IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 5-2-2008 CORAM THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR W.P.No.18035 of 2007 & M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2007 The Management of Proteck Circuits & Systems Private Limited, No.15, Medavakkam Road, Sholinganallur, Chennai - 600 045 ... Petitioner Vs. 1. Controlling Authority under the Minimum Wages Act/ Deputy Commissioner of Labour-II, DMS Compound, Chennai - 600 006. 2. Chennai Yetturmathi Valaga Uzhiyargal Matrum Pothu Thozhilalar Sangam, 11, M.E.S.Road, Kadaperi, Chennai - 600 045. ... Respondents Prayer: This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, praying this Court to issue a writ of Certiorari to quash the order passed by the first respondent in I.A.No.15 of 2006 dated 19.2.2007 in main petition No.42 of 2007 under the Minimum Wages Act. For Petitioner : Mr.Ranganatha Reddy for M/s.King & Partridge For Respondent R1 : Mr.GSankaran, AGP. For Respondent R2 : Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, for M/s.Row & Reddy O R D E R By consent of both sides, the writ petition itself was taken up for final disposal. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2. Prayer in the writ petition is to quash the order passed by the first respondent in I.A.No.15 of 2006 dated 19.2.2007 condoning the delay of 2372 days in preferring the application seeking payment of minimum wages, payable from 1.4.1997 to 31.3.2005. 3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner Company is involved in the manufacture of Printing Machinary and CNC Lathes, for supply to HAL, Defence, Railways, Government of India and Tamil Nadu Press. There are about 368 employees including workers are working in the Company. The second respondent, claiming to be a Trade Union, which according to the petitioner, has less than 60 workmen, filed a petition before the first respondent under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, by raising a contention that the workers in the list annexed therein have received wages less than the minimum wages fixed under the Act by the appropriate Government viz., the Government of Tamil Nadu and they are entitled to get the difference of pay between Minimum Wage and what was actually paid from 1.4.1997 to 31.3.2005. The petition was submitted before the first respondent on 16.10.2006 and claimed a sum of Rs.16,93,271.26 along with 18% interest among other reliefs. The second respondent also field a petition to condone the delay of 2372 days by filing I.A.No.15 of 2006. 4. The said application to condone the delay of 2372 days was resisted by the petitioner management on the ground that as per Proviso (2) to Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the application ought to have been presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages became due. Further the second respondent has wrongly calculated the number of days of delay as 2372, whereas the actual delay was 2737 days. The second respondent also has not given sufficient cause to condone the delay as required under section 20(2) of the Act. The averment that a request was made earlier and also in the year 2005 and in spite of the same minimum wages is not paid is also denied. The delay having not been sufficiently explained, the petitioner prayed that the petition may be dismissed. 5. After hearing the second respondent, who was petitioner in the interlocutory application and the writ petitioner, who was the respondent, the first respondent condoned the delay taking note of the written representation submitted by the second respondent Union on 20.12.2005 and taken prior to the said date as delay, for which the first respondent exercised his discretion. The said order is challenged in this writ petition on the ground that the discretion exercised is improper and the second respondent has not made out a case to condone the delay under section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as second respondent and also perused the order passed by the first respondent. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 7. The claim made in the main application is for payment of Minimum wages as fixed by the Government of Tamil Nadu. Whether the members of the second respondent Union is entitled to get minimum wages or not is the main issue. If the minimum wages are payable, it is the bounden duty of the writ petitioner management to pay the same. Further, payment of minimum wages is a continuous process. It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the condone delay petition that they are making repeated demands orally and submitted a written representation on 20.12.2005. It is also common knowledge that if higher salary is entitled to a Workman, he will not give up the right by not demanding the same. 8. Payment of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, having been enacted keeping in mind the welfare of the workmen, if the petitioner management is liable to pay, it is bound to pay the same. The second respondent Union having made out sufficient cause for condoning the delay, the scope of interference in the said order, is very limited. By condoning the delay, rights of the petitioner management will not be affected in any manner, because the petitioner management can very well argue the matter on merits as to whether minimum wages as prescribed by the Government is payable or not to the members of the second respondent Union. 9. (a) In the decision reported in JT 1998 (6) SC 242 = (1998) 7 SCC 123 (N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy), in paragraphs 9 to 13 (scc), the Supreme Court held as follows, "9. .......... Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (Shakuntala devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (AIR 1972 SC 749). 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." The above decision was followed by this Court (Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.S.Subramani) in the decision reported in (1999) 3 MLJ 21 (V.Amudha v. S.A.Arumugham and others). (b) In JT 2000 (5) SC 389 (State of Bihar & Others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Another) in paragraph 11, the Supreme Court issued guidelines in considering the condone delay application and in paragraph 13 held as follows: "13. .... the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. ..." (c) The denial of family pension to a widow on the ground of delay was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2003) 1 SCC 184 (S.K.Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway). In paragraph 6 the Supreme Court held as under, "6. ............... The very denial of her right to family pension as held by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench is an erroneous decision on the part of the Railways and in fact amounting to a violation of the guarantee assured to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution. The factum of the appellant’s lack of resources to approach the legal forum timely is not disputed by the Railways. The question then arises on facts and circumstances of this case, was the Appellate Bench justified in restricting the past arrears of pension to a period much subsequent to the death of the appellant’s husband on which date she had legally become entitled to the grant of pension? In this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ case as noticed by us hereinabove, the learned Single Judge had rejected the contention of delay put forth by the Railways and taking note of the appellant’s right to pension and the denial of the same by the Railways illegally considered it appropriate to grant the pension with retrospective effect from the date on which it became due to her. The Division Bench also while agreeing with the learned Single Judge observed that the delay in approaching the Railways by the appellant for the grant of family pension was not fatal, in spite of the same it restricted the payment of family pension from a date on which the appellant issued a legal notice to the Railways i.e. on 1-4-1992. We think on the facts of this case inasmuch as it was an obligation of the Railways to have computed the family pension and offered the same to the widow of its employee as soon as it became due to her and also in view of the fact that her husband was only a Gangman in the Railways who might not have left behind sufficient resources for the appellant to agitate her rights and also in view of the fact that the appellant is an illiterate, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was justified in granting the relief to the appellant from the date from which it became due to her, that is the date of the death of her husband. Consequently, we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench fell in error in restricting that period to a date subsequent to 1-4- 1992." (d) While finding out the sufficient cause for condoning delay it has to receive liberal construction is the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 2007 (4) CTC 449 (Arun Alexander Lakshman v. A.P.Vedavalli). In paragraph 11 the Division Bench held as follows: "11. It is settled law that "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence, or inaction, or want a bona fide, is imputable to the applicant, the over-riding consideration being doing substantial justice. ...." 10. In the above referred judgments, the Supreme Court issued guidelines as to how the condone delay applications should be construed and disposed of. Applying the above guidelines to the facts of this case, I am of the view that the first respondent has not committed any error in condoning the delay. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the first respondent while condoning the delay has given a finding that non payment of minimum wages to the members of the second respondent Union is the wrong committed by the petitioner management. The said observation given by the first respondent while deciding the condone delay petition is unsustainable. Hence the said finding given by the first respondent is set aside and the first respondent is directed to consider the issue as to whether the members of the second respondent Union are entitled to get minimum wages, as ordered by the Government of Tamil Nadu as claimed in the petition, on merits and in accordance with law. The writ petition is dismissed with the above observations. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. Sd/ Asst.Registrar /true copy/ Sub Asst.Registrar vr To The Controlling Authority under the Minimum Wages Act/ Deputy Commissioner of Labour-II, DMS Compound, Chennai - 600 006. 1 cc To M/s.King & Partridge, Advocate, SR.5345. 1 cc To M/s.Row & Reddy, Advocate, SR.5553. 1 cc To The Government Pleader, SR.5726. W.P.No.18035 of 2007 & connected MPs. IV(CO) RVL 14.02.2008 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/