1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR JUDGMENT Dharmendra Vs. Shankarlal & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8141/2008) S.B. Civil Writ Petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Date of Order :- 28th July, 2010 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.S. CHAUHAN REPORTABLE Mr.Biri Singh Sinsinwar, for the petitioner. Mr.V.L. Mathur, for the respondents. An application (7431/2010) has been filed for bringing on record the legal representatives of the respondent No.3, Bitthaldas. For the reasons stated in the application, the application is, hereby, allowed. Since the amended cause title has already been filed, the same shall be taken on record. Mr. Biri Singh Sinsinwar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has requested this Court to decide this case on the ground that the appellate court is about to pronounce its judgment in near future. Mr. V.L. Mathur, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 & 2, and according to him, he has verbal instructions from the respondent Nos.3/1, 3/2, 3/3 &o 3/4 to present their interest as well, does not object to this case being decided finally by this Court. Although this case is listed in the category of 'Orders' before this Court today, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court proceeds to decide this case finally. 2 The petitioner has challenged the order dated 29.07.2008, passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.3, Ajmer Camp Kishangarh, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the petitioner's application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for taking the registered sale-deed dated 08.09.1998 as well as the Commissioner's report dated 05.04.2000 on record. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the defendants. In the suit, he had pleaded that he is the owner of a house in the old city of Kishangarh. Along with the plaint, he had submitted a site plan showing the size of the house i.e. 18 fts. 3 Inch from 'A' to 'B' and again 18 fts. 3 Inch from 'E' to 'F'. However, at the place marked as 'C', it was clearly given out by the plaintiff that this place has been left out for the purpose of drainage of water. However, he alleged that the defendants tried to take possession of a part between 'A' and 'B' at the place marked as 'C'. Thus, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The defendants filed their written statements and denied the averments made in the suit. After going through oral and documentary evidence, vide its judgment and decree dated 03.07.2002 the learned trial court had decreed the suit. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, he filed an appeal before the first appellate court. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner submitted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and prayed that the registry dated 08.09.1998 with regard to the property in dispute, as well as the 3 Commissioner's report dated 05.04.2000 should be taken on record as additional evidence. The defendants filed their reply to the said application. However, vide order dated 29.07.2008, the said application was dismissed. Hence, this petition before this Court. Mr. Biri Singh Sinsinwar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that during the course of the trial, the petitioner was unable to submit the registry of the house as the same could not be located. Since the registry of the house was discovered subsequently, the petitioner was justified in trying to produce the said registry as an additional piece of evidence. Moreover, despite the existence of the Commissioner's report dated 05.04.2000, the same has not been taken into consideration by the learned trial court. Therefore, the petitioner was also justified in requesting that the Commissioner's report dated 05.04.2000 should be taken on record as an additional piece of evidence. Thirdly, relying on the case of Eastern Equipment & Sales Limited Vs. Ing. Yash Kumar Khanna [(2008) 12 SCC 739], the learned counsel has contended that in fact, the appellate court ought to have decided the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC along with the appeal. It is his contention that the learned appellate court could not have taken the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC separately from the appeal. Fourthly, basing his contention on the case of Lachhman Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Representatives & Ors Vs. Hazara Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Representatives & Ors. [(2008) 5 SCC 444], the learned counsel has contended that in case a document is required by the appellate court in order to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, the learned 4 appellate court should have allowed the application and should have taken the document in question on record. Lastly, relying on the case K. Venkataramiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors. [AIR 1963 SC 1526], he has contended that in case a document can shed light on the controversy in issue, and assists the court in doing complete justice to the parties, then the appellate court should have allowed the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. On the other hand, Mr. V.L. Mathur, the learned counsel for the respondents, has strenuously argued that the circumstances, in which the power under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC can be invoked by an appellate court, have clearly been laid down by the said provision. The said power cannot be invoked in order to permit the petitioner to fill up a lacunae in his case or in order to permit the appellate court to decide a case in a particular manner. In order to substantiate this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Mahendra Kumar Parshottam Bhai Desai (Dead) By LRs. [(2006) 9 SCC 772]. Secondly, the petitioner as PW-1 had already admitted in his testimony that indeed, the registry of the house was done. Moreover, he had denied the suggestion that he was intentionally not submitting the copy of the registry. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner was well aware of the existence of the registry of the house. Moreover, had he worked with due diligence, the said registry could have been procured by him during the course of trial itself. Thus, there is no cogent explanation given by the petitioner in his application for the non-availability or non-production of the said registry. Thirdly, according to the petitioner himself, he had clearly admitted in his testimony that the 5 point of dispute, namely point 'C' is not under his ownership. Therefore, even if the defendants were trying to raise a construction, the said construction was being raised on a piece of land which was not under the ownership or possession of the petitioner. Therefore, the production of the registry would not throw any light on the controversy involved in the case. Fourthly, the Commissioner's report already existed in the record of the trial court. Therefore, there was no reason to bring the said Commissioner's report by way of additional evidence. Hence, the reasons given by the learned Judge for rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are legally valid. Therefore, the learned counsel has supported the impugned order. The mute issue before this Court is whether the learned appellate court has rightly exercised its power under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC or not ? Section 107(d) of CPC empowers an appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. Order 41 Rule 27 CPC further enumerates the circumstances in which the said power of taking the additional evidence can be invoked by an appellate court. Order 41 Rule 27 CPC reads as under : O. 41 R. 27 : Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court : (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court. But if - (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or 6 (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. A bare perusal of the provision clearly reveals that as far as Sub-clause (a) and Sub-clause (aa) are concerned, the circumstances enumerated therein are specific. According to Sub- clause (a), the said power can be invoked in case the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit a piece of evidence that ought to have been admitted. However, that is not the case presently. Sub-clause (aa) requires the party to establish that even after the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was neither within his knowledge, nor could it be produced by him before the decree appealed against was passed. However, Sub-clause (b) bestows a discretionary power on the appellate court to require that “a document be produced or a witness be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause”. The words “enable it to pronounce judgment” were interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the 7 case of K. Venkataramiah (supra). The Apex court has observed as under : In view of what the High Court has stated in this passage it is not possible to say that the High Court made the order for admission of additional evidence without applying its mind. It seems clear that the High Court thought, on a consideration of the evidence, in the light of the arguments that had been addressed already before it that it would assist them to arrive at the truth on the question of Seetharam Reddy's age if the entries in the admission registers of the School were made available. It was vehemently urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was such a volume of evidence before the High Court that it could not be seriously suggested that the Court required any additional evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment". The requirement, it has to be remembered, was the requirement of the High Court, and it will not be right for us to examine the evidence to find out whether we would have required such additional evidence to enable "us" to pronounce judgment. Apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment" but also for "'any other substantial cause." There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence "'to enable it to pronounce judgment," it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence "for any other substantial cause" under R-27(1) (b) of the Code. (Emphasis added). It is easy to see that such requirement of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect become apparent on an examination of the evidence. That is why in Parsotim Thakur Vs. Lal Mohar Thakur, 53 Ind App 254 : (AIR 1931 PC 143) the Privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted observed:- "It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial 8 cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but "when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent." Obviously the test established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that in case a point remains obscure and in case the document is in position to clarify the said point, only then should the additional evidence be taken on record. In the present case, the benefit of power under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC cannot be given to the petitioner for the following reasons : firstly, in his application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the petitioner has not pleaded that despite the evidence produced by both the parties, an obscure point still needed to be clarified. And the documents sought to be produced, as additional evidence, would clarify the said point. Although the said contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this court, the learned counsel has still failed to show the existence of an obscure point which can be clarified by the registry of the house. Therefore, this case does not pass the test as established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Venkataramiah (supra). Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the benefit of Order 41 Rule 27(b) CPC should be given to the petitioner. But the petitioner has failed to demonstrate both before the first appellate court, and before this Court that even after due diligence, he could not procure a copy of the registry during 9 the course of the trial. Since the petitioner has himself admitted that the registry was done, therefore, the existence of the registry was very much within his own knowledge. The petitioner has not shown what steps he had taken to procure a copy of the registry. He has merely offered an excuse that since the papers were lying haphazardly, the said registry was buried under the papers. Such an explanation is no justification, for the petitioner could have gotten a copy of the registry from the office of the Registrar during the course of trial. Hence, the requirement of Order 41 Rule 27(b) CPC has not been fulfilled by the petitioner. Even the learned Judge has duly noticed this point. Therefore, the reasoning given by the learned Judge for dismissing the petitioner's application cannot be faulted. Thirdly, in his testimony, the petitioner has admitted that the point in dispute, namely point 'C', is not within his ownership and possession. Thus, the submission of the registry would not throw any light on the ownership or possession of the petitioner. Therefore, the document in question is not germane to the controversy in issue. Again this was point noted by the learned Judge for dismissing the application. Thus, the logic of the learned Judge is above reproach. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the case Lachhman Singh (Deceased) Through LRs (Supra) is highly misplaced. In the case of Lachhman Singh (Deceased) Through LRs (Supra), the entire issue was whether the suit filed was within the period of limitation or not ? Since the suit was for redemption of the mortgage of 1913 and the suit was filed on 30.12.1970, therefore, the deed of mortgage was absolutely essential 10 for calculating the period of limitation. It is in these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that “the High Court has erred in rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.” In fact, a bare perusal of para 18 of the report clearly reveals that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that “we are of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstance of this case, the respondent should be permitted to adduce the evidence”. Hence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not lay down a universal principle that in every case an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is filed, it should be allowed ipso facto by the appellate court. In the case of Muncipal Corporation for Greater Bombay Vs. Lala Pancham of Bombay & Ors. [AIR 1965 SC 1008] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that though the appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the requirement of the said court must to be limited to those cases where it found to be necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where, even without such evidence, it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. This observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been approved and relied upon by the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Parshottam Bai Desai (Dead) by LRs (Supra). It has also been the consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as reflected in 11 catena of cases that power under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC cannot be invoked by a party so as to fill in the lacunae left by the party during the trial. In the present case, since the petitioner had ample opportunities to submit the copy of the registry, he cannot invoke the power to fill in the gaps left by him in the trial. A bare perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals that the petitioner in his testimony had clearly admitted that the registry was existing and was readily available. Thus, he was duty bound to produce the registry during the course of trial itself. The explanation given by the petitioner is highly unbelievable as the document is readily available in a public office. In case the petitioner had exercised due diligence, he would have had access to the said document and he would have been in a position to produce the same before the learned trial court. Since his suit has been dismissed on the ground that he has not been able to establish his title over the land in question, he cannot be permitted to now fill in the said lacunae by producing the registry before the appellate court. Moreover, since the petitioner in his testimony had already admitted that the point of dispute 'C' is not under his ownership or possession, the registry-document would not throw any light on the point involved in the controversy. The taking the additional evidence on record would be an empty formality. Therefore, the learned Judge was certainly justified in rejecting the application on this ground alone. The learned Judge is further justified in holding that since the Commissioner's report was readily available in the record of the trial court, the same would have been considered by the trial 12 court itself. The petitioner has not made out any case that the said evidence was not admitted by the trial court. Therefore, the benefit of Order 41 Rule 27 (a) CPC cannot be given to the petitioner. A bare perusal of the impugned order lastly reveals that the learned Judge has given cogent and legal grounds for rejecting the application. Hence, there is neither any perversity, nor any illegality in the impugned order. Thus, this petition is devoid of any merit. It is, hereby, dismissed. (R.S.CHAUHAN)J. Manoj Solanki-