•^ ''iS^^B^g^Sfffi^S^^^E^gKSS^;S^,'^,®'K;^ :;1p?jlp^j%%^|^^SI%^S:ISI' ^. ..^3»> teis'*8 HIGHCOURT QFCHHATT^GARH AT BILASPUR Single Bench : Hon'bte Mr. Justice T.P. Sharma, Judge Criminal Mlscellaneous Petitlon No. 213B008 Petitioners Akhil Prasad Bajpayee and others t^^ .^s^. Versus Respondents State of Chtiattisgarh and another ORDER Postfor 21/07/2008 Sd/- T.P. Sharma Judge •it II! ysr":-'\' HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No,JZlSSQgs Petitioners Applicants Respondents Non-applicants SB: Hon'ble Mr. T.P. Sharma, J. 1. Akhil Prasad Bajpayee S/o Lalta Prasad Bajpayee Aged about 33 years, 2. Pradeep S/o Lalta Prasad Bajpayee Aged about 36 years, 3. Smt. Usha W/o Lalta Prasad Bajpayee, Aged about 65 years, 4. Nikhii S/o Lalta Prasad Bajpayee, Aged about 23 years (Not mentioned in the impugned order) All residents of Ravanbada, In front of Stemp Line No. 8 Khadan, Police Station Parasiya, Chhindwada (M.P.) Versus State of Chhattisgarh Thrpugh District Magistrate Durg (CG) Smt. Sunita Bajpayee W/o AIAil Bajpayee, Aged about 30 years, R/o LIG 326, Padmanabhpur, Durg, District Durg (CG) CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Present : Smt. Fouzia Mirza, counsel for the aptrficants. Shri Rakesh Jha, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the non-applicant No. 1/State. Shri Manish Upadhyay, counselforthe non-applicant No. 2. ORI^R (Passed on 21s* of July, 2008) This petition is directed against the order dated 4.1.2008 passed by 8 Additional Sessions Judge, (F.T.C.), Durg, in Crlminal Revlsion No. 69/2007 afRnning the order dated 17.1.2007 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Duig, in Criminal Case No. 504A32 whereby the tearned Judicial Magistrate First Class rejected the apptication of the appficants for quashing the proceeding on the ground ofjurisdctional error. ^|.. | ;?;r •i .:441. um , ) , i .sy1 : -t-^- »^<-v .-<?</ ^ l^^t^ lt^^,, , 2. The order is challenged on the ground that the offence said to be canmitted punishable under section 498-A/34, Indian Penal Code, in the instant case, is not continuing offence and cause of action arose wlthin the jurisdiction of the Court situated at Chhindwada and not within thejurisdiction ofthe Court situated at Durg, butthe courts below have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by not quashing the proceecting. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order Impugned as also copy of charge sheet filed on behalf of the applicants. 4. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that non-applicant No. 2 Smt. Sunita Bajpayee was married with applicant No. 1 Akhil Prasad Bajpayee. Appiicants No. 2 and 4 are broflier-in-law and applicant No. 3 is mother-in-law of non-applicant No. 2. The applicants are resident of District Chhindwada. Presently non-appiicant No. 2 is residing in her maternal house at Durg. Non-applicant No. 2 has lodged the FIR against the applicant for the offence punishabte under Sectton 498-A/34 of the Indian Penal Code at Durg. The Charge-sheet has been filed by Mahila Thana, Durg before Judicial Magistrate Firet Class, Durg same was registered as a criminal case No. 504G002. According to charge-sheet non-applicant No. 2 was subjected to cruelty by apptfcants when she was in her matrimonial house at Chhindwara where applicants resides, the offence punishable under Section 498-A/34 of the Indian Penal Code is not continuing offence in this case and in accordance with the Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the Court situated at District Chhindwara is comp^ent to take cognizanoe and Court sltuated at Duig is not competent to take cognizance of the offence. Trial Court as well as revisional Court had rejected the objection fited on behalf ofthe applicants. 5. Applicant has placed reliance in the matter of Y. Abraham Alith v. Insnector of Pollce. Chennai reported in AIR 2004 SC. 42861 in whlch Apex Court has held that cruelty on the basis of demand of dowry is a question of fact and if on the bsais of facts such offence is not continuing offence then subsection (c) of Section 178 of the Cr.P.C. (in short 'the Code') has no application. Para 11 ofthejudgment reads as follows:- AIR 2004 SC. 436 ^S^Si^^^S 11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offenee was examined by this court in Sujata MuWierjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30) There the allegations related to commission of all^ed offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 506 and 323 IPC through the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the comptainant went to the plaee where compiainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factuat background that clause ( c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15/4/1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of aitegatibns about any demand of dowry or commission of any aot constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic ofSection 178 (c) ofthe Code relating to commission ofthe offences cannot be apptied. 6. Applicant has further placed reliance in the matter of Vakil Kapoor & Others Vs. State of C.G. & Another reported in 200812) CG.f-J. 1332 in whtoh this Court has held that unless the exceptional cireumstances are there as are embodied u/s 178 of Cr. P.C., the jurisdiction to try an offence shall be with the court within whose local limits, the offence was commltted except where provided otherwise in the code. Appticant has further placed reliance in the matter of Pratap Chand Rathore and others Vs. State of C.Q. & Another reported in 2006(11 C.G.L..). 1013 in which it has held by this Court that in absence of any demand of dowry within the territorial jurisdiction of any other place offence is trialble within the jurisdiction where demand was made. 7. On the other hands, order impugned is supported on behalf of the non-applicants N0.1&2. 8. This is a pdition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code') for invoking inherent jurisdiction, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers so be used sparingly are achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in case where there is no express proviston empowering the High Court to achieve the said object while dealing with the provisions of Section 482 of the Code. In case of Stete of Punlab vs. Kasturi Laf reported in M04 Cr.L.J. 3866 (38681 (SC1, Apex Court obser^d that:- "Exercise of power under S. 482 of the Code is a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the 2200S(2)CG.LJ.133 3 2006(1) C.G.LJ. 101 4 2004 Cr.LJ. 3866 (3868) (SC) sy L-^ inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Cocle. It envisages three oircumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exeroised, namely (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends ofjustice. tt is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rute which would govern the exeroise of inherent jurisdidion. ^k^ legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possible arise, Courts therefore, have inherent powere apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed tfpon them by law. That is the doctrine which flnds expression in the section whieh merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express proviston, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of admlnistration of justice. While exercising powere under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingty, oarefully and with caution and only when such exeroise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the sedion Bself. It is to be exereised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration ofwhich alone Courts exisf. 9. In the light of above legat proposition, I examined the matenal available on record. Accordir®to record the non-applicant No. 2 was married with applicant No. 1, she was living with the appticants at Chhindwara where she was subjected to cruelty by the applicants continuously in 1996. She mas ousted by the applicant Tsom the house of applicant No. 1. She afeang wth father of epp/toanf No. 1 came to Dwg and tather cf appltoant No. 1 tofcf her that if she will try to come ?o her matrimoniat ftouse ffta? she wil! be Ivlled, Again she went to her matrimonial house. She was again subjected to cruelty by her husband and relatives of the husband and tastly she reported the matter in the year 2002. According to story of prosecution non-applicant No.2 was subjected to cruelty by her husband and relatives of the husband continuously since 1994. According to the story of prosecution the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penat Code on the basis of demand of dowry in the present case is continuing in nature it consists of several acts done in different local areas i.e. local areas of Chhindwafa and Durg. 10. As held in case of Suiata Mukheriee (Smtl v. Prashant Kumar Mukheriee reported in (1997) SSCC 30P in case of cruelty on the ground of demand of dowry if the offences conthuing in nature then it may be tried by the Court having jurisdiction where 3 (1997)58cc 30 ) -t- -$~ 8 .:' '•^f^^S^ k3S;S& I'SS.S^SSS^ part of cause of acfion arose in terms of subseetion ( C) of Section 178 of the Code. Para 7 of the judgment reads as follows:- Despite service beirig effected on the private respondents, no one has appeared for any of the accused respondents. We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appeare to us that the complaint reveals a continuing oflence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, olause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct -the learned Chief Judlcial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with the criminal case. Since the matter is pending for long, steps should be taken to expedite the hearing. The appeals are accordingly aliowed. 11. In case of Mohan Baitha and others vs. Stete of Bihar and anotter reported in (200114SCC 350^. it has held by the Apex Court that if the offence complaint has been committed in the jurisdiction of different iocal areas then it may be tried by any Court where part of cause of action arose. In the instant case according to story of proseoution cause of aotion partly arose within the jurisdiction of Duig and partly arose withln the jurisdiction of Chhindwara. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra), after leaving the matrimonial house by the complainant no demand was made by the husband or their relatives in that case offenoe was not continuing offence but the instant case offence is continuing offence. The case of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra) is distinguishable from the present case in the facts and cireumstances. 12. After taking into consideration the facts that part of cause of action arose at Durg. Courts below rejected the application /objection of the applicant, on careful examination, 1 am ofthe viewthat offence in the instant case is a continuing in nature and trialble by the Court having jurisdiction at Dung or Chhindwara. 13. On the foregoing reason, 1 do not find any iilegality or infirmity in the order impugned. Consequently, the petition being devoid of merits, it is liable to be dismissed and hereby dismissed at the stage of admission. __ _ T.P. Sharma Judge