1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 434/2009 IN WRIT PETITION NO. 3436/95 Chetandas s/o Bhagwandas Bajaj .vs. Tulsabai Manikchand Jain & another Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders Court's or Judge's orders or directions and Registrar's orders. Mr. Anand Deshpande, Advocate holding for Mr. F.T. Mirza, Advocate for appellant, Mr. J.T. Gilda, Advocate for respondent no. 1, CORAM : S.A. BOBDE & P.D. KODE, JJ. DATED : APRIL 19, 2010. 1] Heard. 2] The appellant has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge upholding the judgment of the Appellate Authority in review by which the Appellate Authority agreed with the findings of the Rent Controller that the respondent/landlord is entitled for permission under Clause 13(3)(v) & (vi) of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. 3] In brief, the respondent/landlord sought permission under Clause 13(3)(v) & (vi) of the Rent Control Order in respect of tenancy of commercial premises given to the appellant/tenant. Clause 13(3)(v) & 2 (vi) relate to tenant having secured alternate accommodation and the bonafide need of the landlord. The Rent Controller granted permission to the respondent landlord. The appellant/tenant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. That appeal was allowed. Thereafter the respondent/landlord preferred a Review Application. The Appellate Authority allowed the Review Application and thus, confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller. Against the said order, the appellant preferred a Writ Petition before the learned Single Judge. That Writ Petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 4] Mr. Anand Deshpande, learned Advocate for the appellant, submitted that there was no occasion for the Appellate Authority to allow the Review Application filed by the respondent/landlord since a review can be allowed only in case of perversity and there was no such perversity. The submission on behalf of the learned Counsel for the appellant is not entirely correct since it is not only in case of perversity that an order in appeal can be reviewed. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction to review can be exercised in different circumstances as observed in the case of Tukaram Nathuji Sonkusare .vs. Dayalnath Dudhanath Mishra reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. 37, wherein this Court has taken the following view :- 3 “4. This takes me to the real point involved in this matter. It is true that Clause 21(2)(a) does not prescribe any statutory limitations on the power of review unlike say for example Order 47 R.1, Civil Procedure Code where grounds for review are enumerated. Absence of restrictive language in the statute does make the scope of review wider. Review is not restricted to points of law only and in a given case may embrace even points of fact. Order under review may contain a manifest error of fact which has resulted into injustice. In such a case review may be entertained but this does not mean that evidence can be reappreciated and a different conclusion arrived at only because other view of totality of evidence is possible. In other words, court cannot under cover of review arrogate to itself the power to decide the case over again because it now feels that the assessment of the evidence etc. done formerly was faulty or even incorrect. Two views of evidence in a given case may be possible but that does not make it a fit case for review. To hold otherwise would amount to equate the review with appeal. The error of fact for being a valid ground for review must be so manifest and apparent on the face of the record that no reasonable court would permit such an error. If the said error requires for 4 its detection process of examining the whole material afresh and detailed reasonings, it cannot be called manifest. Moreover, it must also be seen whether the said error has resulted into injustice and does not involve mere academic interest. Not mentioning of a circumstance here and a circumstance there by the lower court or tribunal is no ground to interfere with the end result even at appellate stage. By the very nature of review power it can neither be wider or even equal to appellate power. Certainty and finality to a decision is a vital feature of rule of law. If review is permitted on such grounds it would introduce an element of disconcerting unpredictability – usually associated with gambling- and this is a reproach which any judicial process must carefully and scrupulously avoid.” It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the Appellate Authority came across an error of fact which was manifest and apparent on the face of record which required it to review the order. 5] As regards the question of the appellant having secured alternate accommodation, the Appellate Authority had held that the said alternate accommodation was secured by the appellant’s son and not by him. 5 In review, the learned Single Judge has observed that this finding was rightly reviewed by the Appellate Authority in view of the fact that there was no warrant for coming to the conclusion that the alternate accommodation was secured by the appellant’s son. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the appellant/tenant had admitted that the shop in question in Jhulelal Market was his shop and, therefore, he must be taken to have secured alternate accommodation. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly described the earlier finding of the Appellate Authority as perverse. 6] As regards Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order, the learned Single Judge has upheld the order in review on the ground that merely because the respondent/landlord’s son Pradeep has taken some premises on rent for running a medical shop, it cannot be said that the respondent/landlord does not need his own shop for business purposes. The learned Single Judge has rightly opined that the Appellate Authority has rightly viewed its appellate order as perverse while reviewing its order. We find that as a matter of law, the learned Single Judge has rightly relied on the observations of this Court in the case of Mahendrabhai P. Patel .vs. Vasant M. Sangole reported in 1996 (1) Mh.L.J. 339 where it is observed that though the powers of review under Clause 21(2-A) are not to be exercised in a routine manner, but there are no limitations and restrictions 6 on the reviewing authority to exercise its power to correct findings of fact which are patently erroneous and have resulted in failure of justice. 7] In this view of the matter, we see no merit in the appeal. In effect, there are concurrent findings of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority which are confirmed by the learned Single Judge. The order does not call for any interference. The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. Judge Judge J.