HIGH coma’r {3F CH}IA1TIS&ARH AT mmwwa CR.M.?. aim. 125gg003 PEfnTmNER Baljsei Singh ArOIa, Sio. Tn’lok Sirwh Arcra, agad; abcut'35 yaars, Proprietor Janta Boot House, Main Road, Kawardha, Distt. Kabirdham, rfo. Jailta Boot House, Main Road, Kawardha, DiStt Kabirdham (CG) ‘ . VersuS RESPQNDENTS l, State of Chhattisgarh, Through District Magisvato Dismcf Kahirdham (CG) 2. Mahendra Singh Kharxuja S,J o. Late Suxjit Singh Khamlja, AgSC‘L about 42 vears: rio. Main Road, Kawaidha; Disttl Kabirdham (coy 3. Deepak'Kalal, Sic. Vinayak Kalel, Managing Director, Mj s. Symphony Farm 311d Forost Pvt. Limiied, Vatsalva Chamber, F—QO, '2mi floor, '31 Sneha Nagar, Main % Road, Imlore (MP) ?ETIT§$N UNDER SECTIQE ¢$2 6F THE CREE. §S$< :Eon’ble Mr. T.PuShaxma,\-J.) Present: Shri Manish Shama, commol for the applicant. Shri Rakesh Jha, Dy, Govt. Advocate for the State/ Non—apph'cajnt No, 1. ORDER (PasaM on 13th March 2008) This is a petition for quashing the, oyder dated 26.9.20Q7 in Cr, Case No, 752/ 2G0? wheroby the leamed Chief Jndicial Magistrate had issued process againsi the petitioner for prosecution of the o£fence Vpu‘aishabie uader sectioo 420,421 aild 418 of the IPC. L \ \ 2. Hearoi counsel for the pames. Order impugned and copy of the documents filed on behaif‘ of the petitioner perused. 1 2 5: It iS axgucd on bghalf of Th€ petitioner mat the dispute is of civil Eqture. No offvsnca is said to llave b€€n committed by tha applicants. it is aiso submittad on bshalf of the pgtitionssr that he is not debarred from sa€knxg Xphef mdér Sacuon 48’? of T116 Codu of Cmmmal Pmcedure 973 { m $1101“: ‘Coma ; on the Ground thw Them is qlturmative remedy umlex Sub Secnon 2 o; Secuon 24-5 of the Code. . 4. Reliance is placed on behalf of the petifioner 1'11 Ashak Cfaatumedi W 9$her$ Vsu Shim: £.€§aan€ham ami Amr‘her; {1998; ? SCC 598 Whel em 1t 1s held thai “merei‘g; hecause w: mowed has a might to plead at the frame of *ammg sf «mamas that ihere w m; suffiment mienai for sawia frmng of charges as provided éga Sswon 34$ of é§aé €oée, he is not egebwmei from @prmzehéag the Cow‘t army: at as; ewliw‘ poise of time when the Magiswate takes eogm’zxmce of the offeg’we and summons th acmeei to “appear to centend wuw the wary issuaywe of the order of taking eogm’zance £3 imaaii§ on the grauml shat :w ejfeace can be said to have been We out an the ailega§¢ms We in. €ke complainé petition. Powerv underSection 482 has $0 be exercbeci sparingiy wad irg the interest of jmoe. ” (x o. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State] respondent No. 1 submits that at the stage of issuance of process, Court is required to see that whether material auailable on record is prima faicie suiiicierlt for issuance of process against the accusediappiicant. At the stage of issuance of process, no meticulous scrutiny of evidence is required. 6. t is also submitted on behaif of the respondent that the trial Court has only issued process and the petitioners are having alternate remedy to agitate their claim before the trial Court under Sub Section 2 of ‘ e \ Secfioa 245 of the Code.- Th€ have not exhausted ths alt€mata remady avai1able to than. 7. Where there is altemative remedy available, the Court should not interfere in the exercise of inherent power under Section 4-82 of the Cr.‘P.C. 8. Ae held by the Apex court‘in Hamida Vs. Rashid @Rasheed am? Gthers, 2008 1 $CC 474, It is well established principle that inherent power confeered 0x1 the High Courts under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has . to be exercised sparintly with circumspection and in rare cases and that I too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Liinave V. State of Maharastra (SCC P. 555 para 8); and it was held as under: The fotlowing principlee may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power ofthe High Court: (i; that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Cede for the redrees of the grievance of the aggrieved Party; (2) that it: shauid be exercised veyy sparingay to prevgent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to oecure the ends ofjustioe; {3) that it shomd not be exercised as against the express bar of iaw engra‘der m any other provision of the code. 9. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner had already approached the invisional Court against the impugned order. lO. In the instant case, the petitioner has preferred revision against the same order before the Sessions Judge, Kabeer Dhani in Cr. Rev. No. 57] 2007 after dismissal of revision, the petition under Section 482 of the 6F?” Code has been f11€d. The petitioners have not flled any petition before the triél‘Court under Sub section 2 ‘of Section 245 of the Code for their diécharge which is available to the petitioner untier the provisionS of the CnPC. s lli 3 In case of Raia Thi Vs. Shri Ganeshan, 1999(6) S€C 325, it i3 held by'the Apex Court that inherent power uncler Section 482 of the Code are not substitute for second revision. 12. Under the provisions of Section 482 of the Code, Apex Court has held in case of Hamida (Supra) that powers should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare eases and that too to correct patent iilegah‘ties or when some miscarriage of justice is done, when there was an effective alternative remedy available, practice of High Courts in entertaining petitions under Section 482 of the Code is deprecated. 13. On careful examination speciaily in the light of the decision in the case of Hamida (Supra) and after dismissal of revision the second petition against the same order, l am of die opinion that the petitioner is having alternative remedy to agitate the matter before appropriate forum and the second petition for quaslimeiit of the proceedings and recalling of the process after rejection of the revision petition is not maintainahle. Consequentiy, it is dismissed at the motion stage itself. \ . \\ / sw \‘x