1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. CIVIL MISC. APPEAL No.798/06 (Manju Mittal & Ors. V/s. Hemant Kumar & Ors.) Date of Judgment :: 25.08.2008 HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S. CHAUHAN Mr. Vinay Mathur for Mr. Sandeep Mathur for the appellant. Mr. J.K. Singhi for the respondents. Reportable Having lost their sole bread earner who was a business man, and having been awarded Rs.10,45,000/-, the appellants have challenged the award dated 24.11.2005 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Alwar ('the learned Tribunal', in short). The brief facts of the case are that in the morning of 29.08.2003, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Mittal along with Mr. Hemant Kumar were going to Alwar from Ramgarh on a Hero Honda Motorcycle, bearing registration No.RJ-02-8M- 8716. Mr. Hemant Kumar was driving the said motorcycle rashly and negligently. The said motorcycle collided with a cow. Due to the collision, Mr. Pradeep Kumar sustained serious injuries. Resultantly, Mr. Pradeep Kumar expired. The claimants had filed a claim petition before the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal granted the compensation as aforementioned. Being aggrieved from the said award, this 2 appeal has been filed for enhancement. Mr. Vinay Mathur, the learned counsel for the appellant, has raised four contentions before this Court: firstly, Mr. Pradeep Kumar had a business of pesticides, fertilizers and seeds, in the name and style of “Mittal Krishi Seva Kendra” at Alwar. From the said business, he was earning Rs.15,000/- per month. In order to prove his income, the appellants had submitted income-tax returns for the years 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04. However, despite the availability of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Tribunal has assessed his income as merely Rs.7,500/- per month. Thus, the assessment of income is disproportionately less than the income pleaded by the appellants. Secondly, considering the fact that the income of the deceased would have increased over time, his future prospects should have been considered by the learned Tribunal. But, the learned Tribunal has failed to do so. Thirdly, the appellant was twenty-nine years old when he met with the fatal accident. According to the Second Schedule attached to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act', for short), a multiplier of eighteen should have been applied by the learned Tribunal. But the learned Tribunal has applied a multiplier of only seventeen. Thus, the learned 3 Tribunal has erred while applying an incorrect multiplier. Lastly, the learned Tribunal has directed that the interest should be paid from the date of the award, whereas the learned Tribunal ought to have directed that the interest should be paid from the date of filing of the claim petition. In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Smt. Chameli Wati & Anr. V/s. Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. (AIR 1986 SC 1191). On the other hand, Mr. J.K. Singhi, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, the Insurance Company, has vehemently argued that the learned Tribunal was justified in concluding that the income of the deceased was 7,500/- per month. Secondly, the learned Tribunal had applied a multiplier of seventeen taking note of the overall facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the application of multiplier of seventeen cannot be questioned. Thirdly, there is no evidence to show that the deceased would have received an increased income in times to come. Therefore, there is no necessity for including his future prospect while calculating his income. Lastly Section 171 of the Act bestows a discretionary power on the learned Tribunal for granting interest. Therefore, the payment of interest from the date of application cannot be staked by the claimants as a 4 right. Moreover, the learned Tribunal is justified in granting the interest from the date of award itself rather than from the date of filing of the claim petition. In order to support his contention, he has relied upon the following cases : Smt. Indrani Raja Durai & Ors. V/s. Madras Motor & General Insurance Company [I (1996) ACC 35 (SC)], Managing Director, Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. V/s. Geetha & Ors. (AIR 1989 Kant. 104). We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, have examined the impugned award, have perused the documents available on record, and have gone through the judgments cited at the Bar. A bare perusal of the impugned award clearly reveals that according to the Income-Tax return for the year 2001-02, Mr. Pradeep Kumar had earned Rs.73,462/-. According to the Income-Tax return for the year 2002-03, he had earned Rs.86,142/- and for the year 2003-04, he had earned Rs.96,586/-. Therefore, from year 2001 till year 2004, his income was steadily increasing. According to his income-tax returns, he was earning an income of approximately Rs.8,000/- per month. Since the income of the deceased was progressively increasing, it is reasonable 5 to presume that even in future, the income would have increased. Considering the fact that the Indian economy from the year 2004 to year 2008 has been booming, the presumption of increase in income of the deceased is fortified. Therefore, the learned Tribunal ought to have considered the future prospect of increase in his income and should have taken his income as Rs.10,000/- per month. After deducting one-third from the said income as he would have spent upon himself, the deceased would have spent Rs.6,667/- upon his family. As far as the multiplier is concerned, Mr. Singhi has claimed that the multiplier of seventeen was applied looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case. But the impugned award does not reveal the mind of the learned Tribunal for assigning any reason for deviation from the Second Schedule attached to the Act. The learned Tribunal has applied a multiplier of seventeen, whereas the multiplier of eighteen should have been applied in accordance with the said schedule. In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the Courts should use the Second Schedule as a guideline. But, in case, the learned Tribunal deviates from the guidelines, it must state cogent reasons for such deviation. In the present case, not a 6 single word has been assigned by the learned Tribunal for applying a multiplier of seventeen instead of a multiplier of eighteen. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the multiplier of eighteen should have been applied. Section 171 of the Act dealing with the award of interest is as under : “171. Award of interest where any claim is allowed.- Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. (i) Interest award at the rate of 12% per annum is payable on the entire amount awarded from the date of filing of application till realisation. Interest is to be awarded even on the amount awarded by the Tribunal and deposited by the insurer although the same could not be withdrawn by the claimants, because they could not furnish security as ordered in appeal filed by the insurer; Chandro Devi v. Jit Singh, 1989 ACJ 41 (Del). (ii) Tribunal should grant interest from date of application unless claimant is responsible for causing delay in final disposal of the case; Vidhya KaKKAR V. D.T.C., 1989 ACJ 1088 (Del).” The use of the word “may” clearly indicates that 7 a discretionary power is bestowed upon the learned Tribunal for deciding as to the date from which the interest would be payable. The only restriction on this discretion is that the learned Tribunal cannot direct the payment of interest from a date prior to the date of filing of the claim petition. However, the learned Tribunal can direct that the interest be paid from the date subsequent to the filing of the claim petition. The fact that a vast discretion has been bestowed on the learned Tribunal also reposes a responsibility on the learned Tribunal to give reasons while exercising its discretion. The question as to the date from which the interest should be payable arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chameli Wati (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench totally ignored the fact that the enhanced amount of compensation awarded by them was in their judgment the correct amount of compensation payable to the appellants on account of the death of the deceased resulting from the accident. The leaned single Judge and the Division Bench should have therefore awarded interest on the enhanced amount of compensation from th date of application. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the Division Bench as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge in so far as these judgments direct that interest shall be payable on the enhanced 8 amount of compensation from the date of the respective judgments and instead, we direct that interest shall be payable on the enhanced amount of compensation as finally determined by the Division Bench at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application for compensation.” Of course, Mr. Singhi, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company, has relied upon the case of Smt. Indrani Raja Durai (supra) to argue that the rate of interest should be paid from the date of award and not from the date of filing of the claim petition. However, a bare perusal of the said judgment clearly reveals that the issue about the date of the payment of interest was not even raised in the said case. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not discuss the said issue. It merely stated that the “.....The appellants are entitled to a sum of Rs.60,000/- with interest at 6% from the date of the judgment of the Tribunal dated November 30, 1972....” It is also important to note the fact that while the case of Smt. Chameli Wati (supra) was decided by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, the case of Smt. Indrani Raja Durai (supra) was decided by a Bench comprising of two Hon'ble Judges of Hon'ble Supreme Court. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already dealt with the issue in the case of Smt. Chameli Wati (supra), therefore, no fruitful purpose can be served while discussing the cases decided 9 by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court as well as Madhya Pradesh High Court. Mr. Singhi has also relied upon the case of Suresh Oil Mills V/s. Kesar Bai & five others [2004 (3) WLC (Raj)], a Division Bench's judgment of this Court to argue that no interest on the enhanced amount should be paid. However, the said judgment does not deal with the issue as to the date from which the interest should be paid. Therefore, even this particular case law does not come to the rescue of the respondent No.2. As stated above, Section 171 of the Act confers a discretionary power upon the learned Tribunal. Obviously, discretionary power has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The rate of interest should be paid from the date of filing of the claim petition as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Chameli Wati (supra). In case, the learned Tribunal wants to grant the rate of interest from a date subsequent to the date of filing of the claim petition, then the learned Tribunal must state reasons for doing so. In the present case, no reason whatsoever has been assigned by the learned Tribunal for granting the rate of interest from the date of award. Since the impugned award is a non- 10 speaking one, it is, thus, unsustainable. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the award dated 24.11.2005 is modified as under : “Loss of dependency” should be calculated as Rs.6,667/- X 18 X 12 = Rs.14,40,072/- . However, the rest of the award is, hereby, confirmed. The learned Judge is directed to ensure that the Insurance Company pays the enhanced amount, after deducting the amount already disbursed to the appellants, alongwith the interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e., from 16.10.2003 till the date of realisation. The learned Judge is directed to ensure that the remaining compensation amount is paid to the appellants within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. 11 The registry is directed to immediately send back the record to the concerned learned Tribunal. [R.S.CHAUHAN]J A.Asopa/