THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.830 OF 2011 DATED AUGUST, 2011 BETWEEN G.Haribabu and another. …Petitioners And Mirza Mahmood Baigh …Respondent THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.830 OF 2011 ORDER: The learned Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy, by order dated 06.05.2010 dismissed I.A.No.286 of 2010 in O.S.No.43 of 2010 filed for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants in the suit from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property admeasuring Ac.25.04 guntas in Survey Nos.138, 142/A and 147 of Nandigama Village, Patancheru Mandal, Medak District. In appeal, the learned Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, reversed the same by order dated 08.09.2010 in C.M.A.No.18 of 2010 and granted a temporary injunction. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants in the suit are before this Court by way of this Civil Revision Petition. Parties are referred to as arrayed before the trial Court. It was the case of the plaintiff that the suit schedule property was part of the larger extent of Ac.263.19 guntas owned by Smt.Noorunissa Begum, wife of Mirza Jafar Ali Khan. After her death, her four sons and four daughters are said to have succeeded to her properties. One of the daughters, Smt.Vazeera Begum, filed O.S.No.84 of 1967 for partition and separate possession of her share in her mother’s properties before the VI Additional Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Preliminary decree dated 15.12.1969 was passed by the trial Court and basing thereupon, the legal heirs of one of the sons, Mirza Hussain Ali Khan, are said to have filed I.A.No.49 of 2007 in O.S.No.84 of 1967 for passing of a final decree in their favour. The final decree was passed on 05.11.2007 by the V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, (on transfer) allotting Ac.42.26 guntas in Survey Nos.137, 138, 142/A and 147 of Nandigama Village to the sons of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan. The said final decree was registered as document No.20494/2007. The plaintiff claimed that the legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan executed in his favour a registered General Power of Attorney- cum-Agreement of Sale under document No.20555/2007 dated 07.11.2007. Pursuant thereto, a registered sale deed was executed in his favour under document No.20976/2007 dated 16.11.2007. He therefore claimed to have become the absolute owner of the entire extent of Ac.42.26 guntas which fell to the share of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan under the final decree. Mutation was also carried out in the revenue records in his name in respect of the entire extent of Ac.42.26 guntas of land. He further stated that upon transfer of the final decree from the Court of V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, to the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy, in E.P.No.34 of 2008 in O.S.No.84 of 1967 filed by the legal representatives of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan, delivery of possession to the extent of Ac.25.04 guntas, being Ac.13.15 guntas in Survey No.138, Ac.7.29 guntas in Survey No.147 and Ac.4.00 guntas in Survey No.142/A of Nandigama Village, was effected under panchanama. The balance extent was not delivered on the ground that structures were existing in the said land. He further claimed that a pattadar pass book and title deed were also issued in his favour on the basis of this delivery warrant. His complaint in the suit was that the defendants, without having any right over the suit land, tried to interfere with his peaceful possession on 13.02.2010 and 15.02.2010 which was successfully resisted by him. However, as they threatened to dispossess him, he sought a perpetual injunction against them and during the pendency of the suit, a temporary injunction to safeguard his possession in the meanwhile. The first defendant opposed the temporary injunction application contending that as per the record in E.P.No.34 of 2008, the delivery of possession was effected in favour of the legal heirs of Mirza Hussain Ali Khan only on 06.02.2008 and therefore, the recital in the registered sale deed dated 16.11.2007, executed by eight out of the nine legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan in favour of the plaintiff, to the effect that possession had been delivered thereunder was false. He further stated that late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan had sold the land which fell to his share under the final decree in favour of Munoth Charitable Trust under a registered sale deed bearing document No.2951/1981 and the vendors of the plaintiff were also signatories to this document. According to him, the Trust sold the said property in favour of third parties. It was his further case that some portion of the land in Survey Nos.147 and 142 of Nandigama Village was in the possession of protected tenants who had been granted ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. These tenants executed documents whereunder the land was developed through a layout sanctioned by the Gram Panchayat, Nandigama, and plots bearing Nos.633 to 642, admeasuring about 2000 square yards, situated in Survey No.147 are said to have exchanged hands under registered documents of sale and were eventually purchased by his son under a registered sale deed dated 31.03.2005 bearing document No.3769/2005. He further stated that his son had also paid land use conversion charges to the tune of Rs.44,100/- to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Sangareddy, in response to his notice dated 22.02.2010. The second defendant in the suit filed a counter opposing the application contending that he did not have any idea about the location of the suit schedule property and denied any interference on his part with the possession of the plaintiff as alleged. The plaintiff adduced documentary evidence in the form of Exs.P.1 to P.15 while the defendants marked Exs.R.1 to R.11. The trial Court, having considered the pleadings and the material placed on record, held that the plaintiff failed to show his exclusive possession over the suit schedule property of Ac.25.04 guntas and denied him the equitable relief of temporary injunction pending the suit. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff approached the appellate Court in C.M.A.No.18 of 2010 and by order dated 08.09.2010, the appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff had a better title than the defendants and was able to establish his prima facie title and possession, balance of convenience and that grant of injunction in his favour was justified. It accordingly reversed the order of the trial Court and granted a temporary injunction as prayed for. Heard Smt.S.Nanda, learned counsel for the petitioners/ defendants and Sri N.Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. Though both the learned counsel pressed into service a catena of decisions in support of their rival contentions, this Court finds it unnecessary to delve into precedential law at length. Grant of a temporary injunction essentially turns upon the facts of the individual case examined in the backdrop of established legal principles. Grant of a temporary injunction is governed by three basic principles – (i) the plaintiff has to make out a prima facie case; (ii) he has to establish that the balance of convenience is in his favour, i.e, it would cause greater inconvenience to him if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience caused to the defendant by the grant thereof; and (iii) demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted [ZENIT MATAPLAST PRIVATE LIMITED v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA[1]; KISHORSINH RATANSINH JADEJA v. MARUTI CORP.[2]; KASHI MATH SAMSTHAN v. SRIMAD SUDHINDRA THIRTHA SWAMY[3] and YASHODA SUPER SPECIALITY HOSPITALS, HYDERABAD v. YASHODA MEDICARE AND RESEARCH CENTRE (P) LTD., NEW DELHI[4]]. Further, as pointed out in KASHI MATH SAMSTHAN3, when a party fails to prove prima facie case, the question of considering balance of convenience or irreparable loss and injury to such party would not arise and it would not be open to the Court to grant an injunction in his favour in such a case even if he makes out balance of convenience in his favour and that he would suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction is granted. It was thus for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case that he was in possession of the suit property as on the date of the suit for seeking a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his peaceful possession. For this purpose, the Court could not look into the weaknesses in the case of the defendants and give the benefit thereof to the plaintiff. Irrespective of the merits in the case of the defendants, it was for the plaintiff to establish his prima facie case that he was in possession of the suit property as on the date of institution of the suit. The Court would be entitled to look into the case of the defendants only for the limited purpose of examining whether the plaintiff had established his prima facie case. It is not a comparison of which side has a better case that would be determinative of the exercise of discretion by the Court whether or not to grant the equitable relief of temporary injunction [SHAIK AMEER JOHNI v. SHAIK JOHN AHMED[5]]. It is by applying these legally settled norms that the Courts below had to evaluate the case and decide as to whether exercise of discretion by grant of a temporary injunction was warranted. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in DALPAT KUMAR v. PRAHLAD SINGH[6], the phrases ‘prima facie case’, ‘balance of convenience’ and ‘irreparable loss’ are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by men’s ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The examination of facts would therefore be crucial to determine in the first instance whether the plaintiff established his prima facie case and it is only then the question would arise as to whether balance of convenience is in his favour and whether he would suffer irreparable loss and injury if an injunction is refused to him. It is the plaintiff’s case that he became the owner of the suit schedule property under the registered sale dated 16.11.2007. While so his vendors, being eight out of the nine legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan, filed E.P.No.34 of 2008 for delivery of the extent of Ac.42.26 guntas which fell to their share under the final decree. Admittedly, it was only on 06.02.2008 that the possession was delivered through Court under panchanama to the legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan. Therefore, the recital in the sale deed dated 16.11.2007 to the effect that possession was delivered to the plaintiff thereunder was factually incorrect. As rightly pointed out by the trial Court, there is no material to show that there was actual delivery of possession thereafter by the legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan in favour of the plaintiff. Though normally law presumes that possession would go with title, this presumption is rebuttable. In the present case, in the light of the plurality of registered sale deeds and documents covering the suit schedule property, such a presumption cannot be applied. There must necessarily be clear and incontrovertible proof of the plaintiff’s possession before the Court can act upon the same. Further, the absence of one out of the nine legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan in the transactions in favour of the plaintiff compounds the matter. The delivery of possession of the share that fell to this legal heir to the plaintiff would necessarily have to be proved before it can be assumed that the plaintiff came into possession of the entire extent that fell to the share of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan under the final decree, excluding the land covered by structures. In such circumstances, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to show his exclusive possession over the suit schedule property. Relevant to note, none of the documents filed by the plaintiff reflected his actual possession over the suit schedule property. Even the pattadar pass book and title deed issued in his favour under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 were admittedly issued on the basis of the delivery warrant in E.P.No.34 of 2008, whereunder delivery was effected not in favour of the plaintiff but to the legal heirs of late Mirza Hussain Ali Khan. In effect, there was no proof whatsoever of the plaintiff’s possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of institution of the suit. Surprisingly, the appellate Court embarked upon an examination of title in respect of the suit schedule property instead of looking into the aspect of possession, which was the sine qua non for considering the application for grant of a temporary injunction. Further, the appellate Court tilted in favour of the plaintiff upon a comparison as to which party had better title. Such an exercise was not warranted while dealing with an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 Code of Civil Procedure. The bald assertion of the appellate Court that the plaintiff had a better title than the defendants and was able to establish his prima facie title and possession, balance of convenience and that grant of injunction in his favour is justified, is unsupported by discussion on merits. The appellate Court cryptically observed that the documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff clinchingly proved that he had prima facie title over the suit schedule property and that his seeking an injunction was justified. As stated supra, the issue of title did not arise at this stage for deciding the application for grant of a temporary injunction. Viewed thus, the approach adopted by the appellate Court was opposed to the settled legal tenets applicable to the case. The appellate Court therefore erred in reversing the cogent and well reasoned order of the trial Court dismissing the I.A. and refusing the plaintiff a temporary injunction pending the suit. As the appellate Court directed the trial Court to dispose of the main suit within six months and as the valuable property rights of the parties are in issue, it would be appropriate that the trial Court dispose of the suit expeditiously and preferably, within six (6) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed setting aside the order and decree dated 08.09.2010 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, in C.M.A.No.18 of 2010 and restoring the order and decree dated 06.05.2010 passed by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy, in I.A.No.286 of 2010 in O.S.No.43 of 2010. Status quo orders granted by this Court on 25.03.2011 shall stand vacated. CRPMP No.1198 of 2011 shall stand dismissed in consequence. No order as to costs. ____________________ SANJAY KUMAR, J. _______ AUGUST, 2011 VGSR [1] (2009) 10 SCC 388 [2] 2009 (7) SCJ 599 [3] AIR 2010 SC 296 [4] 2011 (1) ALD 79 [5] 1991 (II) ALT 449 [6] (1992) 1 SCC 719