THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.1845 OF 2010 DATED:06-12- 2010. Between Abdul Aziz Bin Almas … Petitioner And G.H.M.C. rep. by its Commissioner having office at Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad. …Respondent THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.1845 OF 2010 ORDER: This revision is directed against the order, dated 03-03-2010 in I.A.No.1498 of 2008 in A.S. S.R.No.8762 of 2008 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, whereunder and whereby the application filed by the G.H.M.C., Hyderabad under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’) to condone the delay of 1962 days in filing the appeal was allowed on payment of costs of Rs.2,000/- to the respondent payable on or before 15-03-2010, failing which the petition stands dismissed. 2. As seen from the impugned order, it is clear that the trial Court came to the conclusion that due to negligence, passing of decree was not brought to the notice of the Municipal Corporation by the Standing Counsel, that therefore sufficient cause was shown and consequently delay was condoned. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein contended that the abnormal delay of 1962 days in filing the appeal has not been explained, that they were aware of the passing of the decree, that immediately after the decree, the petitioner gave representation to the Municipal Corporation and thereafter, they filed Writ Petitions in this Court duly adverting to the fact that the decree was already passed by a competent civil Court and it is a case where abnormal delay has not been properly explained and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned order. 4. On the other hand, learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent herein contended that even though there is negligence on the part of the Municipal Corporation, it cannot be given benefit to the party because the dispute in question is pending for the last 40 years, that as the issue of general public using rastha is involved, the condonation of delay has to be viewed liberally and hence, she prays to dismiss the petition. 5. Both the counsel relied on several decisions, which will be referred to at appropriate time. 6. Section 5 of the Act enables only a Court to admit appeal or an application after the expiry of prescribed period on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. 7. The word ‘sufficient cause’ has not been defined under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but it must mean the cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of section. Any cause, which prevents a person from approaching the Court is said to be sufficient cause. Thus the term is kept elastic and unfettered discretion has been conferred on the Courts to do substantial justice considering the facts and circumstances of the case. However that discretion has to be exercised judiciously. The suit is filed for declaration of right, title and interest in respect of the plaint schedule property. After contest, the suit was decreed on 13-12-2002. They filed copy application on 06-02-2008, which has not been granted. It is specifically stated that the then standing counsel has not informed the disposal of the suit and therefore, they could not file the appeal and hence, there was a delay of 1962 days in filing the appeal. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in STATE OF A.P. V MURALI MADHAVA RAO [1], wherein it was held thus: “Before analyzing the reasons contained in the affidavit, we would like to briefly refer to the settled legal position with regard to condonation of delay. The plethora of case law suggests seemingly divergent views or the approach the Courts needed to adopt in considering the applications to condonation of delay. The earlier view of insistence on explaining day to day delay has given way to a somewhat liberal approach by the Courts. Similarly the view that in considering the delay, the Courts should not discriminate between the State and its instrumentalities and the private citizen yielded to the view that the Courts should recognize the inevitable delays occurring in bureaucratic process and that certain amount of latitude within reasonable limits deserves to be shown in favour of State (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v Mst. Katiji and others, G.Ramegowda Major and others v Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore,State of Haryana v Chandra Mani and others and State of UP and others v Harish Chandra and others.)” The above decision shows that the approach of the Court should be liberal in considering the petition for condonation of delay. 9. He further relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.2075 of 2010, wherein it was held thus (para 10): “A reading of the impugned order makes it clear that the High Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents but allowed the same without adverting to the averments contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant. Not only this, the High Court erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a matter of fact, the appeal was filed after more than four years. Another erroneous assumption made by the High Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to controvert the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay. It may have been possible for this Court to ignore the first error in the impugned order because by deleting the figures and words ‘4 years and 28’ in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and substituting the same with the figure 1067, the respondents misled the High Court in believing that the delay was of 1067 days only but it is not possible to fathom any reason why the Division Bench of the High Court omitted to consider the detailed reply which had been filed on behalf of the appellant to contest the prayer for condonation of delay. Notwithstanding this, we may have set aside the impugned order and remitted the case to the High Court for fresh disposal of the application filed by the respondents under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but, do not consider it proper to adopt that course, because as will be seen hereinafter, the respondents did not approach the High Court with clean hands.” The above decision has no application to the present facts of the case because, the delayed reply for condonation of delay has not been considered by the Court therein. 10. He further relied on the judgment of the this Court in Civil Revision Petition No.1468 of 2009, wherein it was held thus : “It is a case of negligence on the part of the petitioner in not pursuing the case for about more than 4 years and even on 04-11-2004, on which day the ex parte decree was passed, he did not attend the Court and what steps he had taken for further prosecuting the case after 04-11-2004 has not been explained at all. Thus ‘sufficient cause’ has not been shown by the petitioner to condone the abnormal delay of 1305 days in filing the petition for setting aside the ex parte decree.” The above decision would go to show that the party in default should explain the delay. No doubt, the petitioner is not required to explain each day’s delay, but general explanation for the entire delay is given and that if the explanation is satisfactory, delay can be condoned dehors the length of delay. 11. Learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent herein relied on a decision reported in G.RAMEGOWDA V SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BANGALORE [2], wherein it was held thus: “While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, - unmindful of time and impersonally. " Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court. Shri Datar criticized that the delay on the part of Government even after 20-1-1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater deligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in office till 15-12-1970 had applied for certified copies on 20-7-1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader. In a similar context where delay had been condoned by the High Court, this Court declined to interfere and observed : "having regard to the entirety of the circumstances, the High Court thought that the State should not be penalised for the lapses of some of its officers and that in the particular circumstances there were sufficient grounds justifying the condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was a matter for the discretion of the High Court. We are unable to say that the discretion was improperly exercised. . . It is also a case where there is negligence on the part of the officers of Municipal Corporation in not presenting the appeal within the period prescribed under law. 12. She further relied on a decision reported in SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS AND HOUSING GOVT. OF INDIA AND OTHERS V MOHINDER SINGH JAGDEV AND OTHERS [3] , wherein it was held thus: “THE question then is whether the delay has been properly explained in filing the special leave petition. The appellants have sufficiently stated the circumstances in which they came to file the special leave petition after the expiry of limitation. It is not in dispute that the counsel who appeared for the Union of India in the High court had sent his record and intimation of the result after the expiry of limitation. Therefore, the blame has to be laid on the counsel who was irresponsible in not informing the government, after the appeal was allowed by the High court. The government acts only through its officers at diverse stages. The advocate who appeared for the Union of India had forsaken his responsibility without informing the government of the action to be taken on the result of the decision given by the High court. Admittedly, after the receipt of the copy of the judgment from the advocate on 1/9/1994 several steps have been taken till filing the special leave petition on 23/1/1995. Proper explanation for 217 days has accordingly been given in the affidavit filed in support of the SLP. We find that the explanation offered by the appellant is well acceptable and is accepted. Accordingly, the delay is not in our view a bar to consider the matter on merits. Accordingly, the delay is condoned.” In this case, the then standing counsel had not informed the concerned authority about passing of decree. That may not be a ground to condone the delay, because it is the responsibility of officers concerned to know the proceedings of suit. 13. She further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF HARYANA V CHANDRA MANI AND OTHERS [4] , wherein it was held thus: “ IT is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the state - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner” 14. She further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF NAGALAND V LIPOK AO AND OTHERS [5] , wherein it was held thus: “IT is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” 15. She further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF KARNATAKA V Y.MOIDEEN KUNHI (DEAD) BY L.RS AND OTHERS [6] , wherein it was held thus: “The case at hand is a classic example where the circumstances are the same. More than 4000 acres of land are involved out of which, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skilful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G.Ramegowda V Special Land Acquisition Officer, Paras 16-17 of the judgment reads as follows: The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning - of course, within a reasonable limit - is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law-officers. Lindley, M. R. , in the Re: National Bank of Wales Ltd. , (1899) 2 Ch 629 at p. 673, observed, though in a different context : "business cannot be carried on, upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them.” In view of the above decisions, it is clear that when the Government is a party where public interest is involved, the delay has to be condoned in the interest of justice. 16. She further relied on a decision reported in N.BALAKRISHNAN AND M.KRISHNAMURTHY [7] , wherein it was held thus: “IT is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court.” 17. She further relied on a decision reported in PRAKASH SESHMAL JAIN V SUKHMAL & SONS AND OTHERS [8] , wherein it was held thus: “HAVING regard to the fact that the High Court had accepted the unconditional apology tendered by the Advocate on record in the matter of his adding a prayer for condonation of delay in the memo of appeal after it has been filed, we are of the opinion that the High Court should not have dismissed the appeal. As a result of the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant, who had no role, has been made to suffer on account of a fault on the part of the Advocate in respect of which the Court has accepted the unconditional apology of the Advocate.” 18. She further relied on a decision reported in BADLU AND ANOTHER V SHIV CHARAN AND OTHERS [9] , wherein it was held thus: “There could be no doubt that if the appellants filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge due to a mistake of law or fact resulting from a bona fide but mistaken advice given to them by their lawyer, this would be a good ground for condoning the delay. Moreover, it is well settled that if a litigant is pursuing a bona fide civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith in any appeal or revision he is entitled to the exclusion of the time taken in such proceeding. The combined effect of S. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act would, therefore, undoubtedly entitle the appellants to exclude the time taken by them while the appeal was pending before the Additional District Judge. In this view of the matter it is manifest that the Senior sub-Judge was fully justified in condoning the delay and the High court was, therefore)clearly wrong in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the senior sub-Judge on the ground that he had wrongly condoned the delay.” When there is a negligence on the part of the counsel in not informing the stage of the suit, the same is said to be sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 19. She further relied on a decision reported in SHRI HANDRAKANT SHUKLA V MAHARAJA MARTAND SINGH [10] , wherein it was held thus: “NOW coming to the question whether there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay the High Court held that no such sufficient cause was shown. This is essentially a finding of fact and this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the decision of the High Court on question of fact. Further, the relief asked for is essentially a discretionary relief and when a trial court exercises its discretion an appellate court is reluctant to interfere with that discretion unless there are very good grounds for doing so. “ There cannot be any dispute that condonation of delay is exclusively within the discretionary power of a Court, but, however, that discretion must be exercised in a judicious manner, not arbitrarily or capriciously. The suit was filed for declaration of right, title and interest whereunder the respondent-Municipal Corporation claiming that it is a public path way being used by public for several decades. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that an application was filed before the Municipal Corporation for not considering his prayer wherein it is stated about decreeing of the suit as 13-12-2002. Similarly, the petitioner filed writ petition in the year 2007 whereunder he also stated about passing of the decree in O.S.568 of 1995 by civil Court. It seems he also given application to the Municipal Corporation in the year 2003 duly informing about the judgment and decree in the suit. From these documents, it is clear that the subordinates of the Municipal Corporation must have knowledge about the judgment and decree, but for obvious reasons, they did not bring it to the notice of the petitioner. Consequently, no appeal is filed within time. There is a clear negligence on the part of the Municipal Corporation employees and sleeping over the matter for over six years in not taking any action when the subject matter of the dispute is a public path way or park which is meant for use of general public. The lethargic attitude of the employees of the Municipal Corporation cannot be pardoned, but at the same time, public interest is involved in the dispute and one of the reasons given in the affidavit filed in support of the petition is that the standing counsel appeared for the Municipal Corporation has not informed the authorities about passing of the judgment and decree and when they came to know about the passing of the decree in the year 2008, they applied for certified copies. In view of change of standing counsel of the Municipal Corporation, possibility of the then standing counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation in not informing about the decree passed by the trial Court cannot be ruled out. Even though there is negligence on the part of the Municipal Corporation, but as the public interest is involved, the trial Court rightly exercised its discretion in condoning the delay, but on payment of costs of