THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH W.P.NO.27325 OF 2011 O R D E R Heard both the counsel. 2. The case of the petitioner, as stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is that, she was appointed as a Library clerk on 4.3.1987 in the National Institute for the Mentally Handicapped, Secunderabad and thereafter she was promoted as Assistant Librarian on 12.2.1992. The National Institute for the Mentally Handicapped, Secunderabad is wholly owned by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Government of India. The said Institute has been organized into a society and as per the bye-laws, the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short ‘the Rules’) are applicable mutatis mutandi. On the alleged grounds of misappropriation of Government monies, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the Deputy Director by his order no.NIMH/Estt.6 (2017)/2011-12/34 dated 7.4.2011 and by proceedings dated 19.4.2011, she was asked give her explanation and immediately she submitted her explanation. Challenging the suspension, the present writ petition is filed. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raised two grounds, firstly that as per the Rules, the appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in this behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed by the Director and hence the Deputy Director, in the absence of any delegated power, cannot pass orders suspending the petitioner. The learned counsel secondly contended that the disciplinary proceedings are Governed by the Rules. As per Rule 10(6) and (7) the suspension order would not survive after a period of ninety days, unless extended after review. In the present case, the petitioner was suspended on 7.4.2011 and the period of ninety days expired long back and no order reviewing the suspension of the petitioner was passed before expiry of the period and hence continuing the petitioner under suspension is illegal and contrary to rules. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in UNION OF INDIA v. DIPAK MALI[1]. 4. Counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, stating the circumstances under which the petitioner was placed under suspension. In the counter affidavit it is stated that as per the schedule of powers, the Deputy Director (Admn.) is delegated the power vide order dated 18.6.2008 to issue show cause notices including suspension and therefore, in exercise of the power, the petitioner was issued with the order of suspension. Further, in the counter affidavit, the reasons for delay in filing the charge sheet, were sought to be explained. With these averments, the writ petition was sought to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondents reiterated the averments made in the counter affidavit. 5. The petitioner filed reply and the respondents filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the petitioner. 6. The averments made by the petitioner in the writ affidavit, needs no reiteration. The first contention of the petitioner that the Deputy Director has no authority to pass orders of suspension, cannot be countenanced for the reason that the respondents in their counter affidavit has categorically stated that the Deputy Director (Admn.) is delegated the power vide order dated 18.6.2008 to issue show cause notices including suspension and therefore, in exercise of the power, the petitioner was issued the order of suspension. 7. There is no dispute that the disciplinary proceedings are governed by the Rules. Hence, in order to answer the second contention, it is necessary to note sub rules (6) and (7) of Rules as under: “10 (6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before the expiry of ninety days from the date of order of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purposes and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before the expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (5), an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days.” 8. From a reading of the above provision under sub rule (6), it is clear that the order of suspension shall be reviewed by the competent authority before the expiry of nine days from the date of order of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee, either extending or revoking the suspension and under sub rule (7), notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (5), the order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days, unless extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. In other words, the above provisions stipulates that if the order of suspension is not extended or revoked before the expiry of ninety days from the date of order of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee, it shall not be valid after ninety days. 9. The Apex Court in the decision reported in UNION OF INDIA v. DIPAK MALI (1 supra) considering Rule 10 (6) and (7) of the Rules, held that by operation of Rule 10(6), suspension order would not survive after a period of ninety days, unless extended after review and that the subsequent review and extension, could not revive the order. The relevant portion containing facts and conclusion, is extracted as under for better appreciation: 10. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and having also considered the relevant dates relating to suspension of the respondent and when the petitioners' case came up for review on 20-10-2004, we are inclined to agree with the views expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, as confirmed by the High Court, that having regard to the amended provisions of sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10, the review for modification or revocation of the order of suspension was required to be done before the expiry of 90 days from the date of order of suspension and as categorically provided under sub-rule (7), the order of suspension made or deemed would not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it was extended after review for a further period of 90 days. 11. The case sought to be made out on behalf of the petitioner Union of India as to the cause of delay in reviewing the respondent's case, is not very convincing. Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, speaks of abatement of proceedings once an original application under the said Act was admitted. In this case, what is important is that by operation of sub- rule (6) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, the order of suspension would not survive after the period of 90 days unless it was extended after review. Since admittedly the review had not been conducted within 90 days from the date of suspension, it became invalid after 90 days, since neither was there any review nor extension within the said period of 90 days. Subsequent review and extension, in our view, could not revive the order which had already become invalid after the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension. 10. From the above it is clear that if the order of suspension is not extended or revoked before the expiry of period of ninety days from the date of order of suspension, the same is invalid and the subsequent review and extension, will not revive the order, which had become invalid after the expiry of ninety days from the date of suspension. In the present case, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 7.4.2011 and thereafter, before the expiry of ninety days, there was no order extending the period of suspension. Therefore, in view of sub rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10, the action of the respondents in continuing the petitioner under suspension, cannot be sustained. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order of suspension is set aside and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith. 12. It is made clear that this order will not preclude the respondents from continuing and concluding the disciplinary proceedings, as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law. 13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. AVS ------------------------------------- 28—12—2011 [1] (2010)2 SCC 222