A?\ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BtLASPUR WRW PETHWON {3) N6. 6341 of 2806 PET!T!ONER : Harii'am Naik aged aboui 84 years 5w of Shri Anan Singh {‘éaA eccugaatéon retired Pamar; §u RH. No. 42, R/o Village 3aramke§a Tfr am D3stt. Raigarh (CG) VERSUS $£ L363} bm $51; “saw r". §§amhau . régem“ WW Reap Naik, Advocate far the peiitiener. V l; Amw' Dubey, Pane§ Lawyef far the S‘kate/respcndents. QREEE QRgL (Passed an 25" day a? Junes 25%) 1. Heard. 2. Leamed caunsei awearing fer the §etit§onez Jbr. Ls 3w? v: 3e"%€:9ner was apbaimeri as Pem’afi on 9Q.6§.19$5 anti {eiirea‘ from semce on ahamrg “3 a a? 5 “)ei’amucl wn om 31 G7 2002 ln the caurse of sai'wce, m , ”we: m: mt make any apphcahon/repfesentatmn for gram? of benem of Kramonnat: afier efche¥ 12 years or 24 yearg of serv§ce. After re‘iiremen? §rom the service, accmding tc ieamed ccunse! for ihe peiirioner, rhe peiitianer made representatiom dated 28.11.2005 (Annexure PM) arid 03.12.2005 for grant of benefit ae provaded under circuKar dated 19.04.2000 (Amexure 9’2). The cepy of ihe represema’cion dated 03.1 2.2905 has net been fired. 3. The question invehled in thie case is asto when the petitiomer has no? made any applicarion for grant of service benefrt as provided Lmder circuiar dared 19th Apri} 2009 during his service iime, whether the petirioner can be granted relier as prayed, afier his retiremenr. The petitioner has siept over his right and has not taken any steps at the appronriate time. The petition was fiied after a period of about 4 years on 2.11.2006 Without any expianatien for the deiay. At tnts stage, the petttion cannot be entertained on two ceunts. firstty. on tne ground of . i RESPONDENTS :1. Siaie 0f Chha‘msg: ‘d, mew; ma Se 0a , Dcaanwxcm {if Re ewe 3a Kayar’ ' Ssam" 2. ‘ ”.G. P \¥ 3‘ a; $§3‘ti. ’si'd‘ ’“ 1 HQ?* “ff; 1 1 S"§u$TITL'T§0h <2). NDEA deiay ar1d secondiy, ’iha: the petitioner has not made appropriate appiicatiori duiing his sewice iime. 4. The iaw on the principle sf waiver and acquiescence is weii settied that, if the person sieeps over his rights and is hot vigilant of hie rights and acquiesces with the situaticn: he may net be eniitieci i0 the same reiiei as was granted ta oiher vigiian’: persons. 0’! Constim’iion Bench of the Supreme Coun in Chandra Bhuehan and ane‘cher vs. The Deputy Director of Consoiidetion, Utter Pradesh (Regiehai) i Emknew arid Qtherei .~.‘. , v... nhserved that “eermaiiv n’J ...v rive mieefian .1 whez‘her a petition Lieder An‘. 226 of the Conetifua‘ion for the issue of e wrif of cerrierari had been presented wifhour undue deiey er ieches is e quesz‘ion for :‘he High Cour? z‘o decide and this Cour? waeisi not interfere with z‘he exercise 9f the discfefion of fhe High Cou 6. Fui’t‘ner, other Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Rebihoireheéh Ease and Qthers vs. 'i'he Unieh 9f inoiie and Gihers2, observed as undei : “31. But in so far as the aitack is based on the 1952 Senioritv Rules it must fail on anoiher ground The ground being that this petiiion under Articie 32 of the Consfifution has been broughf about fifteen years after the 1952 Ruies were promuigated and effect given to them in the Seniority List prepared on August 1, 1&5’3. Learned counsel for the petitioners says that this Court has no discretion and cannot dismiss the petition under Articie 32 on the grouttd that it has been brought after inordinate delay. We are unable to accept this contention ..... 32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly uroes that the decision of this Court in M/s. Tilokcnand Morrchand’s case (supra) needs review. But after oarefuiiy considering the matter, we are of the View that no reitef should be given to petitioners who, Without any reasonabie expianation, approach this Court under article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate deiay. The highest Court in this land has been given originai jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into state demands after a iapse of years. it is said that Articie 32 is itseif a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not foliow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that ‘Ain 1967 sc 1272 2 1970 (1} scc e4 M this Court should discard aH principies and grant reiief in petiiions fi§ed after inanimate deiay.” 7. Later, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and otheis vs. The State ef Maharashtra and eiherea (Bhagwati, J. in peia 1,9} ebsewed a5 under : “1o ...... it may atso be noted that the principie on which the Court proceeds in retusing reiiefto the petitioner on ground of iaches and deiay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the deiay in filing the petttion shouid not be aiiowed to be disturbed untess there is reaeonabie expianation for the deiay. This principle was stated in the foiiowing terms by Hidayatuitah, C.J. in Tiiok Chahd vs. H.B. Mmehi (supra) : ‘ “The party ciaiming Fundamentai Rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of deiay on the part of the person moving the Court." g 8. in State of MP. vs. Nandlai4, it was observed that that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinariiy assist the tardy and the indoient or the acquiescent and the lethargic. it there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactory expiained, the High Court may dectine to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. it was also observed that if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of infiicting not oniy i hardship and inconvenience but aiso iniustice on third parties. When writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexpiained delay coupled with the creation.of third party tights in the meantime is an important factor which aiso weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 9. The supreme Court in U.P. Jai Nigam and another vs. Jashwant Singh and another5, observed as under: “The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and iaches has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary reiiet under Article 22S of the Constitution.” 3 (1974M soc at 7 4 (AIR 1987 so 251) 5 (200s) n scc 454 ’4’, £6 10. in Yunus (Eaboobha!) A Hamid Padvekar v. Sta€e 0f Maharashtras, the Supreme Court obsewed as under: “Delav 0f Xaches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers. In an appmpriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negiigence or omission on the part of the appiicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the iapse of time andv other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.“ 11.The Supreme Court in Tridip Kumar Dingai and others Vs. State of West Bengai and others? where the appeiiantstook 559 days in approaching the Court, causing unexpiained anci inordinate deiay, observed as under : ‘We are unabie to uphold the contention. it is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But whiie exercising discretionary iurisdiction under Articies 32, 226, 22? or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is deiay and iaches on the part of the appiicant in approaching a writ court. it is weil settied that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One :cf the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. if the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he shouid cor‘ne to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. lnordinate deiay in making the motion for a writ wili indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise suc'n discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying obiect of this principle is not to' encourage agitation of stale ciéims and exhume matters which have been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (Vide State of MP. v. Bhaiiai Bhai, Moon Milis Ltd. v. industrial Court and Bhoop Singh v. Union of india). This principie applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right {wide Tiiokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Durga Prasad v. Chief Controlier of imports 8: Exports and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of lndia).” Further, “There is no upper iimit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts r k s pr . . 2009 (a) so 487) 7 (2009) i scc 768) before the ccur‘t depending on and varying from case to case. it Wm depend upm what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the deiay arose“. 12. This Court in Smt. Shashibaia Gandhrala vs. State of Chhat‘tisgarh & Qthersg on 3-1-2007 observed that “the cause of action arose on 6- 6-1 995, when the communication was sent by the State Government to V the aufhorities for grant of revised pay-scare The petitioner has not taken any steps ever since til] these petitions were filed in December, 2006 and remained tardy and indoient. This beiated approach would cedain/y cause hardship and inconvenience to oiher side.” t3.Appiying weii settled principies of iaw to the facts of the case on hand, the petitioner has not offered any explanation for inordinate delay and iaches. The petitioner kept quiet for about four years and has not taken any steps for redressai of the grievance sought for in this petition, except fiiing of the representations before the respondent authorities after retirement. 14.For the reasoned mentioned hereinahove, the petition is iiable to be and is accordingly dismissed. (‘N Sd/- Satish K. Agnilwtri Judge “ WP (5) No.7222 or zoos