- 1 - VPH IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION No. 131 OF 2000 The Regional Director, ) Employees State Insurance ) Corporation, Panchdeep Bhavan) Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. ) ... Applicant vs. 1. Mr. Shyam Bhatia, ) Proprietor of M/s.Hindustan Labels Unit No.3, 2nd Floor Ghanshyam Indl. Estate, ) Andheri (West), Mumbai-58 ) 2. The state of maharashtra ... Respondents Mr. H. V. Mehta, for the applicant. Mr. K. V. Saste, APP for the respondent No.2. CORAM : D. G. KARNIK, J. DATE : FEBRUARY 14, 2008 ORAL JUDGMENT . Heard Mr. Mehta for the applicant and the learned APP for the respondent No. 2 State. Advocate for respondent No.1 is absent when called. 2. This revision application is directed against the and order dated 29th of September 1999 of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 25th Court, Mazgaon, Mumbai, discharging the respondent No.1. - 2 - 3. The complainant, Inspector of Employees State Insurance Corporation (for short the "ESI Corporation"), filed a complaint in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate against the respondent No.1, alleged that respondent No.1 had failed to pay employer’s and employees’ contribution, in accordance with provisions of section 39 and 40 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short the "E.S.I. Act") read with Regulation 31 of the E.S.I. (General) Regulations 1950. In the complainant it was further alleged that by non payment of the compensation, the respondent No.1 had committed an offence punishable under section 85 of the E.S.I. Act. 4. The complaint was filed on 8th of April 1994. On 5th July 1999 the respondent No.1/accused filed an application before the learned Magistrate, stating that he had been attending the Court continuously for more than two years but the trial had not commenced and hence in accordance with the directin given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause Vs. Common Cause Vs. Common Cause Vs. Union Union Union of India & Ors. [ 1995 AIR SCW, 2279] of India & Ors. [ 1995 AIR SCW, 2279] of India & Ors. [ 1995 AIR SCW, 2279] the respondent No.1 was entitled to be discharged. 5. The revision applicant opposed the application - 3 - for discharge inter-alia on the ground that the offence under the E.S.I. Act was an economic offence and therefore, the direction given in the case of "Common-cause" was not applicable. The learned Magisterate repeled the contention of the applicant that the offence was an economic offence and held that since the trial had not commenced for a period of five years, the applicant was entitled to be discharged. Accordingly the learned Magistrate passed the order discharging the applicant, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of "Common-cause". 6. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of "Common-cause" is no longer good law and has been over-ruled by Bench of seven judges, of Supreme Court, rendered in P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [(2002)4 Supreme Court Cases 578] [(2002)4 Supreme Court Cases 578] [(2002)4 Supreme Court Cases 578]. 7. In paragraph 29(4) of the decision in P. Ramchandra Rao’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that: "It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal - 4 - proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Raj Raj Deo Sharma (II) Deo Sharma (II) Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Common Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and and and (II). (II). (II). At the most the period of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. A.R. A.R. Antulay Antulay Antulay case case case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused." - 5 - Bar of limitation prescribed in the case of Common Common Common Cause Cause Cause is no longer a good law and the accused is not entitled to a discharge or acquittal merely on the ground that the trial has not been completed within any specified time. No court shall be entitled to terminate the trial or acquit or discharge an accused on the ground that the trial is not commenced within the period prescribed in "Common Cause Common Cause Common Cause". 8. In the present case, respondent No.1 has been discharged on the sole ground that the trial had not commenced within the specified time and relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause Common Cause Common Cause. Since that decision is over-ruled by the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, the decision of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the Revision Application is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded back to the learned Magistrate for hearing and decision in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute to the extent, indicated above. Sd/- [ D. G. KARNIK, J.]