IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No 12652 of 2010 1. NEELAM KUMARI D/O SITA RAM YADAV, W/O BASHISTHA PD. YADAV R/O VILL.- RAHMAN KITTA, P.S.- DHORAIYA, DISTT.- BANKA Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 2. THE SECRETARY HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, BIHAR, PATNA 3. THE SECRETARY PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 4. THE DIRECTOR, PRIMARY EDUCATION, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 5. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BANKA 6. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, BANKA 7. THE MEMBER OF DISTRICT TEACHER EMPLOYMENT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, BANKA 8. THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, DHORAIYA, DISTT.- BANKA 9. THE BLOCK EDUCATION OFFICER, DHORAIYA, DISTT.- BANKA 10. THE MUKHIYA, GRAM PANCHAYAT KARHARIA BLOCK & P.S.- DHORAIYA, , DISTT.- BANKA 11. THE PANCHAYAT SACHIV, GRAM PANCHAYAT KARHARIA BLOCK & P.S.- DHORAIYA, DISTT.- BANKA 12. JAY RAM YADAV S/O LATE NIRANJAN YADAV R/O VILL.- RAHMAN KITTA, P.S.- DHORAIYA, DISTT.- BANKA *** For the petitioner : Mr Md Najmul Hoda, Advocate For the S t a t e : M/s R C Bharti, SC 14 with Ajay Ajay Kumar, AC to SC 14 *** 2 27.08.2010 The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 22.06.2010 passed by the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunal in Case No 49 dated 31.12.2008. Petitioner has two grievances, firstly that the Tribunal ordered her dismissal without she being made a party and secondly that she was duly appointed and had committed no mistake or fault and, as such, her services could not be terminated. It is also submitted that the complaint was much delayed in time. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the 2 State and having perused the order of the Tribunal, I am not inclined to interfere in the matter. From the order, it is clear that respondent No 12 Jay Ram Yadav had been recruited as Shiksha Mitra on 28.05.2004. His first extension was granted on 10.12.2005. When it came for consideration of second extension, on 12.02.2006, the same was refused on the ground that, as per State Government directive, he had not obtained Intermediate qualification and, as such, he was not granted extension. The vacancy so caused was filled up by the petitioner. From the order, it is clear that the said respondent immediately protested to the authorities. The matter was enquired into and BDO, after examining the facts, reported that the private respondent had in fact obtained Intermediate qualification even before the refusal of second extension though it was in third division. It was, accordingly, recommended that refusal to extend was wrong. When nothing was done, pursuant to these reports, the said respondent appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has noticed the aforesaid fact and clearly noticed that petitioner has passed his Intermediate examination on 07.06.2005 itself which markssheet was produced before the Tribunal. In my view, if this fact is correct then refusal to renew his appointment was clearly wrong. The Tribunal has even referred to the Circular of the State Government which clearly said that all similarly terminated persons could be taken back to service. Thus, even if one accepts what petitioner submits to be correct, the petitioner cannot get any relief. So far as the question of violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, all I can say is that principles of natural 3 justice are neither an unruly horse nor a bull in the China shop. Its applicability depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Here, even if the order of the Tribunal was to be set aside, all that the petitioner can say which she has submitted here that she was duly appointed on a vacancy created by removal of the private respondent and she had committed no wrong. This aspect, I have already considered. It is not a question of any wrong being committed by the petitioner but the question was squarely about the wrong committed as against the private respondent. Those facts are not in dispute. Thus, no useful purpose would be serviced by remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. In that view of the matter, the writ petition merits no consideration and is dismissed accordingly. M.E.H./ (Navaniti Prasad Singh)