CRIMINAL MISC. M NO.2325 OF 2009 :{ 1 }: IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH DATE OF DECISION: DECEMBER 07, 2009 S.D.Gulati .....Petitioner VERSUS Gurmukh Singh ....Respondent CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRESENT: Mr. Yogesh Chaudhary, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. R. S. Mamli, Advocate, for the respondent. **** RANJIT SINGH, J. The petitioner seeks quashing of the complaint, Annexure P-1 and the summoning order, Annexure P-2 and so also the subsequent proceedings on the ground of limitation. As per the petitioner, this complaint could be filed within a period of three years from the date of the cause, limitation for which would start from the alleged date of FIR containing defamatory allegations. The same, however, has been filed with much delay, after decision of the case in the FIR and, thus, would be barred by limitation. CRIMINAL MISC. M NO.2325 OF 2009 :{ 2 }: The brief facts of the case are that FIR was lodged against Gurmukh Singh, complainant, on 22.10.1998 under Sections 353, 186, 506 IPC. It is alleged that this was a false FIR lodged against respondent-Gurmukh Singh and, thus, he was defamed in the society. He accordingly filed a complaint against the petitioner on 17.9.2006 under Section 500 and 506 IPC. It is pleaded that there is no allegation in the complaint which would show that any defamatory or libelous remarks were made by the petitioner against the character and reputation of the respondent. Besides this it is also pleaded that this FIR was lodged on 22.10.1998 whereas the complaint is filed nearly after 8 years on 17.9.2006. Thus, the plea is that the complainant would be barred under the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. Ignoring this aspect of limitation, the trial Court has decided to summon the petitioner vide order dated 4.1.2008 and the petitioner accordingly has filed this petition to quash the said complaint and the summoning order. Though other pleas are also raised in the petition but the counsel has pressed only the ground of limitation to seek quashing of the complaint etc. Section 468 Cr.P.C. creates a bar to take cognizance of offence after lapse of period of limitation. The Section provides that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence specified in the Section after the expiry of period of limitation. The limitation as prescribed is 6 months if the offence is punishable with fine only, one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term not exceeding one year and three years if the offence is punishable with an imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three CRIMINAL MISC. M NO.2325 OF 2009 :{ 3 }: years. Section 468 Cr.P.C. Read as under:- “468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation:- (1)Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2)The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. [(3) For the purposes of this Section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.]” Section 469 Cr.P.C. regulates the commencement of period of limitation. Accordingly, the limitation shall commence either from the date of offence or where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of the person or to any police officer or where it is not known by CRIMINAL MISC. M NO.2325 OF 2009 :{ 4 }: whom the offence was committed, then from the first day on which the identify of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or the police officer. The moot question, thus, required to be decided in this case will be the date of commencement of limitation in this case. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that limitation would run from the date the FIR was lodged as the commission of offence of defamation, if any, was known to the person aggrieved by the offence from that very date. Counsel for the respondent, however, would seek exclusion of the time spent by him in facing prosecution under the FIR and, thus, would contend that the limitation would run from the date he was acquitted of the allegations made in the FIR. Defamation is related to the allegations made in the FIR and if these were not made in good faith but just with the aim to defame the respondent, then these would have been in the knowledge of the respondent on the date the FIR was lodged. In such like situation, limitation has to run from the date of FIR and not from the date of acquittal. In support, learned counsel for the petitioner would refer to the case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharj Lal Chopra, 1998 (2) Supreme Court Cases 403. This was also a case of a complaint filed under Section 500 IPC for defamation on the basis of prosecution launched against the complainant under Sections 406, 420 IPC, which had ended in his acquittal. The complaint under Section 500 IPC was filed by the complainant after his acquittal. Allegations that were stated to be defamatory were contained in the complaint filed under Section 406, 420 IPC against him. It was held that limitation would commence from the date of CRIMINAL MISC. M NO.2325 OF 2009 :{ 5 }: filing complaint under Sections 406, 420 IPC and not from the date of acquittal. The submission made by learned counsel for the respondent on the support of Section 470 IPC to say that while computing the period of limitation the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision against the offender shall be excluded, was also considered and not accepted. It was held as under:- “It is an essential requirement of the sub-section that the person who seeks its benefit should be able to establish that he was “prosecuting” another prosecution in one Court or the other referred to in the sub-section. But it is not the case of the respondent that he was prosecuting the appellant in any other prosecution. It is also not his case that prosecution related to the “same facts” within the meaning of the proviso to the sub-section. The provision of sub-section (1) of S.470 cannot therefore avail the respondent, and he is not entitled to the exclusion of any time thereunder. It may be mentioned that the respondent has not sought the benefit of S.473 which permits the extension of the period of limitation in certain cases.” Thus, the plea raised in the present petition is squarely covered by the decision rendered in the case of Surinder Mohan Vikal (Supra). The reliance placed by counsel for the respondent on the case of Bharat Damodar Kale and anr. Vs. State of A.P., 2003(4) RCR (Criminal) 924, apparently would not apply to the facts CRIMINAL MISC. M NO.2325 OF 2009 :{ 6 }: of the present case to exclude the period for which the complainant was facing prosecution. It would, thus, seen that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 468(1) which bars every court for taking cognizance of the offence of category specified in sub section (2) after expiry of period of limitation. The present petition is accordingly allowed. The complaint as well as the summoning order and the subsequent proceedings shall stand quashed. December 07, 2009 ( RANJIT SINGH ) khurmi JUDGE