,^' L^ A '^ IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR fC.G.) S.A. No.^? /2005. ^PPELLANT PLAINTIFF RESPONDENTS J^EFENDANTS ' YNaththuram S/o Sadhram Suryavanshi, Aged about-59 years, Residence of .Village- Jagmahant, Tahsil- Navagarh, District- Janjgir-Champa. VERSUS (A) Sadhinbai D/o. Madho Suryavanshi, Age- 40 years. (B) Kirtan Bai S/o. Madho Suryavanshi, ^ Age-25 years. Both are R/o. Jagmahant, Tahsil- Nawagarh, District-Janjgir-Champa. Jethu S/o Kholbahara Suryavanshi, Age- 32 years. Badarabai Wd/o. Kholbahara Suryavanshi, Age- 58 years, Respondents No. 5L&3 R/o. Jagmahant, Tahsil-Janjgir, District- Janjgir- Champa (C.G.) State ofChhattisgarh, Through: The Collector, Janjgir District - Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 2. 3. 4. APPEAL UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE CFVIL PROCEDURE CODE NieH COURT OP CHHATTIS6ARH. BILASPUR SECOND APPEAL N0.239 OF 2005 NATHTHURAM Vs. SADHIN &AI AND OTHERS Shri PushpendraKumar Patel, learned counsel for the appellant. ORAL ORDER (31.8.2005) Sunil Kumcr SJnha. J. Shri Pushpendra Kumar Patel learned counsel for the appellant. Heard on admission. This appeal has been directed against the impu9ned Judgment and decree dated 23/2/2005 passed in Civil Appeal No. 64-A/2004 by Third Additional District Judge (FTC), Janjgir, Chhattisgarh, arising out of Judgment and decree dated 31/8/2001 passed in Civil Suit No.4-A/92 by the Civii Judge Class-I, Janjgir, Chhatt-i^arh. The brief facts are that th®appellant/plaJntiff entered into an agreement with the original defendant for purchase of cgricultural land for a consideration of Rs.t2,000/- on 27/4/i987. Accordin9 to the aforesaid a9reement to sale, a sum of Rs.3,500/- was paid by the purchaser at the time of ogreement and rest of the amount was agreed to be paid at the 1 -2.- time of re9istration and it wos ogreed between the parties that the registration of the document will be done by 20/03/1989. The copy of the flgreement hos been filed on record as Ex.P/1. This story set forth has been denied by the defendant in the written statement. The Trial Court framed various issues in this case and after taking ev'idence, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff could not establish that he entered into such an cgreement with the defendont on 27/4/87. It was also held that the defendcnt had never ogreed to setl his property to the plaintiff at any point of tim®. Leamed Trial Courl- vide its Jud9ment dated 30/08/2001 has discussed this aspect in para 5 and has giving many reasons. It has been held that in fact the documents Ex.P/1 i.e. the ogreement to sale hos not been established on record. The Trial Court has recorded a finding that there are many insertjons and manipulations by different inks in the document Ex.P/1. It has also been held that even the khasra number of the land in the said document hos been changed and the four corners of the Khasra number has been entered by a different ink in the said document. The Trial Court hos observed that Ex.P/1 hos been written on a stamp paper and the stamp paper hos been shown to be purchosed by the defendant Madhav and his signature is there on the back portion of the stamp. However, jn the main port-ion of the so called agreement to sale, there is a thumb impression showing to be the thumb jmpression of the defendant Madhavram. Thou9h it has been submitted by the -3- ^ plaintiff that the possession of the suit tond was also delivered to the plaintiff in part performance of the cgreement to sale dated 27/4/l987, but neither the Trial Court nor the First Appellate Court has recorcted any positive finding in this regard. No separate issue in relation to delivery of possession in lieu of part performance of the agreement has been framed by the Trial Court'. In first appeal, the Fir*st Appellate Court has also taken the same view and has held that in fact the plaintiff could not establish that any such agreement to sale was executed in his favour by the deceased defendant Madhav. In the facts and circumstances, it is clear that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court' hav®concurrently held that the plaintiff failed to establish that any such ogreement to sale was executed by the defendant in hjs favour. It is a settled position of law that the concurrent finding of the two Courts below should not be disturbed in the second appeal unless these findings are shown to be utterly perverse on the face of record. Learned counsel for the c^pellont could not point out any such perversity, which may call for an interference of thjs Court- for disturbing such concurrent findings recorded by the Court's below. It has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of Thio aarcLian and others vs. Shr( VenuaoDalaswamv B. ICoil and others (2004^ 5 SCC paoe 762 that a bare perusal of Section 100 CPC makes it clear that the scope ond exercise of jurisdictjon by the High Court in the second appeal under <^> -/1- ^WHM^. Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or odditionat substantial questions of law framed at the later stage after recording reosons forthe so.me, This makes it clear that the existence of a substantial questions of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdictjon under the amended provision of Section 100 of the CPC. As to which would amount to substantial question of law has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the matter of Santosh Hazarl vs. Purushott>am Tiwari ^2001)3 SCC 179 and it hos been held that "a point of law which odmits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannotbe a substGntial question of law. To be "substflntial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decisfon of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the n^h^s of the parties before it are concemed. To b® a question of taw inwlved in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of the fact arrived at by Court- of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the cas®. An entirely new point rised for the first time before the High Court- is not a question involved in the cose unless it 9oes to the root of matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the p -5- indispensable obligation to do Justice at all stcges and impellin9 necessity of avoiding ppolongatlon in the life of wvy lis." In the above facts and circumstances of this case and also on the basis of above pronouncements of the Apex Court, I am not incline to entertain this appeal because accordmg to me, the present appeal does not involve any substantial questions of law to be considered by the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC. There is not merit in this appeal. It is dismissed at the admission stage itself. No costs. Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge