CRIMINAL APPEAL No.285 OF 1993 *** Against the judgment dated 2.9.1993 and order dated 3.9.1993 passed by Sri B.N.P.Singh, Additional Sessions Judge-II, Patna in Sessions Trial No.225/89. *** SHEOPUJAN RAI---------------------------------Appellant Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR---------------------------Respondent *** For the Appellant :-Mr. Shyameshwar Dayal, Sr. Advocate Mr. Birendra Kr. Roy, Advocate For the State :- Mr. Nand Kishre Prasad, Addl. P.P. For the Informant :- Mr. Sanjeev Ranjan Gupta, Advocate *** P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SYED MOHAMMAD MAHFOOZ ALAM *** S.M.M.Alam, J. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment dated 2.9.1993 and the order dated 3.9.1993 passed by Sri B.N.P.Singh, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Patna in Sessions Trial No.225 of 1989 whereby he has been pleased to convict the appellant Sheopujan Rai under Section 202 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on receipt of the confidential information at Kadam Kuan Police Station that one Baijanti Devi had died due to sustaining of burn injury, the informant Sheo Prasad Singh (P.W.9), who was posted at Kadam Kuan Police Station as S.I. at the time of the alleged occurrence, visited the house of the appellant Sheopujan Rai situated in Amarudigali along with other police personnel. On arrival at the place of occurrence and on opening of the room 2 in which Baijanti Devi had received burn injuries, it was found that smell of kerosene oil was emitting from the room and kerosene oil was found spread over the floor of the room and the inner part of the door plank, some part of cot, wooden table and bed-sheet were found half-burnt. Haridwar Prasad told the informant that he saw the smoke coming out from the room and he along with others got the door of the room opened and found Baijanti Devi in pains as she had caught fire and then the fire was extinguished but Baijanti Devi died due to burn injury. The informant was further told that appellant Sheopujan Rai along with others came at the place of occurrence on being informed that his daughter-in-law had suffered burn injury. He with the help of some persons took out the dead body of the deceased and drove away in an ambassador car. The informant was also told that the deceased was married to Uma Shankar Singh in her childhood and after second marriage (Gauna) the deceased had been residing in her in-law„s house. Since Uma Shankar Singh had not been in visiting terms with the deceased, so relation between them became strained and due to that strained relation the deceased committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body and putting her on fire. On getting the abovementioned information, P.W.8 prepared his written report (Ext.2) on the basis of which he drew up formal F.I.R., and instituted Kadam Kuan P.S. Case No.719 dated 13.11.1987 under Sections 306 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code. As Sheo Prasad Singh had already taken up investigation of the case at the place of occurrence itself so he investigated the case and after completing investigation submitted charge sheet against the appellant and others under Sections 306 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code,on the basis of which cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Session. 3 3. On 7.8.1990 charges under Section 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 201/34 of the I.P.C. were framed against the appellant and three others by Sri S.N. Choudhary, Additional Sessions Judge, Patna. The appellant and other accused persons denied the charge and thus, they were put on trial and by the impugned judgment, all the accused persons including the appellant were acquitted of the charge under Sections 306/34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code but the appellant alone was convicted under Section 202 of the I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Against the said judgment and order of conviction, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 4. During course of argument, the learned Advocate of the appellant raised a legal point that when the appellant was acquitted of the substantive charge i.e. charge under Section 306/34 of the I.P.C. and Section 201/34, he cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 202 of the I.P.C. He further submitted that the impugned judgment will show that the death of deceased Baijanti Devi was held by the trial court as accidental as the trial court did not find any evidence that the appellant or any of the accused abetted the commission of the offence of suicide by Baijanti Devi. The learned Advocate submitted that it was obligatory on the part of the person to give information to the police or to the authority about the commission of any offence if he knows or has reason to believe that any offence had been committed but he is not bound to give any information either to the police or to the authority about any accidental death which is not covered under the definition of an offence. The learned Advocate submitted that the trial court has held that the death of Baijanti Devi was accidental and on that very finding, the trial court acquitted the appellant and other accused persons under Sections 306/34 of 4 the I.P.C. and Section 201/34 of the I.P.C. and so, according to the finding of the trial court itself, the appellant was not duty bound to inform the Police about the accidental death as under law no offence was committed by him or by any other person in causing the death of Baijanti Devi. The learned Advocate submitted that on this score alone the appellant deserves to be acquitted. He submitted that the appellant was never charged under Section 202 of the I.P.C. and Section 202 is distinct from section 201 of the I.P.C. and so, the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence for which he had never been charged. 5. I have gone through the judgment of the trial court and I find that the trial court has acquitted the appellant and other accused persons for the offence under Section 306 and Section 201/34 of the I.P.C. on the ground that the death of the deceased was accidental and there was no evidence on record that Baijanti Devi was forced by the appellant or any other accused persons to commit suicide. When the trial court itself held that the death of Baijanti Devi was accidental, it cannot be held that any offence with respect to the death of Baijanti Devi was committed by the appellant or any other accused. Under such circumstance, the appellant or any other accused are not bound to give any information about the death of Baijanti Devi which was not covered under the definition of the offence. 6. To support my view, I would like to quote Section 202 of the Indian penal Code. Section 202 of the I.P.C. reads as follows:- “Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.” 5 7. The very wording of Section 202 of the I.P.C. shows that any person is bound by law to give information when he knows or has reason to believe that an “offence” had been committed but when “no offence” had been committed then the person is not bound by law to give any information about any incident which was accidental and thus, I am of the view that by not informing the police about the death of Baijanti Devi which was accidental according to the finding of the trial court, the appellant has not committed any offence punishable under Section 202 of the I.P.C. and so, on this score alone he deserves to be acquitted. 8. So far as the argument of the learned Advocate of the appellant that Section 202 of the I.P.C. is distinct from Section 201 I.P.C. is concerned, I am of the view that this argument also appears to be correct as both the offences are distinct offences and without framing charge under Section 202 of the I.P.C., the conviction of the appellant under Section 202 of the I.P.C. is bad in law and on this score also, the appellant should be acquitted. 9. In the result, I find merit in this appeal and as such, the same is hereby allowed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant under Section 202 of the Indian penal Code are set aside and the appellant is acquitted of Section 202 of the I.P.C. The appellant is on bail; as such he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. (Syed Md. Mahfooz Alam, J.) Patna High Court, Patna The 17th July, 2008 N.A.F.R. (B.T.)