Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 Date of decision: 25.03.2010 State of Punjab ...Appellant Versus Gobind Lal ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Ms. Ambika Luthra, AAG, Punjab for the appellant. Mr. Shailendera Sharma, Advocate for the respondent. RANJIT SINGH J. The respondent-plaintiff claims that he was falsely implicated in a criminal case and was placed under suspension on 05.11.1976. He, however, was acquitted of an offence and was reinstated in service. The departmental proceedings were then started on the same charge on a charge sheet, dated 13.10.1976. Executive Engineer was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The punishing authority, thereafter, issued show cause notice to the respondent- plaintiff proposing two punishments i.e. withholding of two increment with future effect and recovery on Rs. 2266/-. Ultimately, however, the punishment of recovery of Rs. 2266/- coupled with censure was awarded to respondent-plaintiff. Respondent-plaintiff, thereafter, sought review of the order when vide order dated 11.04.1980, the amount of recovery was reduced to Rs. 1236/-. The censure, however, was kept intact. Orders were issued to the effect that respondent-plaintiff will not be paid more than the subsistence Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 2 allowance during the period he had remained under suspension. Respondent-plaintiff filed an appeal against the same, which was dismissed on 17.07.1980. Yet another appeal was preferred, which was rejected on 14.01.1983. Both the orders were alleged to be non-speaking orders. Respondent-plaintiff filed a suit to challenge these orders being illegal, void and arbitrary. Defendant contested the suit, objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court at Giddarbaha to try the same on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. It is stated that the order was passed by Superintendent Engineer, Faridkot Circle and delivered to the respondent-plaintiff at Abohar. Objection about the suit being time barred was also raised. It is pointed out that the respondent-plaintiff was suspended on 05.11.1976 and that he was convicted for an offence under Section 409 IPC. After acquittal from the criminal charge, the departmental inquiry was conducted and so the impugned order was passed. Following issues were framed on the basis of pleadings: 1. Whether order No. 45 dated 11.4.1980 order No. 44490 dated 17.7.1980 and order No. 10154 dated 14.4.1983 are null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit? 3. Whether this suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is time barred?OPD. 5. Whether the proper court-fee is not affixed on the plaint?OPD. Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 3 6. Whether notice u/s 80 C.P.C. is not legal? OPD. 7. Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of moral turpitude? OPD. 8. Relief. The suit was decreed on 21.01.1985. The appeal filed by the State was also dismissed and accordingly the present Regular Second Appeal was filed. The State counsel would submit that the question of law as decided by the trial Court to the effect that the acquittal of respondent-plaintiff by a criminal Court would conclude the departmental proceeding against him, would not be correct position of law. The reliance was placed on Corporation of the City of Nagpur versus Ram Chandra and others AIR 1981 Supreme Court Cases 714. It was distinguished on the ground that in the said case the criminal charge was pending and the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even if charge was to fail and if there was sufficient evidence and good ground to proceed with the inquiry, it could certainly be done. The plea raised on behalf of the State was accordingly not accepted and the appeal was dismissed. The question of law as considered and adjudicated in the present case has subsequently been considered in large number of judgments and reference in this regard can be made to NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. Vs. NOIDA & Ors., AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1161, South Bengal State Transport Corpn. Vs. Swapan Kumar Mitra and others, AIR 2006 Supreme Court 3533 and Allahabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd., JT 2004 (6) 349. In NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. (supra), the Court observed as under:- Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 4 “The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution is two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the `Evidence Act'). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 5 enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the department enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.” Reference may also be made to Depot Manager, A.P.State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors., 1997 (2) SCC 699 and State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K.Meena and Ors., 1996 (4) SCT 707 (SC). In South Bengal State Transport Corpn. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not accept this line of submission. Rather, this aspect was found no longer res- integra in view of ratio of law laid down in Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India and others, 1993 (1) SCT 133, where it was observed as under:- “So far the first point is concerned, namely whether the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued in the face of the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case, the plea has no substance whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 6 acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding. Besides, the Tribunal has pointed out that the acts which led to the initiation of the departmental disciplinary proceedings were not exactly the same which were the subject matter of the criminal case.” The above view was endorsed in the case of Sr.Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathamthitta and others Vs. A.Gopalan, 1997 (11) SCC 239. It has been held that the nature and scope of proof in a criminal case is very different from that of departmental disciplinary proceedings and the order of acquittal in the former can not conclude the departmental proceedings. Legal position is well settled that in a criminal case charge has to be proved by a proof beyond reasonable doubt while standard of proof in the departmental proceedings for proving a charge is mere preponderance of probabilities. In Allahabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra), again this argument was repelled by saying:- “We are unable to accede to this submission. The termination was pursuant to a disciplinary inquiry. It is settled law that in a disciplinary inquiry a conclusion different from that arrived at by a Criminal Court, may be arrived at. The strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a Criminal Court is not required in disciplinary proceeding. The Respondent had not claimed that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted fairly. As the termination was based on findings of the Disciplinary Committee, the fact that the Appellate Court exonerated the respondent was of no consequence.” Regular Second Appeal No. 2890 of 1986 7 In view of the above legal position, which now is almost settled, it can be said that acquittal in a criminal case would not lead to concluding the departmental proceeding as has been held by the courts below. The question of law thus has not been rightly decided and is answered by holding the mere fact that the appellant was acquitted in a criminal case, would not conclude the departmental proceeding as was urged on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff. The question now to be considered is what relief is to be granted to the State. After getting instructions, the State counsel has pointed out, that respondent-plaintiff has retired on 31.05.2007 and subsequently have died on 06.03.2008. No action has been taken to implead the LRs of the respondent-plaintiff. Though the appeal may not abate on this ground but there would not be any need to now interfere in the impugned order. In view of this factual position as noticed above, it would be unfair at this stage to set aside the judgment under appeal. Accordingly, while answering the question of law in the above terms, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. March 25, 2010 (RANJIT SINGH) rts JUDGE