IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO:16726 of 1999 Between: M/s. U Foam Private Limited ..... PETITIONER AND The Commissioner of labour and others .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:MR. M.SRIKANTH FOR MR. M.PANDURANGA RAO Counsel for the respondents:NONE APPEARED The Court made the following : ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a writ of certiorari to quash order, dated 08.07.1999 in PG.No.3 of 1998 on the file of respondent No.2. The petitioner also sought for a direction that PG.No.3 of 1998 be heard by any other Assistant Commissioner of Labour. I have heard Sri M.Srikanth, learned counsel for the petitioner. No one appeared for the respondents. On the application filed by respondent No.4, respondent No.2 initiated proceedings for payment of gratuity against the petitioner under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short ‘the Act’). While the proceedings were pending, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.14039 of 1999 alleging that respondent No.2 developed ill will against the petitioner. The said writ petition was disposed of on 22.07.1999 by this Court by observing that the petitioner’s application filed before the Commissioner of Labour seeking transfer of the case was pending and, therefore, the writ petition cannot be entertained. This Court, however, directed the Commissioner of Labour to dispose of the transfer application within a period of two weeks. But, even before the said writ petition was disposed of, respondent No.2 passed order on 08.07.1999, allowing application of respondent No.4 and directing payment of Rs.57,323/- towards gratuity to him. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner company averred that respondent No.3 is highly prejudiced against the petitioner company. The basis for this averment is that when the petitioner company’s Advisor Sri Yadagiri Reddy attended the conciliation proceedings before respondent No.3, the latter asked him to get out of her chambers and not to represent the management and that when PG.No.3 of 1998 filed by respondent No.4 was posted on 16.06.1999, the petitioner’s counsel Sri M.V.Rama Rao represented the case before respondent No.3 and she asked the counsel to bring the Director of the petitioner company who signed the vakalat to give evidence on behalf of the management. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No.3 informed the petitioner’s counsel that she would not accept the evidence of any other personnel unless the Director himself comes and gives evidence in the proceedings and that when the counsel resisted, respondent No.3 told him that she would not hear him and asked him to leave the room and get the senior counsel. Respondent No.3, who was impleaded in her personal capacity filed counter-affidavit wherein she referred to the dates on which the case was posted. It is relevant to reproduce paragraph 7 in this connection. “It is submitted that in view of the above it is clear from the above chronological events that the respondent had suffered ex parte orders on various occasions and the same was set aside in the interest of justice even then the respondent did not avail that opportunity at the final stage as such the PRESIDING OFFICER set ex parte against the respondent management and heard the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner and pronounced the order in accordance with law.” In paragraph 9, respondent No.3 denied the allegation that she is highly prejudiced against the petitioner. She also denied the allegation that she asked the counsel for the petitioner to bring the senior counsel. While prejudice or bias is certainly a relevant ground to vitiate the proceedings, mere apprehension of bias by itself is not enough, but there must be strong basis for such an apprehension. Respondent No.3 categorically denied the allegations. In fact, the events narrated by her clearly show that at least once she set aside the ex parte order and restored the case. Had there been any such prejudice or bias against the petitioner, respondent No.3 would not have restored the case. It is not the case of the petitioner that there were any personal disputes between the petitioner and respondent No.3. Even assuming that respondent No.3 has displayed harsh attitude towards the petitioner in conducting the proceedings that by itself would not justify the petitioner’s apprehension that respondent No.3 has decided the case against the petitioner’s interest on account of prejudice. Therefore, I find no merit in the plea of the petitioner that the order passed by respondent No.2 is vitiated on account of prejudice or bias against the petitioner. Admittedly, the order impugned in this writ petition is appealable under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, in my view, interests of justice would be met, if the petitioner is permitted to file an appeal against the impugned order. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted six (6) weeks’ time to file appeal before the appellate authority. If such an appeal is filed within the time stipulated above, the appellate authority shall entertain and dispose of the same on merits after hearing both the parties. Subject to the above observations, the writ petition is disposed of. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 31st DECEMBER, 2008. kvni