smcaLE my.“ Ck @ w: ,QP IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR CHHATTISGARH w.P.(S) No. 5g3K 12010 PETITIONER . / . Gayaneshwar Prasad Sahu S/o Shri Hari Nath Sahu, Aged about 48 years, Occupation - Head Master Govt. Primary School Dhour Block Dhamdha Distt. Durg (CG). VERSUS RESPONDENTS : / 1. State of Chhattisgrh, Through — The Secretary, Shool Education Department, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) / 2. The Deputy Secretary, School Education Department, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) District Education Officer District Durg (CG) 4.. Block Education Ofticer Dhamdha Distt. Durg (CG). WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1. PARTICULARS OF THE PETITIO HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S) No. 5891 0f2010 PETITIONER : Gyaneshwar Prasad Sahu. VERSUS RESPONDENTS : State of‘Chhattisgarh & Others. WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA SB: Hon’ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Present: Shri Vipin Tiwari, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri Sushil Dubey, Government Advocate for the State/respondents. ORDER (ORAL) (Passed on 215‘ day of January, 201 1) By this petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 15.7.2010 (Annexure P/3) passed by the respondent N0. 3 whereby the petitioner, working as Head Master, Primary School, Dhaur, Development‘Block Dhamdha, District Durg, has been transferred to Government Primary School, Bendri, Development Block Dharsiwa, District Raipur. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that initially, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher with the respondent department on 18.01.1983 and thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Head Master and posted at Government Primary School, Dhour, Dhamdha, District Durg by order dated 01.06.2010. Subsequently, by order dated 15.7.2010, the petitioner was transferred to Government primary School, Baindri, Dharsiwa, District Raipur, and without giving any information to the petitioner, the petitioner has been relieved on 24.09.2010. Shri Tiwari submits that the action of the respondent authorities is bad in law as the petitioner has been relieved ex-parte and the order also does not contain the! signature of any authority and the petitioner himself had to collect the transfer order from the office of the District Education Officer. He further submits the petitioner is a district level employee and by the impugned transfer, the petitioner may loose his seniority. On the other hand, Shri Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents submits that the order of transfer which is sought to be challenged in this petition is a valid order and was passed in administrative exigency. There is no irregularity or illegality. 4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto. 5. On perusal of the order dated 01.06.2010 (Annexure P/l) it appears that earlier, the petitioner was posted at Primary School Kumhari and thereafter, on promotion, he was posted at Primary School, Dhaur, within the same Development Block i.e. Dhamdha. Thus, the contention that the petitioner has been transferred within a period of 1 V2 months, which is maZa fide and arbitrary, is not sustainable as earlier, he was transferred on promotion and thereafter, the subsequent impugned transfer order was passed on administrative grounds. 6. The Supreme Court, in Purushottam Kumar Jha v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others], has settled the legal position in reference to allegation ofmala tide, observing as under: “23. It is well settled that whenever allegations as to mala fides have been leveled, sufficient particulars and cogent materials making outprimafacie case must be set out in the pleadings. Vague allegations or bald assertion that the action taken was mala tide and malicious is not enough. In the absence of material particulars, the court is not expected to make the ‘fishing’ enquiry into the matter. It is equally well established and needs no authority that the burden ofproving mala tides is on the is on the person making the allegations and such burden is ‘very heavy’. Malice cannot be inferred or assumed. It has to, be remembered that such a charge can 1 (2006) 9 scc 458 easily be “made than made ou ” and hence it is necessary for the courts to examine it with extreme care, caution and circumspection. It has been rightly described as ‘the last refuge of a losing litigant’. (Vide Gulam Mustafa vi State ofMaharashtra; Ajit Kumar Nag v. GM (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd)” 7. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that he shall loose his seniority if he is transferred to any other district, the petitioner has not flled any document to establish his contention. Further, he has also failed to explain asto how the impugned transfer order is contrary to the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, except his self-same statement. The contention of the petitioner that he shall loose seniority if he is transferred to any other district, is also not supported by any document. It is well-settled that transfer is an incidence of service and it is for the employer to decide asto where a particular officer/employee be posted, keeping in view public interest as well as administrative exigency. This Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer matter except in the cases of proved mala fide, non— competence of authority passing the transfer order and not being in conformity with the rules and regulations. 9. The petitioner has failed to establish and prove his contentions, except making self same statement. The petitioner/employee cannot be. permitted to remain at one place forever. Under the provisions of service rules, employer has all the powers to post an employee at a particular place in view of public interest and administrative exigency. (See E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another2, Union oflndia and another v. Janardhan Debanath & another3, State ofMP. and another v. S.S.K0urav and others 4 ’ and Mohd. MasoodAhmad v. State ofUP. & 0thers5). 2 1974 (4) scc 3 3 (2004) 4 scc 245 4 (I995) 3 SCC 270 s (2007) 8 SCC 150 10. The Supreme Court, in Airports Authority oflndz'a v. Rajeev Ratarz Pandey & 0thers6, held that “In a matter of transfer of a government employee, scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer”. ll. Even otherwise, there is no challenge to the impugned order on any permissible legal grounds as aforestated, warranting interference. l2. For the reasons as aforestated, the petition is dismissed. No order asto costs. Sdl— Satish K. Agnihotri Judge Amit A a (2009) 8 SCC 337