IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.18364 of 2009 1. RAM JIWAN PRASAD SINGH @ RAM JIWAN SINGH S/O LATE BHUBNESHWER PRASAD SINGH R/O MOHALLA AND P.S.- KHAJEKALA, AT AND DISTT.- PATNA Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH, BIHAR, PATNA 3. THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH, BIHAR, PATNA ----------- 2. 19.3.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. The petitioner posted as a Group Officer, Chowk, Patna City, Special Branch in the Police Department, was placed under suspension on 18.2.2006 for not having intimated the occurrence of fire in a mill on 17.2.2006. Departmental proceedings were initiated against him for negligence and dereliction of duty which resulted in a minor punishment by order dated 6.1.2009 of censure and withholding of full salary for the period of suspension. Acknowledging the status of the petitioner, as a Police Officer, in a uniformed disciplined force, it is submitted that his duties are limited as a Group Officer to political intelligence of political or quasi political significance only. It was, therefore, not his duty under the general instructions of the functions of the special Branch to inform the authorities with regard to any 2 occurrence of fire at the mill on 17.2.2006. It is next submitted that before imposition of the punishment, no second show cause notice was issued to him. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It states that being a Group Officer, he was duty bound to inform the incident to the Special Branch Control Room immediately. In a departmental proceeding, this Court is primarily concerned with matters of procedure. Unless there be allegations of procedural impropriety in the conduct of the proceeding to the prejudice of the delinquent, there is no occasion for a writ Court to interfere. This Court is not persuaded to accept the submission that though he was a police man in uniform, his duty was of a limited nature and he was unconcerned with matters beyond political or quasi political significance. A police officer in uniform is an arm of the State in so far as reporting of incidents, concerning crime, law and order, any untoward incident etc are concerned. Clause 3(a) of the general instructions relied upon by the petitioner reads as follows:- “3(a) Officers of all ranks should be encouraged to send immediate 3 information on all matters of urgent interest and importance. At large centres in a district one or more officers should be specially entrusted with the work of collecting Special Branch Intelligence.” The petitioner himself take the defence that he visited and orally informed the authority on 17.2.1006 and later takes the defence in the departmental proceeding that he was also sent communication by post on 22.2.2006. The defence of the petitioner appears self contradictory blowing hot and cold. If he was not obliged to inform the occurrence as a part of the duty, there was no occasion for him to send such intimation on 17.2.2006 orally followed by postal intimation on 22.2.2006. He claims to have given verbal intimation on 17.2.2006, but failed to prove the same in the departmental proceeding. There was no occasion for him belatedly on 22.2.2006 to intimate by post if he had informed orally. If there was no duty cast on him matters ended on 17.2.2006 when he allegedly sent the intimation. No other ground of procedural infirmity during the departmental proceeding has been urged. The punishment is minor in nature. A minor punishment mandates the mere giving of a show cause notice, consideration of the reply. The procedure for a regular departmental proceeding for major punishment 4 warranting giving of a second show cause notice even which has been held not to be mandatory under certain circumstances does not apply to a minor punishment. On the facts of the present case, the Court is not persuaded that any prejudice has been caused to him in absence of such notice. The Court is not persuaded to interfere with the punishment of „Censure‟. In so far as the challenge to the withholding of the salary during the period of suspension is concerned, in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in 2006(4) PLJR 541, that part of the punishment is held to be not sustainable but without prejudice to the right of the respondent to proceed afresh on that aspect in light of the discussion contained in the Division Bench judgment. The submission that the period of punishment has also lapsed for other service claims, are matters to be more particularly considered by the respondent authorities themselves if the petitioner represents. The writ application is allowed only to the extent indicated. P. Kumar (Navin Sinha, J.)