IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION APPEAL NO. 364 OF 2008 IN CHAMBER SUMMONS NO.595 OF 2008 IN SUMMARY SUIT NO.2590 OF 1991 Ramanand Bhagwati Prasad Harlalka ... Appellant Vs Umesh Kumar Dinbandhu Sharma ... Respondent Mr. V.Y. Sanglikar for the appellant. Mr. D.P. Shah for the respondent. CORAM: SWATANTER KUMAR, C.J., & S.A. BOBDE , J. DATE : 12TH NOVEMBER , 2008 P.C.: We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 9th July, 2008 vide which chamber summons No.595 of 2008 in Summary Suit No.2590 of 1991 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 3. It is not necessary for us to go into greater details in relation to the facts. Suffice it to note that the summary suit under the provisions of Order 37 was filed and an decree was passed. Notice of Motion for setting aside the exparte decree was moved which was also dismissed. The present appellant filed an appeal against that order which was disposed of by the Division Bench of this court vide its order dated 25th March, 1997. The same reads as under: “This is an appeal from the order of the learned single Judge dated 25th February, 1996 in Notice of Motion No.3106 of 1996 by which the learned single Judge dismissed the Notice of Motion and refused to set aside ex-parte decree passed against the appellants. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Counsel for the parties are agreed that this appeal may be admitted and disposed of at this stage itself. Accordingly appeal is admitted, paperbook dispensed with and by consent appeal is taken on board for hearing. Heard the counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned order the admit due as per ex-parte decree as on today according to the respondent may be Rs.3,85,000/-. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that ends of justice in this case will be met if the appellant is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- with the Prothonotary and Sr. Master of this Court within the period of 8 weeks from today and to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- by way of Costs to the Respondent within the same period. We direct accordingly. On deposit of the amount of Rs.3 lakh and the payment of Costs as directed above the impugned order of the learned single Judge shall stand set aside and so also the ex-parte decree in Summary Suit No.2590 of 1991. The Appellant shall file written Statement within 2 Weeks from the day of the restoration of the Suit and reply if any shall be filed by the respondents within 2 weeks thereafter. With the above directions and observations this appeal is disposed of.” 4. Even after the above clear directions, no written statement was filed and when the chamber summons was taken out before the learned Single Judge, the same was dismissed by the impugned order. It was stated that no written statement has been filed despite the fact that the time granted by the Division Bench had already lapsed and it was not open to the learned Single Judge to grant the chamber summons. 5. Firstly, it will have to be seen whether the order dated 9th July, 2008 would be appealable in terms of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In our opinion, the order does not determine any rights of the parties. Declining an extension would not be a relief falling within the definition and scope of the expression “judgment” as contemplated under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Even if reference in this regard has been made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rafiq and Another v. Munshilal and another, (1981)2 SCC 788 and Smt. Lachi Tewari and others v. Director of Land Records and others, 1984 (Supp) SCC 431. Even for the sake of argument we assume that order in question is appealable, even then the present appeal has no merit. Conduct of the appellant is such that he would not be entitled to claim any discretion. Firstly, an exparte decree was passed which was not set aside and upon motion being taken out, the Appellate Court granted indulgence subject to payment of costs. The appellant had failed to file the written statement within the time granted by the Division Bench. The only excuse mentioned in the affidavit which was filed in support of the chamber summons is that the appellant is a semi literate person and dependent upon his counsel. He has signed certain document by assuming the same as written statement, while, in fact, it was not written statement. An attempt is made to shift certain blame on the counsel which we are hardly concerned with. It is expected of an every litigant to be vigilant of his rights and obligations. In the present case, indulgence was shown to the appellant and he was required to pay costs. After such an order is passed, as a person of common prudence, the appellant was expected to file written statement without further default. The affidavit of 9th April, 2008 does not disclose any cause or reasons which would persuade us to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in equity the court can extend the time further as no prejudice is likely to be caused to the respondent in the appeal. This argument again is without any merit in asmuch as equity is not an instrument to frustrate the law. Equity must fall in the line of cause and to further cause of justice. Reliance has been placed on the case of Rafiq and another (supra). As on facts, the judgment is different and was coming up before the Supreme Court against an initial order passed. While in the present case, the appellant has already taken the benefit of Division Bench order. 7. For the reasons aforestated, we find no merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. CHIEF JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE, J.