IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. *** C.M. No. 9701-C of 2006 R.S.A. No. 3816 of 2006 Date of decision: 22.1.2008 Santokh Singh --- Appellant Versus Surinder Singh --- Respondent --- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL --- PRESENT: Mr. Vipin Mahajan, Advocate for the appellant. --- AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J. This is defendant’s appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur, dated 29.5.2006 whereby an appeal preferred by him against the judgment and decree of the trial court, dated 7.2.2000 (whereby the suit was decreed) was dismissed. Plaintiff, the respondent herein, filed a suit against the defendant-appellant for possession by way of specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 15.10.1991(Exhibit P-1) regarding land measuring 5 Kanals. It was averred that the suit land was owned and possessed by the defendant who had agreed to sell it to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 21,875/-. The defendant had received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as part of the sale consideration of the land and rest of the amount was agreed to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. Agreement dated 15.10.1991 was executed by the parties in that regard R.S.A.No. 3816 of 2006 whereby the sale deed was agreed to be executed and registered on or before 22.5.1992. As per terms and conditions of the agreement, the expenses for registration of the sale deed were to be borne by the plaintiff. In case of the defendant’s failure to perform his part of the agreement, the plaintiff had a right to get the agreement enforced through court, and upon the plaintiff’s failure to do so; the money paid by him in advance was to be forfeited. It was further averred that the plaintiff remained ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement whereas on the other hand, the defendant failed to turn up in the office of the Sub Registrar for getting the sale deed executed in terms of the aforesaid agreement which gave rise to the filing of the above suit. Defendant, by means of written statement, came up with a plea that the plaintiff had hatched a conspiracy against him in connivance with the scribe and had fabricated the alleged agreement with an ulterior motive to grab the land in dispute. By way of replication, the plaintiff controverted the pleas raised by the defendant and reiterated the facts pleaded in the plaint. The trial court, upon consideration of the evidence, both oral as well as documentary, returned a finding that agreement, Exhibit P-1, had been executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and the same was binding on the parties. The plea of the defendant regarding aforesaid agreement being a result of any fraud, forgery or misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff was negatived. It also stood proved that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, and it was the defendant who had failed to perform his part of the agreement. Consequently, the suit was decreed. 2 R.S.A.No. 3816 of 2006 Appeal carried by the defendant was dismissed by the first appellate court. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. The findings returned by the trial court are based on correct appreciation of the evidence. The first appellate court agreeing with the findings of the trial court, put its seal of affirmation thereon. Though the counsel for the appellant argued in favour of invalidation of the findings of the facts recorded by the courts below, but could not pin-point any illegality or perversity therein so as to persuade this Court to interfere in second appeal, particularly when the defendant-appellant had admitted his signatures on the agreement to sell Exhibit P-1. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law is shown to have arisen for the consideration of this Court. In view of the above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed in limine. Since there is no merit in the appeal, it is considered not necessary to pass any order on the application for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, which shall otherwise be treated to have been disposed of in so far as the pendency thereof is concerned. (AJAY KUMAR MITTAL) January 22, 2008 JUDGE *RKMALIK* 3