1 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD Criminal Application No.1766 Of 2010 With Criminal Application No.1767 Of 2010 With Criminal Application No.1768 Of 2010 With Criminal Application No.1769 Of 2010 With Criminal Application No.1770 Of 2010 With Criminal Application No.1774 Of 2010 With Criminal Application No.1775 Of 2010 * Premchand s/o Fatechand Surana, Age 59 Years, Occupation : Business R/o B-13, Navjivan, 21, Nepean Sea Road, Mumbai - 400036. ... Applicant. Versus 1) The State of Maharashtra. 2) Jalgaon Janta Cooperative Bank Ltd. Jalgaon, Through Branch Manager, Navi Peth, Jalgaon. ... Respondents. -------- Shri. N.S. Ghanekar, Advocate, for applicant. Shri. V.D. Rakh, Additional Public Prosecutor, for respondent No.1 - State in Criminal Application Nos.1766, 1769 and 1774 of 2010. 2 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 Shri. D.R. Korde, Additional Public Prosecutor, for respondent No.1 - State in Criminal Application Nos.1767, 1770 and 1775 of 2010. Shri. P.P. More, Additional Public Prosecutor, for respondent No.1 - State in Criminal Application Nos.1768 of 2010. Shri. A.N. Nagargoje, Advocate, for respondent No.2. -------- CORAM: K.U. CHANDIWAL, J. DATE: 24th JUNE 2011 ORAL JUDGMENT: 1) Heard. 2) These criminal applications being arising out of identical proceedings between the same parties are heard together and finally. Rule, returnable forthwith. The counsel waives service for respondents – original complainant. 3) The respondent No.2 – a cooperative bank at Jalgaon having its branch at Onkareshwar Mandir Jalgaon filed proceedings in terms of sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the learned Chief 3 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 Judicial Magistrate at Jalgaon. 4) The applicant (accused) asserts that he was a Director of the accused company, however, had no practical role in the day to day business activities. He was not in charge and responsible for conduct of business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed. Merely based on his holding designation he should not have been prosecuted. 5) Learned counsel for the complainant invited my attention to para 2 and verification clause before the learned Judge to address that requirement in terms of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to shower upon the responsibility on the applicant is scrupulously indicated. 6) On going through entire complaint specific averment to the status of accused / applicant to be a Director and person responsible for day to day activities of the company (accused No.1) is averred. Even paragraphs 3 and 4 illustrate that at the time of disbursement of the 4 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 loan, its repayment, the accused / applicant had issued the questioned cheques with assurance that it would be encashed and the amount be remitted in the loan accounts. However, the words are not honoured. In the verification also the complainant has attributed to the role of the applicant to be directly and personally involved in the transactions of the issuance of cheque and responsibility of its honouring. 7) In one of the criminal applications (Criminal Application No.1772 of 2010) incidentally it is informed and not disputed that the applicant had signed the questioned cheque. However, the said application is withdrawn today. 8) Learned counsel for the accused / applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, 2009 DGLS(DOC) 343 dated 6-7-2009 in which the Hon’ble Lordships have dealt with the scope of the term Director in relation to firm means a partner in the firm. Company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. In 5 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 the said judgment the Hon’ble Lordships have given reference to a three-Judge Bench judgment in the matter of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.v. Neeta Bhalla, 2005(8) SCC 89 wherein guidelines were indicated in respect of applicability of Section 141 concerning conduct of business of company and absence of such averments in the complaint. 9) Reverting to the complaint the role of the accused / applicant connecting with the company is indicated in so many words. The applicant-accused had signed relevant documents, promissory notes and other allied documents with the cooperative bank. These aspects only would be established by the bank at an appropriate time. I find substance in it. 10) The second submission of the learned counsel for the bank / complainant is that, a specific remedy is provided under section 397 Cr.P.C. to prefer revision but the same is bypassed and obviously to avoid the difficulty of limitation. In almost all the matters demand notices were issued in February 2007 and the learned Magistrate 6 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 has issued process on 28-7-2008. The applicant certainly has tried to avoid filing revision to escape delay and bar of limitation. On this count also the criminal applications lack merit. 11) The learned counsel for the bank has placed reliance to the judgment in the matter of State v. Navjot Sandhu,(2003)6 SCC 641 wherein the Hon’ble Lordships in para 29 have dealt with the scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and powers of its exercise. It reads as under : “29. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words “Nothing in this Code”. Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma case this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of revisional powers or appellate powers the High Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most 7 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.” 12) The legal position in relation to exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also explained in the matter of M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka AIR 2004 SC 555; Sunil Kumar v. Escorts Yamaha Motors Ltd. (1999) 8 SCC 468 and Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168. 13) Survey of above features of the matter illustrates that on factual aspects the role of the accused / applicant in the management and issuance of cheque to the bank is exclusively indicative of his primary liability in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 8 Cr. Application Nos.1766-1770,1774,1775/2010 The criminal applications lack merits, dismissed. Rule discharged. 14) The observations are prima facie in nature not to be weighed by the learned Judge seized with the matter. Sd/- (K.U. CHANDIWAL, J.) rsl