1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, AURANGABAD BENCH, AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.4560 OF 1996 M/s Wockhardt Limited, B-15/2, M.I.D.C. Industrial Area, Waluj, Aurangabad – 431 135 through its Manager. ... PETITIONER VERSUS 1. Shri Machhindra Kondiba Gaikwad, House No.N-11, C-1/16/3, CIDCO, Aurangabad – 431 003. (Deleted as per Court’s order dated 10.2.2000 passed in Civil Application No.604/2000) 2. Shri Shivaji Abbaji Jadhav, House No.1/6/37, Maliwada, Begumpura, Aurangabad ... RESPONDENTS ..... Shri B.B. Yenge, Advocate for the petitioner Shri T.K. Prabhakaran, Advocate with Shri U.S. Sahuji, Advocate for the respondent ..... Coram : Shrihari P. Davare, J. Dated : 7th July, 2009. ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. By the present Writ Petition, the petitioner herein has prayed that the impugned order dated 6.6.1996, passed by Industrial Court, Aurangabad in Complaint (ULP) No.68/1995 be quashed and set aside to 2 the extent of implied condonation of delay. 2. The petitioner is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is having its registered office at Poonam Chambers, Worli, Bombay and factory situated at Aurangabad. The life saving drugs are being manufactured in the factory at Aurangabad. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 were in the employment of the petitioner factory and they along with other 9 employees came to be charge sheeted and were also suspended pending the enquiry. Being aggrieved by the said charge sheet and suspension, the said 11 employees filed Complaint (ULP) No.68/1995 along with application for interim relief before the Industrial Court, at Aurangabad on or about 7.3.1995. The present petitioner (original respondent) opposed the said complaint by filing written statement as well as reply to the interim application. However, the Industrial Court rejected the application for interim relief by its order dated 14.6.1995. 3. During the pendency of the complaint before the Industrial Court, some of the complainants had resigned and remaining complainants approached to this Court by filing Writ Petition No.4767/1995. After hearing the respective parties, the said Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 3.11.1995 with directions to the Industrial Court, Aurangabad to decide the complaint within a fixed period and also decide the issue of jurisdiction along with the other issues. 4. Thereafter, when the Complaint (ULP) No.68/1995 came up for 3 final hearing before the Industrial Court on 6.6.1996, 3 out of remaining 5 complainants had already resigned and hence only two complainants i.e. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein remained as the complainants. The said remaining complainants sought leave to withdraw the said complaint with liberty to approach the Labour Court. Accordingly, the learned Industrial Court, Aurangabad passed an order and dismissed the said complaint as withdrawn for those who had not resigned, and granted liberty to file it for them in the Labour Court within one month from the said date on the same cause of action. 5. Hence, being aggrieved by the said order dated 6.6.1996, passed by learned Industrial Court, Aurangabad in Complaint (ULP) No.68/1995, the petitioner (original respondent) has filed the present Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India requesting to quash and set aside the said order dated 6.6.1996 only to the extent of implied condonation of delay. 6. It is the contention of the petitioner that, as per Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, the period prescribed for filing a complaint is 90 days from the date of cause of action and admittedly in the instant case, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 had been issued dismissal orders on 5.3.1995. The said Section also provides the condonation of delay if good and sufficient reason is made out before the Court entertaining the complaint. Hence, the main attack of the petitioner in the present petition is that the 4 grant of liberty to file the complaint in the Labour Court within a period of one month from the date of the said order i.e. 6.6.1996 on the same cause of action, passed by learned Industrial Court, Aurangabad amounts to implied condonation of delay without preferring any application therefor by the complainants and also out of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court which is not vested therein in view of Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. Hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said impugned order dated 6.6.1996, passed by learned Industrial Court, Aurangabad be quashed and set aside to the extent of implied condonation of delay. 7. Heard both the learned respective counsel for the parties. At the outset, for the sake of reference, it is necessary to reproduce the impugned order dated 6.6.1996 passed by learned Industrial Court, Aurangabad in Complaint (ULP) No.68/1995, which reads as under : ORDER PASSED BELOW EXH. U-1 ON 6.6.1996 The complaint not survives for complainants No.3, 5, 10 and 11. The complaint has been withdrawn seeking liberty to file it in the Labour Court. Respondent has stated that few more gave resignations. O R D E R Complaint stands dismissed due to withdrawal for those who have not resigned with liberty 5 to file it for them in the Labour Court within one month from today on the same cause of action. Sd/- AURANGABAD Member, Industrial Court, Dt. 6.6.96 Aurangabad ” 8. Considering the text and contents of the aforesaid impugned order dated 6.6.1996 and also considering the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner, the question arises whether the grant of liberty to file the complaint in the Labour Court within one month from the said date of order dated 6.6.1996 on the same cause of action while dismissing the complaint due to withdrawal thereof by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Aurangabad would amount to condonation of delay impliedly ? 9. As mentioned hereinabove, the complainant sought to withdraw the said complaint seeking liberty to file it in the Labour Court. Hence, the learned Member, Industrial Court, Aurangabad, while passing the order, dismissed the complaint due to withdrawal for those who had not resigned, and granted liberty to file it for them in the Labour Court within one month from the date of the said order i.e. 6.6.1996 on the same cause of action. Hence, it is apparently clear that the learned Member, Industrial Court, Aurangabad granted liberty to the complainants to file the complaint in the Labour Court on the same cause of action while permitting the withdrawal of the complaint from the Industrial Court within the period of one month and the said period of one month is meant as outer limit to approach to the 6 Labour Court therefor and it does not mean implied extension of period of limitation since the provisions of law of limitation will take its own course. Moreover, sight cannot be lost of the aspect that the said liberty was granted to complainant to approach to Labour Court on the same cause of action, and accordingly, the said order is self-explanatory and since the said liberty was granted to approch to Labour Court on the same cause of action, it was never intended to condone the delay impliedly. Thus, the grant of liberty to file the complaint before Labour Court within one month from the date of the said order i.e. 6.6.1996 on the same cause of action will not amount to implied condonation of delay as apprehended by the petitioner. 10. Besides that, Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 categorically prescribes the period of limitation of 90 days for filing the complaint from the occurrence of alleged unfair labour practice, as well as the proviso clause thereof also prescribes that such complaint may be entertained after a period of 90 days from the date of alleged occurrence of alleged unfair labour practice, if good and sufficient reasons are shown by the complainant for the late filing of the complaint. Hence, in such scenario, the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 itself encompasses the provision of limitation and its extention, if any, and such condonation of delay was neither prayed for nor contemplated by the complainants and, therefore, there is no question of condonation of delay as alleged by the impugned order, and hence, there is no necessity to interfere in the impugned order 7 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Suhas C. Sen, JJ.) in the case reported at 1996 AIR SCW 2398 (Union of India and another Vs. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Limited), wherein, it is observed in para No.10 as under : “10. According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein. Mr. Hidayatullah submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 27 does not apply either to a suit filed by the importer or to a writ petition filed by him and that in such cases the period of limitation would be three years. Learned counsel refers to certain decisions of this Court to that effect. We shall assume for the purposes of this appeal that it is so, notwithstanding the fact that the said question is now pending before a larger Constitution Bench of nine Judges along with the issue relating to unjust enrichment. Yet the question is whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constiution. The power conferred by Article 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the Rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs Authorities, who are the 8 creatures of the Customs Act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27 whether before or after amendment. May be the High Court or a Civil Court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Article 226 or the power of a Civil Court. No such delegation or conferment can ever be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law.” However, the facts and circumstances in the case before Their Lordships and facts and circumstances in the present case in the hands, with respect, differ from each other and in the instant case, implied condonation of delay was alleged by the petitioner by the impugned order, but so is not the position in the case before Their Lordships, and the question before Their Lordships was that, “Whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Customs Act to act contrary to the statutory provisions” and hence, observations made in the said case will not be of any aid and assistance to the case of petitioner herein. 12. In the result, present Writ Petition fails and same stands dismissed. Rule stands discharged. Interim order stands vacated. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 13. At this stage, Shri Yenge, learned counsel for the petitioner requested to stay the aforesaid order for a reasonable period to enable him to approach the appropriate forum, contending that the interim relief is in 9 operation since 1996. Learned counsel for the respondents opposed the said prayer. Considering the rival submissions, since the interim relief is in operation since 1996, reasonable period is required to be given to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum. Hence, it is directed that the operation of the aforesaid judgment and order be stayed for a period of four weeks. (Shrihari P. Davare, J.)