IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Revision No.4520 of 2010 Date of Decision: November 23, 2011. Kewal Krishan and another. ...... PETITIONERS Versus Gajjan Singh and others. ...... RESPONDENTS. CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAM CHAND GUPTA Present: Mr. Akshay Bhan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Santosh Sharma, Advocate for the petitioners Mr. S.K. Panwar, Advocate for respondent No.1. None for respondent No.2. Mr. D.B. Singh, Advocate for respondent No.3. ***** RAM CHAND GUPTA, J.(Oral) Petitioners have invoked supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside impugned order dated 03.11.2009 (Annexure P-3) vide which objections filed by present petitioners to the execution petition filed by respondent No.1-plaintiff have been dismissed and order dated 14.06.2010 (Annexure P-5) vide CR No.4520 of 2010 which an application for review of order dated 03.11.2009 was also dismissed. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the whole record including the impugned orders passed by learned executing court. Facts relevant for the decision of present revision petition are that present respondent No.2-Baljit Singh entered into an agreement to sell the property in dispute with present respondent No.1-Gajjan Singh on 3.9.1992. Initially, a suit for permanent injunction was filed by respondent No.1-Gajjan Singh against Baljit Singh-respondent No.2 seeking relief of injunction restraining him from alienating the property in dispute to anybody else. However, later on, on the application of respondent No.1-plaintiff, the said suit was converted into a suit for specific performance of the said agreement to sell dated 3.9.1992. The suit was contested by respondent No.2-defendant Baljit Singh. However, during the pendency of the suit, Baljit Singh sold the property in dispute to respondent No.3 Om Parkash who was also impleaded as a party. The suit filed by respondent No.1-plaintiff Gajjan Singh was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 28.07.2004. The said decree has become final as no appeal was filed against the same. The father of present petitioners-objectors had allegedly purchased the property in dispute from Om Parkash-respondent No.3 vide registered sale deed No.1247 dated 18.10.1994 and after the death of their father, present objections were filed by them before the executing Court on the plea that they are bona fide purchasers for consideration and that they were not in the knowledge of the pendency of the present suit and hence, 2 CR No.4520 of 2010 the plea was taken that as possession of the property in dispute was delivered to Om Parkash, they cannot be dispossessed in execution of a decree in favour of respondent No.1-plaintiff Gajjan Singh. The objections filed by present petitioners were dismissed by the executing Court solely on the ground that the sale deed was executed in favour of father of the petitioners during the pendency of the suit and hence, in view of doctrine of ‘lis pendens’ the objections are not maintainable. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the objections were dismissed by the executing Court in a summary manner and however, as the petitioners were bona fide purchasers for consideration, the objections should have been decided after framing issues and after giving opportunity to the petitioners to lead evidence. On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1/decree-holder that admittedly petitioners are transferee after filing of the present suit by respondent No.1-plaintiff and hence, plea of bona fide purchasers for consideration is not available to the present petitioners and they are having no right to obstruct the execution of the decree in favour of respondent No.1-plaintiff in view of Order 21 Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’). He has also placed reliance upon Guruswamy Nadar Vs. P. Lakshmi Ammal (D) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2560. It is pertinent to reproduce Order 21 Rule 102 of CPC, which reads as under:- “102. Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite:- Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor 3 CR No.4520 of 2010 has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person.” In the present case, the fact is not disputed that the father of present petitioners through whom they are claiming rights in the property in dispute, had purchased the property in dispute after filing of the present suit by respondent No.1/decree-holder. Hence, father of present petitioners is transferee pendente lite. Law has been well settled by Hon’ble Apex Court in Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram and others 2008(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 145, wherein it has been observed as under:- 18. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent Court. The doctrine of 'lis pendens' prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject matter of suit. 'Lis pendens' itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102 therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rules 98 or 100 of Order XXI. 19. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, 1998 (1) RCR (Rent) 394 (SC): (1998) 3 SCC 723, this Court held that where the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite, the scope of adjudication is confined to a question whether he was a transferee during the pendency of a suit in which the decree was passed. Once the finding is in the affirmative, the Executing Court must hold 4 CR No.4520 of 2010 that he had no right to resist or obstruct and such person cannot seek protection from the Executing Court. 20. The Court stated:- "It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions "arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99" shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are "relevant to the adjudication of the application". A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act." (emphasis supplied) [See also Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539] 21. We are in respectful agreement with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Silverline Forum. In our opinion, the doctrine is based on the principle that the person purchasing property from the judgment debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct or object execution of a decree. Resistance at the instance of transferee of a judgment debtor during the pendency of the proceedings cannot be said to be resistance or obstruction by a person in his own right and, therefore, is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated. 5 CR No.4520 of 2010 22. For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the decree holder to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment debtor. If the said condition is fulfilled, the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and such applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order XXI.” Hence, in view of Order 21 Rule 102 CPC, the petitioners are having no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree for possession of immovable property in favour of respondent No.1/decree-holder as the property was transferred in favour of father of petitioners after institution of the suit in which the present decree was passed. In view of the aforementioned facts, it cannot be said that any illegality or material irregularity has been committed by learned executing Court in passing the impugned orders or grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, warranting interference by this Court. Moreover, law has been well settled by Hon’ble Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003(6) SCC 675: AIR 2003 SC 3044: 2004(1) RCR (Civil) 147 that supervisory jurisdiction is not available to be exercised for indulging in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors for drawing inference like a Court of appeal. It has been observed as under:- “Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the 6 CR No.4520 of 2010 provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.” Hence, the present revision petition is, hereby, dismissed being devoid of any merit. ( RAM CHAND GUPTA ) November 23, 2011. JUDGE Sachin M. 7