IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 224 of 1999 Date of decision: 24.12.2008 State of H.P. Appellant Versus Jodh Singh. Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellant: Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent: Mr. Rajiv Jiwan, Advocate. Deepak Gupta, J. (Oral) This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the First Appellate Court has misread and misinterpreted the provisions of Nautor Rules as also the evidence on record while holding the respondent entitled for the grant of Nautor? 2. Whether the trial Court has failed to appreciate that the suit is time barred qua the relief claimed against the order of Financial Commissioner dated 14.7.1986? Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent is an ex-serviceman. He served the Indian Army and fought in the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. In the State of Himachal Pradesh, there is a scheme known as the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968 (here-in-after referred to as the Rules) wherein 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes. 2 land is granted to the agriculturists in the State. The petitioner applied for grant of such land. Rule 8 of the Rules reads as follow:- “Where the father is alive, his son or daughter and where the husband is alive, his wife, shall not be eligible to apply for nautor land except as follows:- Exceptions – (a) If a son or a daughter or a wife proved that the father or the husband, as the case may be has disinherited or separated him or her, or has renounced the words, such a son or daughter or wife, as the case may be, will be eligible for nautor land. (b) If a serving member of the Armed Forces or his son happens to have applied for nautor land in the life time of his father, he will be eligible for nautor land to the extent of his inheritable share in the father’s landed property on the date of the sanction of the nautor land that falls short of the celling prescribed under these rules.” The Sub Divisional Officer, Ghumarwin, rejected the application filed by the respondent on the ground that the father of the respondent was alive and also on the ground that the land applied was in the middle of charand (grazing land). Therefore, he was not entitled to such land. The respondent filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur, who dismissed the same and upheld the orders of the Sub Divisional Officer. Revision petition was filed against the same in the Court of the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, which was also rejected. Thereafter, second revision petition was filed in the Court of Financial Commissioner, Shimla. During the hearing of this petition, the Financial Commissioner asked the Divisional Forest Officer to inspect the spot and submit his report about the actual position of the land. This report was submitted and it was reported that the land is situated in the middle of the charand and is surrounded by forest on all sides 3 and many trees are standing on the land itself. When the original report was submitted the site plan had not been attached. Therefore, the Financial Commissioner called for another report so that the land sought by the plaintiff could be identified with the site plan. The Divisional Forest Officer after verifying the actual position of the land with the help of the site plan again submitted his report dated 1.2.1986. It was mentioned in the report that not only is the land which is claimed by the respondent surrounded by forest land and in the middle of the charand land but there are as many as 569 saplings and 49 Class-IV and Class-V tress of Shisham, Khair, etc. and a large number of bushes on the land. Therefore, the Financial Commissioner also rejected the petition on 14.7.1986. The respondent thereafter filed a suit in the Court of Sub Judge, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, praying for a decree for declaration that he is owner in possession of 8-15 bighas of land by virtue of adverse possession and also prayed that a decree of declaration be passed that the orders dated 25.5.1973 passed by the SDO, Ghumarwin, 3.2.1982 passed by the Collector, Bilaspur, 25.6.1985 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla and 14.7.1986 passed by the Financial Commissioner, Shimla, were wrong, null and void. This suit was dismissed by the trial Court. Appeal was filed by the respondent. The learned District Judge also held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he has become owner by way of adverse possession of land in question. However, the learned District Judge set-aside the orders of the Revenue Courts solely on the ground that they had not considered the case of the 4 applicant in light of Rule 8 of the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968. The main point taken by him was under Rule 8, in the case of an army man, even if the land is held by the father the son being an army man could be granted land after deducting the area which he was to inherit from his father from the maximum of 20 bighas admissible under the Nautor Rule. Shri Rajiv Jiwan, learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that this appeal is not maintainable since the State cannot be said to be an aggrieved party. He submits that though the orders of the Revenue Authorities have been set-aside, since the State has not been directed to grant any land to the respondent, the State cannot be deemed to be an aggrieved party. I am not in agreement with this contention. The orders passed by the Revenue Authorities were in favour of the State. Once these orders are set- aside, even if no consequential orders were passed, the State becomes an aggrieved party because an order which was in its favour has been set-aside. If an order in favour of a party is set- aside, even if no consequential relief is granted the party can always challenge the judgement setting aside the order otherwise the same would operate as res-judicata against the said party in subsequent proceedings. Therefore, the State is an aggrieved party and can maintain the present appeal. The Nautor Rules prescribes a complete scheme for adjudication of the claims of any person applying for Nautor under the Rules. There is a provision for appeal and revision. No doubt, 5 the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred but the right to grant Nautor vests in the authorities under the Nautor Rules and such right cannot directly or indirectly be exercised by the Civil Court. Where a special enactment provides for a complete mechanism for the adjudication of the claims of the parties the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is very limited. In The Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and others, (1976) 1 SCC 496, the Apex Court held if a statute confers a right and in the same breath provides for a remedy for enforcement of such right the remedy provided by the statute is an exclusive one. No doubt, under law there is always a presumption that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide a matter. However, in a case where the entire mechanism is provided in the statute itself even if the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not totally ousted it will be limited. The Civil Court would not have the right to go into the merits of the dispute. It may, however, have the right where the jurisdiction is not expressly barred to decide whether the matter has been decided in accordance with the rules of natural justice and the procedure prescribed has been followed. The Civil Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the authorities specifically vested with the jurisdiction under the Act but can only interfere on the ground that there has been an error in the procedure. In the present case, the learned District Judge has approached the matter as if he was an Appellate Authority sitting in judgement over the orders passed by the Financial Commissioner. 6 This was not within his domain. There was no challenge to the procedure. The only argument was that Rule 8 had not been considered in its proper perspective. This was a decision on merits and the District Judge could not have gone into the merits of such decision. Even otherwise, I find that the Financial Commissioner had not rejected the claim on the ground that the father of the respondent was alive. He had rejected the claim on the ground that the land in question was public grazing land and surrounded by forest. He also came to the conclusion that there were a large number of trees growing in the land in question. These are factors to be taken into consideration by the authority, who has to consider the question whether Government land should be granted as Nautor to an applicant or not. It cannot be said that the Financial Commissioner could not have gone into this question. In my opinion, the learned District Judge gravely erred in holding that the Financial Commissioner collected evidence at the revisional stage. It would be pertinent to remember that it was the respondent whose application for grant of Nautor had been rejected by the authorities below, who had approached the Financial Commissioner. In all probability, he may have challenged the findings of the District Collector that there were trees existing on the land and therefore, the Financial Commissioner called for the report of the Divisional Forest Officer. The learned District Judge also lost sight of the fact that here he was not considering a case where rival rights of the parties were involved. He was dealing with a case where a party 7 was claiming that the Court be directed to grant him the land in question. Therefore, the Financial Commissioner was well within its right to call for the reports to ensure whether such land could actually be granted under Nautor Rule or not. The learned District Judge has also gravely erred in totally by- passing the issue of limitation. The first order by the SDO was passed in the year 1973 and the final order by the Financial Commissioner was passed in the year 1986. The suit was filed in the year 1991. Under article 100 of the Limitation Act, the limitation provided for setting aside any decision or order of any officer of a Government Officer in his official capacity is one year. That period of limitation had expired much before the filing of the suit. The suit was patently not within limitation and the orders of the Financial Commissioner having attained finality could not have been challenged after one year. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, is set- aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. December 24, 2008 ( Deepak Gupta ), J. ™