1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH NAGPUR. C.A.NO.5889 of 2008 in A.O.NO.52 of 2008 Shashank s/o Govindprasad Pande ..vs.. Ramesh Gajananrao Thakre. Office Notes, Office Memorandum of Coram appearances, Court's orders or directions & Registrar's orders. Court's or Judges Order -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Mr.M.G.Bhangde, Senior Advocate for the applicant. Mr.B.N.Mohta, Advocate for respondent no.1. Mr.S.C.Mehadia Advocate for respondent no.2. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= CORAM: Smt. R. P. SondurBaldota, J. DATED : 26th February, 2010. 1. This civil application is taken out by the appellant under Order 39 Rule 2-A Civil Procedure Code for taking action against the respondents for alleged breach of the order dated 24th of June, 2008 passed at the time of issuing notice of the appeal. The civil application as filed originally on 14th of August, 2008 was only against respondent no.1. Respondent no.2 came to be impleaded to the appeal as well as the present civil application on 21st of August, 2008. Respondent no.1 2 was served with this civil application on 14th of August, 2008. As regards respondent no.2, there is nothing on record to show that the civil application is either served upon it or any notice was directed to be issued to it. 2. On 24th of June, 2008, when the appeal from order appeared on the board for admission, following order was passed “ Heard parties for the appellant. Issue notice before admission, returnable on 8th July, 2008 with an intimation that this appeal may be disposed of finally at the admission itself. In the meanwhile parties to maintain status quo.” 3. The appeal from order in which the above order was passed arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale by respondent no.1. In that suit, the appellant had filed an application for interim injunction to restrain respondent no.1 from creating third party rights over the suit property. That application was rejected by the trial court by its order dated 17th of June, 2008. Respondent no.1 in his reply to the application for interim relief had disclosed that he had sold the suit property to respondent no.1 even before the suit was filed. However, respondent no.2 was not impleaded to the suit until after the appeal from order was filed. It was also 3 not a party to the appeal proceedings when the order dated 24th of June, 2008 was passed. The interim relief sought in the main suit as well as the appeal proceedings was limited to creating third party rights over the suit property. This is the background against which the allegations made by the appellant of violation of the order dated 24th of June, 2008 are required to be considered. 4. The appellant alleges that the respondents on 1st July, 2008 deposited a sum of Rs.1,48,987/- with Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur for sanction of building plans for construction of the building on the suit land and that the plans were sanctioned on 7th July, 2008. Then on 15th of July, 2008 the respondent started construction on the suit land. As on the date of filing of the application the respondents had dug 10-11 pits and erected 7-8 columns up to the plinth level. The appellant had by the telegram dated 28th of July, 2008 and by his Advocate notice dated 1st of August, 2008 warned respondent no.2 from carrying construction on the suit land. Despite the warnings respondent no.2 proceeded with the construction. The appellant alleges that the act on the part of the respondents in getting the building plans sanctioned and carrying of construction on the suit 4 land amounts to violation of the order dated 24th of June, 2008 and contends that the respondents are liable to be proceeded against for contempt of court. 5. Respondent no.1 on whom the civil application was served has filed his reply dated 28th of September, 2008 contending that he is no way concerned with the construction activity on the suit land. The construction activity is being carried out by respondent no.2, to whom he had sold the suit land, even before the filing of the suit. He further contends that in view of the nature of the prayer made in the application for interim injunction in the present appeal, the ad interim order of status quo must be interpreted as only in relation to creation of third party interest over the suit land. Since the order does not mention anything as regards the construction and since no relief in respect of changing the nature of the suit land was sought by the appellant, the order cannot be read as relating to construction on the suit land. Respondent no.1 states that he has not created any third party interest over the suit land after the order dated 24th of June, 2008. There is no reply of respondent no.2, in view of the fact that he was neither served with the civil application nor issued notice by the court. 5 6. Mr.Bhangade, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, submits that though the interim relief sought by the appellant was limited to creating third party rights over the suit property, the court should read the plaint as a whole so as to interpret the order of status quo. He relies upon two decisions of the Apex court in L. Janakirama Iyer and others ..vs.. Nilkanta Iyer and ors., reported in AIR 1962 SC 633 and in Bhubaneshwar and anr. ..vs.. Parmeshwari Devi Sultania and ors., reported in (1998)3 SCC 481 to submit that while construing the plaint, the court must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form. Since this is a well established legal principle, there is no need to discuss the decisions cited further. Mr.Bhangade submits that since the suit filed by the appellant is for specific performance of an agreement of sale, unless the property is preserved in the same form in which it existed, at the time of filing of the suit, it will not be available to the appellant in the event of his succeeding in the suit and therefore, when the court directed the parties to maintain status quo in the present appeal proceedings the court should put liberal interpretation upon the order and not take restrictive 6 view. The contempt proceedings being the proceedings in the nature of quasi criminal proceedings, there would be limitations on the court in placing any liberal interpretation of the order in order to convict the alleged contemnors and punish them. The court is actually required to interpret the order in the light of the allegations made in the proceedings in which it is passed. In the suit before the trial court as well as in the present appeal proceedings, the application for interim reliefs sought by the appellant was specifically limited to creating third party rights over the suit property. Neither the plaint nor the application for interim reliefs in the suit nor the application for interim reliefs in the appeal proceedings make any allegations as regards either apprehension or attempt on the part of respondent no.1 to change the nature of the suit land by carrying out construction thereon. 7. Mr.Bhangade refers to another decision of the Apex court in Satyabrata Biswas and ors. ..vs.. Kalyan Kumar Kisku and ors. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 266 for the meaning to be put on the order of status quo. He refers to para no.20 and 21 thereof, which read as follows - 20. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7 6th Edn. The relevant passage occurs: “The existing state of things at any given date. Status quo ante bellum, the state of things before the war. ‘Status quo’ to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” 21. This court in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd..vs.. Sate of Bihar stated thus:(SCC p.398,para 5) “According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term ‘status quo’ implies the existing state of things at any given point of time.” The decision cited arose out of the suit filed in the High court relating to the church property seeking declaration of title and also capacity of the plaintiff as secretary of the Diocese. One of the interim reliefs sought therein was to restrain the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession, and use by the plaintiff of one of the premises. The interim orders passed in respect thereof was “so far as the fixed properties are concerned, there 8 would be an order of status quo as of today till the disposal of the application.” It was alleged by the plaintiff that the respondents had committed contempt of the order by putting padlock on the main entrance of the premises, disconnecting water supply, obstructing sewerage line and preventing the plaintiffs from getting the rooms repaired. It appears that while deciding this application, the Single Judge of the High court and later in the appeal proceedings the Division Bench had permitted a third party to occupy the suit premises. The Apex court in the above decision disapproved the same and relegated the parties to the position as on the date of the order. The learned Single Judge of the High court was directed to dispose of the application for contempt in accordance with law. I find no discussion in the decision cited on liberal interpretation of the term “status quo” as desired by the learned counsel. For the reasons already stated above, it is not possible to put such interpretation upon the order of status quo as requested by the learned counsel. 8. It is seen that respondent no.1 against the order dated 24th of June, 2008 was passed is neither in possession of the suit land nor has carried out the construction thereon. The construction has been carried 9 out by respondent no.2 after he has been put in possession of the suit property pursuant to the transaction of sale. The order has never been extended to respondent no.2 by making appropriate application therefor. In these circumstances, the civil application is dismissed. No order as to costs. JUDGE. chute