THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED C.M.A.No.1033 of 2005 JUDGMENT This appeal is filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short ‘the Act’) against an order, dated 06.07.2005, passed in W.C.No.233 of 2004 by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour-III, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Commissioner’). 2. Respondent Nos.1 and 2-dependants filed W.C.No.233 of 2004 before the Commissioner, claiming compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-for the death of Sri P. Krishnaiah during the course of his employment. They stated that on 18.11.2004, the deceased Krishnaiah was working as a cleaner of lorry bearing No.AP 28 T 6107 and when he was checking the tyres of the said lorry parked in front of Venkataiah Hotel at Rajapur village on N.H.N.9, a Qualis vehicle dashed him, due to which, he sustained injuries and while undergoing treatment, he died on 25.11.2004. The case was contested by the appellant-insurer and the third respondent- employer. By the order under appeal, the Commissioner awarded a sum of Rs.2,42,293/- towards compensation payable by the appellant-insurer and respondent No.3-employer jointly and severally by way of demand draft, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order, failing which, the dependants shall be entitled to interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the application i.e., 27.12.2004. Disputing the liability, the appellant-insurer filed the present appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material on record. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that as per the policy, the insurance is covered to only one employee i.e., the driver of the vehicle and that as no additional premium was paid to cover the risk of cleaner, the appellant is not entitled to pay compensation and that it is not a comprehensive policy covering all risks. In support of his contention, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Apex Court in RAMASHRAY SINGH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED[1], wherein it was held as under: “The relevant extract of Section 147 is reproduced with emphasis on the words on which the appellant’s case rests: “147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability;- (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section(2)- i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; Provided that a policy shall not be required- (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee- (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability”. Over and above the risks which are covered by this statutory provision, parties may of course enter into a contract by which the insurer agrees to cover additional risks. It is not the appellant’s case that apart from the policy of insurance there was any contract between the appellant and the Insurance Company. The policy has a clause which defines the limits of liability in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle under Section II (1) of the terms and conditions of the policy. In proviso (b) to Section II(1), it has been expressly stated that “Except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Company shall not be liable in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person in the employment of the insured arising out of and in the course of such employment” He further contended that this Court in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. SURAYA BEE[2] upholding the above said judgment held that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation as no such extra premium is paid. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 has drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of this Court in P. VENKATA RAMANA v. CHINTAGUNTLA KUMARI[3] wherein it was held as under: “The main controversy is, about the liability or lack of it, on the part of the 5th respondent, to pay the compensation. It is not in dispute that the goods vehicle, involved in the accident, was insured with the 5th respondent. The Tribunal found that the deceased was engaged as a coolie, to load and unload the birds in the vehicle. The only ground on which it exonerated the 5th respondent is that, the deceased was travelling in the vehicle, after unloading has taken place. It was indirectly suggested that, a person engaged to load and unload the vehicle, is not supposed to travel in it, after the work is over. On this basis, he was treated as a gratuitous passenger in a goods vehicle. A judgment of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd., v. Bommithi Subbhayamma (2005 ACJ 721) was applied to the facts of the case. In this regard, it becomes necessary to read sub- section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, together with the proviso. ““147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability;- (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (c) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer; and (d) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section(2)- i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; Provided that a policy shall not be required- (iii) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee- (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (iv) to cover any contractual liability”. Explanation:-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place”. 9. The obligation and necessity to insure the vehicle before it is put to use, in a public place, is cast under Section 146 of the Act. Section 147 indicates the extent to which, the policy must cover the liability. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) mandates that the policy must be issued by the authorized insurer. Clause (b) refers to the classes of persons, that must be covered by the policy. The extent of coverage is referred to, in sub-section (2). Su-clause (i) of sub-section (1) (b) deals with the obligation to meet the liability incurred by the owner of the vehicle, in respect of death or bodily injury, or damage of any property of a third party. Through Act 54 of 1994, the owner of the goods or his authorized representative, being carried in a vehicle, is specifically added to this category. Sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1)(b) deals with the obligation arising out of death, or bodily injury to a passenger of a public service vehicle. 10. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 147 is, in a way, the continuation of the list of persons, that are required to be covered in the event of any accident. It covers the persons employed in the vehicle as against third parties, or passengers. These include, (a) drivers, irrespective of class of vehicle, (b) conductors, engaged in a public service vehicle, and (c) persons, being carried in a goods carriage, obviously as labourers. These classes of persons were dealt with under the proviso, obviously because the Parliament felt it fit, not only to identify the persons, but also the extent of coverage under the one and the same provision. As regards this category of persons, the liability was restricted to the one, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Reference to that Act clearly suggests that the persons mentioned in the proviso are workmen of one category, or the other, in contradistinction to third parties mentioned in sub-section (1) (b)(i), and passengers in a public service vehicle (1)(b)(ii). If sub-section (1) is red together with the proviso, it emerges that the Act requires the insurance policy to cover three categories of persons viz., third parties, passengers in a public service vehicle and employees, such as drivers, conductors and labourers, engaged in a goods vehicle”. She has further drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. THUKARAMA ADAPPA[4] wherein it was held as under: “In Ramesh Kumar’s case (AIR 2001 SC 3363) the Supreme Court did not answer the cases arising under the second category. However, they answered the first and third category of cases. Insofar as first category of cases are concerned, the Supreme Court answered in the following manner (Para 6): “the cases under this category need not detain as long as this question has been directly raised and decided in the case of Mallawwa V. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (1999) ACJ 1): (AIR 1999 SC 589). The Court held in the said case that, the insurance company is not liable for any damage in cases the gratuitous passengers including owner of the goods or his representative who traveled in a goods vehicle. So this category of cases are disposed of in term of this declaration that liability to pay compensation to the claimants of such person is not on the insurance company but on the owner of the goods vehicle”. Insofar as third category was concerned the Supreme Court answered as under: “the claim for the owner and his representative is not disputed even by the learned counsel for the insurance company, after its aforesaid 1994 amendment, that insurance company is liable to pay compensation for such person even when they were travelling in a goods vehicle. This is in view of 1994 amendment in sub-clause (i) of Section 147(1)b) of the new Act in which the following words were brought in: … Injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in a vehicle.” Thus, this category of cases are also disposed of by declaring that compensation awarded in such cases where deceased or injured persons were travelling in a goods carriage who were owner or his authorized representative, the insurance company is liable to pay the compensation”. In both the judgments cited by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2, the deceased or injured persons were travelling in the accident vehicle, but in the instant case, the deceased P. Krishnaiah was a cleaner of the lorry and while checking the tyres of the parked lorry, he met with an accident and succumbed to the injuries and as such, the said judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6. Insofar as the liability of the appellant is concerned, following the judgment of the Apex Court in RAMASHRAY SINGH’s case (1 supra), the appellant is exonerated from its liability to pay compensation to the dependants and it is at liberty to recover the compensation, if any, deposited by it, from the owner of the crime vehicle. 7. In view of the above reasons, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ GHULAM MOHAMMED, J Date:26.08.2010. sj [1] (2003) 10 SCC 664 [2] 2009 Andhwr-2-335 [3] 2010(2) ALD 281 [4] 2007 KCCR-2-1001