^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (L) No. 349 of 2008 PETITIONER RESPONDENT Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. .c/ VERSUS Dashrath Singh -M. Post for order on .7.'. April, 2008. J^ Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge mGH^COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR PETITIONER RESPONDENT WRIT PETITION (L) No. 349 of2008 Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd., (Balco), Through : AGM Legal, Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. Balconagar Korba, Tahsil and District Korba (C.G.) VERSUS Dashrath Singh S/rf Late Bhaddelal, R/o Village - New Risda, Bhadrapara Balco Korba, Tahsil and District Korba (C.G.) WRIT PETITON UNDER ARTICLE 226 READ WITH 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA SB: Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri,J, Present: Shri P.Sam Koshy, Advocate with Shri Bhaskar Payasi, Advocate for the petitloner. Shri Sanjay Patel, Advocate for the respondent. ORDER (Passed on .. .7^. day ofApril, 2008) 1. This petition, filed by the Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (for short 'BALCO') impugns the order dated 13.12.2007 (Annexure P/l) passed by the Industrial Court in Civil Appeal No. 33/CGIR AcVA-II/07, whereby the order dated 04.04.2007, passed by the Labour Court, Korba, rejecting the application ofthe respondent on the ground ofdelay, was set aside. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this case are that the respondent working as Senior Attendant was terminated by order dated 14.08.2004 (Annexure P/2). The respondent preferred a writ petition being No. 2473/2005 on 13.6.2005 in this Court. This Court, on 20.6.2005 permitted the respondent to withdraw the petition with liberty to file an appeal before the Labour Court. The respondent, thereafter preferred an application under section 31(3) ofthe CUhattisgarh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short ' the Act, 1960). The petitioner preferred a preliminary objection under provisions ofsection 62 ofthe Act, 1960, the limitation period is one year fi-om the date of tennination of services. The Labour Court, after having considered the objection of the petitioner, held that the application of the respondent was filed beyond fhe period of limitation with delay of 9 months and dismissed the application of the respondent on 04.04.2007 (Annexure P/6). Feeling aggrieved, respondent preferred an appeal being Civil Appeal No. No. 33/CGIR Act/A-II/07, before the StSte Industrial Court, Chhattisgarh, Bench at Bilaspur. The Industrial Court, after having considered the submissions ofboth the parties, vide order dated 13.12.2007 (Annexure P/l), set aside the order dated 04.04.2007 (Armexure P/6) passed by the Labour Court, and remanded back the matter for fresh decision on merit. Thus, this petition. Shri P.S.Koshy, leamed counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the respondent has not preferred an application for condonation of delay alongwith application impugning the termination order. Section 62 of the Act, 1960 provides that if the dispute is connected with termination of the service of an employee, such proceedings shall commence within a period of one year from fhe date oftermination ofthe concemed employee. There is no provision or power with the Labour Court to condone the delay. It is clear from fhe reading of provisions of section 62 and 65 of the Act, 1960 fhat wherever legislature intended to confer power on the Court to condone the delay, it is specifically provided. In case of the Industrial Court, second proviso to section 65 ofthe Act, 1960 provides that the Industrial Court, for sufficient reasons, may admit any appeal after expiry of such period in respect ofmatters specified in clause 'c' ofparagraph (A) ofsection 61 ofthe Act, 1960. It was provided in second proviso to section 62 ofthe Act, 1960 that the Labour Court may, for sufficient reasons admit any application for declaration that fhe change is illegal under Act, after expiry of three months after the date of which the change was made. But in case of limitation prescribed for making an application for initiating proceeding under section 62 (i) (a), (b), (c) of the Act, 1960, one/two years period of limitation has been prescribed and there is no power vested in the Labour Court for condonation ofdelay. Per conb-a, Shri Sanjay Patel, leamed coansel appearing for the respondent submits that since the respondent had preferred a writ petition being No. 2437 of 2005, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 20.06.2005 with liberty to file an appeal before the Labour Court, the limitation ought to have commenced from 20.06.2005. The respondent has prefen-ed an application on 01.05.2006 and the application was preferred within a period of one year from the date of order of the High Court i.e. on 01.05.2006. Thus, the application was within time and the order passed by the Industrial Court is just, proper and in the interest ofjustice. I have heard rival contentions of the leamed counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto. It is clear that the impugned termination order was passed on 14.08.2004 (Annexure P/2). Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a writ petition, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 20.06.2005 with liberty to file an application before the Labour Court (Aanexure P/3). The instant application was filed thereafter on 01.05.2006 within a period of one year. The Industrial Court, after having considered all the facts, came to the conclusion that the respondent should not be not thrown out on the ground of delay particularly in the present case, when the writ petition was filed and the High Court granted liberty to file application before the Labour Court. Therefore, the technical ground of counting limitation from the date of termination is not proper. Accordingly, the Industrial Court set aside the order dated 04.04.2007 passed by the S.3S& Labour Court and remanded back the matter to the Labour Court for decision on ment. 7. It is tme that in nonnal circumstances, ifthe Labour Court has no power to condone the delay in preferring an application against the order of termination, the delay cannot be condoned. The Supreme Court, in the matter ofDamodaran Pillai and others v. South InAism Bank Ltd ., observed that the civil court in absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of provisions of section 5 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963, the Court cannot mvoke its inherent powers under provisions ofRule 106(3), order XXI ofthe Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 8. In the matter ofBabulal Nagar v. Shree Synthetics Ltd. , the Supreme Court observed as under: "20. Ordinarily, the courts exercising extraordinary jurisdiction are loathe to interfere with an order remanding the matter to the authority directed to investigate facts. The Industrial Court had made an order of remand. The High Court was not justified in interfering with the same. By this uncalled for interference, it has merely prolonged the agony of the unemployed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who caa ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issue avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. (D.P.Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration, (1983) 4 SCC 293 : (A1R 1984 SC 153)" 9. In the matter of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhmd Cooperative Marketing-cum- Processing Service Society Limited and Another , fhe Supreme Court has held as under: "10....the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact ' (2005) 7SCC 300 2AIR1984SC1164 3 (1999) 6 SCC 82 10. 11, by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment ofpart ofthe back wages instead offall back wages." A Full Bench ofthe High Court ofMadhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, in the matter of Mohammad Sagir Vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and others , while considering the provisions for scope of condonation of delay under provisions ofsection 62 ofthe Act, 1960, observed as under: "29.....The MPIR Act is a benevolent and beneficial statute. In the absence of a categorical and unequivocal mandate by the Legislature it would not be appropriate to state that a claim of an employee would be thrown over board as he had not approached the Labour Court within the time frame. Tme, it is the doctrine of delay and latches would be attracted but that is in a different compartment and that does not necessarily mean, in the absence of such language used in the provision, the application preferred by the employee is not entertainable beyond the stipulated period as provisions of Limitation Act including Section 5 are not attracted. We may hasten to state that the inference with regard to limitation, in our view, is not permissible. A provision relating to limitation is a technical one and has to be technically constmed and there can not be a liberal interpretation. We are conscious of the same but simultaneously when technically the provision has not excluded the applicability ofthe Limitation Act or not put the provisions in such a way constricting or restricting the power of the Labour Court to condone the delay as has been done in the case of Mohd. Ashfaq (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that the Act applies." The M.P.I.R. Act has been adapted by the State of Chhattisgarh as it is and renamed as C.G.I.R. Act, 1960. I am in respectfiil agreement with the view taken by the leamed Full Bench ofthe High Court ofMadhya Pradesh. Further, in the matter ofN.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy , the Supreme Court has observed as under: 4 2004(2)MPnT 179 5 (1998) 7 SCC 123 ?"% "10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situation is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. .e/ 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress ofthe legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unendmg period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sitflnis litim (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy fhe rights of the parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period oftime." 12. It is well settled that in the case oflndustrial Court, remanding the matter for fi-esh decision, this Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court. 13. In view ofthe above, the petition is accordingly dismissed. No order asto cost. Sd/- r Satish K. Agnihotri Judge Amit