HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU CIMA No. 123/2007 CMP no. 200/207 CIMA no. 186/2007 CMP no. 289/2007 Date of Decision: 04.02.2009 Divisional Manager Vs. Mohd Sultan and anr Divisional manager Vs. Ghulam Mohd and an r Coram: Mr. Justice J.P.Singh, Judge. Appearing counsel: For Appellant(s) : Mr. Vipin Gandotra, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. M. P. Gupta, Advocate. i) Whether to be reported in Press/Journal/Media : Yes ii) Whether to be reported in Digest/Journal : Yes These two appeals, one filed by Divisional Manager, State Forest Corporation, Bhaderwah Division, and the other by Divisional Manager, State Forest Corporation, Extraction Division Doda, question the Awards of Commissioner Workmen’s Compensation Act (Assistant Labour Commissioner) Doda. In terms of award made on 28.05.2007 in File no. 44-1, an amount of Rs. 89380/-, had been awarded to the claimant, which included Rs. 47020/- as interest thereon. Whereas vide another award of August 29, 2007 made in File No 47-1, the Commissioner had awarded an amount of Rs. 1,59,838/- to the claimant which included Rs. 59940/- as interest thereon. In terms of award dated May 28, 2007, compensation had been awarded to Mohd Sultan Parray for receiving injuries in an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment with the 2 appellant while working on Mahan in Khelani Nallah when a wooden sleeper had fallen on his knee resulting in his disablement, whereas vide award of August 29, 2007, compensation had been awarded to Ghulam Mohammad for injuring his right leg while working as Mistri at Basti Nallah Compartment no. 40, when a wooden sleeper had hit him, during the course of his employment with the appellant. The only question canvassed in support of these two appeals by appellant’s learned counsel is, that Commissioner’s award, insofar as it allows interest on the compensation amount from the date of the claim petition, was bad in law, in that, Workmen’s Compensation Act does not contemplate payment of interest on compensation amount from any date interior to one month of the date of Commissioner’s award. Learned counsel places reliance on the provisions of Section 4- A (3) (a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 besides on a judgment of this Court rendered in United India Insurance Company vs. Antar Singh and anr, which had been delivered relying upon National Insurance Company vs. Mubasir Ahmed and anr, reported as AIR 2007 SC, 1298. Per contra Mr. M. P. Gupta submitted that the view taken by this Court in Antar Singh’s case, though based on a judgment of Supreme Court of India in Mubasir Ahmed’s case (supra), may not be correct view of the law in view of Four Judge Bench decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and anr, reported as AIR 1976 SC 222, which had been later followed by a Three Judge Bench judgment of Supreme 3 Court of India in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Valsala K and anr, reported as (1999)8 SCC 254. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties in the light of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the judgments cited at the Bar. Before dealing with the issue as to when the compensation, payable to a claimant in terms of Workmen’s Compensation Act, would fall due, regard needs to be had to what was said by their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Pratap Narian Singh Deo’s case (Supra). Paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the judgment need to be noticed. These read thus:- “ 6. It has next been argued that the Commissioner committed a serious error of law in imposing a penalty on the appellant under Section 4A(3) of the Act as the compensation had not fallen due until it was ‘setlled’ by the Commissioner under Section 19 by his impugned order dated May 6, 1969. There is however no force in this argument. 7. Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer’s liability for compensation. Sub- Section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if “personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under sub- section (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due after the Commissioner’s order dated May 6, 1969 under section 19. What the section provides 4 is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer’s liability to pay compensation under Section 3, in respect of the injury, was suspende3d until after the settlement contemplated by Section 19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. 8. It was the duty of the appellant, under Section 4A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at the rate provided by Section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the respondent.” In view of the above quoted dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the employer becomes liable to pay compensation to the employee the moment he receives injury in an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment. Suspension of liability of employer to pay compensation, until its determination by the Commissioner, having been completely ruled out by their Lordships in the above referred judgment, appellant’s submission that compensation would fall due one month after the determination of such compensation by the Commissioner, may not thus be tenable, even though National Insurance Company vs. Mubasir Ahmed’s case supports such a view. This is so because law declared by a larger Bench of Supreme Court of India has to prevail over its later judgment of smaller strength, in view of the settled legal position affirmed by Supreme Court of India in Union of India and anr. v. K. S. Subramanian, and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manoj 5 Kumar alias Chotu, reported as AIR 1976 SC 2433 and 2008 AIR SCW 6375. That apart, law laid down in Pratap Narian Singh Deo’s case (Supra) stands affirmed by yet another judgment of Supreme Court of India in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Valsala K and anr, reported as (1999)8 SCC 254, where, while agreeing with the view taken by a Full Bench of Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Company vs. Alavi, reported as (1998) 1 KLT 951, their lordships had held that Two Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court of India in New India Assurance Company vs. V. K. Neelakandan was not the correct view of law. Their lordships had held as follows:- “A two Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance co. Ltd vs. V. K. Neelakandan however, took the view that the Workmen’s compensation Act being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two Judges Bench in Neelakandan case however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo case as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo case the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan case is not correct. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerela High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above-noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the 6 date of accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v Srinivas Sabata lays down the correct law and we approve it.” In view of the above position in law and Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case holding the field as to workman’s entitlement to interest on compensation amount from the date he receives injury, Union of India vs. Antar Singh decided by this Court cannot be accepted as laying down correct legal position. At the time of consideration of Antar Singh’s case this Court had not been apprised of the law, which Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had laid down in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Kerala Electricity Board cases (Supra). For all what has been said above, I am of the view that claimant/workman is entitled to interest from the date of receipt of injury and, in that view of the matter, appellant’s contention that workman would be entitled to interest one month after the date of the award, may not be tenable. The only plea raised by appellant’s counsel, questioning the awards, having failed, in view of the law laid down in Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case, these appeals are liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. ( J. P. Singh ) Judge Jammu 04. 02. 2009 Anil Raina, Secy.