MC 3759/2010 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY The instant application, under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short hereafter referred to as the Act), is for condonation of delay of 1566 days in filing the accompanying review petition for a reconsideration of the judgment an d order dated 29.05.2006 passed in CRP No.441/2003. I have heard Mr. BK Das, learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. D Mazumdar, learned counsel for the opposite party. The opposite party had instituted Money Suit No.01/1997 in the Court of Civil Ju dge (Sr. Divn.), Sibsagar, praying for a decree for an amount of Rs. 2,99,018.00 along with other amounts together with future interest at the rate of 18% per a nnum from the institution of the suit till the realisation thereof. The applican ts contested the claim and, eventually, by the judgment and order dated 22.05.20 00 the suit was decreed in full as above. An application for review of the said decision was made by the applicants, which was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 113/2000, which also failed having been rejected by the learned trial court vide its order dated 30.07.2003. Being aggrieved, the applicants approached this Cou rt with CRP No. 441/2003. When this review petition was called on for hearing on 29.05.2006, the applicants were found unrepresented. The revision petition, how ever, was disposed of on merit on that date declining to interfere with the judg ment and order dated 30.07.2003 passed by the learned trial court in Misc. (J) C ase No. 113/2000. The accompanying review petition, as referred to hereinabove, is one seeking a reconsideration of the judgment and order dated 29.05.2006. By the time, the same had been filed before this Court a delay of 1566 days had occ urred. The application discloses the fact that none had represented the applicant on 29 .05.2006, the day on which the revision petition was heard by this Court and the same was disposed of on that date and that this fact came to their knowledge on ly on 30.07.2010. According to the applicants, since after the filing of the rev ision petition their conducting counsel kept them in the dark and did not post t hem with the intervening developments. The applicants have stated that after come to learn about the dismissal of the r evision petition on 30.07.2010 the competing authority i.e. the Legal Department of the Corporation took a decision to seek a review of the judgment and order d ated 29.05.2006. Subsequent thereto, immediate steps were taken to engage a new counsel and on the completion all the formalities, the review petition was, even tually, filed on 11.10.2010. By then, a delay of 1566 days had occurred. The opposite party in his affidavit, in substance, has pleaded that the applican ts have miserably failed to provide any cause satisfactorily explaining the dela y that had occurred and, therefore, the prayer for condonation thereof ought to be rejected. The explanation provided by the applicants, according to the opposi te party, is wholly frivolous. Mr. Das has emphatically argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicants cannot be ascribed any deliberate negligence, inaction or apathy and, thus, in the interest of justice, the delay ought to be condoned. This is more, so, as public revenue is involved. As by no means, the applicants ought to be penalized for the inexplicable lapse on the part of their conducting counsel , rejection of the prayer for condonation of delay would work irreparable loss a nd hardship. The applicant Company being an impersonal machinery, according to M r. Das, having regard to the bureaucratic formalities involved a realistic appro ach ought to be taken. In support of his contention, Mr. Das, has placed relianc e on the decisions of this Court in PRADIP KR. DOHOTIA & ORS. VS. RUSTAM ALI & A NR., 2003 (2) GLT 521 and State of Manipur & Ors. Vs. AK Cycle and Allied Centre & Ors., 2008 (1) GLT 953. Mr. Mazumdar, on the other hand, has reiterated the stand of the opposite party in his counter and has sought for rejection of the application for condonation o f delay. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, and on a consideration of the rival pleadings, this Court is left unconvinced with the explanation offered for the condonation of delay. Even if on a close scrutiny of the averments made in the application vis-a-vis the alleged lapse on the part of their counsel is acce pted, it passes the comprehension of this Court as to how, in the factual backgr ound, the applicant could have consumed 50 days in taking a decision after 30.07 .2010 to chart the next course of action. If the applicants had been really seri ous about the steps to be taken following the rejection of their revision petiti on as above, they ought to be have been more vigilant, agile and prompt in takin g the necessary initiatives. In the attendant facts and circumstances, 50 days i s too long, a duration to be condoned. Noticeably, there is no explanation whats oever in the application to justify the consumption of 50 days for the Legal Dep artment of the applicant Corporation to take a decision to seek a review of the judgment and order dated 29.05.2006. The basic principle, which informs the authorities relied upon on behalf of the applicants is that there is no straight jacket formula to be applied in all fact s and circumstances to ascertain as to whether the explanation furnished for con donation of delay is sufficient as contemplated in section 5 of the Act. It woul d logically be dependent on the facts of each case. Though, visibly a liberal ap proach is generally adopted in construing the explanation put forward for explai ning the delay, the requirement of sufficiency can by no means be substituted by mere sympathy and compassion dehors the facts. In the factual premise, as notic ed hereinabove, though, the applicant Company is an impersonal machinery and sad dled with bureaucratic compulsion to be essentially complied with, in the opinio n of this Court, 50 days time was too long, more particularly, in a situation wh ere the applicants have sought to represent that the relief for review was felt indispensably essential by them. In the above view of the matter, the cause put forward by the applicants for con donation of delay, as above, is not construed to be sufficient within the meanin g of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The application is, therefore, rejec ted.