THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE P.S.NARAYANA M.A.C.M.A.M.P. No :1337 of 2010 IN M.A.C.M.A.M.P.No.1027 of 2007 & M.A.C.M.A.No.464 of 2007 DATED: 01-06-2010 JUDGMENT: M.A.C.M.A.M.P.No.1337 of 2010 had been filed by the legal representatives of the deceased-Shivaiah to vacate the interim stay granted by this Court on 13-03-2007. 2. When the said application came up for hearing, the learned counsel on record made a request for final disposal of the appeal and accordingly made submissions in elaboration in the appeal itself. Hence, at the request of the learned counsel on record, the main appeal itself is being disposed of at the stage of admission. 3. Sri V.Sambasiva Rao, learned counsel representing the appellant-United India Insurance Company Limited, would maintain that inasmuch as in I.A.No.1588 of 2006 permission was obtained to contest the claim on all the grounds available to the insured. The merits and demerits of several grounds, which have been specified in the Grounds of Appeal, especially in the light of the evidence available on record, may have to be gone into in all terms. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would maintain that there is absolutely no acceptable evidence before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’ for the purpose of convenience) to show that the lorry in question was involved in the accident. He would maintain that the Tribunal failed to see that the insured and the concerned police in collusion with the owner of the lorry in question, for the purpose of getting compensation, had created this evidence. He pointed to the First Information Report and would maintain that apart from the contents of the First Information Report, even if the evidence of P.W.3 to consider, it cannot be said that the involvement of the vehicle in question had been established and that being so, granting compensation is totally unsustainable. He placed strong reliance on APSRTC, HYDERABAD v. N.KRISHNA REDDY AND OTHERS [1]. 5. Per contra, Sri K.L.N.Rao, learned counsel representing the contesting respondents, would maintain that the said Shivaiah, the original insured, is no more and the original legal representatives have been brought on record. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant had taken this Court through the evidence available on record in detail, the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3, in particular, and specifically pointed out to the version of cross- examination of P.W.3 as well and would maintain that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 to be read together and in fact, there are no contradictory versions and merely because P.W.3 is closely related to the insured-P.W.1, who is no doubt no more, the evidence cannot be denied in any manner whatsoever and in the absence of contra evidence, the finding recorded by the Tribunal in this regard cannot be found fault. In the light of the same, the award passed by the Tribunal, being in accordance with law, the same to be confirmed. He also relied on a decision reported in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, REP. BY ITS DIVISIONAL MANAGER, KAKINADA[2]. 7. Heard learned counsel on record. Perused the Grounds of Appeal, the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the Tribunal as well. 8. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel on record, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal. 1. Whether the findings recorded by the Tribunal suffer from any illegality or legal infirmity warranting interference? 2. Whether the said findings are to be disturbed or are to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances? 3. If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled to? 9. Point Nos.1 and 2: For the purpose of convenience, the parties hereinafter would be referred to as shown in M.V.O.P.No.22 of 2004 on the file of the Tribunal. 10. It is needless to say that the claimant-insured in the appeal being no more the legal representatives are being brought on record and the said legal representatives are contesting the appeal. 11. The insured filed the aforesaid M.V.O.P. under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act ( hereinafter in short ‘the Act’ for the purpose of convenience) claiming compensation of Rs.6,00,000/- for the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident that had taken place on 14-11-2003 at about 8.00 p.m. at Vardhana school, Cheerala. The facts in brief are as hereunder: “On 14.11.2003, at about 8.00 p.m. while the insured was proceeding from Sai Gupta Rice Mill towards Cheerala on his cycle on extreme left side of the road with great care and diligence and when he reached Vardhana school, a lorry bearing No.AHT.2552 came in a rash and negligent manner and dashed to the petitioner from the opposite direction, resulting the petitioner sustained multiple fractures to his left leg below knee, fracture to both bones of right leg, closed head injury with concussion and other injuries all over the body. He was immediately shifted to Gandhi hospital, Secunderabad where his left leg below knee was amputated and is still undergoing treatment at Gandhi hospital. So far, he incurred around Rs.30,000/- towards treatment and extra nourishment. P.S.Keesara registered a case in Cr.No.163 of 2003 under Section 338 IPC against the driver of the crime vehicle. Petitioner was then aged 45 years. He was working as Manager in a Farm House of Mr.Madhu of Cheerala village, Keesara mandal, Rangareddy District at a monthly salary of Rs.4000/- and was contributing the same to his family. Due to amputation of his left leg below knee and fracture of both bones of his right leg, he is completely bedridden and is not able to move from the bed. Due to his head injury with concussion, he is frequently getting headache, forgetfulness, loss of memory and fits. Thus, he became permanent disabled person. He was removed from service. Thus, he lost his earnings. He may have to have artificial leg in future”. 12. The 1st respondent in the said M.V.O.P. is the owner of the vehicle and the 2nd respondent is the insurer and the said owner of the vehicle is shown as 1st respondent in the present appeal and the 2nd respondent in the M.V.O.P. had preferred the present appeal. The owner-1st respondent had not chosen to contest the matter. The appellant herein-2nd respondent filed counter denying the allegations. Specific stand has been taken that the alleged accident had not taken place at all, muchless due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle in question. The alleged crime vehicle was not insured with the insurance company and the driver was not having valid driving licence as on the date of the accident. The insured had not sustained any injuries and therefore did not incur any amount for his treatment. His leg was not amputated. He had not lost his future earnings. At any rate, the compensation being paid by the insurer is exorbitant. There is no negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle and hence, the insured is not entitled for any compensation and the claim petition is to be dismissed. 13. On the strength of the pleadings, the following issues were settled by the Tribunal: 1. Whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry bearing No.AHT 2552? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any compensation, if so to what amount and against whom? 3. To what relief? 14. On behalf of the insured, who died subsequently, he had examined himself as P.W.1 and further examined P.W.2-Dr.G.Ramachandra Reddy and P.W.3- C.Anjaneyulu and marked Exs.A1 to A9. On behalf of the contesting respondents, R.W.1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B7 were marked. 15. The Tribunal appreciated the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and R.W.1 as well and also Exs.A1 to A9 and Exs.B1 to B8, and ultimately came to the conclusion that the claim of the insured to be apparently allowed awarding compensation of Rs.2,70,000/- with proportionate costs and future interest at 7.5% p.a. from the date of the petition till the date of realization and the rest of the claim, no doubt had been negated. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal had been preferred by the United India Insurance Company Limited as aforesaid. 16. I n Krishna Reddy’s case (1st cited supra), the learned Judge of this Court observed as follows: “Merely because the police charge sheeted R.W.1 it cannot be presumed that the allegations therein are true. The allegations in the charge sheet have to be proved by adducing oral evidence. It is significant to note that Ex.A2-certified copy of the charge sheet, does not show that the Investigating Officer took pains to visit the scene of accident and verify as to how actually the accident took place. He did not even take pains to conduct a panchanama of the scene of accident and draw a sketch of the scene of accident, though the driver of the van died in the accident. In fatal accident cases panchanama and sketch of the scene of offence are very important because they give first hand information as to where actually the accident took place and if there are skid marks and on which side of the road the vehicle involved in the accident, was there at the time of accident and after the accident and would assist the Court in coming to a just decision. In this case the Investigating Officer solely, basing on the statements of witnesses recorded by him, seems to have charge sheeted R.W.1 which is but a table investigation”. 17. Strong reliance also was placed on the decision of the Division Bench in 2nd cited supra, wherein the learned Division Bench observed as follows: “Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ( for short “the Act”), the Claims Tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining just compensation, etc. In holding any such inquiry, Section 169 of the Act mandates the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit subject to rules. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was cautioned not to reject any application on the ground of any technical flaw and was also obligated to obtain whatever information necessary from the police, medical and other authorities. It is true that sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules states that the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of registration certificate of the motor vehicle, insurance certificate or policy, copy of first information report, post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the medical officer and the nature of treatment given by the medical officer. The Division Bench also observed that: “The said sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 obviously refers to the relevant dependable criteria for assessment of the compensation, which is patently illustrative and can never be considered to be exhaustive. This sub-rule stating the basis to award the claim, is obviously subject to the prohibition against depending on any technical flaw and the procedure for summary trial to be followed by the Tribunal. The said sub-rule cannot travel beyond the statutory obligation imposed on the Tribunal to determine the just compensation after an inquiry, in which an opportunity of being heard is given to the parties. The judicial determination of the questions in controversy before the Tribunal in terms of Sections 168 and 169 of the Act cannot be confined to consideration of the five documents referred to in sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules alone and exclude any other oral or documentary evidence. The procedure of summary trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure which the Tribunal shall follow under Rule 476 of the Rules itself mandates taking all such evidence as may be produced by both sides in support of their respective versions, apart from the evidence which the Court, of its own motion, causes to be produced as per Section 262 read with Sections 254 and 255 of the said Code. Sub-rule (7) to be understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, is a directory provision referring to some of the documents which can offer guidance to the Tribunal in discharge of its statutory duty and the word “shall” used in the said sub-rule has to be necessarily understood as “may”. The learned Division Bench further observed at paragraph Nos.7 & 17 as under: “That apart, to say that the first information report alone should be the conclusive basis for determining the manner of the accident, even in spite of the availability of other dependable evidence on record on that aspect, will be offending the plain language of the statute and if that were the purport of sub-rule (7), it cannot be considered valid, as any such delegated legislation cannot travel beyond the legislation itself”. It cannot be even remotely said that the principles laid down by the above decisions were given a go-by by the Tribunal and this Court in assessing the compensation in this case, while it should also be remembered that strict rules of evidence do not govern the proceedings under the Act”. 18. In the light of the decisions referred to supra, submissions in elaboration had been made by the learned counsel on record. Sri Sambasivarao, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that in the light of the admission made by P.W.3 that he is not eye witness and since the number of the vehicle also had not been specified in the First Information Report and some other vehicle had been referred to, inasmuch as no acceptable evidence is placed before the Tribunal, awarding compensation cannot be sustained. On the contrary, Sri K.L.N.Rao, learned counsel for the respondents, specifically pointed out to the contents of the First Information Report and would maintain that the mere fact that the number of the vehicle specifically had not been specified in the First Information Report, that by itself cannot be a ground to negate the claim and apart from the First Information Report, the other evidence available can also be considered and in fact, it is not a case of death but it is a case of injured claiming compensation and the injured supported his version by examining himself as P.W.1 and the said evidence had been well corroborated by his son-in-law-P.W.3 and in the cross-examination clarification had been given by P.W.3 and inasmuch as the involvement of the vehicle has been clearly established, the findings recorded by the Tribunal to be confirmed. 19. This Court had given its earnest consideration to the evidence available on record. The evidence of P.W.2- Dr.G.Ramachandra Reddy, apart from the documentary evidence-Ex.A5-discharge card issued by Gandhi hospital; Ex.A6-CT scan brain report along with bill; Ex.A7- medical bills (6 Nos); Ex.A8-estimates costs of artificial limb and Ex.A9-xerox copy of insurance policy also had been relied on. It is pertinent to note that though the exorbitant claim of Rs.6,00,000/- has been made by the insured, the learned Tribunal having considered the oral and documentary evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that the insured was entitled to a portion of the compensation which was claimed and accordingly granted Rs.2,70,000/- with proportionate costs and future interest at 7.5% p.a. from the date of the petition till the date of realization. 20. There cannot be any doubt or controversy whatsoever that unless the involvement of the vehicle in question had been established, the insurance company cannot be fastened with the liability. As already specified supra, since permission had been obtained all these grounds had been framed by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is no doubt true that in Ex.A1-certified copy of the First Information Report, the number of the vehicle had not been specified. It is pertinent to note that it is not a case of death. It is true that P.W.3 deposed that he was not present at the time of the accident but in the cross- examination he had clarified that he was present at about a distance of about 200 yards from the spot at the point of time. P.W.1 is the injured himself. In the case of evaluating the evidence of eye witness, the case of death would be solely on a different footing from the case of injury. The injuries can be of valid forms. The injured in all probability, might have witnessed the incident since he had sustained injuries by virtue of the accident in question. 21. In the light of the same, the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be totally brushed aside. The mere fact that in the First Information Report, the number of the vehicle had not been specified, by that itself the stand taken by the insurance company that by virtue of an afterthought, in collusion with the owner to get some unlawful gain, this litigation had been brought out cannot be accepted and hence, the same is hereby negated. This Court, in fact, had carefully gone through the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 as well, apart from the evidence of P.W.1 and Ex.A1- certified copy of First Information Report; Ex.A2-certified copy of charge sheet; Ex.A3-certified copy of scene of offence panchanama; Ex.A4-certified copy of M.L.C; Ex.A5-discharge card issued by Gandhi hospital; Ex.A6- CT scan brain report along with bill; Ex.A7-medical bills; Ex.A8-estimates costs of artificial limb and Ex.A9-xerox copy of insurance policy. This Court also had gone through the evidence of R.W.1 and also Ex.B1-certified copy of First Information Report; Ex.B2-certified copy of charge sheet; Ex.B3-certified copy of scene of offence panchanama; Ex.B4-certified copy of case diary parts 2 relating to Ch.Anjaneyulu and M.Narasimha;; Ex.B5- attested copy of charge sheet issued by the Station House Officer, Keesara, Cyberabad; Ex.B6-attested copy of case diary relating to Ch.Anjaneyulu and Ex.B7- attested copy of policy. It is needless to say that several of the documents marked as exhibit ‘B’ series had been marked even as exhibit ‘A’ series. Be that as it may, this being a beneficial case of investigation and well normally when acceptable evidence is available on record and convinced findings had been recorded by the Tribunal, the said findings need not be disturbed by this Court. Accordingly, the said findings are hereby confirmed. 22. Point No.3: In the result, this appeal being devoid of merit the same shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. __________________ P.S.NARAYANA,J 01st June, 2010. Tsy [1] 2004(3) ALD (NOC) 312 [2] 2009(3) ALT 260 (DB)