THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. RAMULU W.P. Nos. 18093 of 2008, 12683 of 2009 and 19759 of 2009 COMMON ORDER: In all these writ petitions, common questions of law and fact arise for consideration. Therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order. The facts as narrated in W.P. No. 18093 of 2008 are necessarily to be noticed even for the purpose of deciding other two writ petitions. W.P. No. 18093 of 2008: Petitioner No.1 is a public limited company, engaged in production of cement and cement products, having its factory and distribution offices all over the country. It had purchased land admeasuring an extent of Ac.9-44 cents or 45,719 Sq. yards or 38,226.50 Sq. meters in S.Nos. 756, 752/1, 755, 753, 754, 751/2, 752/2, 755/1, 748 and 750 of Kukatpally and S.Nos. 287, 286B, 286 Part and 279 of Moosapet village, Rangareddy District, under twelve registered sale deeds, before the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (for short, ‘the Act’) came into force. After the advent of the Act, a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was filed by 1st petitioner in C.C. No.F1/155/93, before 3rd respondent and 3rd respondent, after due enquiry, prepared a draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act and issued the same along with notice under Section 8(3) of the Act, dated 23.6.1995, to 1st petitioner. Thus, petitioner No.1 filed its objections on 26.7.1995. Subsequently, proceedings No.F1/155/1993 dated 12.9.1995 were issued by 3rd respondent under Section 8(4) of the Act and final statement under Section 9 of the Act, confirming the draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act, was also issued without any alteration. The total extent of vacant land was shown as 32,836.50 Sq. meters and after deduction of the retainable area of 1,000 Sq. meters, the extent of vacant land to be surrendered was shown as 31,836.50 Sq. meters. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner No.1 filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Act before 2nd respondent – appellate authority. However, the said appeal was dismissed on 20.9.2005. Aggrieved further, 1st petitioner filed revision, under Section 34 of the Act on 6.3.2007, before the Government of Andhra Pradesh, which was pending at the time of repeal of the Principal Act, that is to say, as on 27.3.2008. The fact of filing of revision before the Government was also intimated to 3rd respondent on 8.3.2007 by filing a memo. However, the 1st petitioner submitted a petition dated 15.4.2007 under Section 20(1) of the Act, which was forwarded by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to 3rd respondent, for report and taking further action in the matter. 3rd respondent submitted a report, along with sketch, to the Government. In para 2 of the said report, 3rd respondent has informed the Government that the file was processed up to Section 10(3) stage of the Act and the applicant is in possession of 23,055.47 Sq. meters of land, as shown in the sketch. In the sketch, the land acquired from 1st petitioner for Indian Oil Corporation, South Central Railway, road widening by M.C.H. and A.P.S.E.B. was detailed, which was neither excluded by 3rd respondent in the earlier order passed under Section 8(4) nor in the final statement under Section 9 of the Act and also not considered by 2nd respondent – appellate authority. Further, Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Ms.No.603 Revenue (UC-1) dated 22.4.2008, published in the A.P. Gazette, Part I Extraordinary No.207 dated 22.4.2008 adopted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Central Act 15 of 1999), with effect from 27.3.2008 and consequential circular instructions were issued by the Government of A.P. vide Circular Memo No.17377/UC.I (1)/2008 dated 24.4.2008, which read as under: (a) only cases in which possession of surplus lands taken by the Government. (b) All cases in which orders passed under Section 20(1) shall be saved and further action could be continued in future in those cases only as if the Principal Act had not been repealed. (c) All pending cases in different stages i.e. under Section 8 (1), 8(4) and notifications 10(1), 10(3) and notice 10(5) shall abate. (d) All cases pending before any Court or authority shall abate. (e) All cases which were remanded back by Courts or any authority on appeal shall also abate if they have not completed 10(6) stage. (f) All pending proceedings in respect of other matters shall abate. (g) Under Repeal Act, 1999, Section 33 of the Principal Act is not protected along with other sections like Sec. 10(3) with land possession, Section 20(1) etc. That means the Commissioner of Appeals has no jurisdiction to pass any order on pending appeals including 10(6) stage cases. He is instructed to close all pending cases with proper endorsement on files. (h) The concerned Special Officer and Competent Authorities, are instructed to file Memo in the shape of counter for all cases which are pending before the Hon’ble High Court and the Supreme Court duly bringing the fact of passing of resolution by the State Legislature on 27.3.2008 to the notice of Hon’ble High Court and Supreme Court through concerned Government Pleaders. (i) Notifications have to be issued with details under Section 22(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 prohibiting the transfer of ULC lands declared under Section 10(6) of the Principal Act. (j) Municipal Authorities, Revenue Authorities, Registration Authorities, Urban Development Authorities etc. have to follow the above Notification strictly for the ULC lands which were taken possession by the Government under ULC Act while granting NOCs effecting mutations, granting registrations etc. without referring to the original authority. (k) All lands not covered by the above notification under Section 22(a) of the Registration Act, 1908 and hitherto fallen under respective Urban Agglomerations are now excluded from the purview of ULC Regulations without any constraints. From the above, it is clear that all the pending matters stood abated except the cases in which possession of surplus land was taken by the Government under Section 10(6) of the Act. In the meanwhile, 3rd respondent issued notices under Section 10(5) and passed orders under Section 10(6) of the Act, on 14.3.2008 and 25.3.2008 respectively. According to the petitioners, the respondents have never issued notice of any kind to them nor was it served on them. The principal office of petitioner No.1 is located at R.P. Road, Secunderabad, but no notice was served either on petitioner No.1 or petitioner No.2, who purchased the land from petitioner No.1 on 30.6.2008 i.e. after the Repeal Act came into force on 27.3.2008. According to the petitioners, no possession was taken by 3rd respondent at any point of time; therefore, the purported notices issued under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act are contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Hence, this writ petition. Respondent No.1 filed detailed counter affidavit denying the allegations made by the petitioner. It is further stated that notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008 and since the declarant was not residing in the address mentioned and no office was existing at the given address, notice was affixed in the locality, in the presence of the staff. Therefore, the complaint that no notice of any kind was issued to the petitioners is baseless. Since the Office itself was not existing and nobody was available, the procedure known to law i.e. affixing the notice in the locality was followed and, therefore, it must be deemed that all the notices were properly served, as per law, on the petitioners. Further, there is no lacuna or irregularity in serving the notices; therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Heard both sides. Sri E. Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, strenuously contended that under Section 10(5) of the Act there is a procedure contemplated for service of notice and accepting the explanation within 30 days, whereas, in the present case, notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008, which was never served on the petitioners, and immediately notice under Section 10(6) of the Act was issued on 25.3.2008, which was again never served on the petitioners. Therefore, on this ground alone, W.P. No. 18093 of 2008 is required to be allowed and once this writ petition is allowed, the other two writ petitions are also required to be allowed and the impugned orders therein are liable to be set aside. Whereas, learned Special Government Pleader Mr. S. Sriram, appearing on behalf of learned Advocate General, strenuously contended, that every infraction of law cannot be challenged by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless there is substantial miscarriage of justice. Petitioner No.2 is admittedly a purchaser after the issuance of notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act and it has no locus standi to join petitioner No.1 in this writ petition. Petitioner No.1 filed declaration on 26.11.1993 and when an order was passed on 27.7.1995 declaring the entire land shown by it as excess, petitioner No.1 filed W.P.No. 16666 of 1995 before this Court and this Court remanded the matter for re-consideration. On such remand, personal hearing was given on 23.8.1995 and, after hearing both the parties, on 12.9.1995 final orders were passed under Section 8(4) of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner No.1 filed appeal on 9.11.1995 and on 20.6.2005, proceedings under Section 10(1) of the Act were gazetted and no objection as required under Section 10(3) of the Act was filed. Further, there is no lapse in the procedure followed in issuing 10(5) notices or order under Section 10(6) of the Act. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. I have given my earnest consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the impugned order and other material made available on record. From the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side, the only question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is: “Whether respondent No.3 has followed the procedure as required under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act while issuing impugned notices and whether they are hit by the Repeal Act, 1999, as applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh”? It may be necessary to notice Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, which read as under: “Section 10(5): Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub- section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. Section 10(6): If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub- section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorized by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary”. In the present case, the notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008, in the prescribed form. However, that part of the notice, which says “within 30 days of the service of the notice” was struck down and the petitioner No.1 was directed to surrender/deliver possession of the said land to the Deputy Tahsildar, by 20.3.2008. Thus, the mandatory provision of allowing time of 30 days from the date of service of notice was not followed. The notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008 and the petitioner No.1 was asked to surrender the land by 20.3.2008. Thus, hardly seven days’ time was provided, which is contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 10(5) itself. Immediately, on 25.3.2008 the notice under Section 10(6) of the Act was issued. Thus, a formality was attempted to satisfy the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, to take possession of the land in question, which is in clear violation of the very Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. However, learned Special Government Pleader strenuously contended that the word “within” 30 days has to be construed as “up to” 30 days and not until or uptill 30 days – rather, a maximum time of 30 days was allowed under Section 10(5) of the Act to surrender the land and not as contended by the petitioners. It is the argument of the learned Special Government Pleader that unless substantial prejudice is shown to have been caused to the petitioners, the notice, even if it allowed seven days’ time to surrender the land, cannot be said to be either arbitrary or illegal, more particularly, when it sub-serves the public interest. Further, this is not a case of ownership and title. This is a case where Section 8(4) proceedings were concluded, land vested in Government and rest of the things are mere formalities. Here, it may be necessary to notice that aggrieved by the orders passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, the petitioners have preferred appeal before the competent authority and the same was pending as on the date the Repeal Act came into force i.e. 23.7.2008. May be, stay was not granted, but the proceedings were not concluded as on that date. It is also in the knowledge of everybody that the Repealing Act was in the offing and, in fact, in order to hurriedly conclude the proceedings under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, the impugned notices were issued by the respondents, so that they can complete the formalities before the Repeal Act comes into force. This argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is not far from truth in the background of the facts. In fact, it was the contention of the learned senior counsel Sri E. Manohar that these proceedings were fabricated. No panchanama was conducted on the spot and no independent panchas were signatories to the same. Further, he had also drawn the attention of the Court to various provisions under the Act, to justify his argument that under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, the word “within” has been used as a mandatory provision whereas under Sections 6(2), 8(3), 14(1), 15(1), 22(1), 23(1), 26(2), 27(4), and 27(5)(b) of the Act, the word “within” was used as a discretionary power vested in the authority for issuing notices within a particular period. The said Sections read as under: “Section 6(2): If the competent authority is of opinion that— (a) … … … (b) in any State which adopts this Act under Cl.(1) of Art.252 of the Constitution, any person holds at the commencement of this Act, vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), it may serve a notice upon such person requiring him to file, within such period as may be specified in the notice, the statement referred to in sub-section (1)”. Section 8(3): The draft statement shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. Section 14(1): The State Government shall, within a period of six months from the date of the order of the competent authority determining the amount to be paid under Section 11, or, in a case where an appeal has been preferred against such order under Section 12 or under Section 13, within a period of six months from the date of the final appellate order, pay the amount referred to in Section 11 to the person or persons entitled thereto. Section 15(1): If, on or after the commencement of this Act, any person acquires by inheritance, settlement or bequest from any other person or by sale in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court or of an award or order of any other authority or by purchase or otherwise, any vacant land the extent of which together with the extent of the vacant land, if any, already held by him exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling limit, then he shall, within three months of the date of such acquisition, file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all the vacant lands held by him and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. Section 22(1): Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, where any person demolishes any building on any land held by him or any such building is destroyed or demolished solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency and as a consequence thereof, in either case, the land on which such building has been constructed becomes vacant land and the aggregate of the extent of such land and the extent of any other vacant land held by him exceeds the ceiling limit, then, he shall within three months from the date of such demolition or destruction file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed, of all the vacant lands held by him. Section 26(2): Where a notice given under sub-section (1) is for the transfer of the land by way of sale, the competent authority shall have the first option to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government at a price calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), or of any other corresponding law for the time being in force and if such option is not exercised within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the notice, it shall be presumed that the competent authority has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government and it shall be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like. Section 27(4): Where within a period of sixty days of the date of receipt of an application under this section the competent authority does not refuse to grant the permission applied for or does not communicate the refusal to the applicant, the competent authority shall be deemed to have granted the permission applied for. Section 27(5)(b): If the option referred to in Cl.(a) is not exercised within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the application under this section, it shall be presumed that the competent authority has no intention to purchase such land with building or a portion only of such building on behalf of the State Government and it shall be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like. Whereas, in Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, absolutely there is no discretion vested in the authority to cut-short the period of notice. I am in full agreement with the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. Further, Section 10(5) contemplates “the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice”. Further, Rule 5(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 contemplates the procedure for service of notices, as follows: “(a) The draft statement shall be served, together with the notice referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 8, on— (i) the holder of the vacant lands, and (ii) all other persons, so far as may be known, who have, or are likely to have, any claim to, or interest in the ownership, or possession, or both, of the vacant lands, by sending the same by registered post addressed to the person concerned. However, no such notice was sent by registered post- acknowledgement due to the petitioners , in spite of the fact that the postal address was available with the authorities and the earlier correspondence was received by the petitioners at that address. It is not the case of the respondents that they have made efforts by sending notices by registered post and they were returned as the addressee was not available. The case of the respondents is that the notices were sent through special messenger and none was available at the address furnished nor the office was existing as on that date, therefore, the notices were affixed in the locality. Further, for the purpose of effectuating notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, a panchanama was conducted. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioners, they have also included the information received under the Right to Information Act, showing as to how farce of an effort was made in taking possession of the land under the said panchanama dated 25.3.2008 i.e. the date on which Section 10(6) notice was issued. Under the same panchanama, lands in as many as 10 places were taken over and in all the cases, the panchas are one and the same. The lands at Moosapet, Uppal, Uppal, Uppal Bhagath, Lalaguda, Uppal, Kukatpally, Guttala Begumpet, Guttala Begumpet, Lalaguda and Malkajgiri were taken over on the same day in the presence of same panchas. This itself would indicate that 3rd respondent has made a farce of attempt to issue notices contrary to the law, and a farce of a panchanama was conducted on 25.3.2008. All this would again fortify the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that these are all fabricated documents. It is not the case of the respondents that in any other case earlier such procedure was followed curtailing the notice period to seven days instead of thirty days as required under the law. Thus, on one side the appeal filed by the petitioners was pending against the order passed under Section 8(4) of the Act and on the other side the Repealing Act was in offing, and only to takeover possession illegally, respondent No.3 curtailed the notice period, which is contrary to law. Such a question had already come up for consideration before this Court in a reported decision in Singireddy Narasimha Reddy v. Government of A.P.[1], wherein, after an elaborate consideration of the matter, it was held that a notice issued stipulating surrender of land within 15 days is contrary to Section 10(5) and accordingly, the consequential proceedings, including notice under Section 10(6) of the Act, and possession taken by conduct of panchanama, were held to be void ab initio and of no legal consequence. In this regard, it is necessary to notice paras 25 to 31 of the said decision, which read as under: “25. One Sri Seshadri assumed the charge of the office of the 2nd respondent, on 1.3.2008. He took the steps under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. A notice dated 5.3.2008 was issued to him. He too tried to compete with his immediate predecessor, in violating the specific provisions of the act. 26. Section 10(5) of the Act mandates that the declarant must be given 30 days of notice, to deliver possession of the land. The provision reads as under: “Section 10(5): Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice”. 27. The Special Officer and Competent Authority has no option, except to stipulate the period of 30 days in this regard. As a matter of fact, the proforma notice itself mentions that the possession must be delivered to the named official within “30 days” from the date of service