1 vks IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2431 OF 1998 Municipal Council Karmala, Through its Chief Officer ....Petitioner. Vs. 1. Hanumant Sudam Jadhav, Mangalwar Peth, Karmala,Solapur. 2. The President Municipal Council, Karmala, 3. The Industrial Court, Solapur, 4. Dattatraya Pandurang Jagtap, r/at Sitamai Niwas, Sutar Galli, Karmala, District:Solapur. ....Respondents. Mr. S.S.Patwardhan, for the Petitioner. None for the Respondents. CORAM : ANOOP V. MOHTA, J. DATE : 6th April, 2010 Oral Judgment: 1. The petitioner Municipal Council Karmala (for short called as “the Council”), has challenged in number of Writ Petitions the order dated 27.3.1997 and similar such orders, passed by the Industrial Court, Solapur by which the complaints were disposed of in view of the joint compromise pursis at exh CU-6 whereby the parties have settled the matter out of Court. 2. The averments made in this petition, basically against the then President of the Council and respective workers employed, 2 remained un-controverted though they were made party respondents in the petitions. Those averments are serious in all respect which are as follows . GROUNDS i) That the impugned compromise order is contrary to the principles of law, justice and equity. ii) That the Complaint(ULP) was filed against the petitioner without giving any notice whatsoever to the petitioner, which is mandatory u/s 304 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, l965. iii) That the impugned compromise is entered into by the respondent no.4 by abusing the powers u/s 100 of the Municipalities Act. iv) That the respondent no.4 has entered into the compromise in derogation of The Maharashtra Municipalities (compromise to suits) Rules, l967,. v) That the respondent No.4 ought to have conducted an inquiry and recoded the reasons in writing as to why was the impugned compromise advantageous to the interests of the Council instead of proceeding with the complaint. vi) That the respondent no.4 ought have seen that by the impugned compromise he was seeking to employ the respondent no.l in the permanent service of the petitioner. The respondent no.4 was not competent to do so in view of section 76 of the Maharahstra Municipalities Act, l965. That it is only the Chief Officer is competent to do so. vii)That the respondent no.4 ought to have seen emergency. The proviso 9c) to Sub section 2 of section58 divests of a President of a municipal Council from making any fresh appointments. viii)That the respondent no.4 ought to have consulted the Chief Officer, who was representing the petitioner as a 3 party Opponent in the said complaint. The compromise ordained without even formally obtaining the consent of the Chief Officer, who was the main contesting respondent is thus a nullity. ix) That the learned Industrial Court ought to have seen that the employees recruited in sanctioned posts can continue in the employment only till candidates from the Public Selection (Sub-ordinate Services) Board are available. x) That the learned Industrial Court ought to have seen that the respondent no.4 has entered into similar compromises with 44 other persons on three days namely 26-11-1997, 01-12-1997 and 03-12-1997 with ulterior motive. Thus, the Industrial Court, which has got equity jurisdiction ought not to have allowed this fraud. xi) That the impugned compromises overburden the petitioner’s economics and the same takes a heavy toll on the fragile economic condition of the petitioner. The petitioner has thus remained with no funds to look after the civic amenities and welfare of the people. As a result of this the Government Grants are likely to be frozen. 3. If above averments/allegations against Ex-President of the Municipal Council, remained un-controverted, then it is difficult for the Court to accept the order on pursis though settled by the parties and even signed by the respective advocates. 4. The President of Municipal Council need to act within the framework of law. The of power of Chief Executive Officer and the power of President are provided under the statute. The President is not empowered to settle or compromise any matter without authority or resolution on behalf of the council. 4 5. At this stage, it is not in dispute that after receipt of the pursis at exh CU-6 as referred above, the Industrial Court has disposed of the those complaints by which respective complainants have been permitted to join on the respective posts of driver and other class IV employees. Thereby they also waived the so called back wages. The Court recording this pursis disposed of the complaints. 6. This Court on l4.l0.1998 admitted the matters and granted interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (b) thereby stayed the impugned compromise orders of the Industrial Court, Solapur in respective complaints. The respective complainants had also moved Civil Application for interim relief for ad hoc appointment. By reasoned order dated 7th August,2003, these applications were also rejected. 7. There is also material on record which remained un- controverted that the Collector under section 308 of the Maharashtra (Municipal Councils), (Nagpur Panchayats) and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 has stayed the appointment orders issued by the then Ex President based upon the pursis. The statement is made that order is also confirmed by the Commissioner, who is appellate authority under the Act. In the result inspite of the compromise pursis, the authority under the Act, stayed the appointment orders as those were unauthorized and illegal. This aspect also remained un-controverted. 8. The pursis even if signed by the respective advocates, but if case is made out that the President had no power or authority to settle such matter, such pursis signed by the advocate had no force and it is not acceptable. In the present case in view of the averments so made 5 and has remained un-controverted, therefore I am inclined to accept the case of the petitioner that such pursis just cannot be the reason to dispose of the complaints as done whereby the complainant employees have been permitted to join on the respective posts by waiving their back wages. The Collector has also stayed the said orders of appointment. In the result, till this date the complainants are out of employment though there are compromise orders in their favour & rightly so. 9. In view of above facts I am of the view that there is no point in keeping these matters pending. It is necessary in the interest of justice to give full opportunity to both parties to make their respective submissions again before the Industrial Court, Solapur in all respect. I am not even deciding the merit of the averments so raised as that of fraud, misrepresentation and/or of authorisation and/or requisite resolutions even if any, that need detailed enquiry and trial. In these Writ petitions, it is difficult for the Court to re-appreciate the facts even by calling the facts or material on record afresh. Let the Industrial Court to do that. 10. The learned counsel, appearing for the respondents referring to the affidavit in reply in writ petition No.2882 of 1998 Municipal Council Karmala -vs- Dattatray Kawade and ors submitted that such similarly situated employees have been absorbed. There is no such statement and/or averments made in the present petition. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am inclined to observe that the petitioner or the parties are at liberty to settle the matter. The petitioner may pass resolution to absorb the complainants, subject to 6 the law and the availability of posts. 11. It is also made clear that if the petitioners able to demonstrate their case even on merit, the Industrial Court needs to consider the same in accordance with law by giving opportunity to all. 12. In view of the above, keeping all the points open to all the parties, the impugned order dated 27.3.1997 and such similar orders are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Industrial Court, Solapur to decide these complaints by giving full opportunity to both parties, if necessary by framing additional issues and permitting them to lead evidence. 13. It is made clear that in view of the fact that the complaints are of the years from l994 to l998, it is desirable that it should be disposed of as expeditiously as early as possible and preferably within four months from the receipt the copy of the order. 14. In view of the above reasoning the impugned orders are quashed and set aside and the Writ Petitions are allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) with above directions. Rule made absolute. No costs. (ANOOP V. MOHTA, J.)