-1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR O R D E R S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.345 of 2008 Ganya son of Ms. Sundari and Others VERSUS Mohd. Rafiq son of Shri Gajal @ Ajeem Baksh Date of Order :::: 7th April 2010 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dalip Singh Shri Ajay Kumar Jain, Counsel for the defendant-appellants Shri Sudesh Bansal, Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent *** By the Court : Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. The learned Lower Appellate Court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of personal-bonafide- necessity. The learned Lower Appellate Court has taken into account the personal-bonafide-necessity, as alleged as well as has taken into consideration the entire evidence led by the parties and has come to the conclusion that there are 30 members in the family of the plaintiff-landlord and as such the landlord requires the premises bonafide for the members of his family. -2- The plea of the defendant-appellants that the landlord has alternative accommodation, has not been found proved. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterated that the landlord has acquired premises in Sector-A of Vidhyadhar Nagar, but the said fact could not be proved. Likewise the fact regarding having obtained alternative additional accommodation in Bagroo-walon-ka-rasta, Chandpole Bazar, Jaipur has also not been found proved. The defendant deposing as DW-1 Mst. Banno has admitted that she has not seen any of the members of the family of the plaintiff residing in Vidhyadhar Nagar, Jaipur and she further admitted to the fact that the plaintiff does not possess any house in Vidhyadhar Nagar. Based upon the above the learned Court below held that the plea of additional accommodation being available with the plaintiff is not proved. The aforesaid findings on the question of personal- bonafide-necessity being a finding of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. and this Court can not re-appreciate the evidence. As regards the comparative hardship, since it has already admitted by the defendants that the size of the family of the plaintiff is of more than 30 members, hence, the present accommodation of six rooms and two kitchens available with the plaintiff is not sufficient for the plaintiff and his family to -3- reside. It cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the findings of the learned Courts below with regard to bonafide necessity, alternate accommodation, partial eviction or comparative hardship. The fact that the tenant has to vacate the premises in which the tenant may be residing for a considerable period of time is no doubt hardship to the tenant, but nonetheless that would not debar the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the present case from obtaining possession of the premises in dispute for his own bonafide requirement for himself and his family. The aforesaid being findings of fact, I am not inclined to interfere with the same in second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. No substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellants submitted that some reasonable time may be allowed to the appellants. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is directed that in case the appellant furnishes an undertaking before the learned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today to the effect that the appellant would handover vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in dispute to the decree-holder on or before 30th April 2011 and further that he would pay or deposit all arrears of rent upto 31st March, 2010 with the learned trial Court, as directed by the learned trial Court, within the aforesaid period of two weeks -4- and further undertakes that the appellant would not create any third party interest in the premises in dispute and shall not sublet, assign or part with the possession of the same to any person and would continue to pay the rent by 15th day of the next succeeding month during the aforesaid period. If such an undertaking is submitted within a period of two weeks from today, the learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holder submits that the decree-holder-respondent would not execute the decree upto 30th April 2011. It is further made clear that in case of default in the payment of rent for any two months or failure to comply with any of the above conditions within the time indicated above, it would be open for the decree-holder- respondent to execute the decree. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed subject to the aforesaid. The stay application also stands disposed of. (Dalip Singh), J. Ashok/