IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.1011 of 2009 RAMESH KUMAR, son of Late Udit Naryan Purvey, Aged about 46 years, R/o 14 Kidwaipuri, P.S. – Kotwali, Town and District – Patna ………………………… Appellant / Petitioner Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR, 2. Principal, Secretary cum Commissioner, Department of Science and Technology, Govt. of Bihar, Technology Bhawan, Visheweshwaria Bhawan, Baily Road, Patna, 3. Director, Department of Science and Technology, Govt. of Bihar, and 4. Project Director, Indira Gandhi Science Complex Planetarium, Patna ……………………….… Respondents / Respondents. ----------- For the Appellant:- Mr. Abhinabh Shrivastava, Advocate. For the State:- Mr. Lalit Kishore, AAG-III. ----------- PRESENT- THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE MIHIR KUMAR JHA O R D E R (08.02.2010) As per Dipak Mishra, C.J.- In this appeal preferred under Clause X of the Letters Patent, the appellant has called in question the defensibility of the order dated 02.07.2009 passed by the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 7355 of 2009. 2. The facts which are requisite to be uncurtained after filtering the unnecessary details are that Vigilance Police Station Case No. 69 of 2007 was instituted against the appellant-petitioner making an allegation that he had 2 been caught red-handed by the authorities of the Vigilance Department accepting illegal gratification and, on that score, he was placed under suspension with effect from 31.05.2007 under the orders of the Project Director, Indira Gandhi Science Complex Planetarium, Patna dated 22.06.2007. The appellant- petitioner claimed that such an order of suspension against him was passed in exercise of power conferred on him under Rule 9(2) of Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005 (for brevity `the Rules’). 3. As the factual matrix would expose, the appellant- petitioner was released from jail custody on 06.01.2008 and gave his joining on the same day. It was urged that when for a period of a year and half neither the order of suspension was revoked nor his joining was accepted, he was compelled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India contending, inter alia, that the entire action of the respondents was unjustified, illegal and unwarranted. It was further contended before the learned single Judge that in the light of the provisions of the Rules, the order of suspension 3 should have been deemed to have been revoked and his joining should have been accepted and he should have been paid full salary with effect from 06.01.2008. 4. The learned single Judge by the order impugned taking note of the submissions directed the Secretary of the Executive Committee, Bihar Council of Science and Technology to consider the grievance of the petitioner in accordance with law and to dispose of the representation and, if advised, to pass a fresh order of suspension for the period of custody. It was also observed that the salary for the period of suspension shall be subject to result of the criminal case. 5. We have heard Mr. Abhinabh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner on the question of admission. 6. It is submitted by Mr. Shrivastava that when the appellant was released and gave his joining the order of suspension should have been deemed to have been revoked and he should have been allowed to draw full salary with effect from 06.01.2008 itself. It is contended by him that in view of Rule 9(3)(ii) of the Rules there is no 4 scope left for considering about fresh suspension after lapse of one year and seven months. It is further urged by him that if the joining of the appellant-petitioner is not accepted and full salary is not paid, the object of Rules 9(2), 9(3)(i) and 9(7) of the Rules would be frustrated and the very basic purpose would be defeated. 7. Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned Additional Advocate General III for the State, per contra, submitted that the interpretations sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner does not commend acceptance inasmuch as there is no command under the Rules to reinstate an employee after his enlargement on bail. It is urged by him the Rules deal with a different scenario altogether and the same have to be purposively appreciated. 8. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar it is appropriate to refer to Rule 9 of the Rules. It deals with the order of suspension. It read as under: “9. Order of Suspension. - (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Government by general or special order, may place a government servant under suspension when- 5 (a) a disciplinary proceeding against the government servant is contemplated or is pending, or (b) in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, the government servant has engaged himself or herself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State, or (c) a case against the government servant in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial and the competent authority is satisfied that it is expedient to suspend the government servant in public interest. (2) A government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority with effect from the following date.- (a) from the date of his or her detention, if he or she is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period exceeding forty- eight hours; (b) from the date of his or her conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence he or she is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction. EXPLANATION- The period of forty-eight hours specified in clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the date of commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (3) (i) After the custody period under sub-rule (2), the period of deemed suspension shall be deemed to end when the government servant give his joining and the joining shall be accepted. 6 (ii) If a decision is taken to suspend the government servant again under sub-rule (1)(a), or (b) or (c), then such action may be taken only after acceptance of joining and by issuing a separate order. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on revision under these Rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (5) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold further inquiry against the government servant to meet a situation where the court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case, on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. (6) (a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent. (b) Where a government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in 7 connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him or her during the continuance of that suspension, the authority, competent to place him or her under suspension, may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the government servant shall continue to be under suspension till the termination of all or any of such proceedings. (c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may, at any time, be modified or revoked by the same authority who or whose subordinate authority has passed such order. (7) Charge-sheet must be framed within three months from the date of issue of suspension order failing which on expiry of three months, the suspension order shall be revoked unless the authority, which issued the suspension order, passes the order renewing the suspension alongwith reasons to be recorded in writing for the delay in framing of charge-sheet for a further period of four months; Provided that after the expiry of extended period of four months the suspension order shall stand revoked if the charge-sheet is not framed.” 9. We have reproduced the Rule in entirety as the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner has endeavoured by scanning the aforesaid Rule to contend that the deemed suspension get automatically revoked and that in the obtaining factual matrix interpretation would be in consonance with the language employed in the Rule. As is evincible from the factual matrix that the petitioner 8 was taken to custody on 30.05.2007 and, therefore, it cannot be said that his order of suspension dated 22.06.2007 with effect from 31.05.2007 (and not 30.05.2007) was an order of his deemed suspension under Rule 9(2) of the Rules specially when the order itself is absolutely silent on that aspect. Thus, the pivotal question that emerges for consideration is whether the impugned order of suspension would come within the compartment of `deemed suspension’ or not. It is canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner with immense vehemence that he was suspended because he was taken to custody and, therefore, Rule 9(2)(a) of the Rules would come into play and, as a sequitur, Rule 9(3)(i) of the Rules would have the full play. The order of suspension which has been brought on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition requires to be scrutinized in its proper connotative effect. The said order which is in Hindi, on being translated into English, would read as follows: “Bihar Council on Science and Technology, Patna. OFFICE ORDER Shri Ramesh Kumar, Maintenance Technician, Lobby Demonstration Planetarium is hereby suspended with immediate effect from 31.5.2007. He has been put under suspension on account of being 9 caught red handed during a raid conducted by the Vigilance Department while his accepting illegal gratification. This is referable to letter no. 1161 dated 11.06.07 of the Department of Science and Technology, Government of Bihar. Sd./- (Illegible) Shri Aniruddh Singh Project Director B.C.S.T., Patna. Memo No. B.C.S.T.-285/Patna, Dated 22.06.2007. Copy forwarded to Shri Sudhir Kumar, Cashier, Planetarium, (2) Shri Ramesh Kumar, Maintenance Technician Lobby Demonstration, Planetarium, Patna, (3) Senior Office Assistant, B.C.S.T., Patna, (4) Shri Ram Nath Singh, Deputy Secretary, Science and Technology Department, Bihar in the light of the Letter No.-1161 dated 11.6.07. He is requested to initiate departmental proceeding against Shri Vikash Chandra Kumar, the then Project Director. Sd./- (Illegible) Shri Aniruddh Singh, Project Director, B.C.S.T., Patna.” 10. As has been indicated earlier, the appellant- petitioner was taken to custody on 30th May, 2007 which is also admitted by the appellant-petitioner himself in Paragraph no. 5 of the Writ Petition, wherein he has stated that “….the Vigilance Police nabbed the petitioner and arrested him and sent to judicial custody on 30.5.2007 in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 69/07”. Thus, the language of the 10 order of suspension of the petitioner set out in Annexure-1 clearly reveals that a positive order had been passed suspending the appellant-petitioner on the ground of a criminal case alleging his being caught red-handed in course of the raid conducted by the Vigilance Department. There is no reference whatsoever in the order of suspension of his being taken into custody. In the scheme of things, if an employee is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours he would be deemed to be suspended and the said suspension shall be deemed to end when the Government servant gives his joining and the joining has to be accepted but, it is equally significant to note that when an affirmative order is passed by giving a reason clearly referable to a particular situation well envisaged under the statutory provisions there would be no question of deemed suspension and deemed revocation. 11. We have already indicated that the order passed by the Project Director putting the appellant-petitioner under suspension is a positive and affirmative order and further investigation was in progress. The same would irrefragably would come within the ambit and sweep of 11 sub-rule 9(1)(c) of the Rules. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted with immense vehemence that the case of the appellant would come under sub-rule (3)(ii) of Rule 9 of the Rules which stipulates that if a decision is taken to suspend the government servant again under sub- rule (1)(a), or (b) or (c), then such action may be taken only after acceptance of joining and by issuing a separate order. On a first flush, the aforesaid submission looks quite attractive but on a keener scrutiny the same has to pale into insignificance inasmuch as the term used therein is `again’. The said sub-rule, in fact, has to be read with Rule 9(6)(a) of the Rules which we again reproduce hereinbelow for clarity: “9(6)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent.” On a conjoint reading of both the rules, we are, thus, of the considered opinion that if the employer decides to continue the order of suspension, the same shall remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the competent authority and till then the delinquent government servant 12 shall remain under suspension. The term `again’ has its own signification. It is well settled in law that while construing a statutory provision, the entire scheme of the provision has to be taken into consideration and, for the said purpose, it has to be read as a whole, sentence by sentence and word by word, for it is unadvisable to treat a part of the same as redundant. Once, an order of suspension is passed by the competent authority, in terms of Rule 9(1)(a) or (b) or (c) of the Rules there would be no question of allowing the delinquent employee to join the service and then to put him under suspension. That will be totally in transgression of the Rules and, in fact, if we allow ourselves to say so, would be a travesty of the interpretation of the Rules. 12. As far as Rule 9(7) of the Rules is concerned, the same relates to framing of charge sheet. As the present case is one which is not based on disciplinary proceeding, the said provision does not get attracted. 13. In view of aforesaid premised reasons, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the order of suspension of the appellant-petitioner was one under Rule 13 9(1)(c) on account of pendency of the criminal case and such order of suspension would continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the competent authority in terms of Rule 9(6)(a) of the Rules. 14. Consequently, the appeal, being bereft of substance, stands dismissed without any order as to costs. Patna High Court. The 8th February,2010. AFR. Dilip. ( Dipak Misra, C.J. ) ( Mihir Kumar Jha, J. )