IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Court’s order whether the case is or not approved for reporting (Chapter VIII, Rule 32(2) (b) Description of Case Criminal Misc. Application No.782 of 2007 Date of decision :-13.10.2008 A.F.R. (Approved for Reporting) Nor approved for reporting Date :- 13.10.2008 Initials of Judge Note :- Bench Reader will attach this at the top of the first page of the judgment when it is put up before the Judge for signature. HIGH COURT OF UTTARANCHAL AT NAINITAL Criminal Misc. Application No. 782 of 2007 Lakhbeer Singh S/o Kashmir Singh R/o village Ethal Bujurg Pargana Jwalapur Tehsil Laksar, P.S. Pathari District Haridwar ……Applicant Versus State of Uttarakhand & others …..Respondents Dated :- 13th October, 2008 Mr. Lalit Tiwari, Advocate for the applicant. Mr. B. S. Parihar, Brief Holder for respondent nos.1 & 2. Mr. M. C. Bansal, Advocate for respondent no.3. Hon’ble J. C. S. Rawat, J. Heard Mr. Lalit Tiwari, Advocate for the applicant, Mr. B. S. Parihar, Brief Holder for respondent nos.1 & 2 and Mr. M. C. Bansal, Advocate for respondent no.3. 2. The petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the impugned order dated 16.10.2007 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Laksar, Haridwar in case No.6/2007 (State Vs. Lakhbeer & another). 3. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent no.3 filed an application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in the court of S.D.M., Laksar with the prayer that the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. may be initiated against the present applicant and the property may be attached under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. After calling the police report, the S.D.M. issued notice to the applicant to appear before the court under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. The S.D.M. simultaneously passed the impugned order under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. on 16.10.2007 directing the S.H.O., Pathari to attach property in dispute until the rights of the parties have not been declared by the competent court of law. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the present petition has been filed by the applicant. 4. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that the order passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. is revisable. It was further pointed out that it is an admitted position that no proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C. is pending before the court below and the parties have been directed to decide their title through the competent court of law. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the impugned order is an interlocutory and it cannot be challenged by way of a revision petition. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not define the interlocutory order. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. It may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it is directed. Interim order means an order of purely interim or temporary nature which did not decide or touch the important rights and liabilities of the parties. Where the order, though it may be interim, decides or touch the important rights and liabilities of the parties that cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi Vs. State & another reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 403 has held as follows:- “6. It has been argued that the order of the Magistrate dated August 8, 1974 was an interlocutory order and the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, could not be exercised in relation to it by virtue of sub-section (2). 7. The Code does not define an interlocutory order, but it obviously is an intermediate order, made during the preliminary stages of an enquiry or trial. The purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 397 is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. But it does not follow that if the order is directed against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, and he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he cannot apply for its revision even if it is directed against him and adversely affects him rights. 8. A somewhat similar argument came up for consideration before this Court in Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujrat 1968 (2) SCR 685. The controversy there centred round the meaning of Article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution and the Court examined the meaning of the words “final” and “interlocutory”. It was held that the meaning “had to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required” to be interpreted. No single test can be applied to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory. Then it has been held by this Court in that case as follows: “An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.” It may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it is directed. As has been shown, the order of the Magistrate dated August 8, 1974 was not according to law and it adversely affected the appellant, who was not a party to the enquiry or trial, as it was solely directed against her. As is obvious, she could have no opportunity to challenge it after the making of the final order, and such a belated challenge would have been purposeless for it would have given her no relief. So insofar as the appellant is concerned, the order of the Magistrate could not be said to be an interlocutory order and the revisional courts erred in raising the bar of sub- section (2) of Section 397 against it.” 9. We have gone through Dhola v. State 1975 Cri. L.J. 1274 and Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand AIR 1967 SC 799 cited by Mr Vohra. Dhola case related to the grant of bail, and Gokal Chand case related to a right of appeal under Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against an order made inter parties. They cannot therefore avail the respondent in this case.” 5. In the instant case, the S.D.M. has directed the parties that he is not in a position to decide the matter. The S.D.M. has opined that there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and the matter is with regard to the possession of the disputed property. He also directed to get decided their rights with regard to the possession from the competent court of law. Thus, the S.D.M. has taken possession of the land, had attached the property and the possession of the property to the parties have been deprived. Thus, it cannot be concluded that it is an interlocutory order. In view of the foregoing discussion, the petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, the petition is dismissed. However, the liberty is given to applicant to file a revision petition before the competent court and the court concerned shall also consider the pendency of the present petition while deciding the limitation for filing of the revision petition before the revisional court. (J. C. S. Rawat, J.) Dated 13th October, 2008 LSR