Regular Second Appeal No.3036 of 2010 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Regular Second Appeal No.3036 of 2010 (O&M) Date of decision:- 07.12.2011 Shyam Lal ....Appellant Vs. Gian Chand and another ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.N. JINDAL ****** Present:- Mr. P.K. Ganga, Advocate, for the appellant. A.N. JINDAL, J (ORAL) Plaintiff-Shyam Lal (herein referred as 'the plaintiff') filed a suit for declaration and in the alternative suit for recovery on the basis of agreement to sell dated 01.10.2002, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sirsa, vide judgment dated 23.01.2009, being time barred. The appeal preferred by him was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Sirsa, vide judgment & decree dated 24.12.2009. The plaintiff had allegedly entered into an agreement dated 01.10.2002 with defendant No.1 for purchase of land. The limitation for executing the sale deed was to expire after three years of the date of execution of the agreement i.e. on 01.10.2005, whereas the suit was filed by the plaintiff on Regular Second Appeal No.3036 of 2010 (O&M) 2 18.08.2006. At the very preliminary stage, the defendants- respondents (herein referred to as 'the defendants') moved an application for rejection of the plaint on the grounds that the suit was time barred. The trial Court, vide order dated 23.01.2009, allowed the said application and rejected the plaint. The appeal was also dismissed by the first Appellate Court on 24.12.2009. Heard. The facts, as referred to above, are not disputed. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case Pukhraj D. Jain and others Vs. G. Gopala Krishna , 2004 (3) RCR 171, has observed as under:- “Article 54 of the Limitation Act, provides a limitation of three years for instituting a suit for specific performance of a contract. This period of three years has to be reckoned from the date fixed for the performance, or if, no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.” From the record, it transpires that after the alleged agreement, defendant No.1 executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 on 27.09.2004. The agreement to sell is dated 01.10.2002. The date for execution of the sale deed was fixed as 15.05.2003. Thus, at the most, the suit could be filed within three years from 15.05.2003 i.e. the stipulated date for execution of the sale deed, but the plaintiff filed this suit on 18.08.2006. Though the plaintiff has pleaded that since defendant No.1 had assured that he would execute the sale deed and therefore, the limitation would automatically extent, yet no specific date of the alleged assurance has been given by the plaintiff and it is not mentioned, as to how limitation to file the suit stood extended beyond Regular Second Appeal No.3036 of 2010 (O&M) 3 15.05.2006. A similar proposition arose in case Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Hede and Company, 2007 (3) RCR (Civil) 157, wherein it was observed as under:- “21. The language of Order VII Rule 11 CPC is quite clear and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Mr. Nariman did not dispute that “law” within the meaning of clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the aid purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint if taken to be correct in their entirety a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense.” It is also well settled by now that once a cause of action accrues to the plaintiff to file the lis, the same cannot be extended by a subsequent cause of action. Resultantly, finding no merit in the appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. (A.N.JINDAL) December 07, 2011 JUDGE ajp