IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION) TUESDAY, THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR WRIT PETITION No.26247 of 2001 BETWEEN: K. Venkata Ramana and others … PETITIONER(S) And Central Board of School Education, Delhi and another … RESPONDENT(S) THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR WRIT PETITION No.26247 of 2001 ORDER: The three petitioners in this writ petition earlier worked as teachers in the Jubilee Hills Public School which is the second respondent herein and by three different termination orders the second respondent removed them from its service. Questioning the same, the petitioners filed this writ petition. The first respondent herein is the Central Board of School Education at Delhi. Despite service of notices on them about this writ petition they did not choose to appear. As the matter is of 2001, the learned counsel for the petitioner was heard and the matter has been taken for disposal. 2. The following two points arise for determination in this writ petition. (i) Whether the second respondent i.e. Jubilee Hills Public School (for short ‘School’) can be treated as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court or even otherwise whether the termination orders can be said to have been passed in violation of rules having statutory force? (ii) If point No.1 is decided in favour of the petitioners, whether the termination orders must be held to be illegal? 3. The above points arise in the following circumstances. The first petitioner A.Venkata Ramana was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher in Mathematics in the second respondent School vide its proceedings No.JHPS/APPT/95-96 dated 20.05.1995 and these proceedings purport to have been signed by Chairman of the School. Similarly, the second petitioner Smt G.Sreelatha was appointed as a Teacher in the English subject by the proceedings No.JHPS/APPT/95-96 dated 03.11.1995 by the Chairman of the School. Likewise, the third petitioner Smt K.Nirmala who earlier worked as primary teacher on a consolidated pay in the School was absorbed into the regular scale of the School by proceedings dated 22.05.1997 issued by the Chairman of the School. The salary scale and other benefits to which the petitioners were eligible are all mentioned in their appointment orders. The petitioners filed copies of their appointment orders in the material papers filed along with the writ petition. 4. Subsequently, the management of the School terminated the services of all the three petitioners by its separate proceedings dated 06.10.2001, 31.07.2001 and 01.05.2001 respectively as per the decision of the academic committee of the School. Questioning the said termination orders/proceedings the petitioners filed this writ petition. It is clear that all the three petitioners filed this single writ petition pleading that each of them has got a similar cause of action which can be questioned in a single writ petition by each paying separate court fee of Rs.100/-. In view of this it is held that this single writ petition is maintainable. 5. The plea of the petitioners is that the appointment orders given to them would show that they were regularly appointed giving them a particular pay scale and also benefits like DA, HRA and CCA as per the School rules and therefore their appointments have to be treated as regular appointments made in accordance with the rules. They then pointed out that the three termination orders by which they were removed from service do not speak of their unsatisfactory performance and they do not show that they were removed on the basis of any misconduct and further the said termination orders do not also show that any enquiry was held against them and consequently the said termination orders should be held to be illegal as passed in violation of rules. This is their first contention. 6. Their second plea is that the School is affiliated to the first respondent which is the Central Board of School Education under the control of the Government of India and that the School also adopted the service rules for employees of the schools affiliated to the first respondent and consequently the School should be treated as State or as an instrumentality of the State falling under Article 12 of the Constitution and the service rules relied upon by them should be treated as having statutory force and consequently the termination orders which are in violation of the above rules and the principles of natural justice should be held to be illegal as they were passed without any inquiry or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Elaborating on this plea, the petitioners urged that no notice was ever given to them about the grounds on which the academic committee of the School has decided to terminate their services and no enquiry was held and therefore the termination orders in question should be held to be illegal as they were passed in violation of the rules. 7. The petitioners relied upon para-45 of the said rules which deals with penalties described as minor and major penalties and also paras 46 and 47 of the said rules which prescribe an enquiry also for imposing a major penalty i.e. removal from service on the lines of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991. A photocopy of a portion of the said rules containing the above provisions has been filed by the petitioners in the material papers. Thus on the above grounds the petitioners pleaded that the second respondent School is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court and consequently the termination orders in question should be set aside as illegal. 8. As already mentioned supra, respondents 1 and 2 did not appear though they were served with notices of this writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued at length on the above two points inviting my attention to the contents of the appointment orders by which the petitioners were appointed as teachers in the second respondent School and also the contents of the termination orders and contended that the termination orders must be held to be illegal inasmuch as they on the face of it show that they were passed in a whimsical manner. They also argued that the second respondent School by reason of its affiliation to the first respondent must be treated as a public authority or an instrumentality of the State within the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore this Court can set aside the said termination orders in view of the violation of the above rules. Basing upon the above contentions the points are now taken up for determination. Point No.1: 9. It may be noted that respondents despite service of notice did not choose to contest the writ petition, but that by itself cannot be a ground to allow this writ petition as the petitioners have to establish their case. Regarding the first point, it should be firstly noted that it is now well settled that in order to hold that an institution is a public authority or a public body falling within the meaning of the State as it is defined in Article 12, it must be pleaded and proved that the said institution or body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government either state or central. The petitioners did not file any material to hold that the second respondent School is acting under the control of our State Government or the Central Government or that it is in receipt of funds from either of the said Governments to hold that it can be treated as a public body or authority falling under Article 12 of the Constitution. 10. The plea of the petitioners on this aspect is that since the appointment orders and the termination orders of the petitioner show that the second respondent School is affiliated to Central Board of School Education it should also be treated as a public authority. It is difficult to accept this contention. The petitioners did not file any document to show as to under what law the second respondent School has been constituted and what is its legal entity and they also did not file any document to show that it is functioning with the aid or funds of our State Government or Central Government. In such a situation, it cannot be held that the second respondent School is a public body falling under Article 12 of the Constitution. 11. Then coming to the other plea of the petitioners on this point which is based on the service rules, the petitioners did not file the entire service rules but they only filed a copy of the chapter-VII of those rules which starts with the heading “service rules for employees” beginning from para-24. This para-24 which is with the sub-heading “short title” reads that each school affiliated or to be affiliated with the Board shall frame service rules for its employees which should be as per Education Act of the State or the Union Territory concerned if the said Act makes adoption of the same obligatory and if not the said para-24 says that each school should frame service rules on the lines of the said rules framed by it i.e. the first respondent. It is true that these service rules prescribe the procedure for appointments and also termination of service due to abolition of post and even prescribes the procedure for imposing minor and major penalties. 12. It may be noted here that the petitioners did not disclose whether the Education Act of our State has prescribed any rules which are to be adopted by the second respondent School and that such rules have statutory force governing the appointments and services of teachers in a school which is in the position of the second respondent School. This apart the petitioners did not file any document or place any other material before this Court to hold that even in the absence of any rules framed under the Education Act of our State, the rules filed by them which are said to have been framed by the first respondent have statutory force. Further nothing is brought on record to hold that there is any provision of law which entitles the petitioners to a protection either under Article 311 of the Constitution which gives protection to the public servants or any other law, statute or provision which gives such protection to the teachers of the second respondent School. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners in the course of arguments has been specifically asked to say as to what is the nature of the School and he has also been asked to show any provision which entitles the petitioners to protection on the lines of either Article 311 of the Constitution or under any law or a rule or other instrument having the force of law. His reply was that since the first respondent Central Board of School Education is to be treated as a public authority the second respondent should also be treated as a public authority and the rules relied upon by him must be held to be having statutory force. It is difficult to accept this contention in the absence of any material to accept the case of petitioners under this point in the above circumstances. The petitioners counsel did not also cite any previously decided case or precedent wherein the second respondent School was treated as a public authority or body. Accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, this point is decided against the petitioners even though the respondents did not appear and contest the writ petition. Point No.2: 14. Then coming to this point, in view of the decision under point No.1, it follows that even if the termination orders are unreasonable or unjust this Court in these proceedings cannot interfere in the matter or even direct payment of compensation to the petitioners. As the petitioners failed to establish that the second respondent School is a public authority or they are otherwise entitled to any protection for continuation in service, their employment in the said School stands on the footing of any other private contract of service which cannot be specifically enforced even if the second respondent is at fault. It shall be open for the petitioners to work out their remedies in a civil Court if they have any right. 16. Accordingly, in view of the decision under points 1 and 2, it follows that this writ petition must fail and is dismissed. No costs. ______________________ N. RAVI SHANKAR, J 25th January, 2011. CVRK