WMT’W %§m@?i% @ IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR CHHATTISGARH . (DB) 1 (WRIT APPEAL UNDER SECTION 2 OF CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT (APPEAL TO DIVISION BENCHI ACT 200g) [II/IL. Ajgalle, S/o Shri MD. Ajgalle, aged about 53 years, presently posted As Assistant Sub Inspector, Police Station Pandri, District — Raipur (C.G.) Writ Appeal No. £4 /2010 APPLICANT PETITIONER VERsus f, NON-APPLICANTS : 1. State of Chhattisgarh, RESPONDENTS Through Secretary, Home Department, D.K.S. Bhawan, Mantraiaya, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Director General of Police, Police Head Quarter, Raipur, District — Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Inspector General of Police, Raipur Range, Raipur, District — Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 4. Deputy Inspector General of Police/ Senior Superintendence of Police, Raipur, District — Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Superintendence of Police, Raipur City, District — Raipur (Chhattisgarh) ‘ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH‘AT BILASPUR‘ DB: Hon’ble Shri Justice LM. Quddusi and Hon’ble Shri Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra Writ Appeal No.74 of 2010 Appellant M.L.Ajgalle verSUS Respondents State of Chhattisgarh and others Present: Shri Prakash Tiwari, cpuns'el for the appellantf ’ é Shri Vinay Harit, Deputy Advocate General for the State/respondents. Writ Appeal under Section 2 of the Chhattisqarh Hiqh Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 ORAL ORDER (Passed on21S‘ April, 201 0) Per LM. Quddusi, J.: Learned counsel for the appellant is heard on admission. 2. This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated'23—2—2010‘ passed by theile‘a‘rned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S.) No.5246/2007 dismissing the writ petition. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the writ appellant was given a minor punishment to thekeffecti oi stoppage. gt one increment for a period of one year only on the basis of calling for an explanation and submission of his reply with a charge that he was entrusted with investigation of a criminal case registered for the offences punishable under Sections:363. and %366‘:oftheulhdianaPenali Code :withv regard to ‘ kidnapping of a girl. During investigation, the writ appellant recovered the kidnapped girl from the house of acCused/kidnapper but did not take any action against him regarding his arrest or any other action despite the specific instructions issued by the City Superintendent of 2 Police, Urla, Raipur in that regard and also did not proceed with the (2/ investigation and thereby committed serious misconduct and insubordination. The said minor punishment order was set aside by the inspector General of Police and thereafter proper charge-sheet was submitted and a disciplinary enquiry was conducted in which the writ appellant was punished by the Deputy Inspector General of Police- cum-Senior Superintendent of Police imposing a punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect for one year. Thereafter, the writ appellant preferred an appeal, which was dismissed. Ultimately, he approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (8.) No.5246/2007, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge against which the instant writ appeal .Lihas f been tiled. ¥ 4. Learned counsel for the writ appellant has raised a contention that the learned Single Judge has ignored the fact that the Senior Superintendent of Police was not competent to pass the punishment order of stoppage of one incrementiwitha’cumulativeaeffect for one year (Annexure P-14 in the writ petition). But, on perusal of the said punishment order, it is found that the same was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police—cum-Senior Superintendent of Police, Learned counsel for the writ appellant has submitted that the Senior Superintendent of Police was holding the charge of Deputy Inspector General of Police. If it is so, it cannot be said that the order of punishment impugned in thewrlt .Kp‘eltitlvon‘wals\vigoti,pais’sjed by the A Deputy Inspector General of Police, as, at the relevant time, the Senior ‘ Superintendent of‘ Police was also holding the charge of Deputy Inspector General of Police and was designated as Deputy Inspector General of Pdlice also. y , “ ‘ \\‘ - -\¥_l $ 5. Regulation 222 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations recites the powers of Deputy Inspector General of Police, according to which, the Deputy Inspector General of Police has been given power to inflict on Head Constables, Constables, Assistant Sub-inspectors, Sub- lnspectors and officers of equivalent ranks any of the punishments specified in Regulations 214 and 215. In Regulation 214 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations, various kinds of punishment are mentioned. They are censure, withholding of promotion, withholding of increments of pay including stoppage at an efficiency bar or stagnation allowance, reduction to a lower post or time scale or reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specmed period with further direction as to whether or not the member of the Subordinate Police Service will earn increments of pay or the stagnation allowance, as the case may be, during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the further increments of his pay ‘or stagnation allowance, recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government or to any fund maintained for the welfare of the Police by negligence or breach of orders, removal from the service which does not disqualify from future employment, dismissal from the service which ordinarily disqualifies for future employment and compulsory retirement. Therefore, the Deputy Inspector General of Police is empowered to impose punishment even for dismissal from the service, which ordinarily disqualifies for future employment. t r6. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the Deputy Inspector , General of Police was not having power to inflict a punishment of I \t NV, FMS c: may”. stoppage of one increment with cumulative effectfonone year, « \\ )1 7. The next contention raised by Iearne counsel for the writ appeHant is that second enquiry could not have been heid. Learned counsel has placed reiiance on the decision in Kanailal Bera vs. Union of India and others, (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 63, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has inter alia held that once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding, a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry wouldbe directedto (be ipiti‘ate’d on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry. l 8. The above case of the Supreme Court is not applicable in the instant matter, as in the instant matter, in fact, no enquiry was held previously and only an explanation was called‘for; for which the writ appellant had submitted his reply and a minor punishment was awarded, but the same was set aside by the inspector General of Police and thereafter a regular enquiry in accordance with the‘ rules by submission of charge-sheet was initiated, therefore, it cannot be said that enquiry initiated subsequent to the order of punishment, which was set aside by the Inspector General of Police, was a second enquiry. ’ Further, in Kanailal Bera vs. Unionwof [India-and others (supra), in the first enquiry proceedings, the charges could not be proved and thereafter the second enquiry proceedings were initiated, but in the instant case, neither any enquiry was conducted at all nor it was at any 4. \s d / different to the facts of the instant case. 9. Further, learned counsel for the writ appellant has also raised a contention that the applicationfor providing permission to engage an Advocate was rejected by the disciplinary authority. On query, learned counsel for the writ appellant has'conceded that from the side of the department, no Advocate was engaged and even a presenting officer was not appointed, therefore, thisCourtrhas neroccasion ito'interfere in the order passed by the disciplinary authority rejecting the application to grant permission to engage an Advocate. 10. We see no good ground to interfere in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge; 11. Therefore, we dismiss this writ appeal at the admission stage upholding the order passed by the learned Single Judge. No order as tocost$;////l ‘i ,. w. N IN //'/_, Sdl— H I MLQuddusx‘. e a a ' Jddger , eye. Sd/— ' Prashant KumanMlshra Judge , xi l ’ ‘ l i i i