1 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD FIRST APPEAL NO.693 OF 2007 1] Shamim W/o Khalil alias Gundamiya Patel, Aged 24 Years, Occupation Household, Resident of Jakekur, Taluka Omerga,District Osmanabad. 2] Faisal S/o Khalil alas Gundamiya Patel, Age 2 years (Minor) 3] Itesham S/o Khalil alas Gundamiya Patel, One month (Minor) Claimants No. 2 and 3 are minors and under the guardianship of ther natural mother claimant No.1 Shamim W/o Khalil Patel. 4] Akhatar W/o Rashid Patel, Age 45 years,Occupation Household, R/o as above. 5] Rashid S/o Gundamiya Patel,Age 52 years, Occupation Agriculturist, R/o as above. Appellants VERSUS 1] Mohammad Ismail Mohammad Ibrahim Bhole, Age 40 years, Occupation Business, R/o Gazipura, House No. 1165, Basavakalyan Ta.Basavkalyan District Bidar (Karnatka). 2] United India Insurance Company Limited Gulbarga through the Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co., Janta Shopping Centre, Navi Peth, Solapur. 2 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 3] Kishan Baburao Mehtre, Age45 years, Occupation Business R/o Gunjoti, Ta. Omerga, District Osmanabad. 4] Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Latur, through the Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. 442, West Mangalwar Peth Solapur. Respondents Mr. M.L.Dharashive,Advocate for Appellants Mr. S.V.Kulkarni,Advocate for respondent no.2. Mr. V.P.Golewar,Advocate holding for Mr. R.F.Totla,Advocate for respondent no.4. ... CORAM : A.V. NIRGUDE, J. DATED : 11th JANUARY, 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT : 1] This First Appeal is filed against the Judgment and Award passed by the learned Ex- Officio Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Osmanabad. 2] Facts leading to the litigation can be narrated as under: One Khalil, the husband and father of the appellants was working as driver on Auto rickshaw belonging to the respondent no.3. On 08.01.1997, Khalil was driving his Auto rickshaw on public 3 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 road from ‘Chaurasta to Omerga’. Some passengers were travelling in his Auto rickshaw. A Truck bearing No. KA-39/145 came from opposite direction and there occurred collision between two vehicles. One of the passenger travelling in the Auto rickshaw died on the spot and Khalil died on next day despite immediate hospitalization. Police reached to the spot and registered the offence against both drivers including the deceased Khalil. The Police Officer lodged complaint about the accident. . The appellants contended that since Khalil was earning Rs.1500/- per month as driver’s salary and since he could have survived till 70 years of his age, they were entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/-(Rs Two Lac). 3] The respondent no.2 Insurance Company, who had covered the risk of the truck, filed written statements and denied all allegations. It is contended that it was Khalil himself who was rash and negligent in driving his vehicle and that Khalil did not hold valid driving licence. The respondent no.4 is the Insurance Company who had covered to the risk of the Auto rickshaw of Khalil. They contended that the accident took place because of rash and negligent driving of the truck driver. They tried to suggest that they were not liable to pay compensation to the appellants/claimants, but it was liability of the owner of the truck as well as Insurance Company. 4 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 4] The learned Member of the Tribunal framed issues and held that the appellants could not prove that Khalil died due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the truck. The learned Member of the Tribunal specifically held that, the accident took place because of rash and negligent driving of Khalil. 5] The learned Advocate appearing for the appellants contended that the finding of facts about the negligence of Khalil recorded by the learned Member is erroneous. He then asserted that the learned Member did not take into account the provisions of section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act especially its Proviso. He pointed out that the learned Member of the Tribunal did not take into account the comprehensive nature of the Insurance Policy, which the respondent no.3, the owner of the Auto Rickshaw had purchased from the respondent No. 2 Insurance Company. 6] The First question, that is required to be decided that whether the finding on facts recorded by the learned Member of the Tribunal are correct? 7] The appellants recorded the deposition of the appellant No.1, who admittedly was not present when the accident took place and therefore unable to throw light on the incident as to how it occurred and due to whose negligence the accident 5 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 took place. The respondent no.2 did not record any evidence on factual aspect of the case. The respondents, specially the respondent no. 1, the owner of the Truck and respondent No.2 the Insurer of the respondent no.1 could have certainly recorded deposition of the driver of the Truck, who knew as to how the accident had taken place. So, there is practically no first hand evidence on record to explain as to how the accident took place. The learned Member of the Tribunal, therefore, peeped into the Police papers that were filed by the appellants on the record. Most important of which was the copy of the First Information Report. The learned Member of the Tribunal read the First Information Report and recorded his finding as mentioned above. The First Information Report was lodged by a Police Sub-Inspector -Mr. Chendke- of Umarga Police Station. He stated that on 8.1.1997 when he was preset at the Police Station. Some time prior to 5.50 p.m. on receiving information about the accident, he went to the spot and saw the spot of incident, noticed the dead body and two vehicles in damaged condition on the road. He recorded his opinion (unnecessarily) that accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of both the drivers of the vehicle. In addition to this, he stated that he made inquiry with one Pandurang Yadav Gaikwad, who also sustained injury in the accident. He stated further that it was Pandurang who informed him that it was Khalil, the 6 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 driver of the Auto rickshaw who tried to overtake the vehicle and while doing so and in the process the truck belonging to the respondent no.1 come from opposite direction and there occurred head on collusion between the vehicles. He also recorded that Pandurang said to him that Khalil was rash and negligent in driving of his vehicle and it was due to such driving accident took place. 8] The learned Member of the Tribunal gave importance to this portion of the First Information Report, which contains the narration of injured witness Pandurang. The question is whether the learned Member of the Tribunal could have used this part of the First Information Report for recording the findings of fact. Admittedly, Pandurang was not examined as a witness in this case. Neither his statement was recorded by Police Officer under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor it has come on record. The learned Member of the Tribunal therefore was completely unaware about as to whether the witness Pandurang was present when incident took place. Assuming that he was present, the question still arises as to whether the complainant Police Sub-Inspector Chendke could have utilised hear-say evidence, which he heard from witness Pandurang to be included in the report and whether such hear-say was useful for the learned Member of the Tribunal while appreciating the facts of the case. I am aware 7 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 that in the cases of this nature, formal proof of documents that are recorded during police investigation is not necessary. Therefore, the copies of First Information Report, scene of offence panchnama, Inquest Panchnama and Post Mortem Notes could have been brought on record without formally recording the depositions of witnesses. In other words, the appellant could have proved the First Information Report without examining the Police-Sub-Inspector Chendke. Yet there is limitation as to what extent such material can be utilised for giving finding on facts. Had PSI chendke come as witness in this case and deposed, the learned Member of the Tribunal would have prevent him from deposing as to what he heard from an eye witness about the incident, such statement would have been hit by section 60 of the Evidence Act. 60. Oral evidence must be direct:-Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; that is to say- if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it; if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be in the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner; if it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held it must be the evidence of the person who hold that opinion on those grounds: Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any 8 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or can not be found, or has become incapable giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable. Provided also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection. 9] In view of this only relevant portion of the First Information Report would be admissible in this case. PSI Chendke could have stated to the Court as to what he saw on the spot. As said above, he even could not have opined about the alleged negligence of both drivers of the vehicles. None the less on the facts of the case he could have registered the offence under sections 304(A), 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code against both the drivers. If one ignores hear-say portion of statement of Pandurang from the First Information Report, there is hardly any material on record to prove that it was Khalil alone, due to whose rash and negligent driving the accident took place. In other words, the material before the Court is rather ambivalent which suggests that the accident took place due to negligence of both the drivers. Therefore, I have recorded my findings that the accident took place due to contributory negligence of both the 9 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 drivers. 10] The learned Member of the Tribunal unfortunately was not shown the provision of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which read as under. Section 147 :- Requirements of Policies and limits of liability: (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily [ injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle] or damage to any person of a a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Provided that a policy shall not be required- (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of an in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of an in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923( 8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee- (a)engaged in driving the vehicle,or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor or the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle ,or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability; 10 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 11] The provision of section (1) lays down that if policy is ‘Act policy’, the insurer would have limited liability to protect the person insured to the extent of his liability which would have arisen under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. In view of this provision the employer of the deceased Khalil (Respondent no.3) would not have escaped the liability and so the respondent no. 4 would have compensated him of the liability. Even on the basis of this the learned Member of the Tribunal could have awarded the compensation to the appellants. 12] However, the case of the appellant is far better than on placing reliance on the above mentioned provision. We have on record the copy of the Policy, which the respondent no.3 purchased from the respondent no.4. It is a comprehensive policy and not ‘Act only’ policy. This Policy is at Exh.57. It seems, the appellant did not invite the attention of the learned Member of the Tribunal on this document at all and so I did not find discussion on this point in the impugned judgment. The policy not only includes third party risk, but it also covers legal liability towards the passengers (three in number). In addition to this, a separate amount of premium is also levied for covering the risk of the driver of the vehicle. In view of these terms of the policy, the respondent no.4 is unable to escape its liability. 11 FIRST APPEAL.NO.693.07 13] The last question is what would be the amount of the compensation. On this point the learned Member of the Tribunal has given finding in para no.12 of the Judgment. I see no error in this part of the judgment. The learned member held that multiplier 15 is applicable to this case and so total amount of compensation payable to the appellants was calculated to the extent of Rs. 1,90,000/-. ORDER 1] The First Appeal is partly allowed. 2] The respondent nos.1 to 4 jointly and severally pay a compensation to the tune of Rs.1,90,000/- (Rs. One Lacs Ninety Thousand) with interest @ Rs.9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim. 3] The respondent nos. 1 to 4 jointly and severally pay the costs of the petition to the appellants/claimants. Sd/- (A.V. NIRGUDE, J.) MTK/ok