IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR. JUDGMENT Smt.Sangita Jain & Others Vs. Anil Jain (S. B. Criminal Revision Petition No.884/2009) S. B. Criminal Revision Petition under Section 397 read with 401 Cr.P.C. against the order dated 21-4-2009 passed by Judge, Family Court No.1, Jaipur in Cr. Case No.314/2002 whereby the learned Judge has denied the maintenance to wife, and granted maintenance to children. Date of Judgment: March 9th, 2010 PRESENT Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. S. Chauhan Mr. Shobhit Tiwari, for the petitioner. Mr. Yashpal Garg, for the respondent. BY THE COURT: Aggrieved by the order dated 21-4-2009, passed by the learned Judge, Family Court No.1, Jaipur, whereby the learned Judge has denied the maintenance to the petitioner No.1, but has granted maintenance to petitioner No.2 & 3, Rupali and Romil, respectively, under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has challenged the same before this Court. 2. Brief facts of the case are that according to the petitioner No.1, she married the respondent, Anil Jain, on 4-2-1995. Out of their wedlock on 25-10-1995, twins were born, namely, Rupali and Romil. The petitioner No.1 and the respondent lived together, as husband and wife, till 3-5-2000. However, as the petitioner No.1 was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the respondent for dowry demands, she eventually left the matrimonial home on 3-5-2000. On 4-5-2000, she filed a FIR, FIR No.173/2000, against the respondent, for offences under sections 342 and 498A IPC. The petitioner also sought financial help from the respondent, as she was facing difficulty in maintaining herself and her two children. But the respondent turned a deaf ear to all her pleas. Consequently, on 16-9-2002, the petitioner filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance. After hearing both the parties, the learned Family Court, vide order dated 20-9-2004, directed the respondent to pay Rs.2000/- per month to petitioner No.1, and Rs.1000/- each, to petitioner No.2 and 3. The said amount was to be paid from the date of filing of the application i.e. 16-9-2002. 3. Since, the respondent was aggrieved by the order dated 20-9- 2004, he filed a revision petition before this court. Vide order dated 19-1-2009, this Court remanded the case back to learned Family Court with the direction to give opportunity of hearing to the respondent and to pass the necessary order in accordance with law. Accordingly, the respondent produced his witnesses and documents. After hearing both the parties, the learned Family Court vide order dated 21-4-2009 has held that while the petitioner No.1 is not entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent, the petitioners No.2 and 3, namely, Rupali and Romil, are entitled to receive maintenance Rs.2000/- per month from respondent from 20-9-2004. Since the petitioner No.1 is aggrieved by the denial of maintenance to her, she has approached this Court. 4. Mr. Shobhit Tiwari, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the reason for denying the maintenance to petitioner No.1, according to learned Family Court is that the petitioner No.1 and the respondent were not “married”. Although, there may not be any documentary proof of marriage of petitioner No.1 and the respondent, but the fact remains that the respondent has admitted in his evidence that the petitioner No.1 and respondent had lived as “husband and wife”. According to the learned counsel, the learned Family Court has overlooked the settled position of law that under section 125 Cr.P.C. The factum of marriage need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since a proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is more in nature of civil proceeding, than a criminal one. In fact, the existence of marital relationship can be proved by preponderance. Once the respondent has admitted the fact that he and the petitioner No.1 had “lived as husband and wife”, the petitioner No.1 is entitled to maintenance. Secondly, initially, vide order dated 20-9-2004, the learned Family Court directed the respondent to pay maintenance to all the petitioners from 16-9-2002. However, subsequently, vide order dated 21-4-2009, the benefit of maintenance has been denied to the petitioner No.1. Thirdly, vide impugned order the learned Family Court granted the maintenance to petitioner No.2 and 3 from 20-9-2004, while the maintenance should have been granted to them from 16-9-2002 when the application was filed claiming maintenance. In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the cases of Badri Prasad Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors. (AIR 1978 SC 1557), Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs. Bidyut Prava Dixit & Anr. (AIR 1999 SC 3348). 5. On the other hand, Mr. Yashpal Garg, the learned counsel for the respondent, has strenuously argued that the petitioner No.1 was earlier married to one Mr.Gopal Agrawal at Akola in Maharashtra. Although she claimed to be divorced from Mr.Gopal, at the time when marriage was to be performed with the respondent, the petitioner No.1 could not produce her divorce papers. Therefore, neither any religious marriage, nor any civil marriage ever took place. This fact was deposed by Swarup Chand Jain, and Hari Shankar Gupta. Thus, the factum of marriage could not be established by petitioner No.1. Therefore, she cannot claim the status of a legally wedded wife. Hence, the learned Family Court was justified in denying her maintenance. Learned counsel further contended that a discretionary power has been given to the Court to decide the date from which the maintenance amount should be paid. Thus, the learned Family Court was justified in directing that the maintenance should be paid from the date of earlier judgment, instead of from the date of filing of application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, considered the material available on record, and examined the impugned order. 7. The existence of a provision Section 125 dealing with grant of maintenance to the wife, to the children and to the parents existing in Code of Criminal Procedure, at the first blush, appears to be incongruous. A lay person may wonder about the relationship between a Code dealing with the procedure to be followed in criminal cases, and a maintenance to be given by the husband, the father or the children. However, to quote Shakespere, “there is some logic in this madness”. When the British had enacted the old Criminal Procedure Code, they had realised that certain provisions were needed in order to ensure peace, tranquility and stability of the society. Therefore, even the old Code had contained a chapter entitled “Order for maintenance of wives, to children and parents”. The English had realised that the family is the basic unit of the society. Therefore, it is imperative that the family is preserved and protected. Moreover, women, who are abandoned by their husband, are not only a burden on their parental family, but are also a threat to the moral fabric of the society. The Victorian Society was protective of the women. Even under the constitutional scheme of a free and independent India, the State and the Indian Society is aware of its responsibilities towards the women of India. Therefore, even after the drastic amendments carried out in the old Criminal Procedure Code, in 1973 the new Code has also retained and refined the provisions relating to maintenance of a wife. Since no society wants its womenfolk to be financially vulnerable, to be physically exploited, the laws have provided provisions for maintenance of a wife. Thus, her maintenance is not only a moral duty of the husband, but is also the legal liability of the husband. In order to protect women, the definition of the word “wife” has been enlarged to include even those women who are divorced by their husband. Thus, the object of the provision is to protect the weaker section of the society, namely the women, the children and the old parents. Hence, Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a social beneficial piece of legislation. 8. A proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C., although is a proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code, but the proceeding is not like a criminal trial. In fact, it is more in the nature of a civil suit. Therefore, the burden of proof, to prove the existence of marriage, is not as onerous on the petitioner as it would be upon the prosecution in a criminal trial. A case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. can be proved by preponderance of probability and need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs. Bidyut Prava Dixit (AIR 1999 SC 3348), the Apex Court observed as under :- The validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under Section 494 of the IPC. If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the Court can presume that they are legally wedded spouses, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption. Once it is admitted that the marriage procedure was followed then it is not necessary to further probe into whether the said procedure was complete as per the Hindu rites in the proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C. From the evidence which is led if the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied with regard to the performance of marriage in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. which are of summary nature, strict proof of performance of essential rites is not required. 9. It is, indeed, trite to state that in case a man and a woman live together and appear in public, and treat each other in public as husband and wife, then a safe presumption can be made that they had lived in wedlock. In the case of Badri Prasad Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation (AIR 1978 SC 1557), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if man and woman live together as husband and wife for a long time, a strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock. A strong proof about the factum of marriage by examining the priest and other witnesses is not necessary. However, the presumption is not an absolute one, but is a rebuttable one. While the court will presume the existence of a marital status, the onus of proof shifts to the other party to rebut the said presumption through cogent and convincing evidence. 10. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court is of the view that the factum of marriage need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent himself has admitted that he had lived with petitioner No.1 “as husband and wife”. Thus, even if the performance of marriage is not proved, even then, the respondent is liable to maintain the petitioner No.1. Since, Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a beneficial piece of legislation, it must be applied liberally in order to protect the interest of woman. Thus, the learned Judge has erred in denying the benefit of maintenance to the petitioner No.1. 11. According to initial judgment dated 20-9-2004, the maintenance was to be paid from 16-9-2002, i.e. the date of filing the application for maintenance. But, while passing the impugned order dated 21-4- 2009, the learned Judge has not given any reason for denying the maintenance from 16-9-2002. Since, the subsequent decision was in continuation of the original application filed by petitioner No.1, the maintenance, in fact, should have been granted from 16-9-2002, i.e. the date of filing the original application under section 125 Cr.P.C. 12. For the reasons, mentioned above, the revision petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 21-4-2009, qua the petitioner No.1 is quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to pay maintenance to petitioner No.1 Rs.2000/- per month from 16-9-2002, i.e. the date of filing the application. The impugned order dated 21-4- 2009, with regard to petitioners No.2 and 3, is modified to the extent that the maintenance amount shall be paid from 16-9-2002, i.e. the date of filing the application. The arrears of maintenance amount shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioners along with 9% interest from 16-9-2000 till the date of payment. The payment shall be made within a period of six months, from the date of this judgment. ( R.S. CHAUHAN ) J. arn/