HMw §E§§$5€ IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (s) No. 2/06} 0f 2010 PETITIONER Rupesh 'Singh Thakur, son of Shri Mannu Singh Thakur aged ‘32 year‘s,’ Resident of I www 9Q \o.» VWar‘d no.7, Rammandirpara, Baghbg‘ra (r66aDvs H' 5} Mahaga mu mi Opposite New Bus Sfand (c ‘0 V5 ./, . REsPONDENTs 1.. 5m“ 0f Chha*’ris9arh, Through fhe Secrefar’y, Fores’r Dépar’rmenf, D.K.S. Bhawan, Manfmlaya, Raipur'. 2.? Divisional Forest Territorial Fores’r Division, Mahasamund, Officer, ‘bisfricf— Mahasamund (CG) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE W i*wi' petitioner submits that in all the criminal cases, he has been acquitted and as such no criminal case was pending against him on the date of submission of criminal antecedents form. In spite of the aforesaid facts, by order dated 14.6.2010, the petitioner was terminated from the service on the ground that the petitioner concealed certain information with regard to criminal cases, which is in Violation of Rule 12 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. Thus, this petition. Shri Rajeev Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned action of the respondent authorities is illegal, arbitrary and against the well settled principles of law. Before passing the impugned order,'proper opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner. Even no departmental enquiry has been conducted against the petitioner. The impugned action was taken by the respondent authorities with malafide intention only to harass the petitioner. The respondents have not at all appreciated the fact that due to lack of knowledge, the petitioner could not fill up“ the form properly. Even otherwise, the petitioner has been acquitted from all the criminal cases. The impugned termination order is disproportionate and irrational. Before passing the impugned order, the relevant documents have not been supplied to the petitioner. Shri I Shrivastava would further submit that since the petitioner has been acquitted from all the criminal cases by the competent court of law, it can be said that the petitioner is an innocent person. The impugned order is against the Articles 14 and 19 ofthe Constitution of India. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would submit that the negative answer i.e. ‘no’ given by the petitioner itself shows that the petitioner could very much understood the contents of column number 10, else he would have given the positive answer ‘yes’ or would have left the said column blank. The petitioner has not disclosed the information before the respondent authorities with regard to registration of criminal cases. The petitioner had willihlly concealed the information regarding pendency of criminal proceedings against him. The criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner was before the date of passing of the appointment order. Thus, the petitioner was duty bound to inform the authorities. However, during the course of verification ofthe conduct of the petitioner, the said fact came to the knowledge of the respondents. Thus, the impugned termination order was rightly passed and does not warrant any interference of this Court. Before passing the impugned order, proper show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the petition deserves to be dismissed. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto. There is no dispute that pendency of criminal proceedings against the petitioner was concealed bypthe petitioner. Thus, it is also a case of suprresio veri and suggestio falsz' (See Abhishek Singh v State of Chhattisgarh & Othersl). The appointment of the petitioner was terminated on knowing the fact with regard to pendency of criminal case against the petitioner which, the petitioner had deliberately concealed, before his appointment. 7. In Kendrzy‘a Vidyalaya Sangathan & Others v. Ram Ratan Yadavz , . the Supreme Court held in para 12 as under: I 1 2010 (3) CGLJ 388 2 (2003) 3 scc 437 #7 J. l wz “12. The Object of requiring information in columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to candidate judge his having suitability suppressed to continue material in information service. A and/0r giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service. The employer having regard other aspects to the had nature the of discretion the employment to terminate and his all services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer of appointment” Deputy Insp n 12 of the attestation respondent authorities issued an terminating the services of th recruitment. In th 8. Recently, the Supreme Court, in Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh & 0thers3, has distinguished the ratio laid down in Ram Ratart Yadavz, on the ground that in the case of Kamal Nqyan Mishra3, appellant submitted the attestation form in the year 1994. Thereafter, the attestation form for verification of particulars, was sent to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Special Cell, Bhopal. The ector General, by letter dated 14.7.195 informed the concerned authority that the appellant had furnished wrong information in regard to the queries in colum form. On receipt of such-information, no such notice was issued. The appellant continued to work for about seven years. Thereafter, the office order dated 07.03.2002 e appellant for giving wrong information and concealment of facts in the attestation form at the time of initial e back ground of the above stated facts, it was held that the termination without an enquiry or affording an opportunity of hearing was illegal and invalid. ssed on 16.10.2008 9. In the case on hand, the appointment order was pa clearly provides that if wherein clause 2 of the appointment order there was any adverse report in respect of police verification, the services of the petitioner may be terminated. Thereafter, notice dated J’ M 3 (20101 2 scc \169 i' M . ‘1 i 13.01.2010 (Annexure P/3) was issued and the petitioner submitted his explanation also (Annexure P/5). After consideration of his explanation, termination order was passed on 14.06.2010. Thus, this is a case ofsuppresio veri and suggestionfalsi. In the course of argument, Shri Roy submitted that non mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision of law does not invalidate an order in the event it is found that a power therefor exists. He would further submit that the impugned termination order was passed under clause 2 of the appointment order. In MIKhan & Others v. Govt. ofA.P. & Others", the Supreme Court held as under: 17. In Union oflndia v. Khazan Singh this Court held: (SCC pp. 585-86, para 6) “The Appellate Authority did not mention in its order as to under which sub-rule o Rule 25(1) the appeal was being disposed of. The Tribunal while noticing Rule 25(1)(e) of the Rules and conceding that the Appellate Authority could remand the case to the disciplinary authority for further inquiry under the said sub-rule, grossly erred in setting aside the order on the concession of the learned counsel to the effect that the Appellate Authority had passed the order under Rule 25(1)(d) of the Rules.” 18. In State of Karnataka v. Krishnajz' Srim'vas Kulkami this Court held: (SCC p. 563, para 6) “Quotation of a wrong provision does not take away the jurisdiction of the authorities to inquire under Section 79- I B(3) ofthe Act.” Having regard to the well settled principles of law to the facts of the case, as aforestated, the impugned order cannot be held as vitiated on the ground that wrong provision has been quoted and secondly, this is not a case where the petitioner became a regular employee and he was allowed to continue for several years to work, as verification was done immediately after order of appointment was passed wherein, it wa 4 (2004) 2 SCC 267 ' l f s _ \x ‘99 6 clearly stated that any adverse remarks on police verification may result into removal from service. On appointment, immediately the case was referred to the police department for verification and also the statement made by the petitioner in the verification form on 18.11.2008. Thereafter, investigation took sometime and by letter dated 17.09.2009 (Annexure P/6), the Inspector General of Police and the District Magistrate, Mahasamund were informed about the police verification. Thereafter, immediately a show cause notice was issued on 13.01.2010 to the petitioner which was also responded to by the petitioner vide Annexure P/S. In View of the above stated faets, the instant case is distinguishable on facts and as such, the ratio of law as laid down in Ram Ratan Yadavz, is applicable to the facts of the case as the petitioner was not holding civil post till all verifications were done by the authorities. The petitioner was also afforded an opportunity of hearing before the impugned termination order was passed. Thus, there is no infirmity, irregularity or illegality in the impugned order, warranting interference. l4. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 15. There shall be no order asto costs. Sd/- . Satish K. Agnihotri Judge Amit