IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 Date of decision: 24th March, 2009 Satish Kumar … Petitioner Versus Chander Parkash and others … Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Present: Mr. R.S. Bajaj, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Sandeep Mann, Advocate for respondents. KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. Present revision petition has been filed by Satish Kumar assailing the acquittal of accused respondents. Accused respondents were tried in case FIR No. 30 dated 10.03.1999 registered at Police Station Division No. 1, Jalandhar under Section 304-B IPC. They were acquitted by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Jalandhar vide judgment and order dated 21st September, 2002. The State had decide not to file appeal against acquittal. The investigating agency had submitted report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (challan) only against Chander Parkash accused, whereas accused Chaman Lal, Parvati, Vijay Kumar, Shobha Rani, Ranji @ Nikki and Vinod Kumar Palli were summoned by invoking Section 319 Cr.P.C. Kiran Bala was married to Chander Parkash accused in year 1994. Accused Chaman Lal and Parvati are parents of Chander Parkash. Vijay Kumar is brother of Chander Parkash, Shobha Rani is wife of Vijay Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 Kumar, Vinod Kumar Palli is another brother of Chander Parkash and Ranji @ Nikki is sister of Chander Parkash. In the present case, on 2nd March, 1999, Kiran Bala was brought to Civil Hospital, Jalandhar, as a result of burn injuries. From there, she was referred to Christian Medical College, Ludhiana. At Christian Medical College, Ludhiana, statement of Kiran Bala was recorded by Judicial Magistrate (1st Class), after obtaining opinion of the doctor. Another statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer, which was attested by the doctor. In both the dying declarations, deceased Kiran Bala stated that she suffered injuries accidentally and nobody was responsible. A Daily Diary Report to this effect was also recorded. Kiran Bala died in Christian Medical College, Ludhiana on 6th March, 1999. Autopsy of her dead body was conducted. Satish Kumar, present petitioner, father of Kiran Bala made a statement to the police on 10th March, 1999, on the basis of which, case was registered, in which for the sake of brevity, it was stated that his daughter was being harassed by the family of her husband for demand of dowry and his daughter has been burnt by her in-laws. In the present case, prosecution had relied upon two dying declarations, one recorded by Harjit Singh, Judicial Magistrate (1st Class) PW-11 on 3rd March, 1999 at 3.55 p.m. in Christian Medical College, Ludhiana and another dying declaration recorded by ASI Amrik Singh PW- 9 on the same day at 5.00 p.m. These dying declarations have been exhibited as Ex.PK and Ex.PW-9/A. Trial Court took into consideration two material facts that both the dying declarations were made on 3rd March, 1999 and deceased died on 6th March, 1999. Trial Court further took into account the fact that on the day of occurrence, complainant, father of the deceased, had reached Civil Hospital, Jalandhar at about 11/11.30 a.m. The occurrence had taken 2 Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 place at 10.00 a.m. Deceased Kiran Bala was moved to the Civil Hospital Jalandhar by her husband and in-laws. The following finding of the trial Court assumes importance: “Satish Kumar stated at page 3 of his statement that he had reached civil hospital, Jalandhar at about 11/11.30 a.m. on the day of the occurrence. The occurrence had taken place at about 10 a.m. She was immediately removed to Civil Hospital, Jalandhar by her husband and in-laws, instead of saying that they pressurized Kiran Bala, rather, their conduct be remove the patient in the Hospital, immediately, should be appreciated. Satish Kumar went to the extent of saying this thing that he did not notice the pressure of anyone of the accused in the hospital, when he reached. Further he deposed that he shifted his daughter to C.M.C. Ludhiana from Civil Hospital, at about ¾ p.m. and reached there at 5 p.m. Also he stated at the end of page 3 of his statement that he alongwith his wife and one son had gone to C.M.C. Ludhiana with their daughter and Chander Parkash accused also accompanied them. This witness further deposed that they remained at C.M.C. Ludhiana upto the death of her daughter. It appears that parents of Kiran Bala remained with her throughout from the day of shifting from Civil Hospital, Jalandhar and certainly they were present in the Hospital where Kiran Bala’s two dying declarations were recorded, one by the Magistrate and another by the Investigating Officer. At what time Kiran Bala was pressurized by the accused? even whose presence in the Hospital, is denied by Satish Chander. He could not deny the presence of Chander Parkash because the expenditure on the treatment was born by him. Satish Kumar admitted that he was not in possession of receipt of deposits in the Hospital or for the purchase of medicines. Faced with this situation, he went to the extent of saying that he did not enter the Hospital to see his daughter and this version is totally unbelievable. When the daughter is lying seriously ill, a father is supposed to go near her to see the condition and not that he did not enter the hospital. On the other hand, he stated that Kiran Bala told him that she had been put on fire by the accused. At what time 3 Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 he could have had interaction with Kiran Bala if, he had not entered the hospital.” The trial Court also attached importance to the fact that in the present case, inquest proceedings on 7th March, 1999 were attested by Surinder Kumar and Rakesh Kumar, brothers of the deceased. Their statements were recorded and before the police officer, they stated that there was accidental fire. Non-examination of brothers of the deceased was construed against the prosecution, as the brothers of the deceased were given up by the prosecution on the request of Satish Kumar complainant. The trial Court held that material witnesses were withheld and had drawn the adverse inference against the prosecution. Trial Court also placed reliance upon agreement (Ex.DB) produced by the defence. This agreement was executed between Chander Parkash accused and his father-in-law Satish Kumar. Following finding of trial Court is significant: “There was hardly any occasion for making demand of Rs.3,50,000/- from a horse cart driver, having no bank account, for running the business by Chander Parkash accused. All this was cooked up story to implicate Chander Parkash and his relations. Relations of Chander Parkash accused involved in this case were living separately and thus having no concern with the so called demand made by Chander Parkash. They were dragged merely for this reason that this would enhance the agony of Chander Parkash. To my mind here also Satish Kumar is trying to conceal the truth. He was such liar that at page 4 of his statement, he went to the extent of saying that he was not aware if A.S.I. Amrik Singh visited C.M.C. Ludhiana alongwith judicial magistrate Sh.Harjit Singh. Even he denied the identification of the dead body by his sons. He showed ignorance about it. Also he stated that none of the police officials of Jalandhar met them at the time of post mortem examination of Kiran Bala and when this suggestion was given to him that it was not conducted by ASI Amrik Singh, he made categorical denial. The facts that 4 Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 inquest report was prepared by ASI Amrik Singh and the post mortem examination was conducted on his direction in Civil Hospital, Ludhiana.” There was a delay of 2 - 3 days in lodging of the FIR. I have perused the judgment of the trial Court and have also heard counsel for the petitioner. It cannot be said that the judgment of the trial Court is perverse. No legal infirmity has been pointed out. It was held in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707 Mahendra Partap Singh vs. Sarju Singh and another, relying upon D.Stephens vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196, as under: “only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the 5 Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re- weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352), Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: “This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when “there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.” In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such 6 Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = (AIR 1968 SC 707) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re- weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. “In other words” said this Court, “the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 444. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled 7 Criminal Revision No. 2359 of 2002 that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh vs. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. There is no merit. Present revision petition is dismissed. [KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA] JUDGE March 24, 2009 rps 8