CRIMINAL REVISION NO.1138 OF 2005 :{ 1 }: IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH DATE OF DECISION: DECEMBER 08, 2008 Parminder Kaur .....Petitioner VERSUS State of Punjab ....Respondent CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRESENT: Mr. S. S. Behl, Advocate for Mr. Rakesh Garg, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Mehardeep Singh, AAG, Punjab, for the State. Mr. H. S. Dandiwal, Advocate, for the complainant. **** RANJIT SINGH, J. (ORAL) The petitioner is aggrieved against the order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, summoning her as an additional accused in exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Gurvinder Kaur is deceased in this case, who allegedly, died on account of burn injuries. As per the allegations in the FIR, she was set on fire by CRIMINAL REVISION NO.1138 OF 2005 :{ 2 }: her husband, Kulwinderjit Singh, mother-in-law Jaswinder Kaur and Parminder Kaur, sister-in-law of the deceased. The incident took place on 24.10.2001. The deceased breathed her last on 28.2.2002. The FIR in this case has been lodged at the instance of the deceased. The complaint lodged by the deceased set the investigation into motion. After investigation, the police found husband, Kulwinderjit Singh and mother-in-law, Jawinder Kaur to be involved in this case. Parminder Kaur, sister-in-law, however, was found to be innocent and shown in column No.2. Gurdial Singh, father of the deceased, was examined as PW1 and thereafter application was moved by the prosecution for summoning Parminder Kaur as an additional accused. As per evidence of PW1, he received a telephonic message from an unidentified person, apprising him that Gurvinder Kaur has been set on fire by her husband, Kulwinderjit Singh, mother-in-law Jaswinder Kaur and Parminder Kaur, sister-in- law, after sprinkling kerosene oil and was admitted in D.M.C. Hospital, Ludhiana. The witness accordingly went to Ludhiana and searched for his daughter. He came to the ward where his deceased daughter was admitted on account of burn injuries. On the said day, he was not allowed to talk to his daughter. He has given evidence that when he met his daughter on the following day, she told him that her husband, Kulwinderjit Singh, mother-in-law Jaswinder Kaur and Parminder Kaur, sister-in-law had poured kerosene oil and set her on fire with an intention to kill her. The reason for doing so was demand of maruti car, which was not fulfilled. It is on the basis of this evidence that the petitioner has been summoned as an additional CRIMINAL REVISION NO.1138 OF 2005 :{ 3 }: accused. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made three fold submissions before me. He would first submit that the incident took place on 24.10.2001 whereas the deceased died on 28.2.2002. He would further point out that the marriage of the petitioner was fixed just four days after the incident and it would not be appropriate to accept from such a person to indulge herself in such an incident. Counsel lastly submits that the impugned order would not show any application of mind inasmuch as that the requirement of law as laid down in the case of Michael Machado & Anr. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., 2000 (2) RCR (Criminal) 75, apparently was not kept in view while directing that the petitioner be summoned as an additional accused. This is a case where the FIR has been lodged at the instance of the deceased. She was there to narrate the entire incident. Unfortunately, she died subsequently but her version was left for the Court to look at. As per Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, statement, written or verbal, which are relevant to the facts by a person who is dead, or whose attendance could not be procured or incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, are, thus, relevant facts, when these relates to the cause of death. Such a statement by a person relating to the cause of his/her death is admissible in evidence even though such person may not be under expectation of death. It is specifically provided that such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation CRIMINAL REVISION NO.1138 OF 2005 :{ 4 }: of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. This statement of the deceased certainly would come within the purview of Section 32 of the Act. Nothing much, thus, can be made out from the fact that the deceased died after a lapse of considerable time. This statement would be admissible. The submission that the petitioner could not be expected to behave in a manner as is alleged, once her marriage was fixed just four days after the alleged incident is not a relevant consideration for summoning her as an additional accused. It may have to be considered while deciding the case finally. What is required to be seen is if there is evidence which is admissible and can be taken into consideration. It is also to be seen if such evidence would satisfy the test as laid down in Michael Machado 's case (supra) and number of other judgments. The Courts are required to see if there is a hope of prospect of conviction on the basis of evidence led and then is entitled to summon someone as an additional accused. The argument addressed by learned counsel that the petitioner could not be expected to commit this act as her marriage was fixed just four days thereafter, thus, would not be a relevant fact to be taken into consideration. It would amount to appreciation of evidence. The evidence as given by PW1 has been referred to above. He has specifically named the petitioner as a one who was equally responsible with the husband and mother-in-law in pouring kerosene oil and then making an attempt on the life of the deceased. The deceased survived to give her side of version, which would be CRIMINAL REVISION NO.1138 OF 2005 :{ 5 }: admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. This evidence, in my view, would satisfy the test of hope of a conviction as laid down in the case of Michael Machado (supra). In fact, in Rajendra Singh Versus State of U.P. and anr. 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1021, it has been held that the court need not be satisfied that the accused has committed an offence and even if it appears that he has committed an offence, that would be sufficient to summon the person as an additional accused. It is also observed by the Supreme Court the legislature apparently has left discretion to the trial Court to summon or not to summon additional accused while exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. This power, as observed by the Supreme Court, cannot be termed as extraordinary power which is to be exercised only under the compelling reasons or the circumstances. The Court is given a judicial discretion which is to be exercised by the judicially trained mind and accordingly it would basically be for a Court deciding such an application which has to take a decision on the basis of law and the evidence. The Trial Court was well advised and could have better expressed itself in stating so but since there is an evidence available, which satisfies the test of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the impugned order would not call for any interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The present revision is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner would be at liberty to seek bail for an offences, which were CRIMINAL REVISION NO.1138 OF 2005 :{ 6 }: added subsequently during the course of proceedings. December 08,2008 ( RANJIT SINGH ) khurmi JUDGE