^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTtSGARH AT BILASPUR il'BLE SHRI RAJEEVGUPTA, CJ. HOWBLE SHRI R.L. JHANWAR, J. Crimina! Revision No. 364 of 2005 Mahesh Ram Dewangan, son of late Ramu Ram Dewangan, aged 33 y^ars, resident of Viltage Devgaon, P.S. Narayanpur, District Bastar. VERSUS 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Police Station, Narayanpur, District Bastar. 2. Shobhiram, son of Shri Mansaram Dewangan, aged about 32 years, resident of Village Dewgaon, P.S. Narayanur, District Bastar. Petjtjon under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 Present: Shri Vivek Chopda, learned counsel for the petitioner. Shri V.V.S. Murthy, tearned Deputy Advocate General with Shri Akhll Agrawal, iearned Panel Lawyer for the State/ respondent No.1. ORDER ith The fol (20m0ctober, 2009) order of the Court was passed by pta, C.J. \. Shri Vivek Chopda, learned counsel for the petitioner is heard on admission. 2. Petitioner Mahesh.Ram Dewangan, the first informant in this case has filed this revision petition against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 29.03.2005, passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur in Sessions Trial ^^^^[s^^MS^^^-i^ :iL'.-:?f .•2ii-i"»" S S a No. 236/2003, whereby respondent No.2/ accused Shobhiram \ was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 3, Police Narayanpur, District Bastar after completion of the investigation of the case registered on the report of petitioner Mahesh Ram Dewangan cj^arge-sheeted respondenV accused ,^. Shobhiram for the alieged commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code on the accusation of his having committed murder of deceased Ramuram Dewangan on 18.02.2003. 4. Respondent/ accused Shobhiram abjured his guitt and pieaded false implication to the charge Tramed by the trial Court under Section 302 ofthe I.P.C. 5. At the trial, the capital charge of murder under Section 302 of the IPC was sought to be proved on the evidence of PW-1 Dr Mahendra Kumar Sharma, PW-2 Dr Arijit Aadiya, PW-3 Ratan Singh Manjhi, PW-4 Chintamani Dewangan, PW-5 Sitaram Kashyap, PW-6 Ganesh Ram Dewangan, PW-7 Janki Dewangan, PW-8 Mahesh Dewangan, PW-9 Smt Shantibai, PW-10 AK Shukta, PW-11 Smt Choukeybai @ Chavakdeyi, \. PW-12 Smt Ramoli and PW-13 Ramprasad Sori 6. The trial Court on a close scrutiny of the entire evidence led by the prosecutipn at the trial found that the prosecution evidence suffered from serious infirmities. The trial Court, therefore, recorded the impugned judgment of acquittal of resporident / accused Shobhiram. , ^•ysSiizsSss'1 ii:;!^?^?^ •d'1' 'iL 7. Shri Vivek Chopda, leamed counset for the petitioner \ vehemently argued that the trial Court has erred in giving undue weight to the mention.of the name of the assailant as Shambhuram in the first information report. 8. The Apex Court while considering the scope of interference in a complainant's revision petition against the judgment of •'f: _ .. . -. .. acqulttal in the case of Ram Briksh Singh And Others Vs. Ambika Yadav And Another, reported in (2004) 7 SCC - 665, observed in paras 3 to 7 : "3. The principles on which a revisional court can set aside a judgment and order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused are well settled by a catena of judgments. The difficulty, however, arises at times about the application of the said principles. It is true that there is a statutory prohibition contained in sub- section (3) of Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code on converting a finding ofacquittal into one of conviction and what is prohibited cannot be done indirectty aswell. The question, however, is, has the High Court indirectiy done what is prohibited. 4. Sections 397 to 401 of the Code are a group of sections conferring higher and superior courts a sort of supervisory jurisdiction. These powers are required to be exercisSd sparingly. Though the jurisdiQtion under Section 401 cannot be invoked to only correct wrong appreciation of evidence and the High Court is not required to act as a court of appeal but at the same time, it is the duty of the court to correct manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriageof justice. .1)1. T ^ 5, More than half a century ago, in D. Stephens v. Nosbolla (AIR 1^51 SC 196 : 1951 SCR 284 : 52 Cri LJ 510) this Court held that revisional jurisdiction when it is invoked against an order of aGquittal by a private complainant js not to be lightly exercised, it could be exercised only in exceptionai cases to correct a manifest itlegatity or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice arja not to be ordinarily used merely for the reason that the trial court has misappreciated the evidence on record. 6. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. (AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 3 SCR 412 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 8) a note ofcaution was appended so that the High Court does notconvert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction in view of specific statutory prohibition. While noticing that it is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining exceptiorial cases which wouid cover all contingencies for exercise of revisional power, some cases by way of illustration were mentioned wherein the high Court would be justified in interfering with the finding of acquitta! in revision. The High Courtwould bejustified to interfere where materiat evidence is overlooked by the trial court. 7. In a recent decision in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh -v. State of B'lhar (now Jharkhand) ((2002) 6 SCC 650 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1448 noticing principtes laid down in Stephens'1 and Chinnaswamy Reddy^ it was he!d that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conciusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the .Code since it was •^r.;?,) :^T"""""T"~"" ^"'ya-wy '•^ ^Bg^ j "^te^S^' weil settled that the order of acquittal cannot be interfered with in Yevision merely on the ground of errors in appreciation of evidence. Relying upon these decisions, Mr'Mishra contends that the High Court while interfering with the judgment and order of the Court of Session has not kept in view the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction." *i. 9. Mere alleged mis-appfeciation of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses by the trial Court in view of the above quoted dictum of-the Apex Court in the case of Ram Briksh Singh And Others Vs. Ambika Yadav And Another (Supra) will not by itself be a sufficient ground to warrant interference in a complainant's revision petition againstthe judgment ofacquittat. 10. The flrst information report in the case was lodged by petitioner Mahesh Ram Dewangan, who is son of deceased Ramuram Dewangan. From the first information report it is apparent that informant's wife PW-9 Shantibai also accompanied him to the police station for lodging the first information report. According to the first information report, informant's wife PW-9 Shantibai was an eyewitness of the incident of murder of her father-in-law Ramuram Dewangan. In this background, the mention of the name of the as.sallant as Shambhuram in the first information .report assumes importance andthe non-mention of the name of respondent / accused Shobhiram as the assailant of the informant's father Ramuram Dewangan is sufficient to entitle respondent / accused Shobhiram for benefit ofdoubtin the case. ^^^^ SE;';. ^~;^^?:^, > 1 : gs ." ^. ^ ^:' .•IK;1 .•'•: :3-.-<':" ..A' ^3 RK We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned \ judgment of acquittat passed by the trial Court, which may warrant interference in this complainant's revision petition against the acquittal. , 11. The revision petition filed by the petitioner/ complainant against the impugned judgrpent of acquittal, therefore, is liable to '<!'. be dismissed and is hereby dismissed summarily. Sd/- Chiefjustice Sd/- R.L. Jhanwar padma \.