( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD SECOND APPEAL NO. 15 OF 1993 1. Jamnabai w/o. Mohan Ladwani .. Appellants Age. 41 years, Occ. Household, [Ori. plaintiffs] R/o. Sunder Ganpati Galli, Vaijapur, Dist. Aurangabad. 2. Sumanbai w/o. Vithal Ladwani Age 36 years, Occ. Household, R/o. Golegaon, Tq. Khultabad, Dist. Aurangabad. Versus 1. Ahilyabai w/o. Narayan Ladwani .. Respondents Age. 63 years, Occ. Household, [Ori. defendants] R/o. Khan Galli, Vaijapur, Dist. Aurangabad. 2. Murlidhar s/o. Mambhaji Ladwani Age 42 years, Occ. Agri., R/o. Chandangaon Road Vasti, Vaijapur, Dist. Aurangabad. 3. Kader s/o. Mohammed, Age. 45 years, Occ. Business, R/o. Vaijapur, Dist. Aurangabad. Shri Y.M. Khan h/f. Shri K.G. Khader, Advocate for the appellants. Shri Zia-ul-Mustafa, Advocate for respondent No.3. ( 2 ) CORAM : P.R. BORKAR,J. DATED : 02.07.2009 ORAL JUDGMENT :- 1. This is an appeal preferred by the original plaintiffs whose suit for declaration of title and possession bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 202 of 1980 was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Vaijapur, on 12.01.1984. Said judgment and decree is further confirmed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Aurangabad, while deciding Regular Civil Appeal No.285 of 1987, on 17.07.1991. 2. Briefly stated it is case of the appellants who are sisters inter se and respondent No.1 is their mother. Their father died when they were children and respondent No.1 sold entire property of their father and came to Vaijapur from Takli. There with the help of her brothers, she purchased suit house bearing No.1855 situated at Gawandi Galli, Vaijapur. Thus it is property of respondent No.1 and the appellants, as it is ( 3 ) property purchased out of sale-proceeds of appellant’s father’s property. It is further stated that respondent No.2 thereafter dispossessed respondent No.1 and entered his name in the Municipal record and later on inducted respondent No.3 into the suit house. In these circumstances, this suit is filed for declaration and possession. 3. Respondent No. 1 did not appear, respondent No. 3 did not file written statement and then they allowed the matter to proceed in their absence. Respondent No.2 filed written statement at Exh.19 and contested the suit. He came with a case that respondent No.1 was only Benamidar and it was not purchased out of funds received after selling property of father of the appellants, but it was property purchased by respondent No.2 and his father for respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 had relinquished her right in favour of respondent No.2 in a compromise that was arrived at in Regular Civil Suit No. 38 of 1971. The suit is also barred by limitation and thereafter the suit be dismissed. ( 4 ) 4. This appeal is admitted vide order dated 11.02.1993 on ground Nos. III, V, VI, VII, IX, X & XI of the appeal memo. The sum and substance of the substantial question of law is :- Whether the appellants proved that they have ownership right in the suit property? 5. Heard Adv. Shri Y.M. Khan h/f. Adv. Shri K.G. Khader for the appellants and Adv. Shri Zia-Ul-Mustafa for respondent No.3. The Trial Court in para 12 considered the evidence on record. Appellant No.1- Jamnabai is examined on oath at Exh.45. She stated that her father died when she was four years of age and appellant No.2 was then two years old. Six months after death of their father, they shifted to Vaijapur. She had no evidence to show that her father owned any house at Takli which is said to be sold to raise funds for purchasing the suit house. It is admitted that respondent No.1 is alive. But she has not entered into witness box. The appellants examined P.W.2-Digambar, their maternal uncle as witness and it has come in the ( 5 ) evidence of Digambar that Narayan – father of the appellants died 27-28 years ago. He stated that he purchased house in the name of respondent No.1 out of sale proceeds which were received by selling property of father of the appellants. The suit house was purchased for Rs.250/- in the name of respondent No.1. In cross- examination he admitted that 4-5 months after death of Narayan, respondent No.1 was brought to his house and she lived there for couple of months. Thereafter, sale- deed was executed in respect of the suit property. Admittedly, the sale-deed is executed on 29.08.1956. Now, it is admitted that 6-7 months before the sale- deed, father of appellants Narayan had expired. 6. The Hindu Succession Act, 1957, came into force on 17th June, 1956. So, even accepting case of appellant No.1-Jamnabai that they shifted to Vaijapur six months after death of father or even accepting case of P.W.2 Digambar that respondent No.1 shifted to Vaijapur, 4-5 months after death of Narayan and two months thereafter sale-deed was executed, that means Narayan had expired prior to the Hindu Succession Act ( 6 ) came into force. In this view of the matter the appellants did not inherit the property that was owned by Narayan. It would have been inherited only by respondent No.1. 7. On record at Exh.21 there is certified copy of decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.38 of 1971. It was a suit filed by respondent No.1 against her father and brothers P.W.2-Digambar and Babu, Sambhaji and respondent No.2-Murlidhar. As per the compromise arrived at in said suit on 29.03.1975 respondent No.1 relinquished her right from the suit property in favour of her brothers. In exchange thereof, defendant Nos. 1 to 3, who were her brothers and their father had agreed to give another open site in Gawandi Galli, Vaijapur, to respondent No.1 and further agreed to make construction thereon before 15th July, 1975. It is also stated that in-case said promises were not kept by the defendants, then plaintiff (present respondent No.1) would be entitled to recover Rs.4000/- from the defendants who are her father and brothers. It is nowhere say of the present appellants that said decree ( 7 ) was not executed. In any case after said decree, it could not be said that respondent No.1 has any more right or interest in the suit property. 8. In these circumstances, in my opinion, there cannot be any interference with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. In the result the Second Appeal is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. [P.R. BORKAR,J.] snk/2009/JUL09/sa15.93