THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR A.S.No.581 of 1992 Date: 09.12.2011 Between: Valluru Venkata Rama Krishna, Vijayawada. … Appellant/ Plaintiff AND Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, Vijayawada … Respondent/ Defendant THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR A.S.No.581 of 1992 JUDGMENT: This is a plaintiff’s appeal. The suit by the plaintiff that the judgments in O.S.No.418 and 419 of 1979 on the file of the Sub-Court, Vijayawada were not binding on the plaintiff, was dismissed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff laid the present suit. 2. The facts run on a very narrow compass. The defendant is Vijayawada Municipal Corporation (VMC, for short). VMC laid O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada against Venkateswara Rao, father of the plaintiff herein. The suits were for recovery of the tax due from the father of the plaintiff to the VMC. As the Statutes provided for first charge, VMC sought for a first charge over the properties of the father of the complainant. Preliminary decrees were passed in both the suits on 02.01.1982. Later, on 07.10.1982 final decrees were passed. 3. On 15.03.1984 the plaintiff issued a notice to the VMC that since 1970 the plaintiff is the owner of the properties in respect of which tax is demanded owing to partition between the plaintiff and his father and that a suit for recovery of the tax ought to have been filed against the plaintiff and not against his father. Sri Ch. Srinivas, learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979 were against the wrong person and that the judgments and decrees therein do not bind the plaintiff. 4. He further submitted that the suits in O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979 are more in the nature of suits on the foot mortgage and that in view of the provision under Order 34 Rule 1 CPC, the person interested in the mortgaged property must be put to notice before filing the suit and relief should be sought against such person interested in the mortgaged suit. 5. Inter alia, it is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant-VMC is not entitled to execute the decrees in O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979, since it cannot execute the decrees against the plaintiff, as the plaintiff is not a party to the suit. 6. The learned counsel for the plaintiff placed reliance upon Hindupur Municipal Council v. Meharunnisa[1] in support of his contention. In that case, the property of the mother-in-law was subsequently purchased by the daughter-in-law in an auction held by a bank. When the decree against the mother-in-law was sought to be executed against the auction purchaser, the Court held that although the auction purchaser is the owner of the property who is the daughter-in-law, as the decree was not against her, the decree against the mother-in-law could not be executed against the daughter-in-law. On the basis of this decision, it is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that when the plaintiff is the owner of the property, the defendant, who obtained decrees against the father of the plaintiff, cannot execute the same against the plaintiff. 7. In the cited case, the property of the mother-in- law was purchased by the decree holder in a court auction in execution proceedings. The decree holder in fact subsequently sold the property to the daughter-in-law. Thus, it is not as though there was a partition between the parties wherein the daughter-in-law became entitled to the property. In the present case, the claim of the plaintiff is that there was partition between the plaintiff and his father in 1970. 8. Smt. G. Jhansi, learned Standing Counsel for the defendant-VMC contended that if there was a partition between the plaintiff and his father, the plaintiff ought to have brought it to the notice of VMC, in view of mandatory provision under Section 93 (4)(a) of the A.P. Municipalities Act. 9. The learned Standing Counsel for the defendant-VMC has taken me through the provisions under Sections 207 and 209 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipalities Act (GHMC, for short). Under 207, GHMC Act, when there is transfer of title of persons in respect of properties, which are liable for payment of property tax, notice should be given to the Commissioner of such transfer by the transferee. Section 209, GHMC Act ordains that the transferee of the property shall be liable in addition to the transferor if such transfer is not notified u/s.207, GHMC Act. Section 90 and 93 of the A.P. Municipalities Act are para meteria with Sections 209 and 207, GHMC Act. 10. It may be noticed that by 1970 when the alleged partition between the plaintiff and his father was effected, VMC was a municipality. The A.P. Municipalities Act was applicable to the properties by then. Section 93 (4)(a) of the A.P. Municipalities Act envisages that the liability of the transferee for payment of tax does not cease even though the original owner of the property also is bound to pay the property tax, which was assessed. 11. It is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the defendant-VMC that the plaintiff who did not inform the Commissioner about this partition between the plaintiff and his father cannot now turn round and claim that the property belongs to him and that the suit filed by the VMC against the father of the plaintiff cannot bind the plaintiff. 12. Section 90 of the A.P. Municipalities Act empowers the municipality to collect tax even from bona fide purchasers without notice. In the cited case, this Court held that a decree for arrears of municipal tax against the original vendor was not enforceable against the purchaser, who had no knowledge about the decree. That case does not apply to the present case where the property was partitioned and the plaintiff was duty bound to inform partition to the municipalities. Added to it, admittedly the plaintiff and his father continued to live together even after the decrees in O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979. Therefore, the cited decision is not an authority for the present case, as the question in that case was about liability of a vendee who had no knowledge about the decree. The plaintiff cannot plead ignorance of decrees in O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979 where the plaintiff and his father admittedly were living together. 13. In fact, the case runs on a short point. Would the plaintiff who acquired title to the plaint schedule property on account of partition with his father be liable and is bound by the decrees in O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979 when the plaintiff was not a defendant in those suits. When there was a statutory duty on the plaintiff to inform the municipality about the change of title on account of the partition and the plaintiff had failed to do so, any obligation of the father engulfs the plaintiff also with the same obligation. Consequently, the plaintiff is as much liable as his father was to honour the decrees in O.S.Nos.418 and 419 of 1979. 14. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff was liable to honour the decrees and the final decrees passed against his father and that VMC could proceed against the properties. The judgment of the trial Court is perfectly justified in the background mentioned above. There are no merits in the present appeal. 15. The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The advocate fee is fixed at Rs.5,000/-. _________________ K.G. SHANKAR, J Date: 09.12.2011 Isn [1] 1984 (2) ALJ 169