THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION NO.4818 OF 2010 ORDER: Heard Sri M.S.Srinivasa Iyengar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt.Kalpana Ekbote, learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent and at their request the Writ Petition is disposed of at the stage of admission. The petitioner is carrying on the business of transportation/logistics of courier and bulk parcels through out the State of Andhra Pradesh. It has several branches and franchises in Hyderabad to collect the parcels, consignments, covers and documents from customers and deliver the same to the destinations indicated by the customers. The name sign boards/glow signs are displayed outside the petitioner’s office and its franchises and other collection centers. The first respondent appointed the second respondent for collection of advertisement fee on its behalf. In this Writ Petition, the validity of the demand notice No.1048 dated 30.01.2010, for Rs.2,47,702.66 ps, issued by the second respondent on behalf of the first respondent is under challenge. While M.S.Srinivasa Iyengar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has put forth several contentions, including that the name sign board/glow sign put up outside the petitioner’s office and that of its franchises and other collection centers, do not amount to an advertisement enabling the first respondent to charge a fee, I consider it wholly unnecessary to examine any of these contentions as the impugned demand notice No.1048 dated 30.01.2010 is liable to be set aside on the short ground that the second respondent could not have issued the said notice calling upon the petitioner to pay the advertisement fee demanded through cheques/demand drafts drawn in their favour. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by judgment dated 31.12.2009 in W.P.No.23354 of 2009 and batch, held that the power to demand a fee or tax is specifically vested with the Commissioner or any person authorized by him; such persons are naturally to be the officials of the Corporation itself; notices issued by an agency on behalf of the Corporation is contrary to law; Section 169 requires any amount received by the Corporation towards tax and fee to be credited to the consolidated fund of the Corporation; the permission accorded by the Corporation to collect the fee was totally opposed to the scheme of the Act; and the notice issued to the petitioners, requiring them to pay the fee through cheques/demand drafts in favour of the second respondent, was in clear violation of the specific provisions of the Act. The impugned notice was quashed as it did not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Act. Following the said judgment, the impugned demand notice is quashed as it does not accord with Sections 169 and 633 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude the first respondent from taking necessary action afresh in accordance with law. The Writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the said circumstances, without costs. _______________________ (RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J) 3rd March 2010 RRB