THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1842 OF 2005 JUDGMENT: The acquittal of the accused for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 {“the Act” for brevity}, by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for Trial of Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case-cum-Additional Family Court, Hyderabad, by the judgment dated 22.11.2004 in Sessions Case No.91 of 2001, led the State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor, to file the present appeal. The factual background for the prosecution of the accused is that he was an active member of ‘Deendar Anjuman Organisation’, the main object of which is Islamization of the entire country through hatred, illegal acquisition of money and holy war. The accused was in possession of explosive substances intending to cause explosion of a nature likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. The Inspector of Police, Ibrahimpatnam Police Station, on information, arrested the accused near Kondapalli High School near Shakkargunj Fareeda Baba Dargha on 20.07.2000 and recovered electronic detonators from his possession. The accused, working as an Assistant Traction Goods Engine at South Central Railway, was remanded to judicial custody on the seizure on his confession and the accused was, accordingly, prosecuted. The case was committed to the Court of Session, after furnishing copies of documents on appearance of the accused and the accused denied the charges under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act framed against him by the Court of Session. After he pleaded not guilty, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 5 and marked Exs.P1 to P16 and MOs.1 to 3 during the trial. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, when he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and he produced no defence evidence. The accused claimed that he was kept in the Police Station up to 17.07.2000, after he was apprehended three days earlier and was shifted from Guntur to Ibrahimpatnam and from there to Vijayawada, being tortured by the police through out. The trial Court rendered the impugned judgment noting that while P.Ws.1 and 2, the Assistant Secretary in Revenue Department, Ibrahimpatnam and the Inspector of Police, Ibrahimpatnam, respectively, were examined to prove the arrest and seizure, P.W.3 was examined to prove the sanction order-Ex.P3 and P.W.4, the Explosive Expert, was examined to prove his opinion-Ex.P4, while P.W.5 spoke about sending the case properties to the Forensic Science Laboratory and obtaining their opinion during his investigation. The trial Court observed that while the accused was prosecuted for possession of electronic detonators, the Explosive Expert described the substances as aluminum capsules. Though the explosive substances described by the Explosive Expert might have answered the description required for an offence under the Act, the trial Court found that sanction was not accorded by the District Collector and District Magistrate to prosecute the accused under Section 4 of the Act, which is indicative that the sanctioning authority was not satisfied about the possession of the explosive substances with the accused to cause explosion in public places. The trial Court also noticed that there was no admissible evidence about the arrest and seizure within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and the trial Court, further, observed about the possible apprehension of the accused by the police on 13.07.2000, while his production before the Magistrate was only on 20.07.2000, though it did not take into consideration, the two news paper reports produced before it by the defence. The trial Court also observed that the quantum of the explosive substances seized was not spoken to consistently and P.Ws.1 and 2 had lot of discrepancies between them about the manner of arrest, confession and seizure. The trial Court, further, noted that these material circumstances make the proof of offence beyond reasonable doubt not acceptable and consequently, it acquitted the accused. The grounds of appeal allege that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 should have been straight away accepted and the seizure of the electronic detonators from the possession of the accused should have been believed. The independent evidence of P.Ws.3 to 5 should have been taken as inspiring confidence and therefore, the State desires the acquittal to be reversed. Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing learned Public Prosecutor, is heard, while none entered appearance for the respondent-accused, though he was personally served with the notice of appeal. The only point for consideration is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. None of the facts and circumstances elicited in the impugned judgment by the trial Court is disputed, as matters of fact. If there was no sanction from the sanctioning authority under the Statute for the prosecution of the accused under Section 4 of the Act, the criminal proceedings against the accused were, obviously, untenable in respect of that offence, as concluded by the trial Court, irrespective of the truth or possibility or otherwise of the accused being implicated in such an offence. While the accused was working in South Central Railway and was not alleged to be having any past criminal record, his alleged membership of ‘Deendar Anjuman Organisation’ with illegal objectives was sought to be probabilised only by some pamphlets and magazines allegedly recovered from the possession of the accused and not by any other evidence. While the evidence of P.Ws.3 to 5 was independent, the same offers no assistance in producing any admissible evidence relating to the alleged confession and consequential seizure of the explosive substances from the possession of the accused. The discrepancies concerning the quantum and description of the explosive substances seized and the place and manner of arrest and seizure, which need not be replicated herein again cannot be considered minor or insignificant, as sought to be contended by the appellant and the statutory prohibition under the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, against admitting into evidence matters not strictly permitted under the provisions makes the prosecution left with no positive evidence by which the guilt of the accused can be concluded beyond reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, the conclusions of the trial Court about the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt cannot be considered to be improper or unreasonable or illegal and in the absence of very strong grounds to interfere with the acquittal on merits, the appeal has to fail. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. ___________________ (G.BHAVANI PRASAD, J) 1st December 2009 RRB