THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. GOPAL REDDY AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVISHANKAR CRIMINAL APPEAL No.221 of 2008 JUDGMENT: (PER T HE HON’BLE SRI JUST ICE N. RAVISHANKAR) Appellant is the sole accused in Sessions Case No.170 of 2006 on the ﬁle of the Court of III Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) , Nellore (trial court). The said case arose out of Cr.No.129 of 2005 of police station, Venkatagiri. He was tried on three charges namely under Section 302 IPC, Section 307 IPC and Section 326 IPC on the allegation that he committed the murder of his younger brother by name Abbisetti Krishnaiah (hereinafterwards referred to as the deceased) and also in the same transaction attempted to commit murder of his sister-in-law Abbisetti Rajamma i.e. the widow of the deceased and caused grievous hurt to her by a dangerous weapon. 2. After considering the evidence, the trial court by its judgment dated 18.02.2008 upheld the prosecution case and convicted the appellant of the charges under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. Regarding the sentences, it awarded life imprisonment for the oﬀence under Section 302 IPC and seven years RI for the oﬀence under Section 307 IPC besides imposing ﬁnes on both the counts with default clause prison sentences. This appeal is filed questioning that judgment. 3. As already mentioned, the appellant and the deceased are brothers and P.W.2 Abbisetti Narsimhulu who is the de facto complainant is their other brother. P.W.1 Abbisetti Rajamma who is the only eye-witness who supported the charges is admittedly the widow of the deceased. There is no dispute on the above aspect. The prosecution case, which led to the above charges against the appellant, is that on 6th October 2005 at about 2.00 AM i.e. some time after the midnight in the house of the deceased at Yathalur village the appellant due to a land dispute attacked the deceased with a billhook and murdered him and that when P.W.1 who was in the house of the deceased at that time intervened to save the deceased the appellant made a murderous attack on her also with the billhook and caused grievous hurt to her. We shall refer to the injuries of P.W.1 a little later but it is suﬃcient to note that she suﬀered grievous injuries as they also assume importance for the charge under Section 307 IPC. 4. The details of the evidence let in by the prosecution in support of its case are mentioned in the appendix of evidence given at the foot of the trial court judgment. The trial court considered the evidence in detail with regard to all the charges and upheld the prosecution case and convicted the appellant under Section 302 and Section 307 IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. It however did not record any conviction under Section 326 IPC on the reason that since conviction is recorded for the oﬀence under Section 307 IPC, conviction under Section 326 IPC is not necessary as both are connected and there is no illegality in this. 5. So far as the charge under Section 302 IPC is concerned, prosecution has examined P.W.10 Dr.Sankaraiah the then Civil Assistant Surgeon of the Government Hospital, Venkatagiri, who is said to have conducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased on 06.10.2005 at about 3.00 PM and Ex.P.17 is the post mortem report given by him. P.W.10 says that he conducted the post mortem at the Venkatagiri Government Hospital. This medical evidence shows that the deceased suﬀered two injuries viz., (i) a cut injury on the left side from hyoid bone towards back of the neck measuring about 13 x 5 x 8 cms and (ii) a cut injury from the right side from tip of the nose extending to back of the right year. He gave the opinion that both the injuries are enough to cause the death. His opinion also shows that the death could have occurred on 06.10.2005 at about 2.00 AM as pleaded by the prosecution. Ex.P.5 inquest report and the evidence of P.W.12 Muralikrishna the Inspector of Police who conducted it with panch witnesses would also show that the deceased met with a homicidal death. 6. Similarly the evidence of P.W.10 would also show that on the morning of 06.10.2005 at 8.30 AM on the requisition of police of Venkatagiri police station he also examined P.W.1 Rajamma and found four injuries on her which are grievous in nature. He further added that injuries on the deceased and P.W.1 are possible by M.O.1 billhook. Ex.P.16 is the wound certiﬁcate pertaining to P.W.1. We have gone through the cross- examination of P.W.10 and also P.W.12 the investigating oﬃcer but we ﬁnd that nothing has been elicited from them to discredit their evidence that the injuries found on the deceased are suﬃcient to cause his death and that P.W.1 suﬀered grievous injuries in the same transaction. Some criticism has been levelled with regard to the evidence of panch witnesses who were examined in connection with Ex.P.5 inquest report but there is no reason to disbelieve the prosecution version that the deceased met with homicidal death as it is supported by medical evidence and so also is the case with injuries found on P.W.1. 7. In fact in this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant did not also raise any objection with regard to the prosecution version that the deceased met with homicidal death and his wife i.e. P.W.1 suﬀered grievous injuries on the date and time pleaded by the prosecution. The dispute raised by the appellant’s counsel is that on the evidence on record he cannot be held responsible for the death of the deceased and the injuries on P.W.1 and this aspect will be dealt with a little later. Thus we ﬁnd that the prosecution has established the ﬁrst requirement of proving the homicidal death of the deceased and that the P.W.1 suﬀered with the serious injuries in the same transaction. 8. It has now to be seen whether the prosecution is able to establish that it is the appellant who murdered the deceased and attempted to murder his (deceased) wife (P.W.1) beyond reasonable doubt and is guilty of the charges under Section 302 and Section 307 IPC as held by the trial court. This is the second requirement. 9. On the above aspect, it may be noted that P.W.2 Abbisetti Narsimhulu who is the eldest brother of both the deceased and the appellant who gave Ex.P.1 report i n Venkatagiri police station about the incident and P.W.3 Sriram Bhaskar, a neighbour, did not support the prosecution case and both were declared hostile by the prosecution and were cross-examined on its behalf but their evidence is not of much help to the prosecution. P.W.4 G.Ramaiah and P.W5 S.Venkata Subbaiah are other neighbours of the deceased and their evidence is relevant to show that they heard the cries of P.W.1 on that night when the incident happened and when they came out from their houses to see what was going on they found the appellant running away from the house of the deceased and this is relevant to show that after the incident the appellant ﬂed away from the house of the deceased. 10. The only evidence on which the prosecution case rests is the evidence of P.W.1 the widow of the deceased and who also according to the prosecution became a victim in the hands of the appellant after he killed her husband or in that transaction. P.W.1 spoke about the incident in a very convincing manner as held by the trial court. She gave the narration about the attack on her husband who was sleeping and also herself when she intervened to rescue her husband. She also stated about the motive for the appellant to attack and kill her husband. Regarding the attack she stated that in the night when herself and her husband were asleep in their thatched house she heard sounds (cries) of her husband and woke up only to ﬁnd that the appellant was hacking him with billhook (matchukatti in Telugu) marked as M.O.1 and when she intervened the appellant attacked her also and caused injuries on her right face on the left temporal region and on her nose and right hand. We are of the opinion that the evidence of P.W.1 can be accepted as convincing as she has been living with her husband and can be treated as a natural witness and her presence at the time of incident cannot be doubted as held by the trial court. 11. Regarding the motive for attack, P.W.1 stated that about 8 months prior to the death of the deceased, the deceased and the appellant together purchased two acres of land at Yathaluru and they jointly dug a borewell in the above land and later on the appellant started demanding the deceased to sell away his share of land to him (appellant) and since the deceased did not agree for that demand the appellant developed grudge against the deceased and that was the motive for the attack. The trial court discussed this aspect also and we ﬁnd no reason to reject the prosecution version regarding motive as spoken to by P.W.1. Even otherwise it is well settled now that motive does not assume much importance when the ocular account about an oﬀence is convincing which is what we ﬁnd in this case. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant raised mainly three contentions to show that the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be relied upon and if that is held unreliable the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. It is now proposed to examine the said contentions. The ﬁrst contention is about the delay in the examination of P.W.1 by P.W.12 the Inspector who investigated the case. It is true that P.W.12 in his cross-examination admitted that he examined P.W.1 on 26.12.2005 at Tirupathi i.e. nearly 2 months 15 days after the incident and it is argued by the defence that this delay is not explained and therefore P.W.1’s evidence should be rejected treating her as a planted witness. 13. In support of the above contention reliance was placed upon a decision of Supreme Court given in State o f U.P. v. Mundrika[1]. This was a case where the statements of eye witnesses were recorded by the police three months after the incident and the delay was not explained and therefore for that reason the acquittals were confirmed holding that such delay casts a serious doubt as to whether the witnesses were eye witnesses. There is no dispute about this proposition, but it may be noted that the above decision itself suggests that where there is satisfactory explanation for the delay, then that delay by itself cannot be a ground to reject the evidence of such witnesses. In fact this view is expressed by the Supreme Court in para-19 of another judgment given in State of U.P. v. Satish[2] relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. It has now to be seen whether the prosecution can be said to have explained the above delay in examining P.W.1 by the police satisfactorily. 14. As already mentioned according to the evidence of P.W.10 (the medical oﬃcer), P.W.1 has suﬀered four injuries and of them injuries 1 and 2 are on the face and they are (i) cut injury over nose from in between two eye brows to upper lip 3x3x2 cms and (ii) the upper lip separated into two parts. P.W.1 in her evidence has also spoken to that she suﬀered the above injuries at the hands of the appellant in the incident. P.W.10 stated that at the time when he examined P.W.1 on the morning of 06.10.2005 he found her in consciousness but said that she was not in a position to speak. P.W.1 herself in her evidence stated that she also went to Tirupathi hospital for treatment of injuries and this is not disputed. 15. What is important to note is that both injuries 1 and 2 of P.W.1 one on her face i.e. on her nose and injury No.2 also shows that upper lip was separated into two parts. These two injuries in our opinion having regard to their serious nature can be said to have disabled her from being available at her village or t o Venkatagiri police immediately after the incident and her version that she went to Tirupathi for treatment can be accepted as true. P.W.12 the Inspector also in his evidence stated that P.W.1 was not in a position to give statement immediately and he could not examine her till 26.12.2005. In his cross- examination P.W.12 was made to say that he visited Tirupathi four times to examine P.W.1 and he was questioned whether he obtained any certiﬁcates from the doctors at Tirupathi to the eﬀect that P.W.1 was not in a position to give any statement during all his visits to Tirupathi and of-course he did not obtain any such certificates. 16. It may however be noted that having regard to the serious injuries one of which also resulted in separation of the upper lip of P.W.1 into two parts, we are of the opinion that the explanation of P.W.12 that he could not examine her till 26.12.2005 can be accepted as truthful though medical certiﬁcates were not obtained by P.W.12 from the doctors at Tirupathi as she could not have been in a position to give statement to the police during the above delay period because of treatment. It should be noted that a court has to see the general probabilities in the case and it cannot look into each and every minor defect to demolish the prosecution case by going on a mission of ﬁnding fault on every aspect as the interests of the victim are also to be looked into vis-à-vis the interests of the accused. In the present case having regard to the injuries of P.W.1, we are of the opinion that the explanation of P.W.12 the Inspector for the delay in examination of P.W.1 can be accepted as satisfactory especially as P.W.1 being the wife of the deceased can be treated as a natural witness to the occurrence as it took place in her house. Thus the first contention of the defence is rejected. 17. Then coming to the second contention, the argument of the appellant’s counsel is that since the incident has occurred in the dead of the night at 2.00 AM P.W.1 could not have seen the assailant and therefore her version that the appellant was the assailant cannot be accepted. There is no force in this contention also which relates to identiﬁcation. It may ﬁrstly be noted that appellant is not a stranger to P.W.1 and he is the brother of P.W.1’s husband who is the deceased. It transpires from the evidence of P.W.4 G.Ramaiah who is a neighbour of P.W.1 that street lights were also there in the locality and they were recently prior to the incident were laid in the locality. Nothing is brought to our notice to the eﬀect that there were no street lights glowing or there was pitch darkness. Even otherwise it may be noted that P.W.1 and the appellant were not strangers and it would not be diﬃcult for a wife to identify her husband’s brother even in darkness. In the present case the evidence of P.W.1 is that she intervened to rescue her husband and in that process the appellant attacked her also and this is a much more stronger circumstance to conclude that P.W.1 could identify the appellant as the assailant and there is no reason to reject her evidence on this aspect as held by the trial court. Thus this second contention of the appellant’s counsel is also rejected. 18. The third contention is that P.W.1 had an idea to adopt her sister’s daughter as she had no children but the deceased wanted to adopt a child of the appellant and because of the same there were always quarrels between them and due to those quarrels on the night of the incident P.W.1 herself attacked the deceased with billhook and there was a ﬁght between them which resulted in the death of the deceased and injuries to her and that P.W.1 conveniently laid the blame on the appellant to escape from her liability. It is not elicited from the prosecution witnesses especially P.W.2 who turned hostile or it did not lead any evidence to show that P.W.1’s diﬀerences with her husband, if any, were of such a magnitude so as to drive her to kill her husband. The trial court rejected this contention as totally unacceptable and we do not ﬁnd any error in its conclusion. 19. The last contention relates to discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.1 and the factum of P.W.2 de facto complainant and P.W.3 a neighbour turning hostile and the locking of doors of the house of the deceased and the accessibility of the appellant to enter into the house of the deceased. The trial court discussed these discrepancies and rejected them as ignorable and not aﬀecting the merits in the prosecution case. The discrepancies pointed out are minor. It may be noted that it was P.W.2 who gave Ex.P.1 report on the next morning after the incident and the version of P.W.1 tallies with it. It appears that P.W.2 did not support the case in order to save his surviving brother i.e. the appellant. Here it should be noted that the evidence of P.W.4 and also P.W.5 who are said to be the villagers a n d neighbours of the deceased have stated that on hearing the cries they immediately came out and saw the appellant ﬂeeing away with M.O.1. Their evidence would show that the appellant after the attack came out of the thatched house of the deceased and fled away and this corroborates the version of P.W.1 that the appellant did enter her house on that night. 20. It should be noted that there were disputes between the appellant and the deceased and the dispute with regard to land also broke out on 05.10.2005. The evidence of P.W.1 and also P.W.2 would also show that the appellant came to the village regarding this land issue and that he also lived in the house of the deceased with his family for some time and later on the deceased stayed in the village by sending away his family. The fact that the deceased and the appellant purchased land though under diﬀerent sale deeds due to which the land disputes arose is also not in dispute. It also transpires from the evidence of P.W.1 that her sister’s daughter Mani also stayed on that night in the house of P.W.2. The trial court discussed all these aspects including the evidence of P.W.2 regarding the disputes and rejected the defence version. We do not ﬁnd any reason to disagree with its conclusion on this aspect. 21. It may be noted that P.W.1 is the wife of the deceased and she can be treated as a natural witness to the incident as it happened in her house. Her evidence regarding the attack on the deceased and his murder and also the murderous attack on herself by the appellant from which she survived is convincing. Nothing is brought on record to show that P.W.1 would stand to gain anything from securing the conviction of the appellant on a false implication. It is settled that the convincing testimony of a single witness is enough to record a conviction. We therefore do not see any reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court regarding convictions. Even with regard to the sentences, for the oﬀence under Section 302 IPC life imprisonment is the minimum sentence. Having regard to the injuries found on P.W.1 it can be said that seven years RI for the oﬀence under Section 307 IPC can also be said to be reasonable. Fine amounts on both the counts cannot also be said to be excessive. 22. For the aforesaid reasons it follows that there are no merits in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed conﬁrming the judgment of the trial court in all respects. _____________________ A. GOPAL REDDY, J ______________________ N. RAVISHANKAR, J 9th December 2011 CVRK [1] 2001 (1) ALD (Crl.) 252 (SC) [2] AIR 2005 SC 1000