HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO & HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATESWARA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO.5979 OF 2004 ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice B. Prakash Rao) The petitioner filed this writ petition seeking writ of Certiorari assailing the orders dated 8th December, 2003 in L.G.C.No.162 of 2003 on the file of the Special Court under A.P.Land Grabbiong (Prohibition) Act at Hyderabad allowing the application filed by respondents 2 to 11 herein. The petitioner herein the 1st respondent who is held to be land grabber and respondent No:12 is the 2nd respondent and respondents-2 to 11 are the applicants before the tribunal. The status of the parties will be referred to as arrayed before the tribunal for the sake of convenience. Briefly stated the facts of the case leading to the filing of the land grabbing case are that the 1st applicant purchased the schedule plot No:2 admeasuring 500 square yards covered by S.No:41 of Ameerpet village, Hyderabad Urban Taluk in T.S.No:21, Block G, Ward No:5 from its owner and pattadar namely Begum Rahamat Khatoon wife of Nawab Mohamood Meer Ali Khan under a registered sale deed dated 23-5-1968. According to them, prior to the purchase, they verified all the title documents and that from the date of purchase, they have been in possession and their names were also recorded in the Town Survey record in the year 1991. Meanwhile, in the year 1981, certain acquisition proceedings were initiated under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and notice under Section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 27-7-1981 was issued. But, however, the same was challenged and they obtained a stay. Later, the said proceedings were sought to be withdrawn. Since the 1st applicant was a lady and her son being in service residing in different places and being out of the city, respondents-1 and 2 therein having colluded together grabbed the said entire land in August, 1998 with the help of ante social elements and constructed two temporary rooms unauthorizedly. Thereupon, the applicants have given a police complaint but in vain. In spite of the protest made by the applicants, they did not vacate the same. Hence the application. Contesting the claim of the applicants, respondents-1 and 2 therein have filed two counter affidavits denying the claim made by the applicants. It is further stated in the counter filed by the 1st respondent that he is in possession of the schedule property to the knowledge of one and all and perfected his title by adverse possession. The land in S.No:41 of Ameerpet village popularly known as Gangabhavi Polampatta is owned and possessed originally by Nawab Mohd. Ameer Ali Khan. After the death of the said Mohd. Ameer Ali Khan, it devolved upon his legal heirs. He denied the purchase of the schedule plot by the 1st applicant and S.No:41 was subdivided. According to Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, in case of conversion of the land into plots, permission has to be obtained from necessary authorities. There is no such permission or sanction and the 1st applicant has failed to produce any lay out from any authorities. In the year 1981, the land Acquisition Officer has notified to acquire the land purchased by this respondent under an agreement of sale dated 10.9.1975 from the legal representatives of Nawab Mohd. Meer Ali Khan covered by S.No:41 of Ameerpet village admeasuring 3440 square meters or 3800 square yards and also an extent of 1750 in S.No:52 of Ameerpet village. His name appeared in the pahanies for the years 1976-77 and 1978-79 as purchaser and possessor. It is further stated that he was a party in W.P.5538 of 1981 filed by Rehmath Khatoon and also in Civil Appeal No:5839 to 5842 of 1983 before the Supreme Court. The name of the 1st applicant do not find place in any of the revenue records and as such, the question of receiving any notice by her from the land acquisition officer, does not arise. The very notification issued by the Land Acquisition Officer was cancelled and most of the properties proposed to be acquired was deleted and that the land in S.No:41 was never in possession of the applicant and the question of this respondent grabbing the land does not arise. This respondent is in possession of the land in S.No:41 as per agreement of sale. The alleged sale deed dated 25-5-1968, for which the 1st applicant alleged to have purchased the schedule property from the mother of the 2nd respondent is creating a doubt. It is further stated that the stamps were purchased on 22.5.1968 from the Government of Nizam, but by that time, the Government of A.P. was formed and therefore, the questioning purchasing the stamps of Government of Nizam after 10 years of forming the Government of A.P. does not arise. Therefore, the entire case is a cooked up and false. It is further stated in the counter filed by R2 that the property in question is known as Ganga Bowli Polam Patta owned and possessed by Rahmath Khatoon and the said Rahmath Khatoon is his mother and that the very execution of the sale deed by his mother in favour of the 1st applicant, is a false one and that 1st respondent with the 1st applicant grabbed the property owned and possessed by the family members of the 2nd respondent by creating fabricated documents. Based on these and other allegations as was in the respective pleadings raised on either side, the Special Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the applicant has title to the application schedule property? 2. Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is true, valid and binding? 3. Whether the respondents are land grabbers within the meaning of the Act XII of 1982? 4. In case of success, whether the applicant is entitled to any damages? 5. To what relief? During the course of trial, the applicants examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.13 on their behalf and on the other hand, the respondents examined themselves as R.ws.1 and 2 and marked Exs.B.1 to 11. On appraisal of the evidence and the material available on record, the Special Court found that the applicants have made out a prima facie case that they are the absolute owners of the schedule property and that the rival claim set up by the respondents is neither true nor valid. It is further observed that the possession of the respondents is without any legal entitlement and they are declared as land grabbers within the meaning of section 2 (d) and (3) of the Act. It is also further held that no case has been made out to consider as to the adverse possession since their possession being an impermissible one. Accordingly, the application filed by the applicants is allowed. Having aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed by the 1st respondent. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-1st respondent by taking us through the entire evidence and material on record sought to attack each and every finding given by the special Court and tried to contend that the applicants have, in fact, failed to prove their title nor discharge their burden and having regard to the very nature of the documents, especially the sale deed, on which they relied, no case has been made out to hold that the 1st respondent is a land grabber. Repelling the said contentions, Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants submitted that having regard to the title of the applicants, the Special Court is justified in holding that the applicants are the absolute owners of the schedule property and no material worth consideration or any cogent evidence is forthcoming on behalf of the 1st respondent to contradict the findings of the Special Court and therefore, the findings of the Special Court, would not in any way warrant the interference of this Court. On a consideration of the submissions made and also on a perusal of the material available on record, the ultimate question which arises for consideration in this writ petition, is as to whether the findings of the Special Court as to the right, title and interest of the applicants are sustainable and whether the 1st respondent therein is a land grabber. From the aforesaid narration as made out, the claim of the parties on either side, rests on their respective purchases, viz., the applicants relied their claim on Ex.A1, sale deed, dated 23.5.1968 executed by one Begum Rahmat Khatoon in favour of the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent therein relied his claim on the agreement of sale dated 10-9-1975 alleged to have been executed by the representatives of one Nawab Mohd. Meer Ali Khan. There is no dispute with regard to the original titleholder or pattadar or possessor as that of Nawab Mohd. Meer Ali Khan and on consequent to his death, his wife Begum Rahamat Khatoon. Now, the applicants claim an extent of 500 square yards in S.No:41 of Ameerpet village under Ex.A1 sale deed whereas the 1st respondent claims about 3,800 sq. yards in S.No:41 of Ameerpet village apart from another extent of 1750 sq. yards in S.No.52 of Ameerpet village under an agreement of sale dated 10.9.1975. Thus, on the evidence gathered from all the material available on record, the question as to the original owner, from whom the parties are alleged to have purchased the property, is not in serious dispute. However, a serious attack is being made on behalf of the 1st respondent therein in regard to the validity of the sale deed dated 23-5-1968 executed in favour of the 1st applicant mainly on the ground that the same is not a relying one in as much as the stamps belonging to the period of Nizam Government, have been used after the formation of Government of A.P. On behalf of the applicants, P.W.1 who is the G.P.A. of the 1st applicant reiterates the averments made in the application and the same is supported by the other two witnesses i.e., P.Ws.2 and 3. The original copy of Registered G.P.A. is marked as Ex.A.2. The sale deed has been marked as Ex.A.1. Apart from that, the applicants have also placed reliance on Exs.A.5 to A.7 which are Encumbrance Certificates issued for the period from 1- 1-1968 to 15-9-1998 to show that there is no encumbrance. Ex.A.8 is the copy of valuation Certificate issued by the Sub- Registrar in respect of the land in the area. Ex.A.9 is the certified copy of T.S.L.R., wherein in Col.No.20, the name of the 1st applicant is noted as enjoyer. Ex.A.10 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 1966-67 relating to the application schedule land showing the name of Rahmath Khatoon as pattadar, who is the original owner of the land in question. Ex.A.11 is the rough sketch of the schedule property. Ex.A.12 is the office copy of the application addressed to HUDA. Ex.A.13 is another Copy of the GPA executed by the 1st applicant in favour of P.W.1. Thus, the evidence of P.ws.1 and 3 coupled with Ex.A1 and the pahanies, makes it clear that it is the 1st applicant who is the absolute owner of the land in question. Now, coming to the case of the 1st respondent therein, he examined himself as R.w.2 and marked Exs.B.1 to B.13. Apart from that, the 2nd respondent therein (12th respondent herein) examined himself as R.W.1. Though the 1st respondent relies his claim as to his possession and title on an agreement of sale dated 10.9.1975, but, it has not seen the light of the day. Apart from that, no explanation is forthcoming as to why the alleged agreement of sale could not have been marked as one of the exhibits during the course of trial, when he came into the witness box. Apart from that, the 1st respondent therein has relied the pahanis of the years 1976-77 and 1978-79 which are marked as Exs.B.1 and B.2 and two receipts dated 27-7-1995 issued by the Sub-Registrar which are marked as Exs.B.3 and B.4 respectively. Besides that, the correspondence with the Sub Registrar was marked as Exs.B.5 and B.6 and Certified copy of order in W.P.M.P.No:9660 of 1996 in W.P.No:7857 of 1996, Certified copy of order and decree in I.A.No.416 of 2002 in O.S.No.2006 of 2002 and certified copies of F.I.Rs.271 of 2002, 325 of 2002 and 890 of 2002 of S.R. Nagar Police station were marked as Exs.B7 to B11 respectively. The Special Court is also justified in arriving at the conclusion that mere agreement of sale does not create any interest over the property and apart from that, in the absence of any title, the entries made in Exs.B1 and B2, lead to create a doubt that they are concocted for the purpose of the case. Irrespective of the fact as to whether the alleged agreement of sale, under which the 1st respondent rests his claim as to his possession and interest over the property, conveys any title or not, the failure on the part of the 1st respondent in producing the same before the Special Court, gives rise to a doubt as to his bonafides. Therefore, We have no hesitation to hold that the non-production of the alleged agreement of sale before the Court, is fatal to his case. Except making a bald statement that Ex.A1 is a forged one, the 1st respondent has failed to prove the same by adducing any documentary evidence to that effect. Apart from that, Ex.A1 is a 30 years old document. Under section 90 of the Evidence Act, in a case of 30 years old document, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Therefore, We have no hesitation to hold that the provisions of section 90 of the Evidence Act falsifies the bald statement of the 1st respondent at this stage of the proceedings that Ex.A1 sale deed is a forged one. That apart, even though a specific plea was taken that the declarations have been filed before the urban Land Ceiling authorities, but they are also not produced. Therefore, the 1st respondent has no locus standi to question Ex.A1. With regard to the allegation that Ex.A1 is a forged one and in view of the using of stamps of Nizam reign for Ex.A1 after the formation of Government of A.P., Ex.A1 becomes void, the 1st respondent has not taken any steps to examine the officials of the Sub Registrar to prove the same and apart from that, that itself could not in any way come to the rescue of the 1st respondent as long as no proper steps as pointed out have been taken to show that Ex.A.1 is not a genuine one. Thus, the entire material available on record amply goes to show that Smt. Begum Rahmat Khatoon was the original pattadar and original owner of the land in question and she has sold the land in question to the 1st applicant under Ex.A.1. In view of non production of the alleged agreement of sale, which has not seen the light of the day, the question of considering the adverse possession, does not arise. In view of the above substantive reasoning, it cannot be said that the findings of the Special Court suffer from any legal infirmity or irregularity. It is now well established that the writ petition invoking the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be converted into a regular appeal and as such, there cannot be any review as such as long as the 1st respondent has failed to prove that there has been a total miscarriage of justice and the relevant material has been excluded from consideration by the special Court as held in KONDA LAKSHMANA BAPUJI v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P., HYDERABAD AND OTHERS ([1]) and confirmed by the apex Court in the Apex Court in KONDA LAKSHMANA BAPUJI v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P., HYDERABAD AND OTHERS ([2]). Having regard to the same, we do not find any merit in the above Writ Petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, no costs. _________________________ Justice B. PRAKASH RAO Dated 8th March, 2007. ___________________________________ Justice M. VENKATESWARA REDDY Dvs HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. VENKATESWARA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO.5979 OF 2004 (Judgment delivered by the Honourable Sri Justice B. Prakash Rao) Dated 8th March, 2007. [1] 1998 (6) ALD 664 (DB) [2] 2002 (3) SCC 258