1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR Mohammad Ameen & Anr. Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.1188/2009) S.B. Criminal Revision Petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. Date of Order :- 04th November, 2009 HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S.CHAUHAN Mr.Kapil Gupta, for the petitioners. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 23.04.2009 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri, District Ajmer whereby the learned Magistrate has framed the charges for offences under Section 498-A & 406 IPC and under Section 4/6 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the respondent No.1, Mohammad Ameen and charge for offence under Section 498-A IPC against the respondent No.2, Anwar. Mr. Kapil Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that according to Section 177 Cr.P.C., an offence is to be tried by the Court in whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is said to have occurred. However, in the present case, no offence has occurred within the territorial jurisdiction falling within the ambit of the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri. Therefore, he is not in a position to try the case. Secondly, according to the complainant-respondent, Smt. Shaheen @ Dilasba, all the acts of cruelty had taken place either at Jaipur where she was residing with her husband, Mohammad Ameen, or at Kapasan where her in-laws' were residing. According to her statement, not a single incident had taken place at her village 2 Jaswantapura which falls within Tehsil Kekri, District Ajmer. However, the complainant-respondent has filed her complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri. Therefore, the Judicial Magistrate, Kekri does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Furthermore, In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. [AIR 2004 Supreme Court 4286]. On the other hand, Ms. Alka Bhatnagar, the learned public prosecutor, has contended that according to the complainant- respondent, the petitioner No.1 and complainant had gotten married within the territorial jurisdiction of Kekri Court. Therefore, the complainant was competent to file her complaint before the court at Kekri. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as considered the case law cited at the Bar. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases. 3 It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in"cause of action". The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows: 4 "Cause of action" has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. "Cause of action" has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action". According to Section 177 Cr.P.C., ordinarily an offence is to be tried by the court in whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is alleged to have committed. However, In the present case, all the acts of cruelty are said to have occurred either at Jaipur, or at Kapasan. In her statement, the complainant-respondent does not claim that she was ever tortured for dowry demand at Jaswantpura. Therefore, no part of offence occurred in the territorial jurisdiction of court at Kekri. Hence, the charge order framed by the learned Magistrate is beyond his territorial jurisdiction. In the result, this petition is, hereby, allowed and the impugned order dated 23.04.2009 is, hereby, quashed and set aside. (R.S.CHAUHAN)J. Manoj Solanki-