HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATESWARA REDDY W.P.No.21314 of 2002 23rd April, 2007. Between: Grandhi Nageswara Rao .. Petitioner AND] Grandi Mangatayaru and others … Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATESWARA REDDY W.P.No.21314 of 2002 ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao) The petitioners 1 and 2 herein are respondents 4 and 1 respectively, who by way of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seek a writ of certiorari assailing the orders in L.G.C.No.22 of 1999 dated 03rd September, 2002 on the file of Special Court under Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act (for short ‘the Act’) at Hyderabad allowing an application purported to have been filed under Section 8(1) of the Act at the instance of respondents 1 to 6 herein alleging land grabbing as against all the four respondents therein, and also assailing incidentally the proceedings in A.T.C.No.3 of 1998 on the file of the Special Officer-cum-Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle, under Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act (for short ‘the Tenancy Act’), in between respondent Nos.1 and 2 therein as collusive and to set aside the same and consequently to direct the eviction of the petitioners. Heard Sri K.V.Satyanarayana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri P.Sriraghu Ram, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent herein. Briefly stated, the facts which emerged out of the present case are that the respondents 1 to 6 herein had filed the said application initially as against petitioner No.2 namely Kolluru Narasinga Rao. Subsequent to the filing of written statement by him, respondent No.3 was added as per the orders in I.A.No.1265 of 1999 and consequently added the prayer included at Serial No.4 to the effect that the applicants be declared as owners having perfected their title to the property in question as against respondent No.3. Later on, enquiry was conducted wherein the evidence had been let in. Again at this stage, petitioner No.1 was added by way of separate application in I.A.No.967 of 2001, which was allowed on 08-2-2002. Therefore, by the time petitioner No.1 was added, the entire enquiry was over and there was no enquiry subsequent to the addition of petitioner No.1 nor any evidence was recorded thereafter. Therefore, the case of the petitioners primarily is to the effect that the way in which the proceedings were conducted and proceeded with is totally contrary to the principles of natural justice apart from the fact that the application filed by respondents 1 to 6 is not maintainable either in law or on facts. It is their case that in an application under Section 8(1) of the Act, the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Tenancy Act cannot be assailed nor the Special Court has the jurisdiction to sit over its correctness. That apart, it is also the case of petitioners that in the application in I.A.No.967 of 2001 filed by respondents 1 to 6, a reference is made to O.S.No.12 of 2000 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalle, which had ended in a compromise before the Lok Adalath, which is marked as Ex.A-19 and there being no challenge to the said proceedings in any manner as contemplated in law and so far as the compromise is not set aside or varied, no relief can be sought for by the applicants. In the application filed by respondents 1 to 6, their case rests on the allegations that the said applicants are the sons of Grandhi Ramamurthy Shetty and the property in question in Sy.Nos.18/2 and 19/1 admeasuring Ac.4-26 cents is the ancestral property and therefore subsequent to their father’s death, they continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property; they had also obtained layout in the year 1995 and after converting the said land to that of non-agricultural land, the local municipality approved the layout on 19-2-1986 and on 21-2-1987, therefore it is the applicants who are absolute owners and possessors whereas the proceedings under the Tenancy Act in between respondents 1 and 2 are collusive and the orders have been passed on the mere memo filed by second respondent and subsequently it was followed up by E.P.No.7 of 1999 even though it is a consent decree and sought to obtain the possession in pursuance of the said order, which was resisted by the applicants, yet there has been a paper delivery of possession in respect of which the applicants have lodged a complaint by making various allegations and the police registered the case in Crime No.28 of 1999 on 14-2-1999, therefore the claim of applicants is to the effect that the petitioners herein and other contesting respondent are land grabbers and they should be evicted from the property. Contesting the claim of the applicants, the case of petitioners and other respondent is that of total denial in regard to the principal allegation, which has been made in support of the application. It was further pointed out that the said property in fact originally belonged to Grandhi Hanumantha Rao and his sons and after the death of Grandhi Hanumantha Rao, his sons partitioned the property in the year 1950 in which the applicants’ father is also one amongst the allottees and signatories to such partition. Therefore, the applicants cannot make any claim and the third respondent was allotted the schedule land in the year 1950 itself and later, he sold the same to respondents 1 and 4 before the Special Court in pursuance of an agreement of sale dated 9-7-1953 and delivered possession. Thereafter, respondent No.1 before the Special Court leased the land to petitioner No.2 under lease deed dated 29-3-1968 and since he committed default in payment of rents, an application was filed under Section 13 of the Tenancy Act and it was allowed and execution was laid in E.P.No.7 of 1999 and obtained physical possession through court on 6-2-1999, therefore it is not a case of collusive decree or fraud as alleged by the applicants. It was further pointed out that the applicants filed O.S.No.30 of 1999 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Anakapally, and since they could not get interim injunction pending suit, they chose to approach the Special Court, therefore there is no justification either on merits or otherwise. With these and other allegations as contained in their respective pleadings, the Special Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the applicants are the owners of the application schedule property? 2. Whether the rival title set up by the first respondent is true, valid and binding on the applicants? 3. Whether the respondents can be treated as land grabbers within the meaning of Sec.2(d) and (e) of the Act XII of 1982? 4. Whether in any view of the matter, the applicants perfected their title to the application schedule property by adverse possession? 5. To what relief? Later, the parties went into trial where the respondent applicants 1 to 4 have examined PWs 1 to 4 and marked Exs.A-1 to A- 25 and on behalf of respondents therein, RWs 1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-17 were marked, apart from marking Exs.X-1 to X-4 through the court. On appraisal of the evidence, the Special Court ordered the said application and declared that the eviction order dated 18-12-1998 in A.T.C.No.3 of 1998 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle, and consequent execution proceedings are not binding on the applicants and the first respondent was directed to deliver possession to the applicants. Hence, this writ petition. Sri K.V.Satyanarayana, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners principally sought to contend that on the face of it especially taking into account the manner in which the parties have been added, there was no proper, due and comprehensive enquiry in the presence of affected parties and without sufficient opportunity to them. Therefore, the entire evidence recorded could not have formed the basis nor be part of record for arriving at the decision by the Special Court. Secondly, his contention is to the effect that the proceedings under the Tenancy Act could not form part of any proceedings in Special Court as constituted under the Act, therefore the Special Court has not got jurisdiction to sit over the decision rendered under special enactment and thus, the order passed against the petitioners is totally illegally and unsustainable. Even otherwise, it has been contended on the facts that the petitioners have made out sufficient case to show that their possession is perfectly legal and justified and there is no act of land grabbing warranting invocation of the jurisdiction of the Special Court. Sri P. Sriraghu Ram, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, repelling the aforesaid contentions submitted that on the facts and circumstances, the Special Court has rightly gone into the merits of which it has the ample power and jurisdiction and upheld the claim of the respondent applicants. Further, the proceedings under the Tenancy Act on the face of it being collusive, do not bind the applicants and therefore, the findings of fact on all the aspects as arrived at by the Special Court are final and this Court would not go into the same or come to the conclusion contrary to the record. Further, it is also pointed out that there is absolutely no basis for the claim of the petitioners herein to sustain their legal possession which itself is sufficient to hold that they are land grabbers. With these and other submissions made on both sides and on perusal of the material, the point which arises for consideration is as to whether on the facts and circumstances, the application filed by the respondent applicants is maintainable and the petitioners are land- grabbers? From the above narrated chequered events, the basic fact at the outset to be taken note of is in regard to sustainability of the prayer as sought for in the application and also the claim of applicants. In the very application filed by the respondent applicants, it has been prayed to the effect that the proceeding in A.T.C.No.3 of 1998 between respondents 1 and 2 before the Special Court is a collusive one and therefore it needs to be set aside and consequently to declare that the petitioners herein are land grabbers. The case of the applicants is simply on the premise that the said property is ancestral property originally belonging to Grandhi Ramamurthy Shetty and subsequent to his death, they succeeded to the same and have obtained the layout from the local municipality and therefore their title is sufficiently established, whereas the petitioners have brought out the fact that no doubt the property originally belonged to their family which consisted of six brothers including the father of petitioners herein and there has been a partition among themselves and later, the same was sold by one of them and thus, respondent No.1 is claiming through such purchase and respondent No.2 is a tenant against whom the proceedings are initiated under the Tenancy Act and the same was ordered and execution was laid in E.P.No.7 of 1999 and ultimately possession was also delivered. There is no dispute with regard to these facts. However, during the course of arguments, it has been pointed out that the applicants themselves have filed an application in E.A.No.32 of 1999 in E.P.No.7 of 1999 in A.T.C.No.3 of 1998 praying for a direction not to record the delivery of possession and the same is still pending and therefore, the case of petitioners is that having regard to the pendency of such parallel proceedings, invoking of the jurisdiction of the Special Court under the Act alleging land grabbing is wholly misconceived and as such, the proceedings are not maintainable. No doubt, there is no serious dispute in regard to the fact of said application filed by the applicants and pendency thereof. Further, nothing has been brought to our notice as to ultimate result in the said application even as on the day when the arguments were advanced. However, the fact remains that the proceedings in A.T.C.No.3 of 1998 are arising under Tenancy Act, which is meant for bringing socio-economic reforms and it is a special enactment governing the relationship between landlord and tenant by providing various remedies before the hierarchies of authorities as constituted thereunder. Therefore, it necessarily follows that such special enactment would exclude the jurisdiction of the normal courts either under common law or otherwise and thus, the matters covered thereunder could not form part of an enquiry before any other court, be it a regular or otherwise. There is no explanation forthcoming from the applicants as to how they could invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court to assail the proceedings arising under the Tenancy Act. Prima facie and even on the facie of it, the very act on the part of applicants in trying to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court under the Act is not permissible nor can such act fall within the mischief of land grabbing as contemplated and defined under the Act. Prima facie, we are of the view that the very nature of proceedings as initiated by respondent applicants is not within the parameters as contemplated under the Act. Even otherwise, the chequered events would show that there is an assertion on the part of petitioners herein in regard to their title and interest including the possession and they have been agitating the same before the authority under the Tenancy Act and in pursuance thereof, the possession has been delivered to them. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that it would amount to an act of land grabbing. Thus, the very prayer and the nature of the application as opted by the respondent applicants as against the proceedings under the Tenancy Act could not have been entertained by the Special Court under the Act. These aspects unfortunately have not been properly considered nor any attention is paid to the scope of the application vis-à-vis the proceedings under the Tenancy Act. Even otherwise, a reading of the application filed by the respondent applicants and the allegations made therein would show that nothing specific has been alleged against any of these individuals including petitioner No.2 initially or subsequently added respondent including petitioner No.1. No direct reference is made as to the specific act or overt act in regard to such land grabbing against these individuals. As already stated, the whole case of the respondent applicants impinges on the proceedings under the Tenancy Act between respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the Special Court. Therefore, in the absence of any such averment, no cause of action could emanate to lay a claim as against the petitioners herein. Even during the course of arguments, except attacking the tenancy proceedings, nothing specific has been pointed out by the respondent applicant in respect of any act or acts which can amount to an act of land grabbing. Therefore, in the absence of proper foundation being laid, the application could not have been entertained as held in PITHANA NANDA KUMAR Vs. KOSTU ESWARA Vs. KOSTU ESWARA RAO [1] and also by the Supreme Court in N.SRINIVASA RAO Vs. SPL. COURT UNDER A.P. LAND GRABBING (PROHIBITION) ACT [2]. In the aforesaid circumstances, the entire proceedings since inception at the instance of respondent applicants before the Special Court under the Act are totally misconceived and unsustainable. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. ____________________ B.PRAKASH RAO, J ______________________________ M.VENKATESWARA REDDY, J 23rd April, 2007 bsc [1] 2000 (1) ALD 575 (D.B.) [2] 2006 (4) ALT 29 (SC)