THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY CIVIL REVISIONPETITION No.2303 of 2008 ORDER: The petitioners filed O.P.No.456 of 2004 in the Court of the I Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar against the respondents under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 (for short ‘the Act). They prayed for a manifold relief, namely, (a) to declare that respondent Nos. 2 to 23 are not the members of M/s.Margadarshini Educational Society, the first respondent herein (for short ‘the Society’); (b) to direct respondent No.24 to recognize the petitioners as the members of the Society; (c) to direct respondents 3 and 4 to return the original lease deed and certificate of registration of the Society and (d) to furnish the accounts for the period, during which, they managed the Society. It was pleaded that the petitioners were inducted as members of the Society in October 2002 and that they have contributed large amounts for the purpose of constructing a building over an extent of 7744 square yards of land at Ramachandrapuram, Medak District acquired by the Society. They pleaded that respondent Nos.3 and 4 did not manage the affairs of the society properly and have misused the funds. In the meeting held on 14.04.2003, resolutions are said to have been passed, electing petitioner No.1 as a General Secretary and removing Respondent No.4 from the Office, held by him. Reference was made to certain changes in the composition of the society and filing of O.S.No.400 of 2003 before the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sanga Reddy by the Society against respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as well as to a complaint registered as Crime No.275 of 2003 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sanga Reddy. It was alleged that the District Registrar, respondent No.24 herein, did not recognize the membership of the petitioners. On behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 23, a common counter-affidavit was filed denying the allegations made by the petitioners. Objection was raised to the very maintainability of the O.P. The affairs of the Society were narrated in a detailed manner. A counter claim was also filed for the relief of declaration that the resolutions said to have been passed at the meeting held on 14.04.2003 are null and void and that the alleged removal of Respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 from the respective Offices and their expulsion from membership is non est in law. In addition to filing a counter-affidavit in the O.P., the respondents filed I.A.No.2126 of 2007 under Section 151 C.P.C., with a prayer to reject the O.P. The petitioners opposed the application on several grounds, including the one as to the maintainability. Through its order, dated 12.03.2008, the trial Court allowed the I.A., and rejected the O.P. Hence, this revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Sri K.V.Satyanarayana, the learned counsel, appearing for Sri A.Sanjeev Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that I.A.No.2126 of 2007 is not maintainable in law. He contends that the O.P. filed under a special enactment could not have been rejected and even assuming that it deserves to be treated on par with the suit, an application cannot be filed, under Section 151 C.P.C. to claim the relief that is referable to Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. He submits that, assuming that the I.A. is filed under correct provision of law, no case is made out for rejection of the O.P. He further submits that the reason assigned by the trial Court in rejecting the application is untenable. Sri Challa Seetaramaiah, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri P.Prabhakar Reddy, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, submits that the trial Court has inherent jurisdiction to reject the O.P. He contends that the provisions of C.P.C. do not apply to the proceedings under the Act and that the objection raised by the petitioners, as to the maintainability of the I.A. cannot be entertained. He further submits that the O.P. filed by the respondents does not fit into Section 23 of the Act. There is no alternative for the trial Court, except to reject it. The learned counsel also submits that the question as to the jurisdiction of a Court or Tribunal to entertain a petition can be considered not only at the threshold of the proceedings, but also at subsequent stages. He contends that even where a petition has been entertained and numbered, it can be rejected at a subsequent stage, if it emerges that the Court has no jurisdiction. From the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for consideration: (a) whether I.A.No.2126 of 2007 in the form, in which, it was presented, is maintainable in law; (b) whether the respondents have made out a case for rejection of O.P.No.456 of 2004. The petitioners approached the trial Court by availing the remedy under a special enactment. Relief of different dimensions was claimed by them. The respondents filed their counter-affidavit not only denying the allegations, but also making a counter-claim. Even before any substantial progress has taken place in the trial, the respondents filed the I.A. for rejection of the O.P. The I.A. was filed under Section 151 C.P.C. The grounds urged by them are that there does not exist any cause of action for the petitioners to file the O.P. Their precise contention was that the petitioners wanted a declaration to the effect that they are the members of the Society; and relief under Section 23 of the Act cannot be claimed or availed by the persons, who are not members of the Society. This weighed with the trial Court. Once a suit or O.P. is numbered by a Court, it has to be decided on merits, except where situations provided for under Order 9 C.P.C. Instances are not lacking, where the defendants in a suit raise an objection as to the very jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. In such cases, issues touching upon the jurisdiction are to be framed. In a given case, they can be decided as preliminary issues, if determination thereof does not warrant recording of evidence and verification of facts. If any evidence is necessary to ascertain the jurisdictional facts, an issue touching on the jurisdiction also is to be decided along with other issues and not as a preliminary one. It is only in rare and exceptional cases, that a plaint can be rejected. The grounds on which a plaint can be rejected are mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7 C.P.C. It reads: Rejection of plaint: The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9. (Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.) In arriving at a conclusion as to whether any grounds mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7 C.P.C. exist, the Court must confine its examination or consideration to the averments in the plaint. The proceedings instituted in a Civil Court are guided and governed by the provisions of the C.P.C. The Civil Courts are also conferred with the jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters provided for under certain special enactments. If such enactments prescribe a different procedure, covering all or certain procedural aspects, that will prevail over the corresponding procedure prescribed by C.P.C. If such enactments are silent as regards any procedural aspects of the matter, the proceedings would be governed by C.P.C. For instance, the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, while conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Rent Controller to decide the matters provided for under it, prescribes a procedure, different from the one under C.P.C. on certain aspects, such as, framing of issues, recording of evidence. The proceedings are required to be summary in nature. It is only the gist of evidence, that is required to be recorded and not the verbatim, reproduction of depositions. To the extent, the said enactment is silent, the proceedings would be governed by the relevant provisions of the C.P.C. The Act, under which, the present O.P. was filed does not stipulate different or independent procedure. On the other hand, it makes the C.P.C. applicable to the petitions filed under it. At one stage, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents argued that the C.P.C. does not apply to an O.P. filed under Section 23 of the Act. However, he did not pursue the matter beyond a point. The very fact that the respondents filed application under Section 151 C.P.C., discloses that they are convinced that the Code applies to the O.P. That being the case, if the respondents wanted the trial Court to reject the O.P., they ought to have filed an application under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. In such an event, they would have been under obligation to mention the ground covered by the provision and pray for necessary relief. The trial Court also would have been in a position, if not, under an obligation, to bestow its attention to the ground pleaded, and to decide the matter objectively. It is relevant to mention here that every alternative precedent, dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 151 C.P.C. is to the effect that the provision cannot be invoked where a situation is governed by a specific provision of C.P.C. Whatever be the latitude exhibited in permitting invocation of Section 151 C.P.C. for the relief that has to be claimed under other specific provisions, no such indulgence can be shown, when it comes to the prayer for rejection of the suit or other proceedings. The reason is that the consequences flowing from such an application would lead to rejection of relief without trial. Instances are not lacking where, an application filed under an otherwise irrelevant provision, can be treated as the one under the correct provision. That however, would be possible only when the application contains the necessary pleadings that can be fitted into a correct provision. In their application, the respondents pleaded several grounds, which are general in nature. The prayer for rejection of a plaint must be with reference to the relevant clauses under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. Since the Court would not be under obligation to undertake trial nor to take into account any other external material, the pleadings in such applications assume significance. From the above discussion, it emerges that: (a) the respondents have invoked a general provision, namely Section 151 C.P.C. for a prayer which is specifically provided for under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C.; (b) the application filed by the respondents cannot be treated as, or converted into, the one under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. The result is that I.A.No.2126 of 2007 in the form in which it presented is not maintainable. Coming to the next question, it has to be examined whether the respondents have made out a case for rejection of the O.P., assuming that the I.A. was presented in the correct form. It has already been mentioned that rejection of a plaint or O.P. would visit the plaintiff or the petitioner before a Civil Court, with serious consequences. The civil Court virtually shits its door at them. Further, the clause under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., under which the plaint is rejected, would have its own importance. If the rejection is on the ground that another forum is conferred with the jurisdiction, it would be only in case of changing the forum. On the other hand, if the rejection is on the ground that there is no cause of action, for all practical purposes, an adjudication takes place, without trial. Law reports are replete with precedents which are to the effect that while arriving at a conclusion that the suit does not disclose the cause of action, the Court must be guided by the contents of the plaint and nothing more. In the instant case, the trial Court arrived at a conclusion that the O.P. filed by the petitioners is without cause of action with the reasoning:- (i) an O.P. can be filed under Section 23 of the Act only by a member of the society; (ii) one of the reliefs claimed by the petitioners is that they be declared as members; (iii) unless they are declared as members, the petitioners cannot claim that status; (iv) an O.P. cannot be filed under Section 23 of the Act by the persons who are not members. The reasoning adopted by the trial Court is fallacious. Firstly, the deductive process undertaken by it is incorrect. The mere fact that a person seeks a particular legal status does not mean that he is not holding that status at all. The very raison d’etre for an individual to seek a declaratory relief is that he is confident of the rights held by him, but declaration by a Court is necessary to prevent others either from disputing or denying the existence of such rights. Take for instance, a suit for declaration of title. A plaintiff in such a suit, refers to the manner in which he has acquired title. Mention would also be made to the acts or omissions on the part of the defendants either denying or disputing the existence of such title. Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide whether the title vests in the plaintiff. From the fact that a plaintiff in a suit of this nature is seeking declaration of title, it cannot be inferred or deduced that the plaintiff does not hold such right at all. The examples can be multiplied. Different consequences altogether would have flown, had it been a case where the petitioners prayed for admission of membership into the Society. That is not so. They asserted that not only they have been admitted as members, but also have made contribution for construction of the building. The truth or otherwise thereof, needs to be examined in the O.P. Their principal grievance was that, when they approached the Registrar to recognize their membership, he gave certain evasive replies. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court as to nonexistence of cause of action in favour of the petitioners cannot be sustained in law. In reply to the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the O.P. ought not to have been rejected, once it was numbered, Sri Seetaramaiah, the learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the jurisdiction of a civil Court is a phenomenon, which cannot and need not remain static and it can keep on changing depending on the factors, such as noticing of jurisdictional facts, or lack of them, change in provisions of law that conferred jurisdiction. He has invited the attention of this Court to a passage in Administrative Law by Sir William Wade, 8th Edition, page 278, which, in turn, is the observation of Lord Reid in the judgment reported in (1968) AC 192 at 234. It reads as under: “If a magistrate or any other tribunal has jurisdiction to enter on the inquiry and to decide a particular issue, and there is no irregularity in the procedure, he does not destroy his jurisdiction by reaching a wrong decision. If he has jurisdiction to go right he has jurisdiction to go wrong. Neither an error in fact nor an error in law will destroy his jurisdiction. In their own time and context, and in relation to errors of fact and law, these statements were unexceptionable. But it does not follow that no sort of error made in the course of the proceedings can affect jurisdiction. Some question may arise which the tribunal is incompetent to determine, or some point may be decided in bad faith or in breach of natural justice or on irrelevant grounds or unreasonably, all of which faults go to jurisdiction and render the proceedings a nullity.” The above passage is both illustrative and educative. The very word ‘jurisdiction’ connotes the power or the competence conferred upon the Court, to adjudicate the dispute brought before it. Such jurisdiction is conferred by the provisions of the substantive, and some times the procedural laws. A person who intends to invoke the jurisdiction of a civil Court must plead the necessary facts that are needed to confer jurisdiction upon it. If the Court is not satisfied as to the existence of such factors, it may reject the proceedings or refuse to entertain them, at the threshold itself. The mere numbering of a suit, or registration of any proceedings by a Court would not draw curtain to the issue, relating to the jurisdiction. In certain cases, the opposite party may draw the attention of the Court as to the absence of jurisdiction and in other cases, the Court itself may notice, that fact, at a later point of time. Inasmuch as the absence of jurisdiction would go to the root of the matter, and disentitle the Court to adjudicate the lis, it can be verified at any stage of the proceedings. It has already been mentioned that not only the jurisdictional facts, but also the relevant provisions of law would have a bearing upon the competence of the Court, to entertain or proceed with the matter. Law does not put any embargo as to the stage at which verification of such important aspects can be undertaken. From a mere perusal of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., it becomes clear that an application for rejection of plaint can be filed at any stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that it would be competent for a Court to verify or satisfy itself as to the existence of the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings brought before it deserves to be accepted. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the jurisdiction of a forum under Section 23 of the Act is taken away, if there is any dispute as to the membership of the petitioners and necessary relief in this regard has to be claimed in a civil Court. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in MAGITI SASAMAL vs. PANDAB BISSOI[1]. That was a case where the proceedings were instituted under the Orissa Tenants Protection Act. On finding that there is a serious dispute as to the existence of relationship of tenant and landlord, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took the view that in such cases, the parties have to first establish their rights before a civil Court and thereafter avail the remedies under the concerned enactment. It needs to be mentioned that the various findings in that case were recorded after hearing the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Collector under Section 7 of that relevant Act has no power to decide the question as to the existence of tenancy. That is not the case here. The respondents wanted the O.P. to be rejected without undertaking trial. The gist of the other precedents relied upon by the respondents is to the same effect. For the foregoing reasons, the civil revision petition is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. The trial Court is directed to decide the O.P. on merits. _____________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY,J Dt:13.08.2009 kdl [1] AIR 1962 SC 547