:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.162 OF 2007 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.162 OF 2007 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.162 OF 2007 Neelam Sridhar Kshirsagar ...Applicant v. Rubina Thadani & Ors. ...Respondents. Mr.Haresh Jagtiani Sr.Counsel a/w Shri Mohan Singh & Siddhesh Bhole, advs. for the Applicant. Mr.A.K.Abhyankar Sr.Counsel with Ms.Raksha D. Tanna , adv. for the Respondent No.1. CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. DATE: 11th January, 2008. DATE: 11th January, 2008. DATE: 11th January, 2008. P.C. P.C. P.C. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the Parties. 2. The respondent no.1 is the original plaintiff no.2, she, her brother plaintiff no.1 Ramchandani and her niece plaintiff no.3 Kalawanti filed the suit for eviction of the defendant nos.1 and 2 namely, Eknath and Shridhar. The suit premises are flat no.103 in Olympus Co-operative Housing Society, 5-C Altamount Road, Cumbala Hill, Mumbai 400 026. This property originally belonged to Mrs.Kaushalya Sahani, who was sister of the plaintiff no.1 and aunt of the plaintiff no.3. She died intestate on 30-3-1989 leaving behind only plaintiffs as her legal representatives and the plaintiffs became the owner of the suit premises. Names of the plaintiffs were recorded in the record of the society as the legal :2: heirs and owners of the flat after the death of Kaushalya. It was contended that the defendant no.1 Eknath, who is the respondent no.2 before this Court was inducted as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs.1050/-. He sublet the premises to his brother Shridhar, defendant no.2. It may be noted that the plaintiff nos.1 and 3 have expired and now the plaintiff no.2, who is the present respondent no.1, alone claims to be the owner and landlady of the premises. It was contended that the defendant no.1 original tenant had already acquired another suitable accommodation. The plaintiff no.2 was residing with her husband at 5B Ananta situated at Dr.Jajabally Patel Road, Bombay as the said premises were provided to her husband by the employer as a part of the employment. She required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for her personal use and occupation. It was also contended that the plaintiff no.2 did not have any suitable residential accommodation in the Mumbai except the service accommodation provided to her husband. It may be noted that pending the suit husband of the plaintiff no.2 died and she made an amendment and added paragraph 6(a) in the plaint contending that after death of her husband, the employer has asked the plaintiff no.2 to vacate the premises on 62 Bakhtawar at Narayan Dabholkar Marg, Mumbai where she was residing with her husband and she contended that as she was required to vacate the said service accommodation, she is in need of the suit premises for :3: personal residence. She has also minor son to look after. 3. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 contested the suit. They denied that the defedant no.1 Eknath had sublet the premises to his brother Shridhar and that the defendant no.1 had also acquired another premises. They also denied that the plaintiffs are their landlord/landlady. They also denied that the plaintiffs reasonably and bonafide require the suit premises for the personal residence of the plaintiff no.2. The learned trial Court decreed the suit on all the counts. The appeal also came to be dismissed. Revision Application is filed by the present applicant Neelam, who is widow of the original defendant no.2 Shridhar. The respondent nos.2 and 3 before the Court are her sons. 4. At the outset, it may be stated that on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent no.1 ground of acquisition of alternate accommodation by the defendant no.1 has not been pressed before this Court. The learned counsel for the revision applicant contended that Eknath and his brother Shridhar were living together in the suit premises and Eknath had left in 1972 itself. Therefore, the defendant no.2 Shridhar was living in the suit premises with his family. In the year 1980 original landlady Kaushalya Sahani had filed the suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide :4: requirement. But at that time she had not taken a plea that the house was sublet to Shridhar. That suit was decreed for a part of the house, taking into consideration the requirement of Kaushalya. That decree was challenged by both the parties sometimes in the year 1986. In the year 1989 Kaushalya died and, therefore, the appeal filed by her abated but the appeal filed by Eknath was allowed. From these facts, it is clear that the personal requirement of Kaushalya came to an end with her death and that ground could not be available thereafter and, therefore, the decree for eviction for a part of the house could not be sustained. However, one important thing is that in that proceeding Kaushalya hadnot taken a plea that Eknath had sublet the premises by inducting his brother Shridhar even though in her lifetime Shridhar was living in the suit premises and, therefore, the ground taken by the plaintiff/respondent no.1 about subletting can not be sustained now. I find substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision applicant in that respect. 5. However, the evidence on record clearly shows that Kaushalya had died leaving behind her brother, sister and niece as her legal representatives . Her husband had predeceased and she had no issues. During her lifetime, she had nominated the plaintiffs and names of the plaintiffs came to be recorded in the record of the society as her legal representatives. Therefore, :5: there could be no doubt that the plaintiffs had become the landlords of the premises. After death of Kaushalya, plaintiff no.1, who was brother and plaintiff no.3, who was niece of Kaushalya also died pending the suit and thus, the plaintiff no.2 Rubina was the sole landlady. In paragraph 6 of the plaint, it was made clear that the suit was filed on the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff no.2 alone. It was alleged that at that time she was living with her husband in the premises at 5B Ananta, Dr.Jajabally Patel Road, Bombay as the said premises was provided by employer of her husband as service accommodation. As pointed out earlier pending the suit, her husband also died and she made amendment in the plaint bringing the facts on record and as per the said amendment at the time of death of her husband, she was living with her husband in the premises at 62 Bakhtawar, Narayan Dabholkar Marg Mumbai, which was also given to her husband as service accommodation by his employer M/s. Independent Market Research Bureau and after his death, the employer was pressing the plaintiff to vacate the premises. She has deposed about these facts in her evidence also. There could be no reason to doubt her version in this respect. If the suit premises were given as service accommodation to her husband by the employer, it was but natural for the employer to ask her to vacate the premises within a reasonable time after the death of her husband. The employer could not be :6: expected to allow her to live in the service accommodation permanently particularly when her husband, who was employed, had died and the plaintiff herself was not in service of that employer. In such circumstances, the reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff no.2 is amply proved. The learned counsel for the revision applicant contended that reasonable and bonafide requirement could not be considered on the basis of amendment made in the year 2001, i.e., almost 8 years after filing the suit. If in the plaint it would not have been pleaded that the plaintiff no.2 required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for her personal residence because at that time she and her husband were living in the service accommodation provided by an employer, the contention of the learned counsel for the revision applicant could be accepted. However, that requirement was pleaded in the plaint filed in the year 1992 itself. It was unfortunate that in the year 2000 during the pendency of the suit, the husband of the plaintiff no.2 died and this created a pressing need of her house immediately. 6. Taking into consideration these circumstances, I find no fault in the concurrent findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff no.2 reasonably and bonafide requires the suit premises for her own residence. I find no substance in the revision application as far as :7: this ground is concerned. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, Revision Application stands dismissed. (J.H.BHATIA,J.) (J.H.BHATIA,J.) (J.H.BHATIA,J.)