IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA C.W.P No.751 of 2008 Decided on : May 29, 2008 Manohar Lal Sharma …Petitioner. Versus State of H.P and anr. …Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jagdish Bhalla, Chief Justice The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner : Mr. G.R.Palsra, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. R.K.Bawa, Advocate General with Mr.Ankush Dass Sood, Addl. Advocate General. Rajiv Sharma, J. (oral) It appears from the pleadings of the parties that the petitioner had submitted an application for being considered to be appointed as Notary Public. The candidature of the petitioner was considered and rejected vide letter dated 3rd April, 2008. The text of the letter dated 3rd April, 2008 reads thus:- “ I am directed to refer to your application dated 2nd February, 2008 on the subject cited above and to inform you that your application has been considered by the State Government and rejected.” Mr. G.R.Palsra, has strenuously argued that the letter dated 3rd April, 2008 does not contain any reasons. He has termed this letter of 3rd April, 2008 as a quasi-judicial order. We are not in agreement with the Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- submission made by Mr. G.R.Palsra. The letter dated 3rd April, 2008 is an administrative order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in 1994(4) SCC 43, State of H.P. vs. Raja Mahendra Pal and ors. that the exercise of power by tribunals or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequences of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well judged. A quasi-judicial function has been termed to be one which stands mid-way a judicial and an administrative function. Their Lordships have further held that the primary test as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi judicial one has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. Their Lordships have held as under: ……….Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature judicial. The exercise of power by such tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequences of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well judged. A quasi-judicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial one, has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in the affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word “quasi” is “not exactly”. 9. It follows, therefore, that an authority is described as quasi- judicial when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial -3- functions, but not all. This Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani dealt with the actions of the statutory body and laid down tests for ascertaining whether the action taken by such a body was a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act. The Court approved the celebrated definition of the quasi-judicial body given by Atkin, L.J., as he then was in R. v. Electricity Commrs. In which it was held: “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.” The aforesaid definition was accepted as correct in R. v. London County Council and many subsequent cases both in England and in India. Again this Court in Radeshyam Khare v. State of M.P. relying upon its earlier decision held: “It will be noticed that this definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a court or a quasi-judicial body, it would follow that the real and determining test for ascertaining whether an act authorized by a statute is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition in the definition given by Atkin, L.J. Relying on paras 114 and 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11 at pp. 55-58 and citing the case of R. v. Manchester legal Aid Committee learned counsel for the appellants contends that where a statute requires decision to be arrived at purely from the point of view of policy or expediency the authority is under no duty to act judicially. He urges that where, on the other hand, the order has to be passed on evidence either under an express provision of the statute or by implication -4- and determination of particular facts on which its jurisdiction to exercise its power depends or if there is a proposal and an opposition the authority is under a duty to act judicially. As stated in para 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 11 at p. 57 the duty to act judicially may arise in widely differing circumstances which it would be impossible to attempt to define exhaustively. The question whether or not there is a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case in the light of the circumstances of the particular case and the construction of the particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid down in the judicial decisions. The principles deducible from the various judicial decisions considered by this Court in Khushaldas S. Advani at p. 725 (of SCR): (at p. 260 of AIR) were thus formulated, namely— ‘(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.’ ” Consequently, in view of the observations made above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we hold that the letter dated 3rd April, 2008 is an administrative order and it does not have the trapping of quasi-judicial order. We are also of the view that the letter dated 3rd April, 2008 need not contain any elaborate reasons. However, -5- the petitioner could file an application for review of the decision dated 3rd April, 2008 in view of sub-rule (2) of Notary Rules, 1956 within a period of 60 days. The petitioner is at liberty to file a review on or before 2nd June, 2008. In view of the observations made above, the Writ Petition is disposed of. (Jagdish Bhalla), C.J. 29th May, 2008. (Rajiv Sharma), J. (ks)