^^a?'S^^3 niiii i •!-l'i.,^ :; sm HIGHCOURTOFCHMATTISGARHATBIL.ASPUR Sinflle Bench : Hon'bleShri Dilip Raosaheb DeShmukh.J. Criminal Revision No. 633 of 2006 Dr. PremishVerma >3:lversus Lokesh Sharma O R D E R -* Postfor (S -11-2007 Sd-/ Dilip Raosaheb Judge n HIGHCOURTOFCHHATTISGARHATBILASPUR Singl^Bench : Hon'bleShri Dilip RaosahebDeshmukh.J. CriminalReyisLon N0.633 of 2006 ApDlicant Non-Applicant versus -^ M Dr. Premish V6rma, aged '56 years, S/o I.P.Verma, Verma City and. Sonography, X-Ray Genter, T.P. Nagar, Kprba Lokesh Sharma, S/o Shri J.K.Sharma, Prp. Axay Agency, Shitla Mandir Ke Pass, Amapara, Raipur Criminal ReviSiOnunderSection 397/401 oftheCodeof Criminal Procedure, 1973 Present : Applicant byShri Ashish Shrivastava.learned counsel. Non-Applioant byShri PravinKumarTulsiyanwithShriVivek Rathore, l.earned counsel. ORDER (PassedQnl3^(^ofNoyember,2007) In this reyision, the orderdated-19-07-2006 passed by Shri G. K. Mishra, Additional Sessions Judge, Korba (hereinafter referred to as 'the ASJ') in Griminal Revision No.6/06 is under challenge, whereby ' , ' . ~ . • : ' ; : : • ;1: the order dated 21-02-2006 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba rejecting theobjedion as to the maintainability of the complaint filed by the applicant herein under Section 138 of the Nggotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereina1^rreferre(:lt()^^e^')wasre (2)6^;||Brief lacts .aite^that^during ^gmiTiera to safisfy a lega|iyenforc!0ableid§bt,:©hequeN6.1547^9 dated09-04-2003drawn by the non-aRpliGan(j,on:lndira-jPEiyadarstlini "Matiila Nagrik Sahakari Barik Limited, Press C<Si'rip)ex^^dar Bazar;^ipur (C.S.) fe LakhswaSgiventejfl^^RRliearitwhichwaspresentedbytheapplicantto his bahker,i.e., thelBankoT|nyi|i,fBFaFich Korba (heFeinafterref^rred^oas /^0 ;1-41> \\\ 4 1 , i 'the Bank'). On 23-08-2003, theapplicantreceivedinformationfromrtBe Bank thatthe aforesaid Cheque had bounced due to lack of sufficient \ .: - • ! ;' balance in the accountof thenon-applicant. (3) Uponreceipt ofsuch information from the Bank, the non-appliGant was informed by the applieant on telephone dn the-same dayand several timesthereafterthattheChequedrawnbyhimhasbeenreturnedunpaid. On 22-09-2003, the applicant sen^ notice in writing under proviso (b) to .w ' : ! ' ~ ' ": • Section 138 of theAct to the non-applicant under certifieate of posting. Despite receipt ofnotice, the non-applicantfailedtomakepaymentofthe said amountof money to the applicant within the statutpry period mentioned in Sectipn 138(c) of the Act. A complaint was filed by the applicant on 21-10-2003 beforethe ChiefJudicial Magistrate, Korba under Section 138 of the Act. Statement on oath pf the applicant under Section 200 oftheCodeofCriminalProcedurewasrecordedbytheGhiefJuclicial Magistrate, Korba, who took cognizance of the offence underSection '138 of theAct on 31-10-2003 and issued notice to the non-applicant. Qn 24-12-2004, an objection was filed by the non-applicant regarding the maintainability of the complaint pn the sble ground that legal notice as contemplated under Seetion 138(b) of the Act was not given by tEie applicant within the statutoi^ penod of ftiirty days from'the receijat of information by the •apRlieant(ffiW^th^B|irik re^ CHequ®;asunpaid. Mis;aiRglj'eationy'Ki§i^iN1^^ .^:yiS;NKl ;l?R^S^-::i8^;..' Judicial Magjstrate Fir^ Clas^ Ko^ Magistrate'),to which Cotirt thec;asewastransferrecjon15-0!Sfc2004. (4) Although, the objection ag to maintainability of ttie cQmplajnt pertained to prpviso (b) tO(:^Se6tion 138 of e Act, the Magistrate considered the Qbjectionas jfitwas fornbn-CRmpliance ofsub-clause^ti) ; pf Section 142 of the Act. Gonsequehtly, the objection was tui-ne^l' d0y»n ^S^^^SSES.::, <tfii'ia!fg?tiSt:ii^!S)iia^KS.SSS'WW*!1s"n;i-^f;yi;3®ii->wi33(!.-"i-'-aiJp^St»ae ••'''BB ar^;^' I'Ktii li ^li :^.lni c!?'1 ^lill' •HtlE'i 3!l :ffll: -ilj:" .•lts ] -1 on the ground that the applicant had within one month of the noticeldatecl 22-09-20Q3 made the complainf as contemplated under Section 142(b) v ' . • : ' ! ' - 1 ;-:'"^ "- read with proviso (c) fo Section 138 ofthe Act. (5) Being aggrieved, the non-applicant herein preferred eriminal Revision NQ.6/06 befdre the Sessions Judge, Korba. By the impugned order, the ASJ allowed the revision on the groundthat notice as contemplated bytheprovisQ(b)t^Section 138oftheActwasnotgivenby ^f)t ; . ! • .! * ;':,'. the applicant/payee within thirtyjdays of the receipt of informatibn by him from the Bank regarding the return of the Cheque as unpaid. 1 The ASJ reckoned the period of limitation from 23-08-2003, i.e., ineluding the date of reeeipt ofinformatipn by the payee froffl the Bank regarding the retyrn of the Gheque as unpaid, and arrived at a conclysion that the nptice dated 22-09-2003 having been given on the 31 day was beyond thestatutory periodofthirtydaysprovidedundertheprovis6(b)toSectioh138Qfthe Act. As a result, theASJ held thatthecpgnizancetakenbytheMagistrate was bad for non-con'ipliance of the proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act. Consequently, the ASJ dismissed the complaint by the impughed order which isunderchajlenge inthis revision. (6) Shri Ashish Shrivastava, leamed counsel for the applicant argued thatinsuchasituaticinunderSectiQnSciftheGeneralGlausesActasafeQ Section 12 ofthe^Limitation^,thej|aa(g.o(^ceip^ ^payie,fi®mttte?Bsinl' gai3i|g|t^|jeti|l!toPtMe?(!^ ^Gluded^wKileiceirTtii^g^lstttuteJiy'peripdroffftirtydays^^^w^^ the payee is required underithe ptovigoQ)) to Section 13&o)i theAct to givean6ticeinwritihgtottiedraweroftheGheqye.i.e.,thenon-ap^ Reliance was placed on.'Satetft /ndra Lftfc andot^ Securities Ltd., (11999) 3 SCC 1, Jindal Steel and Pow6r IMigan^ .r :IH iSS®:!] •aig® IB8S3 aiwthervs. Ashoka Alloy •'^: Stee/ f.jtofe and offieis, ^,-iK^^^v^^i --sss!sa''s,'?s:ss&, iB^Ka'.ift.^^^i^^is^N^^^i sSf^^lfsSs ^ iBI 9:! t Prem Chand Vijay Kumar vs. Yasftpa/ Smgh and another, (2005) 4 SCC 417, Tarun Prasad Chatterjee vs. Dinanath Sharma, (2000) 8 \ '- ; : : :; ;:-1- SCC 649, Padma Charan Mohapatra vs. Superintendent of Police, cum Taxing Authority of Phulbani, MR 19650rissa 71 and Snn»Vasa Silk Mills, Seshadripuram and others ys. State ofMysore and others, AIR 1962 Mysore 117 (7) On the other hand, Sh^.Pravin Kumar Tulsiyan with Shri Viyek Rathore, learned counsel for-the non-applicant argued that the word "within" used jn the provistf (b)to Section 138 of theActtakes into itsfold the day of receipt of infbrmation by ffie payee from the Bank regarding the retumofthe Cheque as unpaid. Itwas also contended that proviso (b) to Section 138 ofthe Act.as also proyiso (b) to Section 142ofthe Act uses the word "of' after the words "within thirty days" and not the word "from" to attractSection 12ofthe LimitationAetorSection 9 oftHeGeneral Clauses Act, whereintheword used is'from" and nottheword "of'. It was also urged while placing reliance onM/sSIL Import, USA vs.M/sEximAides Sllk Exporters, Bangalore, AIR 1 999 SC 1609 that with the advent of e-commerce and technology, the applicant was not precluded from sendirig the noticei[iwritingbyfax,courierQre-mailon 23-08-2003 even iffheinformationfromtheBankhadreatshedtheapplicantlateintheday. Therefore, the applicantcould not seek exclysion of the date of receiptof information by^ Uim fromsthie, BanK regarding return of the eheque as ^..•. • ' '.. ' :::' Yl : :• ;.-' unpaid whjle compufing'yhie statutbry limit of thirty days prbvided under proviso(b) to Sectioh 1:38 Qfthe Act. lfwas,thus;clearasdaythatnptice in writingwasgiven^on 22-0^-2003 i.e. the 31st day. On thesel premises, it was umed that no cause of acSipn could be said to tiave ariseri in lavour of .' :^" '•'.'. ". '••••: '• ;:'."1;:'.'.".' '.' •" •; ""; ' •.'"•''. . ' the applicant for filing lire complaint zjnder Section 142(a)l of^^ ^ -Reliance .was also placed on Ate Aft^fft^vesfmente (.(Gt, ys. At^ IJIjllUli.!! tt' S'l KV Puttukola Properties Ltd. andanother, 2001 Cri.L.J. 4167 (Supreme Coyrt) anQ Balkrishna Maheshwari vs.Meena @ Chaman Ja/n, 2007 \ (1)MPWN 64. (8) Having eonsidered the rival submissions, 1 have perused the record with utmost circumspection. At the outset, 1 must say that there was complete failure on the part ofthe Magistrate to considerthe objection '^!: • - .." . - " ''. ' • '. • regarding maintainability of the ^bmplaint in its true perspective because he failed to notice that the objeGtion was regarding non-complianceof proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act. As a result, the Magistrate considered only proviso (b) to Seetion 142 of the Act and held that the complaint was made within limitation. Suchan errorreflects failure on the part of the Magistrate to^undertake a minute^xamination of the objection and the proviso (b) ofSection 138 oftheAGtin itstrue perspectiye and tq peruse the recordwith circumspection. It also escaped the notice ofthe ASJ that the objection regarding non-CQmplianceofproviso (b) to Section 138 of the Aet had not been considered at all by the Magistrate. Bethat as it may, 1 shall riow proceed to examine the rival contentibns. (9) Before appreciating the contentipns raised by the learned coynsel, it would be necessary to reproduce Sections 138 and 142 of the Act, which are as under: "138^ iIMsHgji'tiCMLtlggflitiStiye for ^nsufficiiemiy, etc., :.i::''Sgffi8 ^&.^®;f...'::.3;:^'•'••^•'A^^ ..". of funds ini|tlie Sc^purit; - Where any elieique drawri by a ipersQn 6n an sicGbunt maintained by him with a bankerfor paymenf of any amount of moneytd another person -frorrii Out of that account for the discharge, in whole-cirinpart,^anydebf6rotherliability,^returned by the ban^unp&id, either because of the amount of money standirig to the credit bf that account B ^ insufficient to hpnourthe cheque orthat itexceeds^llils ? amourit arranged to be paid fr6m that aeGOunt ]byWn^ •:^;l^t:: •^:i^^3! ^^^itlid^ "iSSi B^SIBS1'! •I i •-•>'si i! B!(i&3g^St';:?^£i?'E»g®ft(i^:'ai-'!5iK.f^'<iAi :''7T--iB;':^w;a-:i"i.fc.sa?S; ilt"i.!l!:'M ll'::!: !!!1!i;| ^^^ ^ii-u! n'\^' fc' agreement made with thsit bank, such persoh shal] be deemed to have committed an crffence and shall; without preJLMice to any Qther provisidn ofthisAct,be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two ^ears, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount ofthe cheque, orwith both: Providea that nothing cbntained in this section shall applyunless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a periSd of six months from the date 6n y-'i \::' : ."". ^ :.••••.'." . • . .:,' . . ••••-. which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whicMeverisearlier; (b) thepayeeortheholderinduecOurseof the cheque, as the case may be, makes a'demandfpr the payment of the said annQunt of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the clrawer of the cheaue, within thirtv days t)f thereceiBtof informatiQnby him from the bankregardingthereturnofthechequeasunpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment pfthe said amountpf mOrieyto the payee or, as the case may be, to-the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen davs of the receipt 6f the said nptice. Explanation. - Ror the purposes of this section, "debt pr ottierliability" means a legally enforceable debt orotherliability;" (emphasis supplied by me) "142. Cogni2^nc^;of|:offen(;^ - Notwjthste :anytPiinig^i^ingel^i|fl®?E^e'Bf?C8mina|tPr0eedure, :i1:973::(;2:bf1.9^)-::1'':^..'.':,- ;.;'\'^ /•.'.;.; \ . (a) no court shall take cognizanee oft any pffenGe-pufflshable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in-'writiEig, made by thg paye? or, as thecase may be, thehiOldef'ih dye eourse ofthe Gheque; i ! (b) sych GQmplgfnt is madewithirt;6Hemc)ntla; ofthe'date on IwRich'lhe cause-erf-actjon arises vncieBt Glause (rtOfltheptdviso^tQ sectiori138; •s S'3eE 'lKt)*Bia!»i(Su»wiBi ;•! MS '!! IKIEfflt S! !- ! i Provided that the Cognizanee of a complaint may be taken by theCourt afterthe prescribed period, if the complahant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. . (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate -or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shalltry any offence punishable undersection 138." i;> (emphasis supplied by me) (10) Afore-quoted Section 138 of theAct, /ntera/ia, provides that where any cheque drawn by a person is returned by the bank unpaid, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence, however, it will apply, ifthe conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied. The following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawerfor an offence under Section 138ofthe Act: (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge ofa debt/liability-and the cheque was dishQnoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand fpr payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to thedrawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the paymentwithin fifteen days pf the receipt of the notice. > Section 142 ftirthsr provides;thggthe Cdyrt shall take cognizance bf any offence punisMable Under Sectibn 138 oh a written complaint made by the payeeor the holder in duecourse, ifsuch complaint is?filed jwithin pne month of the dateoh'which the cause of action arises. A morith is to be '''' ^, t. ^ :' ' • ~ ': ! ;:1 : '. .'i.1 ' reckoned according to the' Brjtish Galendar as defineij jn the General ••<^''!.'- '.• •:....: .::':"^'"-'- : ^":;. '•"••:^ •.- ' .;';r.''''' ••:•••"• i:'... . '"" Clauses Act, 1897. The question/whjcKi anSes^Gjrconsideratipn in this revision.wbuld be, whether fpr cal^Hlating the period ofWiirty d;aysg|wtiic; ; 1,r|n—F i'^f3ti;Kf;;:;^': 'SwQg SsWSf :tl aiTra>n^t»^i4^iiii:33^-i-,LL?.^TL^^^^,i.;4:^- TB U.IO.yffiSAlB Sl eiU!l JB|n31)JBd BSJSyM|)B^ RSL|S!|qBlS9 ll^w si 9|nj ayltBqt p|S4 SEM 11 uisiiayM [6£9 30S 1- (ZjtSI^] 'g'M }0 Qysis-hevlnQSBQniBH ^o sseo a^ ui Ijnoo siqtAq psjspisuoo sem uoy.isikioo jeiiiuis •9,, 'i: •y . '» ' .^. " „ ./SSOJEUOIpB joiasneo eq^ qsiqM uo s)ep sq} Buipnioxs Aq psucnioai sq 0}SB4 pousd sqt '(q)2^|. uo]}oag japyn'ipequosaid sj qoiqM qiuoujsuo 10 pqiisd si.il Bu!ie|no]B3 joj. .iSiitStfM 'sq plnom ubiissnb &L|I •j.ggp 'to'g'ssisneioi |BJSUS@ aqi ui psuijsp se jepue|Bo^qs!tug ;^L|i bi euipjooge psuc»|oajsq 01 sj LIIUOUJ v 's9S!JB uo!l°e jo asneo SL|I qoiqm uo StBp sqt^o i|luoiu Suo uiqiiM ps|y si ]:U!B|dtuo3 Ljons i! 'ssjnoo snp ui jspioq sqljo eaAed sqtAqepeuj luieidLuoo UGUUM e uo gei. uoipsg jspun siqeqsiynd eouayo Aue 10 soueziuBoo 8>|Bi iieqs ynoo sqi }eqi sspiAojd jeqpn^ gfri, uoipss •psusiies SJB(O) puB (q) '(e) sgsnep ui psuoitusiu suoiiipuoo SLI) ii 'A|dde ||!M(! 'JSASMOLI 'eousyo UB paniujLuoo SAeq oipsujaap sq ||eqs uosjsd qons 'piedun >|ueq sq} Aq peujnisj si uosjsd e Aq UMBJp snbsqo Aue sj9L|M tBL|) sspiAOJd Bi|e JStui pv 841 1° SSl. uc>!l°SS psionb-sjo^v 'S,, " jspun se 'uoipnpojdsj peau (ejdns) •pn saflunoas e/pu/ •SA sjaii)o pue •pn eipui (ffa^e$ ui yhoo xsdy 94110 )U8LU6pnf 94} ^p ^ pu& g 'g sydejBaed •}3V S4U° 8SI. uoitosg 0} (q) osiAOjd U! punoi ,,>|yeg 841 0104 uiiq Aq uoiieLujo^U! ^o (djsosj SL|I ^o sAep AiJiqt-uiqiiM,, spjOM sqi 01 UDIB SJB spjom \r> sssqi 'vnoo xady S41 ajo^sq uoiie^pisuoo jo^ sujeo loy stfl (q)zfri. uoip89 ui Buuesdde ,,py 841 P gel. uojiosg o( (o) osiAojd jspun sesue uoipe ^o ssnBO avf^ MO!L|M uo ayep 341 p qtuouj suo uiqiiM,, spjOM 941 '(ejdns) •pnsa.nunoas e/pu/ •SA a/a(/»opue 'p)7 e/pu/i/^aj/es u| (i.[.) K..I W i:uEI \^Ssi,: ^:- •peAisosj si N. ! • ! )|ueg sqt LUOJ^UOIIBLUJO^UI sqi ijoiqMUo StBp 8qi6u!pn]oxs Aq peuo^osj eq 0}SBqpou9dsL|l'pv 34110 8SI. uoiioss oi(q) osiAOjdjspun psquossjd si '9S. !tf.i K ;8s" -4- ffllw certain datewithinwhich an act is to be dQne, the day on that date is fo be excluded; the effecf of defining the period fFom sutch aday untilsuch a day withinwhich an act is tbbe done is to exclude the first day and to include thelast flay. In the context ofthat case, the Court heldthat in computing the period of three months from the dateofdetention.whichwas 5-2-1971, before the expiration of which the order of decision for Gonfirming the detention order and continuing the detention thereunde^had to be made, the date of the commencement ofdetention, namely, February 5 has to be excluded; so clone, the order of confirmation dated S'5-1971 was made hgfore the expiration of the periodofthree monthsfrom the date of detention. The Court held that/there is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should hot be applied. Forthe aforesaid principle, the Court referred to the principlg followed jn English courts. The relevant disGUssion is hereunder: (SCC p. 641, para 5) "5. These decisions show that courts have drawri a distinction between a term created withinwhich an act may be done anda time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established that Where a particular time is given from a certaih date within which ari act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (Qee Goldsmiths Company v.The West Metropolitan Railway Company [(1904) 1 KB 1, 5] KB at p. 5.) This rule was followed in Cartwright v. MacConnack[(W63Sl AIIER11,13]:MER at p. 13, where the expression "fifteen days from the date of commerifeement Ofthe policy" in a cover note issued by anjnsurance companywas^CQnstrued as exctuding the first date and the cover npte to eommence at midnight of tKat'day, an<S ateo 'in Marren v. Dawsan Bentley & Co. iM[(196^2QB13^,a case fdrGOmpensation for injuries reeeived in the cxiurse 6f Snlploymenti W^ fpr purposes;ctf|c6rnRu1:in3^he period^of liniifE^^ •<late':Qfji;the'';aeGiyerrt.'gBeiiTg^tl3e:-da(e'^of tBWGS^jseSSfj :,Ssji :3igiBii ^^^^:^?1 ^^-;^11^11 ^^^M^M '^^•^S^M^ 'Stiiil Ei^Waitri^i^iiA £BBi^'ri^£*Afc-^daUh-L^ffi^ .r.-.—.^.^..,.I^..o^^.l-<^'<K8^KiC ?.aflMpI»?e»«h^,;^,gg^^^| l.i agsiSR 3Bi9ffi: B; ;;'^: K: K ,/p9J31!l|3X9Sq;|OU ||BL|S - isipEiy^S] jpajs^t Adoo e jat yQitBajidde ue aipjsq japjo J6 asjoep 8L|( ajed&.id 0} }jno;) sqi Aqus>(Ei SLUJI AUB 'JSpjo ue Jo SSJOSR e'j.o ifttioo e Buiyieiqo jat siisinba au.11) eqj. uoitoss si4i jepun Buitndujooui - •HOffGUB/abg •papniOxssq ||Bi.|s pjBMg SL|I;}O Adoo B Buiuieiqo joj siismbsj suji} SL|I 'pJBMB y&spjSB ].ss 0} u6jtBO!|dde ue JO^ uo!ie(!LUi[ p po]j8dsL|t6u!(ndLu6ou| (t>) •pSpnpxs sq OS|B ||eL|S lysLuBpnf 9t)t jo Adoo e 6u!U]eiqo jcy stisinbai SLUII sqi 'jspjo jo sejoap e LUOJ^ iBsddBOi SAES| jp^ speiu si uoiteoiiddB ue ajsym J6 'PSMSIASJ Jo pasiAai eq cq ttiBnos jo iuoj^psie8ddBS!jepjoj08sjo3ipesj8L]AA fe) •pspnioxs sq ||Bqs psMsiAej jp PSSIASJ sq 0} }L|Bnos jo LUOJI peiesdde jepjo jo sousiuss 'S8J39P SL|} ^O AdOO B BuiUIBtqO joi stisinbsj SLUB 8L|i pue paoynouojd sem p psuieidLuoo tysLuBpnf 9141 L|OIL|M uo Aep QI\\ 'tueLuBpnf e p MSIASJ JQ^ jo UOISIASJ jo^ jo leeddB 01 SAeei joj uoiieoiidde ue jo |eedde ue joj uoiteijLuii p pouad 9416u!tndiuoo u| (g) •pspnpxa aq iieqs 'psuo>|3aj eq oi si pouad qons LJOILIM Luoy Aep sqi 'uojieoiidde jo |esdde 'iins AuB jo^ UoftBiiujii ^o pousd sqi'Buflndujoo u| (l.) - "sBuipsaoojd |eBe| ui aiun ^b uoisnioxg •gi.,, :jepUn SB SpBSJ llt^ UOflBtlUJI-l 8L|t^O 2). UOIWSS (^l.) n ,,-/88k'^enueF p Aep L|iuss)jna( eqi jeye JQ uoapElu su6i}E|n68a ||B olpue 'gggi. 'Ajenuer ^o Aep pJii.It sqi.ieyBSpeiuspv |BJius3 ||B oi OS|B ssildde uoitoas-siqi (z) •,,jo,, pjOM SL|} ssn 0} 'SLUit^o poued jeqio Aue jo sAep j.o ssuss e ui tse| 841 Bu!()p|ou! j.o ssodjnd aqi jo^ 'pue '..uuojj,, PJOM SLII ssn 61 'si.uii ^o poued jsqto AuBijosABp^pseueseuitsjyaqtButpnpxaiossodjnd II a[ii: llliri B ^fi i:ia iilH I; H.I!WS :GS!1: :^m£.;M.:K 12 (15) It is to be noticed that whereas proviso (a), (b) and (c) t6 Section 138ofthe Act as also Section 142 oftheAct uses the word "of' afterthe \ • 1 ! :: • words providing the statutory period during which payee or holder of the Cheque is required to act, Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and Section 12 of the Limitation Actuse the word "from" instead of "of. It is, therefore, necessary to Gonsider what is the purport ofthe word "of. :!! •!!Fi IBS; tiii lllill lljiif ^ll In Vasantlal Ranchhodda^f'Patelandothers'vs. Union of India "71! '"" ~"~~ —•••- and others, AIR 1967 Bombay 138, it was held thatthe word "of' in the expressibn "withinsix months pf the seizure of the goods" usedlin sub- section (2) of Section 110 ofthe Customs Actshould be read as "from". Placing relianceon £xparteFa//on,(1793)5TermRep 283, in which the word used was "of' and not"from", it was observed that "of, "from" and "after" really meant the same thing and that no distinction could be suggested from the natureofthe two prpvisions. In Strpud's Judicial Dictionary,Vol. 3,1953 Edition in Note (5) under theword "of', it has been observed that "of' is sometimes the equivalent of "after" e.g. in the expression "within 21 daysof the execution". The principle underlying Section 9 of the General Clauses Act cannot, therefore, be held to be inapplicable, merely beeause the word used in sub-section (2) of Section 110is"of'andnot"from". (17) In reV.S.Atetftaando(fters,AIR1970AP 234, while considenng the provision contained; in Section 108 ofthe FactoriesAct, 1948 using th& words "within tHree mQfTths ofthedate", itwas held that the word "of is sometimes equivaleht fo the word "after"; This meaning is also to be foiind in the AdvaneedLawl-exieDnbyPRamanafhaAiyar, 3rdj,Editipn 2005 atpage 3300 asalsoin<§tr6ud'sJudicialDictionary. -: SiiaafflBiiiKs&yiB^^5Si^^5®3%^^""l'^'i- ^>.^ \9 :^i^:. "SSISBBIB ttiUHSiBI Ksussr 'WSSSSW! '^i^^M^ WBI^• ^jir IBI BB'IBil,l!:MEiil':l lill)i: :^li'S^:.^Et:->' '.;:1 i.3fN ^ 13 (18) In Halsbury's Laws ofEng/ancf^ 37th Edn.,Vo]. 3, p. 92, it is stated asfollows: \ . "Daysincluded orexcluded -When a period of time running from a given day or even to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed as contract, and the question arises.whether the computation is-to be made inclusiveiy or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposQ| for which the computation has to ^ \ _. • • be made. Whdrd there is room for doubt, the enaetmentor instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate arid notto defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as 'from sych a day' or 'until such a day' are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion of the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a periodin such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day." Bii.;ai !KIH (19) The Apex Court, in Tarun Prasad Chatterjee vs, Dinanath Sharma (supra), while interpreting the words "within forty-five days from but not earlierthan the dateofan election of the returned candidate" used in Sectibn 81(1) of the Representatipn of the People Act, 1951 relating to presentation of petitions, considered the scope ofSection 9 ofthe General Clauses Act and pbserved as under; "12. Section 9 ^ays that in any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the ^ GeneralClauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient forthe purpose ofexcluding thefirst-in a series ofdays orany other period oftime.tousetheword "from", and, forthe "~: , K:. : ' • : •.•'.' purpose of inc|udipg'the last in aseries of days or any ; periodoftimerfouselhewprd'1o''.Theprit'iciRleistha't.^ when a period is delimited by statutedr rule, whitsh hgg; , both af begirining and an 6nd;ana ffie worct 'fi'on'l^is,. :^'Snl;ti; 1 iFi£-4SE!mit«rtffifet ' SMtas^£ftS£~^ Si,6SSKTl^: afi ^ ;^f|:i SSS9 "i^illiti ':ril^%tli "^^©l^ K-Wi ff.Ef^;i BES ll&lii BiW ^ I^S;'!!^^? evsjt t.:lit^^! iffi:»'; » ias Bl' Bi' WE IIli :a»: 1 ~/il IS'- flljiii 14 used indicating the beginning, the opening day is tp be excluded and if the lasf day is to be included fhe word "to" is to be iteed. In order to exclude the first day offhe period, the cruciat thing to be nbted is whefher ttie period pf limitation is delimited by a series ofdaysor by ^ any fixed peripd. This is intended to obviate the difRisylties or~;incc!nyenience thaf may be caused to some parties. For instance; if a policy of insurance has to be good fbr One day frorri 1a January, it might be ;.'> valid only for a f|W hours after its execution and the party or fhe beneflciary in the insurance policy would not get reasQnable time to lay claim, unless 1 January is exclj-ided from the perjod of computation." Itwas held that the date of election of the returned candidate was to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. (20) The arguments advanced by learned counsel for the non- applicant/drawer of the Gheque that the word "within" signifies that the date on which information was received from the Bank that the Cheque has been returned unpaid is included for computatjon of limitation Gan also not be countenanced. In the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1997 Editioh, the word "within" in relation to a period of time does not usually mean "during" or throughout the whole of; it is more frequently used to delimit a period 'inside which' certain events may happen. In relation to time, the word "within" mearis "in fhe limits of, "before the endof and "afternotmorethan".ltisfurthgrstatedthattheword"within"usedinthe x;"'""-'""."" ---.-"-•": "-- contextof a period pftime, iscapable of meaning "before or at the expiry crf" the peridd. In O.MTBfppaswarny vs. Mysore Ffevenue Appellate Trabuna/ Sangatone, AIR 1972 Mys 50, 53, <Wss Aw J. Cama vs. ;~<t. ; ; '. ' Banevarilal Agaryval, AIR;19^ Nagpur 81, 84 and Manorlike Limited vs. ^<».-'?-: ':.1. • •' : '.•: -; : •; '.."..,-^••i;.. •-'•.:,. Le Vifas Trai/e/Agency ancf Ooftsu/fancy Sewfees Lfmrfecf, (1986) t All EFt? 573, 575 (CA) as also^ in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary also the same ^^' :i'^l®^itl^I^I^ lli^^iili^j^f ifltil^l :y !llil|!|l;1! * WWfSV 15 meaning has been attributed to the word "within". Therefore, the arguments advanced by learned couhsel for the non-applicanVdrawer of v . : : : . the Cheque is liable to rejection. '^. i B'N H:i!' .».- (21) Learned counsel for the non-applicant has placed reliance on M/s ••».•' Munoth Ihvestments Ltd. vs. M/s Puttukola Properties Ltd. and another (supra) for the proposition that the Apex Court has held in that i? • case in paragraph5thatfifteendgSrsaretobe counted from the receiptof infonnation regarding the return ofthe chequeas