Civil Revision No. 1583 of 2010 -1- ***** IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Revision No. 1583 of 2010 Date of decision : 20.5.2010 Punit Ahluwalia (NRI) ....Petitioner Versus Dr. (Mrs.) Gurjeewan Garewal ...Respondent CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. D. ANAND Present: Mr. Amarjeet Markan, Advocate for the petitioner. None for the respondent. S. D. ANAND, J. The landlord-petitioner has a grievance that the learned Rent Controller granted the plea under Section 18-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act filed for the leave to defend by the respondent-tenant for inappropriate reasons. The service upon the respondent was effected through learned District Court Counsel representing her. That order had been granted on an affidavit-supported plea filed by the petitioner herein to the above effect. However, none entered appearance on behalf of the respondent-tenant inspite of the fact that appearance was awaited. On point of fact, it may be indicated that service had been effected upon the learned District Court Counsel for appearance before this Court on 30.3.2010. However, none has appeared on that date and the matter was adjourned to 26.4.2010. Civil Revision No. 1583 of 2010 -2- ***** On that date too, none entered appearance on behalf of the respondent and the matter was adjourned to 12.5.2010. It was on that date that the arguments on behalf of the petitioner were heard. None turned up on behalf of the respondent on that date either. The judgment was reserved. It is apparent, from the impugned order itself, that in granting the plea under Section 18-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the learned Rent Controller was influenced by the fact that an earlier plea raised by the respondent-landlord for ejectment of the respondent-tenant from the tenanted premises on an averment of personal necessity had been negatived and an appeal against that order is pending consideration before the learned Appellate Authority. It also weighed with the learned Rent Controller that the respondent-landlord could not have had a resort to the provisions Section 13-B of the Act in view of the fact that he acquired title to the tenanted premises long after the same had been rented out to the petitioner tenant and a controversy about the validity of acquisition of title (by the predecessor-in-interest of the landlord) is pending consideration before the Civil Court. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the foundational premise of the impugned order is not acceptable in view of the fact that the respondent-tenant could not be heard to raise a plea with regard to the pendency of the litigation about title of the house in dispute. The factual facet of the other plea Civil Revision No. 1583 of 2010 -3- ***** was not denied. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not on a firmer footing when he so argued. The reasons therefor are as under:- As already indicated, it is evident from the material obtaining on the file that the petitioner-landlord did file a petition earlier as well for ejectment on plea of personal necessity. That petition came to be negatived. Though there is a plethora of law on the point that even after the denial of a plea under Section 13 of the Act, the provisions of Section 13-B can be invoked by a landlord eligible in the relevant behalf, it cannot be wished away that there was a formal adjudication of the validity of the plea of personal necessity raised by the petitioner-landlord. Whether that finding by the Rent Controller was valid or not is a matter which is pending consideration at the hands of Appellate Authority. None-the-less, there can be no escape from the inference that the dispute in the relevant behalf does give rise to a 'triable' issue, envisioned under Section 18-A of the Act. Apart therefrom, there is yet another 'triable' angle. It stands noticed by the learned Rent Controller that it was not the petitioner-landlord who had rented out the premises to the respondent-tenant and that the former appeared on the scene long after the tenancy in favour of the respondent-tenant came into being. Whether, under those circumstances, the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act can be validly invoked is also a 'triable' facet. A similar controversy came up before five Judges Bench of the Apex Civil Revision No. 1583 of 2010 -4- ***** Court in Nathi Devi Vs. Radha Devi Gupta 2005(1) RCR, 218. In that case, a widow lady had purchased certain premises which were already under the occupation of a tenant. Section 14(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which provides for immediate possession, applies only to a widow who had herself let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises before his death. The interpretation provided by the Apex Court was against the entitlement of the lady who petitioned in that case. The relevant observations, made in the context by the Apex Court, are extracted hereunder:- “There is another aspect of the matter. Section 14D uses the expression, "premises let out by her, or by her husband" which are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the immediate possession of "such premises". "Such premises" obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, "let out by her or by her Civil Revision No. 1583 of 2010 -5- ***** husband" and "such premises" in Section 14D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application of Section 14D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our view, Section 14D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a preexisting tenant.” It cannot, thus, be said with any justification that the plea for leave to defend did not raise any 'triable' issue. The petition is held to be denuded of merit and is ordered to be dismissed. However, with a view to allay the apprehension in the mind of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the matter would thereby get inordinately delayed, it is directed that the learned Trial Court shall ensure meticulous compliance with the direction given by this Court for time bound disposal of petition based on personal necessity in Civil Revision No.302 of 2010 (Sandeep Ghai Vs. Neeraj Malhotra). May 20, 2010 (S. D. ANAND) Pka JUDGE