1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FIRST APPEAL NO. 884 OF 2009 Reliance General Insurance Company Limited. ...Appellant vs 1. Mr. Bablu @ Badruddin Mohd. Akil Salmani & anr. ...Respondents Mr. Nikhil Mehta i/b KMC Legal Venture for the appellant. Mr. P.D. Patil for the respondent No.2. CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J. DATED : 16 TH APRIL, 2010 P.C. : 1. This Appeal is being disposed of at the stage of admission in view of the fact that the dispute lies in a narrow compass. The respondent No.1 filed an application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for compensation in the proceedings under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act by way of interim relief. The contention of the respondent No.1 was 2 that he was involved in a vehicular accident which occurred on 19th February, 2008 at about 20:30 hours. He alleged that he was injured and became disabled as a result of the accident. The accident allegedly occurred due to involvement of the autorickshaw vehicle No. MH-03-R-6616 which is owned by the respondent No.2. 2. The appellant-insurance company asserted before the Tribunal that the autorickshaw vehicle was not insured by the owner and no insurance policy was issued and, therefore, liability for payment of compensation cannot be fastened on it. It was contended that only a letter issued by one M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency was relied upon by the respondent No.1 (claimant), but M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency was not the authorized agent nor any premium was accepted for and on behalf of the appellant and there was no authority to issue any such letter or the insurance cover note. It was contended that in absence of any insurance policy in favour of the autorickshaw owner, the appellant could not be held jointly liable to 3 indemnify the respondent No.1 (claimant). 3. The learned Member of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded interim compensation under section 140 of the M.V. Act holding the appellant jointly liable to pay the compensation for the reason that a receipt about payment of the premium was issued by M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on consideration of the relevant material, it is explicit that a receipt was issued by M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency regarding payment of insurance premium by the owner of the autorickshaw vehicle. It appears from the copy of the receipt, which was made available for perusal during hearing, that the period of insurance commenced from 5th February, 2008. However, there appears no iota of evidence to show that M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency was duly appointed as authorized agent of the appellant to accept the premium from the vehicle owner. There also appears no evidence to show that M/s. 4 Krishna Insurance Agency was authorized to issue insurance cover note nor any insurance cover note was allegedly issued by M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency. It is of common knowledge that when an agent is duly appointed by the insurance company then the authorization includes authority to issue temporary cover note until it is duly issued by the insurance company. There is absolutely no reason coming forth as to why on 5th February, 2008, no cover note was issued in favour of the authorickshaw owner. As pointed out earlier, the accident occurred on 19th February, 2008. So, in the meanwhile, the said agent M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency could have been pursuaded by the owner of the autorickshaw vehicle to issue the insurance policy. In the ordinary course of transaction, between 5th and 19th February, 2008, a duly authorized agent could have remitted the amount to the insurance company for issuance of cover note or insurance policy. In view of such peculiar fact situation, it is difficult to prima facie infer that the offending vehicle was insured with the appellant. The impugned order shows that the learned Member of the M.A.C.T. did not duly consider the 5 attending circumstances and particularly absence of any cover note or insurance policy or absence of evidence regarding authority given to M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency to act as agent of the appellant. 5. Though the M.A.C.T. is required to render prima facie finding, yet it does not mean that the available material cannot be scrutinized at all. The learned Member should have considered the relevant aspects and before holding the insurance company liable, he should have ascribed due reasons in support of such order. 6. I find it difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Member of the M.A.C.T. In this view of the matter, the following order will meet the ends of justice. O R D E R : (i) Appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. 6 (ii) The application under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act stands dismissed. However, the observations made in this order shall not be regarded as binding and conclusive. (iii) The respondent No.1 (claimant) will be at liberty to adduce necessary additional evidence in order to show that M/s. Krishna Insurance Agency was having due authority/agency to act on behalf of the appellant and, therefore, the insurance contract could be relied upon and such issue may be determined on its own merits at the end of the trial. (iv) No costs. (v) The Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. (V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.)