CC/2/2007 1/26 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL CONFIRMATION CASE No. 2 of 2007 WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1171 of 2007 For Approval and Signature: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.BUCH HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE DN PATEL ========================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ========================================= STATE OF GUJARAT - Appellant(s) Versus THAKORE DASHRATHJI SHIVUJI - Respondent(s) ========================================================= Appearance : MR HL JANI, LD.ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for Appellant(s) : 1, MR JM BAROT for Respondent(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.BUCH and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE DN PATEL Date : 15/10/2008 COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.BUCH) 1. The present Criminal Confirmation Case has been registered on account of the reference received CC/2/2007 2/26 JUDGMENT from the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.3, Mehsana, wherein the said learned Additional Sessions Judge has awarded Capital Punishment to the respondent herein-Dashrathji Shivuji Thakor, who is the appellant of Criminal Appeal No.1171 of 2007, resident of village Virta, Taluka Mehsana, District Mehsana, while dealing with Sessions Case No.51 of 2007. It is submitted in the said report made by the learned trial Judge that the judgment and order of conviction and sentence awarding Capital Punishment to the respondent herein dated 30th August 2007 may be confirmed by this Court in light of the provisions of Sections 366(1) and 366(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The said report says that the respondent at the time of awarding sentence was intimated about his right to assail the said judgment and order of conviction and death sentence imposed, within a period of 30 days, if he so desires. This Court has received certified copy of the judgment and order as well as the R & P of Sessions Case No.51 of 2007. CC/2/2007 3/26 JUDGMENT 2. The very judgment and order of conviction and sentence has been assailed by the respondent- appellant by way of preferring Criminal Appeal No.1171 of 2007 before this Court. This Court (Coram : R.P. Dholakia and K.S. Jhaveri, JJ) has admitted the said appeal and has also ordered that the said appeal be heard along with present Confirmation Case No.2 of 2007. 3. Shri H.L. Jani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor and Shri J.M. Barot, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, who is appellant of Criminal Appeal, have jointly submitted that considering the nature of proceedings, both these proceedings i.e. Confirmation Case No.2 of 2007 and Crimnal Appeal No.1171 of 2007, may be heard and decided simultaneously by a common judgment. 4. Shri H.L. Jani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor and Shri J.M. Barot, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-convict, have taken us through the oral as well as documentary evidence led during the course of CC/2/2007 4/26 JUDGMENT trial and also the judgment and order of conviction and sentence awarding death penalty to the respondent-convict. Shri H.L. Jani, while making submissions, in response to the query raised by the Court, has submitted that considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and the basic case placed against the respondent-convict, the extreme penalty i.e. death penalty, was not required to be imposed in the present case and the imprisonment for life to the respondent- convict would have been the most adequate and sufficient punishment. The learned trial Judge before imposing the death penalty ought to have considered the facts and circumstances of the case vis-a-vis the other relevant aspects which are required to be considered closely before imposing the extreme penalty. Shri H.L. Jani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has also pointed out more than two decisions of the Apex Court where the Apex Court has considered various aspects while dealing with the rarest of rare cases. According to Shri Jani, the observations made by the Apex Court if are CC/2/2007 5/26 JUDGMENT considered, the present case would not fall in the category of the rarest of rare case and, therefore, the death penalty may not be confirmed by this Court. However, it is submitted by Shri Jani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that there is a strong case on merit and no error which can be said to have been committed by the learned trial Judge for holding the respondent-convict guilty for the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, According to Shri H.L.Jani, it is a case where the respondent-convict ought to have been imposed imprisonment for life. 5. During the course of submissions, Shri J.M. Barot, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-convict, has submitted that this is a case where the respondent-convict, even as per the case of the prosecution, committed offence when he was under the influence of Alcohol and the death of victim is nothing but undue anger of respondent-convict. According to the prosecution, the victim-Vinaben, who was CC/2/2007 6/26 JUDGMENT the wife of respondent-convict, had no cordial relations with respondent-convict, who was her husband, and there were instances of quarrels between them and on account of the same she occasionally used to go to her parental home and ultimately, she used to come back to co- habit with her husband i.e.respondent-convict. On the date of incident, Vinaben had just returned from her parental home. When Vinaben and respondent -convict were returning from her parental home, there was a quarrel between them and the respondent-convict being habitual drunkard had beaten his wife Vinaben (deceased) prior to the incident on the way to her matrimonial home. Thereafter, the respondent- convict had left the house and he had returned after sometime. After returning, he had poured kerosene on his wife Vinaben and enkindled her and bolted the house from outside ruthlessly. On hearing the shouts of victim Vinaben, the people in the neighbouring area had rushed to rescue the victim Vinaben and they had extinguished the fire. CC/2/2007 7/26 JUDGMENT 6. So this is a case, according to Shri Barot, whether according to the prosecution, the respondent-convict has killed his wife on account of suspicion as to the character of his wife, but this offence though grave would not fall in the category of a heinous crime and hence, the extreme penalty in such or similar cases is not normally awarded by the Courts and on establishment of guilt, the accused person is being sent to jail for life. So it would be at the most a case where the learned trial Judge ought to have felt satisfied by imposing imprisonment for life. 7. The appeal preferred by the respondent-convict herein is an appeal under Section 374 read with Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therefore, while upholding the judgment and order of conviction and sentence this Court has to record its findings on merits, more particularly on the strength of the evidence available on record. Shri J.M. Barot, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-convict, has taken us through the charge framed which is CC/2/2007 8/26 JUDGMENT at Ex.5. It reflects the basic case of the prosecution which reads as under : “(1) That on 17.12.2007 when the complainant-Thakor Vinaben was in the house of Dashrathji Shivuji situated at village Virta, Tal. & Dist. Mehsana, you the accused-Thakor Dashrathji alias Kaluji Shivuji, who had married to the victim complainant Vinaben prior to four years of the incident and you used to demand money often from the complainant who was your wife during the marriage span and as the complainant did not pay the same, by getting instigated and by beating her often as well as by giving her physical and mental harassment and also by falsely doubting her and thereby beating and harassing her, have committed offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code. (2) Further on 17.02.2007 at 03-00 p.m. when the complainant-Vinaben was present at home, you the accused by bolting the house, pouring kerosene lying in the Tin on the complainant Vinaben and igniting her and by CC/2/2007 9/26 JUDGMENT bolting the door of the house, had run away, whereby she died at the Civil Hospital. Thus, you the accused have committed the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by committing murder of the complainant Vinaben by pouring kerosene and igniting her.” 8. To establish the guilt of the respondent, the prosecution has led oral as well as documentary evidence and it would be sufficient to consider the evidence led by PW-3 Hamir Thakor at Ex.14 and PW-4 Shivuji Thakor at Ex.15. The evidence of PW-10 Tejiben at Ex.23, mother of the respondent-convict, according to us, is also relevant. The learned trial Judge has appropriately considered the said part of evidence of PW-10 Tejiben. The medical evidence led by Dr.P.P. Soni at Ex.8, who performed the autopsy, is found sufficient by the learned trial Judge to hold that the death of Vinaben is a homicidal death which had occurred on account of burn injuries sustained by Vinaben. It is not a case that the death of Vinaben was CC/2/2007 10/26 JUDGMENT on account of the injuries other than burn injuries. So there was no need for us to go into detail discussion of the entries made in the postmortem note prepared by Dr.P.P. Soni. The most vital part of evidence, according to us, which even in absence of aforesaid evidence is sufficient to link the respondent-convict with the crime is the dying declaration of Vinaben. There are more than one dying declaration on record and all of them, according to us, are found proved applying the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 9. As the victim Vinaben was inflicted burn injuries by pouring kerosene and igniting her, her relatives had taken her to hospital. So the doctor was supposed to ask the cause for injury sustained by her. The case papers of the Government Hospital, Mehsana, at Ex.49 show that the victim Vinaben had told the doctor that she had sustained those injuries because her husband had poured kerosene on her and thereafter ignited her and he is the person responsible for causing injuries. According to CC/2/2007 11/26 JUDGMENT prosecution, the incident had occurred sometime prior to 02-30 p.m. i.e. in the afternoon hours. So in couple of minutes, she had disclosed the identity of the person who was responsible for causing injuries i.e. respondent-her husband. After her admission in the hospital, she was taken Female Burns Ward. The history was again asked to victim Vinaben and she had narrated the same thing before the doctor who admitted her in the hospital. The entire case papers also show that similar history was given by the victim Vinaben earlier. The doctors are the independent witnesses. The case papers are produced during the course of trial. As such the genuineness of the same is not under challenge since during the court of trial the witnesses have proved the same. It is settled that the dying declaration may not be a detailed dying declaration. A statement regarding cause of death is precisely stated than such the statement would fall in the category of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to us, the history given to the doctor can be given CC/2/2007 12/26 JUDGMENT the weightage of dying declaration within the meaning of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. Fortunately, Vinaben being a young lady of about 30 years was able to even on account of 95% burn injuries. The Police Inspector, Mehsana, had recorded the said complaint and he has proved the said complaint stating in detail as to how he recorded the complaint of the complainant-Vinaben (deceased) and obtained her thumb impression below the complaint at Ex.36. The said FIR is also a dying declaration. The FIR being a detailed FIR describing the contingency under which the Vinaben was victimized by her husband on different occasions and at the time of incident when he ultimately poured kerosene and ignited her. Vinaben has also narrated that prior to two days of the incident in question, she had been to her parental home with her youngest daughter Aasha and they were there for two days and on the date of incident at about 09-00 a.m., they were returning to village Virta i.e. at her matrimonial home, along with her husband. At that time some derogatory remarks were made by CC/2/2007 13/26 JUDGMENT her husband impliedly impeaching her for looking at other persons moving in town Patan and she was beaten there. It appears that since then the respondent-convict must have decided to deal with the victim Vinaben in his own manner and he was not able to forgive her for her alleged conduct at town Patan. It is mentioned in the FIR that her husband was suspecting her character and therefore only, he poured kerosene and ignited her. Even cross- examination has also been made of the said Police Inspector, Mehsana, who has proved the complaint, but according to us, this Police Inspector has stood to the test of cross- examination. True it is that a person who has sustained more than 90% burn injury may not be in a physical and mental state of mind to narrate the incident in such a detail, but there is nothing on record to show that she had become unconscious any time prior to recording of her complaint. In the deposition of the father of the respondent-convict, one thing has come on record wherein he has stated that when she was being taken to hospital, she was CC/2/2007 14/26 JUDGMENT conscious. It is in evidence that the respondent-convict had also attempted to jump in to the jeep car while the victim-Vinaben was being shifted to the hospital, however, he was snubbed. 10. No suggestion was made by the defence as to whether the victim-Vinaben had ever turned unconscious. The hospital case papers do not indicate that prior to recording of the complaint of Vinaben, any strong sedation was inserted into her body so that she can be relieved of the pain. Here when the genuineness of the complaint given by her in detail is required to be scanned, the Court cannot ignore one more fact which is brought on record i.e. dying declaration at Ex.13 recorded at 05-10 p.m. on 17th February 2007 i.e. on the date of incident. The said dying declaration has been proved by PW-2 Chetnaben Damodar Modi-Executive Magistrate, by her deposition at Ex.11. This witness has proved the entire procedure of recording of the dying declaration by her and the dying declaration at Ex.13 recorded in CC/2/2007 15/26 JUDGMENT Question and Answer Format shows that victim Vinaben was conscious even at 05-10 p.m. The endorsement of the doctor was obtained by the Executive Magistrate at the top of the dying declaration at 05-10 p.m. i.e. before recording of dying declaration. This endorsement has been proved by the doctor so also by the Mamlatdar in their depostions and the genuineness of the said endorsement is not found seriously challenged. So a patient who was conscious at 05-10 p.m. cannot be presumed to be either unconscious or under some disturbed state of mind when her complaint came to be recorded by the Police Inspector, Mehsana Police Station. The victim-Vinaben had matrimonial ties with the respondent-convict of 14 years and had four children. An Indian woman having four children and having matrimonial ties of 14 years at least would not try to implicate her husband in such a serious crime. The fact of having bolted the door from outside rules out the possibility of commission of suicide by the victim Vinaben on account of alleged mental torture. In the dying declaration recorded by the Executive CC/2/2007 16/26 JUDGMENT Magistrate, she has stated that at about 03-00 p.m. after consuming liquor, on account of the said quarrel, the respondent-convict had beaten up the victim Vinaben and thereafter, poured kerosene on her and ignited her; and at last he bolted the door of their house from outside. She has further stated that on account of burn injuries she had started shouting and the people in the neighbouring area had gathered on listening her shouts. They had rushed to rescue her. Her mother-in-law and brother-in-law (elder brother of her husband) had taken her to the hospital and when she was brought out of her house, her mother-in-law and others were outside her house. So in brief practically she has narrated the entire incident which had occurred. When this statement is found consistent with the story given by her to both the doctors who admitted her in the hospital and then to the Police Inspector who recorded her complaint, it would not have been possible for the learned trial Judge or any Court to say that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate should be viewed with any CC/2/2007 17/26 JUDGMENT shadow of doubt though the same is recorded after several hours. However, it appears that she had never been under the influence of sedation. There is no evidence on record which go to show that she was under the influence of sedation given to her. The persons who recorded the complaint also were conscious that they may be examined as to the mental status of the victim and, therefore, the Police Inspector at the time he recorded the complaint had obtained the certificate as to the consciousness of the victim Vinaben on the paper on which he was recording the complaint and in the same way, the Executive Magistrate also obtained necessary endorsement of the doctor as stated hereinabove. So irrespective of the evidence of the mother-in-law of the victim or father-in- law of the victim and other witnesses, the respondent-convict could have been linked with the crime even in absence of any other evidence when consistent four dying declarations read with postmortem note proved by the doctor, according to us, are sufficient forms of evidence under which the respondent-convict CC/2/2007 18/26 JUDGMENT could have been held guilty and, therefore, he has been rightly held guilty by the learned trial Judge. 11. Considering the nature of offence as well as the manner and method in which the offence has been committed, it was not possible for the learned trial Judge to hold the respondent- convict guilty for any charge lesser than the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. It is settled legal position that in a case based on dying declaration, if the dying declaration is found truthful and sound and the Court is able to listen the ring of truth, then even from the single statement of the victim, which can be accepted and received in evidence as dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, there is no need to even seek for any corroboration. Seeking of corroboration is not a rule of law but the rule of prudence, even then in the present case, the dying declaration at Ex.13 recorded by the Executive Magistrate is found corroborated by CC/2/2007 19/26 JUDGMENT the FIR, two types of case papers recording history given by the victim herself and the nature of injuries found on her body. When this evidence straight way corroborates the dying declaration at Ex.13, according to us, there was no scope to interfere with the guilt found established by the learned trial Judge. According to us, there is neither any element of error in appreciating the evidence nor any element of perversity while holding the respondent-convict guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and hence, the respondent-convict is required to be punished accordingly. 13. We have considered the statements made by Shri H.L. Jani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor and Shri J.M. Barot, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-convict, on the point of quantum of punishment. When it is submitted by learned Additional Public Prosecutor that this is not a case wherein the death penalty could have been imposed, there is no need for us to go into detailed discussion. However, it is CC/2/2007 20/26 JUDGMENT necessary for us to record the submission made by Shri Jani is the most genuine one and it is based on settled law. In the case of Prithvi (minor) v. Mamraj and others, reported in 2004(15) SCC 279, the Apex Court has held, on facts, that the case before the Apex Court was not the rarest of rare case. In this decision, the Apex Court was dealing with a case of multiple murders. One of the accused was awarded death penalty, who was found the ring leader of the co-accused who committed the offence. The conviction was found justified. The accused had assaulted the victim-deceased with lathis when they were sleeping and the accused were annoyed by declaration of deceased and there was some dispute in reference to agricultural land. Though the person killed was sleeping at the time of incident, the Apex Court found that this case cannot be said to be the rarest of rare case because the Apex Court considered the number of facts and circumstances of the case and the circumstances were not suggestive of the situation where it can be recorded that the case would fall in CC/2/2007 21/26 JUDGMENT the category of the rarest of rare case. The second decision is in the case of Surendrapal Shivlal v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2005(3) SCC 127. In the cited decision, the appellant-accused was awarded death sentence on account of killing a minor after committing rape on her by abducting her in the middle of the night while she was sleeping from her home. There were some altercations between the accused and the mother of the victim girl. The Court found that the accused guilty for the rape and murder of the girl, even then on facts and circumstances of the case found that ultimately the case of prosecution rests upon circumstantial evidence i.e. circumstance of last seen together and the conduct of the accused prior to the incident. So such a case, therefore, cannot be said to be the rarest of rare case. The Apex Court held that the death penalty was not warranted. 14. It is possible for us to pose a question where any mechanism or formula can be worked out under which a particular case can be placed in CC/2/2007 22/26 JUDGMENT the category of the rarest of rare case. The answer obviously would be in the negative. Each criminal case has its own facts and its shadow. The impact of deterrence whether the offence is anti-national or heinous one, should reach to each corner of the country. Here we would like to reproduce the relevant part of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Prajeet Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4202, which are as under : “17. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, has laid down certain guidelines for imposing death sentence which have been culled out by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab, (9183) 3 SCC 470, and accordingly the following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh (supra) : (i) The extreme penalty of death needs to be inflicted except in the gravest cases of extreme culpability. CC/2/2007 23/26 JUDGMENT xxx xxx (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the