Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Revision No.1171 of 2009 Date of decision : 22.3.2010 Pritibha Jhangi ....Petitioner Versus Devinder Kumar Singla ...Respondent CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. D. ANAND Present: None for the petitioner. Mr. Arun Palli, Senior Advocate with Mr. Divanshu Jain, Advocate for the respondent. S. D. ANAND, J. The petitioner herein is a tenant who, having lost at the hustings before both the Forums i.e. learned Rent Controller and also the learned Appellate Authority, is in revision to obtain the invalidation of the orders aforementioned which directed his ejectment from the tenanted premises on a finding that the landlord (respondent herein), a specific landlord in terms of provisions of Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), required it for personal bonafide necessity. The plea raised by the landlord (and upheld by both the Forums) in the context was that he had retired from the Government employment with effect from 31.10.2001 and that he is entitled to occupy the tenanted premises which he had purchased from the initial owner, vide registered sale deed dated 30.10.2001. The landlord claims to be presently residing in the Panchkula House Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -2- of his mother, alongwith other members of his family. The further plea raised by the landlord was that he requires the tenanted premises and he is undergoing treatment for chest pain etc. at the P.G.I. The tenant resisted the eviction action by averring that the tenanted premises ( a room and a garage on the ground floor) is not required by the landlord as the accommodation available with him (one room on the first floor and four rooms on the second floor) is sufficient for use by him and members of his family. It was also averred, in the context, that the landlord had, with a malafide design, not obtained ejectment of yet another tenant who is in possession of certain accommodation on the first floor of the tenanted premises. The maintainability of the petition itself, at the hands of the landlord, was challenged on an averment that the registered sale deed in his favour had been obtained without obtaining the mandatory No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Estate Officer and it is on account of that objection that the name of the landlord had not been recorded in the Estate Office record as owner of the premises aforementioned. With a view to buttress the plea of collusion, it was averred that even after the averred date of registration of sale deed dated 30.10.2001 the initial owner had executed a registered General Power of Attorney in favour of one Vijay Goel son of Dr. S.C.Goel on 31.10.2001. In that very context, it was averred that the tenant tendered arrears of rent for the duration 1.6.2001 to 31.1.2002 to the initial landlord who accepted the tender. The plea raised thereby is that it shows the invalidity of the impugned transaction Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -3- which had been entered into only with a view to enable the initial owner to obtain ejectment of the tenant by making use of the provisions of 'specified landlord' which afford easy remedy to the specified landlord to obtain possession of premises for his own use and occupation. I have heard Mr. S.M.Wadhera, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner (in part) and Mr. Arun Palli, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. The records have been perused. It may be noticed, on point of fact, that the learned counsel for the petitioner assisted this Court on 25.2.2010 by addressing arguments in part. Since the learned counsel wanted large amount of time to conclude and the heavy fixture on that date did not admit the grant of more time on that date, the matter was adjourned to 11.3.2010 for arguments. A proxy counsel appeared on behalf of the learned counsel for petitioner on that date and informed that the arguing counsel was busy before another Bench. The matter was, in view of the nature of request, adjourned to 12.3.2010. On 12.3.2010, inspite of pass over, none entered appearance on behalf of the petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel assisted the Court on behalf of the respondent and judgment was reserved. It is being pronounced today i.e. 22.3.2010. None made a mention till date that there is any inclination on behalf of the petitioner to further assist this Court. In the course of the part assistance, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argued that the ejectment petition itself deserves negation on point of maintainability as the Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -4- respondent could not be said to have become owner of the tenanted premises. In that context, the plea raised was that though there is a registered sale deed in favour of the respondent, it was invalid in character inasmuch as it had been got registered without obtaining the No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office. In an act of resistance, the plea raised on behalf of the respondent was that the non-obtaining of a No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office cannot be said to affect the validity of the sale deed, particularly in view of the record-based statement made by RW-5 Permod Kumar, Record Keeper, Misuse Branch, Estate Office, U.T.Chandigarh, to the effect that there are a number of instances wherein sale deed have been got registered without obtaining No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office. There is no force in the plea aforementioned raised on behalf of the petitioner. The transfer of title of immovable property is governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Whatever instructions may have come to be issued by the various administrative authorities in the context of documentation of the change of title, it does not affect the essential legal proposition that a title of immovable property would change the moment it is done by means of registered documentation which had concededly been done in this case. Whether a No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office had been obtained for transfer of aforementioned property or nor is a matter between the vendor and vendee on the one hand and the Estate Office on the other hand. The change of title as between the vendor and vendee was perfect and unalterable, Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -5- the non-obtaining of No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office notwithstanding. It would be pertinent to notice here that petitioner-tenant conceded to have filed a suit challenging the validity of the sale deed executed by the initial owner in favour of the respondent-landlord. She conceded, as correct, a suggestion that the suit aforementioned had been dismissed in default. She, thereafter, volunteered a statement that an application filed by her for restoration of suit is pending. There is no material obtaining on the record to indicate the fate of that restoration plea. It is interesting to find that even the petitioner-tenant does not dispute the proposition that execution of the sale deed aforementioned the title of the tenanted premise had come to vest in the respondent-landlord who had also become entitled to receive rent from her. (“It is correct that after the sale deed on 30.10.2001 the petitioner if there was an regd sale deed in his favour would have become entitle to receive rent from me”). It was, then, argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ejectment proceedings are, even otherwise, incompetent because the tenanted premises have been ordered to be resumed by the competent authority in terms of provisions of Section 4(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Those proceedings are being taken, as per the averment, in pursuance of notice dated 28.12.2004. There is evidence in the record-based statement of RW-1 Chander Bhushan to the effect that though resumption order had Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -6- come about, it has not attained finality inasmuch as a challenge thereto is pending consideration at the hands of the Chief Administration, U.T.Chandigarh. RW-6 Dev Ram Sharma, Reader to S.D.M.(East), Chandigarh, (who issued the impugned notice) conceded in the course of cross-examination that the resumption order cannot be executed during the pendency of appeal. In that view of things, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the resumption order had not attained finality and pendency of the proceedings aforementioned does not affect the validity of the title of the tenanted premises which has come to vest in the respondent- landlord by means of a registered documentation. Even otherwise, it would require pertinent notice that it is the landlord and the competent authority who are parties to the resumption proceedings and the petitioner-tenant being foreign to those proceedings cannot be heard to raise a plea on the above indicated lines to resist eviction. It would not be out of place to notice that the resumption of the premises has come about on account of misuse thereof by another tenant. In this context, it may be noticed that a suggestion to that effect was put to the petitioner-tenant when she stepped into witness box, as her own witness, and she conceded that suggestion as correct. It was, then, argued on behalf of the petitioner that there is enough accommodation at the disposal of the respondent-landlord which is adquate to meet his needs and that of members of his family. In that context, it was argued that the respondent-landlord is Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -7- in possession of second floor premises which consists of four self contained rooms. The plea was resisted by the learned counsel for the respondent who pointed out, in the course of the assistance, that the respondent-landlord is under going treatment. As correctly observed by the learned Rent Controller, there is not even a word in the examination-in-chief (Ex. RW3/A which was tendered in lieu thereof) to the effect that tenanted premises are not required by the respondent-landlord for personal bonafide necessity. The affidavit runs into three full size pages. It is interesting to find that there is not even an averment in the course thereof that the premises are not required by the respondent-landlord for use of herself and members of his family. The petitioner, in the course of cross-examination, averred that she does not know if there is any flat at Chandigarh in her name and she also does not know if her husband is owner of any house or flat in Chandigarh. She capped that response by averring that these facts are not to her notice. She otherwise conceded that she has cordial relations with her husband and they are living together.(“I have no house or flat in my name at Chd and I do no know if my husband is owner of any house or flat in Chandigarh. It is not in my knowledge. We both husband and wife are having cordial relation and are living together.”) It is not a case where the respondent-landlord has opted to refrain from filing an ejectment plea against the other tenant. It was none else or other than the petitioner-tenant herself who Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -8- conceded, in the course of cross-examination, that respondent- landlord had filed application for eviction against the other tenant as well. As already noticed, the tenanted premises under the occupation of petitioner-landlady is on the ground floor and a portion on the first floor is under occupation of other tenant. The present is, thus, a case where the respondent-landlord is endeavouring to obtain vacation of the entire building for use by himself and other members of his family. There is plethora of law on the point that a landlord is the best judge of his requirement and a tenant cannot be held entitled to dictate terms to him on proof of adequacy or otherwise of the averred requirement. In this case too, the respondent-landlord has to fend for self, her spouse and his son who is presently a student of MBA. The increasing notions of privacy would justify the averred pleading of personal bonafide necessity. The needs of a growing family can safely be taken into consideration by the Court. There being evidence about the health condition of the respondent – landlord, his desire to reside on the ground floor cannot be faulted on any valid score, particularly when his endeavours of obtaining ejectment of another tenant on the first floor have not yet borne fruit. It would be relevant to notice here that, in the course of grounds of revision, much stress appears to have been laid upon the fact that respondent could not be deemed to have become landlord of tenanted premises qua the petitioner-tenant in view of the fact that the sale deed had been got registered without obtaining a No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office. That point has already Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -9- been negatived in the course of discussion in an earlier part of this judgment. Insofar as the accusation regarding there being any clandestine arrangement between the previous owner and the respondent-landlord is concerned, reliance appears to have been placed upon the fact that the petitioner-tenant tendered rent qua tenanted premises to previous owner in another ejectment action and the latter accepted the tender. Reliance also appears to have been placed upon the fact that previous owner executed a registered GPA in favour of a non-party even after the execution of the registered sale deed dated 30.10.2001 in favour of the respondent- landlord. The respondent-landlord is not even averred to be a party to the proceedings where averred tender had been made. The respondent-landlord is further not even averred to be a party to the execution of the registered GPA. If the initial owner, inspite of his having parted with title of the premises in favour of respondent- landlord, opted to commit the indiscretion of accepting tender of rent from the petitioner in the other proceedings and further he opted to commit the indiscretion of executing a registered GPA in favour of a non-party, these acts of his cannot bind respondent-landlord. Things would have obviously been different if the respondent – landlord was a party to the pleadings aforementioned. The averred (illegal) indiscretion committed by the initial owner cannot bind the respondent – landlord who had acquired title of the tenanted premises by means of a registered sale deed which is the only Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -10- documentation envisaged under the Transfer of Property Act. The plea raised shall stand disposed of accordingly. It was, then, argued that want of bonafides on the part of the landlord, is evident from the fact that he had opted to purchase the tenanted premises just on the eve of his retirement. The timing of purchase was averred to be a farcical affair, just in order to make use of the provisions which are beneficial to a retired public servant, particularly when it was to the notice of the respondent that the house is under the occupation of a tenant. The plea raised is totally devoid of force. There is nothing, per se, unnatural on the part of a public servant in purchasing a house just before or after his retirement. It is a matter of common knowledge that a house under the occupation of a tenant would fetch little less than the value which it would fetch otherwise in the market. There is nothing, per se, therein which could attract a charge of want of bonafides in the context. The following facts are, thus, borne out from the record: - (a) The respondent – landlord had obtained title of the tenanted premises by means of a registered documentation. Even the petitioner – tenant conceded that a suit filed by her to challenge the validity of transfer of title has been dismissed in default. (b) The proceedings for resumption of the building, initiated by the competent authority on account of the misuse of a part of the premises by another tenant, Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 -11- have not attained finality inasmuch as an appeal against the resumption order is pending consideration at the hands of the Chief Commissioner. Even otherwise, those proceedings cannot impede the ejectment action initiated by the respondent – landlord against the petitioner – tenant as that is a matter between the respondent – landlord and the Administration. In the light of foregoing discussion, the petition is held to be denuded of force and is ordered to be dismissed. The petitioner- tenant shall have two months time from today to vacate the premises aforementioned. March 22, 2010 (S. D. ANAND) Pka JUDGE