IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE NINETEENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO : 13641 of 2004 Between: Y. Sunkanna, S/o Timmappa, (Removed from service) R/o 4/281, B.G. Guntakal Road, Aluru, Kurnool District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Prl. Secretary (Pol.B), Home Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad. 2 Director General and Inspector General of Police, A.P. Hyderabad. 3 Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kurnool District, Kurnool. 4 Superintendent of Police, Kurnool. 5 Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Purani Haveli, Hyderabad, rep. by its Registrar. .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a Writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the Order dated 5-6-2002 passed in O.A.No. 4509 of 2002 on the file of the 5th respondent i.e., Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad confirming the order of the 1st respondent made in L.Dis.No. 563/L&O/RR/99, dt. 6-9-2001 confirming the order of the 4th respondent made in R.P.No. 128 of 1987 dt. 20-10-1988 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the spirt of the Judgment of the Apex court made in Crl.A.No. 186 of 2001 Reported in A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 938 and set aside the same and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the Petitioner into service with back wages etc, Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.ATCHUTANANDA DONDETI Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES I The Court made the following : THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO :13641 of 2004 ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed,J) Assailing the order of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 4509 of 2002, dated 5.6.2002, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. The facts in brief are that the petitioner herein was appointed as a Police Constable in the year 1978 under direct recruitment quota. According to the petitioner, his marriage was performed with one Nagalaxmi in the year 1973. However, during the year 1985, he contracted second marriage on the ground that his first wife was unfit to conceive. It appears, the petitioner did not obtain permission from the respondent-authorities before contracting the second marriage. Therefore, a memo was issued to the petitioner on 2.9.1988 calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation to the charge of gross reprehensible conduct in contracting second marriage when his first wife was alive. Subsequently, a regular enquiry was conducted into the matter and through proceedings dated 20.10.1988, the petitioner was compulsorily retired. Challenging the same, the petitioner filed R.P. No. 21917 of 1989 before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and on 27.7.1994 the petitioner has withdrawn the said R.P. with liberty to approach the authorities for availing the appellate remedy. Subsequently, he preferred an appeal before the 3rd respondent and the 3rd respondent through proceedings dated 19.5.1998 rejected the said appeal. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision before the Inspector General of Police (Law and Order) Rayalaseema Region, A.P., Hyderabad and through order dated 14.7.1999, the said appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a mercy petition before the 2nd respondent, who in turn forwarded the same to the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The Government again referred the matter to the 2nd respondent to reexamine the issue. The 2nd respondent, through proceedings dated 6.9.2001 confirmed the punishment of compulsory retirement. Challenging the said proceedings, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 4509 of 2002 before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad. The Tribunal, through the order impugned in this writ petition while confirming the order of the 2nd respondent dismissed the O.A. Hence, the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the enquiry officer who was appointed to conduct enquiry against the petitioner also acted as a witness and that there is every likelihood of the enquiry officer being biased against the petitioner. In support of this contention, he relied on para-16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana & Others([1]), which reads thus: We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias, it is “in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner”. He also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ratan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co. Education) Higher Secondary School & others ([2]). In para-10 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed thus: “One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (no man shall be a judge in his own cause). The deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. It has been held by this Court in Secretary to Government, Transport Department v. Munuswamy Mudaliar(1998 Supp. SCC 651) that a predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. Personal bias is one of the three major limbs of bias namely pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. A classic case of personal bias was revealed in the decision of this Court in State of A.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh(1958 SCR 595). In the said case, a departmental enquiry was held against an employee. One of the witnesses against the employee turned hostile. The officer holding the enquiry then left the inquiry, gave evidence against the employee and thereafter resumed to complete the inquiry and passed the order of dismissal. This Court quashed the order of dismissal by holding inter alia that the rules of natural justice were grievously violated.” Secondly, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the Hindu Marriage Act permits a person to contract second marriage and second marriage is not void under the Act. Since the petitioner belongs to Yerukala Community, which is a Scheduled Tribe Community and as there is a custom in the said community for dissolution of marriage by the elders, he contracted the second marriage as per his custom and he need not obtain permission from the Government for contracting second marriage. Let us see Rule 25 of Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,1964. It reads thus: “No Government employee who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government, notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him. (Provided that where the personal law provides for second or subsequent marriage, the Government employee shall while seeking permission to contract another marriage, produce documentary evidence in support of divorce/talaq in respect of previous marriage and the matter in which the same was secured or pronounced and intimated to the first or former wife.” On a perusal of the Conduct Rules, it is quite evident that the Conduct Rules clearly mandate a Government employee to obtain prior permission for contracting a second marriage. Though the petitioner belongs to Yerukala Community, which a Scheduled Tribe community, since the petitioner is a Government employee, he has to obtain necessary permission from the Government for contracting the second marriage. Admittedly, in the instant case, the petitioner has not obtained such permission from the Government before contracting the second marriage. Further, there is no evidence on record to show that he even obtained a valid decree of divorce from his first wife before contracting the second marriage. As the petitioner failed to obtain necessary permission from the Government for contracting the second marriage, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and after due enquiry, he was imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement. One more important factor is that the petitioner has not raised any plea either before the Tribunal or before this Court that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the mis-conduct alleged against him. In the circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that even though the petitioner was compulsorily retired in the year 2001, no monetary benefits were paid to him. In the circumstances, we direct the respondents to pay all the monetary benefits due to the petitioner and to which he is eligible within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. ________________________ GHULAM MOHAMMED,J DATE: 18th March, 2009 __________________ SANJAY KUMAR,J pnb [1] AIR 1987 SC 454 [2] 1993(4) SCC 10