LlimE Hlgl—l COURT OF CHHA’fl‘ISGARI—I : BILASPUR Eli/lit Eggig‘on No. 489 of2004 Petitioner Resohdents p Versus 1. Shii Sunil SahE‘vAEivoéék‘teNféfriiié‘§é£iii5£é£"w”' “WWWwWW Shri Vinay Haxit, Deputy Advocate General for the respondents N0. 1 to 4/State. wdké‘liE’E‘ 1. Thc petitioner ha§ flied this petitiog to direct the respondents No. l to 4 f0 withdraw the charge of B,M.(). Bilha from the re$pondent No. 5 and Teacher, iGo$tf§$chooL Chakarbhata from the respondent No.6 and treat them under suspension during the pendency of the criminal appeal nled byline State against the respondents No. 5 and 6. 2. According to lemned counsel appearing for the petitioner, a \\cn‘minal case was registered against the respondents No. 5 a1 \_\ \\‘ (Passed on this 8m Day ofAugust, 2008) Pannanand S/o Late Dhannamal Baktani, aged about 38 years, resident of Chaliarbhata, district Bilaspur (CG). The State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Halth Services, Mannalay, D.K.S. Building, Raipur (CG). The Chief‘Medical and Health Officer, CIMS, Bilaspur (CG . The State of Chhattjsgar‘h, through the Secretary Public Instructions, Mandalay, D.K.S. Building, Raipur (CG). The Distu'ct Education Othcer, Bilaspur, Tellsii and District Bilaspur (CG). Dr. C. P. Agre, S/o Shri Chhedi Lal Agre, aged about 44 years, posted as BMO Bilha, District Bilaspur (CG). Shatrnghan ’Prasad S/o Kn'pa Ram Upadhyay, aged about 55 years, r/o Chakarbhata, posted at Govt. School Chakarbhata, Disnict Bilaspur (CG). WRIT PE’I‘I’I‘ION UNDER ARTICLE 2261227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (SB: Hon’ble smeatish K. Agnihotn‘ J.) \ and 6 and four othsr co—accused persons for committing malpeet with Dhannamal and Madho Das. Dhannamal is father of the patin'oner and Madho Das is brother of tho petitioner. The first information report of the said incident dated 24.11.1992 was lodged in the police station by the petitioner. After criminal trial the respondents No. 5 and 6 were convicted and sentenced by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur by judgment dated 20th November, 2000, passed in Criminal Case No. 717jgb. 'l‘hereai‘ter, the respondents No. 5 and 6 died Criminal Appeal No.s 195/2000 & 196/2000, respectively, wherein vide judgment dated 19.4.2001, passed by the Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, they were acquitted of the charges. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits that the Criminal Appeal No.s 919/2001 and 917/2001, hled by the State and Criminal Revision No. 190/2001, filed by the petitioner, against the judgment of acquittal dated 19.4.2001 are pending before this Court. 4. 1t is apparent that during the en'minal trial, the respondents No. 5 and o were placed under suspension but after the judgment dated 19.4.2001, in criminal appeals, they were reinstated in service. The respondent No.5 was given the charge of B.M.O. Bilha and the reSpondent No.6 was given the charge of Teacher in Govt. School, Chakarbhata. Objecting the reinstatement and posting of the respondents No. 5 and 6 the petitioner filed representations (Annexure P/4 and P/S). Being aggrieved by the reinstatement and posting of the respondents & No. 5 and 6, the petitioner has filed this petition. \’\ \ \ I am unable to understand how the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the respondents] authorities revoking the suspension order of the respondents No. 5 and 6, who might have been placed under suspension dining the pendency of the criminal trial. The respondents/authorities, after their exonelation in criminal appeal, have rightly revoked the suspension ofthe respondents No. 5 and 6. The Supreme Court 1‘11 the matter of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others { (1976) 1 SCC 671} held as under :— "12. According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certioraii jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an “aggrieved person” and, in a case of defect ofjurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of oertiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfill that character, and is a “stranger”, the Court will, 1'11 its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in Very special circumstances. 13. This takes us to the further question who 1s an aggneved person and What are the qualifications requ1s1te lor such a status 7’ ’lhe expression aggrieved person denotes an elastic, and to an eXtent and elusive concept It cannot be condned Within the bounds of a rigid exact and comprehensive definition At best its features can be descnbed 1n a broad tentative pmanner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, vanabdefactors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention 1s alleged the specmc circumstances of the case the nature and extent oi the petitioners interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or inJury sunered by hlm, English courts have sometimes put a restricted and someu‘mes a \ Wide construction on the eXpression “aggrieved person”. \ \,. \ r—Lt’ However, some general tests have been devised to ascenajn Whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or ‘standing’ to invoke certiorari juxisdiction.” 7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nalakath Sainuddin Vs. Koori'kadan Sulaiman { (2002) 6 SCC 1} held as under:- “17. (iii) “Any aggrieved party”, the expression employed in Section 20(1), means a person feeling aggrieved by the ultimate decision, that is, the operative part of the order. A paity to the proceedings, who has succeeded in securing the relief prayed for, is not a party aggrieved though the order contains a finding or two adverse to him. The respondent can support the order and pray for the ultimate decision being sustained, without tiling a revision of his own, and for achieving such end he may seek reversal of any findings recorded against him. However, if the non-petitioning party feels entitled to a more beneficial or larger order in his favour but was allowed a lesser or smaller relief then to the extent of claiming the more benehcial or larger relief he should have tiled a revision petition of his own as he was “an aggrieved party” to that extent. " / 8. The Supreme Court in the mattenoffgglg‘al Vs. Union of India and others { (2003) 3 SCC 393} held as under:— “19. l-le submitted that Section 19~ of the Administrative Tribunals Act provides that it is only a “person aggrieved” who can tile an application before the Tribunal. In support of his submission he relied upon the cases of’l‘hannnanna v. K. Veera Reddyi and Bar Council of \ Maharashtra V. M,V.Dabholkar2 Whersin it has been held That a person aggxieved muSt be a man'Who has suiTared a legal grievance i.e. a man who has been wrongfully deprived of something or to whom something has been refused wrongfully. ” 1n View of the well settled principles of law, with regard to the ‘aggrieved person’, the petitioner cannot be held as ‘aggn'eved person’ as by revocation of suspension, the petitioner has not suitered any legal grievance or has been deprived of any legal or statutory right. Even otherwise, on merits, a Government employee can be placed under suspension under the provisions of Rule 9 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. In the case on hand, the respondents No. 5 and 6 were acquitted in the Sessions Court, and as such, no investigation, inquiry or trial is pending against them. On the ground of pendency of criminal appeal and criminal revision in the High Court, the respondents No. 5 and 6 cannot be put under suspension. 10. 1n View of the foregoing, this petition is devoid of merits and s the same is dismissed. 'l‘haku: