1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.7314 OF 2007 Maharshi Vivekanand Samaj Kalyan Sanstha and another ..Petitioners. Vs. Smt. Shantabai Bhimasha Talwar and another ..Respondents. ..... Mr. Surel S. Shah for the Petitioners. Mr. A.K. Suryavanshi for Respondent No.1. Mr. R.M. Patne, AGP for Respondent No.2. ..... CORAM: DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 23rd April, 2008. P.C. : 1. These proceedings arise out of an interlocutory order dated 27th August, 2007 passed by the Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal at Solapur granting a stay of an order of termination that was issued on 30th April, 2007. The Petitioner conducts a school at Solapur and it is their case that the First Respondent was appointed as a Peon against a post reserved for a Scheduled Tribe on 1st July, 1999. According to the affidavit filed by the Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad, Solapur the 2 First Respondent had at the time of the recruitment produced a caste certificate of belonging to the Mahadeo Koli community which is listed as a Scheduled Tribe. On 13th October, 1999 the Education Officer is stated to have granted approval to the appointment of the First Respondent subject to the due verification of the caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee. On 18th January, 2007 the Scrutiny Committee rejected the claim of the First Respondent of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe. Thereupon after correspondence took place between the management of the school and the Education Officer, the First Respondent was terminated from service on or about 30th April, 2007. The First Respondent has moved the School Tribunal in an appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 in which by an interim order dated 27th August, 2007, the order of termination has been stayed and a direction has been issued to the management to permit the First Respondent to resume duty. That order has been challenged in the present petition. The Petition was admitted by an order dated 11th December, 2007 and the interim order was 3 stayed until the next date of hearing. The Petition has been taken up for hearing and final disposal by consent and both the learned counsel have argued their cases on merits. 2. Prima facie, the record before the Court discloses that the First Respondent had initially moved the School Tribunal in Appeal 414 of 2004 aggrieved by an oral direction of 3rd September, 2004 terminating her services. In paragraph 5 of the memo of appeal the First Respondent specifically made a statement that she belonged to a Schedule Tribe. Now it is an undisputed position before the Court that the claim of the First Respondent of belonging to the Mahadeo Koli community was rejected by the Scrutiny Committee. Upon the termination of her services, the First Respondent moved a further appeal before the School Tribunal being Appeal No. 36 of 2007 in which, in paragraph 8 it was stated that the First Respondent belongs to the open category and that she does not belong to the Mahadeo Koli community. This statement in paragraph 8 of the subsequent appeal is directly at variance with what was stated in paragraph 5 4 of the earlier appeal where the First Respondent has claimed to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. It is also of some significance for a prima facie evaluation of the merits of the application for interlocutory relief before the School Tribunal that the First Respondent had instituted a Writ Petition being Writ Petition 6464 of 2007 under Article 226 of the Constitution in which relief was sought to the effect that an enquiry should be directed to be instituted by the Education Officer against the management for presenting a photocopy of a caste certificate allegedly in the name of the First Respondent herein and issued by the Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate, North Solapur, District Solapur. This Petition was withdrawn on 23rd January, 2008. Before this Court, it is now sought to be submitted that the caste certificate showing the First Respondent as belonging to the Mahadeo Koli community was never procured by the First Respondent but was fabricated by the management. Even if this aspect of the submission were to be considered, it would be prima facie apparent that this would raise a triable issue which would have to be considered at the hearing and final disposal of the appeal before the School Tribunal. Prima 5 facie, the conduct of the First Respondent in making two conflicting statements about her Schedule Tribe status in pleadings before the School Tribunal and in instituting a petition for an enquiry which was thereupon withdrawn would have an important bearing on whether interim relief should be granted. The School Tribunal undoubtedly does have power to grant interlocutory relief and this power can in appropriate cases be exercised to direct reinstatement at the interlocutory stage. Any such mandatory directions must be passed after the exercise of judicial discretion. Evidently, that has not been done in the present case. The School Tribunal was manifestly in error in granting interim relief and directing that the First Respondent should be reinstated at the interim stage. In the event the First Respondent succeeds in the appeal before the School Tribunal, she would be entitled to consequential reliefs. At the present stage, prima facie the Tribunal ought not to have granted interim relief of the nature that is allowed. As already noted above, even the Education Officer has stated in his reply that at the time of her appointment, the First Respondent had produced a caste certificate showing that she 6 belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Prima facie, the grant of interim relief in such a case would not be warranted particularly when the issue which arises before the Tribunal is as to whether an impostor has claimed a benefit of reservation intended for a genuine applicant. 3. The order of the Tribunal is unsustainable and will accordingly have to be quashed and set aside. There shall be an order accordingly. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause ( c). In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. *****