IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. CWP 4738 of 1987 DATE OF DECISION : MAY 15, 2008 BHAJAN KAUR ....... PETITIONER(S) VERSUS DIRECTOR, SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT & ANR. ... RESPONDENT(S) CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAI LAMBA PRESENT: Mr. Sumeet Abrol, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. AK Sharma, Sr. DAG, Punjab, for respondent No.1. AJAI LAMBA, J. (Oral) Challenge in this Civil Writ Petition is to award dated 6.11.1986, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.T., Chandigarh. The gist of the facts is that the petitioner asserted that she was appointed on 2.1.1978 as Bal Sevika by the Social Welfare Department, Punjab, on temporary basis. Initially, the appointment was for six months on temporary basis, however, she was given extensions from time to time. Her services were terminated on 7.4.1982. The order of termination was not accepted and, therefore, a demand notice was served on 22.4.1984. The demands were not accepted and, therefore, the dispute was referred for adjudication. CWP 4738 of 1987 2 The respondent-Management took the stand that neither the Social Welfare Department was an industry nor the petitioner could be termed as a workman, she being a teacher by profession. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has taken an objection that because the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'), as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Miss A.Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and others, (1988) 4 Supreme Court Cases 42, she could not have approached the Labour Court. The findings recorded in the impugned order to this effect, therefore, cannot be faulted. I have gone through the impugned award. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that her duty was to teach children and to train them in cutting and stitching. She also conceded that no fee was charged from the children who were taught by the Department. Having regard to the nature of work being done by the petitioner, in my considered opinion, the case is covered by the judgment in A.Sundarambal's case (supra), cited by the learned counsel for respondent No.1. Exact reference to relevant portion of para-10 is required and the same reads as under:- “.......The question for consideration is whether even after the the inclusion of the above two classes of employees in the definition of the expression 'workman' in the Act a teacher in a school can be called a workman. We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post graduate education cannot be CWP 4738 of 1987 3 called as 'workmen' within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that teachers cannot be treated as 'workmen' as defined under the Act. It is not possible to accept the suggestion that having regard to the object of the Act, all employees in an industry except those falling under the four exceptions (i) to (iv) in section 2(s) of the Act should be treated as workmen. The acceptance of this argument will render the words 'to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work' meaningless. A liberal construction as suggested would have been possible only in the absence of these words. The decision in May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 678, precludes us from taking such a view. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant was not a 'workman' though the school was an industry in view of the definition of 'workman' as it now stands.” Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bharat Bhawan Trust v. Bharat Bhawan Artists Association and another, 2001(4) RSJ 396, wherein, while referring to A.Sundarambal's case (supra) in para-4, the same principle has been asserted in para-9. Para-9 reads as under:- CWP 4738 of 1987 4 “9. Even assuming that the appellant is an industry the more important question would be to examine whether the artists employed by it are workmen. Under the ID Act, a workman : “means any person (including an apprentice), employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of of any proceeding under this Act, in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed ,discharged, or retrenched in connection with or in consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute but does not include. ......”” Having regard to the fact that the petitioner, admittedly, was serving as a teacher and the law on the issue, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, as noticed above, holding that a teacher would not be a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show any error in exercise of jurisdiction by the Labour Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show how the matter could be brought for adjudication before the Labour Court. In view of the above, I find no illegality or error of jurisdiction in the impugned award. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. May 15, 2008 ( AJAI LAMBA ) Kang JUDGE