IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Civil Revision Petition No.1779 of 2010 Between: Talla Bal Reddy .. Petitioner AND Talla Suguna and others .. Respondents Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying to set aside the order dated 30-03-2010 in C.M.A. No.6 of 2010 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Siddipet. The petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the petition and the grounds filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of Sri E. Phani Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner and of Sri C. Malla Reddy, Advocate for respondents 1 to 3, the Court made the following: ORDER: The common order in C.M.A. No.6 of 2010 and C.M.A. No.7 of 2010 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Siddipet, dated 30-03-2010 led the unsuccessful 1st defendant to file the present revision. In O.S. No.8 of 2010 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Siddipet, the plaintiffs filed I.A. No.23 of 2010, while the defendants filed I.A. No.60 of 2010 respectively claiming interim injunction against interference with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The case of the plaintiffs is that the lands in S.No.814 to an extent of Ac.1-00 ½ guntas and S.No.824 to an extent of Ac.1-23 guntas of Lingareddypally are the joint family properties of the parties along with other properties and in an oral partition between the parties, the plaintiffs and defendants each got Ac.0-20¼ guntas in S.No.814 and Ac.0-31½ guntas in S.No.824 respectively and the defendants got their names mutated mala fide, against which the plaintiffs approached the revenue authorities who passed orders mutating the half share of the plaintiffs in their names. Pattadar pass book and title deed were also issued to them and hence, the plaintiffs sought for a permanent injunction in the suit and an interim injunction in I.A. No.23 of 2010 against interference by the defendants. The defendants, who are the children of Sattavva, claimed that the 1st plaintiff was married to their father after the death of Sattavva, and the father of the defendants was missing since 1988. The plaintiffs, who are staying in Narsaipally and who returned to Lingareddypally in 2006, were creating nuisance. Ac.2-01 guntas in S.No.814 and Ac.3-06 guntas in S.No.824 originally belonged to Abdul Aziz who sold the same to Talla Malla Reddy, Talla Srinivas Reddy and Talla Yadireddy. The relatives and grandparents of late Sattavva purchased half of that land in the name of the 1st defendant under a registered sale deed, while Talla Susheela purchased the remaining half land. The 1st defendant, in possession and enjoyment, was issued a pattadar pass book and title deed, dug a bore-well in the suit property and is cultivating the same. The plaintiffs damaged the eastern portion of the suit property and hence, the defendants sought for an interim injunction in their favour against the plaintiffs pending the suit, in I.A. No.60 of 2010. The trial Court by its common order in both the petitions, dated 04-02-2010 referred to Exs.A.1 to A.14 and B.1 to B.31 marked during the enquiry and the contentions of both parties and observed that the plaintiffs failed to file a single document to prove the property to be ancestral property and as there was only a stray entry in the pahani of 2008-2009, the 1st defendant having long standing possession cannot be prejudiced. Mere entries in the revenue records were held not to create any title when the 1st defendant purchased the land under a registered sale deed in 1991 itself, the genuineness of which cannot be suspected. In the light of the facts and circumstances relating to acquisition of the property, the trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed in proving prima facie case, while the defendants established balance of convenience in their favour and the probability of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction. Accordingly, the trial Court vacated the ex parte interim injunction granted by it in favour of the plaintiffs earlier on 21-01-2010 and dismissed I.A. No.23 of 2010 and allowed I.A. No.60 of 2010. In the appeals against the said common order, the appellate Court pronounced the impugned order in question again referring to the pleadings, contentions and documents of both parties and referred to the third party affidavits filed by the vendors under Ex.B.1 in favour of the 1st defendant showing the father of the parties to have purchased the land and opined that the 1st defendant has to establish the property to be self-acquired property, as he was a minor by the date of Ex.B.1, due to which it has to be presumed that the property was purchased with joint family funds. Even defendants 2 and 3 were noted by the appellate Court to have not been given any share in the property and the appellate Court relied on the enquiry made by the revenue authorities concluding that the plaintiffs have half share in the properties of their father. The appellate Court also refused to rely on the pahanies filed by the defendants and opined that by damaging the crop as shown by Exs.B.14 to B.34 (B.31), the plaintiffs would not gain anything. The appellate Court, therefore, considered that prima facie case and balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs who are claiming an oral partition and sympathizing with the 1st plaintiff, a poor widow, the appellate Court allowed C.M.A. No.6 of 2010 and dismissed C.M.A. No.7 of 2010 and set aside the injunction order granted in I.A. No.60 of 2010 and granted injunction in favour of the plaintiffs pending the suit. The appellate Court also directed that the main suit shall be disposed of within six months. (C.M.A. No.7 of 2010 appears to have been mistakenly stated as dismissed, as it was against the injunction granted in favour of the defendants, which was set aside in the appeal). Sri Eranki Phani Kumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st defendant and Sri C. Malla Reddy, learned senior counsel for respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs are heard at length. The point for consideration is as to who, out of the plaintiffs and defendants, are entitled to interim protection in equity from the Court pending determination of the suit on merits. Point: The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is discretionary, which cannot be claimed as of right by any party and ordinarily the High Court will not up set the pure findings of fact. The jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate and the jurisdiction of the inferior Court will not be interfered with unless it is perverse or not based on any material or it has resulted in manifest injustice. It is only an error that effects the jurisdiction or involves a breach of principles of natural justice that may lead the High Court to interference. These limitations have to be borne in mind while appreciating the present dispute. Keeping the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view and appreciating the questions in issue between the parties on the strength of the documentary evidence placed by them in the interlocutory enquiry, the conclusions of the trial Court rather than the appellate Court appear to be in tune with the broad human probabilities arising out of the material on record. Exs.A.1 to A.14 except Ex.A.2 relate to various entries in the title deeds, pattadar pass books, proceedings of the revenue officials, notices issued by revenue officials and entries in the pahani of 2008-2009 and all the documents are very near in point of time to the suit dispute and are claimed to be based on the enquiries conducted by the revenue officials. The relevance and effect of the entries in revenue records in such property disputes have been the subject of judicial precedents and illustratively in Mahendra C. Mehta v. Kousalya Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., Hyderabad[1], this Court held that entries in revenue records do not confer title and title to a property of a person would not be lost merely because his name is not mutated in the revenue registers. The question was stated to be as to who is in possession of a land, which mainly has to be decided on title and pahanies are maintained mainly for purpose of revenue collection. Similarly, in Mahila Bajrangi v. Badribai[2], the Apex Court also pointed out that it cannot be legitimately claimed that the Tahsildar or authorities exercising the powers of mutation have been accorded the status of civil Courts or Courts of exclusive jurisdiction. It was pointed out that mutation proceedings before the Revenue Authorities are not judicial proceedings in any Court of law and do not decide questions of title to immovable property. The defendants also have Ex.B.2 pass book, Ex.B.3 electricity pass book, Exs.B.4 and B.5 electricity bills, Exs.B.6 to B.13 pahanies in respect of some years between 1985-86 and 2007-08 in their favour, apart from the original sale deed, the registration extract of which is Ex.B.1, in favour of the 1st defendant. If Ex.A.7 proceedings were the result of enquiries by the revenue officials about the parties being in possession of half of the disputed lands each, it is difficult to comprehend as to how there were no corresponding entries in any of the revenue records prior to 10-07-2007 about such possession and enjoyment in equal shares. If Exs.A.1 to A.11, A.13 and A.14 have to be taken as prima facie proof of the claims of the plaintiffs, it is not known as to how Exs.B.1 to B.13 can be denied such a privilege. Ex.B.1 shows that the entire consideration was recited to have been paid by the vendee earlier to the sale deed and nothing appears from the document itself about payment of the consideration by the father of the 1st defendant. There is no presumption under Hindu Law that a Hindu joint family owns joint properties or that a property exclusively standing in the name of one of the members of the family does not belong to him, but belongs to the joint family. When a property stands in the name of one of the members of the family without proof of anything further, it cannot be a matter of presumption that the property was acquired with joint family funds or was treated as joint family property in any other manner. While defendants 1 to 3 are the children of the first wife of Laxma Reddy, the 1st plaintiff is his second wife through whom, plaintiffs 2 and 3 were born and the whereabouts of Laxma Reddy are admittedly not known at least since 1988. The appellate Court based its conclusions primarily on the report of the Village Revenue Officer, which formed the basis for the consequential conclusions of the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer, which proceedings at any level were not specified to be with notice to the defendants. But the Village Revenue Officer himself was not stated to have referred to any oral partition entitling the parties to equal shares, while expressing his opinion that the plaintiffs and the defendants have equal shares in the lands. The property purchased under Ex.B.1 in 1991 in the name of the 1st defendant was not shown to have been mentioned in any revenue record prior to the alleged enquiry by the Village Revenue Officer and the consequential entries made by the revenue officials in various documents to be in the joint possession of the members of the family and the minority of the 1st defendant by the time of purchase under the original of Ex.B.1 should not matter, as it is the claim of the 1st defendant that his grand parents and relatives purchased the property for his benefit. Merely because the relationship of the parties is admitted, the property could not have been assumed to be joint and if the pahanies in favour of the defendants are not helpful to them, how does a solitary pahani in favour of the plaintiffs helps them is equally inexplicable. Any affidavit of a vendor under Ex.B.1 contrary to the recitals in the document could not have vitiated the ostensible title of the 1st defendant to the property and there is absolutely no material to even remotely indicate the truth of any oral partition between the parties as claimed by the plaintiffs. Prima facie, the 1st defendant had not only title to the property but also possession as seen from the electricity connection for the motor to the bore-well as well as the revenue records of a number of years as opposed to the documents for the plaintiffs emanating in close proximity of time to the suit dispute. Under the circumstances, the reasoning adopted by the appellate Court appears divorced from the broad human probabilities arising out of the material on record, which appears to have been the subject of correct appreciation by the trial Court. The grant of an interim injunction in favour of the defendants against the plaintiffs in I.A. No.60 of 2010 was not pleaded to be vitiated on any other legal ground and the findings of fact by the trial Court and the appellate Court being diametrically opposite each other had to be necessarily analysed in proper perspective in this revision to avoid manifest injustice. As the conclusions of the appellate Court appear to be not based on material on record, the same have to be interfered with as being the subject of a jurisdictional error and the said findings have to be reversed. However, the appellate Court has directed the trial Court to dispose of the main suit within six months from the date of its order and any injustice to either party can, thus, be safely avoided by sticking to that time limit. In the result, the impugned order in C.M.A. No.6 of 2010 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Siddipet, dated 30-03-2010 is set aside except to the extent of the direction to the trial Court to dispose of the main suit within six months from the date of its order. The civil revision petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 28-04-2010 Svv [1] 2001(5) ALT 197 [2] (2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 464