*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY +WRIT PETITION NO.22286 of 2009 % 2 4 - 1 2 - 2 0 0 9 Between: # Itineni Linganna, S/o. Pedda Bhumaiah, R/o. Katkapur Village, Raikal Mandal, Karimnagar District. ... Petitioner AND $ The Superintendent, Central Jail, Warangal. and another …Respondents Criminal Petition No.9380 of 2009 Between: #Itineni Pedda Bhumaiah … Petitioner And: $State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad & another … Respondents < G I S T : > H E A D N O T E : ! C o u n s e l f o r p e t i t i o n e Sri C. Praveen Kumar ^ C o u n s e l f o r r e s p o n d e ? C A S E S R E F E R R E D : - - 1. 2004 Cri.L.J. 523 2. AIR 1961 SC 600 3. 1989 Cri.L.J. 632 (FB) 4. 1987 Cri.L.J. 1621 5. 1983 Cri.L.J. 1262 6. 2000 Cri.L.J. 4414 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, TWENTY FOURTH [24TH] DAY OF DECEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY WRIT PETITION No. 22286 of 2009 Between: Itineni Linganna, S/o. Pedda Bhumaiah, R/o. Katkapur Village, Raikal Mandal, Karimnagar District. ... Petitioner AND 1.The Superintendent, Central Jail, Warangal. 2.The Government of Andhra Pradesh, Rep by Secretary, Home Department, Hyderabad. …Respondents Criminal Petition No.9380 of 2009 Between: Itineni Pedda Bhumaiah … Petitioner And: State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad & another … Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R.VARMA AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY W.P.No.22286 of 2009 & Crl.P.No.9380 of 2009 COMMON ORDER: [Per G.V.SEETHAPATHY, J] i) W.P.No.22286 of 2009: This writ petition is filed by the petitioner-Itineni Linganna S/o Pedda Bhumaiah seeking writ of Habeas Corpus directing the first respondent-Superintendent, Central Prison to produce Pedda Bhumaiah-Convict No.6770 lodged in Central Prison, Warangal before the Court so that he may be ordered to be released after declaring that his further detention in prison is illegal and void. ii) Crl.P.No.9380 of 2009: This petition is filed under Section 427 read with 482 Cr.P.C. by the petitioner-Pedda Bhumaiah [hereinafter referred to as convict prisoner] seeking a direction that the sentences imposed on the convict prisoner-Itineni Pedda Bhumaiah-A.1 in SC No.273 of 1997 on the file of the IV Additional Sessions Judge [FTC], Karimnagar for the offences under Sections 451, 323, 449 and 364 all read with Section 34 IPC, which were directed to run concurrently will also run concurrently with the life imprisonment awarded for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent-State. Perused the record. As the question of law and fact involved in both the cases are one and the same, both matters are heard together and they are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The petitioner in Crl.P.No.9380 of 2009 was the first accused in SC No.273 of 1997 on the file of the IV Additional Sessions Judge [FTC], Karimnagar. By judgment dated 10.10.2001 the petitioner was found guilty and was convicted and sentenced by the learned Sessions Judge as follows: “(a) to suffer Rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs.250/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 30 days for the offence under Section 452 read with Section 34 IPC; (b) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC; [c] to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.250/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 30 days for the offence under section 449 read with Section 34 IPC; (d) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.250/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 30 days for the offence under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC; (e) to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.250/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 30 days for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” It was further directed that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently with benefit of set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. except for the sentence of life imprisonment awarded for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioner aggrieved by the conviction and sentences, preferred an appeal in Crl.A.No.1801 of 2001. This Court by judgment dated 04.11.2003 partly allowed the appeal, modifying the conviction for the offence under Section 452 IPC to one under Section 451 IPC and reducing the sentence of imprisonment to one year and imposing fine of Rs.250/-. The conviction and sentences recorded in respect of other offences were confirmed. It appears that the direction of the learned Sessions Judge limiting the concurrent running of the substantive sentences only in respect of the offences under Sections 452, 323, 449 and 364 all read with Section 34 IPC and not extending the same to the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, was not specifically brought to the notice of the Court and the same was lost sight of. The convict prisoner who was lodged in Central Prison, Warangal, was undergoing the sentences. 4. While so, the Government by its G.O.Ms.No.415 Home (Prisons-C) Department dated 01.10.2009 issued orders remitting the un-expired residue of sentences in respect of 940 convicts undergoing life sentence, including the convict prisoner-Itineni Pedda Bhumaiah. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Warangal, did not however, release the convict prisoner. The convict prisoner’s son Itineni Lingaiah, who is the petitioner in W.P.No.22286 of 2009, filed application dated 10.10.2009 under Right to Information Act seeking reasons for not releasing his father under the provisions of G.O.Ms.No.415. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Warangal by his proceedings dated 13.10.2009 informed that the sentences imposed for the offences under Sections 451, 323, 449 and 364 all read with Section 34 IPC alone were directed to run concurrently and the Court has not directed that they should run concurrently with imprisonment for life awarded for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The convict prisoner’s son was accordingly informed that though his father was directed to be released in respect of life sentence by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.415, he had to still serve other sentences for the offences under Sections 452, 323, 449 and 364 all read with Section 34 IPC, which were directed to run concurrently. Hence, the convict prisoner’s son filed W.P.No.22286 of 2009 seeking writ of Habeas Corpus. While the writ petition was pending, the convict himself filed Crl.P.No.9380 of 2009 under Section 427 read with 482 Cr.P.C. seeking a direction that the sentences imposed for the offences under Sections 451, 323, 449 and 364 all read with Section 34 IPC, which were already directed to run concurrently, shall also run concurrently with the sentence of life imprisonment imposed for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC so as to meet the ends of justice, as otherwise, the petitioner would have to continue to languish in jail, notwithstanding the remission of the residuary of the sentence of imprisonment for life under G.O.Ms.No.415. 5. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the interpretation given by the Superintendent, Central Prison, is incorrect because when a person is sentenced to imprisonment for life, the said sentence is for the whole of the remaining period of the convict’s natural life and the question of any convict serving the other sentences after expiry of the sentence of life imprisonment is physically impossible and therefore, the provisions of Section 427(2) Cr.P.C. have to be given a harmonious and reasonable interpretation so that the absence of any specific order or direction to the effect that the other sentences imposed shall run concurrently with the life sentence awarded in the same case, does not make any difference. In that connection, he invited attention to the decision in ‘Hitesh Pravinchand Shah vs. The State of Maharashtra[1]’. 6. Section 427 Cr.P.C. runs as follows: “Section 427: Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence: - (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.” 7. A plain reading of the above provision would make it clear that under sub-section (2), a person already undergoing imprisonment if sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such subsequent sentence shall commence after expiration of the imprisonment which he was already undergoing, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence. There is no practical or physical difficulty for commencement of the imprisonment for life after expiration of the previous sentence of imprisonment for only a term and therefore, the consecutive serving of two sentences is contemplated under sub-section (1) unless the Court directs that they both shall run concurrently. Under sub-section (2) when a person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. The intent and object behind such provision is obvious because, it is physically and practically impossible for any one to serve any other term of imprisonment after expiry of the life sentence, which he was already undergoing and therefore, sub-section (2) directs that both the sentences shall run concurrently. However, both sub- sections (1) and (2) refer to subsequent conviction, which necessarily implies that the second sentence was imposed in pursuance of a subsequent conviction in a different case. 8. In the present case, the various terms of imprisonment on conviction for different offences and life sentence for conviction of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were imposed in one and the same case. The trial Court, while directing that all the other sentences for different terms shall run concurrently, however, did not extend the said benefit of concurrence in respect of imprisonment for life imposed for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and the said fact was also not brought to the notice of this Court at the time of disposal of the appeal. The judgment of the trial Court also does not specify as to which of the sentences of imprisonment shall commence first and which is to follow next. 9. It is well established by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that ‘life imprisonment’ means that the convict is required to undergo sentence for rest of his life. In ‘G.V. Godse vs. State of Maharashtra[2]’ the Apex Court held as follows: “There is no provision of law where under a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal remission by appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one for a definite period. Section 57 does not say that transportation for life shall be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all purposes; nor does the amended section which substitutes the words ‘imprisonment for life’ for ‘transportation for life’ enable the drawing of any such all embracing fiction. A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life” 10. The question of commencement of sentence of various terms in respect of other offences, which are ordered to run concurrently on the expiry of the sentence of life imposed for the offence under section 302 read with Section 34 IPC does not simply arise, as any human being has only one span of life. That is exactly the reason behind the provision contained in sub-section (2) of Section 427 Cr.P.C. wherein, the subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, is ordered to run concurrently with the previous sentence of imprisonment for life, which the person is already undergoing. When such subsequent sentence of imprisonment is made to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of life, there is absolutely no reason as to why the same shall not on an analogy of the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 427 Cr.P.C. be extended in respect of different sentences awarded in the same case, like the present one so as to make them run concurrently with the life sentence. 11. In Hitesh Pravinchand Shah’s case (first supra), the Division Bench of Bombay High Court was dealing with a case where an accused was convicted for three different offences under Sections 302, 392 and 394 IPC in respect of the same act/incident and was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment on two counts i.e., for Section 302 and 394 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under Section 392 IPC, with further direction that the substantive sentences not to run concurrently. In the above case, all the three convictions and sentences were recorded in one and the same case. It was contended that the sentences ought to run concurrently because a person cannot be imprisoned to undergo for life sentence twice and reliance was placed on section 427(2) Cr.P.C. It was held as follows: “Under the circumstances, it must be pointed out that Section 427(2) of Cr.P.C. has consciously made a provision bringing it to the notice of the Court that, if an accused who is undergoing life imprisonment is subsequently awarded a sentence of minor imprisonment, then the sentences will have to be made to run concurrently. Apart from the normal argument that the human being has only one life span and if the remainder of that life span has to be spent in jail, then there can be no question of directing that the remaining life sentences would have to run consecutively because otherwise it would lead to an infractuous situation whereby the remaining sentences cannot be carried out. Therefore, it must be held that the operative part of the impugned judgment, which prescribed to life imprisonments to run consecutively, is required to be modified to the limited extent. In that, it will have to be directed that the life imprisonment should run concurrently. It also cannot be overlooked that the learned Sessions Judge has not recorded any reasons as to why he has taken the view to direct the sentences not to run concurrently, nor the facts involved would warrant any departure from established legal principles. Therefore, in sum and substance, and on the basis of the consistent interpretation by the Supreme Court of the definition of the term “life imprisonment” as being synonymous with the incarceration for while of the remainder of convict’s life read with provision of Section 427(2) of Cr.P.C., we accept the position that the correct direction from the Court would be that the sentences awarded in this case are required to run concurrently”. 12. The above case is virtually on all fours to the facts of the present case, wherein also, the sentences for different terms and the sentence of life imprisonment, all awarded in the same case, are directed to run consecutively by the trial Court for no special reason. The interpretation sought to be given by the first respondent that the other sentences of imprisonment for different terms shall have to commence only after expiration of the life sentence is unsustainable, as such a situation is totally inconceivable and such interpretation would only frustrate the very purpose of sentencing itself. A harmonious and reasonable interpretation would be to direct that the other terms of imprisonment, which inter-se are already ordered to run concurrently, shall also run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life. 13. The interests of justice would also require that the convict prisoner, who is already granted benefit of remission of the residuary period of life sentence under G.O.Ms.No.415 shall not be denied of the said benefit by insisting upon serving of other terms of imprisonment. It is well established that under Section 482 Cr.P.C. this Court is empowered to invoke its inherent powers to make such order as may be necessary to secure ends of justice. 14. In ‘Shersingh vs. State of M.P.,[3]’, the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held as follows: “Inherent powers of the High Court can be invoked under Section 482 even if the trial Court or the appellate or revisional Court has not exercised its discretion under Section 427(1) of the Code in directing running of previous and subsequent sentences concurrently. The inherent powers of the High Court is not in any way fettered by the provisions of Section 427(1) and it can be invoked at any stage even if there is no such order passed under Section 427(1) by the trial Court or appellate or revisional Court and even though the conviction has become final”. 15. The above decision refers to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in ‘V. Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.,[4]’ wherein it was held as follows: “The High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction suo motu or in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, can direct the sentence to run concurrently as provided under Section 427 Cr.P.C. even though the convictions and sentences that have been passed by the Additional Sessions Judges of different Sessions Divisions have become final”. 16. In ‘Mani vs. State of Kerala[5]’ wherein it was held as follows: “Neither the trial Court nor the appellate court is competent to exercise the discretion conferred under Section 427 of the Code after the judgment has been signed. But it would be competent for the High Court in exercise of its inherent power to direct that the sentence under a subsequent conviction to imprisonment may run concurrently with the previous sentence even if the stage for exercise of discretion under Section 427 of the Code is over in circumstances, where it would serve any of the three purposes mentioned in the section i.e., to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice’. 17. In ‘State vs. Mota[6]’ the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows: “The point in issue is really as to whether the Court pronouncing a sentence of life imprisonment is entitled to take into account the latter consideration and after an indepth consideration of the law on different occasions, the Supreme Court has in unequivocal terms laid down that the life imprisonment is life imprisonment and nothing less than that. Under these circumstances, what Mr. Devraj, learned counsel pointed out was that section 427(2) of Cr.P.C. has consciously made a provision bringing it to the notice of the Court that if an accused who is undergoing life imprisonment is subsequently awarded a sentence of life imprisonment, that the sentences will have to be made to run concurrently and the extension of the argument was that if this is the principle, that then Court will always have to construe it as meaning that if in view of the unusual cases such as the present one where multiple murders have been committed and the accused has been awarded life sentences on conviction under each of the heads of charge, that it would still require the Court to prescribe that the sentences have to run concurrently. Apart from the normal argument that the human being has only one life span and if the remainder of that life span has to be spent in jail then there can be no question of directing that the remaining life sentences would have to run consecutively because otherwise it would lead to an infructuous situation whereby the remaining sentences cannot be carried out. Under these circumstances, the view canvassed was that the operative part of the judgment which prescribed that the five life sentences shall run consecutively was required to be modified to the limited extent in that it will have to be directed that the sentences should run concurrently. In this regard, our attention was specifically drawn to the following decisions: AIR 1961 SC 600: [1961(1)Cri.LJ 736), AIR 1980 SC 1336 (sic), AIR 1980 SC 2147:[1980 Cri.LJ 1440) and AIR 1991 SC 2296: (1991 Cri.LJ 3354) In sum and substance, on the basis of the consistent interpretation by the Supreme Court of the definition of the term ‘life imprisonment’ as being synonymous with the incarceration for whole of the remainder of the convicts life, Read with provisions of section 427(2) of Cr.P.C., we accept the position that the correct direction from the Court would be that the sentences awarded in this case are required to run concurrently.” 18. In the above case, initially the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court while maintaining the sentence on the subsidiary charges directed that the two accused shall undergo sentence of imprisonment for life in respect of each of the individual charges of murder in all the five cases for which separate charges have been framed. The Sessions Court directed the sentences shall run concurrently, but the High Court while setting aside the same, directed that in view of the gravity of the offences involved, the sentences shall run consecutively on the premise that five murders cannot be treated on par with a single one and the sentence must realistically be five times as such. Subsequently, the same Division Bench re-considered the matter and modified the earlier direction to the effect that the five sentences of imprisonment for life shall run concurrently. 19. In the present case, the convict prisoner is admittedly not a habitual offender or is there any material placed before the Court to show that he is involved in any other offence. He was in judicial custody from 11.11.1996 to 17.02.1997 as seen from the copy of the warrant issued by the trial Court. On conviction he was again committed to prison by the said warrant on 10.10.2001 and ever since he is undergoing sentence. Thus he has been in jail for more than eight years. He was granted remission of the residuary period of sentence of imprisonment for life by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.415. Under those circumstances, it is neither just nor proper to deny him the benefit of the said remission on the ground that he is required to undergo other sentences imposed for the lesser offences. 20. In the circumstances, it is held that ends of justice in the present case would be met by giving a direction that the sentences imposed for the offences under Sections 451, 323, 449 and 364 all read with Section 34 IPC, which were already directed to run concurrently shall also run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed for the offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC, by invoking inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 21. Accordingly, Criminal Petition No.9380 of 2009 is allowed issuing direction as stated above. 22. W.P.No.22286 of 2009: The question involved in this writ petition is connected with the result in Criminal Petition No.9380 of 2009. It is the grievance