IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE NINETEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO : 18248 of 2008 Between: Banda Raghavendra Rao S/o.Venkateshwara Rao Atapaka (v), Kaikaluru Mandal, Krishna District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Endowments Dept., Kakinada, East Godavari District. 2 Sri Kanakalingeswara Swamy Vari Temple rep. by its Manager, Atapaka, Kaikavolu Mandal, Krishna District. 3 Banda Satyanarayana S/o.Late China Kanakalingeswara Rao R/o.Dattatreyanagar, besides Dattatreya Temple Sadasivapeta, Ranga Reddy District. 4 The Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Dept., Vijayawada, Krishna District. .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction particularly one in the nature of Mandamus declaring the order No. 159/2008 Jdl. dt. 17.5.2008 of the 1st respondent as arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India apart from the same being in violation Section 87 (h) of the Act 30 of 87 and further declare that the petitioner is entitled for being appointed as 'Founder Family Member' of the 2nd respondent Sri Kanakalingeswara Swamy Temple, Atapaka (v) and pass such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioner: MR. M. VIJAY KUMAR Counsel for the Respondent No.: GP FOR ENDOWMENTS The Court made the following : THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN Writ Petition No. 18248 of 2008 Order: The grievance of the petitioner in this writ petition is that, despite an order of this Court in W.P. No.3532 of 2006 dated 11.09.2007 whereby the earlier order of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments dated 15.02.2006 was held to be an order passed without jurisdiction and the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments was directed to consider the respective stands taken by the parties and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law, the first respondent herein (the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments) had, in fact, relied on the earlier proceedings, and the enquiry held by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, in holding against the petitioner without complying with the directions of this Court to consider the matter afresh. Sri M. Vijaya Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that, since the earlier order of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments is without jurisdiction, the Deputy Commissioner had acted contrary to law in relying on the findings recorded therein or in the enquiry held earlier, which formed the basis of the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments dated 15.02.2006. Heard the learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for respondents 1 and 4, Sri VTM Prasad, learned Standing Counsel for the second respondent and Sri S. Syam Sunder Rao, Caveator for the third respondent. All the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would vehemently contend that the order impugned in the writ petition cannot be said to have been passed without application of mind and that, in any event, the Act itself provides for an appeal under Section 88 without exhausting which the petitioner could not have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A perusal of the impugned order would reveal that the Assistant Commissioner had submitted his remarks to the Deputy Commissioner, vide proceedings dated 29.03.2006, wherein he had categorically stated that an opportunity was given to the rival parties, that on 01.02.2006 the petitioner and the third respondent had appeared before him and an enquiry was conducted and that the findings given by him in his order dated 15.02.2006 were valid. The Deputy Commissioner, thereafter, notes as under: “As per the remarks and records of the Assistant Commissioner, at that time of conducting enquiry by him, he perused the property register which was registered in 1970. So the register approved by the Assistant Commissioner is only valid under law. So Ex.A2 is not admissible and the same is not valid under law. The entire remarks of the Assistant Commissioner reveals that he conducted enquiry on 01.02.2006 in the presence of rival parties including the petitioner. So it is proved that the contention of the petitioner that no opportunity was given to him by the Assistant Commissioner is false.” In this context, it is relevant to note that the order impugned before this Court in the earlier writ petition (W.P. No.3532 of 2006) was the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments dated 15.02.2006 which, in turn, is based on the earlier enquiry conducted by him on 01.02.2006. It is this order of the Assistant Commissioner which this Court had held to be without jurisdiction. It is also evident from the afore extracted portion of the order of the Deputy Commissioner that he has relied on the remarks and records of the Assistant Commissioner at the time of conducting enquiry by him. The Deputy Commissioner also notes that the Assistant commissioner had perused the property register. It is clear that despite the directions of this Court, directing the Deputy Commissioner to consider the matter afresh, he has merely accepted what the Assistant Commissioner had stated in his earlier proceedings, and in the enquiry held by him, which order this Court has held to be without jurisdiction. The impugned order does not disclose the Deputy Commissioner having independently perused the property register, or to have come to an independent conclusion, de hors the earlier order of the Assistant Commissioner or the enquiry held by him, that it was not the petitioner but the third respondent who was entitled to be appointed as a member of the Trust Board. Both on the ground that he had relied on an order which this Court has held to be without jurisdiction, and that he had failed to consider the matter afresh despite this Court having directed him to do so, the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner is in violation of the order of this Court. Sri VTM Prasad, learned Standing Counsel for the second respondent, would submit that, it would be appropriate, in the circumstances of this case if this Court were to call for the property register and peruse it with a view to give a quietus to the long drawn process of litigation. I see no reason to do so. The jurisdiction which this Court exercises under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is supervisory and not appellate. It is for the Deputy Commissioner to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on him under the Act, and not this Court to take upon itself the task of perusing the records, and arriving at an independent conclusion on merits. On the plea that there is an alternative remedy of appeal under the Act, it is well settled (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks ((1998) 8 SCC 1) that, while existence of an alternative remedy is a matter which this Court is required to bear in mind while entertaining a writ petition, it is not a bar for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Among the well settled grounds where this Court would still entertain a writ petition, despite the existence of an alternative remedy, is when the impugned order is either without jurisdiction, or is in violation of principles of natural justice. Among the facets of principles of natural justice is the requirement of the statutory authority applying his mind independently to the facts on record, and to arrive at an independent conclusion. In the case on hand, in addition to the rule of natural justice, there is a direction by this Court, whereby the Deputy Commissioner was mandated to consider the matter afresh. I see no reason to non suit the petitioner on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. The impugned order, evidently, suffers from non-application of mind and must, therefore, be quashed. It is made clear that the order passed by this Court will not preclude the first respondent from considering the matter afresh, and from passing an order in accordance with law. The writ petition is allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. __________________________ RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. Date: 19.11.2008 Nsr