LPA No. 1825 of 2010 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH LPA No. 1825 of 2010 (O&M) Date of decision:- 25.04.2011 Kanwar Singh son of Sh. Bhagrawat, r/o village Ratera, Tehsil and District Bhiwani. ......Appellant Vs Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak and others. ......Respondents CORAM:-HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI, CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT Present: Mr. Sanjiv Gupta, Advocate, for the appellant. * * * * RANJAN GOGOI, C.J. (ORAL) C.M. No. 5471 of 2010 We have considered the grounds on which the condonation of delay has been prayed for. We have also heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. On such consideration, we are inclined to take the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the LPA in time. Accordingly, delay of 63 days in filing the appeal is condoned. LPA No. 1825 of 2010 This appeal is directed against the order dated 30.04.2010 LPA No. 1825 of 2010 (O&M) 2 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant-workman. The challenge in the writ petition was against an award dated 04.01.1999 passed by the learned Industrial Adjudicator under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') whereby the reference with regard to termination of services of the workman was answered against him. The facts that will be required to be noticed lie in a short compass. The petitioner was appointed as a Land Valuation Officer on adhoc basis for a period of 89 days w.e.f. 06.12.1985 with The Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Limited. This was by an order dated 27.02.1986. On completion of 89 days' service he was again re-employed on extension for another period of 89 days w.e.f. 08.03.1986 i.e. with a break of three days. A similar exercise was undertaken by another order dated 24.06.1986. Thereafter, apparently, no extension of service was given to the appellant, though before the learned Labour Court, he claimed to have worked upto 1992 against leave vacancies. The appellant, as the workman, stated on oath before the learned Labour Court that his appointment, though, against a regular post, was made for a period of 89 days which was extended subsequently with a break of three days and that such appointment was without any advertisement or selection. The workman further stated that on cessation of his service, regular selection had taken place and an LPA No. 1825 of 2010 (O&M) 3 incumbent had been regularly appointed in the post. The learned Single Judge on the aforesaid facts came to the conclusion that the cessation of service of the appellant was not on account of retrenchment, as claimed, but due to non-extension of his adhoc appointment. The situation, therefore, was covered by the exception contemplated by Sub Section (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. In so far as the engagement/appointment of the appellant-workman for a period of 89 days with small breaks in-between is concerned, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that it was not the case of the workman that the same was done to deprive him of the benefits under the Act or that the same was on account of an unfair labour practice. Before us, learned Counsel for the appellant, has vehemently argued that the appellant-workman had completed more than 240 days of continuous service within the meaning of the said expression as appearing in the Act and even after the end of his adhoc appointment he had worked with the respondent – bank against leave vacancies upto 1992. Learned Counsel has submitted that the said facts would go to establish that the cessation of service of the workman was on account of retrenchment and the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act not having been followed, the workman was entitled to consequential relief in law. Reliance has also been placed on a judgement of the Apex Court in Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mamni, 2006, AIR (S.C.), 2427. LPA No. 1825 of 2010 (O&M) 4 We have considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. We have also considered the decision of the Apex Court in Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd's case (supra) which has been relied upon. The claim of the appellant-workman to have worked/engaged upto 1992 against leave vacancies had been specifically negatived by the learned Labour Court on a finding recorded to the said effect. The aforesaid finding is purely a finding of fact. This Court, therefore, will have to proceed on the basis that there was no formal extension of the adhoc service of the appellant-workman after the order dated 24.06.1986 (Annexure P3) was passed. If that be so, we fail to see why the exception carved out by Sub Section (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Act would not operate so as to take out the present case from the purview of the definition of retrenchment. The reliance placed on the judgement of the Apex Court in Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd's case (supra) having been considered, we find that in the said case (para 3) there was an explicit order of termination of the workman therein dated 07.08.1992. The same would go to show that the workman in the case before the Apex Court had continued to work beyond the periods of engagement on adhoc basis with small breaks as mentioned in para 2 of the judgement. In the present case, there is no specific order terminating the service of the appellant-workman. That apart, the findings of the Apex Court with regard to the short period of appointments followed by extensions with LPA No. 1825 of 2010 (O&M) 5 small breaks was answered by the Apex Court to be an incidence of unfair labour practice on a specific allegation raised to the above effect. In the present case, nowhere in the claims made before the learned Labour Court any such plea was urged. No issue, whatsoever, in this regard was raised by the appellant – workman. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in which the judgement of the Apex Court in Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd's case (supra) was rendered. Consequently and in view of the discussions that have preceded, we are inclined to take the view that this LPA is without any merit and substance so as to warrant any other order except to dismiss the same, however, without any order as to cost. (RANJAN GOGOI) CHIEF JUSTICE (SURYA KANT) JUDGE 25.04.2011 Amodh