IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Criminal Revision No. 2353 of 2003 Date of decision: 20th April, 2009 Khushi Ram Verma … Petitioner Versus Kamla … Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Present: Mr. B.R. Gupta, Advocate for the petitioner. KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. (ORAL) Present revision petition has been filed by Khushi Ram Verma son of Munshi Ram. He is aggrieved against the acquittal of accused respondents Kamla, Radhey Shyam and Subhash. They were tried by the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Meham in case FIR No. 180 dated 30.04.1991 registered at Police Station City Hansi under Sections 498-A, 387, 506, 120-B IPC. In the present case, State has opted not to file any appeal. Therefore, present revision petition has been filed by complainant against the acquittal of accused respondents. Sister of the complainant, Shakuntala was married with Vijay Singh according to Hindu rites and ceremonies at village Badsi on 30th June, 1982. Vijay Singh was declared as Proclaimed Offender. It is stated that in October 1990, Vijay Singh, husband of Shakuntala, gave a threat to her that she will be put to death or grievous injury will be caused, in case the demand of Maruti car and Criminal Revision No. 2353 of 2003 Rs.70,000/- is not fulfilled. It has further been stated that on 2nd December, 1990, Vijay Singh came at Hansi along with three unknown persons, armed with pistol and demanded Maruti car and expenses incurred for construction of house at Bahadurgarh. Complainant, on 23rd April, 1991, reached at Bahadurgarh at the house of Vijay Singh and found that his sister Shakuntala and her minor children were facing starvation and having pangs of hunger, as accused Vijay Singh had failed to supply food to the family members. Radhey Shyam had filed complaint in the Court and on the basis of order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., FIR Ex.P7, was registered. Thereafter, challan was submitted. Prosecution examined PW- 1 Hem Raj, PW-2 Khushi Ram, PW-3 Mahabir Parsad, PW-4 Ram Parkash, aggrieved wife Shakuntala as PW-5 and Rajinder Singh as PW- 6. All incriminating evidence was put to the accused in statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied the incriminating circumstances and examined 38 witnesses in defence. It was contended on behalf of the accused respondents that all allegations of demand of dowry and entrustment of dowry are against Vijay Singh, husband of Shakuntala, who has been declared as Proclaimed Offender. The trial Court considered prosecution evidence and the defence evidence and held as under: “12. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions of both sides I have come to the opinion on appraisal of the evidence of the prosecution as well as accused that solemnization of the marriage of Vijay Singh and Shakuntla Verma on 30.6.82 is not disputed. On careful perusal of the judicial record it appears to me that bone of contention of this case is accused Vijay Singh who is not present before me on today because he had already been declared proclaimed offender.” 2 Criminal Revision No. 2353 of 2003 Mr. B.R. Gupta appearing for the petitioner has read the judgment. Trial Judge has also held as under: 17. … … … … There is no evidence against the accused present before me on today as to in what manner and in which words accused gave threat of killing to her and her family members. However, all prosecution witnesses stated in a bald manner that accused demanded maruti car and cash amount Rs.70,000/- from victim party and in case of failure they also gave threat to kill the family members of victim party but on careful appraisal of the statements of Khushi Ram, Mahabir Parsad and Shakuntla I have come to the opinion that maruti car and cash amount Rs.70,000/- had been demanded only by Vijay Singh accused and not by the accused present before me on today.” Taking the entire evidence into consideration, the trial Court found that Vijay Singh, husband of Shakuntala was responsible and had acquitted the accused respondents Kamla, Radhey Shyam and Subhash, who are mother and brothers of Vijay Singh. The view taken by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse. It was held in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707 Mahendra Partap Singh vs. Sarju Singh and another, relying upon D.Stephens vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196, as under: “only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is 3 Criminal Revision No. 2353 of 2003 entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352), Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: “This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the 4 Criminal Revision No. 2353 of 2003 State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when “there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.” In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re- trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = (AIR 1968 SC 707) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it 5 Criminal Revision No. 2353 of 2003 was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. “In other words” said this Court, “the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 444. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh vs. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. There is no merit. Hence, present revision petition is dismissed. [KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA] JUDGE April 20, 2009 rps 6