IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.B.KOSHY & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE K.HEMA WEDNESDAY, THE 9TH APRIL 2008 / 20TH CHAITHRA 1930 WA.No. 1206 of 2004() --------------------- AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT IN OP.4585/2000 Dated 29/10/2003 .................... APPELLANT: RESPONDENTS: ----------------------- PALAKKAD DISTRICT CO.OPERATIVE BANK LTD. H.P.O. ROAD, PALAKKAD, REP. BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER. BY ADV. SRI.M.P.ASHOK KUMAR RESPONDENTS: PETITIONER/RESPONDENTS: ------------------------------------ 1. P. JAYABALA, SUSHREE, P.O. MANISSERY, OTTAPPALAM, PALAKKAD. 2. STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION, SECRETARIAT, TRIVANDRUM. 3. THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, TRIVANDRUM. BY GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.NOBLE MATHEW FOR R2 & R3 SRI.A.N.RAJAN BABU SRI.K.SUNITHA VINOD FOR R1 THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 09/04/2008, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: J.B.Koshy & K. Hema, JJ. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - W.A. No. 1206 of 2004 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 9th day of April, 2008 JUDGMENT Koshy, J. First respondent/petitioner was employed by the appellant bank. She was suspended pending enquiry by Ext.P2 dated 19-5-1997. Ext.P4 is an order dated 20-10-1998 passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies extending the suspension for a period of six months from 19-5-1998. Ext.P5 is the order passed by the Government upholding the same. Before Ext.P5 order was passed, the 1st respondent has approached this Court by filing O.P. No.13720/98 and the matter was taken in appeal as W.A. No.2217/98. Even though Ext.P4 was passed before disposal of the Writ Appeal, in the Writ Appeal correctness of Exts.P4 and P5 was not considered. In the Writ Appeal it was noticed that even the extended period of six months' suspension would be over on 19-11-1998. The Division Bench considered the issue by Ext.R3(d) judgment directed the bank to reinstate the 1st respondent on 20-11-1998 and complete the disciplinary proceedings within WA 1206/04 -2- three months from the date of the above judgment. It is submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were over and punishment was imposed on her. Challenging the disciplinary action taken against her, an appeal is filed before the Tribunal. In the writ petition what was challenged was the correctness of Exts.P4 and P5. She was suspended from service beyond the period allowed as per the bye-laws and the rules. 2. The learned Judge by the impugned judgment quashed Exts.P4 and P5 and held that she would be entitled to all consequential benefits passed in Ext.P3. The only ground pressed before us is that correctness of Exts.P4 and P5 cannot be questioned after the Division Bench judgment. Ext.P4 was passed during the pendency of the Writ Appeal. None of the earlier orders Exts.P4 and P5 were challenged. The learned Single Judge held as follows:- “...Admittedly, Ext.P4 was passed during the pendency of the appeal. Therefore, there was no occasion for the learned single Jude or for the Division Bench to consider the validity of Ext.P4. It was never raised in those proceedings. From the relevant portion of the judgment quoted above, it can be seen that the validity of Ext.P4 was not considered by this Court. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in the petitioner challenging Ext.P4 before the Government and again challenging Exts.P4 and P5 before this Court. Accordingly, the contention cannot be accepted.” WA 1206/04 -3- The learned Single Judge also held that since Ext.P2 order was set aside by Ext.P3, period of suspension in Ext.P2 cannot be extended. The learned Judge in the impugned judgment held as follows:- “7. Thus, Ext.P2 has been set aside by Ext.P3. Therefore, Ext.P4 order extending Ext.P2 for a further period of six months from 19-5-1998 is plainly untenable. If the original suspension order is in existence, it can be extended. When it is no longer in force, the extension order cannot have any legal efficacy. The Registrar is not competent to suspend the petitioner. So, Ext.P4 is ab initio void. The affirmation of the same by Ext.P5 by the Government will not breathe life into Ext.P4, which is still-born. As rightly pointed out by the petitioner, the Government failed to consider all these aspects.” 3. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. We fully agree with the findings and observations of the learned Single Judge. Hence, the appeal is dismissed with costs. J.B. Koshy, Judge K. Hema, Judge mn.