WP(C) 5315/2009 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI Pursuant to an advertisement, dated 21.08.2004, for filling up the post of constable, the petitioner participated in the selection process and, pursuant to the said selection process, the petitioner came to be appointed by an appoin tment letter issued, in this regard, on 04.02.2005. As the selection process, in question, became a subject-matter of challenge in several writ proceedings, the petitioner could not avail his appointment. Eventually, on disposal of the writ proceedings, he was directed by respondent No.5 by a letter, issued, in this r egard, on 17.07.2007, to appear before a Board, on 23.07.2007, for scrutiny of h is papers/testimonials. The petitioner was, however, not allowed to join by the Board on the ground that the petitioner was under-aged, i.e., below the age spec ified in the advertisement, dated 21.08.2004, aforementioned. Aggrieved by the f act that he had not been allowed to join the post of constable, the petitioner h as made a representation. Since no order, according to the petitioner, has been passed on the petitioner’s said representation, the petitioner has come to this Court, with this application made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , seeking appropriate writ(s) to be issued to the respondents to allow the petit ioner to join as a constable and to send him for training along with other appoi nted candidates. In this regard, the petitioner also refers to some of the appoi ntments, which have been made by the respondents, of the persons, similarly situ ated as the petitioner is, following their representations made to the responden ts /authorities concerned. 2. Heard Mr. J.I. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. RK Bora, learned Govt. Advocate, appearing for the respondents. 3. While considering this writ petition, it needs to be noted that the peti tioner was, admittedly, ineligible to participate in the selection process, whic h had been initiated by the advertisement, dated 21.08.2004, aforementioned. Hen ce, the fact that the petitioner was allowed to participate in the said selectio n process and the appointment letter, as indicated hereinbefore, was issued to h im, cannot be said to have clothed the petitioner with any right to demand that the letter of his appointment be allowed to take effect. Allowing the petitioner to join, in terms of the letter of appointment, dated 04.02.2005, aforementione d read with the letter, dated 17.07.2007, aforementioned, would, in effect, deny to some other eligible candidate his right to be considered for appointment to the post, which the petitioner, if the appointment letter, dated 04.02.2005, tak es effect, would be joining. A person, who was, otherwise, ineligible, in terms of an advertisement, inviting applications, cannot be directed to be appointed m erely because of the fact that due to an error, manipulation or otherwise, he ha s come to be selected. Every public appointment needs to have a transparent basi s of selection and when it is transparent that the petitioner was ineligible on the date, when he had applied for appointment, no right can be said to have vest ed in the petitioner to demand that he be allowed to join the said post. When th ere is no right whatsoever, far less indefeasible, vested in the petitioner, the question of issuance of any writ, in the nature of mandamus, commanding the res pondents to appoint the petitioner, or allow him to join, as a constable pursuan t to the said selection process, does not arise at all. 4. It has been submitted, on behalf of the petitioner, that some persons, s imilarly situated as the petitioner, had made representations and they have been allowed to join the posts of constable. In the name of removal of discriminatio n, the Court cannot direct an illegality to be perpetuated. 5. The mere fact that an authority has passed a particular order in the cas e of another person, similarly situated, cannot be a ground for issuing a writ i n favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination if the order, passed in favour of the other person, is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Noticing that the High Courts, in exerc ise of their writ jurisdiction, have been passing orders to remove discriminatio n and thereby asking the authorities concerned to repeat the illegality, the Sup reme Court has expressed its anxiety on such approach and has laid down the posi tion of law, in Chandigarh Administration & Anr. vs. Jagjit Singh and Anr., repo rted in (1995) 1 SCC 745, in the following words: 8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is uns ustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length . Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent authority has passed a particular order in case of another person similarly situated can never be the g round for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discriminati on. The order in favour of the other person might be allowed and valid or it mig ht not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be fol lowed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances o f his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeat the il legality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretiona ry power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely becaus e the respondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat the illegality over ag ain and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be do ne according to law- indeed, wherever, it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent authority to rep eat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discr imination. Giving effect to such please would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the o ther person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and sim ilar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case. But then why examine another person’ s case in his absence rather tan examining the case of the petitioner who is pre sent before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and con venience to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the re lief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case, than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case, whic h other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion , such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable no r desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-a ccepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the sam e must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is c ontrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factua l and illegal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and acti ons of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court a nd High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as under stood in the judicial word. (What is the position in the case of orders passed b y authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises . ( Emphasis is added) 6. It has also been pointed out, on behalf of the petitioner, that the repr esentations aforementioned were considered by the respondents /authorities conce rned pursuant to the directions issued by this Court. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the Court never directed the respondents to appoint any of those pe rsons, who had made representation. What the Court had really directed was merel y consideration of the representations of the said person. However, while consid ering the representation, aforementioned, the respondents/authorities concerned, as it transpires, committed serious illegality and made appointments, which are wholly illegal, inasmuch as the persons, so appointed, were ineligible to parti cipate in the selection process held pursuant to the order, dated 21.08.2004, af orementioned. Hence, the question of directing the respondents concerned to even consider the petitioner’s representation for appointment to the said post does not arise at all. 7. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this writ pet ition fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 8. No order as to costs.