1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET NO. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR SECOND APPEAL NO. 458/2006 Rewchand Mendhe and others -vs- Parasram Mendhe and others. Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions Court's or Judge's orders and Registrar's orders. CORAM : Smt. Vasanti A. Naik, J. DATED : 05/08/2008. Heard Shri A.B. Mirza, learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant is the original plaintiff in Reg. Civil Suit No.79/1998 and the respondent is the plaintiff in Reg. Civil Suit No.153/1997. It was the case of the present appellant in Reg. Civil Suit No.79/1998 that defendant/respondent Parasram had caused obstruction in the way of appellant Rewchand by stacking goods and illegally erecting a compound thereby encroaching upon the house and upon the space belonging to him. It was the case of Parasram that he had purchased the suit site from the son of Pandhari Donode. It was the case of Parasram in Reg. Civil Suit No.153/1997 that Pandhari Donode had been living in the suit property for about 50 years and after his death, his son had sold the property to him by registered sale deed dated 27/01/1997. Since 2 then, according to Parasram, he was in possession of the suit property and since present appellant Rewchand was intending to purchase the property for a lesser value and he had purchased the same for more value, the quarrel between the plaintiff in Reg. Civil Suit No.153/1997 and defendant in Reg. Civil Suit No.79/1998 had started. According to Parasram, he was not able to repair his house and use the property, in view of the obstruction caused by Rewchand. The present appellant denied the case of Parasram by filing the written statement. It was pleaded that the property was part of Gat No.973, which was sold to appellant Rewchand by one Jagdish Lohiya on 07/09/1996. It was then pleaded that the house property/hut was not mentioned in the sale deed executed in his favour to save the stamp duty, but the house was in possession of Rewchand since he purchased the same in the year 1996. Hence, Rewchand has sought the relief of dismissal of the suit, filed by Parasram. Rewchand also filed Civil Suit No.79/1998 against Parasram for a declaration that he was the sole owner of Gat No.973 and Parasram had no right, title or interest in the suit property. Parasram had denied the claim of the plaintiff Rewchand in Reg. Civil Suit No.79/1998 on the plea 3 that he had purchased the suit property from Pandhari Donode's son and was in possession thereof. He, therefore, sought for the dismissal of the suit filed by Rewchand. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court, on consideration of evidence on record, dismissed the suit filed by appellant Rewchand and decreed the suit filed by respondent Parasram. Both the Courts held that Parasram had proved his ownership over the suit property and had also proved his possession thereon. It was further held by both the Courts that appellant Rewchand had failed to prove his ownership and possession over Gat No.973 specially on which the property was situated. As a result of the aforesaid finding, both the Courts came to a conclusion that appellant Rewchand was not entitled for grant of injunction, as prayed in Reg. Civil Suit No.79/1998 and respondent Parasram was entitled to grant of injunction, as prayed in Reg. Civil Suit No.153/1997. While recording the aforesaid findings, the Courts considered the fact that the property was earlier recorded in the name of Pandhari Donode and respondent Parasram had proved the sale deed dated 27/01/1997. The Courts further considered the fact that in the sale deed executed by Jagdish 4 Lohiya in favour of Rewchand, there was no mention of the dilapidated house property or the hut, which is the subject matter of the suit. The courts further held that appellant Rewchand further failed to examine the person, who had wrongly recorded the name of Parasram in the Gram Panchayat Records. The Courts observed that Rewchand did not produce any documentary evidence on record to show that there was a dilapidated house in Gat No.973. The findings recorded by both the Courts are pure finding of facts, which are based on a proper appreciation of the material evidence on record. They do not give rise to any substantial question of law. The second appeal is therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE gsk