CRP 210/2010 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI I have heard Mr. A C Sarmah, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner No.1, and Mr. G. P. Bhowmik, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opp osite party. 2. The opposite party No. 1 had instituted, as plaintiff, Title Suit No. 31 /2006, against, amongst others, the defendant No.1 (i.e., the present petitioner herein), which is a body corporate constituted under the Banking Companies (Acq uisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970, the suit being for declaration of the plaintiff’s rights, title and interest over the land and house, described in the Schedule to the plaint, and for further declaration to the effect that t he attachment of the land and house as well as purported equitable mortgage, cre ated in respect of the suit land, on 05.02.1996, by the defendant No. 2, in favo ur of the defendant bank, is void, illegal, fraudulent and inoperative in the ey es of law and also for a decree to the effect that the recovery proceeding, cove red by DRT Case No. OA No. 66/2001 and the orders, passed therein by the Recover y Officer, DRT, Guwahati, are inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff-oppos ite party. 3. The petitioner herein contested the case, as defendant No.1, by filing w ritten statement and denying the various allegations made in the plaint. In cou rse of time, issues having been framed, evidence, adduced by the plaintiff, was recorded. So far as the defendant-petitioner is concerned, its Branch Manager, namely, Sri R. K. Bhattacharjee, gave his evidence on affidavit, wherein he ave rred to the effect, inter alia, that the defendant No. 2 had created equitable m ortgage in favour of the petitioner bank. 4. However, when the suit came to be fixed for cross-examination of the sai d R. K. Bhattacharjee, the said witness did not appear in the Court. The suit h ad to be, therefore, adjourned. In fact, the defendant-petitioner obtained a nu mber of adjournments, in the suit, for the purpose of producing its said witness . The learned Civil Judge, Tinsukia, eventually, passed an order, in the suit f ixing 25.02.2010, for hearing of the suit making it clear that the opportunity s o given to the defendant-petitioner for producing the said witness shall be trea ted as the said defendant’s last chance. However, even on the date, so fixed, i. e., 25.02.2010, a petition was filed by the defendant-petitioner seeking adjourn ment of the hearing on the ground that its said witness, namely, R. K. Bhattacha rjee, could not appear in the suit due to his failure to arrange reservation in the train for coming from Lucknow to Tinsukia. Notwithstanding the prayer for a djournment, so made by the defendant-petitioner, an order was passed, on 25.02.2 010, by the learned trial Court rejecting the prayer for adjournment, closing th e evidence of the defendant-petitioner and fixing the suit for arguments. Aggrie ved by the denial of adjournment, the defendant-petitioner has impugned the orde r, dated 25.02.2010, by filing this revision. 5. While considering the present revision, it needs to be noted that though , under Order 17, rule 1, a party to a suit cannot be granted more than three ad journments for hearing of a suit, the fact remains that this is a requirement of procedural law. If, therefore, on good and justified reasons, a plaintiff has obtained three adjournments or more, this alone cannot be made an absolute and i nflexible ground to refuse adjournment of hearing of the suit if, on the date, w hen a party applies for adjournment, he succeeds in making out a good case for h is inability to either produce his witness or offer himself for cross-examinatio n. 6. In the case at hand, the fact, that the defendant-petitioner’s said witn ess could not arrange railway reservation, in the train, for coming from Lucknow to Tinsukia, was not disputed. In such circumstances, merely on the ground tha t the defendant-petitioner had already obtained a number of adjournments, in the past, the learned trial Court ought not to have refused adjournment unless it w as, otherwise, satisfied that no good ground for seeking such an adjournment had been made out. In fact, no finding has been recorded by the learned trial Cour t that the plea, so taken by the defendant-petitioner, was false or untrue. Not withstanding the fact that the defendant-petitioner had been given last chance t o produce its witness, the fact remains that every petition for adjournment has to be decided on its own merit. 7. In the present case, there is no finding, recorded by the learned trial Court, that the witness could have arranged, but did not arrange, for reservatio n in the train. No enquiry, as regards the correctness or veracity of the plea, taken by the defendant-petitioner, seeking adjournment, was ever made. The le arned trial Court appears to have been swayed by the fact that several adjournme nt had been granted, in the past, to the defendant-petitioner to adduce its evid ence and that the hearing of the suit was adjourned to 25.02.2010 as the last ch ance to the defendant-petitioner to adduce evidence. 8. Even when several adjournments had been granted, in the past, in the pre sent case, the fact remains that in order to deny adjournment, the learned trial Court was required to reach a finding that the ground, on which the adjournment had been sought for, was false or not tenable in law. No such finding or concl usion was reached by the learned trial Court. In the absence of any such finding having been reached, the denial to grant adjournment would amount to denial of exercise of jurisdiction by the learned trial Court inasmuch as the learned tria l Court did have grant adjournment, but not to grant adjournment without recordi ng a finding that the witness could have, with due diligence, appear for cross-e xamination, but did not appear and offer himself for cross-examination on the da te fixed. Viewed thus, it is clear that the impugned order is a refusal to exerc ise jurisdiction vested in the court. The rules of procedure, we must remember, are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress, and these rules of procedure a re meant to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. When such are the salutary objects of a court, it would not be fair to reject a prayer for adjour nment of hearing of a suit made by a party merely on the ground that more than t hree number of adjournments, as permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure, have a lready been obtained by the party concerned if the ground for seeking adjournmen t is, otherwise, justified and tenable. 9. In the backdrop of the position of law, as indicated above, vis-à-vis th e circumstances whereunder the defendant-petitioner has been denied adjournment, which it had sought for, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the re fusal by the learned trial Court to grant adjournment, on 25.02.2010, is untenab le in law in the face of the facts and attending circumstances of the present ca se. At the same time, though, it may be true, as claimed by the defendant-petit ioner, that its said witness’s failure to appear, in the suit, on 25.02.2010, wa s bona fide, the fact still remains that the defendant-petitioner cannot be abso lve of its responsibility to ensure that its witness appears on the date fixed a nd, for this purpose, the defendant-petitioner could have arranged, on its own e xpense, other modes of travel for its said witness or could have brought its sai d witness well in advance so that cross-examination of the said witness could ta ke place on the date fixed, i.e., 25.02.2010. 10. While, therefore, the refusal to grant adjournment, was, in the facts an d attending circumstances of the present case, not tenable in law, the defendant -petitioner is liable to pay cost for the expenses, which the plaintiff-defendan t has been required to bear from time to time in connection with the suit. 11. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety and in the interest o f justice, the impugned order is hereby set aside and the suit is fixed for hear ing on 11.11.2010 and, on that day, the defendant-petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/-, as cost, for the adjournment secured. Subject to deposit of cost, as directed hereinbefore, the plaintiff shall be allowed to cross-examine his sa id witness by the plaintiff-opposite party. 12. With the above observations and directions, this revision petition shall stand disposed of.