IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.1254 of 2009 1.THE STATE OF BIHAR. 2.THE SECRETARY-CUM-COMMISSIONER, HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, NEW SECRETARIAT, BIHAR, PATNA. 3.THE DIRECTOR, SECONDARY EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA. 4.THE DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER, BHOJPUR, ARA. 5.THE PRINCIPAL, GOVERNMENT HIGH SCHOOL, DHRUBDIHA, BHOJPUR, ARA. ………(RESPONDENT)…………APPELLANTS. Versus RAM NANDAN MISHRA, S/O LATE GAYA MISHRA RESIDENT OF VILLAGE RAMASARAH, P.S-SANDESH, DISTRICT-BHOJPUR. ………(PETITIONER)…………RESPONDENT. For the appellant: Mrs. Nivedita Nirvikar, G.P.III. For the respondent: K.N. Choubey, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Gopal Prasad Mishra and Mr. Vijay Kumar Mishra. ----------- 4/ 07.01.2011 I.A no. 6216 of 2009. Having heard counsel for the parties and in view of the averments made in the Interlocutory Application, the delay in filing of this appeal is condoned. L.P.A NO. 1254 of 2009 Having heard Mrs. Nivedita Nirvikar, learned Government Pleader No. III and Mr. K.N. Choubey, learned senior counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the 2 recognition of the service of the respondent-writ petitioner cannot date back to the year 1977. To that extent, the order of the competent authority, Secretary of the Education Department, is quite clear that no person authorized under law had either allowed to take over the services of the petitioner when the school was recognized in the year 1977 or had granted leave to the petitioner for improving his qualification. As a matter of fact, the finding is also there that the District Education Officer somehow had authorized the petitioner to put his signature on a blank sheet because his joining was not accepted and he was not allowed to work by the headmaster of the school. Under these admitted facts, when we had called upon Mr. Choubey to justify the claim of the respondent-writ petitioner for his recognition of service from the year 1977, he had tried to explain that school was earlier under private management and the Secretary to the Managing Committee had granted leave and when the respondent-writ petitioner had completed his graduation as 3 also Teachers Training Course, he was allowed to work without pay but the authorities did not pass an order for recognition of his service despite the fact that similarly situated persons of the same school were given such benefit. He has also relied on a certificate of the headmaster of the school dated 28.03.1994, to show that the respondent-writ petitioner had continued to work despite his services being not recognized or joining not accepted by the headmaster of the school. In our considered opinion, whenever an issue of recognition of service of a teacher of a Government school would arise, the criteria to decide the same would be not only actual working but also his being qualified. Admittedly, in the year 1977, the respondent-writ petitioner was not even a graduate and in High School under 1960 rules only a graduate could have been appointed as a teacher and that is how that the services of the writ petitioner were not recognized in the year 1977 along with the other teachers of the school. Thus, it becomes clear that the date of recognition of the 4 service of the petitioner with effect from 1977, as claimed by him and also allowed in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge cannot be justified for more than one reason. The writ petitioner on his own school was not working in the school in between 1976 to 1980 and his claim to have marked attendance on the plain paper as per instruction of D.E.O also does not inspire confidence. In fact, this writ application was filed in the year 2006 after 19 years for recognition of service with effect from 1977 was itself not maintainable on account of unexplained delay and laches on his part. It is also not in doubt that the respondent-writ petitioner’s services were later on recognized by the Government in the school with effect from 21.03.1997. It is admitted at the bar that for the said recognition the representation of the respondent-writ petitioner was filed only on 28.03.1994. Thus the best could have been done for the respondent-writ petitioner as has been contended by Mrs. Nivedita Nirvikar, learned counsel for the appellant was to regularize his service from the date, 5 he had filed his aforesaid representation i.e 28.03.1994, and we accordingly shift the date of recognition of service of the writ petitioner from 1977 as allowed by the learned Single Judge to 28.03.1994. All the consequential entitlement of the petitioner under law except salary for the period 28.03.1994 to 21.03.1997, shall be paid on the basis of the recognition of the services of the petitioner with effect from 28.03.1994. This view that we have taken is only on account of peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and the same shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. With the aforementioned modification in the order of the learned Single Judge, this appeal is disposed of. Ranjan/ Surendra (T. Meena Kumari,J) (Mihir Kumar Jha,J)