CRP 263/2009 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI The most prominent question, which this revision begs for an answer, is: Whether the word ’appeal’, which appears in Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Pap er Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, shall be r ead as an ’application’? Amongst others, the other important question, which thi s revision seeks an answer, is: When no period of limitation is prescribed by a statute for an ’appeal’, which can be preferred to a Court by a person, who is aggrieved by the decision of an adjudicating authority, whether it is possible f or the Court, while dealing with such an ’appeal’ to hold the appeal time-barred or to refuse to give relief on the ground of laches or negligence ? 2. The material facts, which have led to this revision, raising, amongst ot hers, the questions, which I have posed above, may, in a nutshell, be set out as under: (i) The petitioner No.1, namely, M/s. Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. (in short, ’petitioner company’) is a company registered under the Companies Act , 1956, having its registered office at Rajgarh Road, Guwahati, with the petitio ner No.2 as its Managing Director. The respondent No.1, namely, M/s North Easter n Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd., (in short, ’the respondent company’) is also a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office a t Hajobari, Chandrapur, Guwahati. (ii) On 09.11.1082, the respondent Company had received orders from the petit ioner Company for supply of goods. Having made supplies, respondent Company rai sed three bills for diverse sums of money, namely, bill, dated 20.01.1983, for R s.84,595/-, bill, dated 26.01.1983, for Rs.86,812.13/- and bill, dated 31.03.198 3, for Rs.21,433.81/- . The bills of the respondent Company had not been, accord ing to the respondent Company, fully paid by the petitioner Company. (iii) The petitioner Company was declared as a sick company by the Board for I ndustrial and Financial Re-organization under the Sick Industrial Companies (Spe cial Provisions) Act, 1985, popularly knows as ’BIFR’, necessitating its rejuven ation and rehabilitation. This necessity was sought to be filled up by the State by enacting Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition an d Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, which came into force, on 12.09.1990, by v irtue of a notification, dated 24.09.1990, under the Assam Gazette (Extra-ordina ry) on 25.09.1990. This apart, Section 4(b) of the Assam State Industrial Relie f Undertaking Act, 1984, (in short, ’the Act of 1984’), made all contracts of As hok Paper Mill Ltd. (i.e., the petitioner company) with the respondent Company u nenforceable in law and the Act of 1984 continued till 04.01.1992. Consequently, during the period, when the Act of 1984 remained in force, respondent Company c ould not file any suit, in any Court of competent jurisdiction, against Ashok Pa per Mill (i.e., the petitioner company) for recovery of the money, which the res pondent Company claimed to be its dues. (iv) By taking resort to the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limi ted (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, the respondent Company lodged, in terms of Section 16 thereof, a claim before the Commissioner, appoint ed under the Act, for payment of principal amount with interest. By an order, da ted 17.08.94, the Commissioner awarded Rs.1,58,375/- towards principal amount. As no interest was awarded by the Commissioner, the respondent Company filed a w rit petition, which gave rise to Civil Rule No.4210/1997, whereby the respondent Company sought for a direction to be issued to the Commissioner for passing nec essary order for payment of interest as per the representation, dated 16.07.1997 , submitted by the respondent Company to the Commissioner. This writ petition, i .e., Civil Rule No.4210/97, was disposed of by directing the Commissioner to con sider, within a period of three months, the respondent Company’s representation, dated 16.07.97. The Commissioner, then, awarded, on 03.11.2001, interest to the respondent Company, for the period from 23.09.92 to 31.07.2001, which came to t he tune of Rs.6,83,688/- as against the total claim of interest of Rs.21,49,610/ -, which the respondent Company had raised. (v) Aggrieved by the denial of payment of interest amount, as claimed by the respondent Company, respondent Company, once again, filed a writ petition claim ing to the effect, inter alia, a direction to be issued to the Commissioner to m ake a fresh award with regard to the interest payable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertak ing Act, 1993, over and above the amount of Rs.6,83,688/-, which was already pai d to them by virtue of the Commissioner’s award, dated 03.11.2001. This writ pet ition gave rise to WP(C) No.4520/2002, wherein it was claimed by the respondent Company that it was entitled to interest for delayed payment on the amount of th eir bills for supply of goods to the petitioner Company, namely, Ashok Paper Mil l. This writ petition was disposed of by judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, wherein the Court observed, at para 7, that the Court, in exercise of its jurisd iction under Article 226, was not required to embark upon an arithmetical calcul ation for computation of interest payable and that there being no dispute about the respondent Company’s entitlement to interest, as provided in the Delayed Pay ment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993, it was appos ite to refer the matter back to the Commissioner for calculation of interest afr esh in compliance with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1993. H aving come to this conclusion, the writ petition was disposed of by the Court wi th a direction to the Commissioner to re-calculate the amount of interest, payab le to the respondent Company herein, on the value of the goods supplied, on thre e occasions, as mentioned hereinbefore, at the rate applicable as per the provis ions of Section 4 and excess amount of interest, if any, found payable, shall be paid immediately, preferably, within a period of 60 days from the date of such calculation. By the judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, aforementioned, the Court further directed that the Commissioner shall, on receiving a copy of the j udgment and order, complete the assessment within a period of 30 days. (vi) Aggrieved by the decision, which had been reached in WP(C) No.4520/2002, the petitioner Company herein filed a petition seeking review of the directions , given by the judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, passed in WP(C) No.4520/200 2. This application gave rise to Review Application No.91/2004. In the Review Ap plication, the Court came to the conclusion that the Act of 1993 was brought int o force, on 23.09.1992, with retrospective effect and the provisions for delayed payment interest was made effective from 23.09.1992. By order, dated 20.12.200 4, while disposing of the review petition, the Court clarified that interest, on delayed payment, has to be calculated, with effect from 23.09.1992, on the prin cipal as well as the normal interest due. With the clarification so made, the re view petition was disposed of by directing the Commissioner to re-calculate the amount of interest in terms of the provisions of the Act of 1993 for any amount due on or after 23.09.1992. (vii) Following the directions, given in the review petition, though the matte r came to the Commissioner, the Commissioner declined, by its order, dated 13.04 .2005, to direct payment of any further interest to the respondent Company. Aggr ieved by the order of the Commissioner, the respondent Company herein preferred an appeal, to the District Judge, Kamrup, by taking recourse to Section 22(8) of the Joghighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Trans fer of Undertaking) Act, 1990. This appeal gave rise to Misc. Appeal No.18/2008. The appeal was resisted by the Ashok Paper Mills Limited (i.e., present petiti oner Company) on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation inasmuch as , according to the present petitioner Company, an appeal or application, in term s of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be made, at the most, within a period of three years from the date, when the right to apply accrues. The peti tioner Company further contended, in the appeal, that the appeal was time-barred and may, therefore, be dismissed. (viii) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the learned District J udge passed an order, on 14.05.2009, in Misc. Appeal No.18/2008, holding the ’ap peal’ maintainable on the ground that no specific time limit had been fixed, und er the Limitation Act, 1963, for filing of appeal. The appeal was accordingly a dmitted for hearing. It is this order, dated 14.05.2009, which stands impugned b y the present petitioner Company by making this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. I have heard Mr. B.D. Das, learned Senior counsel, for the petitioner C ompany, and Mr. G.P. Bhowmik, learned counsel, for the respondent Company. I hav e also heard Mr. D. Baruah, learned counsel, as amicus curiae. 4. Terming the appeal, which the opposite party herein has filed before the District Judge, Kamrup, as wholly not maintainable, Mr. B.D. Das, learned Senio r counsel, has submitted that the appeal, which has been filed by the claimant-o pposite party, is wholly misconceived in law inasmuch as when the scheme of the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, is considered, in the light of the schedule of the Act, it would transpire, submits Mr. Das, that a creditor, who had made supply of ma terials to Ashok Paper Mill (i.e., the petitioner Company) would not be entitled to recover his dues by taking recourse to the Act. According to Mr. Das, learn ed Senior counsel, the Act envisages, apart from recovery of dues of the employe es on account of salary, wages, provident fund, etc., the recovery of loans, bot h secured and unsecured, of the banks and financial institutions, revenue, taxes , etc., but it does not envisage payment of dues of private creditors, such as, the respondent Company, which had made supplies of materials to the petitioner C ompany. 5. Mr. B. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel, has also submitted that the proce dure, prescribed for disposal of claim in Section 22 of the Act, makes it clear that a claim, when made, shall be disposed of expeditiously and, hence, in such circumstances, the word ’appeal’, appearing in sub-section (8) of Section 22, sh all be read as an ’application’ and if so read, then, the period of limitation f or such ’appeal’, which has to be regarded as an ’application’, becomes, by virt ue of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, three years from the time, when t he right to apply accrues inasmuch as Article 137 lays down that the period of limitation, within which an ’application’, other than the applications, which ar e provided under the Limitation Act, 1963, shall be three years from the time, w hen right to apply accrues. 6. In the present case, according to Mr. Das, the decision of the Commissio ner was passed as far back as on 13.04.2005 and the ’appeal’, in the present cas e, which ought to have been treated as an ’application’, having been preferred, admittedly, beyond the period of three years, the ’appeal’ ought to have been he ld to be time-barred. 7. In support of his submission that the word ’appeal’, appearing in Sectio n 22(8), shall be read as an ’application’, Mr. Das relies upon Snehadeep Struct ures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporat ion Limited, reported in (2010)3 SCC 34. Mr. Das further submits that an ’app eal’, when treated as an ’application’, must be preferred, in terms of Article 1 37, within three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues. In suppo rt of his submission, Mr. Das refers to, and relies upon, Kerala State Electrici ty Board, Trivandrum vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 634. 8. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. G. P. Bhowmik, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent company, cont ends that the word ’appeal’, which appears in Section 22(8), cannot be treated a s ’application’ inasmuch as Section 22(8) provides for an ’appeal’, as a remedy, against the decision, which the Commissioner takes with regard to the claim rai sed by a claimant. Since the appeal, in Section 22(8), has been provided as a re medy against the decision of the Commissioner, if a claimant is dissatisfied by the Commissioner’s decision, Mr. Bhowmik submits that apart from the fact that a n ’appeal’, as envisaged by Section 22(8), ought to be treated as ’appeal’, the legislature, having not provided for any period of limitation for such an ’appea l’, the ’appeal’, which Section 22(8) provides, cannot be saddled with any perio d of limitation and the ’appeal’ ought to be construed as an ’appeal’, which suf fers from no period of limitation. 9. Appearing as Amicus Curiae, Mr. D. Baruah, learned counsel, has elaborat ely taken this Court through various provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 19 08, and comparing the provisions contained therein with the provisions embodied in the Limitation Act, 1963, has pointed out that Article 181 of the Indian Limi tation Act, 1908, provided that applications, for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be made within a period of three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues; whereas the Limitation Act, 196 3, points out Mr. Baruah, stands divided into three clear divisions. The first d ivision, further points out Mr. Barua, prescribes different periods of limitatio n for different classes of suits, the second division prescribes different perio ds of limitation for different classes of appeals and the third division covers ’applications’. 10. Mr. Baruah also submits that when the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was in force, the Courts were of the view that Article 181, which prescribes a peri od of limitation of three years, relates to ’applications’, which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure and not the ’applications’, which may be made under statutes other than the Code of Civil Procedure; but, on coming into force of t he Limitation Act, 1963, the question arose as to whether, with the change in th e designing of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in the light of the language in whi ch Article 173 is couched, the ’applications’, which the Limitation Act, 1963, r efers to, must still be treated to be ’applications’ covered by the Code of Civi l Procedure, or, whether ’applications’, made under statutes, other than the Cod e of Civil Procedure, would also be covered by Article 137. This question, acco rding to Mr. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, was answered in Town Municipal Counc il, Athani, Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 873, by holding that even under the Limitation Act, 1963, an ’application’, whi ch Article 137 speaks of, has to be an ’application’ under the Code of Civil Pro cedure, made to a Court and not under any other statute. 11. The correctness of the decision, rendered in Town Municipal Council, Ath ani (supra), points out Mr. Baruah, was doubted by the Supreme Court, in Nityana nda M Joshi Vs. LIC of India, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 199. Eventually, however , submits Mr. Baruah, it was the Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), which M r. Das relies upon, wherein the question was answered by a three Judge Bench hol ding that Article 137 would apply not only to those ’applications’, which are fi led under the Code of Civil Procedure, but also to the ’applications’, made unde r any other statute, though such ’applications’ must be made to Courts and not t o any statutory body other than Courts. In the light of the decision, in Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), there is no escape from the conclusion, conced es Mr. Baruah, that Article 137 covers not merely ’applications’ made under the Code of Civil Procedure, but also under any other statute, though the ’applicati ons’, under a statute other than the Code of Civil Procedure too, must, accordin g to Mr. Baruah, be made to a Court and not to any Tribunal or any other statuto ry body other than the Court. 12. Referring to the provisions of sub-section (8) of Section 22, Mr. Baruah points out that as far as the case of Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Develo pment Corporation Limited (supra) is concerned, the Court found that Section 7 o f the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Under takings Act, 1993, provided for an ’appeal’ against, amongst others, award and s ince Section 7 would have become redundant if an ’application’, which is made un der Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking setting as ide of an award, is not treated as an ’appeal’, the Supreme Court concluded, in Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra), poin ts out Mr. Baruah, that an application, which Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides for, shall be treated as an ’appeal’ for the pu rpose of Section 7 so as to make Section 7 meaningful, or else, an award, though appeallable under Section 7, would not be covered by Section 7. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Baruah, there is no such provision, which can be used for the purpose of construing the word ’appeal’, which appear in Section 22(8), as an ’application’. 13. In order to sustain the distinction, which he has drawn between the mean ing of the expression ’application’, which appears under Article 137 of the Limi tation Act, 1963, as against the word ’application’, which appeared in Article 1 81 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Mr. Baruah has taken me through the case of The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, reporte d in (1976) 4 SCC 634, which Mr. Das relies upon. 14. Mr. Baruah further points out that a Division Bench of this Court, in Ab dul Gani Sarkar vs. Assam Board of Revenue and others, reported in AIR 1970 ASSA M & NAGALAND 82, has taken the view that since Section 151 of the Assam Land & R evenue Regulations, which provides for revision to the Board of Revenue, has not prescribed any period of limitation, exercise of revisional jurisdiction, under Section 151 of the Regulations, must be treated to be not restricted by any per iod of limitation and it is, thus, possible for the Board of Revenue to entertai n a revision at any point of time however belated the revision may be. 15. Notwithstanding the decision in Abdul Gani Sarkar (supra), which lays do wn that Section 151 of the Regulations having not prescribed any period of limit ation, the revisional jurisdiction must be treated to be exercisable at any poin t of time, Mr. Baruah, referring to Makbool Fatma (Smt) and others vs. Deputy Cu stodian General, Evacuee Property and another, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493, The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryan a, Chandigarh and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acqu isition Officer vs. Thakoredas, Major and others, reported in (1997) 11 SCC 412, submits that all these cases clearly take the view that even where no period of limitation is prescribed, an ’application’, which is made belatedly and suffers from latches, shall not be entertained. What will be the reasonable period, for the purpose of such an ’application’ in the setting of the facts of a given cas e, would, according to Mr. Baruah, depend on the facts of the given case. 16. It is also submitted by Mr. Baruah that the decisions in Makbool Fatma ( Smt) and others vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property and another, repo rted in (1996) 5 SCC 493, The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda vs. Director, Cons olidation of Holdings, Haryana, Chandigarh and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 7 63 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer vs. Thakoredas, Major and others, r eported in (1997) 11 SCC 412, show that when no period of limitation is prescrib ed for a revision or appeal, the Court cannot treat the appeal or revision as ti me-barred, but it can, certainly, refuse to grant any relief if the appeal or re vision, though not restricted by any period of limitation, is filed after a long lapse of time, particularly, if, in the meanwhile, rights of some other parties get matured. In such cases, according to Mr. Baruah, non-interference by the Co urt by refusing to grant relief is not due to the fact that the Court does not h ave the power to entertain such an ’appeal’ or revision, but the laches or negli gence, on the part of the person, who claims to be aggrieved, while preferring a ppeal or filing revision, disentitles him from raising his claim. 17. Mr. Baruah also points out that ’appeal’ has been provided, in the Act, as a remedy to an aggrieved person against the decision, which the Commissioner takes on a claim, which such a person makes. When legislature has made such a p rovision for ’appeal’ in favour of that person, who is dissatisfied with the dec ision of the Commissioner, such an ’appeal’, contend Mr. Baruah, cannot be inter preted as an ’application’, for, had the legislature intended to provide for an ’application’ and not an ’appeal’, nothing had really stopped the legislature fr om using the word ’application’ in place of ’appeal’. This apart, according to M r. Baruah, the word ’application’ would make the scheme of sub-section (8) of Se ction 22 otiose inasmuch as the legislature, in the light of the language used i n Section 22(8), intended to provide for an ’appeal’ to the District Judge again st the decision of the Commissioner. In such circumstances, submits Mr. Baruah, the Court cannot apply the word ’application’ as a substitute for the word ’appe al’. Support for his submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Baruah from the case of Union of India vs. Rajiv Kumar, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 516. 18. Repelling the submissions made by Mr. Baruah, Mr. Das, learned Senior Co unsel, points out that an ’application’, in order to fall within the provision o f Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must not only be provided by way of a statute, but that such an application must be provided to a Court and not to bo dies other than Court, such as, a tribunal. Mr. Das points out that the cases, namely, Makbool Fatma (Smt) and others vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Pro perty and another, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493, The Gram Panchayat, village Kan onda vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana, Chandigarh and others, re ported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer vs. Thakored as, Major and others, reported in (1997) 11 SCC 412, which Mr. Baruah has relied upon, shows that in all these cases, the appeal or revision was provided to a b ody, other than Court, and it is for this reason that it was held by the Supreme Court that such an appeal or revision, as the case may be, must be made within a reasonable period but what would the reasonable period, in a given case, would depend on the facts and the scheme of the statute. 19. Let me, first, determine as to what ’applications’ can fall within the e xpression ’application,’