IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF JULY, TWO THOUSAND EIGHT ONLY PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.8696 of 2000 Between: Yerram Venkateswarlu … Petitioner AND State of A.P., rep., by its, Secretary, Revenue (UC-II) Dept., Secretariat, Hyderabad & others. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioner : Sri M. Chandrasekhara Rao Counsel for the respondents : AGP for Revenue This Court made the following: THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.8696 of 2000 ORDER:- This writ petition is filed for a writ of Mandamus to set aside order dated 30.05.1991 passed by respondent No.1 and declare that the petitioner does not hold surplus land. The facts of the case to the extent they are not in dispute are briefly stated hereunder: The petitioner filed his statement under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1977 (for short, ‘the Act’). Final statement dated 15.11.1979 was issued under Section 9 of the Act showing surplus land in Sy.No.522 part held by the petitioner as 3908 square meters after excluding the retainable area of 2000 square meters. Declaration under Section 10 (3) of the Act was issued on 22.01.1981 and the same was published in the A.P. Gazette Part II No.8 dated 19.02.1981. Notice to the petitioner was issued under Section 10 (5) on 27.07.1982 calling upon him to surrender the excess land to the Tahsildar, Guntur. The record reveals that the said notice was served on the petitioner on 25.11.1982. On 29-11-1982 the petitioner filed application for exemption under Section 20 (1)(a) of the Act. As the said application was not disposed of by respondent No.1, the petitioner filed WP.No.1319 of 1983 for a writ of Mandamus to direct respondent No.1 to pass order on the exemption application according to law. The said writ petition was disposed of on 02.12.1987, wherein this Court directed respondent No.1 to consider and dispose of the petitioner’s application for exemption in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Government from time to time. It was also directed that till the disposal of the said exemption application, the excess land shall not be allotted by the Government to anybody and the petitioner shall not alter the nature and character of the land. As the Government did not pass any order, the petitioner filed another writ petition, namely, WP.No.24013 of 1999. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Government in the said writ petition it was pleaded that on 31.05.1991 it rejected the application for exemption. In view of the said fact, the said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 14.03.2000. The petitioner filed WA.No.405 of 2000, which came to be disposed of on 27.04.2000 with a direction to respondent No.1 to send a copy of order dated 30.05.1991 to the petitioner or his counsel and permitted the petitioner to question the validity of the said order by filing a separate writ petition. That is how the petitioner filed the present writ petition assailing the validity of the said order dated 30.05.1991. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Guntur, respondent No.2, he supported the reasons given by respondent No.1 for rejection of the petitioner’s application for exemption by pleading that even by the time the petitioner made his application, declaration under Section 10 (3) of the Act was published, as a result of which, the land was vested absolutely with the State Government with effect from 01.04.1981 and that the excess land of the petitioner is classified for non-agricultural purpose in the master plan and possession of the land was taken after serving notice under Section 10(5) of the Act to the petitioner on 25.11.1982. In reply to the plea of the petitioner that G.O.Ms.No.733, Revenue Department, dated 31.10.1988 exempted the excess lands to the extent of Ac.5.00 from the provisions of the Act, it is stated that the said G.O. applies to the lands, which are located beyond the municipal limits, but within the urban agglomeration area, whereas, the petitioner’s land, which is comprised in Sy.No.522 of Guntur is situated within the Guntur municipal limits is covered by the master plan approved even before the Act came into force and that, hence, the said G.O., has no application to the petitioner’s land. Before proceeding further, it is required to be noticed that the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature passed resolution on 27.03.2008 adopting Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 passed by the Parliament. Following the said resolution, the State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.603 dated 23.04.2008, which inter alia provided that the repeal of the Act will not have any effect on the lands, possession of which was taken under Section 10 (6) of the Act before 27.03.2008. It is further provided that in cases where the possession was not taken as on the date of the said resolution, all the proceedings under the Act stand lapsed. At the hearing, Sri M. Chandrasekhara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner advanced two contentions, namely, (i) that though notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued, the respondents have not taken physical possession of the land from the petitioner and therefore all the proceedings have got lapsed in respect of the petitioner’s land and the resolution has thus enured to his benefit, and (ii) that even if the proceedings have not lapsed, the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 is liable to be set aside. As far as the first contention is concerned, the learned Assistant Government Pleader produced the record of the Special Officer from the office of respondent No.2. The record contains letter bearing Rc.No.3121/82/D1 dated 05.03.1983 addressed by Sri M.R. Nayak, Tahsildar, Guntur to respondent No.2, which is in vernacular language (Telugu). It is stated therein that in response to the notice issued under Section 10(5), which was served on 25.11.1982 on the petitioner, the UDRI NAA took possession of the excess land of 1203 square meters in Sy.No.533/4 and 2705 square meters in Sy.No.522/6 (total extent of 3908 square meters) and the same was handed over for safe custody to the village Munsiff on 24.02.1983. He enclosed a copy of the panchanama under which the land was taken possession on 24.02.1983. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, while maintaining that physical possession was still with the petitioner relied on the copy of Cooperative Kisan Credit Card and Passbook and revenue receipts for certain years up to the year 1999. I have carefully perused the contents thereof, which clearly show that in all, four survey numbers have been mentioned in the total extent of Ac.2.77 cents. The total land owned by the petitioner in Sy.No.522 was 3908 square meters, which is equivalent to more than Ac.1.00 cents; whereas, the material relied on by the petitioner showed only an extent of Ac.0.69 cents in Sy.No.522 as being his possession. This clearly shows that the land shown in the pass book and revenue receipts produced by the petitioner is obviously the retainable area of 2000 square meters and not the surplus land. In the face of the record produced by the learned Assistant Government Pleader containing the panchanama and letter dated 05.03.1983 addressed by the Tahsildar, Guntur to respondent No.2, I have no reason to disbelieve the said contemporaneous documents, more so when the petitioner failed to substantiate his plea that the physical possession is still with him by producing clear evidence. The material produced by the petitioner is not enough to accept his version, ignoring the official record, which clinchingly establishes that physical possession was taken by the respondents as far back as 24.02.1983. The first contention of the learned counsel is therefore rejected. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, he laid emphasis on purported absence of reasons in the impugned order passed by respondent No.1. A perusal of the said order shows that the petitioner’s application for exemption was rejected on two grounds, namely, (i) that the land is classified for non-agricultural purpose in the master plan (residential), and (ii) possession of the excess vacant land has already been taken over by the Government. Having carefully considered the impugned order, I find myself in disagreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner. Though brief, the order nevertheless contains the abovementioned two reasons. It is to be remembered that in considering the petitioner’s application for exemption under Section 20 of the Act, respondent No.1 discharged administrative function. Unlike a judicial authority, an administrative authority is not expected to write out judgments. While the view that even an administrative body is required to give reasons is unexceptionable, the administrative decision cannot be set at naught, if the same is supported by reasons, even if they are brief, but are relevant and germane. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order does not contain reasons does not deserve acceptance. Let me now see whether the reasons given in the impugned order can be sustained qua the provisions of Section 20. In this connection, it is relevant to consider Section 20, which is reproduced below: “20. Power to exempt:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter – a. where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter. b. where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter. Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. (2) If at any time the Stage Government is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- Sec.(1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for the State Government to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly.” A Division Bench of this Court in Katya Co-operative Building Society Limited and others vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh considered the true scope and purport of Section 20 while examining the validity of G.O.Ms.No.964 dated 27.06.1983, whereby the State Government directed that request for exemption from the land owners shall be rejected under Section 20(1)(a) and the land shall be taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Act. After an indepth analysis of the scheme of the Act, the Division Bench, while invalidating the said G.O., inter alia held that Section 20 confers a power coupled with a duty on the part of the State Government and it has to be exercised by the State Government in respect of each case applying its mind as to the purpose for which the land is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require. In The Secunderabad Wholesale Cloth Merchants Association (Registered under the Societies Registration Act), represented by its President, Mr. Soma Venkateswara Rao vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh the learned Single Judge of this Court held that Section 20 of the Act, no matter in what language it is couched, cannot be construed as conferring unfettered discretion on the Government to grant exemption or refuse to grant exemption, that the so called absolute discretion is subject to the policy of the Act, that discretion, however, wide, can be exercised only for the promotion of purpose of policy and object of the Act and that the policy of the Act is avowedly to impose ceiling on vacant land and acquire the excess land by paying nominal compensation. The learned Judge further held that the Parliament in wide and general terms addressed itself to the problem of fall out of these expropriatory powers by the Government on individuals and that it might have opined that it is better for the law not to acquire the lands in the two cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 20. He further held that the exercise of this exemption power in favour of the owner of the excess vacant land results in taking the excess vacant land out of the purview of the acquisition powers of the Government and the owner would then be somewhat free to deal with that land. He further held that it must be then admitted that it is as much the purpose and policy of the Act to grant exemption under the appropriate conditions and the auspicious circumstances enumerated by Section 20 of the Act as it is to expropriate the excess land by paying nominal compensation under Chapter III of the Act. As held by the Division Bench in Katya Cooperative Building Society Limited (1 supra) the circumstances under which exemption can be granted are enumerated in Section 20 itself. Under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 20, the relevant considerations for granting exemption are (i) location of the land, (ii) the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and (iii) such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require. If the Government is satisfied that these conditions exist and further satisfied that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, it can exempt the excess land from being taken over. Under clause (b) a similar power of exemption is conferred on the State Government, if it is satisfied that the application of the provisions of Chapter III would cause undue hardship to the person. To my mind, while the power under clause (a) is exercisable in public interest, the power under clause (b) is invoked by the State Government to avoid causing of undue hardship to an individual. Though the petitioner has not filed his application in the writ petition, I have read his application, which is found in the file of respondent No.2 produced before me. The said application was filed on 29.11.1982 after he received notice under Section 10 (5) of the Act to surrender the land on 25.11.1982. In the said application, the petitioner stated that the Competent Authority and Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling, Guntur issued a final statement under Section 9 on 21.11.1979 determining the surplus land held by the petitioner’s family at 3908 square meters, that the land in Sy.No.522 is registered in revenue accounts as agricultural land and that the land is under regular cultivation with cotton and chilly crops and that the agricultural land of the petitioner’s family is very meagre and his entire family is depending on the produce being obtained from it. He further stated that if the surplus land is taken away by the Government, his entire family will perish. These reasons stated in the petitioner’s application clearly reveal that he sought for exemption on the ground of individual hardship, but interestingly he claimed exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act, which as noticed above, is concerned with exemption in public interest. If at all, the petitioner’s application falls under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 20, which is concerned with undue hardship to an individual. Be that as it may, I am of the view that since clause (b) does not specifically enumerate any circumstances for granting exemption, it is reasonable to construe that apart from the undue hardship, the same circumstances, which are mentioned in clause (a), are also relevant for the purpose of the State Government exercising power of exemption under clause (b) as well. It is therefore necessary to see whether reasons given by respondent No.1 for rejecting the application for exemption conform to the statutory provisions contained in clauses (a) and (b). As noted supra, the rejection is based on two reasons, namely, (i) that the land is classified for non-agricultural purpose (residential) in the master plan, and (ii) that the possession has already been taken. The learned counsel for the petitioner was critical of the first reason on the premise that such a reason is irrelevant because the necessity of exemption has arisen only on account of the land becoming vacant land having been earmarked for non-agricultural purpose. Though this contention looked attractive at the first blush, I find no substance in it on a deeper scrutiny. This reason given by respondent No.1 has to be considered in the light of the representation of the petitioner. As earlier stated, the only ground on which the petitioner claimed exemption is that in the revenue accounts the land in Sy.No.522 is registered as agricultural land and they are carrying on agriculture and that if this land is taken away, the entire family of the petitioner will perish. While dealing with this ground, respondent No.1 took note of the fact that the land is no longer agricultural in nature and that it is classified as non-agricultural (residential) in the master plan. It is to be remembered that one of the relevant factor for grant of exemption is the land is being proposed to be used in future. The fact that the land ceased to be agricultural is not in dispute and even if the same is exempted from the provisions of application of Chapter III, there would be no possibility for the petitioner to carryon agriculture as the law does not permit him to utilize the land for a purpose other than for which the same is classified in the master plan. Therefore, the very ground on which the petitioner claimed exemption was found un-acceptable to respondent No.1. Considering this ground of rejection in the light of the reason put forth by the petitioner for exemption, it cannot be said that the ground of rejection is either irrelevant or not germane to the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act. With regard to ground No.2, namely, possession was already taken, Section 20 is silent as to the stage at which the application is to be made. I n Katya Cooperative Building Society Limited (1 supra) while dealing with WP.No.2892 of 1983, the Division Bench held that even in a case where notice was served under Section 10(5), an application for exemption can be filed and considered. In this case declaration under Section 10(3) was made on 22-1- 1981 and the same was published in the A.P. Gazette Part-VIII on 19-2-1981. The petitioner’s application was considered for exemption in the year 1991. In this view of the matter, the fact that the petitioner was not in possession of the land for almost eight years by the time of consideration of his application is, in my considered view, certainly a relevant circumstance to weigh with the Government in considering the plea of undue hardship under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 20. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is trite, is confined to examining the decision making process and not the merits of the decision. The Court has to examine whether the decision taken by the authorities suffers from any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. In examining whether a decision is irrational or not, the Courts are applying Wednesbury’s principle viz., whether the conclusion arrived at by the authority is such that no reasonable person would ever reach such a conclusion (See: Tata Cellular V. Union of India). Examined from this settled legal principle, I do not find the impugned order suffering from any of the defects mentioned above. One other aspect which of course is not considered by respondent No.1 in the impugned order and which has drawn my attention while perusing the available record is the fact that in addition to the land of Ac.0.69 cents remained with the petitioner in Sy.No.522, as retainable area, the petitioner appears to own and possess Ac.0.67 cents in Sy.No.526, Ac.1.16 cents in Sy.No.556 and Ac.0.25 cents in Sy.No.523/1 as evident from the Cooperative Kisan Credit Card and Passbook filed by the him. Though respondent No.1 has not shown this as a ground of rejection, obviously in the absence of the availability of this information, I have taken notice of this fact in the wake of the strong attempt made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to impress upon the Court that if the surplus land is taken over by respondent No.1, the same will cause undue hardship to the family of the petitioner. In my considered opinion, the petitioner’s plea of hardship based on the premise that he is not left with any other property except the retainable area is contrary to his own material produced and relied on by him. I would like to make it clear that this observation of mine is, however, not determinative of the outcome this Writ Petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on the two judgments of this Court in The Secunderabad Wholesale Cloth Merchants Association (2 supra) and APSRTC Staff Cooperative Housing Construction Society Limited, Vijayawada vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue (UC-I) Department and others. In the first mentioned case, the petitioner therein entered into an agreement of sale with the landlord for purchase of vacant land for the purpose of establishment of a Grand Modern Cloth Market. The said application was rejected without any reason and by saying that the Government see no justification to comply with the request of grant of exemption. One of the grievances of the petitioner therein was that apart from the fact that no reasons were given for rejection, the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing. The learned Judge upheld the contention of the petitioner and held that the Government ought to have granted an opportunity of personal hearing to enable the petitioner to impress upon it that undue hardship would be caused, if exemption is not granted. In the instant case, from the facts noted hereinabove, the petitioner filed two writ petitions earlier. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has raised any plea in the said two writ petitions that he wanted an opportunity of hearing that he prayed for any direction from this Court to respondent No.1 to afford him an opportunity of personal hearing. While in his application made by the petitioner to respondent No.1 no such request is made, the learned counsel for the petitioner, at the hearing, fairly conceded that the petitioner never asked for an opportunity of personal hearing. In this admitted fact situation, in my considered opinion, the impugned order cannot be set aside on the ground that an opportunity of personal hearing is not given to the petitioner, more so, the plea of undue hardship pleaded by the petitioner was merely based on the claim that his family wanted to continue agriculture in the surplus land, which was duly considered by respondent No.1 and rejected by giving the reason that the land is classified for non-agricultural purpose. Neither in the pleadings of the petitioner nor at the time of hearing, any additional facts are brought out for this Court to hold that affording an opportunity