IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition No. 1106 OF 2010 (S/S) Km. Manju Negi ……Petitioner. Versus State of Uttarakhand ………Respondents. Present: Mr. R.P. Nautiyal, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Subhash Upadhyay, Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand. Hon’ble Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. (Oral) 1. Heard Mr. R.P. Nautiyal, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Subhash Upadhyay, Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand. 2. The petitioner is a Pharmacist in District Hospital, Gopeshwar, Chamoli. She is aggrieved by her transfer from Gopeshwar, Chamoli to Rudraprayag, which has been passed on 10.9.2010 on administrative ground. 3. The primary contention of the petitioner is that the order dated 10.9.2010 is penal in nature, and such order cannot be passed by way of any punishment, and definitely without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. This in short is the contention of the petitioner. 4. On perusal of the averments made in the counter affidavit as well as the documents annexed with the counter affidavit, the real perspective has emerged, under which the transfer has actually been made. As per the records, Km. Manju Negi (petitioner) and one Darshan Singh Panwar used to work at District Hospital, Gopeshwar, Chamoli. Darshan Singh Panwar, who is a married person, certain complaints were filed by his wife 2 to the Authorities about his alleged affair with the petitioner and several correspondence were made with the Police and the proceedings under Sections 107 / 116 of Cr.P.C. have been initiated against Sri Dharshan Singh and the present petitioner. In other words, reason for transferring the petitioner from Gopeshwar, Chamoli to Rudraprayag is to defuse the situation. However, a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Damyanti Bisht Vs. State of Uttarakand and others 2008 (2) U.D., 517, has observed as under: “13. In the present appeal as well as in the writ petition, the only ground which was raised against the impugned transfer orders was that they were passed on administrative ground, and therefore, per se were bad in law. The learned Single Judge, in the judgment impugned in the Special Appeal, in our considered opinion, has taken the correct view that the transfer order on administrative ground per se is not bad in law. We agree with him. We accordingly over-rule the view adopted by the Division Bench in the interlocutory order dated 1st July, 2008 in the aforesaid writ petition. We, while upholding the aforesaid view, substitute our own opinion by laying down that even though a transfer order on an administrative ground per se is not bad in law, no person can be transferred on an administrative ground unless before issuing the transfer order, the authority competent arrived at and recorded his satisfaction upon due verification and confirmation about the existence and truthfulness of anyone of the three factors/grounds/ considerations warranting the transfer of the person concerned.” 3 5. Admittedly, no such satisfaction has been recorded by the concerned authorities as contemplated in the decision. The transfer order, therefore, becomes punitive in nature and this could not have been passed, respondents though are at liberty to initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. They may also suspend the petitioner, in case they feel it appropriate in the interest of justice. However, in the light what has been stated by this Court and in the light of the decision of the Full Bench, the transfer order dated 10.9.2010 cannot survive and is hereby quashed. 6. The writ petition stands allowed. 7. No order as to costs. (Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.) 5.1.2011 Rathour