IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.M.JOSEPH & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS WEDNESDAY, THE 24TH AUGUST 2011 / 2ND BHADRA 1933 MFA.No. 61 of 2011 --------------------------- WCC.45/2008 of THE COMMISSIONER FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, (DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER), ERNAKULAM .................... APPELLANT(S): OPPOSITIE PARTIES: ----------------------------------------------------- 1. SOUTH INDIA CORPORATION LTD., K.P.MENON ROAD, OPPOSITE HARBOUR TERMINAL RAILWAY STATION, WILLINGDON ISLAND, KOCHI-3. 2. SOUTH INDIA CORPORATION LTD., RAIN SEETHAL HALL, 5TH FLOOR, 603 ANNA SALAI POST, CHENNAI-600 006. BY ADV. SMT.P.VIJAYAMMA SRI.V.KRISHNA MENON SRI.U.K.DEVIDAS SRI.PRINSUN PHILIP RESPONDENT(S): APPLICANTS: --------------------------------------------- 1. BEEVI, WIFE OF MAYIN, HOUSE NO.3/137, NELLUKADAVU, FORT KOCHI, PIN-682 001. 2. SHEEBA P.M., HOUSE NO.3/137, NELLUKADAVU, FORT KOCHI, PIN-682 001. 3. ASHEQUE.P.M., HOUSE NO.3/137, NELLUKADAVU, FORT KOCHI, PIN-682 001. 4. RAFEQUEW P.M., HOUSE NO.3/137, NELLUKADAVU, FORT KOCHI, PIN-682 001. 5. SAJITHA P.M., HOUSE NO.3/137, NELLUKADAVU, FORT KOCHI, PIN-682 001. BY ADV. SRI.P.RAMAKRISHNAN SRI.T.C.KRISHNA THIS MISC. FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24/08/2011, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: MFA 61/2011: APPELLANTS' EXHIBITS: ANNEXURE-I TRUE COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DATED 4.1.2011 REGARDING RECEIPT OF THE MEMO. ANNEXURE-II TRUE COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DATED 15.1.2011 REGARDING RECEIPT OF THE MEMO. K.M.JOSEPH & M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, JJ. ----------------------------------------- M.F.A (WCC) No.61 of 2011 ----------------------------------------- Dated, this the 24th day of August, 2011 J U D G M E N T K.M.Joseph, J. Appellants are the opposite parties in the proceedings under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They challenge the order of the Commissioner. The Commissioner has ordered compensation with 12% interest from the date of accident. The substantial question of law which is projected before us revolves around the direction to pay interest from the date of accident. 2. We heard the learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that without adjudication there cannot be any liability to pay interest. It is therefore submitted that the matter is governed by the decision in National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed & Another [2007 AIR SCW 1265], Kamla Chaturvedi v. National Insurance Co. [2008(4) KLT 862 (SC)] and Palraj v. Divisional Controller, NEKRTC [2010-JT-10-94]. They are all judgments rendered by two judges benches. No MFA 61/2011 -2- doubt, they tend to support the case of the appellant. However, we notice that the question engaged the attention of the Apex Court and a bench of four judges in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata [(1976)1 SCC 289] held as follows : “It is wrong to contend that the compensation had not fallen due until it was 'settled' by the Commissioner under Section 19 by his impugned order dated May 6, 1969. The employer became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of employment. There was no suspension of the compensation pending settlement. It was the duty of the appellant, under Section 4A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at the rate provided by Section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the respondent. So in the present facts and circumstances the Commissioner was fully justified in making an order for the payment of interest and the penalty.” It is no doubt pointed out that the said judgment related to a scheduled injury and the facts were different. Thereafter, similar question arose before this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rekha [2007(4) KLT 386]. Therein also, the decision in National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed & Another [2007 AIR SCW 1265] was considered by the Division Bench and MFA 61/2011 -3- it was interalia held as follows : “In Mubasir Ahamed's case, Maghar Singh's case was relied, but, directed to pay interest from the date of award only on the basis of the facts of that case. Wide powers vested in the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Art.142 of the Constitution of India are not available to the Tribunal or even to the High Courts while deciding a statutory appeal. (See the observations in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co.(P) Ltd. (AIR 1996 SC 2005). We are bound by statutory provisions and law declared by the Apex Court as mandated by Art.141 of the Constitution as held in Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdheesan (2002) 2 SCC 420). When there is conflict between the decisions of the Supreme Court, decision of the larger Bench will prevail (See : Mattulal v. Radhe Lal (AIR 1974 SC 1596). In view of the statutory provisions and larger Bench decision, we see no ground to interfere in that part of the order in awarding interest from the date of accident. We also note that this ground was not raised before the Commissioner or even in the appeal memorandum, but only raised as an additional ground by filing petition dated 7.6.2007 in the appeal filed in the year 1998. However, we see no ground to interfere in the impugned award and hence this appeal is dismissed.” However, it is pointed out that the matter is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court against the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. 3. The same view was taken by another Division Bench in an employer's appeal in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. MFA 61/2011 -4- P.K.Ashraf and Others [2009(1) KHC 799 (DB)]. In the light of the said legal position, we do not find any merit in the contention of the appellant. We also notice that this is a case of death and hence we dismiss the appeal. (K.M.JOSEPH) JUDGE. (M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS) JUDGE. MS