IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Civil Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 DATE OF DECISION : APRIL 27, 2009 No.941343356 RT/GD NARESH KUMAR ....... PETITIONER(S) VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .... RESPONDENT(S) CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAI LAMBA PRESENT: Mr. RK Malik, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Yashdeep Singh, Advocate, for the petitioner(s). Mr. CM Sharma, Advocate, for respondents. AJAI LAMBA, J. (Oral) This petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Naresh Kumar, praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing order dated 24.8.1995 (Annexure P-1), whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated while the petitioner was undergoing the basic training. The petitioner has been held entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and allowances for the Civil Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 2 period of notice at the same rate at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his service. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was enrolled in the Central Reserve Police Force as a Constable on 26.8.1994. The petitioner got involved in a criminal case, whereupon his services have been terminated vide order (Annexure P-1). It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that mere involvement in a criminal case and that too under sections 323/324, Indian Penal Code, would not invite the penalty of termination of service. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in The State of Gujarat and another v. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, JT 1998(8) S.C. 326. The other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was acquitted on 17.11.1995. Although, the factum of acquittal was not brought to the notice of the respondents by way of a representation or an application, however, the fact was brought to the notice of the respondents by way of filing this writ petition. The writ petition has, however, been opposed. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that no moral turpitude is involved. In any case, after acquittal, the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed in the writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of the Court towards Rule 16 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (for short 'the Rules') to contend that the petitioner was initially enrolled for a period of 3 years only. He was liable to be discharged by Civil Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 3 the appointing authority at any time on one months' notice. The petitioner has been discharged vide order (Annexure P-1) and, therefore, the petitioner has no substantial right to pray for re-induction in the Force. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties. Rule 16 of the Rules provides as under:- “16. Period of service – (a) All members of the Force shall be enrolled for a period of three years. During this period of engagement, they shall be liable to discharge at any time on one month's notice by the appointing authority. At the end of this period those not given substantive status shall be considered for quasi-permanency under the provision of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Those not declared quasi-permanent under the said rules shall be continued as temporary Government employees unless they claim discharge as per schedule to the Act. Those who are temporary shall be liable to discharge on one month's notice and those who are quasi-permanent shall be liable to discharge on three months' notice in accordance with the said rules, as amended from time to time. Civil Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 4 ........” It is not in dispute that the petitioner was initially enrolled only for 3 years. It is during this period of engagement that he has been discharged and one months' notice has been given. In Suryakant Chunilal Shah's case (supra), it has been held as under:- “....... The involvement of a person in a criminal case does not mean that he is guilty. He is still to be tried in a court of law and the truth has to be found out ultimately by the court where the prosecution is ultimately conducted. But before that stage is reached, it would be highly improper to deprive a person of his livelihood merely on the basis of his involvement. We may, however, hasten to add that mere involvement in a criminal case would constitute relevant material for compulsory retirement or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case ........” Having referred to the facts of the aforesaid case, however, I find that Suryakant Chunilal Shah was appointed as a Clerk in the office of Food Controller, Ahmedabad and had already served for 21 long years, whereafter he was promoted as Assistant Food Controller. The facts and Civil Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 5 circumstances of the present case, however, are different in so much as the petitioner was still within the period of 3 years, as provided under Rule 16 of the Rules. So far as acquittal of the petitioner is concerned, there is no reference in the impugned order (Annexure P-1) to the involvement of the petitioner in the criminal case. It is only in the written statement that it has been brought out in para-4 as under:- “That in reply to para 4 of the petition, it is submitted that verification of Character and antecedents of the petitioner had been sent to Distt. Magistrate (Rohtak) vide Addl. DIGP, GC, CRPF, Pinjore letter No.V.1/95-GC(P)- EC.III dated 30-1-05. Distt. Magistrate (Rohtak) vide his letter No.,271/PKE dated 19-5-05 has intimated that criminal case has been registered against the petitioner (case No. 127 dated 6-5-94) under section 323/324/34 IPC. .....” Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find that the case of the petitioner is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Suryakant Chunilal Shah's case (supra), as the case of the respondents is not based on the plea of involvement of moral turpitude. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find that the petitioner has any substantial right to claim the relief prayed Civil Writ Petition No. 2385 of 1996 6 for in the writ petition. The jurisdiction of the authority that has passed the impugned order is not under challenge. Since the order has been passed while invoking Rule 16, the provisions whereof have been noticed above, I find no illegality in the order passed by the respondents. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has not been able to dispute that Rule 16 is applicable, and could be invoked in view of the brief period for which the petitioner served the respondents. In view of the above, I find no ground to judicially review the impugned order. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. April 27, 2009 ( AJAI LAMBA ) Kang JUDGE