HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR M.A.fC) No. 369 of 2009. APPELLANT APPLICANT RESPONDENT NON-APPLICANTS Laxmidayal Patil aged about 45 years, S/o late Mohan Patil, R/o Devnagar, P.S. Koni, Tah. and Distt. Bilaspiir (CG) Versus Sheikh Rahaman Ali, S/o Shaikh Ishlammuddin, R/o Tiwarawa, P.S. Pali, Tah. and Distt. Korba (CG) (Owner and Driver of Truck No. CG-12C/1807 I.C.I.C.I Lambord, General Insurance Company Limited, through the Branch Manager Lalbagh Complex BSNL Office, P.0. and Distt. Raipur (CG) Insurer of Truck No. CG-12-C/1807 I.C.I.C.I Lambord General Insurance Company Ltd. I.C.I.C.I. Bank Towers, Bandra Kuria Complex, Bandra (East) Mumbai (M.S.) 4000051 Smt. Sonkali Patil, W/o. Laxmidayal Patil, aged about 43 years, Caste Satnami (Daughter-in- law of deceased) R/o Denagar, P.S. Koni (Bilaspur), Tah. and Distt. Bilaspur (CG) SB:- Hon. Shri N.K. Agarwal, J. PRESENT: Shri Devendra Patel, Adv. for the appellant. Shri Siddhsuth Bajpai, Adv. for respondent no. 1. Shri Sourabh Sharma, Adv. with Shri A.L. Singrol, Adv. for the respondent no. 2 and 3. Q RAL ORDER (6-4-2010) Per N.K. Aearwal. J This is claimant's appeal for enhancement of compensation in the award dated 23-7-2007 passed by Kth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (FTC), Bilaspur in Claim Case No. 4/2007. Brief facts of the case are as under:- 3. On 27-11-2006 Mohan Patil aged about 65 years i.e. father of appellant No. 1 and father-in-law of respondent no. 4 ass!S(. 6. 7. 8. met with an accident with a truck No. CG 12 C/1807 being'' driven and owned by the respondent no. 1 and insured by respondents No. 2 and 3 and succumbed to the injuries sustained in the said accident. The claimants have filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (briefly 'the Act) claiming Rs. 7,05,000/- as compensation for the death of deceased in the said accident. Learned Tribunal on a close scrutiny of the evidence led, material placed and submissions made, held respondent No. 1 responsible for said accident, awarded Rs. 65.000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date pf application till its payment to the appellant. Shri Devendra Patel, learned Counsel for the appellant would submit that the accident took place in the year 2006 and notional income is taken by the learned Tribunal as Rs. 15,000/- per annum which is not correct. Leamed Tribunal ought to have taken notional income as Rs. 36,000/- per annum while computing the amount of compensation and thus has erred in assessing the amount of compensation. On the other hand, Shri Sourabh Sharma, leamed counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 and 3/Insurance Company would contend that the appellant is admittedly not dependent upon the deceased and the amoiint awarded itself is on higher side and does not require any enhancement and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. I have heard leamed counsel for the parties and perused the award impugned. As per the finding recorded by the Tribunal in part 10 of its award, it is crystal clear that the appellant and respondent No. 4 are the persons who runs Kirana shop and not the deceased. Looking to the age of the deceased and appellant, even otherwise it can be presumed that the deceased himself may be dependent upon the claimants. \he Supreme Court in case of Smt. Manjuri Bera (Smt.) -v- Oriental Insurance Cotnpany Ltd. and another1 has observed in para 13 to 15 and 20 as under:- "There are several factors which have to be noted. The liability under Section 140 ofthe Act does not cease because there is absence ofdependency. The right to file a claim application has to be considered in the background of right to entitlement. While assessing the quantum, the multiplier system is applied because of deprivation of dependency. In other words, multiplier is a measure. There are three stages while assessing the question of entitlement. Firstly, the Uability ofthe person who is liable and the person who is to indemnity the Uability, if any. Next is the quantification and Section 166 is primarily in the nature of recovery proceedings. As noted above, liability in terms of Section 140 of the Act does not cease because of absence ofdependency. 14. Section 165 ofthe Act also throws some light on the controversy. The Explanation includes the liability under Sections 140 and 163-A. 15. Judged in that background where a legal representative uiho is not dependent files an application for compensation, the quantum cannot be less than the liability referable to Section 140 of the Act. Therefore, even if there is no toss of dependency, the clavnant if he or she is a legal representative will be entitled to compensation, the quantum ofwhich shall be not less than the liability flowing from Section 140 ofthe Act. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There wUl be no order as to costs. ^ * (2007) 10SCC 643 ^"^-.<^ fy ^ 9. 10. 20. In my opinion, "no-fault liability", envisaged\ in Section 140 of the said Act, is distinguishable from the rule of "strict liability". In the former, the compensation amount is fbced. It is Rs. 50,000 in cases of death [Section 140(2)]. It is a statutory liability. It is an amount which can be deducted from. the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Since the amount is a fixed •amount/crystallised amount, the same has to be considered as part of the estate of the deceased. In the present case, the deceased was an eaming member. The statutory compensation could constitute part of his estate. His legal representative, namely, his daughter has inkerited his estate. She was entitled to inherit his estate. In the circumstances, she was entitled to receive compensation under "no-fault liability" in terms of Section 140 ofthe said Act. My opinion is confined only to the "no-fault liability under Section 140 oftke said Act. That section is a Code by itselfwithin the Motor VehiclesAct, 1988." By applying the aforesaid proposition of law in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is crystal clear that the appellant not being dependent upon the deceased, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribiuial is just and reasonable and the award passed by the Tribunal does not call for any interference of this Court. The appeal being without substance, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- N.K. Agrawal Judge