1 S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.1923/2000 (Smt. Rajesh Kanwar & Others Versus Munna Ram & Others) Date of Order :: 26.11.2009 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHESH BHAGWATI Mr. Rajesh Kapoor, counsel for the appellants. Mr. Tripurari Sharma, counsel for the Insurance Company None present for the respondent no.4-State of Rajasthan BY THE COURT: REPORTABLE Challenge in this appeal is to the Judgment and award dated 12th March, 1999 rendered by MACT, Ajmer, whereby an amount of 1,00,000/- rupee ex-gratia payment has been directed to be reduced from the total amount of compensation of Rs. 1,48,000/- under the award and only an amount of Rs. 23,000/- has been decreed in his favour. 2. Skipping unnecessary details, the nub of the appellants' story is thus: “That the deceased Mahendra Singh was working as a volunteer in Home Guards. He had gone on election duty to Naguar with the polling party. It is alleged that on 22nd May, 1991 at about 11.45 PM, when the polling party was returning from Naguar to Ajmer by truck bearing registration no. RJD 8046, an unfortunate accident occurred near Marwar Bus stand. 2 It is further alleged that the driver of the truck was driving it rashly and negligently at a fast speed, as a result of which the driver on a turn of a road lost the control over it and the truck turned turtle, resulting into injuries to all the members of polling party including Mahendra Singh, who during treatment succumbed to his injuries in JLN Hospital, Ajmer.” 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the relevant material on record. 4. The learned counsel has assailed the impugned award primarily on two grounds. He canvassed that the deceased Mahendra Singh was of the age of 26 years at the time of death and as per the Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles, 1988, the learned Tribunal ought to have applied a multiplier of 18 as suggested for that age bracket, but instead of 18, the learned Tribunal applied only the multiplier of 15, which is contrary to law. 5. The second thrust of argument advanced by the learned counsel is that the learned Tribunal erred in deducting 1,00,000/- rupee ex-gratia amount from the total amount of 1,48,000, which is also contrary to the settled 3 proposition of law. He has cited one judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in I (1996) ACC 277 in support thereof. 6. None has appeared for the respondent no.4 – State of Rajasthan. 7. There being statutory force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Tripurari Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance company has not opposed the same. 8. Having ruminated over the submissions made at the bar and carefully scanned the relevant material including the impugned award, it is noticed that the deceased Mahendra Singh was temporarily employed in Home Guard as a volunteer popularly known as 'Home Guard Constable'. It is emerged from the record that Mahendra Singh was 26 years of age at the time of his death and was being paid Rs. 800/- per month salary. Albeit, no evidence with regard to the salary of Rs. 800/- has been adduced by the claimants, but it is reflected in the statements of AW-2 Rajendra Singh, who was also a Home Guard Constable and had gone on election duty along-with the deceased, that they were being paid Rs. 800/- salary per month. Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act, 4 1988 envisages a multiplier of 18 to be applied for a victim above the age of 25 but not exceeding 30 years. Scanning from this angle, it is found that the learned Tribunal erred in applying the multiplier of 15, whereas he ought to have applied the multiplier of 18, as suggested in the Schedule. Having applied the multiplier of 18, the amount of compensation is ascertained as under:- 600 X 12 X 18 = Rs. 1,29,600/- 9. Thus, the appellants are held entitled to claim Rs. 1,29,600/- from the respondents towards the loss of income. The amount of compensation awarded on various other heads by the Tribunal shall remain as they are. 10. Now, the most crucial question springing for consideration in the instant appeal is as to whether the ex-gratia amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- is required to be deducted from the amount of compensation or not? 11. In the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport corporation Versus B. Krishnaji Rao and another reported in I (1996) ACC 277, Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed thus: “7. The Tribunal erred in deducting Rs. 1,000/- paid as ex gratia by the RTC. I have held in C.M.A. No. 782 of 1990 dated 3.7.1993 and C.M.A. No. 1504 of 1998 just now pronounced that 5 tortfeasor cannot claim benefit of deduction of the amount paid voluntarily by either itself or by somebody. So, the respondents are entitled to Rs. 93,000/- in addition to Rs. 1,000/- already received as ex gratia, together with interest at 12 per cent per annum as already granted by the Tribunal.” 12. Adverting to the facts of the instant case and the impugned award, it is found that on account of death of Mahendra Singh during election duty, an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was sanctioned by the District Election Officer (Collector), Ajmer vide his order No. F 3 (60) DEO/91/186 dated 11.7.1991. This amount has been ordered to be deducted from the total amount of compensation by the learned Tribunal. The Andhra Pradesh High court has categorically observed that tort-feasor cannot claim benefit of deduction of the amount paid voluntarily by either itself or by somebody. It is germane to record that the scheme of the M.V. Act in relation to the payment of compensation to the claimant is a beneficial legislation. The intention of the legislature is made more clear by change of language from what was in Fatal Accidents, 1855 and what is brought under Section 110-B of the 1939 Act. This is also visible through the provisions of Section 168 (1) under the Motor 6 Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 92-A of 1939 Act, which fixes the liability on the owner of the vehicle even on no fault. It provides where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident in spite of no fault of the owner of the vehicle, an amount of compensation fixed therein is payable to claimant by such owner of the vehicle. Section 92-B ensures that the claim for compensation under Section 92-A is in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect whereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. This clearly indicates the intention of the legislature, which is conferring larger benefit to the claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled. I would like to impress upon that even if there is a pronouncement otherwise in this regard, the judgment which sub-serves the object of the legislation, viz. benefit to the subject, should be ascertained. I have no hesitation to observe that the ex- gratia payment can never become a part of amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal in any accident claim case. 13. The compensation payable under the 7 Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and no other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness including even death by accident through train or flight, not involving motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The ex-gratia payment of 1,00,000/- rupee by the District Election Officer has been sanctioned to the deceased Mahendra Singh on account of the fact that he died during discharging election duty. Had he not been on election duty and died in a motor vehicle accident, the Election Commission would not have sanctioned any ex-gratia payment. Thus, the amount receivable as compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act on account of the death during accident is one thing, whereas the ex-gratia payment to the claimants of the deceased, who died during elections is altogether a distinct thing. In such a situation, how can the amount of ex-gratia payment be permitted to be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory, which has no nexus with the ex-gratia payment. To my view, the 8 learned Tribunal has erred in deducting ex- gratia amount from the total amount of compensation passed under the provisions of M.V. Act, 1988. The impugned award suffers from legal infirmity, which cannot be sustained to this extent. 14. Another equally crucial question emerging for consideration is as to who would be liable to pay the amount of compensation? 15. It is germane to record when a valid requisition is there for a vehicle and the user of the vehicle has been changed from the real owner to the State Govt., in the event of an accident that takes by the requisitional vehicle, the claim should be against the Govt. alone. The liability of the vehicle that had been requisitioned by the Govt. stands on a different footing than the vehicle that has been hired to a third party for a limited purpose, for marriage function or carrying for goods etc. Thus, the State Govt. alone is liable to pay the compensation amount, if any, during the period of requisition as held by Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Versus S. Ramulamma reported in 1989 ACJ 596 at page 598. 16. For the reasons stated above, the 9 appeal is partly allowed. The order of deducting 1,00,000/- rupee ex-gratia payment from the total amount of compensation under the award is set-aside. On the contrary, the appellants are entitled to claim Rs. 1,69,600/- from the respondent no.4 – State of Rajasthan as the vehicle in question was requisitioned by the District Election Officer (Collector), Ajmer and in the possession of the Government alone. The appellant-claimant shall also be entitled to claim interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till the amount of compensation under the award is actually realized. The respondent no.4 is directed to make the payment of the amount of compensation to the appellants-claimants within a period of 45 days positively. 17. The impugned award stands modified, as indicated here-in-above. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. (MAHESH BHAGWATI), J. DK/-