Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 Date of decision: 07.07.2011 Ram Phal and another .....Petitioners VERSUS The Financial Commissioner Revenue Haryana and others ....Respondents CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Present: Mr. H.N. Mehtani, Advocate, for the petitioners. Mr. Harish Rathee, Sr. DAG, Haryana for the State. Mr. G.C. Shahpuri , Advocate for respondents No. 4 to 6. **** RANJIT SINGH, J. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Haryana, Chandigarh had invoked his jurisdiction under Section 18 (6) of the Haryana Ceiling on the Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to an 'Act') to set aside the order passed by the prescribed authority- cum-Sub Divisional Officer, Bhiwani, who had held that there was no surplus area with the land owner petitioners. The petitioners are Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 2 residents of Village Talu, District Bhiwani. Petitioner No. 1 is the son of Shri Ami Lal and petitioner No. 2 is wife of Ami Lal. Aggrieved against the impugned order passed by the Financial Commissioner, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. Haryana State has enacted Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 to consolidate and amend the law relating to the ceiling on the land holdings in State of Haryana. The said Act came into force w.e.f. 23.12.1972. The appointed date as fixed in the Act is 24.01.1971. The rules known by the name of Haryana Ceiling on Land Holding Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules') have also been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 31 of the Act. Reference is made to detailed provision framed in this Act. As per the provisions of the Act in the rules, the prescribed authority under the Act is required to determine the permissible area. Section 18 (1) of the Act gives a statutory right to any aggrieved person against any decision or order passed by the prescribed authority to prefer an appeal before the Collector. Section 18 (4) of the Act provides right to an aggrieved person to file revision petition before the Commissioner to challenge the legality or propriety of such order passed by the Collector. The revision is maintainable, thereafter, before the Financial Commissioner under Section 18 (6) of the Act. The Financial Commissioner has been bestowed with power to call for record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the illegality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he made deem fit. Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 3 Sh. Ami Lal father of petitioner No. 1 and husband of petitioner No. 2 had filed a declaration form under Section 9 of the Act on 13.08.1976. On verification under Rule 6 (3) of the rules, the prescribed authority found that Sh. Ami Lal and his son petitioner No. 1 owned an area of 620 kanals 12 marlas (ordinary) in equal share and out of that, an area of 13 kanals 2 marlas was Gair Mumkin. Excluding an area of 13 kanals 2 marlas from the holdings, Sh. Ami Lal and petitioner No. 1 were left with an area of 607 kanals 10 marlas (ordinary) which on conversion into 'C' category worked out to be 880 kanals 18 marlas. Vide a decree passed by the Sub Judge, Hansi dated 22.04.1972, 155 kanals, 3 marlas (ordinary) land stood transferred to a daughter of late Sh. Ami Lal. Mutation No. 3274 dated 01.11.1972 was also entered in this regard. This area was transferred to Sh. Ami Lal vide mutation No. 3334 dated 18.02.1974. The prescribed authority on verification found that Sh. Ami Lal and petitioner No. 1 through two separate sale deeds dated 29.03.1979, transferred an area of 155 kanals 3 marlas each totalling 310 kanal 6 marlas for valuable consideration of ` 80,000/- to Smt. Shanti, Smt. Dulari and Smt. Chander daughter of Sh. Ami Lal and sisters of petitioner No. 1. This was stated to be a bona fide purchase i.e. for purchase of tractor and other agricultural purposes. After affording proper and reasonable opportunity to the State of Haryana and upon scrutiny of the record, respondent No. 2 vide his order dated 25.05.1979 held that the aforesaid sale of 310 kanals 6 marlas (ordinary) (equal to 440 kanals 18 marlas on conversion), was made for purchase of tractor and other agricultural purpose and was bona fidely transferred Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 4 under Section 8 (1) (b) of the Act. Thus, while determining the case of surplus area of Sh. Ami Lal, said area was excluded from the holdings of Sh. Ami Lal and he was held entitled to keep the remaining area of 431 kanals of 'c' category as his permissible area. Accordingly, respondent No. 2 also held that there was no surplus area with the landowner. Copy of this order is annexed with the petition as Annexure P-1. No appeal/revision was filed against the said order under Section 18 of the Act and for all intent and purposes this order became final. After considerable lapse of period, Under Secretary, Revenue, Haryana filed review petition under Section 18 (6) of the Act asking the Financial Commis sioner to invoke his suo motu powers and for calling the record relevant to the order dated 25.05.1979 for the purpose of satisfying himself as to be illegality or propriety of the said order. Respondent No. 1/Financial Commissioner, thereafter, on 16..11.1990 while exercising the powers under Section 18 (6) of the Act, had set aside the order dated 25.05.1979 passed by the prescribed authority, Bhiwani on the ground that this was contrary to the statutory provisions and to the law laid down by the Courts. Pleading that the said order passed by the Financial Commissioner is illegal and contrary to law besides being without jurisdiction, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. In the written statement filed by the respondents, the plea raised by the petitioner that the above noted transfer was bone fide has been denied. The contention that no revision was filed under Section 18 and the order was allowed to become final is also denied. Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 5 It is stated that the Under Secretary, Revenue Administration filed ROR No. 200 of 1988-89 against the order passed by the prescribed authority dated 25.05.1979. Accordingly, it is pleaded that the Financial Commissioner acted in accordance with law to invoke his suo motu powers under Section 18 (6) of the Act. The allegation that the powers have been wrongly exercised under Section 18 (6) of the Act is also denied. There is not much dispute in regard to the facts as pleaded in the writ petition. However, it is reiterated that the alleged sale deeds are fictitious one and the Financial Commissioner has rightly ignored these sale deeds. It is also pointed out that the aforesaid sale deeds were got registered in favour of the daughters and deceased Ami Lal. It is stated that the sale consideration is much less than the one, which was prevalent at that time in the market and this transaction to the sisters or father etc. is not bona fide. Accordingly, it is pleaded that there is no case made out calling for interference in the impugned order. Separate reply has also been filed by respondents No. 4 to 7. Respondents No. 4 to 7 would support the stand of the petitioner by saying that the sale deed of the land through these two separate sale deeds was bona fide. The counsel would, inter alia, plead that the application for exercise of revisional power under Section 18 (6) of the Act was filed after the period of 10 years from the date of the impugned order passed by the prescribed authority. It is stated that this delayed approach has remained unexplained and so would be an enough reason to interfere in the impugned order passed by the Financial Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 6 Commissioner. In support, the counsel has made elaborate submission on the basis of case law to contend that though Section 18 (6) of the Act may give an impression that such suo motu powers can be exercised 'at any time' but still these words cannot be interpreted to say that these powers can be exercised without any consideration of delay and latches. Counsel for the petitioner would refer to the contents of Section 18 (6) of the Act and would then compare the wording with other sub sections of Section 18 of the Act to highlight that an appeal under Section 18 (1) of the Act can be filed within 15 days though it may be entertained after expiry of the period if the person is able to satisfy that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause for by filing the appeal in time. 15 days period is laid down under Section 18 (2) of the Act to file appeal against the decision of the Collector and delay if any can also be condoned sufficiently explained. Any person aggrieved by the order passed by the Collector can then filed a revision within 30 days before the Commissioner. Then there is Section 18 (6) of the Act which empowers the Financial Commissioner to invoke his suo motu powers at any time to call for the record of any proceedings to see the illegality or propriety of such proceedings or order and may pass any such order as he may deem fit. Counsel would contend that the words 'any time', cannot be interpreted to mean that these powers can be exercised without any regard to delay and that this section and the words have to be read and assigned meaning, reasonably. In support of this proposition, the counsel has referred to number of precedents. Mr. Rathee appearing for the State, however, will contest Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 7 these submissions and submits that words used in Section 18 (6) have to be assigned their meaning. The word 'any time' as used in the section cannot be read to provide for limitation. Section 18 of the Act reads as under:- 18. Appeal, Review and Revision.-- (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Prescribed Authority, not being the Collector, may, within [Fifteen days] (Vide Act No. 17 of 1976) from the date of the decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Collector in such form and manner as may be prescribed: Provided that the Collector may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of [Fifteen days] (Vide Act No. 17 of 1976) if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Collector (whether acting as Prescribed authority or not) not being a decision or order made in an appeal under sub-section (1), may, within [Fifteen days] (Vide Act No. 17 of 1976) from the date of decision or order, prefer and appeal to the Commissioner in such from and manner as may be prescribed: Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of [fifteen days] if he is satisfied that the appellant was presently by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (3) Omitted vide Act No. 40 of 1976. Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 8 (4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector under sub-section (1), may within (Thirty days) from the date of the order, file a revision petition before the Commissioner so as to challenge the legality or propriety of such order and the Commissioner may pass such order as he may deem fit. The order of the Commissioner shall be final. (5) Omitted vide Act No. 40 of 1976. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, the Financial Commissioner may suo moto at any time call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit. (7) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) or revision under sub-section (4) shall be entertained unless the appellant or the petitioner, as the case be, has deposited a sum equal to thirty times the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed surplus area or has furnished a bank guarantee of the equal amount as security with the appellate or revisional authority; (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 21, a person who files an appeal or a revision against the order declaring his land as surplus area and the appeal or revision filed by him fails, shall be liable to pay, for the Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 9 period he is or has at any time been in possession of the land declared surplus to which he is or was not entitled under the law, a licence fee equal to thirty times the land holdings tax, recoverable in respect of this area, (Vide Act No. 34 of 1980) (9) Omitted vide Act No. 34 of 1990 There is limitation provided for filing an appeal before the authorities and revision before the Commissioner. However, there is no time limitation laid down in Section 18 (6) of the Act. This issue regarding meaning of 'any time' by now has been considered in large number of cases, to which the counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention. Counsel has relied upon two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Gurjarat versus Patel Raghav Natha and others AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1297 (1) and Loku Ram versus State of Haryana 2000 (1) RCR (Civil) 141. In Raghav Natha's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Court. Under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue court, no period of limitation is prescribed but still it was held that power of Commissioner to revise must be exercised within a reasonable time, which must be determined on the facts of the case and the nature of the order, which is being revised. The ratio of law in Loku Ram's case (supra) infact has directly dealt with Section 18 (6) of the Act. While interpreting 'at any time' it is held that period cannot be indefinite. The Court has further observed that the power has to be exercised within a reasonable time and that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Financial Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 10 Commissioner has unlimited power to entertain the revision after lapse of 7 years. It was further noticed by the Court that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner did not disclose or indicate any reason to hold that the period of nearly 7 years was reasonable on the facts of the case. The order passed by the Financial Commissioner was set aside on this ground. Reference is then made to Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham versus K. Suresh Reddy and others AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3592. While interpreting the use of words 'at any time' in A.P. (Telangana Area)Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power has to be exercised within a reasonable period depending on the facts and circumstances of each case and not after decades, inasmuch in affecting rights of parties over immovable property. It is further held that dictionary meaning of words 'at any time' would lead to anomalus result. The Hon'ble Court has also noticed that exercise of powers even after decades would lead to anomalous position and to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. It is observed that the orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. It is, accordingly, held that exercise of suo motu power 'at any time' only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. That, however, would not mean that 'at any time' should be unguided and arbitrary. It is, accordingly, held that the word 'at any time' must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 11 of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation. While agreeing with the view expressed by a Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ibrahimpatnam (supra) has observed as under:- “ It is also necessary to note that suo motu power was sought to be exercised by the Joint Collector after 13-15 years, Section 50-B was amended in the year 1979 by adding sub-Section (4), but no action was taken to invalidate the certificates in exercise of suo motu power till 1989. There is no convincing explanation as to why the authorities waited for such a long time. It appears that sub-Section (4) was added so as to take action where alienations or transfers were made to defeat the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. The Land Ceiling Act having come into force on 1-1-1975, the authorities should have made inquiries and efforts so as to exercise suo motu power within reasonable time. The action of the Joint Collector in exercising suo motu power after several years and not within reasonable period and passing orders cancelling validation certificates given by Tehsildar, as rightly held by the High Court, could not be sustained.” The Division Bench of this Court in Sh. Diwan Hira Lal Kapoor versus The State of Haryana and others 2002 (1) PLJ 28 while relying upon Loku Ram's case (supra) declined to interfere in the award passed by the Financial Commissioner or refusing to Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 12 interfere in exercise of revisional power on the ground that the revision was filed after period of 8 years from the date or orders passed by the Collector. The following observation made in Loku Ram's case (supra) were noted and which are as under:- 5. No doubt, the section uses the expression 'at any time' but it cannot be indefinite. The power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. While construing the expression 'at any time', this Court in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, AIR S.C. 1297 has stated the law thus: “11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.” 6. Section 18(2) of the Act prescribes a period of 15 days for filing an appeal and Section 18 (4) prescribes a period of 30 days for filing a revision before the Commissioner. When the two sub-sections prescribe a very short period of 15 and 30 days respectively, it will be unreasonable to hold that the Financial Commissioner has unlimited power to entertain a revision after a lapse of several years. 7. The test prescribed by this Court in Raghav's case has been ignored by the Financial Commissioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 13 the present case. His order does not disclose any reason to hold that a period of nearly seven years is reasonable on the facts of the case. Nor has the High Court gone into the question and decided whether the power has been exercised on the facts and circumstances within a reasonable period. Hence we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The order of the Financial Commissioner is also set aside. The order of the Collector dated 18.06.82 is restored. No costs.” Recently the Single Bench of this Court in Fauja Singh versus State of Punjab and others 2009 (3) RCR (Civil) 227 has considered this aspect in the light of provisions of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, no limitation is prescribed under Section 42 to present an application. The Court has taken a view that the aggrieved person can file an application within a reasonable time and not with inordinate delay. In this regard, reliance has been placed on Gram Panchayat, Kakran Versus Addl. Director of Consolidation 1997 (4) RCR (Civil) 498 (SC). It is also observed that even though no period of limitation is prescribed under Section 42 for presenting the application but the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within a reasonable time and that the application made after inordinate delay is not to be entertained. Another Single Judge of this Court in CWP No. 4968 of 1986 titled as Banwari Lal (deceased) through LRs versus The State of Haryana and others decided on 22.03.2011 has taken a similar view by observing that even if no period of limitation is Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 14 provided in a statute for taking any action still it has to be reasonable and not that such power could be exercised at any time. The view that would emerge from the judgments noticed above is that these powers given under such provisions where even no limitation is prescribed have to be exercised within a reasonable time. Additional plea is that the party would still be in a position to invoke such powers, if there is some explanation forthcoming to explain this delay. There may be an instance where the party may approach the Court on the ground to condone delay pleading fraud committed by official or non-official respondent etc. Such a case may be one where suo motu power could be exercised though the approach made is delayed one. There may be some other cases, where delay is well explained properly and exercise of such powers then may be upheld though it may be delayed one. That is not the situation in the present case. Infact, there is no explanation forthcoming to explain this delayed approach on the part of the State. The order by the prescribed authority was passed on 25.05.1979 but not even a little finger was raised for a period of 10 years. The application was filed before the Financial Commissioner in the year 1989 and the impugned order was passed in the year 1990. 10 years was too long a period during which the rights of the petitioner had clearly crystalized. Sufficient time, thereafter, has also passed by. The impugned order, which was challenged in the year 1991 has been in operation for all these years as this Court while admitting the writ petition had stayed the operation of the impugned order and so also the dispossession of the petitioner. It would not be fair or Civil Writ Petition No. 1853 of 1991 15 justified to change this position at this belated stage. The delayed approach on the part of the State, in my view, would be enough to decline interference in the impugned order, as per the well settled law. Here I may also refer to a recent Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Ranveer Singh (deceased by L.Rs) Versus State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2011 MP 27. While commenting on similar provision relating to