IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No 6033 of 1990 For Approval and Signature: Hon'ble MR.JUSTICE R.K.ABICHANDANI ============================================================ 1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed : YES to see the judgements? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? : NO 3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy : NO of the judgement? 4. Whether this case involves a substantial question : NO of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 of any Order made thereunder? 5. Whether it is to be circulated to the Civil Judge? : NO -------------------------------------------------------------- SURESH G KAUSHAL Versus GUJARAT FISHERIES CENTRAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION LTD. -------------------------------------------------------------- Appearance: MR. Y.V. Shah for Mr. K.M. Satwani for the Petitioner MR Nikil S. Kariel for Mr. BP TANNA for the Respondent NO.1 NOTICE SERVED on the Respondent No. 2 -------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM : MR.JUSTICE R.K.ABICHANDANI Date of decision: 24/08/2000 ORAL JUDGEMENT 1. The petitioner challenges the order of termination of his service during probation, passed on 31-7-1990 as per Annexure-B to the petition. 2. The petitioner was appointed on probation by an order dated 11-4-1990, as a Senior Manager (Administration) in the pay scale of Rs. 2100-75-2700-EB100-3800. The probation period was of one year from the date of his joining service. Termination of his probation, as per the impugned order dated 31st July 1990, was on the ground that his performance was not satisfactory. 3. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order of termination of petitioner's service was violative of principles of natural justice. It was contended that, though the period of probation was of one year, his services were terminated in a short span of about three months, during which period his performance could not have been properly judged. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission relied upon a decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in V.P. AHUJA Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS, reported in A.I.R. 2000, S.C. 1080, in which the Supreme Court held that a probationer or a temporary servant was also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. The order of termination which was challenged in that matter was held to be stigmatic, because, it was made on the ground that the probationer had failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TPT. CORPORATION & ANR. Vs. S. MANJUNATH, reported in 2000 (4) SCALE, 249, in which the Supreme Court held that, since the presumption about continuance, beyond the period of probation, as a probationer stood negatived by the fixation of a maximum time limit for the extension of probation, in such cases the termination after expiry of the maximum period up to which the probation could be extended would be invalid, inasmuch as the officer concerned must be deemed to have been confirmed. The learned counsel further argued on the strength of Regulation No. 16, which relates to 'termination of service', that the Chairman of the Association could terminate the services of an employee at any time after the expiry of period of probation, by giving him three months notice or salary in lieu there of. He argued that, in the present case the petitioner's services could not have been terminated in the manner in which it was done. It was also contended that, in view of Bye-law No. 63 of the respondent Association, the Board alone had the power to appoint the officers and to take disciplinary action for their removal, and therefore, the impugned order was invalid. 4. In the petitioner's appointment order dated 11-4-1990 at Annexure-A itself it was stipulated that, he was to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of his joining, but even during that period his services could be terminated without assigning any reason. The impugned order dated 31-7-1990 merely states that, his performance was not found to be satisfactory. That would not amount to casting any stigma on the petitioner. The performance of a person can be judged within three months, and it was not necessary for the concerned authority to allow the petitioner to continue for the remaining period of probation, after having found that his performance was not satisfactory. Since termination of petitioner's service during probation was only on the ground that his performance was not found to be satisfactory, the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court which are altogether on a different footing cannot assist the petitioner. 5. There is no substance in the contention that the authority which terminated petitioner's services during probation was subordinate to the appointing authority. Even if an officer who was incharge of the Managing Director has exercised the power of the Managing Director of the said Association, it cannot be said that the order was passed by any inferior authority. No contention on the basis of bye-law No. 63 has been raised in the petition, and there is no reason to doubt that the order has been made after following the requisite internal procedure. Reference to Regulation-16 is wholly misconceived, because, that provision has to be read in harmony with Regulation-11 of the Gujarat Fisheries Central Co-Operative Association Limited's Staff Regulations 1962, which in terms provides in Clause-iv that, " during the period of probation or at the end of the period of probation, an employee is liable to be removed from service without any enquiry or assigning of any reason with 24 hours notice thereof." 6. The impugned order of termination of petitioner's service during probation was therefore made in accordance with law, and as per the terms & conditions of his appointment, warranting no interference by this Court. The petition is therefore rejected. Rule is discharged, with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated. Dt: 24-8-2000 ( R.K. Abichandani, J ) /vgn.