1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.2239 OF 2009 Mr.Vikram Anantrai Doshi & Ors. : Applicants (Orig.Accused 1 to 3) V/s. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. : Respondents .... Mr.Shirish Gupte, Senior Advocate, i/b.Mr.Harshad Bhadbhade for the applicants. Mr.D.N.Salvi with Mr.S.R.Shinde for C.B.I. Mr.K.V.Saste, Addl. Public Prosecutor for State. .... CORAM : B.R. GAVAI, J. DATE : APRIL 22, 2010. P.C.: Rule, returnable forthwith. The learned counsel for the respective respondents waive service. Heard by consent. 2. By way of the present application, the applicants are praying for quashing and setting aside Criminal Proceedings being C.C.No. 85/CPW/06 pending before the learned Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s 19th Court at Esplanade, Mumbai, for offences punishable under sections 406, 467, 468, 471 r/w. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2 3. The applicants were original accused nos.1, 2 & 3. The allegation as to be gathered from the charge-sheet against the present applicants is that one company named as M/s.ATCOM Technologies Ltd. (ATCOM) of which the applicants are Directors was taking Term Loans from various term lending institutions and working capital from a consortium of seven Banks headed by Dena Bank. It is the prosecution case that the loan was sanctioned by Bank of Baroda on the request of ATCOM so as to take over 15% share of the total working capital already sanctioned by the consortium of Banks and for an additional working capital in the form of Non-Fund Based Credit. It is further alleged that upon sanction of the loan, the entire amount was to be transferred to two of the existing consortium members, viz., UTI Bank and Federal Bank. It is the allegation of the prosecution that the facilities which were released in favour of the said ATCOM were in violation of certain regulations of the Bank. Accordingly, charges for offences punishable under sections 406 and 420 read with section 120-B of the I.P.C. were made against the present applicants along with the Officers of the respondent no.2-Bank. However, it appears that subsequently, finding no material to proceed against the officers of the respondent no.2-Bank, proceedings against the said officers for offences punishable under section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act came to be dropped. A charge-sheet came 3 to be filed against the present applicants. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings, the matter has been amicably settled between the parties and the respondent no.2-Bank. Consent Terms have been duly filed in the proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The respondent no.2-Bank has issued a No Due Certificate to ATCOM. In this background, the present application has been filed for quashing the proceedings. 5. Mr.Gupte, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, submitted that since the matter has been amicably settled between the applicants and the respondent no.2-Bank, the pendency of the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility. 6. Mr.Salvi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-C.B.I. vehemently opposed the application. He submits that in view of the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Ravishankar Prasad & Ors. [(2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 1063), the present application is liable to be dismissed. 7. Mr.Salvi further relied on the order of the learned single Judge of this Court in Criminal Application No.2049 of 2009 (Mr.Jamboo 4 Bhandari & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.) decided on 4.1.2010. 8. I had an occasion to consider identical matters in Criminal Writ Petition No.2808 of 2009 (Tejas Kirtikumar Salot & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.) along with connected petition, decided on 5.3.2010 wherein I have observed in paragraph 8 thus:- “8. No doubt, the reliance placed by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Ravishankar Prasad & Ors. [(2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 1063] is well-founded. However, it can be seen that on facts, the said case is distinguishable. In the said case, the allegations were against the customers and officers of the respondent-Bank to the effect that the said customers in collusion with some officers of the Bank had committed forgery, fabrication of documents, use of document as genuine and, therefore, the offence under section 120-B read with sections 420 and 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 were committed. In the said case, after 5 92 witnesses were examined in the trial, the matter was compromised between the Bank and the customers and the High Court invoking the powers under section 482 had quashed the proceedings at that stage. In this factual background, the apex Court found that since the trial was at an advanced stage, the High Court had erred in quashing the charge against the respondent nos.1 and 2 i.e. the customers of the Bank. It could be noted that in the said case, an application was filed after 92 witnesses were examined and that too for quashing of the proceedings only insofar as customers of the Bank and not against other accused who were officers of the Bank and who were also charged with offences punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.” 9. In this present case, it can clearly be seen that though initially there were allegations against the officers of the Bank under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, subsequently proceedings against the Officers of the Bank have been dropped, finding no material against the said officers to proceed further. The only allegations that 6 remains against the present applicants now are for the offences punishable under sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 10. Both the offices under sections 406 and 420 are compoundable with the permission of the Court. As already discussed hereinabove, the Bank has already given its No Due Certificate to the borrower i.e. ATCOM. It can clearly be seen that even if the matter is permitted to go for trial, no fruitful purpose would be served, except burdening the criminal Courts which are already over-burdened. I find that the facts of the present case are more similar to the facts in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab [(2008) 4 SCC 582] where in paragraph 6, the apex Court has observed thus:- “6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the mater alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be 7 utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.” 11. In that view of the matter, I find that a case is made out for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., for quashing the proceedings. The rule is, therefore, made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). B. R. GAVAI, J.