Civil Writ Petition No.19055 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision:-17.3.2011 Karnail Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of Punjab and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR Present:- Mr.N.S.Shekhawat, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.Palwinder Singh, Senior Deputy Advocate General, Punjab for respondents No.1 and 2. Mr.R.K.S.Brar, Advocate for respondent No.3. Mr.Balbir Singh, Advocate for respondent No.4. M ehinder S ingh S ullar , J. (Oral) Succinctly, the facts, which need a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the sole controversy, involved in the instant writ petition and emanating from the record, are that in the wake of general Gram Panchayat elections held in the year 2008, Daler Singh son of Gurdeep Singh (respondent No.4) was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of village Hariao Khurd, District Patiala, in view of the provisions of The Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”). 2. Petitioner claimed that as respondent No.4 was not performing his duty and encouraged unauthorized encroachment of the Gram Panchayat land, therefore, he (petitioner) and other complainants made two different complaints against him to the Director, Rural Development and Panchayats (respondent No.2.) (for brevity “the Director”). The inquiry was marked by the Director to Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad (respondent No.3). After completion of the inquiry, respondent No.3 submitted his report dated 9.8.2010 (Annexure P1) to the Director. After perusal of the report and other material on record, the Director Civil Writ Petition No.19055 of 2010 2 suspended the Sarpanch (respondent No.4) with immediate effect and was further debarred from participating in any proceeding of the Gram Panchayat in future, by virtue of order dated 12.8.2010 (Annexure P2). 3. Aggrieved by the order (Annexure P2), respondent No.4 filed the appeal, which was accepted and he (Sarpanch) was reinstated, by way of impugned order dated 6.9.2010 (Annexure P3) by the Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Punjab (respondent No.1) (for short “appellate authority”). 4. The petitioner-complainant Karnail Singh did not feel satisfied and preferred the instant writ petition, challenging the impugned order (Annexure P3), invoking the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record with their valuable assistance and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, the instant writ petition deserves to be accepted in this context. 6. As is evident from the record, that a criminal case was registered against Sarpanch (respondent No.4) for committing theft of electricity, on accusation of having committed the offence punishable under section 135 of the Electricity Act, vide FIR No.114 dated 5.10.2009 by the police of police Station Anti Power Theft, Patiala. Sequelly, another case of rape under sections 376 and 506 IPC was also registered against him, by means of FIR No.12 dated 14.1.2010 (Annexure P4) by the police of Police Station Patran, on the complaint of one Paramjit Kaur wife of Davender Singh. Not only that, likewise another criminal case was also registered against respondent No.4, by virtue of FIR No.23 dated 29.1.2010 (Annexure P5), for the commission of the offences punishable under sections 323 and 342 read with section 34 IPC and section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 by the police of Police Station Patran, District Patiala. 7. Taking into consideration this vital material of registration of criminal cases, involving moral turpitude of Sarpanch (respondent No.4), the Civil Writ Petition No.19055 of 2010 3 Director has rightly suspended him, by way of order (Annexure P2), which, in substance, is as under:- “From the above, it is evident that not only two different criminal cases are registered against Sh.Daler Singh, Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Hariao Khurd, Block Patran, District Patiala, rather case related to rape under Section 376 IPC is also registered against him which is directly covered in the ambit of moral turpitude under Section 20(3) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, the Director Panchayats has the authority to suspend a Panch or Sarpanch from his office if some case relating to moral turpitude is registered against him. xxx xxx xxx Pursuant to Section 2(zr) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 the office of the Panch has been notified as public servant under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and under such situation it becomes the foremost duty of the Panch not to commit any such act as is not in accordance with the law and facts. Here, it will also be proper to mention that a Panch has been elected by the people of the village for the welfare of the village and under these circumstances his responsibility is increased further. Keeping these facts in view, it is concluded that the conduct of Sh.Daler Singh, Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Hariao Khurd, Block Patran, District Patiala is not primarily worthy for a Sarpanch of the village as different criminal cases are registered against him. From perusal of the report sent by the Inquiry Officer to this Department, this fact also comes to the notice that he has executed a compromise with regard to case registered against him under Section 376 but the case (FIR) registered against him under Section 376 IPC, remains as it is. Therefore, his continuing in the office of Sarpanch is not in public interest till the said case is cancelled.” 8. As strange as it may look, but strictly speaking, all the cogent material in this regard has just been ignored by the appellate authority with impunity and illegally reinstated the respondent No.4 on the post of Sarpanch, vide impugned order (Annexure P3), the operative part of which is as under:- “From the above, it is proved that the complainant wants to remove him from the office of the Sarpanch by adopting every method. No enquiry can be conducted by keeping it open. Apart from this, neither any Civil Writ Petition No.19055 of 2010 4 opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant nor was order for any regular enquiry was passed by the Director Rural Development and Panchayats, which is against the natural justice. Therefore, accepting the appeal of the appellant, order of Director, Rural Development and Panchayats regarding suspension of the appellant is set aside and the Sarpanch is reinstated on his office.” 9. As is clear, the main ground, which appears to have been weighed with the appellate authority to reinstate respondent No.4 on the post of Sarpanch, was that no inquiry can be conducted by keeping it open and the suspension order was passed without affording any opportunity to him. Here, to me, the appellate authority slipped into legal error in this relevant connection. 10. What is not disputed here is that the three indicated criminal cases of theft, rape and illegal confinement etc. involving moral turpitude, were registered against the Sarpanch (respondent No.4). Meaning thereby, the Director has recorded the valid reasons in suspending him from the post of Sarpanch, by virtue of order (Annexure P2), but the appellate authority did not record any cogent reason in the impugned order (Annexure P3) in this relevant direction. Such statutory authority, exercising the appellate powers under the Act, should act independently instead of functioning under any kind of assumed pressure. It is now well settled principle of law that every action of such authority must be informed by reasons. The order must be fair, clear, reasonable and in the interest of fair play. Every order must be confined and structured by rational and relevant material on record because the valuable rights of the parties are involved. The same are totally lacking in this case. 11. Exhibiting the importance of passing speaking and reasoned order, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and others (2009) 4 Supreme Court Cases 240 has held (para 8) as under : - “The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in S.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India, is that people Civil Writ Petition No.19055 of 2010 5 must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons minimises the chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi- judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation.” 12. In this manner and on the same grounds, to my mind, the impugned order (Annexure P-3) cannot legally be maintained, in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 13. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. In the light of the aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of regular inquiry, the instant writ petition is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order (Annexure P3) of appellate authority is set aside and the order (Annexure P2) of the Director is hereby restored. However, the Director (respondent No.2) is directed to entrust the regular inquiry to some appropriate officer with the direction to complete the same within a period of three months thereafter. (Mehinder Singh Sullar) 17.3.2011 Judge AS Whether to be referred to reporter?Yes/No