1 MSS IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE APPELLATE SIDE APPELLATE SIDE WRIT PETITION NO. 8482 OF 2004 VISHWASRAO YASHWANTRAO MANE .. PETITIONER Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.. RESPONDENTS Mr. P.M. Pradhan with S. M. Sabrad for petitioner Mr. P.P. Kakade, AGP CORAM: SMT. RANJANA DESAI & SMT. R.S. DALVI, JJ. DATE: 17/1/2008 P.C. . The petitioner claims to be an Ex-serviceman. He has been given licence to sell kerosene vide order dated 30/9/94. According to him in the area where he is allotted the licence to sell kerosene there was fair price shop of father-in-law of respondent 4. The father-in-law of respondent 4 was given licence to sell kerosene in his fair price shop. According to the petitioner, father-in-law of respondent 4 was involved in blackmarketing of kerosene and hence his licence was cancelled vide order dated 19/4/93. A copy of the said order is annexed to the petition. 2 2. The petitioner was granted licence to sell 7000 kilo-litres of kerosene every month and 1100 card holders were attached to his shop. According to him his licence was extended from time to time and was valid upto October 2005. 3. Admittedly respondent 3 issued an advertisement in Daily Tarun Bharat dated 28/8/01 and Daily Sakal dated 2/9/2001. Applications were invited from ladies for permission to sell kerosene on retail basis. 4. The case of the petitioner is that he apprehended that his quota was likely to be affected. He submitted objections. Fearing that his objections will not be considered the petitioner filed Regular Civil Suit No. 180 of 2002 stating that public notice given by respondent 3 was illegal. Initially he got an ad-interim order in his favour which came to be vacated on 3/4/03. The petitioner challenged this order by filing Misc. Civil Appeal No. 113 of 2003. Status quo order was passed which was to operate till the disposal of the appeal. 5. On 31/7/2003 District Judge, Kolhapur dismissed 3 the said appeal. Thus status quo order which was operating in favour of the petitioner was vacated on that date. According to the petitioner Regular Civil Suit No. 180 of 2002 is still pending. 6. The grievance of the petitioner is that respondent 3 has without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner granted licence to respondent 4 and it was given on the basis that her father-in-law has a fair price shop. Being aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed revision application before respondent 3 on 1/3/2004. Again an order of status quo was passed on 29/3/2004. That revision application came to be dismissed on 31/3/2004. The petitioner preferred a revision application before the 1st respondent. Again an order of status quo was passed pending revision on 30/4/2004. That revision application also came to be dismissed. Obviously therefore, the status quo order was vacated. Being aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 7. Our Farad Order shows that on 2/11/2004, notice before admission was issued by learned Single Judge of this court. The learned Single Judge ordered 4 that the order of status quo that was granted by the State on 30/4/2004 shall remain operative until further orders. 8. Farad dated 13/12/07 states that notice issued to respondent 4 is not served. This petition again appeared on board on 17/12/2004. Again an order issuing notice was passed. It is necessary for us to note the orders which were passed thereafter. On 28/1/2005 counsel for the petitioner sought adjournment. Hence the petition was adjourned to 31/1/2005. On 31/1/2005 counsel for the petitioner was present. The petition was not heard. It was adjourned to 2/2/2005. It again appeared on the board of the learned Single Judge on 7/7/2005, when a request was again made by the petitioner’s counsel for adjournment. The petition was adjourned for one week. 9. On 14/7/2005, the petitioner and his counsel did not remain present. The court adjourned the petition to 15/7/2005. Again on 15/7/2005 at the request of learned counsel for the petitioner the petition was adjourned for one week. It appeared on the board of the learned Single Judge on 25/7/05. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought 5 adjournment. The petition was adjourned to 27/7/05. There is noting of 26/7/05 on the Farad to the effect "II part short". It is further stated that the petitioner’s affidavit is attached separately as paging is not done properly. Thereafter two civil applications for amendment filed by the petitioner were moved before the learned Single Judge. On 22/12/2005 amendment was granted and applications were disposed of. 10. Thereafter the petition appeared on the board of the learned Single Judge on 9/8/2006. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the petition pertains to the jurisdiction of the Division Bench and hence registry was asked to take steps. Throughout this period the interim order continued to operate. 11. Thereafter the petition remained in the registry. Obviously the petitioner was not at all interested in taking up the matter for admission, he having been protected by the status quo order of this court. 12. This court had given an oral direction to the registry to ensure that all old matters where 6 ad-interim orders are passed should be placed before it. The petitioner’s counsel then sought circulation for placing this petition before us and that is how this writ petition is placed before us. 13. We record our displeasure at the manner in which this matter has proceeded in the registry of this court. In matters where stay or interim injunction orders are passed, it is also the duty of the advocates as officers of the court to ensure that such matters are taken up before the court at the earliest. We have, no hesitation in recording our displeasure at the petitioner and the petitioner’s counsel as well. So many adjournments ought not to have been sought. 14. We now turn to the merits of the case. We find that petition itself is frivolous. We have already noted that petitioner has throughout tried to thwart the entire process of issuing kerosene licence. Having lost everywhere he has filed this petition. 15. The petitioner had already been given licence. He is conducting his business. He is aggrieved by the fact that 4th respondent was given licence in 7 the 30% reserve category of women. His grievance is that because 4th respondent is granted licence his units are reduced. The authorities have found that the 4th respondent is an educated unemployed person and she fulfills all the conditions. It cannot be presumed that because her father-in-law was held guilty of malpractice, she would also indulge in malpractice. In any case assuming the petitioner could have objected to the grant of licence to the 4th respondent he should have prosecuted the petition deligently. 16. Reliance is placed by Mr. Pradhan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner on G. R. dated 16/8/2001. He has drawn our attention to clause 2(a) which states that a kerosene licence should not be granted to fair price shop owners, who are convicted for irregularities or mismanagement. Clause 2(c) states that two licences should not be issued in favour of one family. In this context it is further stated that a family means husband, wife, a son who is above 18 years of age or unmarried daughter who is above 18 years of age, a daughter-in-law and dependent parents. 8 17. Mr. Pradhan sought to establish connection between clause 2(a) and (c). He submitted that the petitioner’s father-in-law was convicted. The petitioner belongs to the same family and hence the petitioner cannot be allotted a ration shop. 18. In our opinion these provisions cannot be linked in this manner. Clause 2(a) says that the person who is convicted should not be given a licence. So far as clause 2 (c) is concerned, it states that in the same family two licences should not be given and in that connection it states what is a family. The grievance of the petitioner is that respondent 4’s father-in-law was convicted and, therefore, respondent 4 should not be given licence. It is pertinent to note that on 11/10/04 when the petition was filed, the father-in-law of respondent 4 was already dead. This fact has been brought on record by respondent 4 and the death certificate is annexed at page 85 of the petition. It shows that father-in-law of 4th respondent died on 1/1/04 and the petition was filed on 8/10/04. It was suggested that if the licence was issued in favour of respondent 4 the father-in-law would be in charge of the business and same illegal activities would be continued. We reiterate that 9 in the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, that merely because father-in-law is convicted it is not necessary that the daughter-in-law would also indulge in illegal activities. If such illegality is detected the licence can always be cancelled. 19. In any case in the nature of things in this case, if the father-in-law was dead prior to 8/10/04 there could not have been even a remote possibility of the father-in-law misusing the licence of the daughter-in-law. On the first date of hearing of the petition, if this fact was brought to the notice of the court the petition would have been rejected. It is unfortunate that interim order of status quo was continued for such a long time because correct facts were not placed before the court. 20. Affidavit-in-reply filed by Sunanda Gaikwad, District Supply Officer, Kolhapur states that applications were invited by way of publication of advertisement after following the procedure and the licence was granted on merits and in accordance with law. We have no reason to disbelieve this statement made on oath. 10 21. It is also stated in the petition by the petitioner that advertisements were invited. Therefore, grievance made by the petitioner is totally baseless and frivolous. The petition deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.5,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the 4th respondent. Exemplary costs to be paid within a period of one month from today. The status quo order, if any is vacated. JUDGE. JUDGE.