IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT: THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.S. NARAYANA WRIT PETITION No.18821 of 2007 Between: Mohd. Akber Pasha and another ..... PETITIONERS AND The Collector, Rangareddy District and another .....RESPONDENTS ORDER: This Court issued rule nisi on 26-11-2007. Counter affidavit had been filed. 2. It is stated that the present writ petition is squarely covered by the decision made by this court in GAJJELA NARASIMHA REDDY AND OTHERS v. COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTRICT AND ANOTHER (2008 (5) ALD 302). The order made in writ petition No.17680 of 2007 also is placed before this court and the said order reads as hereunder: “The learned counsel appearing on either side fairly conceded that the issue involved in this writ petition is squarely covered by the order of this Court in W.P.Nos.13863, 14247 and 14478 of 2005 dated 23-07- 2008. In view of the same, following the above order, this writ petition is allowed in terms of the above order and the impugned notifications are quashed to the extent of petitioners. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the respondents from initiating acquisition proceedings afresh in accordance with law. No order as to costs.” 3. The writ petitioners filed the present writ petition praying for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus declaring the Award No.40/LA/ORR/Unit-VII/2005, dated 21-08-2007 passed under Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894, and consequently the notification No.G-2/3128/2004, dated 19-06-2004 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and declaration notification No.G1/3128/2004 dated 23-07-2005 under Section 6 of the Act as null, void, lapsed, ab- initio and also direct the respondents herein not to take the physical possession of the properties of the petitioners in pursuance of the impugned Award and notices, and not give effect to such award and pass such other suitable orders. 4. Several facts had been narrated in detail in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and as already aforesaid counter affidavit also had been filed. 5. I n GAJJELA NARASIMHA REDDY AND OTHERS v. COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTRICT AND ANOTHER[1] it was held that: “ON a careful analysis of the ratio contained in the case law discussed above, in order to decide whether the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act is in conformity with the provisions of the Act, as interpreted by the plethora of judgments of the Apex Court, two aspects are required to be examined, viz., whether the purpose mentioned in the notification is specific and not vague; and such purpose is a "public purpose". In Aflatoon's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that whether the purpose specified in the notification is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under Section 5-A would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (Para 21) THEREFORE, let me now examine whether the first aspect is satisfied by the impugned notifications. As mentioned supra, the purpose mentioned in the notifications is "development of Township and future projects". It is not indicated in the notifications, what is the nature of the Township and for whose benefit the Township is proposed to be constructed. Unless the notifications indicate the nature of the Township and the purported future projects, is it possible for the petitioners to file their objections on the above aspects? In my considered opinion, the answer should be an emphatic 'no'. The notifications are silent as to the size and type of the Township. The expression "future projects" in my considered view is absolutely vague, which does not give any cue as to what type of projects - whether residential, commercial or industrial - that are proposed to be taken up. In the absence of indication of the precise purpose, it is not possible for the owners of the lands to file meaningful objections. As held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Administration's case (supra), even if the purpose mentioned in the notifications is a public purpose, it is open to the objectors to file their objections both with regard to the absence of necessity to acquire this particular land and also about its non-suitability for the purpose for which the land is proposed to be acquired. Interestingly, even in the counter-affidavits, the respondents failed to elaborate on the purpose mentioned in the notifications, except repeating the words mentioned in the impugned notifications and relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court. None of those judgments come to the aid of the respondents because the question whether the purpose mentioned in the notification is specific or vague is required to be decided with reference to the facts of each case as held by the supreme Court in Aflatoon's case (supra) and reiterated in L. Krishnan 's case (supra ). On a careful consideration of the notifications, I am of the view that the purpose of "development of Township and future projects" mentioned in the notifications is too vague to enable the petitioners to file any meaningful objections. (Para 22, 24) AS regards the second aspect, viz. , whether the lands are proposed for a "public purpose", the word 'township' is not defined in the Act. The meaning of 'township' given by the Oxford Dictionary of 2001 edition is as under: "Township - noun 1 (in South Africa) a suburb or city of predominantly black occupation, formerly officially designated for black occupation by apartheid legislation. 2 S. African a new area being developed for residential or industrial use by speculators. 3 N. Amer. a division of a county with some corporate powers. 4 Brit, historical a manor or parish as a territorial division. 5 Austral. / NZ a small town". If one goes by the above mentioned dictionary meaning, a Township takes in many things, including a small town, or an area developed for residential or industrial use. On many occasions the Supreme Court held that the Housing Schemes of housing Boards constitute public purpose. (See the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ratilal Shankarabhai and others v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1970 sc 984, State of Gujarat v. Musamigan imam Haider Bux Razvi and another, air 1977 SC 594, L. Krishnan's case (supra) and West Bengal Housing Board v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta and another, air 1997 SC 2745 = 1997 (5) ALD (SCSN) 7). In each of these cases, before upholding the notifications, the Supreme Court went into the nature of the claims and was satisfied that they served "public purpose". But, the notifications in the instant cases are not indicative as to whether the 'township' is purely of residential colonies or of industrial, commercial or other nature. Unless the purpose is mentioned with specificity, it is not possible to hold that the purpose of acquisition is a "public purpose". As could be seen from the above reproduced judgment in Madhya Pradesh housing Board's case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the State cannot acquire the land of a citizen for building some residence for another, unless the same is in "public interest" or for the benefit of the "public" or an identifiable section thereof. Therefore, assuming that going by the common parlance understanding of a township as comprising residential colonies, that by itself does not constitute "public purpose" unless the same is in "public interest" or for the benefit of the public or an identifiable section thereof. The impugned notifications and the counter-affidavits are conspicuously silent on the above mentioned aspects. (Para 25) From the abovementioned discussion, the conclusion is irresistible that the impugned notifications failed to satisfy both the essential ingredients of a valid notification viz., that the purpose must be specific without being vague, and the acquisition must be for a "public purpose" (Para 28) The provisions of the Act conferred upon the State the power of eminent domain. By exercising this power, the State acquires the property of its citizens against their will. Therefore, the Act is expropriatory in nature and its provisions are required to be construed strictly. (See: Vishnu Prasad sharma's case (supra), Khub Chand's case (supra) and CCE's case (supra).” (Para 27) 6. The learned Judge in fact had referred to the under noted decisions: 1. Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, (1975) 4 SCC 285 (Para12) 2. Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, (1988) 4 SCC 534 (Para 15) 3. CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 597 (Para 19) 4. Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban, 1999 (6) ALD 1 (SC) = (2000) 7 SCC 296 (Para 7) 5. Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad, (1976) 3 SCC 719 (Para 15) 6. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. V. Darius Shapur, Chennai, 2005 (6) ALD 53 (SC) = (2005) 7 SCC 627 = JT 2005 (8) SC 470 (Para 7) 7. Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana, AIR 1964 SC 648 (Para 16) 8. Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074 (Para 19) 9. Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Safi, (1992) 2 SCC 168 (Para 7) 10. Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 (Para 11) 11. Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1-1998 (1) ALD (SCSN) 13 (Para 17) 12. Ratilal Shankarabhai and others v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1970 SC 984 (Para 25) 13. Smt. Bljanbee v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, 2006(1) ALT 479 = 2007 (2) ALD (NOC) 32 (Para 23) 14. Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry, (1994) 4 SCC 675 (Para 26) 15. State of Gujarat v. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi and another, AIR 1977 SC 594 (Para 25) 16. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593 (Para 19) 17. State of Pubjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 (Para 17) 18. State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Mohd. Yousef, (1991) 4 SCC 224 (Para 15) 19. State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan, AIR 1996 SC 497 = 1996 (1) ALD (SCSN) 26 (Para 18) 20. Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 (Para 14) 21. West Bengal Housing Board v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta and another, AIR 1997 SC 2745 = 1997 (5) ALD (SCSN) 7 (Para 25) 7. Inasmuch as it is stated that this writ petition also is squarely covered by the orders already made in the aforesaid writ petitions, following the said orders, this writ petition also is hereby allowed in terms of the aforesaid orders and the impugned notifications are hereby quashed to the extent of the writ petitioners. However, it is made clear that this order shall not preclude the respondents from initiating acquisition proceedings afresh in accordance with law, if they so advised. No order as to costs. ___________________ P.S. NARAYANA, J October 6, 2009. PN THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.S. NARAYANA WRIT PETITION No.18821 of 2007 October 6, 2009 [1] 2008 (5) ALD 302