Lsp IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL CIVIL CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2940 of 2004 Jayprakash Hari Parasad Pardeshi and anr. ..Petitioners V/s. The State of Maharashtra & ors. ..Respondents Mr. G.S.Godbole for the petitioners Mr.V.S.Gokhale, AGP for respondent nos. 1 to 4 Mr. Nitin Jamdar for respondent no.5 CORAM CORAM CORAM : D.K.DESHMUKH & : D.K.DESHMUKH & : D.K.DESHMUKH & N.D.DESHPANDE, N.D.DESHPANDE, N.D.DESHPANDE, JJ JJ JJ 3rd 3rd 3rd June, 2008 June, 2008 June, 2008 P.C. . By this petition the petitioner challenges the notice issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act compulsorily acquiring the property of the petitioner for the purpose of widening the road. Admitted facts are that there is an existing road in the Solapur town. It is an admitted position that there is a Development plan prepared of Solapur under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. It is also an admitted fact that in the final Development plan the width of the concerned road is shown as 18 meters. Present acquisition of the property of petitioner has been made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act because according to the Planning authority/ Municipal Corporation, it is necessary to increase the width of the road to 20 meters. Admittedly, notice 2 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. Petitioner submitted objection and thereafter notification under Section 6 was issued. There were three contentions raised before us by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. First submission was that as in the development plan the width of the road is shown as 18 meters then land could not have been acquired for widening the road to 20 meters without amending the development plan and the acquisition of the land could have been made under the Town Planning Act. Second submission was that an objection was raised that the road is proposed to be widened on the southern side whereas the property of the petitioner is on the northern side of the road, therefore, acquisition of the property is not necessary and that objection has not been considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. The third submission was that the Land Acquisition Officer has violated the requirement of personal hearing provided by Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. So far as first submission is concerned this question has been considered in a series of judgements by the Supreme Court. Those Judgements have been 3 considered by the Division Bench of this Court in its Judgement in the case of Nagpur Land Development Nagpur Land Development Nagpur Land Development Association Association Association Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005 (3) Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005 (3) Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005 (3) Mh.L.J.881) Mh.L.J.881) Mh.L.J.881) and the Court has held that acquisition of land for public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act is permissible. We find that if in the Development plan the width of road is shown as 18 meters and the Municipal Corporation after considering the flow of traffic on that road finds that road is required to be widened immediately, it is not necessary that the Corporation should follow the time consuming procedure for amendment in the development plan. It can take steps to acquire the land compulsorily under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of widening the road further. We do not see any statute preventing the Corporation and the Government from adopting such steps. So far as second submission is concerned, we find from the record that the petitioner did not raise that objection before the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned counsel relies on paragraph 3 of his letter, copy of which is at Exh. N to the petition addressed to the Land Acquisition Officer. Perusal of that paragraph shows that in that para all that was claimed was that in the proposal submitted under Section 37 for modification of the Development plan, it is not proposed to widen the road on the northern side. It is nowhere contended that as per notification issued under Section 6, road is not 4 proposed to be widened on the northern side. It is also not contended that property of the petitioner is on the northern side. In our opinion, therefore, as the objection was not raised before the Land Acquisition Officer, no grievance can be made by the petitioner about non-consideration of that objection. So far as third submission made by the learned counsel is concerned, in the petition there is no clear ground raised that the right of the petitioner of personal hearing under Section 5-A was violated by the Land Acquisition Officer by not giving the petitioner personal hearing. Perusal of ground D in para-3 of the petition, in our opinion, indicates to the contrary. para D suggests that the petitioner was heard by the Land Acquisition Officer but the petitioner was heard on 14-1-2004 and the notification was issued on 15-1-2004 and, therefore, the principles of natural justice and Section 5-A have been violated. The learned counsel also referred to the averments made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer where it is stated that the petitioner was heard by the Solapur Municipal Corporation. It was submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the corporation that there is no question of petitioner being heard by the Corporation for acquisition of land. It also appears that the statement made in para-18 of the statement made by the Land Acquisition Officer that petitioner was heard by 5 the Solapur Municipal Corporation is not with reference to land acquisition but for some other purpose. It is also an admitted position that during the pendency of the petition, the road has actually been widened and the property of the petitioner which was acquired has actually been acquired, the road has been widened. We find that in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, there is a positive statement made that provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act were strictly followed. We see no reason to doubt correctness of that statement. Taking over all view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the submissions urged before this Court. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. (D.K.DESHMUKH,J) (D.K.DESHMUKH,J) (D.K.DESHMUKH,J) (N.D.DESHPANDE,J) (N.D.DESHPANDE,J) (N.D.DESHPANDE,J)