1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR. Criminal Application No. ( APPA) 281 of 2009 (State of Maharashtra .vs. Devidas Ganeshrao Bramhane ) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions Court's or Judge's orders. and Registrar's orders Mr. T.A. Mirza, APP for Applicant. CORAM : A.P. LAVANDE & P.D. KODE, JJ. DATED : JANUARY 08, 2010. Heard. By this application, the State of Maharashtra seeks leave to appeal against acquittal dated 21.8.2009 recorded by Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur in Sessions Trial No. 122 of 2008 by which the respondent has been acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of Indian Penal Code. The trial Court in the impugned order has held that the prosecutrix, who according to the prosecution was 15 years old at the time of incident, was consenting party for the sexual intercourse with the respondent. The trial Court has further held that there was love affair between the prosecutrix and the accused and the intercourse by the accused with the prosecutrix was with her consent. In so far age of the prosecutrix is concerned, the trial Court has held that the prosecution had not led conclusive evidence to establish that the prosecutrix was 2 under 16 years of age. Upon perusal of the judgment, we find that the said finding recorded by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse warranting interference in an appeal against acquittal. The trial Court has rightly held that the prosecutrix was consenting party for sexual intercourse and that the offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of Indian Penal Code were not made out against the accused. Admittedly no ossification test was conducted by the prosecution to ascertain age of the prosecutrix. This being the position, the findings recorded by the trial Court that the prosecution has not conclusively established that the prosecutrix was below 16 years cannot be said to be perverse. In our considered opinion, the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view and there is no perversity in the findings recorded by the trial Court. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any illegality having been committed by the trial Court while passing the impugned judgment and order. This is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal against acquittal. Therefore, the application is rejected. JUDGE JUDGE halwai