SBCWP NO.844/98. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR. O R D E R S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.844/1998. RSRTC Jaipur Versus The General Secretary Transport Workers Union Jaipur & Ors. Date of Order:- March 26, 2010. HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMAD RAFIQ Shri Mukesh Verma for the petitioner. Shri H.P. Singh for the respondents. ******* BY THE COURT:- This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation against the award dated 30/4/1997 by which, reference on the question of validity of order dated 24/9/1985 awarding penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments with cumulative effect to the respondents were held illegal and invalid. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in entertaining the aforesaid industrial dispute, learned Industrial Tribunal has exceeded to its jurisdiction in entertaining the original penalty order dated 9/8/1985 because in that order, respondent was removed from service and SBCWP NO.844/98. 2 the appellate order was converted into that of stoppage of four annual grade increments with cumulative effect and therefore the order of the disciplinary authority stood merged with the order of appellate authority. Learned counsel therefore submitted that examination of correctness of the penalty order dated 9/8/1985 passed by the disciplinary authority was also in terms of reference. In any case, the appellate authority had already substantially reduced the period of removal to stoppage of four annual grade increments with cumulative effect. Learned Industrial Tribunal erred in interfering with the quantum of punishment. Penalty was not so shocking disproportionate to the gravity of charges so as to require interference by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal had no justification in substituting the penalty of dismissal by penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments with cumulative effect and further by stoppage of one annual grade increment without cumulative effect. Learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the writ petition and cited the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Punjab National Bank Vs. Industrial Tribunal to argue that power of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 11A is unlimited for entertaining the industrial dispute by giving its reasons. It is contended that the Tribunal has given a reasoned order in that, that SBCWP NO.844/98. 3 the enquiry officer did not find the charges proved against the respondent and complete charge was that when bus was checked by the Inspectors in which, respondent was Conductor, nine passengers were found without tickets and it was only when inspection was carried out that he issued tickets to them after realizing the fair. He thereby violated the standing orders which required that bus can be started only after issue of tickets to all passengers. Way bill was issued to two other passengers, who boarded in the way. Later part of the charge in starting bus without issuance of tickets and without making way bill was found proved by the enquiry officer yet, the disciplinary authority held the complete charge proved and on that basis imposed an extreme harsh penalty of removal from service. Learned Tribunal therefore has rightly held that the disciplinary authority if wanted to differ with the finding of the enquiry officer, should have separately issued a note of dissent by giving reason thereof. But, the disciplinary authority has mechanically awarded penalty of removal. Appellate Authority did not wholly appreciate this aspect of the matter and the only technical charge that was found proved against the respondent was to the effect that he started the bus without issuing first the tickets to all the passengers and thus awarded penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments with cumulative SBCWP NO.844/98. 4 effect. For such a technical charge, penalty of stoppage of one annual grade increment without cumulative effect was such which justify a penalty. Upon hearing learned counsel for parties and perusing the materials on record, I find that Divisional Manager passed the order dated 24/9/1985 whereas, fact was that this order was passed by the General Manager (Traffic), who was appellate authority. In case, the impugned-order dated 24/9/1985 was passed by the appellate authority, the Tribunal was very much entitled to also look into the original order of penalty dated 9/8/1985 passed by the Divisional Manager. I am, therefore, not inclined to uphold the argument that the Tribunal could not examine the correctness of the original penalty order because even after merger of the original order with the appellate order still, in so far as guilty of the respondent is concerned, appellate order was passed in conformity with the order passed by the disciplinary authority and two orders will have to be conjointly read so as to determine the validity of both or any one of them. The Industrial Tribunal has clearly found that the disciplinary authority has not at all recorded its reasons for holding entire charge proved against the respondent-delinquent whereas, the enquiry officer had in his report recorded the finding that bus should be started only after issue of tickets and Mahesh is responsible for this because without SBCWP NO.844/98. 5 issuing the tickets, the bus was started. If that was the gravity of the proved charge, it was misunderstood by the disciplinary authority, the same pervasive prevailed with the appellate authority. This technical charge can hardly justify in imposing a major penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments. At the same time, I find that the Industrial Tribunal has been rather extra lenient in converting that penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments into stoppage of one annual grade increment, which in my considered view, should have been penalty of stoppage with cumulative effect. Writ petition to that extent deserves to be partly allowed and award of the Industrial Tribunal deserves modification accordingly. In the result, writ petition is partly allowed to the extent of modifying the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 30/4/1997 to the above extent. (MOHAMMAD RAFIQ), J. anil