IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT APPEAL NO.87 OF 2011 DATED:21.2.2011 Between: M. Devender … Appellant And The District Collector Medak District at Sangareddy and others … Respondents THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT APPEAL NO.87 OF 2011 JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Nisar Ahmad Kakru) 1. Appellant - writ petitioner, a fair price shop dealer, was charge sheeted by the Revenue Divisional Officer – respondent 3, vide proceedings dated 8.8.2005, alleging misuse of 250.86 quintals of rice supplied to him under food for work (FFW) scheme, besides, contravention of the conditions of authorization under the Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2001. Spot verification and inquiry was conducted which concluded in a final order dated 28.10.2005, canceling the authorization of the appellant – writ petitioner. Order was appealed against but in vain, resultantly a revision – petition, but again of no avail to the appellant, consequently, invocation of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of this court, on the ground that 79.59 quintals of rice were stored by the appellant in S.C. Community Hall which quantity was not verified by the inspecting staff. This ground, however, was neither raised by the appellant in the explanation nor in appeal and not in the revision petition too. His explanation was that the estimated spoiled rice of 20.00 quintals apart from 96.76 quintals of rice is available in the fair price shop itself and thereby there is no variation in the stocks. In the aforesaid explanation, he has also stated to have issued 38.40 quintals of rice to one Ramesh Reddy and 112.87 quintals of rice to one Sanjeevareddy, both from the office of Mandal Parishad Development Officer, Kondapaka, and thereby the appellant seeks to count 250.86 quintals of rice which was found short in the stock verification of his shop. 2. The initial order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, under which the authorization of the appellant was cancelled, records that the appellant made a statement before the Revenue Divisional Officer, acknowledging delivery of 20 quintals of FFW scheme rice to him which were spoiled by him without obtaining permission from the concerned authorities. There is no denying that he has issued 192.46 quintals of FFW scheme rice to the contractor without obtaining coupons and has admitted that the Mandal Revenue Officer had instructed him to issue FFW scheme rice only after obtaining the coupons and claims to be well acquainted with the system and the procedure that makes mandatory upon a fair price shop dealer to obtain the coupons before issuing rice under FFW scheme. In view of the said statement of the appellant, the charge was found established and the Revenue Divisional Officer held that the appellant has apparently misused the rice meant for daily labourers, who worked under FFW programme. The said conclusions were confirmed by the appellate authority/Collector (CS), Medak, vide his order dated 18.2.2006, and further confirmed by the District Collector, Medak, as revisional authority under order dated 28.11.2006. The appellant thereafter moved the writ court questioning all the aforesaid orders. 3. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the appellant reiterated that 79.59 quintals of rice were available in the shop but the said quantity was not taken into consideration, whereas before the learned single Judge it was contended on his behalf that 79.59 quintals of rice was stored in S.C. community hall attached to Gram Panchayat and the inspecting staff did not take that stock into account. The claim so advanced was never raised by the appellant at any earlier point of time, not in the affidavit too filed in support of the writ petition therefore the learned single Judge rejected the said contention. In this appeal the said contention is reiterated but we are not inclined to entertain a fresh plea which was not urged by the appellant in his explanation, appeal or revision. Since it was raised for the first time before the writ Court, it did not merit consideration. However, the writ Court answered the said contention against the appellant on merits and rightly so, because no Government Order is brought to our notice which would permit use of a community hall for storage purpose. 4. That apart there is an admission by the appellant that he has failed to make supply against coupons making breach of conditions of authorization manifest and the law being settled in the matters of this nature, that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is only with respect to examining a decision making process and not the decision itself, interference with the judgment is uncalled for. In taking the view, we are fortified by judgment of the apex Court in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal[1], and relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder: “The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the Courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review Court. The limited scope of judicial review succinctly put are: (i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies. (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well- defined grounds. (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal. (iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasions miscarriage of justice. (v) The Courts cannot be called upon to undertake the Government duties and functions. The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. [See Ira Munn v. State of Ellinois 1876 (94) US (Supreme Reports) 113] …It is well-settled that while exercising the power of judicial review the Court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself. In doing so, it is often argued by the defender of an impugned decision that the Court is not competent to exercise its power when there are serious disputed questions of facts; when the decision of the Tribunal or the decision of the fact finding body or the arbitrator is given finality by the statute which governs a given situation or which, by nature of the activity the decision maker’s opinion on facts is final. But while examining and scrutinizing the decision making process it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise the decision cannot be tested under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. How far the Court of judicial review can reappreciate the findings of facts depends on the ground of judicial review. For example, if a decision is challenged as irrational, it would be well-nigh impossible to record a finding whether a decision is rational or irrational without first evaluating the facts of the case and coming to a plausible conclusion and then testing the decision of the authority on the touchstone of the tests laid down by the Court with special reference to a given case. This position is well settled in Indian Administrative Law. Therefore, to a limited extent of scrutinizing the decision making process, it is always open to the Court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision maker.” 5. For what is stated hereinabove, neither the decision making process nor the decision can be faulted with. Dismissed. VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J NISAR AHMAD KAKRU, CJ 21-2-2011 B. Narsinga Rao Note: L.R. copy to be marked. (B.O) B. Narsinga Rao [1] AIR 2004 SC 3800