HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.5160 of 2006 ORDER: Petitioners in this revision which is filed under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ‘the Act’) are petitioners in the eviction petition R.C.C.No.30 of 1998 on the file of the Rent Controller cum Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tenali. The Rent Controller allowed the said eviction petition by his order dated 05.01.2003. On appeal by the respondents, the appellate authority i.e. the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tenali by his order dated 28.07.2006 allowed that appeal dismissing the eviction petition. Questioning the same petitioners have come up with this revision. 2. The following points arise for determination in this revision. (i) Whether the denial of title and landlord-tenant relationship by the respondents in the eviction petition can be said to be bona fide? (ii) Whether respondents committed default in payment of rents from January, 1987? (iii) To what order? 3. It may be noted here that Section 22 of the Act which gives the power of revision to this Court says that this Court in a revision can go into the legality, regularity and also propriety of the order challenged in the revision. It is now settled that the revisional jurisdiction of this court under Section 22 is much wider than under Section 151 C.P.C and also article 227 of the Constitution. Thus the learned counsel for the revision petitioners on evidence argued about the correctness of the findings also of the appellate authority and the propriety thereof and argued that the appellate order should be reversed. Equally, the learned counsel for respondents supported the order and both counsel took me to the evidence and the findings of the Courts below in support of their respective contentions. Hence it has become necessary to go into the controversy in detail. 4. The above points arise in the following circumstances. The petition schedule premises which is a residential premises and hereinafterwards referred to as suit premises admittedly belongs to one late Smt.Dasari Bhavani who died on 22.10.1983. Ex.A.1 is the registered sale deed dated 06.03.1957 pertaining to the disputed suit premises and it stands in her name and shows that she purchased it from one Cheboyina Govinda Swamy. The eviction petition was initially brought by three petitioners viz., Dasari Ram Mohana Rao, Mangalagiri Venkata Krishna Rao and Mangalagiri Rama Krishna Rao on the two grounds which are already mentioned as points 1 and 2. Admittedly, the first petitioner Dasari Ram Mohana Rao is the son of late Dasari Bhavani while the second and third petitioners are the sons of one late Bala Gana Saraswathi who was the daughter of late Dasari Bhavani. Thus they brought the eviction petition as the legal representatives of late Dasari Bhavani. During the pendency of the eviction petition itself, the first and third petitioners died and therefore petitioners 4 to 6 were brought on record as the legal representatives of the deceased first petitioner and petitioners 7 to 9 were brought on record as the legal representatives of the deceased third petitioner. 5. The case of petitioners is that during the life time of Dasari Bhavani herself, she let out the property to Seshaiah who is the father of respondents 1 and 2 in the eviction petition on a monthly rent of Rs.100/- and after the death of Dasari Bhavani in 1983 the petitioners allowed the father of the respondents to continue in the suit premises as a tenant. Their further version is that subsequently the first petitioner by the original of Ex.A.14- registered notice dated 09.04.1987 called upon Seshaiah to vacate the suit premises and also demanded rents from January, 1987 but the latter claimed that he purchased the suit premises for Rs.40,000/- and became owner of it and therefore there was no landlord-tenant relationship. Sheshaiah died on 18.09.1990. Hence they brought the eviction petition on the above two grounds against respondents who are the sons of Seshaiah and they succeeded to the tenancy after the death of Seshaiah. 6. The first respondent Dasari Gowri Shankar Rao filed counter and the same was adopted by the second respondent. Their stand is that late Dasari Bhavani was the kept mistress of one Vemulapalli Ranga Rao and it was the said Ranga Rao who purchased the land of the suit premises and raised a thatched house in it with his own money and therefore they say that the suit premises belongs to the said Ranga Rao and not Bhavani. They then admitted that their father was in possession of the suit premises as a tenant from 1982 and the rent was enhanced to Rs.100/- per month and they further say that their father deposited an amount of Rs.5,000/- with Ranga Rao and Bhavani on the understanding that they will repay the same whenever their father vacated the suit premises. 7. Then in para-6 of the counter they admitted about the receipt of Ex.A.14-legal notice dated 09.04.1987 issued by the first petitioner to their father. They however pleaded that their father got issued a reply to the first petitioner and that thereafter they have settled the matter and thereafter their father Seshaiah purchased the suit premises for a sum of Rs.40,000/- and accordingly Seshaiah paid Rs.35,000/- adjusting the deposit amount of Rs.5,000/- paid earlier to Ranga Rao and Bhavani. This pleading of the respondents is silent as to whom Seshaiah paid Rs.40,000/- and from whom he purchased, the date of his purchase and also the particulars of the document or deed under which the purchase was made. 8. Respondents then stated that their father Seshaiah was in possession of the suit premises as absolute owner till his death which occurred on 18.9.1990 and thereafter they became the owners of it as his legal heirs and consequently the petitioners had no title to the suit premises and there is no landlord-tenant relationship also between petitioners and themselves. It must also be mentioned here that respondents took a plea that the first petitioner was in his childhood given in adoption by Dasari Bhavani herself to her maternal aunt Dasari Nagamani and therefore he has no right to the suit premises. Various pleas have been taken regarding the life of Dasari Bhavani and also the birth of Bala Gana Saraswathi to her but they are not relevant for this controversy and all said and done the fact remains that Ex.A.1-sale deed for the suit premises stands in her name and this, as will be presently seen, assumes significance. The Rent Controller accepted the case of the petitioners and ordered eviction but the appellate authority reversed that order. The details of oral and documentary evidence let in by both sides are given at the foot of the Rent Controller’s order. POINT No.1:- 9. The respective cases of the parties on this point have already been set out supra. It should be noted that both the respondents admitted that their father Seshaiah took the suit premises on lease and they also filed Ex.B.28-lease agreement dated 01.01.1982. That document itself shows that Ranga Rao and Bhavani lived like husband and wife since about forty years prior to 01.01.1982 and they were also blessed with a daughter who is the mother of the petitioners 2 and 3. The paternity of first petitioner is not mentioned in the evidence or in the pleadings of the petitioners but admittedly he is the son of Dasari Bhavani. The respondents however took a plea that Dasari Bhavani gave the first petitioner in adoption to her maternal aunt Nagamani in his childhood itself and therefore he has no right in the suit premises. They relied upon Ex.A.15-Will dated 14.02.1959 of Dasari Nagamani filed by the petitioners. In this Ex.A.15-Will, no-doubt, Dasari Nagamani described the first petitioner Mohan Rao as the natural son of Dasari Bhavani and that she took him in adoption and she bequeathed some property to Dasari Bhavani and the vested remainder therein to the first petitioner. The question is in the absence of any other evidence from the side of respondents to hold that the first petitioner is the adopted son of Nagamani, whether this Ex.A.15-Will alone is sufficient to hold that the first petitioner is the adopted son of Nagamani and therefore he lost his right in the suit premises. The answer to this question should be in the negative for the following reasons. 10. It may be noted that in the usual family arrangements where a lady doesn’t have issues, it is usual for such a lady to make a bequest for various reasons to the son of a female related to her from her parents side and in such a will she may describe such male as her adopted son in order to avoid litigation from the agnates of her husband. Thus the recital in Ex.A.15-Will alone cannot be made a ground to hold that the first petitioner, as the son of Bhavani, has no share in the suit premises. In fact it should be noted that if anybody can contest the claim of the first petitioner to a share in the suit premises, the competent persons would be the other heirs of Bhavani who have shares in it and it is not for third parties to raise such a dispute. Even otherwise the other sharers are already on record claiming eviction. Added to this the respondents from their side could not lead any evidence to show that the first petitioner is not entitled as legal heir of Bhavani to any share in the suit premises. Thus this plea of adoption taken by the respondents is rejected. 11. It may now be noted that Ex.A.1-Sale deed which pertains to the suit premises admittedly stands in the name of Bhavani and she therefore must be held to have legal title to it and she can be regarded as landlady of it and after her death petitioners 1 to 3 jointly become its landlords as her legal heirs and this would be the position even on the admitted case of respondents. One plea taken by the respondents is that it was Ranga Rao who purchased the suit premises in the name of Bhavani under Ex.A.1-sale deed and therefore he was the real owner. This plea is in the nature of a benami transaction, but respondents failed to lead any evidence to show that Bhavani was always treated as an apparent owner, the real title vesting in Ranga Rao. It may also be noted that the Binami Transactions Prohibition Act, 1988 was by then brought into force even in 1988 abolishing benami transactions and declaring apparent owners as real owners. Respondents did not lead any evidence to show that Ranga Rao during his life time and during the life time of Bhavani exercised any rights of ownership in any manner inconsistent with the title of Bhavani as evidenced by Ex.A.1-sale deed. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Ex.B.28-lease agreement 01.01.1982 which purports to have been executed by Ranga Rao and Bhavani granting lease of the suit premises in favour of Seshaiah i.e. father of the respondents. There is no recital in this Ex.B.28 to show that Ranga Rao was the real owner of the suit premises. The recitals in this Ex.B.28 however show that both Ranga Rao and Bhavani described the suit premises as belonging to them. This is usual for any wife and husband to jointly claim the property standing in the name of the wife as belonging to them for a convenient description in a lease deed executed in favour of a third party. Thus from Ex.B.28 the above contention of the respondents cannot be upheld. 13. It has now to be seen in the above background whether the plea of the respondents that they purchased the suit premises can be accepted on the evidence let in in these proceedings. In their counter, respondents mentioned about the purchase but they did not specifically say from whom they purchased the suit premises. Then in his evidence R.W.1-GowriShankar Rao i.e. the first respondent has stated that Bhavani died in 1987 and during her life time she executed a Will bequeathing the suit premises to Ranga Rao and thereafter his (R.W.1) father Seshaiah purchased it from him for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/- under an agreement of sale. Respondents however failed to file the said Will of Bhavani and also sale agreement though R.W.1 stated that it was a written agreement. Respondents further examined R.W.2 Shekhar babu, R.W.3-V.Koteswara Rao, R.W.4-B.Srinivasa Rao and R.W.5 M.Koteswara Rao in support of their plea that their father purchased the suit premises from Ranga Rao. 14. The evidence of R.Ws.2 to 5 is relevant only to show that respondents are in possession of the suit premises. The respondents did not file the sale agreement though they pleaded that their father purchased it for Rs.40,000/- which in those days was not a small amount having regard to the value of the money. R.W.2 was examined as the person who lent money to Seshaiah. R.W.3 was examined as a witness to the transaction. The evidence of the other witnesses is also to the same effect. It would be pertinent to note that R.Ws.2 to 5 have stated that they do not know who is the legal title holder of the suit premises except saying that rents were paid to Ranga Rao. 15. It would now be relevant to note here that both the respondents filed O.S.No.1 of 1996 in the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge against the original three petitioners in this eviction petition and another Dasari Sudhakar for a perpetual prohibitory injunction to restrain them from interfering with their possession of the suit premises. The respondents herein in the said suit pleaded that originally their father Seshaiah was a tenant in the suit premises and subsequently he purchased the same after settling the matter with the first petitioner herein who got issued Ex.A.14-notice herein. The petitioners who are defendants in the said suit contested it. The Court which tried O.S.No.1 of 1996 dismissed it holding that there was no sufficient evidence to uphold the case of respondents who are plaintiffs in the said suit regarding the agreement of sale pleaded by them but they were in possession as tenants and in that capacity they can be granted a perpetual injunction. It directed the respondents (the plaintiffs in the said suit) to work out their remedies regarding the sale agreement in a separate suit. Ex.B.26 is the certified copy of the said judgment. 16. The respondents have not let in any evidence to show that after the dismissal of O.S.No.1 of 1996 they filed any suit for specific performance for vindicating their rights regarding the sale and the findings in O.S.No.1 of 1996 that they were in occupation of the suit premises as tenants even by the date of Ex.B.26- judgment dated 23.10.1998 have become final. The suit premises admittedly belongs to Dasari Bhavani who is the predecessor in title of petitioners being the mother of the first petitioner and grandmother of petitioners 2 and 3 and following her death they must be held to have become the landlords of the suit premises. Even Ex.B.28-lease deed shows that both RangaRao and Bhavani executed the same and Bhavani being the legal title holder of the suit premises under Ex.A.1, it follows that the respondents father was her tenant and consequently respondents must be held to have become tenants of the petitioners after the death of Bhavani and Seshaiah. The respondents were not in a position to establish their title to the suit premises or to show that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between them and the petitioners for the suit premises. 17. Thus what emerges is that the respondents having admitted that their father was the tenant in the suit premises have failed to prove the sale transaction pleaded by them. It may also be noted that even if the said sale transaction is true, Ranga Rao was not competent to sell the property and it was only the Bhavani the legal title holder of it under Ex.A.1 and after her death only petitioners were competent to sell it. This being the position, the respondents must be deemed to be continuing as tenants of the petitioners in the suit premises. 18. One circumstance which was relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent was that the petitioners have pleaded that rents are due from January, 1987 and the petitioners kept quite till 1998 when they filed the eviction petition i.e. they kept quite for 11 years without taking any steps previously for collection of rents and eviction and therefore this must be held to be a circumstance fortifying the case of respondents. It is true that there is a delay of 11 years. It may be noted that the rule of prescription applies only when 12 years have elapsed and there is no limitation prescribed in the Act for bringing an eviction petition. Thus having regard to the circumstances of this case, the above delay in filing the eviction petition cannot help the respondents. It may also be noted that Ex.B.26-judgment in O.S.No.1 of 1996 would also show that petitioners did not keep quite and they were after the property. It is true that Exs.B.10 to B.22 Municipal tax receipts from March, 1989 to March,1995 are filed by the respondents for the suit premises but they all show that tax was paid in the name of first petitioner-Mohan Rao and what is recorded therein was the said tax was received from Seshaiah on behalf of Mohan Rao. In other words, even before and after the commencement of litigation the suit premises continued to be in the name of the Mohan Rao in municipal records. Mere payment of municipal tax cannot confer title on a party. Thus this delay factor cannot help the respondents. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents in the course of arguments in this revision filed Xerox copy of a relinquishment deed dated 03.04.2008 executed by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent for his half share in the suit premises and a subsequent gift settlement deed dated 23.07.2008 executed by the second respondent in favour of his wife covering the entire suit premises. He then filed a copy of the judgment dated 12-03- 2004 in S.C.No.18 of 2002 on the file of the I Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Tenali which is a rent suit brought by the petitioners or their legal representatives and this judgment copy shows that the said rent suit was dismissed for default. He then filed a certified copy of the deposition of the first petitioner-Dasari Ram Mohan Rao in O.S.No.1 of 1996 i.e. the judgment in which has been marked as Ex.B.26 wherein he gave evidence to the effect that respondents herein are paying the municipal tax for the suit premises in support of the plea of title set up by the respondents to the suit premises. It may be noted that so far as the above relinquishment and the gift settlement deeds are concerned, they have to be ignored as executants thereof cannot be said to have any title to suit premises. Further any constructions made by the respondents on the suit premises have also to be ignored as the rule is any construction on the land or any addition to the property goes with the land. What should be noted is that in the recitals this relinquishment deed and also the gift settlement deed Dasari Bhavani’s original title to the suit premises is admitted and the recitals therein further show that they are based upon the case pleaded by the respondents herein which is held as not reliable. So also the dismissal of the rent suit cannot also improve the case of the respondents as it does not extinguish title. So far as the deposition of the first petitioner-Ram Mohan Rao in O.S.No.1 of 1996 is concerned, in Ex.B.26 judgment itself the Court held that the same is not sufficient to uphold the plea of purchase set up by the respondents. Accordingly, the above documents cannot help the respondents even for a remand. 20. To sum up, the evidence on record and the above circumstances prima facie show that the respondents have to be treated as tenants of the petitioners in the suit premises. Thus the denial of title by the respondents of the petitioners/ landlords and also the denial of landlord-tenant relationship cannot be said to be bona fide. 21. The Rent Controller considered the above circumstances which weigh in favour of the petitioners and ordered eviction. The appellate authority totally ignored them and reversed that order. The order of the appellate authority can therefore be said to be totally contrary to the evidence and incorrect and in my opinion calls for interference by this Court in this revision. Of-course the matter has to be finally decided in a civil Court if the unsuccessful party here chooses to approach it. This point is accordingly decided in favour of the petitioners. POINT No.2:- 22. In view of the finding under point No.1, it follows that the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties does exist. Admittedly the rents are due from January, 1987 at the rate of Rs.100/- per month. The respondents did not admittedly pay those rents and therefore it can be said that they have committed wilful default in paying the same. The petitioners are held entitled to recover the same subject to the law of limitation relating to recovery of rents and it is made clear that limitation does not apply to recovery of possession of suit premises in these proceedings. This point is also accordingly decided in favour of the petitioners. POINT No.3:- 23. In view of the findings under points 1 and 2, it follows that the petitioners must succeed in this revision. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order of the appellate authority and restoring that of the Rent Controller. Respondents shall vacate the premises within three months from today failing which the petitioners can obtain possession of the same by execution. There shall be no order as to costs. It is further made clear that it shall be always open for the respondents to approach a civil Court to vindicate their rights to the suit premises. _____________________________ JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR 8th MARCH, 2011 CVRK