THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.416 of 2009 Dated:19.02.2010 Between: Gadeela Bakkaiah .. Appellant And Nagojigari Nagoba and another .. Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD SECOND APPEAL No.416 of 2009 JUDGMENT: The Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.62 of 2008 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, dated 21.01.2009. The parties are referred to herein as they are arrayed before the trial Court. The plaintiffs, who are the parents of one Siddappa, aged 22 years, filed the suit for recovery of Rs.75,000/- with interest and costs towards damages from the defendant alleging that on 13.07.1995 Siddappa died due to electric shock suffered in the field of the defendant. He came into contact with a live electric wire set up by the defendant in his field in Survey No.297 /1/A without any indication or caution or warning. The plaintiffs stated that on the report of the Village Administrative Officer, Sadasivpet Police registered a case in Crime No.159 of 1995 and prosecuted the defendant under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The plaintiffs pleaded that their son was earning Rs.1,000/- per month and due to his death, they lost not only the monetary support, but also suffered mental shock, agony and loss of affection. The defendant was claimed to be postponing the demand for compensation and hence the suit. The defendant resisted the suit claiming ignorance about the plaintiffs that they are the parents of deceased Siddappa and he came to be acquitted in C.C.No.600 of 1995 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sangareddy, on merits, in respect of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The defendant also denied owning and possessing of Acs.5.00 of land in Survey No.297 or setting up a live electric wire around his field. He claimed his farm servant to be watching the fields all the time and denied any liability to pay any compensation. On such pleadings, the relationship of the plaintiffs with the deceased Siddappa, ownership of Survey No.297 with the defendant and the defendant setting up a live electric wire around his field, without any indication or warning, were the subject of issues framed by the trial Court. During trial, PWs.1 to 3 and DWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A1 to A6 and B1 to B5 were marked. The trial Court rendered its judgment on 08.04.2004 upholding the claim of the plaintiffs with extensive reference to the oral and documentary evidence on record and it concluded that the judgment in C.C.No.600 of 1995 acquitting the accused was due to non-production of the seized electric wire from the scene of offence and not due to any positive finding of the falsity of the case. The trial Court also observed that the death of the deceased on 13.07.1995 due to electric shock by coming into contact with a live electric wire in Survey No.297 belonging to and in the possession of the defendant was probablised by the evidence on record. The trial Court also concluded that considering the age and earnings of the deceased, which can be estimated at Rs.1,500/- per month, the claim for compensation of Rs.75,000/- with interest and costs was, but, reasonable. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit with interest at 12% per annum from the date of death of the deceased till the date of decree and at 6% per annum from the date of decree till realization, on the compensation of Rs.75,000/-. In appeal before the District Judge, the same contentions were raised again by both the parties and the first appellate Court on a re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record placed before the trial Court pointed out that the standard of proof in a civil suit and in a criminal case are distinct and different, the first being based on preponderance of probabilities and the latter being based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment in the criminal case was, therefore, considered to be not conclusive of the innocence of the defendant and the non-production of the electric wire before the criminal Court could not have led to the civil Court concluding the absence of the incident. The learned District Judge also found that there was ample evidence on record to show that the deceased died due to coming into contact with the live electric wire placed around the field of the defendant for protection of his crops and agreeing with the trial Court, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The defendant contends in the Second Appeal that the first appellate Court did not apply its mind in terms of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure due to which its judgment was vitiated. The questions raised are whether the plaintiffs succeeded in establishing the death of their son to be in the agricultural land of the defendant and whether the non-production of electric wire in the criminal case, which led to the acquittal of the defendant should have also led to disbelieving the case of the plaintiffs in the civil suit. It was also contended that the plaintiffs did not prove the earning capacity of the deceased and the defendant, therefore, desired the verdicts of both the Courts below to be reversed. Heard Sri R.Vinod Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant. The point for consideration is whether the Second Appeal is entertainable on any substantial question of law? POINT:- Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure restricts the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a Second Appeal only on its satisfaction that the case involves a substantial question of law. Any concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the first appellate Court can be reopened for consideration in a Second Appeal only on such Second Appeal indicating a debatable question of law and Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure prohibits any routine and casual interference with concurrent findings of fact only by substitution of the subjective satisfaction of the High Court in the place of the satisfaction arrived at by the Courts below. Keeping such restrictions on the exercise of any jurisdiction in a Second Appeal in view, it is seen on facts of the present case that no substantial question of law appears to arise in the present case. It is true that under Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate Court has to specify in writing in its judgment, the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision, and the relief granted. It is also true that the judgment of the first appellate Court herein did not specifically word its verdict in such a manner by indicating any points for determination in the format of a questionnaire. But it is seen from the judgment that the specific contentions raised in the first appeal about the effect of the acquittal in the criminal case, the questions raised about the acceptability of the evidence for the plaintiffs and the assertions about the dependability of the evidence of DWs.1 to 4 etc., were distinctly referred to and each of the questions so raised questioning the judgment of the trial Court was specifically dealt with, with reference to the oral and documentary evidence placed before the trial Court and it is with reference to such specific reasoning that the conclusions were arrived at and the relief was negatived. While it should be remembered that rules of procedure are only intended to be handmaids of justice and not to interfere with the rights of the parties on mere technicalities, any interference with the judgment of the first appellate Court only on the ground that it was not in the technical format prescribed under Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure will cause substantial prejudice to the aged plaintiffs, who already lost their son for no fault of theirs. Therefore, the technical plea under Order 41 Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot be a ground to entertain the Second Appeal, when in effect and substance, the principle underlying the said provision has been complied with by the judgment of the first appellate Court. Bereft of that plea, it is seen that the questions whether the plaintiffs have established the basis for their claim and whether the defendant produced more dependable evidence are pure questions of fact not involving even remotely any question of law. Therefore, this appeal is not within the parameters of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the Second Appeal is being disposed of at the stage of admission, even without notice to the respondents/plaintiffs, no costs need be awarded. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. ______________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J 19th February 2010 KH