IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.11104 of 1997 Smt. Sudha Sharan alias Sudha Kumari Sharan, Wife of Shri Shivendra Prasad Advocate, Assistant Teacher (Biology) I.N.B. High School, Chapra, resident of Mohalla Bhagwan Bazar (Hafiz Path) Post Office Chapra, Police Station Bhagwan Bazar, District Saran. ------- Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The Director, Secondary Education, Bihar, Patna. 3. The Regional Deputy Director Education, Saran, Commissionary, Chapra. 4. The District Education Officer, Saran at Chapra. 5. Smt. Nirja Ashthana, Wife of Name not known, posted as Teacher in I.N.B. High School, Chapra, Police Station Chapra, District Saran. ---------- Respondents ----------- 14 12.08.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the State. Though the prayer of the petitioner in this writ application in paragraph no.1 reads as follows:- “1. That this is an application for issuance of an appropriate writ, order, direction or a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing a part of the order vide Memo No. 906 (Legal) dated 28th July, 1997 issued under the signature of the Deputy Director of Education by which the Respondent No.2 was pleased to approved to receive the payment of salary to the petitioner by way of paper posting.” 2 learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset would submit that he no longer chooses to assail the impugned order passed by the Director and would be satisfied if a direction is given by this Court for payment of salary of the petitioner for the period 15.12.1996 to 31.12.1996. For this purpose, he would rely on an office order passed by the District Education Officer, Saran contained in Memo No. 730 dated 21.4.1997, wherein, the petitioner is shown to have been sanctioned maternity leave for a period of 89 days, from 16.12.1996 to 14.3.1997 in terms of Rule 220 of the Bihar Service Code. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite the aforementioned order of sanction of leave, the authorities had not understood the meaning of expression “in accordance with law” and that is how, the grievance of the petitioner with regard to the payment of salary for the aforementioned period of 17 days have remained pending consideration for all these period of more than fourteen years. Inasmuch as, this part of the 3 limited relief was not directly raised in this writ application and the attack made in the writ application to the impugned order is not sought to be pressed, this Court would dispose of this writ application with a direction to the District Education Officer, Saran to consider the limited grievance of the petitioner with regard to payment of salary for the period of maternity leave already sanctioned by him. It is well known that every person entitled to maternity leave is also entitled for full payment of salary in terms of the Government Rules. This Court, therefore, would direct the District Education Officer to consider the aforesaid limited grievance of the petitioner and take his decision within a period of three month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. It is made clear that neither the petitioner will be entitled to raise any dispute beyond the claim of payment of salary for the period in question, 15.12.1996 to 31.12.1996 nor the respondents would be at liberty to go beyond the sanction of such maternity leave in terms 4 of Memo No. 730 dated 21.4.1997. As a matter of fact, if the respondents have already paid the salary of the petitioner for the period 1.1.1997 to 14.3.1997, which also was part of the maternity leave sanctioned by the same order of District Education Officer dated 21.4.1997, there seems to be no logical reason for withholding the payment of salary for the remaining 17 days covered by the maternity leave. In that view of the matter, this Court would dispose of this writ application with a direction to the District Education Officer to do the needful and in case he would find the petitioner entitled for payment of salary for the aforementioned period of 17 days, he would also ensure that its payment is made to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of passing of his order. Let it be, however, made clear that the ultimate decision has to be taken by the District Education Officer strictly in accordance with law and only if the order contained in Memo No. 730 dated 21.4.1997 5 still subsist and has not been cancelled by any subsequent order. With the aforementioned observation and direction, this application is disposed of. Rsh (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)