Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH Crl. Misc. No. M-2614 of 2008 Date of Decision:February 10, 2010 Manish Ahlawat ...........Petitioner Versus State of Haryana ..........Respondent Coram: Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sabina Present: Mr. Jasjit Singh Bedi,Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.Y.S.Malik, Deputy Advocate General Haryana Ms.Promila Nain,Advocate for respondent No.2 ** Sabina, J. Petitioner has filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short `Cr.P.C.) seeking quashing of FIR No. 577 dated 1.12.2007 registered under Sections 406,420,467,468,461/506,120-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short `IPC') at Police Station Civil lines Hisar (Annexure P8) and all further proceedings arising there from . Prosecution story, as per FIR (Annexure P8) reads as under:- “Sir, I Bimla Devi d/o Sh.Harsukh Rai am resident of village Bhuthan Kalan, Tehsil and District Fatehabad and am owner of House No.56-P, Sector 15-D. Allotment letter of the same is attached. My daughter Neelu got married on 2.10.2000 with Manish Ahlawat as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. My mother Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 2 and brothers spent around Rs.25.00 lacs on the said marriage. Manish Ahlawat and his parents harassed my daughter physically and mentally for want of more dowry and yesterday have either killed her or had kept her in illegal confinement at some secret place. I have come to know some time back that Manish Ahlawat due to his greedy nature has prepared one rent deed dated 1.8.2002 for grabbing my only house (lease is enclosed). In this deed Manish Ahlawat has referred to himself as owner of the house whereas I am the true owner. The house is rented to M/s Indovax Pvt. Ltd. Company. Other than this one letter dated 28.7.2004 has come into my notice in which Manish Ahlawat and one S.K.Sharma have changed some conditions of rent deed. Manish Ahlawat is neither the owner of the house, nor he has any right to rent the same. I have come to know that by forging my signature, they have obtained a decree dated 2.2.2002 from the Court of Sh. J.S.Sandhu, Civil Judge, Hisar for grabbing the factory. In this way Manish Ahlawat has cheated me out of ill, will and has prepared fake documents for grabbing my house. He has also received rent of my house illegally and by preparing false lease deeds in which he has referred to himself as owner has committed misappropriation of the rent to be received from the property and tried to grab the house in connivance with others. When I confronted Manish Ahlawat as to what has done, he threatened me of dire consequences by saying that whatever happened to my daughter will happen to me also. So keeping the above facts in mind, I pray to you that legal proceedings be Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 3 initiated against Manish Ahlwat s/o Jagbir Singh Ahlawat so that I can spend my old age with ease. The accused be strictly punished and original documents of my house be returned back to me. I will be highly obliged. Sd/- Applicant Bimla Devi d/o Harsukh Rai village Bhutan Kalan, Tehsil Fatehabad.” Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the present petitioner has been falsely involved in this case. In fact, respondent No.2 had suffered a decree in favour of her daughter Neelu qua the property in dispute and Neelu, who was wife of the petitioner, had executed a general power of attorney in favour of the petitioner qua the said property. Petitioner had rented out the premises being husband of Neelu. Now, due to a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife, he has been falsely involved in this case. The genuineness of the decree had been admitted by the brother of the complainant in FIR No.134 dated 15.11.2007 under Sections 364,498-A,406,34 IPC registered at Police station Shivaji Colony against the petitioner and his parents. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on The State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram (1979) 2 Supreme Court Cases 158 wherein it was held as under:- “25.A sample writing taken by the court under the second paragraph of Section 73,is, in substance an reality, the same thing as “admitted writing” within the purview of the first paragraph of Section 73, also. The first paragraph of the section, as already seen, provides for comparison of signature, writing, etc. purporting to have been written by a person with others admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been written by Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 4 the same person. But it does not specifically say by whom such comparison may be made. Construed in the light of the English Law on the subject, which is the legislative source of this provision, it is clear that such comparison may be made by a handwriting expert (Section 45) or by one familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned (Section 47) or by he court. The two paragraphs of the Section are not mutually exclusive. They are complementary to each other. 26.Section 73 is,therefore, to be read as a whole in the light of Section 45. Thus, read it is clear that a court holding an inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of an offence triable by itself or by the Court of Sessions does not exceed its power under Section 73 if in the interest of justice it directs an accused person appearing before it to give his sample writing to enabling the same to be compared by a hand writing expert chosen or approved by the court, irrespective of whether his name was suggested by the prosecution or the defence because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the court before which he is ultimately put up for trial, to compare the disputed writing with his (accused's) admitted writing, and to reach its own conclusion with the assistance of the expert” Learned counsel has further placed on N.Natarajan vs. B.K.Subba Rao 2003(2) RCR(Criminal) 424 wherein it has been held as under:- “8. In our view it is not necessary to pursue the approach of either of the party. It is well settled in criminal law that a Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 5 complaint can be lodged by anyone who has become aware of a crime having been committed and thereby set the law into motion. I respct of offences adverted to in Section 193 Cr.P.C. there is a restriction that the same cannot be entertained, unless a complaint is made by a court because the offence is stated to have been committed in relation to the proceedings in that court. Section 340 Cr.P.C. is invoked to get over the bar imposed under Section 195 Cr.P.C. In ordinary crimes not adverted to under Section 195 Cr.P.C. if in respect of any offence, law can be set into motion by a citizen of the zentry we fail to see how any citizen of this country cannot approach even under Section 340 Cr.P.C. For that matter, the wordings of Section 340 Cr.P.C.a re significant. The Law will have to act in the interest of justice on a complaint or otherwise. Assuming that the complaint may have to be made at the instance of a party having an interest in the manner the court can take action in the matter otherwise than on a complaint, that is, when it has received information as to a crime having been committed covered by the said provision. Therefore, it is wholly unnecessary to examine this aspect of the matter, We proceed on the view that the respondent has locus standi to present the complaint before the Designated Judge.” Learned counsel has also placed reliance on Sachida Nand Singh vs. State of Bihar 1998(1)RCR Criminal 823 wherein it has been held as under:- “11.The sub-section puts the condition that before the Court makes a Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 6 complaint of “any offence referred to in clause(b) of Section 195(1)” the Court has to follow the procedure laid down in Section 340. In other words, no complaint can be made by a court regarding any offence falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code without first adopting those procedural requirements. It has to be noted that Section 340 falls within chapter XXVI of the Code which contains a fasciculus of “Provisions as to offence affecting the administration of justice” as the title of the Chapter appellates. So the offences envisaged in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code must involve acts which would have affected the administration of justice. 12. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340 (1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in Court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis.” Learned State counsel, on the other hand, has submitted that the signatures of Neelu and Bimla on the vakaltanama, plaint and written statement had been got compared from the Forensic Science Laboratory and they did not match with their standard signatures. Hence, the FIR was not liable to be quashed. It has been held in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp(1) Supreme Court Cases 335, the Apex Court has held as under:- “The following categories of cases can be stated by way of Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 7 illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482,Cr.P.C. Can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently chennelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:- (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complainant, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do no disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated under Section Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 8 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” In the present case, the FIR in question has been lodged by the complainant on the allegations that the petitioner had prepared the rent Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 9 deed dated 1.8.2002 with a view to grab her only house. Petitioner had described himself as owner of the said house, whereas, respondent No.2 was the owner of the house. Petitioner had got a decree dated 28.3.2002 in favour of Neelu by committing forgery. Anneuxre P1 is the copy of the plaint in a suit filed by Neelu against her mother Bimla for declaration that she was owner in possession of plot No.56-P and House Constructed thereon in Sector 15 A Hisar. Annexure P2 is the reply filed by Bimla in the said suit admitting the contents of the plaint. Annexure P3 are the statements made by Bimla and counsel for the plaintiff to the effect that the suit be decreed as prayed. Thereafter the suit filed by Neelu was decreed as prayed vide judgment and decree dated 28.3.2002, Annexure P4. Annexure P6 is the general power of attorney alleged to have been executed by Neelu in favour of her husband to look after the house in question. The said power of attorney is dated 2.8.2002, Anneure P6. Rent agreement, Annexure P7, is, however, dated 1.8.2002 wherein petitioner has described himself as owner of the house in dispute. The said agreement was not executed by the petitioner as attorney holder of his wife. Even otherwise the general power of attorney was executed after the execution of the rent agreement dated 1.8.2002. In reply filed by the State, it has been averred that the amount had been received by the petitioner on the basis of the rent agreement and had been deposited in his own account and not in the account of his wife- Neelu. It has been further averred that the signatures of Bimla, owner of the house in question and Neelu- plaintiff in the civil suit were got compared from the Forensic Science Laboratory Madhubhan and as per the expert opinion ,the signatures of Neelu on the plaint and Crl.Misc. No.M-2614 of 2008 10 vakalatnama were not of Neelu. Similarly the signatures of Bimla defendant on vakalatnama and written statement did not match with her standard signatures. In these circumstances, there is prima facie sufficient material available with the prosecution to proceed against the petitioner. Hence, it is not a fit case where the FIR in question is liable to be quashed. The relevancy of the alleged admission made by the brother of the complainant in any FIR would more appropriately be gone into and considered during trial. The said admission has not been made by the complainant. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner fails to advance the case of the petitioner. In the present case the alleged forgery was not committed in the court, rather the plaint, written statement and vakalatnama were produced in the Court with forged signatures. Hence, in these circumstances, the FIR could be lodged by respondent No.2. No ground for interference is called for. Dismissed. (Sabina) Judge February 10, 2010 arya