THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.22788 of 2001 Date: 13-02-2008 Between: Smt.K. Rama Lakshmi. ..... PETITIONER AND The Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Chevella Division, Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.22788 of 2001 ORDER: Petitioner is statedly owner of land admeasuring Ac.0.32 gts in survey No.11 situated at Kondapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal. Said land was acquired under award No.1/4528/97 dated 20.11.1998 under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act, for brevity) for the purpose of widening road. Petitioner alleges that after passing of award, notice of award was neither sent to her nor given to her under Section 12(2) of LA Act. It is her case that on one day, she received a message on telephone asking her to collect a cheque from the Revenue Inspector sitting at a kirana shop at Gutla Begumpet Village. She accordingly, collected the cheque, but notice of award was not given to her. Therefore, not satisfied with award of compensation at the rate of Rs.150/- per sq. yard for land admeasuring 1,220 sq. yards only, she got issued legal notices dated 30.03.2000 and 31.03.2000 requesting respondent to communicate copy of award. Respondent then communicated award on 04.04.2000. Petitioner then made an application under Section 18 of LA Act on 08.04.2000 seeking a reference to civil Court. As there was no response thereto, instant writ petition is filed seeking Mandamus to respondent to refer acquisition proceedings to civil Court. Respondent filed a counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Inter alia, it is stated that award was passed on 20.11.1998 and thereafter notice of award was given on 11.03.1999. Compensation was paid to petitioner by way of cheque on 17.03.1999 and therefore, her application made on 08.04.2000 is beyond the period of two months prescribed under Section 18(2)(b) of LA Act. After hearing learned counsel for petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition appearing for respondent, this Court directed learned Assistant Government Pleader to produce relevant file, which has been produced before this Court. Admittedly the file does not contain any communication dated 11.03.1999, whereby and whereunder award dated 20.11.1998 was communicated to petitioner. Secondly the allegation of petitioner that award was communicated to her on 04.04.2000 is not seriously disputed. Therefore, merely because petitioner received compensation on 17.03.1999, knowledge of award does not amount to notice of award for the purpose of Section 12(2) read with Section 18(2)(b) of LA Act. A Full Bench of this Court in Spl. Dy. Collector. L.A. Unit v. D. Ramulu[1] considered the question whether notice from civil Court in proceedings under Section 30 of LA Act could be equated to notice of Collector under Section 12(2) of LA Act for the purpose of Section 18(2)(b) of LA Act. Full Bench rejected the plea of Government that notice issued by civil Court in proceedings under Section 30 of LA Act imparts knowledge to owner and therefore, it should be treated as constructive notice of award. Dealing with this aspect, Full Bench laid down as under. Mere knowledge of the award cannot commence the period of limitation or set the period of limitation to run against the claimant depriving of his right to seek the reference. It is well known that the legal provisions of limitation are artificial and would not always satisfy the test of either logic or equality. The provisions are being enacted with an object in a civilised society that the sword of Damocles should not be kept hanging for all times to come. It does not obliterate the right but only bars the remedy. As a necessary corollary the limitation cannot commence on the knowledge of an award when statute provides that it would commence from the date of service of the notice. The commencement of the limitation has been provided by the legislation by legal fiction, which should be taken to a logical end. Neither the limitation can be extended nor we can read into the statutory provisions especially when they are not capable of two interpretations at all. In our considered view since the period of limitation provided is six months from the date of award, interpreted to be the date of knowledge, the commencement of six months would not be attracted to the specific statutory provisions providing for the commencement of the limitation of two months from the date of service of the award. The limitation cannot run against the claimant. In spite of no form of notice or mode of service of the award having been provided yet service of notice has been specifically provided for. Service of notice can safely be considered to mean tender of the notice to the claimant and not his mere knowledge acquired through various means. In addition to the above, Full Bench also laid down the following principles. In view of the observations made above we are of the considered view that: (1) In Andhra Pradesh the limitation for seeking the reference under Section 18 is two months statutorily provided from the date of service of the notice by the Collector of the award; (2) The notice under Section 30 by the Court even if served by the Collector cannot be equated with the notice under Section 12(2) required to be served for the purpose of commencement of the limitation under Section 18(2)(b); (3) Since the mode of service of notice has not been provided for, the question of service of notice as a fact can be found in the facts and circumstances of each individual case. (4) The burden of alleging and proving of the service of notice either actually or constructively, is on the State when the State intends to take advantage contending that the application seeking reference under Section 18 is barred by limitation. It is for the State to show the date on which the claimant acquired actually or constructively the knowledge of the award from which the period of limitation would commence. Applying the above ratio, it must be held that in the absence of any proof being produced by Government that notice of award was given to petitioner on 11.03.1999 as alleged, payment of compensation on 17.03.1999 does not amount to notice of award under Section 12(2) of LA Act. As petitioner allegedly received notice of award on 04.04.2000, her application for reference on 08.04.2000 is within time. Therefore, writ petition must succeed. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed and respondent is directed to refer award No.1/4528/97 dated 20.11.1998 in respect of subject land to civil Court under Section 18 of LA Act. This exercise shall be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. _____________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) 13th February, 2008 GHN [1] 2000(2) ALT 83 (F.B.)