HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR CRIMINAL PETITION No.4549 of 2​008 ORDER: The four petitioners herein are accused Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 in the criminal case i.e. C.C.No.38 of 2008 on the file of the Court of the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate (JFCM), Madanapalle, Chittoor District (JFCM Court). They filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C) for quashing the proceedings against them in the said criminal case. 2. Thus the point is whether there are sufficient grounds to quash the aforesaid criminal case against the petitioners. 3. To decide the point the circumstances which led to the filing of C.C.No.38 of 2008 and this petition should be noted. The second respondent Kalikiri Madhurima herein is the wife of the first accused Chintala Nagabharathi Reddy in the said case. Petitioners 1 and 2 herein are the parents and the third petitioner C. Vandana is the sister and the fourth petitioner Sakunthalamma is the maternal grand mother of the first accused. The marriage of the second respondent and the first accused was solemnized on 10.02.2000 at Madanapalle. 4. It may then be noted that subsequently the relations between the second respondent and her husband and the petitioners herein are said to have been strained because of alleged dowry demands/ properties and harassment. It is stated that on 23.09.2007 the second respondent gave a report in Madanapalle II Town Police Station against her husband and his parents and her husband’s sister ventilating her grievances about alleged dowry demands and harassment. The said police took up investigation and they ultimately filed charge sheet against the second respondent’s husband and the petitioners herein in the JFCM Court alleging an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The said charge sheet was registered by the JFCM as C.C.No.38 of 2008 for the aforesaid offences. 5. This Court at the stage admission of this criminal petition issued notice to the second respondent and also the first respondent i.e. the State. The second respondent entered appearance through her counsel Sri Kodanda Ramireddy. After hearing Sri Anantha Krishna for the petitioners and Sri Kodanda Ramireddy for the second respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State the matter has been taken for disposal at the admission stage itself. 6. So far as the fourth petitioner herein i.e. Smt V.Sakunthalamma (A5 in the case) who is aged about 74 years is concerned, I am of the opinion that the proceedings against her should be quashed for the following reasons. It may be noted that in the first information report which is said to have been given by the second respondent to the police and which is an elaborate one nothing is mentioned against the fourth petitioner. Further Section 161 Cr.P.C statement copy of the second respondent filed by the petitioners and which is not disputed would show that at the end of her statement the word “Ammamma” (Telugu word equivalent to maternal grand mother) is found inserted at the end of the said Section 161 Cr.P.C statement suggesting that she also harassed the second respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the fourth petitioner who is a 74 year old lady is the maternal grand mother of the second respondent’s husband and she has nothing to do with the alleged offences and she has been falsely implicated and the above circumstances are enough to show that the case against her should be quashed. He also pointed out that the fourth petitioner would not stand to gain anything from the alleged harassment of the second respondent or any money or property that may be brought by her and therefore this is an additional strong ground to quash the proceedings against her. 8. A perusal of Section 161 Cr.P.C statement of the second respondent and also the contents of the FIR would show that the above contention raised on behalf of the fourth petitioner is not without force. It may be noted that the contents of the FIR and Section 161 Cr.P.C statement of the second respondent would show that there are no allegations against the fourth petitioner and her name has been inserted in the end at Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of the second respondent to show as if she also joined the other petitioners in harassing her. The statements of close relatives of the second respondent who are her parents and others cannot be said to improve the case of the prosecution against the fourth petitioner. The learned counsel for the second respondent could not bring to my notice any circumstance from the record to hold that the plea of the fourth respondent should be rejected. Accordingly I find that the proceedings in the C.C.No.38 of 2008 against the fourth petitioner should be quashed. 9. Then coming to the third petitioner Smt C.Vandana she is the sister of the husband of the second respondent and she is shown as a resident of Atlanta in United States of America (USA). It may be noted that the FIR and Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of the second respondent would show that soon after the marriage she joined her husband who was working in London at that time. It is the case of the second respondent that since she did not have children, her husband, her parents-in-law and also the third petitioner made that also a ground for harassing her and were forcing her to agree for the second marriage for her husband in addition to dowry demands. In this connection it is stated in the F.I.R. and the charge sheet that at the time of marriage out of the agreed dowry amount of cash of Rs.10,00,000/-, a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid and the parents of the second respondent promised to pay the balance amount of Rs.5,00,000/- later but could not pay and therefore, petitioners and the husband of the second respondent demanded that amount also to keep the marriage intact. The allegations regarding the second marriage are also relevant with regard to the case against the third petitioner. 10. The case against the third petitioner is that when the second respondent and her husband were staying in London in the year 2005, the third petitioner who was at that time staying in USA went to London along with her husband in connection with the latter’s employment and stayed in London for sometime. It is alleged that during her stay in London the third respondent used to visit the house of the second respondent and her husband in London on every Saturday and Sunday and that during those visits she advised and convinced the husband of the second respondent to divorce her (second respondent) and marry another divorced woman who was known to her (third petitioner) and was staying in USA. 11. The plea of the second respondent is that the third petitioner apart from harassing her for dowry harassed her in the above manner also forcing her husband to go in for a second marriage whereupon he started demanding her to agree for second marriage and this resulted in harassment to her and caused mental agony to her and that the third petitioner is also therefore guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. 12. It should now be noted that the question whether the above allegations are true and if so whether they attract Section 498-A IPC especially clause (a) in the explanation to the said Section and also clause (b) thereof, can be said to be disputed questions of fact and they have to be decided by the Court dealing with the case in question and not by this Court. What should thus be noted is that the allegations made against the third petitioner do disclose offences complained by the second respondent which have to be examined or adjudicated by the JFCM and therefore the case against her cannot be quashed on the ground that the allegations made against her even if believed do not disclose any offence. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners however pointed out that since the above offence under Section 498-A IPC against the third petitioner is said to have been committed in a foreign territory i.e. in London sanction of the Central Government as stipulated under the Proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C is necessary to prosecute her for that offence and since there is no such sanction in the present case, the proceedings against the third petitioner in the present case in question should be quashed. To decide about the acceptability of this contention it is necessary to look into Section 188 Cr.P.C and it reads as follows. “188. Offence committed outside India.-- When an offence is committed outside India :-- (a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found : Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.” 14. A perusal of Section 188 Cr.P.C., especially the plain language of its Proviso, would show that sanction is required for holding an enquiry into an offence or the trial of an offence in India when it is alleged to have been committed beyond India. This sanction of Central Government is intended to check the prosecution of such accused twice for the same offence i.e. one in the foreign country and the other in India. The plain language of Section 188 Cr.P.C would show that sanction of Central Government is not required for police to investigate into such an offence. Thus only an enquiry into or trial of such an offence, which are steps subsequent to investigation, cannot be taken up by the Court without the sanction of the Central Government and that no sanction is necessary for a police investigation into such an offence and consequently police can after completion of investigation are competent to file a charge sheet in respondent of such an offence. The same view is expressed in Velluru Ramchandar Rao v. State of A.P., reported in 2007 (1) ALD (Crl.) 61. The learned counsel for the petitioners did not make it clear whether his objection was to the police investigation itself into the above offence against the third petitioner or the enquiry or trial of the said offence before the JFCM. Having regard to the language of Section 188 Cr.P.C and for the aforesaid reasons it can be concluded that no sanction is necessary for police investigation in respect of an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code beyond India and that sanction is necessary only for an enquiry or trial. 15. It can thus be said that when a charge sheet is filed in respect of an offence committed beyond India without obtaining sanction of the Central Government, the Court before which it is filed cannot hold an enquiry or trial into the said offences. A question may now arise whether such a charge sheet has to be held to be defective. Here again the language of the Proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C or the language of Section 188 Cr.P.C itself would show that such a charge sheet cannot be said to be defective for want of sanction and the Court can receive it and even take cognizance of it and the only bar is for going ahead with the enquiry or trial into offences disclosed by such charge sheet unless sanction of the Central Government is obtained. 16. Then a further question may arise as to how long the accused or the Court in such a case should wait for the sanction contemplated under the Proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C. This question has not been argued by both sides and hence it is not proposed to be answered. It should be mentioned here that what all that can be stated in this connection is that filing of a charge sheet by the police for an offence committed beyond India in a Court in India cannot be said to be a fatal defect so as to quash the charge sheet. The further questions whether the proceedings before the Court in which the charge sheet is filed should be stopped or not or whether the accused is entitled to a discharge if no sanction of the Central Government as contemplated under Section 188 Cr.P.C is obtained or what will be the effect of abnormal delay in obtaining sanction are all questions which have to be left to the discretion of the Court before which the charge sheet is filed and no rule of universal application in this behalf can be laid down. Each case has to be decided on its own merits. Hence it is open for the third petitioner to raise her objections in this behalf before the JFCM Court and the said Court can decide the same. 17. Another important contention which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the third petitioner is that Section 188 Cr.P.C which is already extracted supra contemplates that the prosecution for an offence committed beyond India can be launched at any place where the concerned accused who is said to have committed that offence is found in India and since the third petitioner is now admittedly residing in USA it was not open for the police to file charge sheet against her also in the JFCM Court at Madanapalle where she is not now staying or living. This contention also cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings against the third petitioner for the following reasons. 18. In connection with the above contention of the third petitioner, it should be noted that in the charge sheet it has been specifically stated that the third petitioner Smt C.Vandana surrendered before the Court of II Additional District Judge, Chittoor at Madanapalle in connection with this case and obtained bail in Crl.M.P.No.2116 of 2007 on the file of the said Court. It is however not made clear that where she executed her bond i.e. before the above Additional District Judge Court or before the JFCM Court Madanapalle undertaking to appear in connection with this case before the concerned Court. This averment in the charge sheet was taken to the notice of the learned counsel for the petitioners. This was not disputed by him. 19. It may be noted that the present case arises out of Crime No.132 of 2007 of Madanapalle II Town Police Station and that is within the limits of the aforesaid II Additional District Court, Madanapalle and also the JFCM Court in which the charge sheet is filed. It can therefore be said that when the third petitioner has surrendered before the II Additional District Court Madanapalle and obtained bail it follows that in terms of the said bail order she under took to appear before the concerned Court in this case as and when her presence is necessary in connection with this case. The above circumstance on the facts of this case, in my opinion, can be said to be sufficient to hold that when the investigation started in this case which ultimately culminated in the present case the third petitioner became available and was found within the local limits of the present JFCM Court before which the case is pending. Thus the above contention of the petitioners’ counsel is rejected. Even otherwise in Om Hemrajani v. State of U.P. and another reported in 2005 Crl.L.J. 665 relied upon by the second respondent’s counsel, our Apex Court while interpreting Section 188 Cr.P.C., held that the victim can file the complaint in a Court convenient to him/her and it is for that Court to decide whether the accused can be found within its jurisdiction and that the same principle applies even to a police case. This decision also supports the contention of the second respondent. 20. There is another aspect in this matter so far as the third petitioner is concerned and that is this. The entire record in the case would show that the second respondent has made allegations relating to dowry harassment also against the third petitioner and it is contended this harassment relating to dowry took place in India at Madanapalle. This is disputed by the petitioner’s counsel. Thus what should be noted is that the allegations against the third petitioner would show that a part of the offence was committed within the territory of India. This is again a disputed question of fact and therefore nothing can be said about the same or the truthfulness or otherwise of the said allegations in this petition and the said questions have to be decided by the JFCM Court before which the case is pending. Accordingly all the contentions raised on behalf of the third petitioner are rejected. 21. Then turning to the case against petitioners 1 and 2 who are the parents-in-law of the second respondent, the allegations made against them would show that they do disclose an offence under Section 498-A IPC. Hence it follows that this Court cannot interfere and quash the proceedings against them. The learned counsel for the petitioners also pointed out that for the reasons best known to the second respondent and her husband, her husband filed a divorce petition in the United Kingdom i.e. Britain and the present complaint to the police is a counter blast to that filed with false allegations and therefore the present case should be quashed. This is again a question of fact which cannot be gone into in this petition and it is accordingly rejected. 22. Yet another contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the second respondent became a citizen of Britain and all the offences were committed in Britain and therefore the present case should be quashed. The petitioners have also filed a Photostat copy of the second respondent’s passport said to have been given by the passport authorities of the United Kingdom. No material is placed in this criminal petition to definitely conclude that the second respondent became a citizen of the United Kingdom or whether she ceased to be so when she gave the complaint. Further there is no material to conclude that the husband of the second respondent and petitioners 1 to 3 also acquired the citizenship of United Kingdom or whether they still continue to be Indian citizens or were Indian citizens when the alleged offences were committed. It is common knowledge that Indian Penal Code has got extraterritorial operation. Thus all the above questions become disputed questions of fact and hence the above objections of the petitioners 1 to 3 cannot be decided one way or the other in this petition and they have to be decided on evidence and that can be done only in an enquiry or trial in the case by the concerned JFCM Court. Hence this contention of the petitioners 1 to3 is also rejected. 23. One more contention that was raised on behalf of the third petitioner and also petitioners 1 and 2 is that there was abnormal delay in giving the F.I.R. by the second respondent and as it was given on 23-09-2007 to the concerned police the case can be held to be barred by limitation also as the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment up to three years and as limitation for filing a prosecution in respect of the same is three years. It is true that the record would discloses that the F.I.R. was given on 23-09-2007 to the concerned police. It is true that in the F.I.R. it is stated that after the marriage which took place on 10- 02-2000 the second respondent joined her husband in London and both lived there happily for three years and the trouble started on the pretext that she could not bear children. It is also true that the allegations against the third petitioner show that it was in 2005 she came to London and convinced the husband of the second respondent to go in for the second marriage. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied up on the above circumstances in the F.I.R. to point out that the case should be held barred by limitation and therefore, it should be quashed. It may however be noted that the allegations in the F.I.R. would show that the second respondent was complaining about harassment even upto the date of the giving of the F.I.R. It may be noted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 498-A IPC relate to cruelty meted out to a woman by her husband and his relatives. It can also be said that it becomes a continuing offence whenever the wife is subjected to cruelty on each and every occasion and consequently in such an event it can also be said that a fresh limitation starts for each such act of cruelty. Be that as it may, it should be noted that the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and evidence has to be recorded in a case like this to decide about the issue of limitation and that can be done only by the trial Court either in an enquiry or in the trial. Thus it is not open for this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to go into that question. Hence it is difficult to accept the above contention of the petitioners counsel. 25. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following cases namely Sanjaylatha v. Amruthgowtham (Crl.A.No.702-DBA of 2006 of Panjab and Haryana High Court); Gopal v. State of Rajasthan i.e., Crl.A.57 of 2002; Noorjahan v. State (Crl.A.No.706 of 2008); Manjuramkalitha v. State of Assam (Crl.A.No.299 of 2003); Omkarnath Misra v. State (Crl.A.No.1716 of 2007) all decided by the Supreme Court to show that the case against these petitioners should be quashed as baseless. The petitioners counsel filed computer generated copies of the said Judgments. In all the above cases trial was held and the matters devolved upon appreciation of evidence. In the present case this petition is under Section 482 Cr.P.C., wherein this Court is called upon to examine the matter and the prosecution record placed before the JFCM Court. Hence, the above decisions cannot advance the case of the petitioners as this cannot be said to be a case wherein the allegations do not discloses any offences at all. 26. Accordingly for the aforesaid reasons this petition in so far as petitioners 1 to 3 are concerned is dismissed but with regard to the fourth petitioner it is allowed and the proceedings against her in C.C.No.38 of 2008 are quashed and the point is accordingly decided. This petition is thus partly allowed. This order shall not be understood to fetter the powers of the JFCM Court which it has got under Section 319 Cr.P.C. ______________________ N. RAVI SHANKAR, J 11th April 2011 CVRK