials on records, it is more than apparent that the land in occupation of the petitioner is different from the one decreed, the impugned order is patentl y illegal and is liable to be interfered with. As Dag No.1021 and K.P. Patta No .206 relate to a plot of land different from the suit land, the impugned order i s untenable in law, he urged. Mr. Dey in response, has argued with reference to Order 7 Rule 3 of the Civil P rocedure Code (hereinafter for short referred to as the Code) as well as the dec isions of the Apex Court in Sheodhyan Singh and others, v. Mst. Sanichara Kuer a nd others(AIR 1963 SC 1879); Pratibha Singh and another, v. Shanti Devi Prasad and another(AIR 2003 SC 643) that even assuming that the Dag number and Patta n umber provided in the schedule to the plaint for describing the suit land do not tally with the one in relation to which the decree had been passed, as the suit land is identifiable otherwise on the basis of the existing physical boundaries , the learned trial Court was perfectly justified in recording the view as embod ied in the impugned order and therefore no interference is called for. The pleadings on record and the judgments rendered in the suit and in the appeal had been duly considered. On being queried by this Court, Mr. Bhagawati in his usual fairness has admitted that the petitioner-defendant had not at any point of time questioned the correctness of the boundaries of the suit land as describ ed in the plaint. The materials on record ending with the Commissioner’s report referred to hereinabove establish that the land in occupation of the petitioner and from which he is sought to be evicted is different from the one carrying Da g No.1021 and K.P. Patta No.206. Meanwhile, these numbers have also undergone c hange as noted hereinabove. That the petitioner is presently in occupation of t he land with the boundaries described in the schedule to the plaint is an undisp uted fact. Though, the eastern boundary discloses that the land thereat is in o ccupation of Harendra Boro, that he is the father of the petitioner is also not disputed. In other words the suit land is clearly identifiable by the boundari es provided in the schedule to the plaint. Order 7 Rule 3 mandates that if the subject matter of a suit is an immovable pro perty, the plaint should contain a description thereof sufficient to identify it and in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a recor d of settlement or survey, the plaint should specify such boundaries or numbers. It is thus obvious that in a given fact situation if need be, an immovable prop erty is the subject matter of suit, can be identified by its boundaries. That it is so permissible even sans its Dag and Patta numbers is unmistakably enunciate d by the Apex Court in Sheodhyan Singh and others, v. Mst. Sanichara Kuer and ot hers (Supra) and Pratibha Singh and another, v. Shanti Devi Prasad and another(S upra). The proposition is so fundamental that it does not call for further dila tion. I have carefully perused the impugned order which is a detailed one. The learne d trial Court, on an examination of factual and legal aspects has concluded that the suit land is otherwise identifiable on the basis of the boundaries provided in the plaint. The decree had been passed before a decade and the title execut ion case is pending from 1999. The Apex Court in Pratibha Singh and another, v. Shanti Devi Prasad and another (Supra) has emphasized upon the duty of a Court to undertake an appropriate s crutiny of the materials on record to obviate the possibility of a decree to be defeated on account of an accidental slip or omission. On a totality of the considerations as hereinabove, this Court is of the unhesit ant opinion that the view taken by the learned trial Court is tenable in law and on facts. The petition lacks in merit and is dismissed. No costs.