CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH -- CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 Date of decision: 20.05.2011 Navpreet Singh and Navi and others ........ Petitioners Versus State of Punjab and another .......Respondent(s) Coram: Hon'ble Ms Justice Nirmaljit Kaur -.- Present: Mr. S S Behl, Advocate for the petitioners Mr. J S Brar, AAG, Punjab Mr. Anant Kataria, Advocate for respondent No. 2 - complainant -.- 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Nirmaljit Kaur, J. This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR No. 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of FIR No. 125 dated 21.05.2010 under Section 306, 34 IPC, Police Station Shimlapuri, Ludhiana City (Annexure P-1) which was got registered by respondent No. 2 - complainant against the present petitioners on the basis of the compromise dated 12.07.2010 arrived at between the parties. Copy of the same has been placed on record as Annexure P-2. CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 2 The complainant is present in Court along with his wife. The aforesaid FIR was got registered by respondent No. 2 against the present petitioners under Section 306 IPC with the allegation that on account of the harassment of the petitioners, his son consumed poison and died. Thereafter, with the intervention of the respectable persons and friends from both the side, the misunderstanding in the mind of respondent No. 2/complainant was cleared and ultimately, respondent No. 2, his wife Tripta Rani and his son Sachin sworn individual affidavits to the effect that the present petitioners are in fact innocent and the FIR in question was got registered by respondent No. 2 as he got emotionally disturbed at the death of his son. Copies of the affidavits dated 08.06.2010 are appended with this petition as Annexures P2 and P4. A compromise between the parties was also reduced into writing in the presence of the Panchayat, whereby, respondent No. 2, his wife Tripta Rani and his son Sachin Kumar agreed that they have no objection if the FIR is quashed. Even otherwise, a perusal of the FIR shows that no offence under Section 306 IPC is made out. Section 107 IPC reads as under:- Section 107. abatement of thing – A person abets the doing of a thing who; Firstly, instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place ini pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly, intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission the doing of that thing. Explanation : 1. A person who by willful misrepresentation or by willful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to discloses voluntarily CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 3 causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done is said to instigate the doing of that thing.” In the case of Cyriac and another v. The SI of Police, 2005 (4) RCR (Criminal) 525, Hon'ble High Court, in para 7 of the judgment held as under:- “7. As per clause 'firstly' in Section 107 IPC, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing if he 'instigates' any person to do that thing. But, when can a person be said to have 'instigated' another to do an act? What is meant by the expression, 'instigate'? The word 'instigate' is not specifically defined in IPC. As per Oxford Dictionary 'instigate' means 'to goad or urge forward, to provoke, incite, urge, encourage to do an act.” The meaning of the word 'instigate' was considered by Supreme Court also. In Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhatisgarh 2001(4) RCR (Crl.) 537 (SC) JT 2001 (8) SC 569, a decision cited by learned counsel appearing for petitioners, Supreme Court held “instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. As per another decision cited by counsel for petitioners in Ved Paraksh v State of M P (1995 Crl. L J 893), the word 'instigate' means 'to goad or urge forward to provoke, incite, urge, encourage to do an act.' Keeping in view the above noted interpretation of the abatement, instant is a case, in which, none of the provisions of Section 107 IPC which could further make out a case under Section 306 IPC, have been attracted in the case in hand. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2002 (2) RCR(Criminal) 687, while relying on CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 4 the various judgments of the Apex Court held that the deceased committed suicide on the third day of the quarrel after the accused told him to commit suicide cannot be held that the suicide was direct result of quarrel. There was enough time to the deceased to think over and reflect. While coming to the said conclusion, reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 as under:- “7. Section 107 I.P.C defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” 12. In Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, in which she had stated that previously there had been quarrel between the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said: "A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 5 differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstance individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." In the present case also, there is no such allegation that the petitioners herein in any way had instigated, provoked, incited or encouraged the son of respondent No. 2 to commit suicide. Thus, the provisions contained in Section 107 IPC are not attracted in the instant case. As such, no offence under section 306 IPC is made out. Moreover, the parties in the present case have compromised the matter. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another-2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052 has observed as under:- “The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduced friction, then it truly is finest hour of justice. Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the court exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rules to prescribe the exercise of such power.” CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 6 The Apex Court in the case of 'Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab' reported as (2008)4 SCC 582 emphasised in para No. 6 as follows:- “6. We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.” Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana reported as 2003(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 888 while relying on the judgment titled as Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 749], that this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal' case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formula to be followed by the court. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary of exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [(1998) 1 SCC 692], it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 7 Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. This Court in the case of Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab and another (CRM M 35576 of 2009, decided on 20.01.2010) accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR under Section 306 IPC, by holding as under:- “7. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down in Kulwinder Singh's case (Supra) and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, in my considered opinion, once the matter has been compromised by the parties, no useful purpose shall be served by proceeding with the prosecution, as that would amount to sheer wastage of the time of the Court; harassment to the parties; and abuse of the process of Court. Even otherwise, the compromise is neither abhorrent to lawful composition of the society nor would it promote savagery. 8. In view of the above, the petition is accepted. Consequently, FIR No. 11 dated 02.02.2008 under Section 306 and 309 IPC P S Kurali, SAS Nagar and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.” Thus, taking into account the fact that the matter has been compromised as well as the fact that no offence is made, there is no impediment in the way of this Court to quash the present FIR and CRM No. M 25849 of 2010 8 subsequent proceedings arising out of the same in view of the above said settled proposition of law. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of FIR No. 125 dated 21.05.2010 under Section 306, 34 IPC, Police Station Shimlapuri, Ludhiana City (Annexure P-1) and subsequent proceedings arising out of the same are hereby quashed. Allowed in the aforesaid terms. (Nirmaljit Kaur) Judge 20.05.2011 mohan