THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR Crl. R.C.No.1211 of 2005 Date: .10.2011 Between: G. Kiran Kumar … Petitioner AND The State of A.P. Rep.by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad, and 6 others … Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR Crl. R.C. No.1211 of 2005 ORDER: Assailing the acquittal of A.1 to A.4 and A.6 in C.C.No.686 of 2000 on the file of the XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, PW.1, who is the alleged victim, filed the present revision. While Sri C. Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/PW.1/victim contended that the trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence of PW.1, Sri P.V.S.S.S. Rama Rao representing A.1 to A.4 and A.6 submitted first, that the scope of the revision against the acquittal is limited, and secondly that the case against any of the accused is not made out. 2) I may narrate the case of the prosecution at the outset for the sake of convenience. The prosecution alleges: a) PWs.1 and 2 are brothers. PW.2 is the elder of the two. They have been doing business in copra (dry coconut) from Ameerpet, Hyderabad since about 1996. In their business, they used to purchase copra in huge quantities from A.1 at wholesale rates. b) A.1 supplied good quality of copra for about six months from the date of the commencement of the business relationship. A.1 started sending bad quality of dry coconut thereafter. PWs.1 and 2 sustained loss of about ` 2 lakhs in their business, so much so, PWs.1 & 2 stopped purchasing copra from A.1 and started dealing with other sellers of copra. c) On 09.02.1998, A.1 went to PW.2 and apologized for his supply of bad quality of dry coconut. A.1 promised PW.2 at that time that A.1 would supply good quality of copra from thence and invited PW.1 to visit Ambajipeta, East Godavari District where from A.1 was conducting his business. d) A.2 is the son of A.1. While A.1 approached PW.2 on 09.02.1998, he re-approached PW.2 on the next day along with his son A.2. A.1 and A.2 reiterated their request inviting PWs1 and 2 to Ambajipeta and to examine the quality of the copra. e) In accordance with their understanding, PW.1 went to Ambajipeta to examine the stock of copra to be supplied by A.1 and A.2. PW.1 as well as A.1 and A.2 booked tickets to go over to Ambajipeta on 10.02.1998 in a bus. f) On 11.02.1998 PW.1 reached Ambajipeta along with A.1 and A.2. A.1 and A.2 initially took PW.1 to their shop and godown and produced the copra for the determination of the quality. PW.1, who was satisfied with the quality, agreed to purchase 10 bags of copra out of the 11 bags shown to him. He then decided to return to Hyderabad by the next day. f) At about 6 p.m. on the same day i.e., on 11.02.1998, A.2 produced PW.1 before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Ravulapalem (A.3). At the Police Station, A.1 to A.3 and one Chinna, a nephew of A.1 threatened PW.1 and demanded PW.1 to sign on blank papers. PW.1 declined to do so. PW.1 was detained at the Police Station. g) PW.1 rang PW.2 on the evening of 11.02.1998, informed PW.2 that PW.1 was in trouble and immediately disconnected the phone. PW.2 immediately contacted A.1 over phone. A.1 demanded PW.2 to bring money and take back PW.1 from Ambajipeta. h) PW.1 was detained at Ravulapalem Police Station till about 3.30 p.m. on 12.02.1998. A.1 and A.2 then took PW.1 to Ramakrishna Lodge, Ravulapalem and started beating PW.1. The accused thereafter produced PW.1 before Ambajipeta Police Station. In the meanwhile, PW.1 sustained chest pain. He was treated by a Doctor. i) He was later taken to a Coconut Garden at Ambajipeta and confined him in a room. All the accused in consortium started beating PW.1 thereafter and obtained the signatures of PW.1 on blank white papers and promissory notes. When PW.1 became unconscious, a Doctor treated PW.1. j) While things stood thus, on 13.02.1998 at about 7.30 p.m. PW.1 went to Panjagutta Police Station and lodged Ex.P.1 complaint. On 14.02.1998, all the accused took PW.1 to a hotel, perhaps at Ambajipeta. PW.1 was allowed to contact PW.2 telephonically for a sum of ` 1,50,000/- as ransom to release PW.1. On the evening of the same day, police from Hyderabad came over and took possession PW.1. k) This is the gist of the prosecution case. 3. Initially charges under Sections 363 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) were framed against A.1 and A.2 only. Later, the case was split up against A.5. Once again charges were framed on 04.02.2005. A.1 to A.4 and A.6 faced trial at that time. A.1 and A.2 were charged for the offence u/s.365 IPC. A.1 to A.4 and A.6 were charged for the offences under Sections 342 read with Section 34 IPC, 325 r/w Sec.34 IPC, 347 r/w Sec.34 IPC and 348 r/w Sec.34 IPC. Thus barring for the offence u/s.365 IPC against A.1 and A.2, rest of the charges were with the aid of Section 34 IPC only against all the accused. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses. PW.5 was the Sub-Inspector of Police, Panjagutta Police Station at the relevant time. PW.4 also worked as Sub- Inspector of Police, at the time of lodging of Ex.P.1 by PW.2. PW.3 was the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, who recorded Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement of PW.1 under Ex.P.2. On an overall consideration, the trial Court held that the prosecution failed to make out the case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted all the accused, who faced trial. Aggrieved by the same, PW.1 preferred the present revision. 5. As already pointed out, the scope of revision against the acquittal is very limited. I n Vimal Singh v. Khuran Singh[1], the Supreme Court observed that the High Court could remit the case to the trial Court for fresh trial in the event of gross miscarriage of justice. Earlier, in Rama v. Jagannath[2], it was observed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court should not be lightly exercised against an order of acquittal, more particularly when the revision was invoked by a private party. The Jharkand High Court observed in Shyam Nandan Singh v. State of Jarkhand[3] that when the order of the trial Court acquitting the accused was based on evidence, the revisional Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could it take a contrary view against the view of the trial Court in the absence of manifest error of law or procedural defect. I have no reason to disagree with this well considered view of the Jharkand High Court. In fact, it is settled law that in a revision against acquittal, every leavage should be given in favour of the accused and the order of acquittal by the trial Court should not be reversed unless there is manifest error and patent miscarriage of justice. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that no case was made out against all the accused for any of the offences levelled against them and that the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is perfectly justified. For the limited purpose, I shall examine the evidence. 6. PW.1 is the victim. PW.2 is the de facto complainant. It is the report of PW.2 that was registered as F.I.R. under Ex.P.1 by Panjagutta Police Station. However, the accused, more particularly, A.1 and A.2 confined PW.1 (and not PW.2) after kidnapping him, according to the prosecution. 7. Section 365 provides punishment for kidnapping/abduction with an intention to secretly and wrongfully confining the abducted persons. Section 342 IPC provides punishment for wrongful confinement. Section 347 IPC, on the other hand, provides punishment for wrongful confinement coupled with extortion. Section 348 IPC provides penalty for wrongful confinement with a view to extort confession or compel restoration of property. Section 325 IPC contemplates punishment for causing grievous injury with a simple weapon. These are the charges that were levelled against the accused. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 deserves to be examined in this background. 8. PW.2 is not a primary material witness for any of the offences levelled against the accused. His claim is that PW.1 had a brief conversation with PW.2 telephonically on 11.02.1998 and that PW.1 informed PW.2 at that time that PW.1 had fallen in trouble. PW.1 did not inform PW.2 either that he was wrongfully confined or that he was beaten. He did not inform PW.2 that the accused made demands as ransom to release PW.1. Thus, PW.2 did not supply the requisite corroboration for the evidence of PW.1. On the other hand, PW.2 claimed that it is A.1 who demanded for money. He did not even state in the chief examination as to what was the quantum of money demanded by A.1 from PW.2. 9. PW.2 was not even clear when PW.1 rang PW.2. It is the further case of PW.2 that the accused (i.e., A.1 and A.2) and PW.1 went to Amalapuram/Ambajipeta on 10.02.1998 and that PW.1 voluntarily went with A.1 and A.2 at that time. As rightly submitted by Sri P.V.S.S.S. Rama Rao, learned counsel for the accused, the offence of kidnap or abduction cannot be made out from these facts. For kidnap and abduction, PW.1 voluntarily going away with A.1 and A.2 would not constitute the offence. The offence of kidnap is made out when the victim is taken away from the territory of India or a minor is enticed to go away from the custody of lawful guardianship. PW.1 was not a minor and was not removed from the territory of India. The offence of kidnapping, consequently, is not made out. Abduction as defined u/s.362 IPC is compelling any person to go from a place or making a person to leave a place by deceitful means. 10. It is the contention of the prosecution that A.1 and A.2 took PW.1 by deceiving him promising him to examine the stock of copra with the accused to determine its quality while the aim of the accused was to abduct PW.1, wrongfully confine him and resort to extortion. While so, it is not known to PWs.1 and 2, obviously about the intention of A.1 and A.2. PW.2 cannot claim that he was aware that the intention of the accused was to abduct PW.1. I am afraid that the evidence of PW.2 does not show that the accused kidnapped PW.1. 11. For wrongful confinement and causing grievous hurt, PW.2 was not an eyewitness. According to PW.2, PW.1 also did not inform him about the same till 16.02.1998 when PW.1 was released from the custody of A.1 and A.2. Thus, PW.2 does not support PW.1 in any manner in establishing the case of the prosecution. 12. PW.1 made categorical statements in his evidence. Admittedly, A.1 filed a suit against PWs.1 and 2 for recovery of ` 1,54,000/- as outstanding amount in the business transactions. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the present case was foisted by PWs.1 and 2 as a counter blast to the civil suit of A.1 to force A.1 to give up his monetary claim. As rightly submitted by Sri C. Kumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, merely because A.1 filed a civil suit, PW.1 could not have filed a false case. I agree with his contention that the civil case by A.1 is not sine qua non with false complaint by PW.1. 13. The accused must go further to show that PW.1 foisted this case. It may be noticed that the accused did not choose to examine any defence witness in support of their contention. I am afraid that the accused failed to show that PWs.1 and 2 foisted the present case to force A.1 to settle the civil lis with PWs.1 and 2. At any rate, it is for the prosecution to establish the offences under which the accused were charged. The prosecution examined PW.1, more or less as the only witness for the incident. There is no proof that the accused took PW.1 from Hyderabad to Ambajipeta by deceitful means. There is no evidence that the accused confined PW.1. There is no evidence that the accused beat PW.1 and caused injuries to PW.1. For all these circumstances, the proof tendered by the prosecution is the solitary evidence of PW.1. The trial Court did not consider it appropriate to base a conviction on the strength of such lonesome evidence of PW.1. As already noticed, PW.2 did not supply the requisite corroboration for the evidence of PW.1. His entire evidence is hearsay evidence. Can the evidence of PW.1 be accepted to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? 14. PW.1 did not know the extent of the transactions between A.1 and A.2 on the one side and PWs.1 and 2 on the other side in their business. PW.1 admitted that there was no documentary evidence to show that PWs.1 and 2 returned material supplied by A.1 considering the same to be bad. Even according to PW.1, there has been no enmity between PW.1 and A.1. The learned counsel for PW.1 contended that there was no need for PW.1 to lodge complaint against A.1 where there was no enmity between PW.1 and A.1. He considers that the mere lodging of the complaint would itself be sufficient to prove the alleged offences. On the other side, if the same logic is applied, there is no need for the accused to resort to the offences. Consequently, in the absence of concrete evidence, the accused would be entitled to acquittal by the operation of benefit of doubt. 15. Curiously, PW.1 claimed that he lodged a complaint with Ambajipeta Police Station on 15.02.1998. Such a complaint has not seen the light of the day. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the complaint lodged by PW.1 was suppressed and that the prosecution, consequently, suppressed the genesis of the dispute, so much so, the accused should be given benefit of doubt. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the trial Court was perfectly justified in not accepting the evidence of PW.1 and the evidence of PWs.1 to 5 in this background. 16. The learned counsel for PW.1 inter alia contended that there was no suggestion to PW.1 that he was not beaten causing grievous injuries to him. On the other hand, Ex.P.4 wound certificate had not been proved, as the Doctor, who issued Ex.P.4, was not examined by the prosecution. I, therefore, hold that Ex.P.4 wound certificate does not serve any purpose in the present case. 17. There cannot be any doubt that some untoward incident occurred at Ambajipeta. However, the prosecution failed to show through cogent evidence as to what exactly happened and who the culprits were. I, therefore, consider that the prosecution failed to establish the case of the prosecution against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court was perfectly justified in acquitting the accused. There are no merits in this revision. 18. The Criminal Revision Case is, accordingly, dismissed holding that there is no error in the judgment of the trial Court. ________________ K.G. SHANKAR, J Date: .10.2011 Isn [1] (1998) 7 SCC 223 [2] AIR 1994 SC 26 [3] 2004 Crl.L.J. 4394