1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO. 916 OF 2006 WITH SECOND APPEAL NO. 933 OF 2006 Ramesh Vinayak Nehulkar ...Appellant V/s. Laxmibai Shirish Nirhali & Ors. ...Respondents .... Mr.Shriram S. Kulkarni a/w Sachin Chavan, Advocate, for the appellant. Mr.P.S.Dani,Advocate, for respondent nos. 1 to 5 (for resondent no.1 n S.A.933 of 2006). .... CORAM : J.H.BHATIA,J. DATE : 8th September, 2009. P.C. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The suit house originally belonged to the family of the appellant. Sometimes in 1932, the suit property was sold away by the father of the appellant to one Dattaraya Davkhare. According to appellant, even after sale of the property, his father and his family were allowed to continue in possession of the house on payment of Rs. 5/- as monthly rent to the purchaser Dattatraya Davkhare. The respondents purchased a part of the suit property in 1995 and remaining part in 2001. And thus, the respondents became the owner of the 2 suit property. The appellant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 15 of 1997 seeking perpetual injunction against the respondents restraining her from causing obstruction in the possession of the plaintiff. Later on, the respondents filed Regular Civil Suit No. 34 of 2001 for recovery of possession. According to her, the appellant was in occupation only as her licensee since 1992. As he had filed the suit claiming to be tenant, he is no more entitled to be in possession as a licensee. The Trial Court decreed the suit, filed by the appellant and dismissed the suit filed by the respondents. Therefore, she filed Civil Appeal Nos.40 of 2004 and 41 of 2004 challenging the judgment and decree passed in those suits. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeals filed by her. Therefore, these two Second Appeals are filed by the present appellant. 3. Admittedly, the suit property previously belonged to the family of the appellant. In 1932, the property was sold away to Dattatraya Davkhare and thus the family of Dattatraya Davkhare became the 3 owner of the property. Admittedly, on 18 th April 1995, a part of the house was purchased by the respondent and remaining part was purchased on 16 th March 2001 and thus she became owner of the suit property. Thus, title of the respondent no. 1 over the suit property is no more in dispute. According to the respondents, the appellant was only a licensee. While according to appellant, he and his family were in occupation of the property as tenants of Dattatraya Davkhare. It appears from the contention of the appellant, he and his father were in occupation of the house for about 70 years before this litigation commenced. In spite of this, the appellant could not produce any document to show that he or his father were tenants in the premises. No witness including was examined to prove the tenancy. Nobody from the Davkhare family was examined to prove that the present appellant is living or was inducted in the suit property as a tenant. 4. In view of this, there is no material on record to show that the appellant is in occupation as a tenant. Once, the plea of the tenancy is 4 rejected, there is no difficulty in holding that he is in occupation as a licensee. It may be noted that he was inducted as licensee before respondent no.1 purchased the property but that makes no difference. If the appellant would not have filed the suit, she could, terminate the tenancy and seek possession. However, in the present case, the appellant himself filed the suit denying that he was a licensee and claiming to be a tenant. Therefore, the respondent could rightly be granted decree for possession, once the appellant failed to prove his tenancy. 5. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is impossible to hold that the findings of the first Appellate Court are perse perverse and illegal. No question of law is involved in the present appeal. Therefore, both the appeals stand dismissed. 6. As the appeals are dismissed, the C.A. Nos.275 of 2007 & 1557 of 2006 and do not survive. 7. At this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant seeks reasonable time to vacate the premises to which Mr. Dani, learned counsel for 5 the respondent has no objection. With consent of the learned counsel for both the parties, the execution of decree shall remained stayed for a period of one year from this date, subject to the appellants filing an undertaking before this Court within four weeks from this date and shall not create any third party interest or shall not cause any damage to the said property. If the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated period, the respondents-decree holders shall be at liberty to act upon the decree at any time. (J.H.BHATIA,J.)