IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. Civil. Revision No.: 315 of 2002. Reserved on: 1.7.2008. Decided on: 12.08.2008. Subhash Chand and Anr. … … Petitioners. Versus Desh Raj and Others. … … Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioners: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate. For Respondents No.3 to 7: Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, Advocate. Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 18.6.2002 passed in C.M.A. No. 56/K/01 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of this revision are that the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) have filed two civil suits for redemption of mortgage, i.e. civil suit No.2 of 1987 and civil suit No.3 of 1987 respectively. The said suits were dismissed on merit by the learned trial Court. The plaintiffs preferred appeals against the Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. - 2 - judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court before the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. These appeals were dismissed. The plaintiffs filed two regular second appeals bearing RSA No.469 of 1990 and RSA No.471 of 1990 in this Court. These regular second appeals were accepted by this Court and the matter was remanded back to the learned trial Court for fresh trial. The suits were tried by the trial Court and dismissed on 27.2.1999. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs applied for the certified copies of the judgments and decree on 1.3.1999 and obtained the copies through his Clerk on 6.5.1999. According to the plaintiffs, the Clerk of Shri P.P. Gupta only supplied the copy of judgment and decree of civil suit No.3 of 1987, but did not supply the copy with respect to civil suit No.2 of 1987. The appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs before the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala against the judgment and decree dated 27.2.1999 passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No.2 of 1987. The same was barred by limitation. The appeal was accompanied with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The application was resisted and contested by the defendants. The learned Additional District Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala dismissed the application on 18.6.2002. This revision has been preferred against the order dated 18.6.2002. Mr. Ajay Sharma has strenuously argued that the order dated 18.6.2002 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Mr. Sharma has further argued that the plaintiffs have made out a case for condonation of delay as per the averments made in the application. Mr. S.D. Vasudeva - 3 - appearing on behalf of respondents No.3 to 7 has supported the order dated 18.6.2002. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. It is evident from the record that initially two civil suits bearing civil suit No.2/1987 and civil suit No.3/1987 were filed before the learned trial Court. Those two suits were dismissed. The appeals preferred against the judgments and decrees of these two civil suits were also dismissed by the learned District Judge, Dharamshala. The plaintiffs approached this Court by way of regular second appeals No.469 and 471 of 1990. These appeals were allowed and the matter was remanded back to the trial Court. The trial court again dismissed the suits on 27.2.1999. The copies were applied by the Clerk of the learned counsel Shri P.P. Gupta on 1.3.1999 and the same were supplied by the Copying Agency on 6.5.1999. The plaintiff No.2 is a rustic villager and plaintiff No.1 is living outside the State of Himachal Pradesh. It transpires from the records that the plaintiffs had filed appeal against the judgment and decree in civil suit No.3 of 1987 before the learned District Judge, Dharamshala. Mr. Ajay Sharma submits that since this Court has decided the regular second appeals by a common judgment, his clients were under the bonafide impression that civil suits No.2 and 3 of 1987 were also decided by the common judgment and the counsel might have filed the appeal against the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.2.1999. The other ground assigned by Mr. Ajay Sharma is that the Clerk of Mr. P.P. Gupta has supplied the copy of civil - 4 - suit No.3 of 1987; however, he has omitted to apply for the copy of judgment and decree in civil suit No.2 of 1987. The Court is of the firm opinion that the plaintiffs had succeeded in explaining the delay in filing the first appeal. It can safely be presumed in view of the observations made hereinabove that the plaintiffs were under the bonafide impression that only one appeal was required to be filed. The non-filing of the rejoinder by the plaintiffs to the reply filed by the defendants to the application seeking condonation of delay was not fatal. The plaintiffs have explained sufficient cogent reasons which have resulted in delay in filing the appeal(s). Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Balakrishanan v. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222 have held that the primary function of the Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Their Lordships have further held that Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties and court knows that refusal to condone the delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. Their Lordships have held as under:- “The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused - 5 - by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always delilberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act shold receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Muni-cipality, AIR 1972 SC 749. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the - 6 - Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. In this case explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High Court was exercising revisional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent must be compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum of Rs. Fifty thousand from the delinquent advocate through the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order by restoring the order passed by the trial Court but on a condition that appellant shall pay a sum of Rupees Ten thousand to the respondent (or deposit it is this Court) within one month from this date.” Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and others v. Gobardhan Sao and others, AIR 2002 SC 1201 have held that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party. Their Lordships have held as under:- “A learned single Judge of Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court as it then existed, by order dated 18th November, 1998 directed for expunging name of appellant No.2 from the record, making a note that appellants Nos. 5, 9 and 10 were - 7 - already on the record as his heirs and legal representatives and impleading the daughter who was not on the record. So far the prayer for substitution of the heirs of appellants Nos. 3, 22 and 41 is concerned, the same was refused as it was held that no sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay in filing the application to set aside abatement and setting aside abatement. Against the said order, the appellants preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the Jharkhand High Court which was created by then, and the said appeal was dismissed on 11th January, 2001. Hence, this appeal by special leave.” Accordingly, the civil revision is allowed and the order dated 18.6.2002 is set aside. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala is directed to hear the appeal on its merits. The learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala is directed to conclude the hearing of appeal within a period of three months since the civil suits bearing No.2 and 3 were filed in the year 1987. To avoid delay, the parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala on 3rd September, 2008. No costs. (Rajiv Sharma) Judge. August 12, 2008. (sck)