HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL CLMA No. 3377 of 2009 (Delay Condonation Application) IN MCC No. 293 of 2009 (Review Petition) Ms. Shalini Dadar. …Applicant IN Writ Petition No. 297 of 2008 (S/B) Jyoti Bala. …Petitioner. Versus State of Uttarakhand and another. .....Respondents Mr. Manoj Tewari, Advocate for the review applicant. Mr. Alok Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Vikas Anand, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. P.C. Bisht, Brief Holder for the State/respondent no.1, Mr. B.D. Kandpal, Advocate for respondent no.2. Coram: Hon’ble V.K.Gupta, C.J. Hon’ble V.K. Bist, J. V.K. Gupta,C.J. (Oral) Heard. For the reasons stated, the CLMA No. 3377 of 2009 is allowed. The delay in filing Review Petition is hereby condoned. MCC No. 293 of 2009 (Review Petition) Whether this Review Application by a person who was not a party in the writ petition is maintainable or not, leaving aside this question, as far as the merits of the application are concerned, we are not inclined to review our judgment dated 16th December 2008 for the simple reason that the interpretation put upon Section-4 read with Sections 5 & 6 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 by Mr. Manoj Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the Review Applicant, is not applicable as far as Sections 15 and 16 of the said Act are concerned. The title of Part-II of 1925 Act is “Of Domicile”. Part-II therefore basically deals with the aspect relating to domicile. Sections 15 and 16 occurring in Part-II itself lay down a principal of law, without any reference to any 2 movable or immovable property, that by marriage, a woman acquires the domicile of her husband and that a wife’s domicile during her marriage follows the domicile of her husband. These two Sections, while dealing with the status of women with respect to their domicile qua the domicile of their husbands are totally independent of any right, title, interest or dispute relating to any movable or immovable property. These two Sections confer a right of a general nature and basically lay down a broad statement of law relating to domicile only, domicile simpliciter. In contradistinction to the aforesaid broad statement of law spelt out by Sections 15 and 16, Section-4 lays down a restrictive statement of law, because it only states that this part shall not apply to a deceased Hindu, Muslim etc. Sections 5 & 6 thereafter make it amply clear that statement of law contained in Section-4 relates to the succession to movable or immovable property. A combined reading of Sections 4, 5 & 6 clearly, therefore suggests that if there is a dispute or an issue relating to succession with respect to movable or immovable property, Part-II shall not apply if the deceased was a Hindu or Muslim etc. etc. In view of forgoing discussion, at the risk of reiteration, we have no hesitation in holding that whatever is stipulated in Section 4, has no application to Sections 15 and 16 of the Act. The Review Petition is dismissed. (V.K. Bist, J.) (V.K. Gupta, C.J.) 04.05.2009 NCM/SKS: