THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD W.P.No.1701 of 2000 JUDGMENT: (Per Justice B.Prakash Rao) The petitioner herein, who is working as Mandal Parishad Development Officer filed this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, seeking to assail the orders in O.A.No.6727 of 1999, dated 24-1-2000 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad allowing an application filed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein, purportedly under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 wherein they successfully assailed the Clarification Memo No.35760/Mdl.II/99-2, dated 12-10-1999 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh being in violation of Statutory Rules 9 and 10 under G.O.Ms.No.39, dated 25-1-1993 and Rules 8 and 16 of State and Subordinate Services Rules and the other consequential proceedings dated 25- 10-1999 issued by the Commissioner of Panchayat Raj and Rural Employment reverting the said respondents 1 to 4 as Extension Officers (Rural Development) from the post of Mandal Parishad Development Officers and set aside the same. There is no dispute in regard to the checkered events and the service data as furnished from both sides. The only question is in regard to the validity of the impugned Memo No.35760/Mdl.II/99-2, dated 12-10-1999 as to whether the same is clarificatory or supplementary or amount to issuing executive instructions contrary to statutory rules. For convenience sake, the Rule 10 of the Rules in G.O.Ms.No.492 dated 20-7-1994 reads as follows: “10. Tests: The persons appointed by direct recruitment as Mandal Parishad Development Officers shall pass the test below during the period at their probation. (a) Accounts Test for subordinate officers Part.I and II or (b) Accounts Test for Executive Officers or (c) Accounts Test for employees of local bodies.” On a bare reading of the aforesaid Rule, without any doubt, it can safely taken as the law governing under the said rules specifically prescribes a pass in the Account Test for Executive Officers or accounts Test for sub-ordinate officers part I & II or Accounts Test for Local Body Employees within a period of probation, which no doubt, the petitioner herein did not pass, but claims to have passed other equivalent test which is sought to be reiterated under the impugned Memo and which is admittedly set at naught by the Tribunal. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the respondents 1 to 4 herein have filed the said application before the Tribunal placing reliance on the impugned Memo dated 12-10-1999 wherein they were reverted. The impugned Clarification Memo dated 12-10-1999 states that a pass in Accounts Test for subordinate officers Part-I and II/the Accounts Test for Executive Officers is equivalent to a pass in Accounts Test for Local Body Employees. It is this arena and the comparison in between these two nature of tests, which constitutes lis between the parties. According to the applicants before the Tribunal, both cannot be neither treated as equal having regard to its syllabus nor can there be any such supplement to a rule which specifically contemplates a pass in a particular test, and therefore, any such attempt under the guise of clarification would only makes the Rule and mandate therein an ordain. The petitioner herein no doubt is senior to the respondents 1 to 4, who are the applicants before the Tribunal and he claims to have passed the Account Test for Subordinate Officers Part I and II during the period of probation, which he completed in the year 1998 and papers I and II in November, 1999. In the D.P.C constituted in September, 1999 he was empanelled for promotion by taking into account the impugned clarification, which has been issued, and there has been some correspondence inter se, and in the meanwhile, the said applicants before the Tribunal were promoted. Subsequently, on the clarification issued again reiterating the similar such situation making clarification of the aforesaid two tests, the applicants were reverted, hence, the application before the tribunal. Before the Tribunal and as well as in this Court the main submission though in a defence to the attack made by the applicants therein is to the effect that it is only a clarificatory nature and does not supplement nor run contrary to the statutory provision. On an elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar from both sides, the Tribunal by referring to the well established principles as to the scope of the executive instructions, which could possibly be issued under Article 162 of the Constitution of India and the reiteration therefore in State of M.P Vs.G.S.Dall & Flour Mills[1], Comptroller and Auditor General of India Vs. Mohan Lal Mhrotra[2], Union of India and Another Vs. Amrik Singh and Another[3], Direct Recruit Clas II Engg. Association Vs. State of Maharashtra[4], Lalit Mohan Deb & Others Vs. Union of India and Others[5], Ratanlal Bohra Vs. State of Rajasthan[6], State of Sikkim Vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia[7], State of Madhya Pradesh & Another Vs. Baldeo Prasad[8], Jaswant Singh Mathurasingh Vs. Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation[9], Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Others Vs. The State of Punjab[10], B.N.Nagarajan & others Vs. State of Mysore & Others[11], Sukbdev Singh and Others Vs. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & another[12], V.K.Sood Vs. Secretary, Civil Aviatiion & Others[13], Gududian Singh Fijji Vs. State of Punjab & others[14] and J.Rangaswamy Vs. Govt of A.P and others[15] and proceeded to hold that the Executive has power to issue executive orders, which are supplementary in nature to fill up the gaps or cover areas not covered by rules even in cases where statutory rules hold the field, but such instructions should not be contrary to the rules. Thus, such basic foundational approach was taken referring to the requirement as provided for under the aforesaid Rule 10 of G.O.Ms.No.492 dated 20-7-1994, which prescribes the pass in the Account Test for the employees of the local bodies Papers I and II within the period of probation. Therefore, when such specific stipulation is provided for, the question of replacing the same by way of clarification with any other test could only waters down the mandate as contemplated therein, and therefore, any such clarification would not be supplementing the Rules, but adding something which is not there in the rules. Further, by referring to the A.P. Departmental Tests Rules, 1965 and the syllabus as prescribed, it was found by the Tribunal that both do not run together and there is a great variation. Even though an attempt was made on behalf of the government by referring to various other instructions in G.O.Ms.No.576, dated 3-11-1993 and G.O,.Ms.No.1799, dated 7-10- 1965 and the Government Memo dated 16-11-1965 for similar such purposes and exercise, which has been taken recourse to, ultimately the Tribunal found that these instructions are in the teeth of the mandate under the aforesaid rule, and therefore, such a clarification has the effect of not supplementing the rule but supplanting the rule and it also goes contrary to the rule, and thus, it cannot be sustained and allowed the application. Once again, we have considered the self same submissions as made before the Tribunal at length in this Court from both sides and as rightly directed against the main question which is involved in regard to the impugned Memo dated 12-10-1999, which again falls for consideration in this writ petition and hold that it is nothing but reiteration of the same submissions. There being no dispute in regard to the well laid principles as regards the scope and interpretation of a statutory rule, it cannot be said that rule can become a go-bye by any such supplement which really supplants. On the perusal of the said rule and giving a consideration to the submissions, we do not find any much substance therein nor any fresh attempt is made to show as to how such clarification could be found sustainable or valid, more so, on the face of the mandate as provided for under the Rule, nor there is any attempt on the part of the petitioner herein to say as to how the approach of the Tribunal is either perverse or based upon not well considered approach. In the circumstances, we do not find any justification or substance in any of the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner. There are no merits in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. _________________ (B.PRAKASH RAO,J) _______________​_____ (G.BHAVANI PRASAD,J) Date:18-2-2011 grk [1] AIR 1991 SC 772 [2] AIR 1991 SC 2288 [3] 1993 (5) SLR 607 [4] AIR 1990 SC 1607 [5] AIR 1972 SC 995 [6] 1996 (8) SCC 735 [7] AIR 1991 SC 1933 [8] AIR 1961 SC 293 [9] AIR 1991 SC 2160 [10] AIR 1955 SC 549 [11] AIR 1966 SC 1942 [12] AIR 1975 SC 1331 [13] 1993 Supp (3) SCC 9 [14] 1979 (2) SCC 368 [15] 1990 (1) SCC 286