1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. SECOND APPEAL No. 542/2010. Motiram Chindkaji Bhorkhade Versus State of Maharashtra and others. ________________________________________________________________________________ Office Notes, Office Memoramda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders of directions Court's or Judge's orders. and Registrar's Orders. _______________________________________________________________________________________ CORAM : R.M.SAVANT, J. DATED : 13.01.2011. Heard Shri S.T. Harkare, the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned A.G.P. for respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The above Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 29.10.2010 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.41/2010. By the said judgment and decree, the orders passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit filed by the present appellant/plaintiff came to be confirmed. The appellant claims to have taken land on lease from a tribal, who has been allotted the said land as a 2 Tribal. The provisions of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 are, therefore, attracted. A preliminary objection was therefore, raised on behalf of the defendants i.e. the State and its Authorities that the suit as filed is, not maintainable in view of the bar as contained in Section 36(C) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Both the Courts below have after taking into consideration the sweep of Section 36(A)(1) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, as also the bar of jurisdiction as contained in Section 36(C), have held that the suit as not maintainable. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant by his learned Counsel that since the land was transferred by a tribal to a tribal, the provisions of Section 36(A) were not attracted and therefore, the bar under Section 36(C) of the Act would not come into play. In my view, the said submissions cannot be countenanced in the teeth of provisions of Section 36(A) of the Act, which prohibits any transfer by a tribal without the permission of the Collector. The said provisions have been incorporated with the avowed 3 objective of protecting the tribal land holders. The reasoning of both the Courts below therefore, cannot be faulted with. In my view, no substantial question of law arises in the Second Appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. No costs. JUDGE Rgd