5.3.2009 Present: Mr. K. D. Shreedhar, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Pawan Kumar, vice counsel for the respondents. CWP(T) 3064/2008 (OA 452/96) The petitioner, who was working as Conductor was removed from service in terms of office order dated 3.2.1993. The charge of misconduct being that he collected fare amounting to Rs.22.50 paise from the passengers but, however, did not issue/punch ticket. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and he was heard in accordance with law. The order of removal was assailed by him in appropriate proceedings before appropriate forums and one such proceeding being OA No. 462 of 1993 before the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. In terms of order dated 11.3.1993, the Tribunal directed the Managing Director of the respondents to consider the petitioner’s representation on merits and decide it in accordance with Law. It is undisputed fact that other similarly situated persons had also approached the Tribunal wherein similar directions had also been passed being OA Nos. 236/1995 titled as Narinder Kumar v. HRTC, 375/1995 titled as Mohd. Naziz v. HRTC & Ors., 398/1995 titled as Narem Lal v. HRTC & Ors. & 699/1995 titled as Dina Nath v. HRTC & Ors. It is also evident from the record shown in the Court that all of the petitioners in the aforesaid OAs were reinstated subject to certain terms and conditions and imposition of minor penalties. However, only in the case of petitioner, the respondents discriminated and passed a fresh order dated 15.6.1993 (Annexure A-2) rejecting his representation. This order has been assailed inter alia on the ground that; (a) the authority did not have competence to pass the order of removal; (b) the petitioner has been unfairly discriminated; (c) the penalty imposed is disproportionate, harsh and excessive to the charge. There is nothing from the record from which it can be made out as to why the petitioner was discriminated. It is a settled principle of law that the Wednesbury principle has now given way to the doctrine of proportionality. Importantly, in the impugned order dated 15.6.1993, none of the contentions raised by the petitioner have been considered or decided. In this view of the matter, the impugned order dated 15.6.1993 is set-aside with the directions that the respondents shall again, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, decide the representation by passing a speaking order, in accordance with law. It shall be open for the petitioner to place such material including the latest decisions of the Apex Court before the appropriate authority hearing the matter. Needless to add, the matter pertains to the year 1996. The respondents shall take a decision within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the additional material as may be placed by the petitioner. Mr. Shreedhar informs that the additional material shall be positively placed within a period of four weeks from today. The petition is disposed of accordingly. ( Sanjay Karol ), Judge. March 5, 2009 (rana)