- 1 - IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1505 OF 1999 WRIT PETITION NO.1505 OF 1999 WRIT PETITION NO.1505 OF 1999 1.Dinesh Inderchand Surana 2.Smt.Kantabai Inderchand Surana 3.Mr.Inderchand Surana ...Petitioners vs. 1.Mrs.Kalpana Dinesh Surana 2.The State of Maharashtra ...Respondents Smt.S.R.Kumbhat for the petitioners Shri Suresh P. Saroj i/b Mr.S.V.Pitre for Respondent no.1 Smt.P.P.Shinde A.P.P. for State CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: A.S.OKA,J. A.S.OKA,J. A.S.OKA,J. DATE DATE DATE : SEPTEMBER 22,2008 : SEPTEMBER 22,2008 : SEPTEMBER 22,2008 ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. The petitioners have filed this petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 for challenging the order dated 19th January 1998 below an application at Exh.60 in Regular Criminal Case No.269 of 1995 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) on an application for discharge filed by the petitioner. Another prayer in the petition is for quashing the order passed by the learned Magistrate of issuing process on a private complaint filed by the 1st respondent. 2. The marriage between the 1st petitioner and the 1st respondent was solemnised on 5th June 1988. The 2nd and 3rd petitioners are the parents of the 1st petitioner. The 1st respondent filed a petition in the year 1989 in the Family - 2 - Court at Pune under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. The said petition was contested by the 1st petitioner by filing the written statement. By Judgment and Order dated 16th March 1993, the said petition filed by the 1st respondent was dismissed by the learned Judge of the Family Court. A counter claim filed by the 1st petitioner was allowed and the marriage between the 1st petitioner and the 1st respondent was dissolved by a decree of divorce. The 1st petitioner was directed to pay permanent alimony of Rs.500/- per month to the 1st respondent. 3. A legal notice dated 18th March 1995 was issued by the 1st respondent to the petitioners stating that a Maruti Car, certain gold and silver ornaments and other articles were brought by the 1st respondent and/or her parents to the house of the petitioners. It was stated that the said articles listed in the notice were brought to the house of the petitioners before the marriage, at the time of marriage and subsequent to the marriage. A demand was made in the said notice calling upon the petitioners to return the said articles. It was contended that the said articles were entrusted to the petitioners. 4. A private complaint was filed by the 1st respondent in which the petitioners were arraigned as accused. The said private complaint was filed on 21st September 1995. In the - 3 - said private complaint, an allegation was made that the articles which were referred to in the notice constituted Stridhan of the 1st respondent and therefore the petitioners had no right,title or interest in respect of the said articles. It was alleged that though the 1st respondent was compelled to leave the matrimonial home, she was not allowed to take the said articles constituting Stridhan. It was alleged that though assurance was given to return the articles, they refused to return the articles. An allegation was made that the petitioners have misappropriated the articles. The 1st respondent alleged commission of offence punishable under section 406 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Process was issued on the said complaint by the learned Magistrate. An application was made by the petitioners before the larned Magistrate praying for recall of the order issuing process and order of discharge. The main contention raised by the petitioners was that the court of the learned Magistrate at Pune had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint as the articles were handed over at Indore. It was also contended that the complaint was barred by limitation. The learned Magistrate passed an order rejecting the said application by observing that the said points cannot be decided at preliminary stage. A Revision application was preferred by the petitioner before the Sessions Court for challenging the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The revision application has been dismissed by - 4 - the learned Additional Sessions Judge by Judgment and Order dated 18th January 1999. The order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge has been impugned in this petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even according to the case 1st respondent, Stridhan property which the 1st respondent allegedly received at the time of marriage was handed over by her to the petitioners at Indore at her matrimonial home. It is contended that the alleged offence has taken place at Indore. As the said property was allegedly entrusted to the petitioners at Indore, it was submitted that the court of the learned Magistrate at Pune had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. The learned counsel further submitted that in the petition filed by the 1st respondent under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955, she had made a claim for the same Stridhan property. The learned counsel pointed out that the said claim was contested by the petitioners and while disposing of the petition, the said claim has been negatived by the learned Judge of the Family Court. The learned counsel further submitted that the claim of the 1st respondent of return of Stridhan has been rejected on merits and therefore, the claim made in the complaint is false. It was submitted that the alleged offence was certainly disclosed when the written statement was filed by the petitioners on 10th June 1999 in the matrimonial petition filed by the 1st respondent. By - 5 - filing the said written statement, the petitioner denied the claim of the 1st respondent as regards the said Articles. It was submitted that as the complaint was filed on 21st September 1995, the same was barred by section 468 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. It was contended that the offence under section 406 is not a continuing offence and therefore, the complaint was barred by limitation and the same ought not to have been entertained. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in case of Dinabandhu Banerjee Vs.Nandini Mukherjee (1994 Cri.L.J.422) as well as the decision of Apex Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Dhada (1997 (2) SCC 397). 6. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent supported the impugned orders by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and another (AIR 1973 SC 908) as well as the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Renu and others vs. State of Haryana and another (1991 Cri.L.J.2049) 7. The first issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is of jurisdiction. It will be therefore necessary to refer to the relevant averments made in the complaint filed by the 1st respondent. In the complaint it was stated that the engagement ceremony was held in the house - 6 - of the 1st Respondent at Pune. It was stated that the marriage was solemnised on 5th July 1999 at Pune. In paragraph 2 of the complaint, the description of the Stridhan articles has been incorporated. In the said paragraph it is stated that the articles were given to the complainant by way of Stridhan at the time of her marriage solemnised at Pune which were taken to her matrimonial home. In paragraph 3 it is alleged that the articles have been given to the 1st respondent by her parents and therefore the articles are owned by the 1st respondent. Thus, on plain reading of the averments made in the complaint, it is not possible to accept the contention that the cause of action arose at Indore. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has rightly observed that according to the case of the 1st respondent, the articles constituting Stridhan were given to the 1st respondent at Pune and were received at Pune. The articles were taken from Pune to the matrimonial home at Indore. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed that a demand was made at Pune by the 1st respondent to return the articles at Pune. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that the Court at Pune had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. 8. Reliance has been placed on the finding recorded by the Family Court in the matrimonial petition filed by the 1st Respondent. My attention has been invited to the finding recorded by the Family Court on issue No.7. In paragraph 13 - 7 - of the Judgment, the learned Judge of the Family Court has observed that the 1st respondent had not given description of the articles, its price, weight etc. It was observed that the 1st respondent had not paid court fees on the price of the articles. I find that there is no determination specifically made by the Family Court as regards the ownership of the articles claimed by way of Stridhan by the 1st respondent. However, all this is a matter of evidence at the time of trial of the complaint. Hence, at this stage, no finding can be recorded one way or the other on the issue whether the articles referred to in the complaint constituted Stridhan. Suffice it to say that at this stage the complaint cannot be quashed by recording a finding on merits on this aspect. 9. Now turning to the issue of limitation, it must be stated that the punishment under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code may extent to a period of three years. Therefore, clause (c) of sub section 2 of section 468 of the said Code of 1973 will apply and the period of limitation will be three years. Section 472 of the said Code of 1973 provides that in case of a continuing offence, period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of time during which offence continues. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of Calcutta High Court in case of Dinabandhu (supra), in which it was held that the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 405 is not a continuing offence. This was - 8 - again a case where allegation was made against the husband by the wife regarding misappropriation of Stridhan property. The Calcutta High Court held that the offence under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code is not a continuing offence because such offence by its definition takes place where an act is committed once and for all. In this behalf, it will be necessary to refer to the decision of Apex Court in case of State of Bihar vs.Deokaran Nenshi (supra). In the said case, the Apex Court dealt with the meaning of continuing offence. Paragraph 5 of the said decision reads thus : "5. Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of - 9 - continuance of the offence which s absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission in committed once and for all." 10. Coming back to the present case, the case of the 1st respondent is that the petitioners have refused to hand over that property despite repeated requests. It must be noted that this is not a case where allegation is that certain cash amount was misappropriated by the petitioners for their use. Offence alleged is in respect of the articles. A demand notice was issued by the 1st respondent to the petitioners on 18th march 1995. Thus, the allegation in substance made by the 1st respondent is that notwithstanding the requests made from time to time by her to the petitioners to return the articles, the petitioners continued to use and retain custody of the said articles. It must be stated here that Calcutta High Court while considering the case of the Dinabandhu (supra) has not considered the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Devakaran in proper perspective. The decision of the Apex Court has been mainly referred to in paragraph 9 by observing that the said decision has been explained by the Apex Court in case of offence 630 of the Companies Act,1956 while deciding the case of Bhagirath (AIR 1984 S.C. page 1658). Under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, continuous use of the property in violation of any directions of law constitutes an offence of criminal breach of - 10 - trust. Therefore, in a given case, it is possible to hold that so long as accused continues to use the articles or property, the offence continues and it is a continuing offence. Therefore, in my view, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that all offences alleged under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code are not continuing offences. Ultimately, it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of accusations. In the present case, the issue will have to be decided after evidence is adduced by the parties. In fact, the learned Magistrate rightly rejected the application for discharge on the ground that the said issue could not be decided at preliminary state. In the present case it cannot be said that from the averments made in the complaint, bar of limitation is attracted. This issue will have to be decided after evidence is adduced by the parties. 11. Subject to what is observed above, Writ Petition is rejected. JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE