1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR WRIT PETITION NO. 5384 OF 2009 (Pauni Shikshan Sanstha, Pauni & Anr. vs. Shri Manohar N. Akare & Ors.) and WRIT PETITION NO. 5099 OF 2009 (Pauni Shikshan Sanstha, Pauni & Anr. vs. Sunil Rajaram Uparikar & Ors.) with WRIT PETITION NO. 5386 OF 2009 (Pauni Shikshan Sanstha, Pauni & Anr. vs. Madhukar Namdeorao Bhure & Ors.) Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders Court's or Judge's orders or directions and Registrar's orders. CORAM : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. FEBRUARY 23, 2010. Heard Shri Jibhkate, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Shende, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Shri Kothari, learned AGP for respondents No. 2 and 3 (in Writ Petition Nos. 5384/2009 & 5386/2009) and Ms. T. Khan, learned “A” Panel counsel for respondents No. 2 & 3 (in Writ Petition No. 5099 of 2009). In all these writ petitions, the challenge is to the order of School Tribunal whereby delay in filing appeal under Section 9 of Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, has been condoned by it. The said delay is of nine years. Shri Jibhkate, learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed that the alleged oral termination is of the year 1993 and School Tribunal has been approached for the first time in 2003. He further states 2 that the employees chose to approach Industrial Court and though objection to jurisdiction of Industrial Court was specifically raised, did not take any note thereof from 1993 till filing of appeal before the School Tribunal. Thus, having continued before wrong forum with knowledge for about nine years, according to him, said delay could not have been condoned. He has also pointed out some dates and events for this purpose. Shri Shende, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in all the matters has opposed the prayer. He has pointed out that the respondents were not aware of technical aspects of jurisdiction and were relying upon their advocate and though the Industrial Court specifically ruled about its limited jurisdiction on 03.08.2001, that order was not informed to respective respondent No.1 by their counsel. He, therefore, states that by looking at these reasons, the School Tribunal had in its discretion condoned the delay and this Court should not interfere in writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioners in reply states that the impugned judgment of School Tribunal does not mention this ground at all and therefore the said order is liable to be set aside. The service by respective respondent No.1 with the petitioners cannot be in dispute at least for the purpose of condonation of delay. The non communication by learned counsel is mentioned by the School Tribunal in para 4 of its judgment. The appeals 3 filed by respective Respondent No.1 have now been registered. The fact show that the employees have been prosecuting the remedy before the Industrial Court for grant of employment. In this situation, I find it improper to observe anything more on these issues at this stage. Nothing to show that things have become irreversible is coming on record. It is to be noted that the management on merits is also disputing the employment of Respondent No.1. Hence, I postpone the consideration of issue after the appeals are finally decided by the School Tribunal by permitting the management to challenge the impugned judgment of School Tribunal dated 07.09.2009 after said adjudication. After the appeals are adjudicated on merits, the rights and liabilities of parties will be clear on record and the impact of delay thereupon can also be gathered. Hence, with said liberty to the petitioner – management, present writ petitions are disposed of. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. JUDGE *GS.