HIGH COURT OF GHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRITPETmON N0.1762 of 19&7 Petitioner Resoondents -1"\ Sammelal, son of Shri Jhaduram Kewat, agsd about 45 years, Resident of Village Gavera-Basti, Tahsif Kathaghora, District Bitaspur (M.P.)(NowC.G.) Versus 1. South Eastem Coalfiekls Limited, Seepat Road, Bilaspur (M.P.) (Now C.G.) 2. Chief Managing Director, South Eastern Coalfiekls Limited, Seepat Road, Bilaspur (M.P.) (Now C.G.) 3. Personnel Director, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Seepat Road, Bilaspur (M.P.) (Now C.G.) 4. General Manager, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Kusmunda Project, Bilaspur (M.P.) (Now C.G.) 5. Chief Pereonnei | Manager, 6.M. Office, Kusmunda Project, Post Kusmunda, Bilaspur (M.P.) (Now C.G.) 6. Additional Chief Mining Engineer, Kusmunda-Gavera, Biiaspur (M.P.) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (SB : Hon'ble Shri Justice Satish K. Agnihotri) Present:- Mr. R.K. Kesharwani, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. VivekVerma, Advocate forthe respondents. ORDER (Passed on this 24"* day of July, 2007) 1. The peUtioner was appointed vide order dated 22.1.1984 (Annexure P/l) as General Mazdoor Category-1 on temporary period on daily wagss basis. 2. According to learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the petitioner had obtained training under Schedule-1 from 24.1.84 to 31.1.84 (Annexure P/IV) and ttiereafter, services of the petitioner were discontinued. The petitioner kept waiting for six years and thereafter, he made a representation to the Pereonnel Director, S.E.C.L., Kusmunda Project, Bilaspur on 5.12.90 (Annexure P?V) and the second representation was made to the Commerce Minister, Govemment of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopalon 12.6.94 (AnnexurePWI). 3. The petitioner has filed this peUtion on 9.4.97 after lapse of about 13 yeare.'seeking a directionto the respondents toallow the petitioner to join his service andgrantseniority w.e.f. 1984 and attematiyely if the petitioner is not appointed, his son Jagdish Prasad may kindty be gwen appointment. 4. This writ petitidn deserves to be dismissed on two grounds. Firstly, there is une)q3lained inordinate delay of 13 years and secondly, appointment of the petitioner was on temporary basis on daily wages.de-horse the constitutional scheme of emptoyment. 5. It is trite law that a person appointed on temporary basis on daily wages has no right to the post, as the appoinbnent is de-hprsthe constitutional scheme of employment and riot in acc'ordahce wtth the rules and regulations as framed under Articte 309 of the Constitution of tndia. 6. tt is well settled that High Court in exercise of its djscretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lettiargicas the belated approach may have the effect pf inflicting notonly hardship as jnconvehience but also injustice on other parties. 7. The Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivasvramy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu obseroed as sunder: "tt is not that there is any period of tlmltatipn for the'Courte to exercise their powers under Articte 226, nor is;jt tta ] there can never be a case where the Courts;;eiaruiot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exereise ^i discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercis^ their extraordinary powers under ArUcte 226 in the case Ofi persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief ahd 3 who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward state claims and try to unsetUe settled matters." 8. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. & others Vs. Nandtal Jaiswal and others further observed as under: "Now, tt is well settled ttiat ttie power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Articte 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exereise of its discretion does not ordinarity assist ttie tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and ttie lethargic. If there is inordinatedelay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satidactory explained, the Hjgh Court may decline to intervene and grant refief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of Uiis rule of taches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The Hjgh Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the exb'aordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights ofthird parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonabte deiay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but ateo injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay eoupled with the creatlon of third party righte in the meanwhile is an important faclor which always weighs with the High Court tn decidlng whether or not to exercise such jurisdicUon. We do not think it necessary to burdeh this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasized time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplalned delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to intBrfere, even if the State action comptained of is unconstitutional or illegal. ~ -.—:-:^--:^ ^-^-"" /.-"' ' ^ B/- 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & others Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar & another^ also observed as under: "The very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee, in our view, should be a sufficient reason for the High Court, not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquiescence, undue delay and laches." 10. The Supreme CoOrt in the ease of Kamataka Power Corporation Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing Director & another vs. K. Thangappan Sanother^ observed as under: "Delay or taches is one of the factors which is to be bome in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powere under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers there is such negHgence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where (undamental right is involved ttie matter is stitl within the discretipn of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad V. Chief Confrotler of Imports and Exports. Of couree, ttie discretion has to-be exercised judicially and reasonably." 11, Thus, at this stage, the petitioner is not entitted to any relief, as he has no right to thepost. The petitioner has slept over his right, if any, for more than 1 3 years. 12. As a result and for the above-stated reasons, this writ petition stands dlsmissed. No order asto costs. Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge 1. AIR 1974 SC2271 2. (1986) 4 SCC 886 3. (1995) 4SCC 172 4. (2008) 4 SCC 322