wnn PEmION (227) NoZ@/§’/2o1o IN THE MATTER OF: / $ing§a @eim TITIONER/ APPELLANT Nakchedu Rom, / S/o Paras Rom Dhimor, Aged abou158 years, R/o lndusfriol Ward, P.O. —Dhomtari, Disirid— Dhamtori (C.G.) VERSUS R PONDENTS NO.1/ ESPONDENT NO. 1 1. The Esiofe Officer / south East RaiIwaQ Managemem Compound, W.R.S. Colony, Roipur, Chhcn‘tisgorh RE$PONDENT NO.2/ PONDENT NO. 2 2 Union of lndio, Through Chief Manager, South Eas’r Runway, Garden Reach, Kolkata, West Bengal, V’V ‘ WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SB ' Hon’bie Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivasiava. J 29-04-2010 MI. Ankh Singhal, counsel for the petitioner. Ms. Naushina Ali. counsel for respc ndents on advance copv urtier instniciions non) Shri Amit Chaudhari, standing counsel for respondents. By this petition, under Articie 227 the constitution of india peiiiioner has assai‘ied iegality and validity af orcier dated i3i03/2 ‘ 0 by which ‘ 1e petiiioner‘s appeal under Seciion 9 of ilie Public Premises (Eviction of unautl orlzed occupants) Act, 1 71 (for short " ihe Act of l 1 i ) has been uisniisseu J .1 as barred'b'y' Leamed counsel for the petitioner n alces Lw'u ioiu 1 J submissions. '1‘L me 1"inst suomission 1 of leameo counsel for thepetitioner is that ' View o the provisions contained under C‘oec‘don 9. Sub-Section 2(a), the period of limitation e to be reckoned from the date of publication of the order under Sub-Section l of Section 5 f i‘ne Act of l§7li it is Submitbecl that ihougii the order was passed by the Estate Office 22/08/68," the same was affixed as required by Section 5 of Sub-Section l, only on 8/ 08. He therefore submits that the period of limitation would commence only Born 8/09 '08 and not before that. it is submitted that the appeal was initially filed on 12/09/08 befo the District Judge. Raipur but later on District Judge. Raipur 'v‘ide its order dated 23/09/08 before the District Judge, Dhamtari Wherea er the appeal was presented on 24/O>mu ueiure the District Judge, Dhamtari. The second mission of iearned counsel for the petitioner though assuming that there was deiay in friii the appeal, as the petitioner had also moved an appiication under Section 5 of the Limitatioi Act 1963, by way of abundant caution leanied Court below was obliged to consider the sar Learned counsel for the petitioner aiso reiied upon the iudgment of Ailahabad High Court in the case of Parma Nand S' Vs. District Judge. Mirzapur and others, 111R 198 8, 2 4i Submission of learned counsel for 1e respondent is that the perusal of impugned order would show that the District Judge. R ipur returned the appeal on $i’08/09 whereafter l e71 in 1.._£ mrned the appeal with liberty to fire 1 tire L swie "ilt'\£’ LAVA ' ‘o 0 l' r 0 ’ r e n . l ‘ the appeai was flied before the learnsd Conn heiow afier delay , 0f aA) days anu 1 mefmore 1 I appea1 was not fi‘ied within the period of iimi 2tion prescribed unda’ the Kaw. it Is submitirf; that the finding of the leamed Cam below that tue appeal was baneu J ‘L uy limitati‘n éoes n‘t suffer from an" error much iess an error app areni on ”(he recard and therefare the petirion is liabie to be dismissed. A pemsal of impugned order shoWs 11a: while considering a to whether the appeai was filed within the period of limitation or not iearned Court below has completely misdirected itself. A bare perusal of Sectior. § of Sub-Section 2(a) shows iii-at ihe appeai is required to be filed within 12 days from date of publication of the order under Sub- nsection -_ x i 0 r n 4 t t i oection Jr However, in the entire order. the iearrieu Court below While considering the case of the petitioner has cor puted the period of limitation from the date of passing of the order wimo'ut taking into c ideration the statutory provisions contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act, 19 . the appeai was filed before the District Judge" The facts ofthe case are that initiai Raipur. Later on, the séme was returned and presented before the Court heiow. This aspect was not taken into consideration More / , it appears that the petitioner, by way of abundant caution. had moved an applicati i under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for eondonation of deiay, if any, Lu niing the ap 1. Though the impug‘ied order records Lk mat ¢L uie appeal is barred by limitation. there is r * .‘- s“ consideration of petitioner‘s appiieation for condonation of delay. The order does not efieet that any of the grounds raised by the petitioner in the application for condonation delay were considered. The order does not Show that any satisfaction has been recorded at the cause shown for delay is not sufficient. \ In View of the above discussion, th impugned order cannot he sustained and the same is therefore set aside. Learned Court be ow shaii reconsider the entire matter ahesh, by taking into consideration the statutory provis ns contained in Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act and pass appropriate orders in acerdance with law. Parties shall appear before the Additional District Judge (are), Dim ~1 on ml“ May; 26m x\ ’ mwzistava l (Manind? / 1 r a Marian g gudge o ‘ ‘i 7 r o p a i‘ f i /