^-^ ^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARHAT BILASPUR Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh, J. Miscellaneous Appeal fC.) No.1311 of 2007 Jagannath Gupta versus Awadh Ram and another ORDER Postfor // -02-2009 Sd/- Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh Judge ^^.^^..^...^.^..^^^...^. ^' HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh, J. Miscellaneous Appeal (C.) No.1311 of 2007 Appellant Jagannath Gupta, S/o Akalu Gupta, aged about 41 years, resident of behind Balaji Petrol Pump, Village Bhanpuri, Tahsil and District Raipur (CG) Respondents versus 1. Awadh Ram, S/o Not known, aged about 65 years, through Rajesh Roadlines, Ring Road No.2, Bhanpuri, Tahsil and District Raipur (CG) 2. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited, City Branch Office No.1, Shyam Market, Jivan Bima Marg, Pandari, Raipur Appeal under Section 30 ofthe Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 Present: Smt. Renu Kochar, counsel for the appellant. Shri Abhishek Sinha, counsel for respondent No.2. No one appears for respondent No.1 despite sen/ice of notice. ORDER (Passed on this li day of February, 2009) In this appeal by the appellanV/workman under Section< 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (henceforth 'the Act') following question arises for determination: "Whether the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, LabourCourt, Raipur was justified in rejecting the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation?" (2) Brief facts are that on 20-02-1997 the appellant/workman, who was employed as a driver of the respondent No.1 in Truck No.M.O.T. 3233 m6t with an accident due to sudden failure of brake. The right leg ^l'.-^'^'x //' '"• 'l ^ 1 of the appellant/workman was amputated near the ankle joint. The appellanVworkman preferred an application under Section 10 of the Act for compensation on 13-03-2002 before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Raipur (henceforth 'the Commissioner'). (3) By the impugned order dated 12-09-2007 passed in Case No.76/W.C.Act/2002 Non Fatal, the Commissioner dismissed the application solely on the ground of limitation. In paragraph 6 of the impugned order, it was stated as under: "(6) ........................ HT^ft ^RT 1?T? y]^ Tra ^r?^T Rld^l ^ ^T f^TT t 3ft? Rtd^ §RT 1^r ^jTT^ ^ •^N^T ^ Zpf^ WcT^f ^^TcTT ?P7^T q^T TR^T ^t "f^n" | ^ft fW^T ^ TTTsff ^RT OTshT T^ ^R^T f^ ^ ^r ^w l^rRr 'CTRT f^TT ^THT "41^Rl<1 ff^T ^t ^T tl 3RT: OTaff ^T PT^ TT^T wrf^r iTrf^m' ?MT Pifl)Id f^TT ^raT 11" (4) Smt. Renu Kochar, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Abhishek Sinha, learned counsel for respondent No.2/insurer were heard at length. No one appears for respondent No.1 despite service of notice. (5) Section 10(1) of the Act provides that - "10. Notice and claim. - (1) No claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner hereinafter provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within two years of the occurrence of the accident or in casa of death within two years from the date of death: The fifth proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act provides that - "Provided further that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, or the claim has not been preferred, in due time as provided in this sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure so to give the notice or prefer the claim, as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause." (6) A plain reading of the above provisions shows that filing of an •^e. application under Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act is not^rs/na qua non for condonation of delay in preferring the claim beyond the period of two years as prescribed underSection 10(1) ofthe Act. Ifthe Commissioner is satisfied that the failure to give the notice or to prefer the claim was due to sufficient cause, he has jurisdiction to condone the delay. A perusal of paragraph 6 of the impugned order shows that the Commissioner completelyfailed to notice that in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the application under Section 10 of the Act, it was mentioned by the appellant/workman as under: "12. ~^ f^, ^C-ll R^fch ^r ^t ^l-||c|c;cb ^.1 ^|c)c{cb ^ 'ST? ^TR^TFR ^TT '??T, 1^ ^? ^^1^-1 'c^pft ^ ^TT^P 'cpt ^<Jl(-ll f^TT "^TT | 13. "q? f^, 'cFTMR fzpTRT ^M- ^f ^p SJI^ch, ^Trfcp 1 ^ yRl^tdi-i ^? '^^R ^THMT ^gT, ^f^T ^ 'cf^f gMlI-11 ^T f^qT ^PTT | ^T ^ 3||c|c{ch ^ R-tl'cb - 14.02.2002 ^l' ^PT^ ^rf^RTT ^ ^TS^FT ^ 3i-j|c|c,co c^^i'ch 1 zpf Tq^? f^tt ^ ^ftrR ^"cp z^ ^ZTt^" 'cfTT "^PT iTcn^" ^T ^lf^^H Rdcll^lt, "f^RTFT f^, ^^1^-1 ^pft ^t 'q'STcpK cpT^R ^jThr -cT^T i^TT ^fT ^, -q^ ^Ttf^T - 3fr1|c|c{ch ^RT^ 1 ^t R-Hch - 18.02.2002 ^t B .^^ ^. % W<T ?t ^TT^ ^ cTK ^jt ^RT^cp -^ \34\11<W ^Ttf^H ^T ^Tf ^^TTsr ^T f^TT, ^M-lRl^ ^ncT^f?, 3HTc|^p ^qtcp 1 ^t -llR^ 'CTTcRft ^rf^T R4|ch ^ 15 f^T fff^^TT ^^ ^ iTK ~^ W^<vi W^ ^R ^T t I" (7) It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The Act is a public welfare legislation and the application by the victim of an accident should not be thrown aside by the legal authority prescribed under the Act merely on technical grounds which includes ground of limitation. (8) A perusal of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the applicationunder Section 10 of the Act, quoted above, would go to show that the appellant/workman had shown sufficient cause for the delay in giving notice as contemplated by Section 10(1.) of the Act to the employer. It appears that the appellant/workman trusted the word of his employer that he would ensure that the claimant/workman would get compensation from the insurance company. It is true that the claimant had waited for almost five years before issuing notice to the employer and knocking at the doors of justice. However, the reasons assigned by the claimant in no manner smack of mala fides. The rejection of the application under Section 10 of the Act by the Commissioner purely on the technicalities of not filing of an application and affidavit for condonation of delay was thus wholly erroneous. (9) In N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Apex Court held as under: "(11) Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim reipublicae interest ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the pariiies. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period oftime." (10) In M.S.Grewal vs. Deep Chand Sood, 2001 ACJ 1719 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under: "Law courts will lose their efficacy if they cannot possibly respond to the need of the society - technicalities there might be many but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since the technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice." (11) In the resulf, the appeal is allowed. Substantial question of law is answered in the negative. Delay in filing the application under Section 30 of the Act before the Commissioner is condoned. The matter is remanded to the Commissioner to decide the claim of the appellant/workman in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. __A_— Sd/- ^Raot^esl ^isiukh Gopal 3.