32 HIGHT COURT QF JUDICATURE CHHATTISHGARH : BIU^SPUR SinaSe Bench : Hora'bleShri S.R. NAYAK. PETjTmOJMER RESPQNDENTS WritPetition N0.59190F 2005 Smt Radha Bai Wjfo, Chaintaram 1 Dewangan, Aged about 63 years, Rfo ) Viiiage Jhalap, P.H.NO. 13,Tahsi! & DJstt.Mahasamund (C.G.) Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through: Cpllector, Mahasamund, Distt.Mahasamund (C.G.) 2. Tah5iidar,IV!ahasamund, Distt. Mahasamund (C.G.) 3. Shanti Bai Wd/o, Garib Das Panika, Aged about57 years, R/QVillage Kharejhiti, Tahsii and District Mahasamund(C.G.) Present: Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel forthe petltioner. ORAL ORDER (passed on 2nd December,2005) The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of the Board of Revenue dated 25/07/2005 marked as Annexure-P/5 affirming the order ofthe Collector, Mahasamund dated 02/11/1998 made in; Revenue Case No. 07B/121, Year 1998-99 has preferred this writ petition underArticles22S and 227 of the constitutionof India. (2) The facts of the case in brief are as followsi : 33 ^Q^r ^' Husband of respondent No. 3, namely Garibdas was a Bhumiswami in respect of disputed land bearing Khasra No. 772/17 admeasuring 1.214 hectBres, which land is hereinafter referred to as 'schedule land'. Husband of responcSent No. 3 sold the schedule land to the petitioner under a registered sale-deed dated 06/04/1983. When the matter stood thus, the Coliector suo motu initiated the proceedings under the Ghhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and issued show cause notice on 03/OS/1995 cailing upon the petitioner to sJiow cause why the above transaction couid not be declared as null and void being violative of the rnandatory provisions of Section 165 (7) (b) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code. The petitioner submitted his reply, TheDistrict coilector havirsg considered the repiy uStimately passed jthe order on 02/11/1998 deciaring the sale transaction dated 06/04/1983 as nuli and void. Being aggrieved by the above order of the District Coliector, the /petitioner preferred revision to the Board ofRevenue.As already pointed out (supra), the Board of Revenue by its orderdated 25/07/2005 dismissed revision petition confirmsng the order of the District Coliector. Hence, this writ petition. (3) I have heard Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material papers. St was strenuously contended by iearned counsei for the petitioner that the very jnitiation of the proceedings that too suo motu by the District Co!iector under Section 165 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code is ex facie i!legal, inasmuch as though there is no limitation prescribed >under the statute to suo motu tnjtiate action, fhat power shouid be exercised by the District CoSSector within a reasonabie time. Learned counsel would contend that in the instant case suo motu actlon was initiated after a lapseof more that twelve years and only on that ground, the impugned orders of theDistrict Coilector and Board of Revenue couid nof be sustained and they are iiabfe to be quashed bythisCourtby writ ofcertiorari. 34 •'b- (4) It is fairly well-settled that though the limitation is not prescribed under a statute, the statutory authorities who are vested with revisionai or review power, should exercjse such power within a reasonable time and if they exerdse such power beyond reasonabie time, in appropriate cases, the Court wouid step-in under Artide 226 of the Constitutlon and prevent the action being taken. There is no hard and fast ruJe as to what could be a reasonable time. !t a!l depends upon the facts and drcumstances ofeach case, nature of violation and kinds of rights otthe parties, the objectives of the legsslation in question and severai other similar attendant circujiistances. Here is a case where the land belonging to a tribal man was purchased by the petitioner without a prior permission from the District Coliector. it is needless to state that the legisjature in order to achieve laudabie socla! objectives contemplated in the preamble of the Constitution and detailed under the proyisions of part IV of the Constitution has prescribed the condition precedent for aiienating the Jands belonging to the disadvantageous classes iike the trlbals. if that is the Constitutional goal pledge and the object of the law, mere gap of tweive years in initiatlng the proceedlngs could not be a justification for this ^ourt to step-in ynder Article 228 of the Constitution in order to help to an individua! who Is guiity of breach of public law and at the peril of the sociai objectives, Seglslative Intendment. Article 226 of the Constitution, 1 am afraid, is not meant to serve such persons who violate the public Jaw requirements and acquire the property at the perii of the beneficiary of the law. In that view of the matter, it Is not a fit case where the Court should coirse to the rescue of the petitioner who is admittediy purchased the schedule land In breach of mandatory provisions of public law. On that short ground, the writ petitson is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. <s^>^