CRP 187/2006 BEFORE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) This application U/s 115 of the CPC is at the instance of the de fendants who seek to challenge the appellate judgment and decree of reversal dat ed 27-6-06 passed in Title Appeal No.19/05. 2. The facts, be brief, may be noticed. The opposite party herein a s the plaintiff instituted a suit being Title Suit No.279/99 seeking eviction o f the defendants from the suit premises on the ground that the said defendant wa s defaulter in the payment of monthly rent and also on the ground that the suit premise is bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord for her use and occupati on. According to the plaintiff she is the absolute owner of the suit house cover ed by Municipal Holding No.92 in Ward No.31 of Gauhati Municipal Corporation, as described in Schedule-A to the plaint. According to the plaintiff the defendant No.1 is a tenant in occupation of a room on the ground floor which is describe d in Schedule-B to the plaint. The monthly rent of the premise, according to the plaintiff, was fixed at R.2000/- per month payable within 15 days of the next m onth. According to the plaintiff the defendants had failed to pay monthly rent o f the premises since August, 1999 and, therefore, the defendants are liable to b e declared as defaulters and evicted from the suit premises. The further case of the plaintiff, as stated in the plaint, is that her husband is a practising adv ocate and her daughter is a doctor. Therefore, the premise described in Schedule -B to the plaint, in occupation of the defendants, is required by the plaintiff for use of her husband and daughter in connection with their respective profess ion. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement wherein the allegation of default has been denied. Insofar as bona fide requirem ent as pleaded by the plaintiff is concerned, according to the defendants the pl aintiff is having alternative accommodation in two multistoried RCC house cover erd by Holding No.92 and 92A of Ward No.31 and, therefore, the suit premise is n ot at all required by the plaintiff for use of her husband and daughter, as clai med. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties as many as seven is sues were framed for trial in the suit. Issue No.5 which alone would be relevant to the present adjudication may be usefully extracted hereinbelow:- Whether the suit house is bona fide required by the plaintiff for her bona fide use and occupation ? 5. In the course of trial the plaintiff examined as many as four wi tnesses in support of her case whereas the defendant examined three witnesses. T he learned trial court found the issue with regard to the default against the pl aintiff and in favour of the defendant. Insofar as the bona fide requirement is concerned the learned trial court came to the finding that though the plaintiff had examined her husband as PW-3, no witness was examined by the plaintiff to su pport the pleaded version which is to the effect that the clients of the plainti ff’s husband face difficulty in going to his chamber in the second floor. Insofa r as requirement of the suit premise by the plaintiff’s daughter for opening a c hamber is concerned, the learned trial court took the view that as the plaintiff ’s daughter was a government doctor she had no need for a chamber. Coupled with the aforesaid conclusions the learned trial court also appears to have taken the view that in the present case the bona fide need pleaded by the plaintiff was n ot her own and, therefore, there was a legal bar for decreeing the plaintiff’s s uit. Accordingly the learned trial court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, the plai ntiff instituted an appeal against the aforesaid decree of dismissal, which havi ng been allowed, the present revision petition has been filed by the defendant/t enant. 6. As already noted, the learned trial court had decided the issues with regard to default and bona fide requirement against the plaintiff and in f avour of the defendants. While the finding on the issue of default has been affi rmed in appeal the finding on bona fide requirement has been reversed. The plain tiff has not instituted any proceeding with regard to the finding on the point o f default as altered by the learned lower appellate court. The present revision filed by the defendants is being against the finding of the learned first appell ate court on the point of bona fide requirement, it is the correctness of the sa id finding alone which will require determination by this court in exercise of i ts powers U/s 115 CPC. 7. Mr DC Mahanta, learned senior counsel for the appellant/defendan t has taken me through the findings of the learned trial court with regard to th e issue of bona fide requirement as well as the conclusions reached by the learn ed trial court as to why the case of the plaintiff with regard to bona fide requ irement was negatived by the said court. Relying on the same Mr Mahanta has stre nuously urged that the plaintiff’s husband already has a chamber in the second f loor of the building and that the plaintiff’s case that the said chamber is not suitable as the clients find it difficult to go to the second floor has not been substantiated in any manner by adducing any cogent evidence in support of the s aid fact. Mr Mahanta, therefore, urged that bona fide requirement on account of the need of the suit premise for setting up a chamber of the plaintiff’s husband has not been established. Insofar as the need of the daughter of the plaintiff is concerned, Mr Mahanta has submitted that it is proved and established by the evidence and materials on record that the plaintiff’s daughter is a government d octor working in the Blood Bank of the Gauhati Medical College and, therefore, n ot entitled to private practice. Consequently, it is urged, she would not have a ny need for a chamber of her own. Therefore, according to the learned counsel th e bona fide need on account of the plaintiff’s daughter is also not proved by th e evidence and materials on record. 8. Mr GM Paul, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party/pla intiff has argued that the conclusions drawn by the learned trial court are mere inferences from the evidence proved and established by the plaintiff. According to the learned counsel such inferences have been incorrectly drawn by the learn ed trial court from the primary facts and that the said primary facts proved and established in the case does not reasonably permit the said inferences to be ma de. Consequently, the learned lower appellate court was fully justified in rever sing the said finding of the learned trial court. Mr Paul, learned counsel has f urther submitted that the findings recorded by the learned lower appellate court are findings of facts based on an appreciation of the evidence and materials on record and, therefore, there will be no occasion for this court to cause any in terference in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction with such findings of facts. 9. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the riva l parties. It will hardly be necessary for this court to deal at any length with the power conferred on this court by the provisions of Section 115 of the CPC. Ordinarily, in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction there will be no re-a ppreciation of the evidence, neither the revisional court will disturb any findi ng of fact recorded on the basis of the evidence on record so long as the said f indings are reasonably possible to be reached on consideration of the materials available on record. In the present case the plaintiff by examining PW-1, an ass ociate of her husband (PW-3), has proved that the second floor chamber of her hu sband is not suitable for the purpose of the profession. The husband of the peti tioner himself appeared as PW-3 and corroborated the said fact. Merely because t he plaintiff did not examine any clients to further support the fact pleaded, i. e. that the second floor chamber was not suitable, it does not logically follow that the plaintiff had not established her case insofar as the requirement of th e husband is concerned. The plaintiff’s daughter may be a government doctor but the said fact cannot be understood to be sufficient to dispense with the necessi ty of the plaintiff’s daughter for a chamber of her own. The inference from the fact that the plaintiff’s daughter was a government doctor and hence she had no need for a chamber of her own, in the considered view of the court, is not the o nly inference that can be reached on the given facts. In such circumstances thi s court is of the view that the learned lower appellate court, as the last court of facts, was perfectly justified in reversing the findings recorded by the lea rned trial court, as noticed above. The learned lower appellate court was also j ustified in taking the view that even if the plaintiff had some other alternativ e accommodation available, such availability, by itself, will not come in the wa y of the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff. After all, it not for the defen dant to point out to the plaintiff as to how alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff should be utilized. The aforesaid conclusion reached by the le arned lower appellate court is on a correct understanding of the several decisio ns of the Apex Court referred to in the impugned appellate judgment. 10. It is virtually a settled position in law that bona fide require ment of the plaintiff will include bona fide requirement of the plaintiff’s imm ediate family members. I am, therefore, of the view that the learned lower appel late court was perfectly justified in ignoring the contrary finding of the learn ed trial court while passing the impugned judgment and decree. 11. For the aforesaid reasons I am of the view that there is no meri t in this revision application. It is accordingly dismissed, however, without an y cost. The judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court is h ereby affirmed.