@ f; ‘BEFQRE THE HKaL—J COURT OF CHHATTISGABtg ' AT :3:LASPL_E«; WRIT PETIT!ON NO. is7 2 OF 2001 Vasudeo Singh Thakur S/ o Late Manrakhan Singh Thakur‘ aged about 55 yearS, resident of Santoshi Chowk. Kushalpur‘ Raipur (CG) PETlTiONER VERS US EspoNDENTs Viwm ébwf’ (‘JJWMWWer-owwwm, C‘gwM/‘Lgo/L $ , wWtrWEiWmmn-rmfw . . , v /f1 ‘ 2. Vice Chancellor, Pt. Ravishankar Shukia Un£veu‘éity, Raipur (Chhattisgar‘h) xwvfgf’gg ’I P-J‘Kmw‘Hwm tymfA’u/Uéi WWW/“J’HV’WWéQg/L‘ 7 ’3’ The RegiSirar, Pt. Ravishankar shukla / \Umversity, Raépur (Chhattiwarh) ,\ \». - c‘ ( - ' . /’~\ . ‘ ta" I . r, ‘ MMW ( ‘jy, u u y enlra, ' . /FW ":Httkfa‘kmvemmur i 523.0% {yC io/1CV” 12w wwwhaww W ' r Chham's: am ).:.£;0N.,8’nizitULIUN (gr mum A w iw -‘ L%/3/& I . . ’é 1‘ BABEQLJLARS OEEEEHUMEE ff The petitiuner reSpectfuHy ssubmits as under R K ' W < ( r ‘, > xxx HIGH COURT OF CHHATTJSGARH : BILASPUR K WRIT PETITION NO.1372 OF 2001 PETITIONER Vasudeo Singh Thakur Versus A ESPONDENTS Vice Chancellor, Pt. Ravishankar Shukla University & Another . , Post for pronouncement of the order on H4" day of March, 2010 ‘ I Sdl- ~ ’ “ Satish K. Agnihotn Judge R \ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR WRIT PETITION NO.1372 OF 2001 PETITIONER Va§udeo Singh Thakur Versus RESPONDENTS Vice Chancellor, Pt. Ravishankar Shukla University & Another (Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India) Single Bench : Hon’ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Present :- Shri J.K. Shastri, counsel forthe petitioner. Shri JR. Verma, counsel for the respondents. ORDER (Delivered on this /S fday of March, 2010) 1. The petitioner, by this petition under ,Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeks a writ to quash the order dated 12-8-1999 (Annexure -— P/45) passed by the Registrar, Pt. Ravishankar Shukla University, Raipur (for short “the respondent University”), whereby and whereunder the petitioner was removed from the post of Upper Division Clerk Grade — I, and . the order dated 294-2001 (Annexure — P/47) passed by the Deputy Secretary to Governor, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the removal order dated 12-8-1 999 was rejected. The facts, in nutshell, asprojected by the petitioner, are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Lower Division Clerkvin the respondent University in the year 1966 and thereafter, he was promoted to the posts of Upper Division Clerk Grade — II and 4.~ Grade — I. According to the petitioner, by order dated 14-5-1985 (Annexure —‘ P/2) the petitioner was suspended from the service without assigning any reasons. However, by or‘der dated 30-1 0-1 985 (Annexure — P/4) the suspension order was revoked. The petitioner joined his duties on 17-7-1989‘ after lapse of about 4 years on account of his iii health. Thereafter, a departmental enquiry proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, on issuing show cause notice dated 20-9-1989 (Annexure — P/9) along ,with the charge sheet (Annexure —7P/10) calling upon the' petitioner to submit his reply within 10 days, By letter dated 20-9-1989 the‘ petitioner ,/ requested for providing some documents. The petitioner was engaged in the election duty and training of census work. The Finance Officer of the respondent University issued memo to the / petitioner on 3-9-1990 (Annexure — P/17) about his absence from the office on 1-9-1990 after 10.30 a.m. Thereafter, also issued notices to the petitioner on various grounds; The salary of the petitioner was also stopped for which the petitioner made seVeral requests, but the same was not released. After initiating the departmental enquiry proceedings, the petitioner participated in the same. DUring the'lcourse of enquiry, according to the / petitioner, so many enquiry officers have been changed. However after completion of enquiry, by order dated 12-8-1999 the petitioner was removed from the post of Upper Drvrsron Clerk :‘Grade — l. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Chancellor of the UniverSIty, which was rejected by order dated 29-1-2001. Hence, this petition. Sh'ri Shastri, Iearned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the departmentai enquiry initiated against the petitioner took about 10 years period to its conciusion. Action of the respondent University towards the petitioner was with mala fide intention and only to harass him the departmental enquiry proceedings was initiated and his salary was stopped. ln spite of the fact that the petitioner was working in the election duty as well as in the training of census work, the respondents issued notice for his absence from the office. The impugned removal order has been passed without application of mind. The action of the respondent University is illegal and arbitrary. . Contradicting the contentions of the petitioner, Shri Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent University, would submit that the petitioner is a habitual absentee and he always used to remain on leave without making proper application. On earlier occasion also on account of dereliction of the duty by the petitioner, he was placed under suspension. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. l have examined the rival contentions of the Iearned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and the documents appended thereto. Show cause notice dated 20-9-1989 (Annexure — P/9) was » issued along with the charge sheet containing four charges e.g. Firstly; without permission of the authorities, the petitioner was in the habit of remaining absent ail of sudden, thus, causing indiscipline in the administration; Secondly; the petitioner was in the habit of violating the Ieave rules, despite warnings given eariier, the petitioner has not changed his conduct. Thus, it amounted serious violation of leave rules; Third/y; the petitioner has always shown lack of sincerity in his work, as he remained on leave unauthorisedly; and fourth/y; he remained absent on 25-8-1989 from 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. and thereafter on 215‘, 22“, 23'“ and 26‘“ August, 1989 without any application or sanction of the leave. The petitioner has justified his action by showing that he remained on election duty on 22-11-1989 to 25-11-1989 (Annexures — P/12 & P/13), 25-2—1990 & 26—2-1990 (Annexure '— P/14) and thereafter, he was relieved from the election duty on 28-2-1990 (Annexure — P/15). Thereafter, the petitioner was engaged in census work, which is evident from Annexure — P/16. The documents filed by the petitioner along with the petition indicate the fact of his duty in election and census duty after issuance of charge sheet (Annexure -— P/10). Thus, the presence of the petitioner in election and census duty is of no relevance to the present case, as charge sheet was issued much prior to those dates. Even after revocation of earlier suspension order, as stated in para 2 of this decisiOn, the petitioner remained absent and joined the duties after a' lapse of about 4 years. V \ \ Reply to the show cause notice dated 20-9-1989 was filed by the \ petitioner on 5-3—1992 (Annexure — P/30) i.e. after a lapse of more than two years. Enquiry Officer was appointed on filing of repiy by the petitioner on 22-5-1992 (Annexure — P/31). Enquiry has started on 30-12-1 992 (Annexure — P/32). According to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the petitioner remained absent thereafter also for about 5 years without grant of leave. The enqUiry could not be completed within the stipulated period on account of non-cooperation of the petitioner. Thus, the enquiry report could be submitted on 29-6-1999 (Annexure — R/1) holding all the charges proved against the petitioner. 11. The disciplinary authority thereafter agreeing with the enquiry report of the enquiry officer, removed the petitioner from service by order dated 12-8-1 999 (Annexure — P/45) under Clause 31 of the Statute No.28 of the College Code. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Chancellor, which was also rejected by order dated 29-1 -2001 (Annexure — P/47). 12. The petitioner has failed to establish that there was violation of principles of natural justice or enquiry was not held properly. lt was further neither pleaded nor established that the enquiry was based on no evidence. Thus, this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the finding recorded in the enquiry, which is not alleged to be either perverse or based on no evidence. \ 13. The Supreme Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. ‘ A.K. Chopra1, observed as under : “16....Once findings of fact, based on a preciation of ewdence are recorded t e High Court in writ jurisdiction may . not normal/y interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findin s Were Wholly perverse and/or legaly untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedin s While exercisin the power ofju icial review, the Hig Court cannot, normally speaking, , substitute its own concluSIon, with regard to the guilt of the delin uent, for that of the departmen al authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplina/y or the departmental appellate ‘ authority, ‘is either impermissrble or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own o inion and impose some other punis ment or penalty. Both the learned Sin le Judge and the Division Bench of t e High Court, it appears, ignored the well—settled prinCIple that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension hot closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities .which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is. directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans obsrved: e ‘The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized or ‘enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” 17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a deCIs/on, but a reVIew of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case a ainst him, the court cannot substitute is judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere ofjurisdiction of that authority.” 14. The Supreme Court in State of U‘.P. v. Jaikaran Singhz, observed that “normal/y, the Court in exercise of power under Article 226 does not interfere with the quantum of punishment alone if the charges a're established against the delinquent and there is no lacuna in the procedure adopted in the departmental proceedings. But at times if the Court feels that the punishment inflicted is gross/y unjust and shocks the conscience then in appropriate cases the Court may interfere.” 15. In State Bank of India and Others v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde3, the Supreme Court observed as under: ”6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it Is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an Appellate Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the High Court and-the Tribunal while exercrsrng the jud/Cla/ 3) 9 SCC 228 \)7scc 212 review do not act as an Appellate Authority: ‘its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error if any resulting in manifest miscarriage at justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority.’ (See Govt. of A.P. v Mohd Nasrullah Khan, SCC p.379,'para 1'1.) 9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence which had officer, been a disciplinary considered auth/ority b the an in uiiy the A pet/ate Authority. The findin of the of the evidence on record. 13. We are, therefore clearly'of the view that the High c’ounr has erred both in law and on facts in interfering with the findings of‘the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority by acting as a court of appeal and reappreciating the evidence. ’ igh Ccurt, on facts, runs to t e teeth 16. Applying the we“ seted principles of law and for the reasons tl stated hereinabove, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as the action has been taken by the respondent University against the petitioner in a fair and transparent manner and after affording full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. There is no breach of principles of natural justice. 17. ln the result, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 18. There will no order asto costs. Gowri