IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.287 of 1998 Date of decision : October 13, 2008 State of H.P. …Appellant. Versus Mansha Ram and another …Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellant : Mr. P.M. Negi, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr. Baldev Singh, Advocate. Surjit Singh, Judge( Oral ) State has appealed against the judgment and decree, dated 2nd March, 1998, of learned District Judge (the first Appellate Court), whereby appeal filed against the judgment and decree, dated 23rd February, 1991, of the trial Court, passed in favour of plaintiff-respondent Mansha Ram, in a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction, has been dismissed. 2. Relevant facts are like this. Respondent Mansha Ram filed a suit for declaration that he is owner in possession of 18 biswas land, comprised in Khasra No.159/90/1, situate in Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., as it had been in his possession since the time of his father. By way of further relief, he prayed for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the present appellant, i.e. the State of Himachal Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? …2… Pradesh, from interfering in his possession, on the basis of revenue entries, showing it to be the owner in possession of the said land. It was alleged that in the year 1945, the Ruler of erstwhile State of Bilaspur granted 1 bigha 19 biswas land to the father of plaintiff-respondent Mansha Ram and that simultaneously with the taking of the possession of said 1 bigha 19 biswas land, father of the plaintiff-respondent encroached upon 18 biswas land bearing Khasra No.159/90/1, hereinafter referred to as the suit land, and that after the death of his father, the plaintiff-respondent had been in possession of the said land. It has been alleged that since the entries in the revenue record showed the State of Himachal Pradesh as owner in possession, the functionaries of the defendant-appellant had been threatening to dispossess him (plaintiff-respondent). 3. Defendant-appellant pleaded that proceedings, under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, had been initiated against the plaintiff-respondent for encroaching upon the suit land and, hence, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction was barred. On merits, it was alleged that encroachment had been made by the plaintiff-respondent in the year 1986 and that the plea of plaintiff’s father having encroached upon the land in the year 1945 and developed the same into fields, was false. 4. Trial Court framed various issues on the pleadings of the parties. Parties went to trial. Trial Court gave the finding that the plaintiff-respondent was in adverse possession of the suit land and his possession had matured into title. Issue regarding jurisdiction was observed to have not been pressed. …3… Appeal was filed by the State in the Court of District Judge. Learned District Judge has dismissed the same. 5. The present Regular Second Appeal was admitted on 15th September, 1998. No doubt, the order does not speak as to on what substantial questions of law the appeal had been admitted, but three substantial questions of law, formulated by the appellant, were submitted alongwith the memorandum of appeal and it appears that the appeal was admitted on these substantial questions of law. The same are as follows: 1. Whether both the courts below misread revenue records and committed error? If so, its effect. 2. Whether the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit? 3. Whether principles of adverse possession have been wrongly applied by both the Courts below? 6. I have heard the learned Deputy Advocate General as also the learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent and gone through the record. 7. From a bare reading of the evidence on record, it is clear that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff-respondent did not establish the plea of adverse possession in a lawful manner. Plaintiff-respondent Mansha Ram appeared as PW-1 and made a vague statement that his father had made the suit land into fields and planted some trees. He did not say as to in what manner he himself had been in possession of the suit land. For example, he did not say that he had been cultivating the suit land or taking the fruit of the trees or using the lopping of those …4… trees. It has come in evidence that the plaintiff is employed as Patwari in the department of Land Acquisition and, therefore, it was all the more essential for him to have stated as to how he was in physical possession of the suit land, when he is busy doing his job as Patwari in a Government department. He stated that he had not constructed any house on the suit land, but another witness examined by him, namely PW-2 Dhani Ram, stated that the plaintiff-respondent had constructed a house on the suit land. That means, testimony of PW-2 Dhani Ram did not pertain to the suit land but to some other piece of land on which the plaintiff has his house. Also, this witness is a resident of a different village. Pw-3 Sham Lal stated that he did not know what was the area of the suit land. He also did not say whether the plaintiff-respondent cultivated the suit land or made use of it in some other manner. The witness has his village at a distance of half a kilometer from the suit land. 8. Revenue record, i.e. copies of the Jamabandis, relied upon by the appellant, i.e. D-1 Misl Hakiat for the year 1959-60, D-2 Jamabandi for 1969-70, D-3 Jamabandi for 1974-75, D-4 Jamabandi for 1977-78, D-5 Jamabandi for 1982-83 and D-6 Jamabandi for 1987-88, show that the suit land is Charand (pasture) and no portion of it is used for cultivation. Both the Courts below have failed to appreciate these entries in the revenue record. Also, the two Courts below have not noticed the aforesaid incongruities and contradictions in the statements of the plaintiff and his abovenamed two witnesses, even though the two Courts below have said that the testimony of the plaintiff …5… and his two witnesses, abovenamed, prove the plea of adverse possession. Presumption of truth attaches to the entries in the record of rights and a very strong, cogent and confidence inspiring evidence is required to be led to rebut this statutory presumption. 9. In view of the abovestated position, it is held that the two Courts below have utterly failed to correctly appreciate the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and this failure on their part has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Consequently, substantial questions of law No.1 and 3 are answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. 10. Since point of jurisdiction was not pressed in the two Courts below and also in the grounds of appeal it is not specifically alleged that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction, it is held that the substantial question of law No.2 does not arise. 11. In view of the findings on substantial questions of law No.1 and 3, appeal is accepted, judgment and decree, dated 23rd February, 1991, of the trial Court, as affirmed by the first Appellate Court (District Judge), vide judgment and decree dated 2nd March, 1998, are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff- respondent is dismissed. Appeal stands disposed of. October 13, 2008(sd) ( Surjit Singh ), J