1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 3889 OF 2009 Suresh Haribhau Thakare .. Petitioner Vs Nashik District Maratha Vidya Prasarak Samaj and others .. Respondents S.K. Shinde i/b Sagar Kasar for the petitioner K.Y. Mandlik for respondent nos. 1 to 3 Ms. S.S. Bharde, AGP for respondent nos. 4 and 5 CORAM : Smt. V.K. TAHILRAMANI, J. DATE : 20th August, 2009 P.C.: 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 3 and the learned AGP for respondent nos. 4 and 5. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed on 01st January, 2003 as an assistant teacher in respondent no. 3 - Janta Vidyalay & Junior College,Karanjvan which is an institution run by the Rma wp3889-09.sxw 2 respondent no. 1. It is his case that he was appointed in clear and permanent vacancy and his appointment was approved by the respondent no. 5 Deputy Director of Education. He worked with the institution till 2008. On 14th August, 2008, he came to be terminated on the basis of serious charge involving moral turpitude without giving him any opportunity of being heard. It is also his case that as he was working since 2003 to 2008, he had acquired status of permanent employee and as such he could not have been terminated without following the necessary procedure under Maharashtra Employees of Private School Act, 1977. He challenged his termination before the School Tribunal by preferring appeal. The said Appeal came to be dismissed by order dated 31st January, 2009. 3. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not appointed as full time teacher but he was appointed on clock hour basis. His letter of appointment also clearly shows that he was appointed on clock hour basis. The appointment letter also shows that the appointment was only for that academic year and his services would be terminated without any notice or assigning any Rma wp3889-09.sxw 3 reason. It is further stated therein that the appointment is subject to the approval of the Deputy Director, Nasik Region. It is an admitted fact that thereafter, every year the petitioner was similarly appointed for a period of one year on clock hour basis. Those appointment letters were similar to the earlier appointment letter. These appointment letters show that the appointment of the petitioner was not made against any clear and permanent vacancy and the appointment was only on clock hour basis. His appointment clearly shows that the services of the petitioner was temporary in nature. Even the approval granted by the Deputy Director of the Education shows that the approval was granted on each occasion only for one academic year and on clock hour basis. The appointment letters show that he was not a permanent employee of the respondent institution. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the petitioner has acquired the status of deemed permanency as per provisions of Sub section (2) of Section 5 of M.E.P.S Act. No doubt, the petitioner had worked with the school of respondent institute from the year 2003 to 2008. However, as indicated above, the appointment of the petitioner was on clock hour basis. Under such circumstances, it Rma wp3889-09.sxw 4 cannot be said that appellant was a permanent employee of the respondent institute. It is well settled that when the service of the employee is temporary in nature, he can be terminated at any stage without inquiry. 4. Thereafter, the learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been terminated on the basis of serious charge that is of moral turpitude and the termination is stigmatic in nature. He submitted that in such case, the petitioner ought to have been given hearing before he was terminated. He further contended that before termination, procedure ought to have been followed. As far as following procedure is concerned, it is seen that the petitioner was serving on temporary basis and his services were liable to be terminated at any point of time which is clear from the appointment orders. Thus, as far as this contention is concerned, I find no merit in this contention. 5. As far as the other contention is concerned i.e the petitioner ought to have been given hearing before he was terminated, it is seen Rma wp3889-09.sxw 5 that there were many complaints by girl students and their parents in respect of the petitioner alleging moral turpitude against him. A memo was issued to the petitioner on 2nd August, 2008 containing allegations of moral turpitude and allegations of misconduct. The petitioner has given explanation to the said memo. Thus, it cannot be said that without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to rebut the allegations again him, he came to be terminated. 6. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the affidavits of one Suvarna Avate and her brother. Suvarna Avate was one of the students in the institution who had made allegations against the petitioner. Reliance is placed on the affidavits wherein it is stated that the allegations made by them against the petitioner were false and they were made under pressure. However, it is seen that both the affidavits are dated 11th February, 2009 whereas the order of the School Tribunal is dated 31st January, 2009. The petitioner was terminated in the month of August, 2008. The affidavits of the Suvarna Avate has been filed on 11th February, 2009 wherein she has stated that when she came to know that the Rma wp3889-09.sxw 6 petitioner had lost his job, she felt very bad and she realized her mistake, hence in order to correct the mistake committed by her, she has filed this affidavit. Though the termination had occurred in the month of August, 2008, this affidavit has been filed on 11th February, 2009. Even before the Tribunal, she had not come forward nor the petitioner examined her as his witness in support of his case. Thus, it is clear that the said affidavit is an afterthought and hence, her affidavit cannot be taken into consideration at this belated stage. 7. Looking to all the above facts, no case is made out for interference in the order dated 31st January, 2009. Writ petition is dismissed. (SMT. V.K. TAHILRAMANI, J) Rma wp3889-09.sxw 7 Rma wp3889-09.sxw