IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CR.W.J.C. No.58 of 2011 AMAR NATH SINGH, S/O LATE CHANDRA MOHAN SINGH, R/O VILLAGE FATEHKPUR, P.S. RAGHOPUR, DISTRICT VAISHALI .. PETITIONER Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. DY. SECRETARY, HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT, BIHAR, PATNA 3. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, VAISHALI 4. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, VAISHALI .. RESPONDENTS **** /3/ 11 February 2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. The prayer, in this criminal writ petition, is for quashing the detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur, vide Memo no. 684, dated 19.10.2010, in exercise of powers under Section 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act’). That order has been confirmed by the Government of Bihar and petitioner is to be detained in preventive custody till 18.10.2011. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two main grounds to assail the order of detention. It has been submitted firstly that the 2 detention order, which is contained in Annexure 2 provides information to the detenue that he may make a representation against the order of detention to the Deputy Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, through the Superintendent of Jail as soon as possible. He has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Vinod Yadav Vrs. The State of Bihar reported in 2007 (supp.) P.L.J.R., 936, in support of his submission that the order of detention suffers from vital lacunae because the petitioner- detenue was entitled by virtue of article 22(5) of the Constitution to be apprised of his right to file a representation against the order of detention before the District Magistrate, who passed the detention order under Section 12(2) of the Act. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of this Court and Annexure 2 clearly show that the order of detention suffers from the defect pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Division Bench judgment of this Court, noticed above, takes note of several earlier judgments of the Supreme Court and we 3 find no good reason to take a different view. In that view of the matter, this writ petition must succeed on the first point itself. Accordingly, it is allowed and the order of detention, under challenge, as well as the later order confirming the same, are quashed. It may be indicated that on behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajammal Vrs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in A.I.R. 1999 S.C., 684, in support of another contention that delay in disposal of petitioner’s representation by about thirty days also invalidates the detention of the petitioner. In the case of Rajammal the Apex Court found an unexplained delay of five days to be fatal to the detention. Since, the petition succeeds on the first ground itself, hence, we find it not necessary to examine whether the delay of thirty days has been properly explained or not. Before parting with the order we would like the authorities of the State of Bihar to keep in mind the observations of the provision in the case of Vinod Yadav (supra) as made in paragraph 15. This Court 4 had observed and directed the State of Bihar to circulate fresh guidelines, if required, to all the District Magistrates that in addition to provision in Section 17 of the Act which entitles a detenue to make a representation to the State Government, on account of judicial interpretation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, a detenue is further entitled to information that he can make representation also to the District Magistrate in case the order of detention has been made by a District Magistrate. It appears that either fresh guidelines, as directed, have not been circulated as yet or else the District Magistrate needs a fresh reminder to follow the guidelines. This should be kept in mind by all the District Magistrates S.A. (Shiva Kirti Singh, J.) ( Gopal Prasad, J.)