IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF APRIL, TWO THOUSAND NINE ONLY PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.2444 of 2009 Between: Sri K.Sudhakar … Petitioner And APSRTC, reptd., by its Managing Director, Musheerabad, Hyderabad and another. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioners: Sri V.Narsimha Goud. Counsel for the respondents: Sri V.Padmanabha Rao for Smt.B.G.Uma Devi. This Court made the following: ORDER: This Writ Petition is filed for a Writ of Certiorari to quash proceedings No.E3/2(1)/09-SDNR, dated 24-1- 2009, issued by respondent No.2, whereby the petitioner was kept under suspension. At the hearing Sri V.Narsimha Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted with considerable stress that the impugned order suffers from a serious illegality. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner’s suspension is in violation of Circular No.PD- 10/2002, dated 9-3-2002. S r i V.Padmanabharao, learned counsel representing Smt.B.G.Uma Devi, learned standing counsel for the respondent-APSRTC, opposed the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner had driven the vehicle in a drunken condition and caused accident resulting in capsizing of the vehicle. He, therefore, submitted that, in view of the serious misconduct of the petitioner, disciplinary proceedings are initiated and the petitioner was placed under suspension. He further submitted that charge sheet has already been issued on 24-1-2009. A perusal of the impugned order of suspension reveals that the petitioner was allegedly driving the vehicle in an intoxicated condition and caused accident resulting in capsizing of the vehicle and injuries to the service conductor and one passenger, by name, Md.Burhan, s/o.Md.Siddique of Tangadpally village. It is also stated in the order that damage to the tune of Rs.5,000/- was caused to the vehicle; and that the image of the Corporation was tarnished. In the Circular referred to above, on which strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is, inter alia, mentioned as under: “II. Accidents: In case of accidents, drivers need not immediately be placed under suspension soon after occurrence of the accident, unless it is a case of serious nature resulting in death of passengers/pedestrian and where the driver is found guilty of rash and negligent driving resulting in death and where the police prosecution is likely to result in the conviction. The punishment imposed should be appropriate depending upon the gravity of the misconduct and connected circumstances. In all other cases where the police treat the case as accidental or the driver is acquitted in a Court of Law but still the employee is held responsible for the accident in the departmental enquiry, suitable deterrent disciplinary action can be taken against the driver”. The circular referred to above does not in any manner help the cause of the petitioner. It only advised against immediate suspension of the drivers except in cases of fatal accidents. This circular cannot be understood as imposing a total prohibition on the competent authority on suspension of the drivers in non-fatal accidents. The circular lays stress on the timing of suspension i.e., not to resort to suspension “soon after occurrence of accident” in non-fatal accidents. While the circular has not imposed any fetters on the powers of the authorities to suspend drivers causing accidents, indeed no such restriction can be imposed on the statutory powers vested in them by an executive order. The facts of this case reveal that suspension order was not passed “soon after occurrence of the accident”. The impugned order shows that while the accident has taken place on 21-1-2009, a report was submitted by AMT/SDNR on 22-1-2009 and after considering the same, the order of suspension was passed on 24-1-2009. On the same day charge sheet was issued. Hence, I find no merit in the contention that the order of suspension is in violation of the said circular. In service jurisprudence, an order of suspension is not perceived as an order of punishment. The Courts are very slow in interfering with the orders of suspension because such interference tends to interfere with the day to day administration of the employer. Unless the order of suspension is passed without jurisdiction or the same is per se malafide, this Court seldom interferes with such orders. The allegations contained in the suspension order and the accusation against the petitioner in the charge sheet are to the effect that the petitioner drove the vehicle in a negligent manner under the influence of alcohol resulting in capsizing of the vehicle and serious injuries to the service conductor and one passenger. The learned standing counsel for the respondents placed before me a copy of the purported signed statement of the passenger, who suffered injuries in the accident, wherein it is stated that the petitioner was in an inebriated condition; that he was demanding money from the passengers; and that he had cut the bus to his right side by increasing its speed, which resulted in capsizing of the vehicle. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that neither the said statement was served on the petitioner nor he was sent for medical examination. In my considered view, these aspects assume relevance at the time of departmental enquiry and it is premature for this Court to examine the same at this stage. Though the petitioner has raised the vague plea that he being the office bearer of the Union, the order of suspension was passed malafide, he failed to implead the Depot Manager in his personal capacity. No material is placed before this Court to give conclusive findings on the allegations of malafides. As the impugned order is in the nature of suspension, pending enquiry, and prima facie the petitioner caused a serious accident resulting in capsizing of the vehicle allegedly in an inebriated condition, I do not see any ground whatsoever to interfere with the impugned order of suspension. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, the respondents are directed to complete the enquiry within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall be free to request for supply of documents, which are relevant for the purpose of enquiry. -------------------------------------- C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J Dt.15-4-2009 MNR