THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.21347 OF 2009 DATED ________JUNE, 2010 BETWEEN: A.V.Ranga Rao … Petitioner And Joint Collector, Guntur District, And others. … Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.21347 OF 2009 O R D E R The petitioner assails the order dated 24.09.2009 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, in effect cancelling his pattadar pass book and title deed and directing issuance of pattadar pass book and title deed to respondent 4 herein in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.13-38 cts. in Sy.No.436 and Ac.9-38 cts. in Sy.No.826 of Agnigundala Village of Ipur Mandal, Guntur District. The petitioner claims to be the absolute owner and possessor of the subject land. He was issued pattadar pass book and title deed under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1971’) on 02.06.1998 which was thereafter confirmed by the Joint Collector, Guntur, by order dated 21.01.2000 in Revision Case No.3864 of 1998. This Revision is said to have been filed by respondent 5. While so, respondents 5 and 6 executed a registered sale deed bearing Document No.7373 of 2008 dated 25.10.2008 in favour of respondent 4 in respect of the subject land, who then approached the Tahsildar, Ipur Mandal, for issuance of pattadar pass book and title deed under the Act of 1971. It is the case of the petitioner that the matter was referred to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, who thereupon issued notice dated 06.05.2009 to him and proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 24.9.2009 setting at naught his pattadar pass book and title deed and directing issuance of such documents to respondent 4. Admittedly, the petitioner filed a Revision against the said order before the Joint Collector, Guntur, on 01.10.2009 but as the Officer was not available in office on that day and even thereafter, he filed the present writ petition apprehending that the hearing of his Revision would be delayed and in the meanwhile, the order impugned would be implemented. By order dated 30.10.2009, this Court granted interim suspension of the order impugned. It is stated by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue that the Revision filed before the Joint Collector, Guntur, is still pending. Copy of the letter dated 05.12.2009 addressed by the Office of the Collector, Guntur, to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, calling for the connected records pertaining to this Revision, is placed before me in support of this submission. Counter- affidavits have been filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet and respondent 4 seeking to support the order impugned in this writ petition. I am however disinclined to adjudicate the present writ petition on merits as the petitioner has already availed the statutory revisional remedy by approaching the Joint Collector, Guntur. It was only due to the apprehension that the order impugned would be implemented before he could obtain stay orders from the Revisional Authority that he filed this writ petition. Pertinent to note, the prayer in the present writ petition is to declare the order dated 24.09.2009 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, as illegal and without jurisdiction. When the said order is already under attack before the Revisional Authority, it is not open to the petitioner to simultaneously maintain this writ petition assailing the very same order. Sri Minnikanti Laxmiprasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently contended that as the very jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, is challenged, the present writ petition ought not to be shut out on the ground that an alternative remedy is available. He submitted that the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasaraopet, had usurped the function of the Primary Authority, the Tahsildar, Ipur Mandal, in directing issuance of documents under the Act of 1971, thereby depriving his client of his valuable right of Appeal. The learned counsel placed reliance on case law in support of his contentions. It is well established that presence of an alternative remedy does not, by itself, constitute a bar to exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it must be remembered that this is not a straight- jacket doctrine to be followed blindly in each and every case. The facts and circumstances of the case would indicate and determine as to whether the presence of the efficacious alternative remedy should posit a restraint on this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not as if this Court is driving the petitioner to invoke the alternate remedy. He has already done so by filing a revision before the statutory authority. The cause for approaching this Court as stated by the petitioner himself is that the Revisional Authority was not available immediately and therefore, apprehending implementation of the order in the meanwhile, he approached this Court. That situation no longer prevails. The Revisional Authority has already taken the matter on file and called for the relevant records. It is no doubt true that the petitioner challenged the very jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer to pass the order impugned. However, nothing prevents the petitioner from raising the very same contention before the Revisional Authority. All grounds of attack which the petitioner levelled in this writ petition against the said order are available to him before the Revisional Authority. The pleadings on record demonstrate that various factual aspects of the matter would also have to be examined and resolved. Therefore, the matter is not amenable to disposal on purely technical and legal issues but would require adjudication on facts. Such exercise is better suited to the statutory authority. I n A.R.ANTULAY V/s. R.S.NAYAK[1] the Supreme Court observed that the power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character, so also the power to confer right of appeal and to take away a right of appeal. It was further stated that no Court, whether superior or inferior, can enlarge the jurisdiction of a Court or divest a person of his right of revision and appeal. This proposition is settled law and it is open to the petitioner to urge his contentions in this regard duly supported by this precedent before the Revisional Authority also. I n WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION V/s. REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, MUMBAI[2], the Supreme Court stated: “15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a Writ Petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. …” It is clear from the above observations that the discretion is left to this Court to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition when an effective alternative remedy is available. In the present case, not only is there an effective alternative remedy available but the petitioner has, in fact, invoked it. Having done so he approached this Court ostensibly for the purpose of interim orders. It must be remembered that the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to circumvent statutory remedies. The observations of the Supreme Court in ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHANDAN NAGAR V/s. DUNLOP INDIA LTD.[3] are of guidance in this regard: “3. …… Art.226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art.226 of the Constitution. But then the court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. ……” The hierarchy of statutory remedies provided under the Act of 1971 is essentially designed so as to obtain a resolution on factual issues by and before such authorities, so that purely legal issues, if any, would remain for adjudication by this Court in the event its extraordinary jurisdiction is invoked thereafter. Matters factual in nature are better suited for resolution before the statutory authorities as this Court would not normally be in a position to decide disputed questions of fact. Further, as stated supra the petitioner, having already challenged the validity of the order before the Revisional Authority, cannot simultaneously mount an attack against the very same order in this writ petition. Permitting the same would amount to abuse of the process of this Court. Thus, on counts more than one, I am not inclined to hear this writ petition on merits. It would suffice to direct the Revisional Authority, the Joint Collector, Guntur, to dispose of the revision filed by the petitioner, after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the parties, as expeditiously as possible and in any event not later than four (4) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Pending disposal of the revision, the interim suspension granted by this Court shall continue to operate. The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. -------------------------- SANJAY KUMAR,J ________ JUNE, 2010. PGS ( PD ) THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.21347 OF 2009 __________ JUNE, 2010 [1] AIR 1988 SC 1531 [2] AIR 1999 SC 22 [3] AIR 1985 SC 330