Regular Second Appeal No. 1897 of 1987 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 1897 of 1987 Date of decision: 21.04.2010 The State of Punjab ...Appellant Versus Sukhchain Singh ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Ms. Ambika Luthra, AAG, Punjab for the appellant. ***** RANJIT SINGH J. The State has filed this appeal against the order passed by the trial Court as well as by the First Appellate Court whereby suit of the respondent-plaintiff, Sukhchain Singh, has been decreed. The respondent-plaintiff was working as Conductor with Punjab Roadways, Tarn Taran and was awarded 3 punishments on different dates which he had impugned by filing the civil suit. On 13.02.1978, two separate orders were passed vide Endst. Nos. 234 and 241 for stoppage of two and one increment respectively with cumulative effect. The State counsel would point out that infact order No. 241 was for stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect but wrongly conveyed as stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. On 12.04.1979 and again on 22.03.1980, stoppage of 3 increments was directed with cumulative effect. All these orders were challenged being illegal, void and unenforceable as having been Regular Second Appeal No. 1897 of 1987 2 passed without hearing the respondent-plaintiff. The order dated 12.04.1979, though was passed after holding an inquiry but the respondent-plaintiff was exonerated of the charge alleged against him. Despite this, the order of punishment was made without recording any note of disagreement or without issuing any notice to the respondent-plaintiff. Similar was the position regarding the order dated 22.03.1980. In this case also the enquiry was held but the respondent-plaintiff was found innocent by the enquiry officer. Still order of punishment was passed by the General Manager without recording any note of dissent or without putting the respondent- plaintiff to any notice. The appellant-State had appeared in response to the notice and had filed written statement raising the plea that the suit was time barred. The State had justified all the orders of the punishment passed against the respondent-plaintiff. The suit was tried on the following issues:- 1. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? OPD. 2. Whether the suit is within limitation?OPP. 3. Whether the impugned orders are illegal, null and void as alleged?OPP. 4. Relief. The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and hence decreed the suit. The State filed an appeal, which has also been dismissed and that is how the State is Regular Second Appeal No. 1897 of 1987 3 in Regular Second Appeal before this Court. The First Appellate Court has observed that stoppage of increment with cumulative effect is a minor punishment. This observation, however, cannot now be accepted as by now it is fully settled that stoppage of increment with cumulative effect is a major penalty. That being the position, the punishment cannot be sustained simply on the ground that the requisite procedure for awarding major penalty was not followed as is observed by the First Appellate Court. So far as the remaining orders are concerned, it can be noticed that the inquiry in these cases were held but the respondent-plaintiff was found innocent by the inquiry officer. It may need a notice that the punishing authority was well within its right to differ with the finding returned by the inquiry officer but before awarding penalty, it was incumbent upon the punishing authority to record a note of disagreement and then put the delinquent employee to notice intimating grounds on which it had differed with the finding to ensure that the principle of natural justice were followed. Concededly, the punishment was awarded without putting the respondent-plaintiff to any notice. Punishment was awarded without following the principle of natural justice. Accordingly, there would not be any need to interfere in the view taken by the courts below. The plea of limitation appears to have been wrongly considered. The view that the void order could be challenged without any consideration of limitation may not now be sustainable in view of law laid down in Sneh Gupta versus Devi Sarup and others 2009 Regular Second Appeal No. 1897 of 1987 4 (6) SCC 194 . The Supreme Court has held that there is no law where the decree is void, no period of limitation for setting aside thereof shall be attracted at all. The orders otherwise were found to have been passed in violation of the procedure and in violation of principle of natural justice and so may not call for interference at this belated stage. The Regular Second appeal is accordingly dismissed. April 21, 2010 ( RANJIT SINGH ) rts JUDGE