IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.2692 of 2009 RAJA RAMCHANDRA RAM Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 3/ 11/11/2009 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. The petitioner is aggrieved by order of his suspension dated 9.2.2009. Urging that the order of suspension was mala fide in law, it was submitted that the petitioner was, in fact, present for Government duties at another place and, therefore, he could not appear when his presence was sought in the Health Camp being held by the Chief Minister. The submission is sought to be buttressed from a news paper report dated 5.2.2009 stated to have been published in a Hindi Daily “Hindustan”. The second submission was that charges have been served only on 31.7.2009. The order of suspension has to be revoked after expiry of three months under Rule-9(7) of the Bihar C.C.A. Rules,2005 as interpreted by the Full Bench in the judgement reported in 2009(4) P.L.J.R. 272 (The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Gyan Kumar Ram & Ors.). Any order of suspension is a matter of administrative action by the employer as a measure of discipline against an employee considered errant. An 2 order of suspension is not an indictment or punishment. The master-servant relationship is neither severed nor suspended. This Court finds it difficult on basis of a news paper report to hold that the order of suspension was mala fide. A news paper report is no evidence. The author of the statements to whom they are attributed has to be examined. The person in whose presence the utterances were made has also to be examined and the publication has to be proved in accordance with law. A news paper report is not per se admissible evidence in law. It has been held in AIR 1988 SUPREME COURT 1274 "Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of T.N. “It is now well-settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported.” If the petitioner could not be present for other administrative reasons that shall be his defence in the departmental proceeding. What Rule-9(7) of Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005 provides is that charges must be framed within three months, or the period of seven months totally as 3 contemplated therein. There has to be and there is a distinction between the framing of charges and the issuance of charges. It is not the contention of the petitioner that no charges have been framed within three months. What is urged is that charges framed have been issued on 31.7.2009 leading to the presumption that charges have been framed on 31.7.2009. This Court has already discussed that there is a vital distinction between framing of charges and issuance of charges. The mischief of Rule-9(7) of the Rules shall come into operation only if the charges have not been framed within the time specified. In absence of necessary factual pleading to that effect in the writ application when the counter affidavit affirmed in April, 2009 states that the charges are in the process of being framed and the petitioner does not assert having filed any representation before the authorities for revocation of charges after three months when the charges have not been framed, this Court finds it difficult to adjudicate that issue. The last submission is that the order of suspension is dated 9.3.2009 and the petitioner approached this Court on 26.2.2009. Therefore, if charges have not been framed within three months of 4 the order of suspension, the authorities are required to revoke the suspension. The argument does not appeal to the Court for the simple reason that what the Full Bench has held is that after an order of suspension is issued and three months have passed, the delinquent is required to submit an application praying for recalling of the order of suspension for absence of charges being framed within three months. In that event charges can be framed even after three months and be acceptable to do so if it was done before any application by the delinquent was made. That analogy clearly does not apply in this case as the writ application filed before the expiry of three months from the date of suspension which cannot be transposed to be considered as an application made afresh after expiry of three months from the date of suspension. This Court, therefore, finds no merit in this writ application. It is accordingly dismissed. However, in the nature of the charges mentioned against the petitioner in the order of suspension this Court is satisfied that the departmental proceedings stated to have been initiated are required to be concluded at an early date within a maximum period of six months from the date provided that the petitioner himself cooperates. If the 5 departmental proceedings are not concluded within a period of six months for no reason attributable to the petitioner the authorities by reason of the present order itself are required to reconsider the issue of suspension without requiring any further application from the petitioner when the departmental proceedings may otherwise continue. KC ( Navin Sinha, J.)