IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.12169 of 2010 1. Ashwani Tiwari S/O Rameshwar Tiwari R/O Pokhranhan, P.O.Atiri, P.S.Nasariganj, Distt-Rohtas Versus 1. The State Of Bihar , Through The Chief Secretary Bihar, Patna 2. The Secretary Labour And Employment Department Bihar, Patna 3. The Controller Of Examination Directorate Employment And Training Campus-I.T.I. Null Digha, Bihar, Patna 4. The Principal , The Industrial Training Institute Gaya ---------------------------------- 2. 25.11.2011 Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the State. The relief sought is for issuance of the certificate and the mark sheet for the ITI examination at which the petitioner appeared in the year 2000. It is contended that he took admission at the ITI Gaya, in the Session 1998-2000. After completing the course he filled up the forms for appearing at the final examination in the trade of „Fitter‟. He successfully cleared the examination but his results are not being published. He had passed Matriculation Examination in the year 1998 and possessed requisite eligibility for admission to the I.T.I. Course. At this stage for publication of the result unnecessary questions were being raised with regard to confirmation of his Matriculation mark sheet. Repeated representations including directions by the Controller of the Examination have evoked no response necessitating the writ petition. In the nature of the vocational course he is also affected in pursuit of a livelihood. Counsel for the respondents from the counter affidavit filed by the Respondents 2 and 4 has taken an objection that the writ petition has been filed ten years after the examination. It should be rejected on the ground of delay. The second objection taken is that the petitioner 2 was granted admission in the Fitter trade during the session 1998- 2000 contrary to the condition of eligibility as he did not possess the minimum qualification of 60% marks in the Matriculation Examination required for admission, a fact not in dispute as he had passed in the second division. This admission being contrary to law, the results cannot be published. The counter affidavit does not allege any misrepresentation or manipulations by the petitioner to obtain admission to the course consciously aware of his ineligibility for not having 60% marks and that but for such manipulations he would not have secured admission. The petitioner presented his papers for admission. The persons entrusted to examine his documents of eligibility for admission, slipped unintentionally or intentionally. The Court would have expected the respondents to be fair enough to acknowledge that fact situation for their own lapses rather than oppose the writ petition at this stage. The conduct of the respondents of adopting the stand of holier than thon pinning the responsibility on the petitioner alone and absolving themselves by a misconceived self appraisal is not possible to uphold. The conduct of the respondents has to be measured by the same standard that they profess to act. The petitioner has completed the course successfully and cleared the examination is not denied. From the public point of view, a seat was denied to another candidate and given to the petitioner. Public funds have been spent on teaching and training him successfully. The petitioner participated in the course successfully and now can claim proficiency. It is a professional vocational course. The practice of the profession by the petitioner will benefit the society and the petitioner both. To deny publication of his result at this stage would set at naught not only the public funds, the time spent in his education, 3 the expertise given to him and deny him the right to pursue a vocation. That shall not be either to the benefit of the society or the petitioner. In (1976) 1 SCC 311 (Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshtra University), considering a similar challenge for refusal to publish result after the candidate was permitted to pursue the course and appeared at the final examination denied on the ground that he was wrongly been permitted to pursue the course, the Supreme Court has held at paragraph 7 as follows:- “7. It appears from the averments made in the counter- affidavit that according to the procedure prevalent in the college the admission forms are forwarded by the Head of the Department in December preceding the year when the examination is held. In the instant case the admission form of the appellant must have been forwarded in December 1971 whereas the examination was to take place in Apri1/May 1972. It is obvious that during this period of four to five months it was the duty of the university authorities to scrutinise the form in order to find out whether it was in order. Equally it was the duty of the Head of the Department of Law before submitting the form to the university to see that the form complied with all the requirements of law. If neither the Head of the Department nor the university authorities took care to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the appellant committing a fraud did not arise. It is well settled that where a person on whom fraud is committed is in a position to discover the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved. It was neither a case of suggestio falsi, or suppressio veri. The appellant never wrote to the university authorities that he had attended the prescribed number of lectures. There was ample time and opportunity for the university authorities to have found out the defect. In these circumstances, therefore, if the university authorities acquiesced in the infirmities which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part I examination in April 1972, then by force of the university statute the university had no power to withdraw the candidature of the appellant.” In (2009) 1 SCC 610 (Guru Nanak Dev University v. Sanjay Kumar Katwal) similarly the candidate was allowed to pursue the professional course successfully. At the stage of publication of the result objection taken was that the grant of admission itself was wrong. 4 Repelling the argument the Supreme Court held at paragraph 19 to 21 as follows:- “19. The first respondent was informed that he was not eligible only after he took the first semester examination. He has, however, also been permitted to continue the course and has completed the course in 2007. He has succeeded before the High Court. Now after four years, if it is to be held that he is not entitled to admission, four years of his career will be irretrievably lost. In the circumstances, it will be unfair and unjust to deny the first respondent the benefit of admission which was initially accepted and recognised by the appellant University. 20. This Court in Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University has observed that before issuing the admission card to a student to appear in Part I Law examination, it was the duty of the university authorities to scrutinise the papers; and equally it was the duty of the Head of the Department of Law before submitting the form to the university to see that it complied with all requirements; and if they did not take care to scrutinise the papers, the candidature for the examinations cannot be cancelled subsequently on the ground of non-fulfilment of requirements. 21. In Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University this Court held where the candidate was admitted to the Law course by the Law College and the university also permitted him to appear for Pre-Law and Intermediate Law examinations, the college and the university were estopped from withholding his result on the ground that he was ineligible to take admission in the Law course.” The submission on grounds of delay for ten years does not appeal to the Court. The rejection of a writ application on the ground of delay is no law but more a matter of discretion to be exercised by the Court on the facts of each case. Where no third party rights are affected and the answerability lies primarily with the respondents themselves, as in the present case, by furnishing a ground not tenable in the law, the Court is not persuaded to uphold the objection of delay. The course pursued was vocational in nature which can endear to the petitioner for his life time. A stultified interpretation of the principle of delay would not be doing justice. 5 Let the result of the petitioner be published within a maximum period of six weeks from the date of receipt and/or production of a copy of this order before the respondent concerned. The writ application stands allowed. Snkumar/- (Navin Sinha,J.)