%!N^? ^ °^\^7n /" 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR W.P.S No...^.3.^.?........ .../2009 ^ PETITIONER: ^^ ,<A\<'y ,.-•" V^ :.--"bv>^...- y^\./ ^w ^' .y\v-+< ?€-^^ ^/ 'y / Smt Sunita Jaiswal W/o Shri Rajendra Prasad Jaiswal, Aged about 33 years, R/o Post Janakpur, Block Bharafrpur, District Koriya(C.G.) VERSUS RESPONDENTS: ^ 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through the Secretary Department of Panchayat and Rural Development D.K.S. Bhawan, Mantralaya Raipur (C.G.) / 2. Chief Executive Officer District Panchayat, Koriya District Koriya (C.G.) ^ 3. Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Bharatpur District Koriya (C.G.) ^ 4. General Administration Committee Through the Chairman Janpad Panchayat Bharatpur District Koriya (C.G.) ^ ^ PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA FOR ISSUANCE OF APPROPRIATE WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI AND FOR OTHER SUITABLE WRITS AND DIRECTIONS:- AF^ .c> HIGH COURTOFCHHATTJSGARH : BILASPUR PETiTIONER RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITtON (Q} N0.7358 OF 2009 Smt. Sunite Jaiswat Versus State of Chhattisgarh & Others QA/rit Petition under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India) Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Present:- Shri Varun Sharma, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Y.S. Thakur, Dy. Adv. General for the State. ORDER (ORAU (Passed on this 17 day of December, 2009) 1. Wtth the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, th® petition is heard finally. 2. By this petition, the petitioner impugns the order of termination dated 30-10-2009 (Annexure- P/1) passed by the Chief Executh/e Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Bharatpur, District Koriya, on the ground that the authority is not competent to pass such an order. 3. Schedule 1 Ruie 2 (b) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Servic^) Rutes, 2007 (for short "the Rutes, 2007") cleariy provides that in case of Shiksha Karmi Grade - III the appointing authority is the Chief Executive Officer of Janpad Panchayat with approval of GeneraS Administration Committee, Janpad Panchayat. Whether approvat has been obtained or not, it is not dear. 4. Rule 13 of the Rules, 2007 provides for an appeat against any order passed under these rules. If the order has been passed either by the Chief Executive Officer or any other Authority, the ^. f.. •- same shall be appelable under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. Be that as it may, without going into the merlts of the case, 1 have found that statutory appeliate provssion is adequate, effeotive and efficadous^ There is no reason to exercise discretion in favour of the peiitioner when the above statutory appetlate forum is avaitable. On the question of availability of alternative remedy, the Supreme Court in State of H.P, and others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement and another , observed as under: "17. We shall first deal with the plea regarding .alternative remedy as raised by the appellant State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been consjdered to be a rule of self-imposed IJmitation. It is essentially a rule of pollcy, convenience and discretjon and never a rule of !aw. Despite the existence of an alternative remecty, it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of th@ High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though th©matter reiating to an altematlve remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court shoutd not interfere If there ?s an adequate ©fficadous altemative remecly. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative rernedy provided the High * Court should ensure that he has made out a stror^ case or that there exist good grounds to invoke th@ extraordinary jurisdiction. 21. ln G. Veerappa Pilla v. Raman & Raman Ud., CC£ v. Duniop India Ltd; Ramendra Klshore Biswas v. Stae of Tripura, Shivgonda Anna PaW v. State of Maharashtra; C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Tjtaghur Paper Milfs Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa; H.B. Gandhi vs. Gopi Nath and Sons; Wtffipoof Corpn. V. Registrar of Trade Marks, Tin Plate Co. of Sndia Ltd. v. Stafe of Bihar, Sheela Devs v. Jaspsl Singh and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Kiishnan, this Court held that where hierarchy of appeats is (2005) 6 SCC 499 provided by ttie statute, paity must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction." 7. Further, applying the said ratio in U.P. State Spinning Co. Ud. vs. R.S. Pandey and another , the Supreme Court observed as under: "21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S.Karmachari Sangh, it was held tihat when the dispute refates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the Nigh Court should not deviate from the generat view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case js made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avaSI of the process as provided under the statute. To the same effed: are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamfekar Shantaram Wadke, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad and in Scooters India vs. Vyai E.V. Eldred." 8. In another decision on the concept of maintainability of writ petition vis-^i-vis availability of alternative remedy, the Supreme Court In Secy. U.P. High School & Intermediate Education, Allahabad & another v. H.K. Lal , observed as under: "4. From the records it is bome oyt that the question asto whether the respondent has a legal right to alter his date of birth recorded in the certificate granted by the Board was pending consideration before the appellate Court. The writ petjtion filed by the respondent should, therefore, not have been entertained particutarly in view of the fact that the appeal thereagainst was pending. Writ jurlsdiction is discretjonary jurisdiction and should not ordtnartty be exercised if there is an alternative remedy." 9. A common thread running into the dicta laid down by thb Suprema Court in the aforementioned cases isthat normallythe High Courit should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious attemative 2 (2005) 8 SCC 264 3 (2007)28cc 216 ^ ^ remedy where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedy before resorting to writ jurisdiction, ©xceptwhen a very strong case is made out for making a departure< 10. This Court also in Chandrika Prasad Sahu and others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others4 relyjng on various decisions of Supreme Court on the question of altemative remedy, observed that "normally the High Court should not interfere jf there is an adequate, efficacious, alternative remedy where hlerarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedy before resorting to writ juri^iictjon, except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure." 11. For the reasons stated hereinabove and applying the well settled principies of law, without expressing any opinion on merits, this writ petition is dismissed, as not maintainable, at the motion stage itself. Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge Gowri 4W.P. (S) No. 4597 of 2008 decided on 28-8-2008