IN THE HIGH COURT OF 5UDICATURE AT BILASPUR ?of»L MISCELLENEOUS APPEAL N0. /2004 11:1 i I] ;11 M APPELLANT (Si RESPONDENT(S) h I.Chief Medical and ^vk/ Heaith Officer, ..^' Raigarh ^v<'^^" 2. Ramprasad, S/o Vc^'y ' Munuram Nayak, ^W'^' Driver, Primary Health .•• -^y _^ Center Chapie- ..•'<i??~ .••" /G^/ .^y/ w RESPONDENT(S) APPLICANT(S) 3. State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Raigarh VERSUS 1. Smt Shyam Bai .W/oLateDevia,' 'Goyernmerrt EmplQyee, Primary Health Centre, Raigarh (CG) ,/2. Uttara Kumari D/o Late Devia! Patel ^3 Mithalesh D/0 Late Devia! Pate! - (Minor) .4 Bhupendra S/o Late Devia|(Minor5 ^-Sarswati D/0 Late ^ Oevlal (Minor) No. 3, 4 & 5: Through Guardian Mother Smt. Shyam Bai Ait R/oO Viilage: Chhaple, Tahsil; Kharsia, District: Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. :lf Hi, APPEAL UNDER ORDER 43 RULE KDl OF THE CODE OF CIV1L PROCEDURE !:1 .ij!fc."-UASii. .uA't^Wf' E...^*? ..M.»*.d« "^''*<-: ^FK HI6H COUKT OF CHHATTIS6ARH. BIL4SPUR '-*^- MISC.AIWAL N0.1012/2004 Chief Medical & t-tealth Officer ond others Vs. Smt. Shyom Bai and others Appearance : Shri Akhil Agrawat, Panet Lawyer for the appelkints/State. Smt. B.R-Maity. counset for respondents No. 1 to 5. ORAL C«DER (21.6.2006) SUNIL KUMAR SINHA. J. (1) This order shall disposts of M.(C.y>.No.l421/2004 which is an application for condonation of delay in filing this Misc. ^ppeal, filed under Order 43, ftule l (d) of -t+ie Code of Civil Proceckire. The aforesaid oppeal has been filed agamst the order dated 7.2.2004 passed by the IVth Motor Accident Claims Tribunat, Raigarh in Misc.Ctaim Case No. 1/2003. By the said order, the Ctaims Tribunal has dismissed an application filed under Order 9, Rute 13 of •the C.P.C. for setting aside the ex-parte award ctated 29.11.2002. The appeal is barred by 136 days of limitation. (2) The brief facts are that the Chim Case No.73/2002 vws fixed for evidence on 9.10.2002 before the Ctaims Tribunal. On the said date, the appellants herein, who were the non-applicants befores — 2- the Claims Tribunal, remained absent and the Tribunal proceected ex- parte against them. Ultimately, after expediting the hearing, after almost obout 1 i month of the said dort'e, an ex-parte award to the tune of Rs.4,12,000/- was passed by -riie Tribunal on 29.11.2002. This was challenged by the oppellonts before the Tribunal by filing an application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. and the smd application was dismissed by the Tribunal on 7.2.2004. It is against the said dismissal, the appellants have filed this Misc. Appeal which is barred by limitation of 136 ctays for which an application for condonation of delay under 5ection 5 of the Limitation Act has been fited vide M.(C.)P.No.l421/2004. (3) Leamed counsel for the oppeltants submits that the detcy in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor intentional but, due to time consumed in taking sanction to file the appeal from the Law Deparhnent, which was granted on 20.5.2004 and further, in appointment of Officer In-charge of the case and other ministerial works, •rfie appeal could not be filed in time. He prays for condoning •riie detay of 136 ctays. (4) On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposes the proyer. C5) I have heard leamed counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the recordsof Misc. Appeal. (6) 5o far as Section 5 of •the Limitation Act is concemed, it has been held by 1+ie Apex Court- in the mafter of Ramlal and <yrtiers. Appellwits Vs. Rewa Coalflelds Lfd.. rwevted m AIR 1962 S.C. 361 that in construing Section 5, it is relevant to bear in mind two /'' - ^- important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed gives rise to a ri9ht in fwour of the decree holder to treat the ctecree <tS binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of Limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, ond this legdl right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time shoutd not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay. This discretion has been detiberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in thnt behalf should be exercised to advance substcntktt justice. This has been has been held by the Apex Court after quoting an observation made by the Madras High Courf- in the matter of Kfishna Vs. CherHmwwi. ILR 13 Maehws 269 which reads as under: "Section 5 gives ihe Cour't a discrelion whidi in reqject of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in w^iidi Judicial power cwid discretion ought to be exercised upon prwicipks which are well understood; Ihe words 'sufficient cmise' receiving a liberal consti/vction so as to advance a.ibstantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor wwit of bonafide is imputabk to the ef^ellent." C7) The Apex Court- ugain held in the matter of Tlie State af West Benaal Vs. The Admlnistrafw. Howrah Mwiicioality and others rwwted m (1972) 1 SCC 3 that the words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advonce substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or w<mt of bonafide is imputable to a party (Please see Para 30 of the said judgment). (8) It has also been held in the matter of N.Bakikrtshmwi VS.M.KrtshiMmiythv (1998) 7 SCC 123 that ' the law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is endirined in the maxim ^lntfrest reitwtolicae w s/t fh»s lithsm" (It is for the general welfare that a period be put to titigation). The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy -the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to ditatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every tegat remedy must be kept alive for a tegistatively fixed period of time". The Apex Court' also held 1+iat "the length of delay is no maner, acceptability of the exphnation is the only criterion. Soinetimes, delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptabte expkination whereas in certain o-tkier cases, delay of a very long ronge can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory". (9) In the present case, the deloy is of 136 days and the exptanation offered for the delay is that alt the time was consumed in obtaining sanction to file appeal from the Law Oepartment ond thereafter in appointment of the Officer In-charge of the case ond other ministerwl works. Learned counsel for the appellants could not point out any statutory provision, whidi moy show that the sanction to fite an appeal in aich mafter is legistatively required. (10) It appears that such sanction etc. are the intemal exercises of the ©overnmentand in doing such exercise, the authorities of the State hme utilized more than sufficient period. The yardstick to test the sufficiency of cause for condoning the dekiy under Section 5 of •the Limilation Act in the matt-er of State Sovemment or the Central Sovemment is not different and where ttie ©ovemmentis to file appeal or other proceedings, in which a period of limitation is prescribed, it is the duty of •the ©ovemmentand its officials to be more vigitant to make all the requisite exercises m time so that, the appeal or proceedings are preferred wi'thin the period of limitation, so prescribed by the faw. If in do'mg so, prompt steps are taken and some detay appears on record due to unavoidable circumstances, •then onty it would amount to a Wfteient cause for not pr'eferrin9 the appeal or the proceedings in time and an extension under Section 5 is possible. (11) In this case. there is no peasonable exphnation for the detoy of 136 days as each day's delay has not been e^hined and the explanation offered by the State in 2 Ihies in vague and genernl manner is not acceptable. (12) I do not fmd any merit in the appti«»tionfited under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the same is dismissed. In con^quence, the oppeal alsostands dismissed. ^—— —— 1 Sd/- SunU Kumar Sinha Judge EwiwtA