IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 07/08/2003 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.B.SUBHASHAN REDDY, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESAN W.P.No.23854 of 2001 and W.P.Nos. 23880, 23881, 24238, 24239, 24863, 24865, 24875, 24901 to 24909, 24925 to 24935, 24968 to 24971, 24973 to 24977, 25000 to 2 5010, 25012 to 25027, 25045 to 25055, 25060 to 25068, 25070 to 25079, 25091 to 25098, 25102 to 25104, 25106, 25107, 25113 to 25117, 25119 to 25130, 25143 to 25147, 25149 to 25153, 25157 to 25163, 25165 to 25177, 25187 to 25189, 25191 to 25205, 25243 to 25246, 25386 to 25390, 25420 to 25425, 25427 to 25433, 25454, 25456, 25469, 25470, 25489 to 25491, 25494 to 25496, 25519 to 25521, 25529 to 25534, 25536, 25545 to 25561, 25565, 25566, 25594 to 25599, 25604 to 25608, 25611 to 25614 , 25619 to 25621, 25624 to 25628, 25632 to 25634, 25646 to 25704, 257 11, 25712, 25719 to 25730, 25732, 25734 to 25754, 25756, 25757, 25760 to 25773, 25775 to 25782, 25785, 25786, 26479 to 26490 of 2001, 29, 91 to 94, 106, 107, 138 to 150, 184, 204 to 206, 229 to 233, 243 to 2 47, 251 to 255, 260 to 264, 288 to 293, 498 to 502, 528 to 537, 547 to 562, 600 to 609, 663 to 670, 695 to 699, 727 to 742, 770, 804 to 80 9, 814, 815, 817 to 826, 829 to 833, 839 to 842, 857, 879, 886 to 892 , 923, 932 to 936, 1028 to 1034, 1045, 1050 to 1058, 1065 to 1069, 11 04, 1141, 1149 to 1154, 1163 to 1169, 1177 to 1193, 1210 to 1214, 1249 to 1254, 1266, 1275 to 1285, 1295 to 1297, 1299 to 1304, 1306 to 1310, 1312, 1345, 1346, 1381 to 1390, 1393 to 1403, 1409 to 1412, 1432 to 1448, 1454 to 1457, 1468 to 1473, 1477, 1484, 1485, 1487 to 1489, 1538 to 1544, 1568 to 1571, 1577, 1599 to 1602, 1607 to 1615, 1625 to 1628, 1633 to 1638, 1657, 1658, 1665, 1668 to 1678, 1700, 1713 to 17 17, 1788, 1893 to 1895, 1917 to 1920, 2098, 2100, 2148, 2168, 2207, 2491, 2544 to 2546, 2579 to 2583, 2698 to 2701, 2730 to 2735, 2739, 2746 to 2749, 2802, 2836, 2865, 2939 to 2943, 3004, 3005 to 3007, 3096 to 3100, 3103 to 3108, 3110, 3115 to 3121, 3137, 3216 to 3218, 3228, 3229, 3255, 3256, 3442, 3443, 3474, 3499, 3500, 3686, 3691, 3742, 3743, 3781 to 3785, 4085, 4249, 4285, 4322 to 4327, 4338, 4354, 4374, 4382 to 4385, 4408, 4409, 4413, 4416, 4510, 4665 to 4667, 4693 to 4695, 4723 to 4725, 4753, 4835, 5002, 5028, 5086 to 5088, 5257 to 5260, 52 68 to 5273, 5459, 5514 to 5517, 5567, 5573 to 5579, 5599 to 5601, 5625, 5686 to 5690, 5736 to 5741, 5772 to 5775, 5785, 5872, 5893, 5894, 6047 to 6050, 6242, 6243, 6247, 6293 to 6296, 6576 to 6580, 6667 to 6670, 6724, 6745, 6867 to 6869, 6885, 6931, 6999, 7020, 7148 to 7152, 7247, 7416, 7417, 7657, 7658, 7829, 7833, 7974, 7978 to 7983, 8253, 8254, 8471, 9336, 9685, 19149 to 19153, 21073, 22495, 22876, 22877, 22 920, 23321, 25412, 29357, 31568, 31842, 32431, 32925, 33341, 34509, 34510, 36827 to 36831 of 2002 W.P.No.23854 of 2001: R.Srinivasan .. Petitioner -Vs- 1. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by Secretary Home Department Fort St. George Chennai-9 2. Regional Transport Authority Villupuram District Villupuram .. Respondents Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issue of a Writ of Declaration declaring the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) (Cancellation of Variation of conditions of Permit) Act, 1996 is unconstitutional, ultra vires and void and for a consequential direction to the second respondent to permit the petitioner to operate his stage carriage service bearing Regn.No.TN-57-Z-2289 on the varied route Melpattampakkam to Villupuram (via) Valavanur and Kolianoor Cross Road as per the order of the second respondent dated 9.4.96 made in R.No.16703/A2/95. !For Petitioners:: Mr.K.Alagirisamy, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Palani, Mr.M.Krishnappan, Mr.C.R.Krishnamoorthy, Mrs.Radha Gopalan, Mr.R.S.Ramanujam, Mr.P.Vedavalle, Mr.T.Padmanabhan, Mr.S.Govindraman, Mr.R.Natesan, Mr.S.C.Palanisamy, Mr.V.Sanjeevi, Mr.V.A.Sadagopan, Mr.K.Hariharan, Mr.S.Parthasarathy, Mr.N.Gopalakrishnan, Mr.K.M.Venugopal and Mr.S.Venugopal ^For Respondents :: Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr.V.Raghupathi Government Pleader :COMMON ORDER D.MURUGESAN, J. In all these writ petitions, the respective petitioners have prayed for writ of declaration declaring the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles ( Special Provisions) (Cancellation of Variation of Conditions of Permit) Act, 1996, (Act 19 of 1996) (hereinafter referred to as the "Impugned Act") is unconstitutional, ultra vires and void and have consequently prayed for directions to the respective Regional Transport Authorities to permit the petitioners to operate their stage carriage services on the respective routes based on variations granted prior to the " Impugned Act". 2. In order to appreciate the challenge, certain facts leading to the impugned enactment must necessarily be stated. After the introduction of Chapter IV-A in the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, the State Government framed various Schemes notifying different routes during the year 1976. The Scheme enabled operators mentioned in Schedule II alone to operate apart from State Transport Undertakings. Pursuant to the publication of the draft Scheme, all other private stage carriage operators were excluded from operating any part of the notified routes. Since there was bifurcation of various routes, the State Transport Authorities issued new permits and also renewed the existing permits for those routes. Such routes also traversed part of the notified routes. New permits and renewal of the existing permits were granted on the impression that exclusion of private operators under the Scheme was partial only. The grant of new permits and the renewal of existing permits were challenged by the State Transport Undertaking on the ground that after the publication of the draft Scheme, all private stage carriage operators were excluded from operating even on any part of the notified route. The said challenge was upheld and it was declared that such permits which overlapped even a portion of the notified route were invalid. One of the operators by name M.A.Egappan who got permit to operate on a non notified route, while obtaining the renewal of permit got permission to ply on a route part of which overlapped the notified route, approached this Court, but was unsuccessful. The matter was taken to the Apex Court and the Apex Court in the judgment in "PANDIYAN ROADWAYS CORPORATION LTD. v. M.A.EGAPPAN 1987 (2) SCC 47" held that no person other than those mentioned in Annexure II to the draft Scheme can operate the stage carriage service on the entire notified route or any part thereof apart from the State Transport Undertaking. The Apex Court following the decision of a Constitution Bench in "ADARSH TRAVELS BUS SERVICE v. STATE OF U.P. (1985 (4) SCC 557)" further declared that the permits granted to stage carriage operators, which overlapped any part of the notified route were invalid. In view of the said judgment, approximately more than 4000 permits of private operators were rendered invalid. 3. The State Government was approached by such of those private operators with a grievance that even small operators having less than five permits were necessarily to take the vehicles off the road which caused hardship. The State Government considering the above plea and also taking note of the hardship and inconvenience caused to the travelling public and also the difficulty by the State or the Undertaking to replace the vehicles as it involved heavy expenditure, issued the Government Order No.2222 of 1997 sometime during July 1997 entitling the State Transport Authorities to renew t he permits of such operators and also requested the Transport Undertaking not to oppose such renewal of permits. In fact a Bill was introduced in L.A.Bill No.42 of 1987 with an object to grant permits to small operators to ply their stage carriage on any portion of the area or the route covered by the draft Scheme or the approved Schemes. Though the said Bill was assented by the President, it was not published and hence it never came into force. 4. While the matter stood at that stage, the Motor Vehicles Act, 193 9, was repealed and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 59 of 1988) was enacted and the same came into force from 1.7.89. The said Act permitted pending Schemes to be published and approved within the year of expiry of which it was to lapse. Therefore the Schemes were to be approved on or before 30.6.90. In view of the Act 59 of 1988 requiring the approval of the Schemes under the Act as well the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pandiyan Roadways case, the private operators were disabled from plying on the notified route and as a necessary corollary, the Government Order No.2222 of 1987 had to be withdrawn. The State Government, therefore, issued G.O.Ms.No.1794 during August 19 90 withdrawing the earlier order no.2222 of 1987. Consequently, L.A.Bill No.42 of 1987 was repealed by an ordinance issued on 8.10.90. In view of the above developments, the small operators were once again placed with difficulty in operating their vehicles and consequently were forced to take the vehicles off the road. Batch of writ petitions were filed seeking for a direction to the State Government to publish L.A.Bill No.42 of 1987 and also challenging the validity of the Government Order issued on 8.10.90 withdrawing the earlier Government Order of 1987. All these writ petitions were dismissed by this Court. Thereafter, the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 1991 was passed repealing L.A.Bill No.42 of 1987. The aggrieved operators numbering approximately 4000 who were granted permits overlapping notified routes after 1976 approached the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for different reliefs. At that juncture, the State Government enacted the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992 (Act No.41 of 1992) validating all permits issued renewal variations granted between 4.6.76 and 30.6.9 0. By the said enactment, permits issued after 30.6.90 but before 31 .7.92 i.e., the date of publication of notification, were not validated and two classes of small operators were created in view of cutoff date. The classification was challenged by those operators who had been issued permits after 30.6.90 on the ground that cut-off date was arbitrary and there could not be any classification between classes of operators. The said contention was repelled by the High Court on the ground that the cut-off date namely 30.6.90 was rational as the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was repealed and the new Act came into force from 1.7.89 with a provision that the Schemes pending on the date when the Act came into force would be valid only for a period of one year namely 30.6.90 unless they were approved and published by the State Government. The said Act 41 of 1992 ultimately came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the judgment in "TMT.T.P.K. THILAGAVATHI v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, PERIYAR DISTRICT, ERODE AND OTHERS (1995 (1) SCC 456)" and the Apex Court held that no permit could have been granted after 30.6.90 and the orders rejecting the request of the operators for new permits after 30.6.90 by the State Transport Authorities were sustained. 5. All the writ petitioners are stage carriage operators. Though they applied for variation of conditions of permits in terms of sub section (2) of section 6 of the Act 41 of 1992, those applications were not considered since the Government did not frame rules. The Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Rules, 1995, were framed in G.O.Ms.No.718 Home (Transport III) Department dated 18.5.95. An amendment was also made to the said Rules by notification issued in G.O. Ms.No.1935 Home (Transport III) Department dated 29.12.95 adding an explanation to Rule 4. By such amendment, certain enumerated variations were included in the explanation. A further amendment to the first proviso of sub rule (4) of Rule 4 was made in G.O.Ms.No.26 Home ( Transport III) Department dated 6.1.96 by restricting the distance of variation upto 24 kms., only in respect of items (c) and (e) of the proviso to sub rule (4) of Rule 4. By the said Rules, Section 6(2) of the Act 41 of 1992 relating to variation of conditions of permits for stage carriage by enabling the permit holder to operate on the entire route or any portion of the route covered by such draft Scheme was given effect to. Rule 4 of the said Rules empowered the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority to consider the application for grant of variation subject to the condition that the distance covered by such variation shall not exceed 24 kms. Pursuant to the said rules, the requests of each of the petitioners for variations were considered and such variations were granted between 24.1.96 and 24.5.96 to as many as 2000 permit holders. The variations were granted on the ground that the applications for variations cannot be treated as grant of new permits though the procedures adopted for grant of new permits are being adopted for grant of consideration of applications for variations also in the public interest. Pursuant to the variations granted, the petitioners commenced their operation. By the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) (Cancellation of Variation of Conditions of Permit) Act, 1996, the variations granted to the petitioners were legislatively cancelled. By individual proceedings of the respective Transport Authorities, the petitioners were duly informed to produce the permits of stage carriage services for making cancellation of various entries. Hence, these writ petitions have been filed. 6. The Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) (Cancellation of Variation of Conditions of Permit) Act, 1996, is challenged mainly on the ground that it lacks legislative competency, excessive legislation inasmuch as the legislature cannot overrule, set aside, cancel or declare void the judgment of competent Court or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authorities and the legislature have only the power to remove the basis of the judgment or order of the Court or Tribunal, but cannot render those judgment or order invalid. 7. We have heard in detail the arguments of Mr.K.Alagirisamy, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Palani and Mr.M.Krishnappan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.K.Muthukumaraswamy, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr.V.Raghupathi, learned Government Pleader for the respondents. All other learned counsel appearing for the petitioners adopted the arguments of Mr.K.Alagirisamy, learned Senior Counsel. 8. Insofar as the arguments as to the legislative competency, it is to be seen that the power of the State to enact the "Impugned Act" is traceable to Entry 35 of List III of Schedule VII. Article 245 of the Constitution of India relates to the power of the Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and the legislature of a State to make laws for the whole or any part of the State. Article 246 of the Constitution of India relates to the distribution of legislative powers as between the Union and the State Legislatures with reference to List I, List II and List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. The union Parliament has full and exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters in List I apart from the power to legislate with respect to the matters in List III. The State Legislature has exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters in List II and has concurrent power with respect to matters included in List III. Entry 35 of List III relates to the power of both the Parliament and the State Legislature to enact laws in respect of mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. No doubt a law passed without legislative competence is nullity ab initio. It is also well settled that the rule of law constitutes the core of our Constitution and it is the essence of the rule of law that the exercise of power of the State, whether it be the legislature or the executive or any other authority, should be within the constitutional limitations. Based on the above principles, the challenge to the "Impugned Act" as to the legislative competency of the State Legislature should be tested. As a follow up of the judgment of the Apex Court in Pandiyan Roadways Corporation's case, large number of permits of private operators amounting to approximately 4000 in number were rendered invalid. Though the Government made an attempt to bring in a legislation by introducing L.A.Bill No.42 of 1987 with an object to grant permits to small operators to ply their stage carriage on any portion of the area or route covered by the draft Schemes or the approved Schemes, the said bill was not published though it was assented by the President. In the meantime, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 59 of 1988) came into force and the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 1991 was passed repealing L.A.Bill No.42 of 1987. While the repealing Act was challenged by the operators who were granted permits overlapping the notified routes through the Federation of Operators before the Apex Court, the State Legislature enacted the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992 (Act 41 of 1992). Section 6 of the said Act relating to renewal or variation of permits came into force from 1.7.90. The said section enabled the Transport Authorities to vary the condition of permits even on routes covered by the approved Scheme. By virtue of Section 10 of the Act, all permits, renewal or transfer of such permits or any variation, modification, extension or curtailment of the route or routes specified in a stage carriage permit during the period commencing on 4.6.76 and ending with the date of publication of the Act were validated. The Apex Court in Thilagavathi's case by upholding the provisions of the Act held that no person is entitled to claim permit after 30.6.90 as the cut-off date fixed in the enactment is reasonable and justifiable, as the Act came into force on 1.7.90 and all those permits issued prior to the said enactment were validated. Thus the power of the State Legislature to enact the laws regulating the grant of permits, variations, etc., even on notified routes was upheld by the Apex Court. While the State Legislature has such a power, it must necessarily be held that the power to enact law for granting variation shall also include the power to cancel the variations already granted. In our considered view, the impugned legislation does not lack any legislative competency. Accordingly, we reject the contentions as to legislative competency of the State Legislature to enact the impugned legislation. 9. Further question still remains for consideration is as to how far the "Impugned Act" would affect the variations granted to the petitioners pursuant to Act 41 of 1992. Before any discussion on the above issue is made, it would be also relevant to consider the submissions made by Mr.K.Alagirisamy, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in challenging the "Impugned Act" on the ground that the State Legislature cannot overrule, set aside, cancel or declare void the judgment of a competent Court or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authorities. The above question is not res integra as it has come up for consideration before the Apex Court on more than one occasion. In the judgment in 1969 (2) SCC 283) the Apex Court has held that the legislature cannot abrogate the power of Courts to nullify a decree, order or judgment. Recently, the Apex Court in the judgment in "GOVT. OF A.P. AND OTHERS v. G.V.K. GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL (2000 (8) SCC 370)", has held that it is well settled that the legislature cannot overrule a judgment by passing a law to that effect unless it removes the basis of the legal rights upon which the judgment is based with retrospective effect and provided there is no violation of any constitutional provision in such withdrawal of rights retrospectively. The grant of permit is only a quasi judicial function of the authority. In the judgment in " B.RAJAGOPAL NAIDU v. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (AIR 1964 SC 1 573)", the Apex Court while considering the exercise of power by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority under Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has held that the Tribunal constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matters according to their best of judgment as they discharge their quasi judicial function. Concepts of judicial act imply that the act is not wholly judicial. It describes only a duty cast on the executive body or the authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power. A quasi judicial function is an administrative function which the law require to be exercised in some respects, as if it were judicial and a quasi judicial decision is therefore an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure. 10. In view of the fact that the Transport Authorities have discharged only quasi judicial function while granting variations to the petitioners under sub section (2) of Section 6 of Act 41 of 1992, how far such variations granted by a quasi judicial authority could be taken away by the subsequent legislation is a further question to be considered. The answer to this question is the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in "TELUGUNADA WORKCHARGED EMPLOYEES STATE FEDERATION, NALGONDA DISTRICT UNION REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS (1997 (3) ALT 492" rendered by one of us The Chief Justice). That was a case where by a Government Order an award of a Tribunal was sought to be annulled. After elaborately considering the various judgments, more precisely in paragraphs 11 and 12, the Court has held as follows:- "Our Constitution ordained democratic form of Government. It has setup three traditional instruments for administering the State affairs, i.e., (1) Legislature, (2) Executive and (3) Judiciary. The power of legislature in our Constitution is limited in three directions-(i) power to legislate on a subject traceable to specific entry, (ii) not to violate Part-III, and (iii) not also to violate the Constitutional provisions or injunction even if it does not fall under Part-III. In State of Bihar and Others v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, speaking for the Supreme Court held "the Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as the Legislature and the Executive are expected to show due regard and deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our Constitution recognizes and gives effect to the concept of equality between the three wings of the State and the concept of 'checks and balances' inherent in such scheme". The purport of the said law laid down by the Supreme Court is that the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary should act within their bounds and limitations and that one wing should not encroach upon the powers of another and that so long as the Legislature and Executive act within their power and competence, the Judiciary should not interfere in their acts or actions. Our Constitution vests judicial powers in the Courts and Tribunals and not in the Executive. Independent judiciary is the essence of Constitution and that is clear from Article 50 and Chapter VI of Part VI thereof. The above are basic concepts of democracy and are, thus, basic features of Constitution. The Rule of Law envisages that administrative decisions should be subject to effective system of review by the Courts. The rule of law secures individual rights through the medium of an impartial judicial authority. Judiciary is one of the pillars of free society erected by rule of law designed to protect the individual from exercise of arbitrary power. Accordingly, the Courts of law are invested with essential attributes of this basic