IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.BASANT & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.CHITAMBARESH FRIDAY, THE 18TH NOVEMBER 2011 / 27TH KARTHIKA 1933 CRL.A.No. 683 of 2007(A) ------------------------ SC.507/2006 of SESSIONS COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA CP.141/2005 of JUDL.MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS COURT, THIRUVALLA .................... APPELLANT: -------------- SAJI, S/O PAPPACHAN, C.NO.1392, CENTRAL PRISON, TRIVANDRUM. BY ADV. SHAHANA KARTHIKEYAN (STATE BRIEF) RESPONDENT --------------- STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTORMR. ROY THOMAS THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18/11/2011, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: R. BASANT & V.CHITAMBARESH,JJ ============================== CRL. APPEAL NO. 683 OF 2007 ============================ Dated this the 18th November 2011 JUDGMENT Basant, J. Is the alternative theory that the deceased suffered injuries in a fall, tenable and acceptable ? Is that at least sufficient to generate a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court against the acceptability of the version of PWs.2 and 3 about the incident ? These questions loom large in this appeal. 2. The appellant faced indictment for the offence of patricide. The prosecution alleged that he on 28.6.2005 at about 8 p.m. in the court-yard of the house where his father resides, caused injuries to his father, to which injuries the father succumbed, by using M.Os 3 and 4 - stones. There was an initial hit with M.O.4. There was a subsequent infliction of injury with M.O.3. This in a nut-shell is the charge against the appellant. 3. Investigation commenced with Ext.P1 F.I.statement lodged by PW.1, the son-in-law of the deceased who was informed CRL.A. 683/2007 2 of his father-in-law sustaining the injury. The neighbours who reside 4 metres away - a couple, PWs. 2 and 3 alone had allegedly witnessed the incident. The investigation was completed by PW.10 who filed the final report/charge sheet against the appellant before the Magistrate. 4. The accused was duly committed to the Court of Sessions by the learned Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance of the offence alleged against the appellant. He pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against him. The prosecution thereupon examined PWs. 1 to 10 and proved Exts.P1 to P10. Mos. 1 to 10 were also marked by the prosecution. 5. PW.1, as stated earlier, is the informant and the son-in-law of the appellant. PWs.2 and 3 are alleged eye witnesses to the occurrence. PW.4 is an attestor to Ext.P4 inquest report and PW.5 is an attestor to Ext.P5 scene mahazar. PW.6, the doctor, conducted the post mortem examination and proved Ext.P6 certificate. Ext.P7 report shows that the deceased had alcohol in his blood to the extent of 57.5 milligram per 100 ml. PW.7, the Village Officer prepared the site plan. PWs.8 to 10 are CRL.A. 683/2007 3 police officials who had various roles to play in the registration and investigation of the crime. 6. When examined under section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused denied all circumstances which appeared in evidence and which were put to him. He took a very specific and definite stand. According to him, the injuries were sustained by his deceased father in his presence. But it is not correct to say that they were homicidal injuries inflicted by him. The deceased was an invalid ex-service men. He had consumed alcohol also. He had fallen in the court-yard of his house, when he hit against a heap of stones. The local people unfairly detained him and handed him over to the police. He is absolutely innocent. 7. The accused did not examine any defence witnesses. Exts.D1 to D4 case diary contradictions were marked when PW.2 was cross examined. Exts.D5 and D6 case diary contradictions were marked when PW.3 was cross examined. 8. The learned Sessions Judge on an anxious evaluation of all the relevant inputs came to the conclusion that the oral evidence of PWs. 2 and 3, notwithstanding the innocuous, CRL.A. 683/2007 4 incongruities and inconsistencies can safely be accepted and acted upon. The alternative theory advanced by the accused of accidental fall can be effectively ruled out from the inputs available, concluded the learned Sessions Judge. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to pass the impugned judgment. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant-accused and the learned Public Prosecutor. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the oral evidence of PWs.2 and 3 should have been disbelieved by the Court. Their evidence is contradictory. PW.2 was declared hostile by the Prosecutor himself and in these circumstances, placing reliance on such testimony, the appellant should not have been found guilty of the capital offence of murder, argues counsel. The learned counsel further laboriously advanced the contention that the available indications and inputs cannot help the Court to effectively rule out the possibility of accidental fall causing the fatal injuries. 10. An appellate judgment is and must essentially be read as a continuation of the judgment of the trial court. In that CRL.A. 683/2007 5 view of the matter, we deem it unnecessary to re-narrate the oral evidence of PWs. 1 to 10 and the contents of the exhibits marked by the prosecution and defence. Suffice it to say, the counsel had taken us through the oral evidence of PWs.1 to 10, the contents of Exts.P1 to P10 and Exts.D1 to D6 in detail. We have been taken through the impugned judgment also in detail. Specific reference shall be made in this judgment wherever necessary to such oral and documentary evidence. 11. The crucial question is whether the core of the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 generate any dissatisfaction or suspicion in the mind of the Court. That according to us is the vital question to be decided in this appeal. The oral evidence of PW.1 and the explanation offered by the accused in Section 313 statement affords the background in which the oral evidence of PWs.2 and 3 is to be considered. 12. Before considering the oral evidence of PWs.2 and 3 for their intrinsic worth, it will be apposite to be reminded of the vital circumstance that the oral evidence of a rustic Indian witness has to be appreciated fairly and reasonably and without any CRL.A. 683/2007 6 undeserved doubt, suspicion or distrust. He does not speak in seriatim with strict chronometric sense. His ability to give expression to the ideas in his mind and narrate the perceptions made by him is often inadequate. He is not used to the formal atmosphere available in a Court and the expression of ideas and narration of events must certainly be understood realistically by any Court. It will be a good question for the court to ask itself as to whether the evidence of such witnesses inherently and in its core do arouse in suspicion or reservation. 13. It is in this context that we intend to refer to the oral evidence of PW.1 at the outset. That provides the background in which the oral evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 must be approached. The deceased is a person aged about 75 years. His son, the accused, is aged 34 years. The deceased was an ex- service man. He had an acquired physical disability. He was walking using a walking stick. He used to consume alcohol. He had his native place at Kayamkulam. His wife was no more. He had two sons and two daughters. The wife of PW.1 is one daughter. The other daughter was married and settled CRL.A. 683/2007 7 elsewhere. One son's whereabouts were not known. It is said that he was somewhere in Chennai. The other son is the accused. It is said that the accused was having bad antecedents. He used to pick up quarrels with his father. Afraid of him, his father had to dispose of his property at Kayamkulam and proceed to PW.1 and his wife. They helped him to purchase a property in their neighbourhood and settle down there. He was afraid of the appellant. PW.1 did not reveal information to the accused as to where his father was settled. However, he used to enable interaction between the deceased father and the accused son at his house without revealing to him where the deceased was settled. This situation continued for some time. However, an attempt to square up matters appears to have been undertaken. The accused allegedly promised that he shall behave properly. He was thus permitted to live with the deceased. Thus the appellant and the deceased were living together for the past less than one week at his residence. According to PW.1, though there was an attempted settlement and harmony, things did not improve and within the short period of time, the relationship CRL.A. 683/2007 8 between the deceased and the son, the appellant soured. It is in that context that PW.1 received information that the deceased had suffered injuries and was lying with injuries in the courtyard in front of his house. 14. It is contended that this version of PW.1 does not deserve acceptance. PW1 is interested against the accused/appellant, it is contended. What is the interest of PW1 against the appellant? The theory is advanced that PW1 and his wife are antagonistic to the appellant, as they stand to gain if the appellant is not there to stake claim for the properties of the deceased. Except this no other particular reason is advanced as to why PW1 is not speaking the truth. In fact one answer given by the accused in 313 examination does, according to us, appear to be eloquent on this aspect. It is his very case that on 27/6/2005 he was prevailed upon by PW1 and his wife that he should live with his father. That stand taken by the accused knocks the bottom out of the theory that PW1 and his wife do have any motive or ill will against the appellant to tender any false evidence against him. We find that the version of PW1in CRL.A. 683/2007 9 court is eminently supported by his version in Ext.P1 F.I. Statement which has reached the court promptly. The same, it is seen, had reached the court on 29/6/2005 at 10.30 a.m. The incident had been taken place at 8 p.m. on 28/6/2005 and Ext.P1 F.I. statement had been lodged at 10 p.m. on the same night. We do not, in these circumstances, find any reason to approach the oral evidence of PW1 duly supported by Ext.P1 with any amount of reservation. We find that it is absolutely fair and reasonable to act upon the evidence of PW1. The evidence of PW1, according to us, offers the background on which the evidence of Pws. 2 and 3 deserves to be approached. 15. We now come to the evidence of PWs.2 and 3. They are husband and wife. They reside adjacent house very close to the house where the deceased was residing. The plank on which the oral evidence of PWs.2 and 3 is challenged is only that they are interested in PW1 and his wife. We have already adverted to that aspect. PWs.2 and 3 are an old couple aged 56 years and 52 years. They are neighbours of the deceased. They were having very good relationship with the deceased as CRL.A. 683/2007 10 can be seen from their testimony. The evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 clearly shows that the deceased had gone for a walk was returning to his house and he was seen by PWs.2 and 3 at that juncture. When PWs.2 and 3 were inside the house. They heard a cry. They rushed out of their house. They found the deceased lying with the injuries and the appellant holding MO3 stone after having inflicted the injury on the deceased. This is the core of the testimony of PWs.2 and 3. We have already noted that we find no reason to approach the testimony of PWs.2 and 3 with any amount of doubt, distrust or suspicion. The evidence of PWs.2 and 3 is inherently inspiring. 16. The challenge is raised against the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 on the ground that there are inter se contradictions and inconsistencies. Undoubtedly, there are. When they spoke about the cry of the deceased one would say that he had called PW2 (അചഛയ) whereas PW3 stated that he had cried for help calling of PW3 (േ മേ ള). This incongruity is too puerile to arouse in a prudent mind any reservation against the testimony. CRL.A. 683/2007 11 17. It is attempted to show that there was no proper light at the scene of the crime. The evidence of PWs.2 and 3 together reveal that there was sufficient opportunity to see in the light from outside the house to perceive what had happened. Of course, PW2 had stated that he had fetched the torch from inside to enable him to see. Both of them in one word stated that the deceased was lying there and the appellant was by his side holding a stone(MO3). It appears from the version of the prosecution that there was an initial first hit and after that the deceased fell after that first hit there was a further hit again with MO.2. Several queries are posed. There was an initial hit with MO.4 and after he fell, there was a further hit with MO.3. How could PWs.2 and 3 have witnessed the first hit, if the appellant had thrown MO.4 at the deceased and he had fallen? How could anyone have aimed so correctly at the head of the deceased to throw MO.4 with such exactitude so that the stone hit the deceased on his head ? 18. According to us, all these queries are not of substance when we consider the core of evidence of PWs.2 and 3 that CRL.A. 683/2007 12 when they heard the cries and came out of their house, they had seen the appellant by the side of the deceased wielding MO.3 stone. We accept that PWs.2 and 3 may not have seen the first hit. They may not have seen the 2nd hit also. They may have only seen the accused holding MO3 by the side of the injured (deceased) after the second hit. They may just be filling up the blanks when they said that they saw both the hits. Even giving due allowance for all this the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 can be safely accepted to conclude that the deceased suffered injuries at the hands of the accused. It is crucial that disinterested Pws.2 and 3 in that circumstance were not informed by the appellant that the deceased suffered the injuries in a fall. They were not evidently given such a version and they did not think that it was an accidental fall. This is crucial and important. 19. In this context, the prosecution heavily relies on the medical evidence tendered by PW6 and Ext.P6 postmortem certificate issued by him. The evidence of PW6 clearly shows that the four injuries seen by him and described in Ext.P6 could not have been the result of an accidental fall in any manner. We CRL.A. 683/2007 13 find no reason to discard the evidence of PW6. There are as many as four injuries described in Ext.P6 postmortem certificate. We extract those injuries below: 1)Lacerated wound 9x1x1cms,obliquely placed on left side, of back of head, its upper inner end was 1 cm outer to midline and 11 cms above the root of neck. 2)Lacerated wound 1.5x0.5cms bone deep on left side of head involving parietal eminence. Its front end was 7cms.above the root of the ear. 3)Abraded contusion incorporating multiple superficial lacerated wound over an area 16x6cms on right side of forehead and face involving the nose and eyebrow. Its upper extent being 7 cms.above the eyebrow and inner end in the midline. 4)Abraded contusion incorporating multiple superficial lacerated wounds over an area 10x9 cms on the left side of face with its upper extent being at the outer end of eyebrow. 20. We are satisfied that the oral evidence of PW6 on this CRL.A. 683/2007 14 aspect can safely be accepted. The expert opinion that all the four injuries could not have been simultaneously caused by a fall does appear to us to be eminently acceptable. The court below has accepted the same. We find no reason to interfere. 21. The theory advanced by the accused also deserves consideration. According to him, it was a case of the deceased falling accidentally and suffering injuries. The deceased was an old man aged about 75 years. He was about 169 cms. tall and was weighing 70 Kgs. He had evidently consumed alcohol at the time, when he suffered the injuries. Ext.P7 shows that there was alcohol in his blood to the extent of 57.5 mg. per 100 ml. He had a physical disability. There was weakness in his legs. He was walking using a stick. All these are questions pressed into service by the learned counsel for the appellant to urge the contention that the theory of accidental fall cannot be ruled out effectively. 22. The evidence of PWs.2 and 3 is available which directly contra indicates the probability of the theory of accidental fall. The alleged fall is on the heap of stones which was available on CRL.A. 683/2007 15 the boundary of the court yard. The body was found lying away from that heap of stone and that contra indicates the theory that the deceased had accidentally fallen on the heap of stones. The expert evidence of PW6 as seen earlier does not also support the theory that there was accidental fall. 23. Finally if as a matter of fact it were a case of the deceased accidentally falling down and suffering the injuries, the conduct of the appellant and the conduct of the others who are present there, is totally inconsistent with the theory of accidental fall. It is the case of the accused in 313 examination that he was detained by the local people who reached there hearing the commotion and was handed over to the police. That is the very specific case of PW1 in Ext.P1. PW1 asserted that the accused was in the police station when he reached the police station to lodge Ext.P1. PW9, the investigating officer did of course advance a different version that the arrest was on the next day, i.e. 29/6/2005 from the railway station. The court below has not accepted this version. The formal arrest may have been recorded elsewhere, but the totality of the inputs available CRL.A. 683/2007 16 clearly show that the accused/appellant was detained by the local people and he was available at the scene. The version of accidental fall does not appear to have been advanced at the scene of the crime by the appellant to PWs.2 and 3 or others. No one accepted the same at any rate. . 24. To summarise, we find no reason to discard the evidence of PWs.2 and 3. Notwithstanding the innocuous and innocent incongruities, inaccuracies and the inconsistencies in the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the core of their evidence that the deceased had suffered injuries at the hands of the appellant/accused is found to be eminently acceptable. The alternative theory advanced by the accused does not commend itself for acceptance in the light of the oral evidence of PWs.2 and 3, in the light of expert evidence of Ext.P6, in the light of the location of the spot of the occurrence in Ext.P5 scene mahazar and in the light of the conduct of the appellant after the accident. We are satisfied, in these circumstances, that the conclusion reached by the court below is eminently reasonable and deserves acceptance. No appellate interference is CRL.A. 683/2007 17 warranted. 25. We do note that PW2 has been declared as hostile by the Prosecutor. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the court must have been reluctant and slow to accept and act upon the oral evidence of a witness like PW2 who stood discredited by the act of prosecution in having declared hostile. The prosecution themselves having not chosen to place complete reliance on the evidence of PW2 the benefit of doubt must have been conceded to the appellant, contends counsel. 26. We find no merit in this contention. It is true that PW2 was declared hostile. We have been taken through the entire evidence. The light hearted manner in which PW2 was sought to be declared hostile and the ready affording of the permission to such declaration of hostility by the court does arouse dissatisfaction in us. A careful reading of the evidence of PW2 clearly shows that there was no intentional or deliberate deviations from his original version before the police. It is trite that if the witness in an unguarded moment gives a version which does not exactly tally with the earlier version that cannot CRL.A. 683/2007 18 operate as a reason for the prosecutor to seek permission to declare the witness hostile or for the court to accord such permission. 27. The words 'hostile' and 'hostile witness' do not appear in the Evidence Act. But in common parlance a witness is said to be hostile when leave under Section 154 is sought by the party calling the witness and such permission is granted. We extract Section 154 of the Evidence Act below: 154. Question by party to his own witness.-(1)The court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any question to him which might be put in cross examination by the adverse party. (2)Nothing in this section shall disentitle the person so permitted under sub-section (1), to rely on any part of the evidence of such witness. 28. A discretion is given to the court to permit the person who has called the witness to put any question to him which might be put in cross examination by adverse party. The purpose of the statutory stipulation is evident. When a witness is CRL.A. 683/2007 19 called by a party and that party gives evidence inconsistent with the purpose for which that witness is called and the court is satisfied that the witness is deliberately deviating from truth, such permission can be granted by the court in its discretion. But such permission is not to be sought lightly or granted readily. A careful reading of the oral evidence of PW2 clearly shows that permission was sought and granted before the Prosecutor satisfied himself and the court was convinced that the witness is deviating deliberately even from his case diary statement. Such declaration of hostility by the prosecution cannot in any way militate against the credibility or acceptability of the evidence tendered by PW2. Declaration of hostility by the Prosecutors or that grant of the permission of Section 154 of the Evidence Act by the court does not in any way weigh with us a sufficient reason to approach the testimony of PW2 with any reservation. We need only mention that Prosecutors must be more convinced before such leave is sought and the courts must be very careful before such permission is granted. 29. The evidence clearly suggests that death resulted from CRL.A. 683/2007 20 the injuries suffered and such injuries were inflicted intentionally. The injury suffered was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The offence clearly falls under clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. The conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed under Section 302 IPC is thus found to be valid and correct. The same does not warrant interference at all. 30. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Sd/- R.BASANT, JUDGE Sd/- V. CHITAMBARESH, JUDGE Nj/ks. True copy P.S. To Judge CRL.A. 683/2007 21 CRL.A. 683/2007 22