IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.4535 of 2004 Chandrabhushan Prasad Singh, S/o Sri Babu Lal Singh, Village Haripur Vadrabad, P.O. Vadrabad Via Bachwara, District Begusarai, At present in Sector-‘J’, House No. 216, People Cooperative Colony, Kankarbagh, P.O. Lohia Nagar, Patna-20. ------- Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Bihar through the Director of Primary Education, Deptt. of Education, Govt. of Bihar, Vikash Bhawan, Patna Secretariat, Patna-15. 2. The Regional Deputy Director of Education, Patna Division, Patna. 3. The District Superintendent of Education, Patna-1 (The Disciplinary Authority). 4. The Regional Development Officer, Office of the Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna-1 (Appellate Authority). 5. The Area Education Officer, Barh, District Patna (Inquiry Officer). ---------- Respondents ----------- For the Petitioner :- Mr. Bishnu Kant Dubey, Adv. Mr. Panchu Ram, Adv. For the Respondents :- Mr. Prabhat Kumar Singh, Adv. AC to GA-1 4 22.11.2010 Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the State as also taking into account that the impugned orders of punishment of withholding three increments with cumulative effect as also its affirmance in appeal by the Commissioner have been passed without taking into consideration the most relevant aspect, namely, that even when a full fledged departmental proceeding was drawn against the petitioner under Article 7(4) of the fcgkj jkT; jktdh;d`r izkjfEHkd fo|ky; f'k{kd 2 ¼LFkkukUrj.k ,oa vuq'kklfud dkjZokbZ½ fu;ekoyh] 1994 and yet the order of punishment was passed against the petitioner without serving a copy of the enquiry report on him, this Court is of the considered opinion that the law as laid down in this regard by the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors. reported in 1993(4) SCC 727 had not been followed by the respondents in letter and spirit. Ordinarily, the recourse, as suggested in the said judgment of B. Karunakar (supra), could have been resorted to by this Court by directing supply of an enquiry report to the petitioner in this very proceeding for eliciting his response on the question of prejudice caused to him on account of non-supply of enquiry report but, then, from reading of the material on record including the enquiry report and the contents of the impugned order of punishment as also the appellate order in the light of the defence taken for the first time by the petitioner in the memo of appeal, this Court is of the view that sufficient prejudice was 3 caused to the petitioner on account of non- supply of the enquiry report. The petitioner infact had taken his clear defence for defending his action which was subject matter of charge but, then, the same was not at all considered by the disciplinary authority who had passed a wholly mechanical order. The petitioner having been not afforded any opportunity to file his comments/reaction to the findings of the enquiry officer in the enquiry report and, as such, it has to be held that the impugned order of punishment was really passed without giving him a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. Counsel for the State, however, has tried to support the impugned order by highlighting the contents of memo of appeal and the consequential appellate order that since this issue of non-supply of enquiry report was not specifically raised by the petitioner, this Court, in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not, for the first time, go into this aspect. In the considered opinion of this Court, such approach could have been adopted 4 had the petitioner been not prejudiced on account of non-supply of the enquiry report. Here the petitioner, after having been given an opportunity of service of memo of charge, had filed his written statement of defence denying all the charges and, thereafter, if the enquiry officer had held the petitioner guilty for all those charges or some of them, the petitioner was required to be given a copy of the enquiry report so that he could be made aware of the reasons for not accepting his defence. The appellate authority, in fact, has not at all gone into this aspect of the matter and has proceeded that since under the relevant Service Rule, the stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect was a minor punishment and that the petitioner was given an opportunity to file his explanation against the memo of charge, that by itself would amount to extending sufficient opportunity. The appellate authority, infact appears to have absolutely amissed the most vital aspect that supply of enquiry report, even in such cases irrespective of the nature of punishment was 5 mandatory as laid down in the case of B. Karunakar (supra) in view of the fact that a full fledged departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. That being so, this writ application is allowed. Annexure-1 & 2, the order of punishment and the appellate order respectively, are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the concerned District Education Establishment Committee, Patna. Since the petitioner now has a copy of the enquiry report as contained in Annexure- 6, he must file his comments/reaction to the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer, whereafter, the disciplinary authority, being the District Education Establishment Committee, must take a final decision within a period of three months from the date of filing of such explanation by the petitioner. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner, for the charges, in question, was inflicted only a minor punishment and, therefore, even if the disciplinary authority goes to hold the petitioner guilty, such punishment would not exceed beyond the one 6 which is permissible under the heading of Minor Punishment under the 1994 Rules. With the aforementioned observations and directions, this writ application to the extent indicated above is allowed. Rsh (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)