Letters Patent Appeal No.334 OF 1999 WITH Letters Patent Appeal No.438 OF 1999 ----- Against the judgment and order dated 26.2.1999 passed by learned Single Judge in CWJC No.9251 of 1995. ----- THE MANAGING COMMITTEEOF RAM MOHUN ROY SEMINARY & ANO. ------ Appellant in LPA334/1999 MAHESH NANDAN SINGH ------ Appellant in LPA 438/1999 Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. …… Respondents in both the Appeals. ------- For the Appellant Managing Committee : M/s Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, Senior Advocate Gyanand Roy, Basant Kumar Tripathy & Kiran Kumari, Advocates For the Respondent no.6 In LPA 334/99 and Appellant in LPA 438/99 : Mr Tej Bahadur Singh, Sr.Advocate For the State : Mr Sunil Kumar Ravi, JC to GP 15 ------ P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVA KIRTI SINGH THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KISHORE KUMARMANDAL Shiva Kirti Singh & Kishore K.Mandal,JJ. Heard learned counsel for the Managing Committee of Ram Mohan Roy Seminary which is appellant in LPA No.334 of 1999 and also heard leaned counsel for respondent no.6, Mahesh Nandan Singh, who is appellant in the connected LPA No.438 of 1999. - 2 - 2. At the threshold it must be indicated that Mr Gyanand Roy and Mr Ishwari Singh, who had initially filed the Letters Patent Appeal on behalf of the Managing Committee of Ram Mohan Roy Seminary are now representing two rival groups who claim to be the real Managing Committee of the school in question. Fortunately, that dispute as to which group is the real Managing Committee of the school is of no relevance in these matters because the stand of the Managing Committee whether consisting of X or Y is one and the same that the Writ Court has wrongly allowed the writ application and set aside the order of dismissal of the concerned employee, a teacher of the school. 3. The facts are not in dispute and particularly, it is not disputed that order of dismissal of the concerned teacher of the school, who is respondent no.6 in LPA 334/99 and appellant in LPA 438/99 was passed on 23.10.1994 in violation of provisions in Section 18 of the Bihar Non- Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over Management and Control) Act, 1981 which provides that Managing Committee of the schools like the present one, can remove teachers from service or dismiss them on approval of the School Service Board. It is also not in dispute that the facts in this regard have been correctly noticed by the Writ Court and during the pendency of the writ petition preferred by respondent no.6, opportunity was granted to the Managing Committee of the school to obtain approval of the Board of the order dismissing the respondent no.6 - 3 - but the Board passed an order refusing to grant such approval on the ground that principles of natural justice had been violated by the Managing Committee while passing the order of dismissal. Since the Board refused to approve the order of dismissal of respondent no.6 which was under challenge in the writ petition, the Writ Court had no option but to hold that the dismissal of the writ petitioner was not in accordance with law. Hence, the dismissal order was quashed and the writ petitioner was directed to be reinstated within seven days and on such reinstatement his seniority and service etc. was to remain intact. With respect to back wages, the Writ Court granted only partial relief by ordering that the writ petitioner will be paid 50 per cent of his back wages. 4. At the time of admitting LPA No.334 of 1999, the order of the Writ Court under appeal was stayed on 23.3.1999. As a result, the writ petitioner/ respondent no.6 was not reinstated and has not received any back wages. There is no dispute that during the pendency of this appeal, the writ petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation. 5. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that since the Board has refused to approve the order of dismissal on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been observed, the Writ Court should not have ordered for reinstatement and should have merely given liberty to the Managing Committee which was a respondent in the writ petition, to pass a fresh disciplinary order after observing principles of natural justice. The - 4 - second submission on behalf of the appellant is that appellant, the Managing Committee of the school, has preferred a writ petition bearing CWJC No.2473 of 1999 to challenge the order of the Board refusing to grant approval to the order of dismissal passed against respondent no.6 and since that writ petition is pending after admission hence, it cannot be said that the Board has finally disapproved the order of punishment passed by the Managing Committee. 6. So far as the first submission is concerned, as a respondent the Managing Committee did not require any liberty from the court and it was free for the Managing Committee to withdraw the order of punishment not approved by the Board and pass a fresh order after complying with the principles of natural justice. For this, no liberty was required nor the order of the Writ Court suffers from any error on this count. 7. So far as the other submission is concerned, merely because the Managing Committee has preferred a writ petition in the year 1999 in respect of order of the Board refusing to approve the dismissal order passed against writ petitioner/ respondent no.6 on 23.10.1994, it cannot be said that on account of such challenge alone the order of dismissal cannot be treated to be an order having approval of the Board and the disciplinary order passed against a teacher cannot become valid on account of pendency of a writ petition preferred in the year 1999 and said to be still pending. On that account, even this appeal cannot be kept pending - 5 - indefinitely so as to make the relief granted to the concerned teacher totally illusory. He has already crossed the age of superannuation and, therefore, part of the relief granted to him by the Writ Court that he should be reinstated within seven days cannot be made effective and as a result, he will not be getting anything by way of full salary after reinstatement. Now, as a consequence of the order of the Writ Court he can get only 50 per cent of his salary by way of back wages for the entire period since his removal from service by the order which has been quashed by the Writ Court till the date he reached the age of superannuation. 8. On behalf of the dismissed employee- the writ petitioner it has been argued that since the appeal has been found to be without any merit hence, he should not be made to suffer on account of interim order obtained by the appellant in the year 1999 and as a result whereof the writ petitioner could not be reinstated and did not receive his salary. It has further been submitted that the writ petitioner should be allowed full salary from the date the Writ Court had directed his reinstatement till the writ petitioner superannuated. It has further been submitted that in LPA No.438/1999 the writ petitioner has challenged that part of the order of the Writ Court whereby he has been allowed 50 per cent of the back wages. It has further been submitted that since the order of dismissal was set aside on ground - 6 - of being against the provisions of law, he should be allowed full back wages. 9. The part of the order of the Writ Court which has permitted only 50 per cent of the regular pay as back wages must be read and understood in the context of entire facts of the case which show that the order of dismissal passed against the writ petitioner was not approved by the Board only on account of violation of principles of natural justice and not on merits. In that view of the matter, the earlier period when the petitioner was not treated to be in service on account of order of dismissal could have been treated as an order under suspension and for that 50 per cent of the salary was rightly treated to be an appropriate amount. Hence, we find no illegality in the order of the Writ Court allowing only 50 per cent of the salary by way of back wages. 10. So far as the grievance of the writ petitioner that he has not been reinstated and, therefore, deprived of full salary after seven days of the order of the Writ Court is concerned, we are of the view that interim order passed by a Division Bench of this Court should not prejudice either of the parties at the time of final disposal of these appeals. Unfortunately, the writ petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation and hence, he cannot be reinstated and cannot earn full wages. However, for the earlier period admittedly he has not worked in the school and he has not been reinstated on account of interim order passed by this Court in LPA No.334 of 1999 - 7 - hence, we do not think it proper to saddle the Managing Committee with the burden of paying full wages of the writ petitioner from one week after the order of the Writ Court. Hence, that prayer of the writ petitioner is also found to be unacceptable. 11. As a result of aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in either of the Letters Patent Appeals. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. It is made clear that since the writ petitioner has already retired from service hence his back wages at the rate of 50 per cent of the salary should be paid to him within a period of three months from today failing which he shall also be entitled to a consolidated cost of Rs.10,000/-, which may be realized from person found responsible for delay in not paying the dues of the writ petitioner within the aforesaid period of three months. (Shiva Kirti Singh,J.) (Kishore K.Mandal,J.) Patna High Court The 5th May, 2008. NAFR/ S.Kumar