1 S.A.No.653/10 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD. SECOND APPEAL NO.653 OF 2010. Managing Director, Maharashtra State Co-op Marketing Federation Ltd., Kanmour House, Narsi Natha Street, PB No.5080, Mumbai. ... Appellant. Versus 1. Tanaji S/o Anantrao Vidhate Age 72 years, Occ.Retd.D.M.O. R/o Umbre Kotha, Osmanabad. 2. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, State of Maharashtra Central Administrative Building, Pune. ... Respondents. ... Mr.S.S.Thombre, advocate for the appellant. Mr.Pradeep Shahane, advocate for the Respondent NO.1. Mrs.R.K.Ladda, Asstt. Govt. Pleader for the Respondent No.2. ... CORAM : S.V.GANGAPURWALA,J. Date : 02.12.2010. 2 S.A.No.653/10 PER COURT 1. The present Respondent No.1 had filed a suit for payment of gratuity and other relief. The same came to be decreed. The present appellant being aggrieved by the same preferred appeal. There was a delay of 120 days in filing the appeal. As such the appellant along with said appeal filed application for condonation of delay. The District Court rejected the said application. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant has approached in the present Second Appeal. 2. Mr.Thombre, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court below has taken a very hyper technical approach while rejecting the application. The delay caused was not intentional one but due to the procedural intricacies involved. The appellant was not going to gain anything by causing delay. 3. Per contra, Mr.Shahane, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 contended that the reasons 3 S.A.No.653/10 stated by the appellant does not come within the ambit and purview of sufficient cause. The expression sufficient cause can not be so liberally construed, so as to erase the very concept of sufficient cause. According to the learned counsel, the Court below has properly considered and has rightly rejected the application. 4. In the facts and circumstances of the case the following substantial question of law arises : " Whether the reasons stated by the appellant for condonation of delay would come within the scope of exression "sufficient cause?" 5. Admit. 6. With the consent of parties, the appeal is heard finally. 7. The expression "sufficient cause" has 4 S.A.No.653/10 to be liberally construed. The approach of the Court should be to sub-serve the cause of substantial justice. When the decree is against the appellant, the appellant was not going to gain by causing delay. The explanation is given that the delay is caused because of the procedural hassles. The Court below has gone on the investigation about whether the authority letter is supported by any provision of law or not. When a Managing Director has issued an authority letter, the same is by a Principal Officer. Just because, there is no provision of law showing that Managing Director can sign the authority letter, that can not be the ground to reject the application. The Court has to view the matter in a broader horizon. When the technical consideration and the cause of substantial justice are pitted against each other, the cause for substantial justice should prevail. 8. In light of the above, I am inclined to allow the appeal and relegate the parties to the lower appellate Court by setting aside the 5 S.A.No.653/10 impugned order. At the same time, the present Respondent No.1 had to face hardship because of the delay caused. He will have to be compensated with costs. 9. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed, subject to appellant paying cost of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) to the present Respondent No.1/original plaintiff. The impugned judgment and order is quashed and set aside and the application for condonation of delay bearing Misc.Civil Application No.97/2009 is allowed. The parties shall appear before the lower appellate Court on 22.12.2010. The Civil Application is disposed of. (S.V.GANGAPURWALA,J.) asp/office/sa65310 6 S.A.No.653/10