IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH R.S.A.No.2462 of 2008 (O&M) Date of Decision : 27.4.2010 D.N.Pandey and another ....Appellants Versus Haryana Development Authority and another ...Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MAHESH GROVER .... Present : Mr. Shiv Kumar, Advocate for the appellants. Mr.G.C.Gupta, Advocate for the respondents. ..... MAHESH GROVER, J. Delay condoned. The appellants filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction praying for a decree of declaration impugning the memos dated 14.5.2001 and 15.5.2001 issued by the respondents and pleading them to be null and void. It was pleaded that they were owners in possession of a plot measuring 476 sq. yard and had constructed one hall, one shop and one office- cum-shop on the said plot. The said property was purchased by appellant No.1 vide two separate sale deeds and he had been paying the house-tax in respect of the said property since 1994-95. The said property was previously owned by Ashok Kapoor and Vijay Kapoor R.S.A.No.2462 of 2008 (O&M) -2- who had purchased the same from Bhajan Lal and Raj Singh. The sale was challenged by the sons of Bhajan Lal and Raj Siingh but ultimately in the litigation which went upto the Supreme Court the sale was found to be valid and legal. It was pleaded that the defendants/respondents had no concern with the suit property but they had issued the aforesaid two memos calling upon the appellants to show cause as to why action be not taken against them under Section 55 of the HUDA Act. The respondents/defendants took the plea that the suit land forms part of Khasra Nos.49 and 50 which land was acquired by the State of Haryana for planned development of Sector 24, Faridabad by the HUDA and possession thereof was delivered to them long back. It is alleged that the plaintiffs/appellants had tried to trespass onto the HUDA land without any right, title or interest and that the appellants had filed the present suit in order to create obstruction in the scheme of the respondents to carry water from Yamuna bed to the Overhead Reservoirs in NIT, Faridabad and various other sectors. It was alleged that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit under the HUDA Act. The grounds on which the plaintiffs had sought declaration have been denied. The trial Court dismissed the suit. An appeal followed which has also been dismissed on the ground of delay. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the delay of 131 days was not so inordinate so as to become fatal to the case of the appellants. The learned counsel for the respondents stated that the impugned judgment was justified because the appellants could not R.S.A.No.2462 of 2008 (O&M) -3- have been permitted to raise the pleas after filing the appeal belatedly. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that there has been miscarriage of justice in this case. The delay was not so inordinate so as to become fatal to the case of the appellants. The appellants had pleaded lack of communication between them and the counsel which during the period of 131 days was not implausible. Having regard to the aforesaid, the appeal is accepted and the matter is remanded back to the first Appellate Court for fresh decision on merits. The question of law which arises for consideration of this Court is whether the substantial right of a person can be defeated by interpreting the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act narrowly or not? The aforesaid question is thus answered to mean that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires that the delay be explained satisfactorily, yet to ensure substantial justice such a provision of law has to be interpreted liberally and delay of 131 days cannot be considered to be so inordinate so as to throttle a substantial right of a litigant. Procedural laws are always meant to enhance justice and not meant to scuttle the rights of a litigant. 27.4.2010 (MAHESH GROVER) JUDGE dss