•3%t,'.??s«a.,,^w;"g;•S^ ^'^:?®?"^^1?^^^^^^^,.^^^..,;..ri^^:.; HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH. BILASPUR CORAIVI: Hon'ble Shri Raieev Gupta, C.J. & Hon'ble Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. Criminal Appeal No. 932/1992 The State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) Vs. Rajendra Prasad JUDGMENT For consideration Sd/- SunU Kaimar Sinha Judge HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJEEV GUPTA Sd/- ChiefJustic ~!-~-'T: Post for Judgment : ^-/ /09/2010 Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge ::^'.i. ."^. HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CORAM: Hon'ble Shri Raieev Gupta, C.J. & Hon'ble Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. Criminal Appeal No. 932/1992 APPELLANT 1 The State of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) BK:N RESPONDENT Versus Rajendra Prasad, S/o Ramlakhan Sao, Age 22 years, R/o Wadrafnagar, District Surguja (Criminal Appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) Appearance: Mr. Akhil Agarwal, Panel Lawyer for the State/appellant. Mr. N.K. Chatterjee, Counsel forthe respondent. JUDGMENT (21.09.2010) Following judgment of the Court was delivered by Sunil Kumar Sinha. J. (1) Being aggrieved with the judgment of acquittal dated 4 of September 1991 passed in S.T. No.72/90 by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur District Surguja, the State has filed this appeal. -.» The facts briefly stated are as under: Deceased -Meeha was married to the respondent in the month of May 1989. She committed suicide by hanging on 22.08.89 inher in-laws' place in Wadrafnagar. The case ofthe prosecution is that the respondent, after the marriage, ^; !ti 'I'H ^l^ Criminal Appeal No. 932/1992 demanded a l-1ero Honda Motorcycle from the parents of the deceased. Since the demand was not fulfilled, he used to treat the deceased with cruelty, on account of which, the deceased committed suicide on the said date. The respondent was prosecuted for commission of offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC. The case of the prosecution was mainly based on two witnesses namely Bachha Sao (PW- 3), father of the deceased and Sushila Devi (PW-4), mother of the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge held that it was not established by the prosecution that the dsceased was being treated with cruelty by the respondent on account of non- fulfillment of the demand of Hero Honda motorcycle and to this effect, the evidence of the above two witnesses were disbelieved. Considering the entire material available on record, the learned Sessions Judge, therefore, acquitted the respondent of the eharges framed against him. (3) Mr. Akhil Agarwal, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State argued that the Sessions Court erred in law in holding that the demand of dowry (Hero Honda motorcycle) by the respondent was not established. The said demand was established by the evidence of Bachha Sao (PW-3) and Sushila Devi (PW-4); the deceased died an unnatural death in her in-laws place; the respondent was residing with the deceased; and there was also evidence of ill-treatment of the deceased by the respondent; therefore, thfe Judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court deserves to be set aside. (4) On the other hand, Mr. N.K. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent opposed these arguments and supported the judgment passed by the Sessions Court.. / ^ I'i :ttf. ^^:: CriminaLApDeal No. 932/1992 We have heard.learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the records of the Sessions Case. (6) Bachha Sao (PW-3) dgposed that the respondent made demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle, when he visited his house. According to him, the said demand was made by the respondent to his wife Smt. Sushila Devi (PW-4) and she stated all this to him. This was his version in para 3 of his examination-in-chief. Thereafter, in para 5 of his examination-in-chief, he deposed that the respondent demanded Hero Honda Motorcycle froni him. At that time, his daughter was in her in-laws place. He said to the respondent that he will not be able to give Hero Honda Motorcycle and after 15 days of such demand, his daughter died. He added that since he could not fulfill the demand, his daughter was killed. In cross-examination, he admitted that the marriage took place in usual mannerand nothing was demanded at the time of marriage. He further admitted that the Hero Honda Motorcycle was demanded from his wife, when she had gone to visit the in-laws place of the deceased and the said demand made by the respondent was told to him. Thereafter, the respondent visited his house in the month of Sawan and again the demand of l-1ero Honda Motorcycle was made. (7) Sushila 6evi (PW-4) deposed that after the marriage, when she went to Wadrafnagar for treatment, she also visited the house of the respondent. At that time, the respondent made demand of Hero Hpnda Motorcycle. Her daughter told her that she was being ill- treated by the husband on account of demand of dowry. Thereafter, she returned back to her village and told this to her husband and she Crjminal Appeat No. 932/1992 ^ also told this to one Ram Pyari. After 15 days of the said incident, her daughter died. Vide para 18 of her cross-examination, she admitted that the respondent visited their place two times, first in the month of Asad and second in the morith of Sawan. In para 22 of her cross- examination, she admitted that she told about the demand of the respondent to Ram Pyari and her husband and she did not tell about it to any other person. The respondent had made demand to her and sbe had told this to her husband and then only, her husband could come to know that the respondent was demanding Hero Honda Motorcycle. She further added that the respondent was also demanding bed set and a cow. This demand was also made to her and she told this to her husband. In appreciation, it appears that there was discrepancy in the evidence of these two witnesses about the demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle by the respondent. The tearned Sessions Judge observed in para 16 ofthe judgment that except the above evidence of parents of the deceased, there was no other evidence relating to demandof dowry and treating the deceased with cruelty by the respondent. The parents of the deceased never disclosed these facts to anybody else, asno other witness was examined to prove these facts. The learned Sessions Judge, ttierefore, held that it was not proved beyond all / reasonable doubts that the respondent demanded Hero Honda Motorcycle from the parents of the deceased. Vide para 17 of the impugned judgment, the learned Sessions Judge further held that 6ven it was not proved by any other evidence that the deceased was bfeihg treated with cruelty by the respondent. In this regard, learned Crjrninal Appeal No. 932/1992 Sessions Judge has referred to the evidence of Gopal Prasad (PW- 1), Rakesh Kumar Gupta (PW-7), Sagar (PW-15) and Rambadan (PW-19) (9) Gopal Prasad (PW-1) was a witness of inquest. However, he was a local resident of village Wadrafnagar and he admitted that he never heard about treating the deceased with cruelty by the respondent. According to him, the relations between the husband and wife were cordial. The learned Sessions Judge observed that the other witnesses have also not deposed about treating the deceased with cruelty by the respondent. After due appreciation, the learned Sessions Judge, therefore, held that it was not proved beyond all reasonable doubts that the respondent demanded dowry from the parents of the deceased and he was treating the deceased with cruelty on account of demand of dowry (10) In Budh Singh and others -Vs.- State of U.P. (2006) 9 SCC 731, the Supreme Court held vide para 9, that in a matter of appeal against acquittal, the High Court does not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidence on record so as to arrive at a finding as / to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consid&r as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidence .broidghton record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden .^ Criminal Appeal No. 932/1992 of proof may also be a subject matter of the scrutiny of the Appellate Court. (11) In V.N. Ratheesh -Vs.- State of Kerala, AIR 2006 SC 2667, the Supreme Court held that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of aequittal is based. Generatly, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Supreme Court said that the golden thread which runs through the Web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Supreme Court further said that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilt is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the Appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining a$ to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. The Supreme Court referred to the decision rendered in the matter of Bhagyvan Sincihand'others -Vs.- State of Madhva Pradesh (2002 (2) Supreme 567). It was further hefd that the principle to be followed by Appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly Un'reasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been Criminal_ApReal No. 932/1992 ^ ^'^ ;i£:'t;-l'S^ unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. (12) In Ramesh Babulal Doshi -Vs- State of Guiarat (1996) 9 SCC 225, the Supreme Court said that "While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the Order of ^cquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusiQns". (13) We have gone through the entire evidence on record with a view to find out as to whether the views of the Sessions Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. After going through the entire evidence available on record, we do not find any compelling and substantial reasons to interfere with the judgment ofacquittal. It is not a case in which the judgment may be said to be unreasonable or a case in which relevant and convincing materials have been eliminated in the process of appreciation. (14) For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in the / appeal. The appeal filed by the State, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- ChiefJustic Sd/- Sunii Kusnar Sinha Judge i-ne