\Q @ivisian §ench IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MISC.APPLICATION {C}NO. (w OF 2006 APPELLANT Moti Lal Soni, Son of Jhujhala / laimant Soni, aged about 51 years, resident of Village-Semara, P.S. Gourella, Tehsil-Pendra Road, District— Bilaspur (C.G.. ) VERSUS REéPONDEDNTS [1,. Mohan Lal Namdeo, Son of ‘W Armeyram Namdeo, resident of ”a Near Ramhepur Primary School, ‘ '9 : :7 r» f 5:? Lormi, District—Bilaspur (C.G.) t . 2 Shiv Prasad Gupta, Son of §WRamashray Gupta, Resident of Laxman Kirana Store, Anuppur, District—Anuppur (M.P.). 3;; National Insurance Company, Through: Divisional Manager, Divisional Office, B-l, Taha Complex, Ring Road, No. l, Bilaspur (C.G.). \/ MISC. APPEAL UNDER SECTION 173 OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACT, 1988 FOR ENHANCEMENT OF AMOUNT OF AWARD. xg? HIGH COURT OF CHEATTISGARH : BILASPUR Division Bench : Hon’be Shrl I. M. Quddusl b l ’ ldra Mohap shrimtam JJ. Honble $hrl Mann ILA Nc.531 of 2006 APPELLANT National Insurance Company Ltd. Versus - RESPONDENTS Motilal Soni as Ors. Appearance: Shri Dashrath Gupta, counsel for the appelfant/Insuranw Company. Shri Ashok Soni, counsel for respondent No. 1. Shri Rahul Mishra, counsel for respondents No. 2 & 3. And nu (C) No. 185 ofzooo Moti Lal Soni RESPONDENTS Versus Mohan Lal Namdeo & 01s. Appeal. “[8 173 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 Aggorance: Shri Ashok Soni, counsel for the appellant. Shri Rahul Mishra, counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2. Shri Dashrath Gupta, counsel for respondent No.3/Insurance ompany. ORDER (Oral) (Passed on this 4'11 day of May, 2O 1 1) Per I. M. Quddusi, J. 1. MA. No. s31 or 2006 as M.A. (C) No.185 or 2006 are beiffg decided by this common order as the appellants in both te h appeals have filed their respective appeal against impugied a C X award dated 30.11.2005 passed by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (FTC), Pendra-Road, in Claim Case No. 22/2004. M.A. No. 531 ‘of 2006 has been med by the appellant/Insuxance company against the impumed award dated 30.11.2005, agg‘ieved by the liability part imposed upon it and M.A. (C) No.185 of 2006 has been tiled by the claimant for enhancement of amount of compensation inV respect of the same award dated 30. 1 1.2005. The brief facts of the case are that on 19.3.2004, Molilal, applicant/claimant in claim petition, was doing agn'cultural work near Teekarkala bypass road at 10:30 am. At the same time, an overloaded truck bearing reg'stration No. C.G. 10 Z” B 0528 was passing through the same road, which was being driven by-‘Mohanlal/non-applicant No.2 in the claim petition Tyre of that truck bm‘st and spread in did‘eient parts. Some of the parts struck the applicant ~Motilal, as a result, he sustained injuries. It was the case of the applicant/claimant before the Claims Tribunal that because of that accident, he became disabled permanently. ll H/ Applicant-Motilal tiled a claim petition under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinatter referred to as “the Act of 1 988) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, claiming compensation of Rs. 19,60,000/- undm‘ various heads. The claimant- injured obtained a certiflcate for disability, but, in that oeru‘fmate, it has been mentioned that the assessment regarding disability is to be made every 6 months and the disability was a temporary disability. The doctor has also not been examined in respect of the same. The appellant —lnsurance Company in M.A. 531/06 has contended that the original driving licence was fake as it was not issued h‘om Jhansi (U.P.), therefore, the renewal of the same, made at Bilaspur was also baseless. He submits that the renewal of the fake licence cannot be treated as valid. In the case of National Inca ce Co. Ltd. vs.- Sm Singh and Others, (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cues 297, the Honble Apex Court observed thus: “when the driver’s licence hfound to bcjakc 92. It may be true as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that a fake or forged licence is as good as no licence but the question herein, as noh'ced hereinbefore, is whether the insurer must prove that the owner was guilty of the willful breach of the conditions of the insurance policy or the contxact of insurance. In Lehru case the matter has been considered in some detail. We are in general agreement with the approach of the Bench but we intend to point out that the observations made therein must be understood to have been made in the” light of the requirements of the law in terms whereof the insurer is to establish willful breach on the part of the insured and not for the purpose of its disentitlement from raising any defence or for the ownexs to be absolved from any liability whatsoever. We would be dealing in some detail with this aspect of the matter a little later." Learned counsel for the appellant —Insuranee Company has further contended that the vehicle which met with accident was overloaded and, therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation. A perusal of the mgisu'aii‘on certiticate of the vehicle Le truck shows its wait as 6,200 kg if without load, and 16200 kg with loadf therefore, the permissible limit to load the goods in the truck was 10000 ‘kg. i.e 10 tones. The Tribunal has g‘ven its hnding that the load was in between 9— 10 tons. Therefore, it cannot be said that the truck was overloaded. The Tribunal has not conducted a proper enquiry regarding permanent disability of the claimant-injured and decided the claim petition as if the same was a civil suit. However, the law casts a duty upon the Tribunal to conduct proper enquiry as provided under Sections 168 (k 169 of the Act of 1988 and Rule 226 of the Madhya Pradesh/Chhattlsgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. Hon’ble the Supreme Oourt in the case Raj Kama:- Vs. Ajay Rum-r, reported in IV (2010) Accident b Compensation Cues 8.15 has held in Para 8 that the Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. It has been further held in Para 11 regarding enquiry into the claim for deciding just compensation, which is quoted below: ‘11.’I‘he Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in mgaxd to the injuries and their eEect, in particular the cxtent of permancnt disability. Sections 168 and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal docs not function as a neuiral umpire as in a civil sut, but as an miive explorer and seeker of truth who is required to ‘hold an inquiry into the claim’ for determining the ‘iust compensation’. The Tribunal should therefore take an acn've role to ascertain the u'ue and correct position so that it can assess the ‘just oompensation‘. While dealin with nal in' cases e Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a Medical Dictionary and a Handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment (for example the Manual for Evaluation‘ of Permanent Physical lm ' ent for Ortho ic eons re American Academx of Orthodic _S_u;geons or its lndian guivalent or other authorized texts! for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the pysical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep in view the nrst schedule to the Woen’s Compensan'on Act, 1923 which ves some indicamo'n about the extent of permanent disability in diEcrent types of injuries, in the case ofwol en. lfa Doctor y'ving evidence uses technw'al medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addidon, in simple non-medical terms, the nature and the edect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the pemenmge of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek claritication as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disabilit with reference to die whole body or whether it is only with reference to a i th g h m @ y limb. If the percentage of pennment disability is stated with reference to a limb, the’l‘rmunalwill have to seek the doctor’s opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding Mnai pennanent disability with reference to the whole body and if so the pementage.’ (Emphasis eupplied) . , “tweet-”em, M 7 :, 7 10. For the reasons stated herelnabove and with the view that the claimant should not be deprived of his legtjmate claim, we are of the opinion that the matter requims fe- ‘ consideration at the end of the Tribunal. Therefore, we allow M. A. No.531/06 in part, set—aside the impugned award dated 30. 1 1.2005 and remit back the matter to the Tribunal to conduct thorough enquiry, if requixed, police verihcadon report should also be obtained and themafter, decision shall be made ahesh in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 11. Needless to mention that the pames shall be allowed to amend their pleadings, adduee further evidence again in support of their pleadings and/may me furtha' documents and get the documents veriiied etc. Thereaner, the decision shall be made by the Tribunal on merits. Since we have remanded the ‘matter to the Tribunal for decision ahesh, M.A. (C) No;185/06 becomes inh'uctnous. Accordingly, M.A. (C) No.185/06 .is dismissed as having t become inh‘uctuouS. l2. \i/ 7, Hmw‘kg; do 13. Ir the amount of compansauon is alréady in deposit, the same shall be kept in the Mad deposit in a Nationalized Bank for a period of six months cxtcndable mm me to time till the decision of the claim petition emsh. However, in case, amount of the compensation or any pm thereof has been paid to the claimant or withdrawn, the same shall not be recovered till flesh decision is made. 14. The lower Courts records shall be sent back forthwith. 15. The parties shall appear before the Claims Tribunal concerned on 16¢ June, 2011. 16, No order as to costs. M -N\_ ’ sw- l.M. Quddusi Judge Sdl- Manindra M. Shrivastava Judge