IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRDESH:: HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TEN PRESENT:: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY C.R.P.No.3724 OF 2010 Between: Sheshojjala Shanker …Petitioner A n d Gopichand Katiyar ..Respondent HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY C.R.P.No.3724 OF 2010 ORDER: This civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 31-05-2010 in I.A.No.48 of 2010 in I.A.No.364 of 2009 in O.S.No.17 of 2006, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad, wherein the said applications filed under Section 148 read with 151 CPC, was dismissed. 2. Heard both sides. Perused the records. 3. The respondent herein filed the suit against the petitioner/ defendant for recovery of an amount of Rs.3 lakhs on the strength of a promissory note. The petitioner/defendant filed written statement denying the execution of the promissory note and borrowal of the said amount. He also filed I.A.No.364 of 2009 for sending the suit promissory note Ex.A-1 to Government expert for comparison of the signatures. The trial Court allowed the said petition, directing the petitioner/defendant to deposit Rs.5,000/- towards expenses of the expert on or before 30-01-2010. According to the petitioner, he was suffering from typhoid from 15-01-2010 and was bed-ridden and, therefore, he could not deposit the amount within the time. The trial Court dismissed the said petition on 30-01- 2010 due to default of non-deposit of the expert expenses. The petitioner further pleads that after recovering from typhoid he came to Asifabad on 17-02-2010 and came to know about the dismissal of the petition. He, therefore, filed I.A.No.48 of 2010 on 18-02-2010 for extension of time granted for deposit of the amount. The respondent/plaintiff filed a counter opposing the application mainly on the ground that as the conditional order was not complied with, the petition was dismissed and extension of time is not permissible. The trial Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the said application, holding that the conditional order was not complied and, therefore, I.A.No.48 of 2010 was not maintainable because it was not filed within the time prescribed for depositing the amount. 4. It is not disputed that a conditional order was passed by the trial Court on 19-01-2010 in I.A.No.364 of 2009 directing the petitioner/ defendant to deposit Rs.5,000/- on or before 30-01-2010 with a condition that in default of deposit, the petition shall stand dismissed. It is also not disputed that the application in I.A.No.48 of 2010 under Section 148 CPC was filed on 18-02-2010 i.e., subsequent to the date on which the time granted for making the deposit expired. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff is that the petition not having been filed before the expiry of the time granted for making the deposit and the conditional order having worked itself out on 30-01-2010, extension of time cannot be granted on a subsequent date. In that connection, he relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in PEDA NASAR SAHEB V. PERECHERLA NABI SAHEB[1] wherein it was held that “the period prescribed under Section 148 CPC can be extended only during the currency of the previous order and once the order has become defunct, no question of extending the time made under that order can arise.” 6. Section 148 CPC lays down as follows:- Enlargement of time – Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period (not exceeding thirty days in total) even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. A plain reading of the above provision would disclose that the Court has ample power to enlarge the period originally fixed even though the period originally fixed or granted might have expired. Thus, the petition for extension of time under Section 148 CPC can be filed even after the time originally fixed or granted might have been expired or over. 7. I n ANDHRA RICE MILL, HYDERABAD V. BELLAM CHANCHAIAH & CO.[2], a Division Bench of this Court held as under: “Under Section 148 C.P.C. extension of time can be granted even on an application asking for it but filed after the relevant date of payment fixed by the conditional order (in this case 15-1-1965) had passed and even though that conditional order says that the petition would stand dismissed if the payment was not done on or before the date indicated (in this case namely 15-1-1965). The lower Court had jurisdiction to grant extension of time in the present case”. In the above case, the decision of the Supreme Court in MAHANTH RAM DAS V. GANGA DAS[3] was followed, wherein it was held as follows: “Held that the High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment. Section 148, in terms, allowed extension of time, even if the original period fixed had expired, and S.149 was equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. An order extending time for payment, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired. The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. Sections 148, 149 and 151 clothed the High Court with ample power to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause was made for extension”. It was further held as follows: “cases are known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed”. It is, therefore, clear from the above decision that time granted or allowed by the Courts can be extended even after final order has been passed and it is operated. 8. In RAMESH BEJOY SHARMA V. PASHUPATI RAI[4], three days time was granted to the appellant by the Court to take steps for fresh service of notice on the respondents, ‘failing which the appeal shall stand dismissed without further reference to Bench.” Repelling the contention that since the direction was not carried out, the appeal stood dismissed and no more survived for consideration on merits, the Apex Court held that “when the Court fixes time for doing a certain thing, it retains the power to extend such time”. 9. In view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, it must be held that even in case of conditional order, the Court can exercise the power under Section 148 and enlarge the time even after the period fixed or granted had expired. 10. I n GANESH PRASAD V. LAKSHMI NARAYAN[5], a relevant portion of the conditional order striking out the defence of the tenant was as follows: “….on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of the order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck out and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment.” Interpreting the expression “shall” as mandatory, the High Court held that “once a default is found, the Courts are powerless, the statutory consequences are bound to follow.” Setting aside the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that “where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.” 11. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff that in view of the conditional order passed by the trail Court, the application filed seeking extension of time subsequent to expiry of original period is not maintainable, cannot be accepted. 12. Even otherwise, the Court can certainly invoke the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC and extend the time in the interest of justice. In the circumstances and having regard to the fact that the application for extension of time has been filed within 20 days from the expiry of the original period, it is considered that the petitioner/ defendant be permitted to deposit the amount of Rs.5,000/- towards the expenses for expert opinion, condoning the delay in making the deposit, by invoking the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. 13. The impugned order is, therefore, held liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. The petitioner is directed to deposit the amount of Rs.5,000/- within two weeks from today. 14. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ G.V.SEETHAPATHY, J 10th December, 2010 Lrkm. [1] A.I.R. 1957 AP 780 [2] 1968 (2) ALT 115 [3] AIR 1961 SC 882 [4] AIR 1979 SC 1769 [5] AIR 1985 SC 964