CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH -- CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 Date of decision: 25.02.2011 Sucha Singh and others ........ Petitioners Versus State of Punjab and another .......Respondent(s) Coram: Hon'ble Ms Justice Nirmaljit Kaur -.- Present: Ms G K Mann, Advocate for the petitioners Ms Gurveen H Singh, Addl. A G Punjab Mr. Mandeep Madan, Advocate for respondent- complainant -.- 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgement should be reported in the Digest? Nirmaljit Kaur, J. This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR No. 389 dated 21.09.2009 under Section 306, 34 IPC, P S Sadar Amritsar (P1) on the basis of compromise (P2). Respondent No. 2 has lodged FIR No. 389 dated 21.09.2009 under Sections 306, 34 IPC, P S Sadar Amritsar against the present petitioners on account of unnatural death of her daughter Harmit Kaur, alleging therein, that she solemnized marriage of her daughter with petitioner No. 3 on 05.06.1996 and thereafter, Harmit Kaur died on CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 2 20.09.20090 after about 14 years of her marriage. It is also alleged in the FIR that her daughter committed suicide because of the harassment caused by the petitioners. Thereafter, the matter has been amicably settled between the parties and the complainant has sworn in her affidavit dated 18.03.2010 (P3) to the same effect. The compromise deed has been placed on record as Annexure P2. Normally, this Court would not have entertained the quashing for an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. However, the facts and circumstances of the present case are somewhat different. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that in order to attract the abetment under Section 306 IPC, the necessary ingredients contained in Section 107 IPC have to be proved and if the provisions of Section 107 IPC are not satisfied, no case can be said to have been made under Section 306 IPC. Before proceedings further, it would be just and relevant to reproduce the aforesaid two Sections as under:- “Section 306 IPC – abatement of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.” Section 107. abatement of thing – A person abets the doing of a thing who; Firstly, instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place ini pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly, intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission the doing of that thing. CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 3 Explanation : 1. A person who by willful misrepresentation or by willful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to discloses voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done is said to instigate the doing of that thing.” Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that none of the provisions of the aforesaid Section have been attracted in the instant case. There is no instigation, no intentional aid or illegal omission on the part of the petitioners in the case in hand. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to various judgments, where the meaning of word 'instigation' has been defined. In the case of Cyriac and another v. The SI of Police, 2005 (4) RCR (Criminal) 525, Hon'ble High Court, in para 7 of the judgment held as under:- “7. As per clause 'firstly' in Section 107 IPC, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing if he 'instigates' any person to do that thing. But, when can a person be said to have 'instigated' another to do an act? What is meant by the expression, 'instigate'? The word 'instigate' is not specifically defined in IPC. As per Oxford Dictionary 'instigate' means 'to goad or urge forward, to provoke, incite, urge, encourage to do an act.” The meaning of the word 'instigate' was considered by Supreme Court also. In Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhatisgarh 2001(4) RCR (Crl.) 537 (SC) JT 2001 (8) SC 569, a decision cited by learned counsel appearing for petitioners, Supreme Court held “instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. As per another decision cited by counsel for petitioners in Ved Paraksh v State of M P (1995 Crl. L J CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 4 893), the word 'instigate' means 'to goad or urge forward to provoke, incite, urge, encourage to do an act.' Keeping in view the above noted interpretation of the abatement, instant is a case, none of the provisions of Section 107 IPC which could further make out a case under Section 306 IPC have been attracted in the case in hand. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2002 (2) RCR(Criminal) 687, while relying on the various judgments of the Apex Court held that the deceased committed suicide on the third day of the quarrel after the accused told him to commit suicide cannot be held that the suicide was direct result of quarrel. There was enough time to the deceased to think over and reflect. While coming to the said conclusion, reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 as under:- “7. Section 107 I.P.C defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” 12. In Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, in which she had stated that previously there had been quarrel between CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 5 the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said: "A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstance individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." In the present case, the allegations in the FIR read as under:- “ During this period, my son-in-law Sukhwinder Singh developed illicit relations with Baldeep Kaur alias Sonu daughter of Phula Singh caste Jat resident of Uggar Aulakh. He started calling her ini the house on the pretext of giving tuition to his children and for sending her abroad. She started visiting the house and this girl Baldeep Kaur in connivance with my son in law Sukhwinder Singh and his parents with the intention to remove Harmit Kaur from her being hindrance in her illicit relations started harassing torturing and beating. On disclosing thing by my daughter Harmit Kaur, I along with my sister Amarjit Kaur wife of Amrik Singh resident of Kashtiwal District Gurdaspur my devar Kulbir Singh and other relatives visited the house of my CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 6 daughter at the rented accommodation Kothi No. 14 Chand Avenue Fatehgarh Churian Road Amritsar where whole of their family is living since last about one year where we have seen all these things with our own eyes and requested to my son in law and his parents and that girl not to do these things. They agreed. And we came back to our houses. Yesterday, on 20.09.2009 at about 4-5 p.m., I received a phone call from my daughter that she being angry from her husband Sukhwinder Singh, mother in law Sarabjeet Kaur, father in law Sucha Singh and fed up from Baldeep Kaur and to end her life I have consumed some poisonous substance.” In some what similar circumstances, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (Criminal Appeal No. 2091 of 2009 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9483 of 2008, decided on 11.11.2009) held:- “22. The prosecution, however, heavily relies on the clause thirdly of Section 107 IPC because, according to the prosecution, the appellant by way of harassment and torturing the deceased at various point of time and by marrying said Anita for the second time without the permission and against the will of the deceased, intentionally aided the commission of suicide by the deceased. 24. The perpetration of physical torture on the deceased on the day prior to the date of the incident which led the deceased to commit suicide is the prosecution case all through out. It is no where the case of the prosecution that the appellant had played any active role either in instigating or aiding the commission of suicide by the deceased for denying to accept Anita as the wife of the appellant. Anita, the second wife of the appellant was brought by the appellant to his house CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 7 about three months prior to the date of the incident of suicide by the deceased and therefore, bringing of the second wife to the house by the appellant cannot be said to have either incited or facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased. It is also not the case of the prosecution as disclosed from the evidence led which we have scrutinized very minutely. The aforesaid contention, in our considered opinion, is far fetched and is not established by the facts of the present case. After carefully assessing the evidence on record, we find that there is no direct evidence to show that the appellant had by his acts instigated or provoked the deceased to commit suicide and has not done any act which could be said to have facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased.” In that case also, the appellant was convicted under Section 498-A IPC but was acquitted for the offence under Section 306 IPC. In the present case also, there is no such allegation that the petitioner herein had instigated, provoked, incited or encouraged the daughter of the complainant to commit suicide. Thus, the provisions contained in Section 107 IPC are not attracted in the instant case. As such, no offence under section 306 IPC is made out. Moreover, the parties in the present case have compromised. The Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052 has held that the compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is “finest CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 8 hour of justice”. Disputes which have their genesis not only in matrimonial discord but others as well, such compromise deserves to be accepted. It is further held as under :- “ The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non- compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.” In the case of Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab 2008 (4) S.C. Cases 582, the Apex Court emphasised and advised as under:- “ We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.” Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana reported as 2003(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 888 while relying on the judgment titled as Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 749], that this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal' case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 9 exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formula to be followed by the court. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary of exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [(1998) 1 SCC 692], it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. This Court in the case of Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab and another (CRM M 35576 of 2009, decided on 20.01.2010) accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR under Section 306 IPC, by holding as under:- “7. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down in Kulwinder Singh's case (Supra) and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, in my considered opinion, once the matter has been compromised by the parties, no useful purpose shall be served by proceeding with the prosecution, as that would CRM No. M 9321 of 2010 10 amount to sheer wastage of the time of the Court; harassment to the parties; and abuse of the process of Court. Even otherwise, the compromise is neither abhorrent to lawful composition of the society nor would it promote savagery. 8. In view of the above, the petition is accepted. Consequently, FIR No. 11 dated 02.02.2008 under Section 306 and 309 IPC P S Kurali, SAS Nagar and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.” In the present case, Jasbir Kaur, mother of the deceased has filed her affidavit dated 15.07.2010, stating therein, that deceased Harmeet Kaur has two sons aged about 10 and 12 years which are living with their father Sukhwinder Singh and that the matter has been resolved keeping in mind the future of the children of deceased Harmeet Kaur. The compromise in the present case shall help the family to resume normal life. Thus, taking into account the facts of the present case which do not constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC coupled with the fact that the matter has been compromised, allowing the proceedings shall only result in wastage of time as the same is not likely to result in conviction. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 389 dated 21.09.2009 under Section 306, 34 IPC, P S Sadar Amritsar (P1) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed in the interest of justice. (Nirmaljit Kaur) Judge 25.02.2011 mohan