Appiicant Respondents SB Present: ri Wt Fe m“: 15‘ Ne. 2232 cf 209 1m 5 Rajesh Kumar Dhurve, Aged 24 years about Slo Shri F.S‘ Dhurve Occupation A.S.l. (M) In the office of Superintendent of Poiice, Rajnandgaon (MR) (New CG.) @ @ HIGH COURT GF CHHATTI$GARH AT BILASPUR The State of Madhya Pradesh Through the Principal Secretary, Home (Police) Department Madhya Pradesh Mantralaya, Bhopal Superintendent of Police, Rajnandgaon‘ Asstt. lnspector General of Police (Selection) Police head Quarters, Bhopal. Director General of Poiice, Madhya Pradesh, Jehangirabad, Bhopal. Mr. Abhay Tiwari, counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Anju Ahuja, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the respondents/’State. 0 R D E R (Passed on this 9th clay of April, 200?) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis by the Superintendent of >Polioe, District Rajnandgaon vide order dated 5.12.88 (A/Z) on the post of Assistant Sub-lnspector (Ministerial Cadre). it was clearly specified in the appoinanent order that the appointment of the petitioner was pureiy temporary and the same couid be terminated with one month's notice’in'aclvance. The services of the petitioner was terminated vide order dated 25.5.99 (A/1) as ‘no ionger required’ with one month’s notice. Being aggrieved, the-petitioner has tiled this petition for quashing the termination notice dated 2545.99 (A/i) for discontinuing of his service Hon’ble Justice Shri Satish K. Aqnihotri n: b). @ @ as ‘no lenger requ§red‘ afte¥ ccmp%e is i of (me monih's ¢e¥icd en the ground that the same being discriminatafy and violative of Articies 14 and 16 of the (Sonstitutian. Admittediy, the appointment of the petitioner was 0n temporary basis with the specified condition that the same could be terminated with Qne month’s notice in advance. One month’s notice in advance was iseued on 25.5.99 for termination of his service as ‘no ionger required’. The order of termination is in consonance with the order of the appointment. Even otherwise, it is trite law that any appointment made on temporary basis dehors the constitutionai scheme of empioyment is not iegai. Thus, the empioyee so appointed has no right to reinstatement, continuation or reguiarization in sen/ice. A constitutionai Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Kamataka and others Vs. Umadevf (3) and others’ has observed as under:- “45. White directing that apoointments, temporary or casual, be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the'person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casuai in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. it may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arm’s iength —— since he might have been searching for some empioyment so as to ' eke out his livelihood and accepts Whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and‘to take the View that a person who has temporariiy or casually got employed should he directeqxobe continued permanently. By doing so, it wili be creating another mode of public appointment Which is not permissibie. If the court were to *2: void a contractuai employment of this nature on the groiici// W/d‘//~" that the parties were not having equa! bargaining power, that toe wouid not enab5e the court to grant any relief to ihai empioyee. A totai embargo 0n suc‘n ‘casual ar temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractual!y or casually, would not be getting even that employment brings at least some succour to them. After ali, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inciined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. ln other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. it is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily emptoyed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the givtng up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to avaitabie posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the emptoyment when he first took it up. is not (sic) one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.” in view of the foregoing, this petition stands dismissed. No order as to/ costs. Sdl Agnih0trl ‘l . Eablu Sat'tsh K‘ Judge (2006) 4 soc 1