WA 275/2007 BEFORE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 5/6/2007 pass ed by a learned Single Judge in WP(C) 1060/2001. We are concerned with promotions to the post of Headmaster in the Adarsh a Hindi Vidyalaya, Mariani, Jorhat (hereafter referred to as the School). In terms of Rule 10(1) of the Assam Secondary Education (Provincialised) Service Rules, 1980, (hereafter referred to as the Rules), the general procedur e for promotion postulates that before the end of each year the Appointing Autho rity shall make an assessment of the likely number of vacancies to be filled up by promotion in the next year in each cadre and in each School. Pursuant to the above, since the Headmaster in the School, Shriniwas Pat hak was due to superannuate on 31/5/2001 at the age of 58 years, a selection pro cess was initiated for promotion to the post of Headmaster. Th e appellant was one of the persons under consideration as also respondent No. 4 before us. It appears that the Selection Committee met on 1/12/1999 and made its recommenda tions, one of which was to the effect that the appellant should be promoted as t he Headmaster of the School. The select list was approved by the Government on 1 /8/2000. We may mention at this stage that learned counsel for respondent No. 4 raised so me doubt about the date of approval of the select list. However, there is no sub stance in this because in the writ petition filed by respondent No. 4, it was sp ecifically stated that the selection process took place on 1/12/1999 while the s elect list was approved by the Government on 1/8/2000. We are, therefore, procee ding on this basis. As luck would had it, about a month before his superannuation, Shriniwas Pathak filed a writ petition in this Court claiming that he should be allowed t o continue as the Headmaster of the School till the age of 60 years. This writ p etition being WP(C) 1931/1999 was allowed by the learned Single Judge by an orde r dated 28/4/1999 and Shriniwas Pathak was permitted to continue in service. The order passed by the learned Single Judge reads as under: The petitioner shall be allowed to continue in service but he shall not be enti tled to any pension. This disposes of the writ application. In view of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the anticipated vacancy of Shriniwas Pathak, did not materialize. Be that as it may, Shriniwas Pathak continued in service till 31/5/2001 by virtu e of the order passed by this Court. Consequently, the select list approved by t he Government on 1/8/2000 was not acted upon but on the superannuation of Shrini was Pathak, the select list was revived and the appellant promoted as Headmaster of the School on 13/6/2001. This was challenged by respondent No. 4 by filing a writ petition. Sometime in 2004, Shriniwas Pathak filed another writ petition in this Court bei ng WP(C) 3999/2004. This writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 3/2/200 5. The sum and substance of the grievance made by Shriniwas Pathak was that sinc e he was being deprived of his pension in terms of the earlier order of the lear ned Single Judge, he was willing to refund the salary earned by him during 1/6/1 999 till 31/5/2001 and in return, he should be paid his pension. This request wa s acceded to by the learned Single Judge in the second writ petition i.e. WP(C) 3999/2004 filed by Shriniwas Pathak. We are given to understand by learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant, who has ref erred to page 72 of the appeal paper-book that Shriniwas Pathak did refund an am ount of Rs. 2,85,187/- as salary drawn by him and he is now getting his pension. The effect of the order passed by this Court on 3/2/2005 is that notionally the post of Headmaster in the School was vacated by Shriniwas Pathak on 1/6/1999. We say ’notionally’ because in fact, Shriniwas Pathak had actually occupied the po st for two years. As mentioned above, on 13/6/2001the appellant was promoted as the Headmaster bas ed on the select list approved by the Government on 1/8/2000 and this was challe nged by respondent No. 4 by filing a writ petition. This writ petition was allow ed by the judgment and order under appeal. The learned Single Judge took the view that since there was no physical vacancy that existed on 1/6/1999, the select list died a natural death and it could not be revived subsequently. Consequently, the learned Single Judge held that the ap pellant’s promotion on 13/6/2001 on the basis of the stillborn select list was i nvalid and could not be sustained. Before us, the learned Counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions. The first contention is based on the hypothesis that there was, in fact, a notional vacancy on 1/6/1999 as a result of the decision rendered on 3/2/2005 by this Co urt in WP(C) 3999/2004. Consequently, the selection process initiated under Rule 10(1) of the Rules was valid. No doubt the facts of this case are rather peculiar. But, given the situation th at arose as a result of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge, we have n o option but to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that a vacancy did exist on 1/6/1999 even though it was only notional and not physica l. The second submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that even otherwis e the select list could be operated on 13/6/2001, the date on which the appellan t was promoted as Headmaster. This contention is based on the submission that th e select list was approved by the Government on 1/8/2000 and normally the validi ty of a select list is one year. Therefore, the select list approved by the Gove rnment on 1/8/200 was valid till 1/8/2001. The appellant was promoted as Headmas ter a couple of months earlier that is on 13/6/2001 or during the currency of th e select list. This position was refuted by the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 who reiter ated his contention that the select list was approved by the Government on 1/12/ 1999. However, as we have seen above, the pleading of respondent No. 4 before th e learned Single Judge is that the select list was approved by the Government on ly on 1/8/2000. Therefore, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 cannot now be al lowed to give a go bye to the pleading of his client. Consequently, we hold that the select list approved by the Government on 1/8/2000 was valid when the appel lant was promoted on 13/6/2001. We may mention another submission made by learned counsel for the appellant. He submitted, by relying upon Rule 7 of the Rules, that the select list could remai n in operation even beyond a period of one year. This argument is based on a rea ding of Rule 7(i)(e) which specifies that the validity of the select list in case of direct recruitment, shall not exceed beyond one ye ar from the date of its publication. Learned counsel submitted that there is no such injunction in respect of the sel ect list of promotes. On this basis, the learned counsel contended, negatively, that the select list for promotees could remain valid beyond a period of one yea r. We cannot agree with this view canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant . A similar situation had arisen in Ghanashyam Gogoi and others versus State of As sam and others, 1999 (1) GLT 117. In that case, it was held by a learned Single Judge (and we agree with the view expressed therein) that a select list for prom otion cannot remain valid indefinitely. It held that when a selection was made, the appointment on the basis of the said selection could only be made to those v acancies that arose in the subsequent year and not thereafter. Were this not so, and if the select list was to remain valid indefinitely, then there would be no scope for promotion for a person who improves his performance in the interregnu m. It is for this reason that the normal principle of service law is that a sele ct list is valid for only one year, unless there is a rule or administrative ord er to the contrary. As already mentioned above, a notional vacancy did exist on 1/6/1999. On this ba sis a select list was prepared and approved by the Government on 1/8/2000. The s elect list was valid till 31/7/2001. The appellant was promoted on 13/6/2001, w hich was during the currency of the select list. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge erred in setting aside the p romotion of the appellant as the Headmaster of the School. The writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition filed by respondent No. 4 is di smissed.