1mm PETmION Na. Z3 (i OF 1996 PE ”I TI (HER : D.SuR3gre, ageé $baut 39 years, son sf Sbri Nsresh Ram Ba£re5R/O “Village Kurud Dhamtari,§w£w PA). Kurud, Ehsil: Dhamtarigmstrict Raipurg(M.P.) RESP ONDE NT Biia $pu1‘ Raipur' Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Hewi Office,Daya1bag,Bi1aspt Di stiicmBilaspur, (M.P.)throug i chairman Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank,BIL.éSPUm (WE) Pmwxow UNDER ARiHCLEs g2§/gg7 OF 1H}; cor‘IsTi‘mlugm OF INDIA FOR ISSUéNCE OF WRIT KN THE I‘mTU‘BE OF CERTI ORARI 03m MANDAMUS OR OTHER AFPROEQ‘IFWE WRIT OR DEEEC‘HQE; 1. Particulars 9i the yetitianem- As :Jer the cause i2i‘L1e abavee 2e Particulars afihe Regpandents As per the cause title above. Particula?s af the srder againstxhich this Qetitiwggg is minim-a (i) Order da teé 31/8/1995With refex°ence ‘ta ANNEXURE P-l) (i1) Order No. :—- D/A/gecret‘ari'a‘t"e7552/‘94mgs (iii) Passed by:- Chairmn &~ Disciplinary Office-r, Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank,Bilaspure (iv) Subject in briefsa By' the afaresaid 01*der the services 0f the peaitianer has been terminateci'. if anz , and exg ainAtia here is ne tieiay in filing this petiticm 4. m C) m‘ h t I r T Petitioner Versus Respondents HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH A'I‘ BILASPUR W.P. No. 736 of 1996 D. S. Ratre V/ ‘xé J F R a 7 %i5*:§£ Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank 2 y?) Post for ondcr on May, 2006. HIQH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT §HA§ELJB W.P. No. 736 of 1996 Petitinner D. S. Rate 'i Without closure of the Loan Account No. DL/V/2/89 and ‘ without discharging the liability of making paymentto the Bank ‘ //V ‘ g’ New Mm‘x‘ Versus Respondents ‘ Bilaspur Raipur Kshein'ya Gramir: Bmm‘” K. Agnihom. ,lk siwe Bench; Hon'ble Mr. Justice swan Agnihom. sun. Indira mpathi, Advocate with Shxi Sum! Saba, Advccats far §) the petitioner. o Miss Sumta Jain, Advocate for the Respondent. 0 R D E R z ‘9 ( z May, 2006) , The following order of the Court was passed by Satish K. ApihOui, J. 1. The present petition tiled under Article 226[227 of the Constitution of India impugns the oxder dated 31.3.1995 (Annexure Pl 1) wheleby the petitioner was mmoved nom t service. { I 1 ’ V 2. The undisputed facts in nutshell are that. on 21.10.1993 (Annexum P/ 3) the petitioner was served with a charge sheet to é submit his mply within a pen‘od of 1o days eom the date or 1 receipt of the charge sheet, containing two charges. hrstly. the i _ 1 petitioner received a sum of Rs. QOOOI- on 7.12.1992 While . _ § working as Clerk-cum-Cashier from the Customer (Shri y Narayan Patel) and not deposited the same in the Bank before 30.1. 1993, and secondly, that the petitioner in order to benefit him and to save his interest sold the hypothecatcd Vehicle & befoxe 24.2.1993. The above stated conduct of the petitioner was treated as grave misconduct under Regmation 3O (1) of the Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gmmin Bank Staff Sewice ' Regulations, 1980. The petitioner submitted his reply on 2. 1 1. 1993 (Annex'ure Pl 4) ' stating that he had not received any money on 7. 12.1992 from the customer, Shri Narayan Patel but the same was received on 27.1. 1993 which was deposited in the Bank on 29/30.1. 1993. *With regard to the charge No.2 the petitioner submitted his 1t .reply that the disputed vehicle was used for the purpose of remittance work and the said vehicle was not in such a condition as to perform the remittance work which was very urgent. Keeping in view the condition of the vehicle, the vehicle was transferred to other person. The Bank has not strh‘ered any loss on account of the transfer of the vehicle, as the amount was paid with interest on 18.9. 1993 and 27. 10.1993. 4. The enquiry was conducted by one Shri G. ’K. Shanna. The Enquiry omcer, who after having examined all the documents produced by both the parties and considering two witnesses produced by the Bank and one witness produced by the delinquent employee i.e. the petitioner. came to the conclusion that the customer (complainant) Shri Narayan Patel deposited a sum of Rs. 9000/- on 7.12.1992 with the petitioner. Who was working as Clerk-cum—Cashier. The petitioner retained the money with him till 30th January, 1993 when the same was deposited through one Shri Laxmi Narayan. Accordingly the charge No’. 1 was found proved. The charge No.2 was also found proved. The enquiry odicer submitted his report on 17. 10. 1994. 5. On the basis of the enquiry report (Annexure PIS) the Disciplinaty Authority issued a Show cause non'oe on 23.2. 1995 (Annexure P/6) as to Why the punishment of removal fmm service should not be imposed. A copy of the enquiry Ieport was furnished along with the second show cause non'ce dated 23.2.1995. Having Ieceived the notice dated 23.2.1995 the petin'oner submitted his reply on 6.3.1995 (Annexule P17) to the eEect that the enquily report was perverse. as the complainant has failed to produce any receipt of cash paid to the petitioner on 7.12.1992 and further it was stated that in fact the cash was handed over to the petitioner on 27.1.1993 which could be deposited on 30.1.1993 on account of some unavoidable cincumstances. The petitioner further submitted that in the ledger, the entry made by him on 21.1. 1993, was by mistake. 6. After having considered the reply of the petitioner. the disciplinary authority vide impugned order dated 31.3.1995 (Annexure Pl 1) imposed the punishment of lemoval h‘om service. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Board of Directors of the respondents on 16.5.1995 (Annexuxe P18). § reiteran'ng the same submissions which he had made in the reply to the second show cause notice. The appellate authority by his order dated 1.3.1996 (Annexute RI?) dismissed the appeal agreeing with the findings of the enquiry omcer and the order passed by the disciplinary authority holding that the misconduct committed by the petitioner is of vely serious nature, of having committed gross financial irregularity and {Lt V .4. comes within the purview of “grave misconduct" and as such the punishment of mmoval wm service was just and proper. Being aggrieved the petitioner has med this petitbn impumling 5 the order of removal dated 31.3.1995 (Annexum P/ 1) Without 3 impugnjng the onier dated 1. 3. 1996 (Annexum R/7)..The ‘ onier dated 31.3.1995 passed by the disciplinary authority was 1 continued and merged in the appellate onier dated 1.3.1996. The petitioner hms not impugned the appellate order dated 1.3. 1996 (Annexuie R/ 7) passed by the appellate authority. The main submission of Smt. Indira 'I‘ripathi, learned counsel for the petih'oner is that the customer (complainant) has failed to produce any documents which would indicate that the petitioner had received Rs. 9000/ - by cash on 7. 12. 1995. It was further submitted that the Bank has not produced any voucher or pay slip dated 7 . 12. 1992 indicating that the said amount was received on 7.12.1992. It was therefore submitted that the ' enquiry report is perverse and based on no evidence and as such the same deserves to be quashed. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents Miss Sunita Jain. submitted that the petitioner had not i$ued any receipt against the receipt of Rs. 9000] - by cash on 7.12.1992. It is clear from the statement of the petitioner itself that the petitioner was receiving cash and making entries to the bank records and depositing in the Bank subsequently. The petitioner, on the contrary, stated that the petitioner has not received the amount on 7.12.1992 but has received the amount on 27.1.1993 which was deposited one 30.1. 1993. The petitioner has not issued any slip or receipt of payment as alleged on 27. 1.1993 also. Learned counsel further submitted that the enquiry was conducted after having examined the peiitioner. the petm'‘oner’s witness, documents pmduced by the petitioner. documents produced by the Bank and [the witnesses produced by the Bank. Them is no inegularity or perversity in the enquiry and the enquiry report is based on suiiicient evidence. 10. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the pleadings and documents appended to the writ petition and return, it is crystal clear that the contention of the' petitioner to the edect that the complainant has not produced L any slip or receipt which would go to show that the amount of Rs. 9000/- so paid to the pehhoner on 7.12.1992. is not suhicient to hold that the enquily Was perverse or the enquiry report was based on no evidence. It is found that even if the statement of the petitioner is accepted as it is. the petitioner had not issued any slip or receipt even .on 21.7.1993 when admittedly he has received the amount which was deposited in the Bank on 30.3.1993. It appears that the petitioner was in the habit of taking money from the customers and retaining the same with him for sometime and thereafter the petitioner used to deposit in the Bank. The enquiry report does not warrant any interference as it is just, proper and based on suEcient evidence. 12. The enquiry report: has been upheld by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India should not interfere and re-appreciate the @ \ evidence and come to a different conclusion which may also be mie of probable conclusions. . ‘ The Supreme Court in Govt. of T.N. and others Vs. s. Vel Raj { (1997) 2 S.C.C. 708 } obsexved that “the finding mcorded by the Enquiry O$cer and coniirmed by the appellate authority ‘ were based upon the evidence led during the enquiry and it was - not even contended that the said findings were perverse. It was. ‘ therefore, not open to the Tribunal to record contrary hndings and hold that the charge against the respondent was not pmved.” The Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Slngh Vs. Commissioner of Police and others { (1999) 2 S.C.C. 10} v observed as under :- “9. Normally the High Court and this Comt would not interfere with the tindings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the hnding of “guilt” is based on no evidence. it would be perverse hnding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefoxe. to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which would be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be heated as perverse and the, findings would not be interfered with”. The another case of Yo§nath Bagde Vs. state of Maharashtra and another, { (1999) 7 SCC 739} . the Supreme Court after considering the earlier decisions observed as under :e A. ,“Ann a, ivv AW in “51 ......... The law is well settled that if the $1dings am §erverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the tindings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no masonable pcrsondwould have mached‘ it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep v. Commr. of‘Police this Court. relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishoxe Prasad v. State of Bihar, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Rao. Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash 'Chand Jain. Bhaxat Iron Works vL Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel as also Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the iindings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry oflcer in a departmental encluiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the iindings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse”. 17. In case of B.c. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others { (1995) 6’SCC 749} observed as under:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that “ the individual receives fair treatment and. not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court] Tribunal is concerned to determine Whether the inquiry was held by a competent ofhcer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the hndings or conclusions are basedon some evidenc . the authority entrusted With the power to hold inquiry has jun‘sdiction, power and authon‘ty to mach a fmding of fact or conclusion. But that onding must be based on some evidence, Neither the technicai rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as dammed therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion mceives support therefrom, the disciplinaxy authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent ofhcer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power ofjudicial Ieview does not act as appellate authon‘ty to reappreciate theevidenc and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authon'ty held the proceedings against the delinquent ofhcer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inqujiy or Where the conclusion or hnding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the iinding. and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case”. 18. In another latest decision, the Supreme Court in V. Ramana Vs. A.P. SRTC and others { (2005) 7 SCC 338 } observed as under :— “11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator‘s decision unless it was illog‘cal or suifeis from“ procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in denance of logic or moral standards. In View of What has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should’not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision”. 4w? e t 19. From the perusal of the papers and‘ the’observau’ons of the Supreme Court in the cases, stated above, it is clear that the allegations have been established on the basis of su$cient evidences which a reasonable person. acting masonahlv and with objectivity may arrive at a hnding of holding the charges against the delinquent o$cen l have not found that any charge has been proved on the basis of no evidence or unmliable evidence or mere conjunctures and surmises. 20. As a result, the petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. om r , Judge l r. t Thakur \t t H ”N \