1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2097 OF 1998 WRIT PETITION NO.2097 OF 1998 WRIT PETITION NO.2097 OF 1998 Raigad Zilla Kamgar Kranti Sangathana .. Petitioner. vs. Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd., & Ors. .. Respondents. Mr. L.S. Deshmukh i/by S.S. Pakale for Petitioner. Mr. V.M. Tayade for Respondent nos. 1 & 2. Mr. R.S. Pai i/by T.R. Yadav for respondent no. 5. CORAM: J.N. PATEL, & CORAM: J.N. PATEL, & CORAM: J.N. PATEL, & SMT. NISHITA MHATRE, J. SMT. NISHITA MHATRE, J. SMT. NISHITA MHATRE, J. DATE: 7TH JANUARY, 2008. DATE: 7TH JANUARY, 2008. DATE: 7TH JANUARY, 2008. P.C. . Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner is a registered trade union which has filed this petition seeking a declaration that master-servant relationship exists between respondent no. 1 i.e. Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd., Nagothane, District - Raigad and the workmen, the members of the petitioner union, whose 2 particulars have been given in Exhibit "A", within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, this Court should issue directions to the respondents to reinstate these workmen in service of the respondent no. 1 Corporation with back wages and consequential benefits with effect from 10.1.1988 and for other ancillary reliefs. 3. It was the case of the petitioner that the respondent no. 1 has set up its plant at Nagothane and for that purpose it has acquired 10,000 acres of land. While acquiring the said land, assurances were given to the local people that the project affected people will be given suitable employment in the factory. Therefore, it was the case of the petitioner union that the workmen mentioned in Exhibit "A" are such project affected persons. They are residents of Nagothane village and were directly affected by the said project and for this reason they were given employment in the said factory as security guards. 4. It appears that the workmen represented by the petitioner union were not employed directly by respondent no. 1 as their regular employees, but, they were engaged on contract basis and, therefore, their services came to be terminated in accordance with the contract with effect from 10.1.1998. 5. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner 3 union that the respondent no. 1 has adopted a policy of engaging workmen on contract basis as security guard for years together in order to deprive them of the benefits of permanent employees and thereby instead of regularising their services, terminated them from service without following the due process of law and, therefore, the said termination is arbitrary, illegal and bad in law. Further, such a practice was prohibited under notification dated 9.12.1976 issued by the Union of India which makes it obligatory on the part of the employer to regularise the services of the workmen, members of the petitioner union. The workmen, members of the petitioner union, on their services being terminated, approached the Industrial Court by lodging Complaint (ULP) No. 581 of 1997 and sought interim reliefs. Initially, an ad-interim order was given in favour of the petitioner union on 25.11.1997. Thereafter the same came to be vacated and the workers were dismissed. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd., & Ors. etc. etc. vs. National Union Water Front Workers & Ors. etc. etc. reported in 2001 III CLR 349, wherein the Supreme Court has quashed and set aside the notification which was issued supplemental to the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 on 9.12.76. The said notification was taken up 4 for consideration in the case of SAIL when the Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph 52 of the reported judgment :- "52. The impugned notification issued by the Central Government on December 9, 1976, reads as under: "S.O.No. 779(E) 8/9.12.76 in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (37 of 1970) the Central Government after consultation with the Central Advisory Contract Labour Board hereby prohibits employment of contract labour on and from the 1st March, 1977, for sweeping, cleaning, dusting and watching of buildings owned or occupied by the establishment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the said Act is the Central Government. Provided that this notification shall not only apply to the outside cleaning and other maintenance operations of multistoreyed buildings where such cleaning or maintenance operations cannot be carried out except with specialised experience." . A glance through the said notification, makes it manifest that with effect from March 1, 1977, it prohibits employment of contract labour for sweeping, cleaning, dusting and watching of buildings, owned or occupied by establishment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the said Act is the Central Government. This clearly indicates that the Central Government had not adverted to any of the essentials, referred to above, except the requirement of consultation with the 5 Central Advisory Board. Consideration of the factors mentioned above has to be in respect of each establishment, whether individually or collectively, in respect of which notification under sub-section (1) of Sec. 10 is proposed to be issued. The impugned notification apart from being an omnibus notification does not reveal compliance of sub-section (2) of Sec. 10. This is ex facie contrary to the postulates of Section 10 of the Act. Besides it also exhibits non-application of mind by the Central Government. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the said impugned notification dated December 9, 1976 issued by the Central Government." 7. As that was the subject matter of challenge by SAIL before the Supreme Court and in view of the fact that the claim of the petitioner union is based on the said notification which has been quashed and set aside by the Supreme Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioner union. 8. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the petition. The petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. 6 (J.N. Patel, J.) (J.N. Patel, J.) (J.N. Patel, J.) (Smt. Nishita Mhatre, J.) (Smt. Nishita Mhatre, J.) (Smt. Nishita Mhatre, J.)