1 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2599 OF 2010 Parmeet Arora @ Sonia ...Applicant vs. Mahadevan Subbiah & Anr. ...Respondent Mr.Rajendra Singh Saluja for the Applicant. Mr.J.P. Kharge, APP for the State. Mr.Devendra Udeshi for Respondent No.1. CORAM : V.M. KANADE, J. DATED : JULY 27, 2010 P.C. :- 1 Heard the learned Counsel for the applicant, the learned APP for the State, the learned Counsel for respondent no.1 and respondent no.1 who is the complainant who has appeared in the court. 2 This application has been filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint filed by respondent no.1 for the offences 2 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467 of the IPC registered with NRI Sagari Police Station, Nerul, Navi Mumbai, vide C.R.No.67/2009. In the complaint, it is alleged that the applicant herein had misused the credit card which was issued in the name of Mrs.Leena Garg. 3 The learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that the parties have now settled the dispute. Respondent no.1 has filed an affidavit-in- reply in which he has stated that he has no objection if the criminal case is quashed since the Bank has received payment of Rs.10 lakhs from the applicant in full and final settlement of their claim. The Apex Court in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1969 has observed in para 5 as under :- 5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing 3 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out. We need to emphasis that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused a compounding of an offence with the 4 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs.250/- which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the later case. We accordingly allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case, direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17th November 2001 P.S. Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed. Appeal allowed. Similarly, in the case of Jagdish Chanana & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1968, the Supreme Court has observed in para 2 as under :- 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 24th July 2006 rejecting the prayer for quashing of FIR No.83 dated 12th March 2005 P.S. City Sonepat registered under Sections 419, 420, 465, 468, 469, 471, 472, 474 read with Section 34 of IPC. During the pendency of these proceedings in this Court, Cri.Misc.Petition No. 42/2008 has been filed putting on record a compromise deed dated 30th April, 2007. The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the 5 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transactions that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash FIR No.83 dated 12th March, 2005 P.S. City Sonepat and all consequent proceedings. 4 In my view, the ratio of the said judgments squarely would apply to the facts of the present case. Respondent no.1 no longer has any objection if the complaint is quashed. Sections 419, 420 of the IPC are compoundable offences. Section 467, however, is not compoundable. However, Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. does not curtail the power of the High Court under Section 482 to quash a complaint even if it is not compoundable. The Apex Court in the case of B.S. 6 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, reported in 2003 Supreme Court 1386 has observed in paragraphs 8, 14 and 15 as under :- 8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interest of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood 7 Crim.Appln. No.2599/2010 that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code. 5 In my view, therefore, there is no impediment in quashing the criminal complaint filed by respondent no.1 in view of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the said respondent. 6 Application, therefore, is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). Application is, accordingly, disposed of. (V.M. KANADE, J.)