IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.10371 of 2002 1. VISHWANATH JHA @ MOHAN JHA, SON OF LATE KASHINATH JHA, RESIDENT OF MOHALLA GANGJALA, P.S. AND DISTRICT SAHARSA. 2. SHASHINATH JHA @ KANHAIYA JHA, SON OF LATE KASHINATH JHA, RESIDENT OF MOHALLA-GANGJALA, P.S. AND DISTRICT-SAHARSA. ................... PETITIONERS Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR. 2. LAND REFORMS DEPUTY COLLECTOR, MADHEPURA. 3. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, MADHEPURA. 4. JAINARAIN YADAV, SON OF LATE KALLAR YADAV, SAKIN VEENATOLA, DHARNIPATH, P.S. AND DISTRICT- SUPAUL, AT PRESENT RESIDING IN MADHEPURA, WARD NO. 6, P.S. AND DISTRICT-MADHEPURA. .................... RESPONDENTS ----------- 5. 29.4.2009 Heard Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners and the counsel for the State as also the counsel for respondent no.4. The provision under the Minimum Wages Act in the Bihar Amendment provides an appeal within a period of 30 days from the date of the order which could be further extended by a period of another 30 days. In the present case the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal by recording a finding that even when the impugned order was passed on 18.3.1998 the appeal came to be filed on 16.6.1998 and as such, in terms of the provisions in the statutes itself delay in filing of the appeal could not be condoned. Having recorded so he has dismissed the 2 appeal of the petitioners. This Court by an order dated 28.11.2002 while issuing notice to respondent no.4 had also directed respondent no.2 (D.C.L.R., Madhepura) to produce the complete records of his court and to inform this Court as to whether after 19.12.1996 the matter before him was taken up on 8.1.1997 or any other date was given to the petitioners. Pursuant to the aforementioned order though an affidavit has been filed by the said D.C.L.R. (respondent no.2) but the connecting records have not been produced. In the counter affidavit it has been admitted by him that on 19.12.1996 both the parties were present and had filed their attendance and the petitioners had also filed attendance of Bimal Sharraf as witness but as the D.C.L.R. himself was busy in other work the case was adjourned for another date and thereafter due to long strike of non-gazetted employees and on account of being busy in Lok Sabha election the final order could not be passed by him in time. It must be mentioned that the D.C.L.R. in his explanation to this Court 3 has tried to explain even after 19.12.1996 the parties had kept on filing their Hajri on 17.1.1997, 6.2.1999 (sick), 13.2.1997, 25.2.1997, 4.3.1981, 15.5.1997, 16.6.1997 and 10.7.1997 but there is nothing to show that as a matter of fact any date was fixed for conducting the proceedings on those dates, inasmuch as the order sheet produced by the petitioners and not controverted by the respondents would go to show that after the order dated 19.12.1996 no further date has been mentioned and the final order is said to have been passed on 18.3.1998. In that view of the matter, this Court must hold that the D.C.L.R. had tried to give an incorrect impression before this Court that the order passed by him on 18.3.1998 was to the notice of the petitioners so as to bind them by the period of 30 days for filing the appeal. This Court is not going further though there are materials to show that the D.C.L.R., having not produced the records as directed in the order of this Court dated 28.11.2002, has tried to mislead this Court by filing an evasive counter affidavit. Counsel for respondent no.4 in fact 4 would draw attention of this Court towards a time petition filed by the counsel for the petitioners on 1.8.1997 to contend that even when the proceedings were being not recorded in the order sheet the parties were aware of different dates and that is how one of such dates i.e. 1.8.1997 the counsel for the petitioners before the D.C.L.R. had sought time by filing an application for filing their written statement. It is true that Annexure ‘B’ would go to show that even after particular date was fixed neither the order sheet was being maintained by the D.C.L.R. nor the counsel for either party or both the parties were keeping track of the case but then in absence of any proceedings recorded by the authority it would be difficult to hold that the petitioners were having knowledge of the final order dated 18.3.1998 so as to be disentitled from maintaining their statutory appeal on account of its not being filed within a period of limitation of 30 days. There is nothing on record to show that the final order dated 18.3.1998 was either sent to the petitioners soon after it is being passed by the D.C.L.R. or even their counsel 5 appearing before the D.C.L.R. was shown the order. In view of this conclusion arrived by this Court it must be held that the appeal filed by the petitioners with a duly self contained application seeking condonation of delay was not considered in just and proper manner by the appellate authority who has rather pedantically proceeded to dismiss the appeal by giving a literal interpretation to section 20(6) of the Bihar Amendment Act. It is true that section 20(6) lays down the period of limitation of 30 days from the date of the order but then in order to bind such person, the order passed thereon either must be communicated or be at least known to him, otherwise a situation may arise that an authority may pass an order not on a date fixed and the party will never come to know of the same in the next 30 days and eventually will have to give up statutory right of appeal for no fault on his part. Therefore it must be held that whenever a final order is passed by any quasi judicial authority on a date not fixed for passing such order, it would be absolutely necessary for him to inform the parties about passing of its final order so that the valuable 6 right of appeal is not taken away only on account of non-communication/ non- information of passing of the final order. That being so, this Court must hold the appellate order to be wholly bad in law and unsustainable and accordingly, Annexure 1, the appellate order, is hereby quashed with a direction to the Collector of Madhepura district to hear the appeal afresh on merits and pass an order within a period of four months from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. It would be open for the petitioners to press all the issues against the impugned order passed by the D.C.L.R. as has been raised in this writ application. It goes without saying that till the appeal is not finally disposed of, the order of the D.C.L.R. and the impugned award passed by him shall not be given effect to. Let it be made clear that this Court has made no opinion on the actual claim of respondent no.4 and that will be decided by the appellate authority strictly in accordance with the provision of the Minimum Wages Act. 7 With the aforementioned observation, this application stands disposed of. (Mihir Kumar Jha,J.) Surendra/