IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR O R D E R S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2896 of 2003. Babu Lal Morwal son of Shri Mali Ram. VERSUS Manju Kanwar wife of late Shri Prabhu Singh & Others Date Of Order ::: 19/03/2008. Hon'ble Mr. Narendra Kumar Jain J. Mr. Sudhindra Kumawant, advocate, for Mr. S.N. Kumwat, Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Akbar Khan, advocate, for Mr. Ashok Gaur, Counsel for the respondent nos.4 to 7. None present for the respondent nos.1 to 3 & 8 to 9. BY THE COURT : Heard learned counsel for the parties. The claimant/respondents No.1 to 3 filed an application for compensation in the trial Court in respect of death of Prabhu Singh under the provisions of Fatal Accident Act, 1855, and in the said application, the claimants filed an application under Section 151, C.P.C. for grant of interim relief. The trial Court vide dated 26.03.2003 allowed the application under Section 151, C.P.C. and directed the non- claimant no.1, Ajmer Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Ajmer to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- and also directed the non-claimant no.6/petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/-, a total amount of Rs.50,000/- towards interim relief/compensation to the claimants. The said order has been challenged by the non- claimant no.6/petitioner in this writ petition. The only argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no provision under the Fatal Accident Act, 1855 to award interim compensation during the pendency of the main application for compensation, therefore, the impugned order passed by the trial Court is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be set aside by this Court. The claimant/respondents have not appeared, in-spite of service of notice. The counsel for the respondent nos.4 to 7 contended that although they have not challenged the impugned order passed by the trial Court, but according to them, the entire amount of interim relief should have been directed to be paid by the Contractor non-claimant no.6/petitioner alone. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and examined the impugned order dated 26.03.2003 passed by the trial Court. The trial Court has considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner about the maintainability of the application under Section 151, C.P.C. for grant of interim compensation in the application filed for compensation under the provisions of the Fatal Accident Act, 1855. The trial Court has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of R.S.E.B. and another Vs. Jai Singh and others, reported in AIR 1997 (Rajasthan) Page 141. The trial Court after considering the provision of Section 151, C.P.C. as well as the above referred decision of this Court recorded a finding that the application under Section 151, C.P.C. is maintainable, and consequently passed an interim compensation in favour of the claimants, as mentioned above. This Court in the case of R.S.E.B. and Another Vs. Jai Singh & Others (Supra) has considered the similar controversy and held that the Court has inherent powers to award interim relief under Section 151, C.P.C. Para No.22 of the judgment, reads as under : “As a result, when there is no prohibition, bar or limit against the exercise of inherent powers by the trial Court which was in seisin of the subject-matter of the claim and the plaintiffs maintained that they were not in a position to maintain themselves, apparently, when there is every likelihood to further delay the decision of the suit, after a passage of 2-1/2 years from the date of accident, the plaintiffs cannot be left as destitute without any interim relief. If it were so, no just and equitable relief can be obtained by the plaintiffs in near future and it will automatically result in frustration of their cause which will amount to abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, with a view to prevent abuse of process of the Court as is usual looking to the defence of the defendants and also to further meet the ends of justice, it was found necessary by the learned trial Court to award interim relief in a suit which cannot be, on any ground whatsoever, termed to be false or vexatious, the learned trial Court cannot be held to have exercised its inherent powers without jurisdiction as well as also to have acted either illegally or with a material irregularity in passing the impugned order. The same being just and necessary for the ends of justice, the same cannot be interfered with in this revision petition.” The controversy involved in the present case is fully covered with the decision of this Court, as referred above. In view of above, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by the trial Court. There is no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. (Narendra Kumar Jain) J. ashok/