1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.3489 OF 2010 Vilas s/o Fakirba Ghodse, Age 25 years, Occu.Kotwal, R/o Akoladeo, Tq.Jafrabad, District Jalna .. Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Maharashtra Through the Department of Revenue, Mantralaya, Mumbai and ors. 2. Tahasildar, Taluka Jafrabad, District Jalna 3. Sub Divisional Officer, Jalna, District Jalna 4. Shivaji s/o Harishchandra Bankar, Age 32 years, Occu.Agriculture R/o At Butkheda,Post Akola (Deo), Tq.Jafrabad, Dist.Jalna ..Respondents Mr.R.S.Deshmukh, Advocate holding for Mr.M.C.Ghode and Mr.N.K.Tungar, Advocates for petitioner Mr. K.G.Patil, Assistant Govt.Pleader for respondents 1 to 3 Mr.E.P.Savant, Advocate for respondent No.4 CORAM : P.V.HARDAS AND S.V.GANGAPURWALA, JJ. DATE : 4th May 2010 2 PER COURT : 1. This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, who takes exception to the order passed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal dated 6.4.2010, in Original Application No.368 of 2009. The Tribunal by the aforesaid order had allowed the original application filed by the respondent No.4 herein and had quashed and set aside the appointment of the petitioner as a Village Kotwal. 2. Pursuant to the drive for filling up the vacancies of 2373 Village Kotal, the petitioner as well as the fourth respondent had submitted their applications for appointment to the post of Village Kotwal, Akole (Deo), Taluka Jafrabad, District Jalna. The petitioner had secured 35 marks out of 50 and had been allotted 25 extra marks as he was the resident of the village. Over and above, the petitioner came to be allowed another 25 marks on the ground that he was a son of former Village Kotwal. Thus, aggregate marks secured by the petitioner were 85 marks as against 69 marks out of 100 alleged to have been secured by fourth respondent. The respondent No.4 being dissatisfied with the appointment of the petitioner as Village Kotwal, filed Original Application No.368 of 2009 before the Aurangabad Bench of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribuhnal. The Tribunal, by its order dated 6.4.2010 allowed the original application and quashed and set aside the appointment of the petitioner as a Village Kotal. 3 3. The Tribunal principally concerned itself with the allotment of 25 marks to the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was a heir of former Village Kotwal. A reference in this behalf may usefully be made to clause 8 of the Government Resolution dated 28.1.1974. The aforesaid clause states that if all other things are equal, preference be given to a son of former Village Kotwal in the appointment. Obviously, the doctrine of preference would contemplate that the person claiming the preference stands with equal footing with the other competent candidates. It is only in the event that doctrine of preference is exercised in favour of the son of the Village Kotwal. The second hurdle which the Tribunal noticed that the petitioner was the grandson of the former Village Kotwal while Clause 8 of the said Government Resolution contemplated preference being given to the son of former Village Kotwal. 4. Mr.Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioner by referring to a communication addressed by the Desk Officer has urged before us that the Desk Officer had expressed an opinion that doctrine of preference would be applicable to the heirs of the former Village Kotwal and, therefore, beneficial interpretation would mean giving benefits to the heirs of the former Village Kotwal also. According to us such interpretation is wholly impermissible. Language of Clause 8 is explicit and no ambiguity is created in the aforesaid Clause 8 of the said Government Resolution. In no uncertain terms Clause 8 states that preference would be available 4 only to the sons of the former Village Kotwal. The Court cannot add words to the statute to advance an interpretation which it thinks to be the intention of legislature. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible. The plain language leaves no room for doubt. 5. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the findings recorded by the Tribunal, according to us no perversity can be noticed in the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal to warrant any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That being the position, this petition being sans merit is dismissed with no orders as to costs. ( S.V.GANGAPURWALA, J.) ( P.V.HARDAS, J.) (vvr/3489.2010wp)