THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.1513 and 1898 of 2009 Dated:23.10.2009 CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1513 of 2009 Between: Komuravelli Kaladhar .. Petitioner/Appellant AND Katakam Ramesh .. Respondent/Defendant CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1898 of 2009 Between: Komuravelli Kaladhar and another .. Petitioners/Appellants AND Katakam Ramesh .. Respondent/Defendant COMMON ORDER: These two Civil Revision Petitions arise against the common order of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Siddipet, Medak District in C.M.A.Nos.4 and 5 of 2008, dated 17.02.2009, which in turn arose out of the common order passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Siddipet in I.A.No.232 of 2006 in O.S.No.60 of 2006 and I.A.No.482 of 2006 in O.S.No.116 of 2006, dated 22.10.2007. The revision petitioners filed a suit for permanent injunction in O.S.No.60 of 2006 restraining the respondent not to interfere with Ac.1.10 gts., in Survey Nos.139 and 140/A of Mutrajpally Village, Gajwel Mandal, Medak District. The respondent filed O.S.No.116 of 2006 for permanent injunction in respect of Acs.0.35½ gts., in Survey No.139, Ac.0.36½ gts., in Survey No.140/A, Ac.0.17¾ gts., in Survey No.139, Ac.0.18¼ gts., in Survey No.140/A, in total measuring Acs.2.28 gts., and Ac.0.12 gts., in Survey No.139 of Mutrajpally Village, Gajwel Mandal, Medak District. Both the revision petitioners and the respondent claimed to be in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the lands covered by the respective suits by the dates of the respective suits. Along with the suits, petitions for grant of interim injunction were filed by the respective plaintiffs in I.A.No.232 of 2006 and I.A.No.482 of 2006, which were heard in common and disposed of together by the common order in question. During the enquiry, the trial Court marked Exs.P1 to P9 and B1 to B22 by consent. The trial Court, in its order, considered the entitlement of the respective plaintiffs to interim injunction, as requested by them, referred to the documentary evidence in detail and came to the conclusion that while the petitioner in I.A.No.232 of 2006 could not prima facie probablise his possession as on the date of the suit, the petitioner in I.A.No.482 of 2006 was able to do so in respect of the lands claimed by him. Consequently, the trial Court vacated the temporary injunction granted earlier on 03.04.2006 in I.A.No.232 of 2006 and accordingly dismissed the I.A.No.232 of 2006 and allowed I.A.No.482 of 2006. In C.M.As., against the common order, the learned District Judge also concurred with the findings of fact by the trial Court and dismissed both the C.M.As. Heard Smt.D.Pramada, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Sri C.R.Pratap Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, are heard at length. The grievance of the revision petitioners is that both the Courts below did not appreciate the pleadings and the material placed before them in the manner they should have been appreciated and came to incorrect conclusions. The point for consideration is whether the concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below are susceptible to any interference in these two revisions? The claim of the revision petitioners in the suit was based on the pattadar pass book and pattedar title pass book said to have been issued in pursuance of Ex.P5 sale deed and Ex.P6 rectification deed, under which the title to the property is traced by the revision petitioners. The link documents were stated to be Exs.P7 and P8, under which the vendor K.Satyanarayana was claimed to have acquired his title to 10% out of the total land and Ex.P9 pahani was also relied as probablising the possession of the revision petitioners to the land claimed by him. The admitted situation of land as on the date of the suit was conversion of the agricultural lands into residential plots without any approved layout from any local authority and Ex.P5 sale deed was found to have been executed by none other than the father of the revision petitioners, as the General Power of Attorney holder of the original owner. The learned District Judge referred to the unnaturality of 10% of the land to which K.Satyanarayana was entitled being allotted as a block in the total extent of land purchased by K.Satyanarayana and many others and more so, when the land was made into plots of 150 square yards each with different plot numbers. Learned District Judge also found that K.Satyanarayana did not purchase any land in Survey No.140/A to enable him to sell any land in that survey number. The respondent herein relied on Exs.B1 to B22 in support of his claim and Exs.B1 to B3 were again the link documents for tracing the title of the respondent. The other documents are the copies of agreements of sale, General Power of Attorney with permission and the copies of the various sale deeds Exs.B12 to B22. Learned District Judge deduced from Exs.B1 to B3 that the vendors of the respondent had the saleable interest in the lands covered by Exs.B4 and B5, agreements of sale, and Ex.B6 receipt for payment of fees for granting permission for construction under Exs.B7 and B8 and Ex.B10 pahani were specifically referred to as prima facie probablising the possession and enjoyment of the vendors of the land claimed by the respondent. A comparison of documents placed before the Court by both the parties, thus, indicated that the consistency in tracing title to the land claimed by the respondent is not matched by the documents relied on by the revision petitioners, whose title or right to possession are traced only through a document executed by the father allegedly as the General Power of Attorney holder of the original owner. The doubts entertained by the trial Court and the revisional Court about the truth of the claims of the revision petitioners about their possession and enjoyment as on the date of the suit cannot be considered, under the circumstances, to be not in tune with the documentary evidence on record. Even assuming that the title claimed by the respondent is equally susceptible to any doubts on similar grounds, the prima facie probability of his possession and enjoyment of the property claimed by him by the date of the suit was rendered probable by various documents which need no replication. In any view, in these two revision petitions arising under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with reference to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court on the subordinate Courts, no deeper probe into the disputed questions of fact can be undertaken in exercise of such restricted jurisdiction. As nothing is apparently incredible or improper or illegal in the prima facie conclusions of the Courts below, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned orders in these revision petitions. Learned counsel for the respondent has stated that in fact the suits are already part heard and are in the midst of trial and the trial Court can consequently be requested to expedite the trial in both the suits. Insofar as the apprehensions of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners about the possibility of intervention of any constructions in the disputed properties or any alienations during the pendency of the suits is concerned, the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act takes care of any claims that may arise from any alienations or attempted alienations during the pendency of the legal proceedings. Even, if any constructions were to be made in the properties in question, any person making such constructions cannot claim any equities by virtue of such constructions. In view of the same, no specific directions need be given concerning any such possible acts by either of the parties pending the suits except again clarifying that either party or any person claiming through either party will not be entitled to claim any rights or equities by virtue of anything done by them in respect of the subject properties during the pendency of the suits. In the result, both the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed, but the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial of O.S.Nos.60 and 116 of 2006 on its file and dispose of both the suits, on merits, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within six months from the date of communication of the orders herein. No costs. ___________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J 23rd October 2009 KH