1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO.664 OF 2008 Baburao Pillaji Hazare ..Appellant V/s. Wamanrao Damodar Doundkar ..Respondent Mr.P.S.Dani, Advocate, for the appellant Mr.P.J.Thorat i/b.Mr.R.A.Thorat, Advocate, for the respondent CORAM : C. L. PANGARKAR, J. DATE : 11TH JANUARY, 2010 P.C. . This is a Second Appeal by the appellant/the original plaintiff, who lost in both the Courts below. 2. The appellant/original plaintiff instituted the Suit for the Specific Performance of Contract. It is the contention of the plaintiff that he had executed the Sale Deed in favour of the defendant and the defendant in turn had executed an Agreement of reconveyance in favour of the plaintiff. The 2 said Sale Deed as well as Agreement had taken place in the year 1980 i.e. On 23rd May, 1980. The plaintiff contended that there was no time fixed as to when the reconveyance should be executed in favour of the plaintiff. It is also contention of the plaintiff that he had approached the defendant in the year 1983 with a sum of money payable to the defendant under the contract and Agreement of reconveyance in his favour. The defendant however, though, did not specifically deny to execute the Sale deed postponed execution of the Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff. Ultimately in the year 1992 the plaintiff issued registered notice calling upon the defendant to execute reconveyance. The defendant failed to do so. Hence, the suit. 3. The defendent filed Written Statement and denied that there was any Agreement of reconveyance. He also denied the contention raised by the plaintiff. The defendant 3 contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The Trial Court recorded the evidence and came to the conclusion that the defendants had executed the Deed of reconveyance in favour of the plaintiff but the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract and the suit was barred by limitation. Holding so the learned Judge of the Trial Court dismissed the suit. 4. The plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the Trial Court, preferred an Appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge confirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the Appeal. 5. I have heard Mr.P.S.Dani, the learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.P.J.Thorat, the learned counsel for the respondent. 6. Mr.P.S.Dani, the learned counsel for 4 the appellant contended before me that the finding recorded by the Trial Court that the suit was barred by limitation was not correct in as much as there was no refusal in the year 1983 as such. He submits that there is specific time which is fixed to perform the part of contract. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submits before me that there was refusal on the part of the defendant and there are two concurrent findings of the fact and what is urged by Mr.P.S.Dani is only the question of fact. He submits that there is questin of law as such which is urged. 7. I have considered the evidence on record. It is found from the evidence that in the year 1983 itself the defendant had not executed the Sale Deed in his favour even though he had gone to the defendant with money to repay him. This admission on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant had not met 5 him is nothing but it is clear that he had not breached the reconveyance of the Sale Deed. This evidence has been appreciated. There is no perversity in such appreciation of the evidence. 8. As far as question of ready and willingness is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant submits before me that the plaintiff had actually gone to the defendant within a period of three years with some money and that itself would go to show that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that parties are supposed to act within a reasonable time. According to him, reasonable time would the time stipulated under the Law of Limitation. He submits that the plaintiff was supposed to act within a period of three years as he has issued notice to the defendant in the year 1992. It could not be said that 6 he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The findings recorded by the Courts below do not appear to be perverse in view of the fact that the plaintiff approached the Court in the year 1992 for the first time. He could have done so immediately upon refusal. 9. In view of the above, I do not find that there is no substantial question of law involved in the above Second Appeal which is accordingly dismissed. (C.L.PANGARKAR, J.)