IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR W.P. (U/A 227) N0. //f gig /2008 Kartik Das S/o. Lal Das, R/o. Village Motimpurkala, Tahsil Tilda, District Raipur (CG) VERSUS PETITIONER APPLICANT «~41 ‘ RESPONDENTS / 1] Smt. Surja Bai, Wd/o. Ramchand Panka, Non—Applicants Taran Das, S/o. Ramchand Panka Both R/o. Village Motimpurkala, Tahsil ’ Tilda, District Raipur (CG) CGIIector, Raipur, District Raipur (CG) Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Raipur, District Raipur (CG) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INA DI HIGH COURT OF CI-IHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR S.B: Hon’ble Shri Prashant Kumar Mishra Writ Petition_(U1A 227LNO. 4723/2008 Kartik Das Versus RESPONDENTS Smt. Surja Bai & others. Non-Applicants Appearance: Shri Manoj Paranjpe, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Sanjeev Agrawal, Panel Lawyet for respondents 3 and 4. None for respondents 1 and 2 though served. WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA ORAL ORDER (20.04.2010) Challenge in this petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India is to the order dated 25/01/2008 (Annexure P-l) passed by . the Board of Revenue and the order dated 12/03/2007 (Annexure P-S) passed by the Additional Collector, Raipur in Revenue Appeal No.35/A/19/year 2006-07. 2. Vide Annexure P—5, the Additional Collector dismissed the petitioner’s appeal as a consequence of dismissal of his application under section 5 of Limitation Act as the Appeal was barred by 174 days. In Revision, the Board of Revenue has also continued the said e 1 order of the Additional Collector after holding that the petitioner has not been able to explain the delay by shoWing any suEcient cause. V. ' } 3. Without entering into the merits of the controversy, on perusal I irof the documents annexed with the writ petition it would appear that l l.. . \3‘3 a \\‘ \ ~,l rt l l W the Naib Tahsildar, Kharora passed the order on 7/01/2005 (Annexure P-2) granting Bhoomi Swami Rights of the subject land to one Laldas, the father of the petitioner.‘ 4. This order of the Naib Tahsildar was the subject matter‘ of Ichallenge before the Sub-Divisional OEmer, who vide order dated 19/07/06 allowed the appeal/preferred by the respondents no.1 and 2 and set aside the order passed by the Naib Tahsildar, Kharora. Within a month ofthis order, the petitioner’s father Laldas died on 11/08/06. 5. According to’the petitioner, he eame to know about the order passed by the SDO for the hrst time on 8/01/07 and thereafter an appeal was preferred before the Additional Collector, Raipur which was barred by 174 days. ' 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the petitioner’s father conducted the litigation, upon his death the petitioner was not aware of the out-come of the proceedings before Sub-Divisional Officer and thus the delay in preferring the appeal ought to have been condoned by the [Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue has also committed aneiror of law by rejecting his revision application. 7. The Additional Collector has not dealt with the reasons assigned by the petitioner in detail and has dismissed the application for condonation of delay by observing that the petitioner has not explained each days delay. .8. The Board of Revenue has also dismissed the Revision by observing that Laldas died on 11/08/06, whereas the order was passed by SDO on 19/07/06, therefore it may not be possible that Laldas had not disclosed about the order to his son i.e..petitioner. The said reason assigned by the Board of Revenue appears to be without any. substance and is based on presumption, for which, there is no foundation. l - ' . t9. VWhen the petitioner submitted on amdavit that he was not iyaware of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and that his father who was a party before Sub-Divisional OfEcer has died within a month of passing of the said order, the learned Additional Collector as well as the Board of Revenue should have taken a reasonable view while considering the matter and should have allowed the application for condonation of delay. 10. It is settled law that Courts should always make endeavour to dispose of the matter on merits, if the» parties are acting bonaiidely.‘ When the delay in filing the application or appeal is explained by assigning suhicient'cause, the court should not reject the application ' on taking hyper technical view of the matter. ll. In the matter of Union of India and others Vs. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ must receive a liberal construction. In G. Ramegowda, Major and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Ofhcer, Banglore (1988) 2 SCC 142, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the word ‘sufhcient cause’ should be so constituted to advance substantial justice and the delay should be condoned when no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the parties seeking condonation of delay. s 12. The present appears to be a ht case for exercise ofjurisdiction under article 227 of the Constitution of India, in as much as the Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue have failed to K exercise the discretion and jurisdiction keeping in view the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard. l3. In the result, the impugned orders passed by the Board of Revenue and Additional Collector are set aside. The Additional Collector shall now hear the appeal preferred by the petitioner on. merits. Sdl— hant Kumar Mishra Judge Pra§