IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.264 of 2002 1. Topline Shoes Ltd. a company incorporated under the Companies Act having its registered office at Plot no.229 Jambusar Road, Village Dabasa, Baroda, Gujarat State 2. H.M.G.Murthy, Managing Director of Topline Shoes Ltd. having office at 66 Kakad Industrial Estate, Lady Jamshedji Road, Mahim, Mumbai-16 ... Applicants v/s 1. Zeus Air Services Pvt. Ltd. 119, Adarsh Ind. Estate, Sahar Road Chakala, Andheri (E) Mumbai 400 099 2. State of Maharashtra ... Respondents Mr.A.S.Khandeparkar for Applicants Mr.A.H.Ponda for Respondent no.1 Mr.J.P.Yagnik for Respondent no.2 CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: V.C.DAGA,J. DATED DATED DATED:3rd July, 2008 P.C.:- 1. This Revision is directed against the order dated 26-4-2002 passed in Appeal No.181 of 2000 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bombay confirming the conviction recorded in Criminal Case NO.614/S/1997 by an order dated 11-8-2000 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 44th Court, Andheri, Mumbai convicting the applicants under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1888 (NI Act). 2. The only contention canvassed by the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant is that the scheme provided in Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) shows that Section 357(1) and Section 357(3) are mutually exclusive. Compensation under Section 357(3) can be awarded only when no fine is imposed under Section 371(1)of the Cr.P.C. 3. In the impugned order the learned Magistrate has imposed fine under Section 357(1) and has also ordered payment of compensation under Section 357(3), which according to the learned Counsel for the applicant is not permissible. As such, the impugned order is bad and illegal. The submission advanced is misplaced. 4. The very same contention canvassed herein was canvassed before the Apex Court in the case of K.Bhaskaran v Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in AIR K.Bhaskaran v Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in AIR K.Bhaskaran v Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in AIR 1999 page 3772, 1999 page 3772, 1999 page 3772, which is clear from paras 31 and 32 of the said judgment, which are reproduced herein for immediate reference. "31. However, the Magistrate in such case can alleviate the grievance of the complainant by making resort to Section 357(3) of the Code. It is well to remember that this Court has emphasized the need for making liberal use of that provision. (Hari Kishan v. Sukbhir Singh, AIR 1988 SC 2127:1989 Cri L.J. 116). No limit is mentioned in the sub-section and therefore, a magistrate can award any sum as compensation. Of course while fixing the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to consider what would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable to complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before a Court of magistrate of first class in respect of a cheque which covers an amount exceeding Rs.5,000/- the Court has power t award compensation to be paid to the complainant. 32.The question of sentence and award of compensation must be considered by the trial court. We deem it feasible that the magistrate shall hear the prosecution and the accused on those aspects. Of course, if the complainant and accused settle their disputes regarding this cheque, in the meanwhile, that fact can certainly be taken into consideration in determining the extent or quantum of sentence". Reading the aforesaid paras sufficiently demonstrate that the submission made cannot be accepted. 5. At this juncture it is relevant to note that after amendment to the provisions of NI Act, now the magistrate is empowered to impose fine exceeding Rs.5,000/-. In view of this amendment submission made holds no water. 6. In the revision petition number of grounds are raised but none of them were canvassed except one referred hereinabove. However to put the record straight even if the various contentions raised are examined, each of them were raised before the Court below and each of them are properly dealt with by the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate court. 7. The signature appearing on the cheques in question has not been disputed by the accused during the course of trial. In the case of K.Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (supra) the Apex Court held that once the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the N.I.Act can legally be inferred to say that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears, Section 139 of the Act enjoins on the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden is on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The accused has failed to rebut this presumption as held by both the Courts below. It is thus not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach to different conclusion. The concurrent finding of facts of both the Courts below cannot be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court unless they are found to be perverse or based on no evidence. No such case is made out by the learned Counsel for the applicant to entertain this revision application. 8. This Court not being a Court of appeal, cannot substitute its view in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Revisional jurisdiction is not only limited in scope but it is discretionary. The Court interferes in the revisional jurisdiction only in exceptional case of flagrant miscarriage of justice as held by Apex court in the case of State of Rajasthan State of Rajasthan State of Rajasthan v. Gurucharandas Chaddha, AIR 1979 SC 1895. . Gurucharandas Chaddha, AIR 1979 SC 1895. . Gurucharandas Chaddha, AIR 1979 SC 1895. If two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record, and one reasonable and possible view is taken, then the higher Court is not expected to disturb the findings of the trial Court as held in the case of Varghese Thomas v. State of Kerala, 1977 SC 701. Varghese Thomas v. State of Kerala, 1977 SC 701. Varghese Thomas v. State of Kerala, 1977 SC 701. 9. In the result, revision application is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. 10. At this stage, the learned Council for the applicant has filed a pursis seeking time to surrender before the trial Court on 9-7-2008. Accordingly, time is granted. JUDGE.