HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr.A. No. : 87 of 1996 Decided on: 30.10.2009 State of Himachal Pradesh ……… Appellant. Versus Suresh Chand ………Respondent. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr.Justice V.K. Ahuja, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Appellant: Ms.Shubh Mahajan, Deputy Advocate General and Mr.J.S. Guleria, Assistant Advocate General. For the respondent: Mr.B.S. Verma, Advocate. V.K. Ahuja, J.(Oral): This is an appeal filed by the appellant under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against judgment passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No.II, Amb, District Una, H.P., dated 23.2.1995, vide which the respondent was acquitted of the notice of accusation issued against him under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that on learning about an accident by the police officer, he went to the spot and recorded the statement of Surender Pal under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. In the said statement, the complainant has alleged that he was working in the house and at about 7.15 p.m., he learnt from one Kalyan Singh, PW-4, that an accident has taken place and ____________________________________ Whether reporters of local newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. - 2 - the wife of Sunder Pal, complainant, has been taken to the hospital. The complainant went to the hospital where his wife had died as a result of injuries sustained by her. This statement was recorded by the police officer, who sent the same to the police station, on which a case under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC was registered. After investigation, the challan was filed before the learned trial Court, who issued notice of accusation against the respondent for the offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC and tried the respondent. On conclusion of the trial, the respondent was acquitted of the notice of accusation issued against him. Hence the present appeal preferred by the appellant/State. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. The material witness in the present case can be said to be the complainant Surender Pal himself, who has been examined as PW-3. A perusal of his statement clearly shows that he was not present at the spot and had reached the spot on learning about the accident in which his wife was injured. He went to the hospital and his wife died there as a result of the injuries sustained by her. There is nothing in his statement to suggest that he had witnessed the occurrence. He stated that he learnt about the occurrence from one Kalyan Singh, who has been examined as PW-4. A perusal of the statement of said Kalyan Singh, PW-4, shows that he was present at a place and was sitting in a tractor, when he heard some sound from the road and then he reached at the spot and found that a van was parked - 3 - there. He further stated that on reaching at the spot he found that the wife of Surender was under the said van. It is clear from a perusal of the statement made by him that he had not witnessed the occurrence. The prosecution had also examined PW-5 Narinder Kumar, who stated that he also went to the spot on hearing the sound. In cross examination he has clearly stated that he is not the eye witness to the accident. He had gone to the spot only on hearing the sound. No other witness has stated about the occurrence. On appraisal of the evidence, it is clear that there is no eye witness to the occurrence and all the witnesses have reached the spot after the accident had taken place and they have no knowledge as to how the accident had taken place. These witnesses could not even state that the accident took place due to the rash or negligent driving of the respondent. In view of the evidence led by the prosecution, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court acquitting the respondent cannot be said to be perverse calling for an interference by this Court. In view of the above discussion, I accordingly hold that there is no merit in the appeal filed by the appellant/State, which is dismissed accordingly. The bail bonds furnished by the respondent shall stand discharged. October 30, 2009. (V.K. Ahuja), (TILAK) Judge.