*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY +WRIT PETITION No.7971 of 2009 % Dated 28.04.2009 # The Depot Manager, APSRTC, Guntur-II Depot, Guntur. ....Petitioner and $ 1 The Depot Secretary, APSRTC, National Mazdoor Union, Guntur-II Depot, rep. for K.L. Rao, E-386692, Guntur, and another …Respondents ! Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.C.PRAKASH REDDY(SC FOR APSRTC) ^Counsel for the Respondents: <GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? Cases referred IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.7971 of 2009 Between: The Depot Manager, APSRTC, Guntur-II Depot, Guntur. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Depot Secretary, APSRTC, National Mazdoor Union, Guntur-II Depot, rep. for K.L. Rao, E-386692, Guntur. 2 The Labour Court, Guntur, rep. by its Presiding Officer. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.C.PRAKASH REDDY(SC FOR APSRTC) ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a writ of certiorari to quash award, dated 25.06.2007 passed in I.D.No.104 of 2002. Having heard Sri C.Prakash Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner, I am satisfied that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on two grounds, namely, 1) the petitioner failed to explain the delay of more than 1½ years in filing the present writ petition after publication of award, dated 25.06.2007, on 04.10.2007, and 2) even on merits, there is no reason to interfere with the well reasoned award of respondent No.2 - Labour Court. As regards the first ground, the petitioner Corporation, unlike its workmen, is backed by strong legal department, which is expected to closely monitor the stages of the cases, render timely advice and ensure filing of cases with expedition. Therefore, there can be no reason whatsoever for it to cause undue delays in approaching this Court questioning the awards. Of late, it has become a common practice for the petitioner Corporation to question the awards with delays ranging between 1 and 2 years. If a statutory Corporation, such as, the petitioner having necessary wherewithal and logistical support to question the awards within a reasonable time, fails to explain the reasons for the inordinate delays, the challenges made to such awards deserve to be rejected at the threshold by applying the well recognized doctrine of laches. While Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not per se stipulate limitation for the High Court to entertain a writ petition, the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions held that the superior Courts do not extend their discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the litigants who do not show diligence in pursuing their legal remedies and fail to avail those remedies within a reasonable time and that what is reasonable time depends upon facts of each case. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.[1], the Supreme Court held that a person aggrieved by the promotion of a junior person must approach the High Court within six months or at the most one year. The Supreme Court further held that it would not be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. In Roshan Lal v. International Airport Authority of India[2], the Supreme Court refused to reopen the question of legality of appointment on the premise that the petitioner had approached the Court after long time gap. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the appointment of the respondents as Airport Officers (Operation) was made at a time when there was no sanction for the posts and, therefore, their appointment was illegal. While rejecting this ground of challenge, the Supreme Court observed as under: “We are afraid that it is rather late in the day for the petitioners to question the appointment of the respondents as Airport Officers (Ops.). The respondents were appointed as Airport Officers in 1975 and the present Writ Petitions were filed in 1978. We do not think we will be justified in reopening the question of the legality of the appointment of respondents as Airport Officers several years after their appointment. We also notice that the prayer in the Writ Petitions also is confined primarily to the seniority list and the consequences flowing from the seniority list.” In the Secretary to Government, I & CAD Department, A.P., Vs. P.Venkata Subba Rao[3] the Division Bench of this Court, of which I am a party, while dealing with a Writ Petition filed by the State against the order passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 held: “In the light of the above, it can be said that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Act for filing an application provides a rationale yardstick for deciding the issue of delay in filing writ petition against the order of the Tribunal. In other words, delay of more than one year in filing a petition should ordinarily be treated as unreasonable and relief should be declined to the petitioner. Of course, in a given case, the Court may, on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing petition within one year, entertain the same and give appropriate relief to the petitioner. Far from pleading sufficient cause, not even an effort is made by the petitioner to explain the delay. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Even on merits, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned award. The ground on which the penalty of withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect was levied was that the petitioner allegedly disobeyed the instructions of on duty Controller and misbehaved with him by throwing the control chart on the table, pulling the chair rashly and using un-parliamentary language. Having carefully analysed the evidence on record, respondent No.2 held that there is no material to prove the said two charges. Under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the power of substituting the punishment/penalty and reassessing the evidence available on record, is vested in the Labour Court. Therefore, I am of the view that respondent No.2 has properly exercised its jurisdiction and the award does not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction. For the above-mentioned reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of main petition, WPMP.No.10444 of 2009 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 28th APRIL, 2009. Note: LR copies to be marked. (B/o) Kvni/mnr [1] (1975) 1 SCC 152 [2] AIR 1981 SC 597 [3]) Judgment in W.P.No.8505 of 2007 dt. 25-4-2007