TH HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPR Writ Petition No. H30 /2002 K.P. Dewangan S/o Shri H.P. Dewangan Aged about 42 years, Presently working as Cashier Cum Clerk Branch-Khadgaon, PETITIONER g/ 9 ,,azegegjonal /):/. Rural Bank, Raigarh xblz’ ' / H.O. Raigarh Regional Rural «7 o 3 Bank Station Road, Raigarh (C.G.) VERSUS RESPONDENTS :— 1. The Chairman, ....... _......................... t Raigarh Regional Rural Bank, H.O.Station Road, Raigarh (C.G.). Mrv A.K. Bhattacharya, Auditor/Officiating General Manager, Raigarh Regional Rural Bank Station Road, Raigarh (,CIG.) RIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1N E U . -k if”i '. W HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR (C.G) Writ Petition No.1430 of 2002 K.P. Dewangan Vs. The Chajnnan, Raigarh Regional Ruml Bank and another ost‘for 28.02005 x ‘ s— lSunil Kumar Sinha i Juge j P .2 w g i d ‘ HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR [c.G) \ Writ Pe'tition No.1430 of 2002 K.P. Dewangan r Vs. The Chairman, Raigarh Ragional Rural Bank and anoth€r Appearance: Shri S.N‘.Nande; counsel for the Pen'h'oner. Ku. Pritha Ghoshal, Counsel for the respondents. ORDER (2s 2.2005) sunil Kumar Sinha, J, The petitioner is a Cashier-cum-Clerkan Raigarh Regional“ " Rural Bank. He has called in question the validity, legality and propriety of his transfer order dated 26.6.2002 (Annexure P- 1) by which he has been transferred &om Branch Khadgaon to Branch Mahadeodand in the same capacity. (2) The case of the pet'm'oner is that he is working in the said establishment since the year 17984. The impugned order of transfer has been issued to Victimize the petih‘oner violating the transfer policy as well as the Stan' Service Regulation. The contention of the petitioner is that respondent no.2 who has signed the transfer r order was working 1n the capacity of o$éiating General Manager, therefore, he was having no authority to pass] Sign the aforesaid Order. The petitioner has also raised this ground that he is a victim of nequent transfers as in between 14.7.2000 to 26.6.2002 he has been transferred for 4 times. His contention is that these h‘equent transfers are the outcome of malaiides and looking to the short period of stay at van'ous places in between the aforesaid span of time, it would appear that the same is in/violation of the transfer policy. (3) Return has been filed by the respondents. The respondents have contended that in fact, the order of transfer has been issued after due approval of the Chairman of the Bank. It has been submitted that since the General Manager was on leave, the Acting General Manager Shri A.K.Bhattacharya (respondent no.2) has issued the'transfer order for which the approval of the ‘chairman as referred to above was taken. About the &equent transfers, reply has been given vide Para 5. It has been stated that before the impugned transfer order, the petitioner was posted at Branch . 41 Khadgaon on 14.7.2000. Under a general transfer, he was transferred from Khadgaon to Dharamjaigarh on 27.6.2001 but since the person posted at Dharamjaigarh namely Shri Sunil Kumar Nayak obtained stay order from the High Court, therefore, the petiu'oner was kept at Khadgaon itself. It has also been "}’ contended tat tee is n Violnf any policy and more over h hr o atio'o the plicies axe the oy uidelin and the same are .not o nl ges enforceable in court of w. hey hav prayed for dismissal of the la T e petih'o. n (4) have heard lerned couns f the respective parties and I a el or ve also se the records. (5 "First o all, I i consie regarding the authority of roe . g te mpge transfer order. It has been cone Vd ar 6. 1 o h pti that respondent no.2 was oiating a Ga aner d as not: empowered to issue the order, It has also bee ctende that the Chairman is the nly authority t issue or of transfer of an einployeef Reference has bee md to he ocument Annexure P‘4 which accog e etitn s a st of Chapter VII of the gulons e with e iscellus provisions. Regulation 9 dea wi the matte of transferity. It has been stated that a o$cr or eploee s le t tnfer to any othce or branch of th Bak. Rgulaion 61 de wit the implementation and interrati elons. It s bn provided 'Vide regulation ( h e Cirmn may, omt 611) tat th haa frime’to time, issue such intrucons r ection ay, is opinion, be necessary for sti o dirs as m in h givig en'ect to, or caying out, the provisions of these regulations. n rr ha perud ) f wll dr espndnt no2 to sin h iund tnded ie Pa f te etion mc s enerl Mag an w n ond o o an der n ae t D rdin to th pioer i ' gi Reati daling th maneo 5 ls th r abli n e my i liab o ras e n et als h peton of Rguati ha ee ALI— Regulation 61(2) pmvides that if ény ques11'on arises ‘as to the application or interpretation of any of these teglilations, it shall be referred to the Boaxd for decision. After bare perusaliof these two regulations, it becomes clear that the Chairman is the authority for issuance of the instructions or the directions for giving eEect toe or carrying out any provisions of! these regulations. Since regulation 59 deals with the nansferability, therefore, there can be no doubt that the‘instructions or the decision about the transfer: has to be taken by the Chairman as has been admitted by the etitioner also. Regulation 60 does not deal with the provisions about the manner of issuance/communication of the instructions or the decisions. If it is established that a decision has been taken by the Chairman, then, it cannot be said that the same cannot be communicated ’or issued by the General‘”Manager under the instructions of the Chairman. (6) In the present case; when the impugned order is properly analYzed it would become‘clear that the same is a communication of the order of transfer issued on certain decision. The very first: Para of the order indicates that on certain decisions being. taken, the impugned order of transfer is. issued. It is not in dispute that at the relevant time, respondent no.2 was Working as the omciating General Manager. If the order of transfer issued on a decision already taken has been signed by the Omciating General manager ‘ ~__ it p ‘>> then it cannot be said that the order is passed Without jurisdictibn. In fact, the General Manager has issued/communicated the order of transfer of the petitioner which was done on certain decisions. (7) Learned counsel for the petitioner co’uld not point out any such provision which may debar the ofhciating General Manager to sign any order/communication of transfer issued on certain decisions and with the approval of the Chairman who is admittedly the competent authority to make the same. There is no force in this submission and the same is not acceptable. \ (8) The second contention is that since the petitioner has been subjected to nequent transfers, the action of respondents be held to be malaflde. \Referring to the representation (Annexure P—S), learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was ‘ posted at Khadgaon on 14.7.2000. On 27.6.2001 he was transferred from Khadgaon to Dharamjaigarh and on 02.11.2001 he was again called back from Dharamjaigarh to Khadgaon. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated 26.6.2002 he has been again transferred h‘om Khadgaon to Mahadeodand. The facts regarding the aforesaid tiansfers have not been disputed by the respondents. However, the respondents have submitted that in fact, when the petitioner was transferred hom Khadgaon to Dharamjaigarh, the person working at Dharamjaigarh namely 39a? “ti-— Sum'l Kumar Nayak obtained an oxder of stay from the High Court, therefore, the petitioner has to be kept at Khadgaon itself and in this situation only, he was brought back to Khadgaon. His posting at Dharamjaigarh from Khadgaon and reposting at Khadgaon from Dharamjaigarh in between 27.6.2001 and 02.11.2001 cannot be said to be an independent action on the part of the respondents because the same was due to the order of stay passed by the High Court as referred to above and no malafldes can be attributed in this regard. (9) The explanation given by the respondents in regard to the allegation of n‘equent transfers of the petitioner seems ‘to 'be reasonable. If the period of transfer from Khadagoan to Dharamjaigarh and Dharamjaigarh to Khed‘agaonjis excluded or the same is not taken into consideration, then it cannot be said that the petitioner is a victim of frequent transfers. It is didicult or this [Court to COnsider the above chronologiCal incidents of transfer of the petitioner to be‘the frequent transfers because the same were the consequences of the order of stay granted in favour of one Sunil Kumar Nayak referred to in Para 5 of the return which have not been factually controverted by the rejoinder. In the opinion of this Court, no malahdes can be assessed on the part of the respondents on the basis of 4 incidents of transfers in between 14.7.2000 to 26.6.2002. Itis not a case of victimization on f (10) ‘ Now coming to the thixd contention of the leained counsel / that the transfer has been effected against the guidelines of the transfer policy (Annex PF Page—9), nrst of all it is made clear-that these policies do not confer upon any employee a legally enforceable right. The order of transfer made even without following the guidelines cannot be interfered with by the Court unless it is visited by malande or is made in Violation of statutory provisions. I am fortined in my Views by the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the matter of Union of India and others, Appellants —Vs- S.L. Abbas, Respondent (AH? 1993 SC 2444). More over, if the policy is properly analyzed, it is specifically mentioned in the clauses of period of retention that the same can be changed with the approval of the Chairman. {Please see note under Clause 4-1 (a)(b)(c)}. In this case, since the approval of the Chairman for transfer has been obtained as has been specihcally mentioned in the return, then it can easily be inferred that the approval regarding period of retention has also been impliedly granted. Therefore, the submission regarding non-following of the policy also fails. muu4 w #7 ‘— account of arbitrariness or mMdes on tha part of transfen‘ing authority and this contention has to be failed. \ (1 1) II1 the sen‘es ofjudgments, the Apex Court has already held that the transfer Which is an incidence of selvice isnot to be interfered with by the Courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitmry or visited by malaflde or infracu'on of any prescribed norms of principles governing the transfer. (Please see 1995 ’ (Suppl) 4 SCC 169 (Ambani Kanta Rag —Vs- state of Orissg. (12) In the matter of National Hydroelectric Power Comorwon’Ltd. -Vs- Shrl Bhgm and another, reggrted in (2001) 8'SCC‘574, the Apex Court again highlighted the same position and emphasized that “no government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts nom'one I place to other is notponly an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and ehiciency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown tobe an . outcome of mala, hde or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts cannot interfere with the’such orders as a matter of routine. It has also been emphasized that the Courts or tribunals do not sit as appellate authorities to substitute their own decision for that of the management, ’as against such orders.passed in the interest of administrative exigenCies Of the service concerned.” (13) More or less the same View has bean reiterated by the Apex Court in the matter of Kendri a Vid a a S athan —Vs- Damodar Prasad Pandey and others reported in 2004 AIR S.C.W. 5563. (14) The above series of judgments pronounced by the Apex Court at various points of time go to show that a very limited scope is given for interfelence with an order of transfer passed by the competent authority. If the jurisdiction and the authority ale not challengeable and the ground of violation of any statutory rule is not shown then unless the mala hde, arbitrariness or extraneous considerations are established 'by coming forward with dennite pleadings and by bringing some evidence on record, it cannot be said that the transfer which has been shown to be on administrative exigency will not'be accepted to be a normal transfer. (15) In the present case, as stated above, the petitioner has‘been failedXto establish that in fact, respondent no.2 was having'no authority to sign the order of transfer. He has also been failedrto establish any instance of malafld‘es or arbitrariness or extraneous consideration on which the order can be quashed by this Court. When all these key factors regarding interference with an order of transfer have not been established, this court is left with no option M’ o except to disiss the peti The as no merits and the m tion. petition h s fails ad is sssed h n orer as to the cost. Accordingl, I.A.. t isposed ofi, y No36 18/ 2003 sands d Sd/- i uil Kumar Sinha i Judge i . t \ i [w 1 ; [Rae] ame n dimi witout ay d Sn