( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 23 OF 1993 Ramniwas Bansilal Lakhotiya, R/o Old Jalna, Kapad Bazar, Jalna, Dist. Jalna. PETITIONER VERSUS 1. The State of Maharashtra 2. Officer on Special Duty and Secretary (Appeals and Revisions), Department of Revenue and Forest, Mantralaya, Mumbai. 3. Ramkumar s/o Kundanlal Gupta, R/o Swami Dayanand Road, Jalna, District Jalna. RESPONDENTS …. Mr. V.J. Dixit, Senior Counsel, for the petitioner. Mr. S.V. Kurundkar, Additional Government Pleader for the respondents No. 1 and 2. Mr. M.K. Deshpande, advocate for the respondent No. 3. ….. [CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] [DATE : 18th June, 2010] ORAL JUDGEMENT : 1. By this petition, the petitioner impugns order dated 19th October, 1992 rendered by the Officer on Special Duty and Secretary (Appeals and Revisions) Revenue and Forest ( 2 ) Department, Government of Maharashtra, whereby and whereunder the review application filed by the respondent No. 3 was allowed and the entry was directed to be continued in name of the respondent No. 3, in the concerned city survey record. 2. The petitioner is auction purchaser who purchased house property in question in a public auction held in 1967. His case is that the house property was owned by one Ali Nawaz Khan who had migrated to Pakistan and, therefore, it was determined as evacuee property after the partition. The property was put on auction on 18th February, 1967. The petitioner claims to have purchased it as a highest bidder in the auction. A sale certificate was issued to him on 5th April, 1967. His name was entered in the C.T.S. record. The respondent No. 3 purchased the house property on 28th July, 1959, allegedly from one Jaheda Begum w/o Kamruddin, who was daughter of said Ali Nawaz Khan. The respondent No. 3 set up rival claim on basis of such a private purchase. The authorities allowed the claim of the petitioner and his name was entered in the city survey record. The second appeal preferred by the petitioner was allowed by the Deputy Director of Land Records and his name was directed to be recorded by deleting name of the respondent No. 3 as per order dated 24th ( 3 ) March, 1987. The respondent No. 3 preferred revision application No. OTS-3987/299/5411/L.1/CR-611/88 (A&R). The Officer on Special Duty dismissed the revision application filed by the respondent No.3. With the result, the order of the Deputy Director of Land Records was maintained and the petitioner became eligible to get his name mutated in the city survey record. The respondent No. 3 thereafter preferred review application which came to be allowed and hence, this petition is filed. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and learned Additional Government Pleader. 4. The short point involved in this matter is : “Whether the review application of the respondent No. 3 could be allowed without considering the limitation provided for and without condoning the delay of the period of more than 90 days as contemplated under section 258 (1) (I), Proviso (iv) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 “” 5. Perusal of the impugned order shows that the ( 4 ) respondent No. 3 did not file any application for condonation of delay. Nor the learned Officer on Special Duty ascribed any reason as to why the review application was being entertained though it was filed much after 90 days' period. The impugned further shows that there was delay of about six (6) months in filing of the review petition and after deduction of 90 days' period, the respondent No. 3 was required to explain the delay of atleast remaining 90 days. The copy of the review application does not indicate as to why such delay is explained. The review application purports to show that it was dealt as if the same grounds were available and could be re-agitated. Not a single explanation is given so as to consider the condonation of delay. The Proviso (iv) appended below Section 258 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short, “the M.L.R. Code”) would make it amply clear that the review application could not be entertained unless it was made within 90 days from passing of the order which was sought to be reviewed. This legal mandate could not be surmounted without filing the required application for condonation of delay and without ascribing proper explanation which could satisfy parameters of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. That was not done. Under these circumstances, apart from merits, the impugned order is quite arbitrary on ( 5 ) such ground alone. Secondly, the impugned order shows that the reviewing authority considered the entire material again and came to a different conclusion by invoking the review powers though there was no error apparent on the face of record. The review application was considered by another Officer on Special Duty and was allowed for the reason that there existed “sufficient reason for condoning delay due to the existence of sufficient reason” as contemplated in sub-section (2) of section 258 of the M.L.R. Code will mean existence of sufficient reason to reach conclusion that the earlier order was rendered without considering the relevant record or that there was failure of justice due to consideration of mere irrelevant record. The expression “sufficient reason” does imply duty to ascribe substantial reasons for the purpose of exercising the review powers. The impugned order does not show that substantial reasons are recorded to take another view. Consequently, the impugned order is quite irrational and liable to be interfered with. 6. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. However, it is made clear that the entry in the C.T.S. Record, if is effected in name of the petitioner, the same shall be subject to the final outcome of ( 6 ) the second appeal No. 240/2005 which arose out of the civil dispute between the parties. The petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. [V.R. KINGAONKAR] JUDGE NPJ/wp23-93