IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA C.R. No.134 of 2008 Sheikh Sahrab, son of Late Mehrab, resident of village Saharsa Basti, Ward No.11 Old, District Saharsa ...Plaintiff/Respondent/Petitioner Versus 1. Md. Kaiyum son of Late Sheikh Salim 2. Sheikh Natho 3. Sheikh Warli - All sons of Late Abul Hasan 4. Bibi Maisum Nira, wife of late Md. Haiyul 5. Md. Jaffar Alam 6. Md. Safiqueuddin @ Md. Safiduddin 7. Md. Saiful - All sons of late Md. Haiyul 8.Bibi Madina Khatoon, daughter of late Md. Haiyul All are residents of village Saharsa Basti, Ward no.11 Old, District Saharsa .......Defendants/Appellants/Opposite Parties 1st set 9. Bibi Bakridan widow of late Sheikh Domi 10. Bibi Kamrunnisha daughter of late Domi 11. Md. Noor Hassan 12. Sheikh Noor Alam - Both sons of late Sheikh Rahim All residents of village Saharsa Basti within Saharsa Municipality, PO & PS and District Saharsa .....Plaintiffs/Respondents/Opp.Parties 2nd set 13. Md. Kalim, son of late Md. Haiyul, resident of village Saharsa Basti within Saharsa Municipality Ward no.11 Old, PS and District Saharsa .....Defendant/Respondent/Opp.Party 14. State of Bihar through its Collector, Saharsa, PO & PS and District Saharsa 15. Collector, Saharsa ....Defendants/Respondents/Opp.Party 16. Hano Hussain 17. Najjo Hussain 18. Matto Hussain -All sons of Taiyab Hussain 19. Saffo Hussain, son of late Tarikat Hussain - All residents of village Saharsa Basti within Saharsa Municipality Ward no.18/24, PO & PS and District Saharsa ....Defendants/Respondents/Opp. Parties ----------- 08- 24/10/2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The respondent of Title Appeal no.36 of 1998 has filed this application under Section 2 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and raises a grievance with respect to the order dated 2.11.2007, passed by the learned Additional District Judge –cum- Fast Track Court VIth, Saharsa, whereby his application under Order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been rejected. 2. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It appears that the present petitioner had instituted Title Suit no.87 of 1991, for declaration of title and possession over the suit land since 1957. After disposal of the suit, the defendants preferred the aforesaid Title Appeal no.36 of 1998. The plaintiff (the petitioner herein) filed an application under Order 41, rule 27 of the Code, for production of additional evidence which has been rejected by the impugned order. We are of the opinion that, in view of the reasons assigned in the impugned order, the application under Order 41, rule 27 has rightly been rejected. The suit is of 1991, and the appeal is of 1998. 3. The plaintiff does not seem to be mindful of the position prevailing in the country with respect to the growing pendency in courts in India. I am in this context reminded of the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Bibek Debroy, in his book entitled `In the Dock: Absurdities of Indian Law’, that the pending litigations in this country without any addition thereto, will take 324 years for disposal. These observations were made more than two decades ago, and the situation has further deteriorated. One Judge perhaps of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in one of his speeches recently has made observations that it will now take 350 years or so to dispose of the 3 pending cases. 4. The following portion of the book by Fali S Nariman, entitled `India’s Legal System : Can it be saved’, is also relevant in the present context : “More than one hundred years ago, a law member in the Government of India (Hobhouse) recorded in a minute dated 5 September 1872 (on the Bill leading to the Privy Council Appeal Act, 1874) the following observation: In considering what limit should be assigned to the power of appealing, our leading maxim is, that it is the interest of the commonwealth to have and end of law suits. No man has a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes. The State’s duty is discharged when it has provided such a reasonable amount of attention and skill and honesty as will satisfy reasonable men that their causes have been decided, erroneously or otherwise, on the merits, and according to the best ability of the judge, and so will prevent them from feeling that resentment of sheer injustice which drives people to take the law into their hands and to wage private war. Upon this principle all laws place some limits to litigation. And so have we placed limits to the power of appealing. Pithily put, and elegantly phrased. The portion about no man having a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wished was quoted by Justice Gajendragadkar (who later became Chief Justice of India) in one of the early reports of the Law Commission of India, but despite what was so wisely said by Mr. Hobhouse and again by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, our laws continue to provide (by way of appeals, reviews and revisions) unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get private affairs ultimately settled. For instance, we have now abolished second appeals, and yet lawyers go on arguing endlessly about the maintainability of intra-court under special laws”. No person has a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled. 4 5. This civil revision application is accordingly dismissed. mrl ( S K Katriar, J. )