IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHA'ITISGARH AT BILASPUR wRn PETmON (227) N00102J/2o1o IN THE MATTER OF: PEImONER/ APPELLANI 0 )xsw .‘ w / Rafon Lal Agrawol, S/o Shri Ghosi Rom AgrowuL Aged aboui 62 years, R/o Industrial Ward, P.O. -Dhamfori, District: Dhcmtori (C.G.) VERSUS ResPONDENTs No.1/ ResPONDENT No. 1 1. The Es’rofe Officer, Sou’rh Easf Railway Management Compound, W.R.$. Colony, Raipur, Chhottisgorh RESPONDENT NO.2/ RESPONDENT NO. 2 Union of India, Through Chief Manager, South East Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkafa, Wesf Bengal, WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA a" l / Wm WW, W faa’raa? mwPQwWQaQv 2m mm f‘g‘ém %Wm SB : Hon’ble Sim Manindra fv'iohan S’hrivastava, J. 29=G4=291 Q Ml: Ankit Singhal, counsel for the petltioner. Ms. Nauslmla Ali, counsel for respou Elems on advance copy under instructions from Shli Amit Chzudhari, standing counsel for respondents. By this petiiion, under Article 227 of ihe comitution of lnrlia, petitioner has assailed legality and validity of order dated 18/03/201C by which tha patitioner's appeat under Section 9 of the Pu‘olic Premises (Eviction of mauthorized occupsrm) Act, 1971 (for shoit " the Act of 1971") has been dismissed as barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner makes two fold subnnssions. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in ‘Hew of the provisions contamed under Section 9. Sub-Section 2(a), The period of limitation is to be reckoned Erom the date of publication of the order under Sub—Section l of $ection 5 oi‘the Act of 193'1. it is submined mat rhoug‘n Sectian 5 of Sub-Section I, only on 8/09 limitation wouki commence only &om 8/09/0 Judge, Raipur Vida ifs orc‘nor dated 23/09/08 though assuming that theta was deb}! in fxiing application under Section 5 of the Limitation t, X963, by way of abimdant caution, learned Com bekow was ob}iged to consirjer the same, I Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Farms Nand Singh ’s. Bish’ict Judge, Mirmpur and others, AIR ‘ 1983, 264. Submission of learned counsel for thi respondent is that the perusal of impugned l order wouid show the: the Dismct Judge, Raipio rem-nee the appeal on 23i08/09 whereaher We? oer}; M He therefore submits that the period of and not before that. It is submittad that the ed the appeal with 'berty to tiie the same the order was passed by the Estate Officer on “2i08f08, the same was affixed as required by appeal was initially filed on 12/09/08 before e District Judge, Raipur but later on Disn‘iot before the Distxict Judge, Dhamtari whereafze the appeal was presented on 24/09/‘08 Before the District Judge, Dhsmtari. The second su" mission of learned counsel for the petitioner ie appeal, as the petitioner had also moved an / ‘ r‘ h- ‘ W ‘ 3a 2mm, m, fs—lW mm MDQQ} 3cm; {migw m‘anéa 311%! { Tm‘T mmmm “Qk WWW WW amrmaném :he appeal was filed before the: learned Cowt below atier delay of 20 days and iherefoxe appeal was not file€t within the pericd of limite rice prescribed under the iaw. It is suiamitted that the finding of the learner} Court below the appeal was baited by limitation does not suffer &om any error much iess an error app ent on the record and therefore the petition is liable to be dismissed. A pemsal of impugned order shows t} at while considering as to Whether the appeai was med within the period of limitation 0‘ not, teamed Court beiow has compieteiy misdirected itself. A bare perusal of Section of Sub-Section 2(a) shows that the appeai is required to be filed within 12 days £rom the date of publication of the order under Sub- Section l of Section 5. However, in the tire order, the ieamed Coon below while considering the case of the petitioner has com uted the period of limitation from the date of passing of the order without taking into eonsi ration the statutory provisions comained in Section 9 oi Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act, 1971 The facts of the case are that Initially e appeal was filed before the District Judge Raipur Later on, the same was returned and emed before tne ourt below. This aspect was not taken into consideration. Moreov it appears that the petitioner, by Way of abundant caution, had moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condomtion of delay, if any, in fiiing the appea . Though the impugied order records that the appeal is barred by limitation, there is no onsideration of petitioners application for oondonah‘on of delay. The order does not r fleet that any of the younds raised by the i petitioner in the application for condonation o delay were considered. The order does not In View of the above'discussion, the ugned order cannot be sustained and the same is therefore set aside. Leanied Court belo shall reconsider the entire matter afresh, by taking into consideration the statutory provisi of the Act and pass appropriate orders in acco e Additional District Judge (F.T.C._), Dha .Kf Show that any satisfaction has been recorded the cause shown for delay is not sufficient, contained in Section 9 of dub-Section 2 (a) ce With law Parties shail appear oeioie on lO may, 2016 \W\/\ 1 § V I r, a Mohan d1- shrIVdStava i _ a i i.“ " Manindr i dge ' i s e p o r ‘ m i ’