IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No: 4244 of 1999 Between: B. Subbanna S/o Subbarayalu R/o Tirupathi, Chittoor Dist. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, Kurnool Region, Kurnool 2 K.S. Vitramma W/o K. Peeraiah (late) R/o Jagadam Pali, D.No.7/569, Kodur (Rly), Cuddapah Dist. 3 K. Prashanthi D/o late K. Peeraiah R/o Jagadam Pali, D.No.7/569, Kodur (Rly), Cuddapah Dist. 4 K. Ambika D/o K. Peeraiah (late) R/o Jagadam Pali, D.No.7/569, Kodur (Rly), Cuddapah Dist. 5 K. Vijayasanthi D/o K. Peeraiah (late) R/o Jagadam Pali, D.No.7/569, Kodur (Rly), Cuddapah Dist. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to to issue a Writ, order or direction particularly a writ in the nature of Mandamus, declaring that the order of the 1st respondent herein Rc.No.C/6604/96 and M.P.No.2/98 dt: 26-11-1998 as illegal and further direct the 1st respondent herein to refund the sum of Rs.90,000/- deposited by me with him in pursuance of his notices and pass Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.L.J.VEERA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.: GP FOR LABOUR The Court made the following : ORDER: Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, in Rc.No.C/6604/96 and M.P.No.2/98 dated 26.11.1998, the present writ petition is filed by the employer. In the impugned order, the authority, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short – ‘the Act’), records that he had issued a notice to the petitioner. Pursuant thereto the employer, despite his contention that he had no legal liability to pay compensation to the dependents of the deceased, had deposited Rs.90,000/-. Details of the said notice are, however, not available on record. The petitioner informed the authority that a compromise agreement had been entered into between him and the deceased’s wife. He requested the authority to register the said agreement under Section 28 of the Act. As no orders were passed thereupon the petitioner filed W.P.No.29407 of 1998 and this Court, by its order dated 27.10.1998, directed the first respondent to consider the memo of compromise filed by the parties and pass orders in accordance with law. Consequent thereto, the first respondent issued notice dated 07.11.1998 and, thereafter, an enquiry was held wherein the petitioner herein examined himself as P.W.1 and the wife of the deceased was examined as R.W.1. While the petitioner placed reliance on Section 28(1) of the Act to contend that the compromise agreement should, necessarily, be registered, the first respondent, relying on Section 8(1) of the Act, observed that Section 28(1) of the Act applied only to non- fatal cases and since, in the instant case, the employee had died in an accident, and as there was no provision for registration of the agreement or for payment of amounts directly to the dependents in fatal cases, the petition filed by the applicant was liable to be dismissed. Sri L.J.Veera Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the Act made no distinction between fatal and non-fatal cases and that Section 28 of the Act provides for registration of the agreement in all cases where payment of compensation has been settled by agreement between the parties. Learned counsel would rely on proviso(d) to Section 28(1) of the Act to submit that a discretion is conferred on the Commissioner to refuse registration of an agreement only in cases where compensation is payable to a woman or a person under a legal disability, where the sum or amount payable is found inadequate, where the agreement has been obtained by fraud or undue influence or other improper means and to make such order as he thinks just in the circumstances. Learned counsel would submit that, in the absence of such satisfaction having been arrived at by the authority, the agreement between the parties should have been accepted and recorded, that the compromise agreement did not contravene Section 8 of the Act, that, though the death of the deceased was not in the course of or arising out of employment, the petitioner had paid Rs.41,000/- directly to the wife of the deceased and, since the total compensation payable under the agreement was for Rs.1,31,000/-, the balance of Rs.90,000/- had been deposited with the authorities under the Act. Learned counsel would submit that after the said amount was deposited the petitioner had, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, paid Rs.87,000/- by way of demand drafts. He would point out that, though the wife of the deceased herself admitted to have received Rs.1,31,000/-, that her husband had died while returning from Madras where he had gone on personal work and Rs.90,000/- was deposited before the authority under the Act, the impugned order came to be passed. Learned counsel would further submit that the amount of Rs.90,000/- still continued to be illegally retained by the first respondent and that it had neither been returned to the petitioner nor paid it to the wife of the deceased. Section 8(1) of the Act reads as under:-- “No payment of compensation in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death, and no payment of a lump sum as compensation to a woman or a person under a legal disability, shall be made other than by deposit with the Commissioner, and no such payment made directly by an employer shall be deemed to be a payment of compensation: Provided that, in the case of a deceased workman, an employer may make to any dependent advances on account of compensation of an amount equal to three months’ wages of such workman and so much of such amount as does not exceed the compensation payable to that dependant shall be deducted by the Commissioner from such compensation and repaid to the employer.” Section 8(1) makes it clear that, in cases where an injury to a workman has resulted in his death, payment of compensation shall be made only by way of deposit with the Commissioner and not directly and that any direct payment shall not be deemed to be payment of compensation under the Act. The proviso to Section 8(1) makes allowance for payment of advances directly to any dependent, on account of compensation, for a sum equal to three months’ wages. Section 28(1) of the Act deals with registration of certain agreements. It provides for settlement of compensation by agreement and a memorandum thereof to be sent by the employer to the Commissioner under the Act who shall, on being satisfied as to its genuineness, record the memorandum in a register in the prescribed manner. Proviso (d) thereunder enables the Commissioner, if he is satisfied that the compensation under the agreement is inadequate or that the agreement was obtained by fraud or undue influence or other improper means, not to register the agreement. The question which arises for consideration is whether Section 28(1) of the Act would apply to all case of injury including death or whether it should be limited as applicable only to cases of injuries other than those which have resulted in the death of a workman. Holding Section 28(1) of the Act to apply to all cases of compensation payable would make Section 8(1) of the Act redundant for if an agreement, entered into for payment of compensation directly to the deceased’s wife, is required to be registered under Section 28(1), the stipulation in Section 8(1), of directly depositing the compensation with the Commissioner, would be rendered a dead letter. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit vs. State of Maharashtra[1]). The legislature may be safely presumed to have intended what the words plainly say. (Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla[2]). What is to be borne in mind is what has been said in the statute and what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided. (Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. vs. Custodian of Vested Forests[3], Shyam Kishori Devi vs. Patna Municipal Corpn[4], A. R. Antulay vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak[5], Dental Council of India vs. Hari Prakash[6], J. P. Bansal vs. State of Rajasthan[7] and State of Jharkhand vs. Govind Singh[8]). The primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. (Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation[9]). Courts should not, ordinarily, add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result. (Delhi Financial Corpn vs. Rajiv Anand[10]). There is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. Courts expound the law, they do not legislate. (State of Kerala vs. Mathai Verghese[11], Union of India vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal[12]). A Judge is not entitled to add something more than what is there in the Statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. (Union of India vs. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd[13]). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. (Maruti Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. S.T.O., I.S.T. Circle, Mattancherry[14], State of Jharkhand vs. Govind Singh[15]). No construction which requires the words in Section 8(1) of the Act to be ignored or construed as inapposite surplusage is permissible. Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute, as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. (Gurudevdatta1, Manohar Lal vs. Vinesh Anand[16]). When the legislative intent is found specific mention and expression in the provisions of the Act itself, the same cannot be whittled down or curtailed and rendered nugatory. (Bharathidasan University vs. All India Council for Technical Education[17]). Effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” must be avoided. (Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Mohd. Shafi[18]). Both Sections 8(1) and 28(1) have to be read harmoniously and effect should be given to both the provisions. This can only be done if the agreements, referred to in Section 28(1), are held applicable to cases other than those falling under Section 8(1) of the Act i.e. to cases where an injury has occurred and it has not resulted in the death of the workman concerned. This, however, does not conclude the matter in issue. The deceased’s wife has deposed before the first respondent that she had directly received Rs.1,31,000/- as compensation, that her husband had gone to Madras on personal work and that he had died in an accident thereat. If so, the contention of Sri L.J.Veera Reddy, that it is not even a case of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, cannot be brushed aside. Further, the deceased’s wife, in her evidence as R.W.1, has expressed her no objection for the employer to take back Rs.90,000/- deposited by him with the competent authority under the Act. The authority has not even recorded a finding that this statement was made under duress or undue influence. Even, under the proviso to Section 8(1), payment can be made directly to the extent of 3 months wages. It is not known at whose behest, and under what circumstances, the notice, which resulted in the petitioner depositing Rs.90,000/-, was issued. It is evidence that no further action has been taken by the authority pursuant to the said notice, as the order, impugned in this writ petition, is the result of an application being filed by the petitioner to register the agreement. The first respondent shall, therefore, take action pursuant to the notice issued by him earlier and pass an order in accordance with law, taking into consideration the evidence already let in both by the petitioner as P.W.1 and the deceased’s wife as R.W.1, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Payment of Rs.90,000/-, deposited by the petitioner before the authority, shall be subject to the outcome of the decision to be taken by the competent authority, and shall not be retained thereafter by the first respondent. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly. However, in the circumstances, without costs. _____________________________ RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J 4th March 2009 CVRK [1] (2001) 4 SCC 534 [2] (2003) 1 SCC 692 [3] AIR 1990 SC 1747 [4] AIR 1966 SC 1678 [5] (1984) 2 SCC 500 [6] (2001) 8 SCC 61 [7] (2003) 5 SCC 134 [8] (2005) 10 SCC 437 [9] (2003) 2 SCC 455 [10] (2004) 11 SCC 625 [11] (1986) 4 SCC 746 [12] AIR 1992 SC 96 [13] (2001) 4 SCC 139 [14] (2001) 3 SCC 735 [15] (2005) 10 SCC 437 [16] (2001) 5 SCC 407 [17] (2001) 8 SCC 676 [18] (2001) 8 SCC 540