CIVIL WRIT JURISDICTION CASE No.6984 OF 1997 In the matter of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ---------- Kamta Prasad Singh, son of Shri Ramchandra Singh, Resident of village Panki, P.S.- Silao, District- Nalanda, at present posted as Area Manager, Nalanda Gramin Bank at Rajgir, P.S. Rajgir, District-Nalanda …………… Petitioner Versus 1. The Nalanda Gramin Bank, Head Office At & P.O. Biharsharif, District-Nalanda, through its Chairman 2. The Chairman-cum-Disciplinary Authority, Nalanda Gramin Bank at Biharsharif 3. Board of Directors, Nalanda Gramin Bank at Biharsharif, District-Nalanda 4. General Manager, Nalanda Gramin Bank at Biharsharif, District-Nalanda 5. Shri Ram Nandan Singh, Area Manager/Senior Manager, Nalanda Gramin Bank at Biharsharif, District-Nalanda ……………………..Respondents For the Petitioner :Mr. Bipin Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent :Mr. Sharad Kr. Sinha, Advocate. P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH KUMAR DATTA R.K.Datta,J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent-Nalanda Gramin Bank. 2. The petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 22.2.1996 passed by the respondent no.2, the Chairman-cum-Disciplinary authority, Nalanda 2 Gramin Bank by which the petitioner has been awarded the punishment of reduction of three increments in his pay scale from immediate effect as also the order dated 20.1.1996 passed by the appellate authority, Board of Directors, by which the punishment has been reduced to reduction of two increments from his pay scale. 3. The petitioner while posted as Area Manager in the respondent-Bank was placed under suspension by order dated 5.5.1994 and departmental proceedings were thereafter initiated against him. Two supplementary charge sheets were also issued. The total number of charges were 14. The Enquiry Officer found that all the charges except two, (charge nos. 5 and 9) were proved against the petitioner. On a consideration of the same the aforesaid impugned order was passed by the disciplinary authority, Chairman of the Bank which on appeal was partially modified as stated above. 4. The only serious plea taken by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner hold the same post and rank and thus he could not have acted as Enquiry Officer as per 3 Regulation 30(3) of the Nalanda Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980. It is further submitted that the suspension order has not been signed by the Chairman which is in violation of provisions of Regulation 30(2). 5. In support of the aforesaid stand learned counsel refers to the order dated 14.9.1988 by which the Enquiry Officer, Ramanand Prasad Singh and the petitioner were both promoted and in that view of the matter, the Enquiry Officer clearly belongs to the same rank holding the same post of Area/Senior Manager and the said Ramnandan Prasad Singh could not have acted as Enquiry Officer. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent- Bank, on the other hand, submits that the issue is being raised by the petitioner before this Court for the first time and no such plea was raised in the appeal. However, the submission of learned counsel is that the Enquiry Officer was senior to the petitioner as is evident from the order dated 3.7.1989 relied upon by the petitioner. Moreover, it is urged that the petitioner is unable to prove whether any substantial miscarriage 4 of justice prejudicial to him has been caused as a result of the enquiry by the said Enquiry Officer. In the absence of prejudice, it is submitted by learned counsel that the impugned order cannot be set aside on a mere technical plea. In support of the said stand learned counsel relies upon a three Judges Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pankajesh Vs. Tulsi Gramin Bank and another: (1997) 7 SCC 68. 7. I have considered the rival submissions. At this stage it would be appropriate to quote the provisions of Regulation 30(3) of the Nalanda Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulation, 1980 which is in the following terms:- “30(3) The inquiry under this regulation and the procedure with the exception of the final order, may be delegated in case the person against whom proceedings are taken is an officer to any officer who is senior to such officer and in the case of an employee to any officer. For purpose of the inquiry, the officer or employee may not engage a legal practitioner.” 8. The said regulation is not under challenge in the present proceedings rather the petitioner seeks to take the benefit of the same. It is 5 evident from the perusal of the said Regulation 30(3) that the requirement is not that the Enquiry Officer should be on a higher grade post or rank than the petitioner but merely that he must be senior to the officer who is being proceeded against departmentally. It is not the case of the petitioner that he is senior to the Enquiry Officer, Ramanand Prasad Singh which is evident even from the order dated 3.7.1989 referring to the promotion granted to the said Enquiry Officer and others including the petitioner on 14.9.1988; the name of the Enquiry Officer is at Sl. No. 1 and that of the petitioner at Sl. No.5. In the absence of anything to the contrary and considering the normal practice, it is evident that the said Enquiry Officer, Ramnandan Prasad Singh was senior to the petitioner although holding the same rank. The said fact has also been asserted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank. It is stated that the Enquiry Officer was much senior to the petitioner in the gradation list of Senior Manager of the Bank as he occupies the 1st position and the petitioner occupies 5th and last. The gradation list dated 2.1.1996 has also been annexed to the counter 6 affidavit. It is thus, evident that there has been no violation of the provisions of Regulation 30(3) in appointment of Enquiry Officer. 9. In Pankajesh’s case (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the Staff Service Regulations of the Tulsi Gramin Bank which was on different terms and provided that the enquiry may be delegated to a person higher in rank than the delinquent officer whereas in the regulation of the respondent-Bank, the requirement is only that the Enquiry Officer must be senior to the officer against whom proceedings have been taken. But even in the face of the more stringent regulation in the said case the Supreme Court held that while it is desirable that an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer should be directed to conduct an enquiry but the ultimate decision is to be taken by the disciplinary authority and the mere delegation of the enquiry, whether the enquiry officer is of the same cadre or of higher grade than that of the petitioner, did not cause any material irregularity or any injustice to the petitioner. It was also held that there must be a substantial miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the 7 petitioner for interference in such matters. 10. Thus, the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the petitioner has no legs to stand. So far as the violation of Regulation 30(2) is concerned, it is evident that the impugned order has been passed by the Chairman himself as disciplinary authority which is the only requirement of Regulation 30(2) wherein for a punishment of degradation to a lower stage in pay scale there must be orders in writing signed by the Chairman. As regards the suspension by Senior Manager, the same is not at all covered by the said provision and in any case it can have no effect on the ultimate order of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority in terms of Regulation 30(2). 11. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid discussions, there is no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Patna High Court Dated 17th May, 2011 NAFR/S.Pandey ( Ramesh Kumar Datta, J.)