1 SA 742.2010 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET NO. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD SECOND APPEAL NO. 742 OF 2010 Office Notes,Office Memoranda of Coram,appearances, Court's orders or directions and Registrar's orders Court's or Judge's orders Mr. P.R.Katneshwarkar,Advocate for the appellant. Mr.G.G.Suryawanshi, Advocate for respondent. .......................... CORAM : S.V. GANGAPURWALA, J. DATE : 06/04/2011 PER COURT : 1. The present appellants had filed an Appeal against the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court decreeing the Suit of the present respondent for simplicitor injunction. There was delay of 803 days in filing the Appeal. The appellants filed an application for condonation of delay which was registered as Misc. R.J.E. No. 23 of 2004. The District Court rejected the said application. Aggrieved thereby, the present 2 SA 742.2010 Second Appeal has been filed. 2. Mr. Katneshwarkar, the learned counsel contends that in fact the litigation was being looked after by appellant no. 2. The husband of the appellant no. 2 died and that is why the Appeal could not be preferred. The learned counsel contends that the expression “ sufficient cause ” has to be liberally construed. The applicant is not expected to explain each and every day’s delay. Mr. Katneshwarkar, the learned counsel further contends that whenever technical considerations and cause for substantial justice are pitted against each other, the cause for substantial justice should sub-serve. According to the learned counsel, hyper technical approach has been taken by the Court below. The rights in an immovable property are the subject matter of the dispute and as such by condoning the delay, the liberty be given to the appellant to prosecute the Appeal as the same is the substantive right of the party. 3. Per contra, Mr. Suryawanshi, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that no sufficient cause has been spelt out. The application is vague. Even the date of the death of the husband of appellant no. 2 has not been given and the lower appellate Court has properly considered 3 SA 742.2010 the points and has rightly rejected the application. 4. No doubt, the expression “ sufficient cause ” has to be liberally construed, but the same can not be construed in such a manner so as to jettison the provisions of the Limitation Act. The applicant has not stated the grounds. Though the reason is stated that on account of the death of the husband of appellant no. 2, the Appeal could not be filed, but no date of death of the appellant no. 2 is spelt out. The delay is of more than two ( 2 ) years. In absence of date of the death, one can not come to the conclusion that the appellant no. 2 was prevented from filing the Appeal because of the said cause. More over, there are four ( 4 ) appellants. Either of the appellants could have preferred Appeal. No reason is spelt out as to what prevented the other appellants from filing the Appeal. The application for condonation of delay filed before the Court below is scanty and is as vague as it could be. The District Court has properly construed the said application and has dealt with it in a proper manner. 5. The Second Appeal does not involve any substantial question of law and as such is dismissed, however with no order as to costs. 4 SA 742.2010 6. In view of dismissal of Second Appeal, the Civil Application does not survive and is dismissed. [ S.V. GANGAPURWALA,J. ] KNP/SA 742.2010