THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.23827 of 2002 ORDER: The petitioner was appointed as an Attender in the 1st respondent Society. A scheme of voluntary retirement was introduced by the 1st respondent in the year 2000. The petitioner submitted his application and the same was accepted by the 1st respondent, through proceedings dated 30.10.2000. He was scheduled to be relieved on 30.11.2000. The benefits were not extended to him. At that time, the petitioner was working at the branch of the 1st respondent situated at Karvan, Hyderabad. On 09.11.2000, a fire accident occurred in the godown. The Government directed the Crime Investigation Department to conduct enquiry. A report was submitted on 22.10.2001 to the effect that the accident occurred on account of electric short circuit, which in turn was traceable to illegal power connection extended to the godown in an unauthorized manner. One year thereafter, the 1st respondent issued a charge memo dated 20.11.2001 to the petitioner, alleging that he failed to intimate about the fire accident to the authorities in time. Four days thereafter, an order was passed transferring him to Kanpur. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed W.P.No.25856 of 2001. An interim order was passed on 24.12.2001, observing that the petitioner is deemed to have been relieved on 30.11.2000 and he cannot be transferred to any other place. However, liberty was given to the respondents to post the petitioner to any other place within the State. In writ appeal No.52 of 2002, the last portion of the order was set aside, leaving it open to the respondents to proceed with the domestic enquiry. The petitioner submitted his explanation and, after conducting domestic enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted report stating that the charge framed against the petitioner is not proved. Not satisfied with that, the 1st respondent directed the Enquiry Officer to re-examine the matter. This time, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding to the effect that the charge against the petitioner is proved. Taking the report into account, the 1st respondent passed an order dated 19.10.2001 dismissing the petitioner from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner to the 2nd respondent was rejected on 29.10.2002. Hence, this writ petition. The petitioner contends that once the application for voluntary retirement was accepted, there was no basis for the respondents to initiate disciplinary proceedings one year thereafter. According to him, the order accepting the application for V.R.S. was not withdrawn and it continued to operate. He also submits that serious error has crept into the disciplinary proceedings inasmuch as the 1st respondent ordered re-enquiry into the matter, ignoring the 1st report. Some other grounds are also urged. The 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit. It is stated that various facts pleaded by the petitioner are denied. However, as to the competence to initiate disciplinary proceedings even after acceptance of application for V.R.S., it is stated that it is competent for them to take such step anytime before the petitioner is relieved from service. It is also stated that the procedure prescribed under the law was followed before the petitioner was dismissed from service. Heard Sri V.Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri T.Venkata Raju Goud, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent. It is not in dispute that the application submitted by the petitioner for V.R.S was accepted on 30.10.2000. The petitioner was scheduled to be relieved on 30.11.2000 obviously to avoid payment of the notice pay. An unfortunate fire accident occurred on 09.11.2000. The C.I.D. enquiry caused into the incident disclosed that it occurred only on account of negligence on the part of the administration in securing illegal power connection, in an improvised manner. Once the request of the petitioner for V.R.S. was accepted, the relationship of employer and employee between him and the 1st respondent ceases to exist. Whatever may have been the competence of the respondents to proceed against the petitioner till 30.11.2000, on which day he was supposed to be relieved, there was absolutely no justification for issuing the charge memo dated 15.12.2001. The reason is that one year before that, the petitioner stood relieved from duty and the acceptance of V.R.S. was completed in all respects. No provision of law was cited, which empowers the respondent to proceed against an employee whose application for V.R.S. was accepted. Therefore, the very initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was untenable in law. Assuming that it was competent for the 1st respondent to initiate disciplinary proceedings, he committed a serious error in the course thereof. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 09.03.2002 holding that the charge framed against the petitioner is not proved. In case the 1st respondent wanted to differ with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, he was under obligation to issue notice to the petitioner indicating the reasons as to why such a course be not adopted. He did not do so. Instead, he directed the Enquiry Officer to re-examine the matter. On such direction, the Enquiry Officer did nothing more than recording the statement of the petitioner once again. Had any fresh material been brought on record, there would have been some justification for the Enquiry Officer to take a different view, provided the re-enquiry was legal. Obviously, to satisfy the 1st respondent, the Enquiry Officer has simply submitted a report holding that the charge is proved. That resulted in passing of orders dismissing the petitioner from service. The proceedings are totally opposed to settled principles of law. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 19.10.2002, as confirmed in the appeal by the 2nd respondent on 29.10.2002, is set aside. The 1st respondent shall extend all V.R.S. benefits to the petitioner, within six weeks from today. If he fails to do so, he shall be under obligation to pay interest at 9% per annum on such amount till the date of payment. There shall be no order as to costs. __________________________ JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY 27.12.2010 v v