HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH^ BILASPUR Division Bench: Hon'ble Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha 85. Hon'ble Shri Radhe Shyam Sharma, JJ Writ Appeal No. 286 of 2010 Shri Kedar Ram Dumar Kamri Vs. State Bank of India 85 Ofhers ORDER For consideration ^ Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge ! HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RADHE SHYAM SHARMA 3 c<3^-*<_ 'l: . . Sd/- ':^ Radhe Shyam Sharma 1 Judge '>-..--.' ' " Post for Order : /2-/ 10/201 !.£ Sd/- Judge f^ /10/2011 1 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR ^ Division Bench: Hony>le Shri SuniljCumar Sinha & Hon'ble Shri Radhe Shyana Sharma, J J APPELLANT RESPONDENTS Writ Appeal No. 286 of 2010 Shri Kedar Ram Dum.ar Kamri, S/o Shri Sekhau Dumar Kamri, Presently aged about 66 years, Retired Assistant Manager of S.B.I., R/o: Sarangarh, District: Raigarh (CG) Verstis 1 State Bank of India, Through: The General Manager, (Appellate Authority) State Bank of India, Local Head Office, BHOPAL (MP) 2 The General Manager (D & PB) (Appointing 8s Disciplinary Authority) State Bank of India, Local Head Office, BHOPAL (MP) 3 Assistant General Manager, Region- 5, State Bank of India, Regional Office, RAIPUR (CG) (Writ Appeal under Section 2 (1) ofthe Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Benchl, Act 2006) Appearance: Appellant in person. Mr. Gautam Bhaduri, Advocate for the respondents. ORDER ( 12,. 10.2011) Following order of the Court was delivered by Sunil Kuinar Sinha, J. (1) This appeal is directed against the order dated 1st of July, 2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 962/2001 by the Writ Court. (2) By the impugned order, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Writ Court. r WritApueal No. 286 of 2010 (3) The facts, briefly stated, are as under:- The appellant was appointed as a Cashier-cum-clerk in the State Bank of India in the year 1974. On 27.4.94, when he was posted at Balod Branch, he was served with a notice seeking explanation about fraud and misappropriation in Saving Bank Account No. 74/18676 making allegations that a superfluous credit entry of Rs. 35,024/- was made in the said account which was posted by a counter clerk and authenticated by the appellant on 3.1.94. The account holder withdrew Rs. 34,000/- from the above account on different dates. Considering explanation offered by the appellant, on 17.5.94, the respondent-Bank lodged the F.I.R. and the appellant was arrested on 31.8.94. Later on, a charge-sheet was filed and the appellant was prosecuted in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod, District Durg who framed charges u/ss 420, 468, 471 & 409 IPC against the appellaht. The appellant was suspended on 27.9.94 and the respondent-Bank also proceeded with department enquiry against the appellant for contravention of certain provisions of State Bank of India Officers Service Rules which was applicable in case of the appellant. Statement of allegations and articles of charges were served upon the appellant. Enquiry was conducted, enquiry report was submitted and thereafter the disciplinary authority by order dated 6.12.97 imposed two penalties i.e. (i) reduction in the time scale pay by three stage for a period of one year and also stopped increment and such reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increment; and (ii) the suspension period from 31.8.94 to 20.2.97 will not be counted for annual increment. The criminal trial was also concluded and the appellant was convicted on 22.1.98 for commission of the aforesaid offences and sentenced to under R.I. for 2 years and to pay fine of Rs.900/-. On the basis of conviction, the appellant was terminated from the sendce on q .:.r WritAppeal No.286of2010 4.5.98. The appellant was acquitted, in appeal, on 17.2.99. After judgment of acquittal, the respondent reinstated the appellant in servlce vide order dated 17.8.99. Thereafter the appellant took voluntary retirement on 31.3.2001. Against the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the appellant fi.led a departmental appeal and the same was disposed of by the appellate authority on 17.5.2000 by imposing penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay by one stage for a period of one year with further directions that the officer will not earn increment during the period of such reduction and on the expiiy of such period the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. The appellant thereafter filed the writ petition for quashing of the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellant authority; payment of back wages; as also full salary for the entire period and other consequential benefits as a result of quashing of the orders passed by the domestic forums. (4) The writ Court dismissed the petition finding no merits in the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant relating to defect in the enquiry as also relating to full claim made by the appellant for pay and increments. The writ Court held that there was sufGcient evidence to support the Gndings of the enquiry officer and the findings are not perverse. There was no infirmity in the findings and the punishment imposed by the department authorities were just and proper. It was held that the difference of salary claimed by the appellant was also not payable on the basis of principle of 'no work no pay' and the appellant was also not entitled to any consequential benefit as the proceedings of departmental enquiry were proper. Writ Aoceal No. 286 of 2010 (5) The appellant, in appeal, mostly argued on factual aspects. He tried to canvas that he was not at fault and the departmental authorities erred in law in holding him guilty of the charges framed against him. We have considered the arguments and perused the records. It is well settled proposition of law that in such matters courts/tribunals should not act as an appellate authority. If the findings of departraental authorities are not perverse and are based on sufficient material on record, they cannot be interpreted by a court or a tribunal. We have gone through the documents filed by the appellant before the writ Court. Annexure-P/4 is the enquiry report which records findings against the conduct of the appellant by holding that the charges were found proved. The findings are mostly based on the documentary evidence and almost each and every document, filed by the presenting officer and the contentions of the appellant to rebut the allegations have been considered and findings have been recorded. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, we do not fi.nd any infirmity in the findings recorded by enquiry officer and disciplinary authority so as to warrant interference by a writ Court. We are of the view that the writ Court has taken a correct view in light ofthe above facts and circumstances ofthe case. (6) The appellant has also argued for payment of back wages and has claimed for setting-aside the findings of departmental authorities as perjudgment of acquittal in criminal case. ^' ^' .i\ ~v> y^^ ~'^. .Js '^sy WritApueal No, 286 of 2010 What would be the effect of acquittal in a criminal case on the disciplinary proceedings is also well settled. It is a settled view that the acquittal in a criininal case would not operate as a bar for drawing up of a disciplinary proceeding against a delinquent. It is well settled principle of law that yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the one in disciplinary proceedings. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in a department proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. This is what the Supreme Court also said in Enwlovers in relation to the Manasiement of West Bokaro Colliery of M/s. TISCO Ltd. -Vs- The Concemed Workman, Ram Pravesh Sinoh, 2008 AIR SCW 1098. In Southern Railwau Officers Assn. & Anr. -Vs- Union oflndla & Ors. And Connected matters. 2010 AIR SCW 548, the Supreme Court held that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be ground for interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. It is now well settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charges. On the above principle, laid down by the Supreme Court, which is almost settled, the appellant cannot base his claim only on the ground of acquittal from the criminal Court. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that since he has been acquitted from the criminal Court, his entire claim should be awarded setting-aside the orders of the departmental authorities only on the ground of such acquittal cannot be accepted. /c 7 1<;^>- WritAppeal No. 286 of 2010 (8) The appellant has also argued about payment of full back wages to him which was denied to him on the basis of principle of "no work no pay". In Ranchhodii Chatun'i Thakore -Vs- Superintendent Engineer, Gufarat Electricitti Board, Himmatnagar, IGv.iarat] and another, AIR 1997 SC 1802, the Supreme Court held in Para-3 that : "3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is : Whether he is entitled to back wages ? It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The leamed single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference." n Writ Aupeal No. 286 of 2010 (9) In Baldev Sinah -Vs- Union of India & Ors., 2005 AIR SCW 6180, the appellant was not in actual service for the period he was in custody. The Suprenie Court held that "Merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the concerned period. This is more so, on the logic of no work, no pay. It is to be noted that the appellant was terminated from service because of the conviction. Effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. The Supreme Court also referred to the judgments of Ranchhodti Chaturji Thakore (supra) and Union of India and Others -Vs- Jatoa.l Sinah 12004 11) SCC 121. (10) In light of the above principles, if we examine the provisions of the Rules, it would be clear that on account of conviction by criminal Court under certain circumstances, the appointing authority was entiUed to discharge the appellant from Bank's service without any notice whatsoever and thus the termination of the service of the appellant was as an essential consequence thereof. It was not a termination on account of culmination of a disciplinary proceeding and then the said proceeding was found to be unsustainable in law and by that way the appellant was prevented from discharging the duties. We are of the view that in such a situation, if the appellant was not given back wages on ry" Writ Appeal No. 286 of 2010 account of non-perforraing the duties remaining out ofjob for the above reasons of criminal case, he cannot claim back wages. s ^i-':'?' (11) For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in fhe writ appeal. The writ appeal, therefore, is liable to be disraissed and is accordingly dismissed. (12) There shall be no orders as to cost. Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge fc L . sdA r Radhe Shyam Sharma Judge vatti