1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY O. O. C. J. WRIT PETITION NO.2094 OF 2009 Santprasad Patiraj Singh. ...Petitioner. Vs. M/s.Hin dustan Spg. & Wvg. Mills & Ors. ...Respondents. .... Mr. N.M.Ganguli for the Petitioner. Mrs. N.R. Patankar i/b. Mr. V.P. Sawant for the Respondents. ..... CORAM : DR.D.Y.CHANDRACHUD, J. November 30, 2009. P.C. The Labour Court by its judgment dated 18th July 2008, dismissed an application filed by the Petitioner as being barred by the principle of res judicata. The order of the Labour Court was confirmed in appeal by the Industrial Court on 7th May 2009. The Petitioner was employed in the Process House of the First Respondent as a substitute Mazdoor. The Maharashtra Kamgar Mahasangh filed a complaint of unfair labour practices before the Industrial Court in August 1989, claiming permanency for a group of 2 workmen including the Petitioner. The complaint was dismissed by the Industrial Court. The Union moved this Court in writ proceedings. By a judgment dated 12th November 1997, a Learned Single Judge of this Court noted that from the evidence on record, the Industrial Court has held that none of the workers had completed 240 days’ continuous service in a calendar year and that as a result, the claim for permanency could not be accepted. While confirming the order of dismissal of the complaint, the Learned Single Judge directed that since the names of the workmen had been maintained on a Badli List, the First Respondent shall include their names in the list and complete all necessary formalities. An appeal against the judgment was dismissed by the Division Bench on 21st September 1999. The Petitioner once again filed an application being Application (BIR) 84 of 1999 before the Labour Court seeking a declaration that the action of the management in treating him as a Badli operative was not lawful and a declaration that he had been a permanent employee since the inception of his employment with the Mills. Consequential benefits were sought. The Labour Court held 3 that the application was barred by the principle of res judicata since the Petitioner had sought to claim the same relief which was denied to him in the complaint of unfair labour practice which had been dismissed by the Industrial Court. The Judgment of the Labour Court was confirmed in appeal. During the course of the hearing of these proceedings, it is common ground that the Process House was closed down on 1st July 2003. The closure was challenged and the Issue of closure was eventually carried to the Supreme Court in appeal. Before the Supreme Court, a settlement was arrived at between the management, the third party purchaser which had entered into an agreement with the management for the sale of the immovable property and the Hindustan Crown Mills S.K.K.S. Sanghatana. By an order dated 21st August 2009, the Supreme Court accepted the settlement which was arrived at between the parties and the Consent Terms were taken on record. The Civil Appeals filed by the Union were dismissed as withdrawn. A copy of the order of the Supreme Court has been placed on the record of these proceedings by Counsel 4 appearing on behalf of the First Respondent. The Consent Terms envisage that the Union had accepted a settlement in the total amount of Rs.11.77 crores approximately, out of which payment would be made to the individual workmen covered by the settlement. Clause 6 of the Consent Terms records the undertaking of the Union that each of the members of the Union whose names are listed in the Annexure to the settlement have accepted the settlement towards a full and final settlement of all their dues and that on the order being passed on the Consent Terms, the entire claims of the workers are fully satisfied and there are no further claims on the management or purchaser. Under Clause 6(h), the Union has accepted that the closure of the Process House is lawful. Under Clause 6(j), the Union has discharged the management and the purchaser from all their claims arising out of suits and proceedings. Clause 7(a) requires withdrawal of all the suits and proceedings listed in Annexure 6. The name of the Petitioner is set out at Sr. No.8 of the annexure to the Consent Terms. The amount payable to the Petitioner is quantified against his name. The compensation includes the payment of 85 days’ wages per year, compensation for future three years at the same 5 rate, wages for unavailed leave, bonus and wages for the period between 1st July 2003 and 31st March 2004. Besides, contributions to ESI and the Company’s contribution to P.F. have also been included. In Annexure 6 of the Consent Terms, the proceeding instituted by the Petitioner before the Labour Court, namely, BIR Case 84 of 1999 has also been listed out as one of the proceedings which is required to be withdrawn. The Consent Terms envisage that the Commissioner of Labour is to invoke a Bank Guarantee in the amount of Rs. 11.77 crores and to effect payment to the workers after complying with the modalities spelt out in the Consent Terms. The Supreme Court has accepted the settlement which includes the claim of the Petitioner. Hence, it would neither be appropriate nor proper for this Court to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, however, urged that the claim of the Petitioner is for the grant of permanency and if the claim for permanency is granted, the benefit to which he is entitled is required to be revised. It was urged that during the course of the evidence, the witness for the 6 management has accepted that between March 1998 and December 2002, the Petitioner had completed 240 days’ service in a year. The submission cannot be accepted. Once a settlement has been arrived at under which the claim of the Petitioner has been settled against the payment quantified therein, there would be a full and final settlement of all claims and outstandings. A proceeding of this nature cannot be set in motion to reagitate an issue which has been closed. Finality has been brought to the dispute consequent upon the order of the Supreme Court dated 21st August 2009 taking the terms of the settlement on the record. In this view of the matter, though for the reasons indicated in the earlier part of this judgment, the order of the Labour Court, which has been confirmed in appeal by the Industrial Court, dismissing the application under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 does not warrant interference. The Petition shall stand dismissed. ....