LPA No.101/2009 Page 1 of 6 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + LPA 101/2009 & C.M. No. 3238/2009 SUNIL DUA ..... Appellant Through: Mr. J.C. Mahindro, Advocate. versus GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. Rajiv Nanda, Advocate for Respondent No.1/GNCTD. Ms. Anusuya Salwan and Ms. Renuka Arora, Advocates for Respondent DSIDC. HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL O R D E R % 12.05.2009 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 13th January, 2009. The narrow factual matrix of the case is as follows:- 2. The Supreme Court had directed closure of all industries which did not conform to the Master Plan of Delhi on or before 31st July, 1996. By the same and subsequent orders, the Supreme Court directed the development of alternative industrial estates by the respondent, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, through its agencies, including Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (hereafter called „DSIDC‟). The appellant (original petitioner in the writ petition) had been engaged in an industrial activity in a non-confirming area and claimed to be effected by the LPA No.101/2009 Page 2 of 6 order. He applied for allotment of an alternative industrial plot in Bawana on 30th December, 1996. He was determined provisionally eligible for allotment of an alternative plot and subsequently informed about allotment of a plot measuring 100 square meters in Pocket-O, Sector-1, Bawana Industrial Complex. The appellant claimed to have complied with procedural requirements and made certain payments. On 9th November, 2004, DSIDC wrote a letter to the appellant stating that his request had not been acceded to because he had failed to deposit 50% of the cost of the plot as on 31st March, 2001. It was contended by the appellant before the learned Single Judge that the stand of the DSIDC was untenable because his applications were constantly being processed and considered on the file of DSIDC even as late as 2005. The DSIDC, on the other hand, relied upon an order of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court dated 12th September, 2000. It was contended that pursuant to the order, the Corporation had fixed a cut-off date, namely, 31st March, 2001 for deposit of the amount after giving wide publicity to the same. A copy of the public notice was also filed by the DSIDC. As per the DSIDC, the appellant had not deposited the requisite 50% of the cost within the stipulated time, thus, the DSIDC had no discretion in the matter but to communicate cancellation of appellant‟s allotment. It was also stated that the time taken in doing so was because the Corporation was dealing with not less than 51,000 applications and the task of reviewing such allotments involved a considerable time and delay. 3. There is no dispute that the Supreme Court‟s order dated 12th LPA No.101/2009 Page 3 of 6 September, 2000, desired that allotment of those who did not make substantial payment should be cancelled. As per the DSIDC, according to the directions of the Supreme Court, the draw of plots was held on 3rd October, 2000 and eligible allottees held successful in the draw were issued allotment letters. Under the allotment letters, 50% of the demand was to be made immediately on issuance of the allotment letters. The last date for payment of 50% was extended upto 31st March, 2001 by press notification. It was also stated on behalf of the DSIDC that by a public notice dated 21st January, 2001, published in „Times of India‟, allottees were informed that the Supreme Court of India in its hearing dated 24th January, 2001, had extended time for receipt of 100% payment in the case of allottees at Narela, Badli, Jhilmil and Patparganj as well as 50% payment in case of Bawana upto 31st March, 2001. A number of allottees did not deposit 50% payment within the stipulated time, however, keeping in view the hardship faced by the allottees, it was decided by the DSIDC that all those allottees who did not make the first 50% payment on time would be given an option to withdraw their amounts deposited and keep only the security deposit amounts with the Corporation and DSIDC would maintain a separate list of these allottees and their cases may be considered after new land was acquired and developed and after complying with the Supreme Court‟s order for exhausting the pending allottees. A copy of the notice dated 26th August, 2001 is annexed at page 109 of the paper book, a copy of the public notice dated 26th January, 2001 published in the newspaper is annexed at page 121 of the paper book and a copy of the order dated 12th LPA No.101/2009 Page 4 of 6 January, 2000 passed by the Supreme Court is annexed at page 101 of the paper book. 4. It is thus clear that the intimation pursuant to the Supreme Court‟s orders was published in the newspaper informing the allottees of the cut-off date of 31st March, 2001. Despite this, admittedly, the appellant did not make the stipulated payment as required by the orders of the Supreme Court and the public notice of 26.01. 2001. Thus the allotment was liable to be cancelled in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court and the public notice. 5. The DSIDC has also filed an additional affidavit in the present appeal, wherein it is stated that there are about 30 allottees who did not pay the initial 50% cost within the scheduled time but have deposited 100% cost later on. The appellant is one of them. The DSIDC also fairly stated that in terms of its public notice dated 26th August, 2001, the case of the appellant would be maintained in the separate list with other similarly placed allottees who would be considered in future after new land is acquired and developed and after complying with the Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s orders for exhausting the pending allottees. 6. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that pursuant to the Supreme Court‟s order dated 12th September, 2000, DSIDC formulated a policy which would give wide publicity in the press stating that those who did not deposit 50% of the cost on or before LPA No.101/2009 Page 5 of 6 31st March, 2001 would incur the risk of cancellation of their allotment and the appellant was not unaware of this position and thus was clearly ineligible for allotment as he had failed to make the payment by 31st March, 2001. 7. We are in agreement with the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge that the grounds urged by the appellant do not justify interference with the decision of the DSIDC as the appellant has not made out a case for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant has not challenged the policy but has contended that notwithstanding the policy, the DSIDC took long time in processing his case and indicating his ineligibility. This cannot be a ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, this case is also covered by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in “Dinesh Lalwani vs. DSIDC”, LPA No. 48 of 2008 decided on 1st February, 2008, wherein it was held that since the appellant in that case had not deposited the required amount of 50% by the cut-off date, no equity could be shown to him and the writ petition had been rightly dismissed. The learned Single Judge‟s order in that case dismissing the writ petition was upheld as cogent and justified and it was stated that if the mandate of the allotment letter was not followed and the stipulations under the public notice are not adhered to, there was no other alternative for the respondent DSIDC but to cancel the allotment of the plot. LPA No.101/2009 Page 6 of 6 8. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, we find no infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge to warrant any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The pending applications also stands disposed of. CHIEF JUSTICE NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL, J. MAY 12, 2009 Sb/RS