LPA No. 22 of 2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision: 07.01.2011 1. LPA No. 22 of 2010 M/s National Woolen Mills and another Appellants Versus Ramesh Chand ..Respondents. 2. LPA No. 23 of 2010 M/s National Woolen Mills and another ...Appellants Versus Gopal and others ..Respondents. 3. LPA No. 24 of 2010 M/s National Woolen Mills and another ...Appellants Versus Balbir Kaur and others ..Respondents. 4. LPA No. 25 of 2010 M/s National Woolen Mills and another ...Appellants Versus Dharam Kaur and others .. Respondents. 5. LPA No. 26 of 2010 M/s National Woolen Mills and another ...Appellants Versus [1] LPA No. 22 of 2010 Urmila Devi and others ..Respondents. 6. LPA No. 27 of 2010 M/s National Woolen Mills and another ...Appellants Versus Sulinder Kaur and others ..Respondents. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2. Whether to be referred to the Reporters or not ? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Present : Mr. Parveen Kumar Kataria, Advocate, for the appellants in all the appeals. Mr. Suram Singh Rana, Advocate, for the respondent-workmen in all the appeals. **** RANJAN GOGOI, A.C.J.(Oral) These appeals by the Management being directed against the common order dated 21.07.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge were heard together and are being disposed of by the present order. The facts in brief may be noticed at the outset. [2] LPA No. 22 of 2010 By an award passed in the year 1993, each of the respondent- workman in the six appeals under consideration was directed to be reinstated. The details of the dates of award passed in each of the cases; the dates of publication thereof in the official Gazette; the dates on which the respondent-workman claims to have submitted the joining reports; as well as the dates of their actual joining are reflected below. The chart below also indicates the period/dates for which claims were made by the workmen under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) :- LPA No. LPA No. 22 LPA No. 23 LPA No. 24 LPA No. 25 LPA No. 26 LPA No. 27 Name of the appellant Ramesh Chand Gopal Balbir Kaur Dharam Kaur Urmila Devi Sulinder Kaur Date of Award 13.5.1993 3.9.1993 3.9.1993 3.9.1993 13.5.1993 3.9.1993 Date of Publication 19.11.1993 19.11.1993 19.11.1993 10.12.1993 29.10.1993 10.12.93 Date of joining 13.12.93 13.12.1993 13.12.1993 13.12. 93 Not proved 13.12.1993 13.12.93 Not proved Date of actual joining 11.7.97 11.7.1997 11.7.1997 11.7.1997 11.7.1997 11.7.1997 Period of Claim U/s 33-C(2) of the Act. 1.10.1993 to 31.7.1997 19.11.1993 to 31.8.1996 19.11.1993 to 31.8.1996 1.10.1993 to 31.8.1996 29.10.1993 to 31.8.1996 3.9.1993 to 31.8.1996 The dates of joining of the respondent-workmen were preceded by the institution of separate writ petitions filed by each of [3] LPA No. 22 of 2010 the workman seeking a direction for enforcement of the award which was granted by this Court by the orders passed on different dates. After the reinstatement on the dates as noticed above, the respondent- workmen filed applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act for payment of wages due to them in terms of the award. In the proceedings before the Industrial Court out of which LPA Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 26 of 2010 arises. Orders were passed by the learned Labour Court allowing the claim of wages for a period of three years prior to the date of the application(s). In so far as the proceedings out of which LPA Nos. 25 and 27 arises, the claims of the workmen were dismissed primarily on the ground that the workmen could not satisfy the learned Labour Court that they had raised a demand to be allowed to join in service pursuant to the award passed. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Labour Court in both the sets of cases separate writ petitions were filed by the respondent-workmen which were answered by the common impugned order dated 21.7.2009 holding the respondent-workmen to be entitled to full wages for the entire period upto the date of joining. Aggrieved, the Management has instituted the six appeals presently under consideration. In so far as the proceedings in which the claims of the workmen were partly allowed by the learned Labour Court it is the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the awards were passed in the year 1993 and the applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act were filed in the year 1999. The said applications, according [4] LPA No. 22 of 2010 to the learned counsel, were highly belated with no explanation for the delay forthcoming from the side of the workman. Learned counsel has further argued that the learned Single Judge had directed for payment of wages to the respondent-workmen from 19.11.1993 till the date(s) of joining, which, in certain cases, is for a period beyond the period claimed by the respondent-workmen. In so far as LPA Nos. 25 and 27 are concerned, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the learned Labour Court had dismissed the claims of the workmen in the proceedings before it. The reasons and grounds which had prevailed upon the learned Labour Court to dismiss the said claims have neither been considered nor evidence and materials adduced in this regard by the respective parties which were taken into account by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, it is argued that the order of learned Single Judge deciding both sets of cases in favour of the respondent-workmen is untenable in law. In reply, Shri Suram Singh Rana, learned counsel for the respondent-workmen has contended that the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in awarding the claim for wages beyond the period of three years from the date of claim in as much as the award(s) has become enforceable on its publication. That apart, the learned counsel has argued that the learned Single Judge had rightly considered the decision of the Apex Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S.Rajagopalan etc. AIR 1964 SC 743 to hold that no limitation has been prescribed for bringing an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is further argued that the workman had to run from pillar [5] LPA No. 22 of 2010 to post to obtain the relief of reinstatement and it is only upon the intervention of this Court that reinstatement was granted to each of the workmen w.e.f. 11.07.1997. It is, therefore, that date of reinstatement that has to be considered and so construed the claim for wages under Section 33-C(2) of the Act made in the year 1999 is not a belated claim. In so far as the claims of the workmen which had been dismissed by the learned Labour Court is concerned, learned counsel has pointed out that though it was the admitted case of the management, as evident from the evidence of testimony of MW-1, that each of the workman had moved this Court seeking enforcement of the award. The learned Labour Court had not considered the said fact in its proper prospective to come to the conclusion that the concerned workmen had not established that they had lodged claims for reinstatement on the dates as claimed by them. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. We have also read and considered the materials on record including the evidence rendered by MW-1; the reasons that had prevailed upon by the learned Labour Court to pass the orders under Section 33-C(2) of the Act as well as the orders of learned Single Judge. The plea of delay raised on behalf of the appellant would stand adequately answered by the view recorded by the learned Single Judge on the strength of the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Bank of India’s case (supra). In the present case, though the award was passed in the year 1993, [6] LPA No. 22 of 2010 reinstatement was actually effected on 11.7.1997 and that too at the intervention of this Court in the writ petitions filed by each of the workmen. If the reinstatements were actually affected in the year 1997 and there is no bar of limitation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the filing of an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, the period of about two years that had intervened cannot be construed by the Court to be unreasonable delay on the part of the workman in approaching the learned Labour Court for relief under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It cannot be logically perceived as to how a workman, who is yet to be reinstated pursuant to an award, can lodge a claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Such a claim can logically follow only after reinstatement. This is what had happened in the present case. We are therefore inclined to take the view that the plea of delay that has been urged on behalf of the appellants to defeat the claims of the workmen should not have the approval of the Court. In so far as the two proceedings before the learned Labour Court where the claims of the workmen were dismissed on the grounds noticed earlier, a perusal of the order passed by the learned Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act would go to show that two reasons have been cited for the conclusion reached. The first is that the concerned workmen had failed to produce before the Court the original of the U.P.C. receipt by which the demand of reinstatement was raised and that the photocopy of the said document was not legible. The second reason assigned by the learned Labour Court is that the concerned workmen could not produce any material before [7] LPA No. 22 of 2010 the Court to show that they had earlier moved the High Court for enforcement of the award. According to us, both the grounds cited by the learned Labour Court are fallacious. The workmen did adduce some evidence to show that they had raised a demand for reinstatement. This was in the form of the photocopies of the U.P.C. Merely because the photocopies were not legible to the learned Labour Court, without making a further endeavour in this regard, the learned Labour Court could not have considered the said fact to be amounting to a failure on the part of the workmen to prove that a demand for reinstatement was raised by them. In any event, to fortify its conclusion reached on the first score, the learned Labour Court took the view that the concerned workmen failed to prove that they had moved the High Court earlier seeking enforcement of the award. In recording the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Labour Court overlooked the evidence of MW-1 which indicates that the said management witness had admitted before the learned Labour Court that all the six workmen had moved earlier the High Court for enforcement of the award. That apart, from the other material on record i.e. photocopy of the order passed by the High Court, it is clear that at least one of the aforesaid workman i.e. Dharam Kaur had, infact, moved the High Court in an earlier proceeding seeking enforcement of the award. In the face of the aforesaid material we find it difficult to sustain the findings of the learned Labour Court dismissing the claims of the two workmen. [8] LPA No. 22 of 2010 We have, however, noticed that by the order of the learned Single Judge relief of wages has been granted for periods beyond what had been claimed by the workmen in their applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Relief not claimed could not have been granted. The workmen having raised a claim and having stipulated the period of such claim, naturally, relief could not be granted in excess of what had been claimed. In an earlier part of this order, we have already noticed the period of the claims made by each of the workman in their respective applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In view of the foregoing discussion, we dispose of all the appeals by maintaining the order of the learned Single Judge with the modification that the relief of wages that will be granted to the workmen will now be confined to the period(s) for which claims had been raised by the workmen in their applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. Naturally the wages will be paid to each of the workman calculated from the expiry of 30 days of the date of publication of each of the awards, the details of which have also been noted in the earlier part of this order. Consequently, except for the modification as above, the order of the learned Single Judge is affirmed and the appeals are disposed of accordingly. (RANJAN GOGOI) ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE [9] LPA No. 22 of 2010 (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH) 07.01.2011 JUDGE 'ravinder' [1