r^ ^fA -<x HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE CHHATTISGARH: BILASPUR (Division Bench) CORAM : Hon'ble Shri S.R. Nayak, CJ & Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. WRIT PETITION N0.2346 OF 2005 ORDER FOR CONSIDERATIQN Sd/- Chief Justice HON'BLE SHRI SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI. J. Sd/- SatishK.Agnihotri Judge POSTFORORDER: L3/12/2005 Sd/- Chief Justice ^ HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE CHHATTISGARH: BILASPUR (Division Bench) CORAM : Hon'ble Shri S.R. Nayak, CJ & Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. WRIT PETITiON N0.2346 OF 2005 PETmONER RESPONDENTS .-^- Mani Shankar Pandey S/o Late Shri Ramkhilawan Pandey, Aged 34 years, R/o Maharana Pratap Nagar, Tifra. Bilaspur (C.G.) VERSUS (1) Unjonoflndia Through: Secretary, Ministry of Petroteum and Natural Gas, Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi. (2) Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, Through: Secretary, 1, Sansad Marg, New Delhi. (3) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Through: Regional Manager, Madina Manzil, Medical College Road, Raipur (C.G.) (4) The Collector & District Magistrate Bilaspur (C.G.) (5) M/s. Astha Service Station, Through: ite Proprietor, Khagendra Manhar, Aged about 41 years, R/o Bhartiya Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.) (6) M/s. Gumber Service Station (Petrol Pump) Through: Proprietor, Sirgitti, Bilaspur, District: Bilaspur (C.G.) Present: Mr. Ravish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Bhishma Kinger, learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2. Mr. Sachin Singh Rajput, learned counsel for respondent No.3. ^.-- Mr. Prashant Mishra, teamed Addittonal Advocate General, with Mr. Sumesh Bajaj, leamed Dy. Govt. Advocate, for respondent No.4. Mr. R.S. Patel, leamed counsel for respondent No^. Mr. P. Diwakar. teamed Sr. Advocate. with h4r. A.S. Kachwaha, learned counsel for respondent No.6. O R 0 E R (Passedon J3 of December, 2005) The following Order of the Court was passed by S.R. Nayak, CJ: - This case brings to the fore how a noble, laudabte and public justice-oriented legal process, that is what we call "F»ublte Interest Litigation" whfch is essentially and initially meant to provide tegal representation to previously unrepresented grou| and citizens. can be misused and abused by unscrupulous persons, without any etement of public interest either in their heart or in mmd, to have their own axe to grind agai'nst an indMdual for an oblique consideration and as a vexatious measure. (2) The facte are simpte, and in brief, they are: The petitioner is a permanent resident of Maharana Pratap Nagar, Tifra in Bilaspur City. The petitioner daiming to be a pm bono pubBc character has filed this writ petition as a Publte Interest Lttigation (hefeinafter referrod to as 'the PIL) to espouse cause of the public at large. The petitioner has stated tfiat the fifth respondent is a business concem which is running a fuel outlet in Bilaspur and at present that fuel outlet is sihiate at Vyapar \fihar in Bilaspur City. The fifth respondent made an applicallon to the Coltector and District Maglstrate, Bilaspur for no objecUon certfficate to shift the ftiel outtet from the existing place to the premises bearing Nos.1435/1 . 143^2, 1436 and 1459. The fourth respondent has granted 'no objedion 't"^ ^.. certificate' to the fifth respondent. It is alleged that ttie flfth responderrt Is shiftinQ fuel outlet in utter violation of the guidelines and norms prescribed jn Circular No.RW/NH-33023/19/99-DO IH dated 31st Augyst 2000 issued by the National Highways Authority. It is also alteged that the fifth responctent did not appty to the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, the seconct respondent herein, for shiffing and setting up Fuet Outlet at a new place as required uncter the circular datBd 31st August 2000. tt is further alteged that if the fifth respondent is permitted to shift Fuet Outtet, it will be totally dangerous to public saf^y and road safety and tt would also cause inconvenience to motwists bavellng on N^iwial Highway No. 200 from Bilaspur resulUng in frequent accidents. In the premise ofthe above altegations, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefe: "In view of facts stated above and the petitioner prays for the following roliefs: 0) That no objection certificate issued by reapondent No. 4 for settfng up of fuel statton wtth dtesel retail outlet at Khasra No. 1435/1. 1435/2. 1436,1459 area 18525 sq. ft., Sec. C, CSIDC Tifra - SJrgitM dated 05.03.05 may be cancelted and quashed in the interest ofjusUce, equity and good conscience. Cii) That the Hon'ble Court be pteased to fssue any other writ or writs, order or orcteis, directton or directfons deemed fit in the interest ofjusfa'ce." (3) This Court having entertained the writ petttjon, by Ws interim order dated 24/06/2005, directed that pending disposal ofthe writ petition, the work for setting up of fuel statton with diesel retail ouUet at Khasra Nos.1435/1, 1435/2, 1436 and 1459 may contfnue, but witl be entirefy at the risk of respondent No.5. ^•1 ^ (4) On service of notice r^pondents 1 and 2, nam^y, Unfon of India and Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, respectively, put in a^pearance and filed their retum on 26/07/2005 virtually reiterating the allegations made by the petitioner smd supporting the writ petition. Respondent No.5 also on service of nodce put in appearance ttirough his counsel and filed an application on 27/07/2005 for vacating the interim order dated 24/06/2005. In the sakl application, the flfth respondent white denying all material altegations leveled against it by the petitioner has alleged that the petitioner is not a pro bono public character; the petiUoner never espoused any cause by way of a PIL eariier; the petitioner is a contractor and the fifth respondent supplied pefrol, diesel and automobile oil to the petitioner on credit basis between 22/05/1997 and 25/07/2004 and he did not ctear the bills for Rs.1,11,735.12 paisa. When the fifth respondent demanded payment of outstanding dues, the pefitioner being annoyed by ttie said demand and in order to harm him, he has filed the writ petition under the garb of PIL. It is also statedthat the proprietor of the fifth respondent is a scheduled caste pereon and the pefitioner has been torturing him mentally not only by not paying outstanding dues but also subjecting him to vexatious litigation. The fifth respondent has also produced bills as document No.1 to show that the petitioner has drawn pefrol, diesel and motor vehides' oil from the Fuel Outlet owned by it. It is also alleged that the status claimed by the petitioner that he is a social worker and pro bono public character and he has been espousing the causes for protwting the public intere^ are all utteriy false and the present writ petition is filed as a vexatious measure to harm the innocent fiffli respondent. (5) We have heard tearned counsel for the parties in great elaboration and for considerable time. It needs to be stated at the ^•T^ ^:'. ^-..- threshold that unfortunately teamed counsel for the ftfth rospondent did not bring to our notice at the threshold of the argumerts about the financial dealings the petitioner had with him and a sum of Rs.1,11,735.12 paisa due from the petitioner towaids supply of pefrol, diesel and automobite oite and the altogations made by him again^ the petjtioner in his application filed by him on 27/07/2005 and that fact was brought to our notice only at the fag end of hearing. Ifthe (eamed counsel for the fifth respondentwere to disdose the uncontroverted facts sfcated by the fifth respondent in his appltcation, perhaps, we woukl not have heard the teamed counsel for the petitioner so long. Leamed counsel tor the petitioner in all faimess, ought to have brought the uncontroverted facts and anegations made against his client in the applicatfon of the fifth respondent dated 27-07-2005 for vacatfng stay. Leamed counsel for the petitioner guardedly withhekl that information from our noh'ce till the last. Furthermore, even after we pointed out to the learned counsd aboirt the msilafkte intention of the petitioner in inslituting this writ petifion by way of PIL, he did take considerabte time to argue and hjghlighton the meritof the case to the detriment of other advocates waiUng for their cases. Learned counsel for the petttioner vehemently argued on brtialf of his dient on the basis of the unfounded altegations made in the wrtt petMion for considerabte time. It needs to be notreed at this stage Mself that the petitioner has not traversed the allegations made by the firth responctent jn his application dated 27/07/2005. Furthermore, even during the course of hearingthe correctness of those anegafions was not contested. (6) ln the premise of the facts bome out from ttie records. the first concem of the Court is v^iettier ttiis Court should entertain dils wtit petition fried by the petittoner as PIL notwithstanding the merit and demerit ofthecase. "X "\^ 6 (7) The petitioner has filed this writ petiUon claiming to be a pro bono public character; he has been taking up the cause of the public to sub-sen/e the public interest. In para 5.1 of the writ petition he has stated that "he is a publte spirited cjtizen who always makes endeavours for taking up the causes for community benefif and that he has approached the Court for redressal for tfie wrong done to general public by way of public interest litigation. The question is whether there is any semblance of truth in the above assertion. It is now satisfactorily established ttiat the petitioner is a contractor and a businessman; he has borrowed petrol, diesel and automobile oils on credit basis from the fifth respondent and he has to pay a sum of Rs.1,11,735.12 paisa to the fifth respondent towards its cost. It is also ctear thatthe present writ petition is the only writ p^ition filed by the petitioner as public interest litigation and before he never filed any writ petition as PIL to espouse the cause of the public at large. Should we say that this PIL is the first attempt of the petitioner; should we say let it be the last attempt of the petttioner also if the same baseness which prompted the petitioner to file this PIL is going to be the base for future PILs also. The Court should throttte any such attempt on the part the petitioner. (8) PIL has been a significant American development. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation m U.S.A., in its report (1976) at pp. 6-7defined PIL thus: "Public Interest Law is the name that has recenfly been given to efforts to provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and intereste. Such efforts have been undertaken in recognltion that the ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segmente of the population and to signfficant interests. Such groups and interests indude the poor, 'EFH 'i^ I, ^. environmenteBsts, consumers racial and ethnic minortttes and others". PJL programmes focus on poltey-oriented cases, where a decision will affect large numbers of people or advance a major law reform objecUve. The consequences extendwell beyond the particular lit^ants. PIL programmes are also designed to provkle legal serwces to und^erved grou|» on matters of immediate concem only to the parties cHrectly invoh^ed. PIL in India has been used for various types of reliefe for undertrial prisoners in jails, amelioration of the conditfons of detentton in protective homes for women, for medical check-up of remand home inmates, prohibition of trafRc in women and relief for their victims, for the retease of boncted labow, enforcement of other labour laws, e.g. full and direct payment of wages to workere or prohibiting the emptoyment of chBdren in construcfion work, acquisftion of cycle rickshaws by licensed rickshaw pullers, relief against custodial violence to women prisoners wWte in police loek-up, for environmental protection, for enforcement of gender equality and protectton from sexual harassment and the like. Such litigation envisages that a Court action by an indjvklual or a group of indwiduats belonging to a community or an indetenninate dass against an administrative wrong, remot^y or equally affecting the members of that community or class; and that a Court action by a public spirited ciUzen or a body ctewted to tiie public cause to vinclicate the rights of indMduate. groups or even the publfc at large against admjnistrative wrongs, though the person or body undertaking the Court action may not have sufFered any injury. Manifokl reasons are stated to justify PILs; it provjdes a means to redress public wrongs which remsnned unremedied under the tradiUonal rutes of focuss standi; the indMdyate or groups suffering from adverse administraUve action may not ttiemsehws be in a positton to undertake litigation to vindfcate their tntoreste because of ® 8 poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, fear and other fonns of socio-economic djsabilities. In S.P. Gupta Vs. Unfw oflndfa (AIR 1982 SC 149) Bhagwafi, J. has pointed out ttiat jndividual rights and dutfes are giving place to meta- jndividual, collective, social rights and duties of ctasses or groups of persons. (9) Two main propositions conceming PILs surface from ttw dwisions of the Apex Court. In S.P. Gupta's case (supra) the Supreme Court has observed thus: ".....whenever there is a pubic wrong or public injury caused by an act or omisston of the State or public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having suffident interest can maintain an adfon for redressal of such publte wrong or public injury." Further the Supreme Court in Peoples Union fWDemoeraffe RlghtsVs. Unlon of/ncffa (AIR 1982 SC 1473) has observed thi® ".....where a person or class of persons to whom tegal injury is caused or tegal wrong is done is by reason or poverty, disabjlity or socially or economically disadvantaged posiUon not able to approach the Court for judicial redress, any member of the public acting bona ffde and not of any ©xtraneous motivation may move the Court ftw jucNcial redress of the legal mjury or wrong suffered by such persoR orclassofpersons." In both the propositions, an emphatic and teree caution is administered by the Supreme Court that the person approaching the Court for redressal of a public wrong or public injury has sufficient interest in the proceedhigs and is acting bona fkte and not for personal gain or private proflt or political moUvation or other oblique considerations. 1 '^ 9 ^- &. (10) The Court, m this case need not ackl much to the abundance of the prindptes goveming PILs. Deating with PILs, the Apex Court, this Court and other High Courts Sn a catena of decisions quite extensh^ely dealt with the quesfions, such as, who can be considered to beapfo bono pubMc character, what kinds of dispute coukl be brought before the Constitutional Courte in the form of PILs, the circumspection to be exercised by ttie Courts b^ore entertaining a PIL, the danger <rf entertaining applications filed underArticto 226 of the Constitution witti a fa9ade or under a garb of PILs. To cite the few are the decisions of th® Apex Court in M.C. Mehta Vs. Unlon of Indla {(1998) 9 SCC 589}: Vlshaka Vs. State ef Rajasthm {(1997) 6 SCC 241}; S.P. Anwwl Vs. H.D. Deve Gmnia {(1996) 6 SCC 734}; Janate Dal Vs. H.S. Chmidhary {AIR 1993 SC 892}, Aixlul Rehman Antulay and ottiws Vs. I^S. Nsyak and another {(1992) 1 SCC 225}; Klshan Patnalk Vs. Stote ofOrissa {1989 (1) SCALE 32}: Sachldanand Pwdey Vs. Stete of W.B. {1987 (2) SCC 295 »AIR 1987 SC 1109); Olga TelHs Vs. Bwnbay Munlcfpaf Corporatlon {(1985) 3 SCC 545}: State of Hlmachal Prwlesh Vs. Parwt of a Studwt MwSlcal College Slmla andothws {(1985) 3 SCC 169}; Bandfiua Muktt Morcha Vs. Unton of Indla {MR 1984 SC 802}; People's Unlon lorDwnocratic Righte Vs. Unton of/ncf/a ( supra); S.P. Gupta Vs. Union oflndla (1 supra): fertllfxerCorpof'atton KagarUnlon, Sindri and othws Vs. Unfon oflndla ancf ottwrs {(1981) 1 SCC 568}; Hussalnarakhatoon Vs. Home Seeretary, State ofBlhar{MR 1979 SC 1360}; Smttbatra Vs. Delhl AdmfnlstrsitSm {AIR 1978 SC 1675}; M.H. Hoskot Vs. Stete of Maharashtra {AtR 1978 SC 548} and the decisions of Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Hanumantha Rao Vs. Prt. Sub- Judge {1997 (4) ALT 444 (DB)}; K. Prabhakar Reddy Vs. State of 10 Andhra Pradesh {1998 (2) ALT 1 (DB)}; fl. Kfotefa^ Vrs. Qwemment of Indla {1998 (4) ALT 738 (DB)}. (11) What can be gathered from these pronouncements can be stated briefly thus: Ordinarily it is the person aggrieved and directfy affected who must seek the relief himself untoss cBsabled from doing so on account of socio-economic disabilities and only in such event the law permits someone etee to seek the relief on his behalf. PIL te essentially to ensure observations of the provisions of the Constitution or the law whteh can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and indivjduate or pubBc interest by permitting any person, acting bona fkte and having genuine interest in maintaining an action for juctidal redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion Uke acffo popularis of Roman Law whereby dtizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict. Individual disputs canno* be subject matter of a PIL and any attempt in that regard should be discouraged by the Court, and it js only in the clearest of cases of generat affectation of right of the community at large or a wide variety of cross-section of peopte, the Court would extend its assistance by entertaintng a PIL so as to avokl any social or general mischief having due regard to the concept of ^isttee. However, only a person acting bona We and having sirfficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a tocus stencSand can approach the Court for the poor and needy, sutfering from viotation of their fundamental rights or other legal rights and to enforce pubtic law duties against the administration. But a pereon for personal galn or private profit or polttical motive or any oblique consideration has no tocus stendl. Slmjlarly, a vexatious petition under the colour or garb of PIL brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold. The Court should not allow jts process to be abused by mere busybodies. 11 l^. meddtesome intertopers, wayfarers or offidous intorvenere having absolutely no pubtic interest in their mind or heart except for personal gain or private profit or political miteage either for themseh^es or as proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or collateral conskleraUon or for gainjng publicity. (12) If the above prindptes are applied to the facts of this case, can it be said that the petitioner is a pro bono public character ? The answer should be emphatic 'No'. There is a total lad< of bona fkte in the action of the petitioner in instituting this writ petition as a PIL. On Ihe other hand, it is satisfactorily established that this writ petition is filed in the garb of a PIL as a vexatious measure, annoyed by the demand by the flfth respondent to pay Mm sum of Rs.1,11,735.12 paisa towards the outstanding dues, being the cost of pefrol, diesel and automobite oils supplied by the fifth respondent. In that vlew of the matter, we are of the considered opinfon that this writ petition does not deserve our aceeptance as a public interest litjgation. The petitioner has abused the process of law to indirecUy achieve his goal to subject the fifth respondent to unnecessary litigative process and thereby to cause harm to him. (13) Before concluding a word or two about the accountabitity of the petitioner in moving this Court by way of peUtion under Articte 226 of the Constitution under the garb of PIL. The tfme of the Court is public time; it is neither the time of the Judges nor the time of the Htigant or his counsel; the public time should be sperrt judiciously and economically; insistence of such rute is adasolutely necessary particulariy Sn the context of alarming pendency of cases in Law Courts and other judteiat and quasi-judicial fora today. The Court's time should not be altowed to be misused or abused by unscrupulous litigants or busy-bodtes in the garb of ^^^^ (@ 12 PJLs. That is also responsibUity cast on the tearned members of the Bar in espousing the cause of the puMic by way of PILs. Lawyer plays a very crucial and important role in public interest litigation. His duty and responsibilrty to the Court in a Public Interest Litigatfon case is even greater in comparison to ysual cases. The Lawyere' repertoire and forensic skills and craftsmanship are central to a purposeftil use ofjudicial processes as instruments of institutional reforms. An Advocate is an integral part of administration of Justice. The tegal fratemity and juclicj»y are the two sides of the same coin. The Court would not be wrong in expech'ng that every advocate would conduct himself in responsible manner and assist the Court properiy in discharge of fliis tegal and constjtutional obtjgations. They do act, ptead and achwcate tfie cause of the clients but their duty to Court is much hjgher than that of serving theh' clients. It is stated that every advocate is an amicus curiae, a friend of the Court; his first loyalty is to the Court and not to his client. The Court's thne is not meant for the satisfaction of the ego of a judge who presides over the Court that he knows the whole law correctly and there cannot be a second opinion on the point addressed to the Court. nor to satisfy the counsel himself who appeara for a party that he could put forth any plea or point irrespective of its tenability in ttie legal premise, nw to pjease a party sitting behind his counsel that his counsel did argue the case on his behatf marvelousfy and to his satisfaction. Adjudicatory deliberations in a Law Court are serious pursuits, and they should recewe responsibte and consfructive co-operation from both the parbwre <rf ttie institution, and both of them shatl practice and do everything at their command to save the precious time of ffie Court without sacrificing justice. Such a course has become imperaUve necessify in the Constitutional Courtewhere the accumulation of the cases is alarming as wetl as long pending. Fruitful @ 13 .^.'^ management of the Court's Ume is need of the hour and that cannot be achieved without constructive co-operation between the Bar and the Bench. (14) Time has come for the Constitutional Courts not only to nip the unscrupulous and unjustified PILs at the bud but also to make the movers of such PILs accountable in concrete terms. Mere disapproval of such PILs by the Courts by way of observations jn the judgment will not help the public justice in the long run. The State spends huge sums of money out of the limited resources to provide, maintain and conduct apparatus of adjudicatory processes. ff ttie Court finds that the adjudicatory process is abused or misused wantonly by a person under the garb of PIL, it is but necessary to make him accountabte for his litigatwe luxury, in order to subserve ttie putrfic interesi Public interest will never be permitted to suffer in a Public Interest Litigation. That can be achieved by imposing exemplary costs. One cannot have the pleasure of an unjustified PIL at the cost of the public just paying Rs. 100/- towards Court fee, a pittance when compared to the actual cost incurred by the State. (15) The Supreme Court in Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdary (supra) expressed its total displeasure and disgust in wasting the Court's time on account of trumpery proceedings initiated under the garb of PILs in the following words: "It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts innumerable days are wasted v^iich time ottierwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigante. Though we are second to none in fostering and developing the newly invented concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to tiie poor, the 14 ^ ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose ftindamental rights are infringed and violated and whose