IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.471 of 2009 Doman Singh, son of Late Sukhdeo Singh, residing at Mohalla- Anand Vihar, P.S. Danapur, District- Patna. ...Petitioner-Appellant. Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The Secretary, Industries Department, Govt. of Bihar, Vikash Bhawan, Patna-800 001. 3. The Managing Director, Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. (BICICO), a Govt. of Bihar Undertaking, 4th Floor, Indira Bhawan, Patna. 4. Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. (BICICO), A Govt. of Bihar Undertaking, 4th Floor, Indira Bhawan, Patna, through the Managing Director. 5. Board of Director of Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. (BICICO), a Govt. of Bihar Undertaking 4th Floor, Indira Bhawan, Patna through Managing Director. ...Respondents/ Respondents. ----------- 03- 13.5.2009 Heard Mr. Devendra Kumar Sinha for the petitioner, Ms. Sunita Kumari, learned Assistant Counsel to Government Pleader No.3 for respondent nos.1 and 2, and Mr. Nirmal Kumar for respondent nos.3 to 5. The appellant (writ petitioner) is aggrieved by the order dated 17.3.2009, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No.7349 of 2002 (Doman Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and others), whereby the order of compulsory retirement passed against him has been upheld. We shall draw the basic facts from the writ proceedings. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this appeal may be indicated. 2 The writ petitioner was, at the relevant point of time, functioning as a Deputy Manager in the Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the „BICICO‟). The Corporation served show-cause notice dated 5.3.2002 (Annexure-3), whereby he was called upon to explain as to why recovery of loans from the companies under his direct charge was negligible as compared to the over-dues in his zone. This was followed by the supplementary show-cause notice dated 8.3.2002 (Annexure-3/1) on the same lines. The writ petitioner had shown cause by his communication dated 9.3.2002 (Annexure-4), as well as the supplementary communication dated 9.3.2002 (Annexure-4/1). On a consideration of the materials on record including the cause shown by the writ petitioner, respondent no.3 passed the order dated 16.3.2002 (Annexure-3/2), wherein he found that the writ petitioner had not made any attempt for recovery of the dues from the companies in his zone. The cause shown by him was found to be extremely unsatisfactory and clearly reflected the position that he had not made any attempt at all for recovery. It was further stated therein that the writ petitioner is liable to compulsory retirement in terms of Section 72(a) of the 3 Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Resolutions 1976 (hereinafter referred to as „the Resolutions‟). The same was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors considered the matter on 23.3.2002, and approved the decision for compulsory retirement of the petitioner, leading to the formal order dated 28.3.2002 (Annexure-1), and impugned herein. The writ petitioner challenged the same by preferring the aforesaid C.W.J.C. No.7349 of 2002, which has been rejected by the impugned order. 3. While assailing the validity of the order of the learned writ Court, learned counsel for the appellant (writ petitioner) submits that respondent no.3 had passed the order in anticipation of the order of the Board of Directors leaving it with the formality of putting its seal of approval in a mechanical manner. He next submits that the appellant has maintained good record of service and, therefore, there was no material to justify the petitioner‟s compulsory retirement. The impugned order is beyond the para-meters of compulsory retirement laid down by the Supreme Court. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief 4 District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, reported in (1992) S.C.C. 299. 4. Learned counsel for respondent nos.3 to 5 has supported the impugned action. 5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. We should first of all acquaint ourselves with the procedure prescribed in this connection, and the authority of respondent no.3 to pass the order. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to bring to our notice any provision to establish that the Board of Directors is the appointing authority, and not the Managing Director. The usual procedure in the case of Public Sector Undertakings is that such powers are delegated to the Managing Director who is in control of the day-to-day affairs of the Corporation and exercises all powers of the Board of Directors. That apart, we are proceeding on the footing for the sake of argument that the Board of Directors is the appointing authority. We observe from the order dated 16.3.2002 (Annexure-3/2) that the Managing Director passed an order which was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors, and the meeting of which was scheduled to be held on 23.3.2002. It appears 5 from a perusal of the impugned order dated 28.3.2002 (Annexure-1) that the meeting of the Board of Directors was in fact held on 23.3.2002. The appellant‟s case was Agenda Item No.176/4. The Board of Directors approved the recommendation of respondent no.3 to compulsorily retire the appellant in terms of Section 72(a) of the Resolutions. The contention is rejected. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the appellant‟s service record is good and, therefore, there was no basis for the order of compulsory retirement. This is taking a very myopic view of the matter, and overlooks the parameters for compulsory retirement indicated in Baikuntha Nath Das Vs. Chief District Medical Officer (Supra), paragraph 34 of which is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. 6 (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary- in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter- of course attaching more importance to record of an performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.” It is evident that the principles of natural justice are not attracted in the case of 7 compulsory retirement. The Court can interfere on very limited grounds one of which was that the order of compulsory retirement is based on no evidence or that it is arbitrary. It appears to us on a perusal of the materials on record that the respondent authorities had taken full care to assess whether or not the appellant had been functioning well, and living up to the expectations of his office and salary and the perquisites he was receiving, or had become functionless. Respondent no.3 seems to have taken great care to analyse the materials before him including the cause shown by the appellant as well as the supplementary cause shown by him and came to the conclusion that the appellant was not functioning, had not made any effort at all to realise the recovery from the borrowers. The appellant tried to mislead the respondent authorities that he had been visiting the premises of the companies for recovery the dues. He had visited the companies, not for recovery, but for evaluation work. We are convinced that there was ample evidence before the respondent authorities to pass the order of compulsory retirement against the appellant. We further observe from the materials on record that the Corporation was faced with the prospect of 8 extinction and was likely to reach the state of liquidation. The Managing Director had, therefore, addressed his communication to his employee to make their best efforts to revive the Corporation, otherwise the company will go into liquidation. In such a situation, the view taken by the respondent authorities for compulsory retirement is a just, proper and appropriate decision. The appellant seems to be labouring under the impression that the adverse character roll is the only material which can lead to compulsory retirement. The authorities have to be satisfied on the basis of the materials before them, which is subjective satisfaction that the employee has become worthless, is only interested in his salary and perquisites, and his services were not longer in public interest. Salary is paid to an employee to work. 7. The Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the principles of natural justice are not attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. The respondent authorities yet took the greatest care to afford more than adequate and reasonable opportunity to the appellant to explain his position. We are convinced that the respondent authorities acted very fairly in 9 dealing with the matter. The impugned action cannot be faulted. We respectfully agree with the order of the learned Single Judge. 8. The appeal is dismissed. (S K Katriar, J.) (Kishore K. Mandal, J.) S.K.Pathak/