IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.2137 of 2004 RAMKISHORE PRASAD Son of late Rameshwar Prasad resident of Mustafabad P.S. Rampur, Distt:- Gaya, Ex- Manager Magadh Gramin Bank, Rasalpura, Distrtict- Nawada. -----------------Petitioner Versus 1. SRI SHARAD TIWARI., DEPUTY ZONAL MANAGER Punjab National Bank Zonal Office, Patna. 2. Sri S. N. D. Bharali Assistant General Manager Reserve Bank of India, Patna. 3. Sri Kumar Rakesh Chandra District Manager Nawada Gaya. 4. Sri B. K. Thakur Director Institutional and Finance and Programme Implementation Department, Govt of Bihar, Lalit Bhawan, Bailey Road, Patna. 5. Sri Madeo Prasad Director, Magadh Gramin Bank, Bisar Talao New Area, Gaya. 6. Sri Binay Kumar Sharma Director Magadh Gramin Bank, Ramdhanpur Chhatiana House, Gaya. 7. Sri Ramayan Tiwari, Chairman, Magadh Gramin Bank Head Office Sondiha House, Kataria Hill, Road, Gaya. 8. The Manager Magadh Gramin Bank Branch Office Rasalpura, At and P.O. Hisua, District- Nawada. -----------Respondents. ------------------ For the Petitioner:- Dhirandra Kumar Sinha, Advocate. Diwakar Yadav, Advocate. For the Respondent:- Prashant Vedasan, Advocate For the State:- Shalini Raut, A.C. to G.A. 3 ------------------ 10. 06.05.2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent Magadh Gramin Bank and for the State. 2. The petitioner has filed the writ petition for quashing the order dated 26.07.2003 of the Board of Directors which has confirmed the order dated 21.12.2002 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, that is, Chairman of the Magadh Gramin 2 Bank by which the petitioner has been given the punishment of compulsory retirement. 3. A number of arguments have been addressed by learned counsels for the parties on various issues but in view of the order that I propose to pass it may not be necessary to refer to each of them. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the enquiry officer held that a large number of charges, including that at serial no. 2B (Sl. no. 5), 2B (Sl. no. 6), 2C (Sl. no.1) 2C (Sl. no.3) III A, IV and VI, amongst others, have not been proved but the disciplinary authority while differing with the same by letter dated 9.7.2002 has not assigned any reason in the eye of law for differing with the finding of the enquiry officer and only mentioned the fact that the said charges were established on the basis of certain Management exhibits, without specifying how those exhibits would lead to the conclusion of the charge being proved contrary to what has been decided by the enquiry officer. It is said that the said reasons are no reason in the eye of law and thus the order dated 21.12. 2002 passed by the disciplinary authority and consequently, the order dated 26.7.2003 of the appellate authority are illegal and fit to be quashed. 3 4. In support of the same learned counsel relies upon the judgment in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra: A.I.R.1998 S.C. 2713, paras 18 and 19 which are quoted below:- “18. Under Regulation 6 the inquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an inquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not to be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of quilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar’s case (1994 AIR SCW 1050) (Supra). 19. The result of the 4 aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7 (2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary Authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer”. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits that the disciplinary authority having mentioned the Management exhibits on the basis of which he found the charge proved has complied with the condition laid down in Kunj Bihari Mishra’s Case (Supra). 6. On a consideration of the letter dated 9.7.2002, I find that the following reasons have been assigned for differing with the finding of the enquiry officer: “ However, the finding of EO with regard to charges at Sl. No. 2B (Sl. No. 5), 2B (Sl. No.6), 2C (Sl. No. 5 1), 2C (Sl. No. 3), III A, IV & VI are not acceptable to me for reasons given below:- Charge no. 2B (Sl no. 5) is established on the basis of ME14, charge no. 2B (Sl. No. 6) on the basis of ME 16 & 17, Charge no. 2C (Sl no. 1) on the basis of ME 23 to 27, charge no. 2C (Sl. no. 3) on the basis of ME 34 to ME 36, charge no. III A on the basis of ME44 to ME51, charge no. IV is proved on the basis of ME 58 to 63 and charge no. VI is well established on the basis of ME71 to ME100”. 7. It is evident from the decision of the Apex Court in Kunj Behari Mishra’s case (supra) that in case the disciplinary authority disagrees with the finding of the enquiry officer he must assign reason for such disagreement and give an opportunity to the proceedee to meet the same by filing a representation before he passes the final order in the matter. From the letter dated 9.7.2002, in which the disciplinary authority has differed with the view of the enquiry officer, it is evident that he did not assign any reason as to how the referred Management exhibits would lead to a different conclusion of guilt contrary to that found by the enquiry officer. 8. In the above circumstances, it has to be held that the disciplinary authority has not complied with the principles of natural justice in terms of the law laid down in Kunj Behari Mishra’s Case (supra). 9. For the reasons aforesaid the impugned 6 order dated 21.12.2002 passed by the Disciplinary Authority cannot stand and it is accordingly quashed. Consequently, the appellate order dated 26.7.2003 is also quashed. It would, however be open to the authorities of the respondent Bank to proceed afresh in the matter from the stage the proceedings became vitiated. The petitioner is accordingly directed to be reinstated with liberty to the respondent authorities to proceed afresh from the stage the disciplinary proceedings became vitiated by the issuance of a show cause assigning reasons for disagreeing with the report of the enquiry officer. It would also be open to the respondents to place the petitioner under suspension with effect from the date of the order of disciplinary authority and any amount to be paid to the petitioner for the period from the date of dismissal, that is, 21.12.2002 till the final order passed by the disciplinary authority shall be subject to the final order to be passed in the proceedings. 10. The writ application is accordingly allowed in terms of the aforesaid observations and directions. Anand Kr. ( Ramesh Kumar Datta J.)