WA 92/2010 BEFORE THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI JUDGMENT & ORDER (oral) R.S.Garg, CJ. 1. Heard Mr. M. U. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitione r on the question of admission. 2. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 25.2,2010 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No.5425 of 2008 (Abdus Samad -vs- Un ion of India and 4 others) whereunder the order dated 17.9.2008 passed by the le arned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, Goalpara in F.T. Case No.941(G)/2008 has been confirmed has come to this Court with a submission that not only the learned Tr ibunal but even the learned Single Judge failed in not appreciating that the evi dence put forth by the present appellant before the learned Tribunal was suffici ent to prove that his father’s name was recorded in the voters’ list of 1966 and that he had a Panchayat certificate in his favour. Therefore, placing reliance upon this evidence so also the oral testimony of the petitioner and his two witn esses the learned Tribunal should have held that the petitioner who is a disable d person to the extent of 80% is an Indian national. 3. Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, after tak ing us through the order passed by the learned Tribunal, firstly, submitted that the learned Tribunal was unjustified in not relying upon the certificate issued by the Panchayat observing that the same was inadmissible in evidence. His furt her submission is that the father’s name of the appellant has been enrolled in t he voters list of 1966 and that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act provides that if the name of one of the parents is recorded in the voters list then such pers on has to be deemed to be an Indian national. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the learned Single Judge also committed the identical mi stake and erred in not relying upon the evidence led by the present appellant. 4. We have gone through the orders passed by the learned Tribunal so also b y the learned Single Judge. 5. Insofar as the certificate issued by the Gaon Panchayat is concerned, a ssuming we hold that to be admissible in evidence then also the appellant-writ p etitioner had to prove his linkage with his alleged father, namely, Md. Ali Shei kh. In the year 2005 when the matter was taken up by the learned Tribunal the a ppellant was shown to be around 45 years meaning thereby that he was born somewh ere in the year 1960 or so. He must have attained majority somewhere in between 1978-80 and must have exercised his right of franchise immediately after 1980. T he appellant-writ petitioner is relying upon an order whereunder his name was de leted from the voters list but unfortunately he has failed to file/produce any s uch voters list. 6. In a case where a Panchayat issues a certificate in favour of a person t hen production of such certificate itself would not be sufficient proof of the c ontents of the document. It is also to be noted that certain documents are deeme d to be proved on simple production. A certificate of residence or of paternity are not such documents which are deemed to be proved on their production. Produc tion of such document, in our opinion, was not sufficient proof of proving the l inkage between the appellant-writ petitioner and Md. Ali Sheikh. 7. Insofar as the voters list of 1966 is concerned, it only says that Md. A li Sheikh was a resident of a particular village. The learned counsel for the ap pellant has condemned the order passed by the learned Tribunal on the ground tha t contrary to the requirement of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act the learned T ribunal has pressed upon the mother’s name of the appellant- writ petitioner. Af ter going through the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal we are unable to concede to the argument. The learned Tribunal did not refer to the question of the mother’s name to reject the 1966 voters list but, in fact, it was impressing upon the fact that if father was the voter of a particular village or in a part icular Legislative Assembly Constituency then declaration of mother’s name by th e appellant would have provided solid and positive foundation in favour of the a ppellant-writ petitioner’s claim. 8. It was contended that a Tribunal or a Court should rely upon the quality evidence instead of harping upon the quantity. True it is that the quality evid ence is always to be relied upon. The question still would be whether the eviden ce led by the appellant is sufficient to lead to the irresistible conclusion tha t the appellant-writ petitioner is a national of India. 9. Above is not the only flaw in the matter of the appellant-writ petitione r’s case, the learned Tribunal has found that the present appellant in his evide nce-in-chief did not state as to how he became permanent resident within 39 No. Joleswar L.A.C. whereas the respondent has stated that the house of his father w as under 31 No. Mancachar L.A.C. If that evidence is also not available on the record then we have to hold that the learned Tribunal was absolutely justified in recording the finding against the interest of the appellant. 10. Apart from all those discussion in the order passed by the learned Tribu nal, the learned Single Judge has examined all the evidence threadbare and after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances has approved the fi ndings recorded by the learned Tribunal. 11. The question that a particular person is an Indian national or not basic ally is a question of fact. If the fact finding Tribunal has found that the appe llant-writ petitioner is not an Indian national and the High Court in its jurisd iction under Article 226 of the Constitution after taking into consideration the entire evidence has affirmed the evidence then we do not think that in our appe llate jurisdiction there is any scope for any interference. 12. We find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Sing le Judge. The appeal is dismissed.