In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh R.S.A. No. 410 of 1987 Date of Decision: October 28, 2009 Ex. Constable Suba Singh …Appellant Versus State of Punjab …Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. KUMAR Present: None for the appellant. Mr. Rajesh Garg, Addl. AG, Punjab, for the respondent. 1. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 2. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? M.M. KUMAR, J. The sole question of law raised in the instant appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, ‘the Code’) is whether departmental proceedings could continue during the pendency of criminal charge. Brief facts of the case, which are necessary for deciding the aforesaid question, are that the plaintiff-appellant joined Police Department as Constable on 2.6.1976. However, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him in the year 1981 when he was posted in the Police Lines, Ferozepur. The allegation was that on RSA No. 410 of 1987 16.7.1981 when he was serving in Second Reserve Police Lines, Ferozepur, he went to Control Room to seek permission to proceed on leave from Reserve Inspector Gurbux Singh. The Reserve Inspector asked him to go to Mahairir Head Constable of Police Lines for obtaining report as to how many constables were on leave. Thereafter the Reserve Inspector asked him to obtain permission of Lines Officer and then proceed on leave. The plaintiff-appellant is alleged to have abused the Reserve Inspector Gurbux Singh and also slapped him. On the intervention of Naresh Kumar, ASI, and Avtar Singh, Constable, he was forced to leave the room. After holding inquiry in accordance with the rules, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ferozepur, vide his order dated 12.1.1982, dismissed him from service with effect from that date. In respect of the suspension period, the Senior Superintendent of Police observed that whatever he was paid during the suspension period shall be retained by him. The plaintiff-appellant preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, which was still pending at the time when the suit was filed challenging the order of dismissal dated 12.1.1982. The Trial Court after examining the evidence framed the following four issues:- “1. Whether the order dated 12.1.1982 passed by the S.S.P., Ferozepur is illegal, null and void? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD. 2 RSA No. 410 of 1987 4. Relief.” On issue Nos. 1 and 2 the Trial Court after examining the evidence expressed the opinion that departmental proceedings could not continue if the criminal charge is pending. In that regard the Trial Court has placed reliance on the judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, AIR 1980 SC 806, Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 155 and some other judgments of this Court or other High Courts. Accordingly, issue Nos. 1 and 2 were decided against the respondent State and in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. Under issue No. 3, suit was found to be filed within limitation and the same was decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. In pursuance of the findings recorded on all the three issues, the order of dismissal, dated 12.1.1982, was set aside by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 20.3.1986. Aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, the respondent State preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code, which was allowed and the findings on issue Nos. 1 and 2 were reversed. According to the learned lower Appellate Court the departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings could progress side by side and there was no bar in the police rules to the adoption of such a course. The departmental proceedings were concluded on 12.1.1982 whereas the plaintiff appellant was acquitted in the criminal case on 24.7.1984. It was further noticed that the plaintiff-appellant was 3 RSA No. 410 of 1987 acquitted for want of proof beyond reasonable doubt. After reversing the finding on Issue Nos. 1 and 2, the finding on Issue No. 3 with regard to limitation was affirmed. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed and the appeal filed by the respondent State was allowed by the learned lower Appellate Court. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellant has filed the instant appeal. Having heard the learned State counsel and perusing the record with his able assistance I am of the considered view that there is no merit in the instant appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed. The matter is no longer res integra. It is by now well settled that proceedings of criminal case and departmental inquiry can proceed simultaneously though separately. It is further evident that charge against delinquent employee in the criminal case has to be of a grave nature, which involves complicated questions of law and facts and while considering the aforementioned facts due regard has to be given that the departmental proceedings are not unduly delayed. In the present case, the plaintiff-appellant was facing trial under Section 352/332/506 IPC, where concededly he has been acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ferozepur on 24.7.1984. However, punishment of dismissal from service has been imposed upon the plaintiff-appellant by the punishing authority after conducting departmental inquiry and by following due procedure in accordance with rules. It is well settled that unless there is violation of mandatory provisions of Rules, the quantum of punishment cannot be interfered with. In that regard reliance may be placed on the 4 RSA No. 410 of 1987 judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the cases of Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 3 SCC 309; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; and Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386. The Trial Court has only taken into account the fact that since the plaintiff-appellant was acquitted in criminal case, therefore, he was also liable to be exonerated in the departmental proceedings because the charges in the departmental inquiry were the same. The aforementioned view taken by the Trial Court cannot be subscribed because in the departmental inquiry various witnesses have been examined and full opportunity to the plaintiff-appellant was given. There is sufficient evidence on record of the inquiry file to sustain the charges. The inadequacy of evidence in a departmental inquiry cannot constitute the basis for setting aside the findings. It is only in cases where there is no evidence that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer could be set aside. Moreover, the standard of proof required in a criminal case is qualitatively different than what would be required in a departmental inquiry. The object of enquiry and criminal trial are also entirely different. For the aforesaid view reliance can be placed on a catena of judgments rendered in the cases of Ajit Kumar Jog v. Indian Oil Corporation, (2005) 7 SCC 764; Chairman-cum-M.D., T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265; Govind Das v. State of Bihar, 5 RSA No. 410 of 1987 (1997) 11 SCC 361; Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, (1997 (4) SCC 385; Indian Overseas Bank v. P. Ganesan, (2008) 1 SCC 650; Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce, (2006) 10 SCC 572; Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn. v. Mansaram Nainwal, (2006) 6 SCC 366. There are no complicated questions of law or facts. Moreover, the plaintiff-appellant was a member of disciplined force, who was working on the post of Constable. Therefore, proceedings in departmental inquiry cannot brook undue delay. All these questions have been considered by this Court in the cases of Ranbir Singh v. State of Haryana and others (C.W.P. No. 13963 of 2006, decided on 13.11.2006); Prem Singh v. State of Haryana and others (C.W.P. No. 9999 of 2006, decided on 28.10.2006); and A.S.I. Ranvir Singh v. State of Haryana and others (C.W.P. No. 13422 of 2006, decided on 25.8.2006). As a sequel to the above discussion, the question of law raised in the instant appeal is answered against the plaintiff-appellant and in favour of the respondent State. (M.M. KUMAR) October 28, 2009 JUDGE Pkapoor 6