pvr １ wp37-07 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.37 OF 2007 Kailash s/o. Purushottamdas Kanugo ...Petitioner vs. 1.State of Maharashtra & Ors. ...Respondents --- Petitioner in person. Mr.Nitin Jamdar, for Respondent nos.3 & 4. Mr.V.S.Gokhale, AGP for Respondent nos.1 & 2. --- CORAM: D.K.DESHMUKH & ANOOP V. MOHTA, JJ. DATED: 10th October,2011. P.C.:- 1. By this petition, the petitioner challenges the order dated 20.3.1997 terminating the services of the petitioner. The petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class by order dated 11.7.1990 on probation for a pvr ２ wp37-07 period of two years from the date he assumes charge of the office. The petitioner joined his duty on 5.9.1990. It appears that during the initial period of probation while the petitioner was posted at Madha, there was a complaint received against him from the members of the Bar. The complaint was investigated, report of the District Judge was called and the petitioner was cautioned by the High Court in relation to the complaint made by the Bar and he was cautioned to be careful in his view and conduct towards the members of the Bar and that he should maintain dignity, decorum of his office. The petitioner was also communicated with the adverse remarks for the year 1991-92. By Communication dated 28.9.1993 the probation period of the petitioner was extended from 30.10.1992 to 28.2.1994. By communication dated 21.3.1995 the probation period of the petitioner was extended from 1.3.1994 for a period of one year. By communication dated 30.7.1996 the probation period of the petitioner was extended till December,1996. Ultimately the services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 20.3.1997 pvr ３ wp37-07 on the ground that the performance of the petitioner during the probation period was not satisfactory. By that order the probation period of the petitioner was extended till the date of termination. It may be pointed out that by the earlier order, the probation period was extended upto December,1996. Thus, by termination order dated 20.3.1997 the probation period for the period subsequent to December,1996 till the date of termination was extended. The petitioner has filed this petition challenging that order. 2. The petitioner appears in person. He has filed written submissions. The principal submission of the petitioner relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case H.B.Chhathar Vs. State of Gujarat (SC), 1988(56) F.L.R. 146 is that because by termination order dated 20.3.1997 termination of the services of the petitioner was brought about as also by the same order the probation period was extended, the order terminating the services of the petitioner is invalid. The petitioner does not dispute that pvr ４ wp37-07 because there is no maximum period of probation laid down in the Rules, unless there is an order of confirmation made, the petitioner does not become permanent on the post and continues to be on probation. But according to him, the services of the petitioner were wrongly terminated because according to him, the performance of the petitioner during the probation period was satisfactory. He also submitted that he was not given an opportunity to explain various allegations that were made against him. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for respondents. Respondent nos.3 & 4 have also filed their reply. They have also filed documents in support of their case. 4. So far as the submission of the petitioner relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case H.B.Chhathar Vs. State of Gujarat referred to above is concerned, the submission has no substance. In the case before the Supreme Court, the petitioner was appointed by order dated 10.11.1983 on probation pvr ５ wp37-07 for a period of two years. No order extending his period of probation was issued. Ultimately, order dated 4.8.1987 was issued terminating his services and also extending probation period upto the date of termination. In this background, the Supreme Court has held that the order extending the probation period has lost its significance because on the same date on which the probation period was extended, the termination of the services was brought about. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed on probation for two years by order dt. 11.7.1990 and the probation period was thereafter extended twice before ultimately the services of the petitioner were terminated and at that time last extension period of probation was granted. If the purpose behind extending the probation period is to grant an opportunity to the probationer to improve his performance, then the petitioner was granted that opportunity because his probation period was extended at least twice before the services of the petitioner were terminated. Perusal of the record which has been produced by the respondents shows that there were pvr ６ wp37-07 several complaints against the petitioner. When there was complaint against the petitioner received from the members of the Bar, High Court did not act on that complaint without getting it investigated by the District Judge. The report of the District Judge was called. The District Judge found that there are 60 members of the bar and out of them 50 members have complained against the petitioner. It is only after getting that complaint investigated that the warning was issued to the petitioner. The performance of the petitioner at other places was also not upto the mark. The petitioner was also communicated the adverse remark in relation to his performance as Judicial Officer and ultimately after taking overall view of the record of services of the petitioner, it is found that the petitioner is not to be continued as Judicial officer. In our opinion, considering the settled law that the probationer does not have right to the post, and if the employer finds that the performance of the petitioner is not satisfactory then the employer has absolute right to terminate his services, the termination order cannot be faulted. pvr ７ wp37-07 There is no question of granting any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner when his employer has considered his performance during the probation period. Taking overall view of the matter, for the aforesaid reasons, in our opinion, no exception can be taken to the order terminating the services of the petitioner. The petition is devoid of any substance. It is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. (D.K.DESHMUKH, J.) (ANOOP V.MOHTA, J.)