IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr. Misc. No.2872 of 2010 GODHA PRASAD SINGH, aged about 70 years @ Godhan Singh, son of Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh, R/o Bhagat Singh Chowk, Munger, P.S. – Kotwali, Distt. – Munger ………… …………………………………. (Opp. Party) …. Petitioner Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR, 2. Sri Ajit Kumar Sao, Son of Late Biranchi Lal Sao, R/o Near Kasturba Water Works, Ghosi Tola, Munger, P.S. – Kotwali, Distt. – Munger (Complainant) …………….. Respondents. ----------- For the Petitioner:- Mr. Pramod Kumar Sinha and Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma No.1, Advocates. For the Respondents:- Mr. Maya Nand Jha, Advocate. ------------ 2. 27.01.2010. In this application preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 17.08.2007 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Munger in Complaint Case No. 417C of 2007, corresponding to Tr. No. 394 of 2007, whereby the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance and issued processes under Sections 504 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (in short `I.P.C.’). It is urged in the petition that the complaint was 2 filed in a malafide manner and inasmuch as the complainant has been filing a number of cases out of sheer malice. Various instances have been given how he complaint petitions filed by him had been dismissed earlier. It is also urged that he had filed complaint cases against different persons which include Advocates and others. In support of the assertions made in the petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has commended me to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Limited and Another v. Rajiv Dubey, (2009) 1 SCC 706. In Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Limited and Another v. Rajiv Dubey (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the situation where the complainant had filed a complaint alleging that the accused persons were liable for offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 I.P.C. and the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance in respect of said offences and, on an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being preferred, the High 3 Court had declined to interfere. The Apex Court took note of the fact that the accused-appellant had initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short `the Act’) against the complaint as the cheques issued by the complainant were returned by the Bank to the accused-appellant with the endorsement that the account was not valid and insufficient funds. The complaint case was filed to pre- empt the impending proceeding under Section 138 of the Act claiming that the cheques issued by the complainant were towards an outstanding amount. In the said factual backdrop their Lordships have held as under: “18. It is interesting to note that the respondent does not dispute issuance of cheques. Even a casual reading of the complaint does not show that the ingredients of Section 406 IPC are in any event made out. It is also not understandable as to how Section 294 has any application to the facts of the case mush less Section 506 IPC. In addition to this, perusal of the complaint apparently shows the ulterior motive. It is clear that the proceeding initiated by the respondent clearly amounted to abuse of process of law.” In my considered opinion the factual matrix in the said case is totally different than the present case 4 and, therefore, the said decision is of no assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid I do not perceive any merit in the application and, accordingly, the same stands rejected. Dilip ( Dipak Misra, C.J. )