CWP No.1595 of 2004 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP No.1595 of 2004 Decided on : 04.03.2009 Piara Singh ....Petitioner VERSUS State of Haryana and others ....Respondents CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY TEWARI Present:- Mr. Harkesh Manuja, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Harish Rathee, Sr. DAG, Haryana. Mr. Ramesh Sharma, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3. AJAY TEWARI J. The petitioner was appointed as Secretary-cum-Manager of respondents No.2 and 3 on 23.07.1976. On 21.08.1984, the petitioner’s services were terminated. The reference filed by the petitioner was rejected on the ground of delay by Labour Court, Panipat and the petitioner had challenged the same by filing CWP No.6533 of 1998 which was allowed vide judgment dated 07.03.2001 in the following terms:- “In view of the aforesaid facts and the law laid down by the apex court as above, this writ is allowed. The award made by Learned Presiding Officer is modified to the extent that the petitioner if the reinstated be reinstated forthwith as he has agreed to relinquish his demand for back wages. It is, therefore, ordered that the petitioner will not be entitled to CWP No.1595 of 2004 -2- back wages from the date of termination of his service till the date he raised the demand. He will, however, be entitled to full wages from the date the demand was made.” The precise claim of the petitioner is that even though the payment of back-wages was restricted, yet the other benefits following from the setting aside of the termination order viz. continuity to service and notional fixation of pay have not been granted to him. In reply, the stand of the respondents are that since the back-wages were restricted from 07.03.2001, therefore, all the benefits would be determined from that date. Another plea which has been taken is that of existence of an alternative remedy by stating that the petitioner was entitled to file application under Section 33C(2) and thus this writ petition was not maintainable. In my opinion, both the arguments pressed in to service to deny the claim of the petitioner are unsustainable. In Gurpreet Singh V. State of Punjab and others reported as JT 2002(1) SC 409, Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as follows:- “Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on examining the materials on record, we fail to understand how the continuity of service could be denied once the plaintiff is directed to be reinstated in service on setting aside the order of termination. It is not a case of fresh appointment, but it is a case of reinstatement. That being the position, direction of the High Court that the plaintiff will not get continuity of service cannot be sustained and we set aside that part of the impugned order. So far as the arrears of salary is concerned, we see no infirmity with the CWP No.1595 of 2004 -3- direction which was given by the lower appellate court taking into account the facts and circumstances including the fact that the suit was filed after a considerable length of time. That part of the decree denying the arrears of salary stands affirmed and this appeal stands allowed in part to the extent indicated above.” In my opinion, the dictum of law expounded above will be squarely applicable to the facts of this case. I put it to the learned counsel for the petitioner that what would be the effect if a termination order was set aside with no other stipulation. Learned counsel fairly admitted that in that eventuality the employee would be entitled to all benefits. The corollary that follows is that in this case only the issue of back-wages was restricted. Thus, all other benefits will be available to the petitioner. As regards the existence of alternative remedy, it may be noticed that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to entertain the writ petition. Of course, the High Court can refuse to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction where a party has an equally efficacious alternative remedy. However, in the present case, it cannot be forgotten that the petitioner has been in litigation with the respondents since 1994 and a period of 15 years has elapsed. Even the present petition has been pending for the past 5 years. Thus, at this stage, it would not be equitable to relegate the petitioner to the time consuming remedy under Section 33C(2). In the case of Workmen, W.B.M.&S.R. Union V. Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Ltd. reported as 2002 LAB. I.C. 230, Hon’ble Bench of Calcutta High Court held as follows:- “I have heard the learned counsel of the respective parties CWP No.1595 of 2004 -4- at length. It appears that there is an alternative remedy under Section 33C(2) of the said Act but it is to be found out whether such remedy is adequate having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the present case this Company has since referred to BIFR and that a notice has been issued on February 21, 2001 inviting all persons or secured creditors to initiate proceedings for the recovery of their dues and that the proceeding is in contemplation of the winding up of the Company. Thus, if the petitioners are driven to take resort to Section 33C(2) of the said Act as an alternative remedy which is absolutely a time consuming affair having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said to be an adequate remedy. Therefore, this petition cannot be thrown out on that ground.” I am in respectful agreement with the judgment cited above. Resultantly this writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to grant all the consequential benefits to the petitioner except for back-wages as mentioned above. March 04, 2009 ( AJAY TEWARI ) ashish JUDGE