IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOMAS P.JOSEPH WEDNESDAY, THE 10TH MARCH 2010 / 19TH PHALGUNA 1931 RSA.NO. 269 OF 2010() --------------------- AS.27/2008 OF DISTRICT COURT,THODUPUZHA OS.213/2006 OF MUNSIFF, DEVICOLAM .................... APPELLANT/APPELLANT/SECOND DEFANDANT -------------------------------------------------------- G.KALIMUTHU,S/O.GURUSWAMY,AGED 56 YEARS, RESIDING AT MP IX/696,NEAR VETERINARY HOSPITAL, MUNNAR,K.D.H.VILLAGE. BY ADV. SRI.T.J.MICHAEL SRI.JOSE MATHEW (KAVALAKALAM) RESPONDENT(S): RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF ----------------------------------- 1. M/S TATA TEA LIMITED,A COMPANY INCORPORATED IN INDIA WITH R/O,AT NO.1,BISHOP LEFORY ROAD,CALCUTTA WITH R/O.AT MUNNAR,KDH VILLAGE,DEVIKULAM TALUK,REP;BY P.O.A PRATAP RAMDAS MANAGER ADMINISTRATION,TATA TEA LTD.SPL.PROJECT OFFICE,GH COMPLEX,MUNNAR,K.D.H.VILLAGE. 2. M/S.P.N.R.ENGINEERING WORKS,COIMBATORE, A PARTNERSHIP FIRM BEARING NO.354 OF 1959,ADMN.OFF 112,BIG BAZAAR STREET,COIMBATORE-641001,BY PARTNER G.SATEESH KUMAR,S/O.P.R.GOVINDARAJALA 20,BHARATI PARK ROAD,1 & 2 LINK ROAD,HOME SCIENCE COLLEGE IST STREET,COIMBATORE-641941. THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 10/03/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: THOMAS P.JOSEPH, J. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = R.S.A. NO.269 of 2010 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 10th day of March, 2010 J U D G M E N T --------------------- Second Appeal arises from judgment and decree of learned District Judge, Thodupuzha in A.S.No.27 of 2008 confirming judgment and decree of learned Munsiff, Devikulam in O.S.No.213 of 2006 as per which respondent No.1 was granted a decree for recovery of possession of the building referred to in the plaint schedule from the appellant. According to respondent No.1 which is a Limited Company it had entered into an agreement with respondent No.2/defendant No.1 as per which the latter undertook to carry out repairs of its tractors at High Range estate till 31.5.2005 and on the request of respondent No.2 certain buildings belonging to respondent No.1 were entrusted to respondent No.2 on the strength of Ext.A1, licence agreement dated 1.6.2004 to accommodate its workers. Appellant/defendant No.2 is one of such workers who was accommodated by respondent No.2 in one of the buildings covered by Ext.A1 and referred to in the plaint schedule. Even after period of contract which expired on 31.5.2005 and the period of licence (Ext.A1) which expired on 1.6.2005 appellant R.S.A. No.269 of 2010 -: 2 :- continued his occupation of the building. Hence the suit. Respondent No.2 remained ex parte. Appellant contended that he joined the service of respondent No.1 as a mechanic in the year 1979 and as per instruction of respondent No.1 got a voluntary retirement in the year 2002 but continued under respondent No.2 under contract basis. Thereafter when respondent No.2 came to the picture, appellant worked under respondent No.2 as well. The schedule building was given to the appellant (by respondent No.1) free of rent for his residence. It is his contention that he is a tenant entitled to protection of Act 2 of 1965. Trial court observed that in the absence of documents of title produced by respondent No.1 it is not possible to grant declaration regarding title but recovery of possession was granted on the strength of the licence agreement (Ext.A1) which respondent No.1 had with respondent No.2. First appellate court has confirmed that finding of the trial court. Hence the Second Appeal urging by way of substantial question of law whether in the absence of title of the building proved by respondent No.1. it was possible for the courts below to grant recovery of possession. It is contended by learned counsel that any amount of admission by the appellant cannot confer title on R.S.A. No.269 of 2010 -: 3 :- respondent No.1, trial court has found that respondent No.1 was not able to prove title and hence the suit without proving title cannot be sustained. 2. In fact it was not the contention of the appellant that the building in question did not belong to the respondent No.1. True admission cannot confer title but at the same time I must bear in mind that admission is the best form of evidence and that facts admitted need not be proved. Respondent No.1 produced Ext.A4, extract of building tax assessment register to prove its title. But the trial court was not impressed by that document or the fact admitted by the appellant. I must also bear in mind that it was not a case where the courts below found against the claim of title raised by respondent No.1 over the building. Finding of the trial court is that respondent No.1 was not able to prove title. At any rate ExtA1, licence agreement between respondents Nos.1 and 2 is proved. It is not disputed that appellant had worked during the period of Ext.1 under respondent No.2. Evidence is that buildings including the schedule building were entrusted to respondent No.2 on the strength of Ext.A1, licence agreement to accommodate workers under respondent No.2 and it is under respondent No.2 R.S.A. No.269 of 2010 -: 4 :- that appellant occupied the building. That can only be during the period of Ext.A1 which expired on 1.6.2005. Though appellant has a contention that even during the time he was working with respondent No.1 on regular basis he was occupying the building in question, he did not adduce evidence to show that he continued such possession after his voluntary retirement in the year 2002. That apart, even going by the case of the appellant he was accommodated in the building by respondent No.1 and none else. Appellant was not able to prove that he had any conceivable right to remain in the building. Courts below found that his occupation was under respondent No.2, licensee under respondent No.1. If that be so, on the expiry of period of licence, licensor is entitled to get back the building. Period of (Ext.A1) licence expired by 1.6.2005. Suit is filed in 2006 demanding recovery of possession. Appellant is liable to vacate the premises. No substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal. 3. Learned counsel for appellant requested six months’ time to vacate the building. Counsel states that appellant has no other place to stay. But suit is instituted in the year 2006. Appellant was able to pull on for about four years without any R.S.A. No.269 of 2010 -: 5 :- conceivable right in the building. He should have thought of alternative accommodation. In the facts and circumstances highlighted by learned counsel, appellant is granted three months’ time from this day to vacate the building on condition that appellant shall file an affidavit in the trial court undertaking to vacate the building on the expiry of three months without putting forth any claim whatsoever. Second Appeal is dismissed in limine but appellant is granted three months’ time from this day to vacate the building subject to the following conditions. i) He shall not cause any damage to the building in question during the said period of three months or he vacates whichever is earlier. ii) He shall file an affidavit in the trial court within one month from this day undertaking to vacate the building on expiry of three months from this day without putting forth any claim on any account. R.S.A. No.269 of 2010 -: 6 :- If any of the conditions are violated it will be open to respondent No.1 to proceed with execution of the decree. Interlocutory Application No.669 of 2010 shall stand dismissed. THOMAS P.JOSEPH, JUDGE. vsv