IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOMAS P.JOSEPH THURSDAY, THE 12TH MARCH 2009 / 21ST PHALGUNA 1930 SA.No. 573 of 1998(B) --------------------- AS.44/1992 of II ADDL.SUB COURT,KOZHIKODE (AS NO.107/1992 OF DISTRICT COURT, KOZHIKODE) OS.619/1975 of PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF COURT, KOZHIKODE-I .................... APPELLANT(S)/RESPONDENTS 2 TO 6/SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENDANTS 4 TO 8: -------------- 1. AMBALAKANDI RADHA. 2. ANILKUMAR. 3. SATHEESAN. 4. AJITHA. 5. MANOJKUMAR. THE 1ST APPELLANT IS WIFE OF AMBALAKANDI BHASKARAN AND APPELLANTS 2 TO 5 ARE HIS CHILDREN, AND ARE RESIDING AT THALAPOYIL HOUSE, P.O.WEST HILL, ATHANIKKAL, CALICUT-5. BY ADV. SRI.D.KRISHNA PRASAD SRI.D.NARENDRANATH SRI.JOJI VARGHESE SRI.M.HARISHARMA SRI.T.P.ELDHOSE RESPONDENT(S)/APPELLANTS, RESPONDENTS 1, 7, 9 TO 16 AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEASED 8TH RESPONDENT/ PLAINTIFFS, DEFENDANTS 2, 9, 11 TO 18 AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEASED 10TH DEFENDANT: --------------- 1. VALLIL KOUSU, D/O.AMBALAKANDI KANDAN. 2. VATTAKANDI SREEMATHI, -DO- 3. PILAKANDI SAROJINI, -DO- 4. KARUVANKANDY RAMANI, D/O.LATE KURUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. SA NO.573/1998 2 5. MOHANLAL, S/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 6. RATNAVALLI, D/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 7. DHARMARAJAN, S/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 8. THANKAMANI, D/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 9. VISHNUDAS, S/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 10. DURGADEVI, D/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 11. SURYAKUMARI, D/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 12. KAILASAN, S/O.LATE KARUVANKANDI MEENAKSHI. 13. RADHA, W/O.DEVARAJAN. 14. SUNIL KUMAR (MINOR) AGED 17 YEARS, S/O.DEVARAJAN, REP. BY HIS GUARDIAN-MOTHER RADHA (13TH RESPONDENT) 15. SUKESH (MINOR) AGED 15 YEARS, S/O.DEVARAJAN, REP. BY HIS GUARDIAN-MOTHER RADHA (13TH RESPONDENT) RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 ARE RESIDING AT PUTHIYANGADI VILLAGE, EDAKKAD, KOZHIKODE TALUK AND RESPONDENTS 3 TO 15 ARE RESIDING AT KATCHERI AMSOM, EDAKKAD DESOM, KOZHIKODE TALUK. R1 TO R3 BY ADV. SRI.A.P.CHANDRASEKHARAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE SRI.PUSHPARAJAN KODOTH SMT.PRABHA R.MENON SRI.M.KRISHNAKUMAR R4 TO R15 BY ADV. SRI.A.P.CHANDRASEKHARAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE THIS SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26.2.2009, THE COURT ON 12.3.2009 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: THOMAS P. JOSEPH, J. -------------------------------------- S.A.No.573 of 1998 -------------------------------------- Dated this the day of March, 2009. JUDGMENT A dispute about just over 20 cents of land is coming to this Court for the second time, on the earlier occasion when this Court considered that dispute in S.A.No.158 of 1981 the matter was remanded to the trial court for fresh consideration allowing both sides to amend their pleadings. Thereafter, the parties amended their pleadings and adduced further evidence. Learned Munsiff decided in favour of defendant No.1 and dismissed the suit for partition upholding Ext.B1, gift deed dated 26.3.1975. Plaintiffs challenged the judgment and decree before the first appellate court. Learned Sub Judge found that the execution of Ext.B1 is not proved and ordered partition. Hence, this Second Appeal. Parties are referred as plaintiffs and defendants as in the trial court for convenience. 2. Plaintiffs and defendant Nos.2 and 3 are daughters of Janaky. Defendant No.1 is her only son. Janaky died on 4.6.1975. Defendant No.3 issued Ext.B2, notice to defendant No.1 on 16.6.1975 demanding partition of the suit property referring to a Will executed by Janaky on 19.11.1973 and registered as document No.36 of 1973 of SRO, West Hill bequeathing the SA No.573/1998 2 property in favour of all the children. Defendant No.1 gave Ext.B3, reply dated 24.6.1975 stating that the said Will was cancelled by Janaky as per document No.7 of 1975 of SRO, West Hill and that later, Janaky executed Ext.B1, gift deed dated 26.3.1975 in his favour gifting the suit property to him. Plaintiffs filed the suit for partition on 22.10.1975 but without referring to the Will, its cancellation or the gift deed referred to in Exts.B2 and B3. Plaintiffs proceeded on the basis that on the death of Janaky, the suit property devolved on her children equally and demanding their share of the property. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 supported the plaintiffs. Defendant No.1 resisted the suit setting up Ext.B1, gift deed, Plaintiff No.1 gave evidence as PW1. PW2 is the husband of plaintiff No.1. Defendant No.1 gave evidence as DW1. He examined one of the attesting witnesses in Ext.B1 as DW2. Learned Munsiff dismissed the suit upholding Ext.B1. The appeal preferred therefrom was also dismissed. Against the dismissal of the appeal, plaintiffs and defendant Nos.2 and 3 came up in S.A.No158 of 1981 which as per judgment dated 14.8.1990 was allowed by this Court and the case was remitted to the trial court for fresh consideration as aforesaid. After remand, plaintiffs amended the plaint specifically stating that no such gift deed was executed by Janaky, Janaky has not signed or got registered any such instrument and that the gift deed is fraudulently created. They also claimed that there was no reason or necessity for Janaky to show any special consideration for defendant No.1 (by gifting the entire property to him) as Janaky loved all the children alike. She was aged 72 years at the time of death and since about nine months preceding the death she was laid up due to SA No.573/1998 3 rheumatic complaints and could not even talk. She required the assistance of others even to take food. She could not write or sign on the day of Ext.B1. She was not also able to even sit up on the bed without the assistance of others. The signature in the gift deed is forged. Plaintiffs also contended that Janaky could not read or understand what all stated in a document. After remand, plaintiffs examined PW3 who claimed to be a former employee of Janaky to say that she was laid up as contended by them. Defendant No.1 examined DW3, a neighbour and relative of Janaky who asserted that she was hale and healthy during the relevant time and that he had occasion to see her even two days before her death. Learned Munsiff found that due execution of Ext.B1 is proved and dismissed the suit. Learned Sub Judge while considering the appeal referred to some of the observations made by this Court in the judgment dated 14.8.1990 in S.A.No.158 of 1981, found that the due execution of Ext.B1 is not proved and granted decree for partition. 3. Substantial questions of law raised for a decision are:- (i) When a registered document like Ext.B1 is attacked on the ground that it is not one duly executed and also on the ground that the executant was ill and laid up at the material time, is not the burden to prove the same on the person who alleges so? SA No.573/1998 4 (ii) When a registered gift deed is attacked on the ground that it is not one duly executed, is not due execution thereof alone to be proved by the person who relies on the document and does the question of suspicious circumstances surrounding execution thereof arise in such a case as in the case of a Will? (iii) When the signatures contained in a registered gift deed are disputed by a party, whether the court is justified in making a comparison of such signatures by itself without the aid of an expert or such other competent person and in entering a finding in this behalf without such aid? Certain other questions of law are formulated in the appeal memorandum which ofcourse is not of much relevance in the light of the questions already formulated. 4. Learned counsel for defendant No.1 contends that the whole approach made by the first appellate court is erroneous in that due weight was not given to the fact of registration of Ext.B1. According to the learned counsel, when the document which is required to be registered under law is so registered, it raised a presumption regarding validity of its execution. It is also contended that a reading of paragraph No.IV(2) of the plaint incorporated by amendment after remand would show that the only contention raised by the plaintiffs is that on account of the old age illness of Janaky, she was not able to sign the document, and if the evidence shows that late Janaky was hale and SA No.573/1998 5 healthy, then the contention of the plaintiffs that she has not signed the instrument cannot be accepted. Learned counsel also contended that in the nature of the contention advanced by the plaintiffs, they could not have merely ignored Ext.B1 and instead, they had to file a suit to set aside Ext.B1 on the grounds enumerated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act. According to the learned counsel, proof regarding execution of the gift deed is not required as in the case of a Will and the responsibility of the propounder is only to examine one of the attesting witnesses as stated in Section 68 of the Evidence Act (for short, “the Act”) which has been complied with. Learned counsel for defendant No.1 placed reliance on the decisions in Ningawwa v. Byrappa [AIR 1968 SC 956], Brij Raj Singh v. Sewak Ram [AIR 1999 SC 2203], M.Rangasmy v. Rengammal [(2003) 7 SCC 683], Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006(2) KLT 863-SC], Gopalakrishnan v. Rajamma [2006(4) KLT 377] and Asokan v. Lakshmikutty [2008(1) KLT 54-SC]. Learned counsel for plaintiffs placed reliance on the decision in Laxmanan v. Padmini [2009 (1) KLT 29-SC] and contended that as in the case of a Will, the propounder has to prove the due execution of the gift deed also when its execution is denied. 5. The plaintiffs have denied the execution of Ext.B1, gift deed. According to them, Janaky has not signed or written in Ext.B1. True, they have also contended that Janaky on account of old age illness was not having physical health or sound mental state of mind either to execute the document or to understand it and be to the office of the Sub Registrar for the purpose of SA No.573/1998 6 registration of Ext.B1. Since the fact of execution of Ext.B1 is denied, burden is on defendant No.1 to prove the same. In that situation, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs or defendant Nos.2 and 3 to have sought for setting aside Ext.B1 since they are not challenging Ext.B1 on any vitiating circumstances such as fraud, mis-representation or undue influence. Position may be different if execution of Ext.B1 is admitted and it is challenged on any vitiating circumstances which made the document voidable. It is idle for defendant No.1 to contend that in the nature of the contention advanced by the plaintiffs concerning Ext.B1, the challenge to it without attempting to set aside that document cannot be sustained. 6. It is contended by the plaintiffs and supported by defendant Nos.2 and 3 that on account of old age illness Janaky was unable to move about or even execute a document. Evidence in that line is given by PWs 1 to 3. But, even according to PWs 1 and 2, Janaky had only some rheumatic complaints which I am not inclined to think affected her sound disposing state of mind. No convincing evidence is given by PWs 1 to 3 even regarding the alleged illness and treatment of late Janaky. PW2 says that one Dr.L.K. Balakrishnan was treating Janaky and defendant No.1 used to purchase medicine for her from Aryavaidyasala. Defendant No.1 in his evidence as DW1 denied that. PW3 who claimed to be a former employee of Janaky was residing near the house of Janaky. As per the evidence of PW2 there were 18 coconut trees in the suit property. According to PW3, there were about 10-40 coconut trees. PW3 was SA No.573/1998 7 not able to say the extent of the suit property or to whom the properties on its boundaries belonged. On going through the evidence of PW3, that does not appear to be convincing. On the other hand, DWs 1 to 3 have given evidence that Janaky was hail and healthy. DW3 is also a neighbour and related to all the parties alike. When the plaintiffs contended that Janaky was laid up due to old age illness, it was for them to prove that. Even as per the version of PWs 1 and 2, defendant No.2 who was a widow by then was staying with Janaky and defendant No.1 in the house situated in the suit property and she knows about the illness of Janaky better. But, defendant No.2 did not enter the witness box to speak about the alleged physical and mental condition of Janaky. 7. But, that does not necessarily lead to a finding that Janaky executed Ext.B1. That is a matter still to be proved by defendant No.1. Version of defendant No.1 as to the execution and registration of Ext.B1 is that about a week before Ext.B1, Janaky asked him to bring a document writer to the house which he obliged. Janaky gave instructions to the document writer to prepare the document. Defendant No.1 was also present at that time. The document writer brought the document prepared to their house on 27.3.1975. Document writer then took the document to the office of the Sub Registrar asking him and Janaky to reach there. They took DW2 with them to the office of the Sub Registrar. There, Janaky executed the document and presented it for registration. Though it is the version of defendant No.1 that Janaky had spent money and purchased the stamp paper, Ext.B1 shows that the stamp paper was SA No.573/1998 8 purchased by defendant No.1 on 25.3.1975. The document is dated 26.3.1975 and it was registered on 27.3.1975. Going by the version of defendant No.1, Janaky executed the document at the office of Sub Registrar and the same day it was registered, in which case it must have been on 27.3.1975. But going by Ext.B1, its execution was on 26.3.1975. 8. DW2 who is one of the attesting and identifying witnesses in Ext.B1 said that himself and Narayana Menoky (the other attesting and identifying witness in Ext.B1) signed the document at the office of the Sub Registrar where, Janaky also signed the same. He would say that the document was read over to Janaky at the varandha of the office of the Sub Registrar, she admitted it and signed the same. It is also the version of DW2 that the document writer held on the hand of Janaky and made her to 'scribble' once or twice on the papers. 9. Now I shall refer to Ext.B1. As pointed out by the first appellate court, it is seen that the signature of the executant on the body of the document is quite dissimilar with the signature of the person who presented the document for registration and appearing on the reverse side of the stamp paper. The contradiction is such that it is not possible to reconcile the signatures on the body of Ext.B1 with the signatures put by the person who presented it for registration. In this regard, the version of DW2 that 'the document writer held on the hand of Janaky and made her to scribble the signature once or twice' assumes importance. None of the signatures on the body of Ext.B1 appears to be a scribbling. Learned counsel for defendant No.1 was not able to explain how SA No.573/1998 9 such irreconcilable and dissimilar signatures appeared on Ext.B1. In fact, this Court while deciding S.A.No.158 of 1981 had also taken note of the dissimilarity in the signatures as a suspicious circumstance. Unfortunately, even after the remand no attempt was made by the propounder of Ext.B1 to justify or explain the dissimilarity in the signatures. It is not the case of defendant No.1 that Janaky used to sign in both the ways as seen in Ext.B1. Defendant No.1 admitted that Janaky did not know how to write or read. But the signatures on the body of Ext.B1 do not appear to be of such an illiterate person. As per the version of defendant No.1 (DW1), inspite of the document writer preparing Ext.B1 and bringing it to their house, it was not read over to Janaky at the house. Instead, the document writer asked himself and Janaky to reach the office of the Sub Registrar. At the varandha of that office, Ext.B1 is said to have been read over to Janaky and she is said to have admitted and signed it. That conduct appears to be very strange, that inspite of the document writer bringing the document to her house, it was not read over to her, at the house. Then why was the document brought to the house at all? 10. It is when faced with the above situation that learned counsel for defendant No.1 contended that once the document is duly registered, there is a presumption regarding its valid execution. In Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006 (2) KLT 863] the Apex Court stated that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed and the onus of proof would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. But that presumption is one of fact SA No.573/1998 10 which is rebuttable in nature. Rebuttal of that presumption can be by leading positive evidence or by relying on the circumstances emerging in the case. That irreconcilable and contradictory signatures purported to be of the same person appear in Ext.B1 is sufficient to rebut the presumption. The dissimilarity in the signatures raised a strong suspicion that the person who signed on the body of Ext.B1 was not the person who presented it for registration and, vice versa. DW2, it is not disputed, is closely associated with defendant No.1. Plaintiffs have a case that the other attesting/identifying witness, Narayana Menoky is a regular witness in the office of the Sub Registrar. True, there is no evidence in that line. But, that witness is not examined. The document writer is also not examined. 11. It is true that plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were already sent in marriage at the time of Ext.B1 and going by the evidence it would appear that they were sent in marriage with the financial assistance of defendant No.1 also. The only property that Janaky had was the suit property. Defendant No.1 was married and had four children at the time of Ext.B1. He was looking after Janaky. According to the learned counsel for defendant No.1, that could be a reason for Janaky showing special consideration to defendant No.1. But, it is admitted that defendant No.2 who was a widow along with her children were staying with Janaky and defendant No.1 during the relevant time. If that be so, in the normal course Janaky would not have forgotten atleast defendant No.2 at the time she thought of disposing of her property. SA No.573/1998 11 12. The fact that defendant No.1 examined DW2 who is one of the attesting and identifying witnesses in Ext.B1 may be sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 68 of the Act but, the mere examination of DW2 does not amount to proof of due execution of Ext.B1. The question remains whether the evidence regarding the execution of Ext.B1 can be accepted. In the light of the circumstances stated above, version of DWs 1 and 2 regarding the alleged execution and registration of Ext.B1 is quite suspicious. The first appellate court has considered the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that due execution of Ext.B1 is not proved. That being a finding of fact entered on proper appreciation of the evidence it requires no interference in the Second Appeal. No other point is raised for consideration. Resultantly, this Second Appeal fails. It is dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer their respective costs in this appeal. THOMAS P.JOSEPH, Judge. cks SA No.573/1998 12 Thomas P.Joseph, J. S.A.No.573 of 1998 JUDGMENT March, 2009.