IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.2131 of 2009 Brahmanand Singh @ B.N.Singh, Son of Late Alp Nath Singh, resident of Village—Dedhaval, P.S.-Sakaldiha, District-Chandauli (U.P.) [Wrongly written as Awazapur in case diary], presently at Ashok Nagar, S.N. 18.106, Sarang Talab, P.S.-Sharnath, Varanasi (U.P.). ……..Petitioner. Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR ………Opp. Party. ----------- 3/ 11.01.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. Petitioner has challenged the order dated 04.01.2008 taking cognizance under Sections 420, 465, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, in which the petitioner and his son both be noticed to face trial. An F.I.R. was instituted, in which it is said the Binod Kumar Singh, son of Brahmanand Singh @ B.P. Singh has disclosed that he is a resident of Gaya and had obtained a arms licence in his name, whereas he is actually a resident of erstwhile district of Varanasi now known as district Chandauli. It is also said that there are about eleven cases pending against Binod Kumar Singh, which are from the year 1992 to the year 2006. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, the F.I.R. was instituted. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as far as petitioner is concerned, he is the father of Binod Kumar Singh, and, therefore, he has been made accused on the presumption he would be aware of the fact that Binod Kumar Singh had wrongly obtained the licence from the district of Gaya, although, he was not a resident of Gaya. The petitioner has retired in the year 1996 from 2 government service. It is submitted that he had obtained the licence in the year 1962 and had sold the said rifle to his son when he was posted at Kanpur as Chief Engineer in the year 1989. The charge sheet against the petitioner has been submitted on the presumption that he would necessarily be aware of the fact that the petitioner‟s son had obtained a licence from the district of Gaya. Counsel for the petitioner submits that he had neither recommended nor endorsed the application for submission of the licence at Gaya, and, therefore, he cannot be guilty of offences of cheating and forgery. As far as Section 465 of the IPC is concerned, I find that there is no material in the case diary to indicate that any forgery was made by the petitioner. Section 463 defines „forgery‟ which is that whoever makes any false documents, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. In this case, the petitioner has not signed or endorsed any document which would lead the court to conclude that he had committed forgery, and, therefore, I find that no offence under Section 465 of the IPC is made out vis-à-vis this petitioner. 3 Section 415 defines “cheating”- The ingredients of cheating are firstly, that a person would be induced (a) to deliver any property to any person. (b) to consent that any person shall retain any property or, (c) intentionally induces the person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived or which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body and mind, reputation or property commits an offence by cheating. The very definition of this section envisages that there should be a delivery of property or an intention to deceive. In the facts of this case, the deception, if any, was on the part of the Binod Kumar Singh and not the father of Binod Kumar Singh, and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was guilty of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 468 of IPC is cheating with the purpose of committing forgery, if the offence under Section 420 and 465 are not made out against the petitioner. It cannot be envisaged that he would be guilty of offence under Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 120B will only be applicable if, it is proved that the person concerned somehow was responsible for committing forgery in documents to deceive a person or a set of persons. The relationship of father and son would not automatically draw the presumption that the father would be responsible for each and every act of the son. 4 In any event the F.I.R. discloses that at the relevant time it cannot be said that the father was even aware of the criminal history of Binod Kumar Singh because at the time of transfer of the said weapon the son Binod Kumar Singh had clean antecedent, and therefore, no adverse presumption can be drawn on the basis of this fact. In the result, the order of cognizance dated 04.01.2008 Delha P.S. Case No. 67 of 2007 is quashed, as far as it concerns the petitioner, Brahmanand Singh. This application is allowed. Sanjeet/ (Sheema Ali Khan, J.)