IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No 420 of 1981 Date of decision: 16-8-1996 For Approval and Signature The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. K. KESHOTE 1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment? 4. Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India,1950 or any order made thereunder? 5. Whether it is to be circulated to the Civil Judge? -------------------------------------------------------------- CHUNILAL PRABHUDAS PATEL Versus HARIKRISHNA VITHALBHAI PATEL -------------------------------------------------------------- Appearance: MR AJ PATEL for Petitioner MR DD VYAS for Respondent No. 1 -------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM : MR.JUSTICE S.K.KESHOTE Date of decision: 16/08/96 ORAL JUDGEMENT Heard the learned counsel for the parties. This petition arises out of the order dated 1-12-1973 passed by the Mamlatdar & Agricultural Land Tribunal, Nadiad, in an application under section 32PP of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ("the Act" for short) in respect of lands bearing survey Nos.463/1,2,3,4, 464'2, 477, 479, 480 and 462/A/2 situate in the sim of village Mahudha in Nadiad Taluka of Kheda District. The petitioner then preferred appeal before the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeals),Kheda and that too also came to be dismissed on 28th July, 1979. The matter was carried in revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The revision application also was dismissed on 18-4-1980. Hence the present special civil application. 2. It is not in dispute that the order has been passed under section 32G of the Act on 30th November, 1965 whereunder the petitioner has declined to purchase the land in dispute. It is also not in dispute that order was made on 2-2-1967 under section 32P of the Act requiring him to hand over possession of the land in dispute. The order made under the aforesaid provision has been challenged by the petitioner before the Government but those orders were maintained. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that though the petitioner declined to purchase the land and order was passed for handing over possession to the respondent landlord, actual possession was never delivered and the actual physical possession of the land remained with the petitioner and as such provisions of subsection (2) of section 32PP of the Act as amended by the Gujarat Act, 1965 are attracted in the present case. Reliance is placed on the explanation of section 32PP. Insistence is also placed that actual possession of the land has to be taken in pursuance of any direction issued under section 32P(2) in accordance with law, but not otherwise. In the present case the counsel for the petitioner contented that the actual possession of the land was not taken. He further contended that under section 32G of the Act the petitioner declined to purchase the land in dispute because of the persuasion of the respondent landlord that notwithstanding the refusal to purchase the land he continued to cultivate the land irrespective of the order which has been passed by the competent authority under the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the actual possession of the land has been taken long back which fact comes from the revenue record also. 4. The question which arises for consideration of this court is whether the findings recorded by the authorities below that the possession of the land has been taken by the respondent landlord calls for interference by this court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There is concurrent finding of fact by the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeals) and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal that possession of the land was taken over by the respondent landlord. Sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India this court will not reappreciate the evidence and the findings of the authorities below have to be taken as correct unless the petitioner is able to make out a case of perversity in the findings or that the finding is based on no evidence, or that the authorities have altogether misread the evidence. 5. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 is a special legislation. Second appeal or revision has not been provided under the Act against the orders made finally by the authorities under the provisions of the Act to this court. That indicates that the object of the legislation is to give finality to the decision of the authorities under the Act. This Court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative jurisdiction to correct all species of hardship and wrong decisions. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmikant Revachand Bhojwani vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576, the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 6. The order which has been made under section 32P to deliver possession of the land to the landlord has attained finality as it has been confirmed by the State Government in appeal. The petitioner has not challenged the final order in any proceeding. Both the authorities below arrived at concurrent finding that possession was handed over to the landlord. It is a case where the petitioner himself has admitted that he has no documentary evidence whatsoever to show that he has cultivated the land during the the period 1967-68 and 1969-70. Evidence which has been produced by the petitioner relates to the period 1971-72 onwards. The Tribunal has also confirmed this fact which finding is not challenged by the petitioner before this Court. When the petitioner holds other lands also and he has grown tobacco thereon after taking licence, no such licence appears to have been taken by the petitioner for the land in dispute. That fact goes against the petitioner. The Tribunal has taken into consideration the fact that the rent receipts were produced by the respondent. Tobacco licence and extract from the survey books of Excise Department produced by the tenant are all in the name of the deceased respondent for the period 1968 to 1974. If that is the position of evidence, then the Tribunal was right in its conclusion not to interfere with the finding of the court below. This court, as observed earlier, has very limited power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the orders of the authorities below. Counsel for the petitioner is unable to make out any case for interference. It is difficult to believe that possession was with the petitioner for all these years under some arrangement. Such a plea can be taken and raised by the tenant at any time but cannot be accepted unless it is substantiated which the petitioner has failed to do in the present case. 7. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that possession could not have been taken when the landlord was not entitled to take possession until the amount refundable to the tenant is refunded to him. This contention was not allowed by the Tribunal and rightly so because the petitioner has failed to establish what amount was refundable by the landlord to the petitioner. Before the Mamlatdar and ALT the petitioner has not disclosed what amount was there to be refunded to him under sub-section (3) of section 32P of the Act. The order which has been passed by the authority under section 32P(2) of the Act was confirmed in revision application and the petitioner has not challenged that order. When the order made under section 32P has become final how this plea can be taken by the petitioner in this proceeding. The petitioner, while raising this plea, made attempt to challenge the order passed under section 32P(2) of the Act which is admittedly not available to the petitioner. I do not find any substance in this contention also. The judgment of the Tribunal does not call for interference. 8. In the result the special civil application fails and the same is dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. Ad interim relief granted earlier by this court stands vacated. ........