IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.11607 of 2007 Mitrajit Singh Son of Late Ram Nandan Singh resident of Village Kurmuri Police station Sikarhatta Dist. Bhojpur…. Petitioner Versus 1.THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. Collector cum District Magistrate, Bhojpur… Respondents ----------- 2 19.02.2009 Heard Mr Ajay Kumar Thakur for the petitioner, and Mrs Kumari Amrita learned Standing Counsel no. I (Ceiling). This writ petition is directed against the order dated 10.4.2007 (Annexure 13), passed by the learned Collector of the district of Bhojpur, in Ceiling Appeal no. 25 of 2006-07 (Mitrajit Singh vs. State of Bihar), whereby he has rejected the petitioner‟s application on the ground of delay. Learned Standing counsel has opposed the writ petition. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Proceedings under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land)Act,1961, were initiated with respect to the lands held by one Ram Nandan Singh (deceased), father of the present petitioner . Bhikhan Singh, full brother of the present petitioner, had represented the Estate before the authority. Lands were declared surplus. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred CWJC no. 9721/2005 (Mitrajit Singh vs. State of Bihar & others), which was allowed in part by order dated 21.11.2006 (Annexure 10), with the following directions: “In the aforesaid circumstances, this writ - 2 - application is disposed of with a directions to the respondent-authorities to give an opportunity to the petitioner to exercise his option with respect to the surplus lands in question. Let the petitioner exercise his option before the Collector within a period of two months from today who shall dispose of the matter within a further period of six months in accordance with law.” The petitioner filed his application in terms of the order of this court before the learned Collector on 26.3.2007. The learned Collector has refused to examine the merits of the matter on the ground of delay. He has also observed in the impugned order that the petitioner has not made any attempt at all to explain the delay. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Collector ought to have gone by the spirit of the order of the High Court, rather than taking hyper-technical view on the question of delay. The High Court had directed the learned Collector to dispose of the matter within a period of six months and the learned Collector was left with adequate time to dispose of the matter on merits. Learned Standing counsel submits that the learned Collector was bound by every observation of this court, and the petitioner‟s approach is tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. She relies on the order dated 7.1.2009, passed by this court in Civil Review no. 127 of 2007( Vidya Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar & ors). We have perused the material on records and - 3 - considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Learned Standing counsel is right in her submission the learned Collector was bound to notice, and take into account, every observation made by this court. Once the High court had granted two months‟ time to the petitioner to file his application before the learned Collector, which in the estimation of this court and in the circumstance of this case, was adequate time, the petitioner ought to have filed it in time. In view of the protracted precedings over the years, the petitioner must be in possession of all the material particular and the issues have crystallized. In other words, the petitioner was not required to make effort to find out the materials needed for submission of the application. The learned Collector is right in his observation in the impugned order that the petitioner‟s approach is one of gross negligence and disregard of the order of this court. He has also observed that the petitioner did not make any attempt at all to explain the delay. Learned Standing counsel has rightly relied on the following observations in the order dated 7.1.2009, in CWJC No. 127 of 2007 (Vidya Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar & others): “It is difficult to recall the judgment in question also in view of growing pendency in courts in India. I am reminded of the conclusion arrived at by Mr Bibek Debroy in his book entitled „In the Dock: Absurdities of India Law‟, that the pending litigations in this country without any addition thereto, will take 324 years for disposal. The following portion of the book by Fali S. Nariman, entitled ‟India‟s legal system: Can it be saved”, are - 4 - relevant in the present context: “More than one hundred years ago, a law member in the Government of India (Hobhouse) recorded in a minute dated 5 September 1872( On the Bill leading to the Privy Council Appeal Act, 1874) the following observation: In considering what limit should be assigned to the power of appealing, our leading maxim is, that it is the interest of the common wealth to have and end of law suits. No man has a right to unlitimated draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes. The state‟s duty is discharged when it has provided such a reasonable amount of attention and skill and honesty as will satisfy reasonable men that their causes have been decided, erroneously or otherwise, on the merits, and according to the best ability of the judges, and so will prevent them from feeling that resentment of sheer injustice which drives people to take the law into their hands and to wage private war. Upon this principle all laws place some limits to litigation. And so have we placed limits to the power of appealing. Pithily put, and elegantly phrased. The portion about no man having a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wished was quoted by Justice Gajendragadkar (who later became Chief Justice of India) in one of the early reports of the Law Commission of India, but despite what was so wisely said by Mr Hobhouse and again by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, our laws continue to private (by way of appeals, reviews and revisions) unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get private affairs ultimately settled . For instance, we have now abolished second appeal, and yet lawyers go on arguing endlessly about the maintainability of intra-court appeals under special laws.” The writ petition is dismissed. shahid (S.K.Katriar, J)