Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 Date of decision: 19.10.2011 Jatinder Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Punjab and another ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Mr. R.P.S. Rana, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. A.S. Jattana, Addl. AG, Punjab for the State. Mr. Amit Dhawan, Advocate for respondent No. 2. RANJIT SINGH J. The petitioner alongwith his parents Milkhi Ram and Ram Piari were tried for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The complaint was filed by Aruna Rani wife of the petitioner alleging that she was married to the petitioner on 28.03.1993 and that her parents had given dowry worth few lakhs. A scooter, refrigerator, colour TV, Almirah, gold ornaments besides other household articles were allegedly given in dowry. At the time of marriage, it was made clear to the petitioner that these articles were meant for use of the complainant. It is alleged that soon after the marriage, the petitioner and his parents started complaining that the complainant had not brought sufficient dowry and thus, used to abuse her. Quarrels got aggravated and ultimately the complainant was turned out of the matrimonial home after 6/7 months of the marriage. On 04.04.1994, Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 2 the complainant gave birth to a son but none from the side of the petitioner came to see the newly born child. Once the matter could not be settled, the complainant filed a complaint on the basis of which the petitioner alongwith his parents were summoned for offences under Section 498-A IPC. The trial Court convicted all the accused persons. They had, accordingly, filed an appeal before the Sessions Court, which convicted the petitioner but acquitted his parents. The petitioner, accordingly, filed the present revision petition to impugn the order of his conviction. When the case came up for hearing on 08.06.2009, counsel for the petitioner had pointed out before the Court that during the pendency of the case before the trial Court, the matter had been compromised between the parties. The trial Court had not relied upon this compromise on the ground that the offence alleged against the petitioner is not compoundable. The plea of the counsel for the petitioner was that matrimonial disputes ought to be settled amicably rather than allowing these to persist, which may further retard the process of re-settlement of the estranged couple in life. The petitioner has, thus, relied upon this compromise to impugn his conviction and sentence. The revision was, accordingly, admitted. The sentence imposed on the petitioner was ordered to be suspended during the pendency of the petition. During the pendency of the revision petition, the complainant-wife had filed an application for cancellation of bail granted to the petitioner. Plea was that the petitioner has misled the Court while seeking concession of bail. While issuing notice on this Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 3 application, the parties were directed to remain present. Instead of cancelling the bail, the revision, was ordered to be heard. It then transpired before the Court on 26.02.2010 that the husband and the wife have again reached a compromise and had decided to finally separate. The wife had come present in the Court on the said date. The Court then had satisfied itself by interacting with complainant- wife and she had confirmed this fact that the case had been settled to her satisfaction. The parties had then submitted that they were going to approach the Court for grant of divorce on the ground of mutual consent. The petition was, accordingly, adjourned sine die and the parties were given liberty to revive the petition as and when the matrimonial dispute had been finally settled between them. The present application is, thus, filed in this background. The complainant is duly represented through the counsel before me. Counsel for the complainant confirms this fact that the parties have reached compromise and even divorce has been granted by the family Court. The complainant is also present in the Court in person and has duly confirmed this fact. She also confirms before the Court that the matter has been amicably resolved to her satisfaction and she would have no objection in case the necessary relief, as prayed for by the petitioner, is granted. Counsel for the petitioner, at this stage, submits that this Court would have an ample power to permit compounding of the offence even at that stage while exercising revisional jurisdiction even though the petitioner has been convicted and is under the rigors of the sentence imposed on him. In this connection, reference is made to the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 4 Procedure, 1973, which lists the offences, which are compoundable offences. As per this Section, certain offences specified in the first two column can also be compounded with permission of the Court where the prosecution of such offences is pending. Section 320 (8) of Cr.P.C. clearly provides that the High Court or Court of Session acting in exercise of his power of revision under Section 401 IPC may allow any person to compound any offence, which such person is competent to compound with the permission of the Court. Though offence under Section 498-A IPC is not mentioned in the list of offence, which are compoundable with the permission of the Court or otherwise but that appears to be due to obvious reason that this provision was introduced subsequently as an offence under the IPC, in the year 1983 (Act No. 46 of 1983). I do not find see any bar, which would stand in the way of this Court while exercising revisional power to invoke inherent powers coupled with revisional powers to do the substantial justice. If any authority is needed for this then reference can be made to K.M. Ibrahim Vs. K.P. Mohammed and another, 2010(1) RCR (Criminal) 595. This was a case where the accused was convicted for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The proceedings had concluded before the Appellate Forum, when parties moved an application under Section 147, seeking compounding of offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that since the parties have settled their disputes and compounding of offence under Section 138 at the appellate stage is not barred by Section 147, offence was permitted to be compounded and the conviction was set-aside. Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 5 While taking this view, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made reference to the case of O.P.Dholakia Vs. State of Haryana, 2001(1) RCR (Criminal) 638; (2000) 1 SCC 762. It has been held in this case that since the petitioner had already entered into a compromise with the complainant and the complainant had appeared through the counsel and stated that the entire money has been received by him, he has no objection if the conviction already recorded under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is set- aside. The Court had thought it appropriate to grant permission in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case to compound the offence. It is further noticed that this view has been consistently followed in large number of cases, which are noted as under:- Anil Kumar Hartiwal & Anr. V. Alka Gupta & Anr., 2004 (3) RCR (Criminal) 116: 2004 (3) Apex Criminal 180: [(2004) 4 SCC 366]; (2) B.C. Seshadri v. B.N. Suryanarayana Rao [2004(11) SCC 510] decided by a three Judge Bench; (3) G. Sivarajan v. Little Flower Kuries & Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. [2004(11) SCC 400]; (4) Kishore Kumar v. J.K. Corporation Ltd. [(2004) 13 SCC 494]; (5) Sailesh Shyam Parsekar v. Baban, 2006 (4) RCR (Criminal) 841 : 2006 (3) Apex Criminal 588 : [2005(4) SCC 162]; (6) K. Gyansagar v. Ganesh Gupta & Anr. 2006 (2) RCR (Criminal) 677 : [(2005) 7 SCC 54]; (7) K.J.B.L. Rama Reddy v. Annapurna Seeds & Anr. [(2005) 10 SCC 632]; (8) Sayeed Ishaque Menon v. Ansari Naseer Ahmed, Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 6 2006 (2) RCR (Criminal) 331 : 2006 (2) RCR Apex Criminal 37: [(2005) 12 SCC 140]; (9) Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd., 2008 (1) RCR (Criminal) 249 : 2008 (1) RCR (Civil) 249 : 2007 (6) RAJ 558 : [(2008) 2 SCC 305]; wherein some of the earlier decisions have been noticed; and (10) Sudheer Kumar v. Manakkandi M.K. Kunhiraman & Anr., 2008 (2) RCR (Criminal) 97 : 2008 (2) RCR (Civil) 712 : [2008 (1) KLJ 203] which was a decision of Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, wherein also the issue has been gone into in great detail. While taking this view, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noticed that object of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which would not in strict sense of terms apply to proceedings under Negotiable Instruments Act gives the parties to the proceedings an opportunity to compound offences mentioned in the table contained in the said Section with our without leave of the court and also vests the Court with jurisdiction to allow such compromise. By virtue of sub-section (8), the legislature has taken one step further in vesting jurisdiction in the Court to also acquit the accused/convict of the offence on the same being allowed to be compounded. As observed, Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is amended with the similar object and analogy has accordingly been drawn as to the intention of the legislature as expressed in Section 320(8) Cr.P.C. Although the same has not been expressly mentioned in amended Section to a proceeding under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act. Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 7 In B.S. Joshi and others versus State of Haryana and another, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1386 (1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that Section 320 Cr.P.C. does not limit or effect the powers of the High Court for quashing a proceeding or FIR or complaint by invoking inherent powers. Section 320 Cr.P.C, thus, would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing but, however, it is a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such powers. In Nikhil Merchant Vs. C.B.I. and another AIR 2009 Supreme Court 428, the Court has observed that Section 320 of Cr.P.C would not apply to Section 498-A and 406 IPC, which are non-compoundable but it did not limit or effect the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred on High Court and the Supreme Court under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma V. State and others AIR 2008 Supreme Court (Supp.) 1171, has observed that the powers of the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings or first information report or complaint is in no way limited by the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C., where the FIR, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused of a private nature continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility. Reference here can also be made to Dr. Arvind Barsaul etc. versus State of M.P. And another AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 989, where appellant-husband and his parents were convicted for an offence under Section 498A and a compromise between the parties Criminal Revision No. 1549 of 2009 8 was arrived at during pendency of appeal. The marriage in the meantime has also been dissolved. In peculiar facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice, continuation of criminal proceedings was held to be an abuse of the process of law and while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed the criminal proceedings. Once the estranged couple has decided to part way and has further decided to follow their own lives, there may not be a much need to stick to some technicalities. Apart from the revisional jurisdiction, this Court in order to do substantial justice, can invoke its inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice as can be noticed from precedent noted above. Since the complainant has settled the matrimonial dispute and differences between the petitioner, it can be taken that she would no more rely on the allegation made and would deemingly withdraw or resile from her previous stand. No useful purpose would now be served to make the petitioner to undergo rigors of punishment so imposed. The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner is set aside. The petitioner is relieved of the consequences of trial. October 19, 2011 ( RANJIT SINGH ) rts JUDGE