IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO : 7976 of 1999 Between: Ch. Showry S/o. Joseph R/o. Machilipatnam Krishna District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. Rep. by its Director, Vidyutsoudha, Hyderabad. 2 State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by the Secretary to Government, Department of Power, Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing a Writ of Certiorari or other order quashing the orders CE/DC/AS-XX/71/NA(1)90-340 dated 22.2.99 and also setting aside of the earlier orders passed by the 1st respondent in Memo No.DE/DM/IV/71/DM-XX/NA1/90-192 dated 9.12.94 and DM- XX/71/HACD/90-334 dated 29.11.97 with specific directions to treat the entire period of suspension as duty with all consequential benefits and to pass such other or further orders as may be deemed fit in the circumstances of the case. Counsel for the Petitioner:MS.S.TRIPURA SUNDARI Counsel for the Respondents: Sri P.R.BALARAMI REDDY (S.C. FOR TRANSCO) The Court made the following Order: Aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary authority imposing on him the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, and in treating the period of suspension as ‘suspension’, the present writ petition is filed. Smt S.Thripura Sundari, learned counsel for the petitioner, would challenge the order of punishment on the ground that the petitioner was acquitted in a criminal case on identical charges. As held in a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, including in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.[1] and G.M.Tank v. State of Gujarat[2], it is only in cases where the facts and evidence in the departmental enquiry as well as the criminal proceedings are the same without there being an iota of difference and the witnesses in both the proceedings are the same, would acquittal in the criminal case justify quashing of the disciplinary proceedings. Smt S.Thripura Sundari, learned counsel for the petitioner, would fairly concede that it is not even pleaded in the writ petition that the witnesses examined in the criminal case were the same as those in the disciplinary proceedings. While a copy of the judgment in C.C.No.226 of 1999 is filed, a copy of the enquiry report has not been made available to this Court. It is not possible for this Court to ascertain whether the witnesses in both the departmental enquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical. I see no reason, therefore, to quash the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. This contention must necessarily be rejected. Smt S.Thripura Sundari, learned counsel for the petitioner, would further contend that pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.238, dated 07-04- 1992, the Government had decided that, in cases where disciplinary proceedings end in imposition of a minor penalty, the period of suspension should be treated as on duty. Learned counsel would refer to the averments in the counter affidavit wherein this fact is admitted. Learned counsel would submit that, while the petitioner was placed under suspension from 05-06-1986 to 12-04-1994, the petitioner has been given the benefit of having the period of suspension treated as on duty only from 07-04-1992 to 12-04-1994. She would contend that the period of suspension cannot be split into two as that would amount to imposition of another punishment. Sri P.R.Balarami Reddy, learned standing counsel for the respondent-Corporation, on the other hand, would submit that G.O.Ms.No.238 dated 07-04-1992, was adopted by the respondent- Board only from 20-05-1997, despite which, the petitioner was extended the benefit from the date on which G.O.Ms.No.238 dated 07-04-1992, came into force and accordingly, the period of suspension of the petitioner from 07-04-1992 to 12-04-1994 was treated as on duty. Learned standing counsel would contend that, since prior to issuance of G.O.Ms.No.238 dated 07-04-1992, there was no provision which conferred any right on an employee to claim that the period of suspension should be treated as on duty, the relief sought for i.e. for treating the period of suspension from 05-06-1986 to 06-04-1992 as on duty must necessarily be rejected. The manner in which the period of suspension is required to be treated, whether on duty or as not on duty or as on leave etc. are all matters for the disciplinary authority, in its wisdom, to decide. The manner in which the suspension period is required to be treated does not amount to imposition of punishment. In the absence of any rule which confers on a delinquent employee any right to have the period of suspension treated as on duty, it is in the disciplinary authority’s realm to decide the manner in which the period of suspension is to be treated. As rightly pointed out by Sri P.R.Balarami Reddy, learned standing counsel for the respondent- Corporation, G.O.Ms.No.238 dated 07-04-1992 came into force only with effect from 07-04-1992 and it is only thereafter did any right accrue in favour of the petitioner herein to have the period of suspension treated as on duty and, accordingly, the period of suspension from 07-04-1992 to 12-04-1994 was treated as on duty by the respondents herein. In so far the period anterior to 07-04-1992 i.e. from 05-06-1986 till 06-04-1992 is concerned, in the absence of any specific provision prescribing the manner in which the period of suspension is required to be treated, this question fell within the discretion of the disciplinary authority. Unless arbitrariness is writ large, this Court would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the disciplinary authority. It cannot be said that the action of the respondents in treating the period of suspension from 05-06-1986 to 06-04-1992 as ‘suspension’ is so arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, that it would necessitate interference in writ proceedings. This contention of Smt S.Thripura Sundari, learned counsel for the petitioner, must also be rejected. Since no other contention has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and as both the aforesaid contentions are rejected, the relief sought for in the writ petition cannot be granted. The writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. _______________ 28-02-2008 usd [1] 1999(3) SCC 679 [2] 2006(5) SCC 446