- 1 - IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION No. 2212 OF 2007 Ravindra Narayan Joglekar, ) Indian Citizen, Age about 50) years, Occu.- Business, ) Residing at 3807, BRATTON ) Street, Sugar Land ) Texas-77479, U.S.A. ) Petitioner Vs. 1. Encon Exports Pvt. Ltd. ) A company incorporated ) under Indian Companies Act 1956 having its registered office at 2047, Sadashiv ) Peth, Second Floor, Kakade Building, Pune-411 030. ) (Through its authorised ) person Mr. Sanjay Shashikant Joglekar) ) 2. The Secretary, Home Department, Mantralaya Mumbai. ) 3. The Police Commissioner, ) Commissionerate Office,Pune 4. The Secretary, ) Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, ) New Delhi. ) 5. The Regional Passport Office through Passport Officer, ) Manish Commercial Centre, ) 216-A, Dr.A. B. Road, Worli Mumbai 400 025. ) 6. The State of Maharashtra Respondents Mr. Shrihari Anney, Sr. Counsel with M. S. Mohite, Advocate for the petitioner. - 2 - Mr. S. S. Kulkarni with Shri Sachin Chavan, Advocate for respondent No.1. Mrs. S. D. Shinde, APP for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 7. Mr. D. N. Salvi, Advocate for respondent Nos. 4 to 6. CORAM : SRI R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR,& SRI. A.A. SAYED, JJ. DATE : FEBRUARY 27, 2008. ORAL JUDGMENT [PER : R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.] . Rule. By consent, the rule is made returnable forthwith. The advocates for the respondents waive service. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner is seeking relief in the nature of direction to restrain the respondent from proceeding in any manner with the extradiction proceedings stated to have been initiated against the petitioner in connection with Criminal Case No. 10025 of 2003 pending on the file of J.M.F.C. (AC) Court Pune and consequently to review and recall of the order dated 17th April 2006 passed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 272 of 2006 and also to quash and revoke the order dated 22nd September 2005 - 3 - passed by the Regional Passport Office, Mumbai impounding the passport issued in the name of the petitioner. 3. The respondent No.1 had filed Cri. Writ Petition No. 272 of 2006 seeking the reliefs in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or direction to the respondents in the said petition which included the Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Maharashtra, Police Commissioner Pune, State of Maharashtra, the Secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, and Union of India for completing all the formalities under section 19 and other sections of Extradition Act, 1962 and to make provision for extraditing the accused from U.S.A. to India as early as possible and within a time bound programme to ensure the presence of the petitioner who has been arrayed as accused in Cri. Case No. 10025 of 2003. This Court by order dated 17th April 2006 disposed of the said petition granting the said relief. 4. It is contention of the petitioner that this Court was made to believe that the - 4 - offence, for which the petitioner is sought to be prosecuted in Cri. Case No.10025 of 2003 before the J.M.F.C. Pune, is an extraditable offence within the meaning of the said expression under "Extradition Treaty" between the Government of Republic of India and the Government of the United States of America, when in fact the said offence is not an extraditable offence within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the said Extradition Treaty. 5. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is sought to be prosecuted in the said Cri. Case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Section 138 reads thus- "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in - 5 - whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: . Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) the payee or the holder in due course - 6 - of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice." 6. The said Extradition Treaty provides under Art. 1 thereof that "the Contracting States agree to extradite to each other, pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty, person who, by the authorities in the Requesting State are formally accused of, charged with or convicted of an extraditable offence, whether such offence was committed before or after the entry into force of the treaty". Article 2(1) of the said Treaty provides that, "an offence shall be an - 7 - extraditable offence if it is punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty, including imprisonment, for a period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty". 7. Plain reading of Article 2(1) would reveal that an offence to be an extraditable offence under the said Treaty, it has to be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period more than one year. The provision clearly speaks of deprivation of liberty and it further specifically provides that imprisonment shall be for a period more than one year or by a more severe penalty. Specific provision, to the effect that the period should be more than one year or that the more severe penalty would obviously mean the punishment of the nature of imprisonment for more than one year. It would naturally warrant punishment of nature of deprivation of liberty for a minimum period of one year or more. 8. If we peruse section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act quoted above, it is - 8 - apparent that there is no compulsion to impose an imprisonment as such for the offence under the said section 138 of the Act. It is in the discretion of the Court to impose penalty of imprisonment while convicting the accused person under section 138 of the Act. If the court decides to impose the imprisonment, it can extend it for a period of two years. The discretionary power given to the Court to impose or not the imprisonment, merely because it can extend to a period of two years, that itself would not mean that the punishment prescribed for the said offence is an imprisonment for minimum period of one year or above. Being so, the petitioner is justified in contending that the offence for which the petitioner is sought to be prosecuted does not prescribe a minimum imprisonment for more than one year. On this count itself, the petitioner is justified in contending that the authorities erred in initiating extradition proceedings against the petitioner. 9. Although the order in proceedings for extradition is sought to be challenged on various other grounds, it is not necessary to - 9 - deal with those grounds, as the offence for which the petitioner is sought to be prosecuted is not extraditable offence within the meaning of the said expression under Article 2(1) of the Extradition Treaty. The proceedings for extradition are, therefore, not maintainable and on this ground itself the order dated 17th April 2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 272 of 2006 is required to be recalled. It is settled law that in case the order passed by the Court is patently contrary to the provisions of law, the same cannot be allowed to remain in force as it can result in great prejudice and irreparable loss to the parties. Plain reading of the order dated 17th April 2006 would apparently disclose that the same was passed on the basis of uncontested submissions made on behalf of the petitioner therein and without adjudicating the issue as to whether the offence in question was extraditable offence or not. An order totally contrary to the provisions of law, if allowed to remain in force, is bound to cause irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. No amount of technicalities can abstain this court from exercising its plenary - 10 - jurisdiction to do the needful to wreck the wicked wrong. In the circumstances, the said order cannot be allowed to remain in force and hence, the petitioner is entitled for recall of the said order. 10. As regards the challange to the order of impounding of the passport, it is rightly pointed out by the learned advocate for the respondent that the same is appellable under section 11 of the Passport Act 1967. Besides the points of challange would also require appreciation of certain facts which exercise is not possible in writ jurisdiction. Therefore, it would be appropriate to allow the petitioner to challange the said order by way of an appeal. Needless to say that in case such an appeal is filed, the authorities will have to take into account the fact that the petitioner was pursuing the matter by way of writ petition and therefore, question of bar of limitation cannot arise while dealing with the appeal. However, such an appeal will have to be filed by the petitioner within eight weeks from today and on filing of such an appeal, the competent authority shall hear - 11 - the same in accordance with the provisions of law, comprised under the Passport Act and the Rules made thereunder, and shall dispose of the same within four weeks from the receipt of said appeal after hearing the aggrieved party. 11. The records disclose that the Magistrate had already proceeded to exercise the powers in terms of section 105 Cr.P.C. It appears that the concerned authorities instead of taking the necessary steps in accordance with provisions of law, had chosen to proceed with the proceeding for extradition of the petitioner. The competent authorities to take note of this fact and act according to the provisiosn of law, subject to outcome of the Writ Petition No. 3671 of 2006, pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. 12. In the result, therefore, the petition partly succeeds and while recalling the order dated 17th April 2006 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 272 of 2006, the present Writ Petition is allowed with the directions, as stated above and consequently the Criminal Writ Petition No. 272 of 2006 stands - 12 - dismissed. The rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to cost. Sd/- [ R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.] Sd/- [ A. A. SAYED,J.]