HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. CHANDRA KUMAR C.R.P.No. 969 of 2010 Date: 13-07-2010 Between: S.M. Hussain Rasheed (died) and another ……….. petitioners And The Arbitrator/CSR and others ……… Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. CHANDRA KUMAR C.R.P.No. 969 of 2010 ORDER: This Revision Petition is filed challenging the order, dated 02- 02-2010 in I.A.No.298 of 2009 in C.T.A.No.41 of 2002 on the file of the A.P. Cooperative Tribunal, Hyderabad, whereby and whereunder the Application filed by the petitioner to condone the delay of 1974 days in filing the restoration petition to restore the Appeal, was dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The husband of the petitioner, Sri S.M. Hussain Rasheed, borrowed an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- from Hyderabad Cooperative Urban Bank Limited, which is the second respondent herein, and subsequently as he could not repay the amount, the matter was referred to the Arbitrator and an Award was passed in A.R.C.No.296/2001/J/1 directing him to repay a sum of Rs.12,48,995/- as on 31-12-1999 together with interest @ 21% along with incidental charges till the date of realization of the total loan amount. Then the husband of the petitioner approached the bank for fresh loan and accordingly, fresh loan of Rs.15,00,000/- was released and the earlier loan amount was adjusted. However, the husband of the petitioner, who was suffering with heart ailment, could not repay the amount and therefore, the bank filed another Arbitration Application and the Arbitrator had passed an Award in A.R.C.No.428/2001/J/1 in favour of the bank on 29-01-2002 directing the husband of the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.16,54,447/- as on 30-09-2001 together with interest @ 24% per annum plus 12% penal interest and also to pay incidental charges. The husband of the petitioner had preferred an Appeal challenging the said Award before the Tribunal which was numbered as C.T.A.No.41 of 2002 and he had also filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.275 of 2003 disputing the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to try the cases of above Rs.10,00,000/- and orders were passed in W.P.M.P.Nos.5428 and 5766 of 2003 directing the Tribunal, before which C.T.A.No.41 of 2002 is pending, to transfer the case to Debt Recovery Tribunal. Subsequently, a Full Bench of this Court by order, dated 05-07-2005, held that the Tribunals have no jurisdiction as the amount is more than Rs.10 lakhs. Then the matter was carried to the Apex Court and the Apex Court through the Judgment in GREATER BOMBAY COOP. BANK LTD. v. UNITED YARN TEX (P) LTD [1], set aside the order of this Court and held that the Tribunals have jurisdiction to entertain the matter irrespective of the value even if the value of the loan is more than Rs.10 lakhs. 3. Then the bank served a sale notice on the petitioner. The petitioner’s main case is that she is the widow of the borrower and until she was served with the notice of sale of the property, she was not aware of the loan transaction of her husband with the second respondent-bank and that her husband died after a prolong illness of heart disease on 15-06-2006 and then she filed an Application to set aside the dismissal order of C.T.A.No.41 of 2002 for default with an Application to condone the delay. 4. The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the A.P. Cooperative Tribunal ought to have considered that stay order was pending in respect of E.P.No.111 of 2002 in W.P.M.P.No.1138 of 2003 in W.P.No.881 of 2003 filed by S.M. Hussainand S.L. Hussain jointly and that subsequently the matter was carried to the Apex Court. It is also submitted that while granting special leave, the Apex Court ordered that status quo shall be maintained in all the concerned proceedings before any Authority or Tribunal through the order, dated 24-10-2005. Admittedly the Civil Appeal is disposed of by the Apex Court on 04-04-2007. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is a widow and that the property was originally mortgaged at the time of availing first loan by her husband and that the loan was totally discharged and that when subsequently her husband availed second loan, there was no renewal of mortgage of the property in favour of the bank. It is also submitted that the Arbitrator had awarded interest @ 36% per annum, which is abnormal and totally unjust and that the petitioner was not issued any demand notice. It is also his contention that after allowing the SLP by the Supreme Court, no steps were taken by the bank and now the petitioner came to know about this litigation when she was served with the sale notices and therefore, due to lack of knowledge, there was delay and the same may be condoned. 6. Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the Appeal filed by the husband of the petitioner in C.T.A.No.41 of 2002 was dismissed on 24-11-2003 and that subsequently he had filed W.P.No.275 of 2003 and in the said writ petition he did not sought for revival of the Appeal. 7. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner has explained the delay and whether the lower Court is justified in dismissing the Application? 8. Admittedly, the petitioner is not the original borrower and her husband is the original borrower and the Appeal and the writ petition were filed by him and he died due to heart attack. Admittedly status quo order was in force and it is not the petitioner, who had mortgaged the property with the bank. Now whether there was renewal of mortgage at the time of obtaining second loan is a question of fact, which cannot be determined in this Revision. However, the fact remains that the husband of the petitioner filed the writ petition and it was pending for a considerable period and subsequently, the matter was also pending before the Apex Court and in the above circumstances, it appears that the contention of the petitioner that only after serving of the sale notice, she has come to know about the proceedings cannot be doubted at this stage. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the pending litigation between the parties and interest rate awarded by the Arbitrator, I consider just and reasonable that the petitioner should be given opportunity to agitate the matter in the Appeal. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 9. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order, dated 02-02-2010 in I.A.No.298 of 2009 in C.T.A.No.41 of 2002 is set aside. Consequently, I.A.No.298 of 2009 stands allowed. No order as to costs. ___________________ B. CHANDRA KUMAR, J Date: 13-07-2010 YCR [1] (2007) 6 SCC 236