IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (M/S) No. 765 of 2009. Smt. Chanderkanta Wiz W/O Late Roshan Lal Wiz, R/O Mohalla Niyazganj, Almora. ……. Petitioner. Vs. 1. Madan Mohan Bhatt, 2. Anil Kumar Bhatt, Both S/O Late Krishananand Bhatt, R/O Jauhari Mohalla, Almora. … Respondent. Sri Sharad Sharma,Senior Advocate with Sri Pramod Bailwal, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Pradeep Hairiya, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents. Date June 22, 2009. P.C.: Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. Both the parties are ready to argue the writ petition finally at the admission stage. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment and order dated 10- 06-2008 (Annexure no.3) passed by Prescribed Authority, Almora, in Rent Case No. 3 of 2005 Madan Mohan Bhatt and another Vs. Smt. Chandrakanta Wiz as well as the judgment and order dated 1-4-2009 (Annexure No. 5) passed by the District Judge Almora in appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of the Prescribed Authority. By the order dated 10-6-2008, the Prescribed Authority allowed the application for release of accommodation moved by the landlords under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) and allowed two months time to the petitioner to vacate the premises in dispute. By the order dated 1-4-2009, the learned District Judge Almora upheld the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority and dismissed the Rent Appeal No. 2 of 2008 preferred by the petitioner. 3. Relevant facts giving rise to the present writ petition, in brief, are that the respondents, who claimed themselves to be the owners and landlords of the accommodation in question, filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act with the allegation that they are landlords of the Building No. 103 of 96 recorded in the municipality. The premises in question as detailed in paragraph no. 1 of the application was given under the tenancy of one Roshan Lal Wiz (husband of the petitioner) at the monthly rental of Rs. 40/- per month. Said Roshan Lal died on 20-1-205 leaving behind the petitioner as tenant in the premises in question. Landlords moved the application for release mainly on the ground of bona fide need of applicant no. 1 Madan Mohan Bhatt, who is doing business in a shop owned by Municipal Board Almora. The landlords also alleged in the release application that the husband of the petitioner has already constructed a new triple-storeyed building within the municipal limit which is within a close distance from the disputed premises and in two storeys of the building the petitioner was running the business of Aarat and retail shop of goods after the death of her husband and now the petitioner has sublet her won shops to other person. Therefore, on the ground of bona fide need, the application under Section (21)(1)(a) of the Act was moved before the Prescribed Authority. The application was contested by the petitioner by filing his written reply. It was contended therein that the application for release of accommodation has not been moved by all the three sons of the original landlord late Krishananand Bhatt. The need of applicant no. 1 has been questioned. Regarding building of her husband Rohan Lal, she stated that the said building belongs to Roshan Lal and one Kishan Lal co-owners and the petitioner earns her livelihood from the business run in that building. Subletting of the shop/Aarat has been denied by the petitioner. It was further contended that the application no. 1 had given other shops of his ownership on rent but no application has been moved for release of those shops. It was also contended that the applicants are doing business jointly in the main market in the name and style of Sumangalam Restaurant and they have no bona fide need for the premises under the tenancy of the petitioner. It was lastly contended that the application has been moved on imaginary grounds. 4. The applicants-respondents in support of their application filed affidavits of the applicants and affidavit of Girish Chandra Bhatt and some other documents, which are detailed at page no. 7 and 8 of the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority. the tenant- petitioner filed her own affidavit and counter affidavit and its enclosure. Commission reports paper nos. 55-C and 61-C were also filed on record. 5. Learned Prescribed Authority after hearing both the parties and on perusal of all the evidence filed before her, while dealing with the bona filed need of the landlords-respondents has observed that the applicant no. 1 Madan Mohan Bhatt is doing his business in a shop owned by Nagar Palika Almora and the applicant no. 2 Anil Kumar Bhatt has no concern with that shop. It was also observed by the Prescribed Authority that Sumangalam Restaurant is in the exclusive ownership of applicant no. 2. The prescribed Authority also came to the conclusion from the commission reports that the house of the landlords is meant for residential purpose and is ancestral property. It was also observed that from the affidavit of the tenant the fact that the house of the landlords is a joint property and the same can be used for residential purpose is established. It was also observed that the applicant no. 1 is doing business in a rented shop is admitted to the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority has ultimately held that the need of the respondent-landlords in bona fide. 6. On the point of comparative hardhisp, after perusal of the documentary evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that the petitioner-tenant is having her own separate building and she is running Aarat therein. It was categorically held by the Prescribed Authority that the balance of comparative hardship also tilted in favour of the landlords. Accordingly, the application for release moved by the landlords was allowed vide order dated 10-6-2008 and the petitioner was directed to vacated the disputed shop within two months. 7. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Rent Appeal No. 2 of 2008 before the District Judge, Almora. The learned appellate court also recorded its separate findings on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship and dismissed the appeal by order dated 1-4- 2009 which have rise to the present writ petition. 8. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the impugned judgment passed by the court below. 9. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 is limited. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the court concerned. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 675 that “On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercise for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be estab lishe by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the error in drawing inferences like a court of appeal. 10. The first contention of the learned senior counsel Sri Sharad Sharma appearing for the petitioner is that the applicant no. 1 has a shop let out by the Nagar Palika, which is sufficient to run his business. It is an admitted fact that the applicant no. 1 does not have his own independent shop to run his business. The Prescribed Authority has elaborately dealt with this aspect in the impugned order. This contention does not help the petitioner and it cannot be said that the need of the landlords in not bona fide. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the applicants have their own business in the main market of Almora and they are running a shop in the name of Sumangalam Restaurant. This contention of the petitioner is not tenable. There is categorical finding of fact by the Prescribed Authority that the said restaurant is in exclusive ownership of applicant no. 2 Anil Kumar Bhatt and applicant no. 1 has no concern with the said business. 12. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Prescribed Authority is perverse because the business of Aarat is a joint business of the co-sharers and there is no independent business of the tenant. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that the Prescribed Authority at page 16 of the impugned order has held that the tenant has not adduced any evidence to show that the property in question is joint, while in the Municipal assessment record the house is entered in the name husband of the petitioner and it was not shown by the petitioner that the said house also belongs to Kishan Lal. The electricity bill also exists in the name of Sri Roshan Lal, who was husband of the petitioner. 13. From a bare perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 10-6-2008 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority, it is obvious that Prescribed Authority has examined the evidence led by the parties and after perusal of the evidence, the Prescribed Authority has recorded categorical finding of fact that the applicant no. 1 Madan Mohan Bhatt does not own any shop to run his business and the need of applicants if bona fide. It was also held that if the release application is rejected, the landlord shall suffer greater hardship than the petitioner. There is concurrent finding of fact that the need of the landlord-respondent is bona fide. I do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned order. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed outright. 14. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that two years’ time may be given to the petitioner to vacate the disputed shop. The learned counsel for the respondents-landlords, on the basis of instructions received from the landlords-respondents, submitted that the landlords have no objection if the petitioner is given one year’s time to vacate the disputed premises, provided she continues to pay the damages/rent at the agreed rate for that period and on her furnishing a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority that she will vacate the premises within one year from the date of his order and deliver peaceful possession to the landlords. 15. The writ petition is dismissed with no order to costs. The petitioner is granted one year’s time to vacate the disputed shop and to deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord- respondents, provided the petitioner furnishes an undertaking to that effect within a period of eight from today and deposits the rent/damages due, if any, before the Prescribed Authority concerned and continues to pay month to month rent by the 7th of each month for the previous month. (B.S. Verma, J.) RCP