1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY O. O. C. J. WRIT PETITION NO.2036 OF 2009 Aakhil Bharatiya General Kamgar Union ..Petitioner. Vs. M/s.Shah Metal Industries and another ..Respondents. .... Mr. N.M. Ganguli for the Petitioner. None for the Respondents. ..... CORAM: DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 3rd November, 2009. P.C. : 1. The Industrial Court by its award dated 29th April, 2008 dismissed the reference and came to the conclusion that there was a closure in fact and there was no functional integrality between M/s. Shah Metal Industries and M/s. Pravinchand Chunilal & Co., the First and Second Respondents to these proceedings. 2. The case of the management was that the First Respondent which was a partnership concern was engaged in the activity of ‘pressing’ brass sheets which were purchased from Hindustan Brass Limited for the purposes of manufacturing tanks meant for kerosene stoves. According to the employer over the last several years, the use 2 of kerosene stoves had been reduced due to the availability of L.P.G. cylinders and the cost of brass sheets had also increased. The management had taken a decision to close down its activities and at the time of closure only four employees have been engaged. According to the management, the workmen had been offered their dues, but they had refused to collect them. 3. Before the Industrial Court it was sought to be contended by the Union that there was functional integrality between the business conducted by the First and Second Respondents. The Industrial Court has upon reviewing the evidence entered a finding of fact to the effect that the Petitioner has been unable to establish functional integrality between the First and Second Respondents. The Industrial Court noted that the employees of the two firms were borne on separate attendance registers and there was no material on the record to establish interchangeability between the two sets of employees. The witness who deposed on behalf of the Petitioner also admitted that since April 1998, the First Respondent was closed. The 3 Industrial Court arrived at a finding that there was a permanent and irrevocable closure. The reasons for the closure indicated in the notice were that the market conditions had deteriorated to the extent that salaries had to be paid without work. Though the two partnership concerns were mentioned as being “sister concerns”, the Industrial Court noted that there was no material on the record to show that both the units depended on each other or that they carried out common functions. As a matter of fact, the Second Respondent continued to exist even after the closure of the business of the First Respondent and the workmen of the Second Respondent were still engaged. The Second Respondent had not been closed down. On the evidence on record the Industrial Court entered a finding of fact that it was only the First Respondent which had closed down its business and that the employees have been offered their legal dues and closure compensation. On this material a finding of fact is arrived at to the effect that there was no illegal lock out, but a valid closure in fact. 4. Now the admitted position before the Court, 4 even according to counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that the First Respondent engaged only five employees. In that case, the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not attracted. It is a well settled position in law that once there is a closure in fact the underlying motive for closure is not a matter for judicial enquiry or intervention. The effort to establish that there was a functional integrality between the First and Second Respondents failed inasmuch as there was no material on the record to establish this position. In the circumstances, the dismissal of the reference by the Industrial Tribunal cannot be faulted. The Industrial Tribunal has directed the employer to effect payment of the notice pay, closure compensation and other legal dues arising out of the closure. The award does not suffer from any error apparent. The interference of the Court in a pure finding of fact is not warranted. The Petition shall accordingly stand dismissed. ****