IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE P.V.SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO : 4990 of 1999 Between: M/s GMR Agro Chemicals (Pvt) Ltd., Amaravathi Road, Gorantla Guntur - 522 034 rep. through its Chairman P.S.N.Prasad ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The E.P.F.Appellate Tribunal 7th Floor, Skylark Building 60, Nehru Place, New Delhi-110 019 rep.through its Registrar 2 The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Gr.II, Sub-regional Office, Laxmipuram, Guntur-522 007 3 The Secretary to Government of India Ministry of Labour, New Delhi 4 The Central Provident Fund Commissioner & Chief Executive Officer, Central Board of Trustees E.P.F.Organisation, Hudco Vishala Buildings, 14, Bikaji Cama Place New Delhi-110 066 5 The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Gr.II Barkatpura, Hyderabad-500 027 .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Aﬃdavit ﬁled herein the High Court will be pleased to to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari calling for the recrods relating to the order Dt.4/12/1998 in Appeal proceedings No.ATA-1(28)98 on the ﬁle of the 1st respondent and quash the same as being illegal, unjust and arbitrary and declare that the provisions of the Limitation Act,1963 do apply to the PF Act as the said PF Act being a special law does not expressly exclude the operation of the Limitation Act and hence the 1st respondent is vested with powers to entertain appeals and consider applications seeking condonation of delay exceeding 60 days and decide the same in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 with further directions to the 1st respondent to restore and register the appeal of the petitioner herein and decide it on merit in accordance with the provisions of the PF Act and be also pleased to pass such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.K.N.PURANIK Counsel for the Respondent No.: MR.R.N.REDDY The Court made the following : THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE P.V.SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.4990 OF 1999 ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Goda Raghuram) The singular issue presented for the consideration in this case is the correctness of the order dated 04.12.1998 of the ﬁrst respondent-the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, rejecting the appeal of the petitioner-company on the ground that the appeal was preferred/instituted beyond the period of limitation as prescribed in Rule 7 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (for brevity, ‘the 1997 Rules’) being Rules issued in purported exercise of the powers under Section 21(1) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) (Central Act 19 of 1952). The second respondent-assessing authority under the provisions of the Act, by an order dated 11.05.1998 exercising powers under Section 7-A of the Act concluded that the petitioner-company was governed by the provisions of the Act and is liable to contribute to the Provident Funds. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the ﬁrst respondent-Appellate Tribunal which was ﬁled on 16.09.1998, i.e., 123 days after the date of the order dated 11.05.1998 of the second respondent. The appeal was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it was presented after the period of limitation specified in Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules. Rule 7 (2) of the 1997 Rules provides that any person aggrieved inter alia by an order passed by any authority under the Act may within 60 days from the date of issue of the order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. The proviso to Rule 7(2) is to the eﬀect that the Tribunal may, if satisﬁed that the appellant was prevented by suﬃcient cause from preferring an appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. Sri K.N.Puranik, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would strenuously contend that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is erroneous as Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules does not carve out any period of limitation diﬀerent from the period of limitation spelt out under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the appellate Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay on reasonable cause having been shown for the delay, notwithstanding the expiration of “123 days from the date of order of the second respondent”, in ﬁling the appeal. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides: “29. Savings.–– (2) Where any special or local laws prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation diﬀerent from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoins that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although the limitation has not been set up as a defence. The Schedule to the Limitation Act enumerates diﬀerent periods of limitation in respect of diﬀerent proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section 29, which is a part of the savings provision in the Act, enjoins that where any special or local law prescribes a diﬀerent period of limitation from the period prescribed by the schedule (to the Limitation Act), then the provisions of Section-3 shall apply as if such (diﬀerent) period was the period prescribed by the schedule and further that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only to the extent not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It is trite, as pointed by the Supreme Court in STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. M/S.HIND STONE[1]: “Rules made under the statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same eﬀect as if contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction and obligation." In HIND STONE’s case the Supreme Court relied on the above passage of the statement of law explicated by it earlier in STATE OF U.P. v. BABU RAM UPADHYA [2] after quoting a passage of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, which is also to the eﬀect that statutory Rules made pursuant to the power entrusted by Parliament are law made by Parliament. The provisions of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules insofar as they prescribe a limitation period of 60 days which period may be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal on satisfactory cause shown by the appellant only for a further period of 60 days thereafter is distinct (diﬀerent) period of limitation (in a special law) which proprio vigore disapplies the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. In view of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, beyond the period of 120 days (even if the Appellate Tribunal were satisﬁed as to reasonable cause arising for the delay), the delay in filing an appeal cannot be condoned. On the aforesaid analysis, the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 04.12.1998 is impeccable and warrants no interference. There are no merits in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs. ______________________ GODA RAGHURAM, J. _________________________ P.V.SANJAY KUMAR, J. 21st OCTOBER, 2008. VGSR / PGS [1] AIR 1981 SC 711 [2] AIR 1961 SC 751