IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY THURSDAY, THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER, TWO THOUSAND EIGHT ONLY WRIT PETITION No.9330 OF 2002 Between: Macherla Penchalaiah. ... Petitioner And The Government of A.P., reptd., by its Principle Secretary to Revenue, Secretariat, Hyderabad and six others. … Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri V.Raghu. Counsel for the respondents: Sri K.Sankaraiah for R.5 and R.6. This Court made the following: ORDER:- This Writ Petition is ﬁled for a Writ of Certiorari to quash order dated 16-4-2002 passed by respondent No.1. By the said order, respondent No.1 dismissed the revision petition ﬁled by the petitioner against the order dated 10- 9-2001 passed by respondent No.2. Heard Sri V.Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri K.Sankaraiah, learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, and perused the record. An extent of Ac.3.76 cents of land in Malemapuram village, Chitvel Mandal, was assigned to the petitioner in the year 1967. The said land was allegedly sold away by him to one Sri Yedoti Venkataiah under registered sale deed 6-5-1967. The said Venkataiah in turn sold the said land to Thunga Papaiah, who is the husband and father of respondents 5 and 6 respectively, under registered sale deed dated 10-11-1967. After a lapse of nearly 25 years, the petitioner approached respondent No.4 with the complaint that the said Thunga Papaiah highhandedly grabbed the said land. Respondent No.4 conducted an enquiry under the provisions of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (for short “the Act”) and held that the said Thunga Papaiah was a landless poor person and purchased the said land bonaﬁde for valuable consideration. The petitioner questioned the said order by ﬁling an appeal, which was allowed by respondent No.3 by order dated 29-9-1996. The said order was questioned by respondents 5 and 6 in the Second Appeal ﬁled before respondent No.2, who by his order dated 10-9-2001 allowed the same and set aside the order of respondent No.3. The petitioner ﬁled a revision petition before respondent No.1 unsuccessfully. He, therefore, questioned the order passed by respondent No.1 in this Writ Petition. At the hearing, Sri V.Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that respondents 1 and 2 committed serious error in reversing the well-considered order of respondent No.3. He further submitted that even assuming that the sale deed executed by the petitioner in favour of the vendor of Thunga Papaiah was genuine, the record clearly revealed that possession of the land remained only with the petitioner in the year 1993; and that one of the main ingredients of the provisions of Section 3(5) of the Act viz., the purchaser being in possession, is not satisfied. Sri K.Sankariah, learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, opposed the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that though the name of Thunga Papaiah was not entered in the revenue records formally, he was put in physical possession and was enjoying the land from the time of his purchasing the same under registered document and also at the time of the Act coming into force. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. In his order respondent No.3 relied on the report of the VAO in coming to the conclusion that Thunga Papaiah came into possession of the land only after respondent No.4 passed order on 9-3-1993 rejecting the claim of the petitioner for restoration of the land. On the said premise, respondent No.3 disbelieved the contention of Thunga Papaiah that the petitioner sold away his property to his vendor under registered sale deed dated 8-5-1967. He surmised that if the property was really sold, there was no reason for non- mutation of the names of the vendees and their not being in possession till the year 1993. He also relied on the circumstances that while the sale deed mentioned Survey No.799, the Survey records show that Survey No.799 was sub-divided on 14-5-1964 i.e., prior to the execution of the disputed sale deed and that if the sale deed was genuine, Survey No.799/3 ought to have been mentioned. Respondent No.3 also embarked upon comparison of signatures of the petitioner found on the registered document with his signatures subscribed before the Mandal Revenue Oﬃcer, Chitvel, on 22-1-1993. On these circumstances, respondent No.3 concluded that the petitioner has not sold away the land and by purportedly giving beneﬁt of doubt to him, he allowed the appeal. Respondent No.2 in his order framed the following three points: 1) Whether the 1st appeal entertained by the RDO, Rajampet, was time barred and not maintainable in law? 2) Whether the 1st sale document is genuine or fabricated one? 3) Whether the purchase of the disputed land is valid in the eye of law? Under the ﬁrst point he held that the appeal ﬁled by the petitioner on 28-3-1996 is barred by limitation. Respondent No.2 also held points 2 and 3 in favour of respondents 5 and 6. As regards Point No.1 framed by respondent No.2, admittedly the period of limitation for ﬁling appeal against the order of the Revenue Divisional Oﬃcer is 90 days. A perusal of the record shows that respondent No.4 passed order on 9-8-1992. The petitioner ﬁled the appeal on 28-3-1996. Therefore, there was a delay of more than 3½ years in ﬁling the appeal. Though respondent No.2 held that the appeal was barred by limitation, he gave an erroneous ﬁnding that there was a delay of more than one year in ﬁling the appeal from the date of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. As I found, the delay is more than 3½ years. Admittedly, the petitioner has not ﬁled any application for condonation of delay. Respondent No.2, therefore, ought not to have entertained the appeal and adjudicated the same on merits without the petitioner ﬁling an application for condonation of delay and the delay being condoned. I, therefore, do not ﬁnd any error in the conclusion drawn by respondent No.2 on Point No.1. With regard to the ﬁndings rendered on Points 2 and 3, respondent No.2 scrutinized the sale transactions and also referred to the statements of the witnesses, who identiﬁed the signature of the petitioner, recorded by the Mandal Revenue Oﬃcer. On that basis, respondent No.2 held that the ﬁnding of respondent No.3, that the admitted signatures of the petitioner did not tally with the signatures found on the sale transaction, was erroneous. As regards possession, he referred to the report of the Mandal Revenue Oﬃcer and concluded that after alienating the land the petitioner left his habitation and resided at Chinna Rachapalli, Hamlet of Thummakonda village, Chitvel Mandal for a period of ten years; that Thunga Papaiah dug a well in the land and planted lime trees; and that when some of the lime trees withered away, he planted mango trees, which are still in existence. Respondent No.2 also referred to the ﬁnding relating to sub-division and diﬀered with the opinion of respondent No.3 by giving cogent reasons. Respondent No.1, which is the revisional authority, conﬁrmed the order of respondent No.3. Having carefully considered the reasons contained in the order of respondent No.2, I am of the considered opinion that they do not suﬀer from any error requiring intervention by this Court. The question whether the purchaser, viz., Thunga Papaiah, satisﬁed the ingredients of Section 3(5) of the Act principally falls in the realm of appreciation of facts with reference to the material on facts. Though respondent No.3 gave ﬁndings in favour of the petitioner, respondent No.2, on a detailed analysis of the evidence available before him, diﬀered with the ﬁndings of respondent No.3. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is conﬁned to decision-making process but not to the merits of the decision. ( See: Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India[1]). Even if, on an analysis of evidence, a diﬀerent conclusion emerges, still this Court seldom substitutes its ﬁndings on facts with that of the ﬁndings rendered by the lower authorities if such ﬁndings are not irrational or perverse. I do not ﬁnd any error of law or jurisdiction in the orders of respondents 2 and 1 warranting interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed. --------------------------- --------- C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J Date:16-10-2008 MNR [1]) (1994) 6 SCC 651.