THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY SECOND APPEAL No. 91 of 2011 JUDGMENT: The appellants herein are defendants in O.S.No.1914 of 2001 on the ﬁle of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada. The suit was ﬁled for the relief of recovery of possession of the suit schedule property, an extent of Ac.1.33 cents of agricultural land. The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment, dated 31.12.2004. The appellants ﬁled A.S.No.7 of 2005 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Nuzvid. The appeal was dismissed on 24.08.2009. Hence, this second appeal. The facts that gave rise to the ﬁling of O.S.No.1914 of 2001 are as under: The appellants ﬁled O.S.No.1872 of 1987 in the Court of the III Additional District Munsif, Vijayawada against the respondents for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the same property. They relied upon a gift deed said to have been executed in their favour by their ancestor, by name Challa Nageswara Rao, one of the sons of Challa Pakeerayya. The respondents represent the other sons of Pakeerayya or their legal representatives. Appellants pleaded that Nageswara Rao in turn got the property in a partition that took place in the year 1973 and that he gifted it to them in the year 1987. The respondents, on the other hand, pleaded that the partition of the properties left by Pakeerayya took place in the year 1982 and that Nageswara Rao did not have any right to execute the gift deed in favour of the appellants. The contention of the respondents was accepted by the trial Court and the suit was dismissed on 05.07.1991. A.S.No.20 of 1991 ﬁled by the appellants in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Nuzvid was dismissed on 25.09.2000 and S.A.No.172 of 2001 was dismissed by this Court on 13.04.2001. The respondents ﬁled O.S.No.1914 of 2001 pleading that with the dismissal of S.A.No.172 of 2001, their title vis-à-vis the property stands established and that they are entitled to recover the possession of the suit land. The appellants resisted the suit by stating inter alia that there is no cause of action for the respondents to ﬁle the suit in view of the fact that they have been contending throughout that they are in possession and enjoyment of the property and the said contention was accepted in the earlier round of litigation. It was also pointed out that even in the plaint in O.S.No.1914 of 2001, their plea was that they are in continuous possession ever since 1982 and that there is no mention as to the date on which they have been dispossessed. As observed earlier, the trial Court decreed the suit and the lower appellate Court conﬁrmed the same. Sri M.V.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the trial Court and the lower appellate Court erred in not verifying the very existence of cause of action for the respondents to institute the proceedings. He further submits that in a suit for recovery of possession, the minimum that is required to be stated by a plaintiﬀ is, the date and the manner in which he has been dispossessed and in the absence of such an averment, there does not exist any cause of action at all. Learned counsel submits that though not from the point of view of the limitation for ﬁling of the suit, at least to show that the plaintiﬀ had a genuine grievance, the statement as to the dispossession becomes necessary. He contends that the plea of the respondents in the earlier round of proceedings on the one hand and the present round on the other is self-contradictory. Sri Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that in the earlier round of litigation, the emphasis was much upon the title to the property and once the Courts held that the title to the property vested in the respondents, the subsequent suit instituted by the respondents herein for recovery of possession is permissible. He contends that an owner of the property is entitled to recover possession of the property and that under the Limitation Act, 1963, it is not necessary for a plaintiﬀ to state the date of dispossession. Other grounds are also urged. The suit ﬁled by the respondents was for the relief of recovery of possession. Obviously because their title was upheld in the earlier round of litigation, they did not pray for the said relief in the present suit. The principal objection raised by the appellants was absence of cause of action in the suit. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: (1) Whether plaintiffs are having exclusive right in suit property? (2) Whether defendants gift deed dated 30.04.1987 is valid and whether defendants have title to suit property? (3) Whether plaintiﬀs are entitled for recovery of possession of suit property and for past and future mesne profits? On behalf of the respondents, respondent No.1 was deposed P.W.1 and he ﬁled Exs.A1 to A5. On behalf of the appellants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B1 and B2 were filed. The suit was decreed and in A.S.No.7 of 2005 ﬁled by the appellants, the lower appellate Court framed only one point for its consideration, namely “Whether the plaintiﬀs are entitled for recovery of plaint schedule property as they got exclusive right over the same”. The appeal was dismissed. One of the primary requirements for an individual to ﬁle a suit is the existence of cause of action. The phrase ‘cause of action’ is a compendious expression, which takes in its fold a bundle of facts that confer right upon an individual to institute the proceedings. There cannot be any deﬁnite connotation of this expression. This much, however, can be said that the plaintiﬀ in a suit must state the facts that prompted him to ﬁle the suit. The cause of action, once ascertained, would constitute the starting point in the context of reckoning of limitation. It would also become relevant to examine whether any proceedings were instituted on an earlier occasion on the same cause of action and if so, whether the result thereof would operate as res judicata. These are a few consequences that follow from the cause of action and there are many other. The eﬀort is only to emphasize the importance of cause of action, in civil proceedings. In a suit for recovery of possession, it is fundamental that the plaintiﬀ must state the factum of dispossession from the property. Though under the Limitation Act, 1908, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiﬀ to state the date on which he was dispossessed, to know whether the suit was ﬁled within limitation, such a requirement is not there under the Limitation Act, 1963. All the same, unless the plaintiﬀ states that he has been dispossessed, as a matter of fact, the very basis for institution of the suit becomes shaky. It may be true that the very fact that the relief of recovery of possession is prayed for would indicate that the plaintiﬀ in such a suit is not in possession of the property. The necessity to state the manner in which he lost the possession becomes relevant for the purpose of assessing his right to recover. Take for instance, a case where an individual was dispossessed from a property in accordance with law, such as tenant having been evicted by land lord by instituting proceedings or the owner of a piece of land having been dispossessed as a consequence of acquisition. Though in these cases also, the individuals are dispossessed from the property, they cannot seek the relief of recovery, since the dispossession took place in accordance with law. It is only when a person is dispossessed in violation of law and in abrogation of rights of the plaintiﬀ, that the occasion would arise for granting the relief of recovery of possession. In the instant case, the respondents did not state a word as to dispossession. On the other hand, at one place in the plaint, they stated that they are in possession of the property ever since 1982. In para pertaining to the cause of action, it is stated as under: “The cause of action for the suit arose on 30.04.1987 when challa Nageswara Rao executed the gift deed in favour of the defendants without having any manner of right, title to and possession and on 24.09.1987. When the defendants have ﬁled O.S.No.1872 of 1987 on the ﬁle of the III Additional District Munsif, Vijayawada and on 05.07.1991 when the suit O.S.No.1872 of 1987 was dismissed with costs and when A.S.No.20 of 1991 was ﬁled on 18.07.1991 on the ﬁle of the Senior Civil Judge’s Court and the said appeal was dismissed on 25.09.2000, and S.A.No.172 of 2001 was ﬁled on the ﬁle of the A.P. High Court, Hyderabad and the said second appeal was dismissed on 13.04.2001 at the admission stage and subsequently at Atkuru Village, G.Konduru Mandal, Krishna District, within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court”. The word ‘dispossession’ does not ﬁnd place in this entire paragraph. Unless the respondents were dispossessed, there was no occasion for them to seek the relief of recovery of possession. A substantial question of law, namely “ whether a suit for recovery of possession can be instituted without stating the factum of dispossession and whether such a suit can be decreed at all” arises for consideration. In view of the discussion undertaken above, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the appellants. Hence, the second appeal is allowed. The decree passed by the trial Court and upheld by the lower appellate Court, is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. _______________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY,J Dt:28.11.2011 kdl Note: LR copy to be marked.