1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 402 OF 2008 IN WRIT PETITION NO. 4018 OF 1993 Shashikala Bhaskar Yadav. . .. Petitioner. vs. Pune Vidyarthi Grih & Ors. .... Respondents. Mr. Uday Warunjikar for the Petitioner. Mr. P.S. Dani for Respondent No.1 CORAM : J.N. PATEL, & SMT. V.K. TAHILRAMANI, JJ. DATE : 19th MARCH, , 2009. P.C. : . Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2 2. The appellant was appointed by respondent nos. 1 to 3 as full time teacher on 17.7.1991. The services of the appellant were terminated by letter dated 30.03.1992 with effect from 01.05.1992. The appellant preferred an appeal before the School Tribunal. The appeal came to be allowed and the order of termination came to be set aside. Being aggrieved thereby the respondent management preferred Writ Petition No. 4018 of 1993. The learned Single Judge by order dated 13.02.2007 set aside the order of the School Tribunal. Being aggrieved thereby this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. Warunjikar, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration some documents which were not before the School Tribunal. He submitted that on this basis the learned Single Judge held that the appointment of the appellant was temporary and hence the termination order cannot be faulted. However, it is seen that the appointment letter itself clearly states that the appointment of the appellant is purely temporary for one year i.e. From 17.7.1991 3 to 30.4.1992. A copy of the appointment letter is annexed to this appeal. It is not disputed by the appellant that the said document is indeed the appointment letter of the appellant. As stated earlier, the appointment letter clearly shows that the appointment of the appellant was temporary in nature. 4. In addition to the above, it is seen that the appointment of the appellant was accorded approved by the Education Officer and the approval order dated 30.9.1991 categorically mentions that the appointment of the appellant is approved only for one academic session. In the said approval order it is further stated that clear understanding should be given to the candidate that the appointment is purely temporary and that too against reserved category. 5. The contention of the appellant is that the appointment was not a temporary appointment. It is not disputed by the appellant that the post wherein she was working was advertised for the next academic session i.e. 1992 and 1993 and the appellant along with some other candidates had applied for the said post. It is also admitted 4 that in the process of selection the appellant was rejected and some other candidate was selected. The categorical case of the appellant is that her appointment was not temporary but it was permanent in nature. If such was the case, there was absolutely no need for the appellant to have responded to the advertisement for the year 1992-93. This action on the part of the appellant also shows that her appointment was in fact temporary in nature and she was well aware that her appointment was temporary in nature. Hence, she has responded to the advertisement in the year 1992-93. 6. Mr. Warunjikar thereafter submitted that there is no reference in the advertisement that the post was a reserved post and in the advertisement it is only stated that preference shall be given to candidate from reserved category. However, assuming that this is so, the appointment letter, the approval letter as well as the action of the appellant in responding to the advertisement in the year 1992-93 clearly show that the appointment of the appellant was temporary in nature. Hence, the issue whether the post was meant for reserved category or not would not really affect the 5 matter. 7. The appointment of the appellant was not a permanent appointment and it was a temporary appointment. Hence, the School Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the termination order on the ground that the appointment of the appellant was a permanent appointment and granting reinstatement to the appellant without there being any evidence on record that the appointment' was permanent in nature. Looking to the above position, we see no error or illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge. Hence, the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. (J.N. PATEL, J.) (SMT. V.K. TAHILRAMANI, J.) 6