IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT HON'BLE SRI ANIL R. DAVE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE and HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT APPEAL No. 1114 OF 2009 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 23/03/2009 in WP NO : 5905 OF 2007 on the file of the High Court.) Between: The District Collector, West Godavari District at Eluru and two others ... APPELLANTS AND S. Pichappan and three others ... RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellants: Government Pleader for Land Acquisition Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 3: Sri M.S. Ramachandra Rao Counsel for Respondent No.4: S. Nageswara Reddy The Court made the following: JUDGMENT: (Per Sri Anil R. Dave, CJ) The appellants – original respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 in Writ Petition No. 5905 of 2007 have filed this appeal as they have been aggrieved by the order dated 23-03-2007 passed in the aforestated petition and the order passed in Review WPMP No.22279 of 2007. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the litigation have been referred to as they have been arrayed in the writ petition. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under: The land belonging to the petitioners was sought to be acquired for Bhimavaram Municipality for setting up a compost yard in Bhimavaram. For the purpose of acquisition of the land in question, notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was issued on 20-02-2007. Urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act had been invoked for getting the possession of the land so that enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act may not have to be made. Being aggrieved by the aforestated action on the part of the acquiring body, the aforestated writ petition had been filed. After hearing the concerned advocates, the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition by coming to the conclusion that the circumstances were not such that invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) was called for. The learned single Judge had referred to the importance of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and ultimately, disposed of the petition by observing that necessary enquiry under Section 5-A should be made. Thus, the petition was finally disposed of on 23-03-2007. Thereafter, the present appellants – respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 filed Review WPMP No. 22279 of 2007 in the aforestated writ petition. The said review petition was also rejected on 01-04-2009. The learned single Judge reiterated the view which he had expressed in the order, whereby the petition had been rejected. 3. It is pertinent to note that in spite of the order dated 23-03-2007 passed in Writ Petition No. 5905 of 2007, whereby the respondents, namely, the present appellants were directed to hold enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, award was made in respect of the land in question on 27-04-2007 and possession of the land in question had been taken on 26-04-2007. It is really very strange as to how the government authorities did not respect the order passed by the learned single Judge. Of course, the learned advocates appearing for the authorities have submitted that the order passed in Writ Petition No. 5905 of 2007 had not been communicated by the concerned advocates to the concerned authorities. The said fact shows sheer negligence on the part of the learned advocates appearing for the official respondents. 4. Be that as it may, now the question is whether the order passed by the learned single Judge can be said to be incorrect. The land in question was required for the purpose of setting up of compost yard in Bhimavaram. The petitioners are agriculturists and their lands were acquired under the aforestated notification. They had set out reasons in the petition to show that the acquisition was not proper and at least, according to the learned single Judge, some enquiry should have been made so that the views expressed by the petitioners can be considered by the authority. 5. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the learned single Judge was right in observing that enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could not have been dispensed with by invoking Section 17 (4) of the Act. So as to substantiate his case, he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja[1], wherein at para 16 of the judgment, it has been held as under: “Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a landowner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the landowners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State administration.” 6. On the other hand, the learned advocate appearing for the official respondents has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kilarapu Satyavati vs. the District Collector, Kakinada in Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2006. According to him, the Division Bench of this Court had expressed an opinion in the aforestated judgment to the effect that acquisition of land for the purpose of constructing a compost yard can be treated as an urgent need. It is true that the Division Bench of this Court had made such an observation in the aforestated judgment, but the facts and circumstances in which the aforestated observations were made were different. In the said case, there was an existing compost yard which had become full and it was not possible to put further garbage etc., in the compost yard and, therefore, there was an immediate need for having some land so that another compost yard can be set up. In the aforestated circumstances, it was absolutely necessary to have another piece of land for the purpose of having another compost yard. Whereas, in the case which is on hand, the circumstances are different. For the first time, compost yard was to be set up at a particular place, which according to the petitioners, was not proper for the reason that it was likely to affect health of the citizens and their agricultural lands adversely. In our opinion, the official respondents ought to have made some enquiry in relation to the averments made on behalf of the petitioners and such an enquiry could have been made under Section 5- A of the Act. It is also pertinent to note that the Legislature in its wisdom has enacted Section 5-A so as to see that before acquisition of somebody’s land and before exercising right of the State as eminent domain, due enquiry is made. 7. The said view of ours has been fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Vs. Darius Shapur Chennai and others[2], State of Punjab Vs. Gurdial Singh[3], Om Prakash Vs. State of UP[4] and Union of India Vs. Krishna Lal Arneja[5]. 8. For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the view expressed by the learned single Judge cannot be said to be incorrect in view of the fact that the official respondents have disregarded the direction of this Court and practically, have committed contempt and now they have approached this Court with a prayer that the said order be quashed and set aside. 9. We do not see any justifiable reason for quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned single Judge. In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. ANIL R. DAVE, CJ C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 28th August, 2009 ks [1] (2004) 8 SCC 453 [2] (2005) 7 SCC 627 [3] (1980) 2 SCC 471 [4] (1998) 6 SCC 1 [5] (2004) 8 SCC 453