Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -1- In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. Date of decision:14-5-2008 Harbhajan Singh. ...Appellant. Versus Punjab State through Collector, Gurdaspur and another. ...Respondents. ... Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. C. Puri. ... Present; Ms.Isha Gupta Advocate for the appellant. Mr. S.S.Sahu, AAG Punjab. ... K. C. Puri, J. Judgment. Under challenge, in the instant appeal, is the judgment and decree dated 19.5.1986 passed by the then District Judge, Gurdaspur whereby he dismissed the appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 1.10.1985 passed by Shri A.K.Sharma, the then Additional Senior Sub Judge, Pathankot. The brief facts of the case, as gathered from the pleadings of the parties, are that the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for a Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -2- declaration to the effect that order passed by defendant No.2 vide his endorsement dated 13.10.1983 regarding his removal from service with immediate effect was illegal, null and void, ineffective, unconstitutional, against the principles of natural justice, in violation of service rules, cryptic, unwarranted, without jurisdiction and non speaking with consequential relief that he was entitled to all the benefits of service including pay and other allowances. The plaintiff has pleaded that he joined the service in the Punjab Roadways Department in the year 1981 and continued in service till 13.10.1983 when the impugned order of his removal from service was passed. He has challenged the validity of the impugned order on the ground that no enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer; that his replies to the charge sheet and show cause notice were not considered; that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were based on no legal evidence; that no critical analysis of the evidence of the parties was made and that the material evidence favourable to the plaintiff was also not considered. The defendants contested the suit of the plaintiff. Besides raising certain preliminary objections, the defendants, on merits, defended the validity of the impugned order of dismissal on the ground that it was passed after considering the evidence of the parties and is in consonance with the Civil Service Rules. ` On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -3- framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the impugned order dated 13.10.1983 is illegal, null and void, ineffective and in violation of Service Rules as alleged. If so, its effect?OPP. 2. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C?OPD. 3. Whether the Director State Transport, Chandigarh is a necessary party?OPD. 4. Relief. The learned trial Court decided issue No.1 against the plaintiff. Issue Nos.2 and 3 were decided against the defendants. As a result of said findings, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 1.10.1985. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed an appeal which was also dismissed by Shri Amrit Lal Bahri, the then District Judge, Gurdaspur vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 19.5.1986. Still feeling dis-satisfied, the plaintiff/appellant has filed the instant appeal. I have heard arguments addressed by the counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the plaintiff was appointed by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Jalandhar. The Enquiry Officer was appointed by the General Manager, Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -4- Punjab Roadways, Pathankot and the order of termination has also been passed by the latter. It is contended that since the order has not been passed by the appointing authority, as such on that count, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. I have considered the said submission but do not find any force in the same. The learned counsel for the appellant has formulated the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, the subsequent proceedings thereupon and the impugned order dated 13.10.1983 removing the plaintiff/appellant from the service passed by General Manager, Roadways, Pathankot and when the appointing authority of the plaintiff/appellant is General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Jalandhar are without jurisdiction and null and void? 2. Whether the impugned order of removal dated 13.10.1983 is illegal and unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case, in view of the admission of the defendants/respondents themselves that neither the passengers were examined nor the cash of the plaintiff/appellant was checked on the alleged date of checking and hence being case of no evidence? Both the Courts below have returned a concurrent finding Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -5- that the order cannot be set aside on the ground that the same has been passed by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Pathankot. A Government employee can be transferred from one place to another. It is not disputed that the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Jalandhar and the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Pathankot exercise the same power and authority. After the transfer of the plaintiff to Pathankot, the General Manager, Pathankot has the power to take disciplinary action. So, in view of the above circumstances, the substantial question of law formulated by the appellant stands answered against the appellant. The counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned order dated 13.10.1983 is illegal and unsustainable, in view of the fact that no passenger of the bus has been examined nor cash of the plaintiff/appellant was checked at the time of checking. Hence, it can be safely presumed that the it is a case of no evidence. Both the Courts below have committed an error in not setting aside the order dated 13.10.1983 being based upon no evidence. The departmental enquiry conducted by the authorities is vitiated on that count. To support this contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following authorities:- 1. General Punjab, Pb.Roadways Versus Amir Chand, 2002(1) S.C.T 300. 2. Didar Singh Versus The Presiding Officer, Labour Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -6- Court, Bathinda, 2003(3) S.C.T. 334. 3. State of Haryana and others Versus Bikar Singh and others, 2002(1) Recent Services Judgments 519. In reply to the above noted submissions, the learned AAG Punjab has submitted that proper enquiry was conducted in this case. The evidence of the official witnesses i.e. members of checking staff is legal and as such the same cannot be said to be a case of no evidence. To support his contention, the learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the following authorities:- 1. Full Bench Judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as The State of Haryana and others Versus Shri Ram Chander, 1976(2) SLR 690. 2. State of Haryana and another Versus Rattan Singh, 1977(1) SLR 750. 3. State of Punjab Versus Gurdial Singh, 1985 SLR 637. So far as second substantial question of law raised by the appellant is concerned, it has to be seen whether it is a case of no evidence before the departmental proceedings. The Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ram Chander' s case (supra), has over-ruled authority reported as Tarlochan Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1975 Current Law Journal page 1, where the evidence of Checker against the conductor was not accepted on the ground that the passengers have not been examined. It has been categorically laid down Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -7- in the said ruling that the passengers need not be examined. The concluding para is reproduced hereunder:- “We are, therefore, of the view that while there is no bar against the reception of hearsay evidence by domestic tribunals, the extent to which such evidence may be received and used must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1245, where the learned Judges of the Supreme Court compared the U.P. Police Regulations and the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules and observed as follows:- “There is no substantial difference between the procedures prescribed for the two forms of enquiry. The enquiry in its true nature is quasi-judicial. It is manifest from the very nature of the enquiry that the approach to the materials placed before the enquiring body should be judicial. It is true by Regulation 490,the oral evidence is to be direct, but even under rule 8 of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal is to be guided by rules of equity and natural justice and is not bound by formal rules of procedure Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -8- relating to evidence. It was urged that whereas the Tribunal may admit on record evidence which is hearsay, the oral evidence under the Police Regulations must be direct evidence and hearsay is excluded. We do not think that any such distinction was intended. Even though the Tribunal is not bound by formal rules relating to procedure and evidence it cannot rely on evidence which is purely hearsay, because to do so in an enquiry of this nature would be contrary to rules of equity and natural justice.” So, in view of the Full Bench authority, the single Bench authorities in cases Amir Chand, Didar Singh and Bikar Singh and others (supra), cannot be relied upon. The Full Bench case was also of a Conductor and in that case, the evidence of checking staff was held to be evidence and it was held that it was not a case of no evidence. The Apex Court in Rattan Singh's case (supra), in para 4 of the judgment has held as under:- “It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating Regular Second Appeal No.2192 of 1986. -9- such materials and should not glibly swallow that is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.” Again, in authority in case Gurdial Singh (supra), it has been held that if the passengers were not produced nor the cash in hand was counted, then it cannot be said to be a case of no evidence. So, in view of the above discussion, both the substantial questions of law stand determined against the appellant. In the light of what has been stated above, the appeal is without any merit and the same stands dismissed with costs. May 14,2008. ( K. C. Puri ) Jaggi Judge