1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR ORDER Lt. Col. Raghvir Singh Vs. The National Highways Authority of India & Ors. D.B. CIVIL SPECIAL APPEAL NO.464/2010. Date of Order :: 21st July 2010. PRESENT HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JAGDISH BHALLA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI Dr.P.S.Bhati for the appellant. <><><> BY THE COURT: By way of this intra-court appeal, the petitioner-appellant seeks to question the order dated 25.06.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No.5668/2010. The petitioner-appellant, an ex-serviceman, preferred the writ petition aforesaid with the prayers for quashing of the orders dated 22.06.2010 (Annex.4 & 5) whereby his User-fee collection contract was sought to be terminated and for the direction that he be allowed to work in the contract initially for a period of one year. The petitioner-appellant averred in the writ petition that his name was sponsored, alongwith other ex-servicemen, by the Director General Resettlement under the letter dated 22.05.2009 (Annex.1) to the Project Director, National Highways Authority of India ['the NHAI'] for award of contract of “User Fee Collection at Chainage 28 + 100 in the section of Chittorgarh Bypass”; and that he was invited for interview and 2 was selected for awarding the said contract. The petitioner- appellant further averred that by the letter dated 15.10.2009 the respondents asked him to furnish bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.10 lacs valid upto 31.10.2010; and then, by the communication dated 07.11.2009 (Annex.2), he was asked to submit further bank guarantee for the contract period plus 180 days; and thus, he submitted the bank guarantee valid upto 31.07.2011. The petitioner-appellant asserted that it was agreed since the beginning that initial contract period had been fixed for one year; and referred to a clause in the aforesaid letter of sponsorship (Annex.1) wherein it was suggested that,- “The duration of initial contract will be as per requisition received from NHAI, however, to make the contract financially viable the minimum period contract should not be less than one year. The contract may be further extended, subject to satisfactory performance of the selected ESM (O).” According to the petitioner-appellant, the notification of rates for collection of User-fee was published in the gazette dated 24.12.2009 and thereafter, pursuant to the letter sent by the respondents, he started the work from 28.12.2009 at 4:00 p.m. The petitioner alleged that the respondents did send him a copy of the agreement on 15.01.2010 but the same was put in the file because he was busy in managing the affairs of toll collection. The petitioner further averred that he received a message advising to seek extension of the contract and thereafter, he went through the agreement and came to know that the period of contract had been mentioned as six months 3 in place of one year. The petitioner stated the grievance that without any notice and without any opportunity of hearing, the respondents took the decision to take over the plaza; and sent the impugned communication in that respect on 22.06.2010. While questioning the said communication dated 22.06.2010, the petitioner contended with reference to the aforementioned background facts that the contract was intended to be of one year duration and there was no reason to reduce its period to six months; and then, rescinding of the contract even prior to the expiry of six months without notice and opportunity of hearing was per se illegal. The learned Single Judge was not impressed with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner particularly for the reason that the agreement in question prescribes its period in unambiguous terms as six months. While deciding the writ petition on 25.06.2010, the learned Single Judge observed that in the admitted fact situation, the period of six months was going to expire on 27.06.2010 and in the light of the agreement executed between the parties, the petitioner shall be having no authority to continue as toll collection agent after completion of the period of six months. The learned Single Judge, therefore, dismissed the writ petition in limine. Seeking to assail the order aforesaid, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant strenuously contended that from all the acts, deeds and communications, the petitioner-appellant was given the unambiguous impression that the contract 4 would be of one year duration and in the given fact situation, it was the duty of the respondents to continue with the contract for another period of six months. The learned counsel submitted that the respondents have acted wholly unfair and unreasonable in seeking to rescind the contract though, at every stage, the contract was suggested to be of 12 months' duration minimum and for this reason alone, the petitioner was asked to submit the extended bank guarantee. The learned counsel has referred to and relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Reliance Energy Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Maharashtra State Road Development Corpn. Ltd. And Ors.: (2007) 8 SCC 1. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and having examined the material on record, we are unable to find even a wee bit of reason to consider interference in this case. The reference as made to the contents of the letter of sponsorship in regard to the suggested period of contract or to the communication from NHAI asking for extended bank guarantee are hardly of any effect, relevance or bearing when viewed in the light of the unambiguous terms of agreement, duly signed by the petitioner-appellant. The relevant clauses in the agreement specifically state in figures and words that the period of contract shall be six months beginning from the time and date of commencement of fee collection. Clause 2(i) on 'Period of Contract' reads as under:- 5 “(i) This Contract shall be for a period of 06 months (six months) beginning from the time and date of commencement of fee collection, which period may be reduced/extended at the sole discretion of the Authority on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed to in writing by the parties.” There has not been any ambiguity about the duration of contract; and the said period of six months got reiterated even in Clause 6 (a) regarding 'Commencement of Fee Collection' thus: “(a) The fee collection shall commence from the date & time as communicated by the Authority in writing and shall terminate on expiry of a period of six months beginning from the time and date of commencement of fee collection or at the end of extended period, if any, as the case may be.” There is no and there cannot be any quarrel with the fundamental principles that even in the contractual matter, if any act of the Government fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, then such an act or decision would be unconstitutional and unsustainable. However, at the same time it remains trite, as held again by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Reliance Energy (supra), that the grounds upon which administrative action is subjected to control by judicial review are essentially of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The indisputable fact situation of the present case leaves nothing to doubt or dispute that the contract was consciously entered into between the parties for a period of six months. No other correspondence or communication could be read in modification or alteration of this material term of 6 contract pertaining to its duration. The petitioner has consciously signed the agreement and remains bound by it. The suggestions as cursorily and in uncertain terms made in the writ petition that the petitioner put the agreement in file or as if the petitioner was less aware of its terms have hardly any value or worth and could only be rejected as a late attempt seeking extension of the period of contract. We are unable to find anything of illegality or irrationality or procedural impropriety in this case so as to consider interference. Noteworthy further it is that the agreement in question came to be executed as back as on 19.11.2009 and according to the petitioner, he commenced the work on 28.12.2009. The petitioner never objected against the terms of contract at the relevant time although, even according to the petition averments, the petitioner had the copy of the agreement with him at least in the month of January 2010. A late and last moment attempt to seek infusion of extension into the contract by filing a writ petition only a few days before expiry of the term of contract could only have been, and has rightly been, declined. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed summarily. (DINESH MAHESHWARI),J. (JAGDISH BHALLA),CJ. MK