IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CR. REV. No.832 of 2011 Bijendra Yadav @ Bijendra Kumar, son of Sita Yadav, resident of village- Shahjahanpur, P.S.-Bikram, District- Patna. ……….Petitioner Versus The State of Bihar . ….Opposite Party ----------- 3. 21.11.2011 The accused petitioner has preferred this revision application under Section 53 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for the sake of convenience) against the order dated 24.03.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Jduge, 2nd , Danapur in S.T.No.786/1995 by which petition filed under Section 18 of the Act has been dismissed. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is facing trial in Bikram P.S. Case No.300/1992 under Sections 324, 307, 300/34 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act in the court of 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Danapur. The allegation is that the occurrence took place on 22.12.1992 and the date of birth of the petitioner is 12.10.1976. As such, he is a juvenile. In support of this contention, the petitioner has 2 filed photo copies of the certificate of the School as well as the college. The learned trial court has also considered that on the date of occurrence, the petitioner was 16 years, 2 months and 8 days. It appears from the impugned order that the learned trial court has held that at the time of occurrence Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force and the Act of 2000 came into force on 1.04.2001 under which the age of juvenility has been raised as below 18 years. Since the occurrence has taken place when the Act of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in forced at that time the age of juvenile for a male was below 16 years. It further appears that the learned trial court has placed reliance upon a decision in the case of Pratap Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand and another reported in (2005) 3 SCC 551. He has further submitted that the learned trial court has not appreciated the decision correctly. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that during the pendency of the trial, the 1986 Act repealed and new Act of 2000 came into force. As such, the petitioner will also be declared a juvenile as 3 his age is below 18 years. Under the new Act, the age of juvenile is below 18 years. Thus, it will be presumed that on the date of occurrence, the petitioner was a juvenile. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a decision in the case of Dayanand Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2011 (1) Supreme 77. The learned counsel for the State could not controvert the contention of the petitioner. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State and on perusal of the materials on the record, it appears that the learned trial court has found that it is admitted case that the occurrence has taken place on 20.12.1992 and the certificates produced by the petitioner shows that the date of birth of the petitioner is 12.10.1976 and as such, on the date of occurrence, the petitioner was more than 16 years and below 18 years. During the pendency of the trial, the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 was amended in 2006. It appears that effect of the amendments in the Juvenile Justice Act has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dayanand (Supra). In paragraph 14, it has been held as 4 follows : “The effect of the amendments in the 2000 Act were considered by this Court in Hari Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another reported in (2009) 13 SCC 211. In Hari Ram this Court held that the Constitution Bench decision in Pratap Singh’s case was no longer relevant since it was rendered under the un-amended Act. In Hari Ram this Court held and observed as follows : “59. The law as now crystallized on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7-A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1.04.2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted. xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx 67. Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, made provision for the claim of juvenility to be raised before any Court at any stage, as has been done in this case, and such claim was required to be determined in terms 5 of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act. 68. Accordingly, a juvenile who had not completed eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence was also entitled to the benefits of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if the provisions of Section 2 (k) had always been in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act. 69. The said position was re-emphasized by virtue of the amendments introduce in Section 20 of the 2000 Act, whereby the provision and Explanation were added to Section 20, which made it even more explicit that in all pending cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile would be in terms of Clause (1) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force when the alleged offence was committed. 70. In the instant case, there is no controversy that the appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age. In view of Sections 2 (k), 2 (1) and 7A 6 read with Section 20 of the said Act, the provision thereof would apply to the appellant’s case and on the date of the alleged incident it has to be held that he was a juvenile”. Considering the facts and circumstances stated above, in my opinion, the impugned order is not fit to be sustained. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned trial court to pass an order in accordance with law. In the result, this application is allowed. V.K. Pandey ( Amaresh Kumar Lal, J.)