IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.M.JOSEPH MONDAY, THE 29TH SEPTEMBER 2008 / 7TH ASWINA 1930 WP(C).No. 14534 of 2008(E) -------------------------- PETITIONER(S): --------------- A. ABDUL RAHMAN, AGED 45 YEARS, S/O. ABOOBACKER, RESIDING AT ASHARIMOOLA HOUSE, MANJESHWAR P.O., PIN-671 323. BY ADV. SRI.S.VINOD BHAT RESPONDENT(S): --------------- 1. DEPUTY TAHSILDAR (REVENUE RECOVERY), KERALA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, KANNUR. 2. KERALA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION ADV. SRI.K.JAJU BABU,SC,KERALA FINANCIAL COR FOR R2 GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.BEJOY CHANDRAN THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 29/09/2008, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: APPENDIX PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS: P1 COPY OF SALE DEED DT 9.7.03. P2 COPY OF NOTICE DT 17.4.08 BY R1 P3 COPY OF DEMAND NOTICE ISSUED BY R1. // TRUE COPY // P.A. TO JUDGE K.M. JOSEPH, J. ```````````````````````````````````````````````````` W.P.(C) No. 14534 OF 2008 E ```````````````````````````````````````````````````` Dated this the 29th day of September, 2008 J U D G M E N T Petitioner availed a loan from the Kerala State Financial Corporation. The petitioner apparently could not repay the entire amount. The KFC started proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Petitioner challenges the same. 2. I heard learned counsel for petitioner, learned Government Pleader and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent. The contention which is raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there are only four modes of recovery available to the KFC under the Kerala State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 ie., the Financial Corporation may institute a suit, it may invoke section 29 of the Act or it may invoke section 31 of the Act and finally, it may resort to section 32G of the Act. In this regard, he relies on the decision of the apex court reported in Unique Butyle WPC.14534/08 : 2 : Tube Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. U.P. Financial Corporation [AIR 2003 SC 2103]. It is pointed out in this case, having regard to the wording of section 32G resort made by the KFC to the provisions of the recovery Act is illegal. Per contra, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that interpreting the decision of the apex court a Division Bench of this court had granted its seal of approval to resort made by the KFC to the provisions of the RR Act in the decision reported in Usman Vs. K.F.C. [2007 (2) KLT 604]. He also relies on the decision of the learned single Judge in Amritha Cyber Park (P) Ltd. Vs. KFC [2006 (2) KLT 394]. In the decision of the Division Bench referred above, the Division Bench has dealt with a case where the KFC was proceeded under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. After referring to the decision of the apex court, the Division Bench proceeded to hold as follows. “ The above paragraph would categorically hold that it was the option or choice of the financial institutions either to WPC.14534/08 : 3 : choose their remedy under the DRT Act or the SFC Act. In the present case, the KFC decided to opt to proceed under the SFC Act and since S.32G of the SFC Act permitted the financial corporation to recover amounts due to it as arrear of land revenue and further the Government of Kerala has issued notification under S.71 of the Revenue Recovery Act making the provisions of the Act applicable to recovery of amounts due to the Kerala Financial Corporation Act, on finding that the amount recovered by proceeding under S.29 of the SFC Act is not sufficient to satisfy the debt due from the Company, the KFC was perfectly justified in proceeding against the personal guarantors for the loan given to the Company by resorting to proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act. Further, the first sentence of Unique Butyle Tube's case shows that the question decided in that case was a different one.” No doubt, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the question which he raised in this writ petition did not arise for consideration. What the learned counsel for WPC.14534/08 : 4 : the petitioner would argue is that the specific procedure mentioned in S.32G must be followed. I do not accept the contention. It would be subversive of judicial discipline if I were not to decide the fate of this case being bound by the dictum of the Division Bench. It would have been another matter if the Division Bench did not consider the decision of the apex court. But here is a case where the Division Bench considered the apex court judgment and proceeded to approve the recovery proceedings. That another argument may have been advanced may not be a ground for me to not follow the Bench decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. Writ petition fails and it is dismissed. (K.M.JOSEPH, JUDGE) aks