1 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw vks IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.65 OF 1997. WITH CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.1492 OF 2010 Anil Shashikant Dukhande, age 22 years, residing at: Masure, Godghera, Taluka: Malwan, District Sindudurg. .. Appellant -versus The State of Maharashtra .. Respondent. Mr. J.G. Bhanushali, Advocate, for the Appellant. Mrs. Geeta Mulekar, Additional Public Prosecutor, for the Respondent State. CORAM: R.C. CHAVAN, J. Judgment dictated in Court but not transcribed : 2nd December,2010 Appeal reheard and again Judgment pronounced on : 17/02/2011 Judgment 1. The appeal was called out first on 26th November, 2010, but none appeared for the appellant. The learned APP was, 2 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw therefore, heard on that day and matter was adjourned. On 2nd December, 2010 when the case was called out, again none appeared for the appellant. Since it was not shown that the advocate for the appellant has ceased to practice, there was no question of issuing any notice to the appellant to engage another advocate. After matter was heard on 26th November, 2010, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, made enquiries with the investigating Officer and found that the prosecutrix had committed suicide by consuming poison on 05.01.2009, out of frustration since her marriage could not settled. The Investigating Officer, seems to have also recorded the statement of the appellant on 29.11.2010, wherein the appellant stated that he was aware that he had been convicted and appeal against conviction was pending before this Court. Thus, it was not that the appellant was not aware of the need to prosecute his appeal, yet he and his learned counsel were absent on 2-12-2010. Therefore, on 2.12.2010, with the help of learned Additional Public Prosecutor, I went through the record and proceeding in the light of grounds raised in the memo of appeal and also attempted to consider all the arguments that could have been advanced on behalf of the appellant and proceeded to dismiss the appeal by dictating the judgment in the Court. 2. Before the judgment came to be transcribed the learned counsel Mr. Bhanushali, for the appellant appeared on 3.12.2010 3 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw and requested that he may be heard. Since the judgment was already dictated, the question was whether the appeal could be reheard. The learned counsel for appellant, therefore, filed Criminal Application No.1492 of 2010, for being permitted to argue the appeal on merits. This application too is now being disposed of by this judgment. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to a judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh delivered in Appeal No.618 of 1997 on 1.3.2000. In that case a judgment allowing a Criminal Appeal was pronounced i.e. dictated on 22.01.2000. It was, however, not transcribed and signed. Thereafter the Court itself entertained a doubt and so decided to rehear the matter. A specific objection was raised by the appellant that a judgment in a Criminal Case once pronounced could not be reviewed for whatever reason. After considering the provision of section 362 of the Code of Criminal procedure, as also several judgments, the learned Judge (B. Sudarshan Reddy, J), held as under in para Nos 18 and 19 of the said judgment. “18. In my considered opinion, the High Court can alter review or modify its judgment before the judgment is transcribed and actually signed by the Judge, after its pronouncement in the open Court. The High Court can recall its judgment and rehear the matter even after pronouncing the same in the open Court. The High Court’s 4 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw power to annul, modify, review or correct the judgment after pronouncing the same in the Court, before the transcript is signed by the judge, is in no way limited or effected by Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 19. There is yet another way to look at this issue. Article 215 of the Constitution of India, declares that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. It is well settled that the High Courts in India are superior Courts of record. They have inherent and plenary powers. They have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers. The High Court has inherent power to correct the records. A Court of record envelopes all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A Court of record is undoubtedly a superior Court, which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a Court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law “. 4. The learned Judge then heard the appeal again and again allowed it. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that notwithstanding provisions of section 362 of the Code of Criminal procedure, the High Court would have the power to review its own judgment delivered in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The learned APP had a strong objection to such a course. 5 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw 5. The need to look into the question of law whether the High Court in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction can alter a judgment dictated and thus pronounced in open Court, but not transcribed, could arise only if after considering the appeal in the light of arguments of the learned counsel for appellant on the merits of the matter a need to alter the judgment arises. Since there is no doubt about the power of the Court to modify the text dictated before the transcript is actually signed, the text has been suitably modified to deal with the arguments of the learned counsel for appellant and is being pronounced again today. 6. The appellant questions his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of R.I. for five years and fine of Rs.1,000/- or in default further R.I. for six months, imposed upon him, by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Sawantwadi, on conclusion of the Sessions case No.44 of 1996. 7. The facts which are material for deciding this appeal are as under:- The prosecutrix and the appellant reside in the same area in village Masure, taluka: Malwan, District: Sindhudurg. The prosecutrix was l7 years old and was studying in XII th Std at the relevant time. On 10th February, 1996, the prosecutrix had gone to collect firewood. The appellant allegedly came from backside 6 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw and embraced her from behind and inspite of her protest the appellant gently made her to lie on back on ground and had a forcible sexual intercourse with her. She reported the matter to her mother immediately on reaching home. Since her father, who was working as a driver in the State Transport, was not at home and matter was reported to her father when he returned on the next day. Her father took up the cause with the leaders in the village and the appellant. The appellant was called to victim's house on the night of 11th February, 1996. The appellant allegedly admitted his mistake and requested that the victim may not go to the police. The appellant agreed that he would marry the victim before 3lst March, 1996. On 14th February, 1996, the appellant agreed on a stamp paper in presence of witnesses that he would marry the prosecutrix before 31st March, 1996. 8. In the meantime, victim missed her menses and therefore visited Dr. Mehendale, who gave her necessary treatment. The appellant did not keep his promise to marry the victim before 3lst March, 1996 and therefore, on the 1st April, 1996, the prosecutrix lodged a report with the police whereupon an offence was registered and investigation commenced. Nothing incriminating was found either at the spot or on the clothes of the prosecutrix and the appellant which were seized. The Medical Officer opined that the prosecutrix had undergone the sexual 7 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw intercourse, but obviously could not state after lapse of time as to whether it was forcible sexual intercourse or not. The appellant was apprehended. The police recorded the statement of witnesses in the course of investigation and on completion of investigation sent charge sheet to the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malwan, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions at Sawantwadi. 9. The charge for the offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code was framed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, against the appellant, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and hence he was put on trial. In the course of trial, the prosecution, examined as many as 7 witnesses to bring home the guilt of the appellant. After considering the evidence in the light of defence raised by the appellant, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment as stated above. 10. In his statement under Section 313 of Criminal procedure Code, the appellant had admitted having executed the stamped document whereby he promised to marry the victim. However, he stated that he refused to marry her because she had missed her menses. 11. P.W.1, Jaywant Harischandra Chavan is a panch at the panchnama of spot recorded at Exhibit 9, which does not throw 8 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw any light on the incident since the panchnama was recorded long time after the incident. 12. P.W.2 Laxmikant Parab, is another panch of the seizure of undergarments of prosecutrix, vide Exhibit 11, which too is unhelpful to connect the appellant to the crime. Reports from the Forensic Science Laboratory at Exh. 20, 21 and 24 do not help to connect the appellant to the crime. 13. The evidence of P.W.5 Dr. Somwanshi shows that the prosecutrix was used to sexual intercourse, but since he examined the prosecutrix on 24th April,1996, long after the incident, his evidence is obviously unhelpful in indicating whether there was actually rape or not. 14. P.W.3 the prosecutrix herself stated that on the incidental noon, she had gone to collect firewood, when the appellant embraced her from behind, when she was bending forward to collect firewood. She stated that she knew the appellant. She stated that though she scuffled, the appellant overpowered her and then squeezed her breasts, she stated that the appellant then gently made her to lie on her back on the ground. There was some cross examination about the use of word ‘gently’ by the prosecutrix which is, however, irrelevant. She then stated as to how the appellant had forcible sexual intercourse with her. She stated that the appellant told her that her informing anyone about the incident, 9 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw would injure her reputation. 15. Even so the prosecutrix informed her mother who has been examined as P.W.6. Both of them then stated that on the return of the father of prosecutrix, he was informed of the incident and then he called the appellant. The appellant admitted having committed mistake. A Stamp paper was procured by Jaymala, the sister of the prosecutrix, on 14.2.1996, and, in the presence of witnesses, the appellant agreed to marry the prosecutrix. The stamp paper at Exhibit 13, which has been proved by the prosecutrix, shows that the appellant admitted that he had love affair with the prosecutrix for several months. The document further recites that this fact was not known to the father of the prosecutrix and when the father came to know about this fact, the appellant was called upon by the father of the prosecutrix on 13.2.1996. It then recites that he had admitted that he had love affair with the prosecutrix and therefore, agreed to marry her before 31st March, 1996 and therefore, executed the necessary document on 14.2.1996 in the presence of several persons. One of them, Sangram Narayanrao Prabhugaonkar, has been examined as P.W.4. Sangram Prabhugaonkar states that in his presence the appellant admitted that he committed some indiscretion and was ready to marry the prosecutrix. As already recounted since the appellant did not keep his promise , report was given on 1st April, 10 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw 1996. 16. In his statement under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the appellant admitted in response to question Nos 34, 42, 48 and 55, that he had executed a document whereby he agreed to marry the prosecutrix before 31st March, 1996. He also admitted that he had not actually kept the promise and did not marry prosecutrix. According to appellant though he had agreed to marry the prosecutrix by 3l.3.1996, since he came to know that the prosecutrix had missed her menses and had received treatment for regularizing it, he did not marry her, though he had “love and affection with her”. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned APP. The impugned judgment is sought to be assailed on behalf of the appellant on the ground that the learned trial Judge erred in relying on evidence of P.W. 1 Jaywant Chavan, a panch at the scene of offence, branding his evidence as inadmissible. It seems that what the appellant wanted to show is that the prosecutrix could not have shown the scene of offence and that her showing scene of offence was nothing but a statement before police not leading to any discovery. Ordinarily, it would be the victim who would show scene of offence to the police. Victim’s showing scene of offence is, therefore, natural and usual and on this ground the panchnama which was drawn cannot be assailed 11 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw and it cannot make panchnama inadmissible, since, what the panchnama proves is not the fact that the prosecutrix had shown the spot, but what was observed at the spot. In any case, nothing incriminating was found on the spot and therefore, this ground has absolutely no bearing on the merits of the matter. 18. The absence of any injuries on the victim’s person has been next pressed to contend that there could be no rape. There can be no doubt that if on uneven or hard surface a forcible sexual intercourse is committed while prosecutrix resists such attempt, there would be some injuries. The prosecutrix had stated that there was not a single scratch on her person. 19. It has also been urged that failure on the part of prosecutrix to raise cries to invite attention of the public is a pointer to the fact that there was no forcible sexual intercourse. Now the prosecutrix has stated in the evidence that she was crying and shouting, but the appellant had placed his palm on her mouth. While suffering such assault it may not be unusual for the victim to respond in a manner different from that which would ordinarily be observed in cases of normal assault where physical injuries are caused to the other parts of the body. Therefore, first the contention of the appellant that the prosecutrix did not raise any cries is belied by the evidence of the prosecutrix, and in any case, given the nature of assault it cannot be said that the response of 12 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw the prosecutrix was nu-natural. 20. The judgment of the trial Court is assailed on the ground that the learned trial Judge, disbelieved the story of love affair which has been stated in the stamped document at Exh.13 and therefore the conclusions drawn are contradictory. First it has to be pointed out that in the social milieu in which parties have grown up, any admission of physical relations would be destructive of futures of the parties. Therefore, the appellant may have stated that he had love affair. It does not become an admission on the part of the victim. 21. It had been urged that according to P.W.5 Dr. Achyut Somwanshi, victim was possibly habituated to sexual intercourse. This is after all an opinion expressed upon the examination of the prosecutrix about one and half month after the incident. The victim’s not being virgin does not eliminate her as a possible victim of rape. 22. It is further submitted that the prosecutrix herself stated that appellant had “gently” laid her and that her resistance lasted just half a second. It has been submitted that absence of injuries on the prosecutrix coupled with the recital in Exhibit 13 that the appellant had love affair with the prosecutrix would show that it was a case of consensual sexual intercourse. These arguments have to be rejected because the story of consensual sexual 13 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw intercourse runs counter to appellant’s subsequent refusal to marry the prosecurtix only because she had been to a doctor as she missed her menses. If he did have intercourse he knew why the prosecutrix missed her periods. If he did not at all have intercourse there was no reason to agree on a stamp paper to marry the prosecurtix. 23. In a small village, if the appellant did have a love affair with the victim it would be hard to believe that the victim could have another affair with another person not known to the appellant. Therefore, somersault by the appellant on the pretext that the victim had missed her menses or victim not being virgin, does not help the appellant. 24. It has been alleged that there are some inherent improbabilities and that the prosecutrix had involved the appellant because their love affair had become widely known to all the persons. First there is no improbability worth name. Secondly, there would be no question of the prosecutrix falsely involving the appellant because love affair became known to all, since the appellant promised her to marry her in writing. It has also been submitted that it would be impossible for a person to have forcible sexual intercourse with a woman as she is bound to resist with all the force. This may not be always true. Fear of physical assault and the social stigma that attaches to sexual assault itself would 14 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw render the victim defenceless. Therefore, merely because there are no marks of physical resistance, rape cannot be ruled out. Much need not be made out of the statement of the prosecutrix that the appellant dressed up the victim, in the background of the claim that he had love affair with the victim. 25. As to the delay in lodging F.I.R, in fact there is no delay at all. The prosecutrix had gone to the police at the right time i.e. when stipulated time within which the appellant was to marry her had expired. There is nothing wrong in the victim’s parents or villagers trying to have matter amicably settled without stigmatizing the girl and therefore, if they waited for the appellant to marry her, it cannot be said that there was any unexplained delay in lodging F.I.R. 26. Learned Counsel for for appellant referred to some omissions in the statement of prosecutrx. They are far too insignificant to make her story unreliable, particularly in the light of the fact that the appellant had admitted having signed the stamp paper after incident. The stamped document signed by the appellant lends an assurance of the truthfulness to the evidence of the prosecutrix and therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Judge erred in accepting the word of the prosecutrix. 27. To recapitulate, the appellant’s claim that there was no intercourse at all cannot be accepted, since the cross examination 15 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw is directed to establish that there was a consensual sexual intercourse. In fact it was sought to be argued that the claim that the prosecutrix was made to gently lie on her back and that her clothes were tidied it up after the incident would point to connivance of the prosecutrix in the incident. It was also submitted that the claim of the prosecutrix that she scuffled for half a second would point to consensual sexual intercourse. But this claim was not taken to its logical end and the appellant seems to have chosen to claim that there was no intercourse at all by submitting that he refused to marry the prosecutrix though he had agreed so on the stamp paper because she missed her menses and therefore there she was not virgin. The appellant should have chosen either to go with the theory that intercourse was consensual or that there was no intercourse at all. The absence of any intercourse would have to be rejected since there will be no other reason for the appellant to execute the stamped document agreeing to marry the prosecutrix within a month. Therefore, though the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is open for the defence to take contradictory defences, these defences are self destructive and deflate the entire defence itself leaving the court with no other option but to accept word of the prosecutrix that she was ravished without her consent. 28. In view of this it cannot be held that the conviction of 16 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, suffers from any defect. 29. This takes me to the question of sentence. The defence that had been raised by the appellant would, however, be material for considering question of sentence. It has to be first noted that the appellant claimed to have an affair with the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix herself stated that the appellant made her gently lie on her back and also that her resistance lasted only for half a second. Therefore, the possibility of the appellant mistaking her resistance to her modesty and therefore proceeding further with the sexual act may be there. Even considering this, as also the fact that the appellant has been convicted for the incident which took place almost 14 years ago and now has settled down with his family, it cannot be said that the sentence of R.I. for 5 years imposed upon the appellant is harsh. It would obviously be impermissible to let off the applicant with period for which he was in custody namely just one month and 23 days. Therefore, any reduction in sentence is unlikely to avoid appellant’s being jailed again. Hence even the sentence imposed does not call for any interference. 30. Since the judgment which was pronounced on 2nd December, 2010, does not call for any modification, there would be no occasion to decide as to whether this Court could alter its judgment. Therefore the appeal is dismissed. The appellant shall 17 APPEAL 65 OF 1997.sxw surrender to his bail, within a period of four weeks and if he does not so surrender, the learned Judge shall take necessary steps to have the appellant arrested and committed to serve the sentence. (R. C. CHAVAN, J.)