IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE B.SESHASAYANA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.24771 of 2001 Between: A.S.Murthy, S/o.Swamy Naidu, R/o.Vijayawada, Krishna District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Senior Divisional Comml.Manager, S.C.Rly Vijayawada Division, Vijayawada. 2 Mr.Anjaneyulu, AEO/Hqrts/S.C., S.C.Rly, Rail Nilayam, Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other Writ or order or direction quash the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench in O.A.No.1426/01, dt.19-11-2001 and quash the charge Memo dated 22-6-1999 issued by R-1 including the order dated 27-8-2001 and pass such other order or orders as deemed fit. Counsel for the Petitioner: MR.K.S.MURTHY Counsel for the Respondents: Smt.Pushpender Kour, Standing Counsel for Railways. The Court made the following : THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE B.SESHASAYANA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.24771 of 2001 ORDER: (per the Hon'ble Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed) This writ petition is filed seeking writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A.No.1426 of 2001, dated 19.11.2001 and also to quash the Charge Memo dated 22.06.1999 issued by the first respondent including the order dated 27.08.2001. It is stated that the petitioner, who was working as Head, Travelling Ticket Examiner (H.T.T.E), was suspended on 23.02.1996 in view of the pendency of criminal case against him in C.C.No.1 of 1997. The Special Judge for the C.B.I Cases acquitted the petitioner on 30.11.1998. As the suspension was not revoked, he filed O.A.No.587 of 1999 and the O.A. came to be allowed directing the respondents to revoke the suspension forthwith. Consequently suspension was lifted and he was reinstated on 16.08.1999. Pending delivery of the judgment in the said O.A., charge memo was issued by the department on 22.06.1999. The charges framed in the charge memo are similar to the charges framed against him before the Special Court for C.B.I Cases and the department relied upon the same set of documents and witnesses and suspended him again on 15.09.1999. Challenging the departmental proceedings and charge sheet, dated 22.06.1999, he filed O.A.No.1670 of 1999 and the same was disposed of with a direction to the respondent to consider the application for reinstatement and it was made clear that a separate O.A can be filed to challenge the charge sheet. On 10.11.2000 the charge sheet was amended with minor corrections and additions. Thereafter, he filed another O.A in O.A.No.88 of 2001 challenging the charge sheet and initiation of enquiry proceedings. The said O.A was disposed of on 28.02.2001 directing the respondent-administration to pass orders on the question of feasibility of continuing the charge sheet pursuant to the judgment in Criminal Case. The charge memo dated 22.06.1999 has been kept in abeyance. Thereafter, pursuant to the judgment delivered in O.A.No.88 of 2001, the first respondent herein passed the impugned order dated 27.08.2001 assigning the reasons for continuation of departmental proceedings. Challenging the charge sheet dated 22.06.1999 and the impugned proceedings dated 27.08.2001, the petitioner filed O.A.No.1426 of 2001, and the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 19.11.2001 held that the respondents ought to have proceeded against the applicant for disciplinary proceedings irrespective of the criminal proceedings and accordingly directed the respondents to expedite the disciplinary proceedings by following due procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the disciplinary authority has made up his mind and prejudged the issue, without leaving anything open to the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer in all probability would be carried away by the observations made by the disciplinary authority and that in the teeth of that order there is no chance of fair enquiry. He also contended that the nature of evidence in both the proceedings, namely, departmental and criminal are same without any iota of difference. The Criminal Court has analyzed the issue and the witnesses and acquitted the petitioner and therefore the respondent-authority ought not to have proceeded with the departmental proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Capt.M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [1] , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: “Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.” He further relied upon the judgment of this Court in S.K.Ramju v. Regional Manager, APSRTC, Nalgonda, Nalgonda District[2], wherein this Court held as under: “………..In any event, as it has been held by the criminal Court that the appellant was not guilty of the charge of causing death, and he had not been acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, we fail to understand as to how despite the said finding of competent Court of law, the reputation of the respondent- Corporation has been damaged.” The learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in G. M. Tank v. State of Gujarat[3], wherein it was held as under: “In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” On the other hand, Smt.Pushpender Kour, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent – Railways vehemently argued that in the impugned order dated 27.08.2001, reasons were assigned pursuant to the judgment rendered by the Tribunal in O.A.No.88 of 2001 and those reasons cannot be subject matter of the judicial review. She also contended that with reference to the criminal case the prosecution has to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and whereas in the departmental proceedings the guilt of the delinquent is required to be established basing on the preponderances or probabilities. She further contended that the criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are altogether different and distinct. The learned Standing Counsel has drawn our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA & others[4], wherein the Apex Court held as under: “The position in law relating to acquittal in a criminal case, its effect on departmental proceedings and reinstatement in service has been dealt with by this Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari-Lal Sidhana(1997(4)SCC385). It was held in paragraph 5 as follows: 5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary government servant, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a government servant accused of defalcation of public money. Re- instatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.” She also placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rattan Pal v. Punjab Gramin Bank[5], a Division Bench Judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Kulla Venkata Shetty v. The Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation[6] and a Judgment of this Court in W.P.No.1603 of 2008, to which of us is a party, wherein this Court held as under: “It is the settled proposition of law that departmental proceedings is with regard to misconduct alleged against an employee, whereas the criminal case relates to an offence. The standard of proof with regard to the departmental proceedings is quite different from that of the criminal case. Apart from this, the enquiry in the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner was completed and the report was also furnished to the petitioner. He could not explain as to how he will be prejudiced if the departmental proceedings are allowed to continue when admittedly the enquiry was over. In these circumstances, we hold that the Tribunal has rightly refused to stall the departmental proceedings. We do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the Tribunal, calling for interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. It is open to the respondent- authorities to complete the departmental proceedings, as per law. There shall be no order as to costs.” She further placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in UCO Bank v. M.Venuranganath[7], wherein this Court held as under: ‘There is no legal bar on the part of the bank to initiate disciplinary proceedings against delinquent-employee on the alleged ground of misconduct. It is well settled proposition that the criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are altogether different and distinct. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Charge memo issued pursuant to observations made by criminal court while acquitting delinquent-accused on benefit of doubt to proceed departmentally. Mere delay of 1½ years to initiate departmental proceedings due to non-receipt of records from criminal court, is not fatal to quash the charge memo. Since no prejudice pleaded to have been caused to delinquent on account of delay, the order passed by the learned Single Judge has been set aside.” Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the point that arises for consideration is whether the Tribunal is justified in directing the respondents to expedite the disciplinary proceedings? It is settled proposition of law that departmental proceedings is with regard to misconduct alleged against an employee, whereas the criminal case relates to an offence and the standard of proof with regard to the departmental proceedings is quite different from that of the criminal case. There is no bar to proceed both in criminal case and departmental proceedings. In the impugned order, dated 27.08.2001 cogent and convincing reasons were assigned by the disciplinary authority pursuant to the decision rendered by the Tribunal in O.A.No.88 of 2001. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having given our anxious consideration, we see no grounds to quash the impugned orders. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, the respondent-authority is directed to conduct the enquiry uninfluenced by the observations made by the disciplinary authority in proceedings dated 27.08.2001 and complete the same expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. GHULAM MOHAMMED, J B.SESHASAYANA REDDY, J Date: 26.11.2008 va [1] (1999)3 SCC679 [2] 2001(4) ALD 535(DB) [3] AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 2129 [4] AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 1161 [5] 2008(1) SLR 444 [6] 2008(3)SLR 591 [7] 2002 (5) ALT 162 (D.B)