IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD THURSDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Criminal Appeal No.606 of 2008 Between: The State represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad .. Appellant AND Kapileswarapu Mani Kumar and 2 others .. Respondent JUDGMENT: The Criminal Appeal is directed against the acquittal of the accused 1 to 3 in S.C.No.248 of 2004 on the ﬁle of Assistant Sessions Judge, Parchur, for the oﬀences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 of the Indian Penal Code by the judgment dated 30-01- 2006. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Karamchedu, ﬁled the charge sheet against the three accused in Crime No.31 of 2002 alleging that Kapileswarapu Ratnakumari is the wife of the 1st accused and daughter-in-law of 2nd and 3rd accused with her marriage being performed three years prior to the incident and a daughter being born out of wedlock. The accused were claimed to be harassing Ratnakumari mentally and physically and on 01-07- 2002, the accused quarrelled with Ratnakumari and at about 11.00 A.M., she was dragged to the backyard and while the 2nd and 3rd accused caught hold of her, 1st accused poured kerosene on her and lighted the same. On witnessing Ratnakumari running with ﬂames, Kandula Koteswara Rao rushed to her and covered her with a towel and Katta Thirupathirayudu, a neighbour, poured water on Ratnakumari. Another neighbour Nidamanuri Veeranjaneyulu also rushed to the spot and when Kambhampati Elishamma questioned Ratnakumari, she replied that it was her fate. Bodavula Mallikarjuna Rao and Koduri Seetharama Swamy, who rushed to the spot noticed the 3rd accused and after some time when the accused 1 and 2 also returned home, the injured was taken to the private nursing home of Dr. Richard Salmon, After the parents of Ratnakumari also arrived, the injured was shifted to Government Hospital, Chirala on 02-07- 2002 and on intimation from the medical oﬃcer, the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chirala recorded the dying declaration and the police later recorded the statement of Ratnakumari. The statement of Ratnakumari to the Magistrate was an exaggeration involving not only the accused but also the elders, who settled the marriage. On registration of the crime and after completion of the investigation during which the empty kerosene tin was seized under a mediator’s report, the police ﬁled the charge sheet after obtaining a medical certiﬁcate about 48% burns being grievous in nature. After the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Parchur, took cognizance of the oﬀences and served copies of documents on the accused, the case was committed to the Court of Session in PRC.No.4 of 2004. The Court of Session made over the case to the trial Court, which framed charges under Sections 498- A and 307 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and during trial, PWs.1 to 14 were examined and Exs.P.1 to P.7 were marked by the prosecution. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence when they were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and they did not produce any defence evidence. The trial Court rendered the impugned judgment, ﬁrstly noting that the learned Additional Public Prosecutor conceded that there was no evidence in respect of the oﬀence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court found that the victim PW.1 alone was the eye-witness to the incident, while all other evidence was circumstantial. The trial Court observed that the most important witness Kandula Koteswara Rao, who was alleged to have witnessed PW.1 when she was in ﬂames and claimed to have extinguished the ﬂames, was not examined without assigning any reason. Similarly, Kambhampati Elishamma to whom PW.1 told that it was her fate was also not examined and similarly, four other witnesses cited to speak about harassment of PW.1 by the accused etc., were also not examined. The trial Court further found that PWs.2 and 3 contradicted each other about the manner in which they rushed to the house of the accused on hearing about the incident. The trial Court also found that when Ex.P.1 statement was allegedly recorded by PW.12, admittedly nobody else including the doctor was present and PW.12 did not obtain any certiﬁcate from the doctor about the condition of the patient. It was also noted that in Ex.P.4-Dying Declaration recorded by PW.10-the Magistrate, the allegation was that accused 1 to 3 poured kerosene and accused 1 and 3 set ﬁre to PW.1, but the same is contradicting Ex.P.1 according to which 1 st accused alone set ﬁre to PW.1 and the claim that no body came forward even though she raised cries as stated in Ex.P.1 is contrary to the prosecution version. PW.4 was found to have not corroborated the claim of PW.2 or PW.3 visiting the house of the accused on receiving a telephonic message. The trial Court further found that PW.5 stated about an attempt by PW.1 to commit suicide by pouring kerosene and setting ﬁre to herself, which is in support of the defence version. It is also noted that the evidence of the doctor showed PW.1 to be not fully conscious, which may be the reason for her diﬀerent statements and M.O.1-tin seized from the kitchen of the house of the accused was not believed to have been so seized by the very nature of the incident, which allegedly took place outside the house. The evidence of PWs.2 to 4 that PW.1 used to reside with her parents was also referred to and the settlement of matrimonial disputes by Chirala Mahila Mandal was also noted to have been admitted by PWs.1 to 4. The trial Court further observed that even the statement of PW.1 recorded by Mahila Mandal, the true copy of which was ﬁled before the trial Court and the contents of the statements recorded at the family counseling centre were noted to be contrary to the allegation of harassment by the accused. The trial Court further found that the evidence showing such attitude on the part of PW.1 is in support of the defence version and the investigating oﬃcer himself stated that the witnesses told him that the 1st and 2nd accused were not present at the house at the time of incident. Hence, it was considered probable that PW.1 must have poured kerosene herself and set ﬁre to herself in the absence of accused 1 to 3 and implication of two other persons falsely in the crime was also considered to create a doubt making any court not to rely on the solitary testimony of PW.1. Hence, the trial Court found the accused not guilty of the oﬀences with which they were charged and acquitted them. The said acquittal is challenged by the State through the learned Public Prosecutor in this appeal contending that though there were discrepancies regarding the narration by PW.1, the testimony of PWs.2 and 3 could not have been discredited and it is only PW.1 that could have spoken competently about the harassment meted out to her. Hence, it is desired that the judgment of acquittal be reversed. Heard Sri Rudresh Deshpande, learned counsel representing the learned Public Prosecutor and Sri N. Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the accused. The point for consideration is whether the judgment of acquittal is liable to be reversed on any valid and strong grounds? The earliest version even in the First Information Report is that the 2nd and 3rd accused caught hold of the victim tight, while the 1st accused poured kerosene on her and later set ﬁre to her and it is also speciﬁcally stated that no other person was attracted to the scene in spite of cries raised by PW.1 and it was also stated even at that point of time that the accused told the neighbours that PW.1 attempted to kill herself by such an act. However, in Ex.P.4-Dying Declaration recorded by the Magistrate, PW.1 alleged that all the three accused poured kerosene on her and the accused 1 to 3 together set ﬁre to her. The allegations about Bodavula Ranganayakulu and Bodavula Mallikarjuna Rao being involved in the incident and obtaining the signatures of PW.1 under threat was found by the investigating agency itself to be false and there was no reference to their involvement by any witness during the evidence before the trial Court. If no other person was attracted to the scene even in spite of cries of PW.1 after being set ﬁre to, the whole prosecution story revolving around the various persons attracted to the scene and trying to save PW.1 and PW.1 stating about her fate to them etc., must have been fabricated. The statement of PW.1 admittedly recorded at the Family Counselling Centre by Mahila Mandal contains a totally conﬂicting version to the allegations of PW.1 in this case and though every interested evidence is not false evidence, such evidence can be accepted only if it ﬁnds some satisfactory corroboration from some other material on record or the facts and circumstances arising out of the evidence. As such, the version of PW.1, whose claims do not appear to be consistent at diﬀerent times, alone could not have been the basis for a successful prosecution. The trial Court had also the beneﬁt of observing the demeanour of the witnesses in ﬂesh and blood. The claim about the presence of all the three accused at the time of incident does not ﬁnd corroboration from the version of the prosecution or the evidence of the witnesses with PW.5 stating that he learnt about an attempt by PW.1 to commit suicide and PW.6 claiming ignorance about the incident. PWs.2 to 4 were admittedly circumstantial witnesses and as analyzed by the trial Court in detail, their version is not a picture of consistency. Under the circumstances, though the medical evidence may probablise PW.1 sustaining 48% burn injuries, which were grievous in nature at about the time of the incident, the manner in which PW.1 would have sustained such injuries cannot be considered to have been proved in any manner by the evidence on record. From any suspicion arising out of PW.1 so sustaining the burn injuries at the house of her parents-in-law, the accused cannot be considered to have been proved to be guilty of causing the same beyond reasonable doubt and suspicion, however, strong it may be, cannot take the place of requirement of proof. Under the circumstances, there are no strong and compelling reasons for deviating from the judgment of the trial Court and the Criminal Appeal has to, hence, fail. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 17-11-2011 Ksn