IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE THIRD DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT: THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No.998 of 2005 Between: J.P.Krishnasingh, S/o.Balaji Singh, Aged about 44 years, R/o.344, Bandla Street, Tirupathi, Chittoor District Petitioner / Complainant AND J.P.Dhansingh, S/o. Balaji Singh, Aged about 50 years, R/o.297, Gandhi Road, Tirupathi, Chittoor District And another. …Respondent / Accused The Court made the following: THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No.998 of 2005 ORDER: The acquittal of the accused in C.C.No.264 of 1999 on the file of the Court of the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupathi, by the judgment dated 15.12.2003, led the complainant to file the present appeal. A private complaint was filed by the appellant alleging the accused/respondent to have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act’, for brevity). The appellant alleged that his elder brother – the accused borrowed Rs.30,000/- and at the same time issued a cheque for the same amount on 29.04.1999 with a direction to present the same, and accordingly, the complainant claimed to have presented the cheque for encashment on 30.4.1999, which was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. The appellant claims to have issued a statutory notice dated 04.05.1999 to the accused, who failed to comply with the same in spite of receipt of notice on 06.05.1999, and gave a false reply on 19.05.1999. Then the complaint was filed into Court. After taking cognizance of the offence, after recording the sworn statement of the appellant and after furnishing copies of the documents to the accused on his appearance, the accused was examined under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., when he pleaded not guilty. P.W.1 was examined and Exs.P.1 to P.5 and Exs.D.1 and D.2 were marked during the trial and the accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, when he was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and he did not produce any defence witness. The trial Court rendered the impugned judgment referring to the evidence of the solitary witness - P.W.1 and concluded that it was admitted that the cheque in question was given and was dishonoured when presented for encashment. The contention of the accused about the complaint being barred by limitation was appreciated, with reference to the complaint being originally filed before the Court of the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tirupati on 22.06.1999, and the same being represented before the trial Court only on 18.07.1999, after the return of the complaint by the other Court. The trial Court, while referring to the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, observed that the time fixed for filing a complaint was one month from the date on which the cause of action arose. On facts, the trial Court found that the complaint should have been filed before the competent Court before 20.06.1999, and though it was presented on 21.06.1999 before the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tirupati as 20.06.1999 was a holiday, that was a presentation of the complaint to a Court without jurisdiction. The trial Court referred to an analogous principle laid down in P.Preetha v Panyam Cements & Mineral Industries Ltd.[1] wherein, His lordship the Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Sudarshan Reddy (as His lordship then was) laid down that, what was relevant is only proper presentation of the complaint and not mere presentation before the Magistrate. It was held that the relevant date has to be arrived at, with reference to making of complaint, as required by law, and the calculation of the period of limitation of one month from the date on which the cause of action arose, should be with reference to such presentation. Consequently, the trial Court acquitted the accused. The appellant contends herein, that the complaint was filed within the stipulated time before the Court and returned by that Court for representation before the other Court in continuation of the same complaint. Acquitting on the sole ground of bar of limitation when there was positive evidence about the committal of the offence was hence questioned by the appellant, who desired the impugned judgment to be reversed. Sri Mastan Naidu Cherukuri, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri J.Ugranarashima, learned counsel for the first respondent/accused and Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing learned Public Prosecutor for the second respondent – State are heard. Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act prescribes that a complaint should be made within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under Section 138(c) of the Act. The proviso to the said provision enabling the Court to receive the complaint, even after prescribed period, on establishment of a sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court, was incorporated in the statute only by Central Act 55 of 2002, with effect from 06.02.2003. For the present complaint, the said proviso cannot be retrospectively applied, apart from the fact that no such application or request was made to the trial Court explaining a cause for not making the complaint within the prescribed period of limitation before the competent Court. There is no provision which is analogous to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, by which, the appellant could have got the period spent due to presentation of the complaint in a wrong Court excluded from computing the period of limitation, and when the period of limitation was inflexibly and rigidly prescribed, there is no escape, either for the trial Court or this Court, from applying the same to the admitted facts of the case on which, the complaint is obviously barred by limitation. If so, the judgment of acquittal cannot be interfered with in this appeal. Consequently, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. ______________________ JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD December 03, 2009 BVV [1] 2001 (6) ALT 775