LPA No. 299 of 2008 :1: In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh. LPA No. 299 of 2008 Date of Decision: 15.04.2009 Haryana State Electricty Board ....Appellant. Versus Lal Chand ....Respondent. Coram:- Hon'ble Mr.Justice J.S. Khehar Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uma Nath Singh Present: Mr. B.S. Rana, Advocate for the appellant. ... J.S. Khehar, J. (Oral). Respondent – Lal Chand approached this Court by filing Civil Writ Petition No.1174 of 1988. Through the aforesaid writ petition, he impugned the revised seniority list dated 17.3.1987 (Annexure P-3). Based on the aforesaid challenge, respondent – Lal Chand also claimed consequential benefits. It is not a matter of dispute, that in so far as the issue of seniority is concerned, the challenge was as against respondents No.3 to 8. Some of the aforestated respondents had been allowed promotion to the next higher post of Deputy Superintendent with effect from 2.3.1988. During the pendency of Civil Writ Petition No.1174 of 1988, the appellant i.e. Haryana State Electricity Board unilaterally accepted the claim of respondent – Lal Chand and placed him at a slot higher than the slot assigned to respondents No.3 to 8, in furtherance of the judgement rendered LPA No. 299 of 2008 :2: by this court in Civil Writ Petition No.9342 of 1988, decided on 10.9.1992. Faced with the aforesaid situation, the only issue which remained for adjudication in the writ petition filed by Lal Chand (respondent herein) was whether he was entitled to the consequential benefits of his retrospective promotion ? Since Lal Chand was assigned a position higher in the seniority list, he was also unilaterally granted promotion retrospectively with effect from 2.3.1988 i.e. the date with effect from which respondents No.3 to 8 had been allowed promotion as Deputy Superintendents. This action was taken by the appellant by passing an order dated 9.8.2001 (appended to the instant appeal as Annexure A-1). The aforestated order dated 9.8.2001 allowed respondent – Lal Chand wages against the post of Deputy Superintendent with effect from 30.10.1990 i.e. the date with effect from which he was allowed to discharge the duties of the post of Deputy Superintendent. He had not been allowed wages of the post of Deputy Superintendent with effect from the date of his notional promotion i.e. 2.3.1988. The solitary grievance of the appellant in the present appeal is, that respondent – Lal Chand has been granted salary in the pay scale of the post of Deputy Superintendent with effect from 2.3.1988. This grievance is based on the fact, that respondent – Lal Chand had failed to discharge the duties of the post of Deputy Superintendent, and as such, should not be granted wages for the aforesaid period under the principle of “No work, no pay”. It would be pertinent to mention, that the impugned order dated 23.5.2007, passed by this court while disposing of Civil Writ Petition No.1174 of 1988, was in the first instance challenged by the appellant by LPA No. 299 of 2008 :3: filing a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant chose not to press the aforestated Petition for Special Leave to Appeal on the plea, that the appellant desired to avail of the intra-court remedy available to the appellant before this court. It is, therefore, obvious that the appellant first approached the Supreme Court and then reverted back to this court by filing the present Letters Patent Appeal. During the course of hearing, while agitating the claim for denial of wages to respondent – Lal Chand under the principle of “No work, no pay”, learned counsel for the appellant has placed emphatic reliance on three judgements rendered by the Supreme Court, namely, State of Haryana and others Vs. O.P. Gupta and others, (1996)7 SCC 533, Union of India and others Vs. Tarsem Lal and others, (2006)10 SCC 145 and Union of India Vs. B.M. Jha, (2007)11 SCC 632. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant (based on the aforesaid judgements) that in all the judgements referred to by him are in cases where retrospective promotion had been given to employees, but they had been denied payment of arrears of wages under the principle of “No work, no pay”. We have considered the solitary contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. We have also perused the judgements relied upon by him. It is, however, not possible for us to accept the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. In none of the cases under reference, promotion had been granted to a person junior to the person claiming promotion; and on the acceptance of the claim of the person (denied his rightful benefit), he was allowed promotion retrospectively. It is therefore, not possible for us to accept, that any of the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, is relevant for the LPA No. 299 of 2008 :4: determination of the present controversy. It is apparent that others junior to respondent – Lal Chand had been promoted to the post of Deputy Superintendent with effect from 2.3.1988, and were duly paid wages. As such, it would be highly arbitrary, if wages are paid to a person not entitled to the post or promotion, but are denied to the rightful recipient thereof. Had the respondent been given his due, he would have rightfully been promoted with effect from 2.3.1988. And would have drawn wages on the promoted post. It is, therefore, that we are satisfied to conclude, that the learned Single Judge was fully justified in allowing back wages as a matter of consequential relief to respondent – Lal Chand. We are also satisfied that the instant appeal is frivolous. It was undoubtedly open to the appellant to approach the Supreme Court in the first instance, as was actually done. When the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal was filed by the appellant (so as to impugn the order rendered by the learned Single Judge dated 23.5.2007 in Civil Writ Petition No.1174 of 1988) rather than pressing its claim before the Apex Court by relying on the judgements rendered by the Apex Court itself (which were relied upon during the course of hearing the present appeal), which were available to the appellant at the time when the aforesaid Petition for Special Leave to Appeal was filed; the appellant chose to revert back to this court on the very first date of hearing with the request that the appellant desired to avail of the intra-court remedy before this Court. Unnecessary expenses have been incurred in preferring the appeals under reference, and unnecessarily court time has been wasted. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that costs deserve to be imposed on the appellant for filing the instant appeal. Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed with costs, LPA No. 299 of 2008 :5: quantified as Rs.10,000/-. The aforesaid costs shall be deposited by the appellant with the Legal Services Authority, Haryana, within one month from today and a receipt thereof shall be placed on the record of the instant case. In case, the aforesaid costs are not deposited within the time stipulated hereinabove, the Registry is directed to re-list this case for motion hearing for the recovery of costs. Since we have dismissed the main appeal on merits, it is not necessary for us to pass separate orders on the civil miscellaneous applications for condonation of delay etc.. ( J.S. Khehar ) Judge (Uma Nath Singh) Judge. 15.04.2009 sk.