IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.8502 of 2003 KRISHNA SINGH, son of Sri Late Deoki Singh, resident of village- Gavaspur, P. S. Haspura in the District Aurangabad. …. Petitioner. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. The Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya. 3. The District Magistrate, Aurangabad. 4. The District Development Officer, Aurangabad. 5. The Superintendent Police, Aurangabad. 6. The Sub divisional Officer, Dau Nagar (Aurangabad). 7. The Conducting Officer-cum-Block Development Officer-cum-Circle Officer, Haspura in the District of Aurangabad. 8. The Officer-in-Charge, Haspura in the district of Aurangabad. …. Respondents ----------- 3. 07.01.2010 Heard counsel for the parties. The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 14.9.2001 whereby and whereunder he has been subjected to an order of punishment in the form of censure as also non-payment of salary for the period of suspension. The petitioner consequently has made following prayer in this writ application:- “1. That this is an application for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari or for issuance of appropriate order/orders or direction/directions quashing the order dated 14.9.2001 passed by the District Magistrate, Aurangabad (respondent no. 3), as contained in Annexure-1, whereby and whereunder the suspension order of the petitioner has been revoked whereas the petitioner has been censured and has also 2 been directed for the payment of subsistence allowance only for the period of his suspension, although the petitioner claims for full salary during the period of his suspension.” Counsel for the petitioner has raised a very simply point inasmuch as he claims that when a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner after placing him under suspension on 12.7.1996 and framing charge on 24.7.1996, the enquiry officer in his enquiry report dated 12.11.1999 did not find any charge framed against him to be proved and yet the petitioner without being given any show-cause notice as with regard to disciplinary authority, Collector of the District differing with the enquiry report was subjected to the impugned order of punishment dated 14.9.2001. Counsel for the petitioner therefore submits that such action and the resultant impugned order on the part of collector, Aurangabad District is not only in violation of principles of natural justice but also against the judgment of Apex Court and this Court including one in the case of Punjab 3 National Bank & Ors. vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84. Counsel for the State as usual would first take a plea that as he has not filed any counter affidavit, he is not in a position to say as to whether any show-cause notice was given to the petitioner after his being exonerated by the Enquiry Officer. This Court, however, cannot allow an unlimited indulgence to the officers and if the period of more than six years has not been good enough for filing of counter affidavit, this court must proceed to decide this writ application on the existing materials on record. Counsel for the State would next contend that from the impugned order it does not transpire that the petitioner was not given a notice or that the Collector of the District was not aware of the petitioner being exonerated in course of departmental enquiry. He would also submit that the finding of the enquiry officer was not binding on the Collector of the District and therefore if having taken overall picture from the records the Collector has proceeded 4 to pass the impugned order, the same cannot be said to be bad specially when the punishment is one which can be described to be minor in nature on account of its being censure and withholding of salary for the period of suspension. In the opinion of this court, whether punishment is minor or major, the procedure as laid down by law has to be followed. If that is not done every government/ public servant would be, at beck and call and in fact on the mercy of his employer. Once a departmental proceeding is drawn and the disciplinary chooses to hold an enquiry and appoints an enquiry officer, the findings arrived in the report enquiry officer may not be binding on him but then if such findings are in favour of delinquent, the disciplinary authority before taking a different view is bound to at least inform the delinquent that he is not prepared to accept the findings of the enquiry officer. That would be in fact minimum expectation from the disciplinary authority in a departmental proceeding which has definitely to be followed by observing the principles 5 of natural justice, fair play and equity. If that is not done, the charges framed by the disciplinary authority being the once sided affair of the employer and the order of punishment ignoring the finding recorded in favour of the delinquent by only be reiterating earlier view formed at the stage of framing of charge would amount to arbitrary exercise of power. Apex Court in the case of Kunj Behari Misra (supra) in this context had settled the law which has been followed in almost all the subsequent cases without any exception. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the Collector Aurangabad as contained in Annexure- 1 is hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Collector of Aurangabad district who now would proceed from the stage of submission of enquiry report. If the Collector of Aurangabad District has any reason to differ with the aforementioned enquiry report, he would be required to record the same and communicate through a show-cause notice to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of 6 a copy of this order. The petitioner thereafter would be required to file a show- cause reply to the Collector of the District whereafter any further order either exonerating or punishing the petitioner will be passed. Let it be made clear that this Court has not neither gone into the merit of charge framed against the petitioner nor has approved the findings of the enquiry officer in the enquiry report and therefore it would be open for the Collector of the District to pass any appropriate final order within a period of six months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. Accordingly, this writ application is allowed only to the extent indicated above and the matter is remitted back for passing a fresh order in accordance with the aforesaid observation and direction. kanchan (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)