THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJU CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3 of 2004 BETWEEEN: Sham Prasad, Principal … Appellant AND State of A.P rep. by Spl.Public Prosecutor. … Respondent HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3 of 2004 JUDGMENT: The appellant/accused was working as Principal, A.P. Residential High School for B.C Girls, Arekal at Adoni during the relevant period. The Additional Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Hyderabad by Judgment dated 01.12.2003 in CC.No. 18 of 1999 convicted the accused for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short, the Act) 1988 and sentenced him separately on two counts to rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs.2,000/- each. 2. PW1 was appointed as Kitchen Helper in A.P. Residential School for B.C Girls, Arekal at Adoni on 09.11.1997. It is alleged that the accused was dodging for opening of service register of PW1 whenever he met him and requested him to do so and that on 02.03.1998 when PW1 requested the accused to open his service register, the accused stated that it is not that simple to open his service register and demanded bribe for the same, for which PW1 expressed his inability to pay and that on 21.03.1998, when PW1 approached the accused with the same request, the accused demanded bribe of Rs.2,000/- and that after bargaining, the demanded bribe was reduced to Rs.1,000/- and it was made clear to PW1 that his service register will not be opened unless he paid the said bribe amount. Thereupon, PW1 gave Ex.P2 report to PW6, who was the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB), Kurnool Range on 22.03.1998 at Kurnool. After issuing Ex.P11 FIR on the basis of Ex.P2 report, PW6 arranged trap for the accused on 23.03.1998. PW2, who was working as Deputy Director in District Industries Center, Kurnool functioned as one of the two mediators for Ex.P4 pre-trap proceedings prepared at R& B Guest House, Yemaganur and in Ex.P7 post- trap proceedings prepared at the residential quarter of the accused at Adoni. It is alleged that on 23.03.1998 when PW1 approached the accused at about 6:05 PM at his residence, the accused reiterated his demand for bribe and accepted tainted cash of Rs.1,000/- covered by MO.5 from PW1 and that after receiving pre- arranged signal from PW1, the raid party consisting of PWs 2 and 6 and another rushed to the accused and seized MO.5 tainted cash from his possession. 3. During spot explanation given by the accused in Ex.P7 post-trap proceedings as well as during trial in the lower Court, the accused did not dispute receipt of MO.5 tainted cash of Rs.1,000/- from PW1. The accused pleaded that PW1 in the first week of March, 1998 obtained loan of Rs.1,000/- from him and that on 23.03.1998, PW1 repaid the said hand loan of Rs.1,000/- by way of MO.5 to the accused. In view of admission of receipt of tainted cash of MO.5 from PW1 by the accused together with his explanation, in my opinion, evidence of PWs 2 and 6 assumes little importance. The contradictions in their evidence pointed out by the appellant's counsel with regard to number of vehicles in which they travelled from Kurnool to Yemaganur and then to Adoni and the procedure adopted during post trap proceedings etc. become irrelevant. In view of acceptance of MO.5 tainted cash of Rs.1,000/- from PW1 by the accused, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act comes into play. The said presumption being a rebutable presumption, it is for the accused to rebut his demand and acceptance of illegal gratification from PW1. 4. Placing reliance on S.P. Paulraj Vs. State[1] of the Madras High Court, it is contended by the appellant's counsel that it is for the prosecution to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. No doubt, the rebutable presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be invoked only in respect of the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act and not to prove the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Act. Ultimately, it is for the prosecution to prove demand as well as acceptance or obtaining of illegal gratification by the accused from PW1. 5. It is well settled principle of law that the burden is heavy on the prosecution to prove the prosecution case beyond all reasonable doubt; and at the same time, the said rigor of burden cannot be placed on the accused while proving his defence version. It is open for the accused to prove his version by preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court in C.M. Girish Babu Vs. CBI, Cochin[2] observed as follows: “20. It is equally well settled that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the At is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. “It is well established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence of proof his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, of course the test prescribed in deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but the same test cannot be applied to an accused person who seeks to discharge the burden placed upon him under Section 4 under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur verdict of guilt. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e.; that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” 6. It is evidence of PW1 that four months after his joining in service, he asked the Senior Assistant in the school by name PW3 to open his service register and that PW3 informed that there must be an order of the principal for opening service register. PW1 says that on 02.03.1998, he requested the accused for opening service register and that the accused replied that he should pay some amount for opening the service register, for which he expressed his inability to pay any amount. PW1 further says that on two or three occasions subsequently he made similar requests and that the accused asked him to talk only if he is prepared to pay money. PW1 further says that on 21.03.1998, the accused demanded him to pay Rs.2,000/- and that when he expressed his inability to pay that much amount, the accused asked him to pay at least Rs.1,000/-. PW1 deposed that subsequently he took permission for 22.03.1998 and applied casual leave on 23.03.1998 for going to his native village. Ex.P1 is the leave application dated 21.03.1998 of PW1 for casual leave on 23.03.1998. As pointed out earlier, on 22.3.1998, PW1 gave Ex.P2 report to PW6 at Kurnool. With regard to the trap which took place at the residential quarter of the accused, it is evidence of PW1 that at about 6:00 PM, they reached Adoni and that he went to the house of the accused who was available in varanda of the house and that the accused asked him whether he brought the amount and that he replied in positive and gave the cash to the accused who kept the cash in his right side pant pocket and told him that he would get his service register opened very soon. PW1 says that when he gave signal to the trap party, the trap party came and entered into house of the accused. As pointed out earlier, there is no dispute about the trap party/raid party of ACB seizing MO.5 tainted cash of Rs.1,000/- from the possession of the accused. In view of admission of receipt of MO.5 cash by the accused, failure to conduct Sodium Carbonate solution test on money purse/wallet or brief case of the accused becomes irrelevant. 7. In cross-examination, PW1 admitted that six of them were appointed at a time and for none of those six persons, service registers were opened. He says that he knew that he will have to purchase the service register with his own money so as to enable the school to open the service register. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that PW1 did not give the place and timings where the accused is stated to have demanded the bribe. PW1 deposed in cross- examination that on 02.03.1998, he met the accused in the school. PW1 admits that none of them purchased any service register and submitted the same to the school. PW3 deposed in cross examination that on 01.04.1998, PW1 submitted an application to the accused in the office along with the service register requesting to open the same. Ex.D1 is Photostat copy of the said letter. It was subsequent to the date of trap. As per evidence of DW3, who is successor of the accused as principal, some of the workers who were appointed along with PW1 made Exs.D4 to D6 applications for opening service registers on 27.03.1998. It is contended for the appellant that without the accused submitting an application along with blank service book, the accused will not be in a position to open service register of PW1. No doubt, PW3 as well as DW3 also deposed that the employee has to furnish blank service register book for opening service register at the cost of the employee. But the rule position is otherwise. As per G.O.Ms.No.153, Finance dated 04.04.1961, which is cited by the appellant’s counsel, a service book in fundamental rule Form No.10 should be opened for every Non-Gazetted Government servant at his own cost as soon as he is regarded as selected for admission to a Government service and as on probation for that service, “except in the case of members of the police force of rank not higher than that of head constable and last grade servants of all sorts.” There is no dispute that PW1 being a kitchen-helper, belongs to last grade service. Therefore, it is the duty of the head of office to open service register for PW1 as soon as he is selected and appointed as such. In any event, the question herein is not as to who should bear the cost of blank service register in Form No.10 of the Fundamental Rules. Certainly, it is incumbent on the accused being principal of the school to open service register of PW1 as soon as PW1 joined in service of that school as kitchen helper in the last grade service. 8. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that opening of a service register cannot be regarded as an official favour to PW1. It is contended that as per dictionary meaning of favour, there must be unfair partiality and that in the absence of opening of service register, the employee namely, PW1 is not going to suffer any prejudice either financially or otherwise. It is further contended that there are priorities for the principal, who is head of the institution and that in March 1998, when the girls of the school were going for public examination as first batch students of the school, the main priority for the principal is to concentrate on the performance of the students in the public examination and opening of service book of a last grade servant like a kitchen helper cannot be his priority. By March 1998, it may be an examination season. It is not as if PW1 was appointed as kitchen helper in the school in March, 1998. He was appointed and joined in service on 09.11.1997 itself when there was no rush for examinations. The relevant Government order imposes a duty to open the service register as soon as a person is selected and inducted into Government service. At this stage, evidence of PW3 about conduct of the accused in opening service registers of his employees becomes relevant. As pointed out earlier, it is evidence of PW1 that when he met the Senior Assistant in the school and asked him, the senior assistant informed him that there must be an order by the principal for opening service register. PW3 deposed that he was attending to the service matters of the employees of the school apart from other duties. It is his evidence that when he asked the accused with regard to opening of service registers of new entrants into service, the accused asked him not to open the same without his knowledge and until he directs to open the service registers. Thus, even though opening of service register is part of the duty of the accused, the accused gave specific instructions to PW3 who was looking after establishment matters of the employees of the school not to open the service registers of the new entrants without his knowledge and without his specific direction in that regard. It shows that for the said reason, the service registers of PW1 and others who joined in service during the first half of November, 1997 were not opened till the second half of March, 1998. The accused by his instructions to PW3 and by his demands to PW1 made opening of service registers of employees as an official favour towards the employees. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that opening of service registers of employees cannot be termed as an official favour to the employees including PW1. 9. With regard to the defence version based on loan theory, PW1 in cross-examination denied the same. According to the defence version, DWs 1, 2 and 4 and another M.David were present when PW1 paid MO.5 tainted cash of Rs.1,000/- to the accused. PW1 in cross-examination denied their presence. There is no basis in Ex.P7, post trap proceedings about the presence of DWs 1, 2 and 4 and M.David at the time of payment of MO.5 by PW1 to the accused. DW4 is brother-in-law of the accused, DW4 being younger brother of wife of the accused. He belongs to Mulakaluru of Narsaraopet of Guntur District. As per evidence of DW4, he was present not only on the date of the accused advancing hand loan of Rs.1,000/- to PW1 in the first week of March 1998, but also on 23.03.1998 when PW1 handed over MO.5 cash of Rs.1,000/- to the accused. Presence of DW4 either on 01.03.1998 or on 03.03.1998 or in the first week of March, 1998 at the residence of the accused at Adoni when the accused is stated to have advanced loan of Rs.1,000/- to PW1, was not even suggested to PW1 in the cross-examination. DW4’s presence was suggested only at the time of payment of MO.5 on 23.03.1998 and it was denied by PW1. In Examination-in-chief itself, DW4 gives two different dates for the alleged lending of Rs.1,000/- by the accused to PW1 as 01.03.1998 and 03.03.1998. According to DW4, PW1 came to the residence of the accused and requested the accused either to give some advance from his salary or a hand loan of Rs.1,000/- as he required the same for the purpose of treatment to his wife who was ill. DW4 says that the accused did not reply to the request of PW1 and that he (DW4) interfered and advised the accused to advance the amount to PW1 as the purpose of his request was treatment to his wife and as PW1 was working under the accused, who can always deduct the money from his salary. According to the accused, PW1 got his salary on 09.03.1998 and since PW1 did not repay the said amount of Rs.1,000/-, he chastised the accused and that therefore, the accused might have developed grudge against him and gave false report against the accused for arranging a false trap. The lower Court commented that there is no evidence placed before the Court to show that salary of PW1 was paid on 09.03.1998 and that as per rules, the salary is payable on the first of every month. The appellant’s counsel filed copy of acquittance register for the month of March, 1998 along with a memo in this appeal. The appellant did not take any steps to get the said document on record by following the procedure prescribed by Section 391 Cr.P.C. But, this Court proposes to assume that PW1 got his salary on 09.03.1998 and consider whether the evidence let in by the accused is probable. When PW1 received his salary on 09.03.1998 by way of disbursement of the same from the school, nothing prevented the accused to deduct the alleged hand loan of Rs.1,000/- from PW1’s salary and pay the balance to PW1. The fact that PW1 was paid his complete salary without any deductions on 09.03.1998, falsifies the defence version of the accused lending Rs.1,000/- to PW1 either on 01.03.1998 or on 03.03.1998 or in the first week of March, 1998. DW1 is father of a girl student in the residential school. DW2 is a Dhobi who is stated to be present at the house of the accused for collection of soiled clothes. DW4 claims that he made a second visit to the house of the accused in the same month prior to 23.03.1998 when he received a letter from his sister, who is wife of the accused to the effect that she was ill. It is contended by the Special Public Prosecutor that DW4 did not produce the alleged letter stated to have been addressed by his sister to him prior to 23.03.1998 informing him about her illness and asking him to go over to Adoni from Narsaraopet. In any event, DWs1, 2 and 4 are chance witnesses and their presence in the house of the accused at the time of PW1 paying MO.5 tainted cash of Rs.1,000/- to the accused is not borne out by any record. It is their evidence that while paying Rs.1,000/- to the accused, PW1 stated that he was paying back the loan amount taken from the accused and that it was not proper on the part of the accused to scold him for not repaying the same; for which the accused replied to the effect that though PW1 received his salary, he delayed the payment and therefore, he scolded him and therefore it was not improper. At the time of alleged repayment of loan, exchanging of so many dialogues is highly improbable. There may be exchanging of words for non- repayment and not at the time of repayment. Therefore, this Court does not intend to place any reliance on evidence of DWs1, 2 and 4 on repayment of loan theory put forward by the accused. 10. Placing reliance on Asraf Ali Vs. State of Assam[3] of the Supreme Court, it is contended by the appellant’s counsel that the lower Court did not give proper opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances in the prosecution evidence during examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The said contention was not raised on behalf of the accused in the lower Court. In any event, on perusal of examination of the accused conducted by the trial Court under Section 313 Cr.P.C., I am satisfied that the trial Court has put in forefront the entire incriminating evidence of the prosecution witnesses and examined the accused giving opportunity to him to explain all the incriminating circumstances. The evidence relating to demand as well as acceptance of the bribe amount by the accused form part of the said examination. They are the crucial circumstances and questions which find place in the examination. The accused denied the said part of incriminating evidence during the said examination. The defence version basing on repayment of loan theory need not be put to the accused in the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is for the accused to plead the same. In fact, the accused pleaded the same even since the time of trap as evidenced by Ex.P7, post-trap proceedings. Examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is intended to highlight incriminating prosecution evidence to the accused and it is not intended to highlight the reasoning that the trial Court may adopt while accepting the prosecution evidence or for negativing the defence version. The examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in this case is appropriate and is in accordance with law. 11. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that the officer who issued Ex.P-10 prosecution order viz., Vice Chairman, A.P. Residential Educational Institutions Society, Hyderabad was not examined as witness by the prosecution during trial and that there is nothing on record to show that the sanctioning authority applied its mind before passing Ex.P-10 prosecution sanction order. It is further contended that as per evidence of PW-4 who is working in the office of the sanctioning authority admitted that a proforma sanction order was enclosed by the A.C.B while sending requisition for sanction order. This contention was not raised by the defence counsel in the lower Court. Simply because proforma sanction order was enclosed along with requisition letter, one cannot conclude that the sanctioning authority signed the sanction order without application of mind and without perusing the investigation records. Evidence of PW-4 reveals that the investigating agency enclosed the entire investigation record along with the requisition for sanction order and that the sanctioning authority perused the record and applied mind before passing Ex.P-10 prosecution sanction order. In these circumstances, I find that Ex.P-10 sanction order is properly proved and is valid in law. Examination of the sanctioning authority as witness, is not incumbent in each and every case. 12. Therefore, for all the above reasons, I am of the opinion that the lower Court came to a right conclusion in favour of the prosecution and the lower Court also came to the right conclusion in not accepting repayment of loan theory put forward by the accused. However, though this Court accepts finding of guilt of the accused recorded by the lower Court, this Court is of the opinion that imposing sentence of imprisonment for two years is on higher side. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, but altering the sentence of imprisonment from rigorous imprisonment for two years to rigorous imprisonment for one year on each count. _____________________________ SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU, J Dated: 23.03.2011 ysk THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJUL CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3 of 2004 DATED: 23.03.2011 ysk [1] 2009 CRI. L. J. 2107(MADRAS HIGH COURT) [2] 2009(3) SCJ 344 [3] 2008 (7) SCJ 580