*HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. CHANDRAIAH AND HON’BLE Dr. JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR +Review W.A.M.P.No.1983 of 2011 in Writ Appeal No.1817 of 2005 % 31.01.2014 Between: #Pulugoru Gopal Reddy and 37 others. … Review Petitioners/ Respondents 4 to 34 AND $Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi (Urban) Mandal, Tirupathi, Chittoor District. and another. … Respondent/ Appellant The Commissioner of Appeals, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, and 2 others. … Respondent/ Respondents 1 to 3 ! Counsel for the petitioners: Sri E. Manohar, senior counsel Counsel for the Respondents: Spl. Govt. Pleader <Gist: >Head Note: ? Cases referred: 1. (2006) 4 SCC 78 2. (1995) 1 SCC 170 3. (1997) 8 SCC 715 4. (2006) 8 SCC 686 5. (2000) 6 SCC 224 6. (2005) 4 SCC 41 7. (199) 4 SCC 478 8. 1997 AIHC 911 (Kant) 9. (2008) 3 ICC 435 10. 1971 (2) SCC 200 11. (1970) 3 SCC 643 12. (2008) 8 SCC 612 13. (2004) 4 SCC 122 14. (2005) 12 SCC 149 15. (2000) 6 SCC 359 16. AIR 1963 AP 18 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH AND HON’BLE Dr. JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Review W.A.M.P.No.1983 of 2011 in Writ Appeal No.1817 of 2005 Date: 31-01-2013 Between Pulugoru Gopal Reddy and 37 others … Review Petitioners/ Respondents 4 to 34 and Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi (Urban) Mandal, Tirupathi, Chittoor District … Respondent/Appellant The Commissioner of Appeals, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad; and 2 others … Respondents/ Respondents 1 to 3 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH AND HON’BLE Dr. JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Review W.A.M.P.No.1983 of 2011 in Writ Appeal No.1817 of 2005 Order: (per Dr. K.G.Shankar, J.) What is the scope of a review? Whether a review lies in this case? Whether the impugned order is liable to be reviewed? If so, to what extent? – these are the questions that arise for consideration in this case. 2. The primary question is whether Survey No.46, Akkrampally Village, admeasuring Ac.23-83 cents of land is a tank known as Polavani Kunta or Polavari Gunta is a village wherein a small tank by the same name exists. Government declared Akkrampally as Inam Estate and had taken over the same on 07-01-1959 under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Abolition Act, 1948 (Estates Abolition Act, for short). One Tirupathi Doraswami Iyengar owned Ac.23-83 cts. of land in R.S.No.46 as a pattedar. The property was purchased on 14-7-1930 by P.Munuswamy Reddy as a member of the joint family consisting of himself and his brother P.Ramakrishna Reddy. 3. P.Ramakrishna Reddy and 6 others filed W.P.No.5121 of 1979 apprehending assignment of Survey No.46 in favour of M.S.Reddy. The writ petition was dismissed on 18-11-1985. During the pendency of W.P.No.5121 of 1979, Puligoru Gopal Reddy filed an application before the Settlement Officer, Nellore under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act contending that the land covered by Survey No.46, Akkrampally Village originally belonged to Tirupathi Doraswami Iyengar and that P.Munuswamy Reddy purchased the same as a member of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) consisting of himself and his brother P.Ramakrishna Reddy through a registered sale deed dated 14-7-1930. 4. The Settlement Officer, who is the Primary Authority took the application of P.Gopal Reddy on file as SR No.65/11(a)/81 C.G.R. He ordered notice to the Tahsildar, Chandragiri who was the respondent in those proceedings. The Tahsildar entered appearance and filed counter. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri claimed that the admission of the claim of P.Gopal Reddy without any application to condone the delay and without notice and opportunity to the Tahsildar to oppose the same was unjustified as violative of principles of natural justice. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri also took the stand that the land in question was required for future public purpose. The Settlement Officer conducted enquiry at Kalahasti and at Tirupathi. Through orders dated 25-10-1982, the claim petition of P.Gopal Reddy was allowed. Ryotwari Patta in favour of Puligoru Gopal Reddy, P.Sivanarayana Reddy; the vendors of Gopal Reddy by name Y.Bala Chandraiah, G.Satyanarayana Rao, A.Padmavathamma, P.Chandravathi, Karanam Chalapathi, M.Munikrishna Reddy and P.Bharathi were granted ryotwari pattas with specified extents of land mentioned in the Schedule. 5. The Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement cum took up suo motu revision on the orders of Settlement Officer-Primary Authority through proceedings in R.P.186/83/(H1) in exercise of the powers under Section 5(2) of the Estates Abolition Act. The Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement, however, confirmed the orders of the Settlement Officer through orders dated 30-9-1999. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal preferred a revision under Section 7(d) of the Estates Abolition Act on the orders of the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement dated 30-9-1999. The Commissioner of Appeals took the revision of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal on file as P.3/639/99 but dismissed the same. Questioning the same, W.P.No.22868 of 2002 was laid by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal. P.Gopal Reddy and 17 others filed W.P.No.22656 of 2002 praying for a direction to the Government to implement the orders of the Settlement Officer dated 25-10-1982 as confirmed by the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement and by the Commissioner of Appeals. The learned single Judge passed a common order in W.P.Nos.22868 and 22656 of 2002 on 08-8-2005. He dismissed W.P.No.22868 of 2002 filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer as meritless. He allowed W.P.No.22656 of 2002 filed by P.Gopal Reddy and others directing the respondents therein to implement the orders passed by the Settlement Officer. The respondents in W.P.No.22656 of 2002 filed W.A.No.1802 of 2005. The Mandal Revenue Officer filed W.A.No.1817 of 2005. A 3rd party filed W.A.No.731 of 2006 questioning the orders in W.P.No.22656 of 2002. Another writ petition in W.P.No.8346 of 2000 was laid by 3 individuals to declare that they are the pattedars of land covered by R.S.No.46 in an extent of Ac.23-83 cts. of Akkrampally Village. The Division Bench delivered a common judgment in the 3 writ appeals and the writ petition on 30-4-2011. The writ appeals were allowed. The orders passed by the Settlement Officer on 25-10-1982 were set aside. Consequently, W.P.No.8346 of 2000 was dismissed. 6. Puligoru Gopal Reddy and others preferred Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court which were numbered as Civil Appeal Nos.13881 to 13884 of 2011. Before the Supreme Court, the counsel for Puligoru Gopal Reddy and others submitted that many documents in the shape of Revenue Records including the Field Map relating to the property in dispute were not considered by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court held that the proper remedy in such circumstances was to move the Division Bench by way of a review. The SLPs consequently were disposed of granting liberty to Puligoru Gopal Reddy and others to move the High Court. The appeals were disposed of on 26-9-2011. The Supreme Court made it clear that they were not expressing any view on the merits of the claim of both sides. Consequently, the present review petition was laid. 7. The learned Special Government Pleader representing the Government contended that this review petition is not maintainable as there was no error apparent on the face of the record for review. Section 114 CPC deals with review powers. However, Order XLVII is more elaborate. Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC dealing with the review reads: “1. Application for review of judgment:-- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation:-- The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” 8. It is contended by the learned Special Government Pleader that the discovery of new and important matter or evidence or mistake or error apparent on the face of the record are the grounds on which a review can be laid. I n HARIDAS DAS v. USHA RANI BANIK[1], on the basis of an agreement of sale, the agreement holder took possession of the property after paying the entire sale consideration. He subsequently laid a suit for confirmation of his possession and to restrain the vendor from dispossessing him and from selling the property to any other person. The plaintiff reserved the right to file a suit for specific performance or for a direction to direct the vendor to execute the sale deed. Later, the plaintiff filed another suit for a direction to the vendor to execute the sale deed. Before the suit for execution of the sale deed was filed by the plaintiff, the vendor of the plaintiff sold away the property to third party and executed the sale deed in favour of such a third party. The plaintiff then filed the third suit for annulment of the subsequent sale deed executed by the vendor in favour of the third party. 9. The Supreme Court considered that the question whether the second suit seeking for a direction to execute the sale deed was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC was irrelevant to the third suit and that the High Court erred in holding that the second suit was hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that the earlier view of the High Court that the suit was hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC was a mistake or error apparent to enable the High Court to review its earlier order. The Supreme Court held that the view of the High Court that the earlier order was a mistake or error apparent for the purpose of review was incorrect. It clarified that review on the ground that the review petitioner had not highlighted all aspects of the case or could have argued forcefully or cited binding precedent to get a favourable judgment was not permissible and that where the remedy of appeal was available, the power of review should be exercised by the courts with circumspection. 10. In MEERA BHANJA v. NIRMALA KUMARI CHOUDHURY[2], the Supreme Court referred to Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] with approval. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma, the Supreme Court said: “... ... ... it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 11. In MEERA BHANJA (2 supra), the Supreme Court noted: “... ... ... an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. … … …” 12. The Supreme Court considered that when a judgment of the Division Bench has become final rightly or wrongly so far as the High Court is concerned, the same could not be reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to find out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of the review power. 13. In PARSION DEVI v. SUMITRI DEVI[3], it was said: “10. … … … There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. … … …” 14. In UNION OF INDIA v. B.VALLUVAN[4], the Supreme Court held that the High Court shall exercise the power of review within the limitations as provided under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC and that the High Court cannot go into the merits of the case while exercising its review jurisdiction without first arriving at a finding as to how error apparent on the face of the record was committed. 15. Sri E.Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners did not dispute the stand of the learned Special Government Pleader. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India[5], the Supreme Court held: “If the court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error.” 16. In BCCI v. NETAJI CRICKET CLUB[6], it was pointed out: “90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefore. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words “sufficient reason” in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine “actus curiae neminem gravabit”.” 17. The review petitioners did not contend that additional evidence was unearthed, which could not be produced earlier for the court to consider the same, so much so, the case shall be reviewed. The review petitioners contended that there was error apparent on the face of record, which needs rectification. In view of various decisions referred to by both sides, there is unanimity between the parties that the review is permissible only when there is error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment to be reviewed in view of Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC. It therefore has to be examined whether there is any apparent error on the face of record. While doing so, the dictum of the court shall be kept in mind that the error apparent must strike the court at once and not on a prolonged sequential logical interpretation. 18. In DOKA SAMUEL V. DR. JACOB[7] it was held that the omission of the counsel to cite an authority of law does not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record so as to furnish a ground of review. The Karnataka High Court clarified in B. SHARMA RAO V. H.Q. ASSISTANT[8] that possibility of two interpretations of a provision of law is no ground of review. 19. In HARIDAS DAS (1 supra), the Supreme Court considered that there were only three circumstances in which review of a judgment or order is permissible, viz., i) discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the appellant; ii) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and iii) on account of some mistakes or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason. 20. Karnataka High Court had succinctly put it in G. VENKATESH V. C. GANGAIAH[9] that review was permissible under five circumstances viz., i) review can be made only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record, ii) if a party has not highlighted all aspects of the case, it is not a ground on the basis of HARIDAS DAS (1 supra); iii) review of its order can be made only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Omission on the part of the learned counsel for the review petitioners to cite an authority of law does not amount to error apparent on the face of the record (on the basis of DOKA SAMUEL (7 supra); iv) review court shall not act as an appellate Court, as noticed in MEERA BHANJA (2 supra); and v) counsel’s failure to cite authorities does not amount to error apparent on the face of the record. 21. In RAJA SHATRUNJIT V. MOHD. AZMAT[10], it was noticed that a review would lie if a judgment was rendered erroneously on account of an amendment of an act which was brought out with retrospective effect. In GULAM ABBAS V. MULLA ABDUL[11] when court did not consider a circular having the force of law, the Supreme Court considered it to be a ground to review its earlier judgment. I t STATE OF WEST BENGAL V. KAMAL[12] it was noticed that an order or a decision or judgment could not be corrected merely because it was erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the Court on a point of fact or law and that the review court could not sit in appeal over the decision under review. However, in GREEN VIEW TEA AND INDUSTRIES V. COLLECTOR[13], the Supreme Court held that review was permissible where the High Court did not consider the material evidence on record on the ground that it would constitute an error apparent on the face of the record. 22. It is the contention of the senior counsel for the review petitioners that the Division Bench committed patent errors which are errors on the face of the record, so much so, it is a fit case to review the order. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners contended that the very approach of the Division Bench was erroneous and did not confirm to the legal principles. It may be noticed that one Sri A.D.V. Reddy, Settlement Officer passed orders as a primary authority on 25.10.1982 in favour of Puligoru Gopal Reddy against the Tahsildar, Chandragiri. The learned Special Government Pleader representing the learned Advocate General inter alia attacked the findings of the Settlement Officer contending that the Settlement Officer passed orders deliberately with a view to help the claimant who is one of the review petitioners. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that in the appeal, Government filed a memo casting aspirations against the Settlement Officer in general prejudicing the mind of the Division Bench. 23. He further submitted that although such a plea was not taken in the writ appeal, the learned Advocate General submitted before the Division Bench about the misconduct of the Settlement Officer; and contended that the Division Bench had taken note of the same. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that the claim about the misconduct of the then Settlement Officer prejudiced the minds of the learned Judges of the Division Bench. We are afraid that we cannot accept this submission of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. The submission of the learned Advocate General certainly cannot prejudice the mind of the court to judge the whole issue prejudicially. 24. At any rate, from a reading of the common judgment of the Division Bench, it does not appear that the Division Bench reversed the finding of the learned Single Judge in view of the misconduct of the Settlement Officer in disposing the application under Section 11 (a) of the Estate Abolition Act, through orders dated 25.10.1982. 25. The Division Bench sat in judgment over the decision of the learned Single Judge and not over the orders of the Settlement Officer in the application under Section 11 (a) of the Estate Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer, the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement, the Commissioner of Appeals and ultimately a learned Single Judge reached identical conclusions that the review petitioners herein were entitled to ryotwari pattas in respect of Survey No.46, Akkrampalli village. When the learned Single Judge could not be prejudiced by the alleged misconduct of the Special Officer, it may not be correct to consider that the Division Bench was prejudiced by the allegation that the Special Officer committed misconduct in the disposal of the application of the review petitioners. Further, we are unable to agree with the claim of prejudice; assuming that the learned judges of the Division Bench were prejudiced, it would not be a good ground for review, whether it would be a good ground for appeal or not. Viewed in any angle, we are not impressed with this contention of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. We consequently reject this contention of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners that the Division Bench was prejudiced by the fact that the Settlement Officer allegedly committed misconduct in passing orders in application under Section 11(a) of the Estate Abolition Act. 26. The review petitioners were grantees of ryotwari pattas, apart from other survey numbers in respect of Sy.No.46 also. The Settlement Officer granted pattas in their favour through orders dated 25.10.1982. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri, who was the respondent before the Settlement Officer, did not prefer any appeal to the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement from the orders of the Settlement Officer. The Special Commissioner-cum-Director of the Settlement took up suo motu review under Section 5 (2) of the Estate Abolition Act on the basis of the report of the District Collector. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement heard the counsel for the District Collector and grantees and dismissed the appeal as he did not find any mistake in the order of the Settlement Officer. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri then preferred a revision before the Commissioner of Appeals questioning the orders of the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners contended that the revision under Section 7 (d) of the Estate Abolition Act was not maintainable. 27. Section 7 (d) of the Estate Abolition Act empowers the Board of Review to cancel or revise any order, act or proceeding of the Director or the District Collector. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the learned senior counsel that the Commissioner of Appeals had no authority to entertain the revision. Added to it, the review petitioners participated in the revision before the Commissioner of Appeals. Indeed, the order of the learned Commissioner of Appeals went in favour of the review petitioners herein. It would appear that the District Collector addressed the Government through letter dated 21.05.2002 seeking permission of the Government to file a writ petition challenging the orders of the Commissioner of Police. Curiously, Government passed orders on 27.09.2002 rejecting the request of the District Collector. Curious because, despite such rejection, the Tahsildar, Chandragiri, filed Writ Petition No.22868 of 2002 before this Court challenging the order of the learned Commissioner of Appeals. The fate of W.P.No.22868 of 2002 together with W.P.No.22656 of 2002 had already been noticed. It may be clarified that although common orders were passed in Writ Appeal Nos.1802 and 1817 of 2005 and 731 of 2006 as well as W.P.No.8346 of 2000 on 30.04.2011, this review is only in respect of W.A.No.1817 of 2005 which was an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of the