IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 Date of decision: 03.02.2011 Dharam Pal and others …..Petitioners versus State of Haryana and others ……Respondents CORAM: Hon’ble Mr.Justice Jasbir Singh Hon’ble Mr.Justice Rakesh Kumar Garg Present: Mr.Shailendra Jain, Advocate for the petitioners Jasbir Singh, J. (Oral) This writ petition has been filed with a prayer to quash an award passed on 24.5.2010 (P7) with regard to land falling in khasra Nos.36//9/2 (0-12), 50//20 min (1-9), 9/3 (0-16) and 22/2 min (1-9), total measuring 4 kanal 6 marla. It is further prayer of the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings, which were initiated vide notifications dated 27.11.2003 and 24.11.2004, issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, the Act), respectively, be also quashed. It is primary contention of counsel for the petitioners that the award, having been passed beyond the period of limitation, as envisaged under Section 11-A of the Act, deserves to be quashed. It is an admitted fact that this writ petition has been filed through an attorney, copy of the power of attorney has been placed on record. A reading of the contents thereof clearly indicates that it is virtually a sale in favour of the attorney by the land owners. It is a fact that when Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act on 27.11.2003, the land owners then, did not file any objection under Section 5-A of the Act. It is an admitted fact that land was lying vacant and further that as per record vide notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, 141 acres of land was proposed to be acquired. Many land owners came to this Court and in their favour, an interim order, staying their dispossession, was passed. Qua some part of the land, an award was passed on 22.11.2006, whereas qua rest of the land, award could not be passed on account of pending litigation. As per established law, once, stay order has been granted in favour of any of the right holders, whose land is subject matter of acquisition, the State is justified in not passing an award, not only qua the land subject matter of challenge but also regarding rest of the land. Controversy, whether stay granted in favour of a land owner, whose land is subject matter of acquisition along with others will stop the running of period of limitation, to issue a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) AIR 1069. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and exception No.1 added to sub-section 1 of Section 6 of the Act. After discussing those provisions and various judgments on the subject, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:- “87. Perusal of the opinion of Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word 'any' in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of land owners to be automatically extended to all those land owners, whose lands are covered under the 2 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appear to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper.” In that case, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has approved the following ratio of a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1987 Delhi 239:- "26. Learned counsel for the petitioners is to some extent right in his contention that broad as the above observations are, these cases are slightly different in that they all dealt with the effect of the operation of stay order only vis-a-vis one of the parties to the litigation in which the stay order is passed. But we are of opinion that these decisions are of guidance as to the proper approach to such a question. In the first place, they show that a stay of execution of a decree can be pleaded as a ground for conclusion of the period of stay even by a judgment-debtor who did not seek the stay. To that extent, the insistence by the petitioners that the exclusion can operate only against the party who obtained the stay order would not be correct. Secondly, these decisions show that the prohibition on action need not be the direct effect of a stay order of a court. Thus, in the present cases, even if in terms the court be held not to have stayed a declaration in other cases, such was the indirect effect of the stay order inthese cases. Thirdly, they lay down that we should not interpret a provision of this type rigidly but should 3 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 give it an interpretation that gives effect to the object of the legislature. 27. We, therefore, think that, in proceeding to interpret the scope of the explanation, we should keep in mind the nature of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and the nature of the proceedings in which stay orders are obtained. So far as the first of these aspects is concerned, while it is possible for the Government to issue notifications under S. 4 in respect of each plot of land sought to be acquired, it is not feasible or practicable to do so, particularly in the context of the purpose of many of the acquisitions at the present day. It is common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as many other capital cities, vast extents are being acquired for 'planned development' or public projects. The acquisition is generally part of an integrated scheme or plan and, though, technically speaking, there can be no objection to individual plots being processed under Ss. 5A, 6, 9, 12, etc., particularly after the amendment of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that at least substantial blocks of land should be dealt with together at least upto the stage of the declaration under S.6. To give an example, if a large extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a canal, the scheme itself cannot be put into operation unless the whole land can be eventually made available. If even one of the land owners anywhere along the line applies to court and gets a stay of the operation of the notification under S. 4, in practical terms, the whole 4 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 scheme of acquisition will fall through. It is of no consolation to say that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by the scheme. To compel the Government to proceed against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste of public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the S.4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands. (See: Shenoy Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1985 SC 621 and Gauraya Vs. Thakur, AIR 1986 SC 1440. Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of. 28. It is true that the object of having contiguity of all plots sought to be acquired may fail for various reasons. For 5 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 instance, there may be items of properties exempt from acquisition in between. Again, it may happen that a particular person may have been able to stave off acquisition of his land for one reason or other, particularly since dates of declarations under S.6, awards and taking of possession may vary from plot to plot. Moreover, it is not in all cases that the object of acquisition needs a number of contiguous plots and may be workable even without some of the intervening lands. However, in considering a question of interpretation, one should not go only by one particular situation but must consider all eventualities to the extent possible. It is only on a broad perspective of the scheme of present day acquisitions in large measure that we say that any hurdle in regard to any one plot of land can hold up an entire acquisition, all promptness and expedition on the part of the Government notwithstanding. 29. It was sought to be urged that the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondent would result in equating an interim order with a final judgment and the final judgment in a land acquisition case to a judgment in rem and in this context reference was made to S.41, Evidence Act, and to a passage in Woodroffe on Evidence (14th Edition, Vol.2) at page 1225. We do not think this analogy is correct. If the final order can operate to the benefit of all the parties, there is no reason why the interim order cannot also affect them. Moreover, we are considering the nature and effect of an injunction passed by 6 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 the court against one of the parties thereto who has to act in the same capacity not only in the acquisition of the plot of land the owner of which has obtained a stay order but in all proceedings consequent on or in pursuance of the same notification that is challenged in that petition. 30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in this type of proceeding, the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter: it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; 7 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 and if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended. 31. We have, therefore, to give full effect to the language of the section and the stay orders in question, in the above context and background. The use of the word "any" in the explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed. It may be complete stay of the operation of the entire notification or may even be a partial stay - partial in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate. The words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is no justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only to the cases in which the stay order is actually obtained." In the award, under challenge, it is clearly mentioned that the award has been passed on passing of an order by this Court in CWP No.10845 of 2004. It is also an admitted fact that some writ petitions, in which, interim stay was granted, are still pending. If that is so, we feel that the period of limitation as provided under Section 11-A of the Act, will not come in the way and it cannot be said that acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The owners were sleeping throughout. This fact is evident from reading of mutation entries made in their favour on 26.5.2010, whereas their predecessor-in-interest continued to be shown as owner, though he died on 21.12.1970. Our view that land has been sold to the attorney is affirmed 8 Civil Writ Petition No.2045 of 2011 because even before entry of mutation in their favour, they executed a power of attorney on 10.11.2009, giving absolute right to sell the land, to the attorney. No case is made out for interference. Dismissed. (Jasbir Singh) Judge 03.02.2011 (Rakesh Kumar Garg) gk Judge 9