THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY SECOND APPEAL No.819 of 2009 JUDGMENT: The appellant is the tenant of the respondent in respect of the premises bearing No.40/301-B, Bellary Road, Kurnool Town on a rent of Rs.1000/- per month. A notice, dated 18.08.2003, was issued by the respondent to the appellant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short ‘the Act’) with a request to vacate the premises. The appellant did not comply with the same. Hence, the respondent filed O.S.No.1538 of 2003 in the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool. It was pleaded that the appellant is not regular in payment of rents and that the premises are needed for the occupation of the respondent. The appellant opposed the suit by filing a written statement. Through its judgment, dated 24.10.2005, the trial Court decreed the suit. The appellant filed A.S.No.140 of 2005 in the Court of the IV Additional District Judge, Kurnool. The appeal was dismissed on 04.06.2009. Hence, this second appeal. Sri B.Narasimha Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the trial Court and the lower appellate Court did not take into account the fact that even after issuing quit notice, marked as Ex.A1, the respondent received rents and thereby, the notice lost its significance. He further submits that the findings as to the bona fide requirement and default of rents, are unsustainable in law. Sri C.Prakash Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that with the issuance of Ex.A1, the relationship of tenant and landlord between the appellant and the respondent stood terminated and the mere fact that the rents were received for subsequent period does not make any change in terms of law. Based on the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: (1) Whether the notice issued by the plaintiff terminating the tenancy is valid? (2) Whether the plaintiff is required plaint schedule premises for his own use? (3) Whether the defendant is irregular in payment of rent? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the eviction of defendant from plaint schedule shop? The respondent deposed as P.W.1 and filed quit notice, dated 18.08.2003, as Ex.A1 and the reply issued by the appellant on 10.09.2003 as Ex.A2. The appellant deposed as D.W.1 and he filed bunch of receipts marked as Exs.B1 to B15. The suit was decreed and in the appeal preferred by the appellant herein, the lower appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration: (1) Whether the conduct of the respondent/plaintiff in accepting the rents tendered by the appellant/defendant for the period subsequent to the quit notice amounts to waiver of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act? (2) Whether the fresh quit notice is mandatory requirement? The appeal was dismissed on 04.06.2009. Before dealing with other aspects, it needs to be observed that once the relationship of lessor and lessee is not disputed and notice under Section 106 of the Act was issued, it would not at all be necessary for the landlord to plead the grounds of bona fide requirement or default in payment of rents. Those grounds are relevant in the proceedings that are initiated under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1960. Therefore, the findings recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court on those aspects are just outside the scope of the suit, if not irrelevant. The appellant does not dispute that he is the lessee of the premises owned by the respondent and that the tenancy stood terminated with the issuance of Ex.A1. No serious flaw in Ex.A1 is pointed out. Law does not place any prohibition against receipt of rents after issuance of the quit notice. If the contention of the appellant is to be accepted, the lessor would lose on both counts, namely that he would not get the rent after issuance of the notice nor he would get the possession of the premises forthwith. Once Ex.A1 is found to be legal, the mere fact that the rents were received subsequent thereto does not make any difference. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in this second appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. The learned counsel for the appellant makes a request to grant reasonable time for his client to vacate the premises. Though such a course is not common in matters of this nature, it is felt that four months time can be granted for him to vacate the premises. Therefore, the respondent shall not execute the decree against the appellant till 31.04.2011, subject to the condition that the appellant shall deposit the rents for the premises from time to time and he would file an undertaking before the trial Court to the effect that he would put the respondent in possession of the premises on or before 30.04.2011. There shall be no order as to costs. _______________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY,J Dt: 20.12.2010. kdl