THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.34604 of 1998 Dated 01-02-2008 Between: T.T.Devasthanam rep. By its Executive Officer, Tirupathi, Chittoor District and another. ..... PETITIONER AND Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Tirupathi, Chittoor District and others. .....RESPONDENTS THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.34604 of 1998 O R D E R: Sri P.Ugra Narasimha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the fourth respondent, would state that the amount, as directed by the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, of Rs.914/- insofar as the fourth respondent is concerned, has already been adjusted against his earn leave and had been entered in his service register. Learned counsel would submit that the fourth respondent is not pressing his claim in the writ petition. Recording the submission made on behalf of the fourth respondent, the order of the Payment of Wages Authority to the extent the fourth respondent is concerned, is set aside. Sri M.Adinarayana Raju, learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of T.T.D., would vehemently contend, not without justification, that the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has not dealt with the question of jurisdiction. Learned standing counsel would draw attention of this Court to Section 1(4) of the Payment of Wages Act, whereunder the Act is applicable only to a factory, railway administration, or an industrial or other establishment. Learned standing counsel would refer to the definition of ‘industrial or other establishment’, under Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act, to contend that the S.V.Dairy farm would not fall within the definition of ‘industrial’ or ‘other’ establishment. Learned standing counsel would also refer to the definition of ‘factory’, under Section 2(ic) of the Payment of Wages Act, whereunder ‘factory’ has been defined to mean a factory as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Learned standing counsel would submit that, under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, a ‘factory’ means any premises where 10 or more workers are working, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or where 20 or more workers are working in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power. Learned standing counsel would refer to the definition of ‘manufacturing process’ under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, where under clause (i) thereof, the process of making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal is a manufacturing process. Learned standing counsel would state, rightly so, that the finding recorded by the appellate authority that milk was being sold would not suffice to bring the activities of the S.V.Dairy farm under the said definition since the prerequisite for ‘manufacturing process’ is that a process of making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing must be carried on in the factory and such process being carried on must be with a view to its use or its sale. According to the learned standing counsel, in the absence of a finding being recorded by the authority under the Payment of Wages Act that any of the process specified in Section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act was being carried on, the mere fact that milk was being sold would not bring the activities of the S.V.Dairy farm within the meaning of a ‘manufacturing process’ under Section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act and, consequently, it would not come within the scope of the definition under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act. The appellate authority under the Payment of Wages Act merely referred to the judgments of various High Courts and to the definitions under the Payment of Wages Act and the Factories Act. The factors prerequisite for the S.V.Dairy farm, to fall within the definition of a ‘factory’ or an ‘industrial’ or ‘other establishment’, have not been examined by the appellate authority. It is only if these factors are found to exist, could the appellate authority have arrived at a conclusion therefrom that the S.V.Dairy farm was a ‘factory’ or an ‘industrial’ or ‘other establishment’. Failure on the part of the appellate authority to record these jurisdictional facts, essential for it to assume jurisdiction, would necessitate the matter being remanded back to it for its consideration afresh. The fact, however, remains that the amount directed to be paid to the third respondent is Rs.4,665/-. The dispute has been pending determination ever since 1991 and nearly 17 years has elapsed since then. I see no reason at this length of time to drive an employee back to the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act for adjudication afresh on the question of jurisdiction when the amount involved is a meager sum of Rs.4,665/-. It is well settled that the jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is discretionary and exercise of discretion is not as a matter of course. I see no justification, therefore, to interfere with the order of the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act. Leaving the question of law, including that of the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act to adjudicate claims made by employees of the S.V.Dairy farm open, in view of the meager amount involved, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. _______________ 01-02-2008 usd