IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOMAS P.JOSEPH WEDNESDAY, THE 7TH JULY 2010 / 16TH ASHADHA 1932 CRP.NO. 250 OF 2004() --------------------------------- AS.40/1998 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT (ADHOC -II) KOTTAYAM OS.44/1997 OF MUNSIFF COURT, CHANGANACHERRY .................... REVN. PETITIONER(S): RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF --------------------------------------------------------------------- V.K.SULAIMAN RAWTHER, S/O.KANI RAWTHER, VILANGUPARA VEETTIL, NEDUMKUNNAM VILLAGE, CHANGANACHERRY. BY ADV. SRI.ESM.KABEER RESPONDENT(S): APPELLANT/DEFENDANT --------------------------------------------------------------- V.N.SUKUMARAN, VENGACHERRY VEETTIL, MANTHURUTHY BHAGATHU, NEDUMKUNNAM MURI, NEDUMKUNNAM VILLAGE, CHANGANACHERRY. ADV. SRI.V.B.PREMACHANDRAN SRI.S.MADHAVAN NAIR THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07/07/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING: THOMAS P.JOSEPH, J. ==================================== C.R.P. No.250 of 2004 ==================================== Dated this the 07th day of July, 2010 O R D E R As the courts below have concurrently found, petitioner advanced Rs.10,000/- by way of loan to the respondent as per Ext.A2, cheque dated 03.07.1993 while petitioner was at Riyad. Petitioner has a case that there was an oral agreement between him and the respondent as per which the latter agreed to repay the said amount within one year from date of its encashment. Respondent encashed the cheque on 15.07.1993 but he did not care to repay the amount. Hence petitioner filed the suit on 22.01.1997. Respondent contended that there was no such agreement and that what was paid to him as per Ext.A2, cheque is commission payable to him. He also raised a contention that the suit is barred by limitation. 2. Trial court relying on Exts.A1 to A3 held that contention of respondent that amount paid by way of Ext.A2, cheque is towards commission is not correct and that it was actually a case where petitioner had extended assistance to the respondent to meet expenses in connection with marriage of C.R.P. No.250 of 2004. -: 2 :- daughter of the latter. Trial court found that period of limitation will run from 14.07.1994, date on which respondent was to discharge liability and since suit is filed on 22.1.1997 it is within time. Accordingly a decree was granted. Respondent was successful in the appellate court in getting a reversal of the finding regarding limitation. Appellate court held that period of three years must be reckoned from the date of loan and in this case payment was made as per Ext.A2, cheque. Period of three years is to be reckoned from date of encashment of Ext.A2. If so, suit filed in 1997 is beyond the prescribed time. Holding so appellate court reversed judgment and decree of trial court and dismissed the suit. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that appellate court failed to note that there was an agreement between parties whereby respondent had agreed to pay the amount within one year from date of encashment. Learned counsel for respondent per contra contends that there is no evidence of any such agreement and the period of limitation commenced from 15.07.1994. 3. Article 19 of the Limitation Act (for short, “the Act”) deals with period of limitation for suit for money payable for money lent while Article 20 of the Act deals with such cases where C.R.P. No.250 of 2004. -: 3 :- the payment has been made by cheque. Period of limitation is three years and it commences to run from the date when the cheque is paid. Here payment as per cheque is made on 15.07.1993 in which case suit filed on 21.07.1997 is beyond the period of limitation. Even if it is assumed that there was an oral agreement between parties whereby respondent agreed to repay the amount within one year from date of encashment that does not amount to any acknowledgment as provided under Sec.18 of the Act so that cause of action arose from the date of expiry of the period of one year. Viewed in that line Appellate Court is justified in holding that suit is barred by limitation. I do not find reason to interfere with that finding or reversal of the judgment and decree of the trial court. Civil Revision Petition fails and it is dismissed. THOMAS P. JOSEPH, JUDGE. vsv