* 1 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION APPEAL NO. 24 OF 2009 A L O N G W I T H NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 2786 OF 2009 IN APPEAL NO. 24 OF 2009 Smt. Jyoti P. Gandhi .....Appellant/Orig.Plff V/S. 1. Rohit M.Sanghvi 2. Mrs.Ila Rohit Sanghvi 3. Mr.Devang Rohit Sanghvi 4. Miss. Falguni Rohit Sanghvi 5. Mrs.Savitri Maneklal Sanghvi .......Respondents ------------ Ms.Jyoti P. Gandhi, appellant in person. Mr.Divekar i/by.M/s.Divekar & Co.adv.for respondent no.1. Respondent no.3 present in person. CORAM : J.N.PATEL, & : SMT.R.P.SONDURBALDOTA, JJ. JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 29TH SEPTEMBER 2009. JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: TH OCTOBER, 2009. * 2 * JUDGMENT (Per Coram: Smt.R.P.SondurBaldota, J): 1. Heard appellant in person and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This Appeal arises out of the order dated 16th September, 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge on the Chamber Summons taken out by respondents no.1, 2 and 4. 3. The appellant herein has filed a suit seeking several compensation/damages under different heads from the respondents. She has valued the suit at Rs.42,41,085/- but has claimed exemption from payment of court fees in view of Maharashtra Government Notification No.S.T.P.1904 C.R. 859/M-1 dated 1st October, 1994. Respondents no.1, 2 and 4 took out the Chamber Summons, for a direction to the appellant to pay requisite court fee on the value of the suit at Rs.42,41,085/- within a specific period. By prayer clause (b) they sought rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure, in case of default on the part of the appellant in paying the court fee within the time stipulated. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge accepted the claim of the appellant of entitlement of exemption for prayer clauses (a) , (b) , (d) , (g) , (i) and (j) and held that there was “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” no need for her to pay court fee on the amount claimed under the reliefs. The appellant, however, was directed to pay court fee in respect of the reliefs at prayer clauses (c) , (e) and (f) . Therefore, the present appeal. “ ” “ ” “ ” * 3 * 4. The relevant part of the Government Notification relied upon by the appellant reads as follows : Whereas the Government of Maharashtra has recently announced a “ policy with a view to promote the welfare of the women. And whereas the said welfare policy for women inter alia provides for exemption of Court fees for women litigants in cases relating to maintenance, property dispute, violence and divorce. And whereas section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom.XXXVI of 1959) empowers the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazettes to reduce or to remit any of the fees mentioned in the First and second Schedule to that Act. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 45 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bombay XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra hereby remits the fees payable by women litigants on any of the plaints, applications, petitions, memorandum of Appeal or any of the documents specified in the first and Second Schedule to the said Act to be filled in any Civil, Family or Criminal Court, in respect of cases relating to (a) Maintenance (b) property Dispute (c) Violence and (d) Divorce.” 5. It is seen from the Notification that exemption to a women from payment of court fees is available thereunder only in respect of four categories of cases i.e. proceedings relating to maintenance, property dispute, violence and divorce. Undisputedly, in the instant case, we are not concerned with two of the categories i.e. maintenance and divorce . The learned Single Judge in the “ ” “ ” impugned judgment has opined that the reliefs at prayer clauses (a) and (b) are covered by the category of property and granted exemption from payment “ ” of court fee. As regards prayer clauses (d) and (g) are concerned, the learned Single Judge has taken liberal view of the matter and exempted the appellant * 4 * from payment of court fee. Prayer clauses (i) and (j) according to the impugned order, do not fall within the parameters of Notification but they are consequential prayers and hence attract exemption. 6. Out of remaining three prayers, prayer clause (c) is for recovery of mesne profits from respondents no.1, 2 and 4 at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month for occupying the suit flat during the period 13th May 1996 to 29th May 1997. The learned Single Judge has noted that the suit flat is not owned by the appellant. The ownership of the same is with the husband of the appellant who has not been impleaded to the suit. He is the member of the society in whose building, the suit flat is situated. There is an attempt made by the appellant to contend that the suit flat is owned by an HUF consisting of herself, her husband and their two children. But it is not disputed that the agreement in respect of the suit flat is with the husband in his own name. Having regard to this fact, the learned Single Judge has observed that the claim of the appellant to recover mesne profits is required to be decided on the touchstone of the law as regards the ownership of the suit flat. He has held that prayer clause (c) therefore, is not covered by the term property and directed that “ ” the appellant will have to pay court-fee on prayer clause (c). 7. By prayer clause (e), the appellant seeks to recover legal expenses incurred by her in fighting out the dispute with respondents no.1, 2 and 4 and by prayer clause (f) compensation for defamation. As per the impugned order, * 5 * both the prayers would not fall within the parameters of the term property “ ” or violence and therefore there can be no claim of exemption from payment “ ” of court fee on the prayer clauses. 8. We have carefully gone through the impugned judgment. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that prayer clause (c), (e) and (f) sought by the appellant in her plaint do not attract the exemption under the Government Notification relied upon by the appellant. In our opinion, the learned Judge has infact taken a very liberal view of the matter in granting exemption in respect of majority of the prayers, and refused exemption only in respect of prayers which are completely beyond the Notification. Hence, we find no error or illegality in the impugned order. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant shall pay court-fees as per the impugned order within a period of 6 weeks from today. 9. In view of dismissal of the appeal, Notice of Motion No.2786 of 2009 stands disposed off as having become infructous. [SMT.R.P.SONDURBALDOTA, J] [ J.N.PATEL, J]