IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR wm PETITION (227) N0@2010 glw g5 Qd G IN THE MArrER 0F: PETITIONER/ APPELLANT / Narmada Prasad Dhimar, S/o Shri Paras Ram Dhimar, Aged about 48 years, R/o lndustrial Ward, P.O. -Dhamtari, Disfricf— Dhamfan‘ (C.G.) VERSUS WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IE) l ‘\ RESPONDENTS No.1 / RESPONDENT NO. 1 1. The Es’ra’re Officer, Soufh East Railway Management Compound, W.R.S. Colony, Raipur, Chhattisgarh RESPONDENT NO.’2/ RESPONDENT NO. 2 2. Union of IndiCI, Through Chief Manager, South East Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata, West Bengal, W m . .MQQFEggR WWW? f3. WW, WW fa'm gligsi m aw mmm Wmfwgérm émfwwm SB : Hon’ble Shri Manindra Mahan E 29 =94u291 0 Mr. Ankit Singhal, counse} for the pet Ms. Naushina A11, counsel far respmm Shri Amit Chaudhari, standing counsel far reS} By this petition under Article 227 of 1 1egakity and validity 0f order dated 18/03/201C 9 of the Fublic Premises (Eviction of unamhw of 197k") has been dismissed as barked by limi Leamed counsel for the petitioner of learned comsei far the petitimer is that in 9, Sub-section 2(a), the period of limitation is the order under Sub-Section I of Section 5 o the order was passed by the Estate Officer on Section 5 of Sub-Section 1, only on 8/09 limitation would commence only h’om 8/09/0 and not before that. It is submitted that the appeal was initially filed on 12/09/08 before Judge, Raipur 'vide its order dated 23/09/08 before the District Judge, Dhamtari whereaf‘z the District Judge, Dhamtari. The second su’ mission of learned counsel for the petitioner ' he appeal, as the petitioner had also moved an " ct, 1963, by way of abundam caution, learned rhrivasiava J. HOIEI'. lents on advance copy under mstmctions from mndents. he constitutioil of inc‘da petitioner has assaiied ‘ay which the petitionei‘s appeal under Section 'ized occupants) Act, 197i (for shon " the Act ‘tetion s two fold submissions. The first submission ‘ew of the provisions contained under Section to be reckoned from the date of publication of the Act of 19H. It is submitted that though 2/08/08, the same was affixed as required by He therefore submits that the period of r though assuming that there was delay in tiling application under Section 5 of the Limitation . i Court below was obliged to consider the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner l l High Court in the case of Penna Nanci Singh 1§88, 264. Submission of iearned counsel for thti respondent is that the perusal of impugned ,/ ark; order would Show that the District Judge, Raip‘ttrreturned the appeai on 23/08/09 whereafter 1e District Judge, Raipur but later on District d the appeai with liberty to hie the same the appeal was presented on 24/09/08 before also reiied upon the iudgment of Nlahahad V’s. Bistriet Judge, Mirzapur and others, AER \‘ r /git... .L.___. 1 m f r‘ e r l e e mm WWQawwwd‘égt WW wm amxrmm the appeal was filed before the learned Court below after dalay of 2O days and therefore appeal was not tiled within the period of limitz tion prescribed under the Raw. It is submitted that the fmding of ihe learned Court below the appeai was barred by imitation does not suffer &om any error much {ass an error app ent on the record and therefore the petition is liable to be dismissed A perusal of impugned order shows tl t while considermg as to whether the appeal was tiled within me period of limitation o not; learned Court below has completely misdirected itself. A bare perusal of Section of Sub-Section 2(a) shows that the appeal i required to be filed within 12 days from the éate of publication of the order under S - Section l of Section 5. However, in the ire order, the learned Coon below while considering the case of the petitioner has com uted the period of limitation from the date of passing of the order without taking into cons tion the statutory provisions contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Aet, 1971 The facts of the ease are that initially e appeal was filed before the Disoict Judge, Raipur. Later on, the same was returned and esented before the Court below. This aspect was not taken into consideration. Moreov it appears that the petitioner, by way of abundant cautioo, had moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for Though the impugied order records that the appeal is barred by limitation, there is no onsideration of petitioners application for condonation of delay. The order does not r fleet that any of the 'gounds raised by the petitioner in the application for condonation o delay were considered. The order does not show that any satisfaction has been recorded the cause shown for delay is not sufdeient In View of the above discussion the npugned order cannot be sustained and the 'same is therefore set aside. Learned Court belo shall reconsider the entire matter afresh, by taking into consideration the statutory provisio contained in Section 9 of dub-Section 2 (a) of the Act and pass appropriate orders in acco ‘ ice with law. Parties shall appear before / e Additional District Judge (FTC), Dham ’ on 10th May, 201 O. ,dx/'# Sdl ‘ hrivéS‘ava i l 1 Manindh‘a condomtion of delay, if any, in filing the appe 1 gnarl 5s gudge s ‘ m i a e t «