IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA C.R. No.430 of 2010 MD. ABDUL SAYEED @ MD. SAYEED, SON OF LATE ABDUL SAMAD, RESIDENT OF MOHALLA-MOHIUDDIN ALICHAK, P.O. AND P.S. HABIBPUR (JAGDISHPUR), DISTRICT- BHAGALPUR. ………………..…….DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER. Versus MD. SAMSAD @ POLLO, SON OF LATE MD. SAMSUL HODA, RESIDENT OF MOHALLA-TATARPUR, P.O. AND P.S. TATARPUR, DISTRICT-BHAGALPUR. ……………………PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/OPPOSITE PARTY. ----------- For the Petitioner : M/s. Shashi Shekhar Dwivedi, Sr. Advocate, Satish Chandra Mishra and Md. Nurul Hoda, Advocates. For the Opp. Party: Mr. Shiv Nandan Rai, Senior Advocate. ------------ 5. 7.7.2010. This Civil Revision is directed against the order dated 3.2.2010 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No.III, Bhagalpur, in Titile Appeal No.36 of 2009, whereby the prayer of the respondent-petitioner to hold that the aforesaid appeal would not be maintainable in view of the provisions as contained under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, had been rejected. I have heard the parties and perused the records of this Case. 2 This matter is being disposed of at this stage with the consent of the parties. Bereft of unnecessary details, the short facts of this case are as follows: Eviction Suit No.39 of 2001 was filed by the plaintiff-opposite party for eviction of the defendant-petitioner on the ground of personal necessity. The trial court held that the plaintiff had bonafide personal requirement of the suit premises. However, it has further held that the personal necessity of the landlord, i.e., the plaintiff-opposite party could be satisfied by partial eviction of the tenant as detailed in the order/ judgment dated 24.3.2009. The plaintiff-opposite party, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order/ judgment and decree aforesaid, preferred Title Appeal No.36 of 2009. In the aforesaid Title Appeal, the defendant-respondent-petitioner filed a petition dated 10.12.2009 raising a question therein that the aforesaid appeal, in view of the provisions as contained under Section 14(8) of the Act, would not be maintainable as rather only remedy would be a revision under Section 14(8) of the Act. The appellate court did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent-petitioner and disposed of the petition by the impugned order dated 3.2.2010 directing the 3 appeal to be put for hearing. Hence, this Civil Revision has been filed by the petitioner challenging the propriety and legality of the aforesaid order dated 3.2.2010. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the appeal would not be maintainable for two reasons. Firstly, that the statute provides only a revision against an order/judgment/decree passed in a eviction suit filed on the ground of bonafide personal necessity and disposed of following the procedure laid down under Section 14 of the Act. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the findings recorded in the concerned order/ judgment of the trial court under appeal having been in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and the suit having been decreed in his favour, there was no occasion for him to challenge the aforesaid judgment and decree in appeal. In support of his submission, learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of this Court rendered in Banarsi Sah and others Vs. Bhagwanlal Sah and others (AIR 1977 Patna 206). It has been submitted that this Court had held in the aforesaid case that where a decree is absolutely in favour of a party but some issues are found against him, he would have no right of appeal against the decree. 4 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party contended that Section 14(8) of the act clearly lays down that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. However, a remedy, in that case, was provided as a proviso to the aforesaid Section 14(8) of the Act empowering the High Court to call for the records of the case and pass necessary order for satisfying itself as to whether the order passed under this Section was in accordance with law or not. Thus, it is contended that the aforesaid forum being available only against an order of recovery of possession, in a case where a suit filed by he landlord fails or is decreed in part, the landlord would only have a remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against such dismissal of suit or against the dismissal of the suit in part even though the same had been allowed in part. It is contended that in the present case, though the suit has been decreed but only partial eviction has been ordered and decreed and, thus, the same would amount to dismissal of the suit in part while decreeing the same in part. Thus, the landlord was fully justified in preferring an appeal against the part of the decree. 5 Upon hearing the rival submissions, I find force in the submissions raised on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party. It would be pertinent to quote the relevant provisions of law as contained under Section 14(8) of the Act, which is as follows: “14(8).No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction, the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.” From the reading of the aforesaid provision, it would be manifest that no appeal or second appeal is available against an order for recovery of possession of any premises if the same was made in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. However, the High Court can call for the records of the case to satisfy itself as to whether the order concerned was passed in accordance with law or not. The remedy of revision is clearly provided against an order of eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide personal necessity and the bar to prefer an appeal is also limited to that. It is well settled that while interpreting a law 6 nothing can be added, removed or substituted rather the same has to be read as it stands. Thus, it cannot be inferred that the landlord has the same remedy available as the tenant had in the aforesaid case. Therefore, even if the eviction suit is decided following the procedure laid down under Section 14(8) of the Act and is dismissed, the only remedy available to the landlord would be to prefer an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, it is true that if the suit is decided absolutely in favour of a party, even if the some issues are decided against him, he has no right of appeal against the decree as has been held in Banarsi Sah (Supra) but in the present case all the issues have not been decided in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction of the tenant, i.e., the respondent-petitioner from the entire suit premises, however, the decree had been only for partial eviction, i.e., from part of the premises. Therefore, it would definitely amount to be decreed in part and, thus, the landlord had the remedy to prefer an appeal against that part of the decree whereby part of relief had been refused. In Akhileshwar Kumar and others Vs. Mustaquim and others, reported in 1997 (2) BLJ 742, identical matter was dealt with 7 by a Bench of this Court and it had been held that Section 14(8) of the Act does not contemplate filing of any revision at the instance of landlord at all and only an appeal is maintainable at the instance of the landlord, whether the suit has been dismissed in whole or in part. It has also been held that there should not be any doubt that when the landlord files a suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises and the court passes decree of partial eviction, the suit cannot be said to be decreed as a whole. His remedy could be by way of appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the part of the decree by which the part of his claim was disallowed. In the above view of the matter this Court does not find any jurisdictional error having been committed by the appellate court. In the opinion of this Court, this Civil Revision is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. P.S. (Dr. Ravi Ranjan, J)