HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR W.A.No. 1277 of 2002 Date: 15-12-2010 Between: M/s Sanghi Textiles Limited ……. Petitioner and Government of Andhra Pradesh and others ………… Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR W.A.No. 1277 of 2002 JUDGMENT: (Per BPR, J) The appellants are the writ petitioners who were unsuccessful in seeking the relief of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing W.P.No.236 of 2001, whereby they sought for a writ of Mandamus declaring the entire acquisition proceedings in pursuance of the notification purportedly issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) vide G.O.Rt.No.4518, dated 27-11-2000 and the notification, dated 30-11-2000 under Section 6 of the Act, as published in the local newspaper on 04-01-2001 and 06-01-2001 respectively, in respect of the lands belonging to the appellants in Sy.Nos.379/2 and 514/2 situated at Koheda and Anajpur villages of Hayatnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, as illegal. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge as per the orders, dated 11-10-2001. 2. Briefly, the facts, which involved in the present case, are that the appellants claimed to be the owners and possessors of the lands in the aforesaid survey numbers to an extent of Ac.3-01 guntas, which is sought to be acquired by invoking the provisions of the Act, and proceedings were issued for acquisition of those lands purportedly under Section 4(1) of the Act and declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 30-11-2000, which was followed by the publication in the local newspapers on 04-01-2001 and 06-01-2001. 3. The main contention urged on behalf of the appellants- petitioners before the learned single Judge was that though the acquisition is admittedly for the purpose of a company, there is no mention about the same in the notification, nor the procedure as contemplated under the provisions of the Act was followed. Further, having regard to the facts and circumstances, there could not have been any dispensing with of the enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. 4. The learned single Judge, after taking into consideration the entire chequered events which preceded and followed up later the aforesaid notification issued under the provisions of the Act, did not find favour with any of these contentions and rejected the same holding that the appellants-petitioners were aware of the entire nature of acquisition and the purpose for which it is being sought and therefore, no grievance can be made for the procedure for acquisition in respect of a company as provided for under the said Act and there is no warrant or necessity for holding an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, and accordingly, dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the Appeal. 5. During the course of arguments, there is a reiteration of the selfsame grounds as urged before the learned single Judge in assailing the correctness of the entire impugned action of acquisition mainly on the ground that the procedure to be followed for an acquisition intended for a company, as provided under the provisions of the Act, has not been adhered to and secondly, having regard to the chequered events and the facts and circumstances, there is no justification for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. These submissions were once again sought to be repealed on behalf of the respondents who, apart from supporting the reasons given by the learned single Judge, tried to justify the entire impugned action. 6. In view of the above submissions, the point, which boils down for consideration, is whether the order of the learned single Judge is correct and whether it requires any reconsideration? 7. There is no dispute of the fact that the acquisition of the land in question to an extent of Acs.3-01 guntas is for the purpose of laying a road to the benefit of respondent No.4 herein, which is a private concern, and has nothing to do with any public purpose as such of the State. The facts reveal that it is only at the instance of respondent No.4, the entire process is initiated and followed up by invoking the State’s power of eminent domain under the provisions of the Act. 8. Few facts, which necessarily need to be referred, are that on the representation filed by respondent No.4 on 16-04-1997 seeking for the land for the purpose of their access by way of a road, the matter was referred to the Collector on 14-05-1997 for Report in terms of Section 40(1)(b) of the Act. The Collector held an enquiry with due notice to the parties. During the said enquiry, the appellants-petitioners have submitted the representation on 28-07-1997 requesting to drop the entire proceedings of acquisition. The purpose is sought to be reiterated by Respondent No.4 as per their applications filed on 09-12-1997. In view of the controversy, a letter was given on 20-01-1998 to the Joint Director to inspect and submit a Report. Accordingly, the Joint Director conducted inspection and submitted a Report on 20-04-1998 stating that the land is not useful for cultivation. Basing thereon, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted a Report on 20-05-1998 to the Collector recommending for the acquisition. The Collector submitted a Report to the Chief Commissioner, who in turn submitted a Report to the Government on 29-07-1998. Thereupon, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.427, dated 02-02-1999 appointing a Screening Committee to go into these aspects and Report. Accordingly, the Screening Committee submitted a Report on 04-10-1999 to the Government proposing for the acquisition. Based thereon, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.458, dated 08-11-1999 granting permission for the acquisition. There has been some variation in regard to the land and accordingly, a fresh G.O.Ms.No.107, dated 25-03-2000 was issued restricting acquisition for Sy.Nos.379 and 514. It is on this basis, the present impugned notification purportedly was issued in G.O.Rt.No.4518, dated 27-11-2000 and accordingly, the notification was published under Section 4(1) of the Act and final notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 30-11-2000 and the local publications in a newspaper appears to have been made on 04-01-2001 and 06-01-2001. Once again the appellants have submitted the representation on 28-07-1997 proposing acquisition. Under the aforesaid notification, by invoking Section 17(2) of the Act, the enquiry, which is normally held to be mandatory and prerequisite under Section 5-A of the Act, was dispensed with. It is at this stage, the present proceedings have been initiated by the appellants challenging acquisition. 9. From the above stated chequred events, which are not only undisputed but also can be born out from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it shows that there is a claim and opposition between respondent No.4 and the appellants herein in respect of the acquisition. There is no dispute to the fact that the appellants are the owner of the land in question having absolute right, title and interest and also possession. There is also no dispute to the fact that the acquisition is only for the purpose and benefit of the respondent No.4, a private company. No doubt the attempt apparently on the part of the Government was to enquire and find out the feasibility for such purpose of laying a road for the convenience of respondent No.4, however, the fact remains that it is only for a purpose intended for a private company. There is no dispute on the part of the respondents herein that under the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act or the decisions taken, there is no mention about the purpose for which it is being acquired namely for the benefit of the company. There is no explanation coming forth on behalf of the respondents as to why such purpose is not indicated or disclosed when the final notification is sought to be issued by invoking Section 4(1) as mandatory and contemplated. Especially when so much water has been flowing from the bridge coming from the date of representation of respondent No.4 as long back as on 16-04-1997 and the other enquiries being conducted and Reports obtained and the purpose itself is being one for such company, the absence of the intent and mentioning of the purpose for the company, on the face of it, is fatal and does not appears to be justified. Further, having held such a detailed enquiries before issuance of the notification on 27-11-2000 and obtained reports from various quarters even though it appears that the Collector held an enquiry, during which the appellants-petitioners opposed the very acquisition, but the appellants-petitioners are not parties to the Reports which have been at various points of time on 20-04-1998, 29-07-1998 and 04-10-1999. When the appellants’ proprietary and vested rights are being sought to be interdicted, there is no reason as to why they are not made parties to such Report nor any communication thereof. The appellants are totally kept in dark about all these Reports and the purpose for which they are being obtained and also no opportunity is being given to them either to rebut the contentions therein or to substantiate their own case. Admittedly except holding a formal enquiry by the Collector before somewhere in the latter part of 1997, there was no notice whatsoever in nature later either by the Collector or by any of the authorities who submitted the said Reports. There was no prior notice whatsoever to the appellants herein by those authorities, who submitted the Reports on 20-04-1998, 29-07-1998 and 04-10-1999 nor there is any notice or any opportunity given to the appellants before issuance of the ultimate decisive proceedings by the Government on 08-11-1999 or even on 25-03-2000 which preceded the issuance of the impugned notification on 27-11- 2000. There is no explanation forthcoming as to why such opportunity is not given especially when the Government is armed with so many Reports at various points of time from various authorities as well. 10. Thus, prima facie, we are of the view that having proceeded to act upon the request of respondent No.4, which is a company for a private purpose, the State’s power of eminent domain could not have been made use thereof for such purpose at the cost or detriment to the substantive right vested in the appellants. It is also now held that for an acquisition, which is necessarily points out for the purpose of a company, the procedure as contemplated under Part-VII of the Act is held to be mandate. Neither the said procedure is followed nor any opportunity is given to the appellants herein much less the very notifications do not indicate that the acquisition as such is for a company. There is absolutely no justification much less valid reason coming forth on behalf of the respondents herein as to why the factum of acquisition for a company is being suppressed and also as to why the procedure contemplated under Part-VII of the Act is not taken recourse nor followed up in the manner as contemplated under the law. Except trying to justify the acquisition by invocation of the powers as contemplated under the provisions of the Act, no other valid aspect is pointed out to justify the action, which is only for the benefit of respondent No.4. These facts, on the face of it, would amply show that apparently the authorities are only trying to lend hand to respondent No.4, but not to lend any ear to the appellants whose lands and property is being meddled with. 11. Coming to the invocation of the powers under Section 17 (2) of the said Act for the purpose of dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, it is to be seen that the very same telltale facts would amply throw out any justification for such invocation. Having held a repeated knock by the different authorities and obtained Reports which, on the face of it, are behind the back of the appellants and not provided for with any opportunity to rebut or substantiate their own case, it cannot be said that there is any such urgency which really warrants an immediate action on the part of the Government to go for such acquisition. All these aspects could have as well been duly considered in an enquiry as provided for under Section 5-A of the Act by duly providing all the papers, documents, reports etc. as sought to be relied on or which have been obtained by the authorities at different levels and also allowing the appellants to substantiate their own case by proper rebuttal. There should have been an enquiry as mandatorily contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. It is now well established that such an enquiry as provided under Section 5-A of the Act is not only necessary, but also mandate the authorities to go into all these aspects. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the learned single Judge was not right in disallowing the contentions of the appellants as set forth. 12. For the reasons mentioned above, we are not agreeing with the reasons given by the learned single Judge while rejecting the aforesaid aspects. In the circumstances, we hold that the entire impugned proceedings, including the notification issued on 27-11- 2000 apart from the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act thereof on 30-11-2000, are held to be illegal and void and accordingly, they are set aside. 13. The Writ Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.236 of 2001, dated 11-10-2001 is set aside and consequently, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. _________________ B. PRAKASH RAO, J ________________ SANJAY KUMAR, J Date: 15-12-2010 YCR