WA 11/2002 BEFORE THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE B. S. REDDY THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY JUDGMENT AND ORDER HRISHIKESH ROY, J. Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, the learned senior Advocate for the appellant. Also heard Mr. P.C. Deka, the learned senior Advocate for the respondent/writ p etitioner Vijaya Bank. 2. Assumption of jurisdiction by the State Government constituted Labour Co urt at Dibrugarh on claims for subsistence allowance put forward by the appellan t led the respondent Vijaya Bank (herein after referred to as the ’Bank’) to fil e writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Dibrugarh. The judgment given by the learned Single Judge on the writ proceedings initiated by the Bank by holding that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain t he claim of the appellant for subsistence allowance, has given rise to presentat ion of the two writ appeals, which are to be considered in the present proceedin gs. 3. The W.A.381 of 2001 has been filed assailing the judgment dated 22.8.200 1 in Civil Rule No.3735 of 1995. In the said writ petition, the Vijaya Bank had challenged the process issued by the Labour Court at Dibrugarh on an application filed by the present appellant under Section 33(c)(2) seeking recovery of money allegedly due from the Bank. The Bank in the writ proceeding contended that it is a nationalized bank and as such the ’Appropriate Government’ for them in rela tion to a matter under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as 1947 Act) would be the Central Government in terms of the definition given under Section 2(a) of the 1947 Act. It was contended that as the Labour Court a t Dibrugarh has been constituted by the Assam Government and the appropriate Gov ernment for the Bank, i.e. the Central Government has not ’specified’ the said c ourt for exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act, the iss ue of process to Vijaya Bank by the said Court is without any jurisdiction. The decision of the learned Single Judge upholding the said contention of the writ p etitioner bank is under challenge in the present proceeding. 4. The challenge in W.A. No.11 of 2002 is to an order dated 24.8.2001 passe d in Civil Rule No.2771 of 1997 of the learned Single Judge which was passed by following the earlier decision dated 22.8.2001 in Civil Rule 3735 of 1995, where by it was reiterated that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has no jurisdiction to e ntertain a matter pertaining to an employee of the writ petitioner Vijaya Bank. By the order dated 24.8.2001, the learned Single Judge has permitted the appella nt to seek relief before any other appropriate authority. 5. It appears from examination of the judgments under appeal that, the lear ned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that in case of employees of the nationa lized Vijaya Bank, the appropriate Government is the Central Government and it accordingly concluded that only such Labour Court as has been specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (Central Government), which would have juri sdiction to decide the dispute raised by an employee of the respondent Bank. The learned Single Judge accepted the submission made on behalf of the Bank that as the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has not been specified by the Central Government to consider applications under Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act in respect of empl oyees of the bank, the entertainment of application filed by an employee of the bank by the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was without jurisdiction. In support of the said view taken by the learned Single Judge, reference to the decision in Management of Socklatinga Tea Estate vrs. N.I. Korean, repor ted in AIR 1968 Assam & Nagaland 15 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Treogi Nath vrs. Indian Iron & Steel Co., reported in AIR 1968 SC 205 h as been made in the impugned judgment. 6. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel for the appellant has dra wn attention of this Court to various provisions of the 1947 Act and also the pr ovisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (herein after referred to as the Standing Orders Act ) to contend that the Labour Court at Di brugarh has the jurisdiction to entertain the application of the appellant. It is submitted that by virtue of the ’explanation’ incorporated in Section 33C of the 1947 Act, the Labour Court constituted by a State Government would also b e competent to entertain an application of an employee of a nationalized Bank fo r whom the appropriate Government may be the Central Government. The learned cou nsel has further argued that the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Jud ge in Management of Socklatinga Tea Estate(supra) and Treogi Nath(supra) are not applicable and accordingly, the decision of the learned Single Judge is liable to be interfered with by accepting the present appeals. The learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn attention of the Co urt to the provisions of Section 10A(2) of the Standing Orders Act. Section 10A( 2) of the Standing Orders Act provides that if any dispute arises regarding subs istence allowance payable to a workman, the workman or the employer concerned ma y refer the dispute to the Labour Court constituted under the 1947 Act within th e local limits of whose jurisdiction, the industrial establishment wherein such workman is employed, is situate. On the other hand, Mr. P.C. Deka, the learned senior counsel appearing for the w rit petitioner Bank has supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge a nd has argued that as the writ petitioner Bank is a nationalized bank, the appro priate Government under the provisions of Section 2(a)(i) of the 1947 Act is the Central Government. Therefore, it is argued by the learned counsel that only a Labour Court constituted by the Central Government can adjudicate on the present dispute having regard to the provisions of Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act. The Labour Court at Dibrugarh has been constituted by the State Government and s ince the Central Government has not ’specified’ the said Court to adjudicate on disputes in relation to employees of the Bank, the assumption of jurisdiction by the State Government constituted Labour Court at Dibrugarh has been submitted to be without any authority. Through this submission, the learned counsel for the respondent Bank has tried t o support the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgments. 7. On examination of the provisions of Section 2(a) of the 1947 Act, it is seen that in respect of the Vijaya Bank, which is a nationalized bank, the appro priate Government would naturally be the Central Government. It is further seen that the Central Government has not specified the Labour Court at Dibrugarh as t he authority to decide on a dispute raised under Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act in respect of employees under the said Bank. There is no dispute about the fact that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has been constituted by the Assam Government, which is not the appropriate Government in respect of a nationalized bank. The explanation appended to Section 33C of the 1947 Act, in the percepti on of this Court, appears to indicate that even a Labour Court constituted by th e State Government could be ’specified’ to adjudicate on a dispute raised by an employee of a nationalized bank, provided such Labour Court is specified by the appropriate Government for the said purpose. In the instant case, the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has not been ’specifi ed’ by the Central Government for the said purpose and accordingly, we are unabl e to agree with the first submission advanced by the learned counsel for the app ellant that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh would have jurisdiction to entertain t he application filed by the appellant only on the basis of the provisions under the 1947 Act. However, the provisions of the Standing orders Act appear to indicate th at a Labour Court constituted under the 1947 Act, whether by the State Governmen t or Central Government, would have jurisdiction to entertain a claim of subsist ence allowance payable to a workman on an application made to such Labour Court by the concerned workman. The provisions of Section 10A(2) of the Standing Order s Act is a special provision incorporated only for adjudicating on claim relatin g to payment of subsistence allowance. Having regard to the special provision under Section 10A(2) of the Standing Orde rs Act, we feel that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh, although constituted by the State Government, would have jurisdiction to entertain a claim for subsistence a llowance even in respect of employees under a nationalized banks. It is not spec ified in Section 10A(2) of the Standing Orders Act that the Labour Court constit uted under the 1947 Act has to be a Labour Court constituted by an appropriate G overnment. It is also not stipulated that the appropriate Government has to ’spe cify’ such a Labour Court for entertaining an application under Section 10A(2) o f the Standing Orders Act. The only requirement for assumption of jurisdiction b y a Labour Court under Section 10A(2) of the Standing Orders Act is that the Lab our Court has to be one, which has been constituted under the 1947 Act and the c oncerned establishment must be functioning within the local limits of the jurisd iction of such Labour Court. 8. Having noted the provisions as above, we are of the view that the entert ainment of the application by the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was proper in respec t of the claim for subsistence allowance put forward by the appellant. We hold t hat with regard to the claim for subsistence allowance put forward by the appell ant against the respondent bank, the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has jurisdiction. We accordingly declare that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was competent and had jurisdiction to entertain the claim for subsistence allowance put forward by th e appellant. The impugned decisions of the learned Single Judge to the contrary is accordingly interfered with. The writ appeals are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.