1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 345 OF 2009 IN FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 17852 OF 2006 (The Collector, Nagpur .v. Marotrao Annaji Potdar and others) Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram appearances, Court's orders or directions Court's or Judge's Orders and Registrar's orders. Shri K.S. Dhote, AGP for the applicant/appellant. Shri Bhushan Mohata, Advocate holding for Shri Anand Parchure, Advocate for the respondent Nos.1 and 2. CORAM : A.P. BHANGALE, J. 11TH NOVEMBER, 2009. Heard. The applicant/State is seeking condonation of delay of 467 days in filing the First Appeal. It is submitted that the impugned judgment and award was passed on 15.04.2005. After the same was communicated to the Land Acquisition Officer by the Assistant Government Pleader on 06.05.2005, the Land Acquisition Officer moved an application for certified copy on 12.05.2005 which was received on 02.06.2005. The same was forwarded to Joint Secretary, Law and Judiciary Department, Nagpur on 20th June, 2005 for opinion to prefer First Appeal and sanction from the Law and Judiciary Department, Nagpur including to make arrangement for the amount of expenses. The learned AGP contended that the delay has occurred due to administrative exigencies and bona fide reasons and, therefore, the same may be condoned. As against his submissions, the learned Counsel for the respondents made a reference to earlier 2 order dated 4th November, 2009 passed by this Court in Civil Application No. 795 of 2009 when condonation of delay for the period of 626 days in order to prefer First Appeal was refused, after making reference to ruling in Pundlik Jalam Patil .v. The Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another (reported in 2008(6) All MR 954 (SC)), in which it was observed thus :- “23. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by restoring to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit which otherwise not entitled in law in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging 3 the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 24. It is true when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for Governmental authorities. Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 4 Applying the above principle, it appears that the present application does not contain satisfactory explanation to condone inordinate delay of 467 days and, therefore, considering the conduct of authorities was negligent, application for codonation of delay deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed accordingly. JUDGE *rrg.