THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.32928 of 2011 ORDER: The order of the Joint Collector, Nellore (first respondent) dated 08.10.2011, whereby the matter was remanded back to the Tahsildar, Kaluvoy Mandal, Nellore District (third respondent) to cause an enquiry afresh bearing in mind the condition of the fourth respondent’s husband as on the date of the registration of the sale deed, and of the gap between the date of registration and his death, is questioned in this Writ Petition as being illegal and arbitrary. The fourth respondent, the widow of the deceased late Sri Yegetala Obaiah, filed a revision before the first respondent, under Section 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (the Act), contending that an extent of Ac.1.51 cents in Sy.Nos.172/3, 372/3B, 371, 261 and 202 of Kalluru Village, Kaluvoy Mandal, Nellore District stood in her husband’s name; her husband was suffering from Hepatitis-B; the petitioner and her other in-laws, taking advantage of her husband’s disease, had got the subject lands surreptitiously transferred in their favour having obtained his thumb impression while he was in an unconscious state (which was less than five days prior to his death); without even verifying these aspects, both the third respondent and the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nellore District (second respondent) had issued pattadar pass books in favour of the petitioner; and the first respondent, having noticed that the third respondent had issued pattadar pass books without conducting due enquiry as envisaged under the Act, had cancelled the pattadar pass books issued in favour of the petitioner, and had remanded the matter back to the third respondent to conduct a fresh enquiry to ascertain the condition of the fourth respondent’s husband on the date of registration of the sale deed, and the gap therefrom till his death. Sri A.Prabhakar Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would contend that the remedy, if any, for the fourth respondent was only to have the registered sale deed cancelled before an appropriate Civil Court even if the allegations of fabrication and forgery are held to be true; the scope of an enquiry by the third respondent, under Section 5(3) of the Act, is extremely limited; and the fourth respondent, having deserted her husband as he was suffering from Hepatitis-B, was attempting to take away the subject lands which the deceased had legally transferred in favour of the petitioner. Section 5(3) of the Act requires the third respondent to cause such enquiry, as may be prescribed, before carrying out any amendment in the record of rights under sub-sections (1) or (2) or (5) of the Act. The allegation made by the fourth respondent, in the revision petition filed before the first respondent, is that the signature of her deceased husband was obtained on the registered sale deed while he was in an unconscious state, less than a week prior to his death. The first respondent has merely directed the third respondent to cause an enquiry in this regard. While the submission of Sri A.Prabhakar Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that, in an enquiry under Section 5(3) of the Act, the registered sale deed cannot be cancelled, and the remedy for cancellation of such a document is only by initiating appropriate proceedings before a competent Civil Court cannot be said to be without merit, it must also be borne in mind that fraud vitiates all acts. “Fraud” is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss and cost of another. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation” has limited application in cases of fraud, and cannot be stretched to an absurdity resulting in its being utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. (A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.[1]; K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited[2]). “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal”. (S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath[3]). Fraud vitiates all solemn acts. A contract would mean a valid agreement which is enforceable in law, and not one vitiated by fraud. (India Household and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd.[4]). Justice has no favourite other than truth. Fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law, however high degree of solemnity may be attached to the transactions. (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction[5]). A judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as a nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. (A.V. Papayya Sastry1; K.D. Sharma2). Fraud is essentially a matter of evidence which can be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. (Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd.[6]). Every puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud need not be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dextrous knave would escape. This principle will apply not only to courts of law but also to statutory tribunals. (Indian Bank6). Only where fraud on the party or on the court is alleged and established, would the court treat the same to be a nullity. (Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat[7]; Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash[8]). When a fraud is practised on a court, the same is rendered a nullity. It would be non est in the eye of the law. (Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi[9], Tanna & Modi v. CIT[10]; Rani Aloka Dudhoria v. Goutam Dudhoria[11] and State of Chhattisgarh v. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar[12]). In a case of nullity, even principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with. (Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ajay Kumar Das[13]; A . Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies[14]; T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian[15]; Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai Solanki7). Once it is held that, by reason of commission of a fraud, a decree is rendered void all subsequent proceedings taken pursuant thereto are also rendered a nullity. It would be wholly inequitable to confer a benefit on a party who is a beneficiary thereunder. (T. Vijendradas15; Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai Solanki7). Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court, courts have the inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court. (Indian Bank6). Fraud vitiates any act or order passed by any quasi-judicial authority even if no power of review is conferred upon it. The effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate all acts and orders. A power to cancel/recall an order which has been obtained by fraud applies not only to courts of law, but also to statutory tribunals which do not have the power of review. (Ranganayakamma8; Smith v. East Elloe Rural Distt[16]; Council; Indian Bank6). If the third respondent, on enquiry, is satisfied that the earlier pattadar pass books were obtained by fraud, it would well be within his power to refuse to issue pattadar pass books to the petitioner in respect of the subject lands. Even otherwise exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary, and a Writ is not issued as of right or as a matter of course. (C.R. Reddy Law College Employees’ Association, Eluru W.G.District vs. Bar Council of India, New Delhi[17]). The discretionary power of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, need not be exercised in every case where there is an error of law. One of the limitations imposed by this Court, on itself, is that it would not exercise jurisdiction unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. (Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah[18]). One of the principles inherent is that exercise of discretionary power should be for the sake of justice and, if granting relief results in greater harm, the Court may refrain from exercising the power. (State of Maharashtra Vs. Prabhu[19]). This Court exercises its discretionary power, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with great caution and only in furtherance of public interest, and not merely on the making out of a legal point. This Court is required to keep larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, would it intervene in the matter. (Master Marine Services Pvt. Ltd v. Metcalfe and Hodgkinson Pvt Ltd[20]; Air India Ltd v. Cochin International Airport Ltd.[21]) All that the first respondent has done in this case is to remand the matter back to the third respondent to cause an enquiry into the allegations made by the fourth respondent that her husband’s signature was obtained on the registered sale deed while he was in an unconscious state, less than a week prior to this death on account of Hepatitis-B. The petitioner can as well appear before the third respondent and put forth his defence that the allegations levelled by the fourth respondent are without basis; and the registered sale deed is neither vitiated by fraud nor was the signature of the deceased obtained on the registered document by fraudulent means. I see no reason, therefore, to exercise discretion, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to entertain this Writ Petition. Sri A.Prabhakar Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would further state that, since the pattadar pass books granted in favour of the petitioner had already been cancelled, atleast a timeframe should be fixed within which the third respondent should be directed to conduct, and complete the enquiry. I consider it appropriate, in such circumstances, to direct the third respondent to complete the enquiry, after affording an opportunity both to the petitioner and the fourth respondent, and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Subject to the observations aforementioned, the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. RAMESH RANGANATHAN,J Date:20.12.2011 usd [1] (2007) 4 SCC 221 [2] (2008) 12 SCC 481 [3] (1994) 1 SCC 1) [4] (2007) 5 SCC 510) [5] (2007) 15 SCC 601 [6] (1996) 5 SCC 550 [7] (2008) 12 SCC 353 [8] (2008) 15 SCC 673 [9] (2003) 8 SCC 319 [10] 2003 (8) SCC 319 [11] JT 2009 (3) SC 616 [12] (2009) 13 SCC 600 [13] (2002) 4 SCC 503 [14] (2004) 7 SCC 112 [15] 2007 (12) SCALE 1 [16] 1956 AC 736 [17] 2004(5) ALD 180 (DB) [18] AIR 1955 SC 425 [19] (1994) 2 SCC 481 [20] (2005) 6 SCC 138 [21] (2000)2 SCC 617