IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 177 OF 2008 IN STAMP NUMBER MAIN NO. 1338 OF 2008 SHRI. CHANDER MOHAN MEHTA ... Applicant Versus MR. WILLIAM ROSARIO FERNANDES AND ANR., ... Respondents Mr. A. D. Bhobe, Advocate for the Applicant. Coram:- N. A. BRITTO, J. Date:- 15th September, 2008 P.C.:- Heard Mr. A. D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the Applicant. A similar application between the same parties was disposed of by Order dated 8-9-2008 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.176 of 2008. In disposing of the said application, this Court observed that since the accused was acquitted on the basis of the view held by me in Narendra V. Kanekar v. Bardez Taluka Co-op Housing Mortgage(2006(6) Bom.C.R. 874) which still holds the field, I have no other option but to follow the same. In Narendra V. Kanekar v. Bardez Taluka Co-op Housing Mortgage(supra) this Court observed as follows:- "There appears to be preponderance of judicial opinion in support of the view that only if the cheque is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or other liability that Section 138 of the Act is attracted but if a cheque is issued for the discharge of a time barred debt and it is dishonoured, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 138 of the Act. This view was first taken in Girdhari Lal Rathi v. P.T.V. Ramanujachari(1997(2) Crimes 658), then by this Court in the case of Smt. Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar(1999(1) GLT 408) and Joseph v. Devassia(2003 K.L.T.(3) 533), and it appears that the last judgment also has the imprimatur of the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal(Cri) No.1785/2001, which was dismissed by Order dated 10.09.2001". In my Order dated 8-9-2008, I had also referred to the Judgment of the learned Division Bench in N. Ethirajulu Naidu v. K. R. Chinnikrishnan Chettiar(AIR 1975 Madras 333) wherein the learned Division Bench held that what Section 25(3) of the Act required is an express promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith. Nothing short of an express promise therefore would provide a fresh period of limitation and that it is settled law that an implied promise is not sufficient. I had also observed that the learned Division Bench had also noted the distinction between an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and a promise to pay under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, 1872 as both had to be in writing and in the case of the first, it had to be given before the expiry of the period and in the case of the second, it could be given beyond the period of limitation. A cheque is an order to the specified banker to make the payment. It cannot therefore be considered as an express promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith. In view of the above, this is not a fit case to grant special leave to appeal. Application dismissed. N. A. BRITTO, J. RD.