1 UNREPORTED IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD. SECOND APPEAL NO.169 OF 2010. Nimba Fakira Suryawanshi ... Appellant. Versus Santosh Traders, Prop. and owner Dilip Gulabchand Chhajed. ... Respondent. ... Mr.P.N.Kutti, advocate for the Appellant. Mr.V.B.Patil, advocate for the Respondent. ... CORAM : S.V.GANGAPURWALA,J. Date : 21.09.2010. ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. Admit. 3. With the consent of the parties, this Second Appeal is taken up for final hearing 2 forthwith. 4. The present Respondent had filed Special Civil Suit No.189/2004 for recovery of Rs.1,46,053/- (Rupees one lac forty six thousand fifty three) with interest at the rate of 24% p.a. against the present appellant. Pursuant to the suit summons, the present appellant appeared and contested and denied the contentions of the plaintiff by filing written statement. After filing of the written statement, the present appellant/original defendant did not participate in the said proceedings. The trial Judge vide its judgment and decree dated 31.2.2007, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 5. As per the case of the appellant, the appellant got knowledge of the decree on receipt of notice of Darkhast on 3.3.2008. According to him, thereafter he was under medical observations from 10.1.2008 to 15.12.2008 and was advised bed- rest. Thereafter, the present appellant preferred Regular Civil Appeal against the said judgment and decree before the District Court on 3 17.12.2008, along with an application for condonation of delay. The said application for condonation of delay was numbered as Misc. Civil Application No.196/2008. 6. The present Respondent/original plaintiff resisted the said application by filing his say. The learned District Judge-2, Jalgaon, vide its order dated 1.12.2009, rejected the Misc.Civil Application No.196/2008, for condonation of delay. 7. The appellant assails the said order before this Court in Second Appeal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the following substantial question of law arises : "Whether the appellant has made out sufficient cause as contemplated U/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.?" 8. Mr.S.I.Nandode, learned counsel holding for Mr.Kutti, advocate for the appellant 4 contends: (i) that the applicant/appellant did not have the knowledge of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and for the first time, the appellant got the knowledge only when he received the notice of Special Darkhast and thereafter he was under medical treatment. The medical certificate to that effect was also filed but the lower appellate Court has not considered the same. (ii) The appellate Court should have taken a liberal approach while considering the application for condonation of delay. (iii) The appeal is a substantive right provided by the statute and on such a technical ground the right of the appellant should not have been negatived. (iv) The appellant to show his bonafides, is ready to deposit some amount. 5 9. Mr.V.B.Patil, learned counsel for the Respondent resisted the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and contended that : (i) No illegality can be found in the order passed by the lower appellate Court. (ii) No cause much less a sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant and as such the application for condonation of delay is rightly rejected. (iii) The appellant/applicant has not explained the delay. (iv) If the Court is inclined to consider the application for condonation of delay, then the appellant/applicant should be directed to deposit the total decretal amount. 10. The application for condonation of delay has to be liberally construed. The appellant is not going to gain anything by causing delay. Judiciary is respected not 6 because it can deny justice on technical ground but it can sub-serve the cause of substantial justice. When the technical considerations and cause for substantial justice are pitted against each other, the cause for substantial justice shall prevail. 11. The appellant/applicant in his application which was supported by affidavit has stated that for the first time, he got the knowledge of the decree only when he received the notice of the Darkhast and thereafter he was advised bed-rest. There was no reason to doubt the medical certificate which is produced on record. Even the said medical certificate was not seriously disputed by the present Respondents. 12. The First Appeal being the substantive statutory right and a last fact finding Court, the District Court ought to have taken a liberal approach and not a pedantic approach. 13. The delay has been caused by the 7 appellant and the decree of the trial Court is a money decree, as such while condoning the delay, I direct the present appellant to deposit an amount of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand) in the District Court. 14. The Respondent herein is allowed to withdraw an amount of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) on furnishing solvent security to the satisfaction of the District Court. The parties shall appear before the concerned District Judge on 15.11.2010. The appellant shall deposit the said amount of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand) on or before 15.11.2010 and the learned District Judge, shall register the appeal on the appellant depositing the said amount and shall decide the same within a period of six (6) months thereafter. 15. The Second Appeal is allowed with above observations. However, there shall be no order as to costs. (S.V.GANGAPURWALA,J.) asp/office/sa169.10 8