1 I N THE HI GH COURT OF JUDI CATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAI PUR BENCH, JAI PUR M/ s. Bh ar at Pest icides Man u fact u r in g Co. & An r . vs. Th e St at e of Raj ast h an ( S.B. CRI MI NAL MI SC. PETI TI ON NO. 3 7 3 / 2 0 0 3) Dat e of Or der : 2 7 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 8 PRESENTS HON'BLE MR. JUSTI CE RAGHUVENDRA S. RATHORE Mr. Raj Kumar Goyal on behalf of Mr. Mahendra Goyal, for the petitioners. Mr. B.K. Sharma, Public Prosecutor for the State. By t h e Cou r t : ( Or al) . This criminal misc. petition has been filed by the accused-petitioners for quashing of criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 860/ 88 pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer under Section 29(1) (2) (3) & (4) of the Insecticides Act, 1968. 2. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint under Section 29(1) of the Act of 1968 and in the Rules of 1971 came to be filed on 04.11.1988 in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer. It was stated in the complaint that on 18.09.1986, a sample of Chemical Monocid 36-EC was taken from the M/ s. Rajendra Kumar Lalit Kumar, under the provisions of Section 22 of the Action of 1968. The said sample was manufactured by the M/ s. Bharat Pesticides Manufacturing Company. The sample was found to be misbranded by the State 2 Pesticides Testing Laboratory, Jaipur. The sample was manufactured in the month of January, 1986 and the date of expiry was July, 1986. 3. This misc. petition was filed in the year 2003. By that time, the trial in the case had substantially progressed. After filing of the complaint, the learned trial court took cognizance on 30.11.1988. Thereafter, the charge substance was pronounced, which the accused-petitioners had denied and claimed for trial. Subsequently, the learned trial court proceeded with recording of the prosecution evidence. Upto 03.03.2001, five prosecution witnesses had already been examined. A perusal of the order- sheets of the trial court goes to show that efforts were being made for summoning the remaining witnesses. 4. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case where inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised. It is a settled principle of law that this Court is to exercise inherent powers only in exceptional and rarest of the rare cases. The exercise of the inherent powers are to be made, where the learned trial court has abused the process of the Court. However, the proceedings of the trial court goes to show that it had proceeded very much in accordance to law. Th is Cou r t , w hile ex er cisin g t h e in her en t pow er s, is n ot t o st ifle a pr osecut ion . W hile ex er cisin g j u r isdict ion u nder Sect ion 4 8 2 Cr .P.C., t h is Cou r t w ou ld n ot em bar k u pon an 3 enqu ir y w het h er t h e ev idence in quest ion is r eliable or n ot or w het h er on a r easonable appr eciat ion of it accu sat ion w ou ld n ot be su st ain ed t h at is w h at t he t r ial cou r t has t o look in t o. The inh er en t pow er s ar e not an inst r u m en t t o t h e accused t o sh or t cu t a pr osecut ion an d br in g abou t it s sudden deat h . 5. The Hon'ble Apex Court has time and again reiterated the scope and limitation of the inherent power of this Court. Only to name one, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cent r al Bu r eau of I nv est igat ion vs. Rav i Sh ank ar Sr iv ast av a, I AS & Anr ., ( 2 00 6) 7 SCC 18 8 , held as under: - “7. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person 4 anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” “10. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of 5 Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person.” 5. For the reasons aforementioned and taking into consideration the fact that substantial progress in the trial had already been made, in my view, it would be more appropriate for the learned trial court to consider all the objections and contentions of the accused-petitioners so as to assess their involvement/ innocence in commission of the crime. In such view, I am of the considered opinion that the inherent powers of this 6 court are not to be exercised in the instant case. 6. Consequently, this criminal misc. petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit. The record of the trial court be sent forthwith. ( RAGHUVENDRA S. RATHORE) ,J. t ik am / - Jr.P.A.s-22