HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD W.P.No.7458 of 2007 ORDER: (Per. Hon’ble Sri Justice G. Bhavani Prasad) The dismissal of LGC (SR) No.4200 of 2006 at the stage of admission by the order dated 28-2-2007 of the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, led the applicants therein to file the present writ petition. LGC(SR)No.4200 of 2006 was filed by the two petitioners herein against the other respondents herein before the Special Court, the 25th respondent herein. The petitioners contended that the application schedule site of about 74,000 square yards in Sy.No.194/11, of Begumpet is part of the Estate of Lady Viquar and the estate was undivided among her heirs, who are hence, joint owners and possessors. The petitioners, as the widow and son of Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung, are entitled to a sherai share in the schedule site along with the other siblings of Nawab Nazeer Nawaz Jung and their descendents. The entire estate was entrusted to the custody of the Court of Wards by G.O.Ms.No.841 (Revenue), dated 17-2-1959 and by a letter No.Y1/750/59, dated 3-1-1961, the Government directed the Court of Wards to release the estate to the legal heirs and successors of Lady Viquar, but there was no evidence of the letter being given effect to. As per G.O.Ms.No.225 (Revenue) dated 12-2-1964, the entire estate continued to vest in the custody of the Court of Wards, which was confirmed by the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration by a letter dated 27-1-2003 stating that the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, is officiating as Court of Wards. There was never any release of the estate as per the Court of Wards Act. As the estate including the application schedule site was Inam land, the heirs and successors of Lady Viquar filed an application before the Inams Tribunal, Chevella for occupancy certificates and a comprehensive order No.L/3842/82, dated 25-10-1997 was passed by the Inams Tribunal that the entire estate including the Begumpet palace stood vested in the State. The said orders are non-est as the entire estate comprises non-agricultural land as contemplated by Section 9 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1955, in the light of the judgments in W.P.No.199 of 1998, dated 8-6-2001 and W.A.No.975 of 2002, dated 1-10-2002. The second respondent, who is the son-in-law of one of the legal heirs of Lady Viquar and his elder brother, the first respondent, a prominent Muslim politician, promised to ensure the release of the application schedule site from the clutches of the Government by using their political connections and believing the same, the helpless heirs of Lady Viquar including the petitioners appointed respondents 1 and 2 as their General Power of Attorney holders under separate documents. Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung also executed a registered General Power of Attorney dated 21-3-1990 similarly. The first and second respondents in collusion with the other respondents and in violation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the Income Tax Act 1963, the Court of Wards Act etc., and in suppression of facts, inducted the respondents 3 to 22 and their predecessors-in-title into the application schedule site by execution of various documents in their favour. As per Section 55(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the respondents 3 to 22 and their predecessors-in-title cannot claim ignorance of the statutory embargos or claim to be bona fide purchasers without notice of such provisions or proceedings. Respondents 3 to 22 and their predecessors-in-title are thus, conspirators and abettors of respondents 1 and 2 in grabbing the application schedule site dishonestly. Obtaining municipal numbers in respect of portions of the site and making constructions are of no avail and the act of land grabbing is within the jurisdiction of the Special Court under Section 8(2) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, including questions of title, ownership and possession. The petitioners cannot file any civil suit or any other proceedings in respect of the land grabbing and have no alternative relief except to approach the Special Court. Any sale deeds or other documents of conveyance are non-est and the criminal breach of trust by respondents 1 and 2 was by taking advantage of the position of the first respondent as a Minister in the State and silencing the officials, misusing the position. Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung issued a legal notice to respondents 1 and 2 on 8.5.2006 to account for all the transactions effected by them in respect of the application schedule site, for which they gave a reply dated 18-5-2006 stating the said site to be vacant land with which they did not deal in any manner. Another notice was given on 7-8-2006 to the respondents 1 and 2 to explain the existence of the buildings of the other respondents in the site for which there was no reply. Respondents 23 and 24 representing the State committed dereliction of statutory duties and the concerned officials of respondents-3, 11, 14 to 16 and 18 to 22 could not be identified. Either the Court of Wards or the heirs of Lady Viquar are entitled to lawful possession of the schedule site and as co-owners, the petitioners are entitled to file the land grabbing case which is within limitation, more so, by virtue of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963. Hence, the petitioners sought for declaring the respondents 1 to 22 as land grabbers, directing them to deliver vacant possession of the schedule site to the petitioners or the Court of Wards, directing the respondents 1 to 22 to pay adequate compensation similarly and to prosecute them for the offence of land grabbing. The Special Court in the impugned order observed that the petitioners executed the General Power of Attorney in favour of respondents 1 and 2 including the right to alienate to get over their lack of title and other legal hurdles. As the heirs could not come to an amicable settlement when the estate was released, it was put back under the custody of the Court of Wards. The Special Court observed that the petitioners have to proceed against the respondents 1 and 2 for any alleged misdeeds in an appropriate forum, if so advised, and it is for the petitioners to find out how respondents 3 to 22 acquired title to and possession of the schedule land, if the G.P.A. holders did not alienate the same as stated in their reply notice. When the petitioners did not object for the construction of huge buildings by respondents 3 to 22 in the site, they also might have been parties to the conspiracy and collusion they are alleging. If the petitioners and the respondents 1 and 2 acted in unison in alienating the schedule land to respondents 3 to 22, they did not come to the court with clean hands in trying to unsettle the alienations. The Special Court specifically observed that as admittedly the respondents 3 to 22 were put in possession under documents executed on behalf of the applicants by their G.P.A. holders, respondents 1 and 2, the possession of the respondents cannot be termed as possession without lawful entitlement, and hence, the essential ingredients of Section 2 (d) and (e) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, are unavailable. While noting the unusuality of giving lengthy written submissions on merits at the stage of admission, the Special Court has, therefore, dismissed the petition at the stage of admission. The petitioners filed the writ petition reiterating all their factual contentions and contending that the impugned order at the stage of admission was unilateral without any material on record and without any notice to or pleadings of the respondents. The written arguments and the additional written arguments were not considered and the precedents cited were ignored constituting a grave procedural error. Only lawful acts of the attorney holders will be binding on the heirs of Lady Viquar, but not illegal and void deeds and transfers in violation of the statutes. The same Special Court in LGC.No.103 of 1998 and LGC.No.160 of 1999 held by judgments dated 29-1-2007 and 20-9-2005 that the estate of Lady Viquar including the schedule site is in the custody of the District Collector, Ranga Reddy. The Special Court considered the respondents to be innocent purchasers, ignored the plea about limitation and passed the order which has to be declared as illegal and quashed, directing the Special Court to take cognizance of LGC(SR)No.4200 of 2006 for disposal as per law. Respondents 1 and 2, along with WVMP.No.1901 of 2007 filed by them for vacating the ex parte interim directions granted in WPMP.No.9548 of 2007 on 12-4-2007, filed copies of a notarized affidavit of Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung dated 18-3-1996 about confirmation of the acts, deeds and things done by the heirs and the General Power of Attorney holder in respect of this 74,000 square yards and a declaration by Muzeeb Yar Jung and Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung dated 1-2-1994 along with a plan about property said to be owned and possessed by the 20th respondent now. They claimed in their affidavit that the copy of the registered General Power of Attorney No.861/1990, dated 21-3-1990 produced by the petitioners destroys their contentions and the release of the property of Lady Viquar from the Court of Wards under notification No.341, dated 17-2-1959 stood confirmed. The power given to the respondents 1 and 2 was neither challenged nor withdrawn till now, even after the exchange of the notices and the acts of the G.P.A. holders cannot be land grabbing. The petitioners can approach a competent civil Court in respect of any grievance regarding accounting and Section 14 of the Limitation Act has no application when no proceedings were prosecuted by the petitioners. The Special Court’s order was just and reasonable. The petitioners filed W.P.M.P.No.24425 of 2007 requesting to impound the above referred to affidavit and declaration terming them as insufficiently stamped, apart from claiming them to be forged. The petitioners claimed the documents to be confirmation deeds/ release/relinquishment deeds/conveyance deeds liable to be stamped as such. The petitioners also contended that the disputed documents even after payment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty cannot lead to any trial and decision in this writ petition, as disputed questions of title cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings. The other material papers placed on record by the petitioners include the copy of the registered General Power of Attorney by Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung in favour of respondents 1 and 2 dated 21-3-1990, which shows that the Power of Attorney Holders were intended to represent all the heirs of the estate of Lady Viquar to manage, develop or dispose of the property. The empowerment of the attorney holders was total, unqualified and absolute under various clauses. The schedule land of 74,000 square yards in Sy.No.194/11 was the subject of specification in various clauses conferring absolute discretion on the attorney holders to deal with the property in any manner. The copies of the orders in W.P.No.199 of 1998 and W.A.No.975 of 2002 show that the controversy with regard to vesting of the land in the State Government under the Inams Abolition Act was kept open to be agitated in appropriate legal proceedings at an appropriate stage. The copy of the order in LGC.No.160 of 1999, dated 20-9-2005 shows that the private respondents to 1 to 3 remained ex parte and the State represented by the Mandal Revenue Officer alone contested the claim of Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung and three others over the land in R.S.No.194/8/1. It was brought out from the evidence in that case that the Inams Tribunal dismissed the claim of respondents 1 to 3 to Lady Viquar’s estate in order No.L/3041/90 against which they did not prefer any appeal. Consequently, respondents 1 to 3 were considered to be land grabbers within the meaning of Section 2(d) and (e) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, more so, in the light of oral evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer. Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung and the other petitioners filed review application No.1096 of 2005 against the said order to the extent of the finding that the Inams Tribunal or the Special Tribunal under the Inams Abolition Act have jurisdiction to decide the title and not the Special Court. The copy of the notice issued by Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung to respondents 1 and 2 on 8-5-2006 about the present schedule site sought for a true and lawful account of all the acts, deeds and things done by respondents 1 and 2 under the colour of the registered General Power of Attorney. In their reply dated 18-5-2006, respondents 1 and 2 stated that after their appointment as General Power of Attorney holders, there was settlement of about 74,000 square yards of land for which the parties executed various documents including Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung. Respondents 1 and 2 also stated that they have not transferred or alienated the share of Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung or any part of the land, and hence, rendering any account or violation of any laws does not arise. They asserted that the heirs themselves settled the above land and executed documents, including Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung, who is also a signatory and they did not sell any part of the land. Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung gave a further notice on 7-8-2006 stating about the residential houses, buildings and structures standing in the schedule land belonging to respondents 3 to 22 which do not fit in with the claim that the entire land was still vacant and unencumbered according to the reply notice of respondents 1 and 2 dated 18-5-2006. Respondents 1 and 2 were asked to clarify whether respondents 3 to 22 hold any documents or were mere trespassers. The copy of the judgment of the Special Court in LGC No.103 of 1998 dated 29-1-2007 between Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung and another and others shows the dispute to be in respect of 1200 square yards in Sy.No.194/1. The Special Court found the applicants therein to be heirs of Lady Viquar and to be owners of the schedule land, possessed through Court of Wards. The pleas of the contesting respondents about their rival title or perfection of title by adverse possession were negatived on merits on the evidence placed before the Special Court and consequently, respondents 2, 4 to 8 therein were held to be land grabbers. Elaborate written arguments and additional written arguments were submitted to the Special Court before the impugned order and equally elaborate written arguments are placed before this court during hearing on behalf of the petitioners. Learned counsel for the parties advanced their detailed submissions in reiteration of their respective claims. The legality, justifiability and sustainability of the impugned order of dismissal of LGC(SR)No.4200 of 2006, dated 28-2-2007 is the sole point for consideration. The provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and the jurisdiction of the Special Court thereunder were the subject of in depth consideration by a Full Bench of this Court in Mohd. Siddiq Ali Khan and others v. Shahsun Finance Limited, Chennai and another[1]. Hon’ble Sri Justice B. Sudershan Reddy, (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Full Bench had a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act and the statement of objects and reasons and held that the Special Court is not entitled to try every case involving disputes as to the ownership and title to any land but is entitled to go into the question of the ownership and title to, of lawful possession of, the land grabbed. It was held that the Special Court is conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction to try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing and the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts to that extent is taken away by the Special Court. It was observed that the Special Court is duty bound to reject any application filed before it, if in its opinion, such application, prima facie, is frivolous or vexatious one. His Lordship made it clear that taking cognizance of a case under the provisions of the Act is not a formality and the Special Court is bound to reject any application, which in its opinion, is, prima facie, frivolous or vexatious, without making any further enquiry. It was held that before a Court of competent jurisdiction takes cognizance of a case, it has to apply its mind to the facts of the case alleged in the petition and the documents annexed thereto and if all the allegations made in the application, even if, to be taken true, do not disclose and satisfy the basic ingredients of any offence, so far as criminal cases are concerned and the cause of action in civil cases, the Court is bound to reject the case. The question of jurisdiction is determined at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry and the special Court is required to carefully scrutinize the allegations made in the application in order to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the application reveal and attract the ingredients of land grabbing and mere statement or assertion that the respondents have grabbed the land is not enough. Hence, it was pointed out that an application under Section-8, which does not disclose cause of action would be a frivolous petition liable to be rejected without any further enquiry. The Full Bench was categorical and clear that mere repetition of expression of land grabbing and land grabbers by themselves would not be enough for taking cognizance of a case, unless the averments and the allegations made in the concise statement and the application satisfy and attract the ingredients of land grabber and land grabbing as provided for in Section 2(d) and (e) of the Act and that the factum as well as the intention should be satisfied by the statement or the allegations. Taking possession of the land without any lawful entitlement thereto was held to be sine qua non to hold a person to be a land grabber. It is also pointed out that the land grabber must be aware of the fact that he is entering into the possession illegally and without any lawful entitlement; If such elements are missing, it would not be a case of land grabbing. It is also made clear by the Full Bench that the special Court is not a substitute for civil Courts in the matter of adjudication of inter se rights and disputes involving intricate questions of right, title and interest in the land and bona fide disputes can never be concluded to be acts of land grabbing. In State of A.P. Vs. Prameela Modi and others, appeal (Civil) 4604 of 2006, the Apex Court in its judgment dated 30-10-2006, analyzing Section-8 of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, found that the special Court can play the role of a civil Court and decide the disputed question of tile and possession and the extent of jurisdiction as is permitted by the statute is rather wide in its application. The apex Court held that an alleged act of land grabbing, determination of question of title and ownership involved and lawful possession of any land grabbed involved are three specific situations envisaged by and under the statute triable in the special Court. It was held that the civil Court is barred from trying the matters, which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special Court. This decision of the Apex Court that the special Court alone has the jurisdiction to try the matter with respect to the ownership, title and lawful possession and the decision of the Full Bench i n Mohd. Siddiq Ali Khan and others v. Shahsun Finance Limited, Chennai and another (stated supra) have no apparent or inherent conflict as is sought to be made out. The apex Court was referring to the three specific situations stated in Section 8 (6) about the binding nature of the judgment of the special Court regarding the determination of title and ownership, or lawful possession of any land grabbed and the finding of the special Court with regard to any act of land grabbing being conclusive proof and stated that all these three specific situations as envisaged by and under the statute would be triable by the special Court and the special Court alone has the jurisdiction to try such matters with respect to ownership, title and lawful possession. However, the apex Court immediately qualified the exclusivity of such jurisdiction when it made it clear that “the condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the special Court is that the case must have arisen out of any alleged act of land grabbing”. It is, thus, clear that an alleged act of land grabbing is a condition precedent for assumption of any jurisdiction by the special Court and it is only on assumption of such jurisdiction over an alleged act of land grabbing, the ouster of jurisdiction of the civil Court and exclusive jurisdiction of the special Court followed. What the Full Bench decided in Mohd. Siddiq Ali Khan (stated supra) is also the same when it held that the special Court is conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction to try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing and the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts to that extent is taken away. The apex Court and the Full Bench, thus, elaborated the same salutary principles governing the assumption of exclusive jurisdiction by the special Court and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the civil Court. The facts in the present case, examined in the light of the above legal position, do not convey the refusal of the special Court to assume jurisdiction to be in any manner improper or irregular or illegal on the facts and circumstances of the case. The schedule land is admittedly part of the estate of Lady Viquar and irrespective of whether the estate is continuing under the custody of the Court of Wards or not, the heirs of Lady Viquar admittedly executed the registered General Power of Attorney in favour of respondents 1 and 2 on 21-3-1990 empowering respondents 1 and 2, among other things, to deal with the subject property of 74,000 square yards in Sy.No.194/1 in any manner they pleased including alienating the same to third parties. That the General Power of Attorney continued to exist as it is, is evident even from the notice dated 8-5-2006 and the further notice dated 7-8- 2006 issued on the instructions of Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung to respondents 1 and 2, what all that has been demanded under the said notices being rendering a true and lawful accounts of the acts, deeds and things done by respondents 1 and 2 and clarifying the manner of occupation of the subject land by respondents 3 to 22. It is true that respondents 1 and 2 in their reply notice dated 18.5.2006 claimed that they did not transfer or alienate or sell any part of the land in question after their appointment as G.P.A. holders but they stated that the heirs themselves settled in respect of 74,000sq.yds. of land and executed various documents to which Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung was also a signatory. While the documents, if any, executed either by respondents 1 and 2 or the heirs of Lady Viquar including Nawab Rasheed Nawaz Jung are not before the special Court or this Court, the allegations in the land grabbing case are about respondents 1 and 2 introducing respondents 3 to 22 into the subject land in violation of different statutes under the guise of void and illegal documents. The specific pleadings of the petitioners and the various material papers relied on by them before the special Court and this Court themselves show that the continuance or otherwise of the estate of Lady Viquar in the custody of Court of Wards is in controversy or at least in doubt. The attempts by the heirs to have occupancy certificates