Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 Date of Decision: 26.05.2011 Paramjit Singh ....Petitioner Versus State of Punjab etc. ...Respondents CORAM : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Nirmaljit Kaur Present:- Mr. J.S. Chahal, Advocate for the petitioners. ***** 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? ** NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. (ORAL) This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR No.56 dated 26.04.1998 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 IPC registered at Police Station Division No.4, Jalandhar on the basis of compromise between the parties. Notice of motion. On the asking of the Court, Ms. Gurveen H. Singh, Additional Advocate General, Punjab accepts notice on behalf of respondent-State. Mr. Daljit Singh Kahlon, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No.2 and had filed affidavit on behalf of respondent- complainant. He does not dispute that the matter has been compromised. The FIR, in question, was got registered by respondent No.2- Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 2 Harjit Singh. However, the matter has been compromised. Compromise deed (Annexure P-3) has been placed on record to this effect. Learned counsel for respondent-complainant states that the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender. However, he has since surrendered before the trial Court and is in custody since 28.04.2011. The regular bail filed by the petitioner i.e. Crl. Misc. No.M-15602 of 2011 is pending in this Court in which notice of motion has been issued for 11.08.2011. Thus, there is no impediment in the way of the Court to entertain the present petition. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has placed on record the affidavit of respondent No.2 admitting the factum of compromise. As per the said affidavit, respondent No.2 has no objection, if the proceedings qua Paramjit Singh are quashed. Further, the co-accused of the petitioner has since been acquitted by the then Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jalandhar vide judgment of acquittal dated 13.07.2006 being Criminal Case No.129/1/2000. The question therefore arises is whether the proceedings can be quashed qua the petitioner who is a declared proclaimed offender. The said issue came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court in Crl. Appeal No.D-638-DB of 2007. The Division Bench after serious consideration held that “inherent powers can be exercised when this Court finds that the innocent accused, who had absconded would simply face the empty formality of trial with the very same unbelievable and untrustworthy evidence, which would ultimately lead to their acquittal.” The detailed discussion in paras 22, 23 and 24 of the said judgment reads as under :- “Quashing of pending proceedings against other accused:- 22. While disposing of these two appeals, we are very much concerned about the absconding village rustic accused namely Radha Mandal, Rajiya Mandal and Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 3 Sambodh Mandal, who had successfully evaded the dragnet of the police. The Investigating agency has put up a case implanting eye witnesses as against all the accused. Both the eye witnesses projected by the prosecution had not passed the test of trustworthiness. Their own showing would go to establish without any pale of doubt that they could not have witnessed the occurrence. The other materials produced by the prosecution also did not advance the case of the prosecution any further. The above facts and circumstances have persuaded us to come to a definite conclusion that the accused in this case were not the perpetrators of crime of murder as alleged by the prosecution. The same set of materials would be produced before the Sessions Court on production of the remaining three accused namely Radha Mandal, Rajiya Mandal and Sambodh Mandal. After all the poor innocent labourers had migrated to other places to eke out their livelihood. The appellants herein had in fact suffered imprisonment for such a long time leaving behind their kith and kin, who might have been in dire need of financial support and help from them. Such an unpleasant situation shall not be created for the other three accused against whom also there is no material on record to fasten them with the charge of murder. We seriously pondered over rendering judicial succour to those faceless and voiceless accused who had taken to heals and hidden themselves apprehending the wrath of criminal proceedings for the heinous crime of murder. We are convinced that our judicial arm is not so crippled as to betray the vague hope of the hopeless. 23. We are conscious of the fact situation that those three accused namely Radha Mandal, Rajiya Mandal and Sambodh Mandal had absconded and were declared as proclaimed offenders. They had not faced the trial, but when we find that no case could be made out as against them also with the very same rickety materials, those accused also will have to be relieved of Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 4 the impending pain of facing the prosecution for murder. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:- “Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 24. The above provisions recognize the inherent powers of the Court to do real and substantial justice, preventing the abuse of the process of the Court. The statutory recognition of the inherent jurisdiction of the criminal Court indicates that there is a power for the criminal Courts to make such an order as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice. We are conscious of the fact that the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be exercised very sparingly and in exceptional cases where abuse of the process of the Court would result in serious miscarriage of justice. The inherent powers of the Court should not be exercised to stifle legitimate prosecution. But at any rate the settled position is that this Court has the jurisdiction to quash the entire criminal proceedings to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court in order to secure the ends of justice. In our considered view the same inherent powers can be exercised when this Court finds that the innocent accused, who had absconded would simply face the empty formality of trial with the very same unbelievable and untrustworthy evidence, which would ultimately lead to their acquittal. Bringing the absconding accused to face the trial in this case in the above facts and circumstances would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. To secure the ends of justice, we hereby quash the entire proceedings as against the absconding accused namely Radha Mandal, Rajiya Mandal and Sambodh Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 5 Mandal pending before Judicial Magistrate Ist Class,Bathinda/Sessions Judge, Bathinda, as no useful purpose will be served even if they are procured and ordered to face the trial in this case.” The facts of the present case are somewhat similar. The co-accused of the petitioner had already been acquitted. There is no chance of any other evidence against the present petitioner as the matter has been compromised with the petitioner. Moreover, in case the petitioner is put to trial, the evidence against him, would also be the same, on the basis of which, the other co-accused had already been acquitted. Even otherwise, in the case of Gurpreet Singh alias Khinder vs. State of Punjab reported as 1995(2) RCR (Crl.) 127, somewhere in similar circumstances, where the petitioner was charged for an offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, as well as, Sections 302/34 IPC, the FIR was quashed as the co-accused, who were arrested stood acquitted by the trial Court. It was held in the said case that where the evidence is same, continuation of proceedings in the case of the co-accused would result in waste of court's time and unnecessary expenditure on State exchequer. The proceedings in the said case against the petitioner were quashed while relying on the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court rendered in the case titled as Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and another vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others reported as 1988(1) Recent CR 565 by observing in para 4 as under :- “ The local position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 6 the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are weak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” In another case, the Single Bench of Delhi High Court titled as Urmila Devi vs. The State (NCT of Delhi), (Delhi) reported as 2007(1) RCR (Criminal) 246 while relying on various judgments of Hon'ble the Apex Court and the other High Courts quashed the proceedings against the petitioner under Section 304-B/34 IPC, as all the co-accused were acquitted and there was no question of invoking Section 34 IPC. Para 5 of the said judgment reads as under :- “5. The learned counsel for the petitioner took me through the judgment dated 24.09.2003 to show the manner in which the evidence led by the prosecution witnesses and, particularly, by the mother and sisters of the deceased (Meenu) have been discussed in detail by the trial court and have been found to be untrustworthy. He then referred to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar v. State, 81(1999) DLT 197 wherein, also, the co-accused had been acquitted while the petitioner therein had been absconding and, therefore, the trial could not proceed against him. Subsequently, after the co-accused were acquitted, the petitioner, in that case, surrendered before the Additional Sessions Judge and sought his discharge on the ground that the other accused had been acquitted of the offences under Sections 148/302/149 IPC. Rejecting that prayer, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had framed a charge under Sections 304/34 IPC against the petitioner therein. However, this court set aside that order and concluded Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 7 that the trial would only mean a wastage of time inasmuch as it was of the view that the evidence against all the accused persons was inseparable and indivisible and, therefore, when the co-accused had been acquitted, there was no reason to treat the petitioner differently on the basis of the same evidence. Paragraph 3 of the said decision is relevant and it reads as under:- “3. The question thus is as to whether in the face of the judgment of acquittal the petitioner should still be permitted to undergo the ordeal of a trial. In Sat Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1974 SC 294 it was held that there is no rule of law that if the Court acquits some of the accused on the evidence of a witness raising doubt with regard to them the other accused against whom there is absolute certainly about his complicity in the crime based on the remaining credible part of the evidence of that witness must be acquitted. But where the evidence against all the accused persons is inseparable and indivisible and if some of the accused persons have been acquitted, the remaining accused persons cannot be treated differently on the basis of the same evidence.” In the case of Amarjit vs. State reported as 1996(1) C.C. Cases 465 too, the co-accused had been acquitted, the Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not required to undergo the ordeal of a trial, particularly, when the co-accused was acquitted. The case of the petitioner is even better. No doubt, he was declared proclaimed offender but he has since surrendered before the trial Court and is in judicial custody. Secondly, the complainant has entered into compromise with the petitioner. Besides, the other co-accused are acquitted. The dispute is also personal in nature. Thus, there is no impediment in the way of the Court to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of the FIR. The Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Kulwinder Singh Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 8 and others vs. State of Punjab and another 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052 has held that the compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is “finest hour of justice”. Disputes which have their genesis not only in matrimonial discord but others as well, such compromise deserves to be accepted. It is further held as under :- “ The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non- compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.” In the case of Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab 2008(4) S.C. Cases 582, the Apex Court emphasised and advised as under :- “ We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.” In view of the above discussion and facts, the present petition Crl. Misc. No.M-16017 of 2011 9 is allowed and FIR No. 56 dated 26.04.1998 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 IPC registered at Police Station Division No.4, Jalandhar is hereby quashed qua the petitioner. (NIRMALJIT KAUR) 26.05.2011 JUDGE gurpreet