^ ^ 1~ WR1T PETmON (S) No. 4181 of2008 PETmONER 1. Ghitralekha Patel, aged 28 years, Prakash Patel, R/o Patel Bhawamn, Annapuma Para, Kanker Distt. Kanker. 2. Ku. Indu Bodh, age 33 years, D/o Shri Aatmaram Bodh, Tahsil KeshkaL Moongbadi,—Distt.Bastar, Jagdalpur. ^ VERSU8 RESPONBENT8 : 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through tfae Secretary, Departmetit pf Panchayat & Graniin Vikas DepMtment, D.K.S.Bhavan, Mantralaya, Raipur :<GG.) . : ,• 2. Director, Du-ectorate Panchayat Evam Samaj Seva, Raipur (Cfaliattisgarh) 3. Collector, District Uttar Bastar Kanker (Chfaattisgarh) 4. Chief Executive Qfficer, Jila Pancha^rat, District Uttai- Bastar Kanker (CIihattisgarh) WM.T PETITION UNDER AR'HCLE 226 OF THE CONSTn'UTION OF INDIA SB: Hon'ble Shri SattshK. Aenihotn,_J,. Shri Prashant Mishra, Advocate Shri Arun Sao, Govemmeat Advocate for the State/respondeat No. 1 to 3. .w- (Passed on l9ul day of August, 2008) I^amed counsel appearing for the petitioners submits fhat the respondent-aufhorities have failed to understand ttie purport ofthe order wherein, before passing the impugned orders dated 23.05.2008 (Annexure P/l & P/2), prmciples of natura! justice was required to be complied wifh. It is fiirther conteaded that show eause notice was issued on one ground and fhe impusned orders dated 23.05.2008 (Anaexure P/l & P/2) were passed on different ground.No show-cause-notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner in respect of the- ground, which was taken for passing the impugaed order. ' Be Ifaat as it may, since it. invoives questipn of facts which can be considered only by the appellate authority, tfaus, ttris.case is not one of the case wherein departure from normal rule of resortiag to statutory forum, be allowed. Qn the question of availability of altemative remedy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State ofH.P. and others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement and csnothe/, obsenied as under: "17. We shall first deal with the plea regarding aitemative t'eniedy as raised by the appiillant State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended bytiie Constitution (Fort5r- second Amendment) Act, .1976, the power—relatiflgto attemative remedy has been considered to be a rule ofself- imposed limrtatioa.It is essentiaUy a rule of poiicy, conveniehee aitd discretioii and never a mle of law. Despite the esastence of m atemative remedy, ll is witlrin the jtirisdictioa of discretion of the High Court to grant relief ynderArttcle 226 oftfae Coiistitution. Al the same time, it cauuot be iQst siglit pfthat tKough the matter relating to an alfemative remedy lias nofhmg to do with the jurisdiction 6f the case, normallvthe HighCourt should riot interfere ifthere is an adequate efficaeious altemative remedy. tf somebody approaches tiie High Court wifhout availing tfae altemative remedy provided the Higti Court should ensure tliat he has made out a strong case or that tfaere exist good grounds to 21. ta G.Veerappa Pilla v. Raman & Ramwi Ltd.; CCE v. Dtmhp In& Ud.: 'Ramendra Ktshore Siswas v^^^S Tripura, Shivgonda An^ J^ff! n ^te qf A^firfa^^t^ CAAbrahamv.ITO,TitaghwPaperMillsCo.Ltdv.Statepf Orissa; H.B.Gandhi v. Gopi Nath fwtd Soris; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar ofTrcu.je Marks; TinPlateCo. oflndia , Ltd. v. Sfate ofBihar, SheelaDevi v. Jaspat Singh and Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan, Ifais Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by fhe sstatute, party must exfaaust'the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction." 4. Further, applying the said ratio in the matter of U.P.State Spmning (7o. Ltd. v.R.S.Pandey andvnothei^, the Supreme Court observed as under: "21. te U-P.State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P.Rajya Setu Nigam S.Karmachari Sangh,'A'was hcld that whenthe dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute.aiid speeific remedy is, fherefpre, provided under flie statute, the High Court ahould not deviate fi'om fhe general view and interfere uiider Article 226 except when a very -.' strong case is made out for maldng a departure. The persoa who insists upon sueh remedy caa avail of llie prQcess as provided under the statute. To tUe same effect are the decisions 'm Premier Atttomobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar ' (2005) 6 SCC 49S 2 (2005) 8 SCC 264 "3- •w 7. .ajnit Shantaram Wadke, Raj'asthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Murticipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad and in Scooters India v. Vyai E.V.Eldred. " In another decision on the concept of maintainability of writ petition vis-a-vis availability of altemative remedy, the Supreme Court in the matter ofSecy. U.P. High School & Intermediate Education, Allahabad & anofher v. H.K.Laf, obsCTved as under: "4. From the reeords it is bome out that the question asto whethei' the respondent has a legal right to alter his date of birth recorded in fhe certificate granted by tfae Board was pendiiig consideration before flie appeUate Court. The writ petition filed by. the respondent should, tfaerefore, not have beea entertained particularly in view of the fact tfaat the appeal thereagainst was pending. Writ jurisdiction is discrstionary jurisdiction aad should not ordinarily be exercised ifthere is an altemative remedy." A common thread rurming mto the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court m fhe aforementioned cases is that, nonnally the Hi^i Court should not interfere if there is an adequate effieacious alteniative remedy where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute,party must exhaust fhe statutory remedy before resorting to vmt junsdictioa, except when a very strong case is made out for makiag a departure. Applying the well-settled dicta laid down by the Supreme Court on the issue of availability of altemative remedy to the facts of tlie case, fhis petition is dismissed as not maintamabie as no strong case has been made out for exercise of extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction in favour ofthe petitioners. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioners to take recourse to attemative statutory forom, raising all available to the petitionars, ifso advised. No order asto costs. ^t^ ^^ J 7) 2 SCC 216