THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY Writ Petition No.22165 of 2006 Dated 13th June, 2011 Between: Dr.V.Vasumathi Reddy and others …Petitioners And The Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep.by its Special Chief Secretary, Revenue (LA) Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad and others …Respondents Counsel for the petitioners: Sri Ghanta Suryanarayana Counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3: GP for Land Acquisition Counsel for respondent No.4: Sri A.Rajender Kumar For Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud The Court made the following: ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to declare G.O.Ms.No.721, dated 19.06.2006, issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) and declaration, dated 19.06.2006, under Section 6 of the Act in respect of Ac.1.31 guntas of land in Survey No.149/A of Jillelaguda Village, Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District as illegal and arbitrary. The petitioners are the owners of the above noted land, which is part of the larger area of Acs.11.21 guntas in Survey No.149. Earlier an extent of Acs.7.16 was acquired under a separate notification for central defence research laboratory, i.e., Defence Metrological Research Laboratory (DMRL). By the impugned notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, a further extent of Ac.1.31 guntas of land was proposed to be acquired. The respondents have dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act by invoking urgency clause contained in Section 17(4) of the Act. The main ground, on which, these proceedings are questioned in the writ petition, is that the notification failed to specify the precise purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. At the hearing, Sri Ghanta Suryanarayana, learned counsel for the petitioners, while inviting this Court’s attention to the notification, submitted that the purpose mentioned in the notification is “for defence purpose, ‘DMRL’”. The learned counsel placed reliance on two judgments of this Court, namely, Gajjela Narasimha Reddy and others v. Collector, Ranga Reddy District and another[1] and D.Ramadevi and others v. District Collector, West Godavari District, Eluru & others[2], in support of his submission that if the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act do not specify the precise purpose for which the lands are proposed to be acquired, the same cannot be sustained in law. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri A.Rajender Kumar, learned counsel, representing Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud, learned Assistant Solicitor General, opposed the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. I n Gajjela Narasimha Reddy ( 1 supra), a notification for acquisition was issued by the Special Deputy Collector (LA), Unit-I, ORR, HUDA proposing to acquire certain lands for formation of a township. This Court referred to the relevant case law i.e., Aflatoon and others v. Lt.Governor of Delhi and others[3], Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban[4], Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd.Safi[5], State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohd. Yousef[6], Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana[7], Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad[8], State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan[9] etc., and held as under: “On a careful analysis of the ratio contained in the case law discussed above, in order to decide whether the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act is in conformity with the provisions of the Act, as interpreted by the plethora of judgments of the Apex Court, two aspects are required to be examined, viz., whether the purpose mentioned in the notification is specific and not vague; and such purpose is a “public purpose”. I n Aflatoon (5 supra), the Supreme Court held that whether the purpose specified in the notification is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under Section 5-A would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, let me now examine whether the first aspect is satisfied by the impugned notifications. As mentioned supra, the purpose mentioned in the notifications is “development of Township and future projects”. It is not indicated in the notifications, what is the nature of the Township and for whose benefit the Township is proposed to be constructed. Unless the notifications indicate the nature of the Township and the purported future projects, is it possible for the petitioners to file their objections on the above aspects? In my considered opinion, the answer should be an emphatic ‘no’. The notifications are silent as to the size and type of the Township. The expression “future projects” in my considered view is absolutely vague, which does not give any cue as to what type of projects – whether residential, commercial or industrial – that are proposed to be taken up. In the absence of indication of the precise purpose, it is not possible for the owners of the lands to file meaningful objections. As held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Administration (1 supra), even if the purpose mentioned in the notifications is a public purpose, it is open to the objectors to file their objections both with regard to the absence of necessity to acquire this particular land and also about its non-suitability for the purpose for which the land is proposed to be acquired. Interestingly, even in the counter-affidavits, the respondents failed to elaborate on the purpose mentioned in the notifications, except repeating the words mentioned in the impugned notifications and relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court. None of those judgments come to the aid of the respondents because the question whether the purpose mentioned in the notification is specific or vague is required to be decided with reference to the facts of each case as held by the Supreme Court in Aflatoon (5 supra) and reiterated in L.Krishnan (13 supra).” In D.Ramadevi (2 supra), an extent of Ac.0.24 cents of land was sought to be acquired for construction of houses by the A.P.Housing Board and selling them to the general public. Challenge to the said notification was mounted on the ground that the said purpose is too vague, which does not disclose a public purpose. This Court again referred to the relevant case law and held that as the notification impugned therein was vague which did not contain even minimal details, such as, what type of housing accommodation was proposed, for whom it was intended or any other relevant details, it was not possible for the petitioners to know whether the acquisition is for a public purpose or not. The notification was accordingly set aside while giving liberty to the respondents therein to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with law. On a careful consideration of the facts borne out by the record and the judicial precedents referred to above, I am of the opinion that the purpose mentioned in the impugned notification, namely, that the land is needed for defence purpose ‘DMRL’, is too vague which does not disclose the precise purpose for which the land is needed. As such, the impugned notification suffers from vagueness, which cannot be sustained in law in the light of the case law discussed above. For the above-mentioned reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notification and the declaration are quashed. This order, however, does not preclude the respondents from initiating fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with law. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.28153 of 2006 and W.V.M.P.No.2516 of 2006 are disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 13th June, 2011 VGB [1] 2008 (5) ALT 233 [2] AIR 2009 AP 15 [3] AIR 1974 SC 2077 [4] (2000) 7 SCC 296 [5] (1992) 2 SCC 168 [6] (1991) 4 SCC 224 [7] (1988) 4 SCC 534 [8] (1976) 3 SCC 719 [9] AIR 1996 SC 497