THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.19142 of 2000 Dated:25.01.2008 Between: Kondapalli Venkamma, W/o.Late Subbaiah (died), and another. …Petitioners and The District Collector, Krishna at Machilipatnam, and others. …Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO WRIT PETITION No.19142 of 2000 ORDER: Kondapalli Venkamma filed the Writ Petition seeking a writ of mandamus declaring Endorsement No.Rc.B1.2470/93, dated 08.10.1999, issued by the third respondent as illegal and arbitrary. Be it noted, by such endorsement the third respondent informed the petitioner that her application under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act, for brevity), for reference to civil Court deserves no consideration, because the Award was passed after obtaining her consent. Besides seeking a declaration that the said endorsement is illegal, Venkamma also prayed for further direction to the second respondent to refer the matter to civil Court under Section 18(1) of the Act for redetermination of the compensation for her lands. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, Venkamma died, and her son, Kondapalli Nageshwar Rao, has come on record as legal heir. Land admeasuring Acs.3.65 cents in R.S.No.280/1B situated at Anasagaram Village of Nandigama Mandal in Krishna District was sought to be acquired by a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, dated 25.02.1987. The petitioners allege that the same was not pursued to its logical end and the notification lapsed. Again another notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 05.02.1994 for acquiring the land belonging to the petitioners. The first petitioner was paid an amount of Rs.50,000/- per acre towards compensation. She allegedly received the amount under protest. According to her, cost of the land would be Rs.3,50,000/-. Therefore, she approached the third respondent seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act, which was negatived by the respondents on 08.10.1999. Counter affidavit is filed by the second respondent. The allegation that notification issued in February 1987 lapsed is not correct. It is stated that again the land was acquired by issuing notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on 05.02.1994. The first petitioner gave her willingness and gave a statement that there is no objection for acquisition of land for providing house sites to weaker sections at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per acre. Accordingly, after completing the formalities, consent Award was passed in prescribed form. She was paid compensation, but she took the compensation under protest. Initially, she filed W.P.No.17211 of 1999 for redetermination. The same was disposed of on 13.08.1999 directing the Collector to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. Therefore, the impugned endorsement was given to her. The other allegations made are denied. Learned Counsel for the petitioners vehemently contends that his clients gave consent for acquisition of land in 1987 and when once notification issued then lapsed, the subsequent Award passed pursuant to notification dated 05.02.1994 cannot be treated as consent Award. Refuting the allegation, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition submits that when the land was notified on 05.02.1994, the first petitioner gave a statement agreeing for acquisition, executed the letter in Form No.IV and Agreement in Form No.III as per the Andhra Pradesh Land Acquisition (Negotiations Committee) Rules, 1992. Learned Assistant Government Pleader, therefore, contends that the Award is passed after obtaining the consent and a reference would not lie. She placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar[1]. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has placed before this Court the statement given by Venkamma, the agreement in Form No.III and agreement in Form No.IV as well as consent Award. A perusal of these would belie the submission of the learned Counsel that the consent was given by Venkamma in 1987. No documents are placed before this Court to that effect. Therefore, it stands proved that the Department approached Venkamma only when notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 05.02.1994 was issued. When a consent Award is passed, can the awardee seek reference under Section 18(1) of the Act? The question is no more res integra. In State of Karnataka (supra), the Supreme Court laid down that when an Award under the Act is passed on consent of the parties, a reference under Section 18(1) of the Act is not maintainable. It was held. A right of a landholder to obtain an order of reference would arise only when he has not accepted the award. Once such award is accepted, no legal right in him survives for claiming a reference to the Civil Court. An agreement between the parties as regards the value of the lands acquired by the State is binding on the parties. So long as such agreement and consequently the consent awards are not set aside in an appropriate proceeding by a court of law having jurisdiction in relation thereto, the same remain binding. It is one thing to say that agreements are void or voidable in terms of the provisions of the Indian Contract Act having been obtained by fraud, collusion, etc, or are against public policy but it is another thing to say that without questioning the validity thereof, the Respondents could have maintained their writ petitions. We have noticed hereinbefore that even in the writ petitions, the prayers made by the Respondents were for quashing the order dated 23-8- 1999 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and for issuance of a direction upon him to refer the matter to the Civil Court. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thus, could not have substituted the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer by reason of the impugned judgment. Furthermore, the question as regard the validity of the agreements had not been raised before the High Court. (emphasis supplied) In view of the settled legal position, when the consent Award is passed, reference under Section 18(1) of the Act would not lie, and the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed. The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. ____________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) 25.01.2008 vs [1] (2005) 4 SCC 264 = AIR 2005 SC 2204