F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 1 }: IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH DATE OF DECISION: AUGUST 18, 2008 National Insurance Company Limited, Chandigarh .....Appellant VERSUS Smt.Paramjit Kaur and others ....Respondents CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRESENT: Mr.D.P.Gupta, Advocate, for the appellant. None for respondent Nos.1 to 4. Mr. Yashwinder Singh, AAG, Haryana, for respondent Nos.5 to 7. **** RANJIT SINGH, J. Insurance Company has filed this appeal to impugn the order passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act (for short, “the Act”), Circle Sirsa, awarding compensation to the respondents on account of death of Sh.Gurdial Singh, who was working as a Driver with the Haryana Roadways. The respondent-claimants are widow and minor son and daughters of the deceased, who was detailed to ply the bus under the control and F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 2 }: supervision of General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Sirsa. In the claim application filed, it is pleaded that the deceased was drawing a salary of Rs.2500/- per month from the Department. It is further averred that deceased was detailed to drive a bus from Dabwali to Delhi on 13.3.2000 and accordingly reached Delhi at 10:45 hours. On his return journey, when he reached near Bahadurgarh, the bus met with an accident and accordingly had to observe a forced halt till 22:45 hours on 15.3.2000. The deceased while driving the bus from Bahadurgarh to Dabwali, felt pain in his chest while somewhere between Sirsa and Dabwali and he told so to the Conductor of the bus. The pain increased in intensity on the morning of 16.3.2000, when the bus reached at Dabwali. The Conductor made arrangement for the treatment of the deceased, who was then taken to Aggarwal Nursing Home. There he was checked by Dr.O.P.Aggarwal. At 2 P.M., the deceased again experienced shooting pain in his chest and finally breathed his last on account of heart attack. The application accordingly was filed for seeking compensation, pleading that the deceased had expired during the course of his employment while on duty. It is further averred that no reply was received despite notice sent through a counsel and accordingly petition for compensation was filed before the Commissioner. The claim was resisted by the appellant-Insurance Company and respondent Nos.5 to 7. A written statement was filed on their behalf, stating that true facts were not stated in the application. It was further pointed out that the bus was insured with the National Insurance Company and if it is held that the said F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 3 }: respondents were responsible then liability would be that of the Insurance Company. Otherwise, the employment of deceased, Gurdial Singh, on contractual basis was conceded and so also the fact that he was drawing a salary of Rs.2760/- per month. It was also conceded that deceased was assigned duty on 13.3.2000 from Dabwali to Delhi and back but it is pleaded that he did not die during the course of employment. On the basis of pleadings, various issues were framed. The parties were permitted to lead evidence and on appreciation thereof, the Commissioner has held that the deceased died due to heart failure during the course of his employment while he was performing his duties. The Commissioner has relied upon the evidence of Dr.O.P.Aggarwal (PW2). Raj Kumar, Conductor of the bus, who appeared as a witness to give account of the events, which clearly showed that the deceased died, enroute while driving his bus from Bahadurgarh to Dabwali. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company would mainly contend that the deceased died due to heart attack and there was no evidence to establish that death was attributable to working condition of the deceased. In this regard, the counsel has made an attempt to seek support from the observations made in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti Vs. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and another, 2007 ACJ 1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has observed that without any evidence that death was due to cardiac arrest because of stress and strain, the Commissioner would not have jurisdiction to grant compensation. The facts in the case of F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 4 }: Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) were entirely different. It was a case of death of a Cleaner (Conductor), who died of heart attack while alighting from the vehicle. It was found that the job of Cleaner was not strenuous and he was merely getting down from the vehicle, when he died of heart attack. In this background, it was found that there was no evidence of any casual connection with the accident or injury so as to cover the requirement of term `out of employment'. It was also observed in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) that nothing was brought on record that heart attack was suffered while doing any job. The Driver of the vehicle in this case was brother of the deceased Conductor but was not produced. The facts in the instant case are entirely different. In the present case, the deceased was a Driver of the bus. He was in the course of his employment, when the bus met with an accident, leading to forced halt for a long duration and prolonged duty hours. The deceased complained of a chest pain but still continued to drive the vehicle. It was only when the pain increased that he was taken to the hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. In the background of this factual position, it can clearly be inferred that the deceased died during the course of employment and this is relatable to the stress and strain of the employment of the deceased. Thus, the ratio of law laid down in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) is clearly distinguishable. In the case of Employees' State Insurance Corporation Vs. Francis De Costa, 1996 ACJ 1281 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the essential ingredients for such F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 5 }: finding and the tests attracting the provisions of Section 3 of the Act are as follows:- “(1) There must be a casual connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment. (2)The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the injury. (3)If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the facts of each case.” In Employees' State Insurance Corporation's case, (supra), the words “arising out of and in the course of the employment” have been explained as under:- “Nothing could be simpler than the words `arising out of and in the course of the employment'. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises `in the course of' the employment is to be distinguished from what arises `out of employment'. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not every accident which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employment, that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 6 }: to do, gives a claim to compensation unless it also arises out of employment. Hence, the section imports a distinction which it does not define. The language is simple and unqualified....” Referring to the opinion of Lord Lindley, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti's case (supra) referred to `accident' as under:- “The word `accident' is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause; and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident. The word `accident' is also often used to denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to discriminate between them. The great majority of what are called accidents are occasioned by carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often important to distinguish careless from other unintended and unexpected events.” It is accordingly observed as under:- “Injury suffered should be a physio-logical injury. Accident, ordinarily, would have to be understood as unforeseen or uncomprehended or could not be foreseen or comprehended. A finding of fact, thus, has to be F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 7 }: arrived at, inter alia, having regard to the nature of the work and the situation in which the deceased was placed. There, thus, must be shown to be a casual connection between the injury and accident and the work done in the course of employment. There would be no requirement of showing that there was a direct connection between the cause of death and nature of duties. Even a casual connection between the two will suffice and the claim of the compensation on such count will be maintainable. The evidence brought on record is also required to be seen to establish a greater probability which would satisfy the reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the injury, death etc. In the instant case, respondent-claimants apparently have discharged their burden by producing the evidence of a doctor who attended the deceased immediately and by producing the Conductor, who gave a direct account of the events. The deceased was driving the vehicle. He had to remain on duty for extended hours. He suffered heart attack while he was driving the vehicle. It can give rise to an inference that death is related to stress and strain of duty/jobs. It has been noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) that in a case of this nature, to prove that the accident had taken place, factors which are to be established are as under:- “(1) stress and strain arising during the course of employment; (2)nature of employment; and F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 8 }: (3)injury aggravated due to stress and strain.” Since the deceased was driving the bus and had to remain engaged in his job for a considerable long period, it would be reasonable to infer that there was stress and strain in the course of his employment. The deceased complained of chest pain but still had to drive the vehicle before it became acute leading to his hospitalisation. The heart attack, which he suffered apparently got aggravated due to this stress and strain. The nature of his employment was also such, which could lead to stress and strain. It is otherwise established that death in this case was caused due to heart failure. It would be reasonable to presume that the heart failure in this case was due to stress and strain, resulting from the nature of the employment of the deceased. The legal fiction, thus, can be raised that there was a casual connection between the injury and the accident, which did take place in the course of the employment and it arose out of employment. It is to be noticed that there was no requirement for the respondent-claimants to prove that the death was due to heart attack which had a direct connection with the stress and stain on account of working conditions. Accordingly, I do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Commissioner, which is well supported by the evidence on record. I am also not impressed with the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant that the interest as awarded by the Commissioner is not justifiable. The interest is payable under Section 4A (3), if there is a default in paying the compensation due under the Act. The learned counsel has mainly raised a grievance in regard to F.A.O. NO.2912 OF 2006 :{ 9 }: the period for which the interest has been awarded. The Commissioner has directed the payment of interest from the date of filing of the written statement i.e. from 5.6.2000 to the date of this order i.e. 6.12.2005. In Partap Narain v/s Shrinivas, AIR 1976 SC 222, it is held that the liability of the employer arises as soon as the injury is caused and not at any subsequent occasion. This four Judges bench decision would rather entitle the claimant to ask for interest from the date of injury/death instead from the date of filing written statement as granted by the Commissioner. This approach of the Commissioner is legal and justifiable and would not call for any interference. The appeal is, thus, dismissed. August 18, 2008 ( RANJIT SINGH ) khurmi JUDGE