THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD DATED 2nd FEBRUARY, 2011 C.M.A.NO. 997 OF 2003 Between: GARIKINA DHANAYYA AND OTHERS ..... Appellants AND DHARMALA NARASINGA RAO @ NARASIMHA RAO AND OTHERS .....Respondents THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD C.M.A.NO. 997 OF 2003 JUDGMENT: This appeal is directed against the dismissal of I.A.No.1522 of 2001 in M.O.P No. 1986 of 1999, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-Cum-I Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, dated 19.08.2002. 2. The petition under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the claimants in M.O.P No.1986 of 1999 was dismissed with reference to the conduct of the claimants before the disposal of the claim for default and also with reference to the alleged non-compliance with the direction of the Court to give notice to the other side in this petition. 3. The claimants contend herein that the Tribunal should have given an opportunity to the claimants, who are poor labourers and should not have dismissed the petition. 4. Heard Sri Akkam Eshwar, learned counsel representing Sri T.M.K. Chaitanya, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Ramachandra Reddy Gadi, learned counsel for the third respondent/insurer. None appeared for respondents 1 and 2, the driver and the owner of the vehicle, before this Court. 5. The point for consideration is whether the impugned order is susceptible to interference? 5. The impugned order referred to the conduct of the respondents in not filing their counters in the main claim petition on 17.08.2001 on which they were set ex parte and further conduct of the appellants in not turning up on 28.09.2001 and 16.11.2001 to give their evidence on which the petition was dismissed for default. It is well settled that conduct prior to any order of dismissal for default is irrelevant in determining the request for setting aside the order of dismissal and it was only the existence of sufficient cause or not for the absence on the day on dismissal for default that is relevant for the purpose. 6. In so far as the reason for the absence on 16.11.2001 is concerned, the Tribunal did not go into that aspect at all and it found fault with the appellants for not giving notice to the other side in spite of the directions of the Court. However, a perusal of the original record shows that after ordering notice to the other side by 13.02.2002, the Tribunal itself endorsed on 13.02.2002 that the respondent was already set ex parte in the main O.P. and hence, posted the matter for hearing the petitioner. Thereafter, the matter was posted on six occasions only for hearing and never for notice to the other side, but ultimately the Court dismissed the application saying that the default in giving the notice as ordered by the Court should result in the dismissal of the petition, which is apparently improper and unjust. 7. In the affidavit in support of the application, the first appellant explained that they are very poor persons living by coolie work and went to Kadapa District for so eking their livelihood due to which they could not attend the Court on 16.11.2001. There was no reason to disbelieve the statement on oath and even the deceased was also a labourer according to the claim. Being compelled to go to a far off place for earning livelihood by labour cannot be considered as a legal disadvantage and, therefore, the appellants can be considered to be having sufficient cause for their absence on 16.11.2001. In view of the length of time for which the claim remained unadjudicated and the economic distress of the appellants, it will be in the interests of justice to invoke the inherent and equitable jurisdiction of this Court to set aside the default order in this appeal itself under the circumstances. It is well settled that rules of procedure are intended to be hand maids of justice and not to punish the parties for their technical lapses. The word sufficient cause always received a liberal consideration from Courts and hence, the appellants have to be given relief accordingly. 8. Sri Ramachandra Reddy Gadi, learned counsel for the insurer submitted that it was no fault of the insurer that the claim was pending for such a length of time and hence, there may be a specific direction not to grant any interest for the entire period till now in the event of the appellants being found entitled to any compensation in the main claim against all the respondents or any of them. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal will undoubtedly determine the right of the claimants to any interest on any compensation in accordance with law and no opinion need be expressed on such a contention herein. 9. Accordingly, the order in I.A.No.1522 of 2001 in M.O.P. No.1986 of 1999, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum- I Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, dated 19-08-2002, is set aside and the said I.A. No.1522 of 2001 is allowed and M.O.P. No.1986 of 1999 be restored to file and the Tribunal shall give notice of the restoration and the date of hearing to the parties to the claim and proceed to determine the claim in accordance with law on merits as expeditiously as possible at any rate within six (6) months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order of this Court. 10. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is ordered, accordingly, without costs. ______________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J 02.02.2011 SP/ KL THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD C.M.A.NO. 997 OF 2003 02-02-2011 SP/ KL