Lsp IN IN IN THE THE THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORDINARY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2277 of 2008 Leela Mohan Das ...Petitioner v/s. Slum Rehabilitation Authority & 3 ors. ...Respondents H.S.Anand a/w. Sarita Donde for the petitioner. Mr.G.D.Utangale i/b. Utangale & Co. for respondent no.1. Mrs. Madhubala Kajale - AGP for respondent no.2. Mrs. S.A.Mudbidri for respondent no.3. CORAM CORAM CORAM : A.M.KHANWILKAR,J. : A.M.KHANWILKAR,J. : A.M.KHANWILKAR,J. DATED DATED DATED : APRIL 06, 2009. : APRIL 06, 2009. : APRIL 06, 2009. P.C. . Heard Counsel for the parties. 2. Indeed, the petitioner has made successful attempt in confusing the issue by relying on two documents produced before this Court stated to be Form No.6 and election certificate slip. In the first place, there is nothing on record to show that these documents were relied before the High Powered Committee. In any case, Form No.6 makes no reference to any specific house number. In so far as election certificate slip is concerned, that indeed makes reference to HEG 25-16/16 Bartanwala Chawl. However, I find substance in the stand taken by the Society that this document is only to 2 confuse the issue which has been unravelled by the first Authority who has clearly found as of fact that House HEG 25-16/16 was built on Pitch No. 39 originally allotted and owned by Rehmatullah which he sold to petitioner’s son Inder Singh Hira Singh Bisht for which he executed documents dated 7/10/1993 and 21/9/1993 on stamp paper issued on 16/09/1993. These documents clearly reveal that Rehmatullah sold the tenement to petitioner’s son. It is not in dispute that the petitioner’s son has been held to be eligible in the context of said tenement HEG 25-16/16. The petitioner has now come forward with a novel argument that she has been divorced by her husband sometime in December 1993 and she in turn purchased the same tenement 25-16/16 from Rehmatullah. The Society as back as on 20/2/2000 had made complaint about the unauthorised activity of the petitioner and her son of dividing the tenement into two portions. Taking advantage of that situation, the petitioner now asserts that she has become owner in respect of the said tenement HEG 25-16/16 having purchased the same from Rehmatullah. Significantly, the authorities below have noticed that petitioner’s husband has already been allotted the tenement on the basis of his claim. The authority below has found as of fact that the petitioner was residing with her husband for the relevant period. 3 3. To get over this position, plea of divorce has been set up by the petitioner which is founded on the basis of affidavit purportedly executed on 13/12/1993. Now the petitioner claims that she has already taken divorce by mutual consent before the Court which however has happened in 2005. The authority below, therefore, in my opinion, has rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner being bogus and fraudulent. No interference with the said opinion is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Hence, dismissed. 4. While parting I would however observe that such cases should be viewed seriously and appropriate action against such litigant should be taken so as to unravel the fraud committed by the party in the process of substantiating its claim and which documents have been used before the Court of Law clearly showing little respect to the process of Court. Rather this is a case of abuse of process of law. 5. To observe sobriety, I would refrain myself from making any further observation but at the sametime indicate that this is a fit case where exemplary cost should be imposed. If the petitioner takes the matter in appeal and if the Appellate Court were to agree with 4 the opinion recorded by me, I hope that appropriate orders would be passed by the Appellate Court in this behalf. [A.M.KHANWILKAR,J.] [A.M.KHANWILKAR,J.] [A.M.KHANWILKAR,J.]