Regular Second Appeal No. 4319 of 2008 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 4319 of 2008 Date of decision: September 10, 2009 Tarlochan Singh .....APPELLANT VERSUS Harbhajan Singh .....RESPONDENT CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.P.S.MANN PRESENT: Ms G.K.Mann, Advocate T.P.S.MANN, J. Suit filed by the respondent was decreed with costs by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Amritsar on 28.9.2006. A decree for possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 28.2.1997, pertaining to the suit property, measuring 8 Kanals 1 marla was passed and the defendant-appellant was directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent within two months of receipt of the balance sale consideration. The appellant was also restrained from alienating the suit land to any other person, except the respondent. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was upheld by learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar on 16.5.2008, when the first appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. Hence, the second appeal before this Court. According to the plaintiff-respondent, as averred by him in the plaint, the defendant entered into an agreement dated 28.2.1997 to sell the suit land to him for a sale consideration of Rs.2,58,000/- per acre. An amount of Rs. 1 lac was paid by way of advance sale price and the sale deed was to be executed on or before 20.6.1997. Though he was ready and Regular Second Appeal No. 4319 of 2008 -2- willing to perform his part of the contract, yet the defendant had been dilly- dallying on one pretext or the other. At one point of time, the defendant came out with the pretext that there were certain eucalyptus trees standing on the land and after cutting the same, he would execute the sale deed, but even after cutting those trees, he did not execute the sale deed. While opposing the suit, the defendant denied the execution of the agreement to sell by him in favour of the plaintiff. According to him, the so-called agreement to sell was a forged and fabricated document. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the evidence brought on the record, the learned Courts below held that the defendant entered into an agreement to sell dated 28.2.1997 and received an amount of Rs.1 lac as earnest money. Though the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, yet it was the defendant who did not come forward to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that neither the appellant had agreed to sell the suit land, nor he received any earnest money of Rs.1 lac., as alleged by the respondent. The agreement in question is a forged and fabricated document. It did not bear his thumb impression. Kashmir Singh, who was one of the attesting witnesses of the so-called agreement to sell, appeared before the learned trial Court as DW2 and testified that the agreement Ex.P1 was a forged and fabricated document, and, that no such transaction regarding the sale of suit property had taken place in his presence. The plaintiff-respondent had examined PW1-Dalbir Singh, who was one of the two attesting witnesses of the agreement to sell. Said Dalbir Regular Second Appeal No. 4319 of 2008 -3- Singh corroborated the version of the plaintiff regarding the agreement to sell entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, under which the latter agreed to sell the suit land for sale consideration of Rs.2,58,000/- per acre and received an amount of Rs.1 lac as earnest money. Though the other attesting witness, namely, Kashmir Singh DW2 tried to help the defendant by denying the execution of the agreement in question, yet his testimony stands belied by the fact that he admitted his thumb impression on the agreement itself. Moreover, the defendant-appellant failed to show as to how the agreement to sell was a forged and fabricated document, especially, when he also admitted that the said agreement bore his thumb impression as well. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the attesting witnesses of the agreement to sell did not belong to the village of the parties and, therefore, no reliance could be placed upon the agreement to sell itself. There is no requirement of law that the attesting witnesses of any document should belong to the village of the parties. Even, both the attesting witnesses belonged to a village, which adjoined the village of the parties. Another objection taken by learned counsel for the appellant is that under the agreement dated 28.2.1997, the sale deed was to be executed by 20.6.1997, whereas the suit was filed on 16.2.2000. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for specific performance could not have been decreed by the learned Courts below. The cause of action arose to the plaintiff-respondent on 20.6.1997, when the defendant-appellant did not perform his part of contract of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The suit for Regular Second Appeal No. 4319 of 2008 -4- specific performance could be filed within a period of three years from the date on which cause of action arose. Therefore, the suit filed on 16.2.2000 was very much within the period of limitation of three years, as prescribed by law. The concurrent findings of facts, arrived at by the learned Courts below, are based on proper appreciation of evidence led by the parties. The findings arrived at cannot be said to be either perverse or suffering from any illegality or infirmity. These findings cannot be disturbed in a second appeal, which is maintainable only on some substantial question of law and not otherwise. The various substantial questions of law, as formulated by learned counsel for the appellant, do not arise for determination. Resultantly, the appeal is devoid of any merit and, therefore, dismissed in limine. (T.P.S.MANN) September 10, 2009 JUDGE Pds.