THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.RAMULU W.P.Nos.13870 & 19037 of 2007 COMMON ORDER: In these two writ petitions, common questions of law and fact arises for consideration, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order. W.P.No.13870 of 2007 The writ petition is filed seeking a Mandamus declaring the suo-moto revision of the 2nd respondent against the proceedings of 3rd respondent in No.SEP3/654/82 dated 15.1.2003 as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. Under the impugned order dated 15.1.2003, the Collector, Ranga Reddy district was directed to implement the orders of the Apex Court dated 29.1.1998 in S.L.P.Nos.1016 – 1018 of 1998 by handing over Evacuee Property lands admeasuring Ac.2-16 guntas and Ac.1-04 guntas in Sy.Nos.644 and 645 respectively at Uppal Kalan village, Ranga Reddy district to the allottees. The Collector was further directed to instruct the Mandal Revenue Officer, Uppal to make necessary changes in the revenue records in favour of allottees. This order is sought to be reviewed by the respondents by issuing notice dated 20.8.2003 in Memo No.35846/JA/2003- 1 by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Government of A.P. In a way, this is a second round of litigation. The facts of the first round of litigation are as under: One Shawaram Sukhramdas was a displaced person from Sind (now in Pakistan) and was allotted agricultural land vide allotment Order No.Nal-29 dated 12.5.1954 admeasuring Ac.712-8 guntas in Sy.Nos.9, 24, 28-35-38, 49 to 52-73, situated at Chintalapalem village, Miryalaguda mandal, Nalgonda district. The said lands under allotment were evacuee properties. The actual and physical possession of the above land could not be delivered to the displaced person on account of the fact that it was in the possession of third parties including the protected tenants of the evacuees. The original allottee Mrs.Shewaram Sukhramdas died leaving behind three sons viz. Tajumal Shewaram, Salmatraim Shewaram and Bhagwandas Shevaram. The said three sons also died. Petitioners 2 to 6 are the legal heirs of Tejumal Shewaram, petitioner No.7 is the legal heir of Salamatrai Shewaram and petitioner Nos.1, 9 to 11 are the legal heirs of Bhagwandas Shewaram. An extent of Ac.712.00 of land in Nalgonda district was allotted to the above displaced person. In the correspondence of the District Collector, Nalgonda in Letter No.C6/III/LP/76 dated 31.5.1976, he has informed the State Government as also Government of India that while some of the land allotted in Nalgonda district was unsuitable for cultivation being covered by boulders etc. and the other cultivable land is in occupation of protected tenants. As the Government of India had already delegated powers to the State Government authorities, the displaced person was asked to deal with the matter with the latter. While the powers of the Custodian General were delegated to the first respondent, the powers of the Custodian were delegated to the Secretary to Commissioner, Survey Settlement and Land Records, Andhra Pradesh. On 6.10.1989, the Secretary to Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records vide his proceedings No.CSS & LRR No.SEP-2/937/82 made an allotment of 24 standard acres out of anticlement of the displaced person of 34 standard acres of Attewalli of Medchal mandal and the remaining 10 standard acres were allotted in Uppal Kalan village, Uppal mandal of Ranga Reddy district. Questioning the same, W.P.No.3181 of 1990 was filed by Mohd. Hasnuddin and though initially stay was granted, the same was vacated on 20.6.1990 insofar as the land of the petitioners was concerned. By order dated 15.2.1991, the first respondent canceled the said allotment order passed by the Secretary to Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records on the ground that the land was already allotted to the displaced person in Nalgonda district and that the second allotment cannot be made. Further, the jurisdiction of the Secretary to Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records was also question. The writ petition was disposed of holding that as substantive justice has been done by the Custodian Secretary to CSS & LR in allotting the alternate lands to the petitioners and there was no double benefit conferred on the petitioners. The impugned order therein was set aside being hyper-technical (question of jurisdiction) and unsustainable (that there is a double benefit to the displaced persons) reasons and the petitioners were held to be valid allottees consequent to the proceedings of Secretary to CSS & LR dated 6.10.1989 in SEP/2/937/82. The petitioners right over the lands allotted by the Secretary to CSS & LR in his proceedings No.SEP/2/937/82 dated 6.10.1989 shall not be interfered with and shall not be disturbed. The petitioners shall not be entitled to claim any rights in the lands at Nalgonda which were allotted vide allotment No.NAL-29 dated 12.5.1954 and the said allotment pertaining to the lands at Nalgonda shall be held to be invalid and inoperative. The writ petition was thus allowed. Aggrieved by the same, respondents carried the matter in W.A.Nos.37, 43 and 54 of 1994 and the Division Bench of this Court disposed of the Writ Appeals by common judgment dated 1.10.1997 as under: “Since all contentions/issues in the instant appeals are based on some issues of fact in respect of which, certain prima facie findings are recoded by the learned single Judge, we are of the view that only reiteration and paraphrasing of the impugned judgment alone, without deciding the issues of fact on the basis of such evidence which is produced by either party, will not settle the controversy between the parties. We do not, for the said reason, intend to interfere with the impugned judgment, as learned single Judge has observed that the appellants herein, if so advised, can institute such civil proceedings as are available under law. We, however, observe that any finding of fact recorded by the learned single Judge except insofar as such admissions and pleadings which are referred to in the impugned judgment, shall not be binding upon the parties. It is made clear however, that no party shall be precluded from raising any legal issue including the issue of maintainability, if so advised, in any of the suits that parties may file”. Aggrieved thereby, the Deputy Custodian General and Commissioner for Survey, Settlement and Land Records, Hyderabad filed S.L.P.Nos.1016- 1018 of 1998 before the Apex Court and the Apex Court dismissed the said SLPs at the admission stage by order dated 29.1.1998. Thus, the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration by proceedings dated 15.1.2003 directed the Collector, Ranga Reddy to implement the orders of the Supreme Court dated 29.1.1998. Immediately, thereafter to nullify the attainment of finality of matter before the Apex Court, as noticed above, the Secretary to Government, Revenue (JA) Department issued Memo No.35846/JA/2003-1 dated 20.8.2003 directing the petitioners to show cause as to why the allotment of evacuee property lands in Sy.No.644 and 645 of Uppal Kalan village and mandal, Ranga Reddy district under proceedings dated 15.1.2003 should not be cancelled, on the following grounds: “All the records relating to the above subject matter have been called from the office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration and verified with reference to the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and the rules framed there under. The detailed examination revealed the following irregularities in the allotment: (a) Under Rule 34-E allotment of land in excess of Rs.10,000/- in value is not permissible. The present allotment has been made in contravention of Rules 34, 53 to 56. The lands allotted are worth Rs.2.50 crores approximately. (b) The petitioner’s claim to be persons displaced during the break of India into Pakistan and India proper. Some of the allottees were not even born then and do not satisfy the definition of displaced persons as seen from the applications. (c) The orders appear to have been passed in a hurry without proper enquiry and without application of mind to the relevant legal provisions and factual situation. (d) Some of the allottees figure in more than one order.” Petitioners submitted their detailed explanation stating that firstly the respondents have no jurisdiction to rake up the issue again and again and no suomoto revision can be entertained under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 since the allotments were made under 1950 Act. Even written submissions were filed as early as in the year 2004, but no action was taken by first respondent till 2007. Therefore, petitioners filed the present writ petition. In this regard, the learned Government Pleader strenuously contended that the petitioners having received notices and submitted their objections, could not have filed this writ petition and thus, the very writ petition is not maintainable. On the other hand, the learned counsel for petitioners contended that the memo was issued on 20.8.2003 calling for explanation of the petitioners and immediately thereafter petitioners submitted their explanation and also written arguments, but no orders were passed for over three long years. Therefore, they were forced to file the present writ petitions in 2007. Though, a counter was filed in the year 2007 itself, but the respondents have not taken care to dispose of the objections filed on the questions of sumoto revision entertained by the Government. This itself shows the callous attitude of the respondents in dealing with the matter and harassing the petitioners, who are displaced persons from Pakistan, who lost their property and belongings and came to India only to be Indians and to live in Indian Union, and such displaced persons were dealt with in this manner. I am in full agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for petitioners that the displaced persons who were allotted with some land and when the matter attained finality before the Apex Court, in the guise of suo moto revisional power under Section 24(4) read with Section 33 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, petitioners are again sought to be disturbed. Though the matter was pending for (7) years and even during the pendency of this writ petition, the objections filed by the petitioners to the memo issued on 20.8.2003, there is no response. I am of the opinion that the writ petition in this shape is maintainable in order to give a finality to the litigation. Thus, the objections raised by the respondents are not sustainable. The other grounds raised by the petitioners while questioning the impugned action of the respondents are; (1) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 has no application to the case of the petitioners. (2) Though the earlier litigation had already attained finality before the Apex Court between the parties, the same cannot be re- agitated and is hit by Doctrine of Res judicata. (3) The Doctrine of Finality has to be honoured in each and every case and no litigation shall be unnecessarily prolonged and agitated and re-agitated on the basis of some technicalities and on unreasonable grounds. It is not in dispute that earlier when the jurisdiction of Deputy Custodian General and Commissioner for Survey, Settlement and Land Records, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad was challenged before this Court, this Court held that the Deputy Custodian has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. In fact, the respondents, by filing a detailed counter have stated that “the entire lands declared as Evacuee Property in the State of A.P. have been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 as a result of which all the evacuee property vests in the Central Government and they have been part of compensation pool under Section 14 of the Act, so as to be dealt with and utilized in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder only. From the date of acquisition of said lands under the Act, the AEP Act cannot be invoked for any purpose whatsoever and the only law that governs these properties is the D.E. (C&R) Act, 1954 and the rules made thereunder”. This was not accepted by this Court earlier in W.P.No.15320 of 1991, wherein it was held; “In any event of the matter, as the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners were entitled for the allotment of the evacuee lands and as they were not inducted into possession of the allotted lands of Adilabad district, and as their entitlement is not disputed, on technical grounds, I am not inclined to disturb the orders of allotment dated 12.5.1989, as by doing so, the illegality and arbitrariness will be perpetuated as the displaced persons who are entitled for allotment of lands in a beneficial legislation would be deprived of the same by unnecessary and unwarranted legal proceedings and the protraction of the same. It is needless to mention that in exercise of the extraordinary powers contained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court will always consider the substantive justice rather than technical one. As the substantive justice has been done by the Secretary to CSS & LR pursuant to the orders dated 10.4.1989 of the 1st respondent and as I am convinced that no double benefit has been conferred on the displaced persons, I am constrained to set aside the impugned orders passed by the 1st respondent which are on hyper-technical (the question of jurisdiction) and unsustainable (that there is a double benefit to the displaced persons) reasons.” These findings of the learned single Judge were confirmed by the Division Bench in the Writ Appeal as well as by the Apex Court as noticed above. Now at this stage again, on the ground of suo moto revisional powers, the present action is initiated. In fact, the issues as to double allotment, jurisdiction and technical aspects and the entitlement of petitioners had already attained finality being part and parcel of the issues that arose for consideration in the earlier writ petition W.P.No.15320 of 1991. There must be some finality for any proceedings. The respondents in the guise of some technicalities and availability of suo moto revisional powers, could not have initiated the impugned action, which is opposed to theory of Doctrine of Finality and Resjudicata. In this regard, the learned counsel for petitioner has rightly relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No.29852 of 2009 (C.C.No.11768) in the matter of URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. MOHAN LAL, wherein the Apex Court held; “It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When glaring wrong acts by their officers is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to be corrected. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that the governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice.” Whereas the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents relied upon the judgment in CCT, ORISSA AND OTHERS v. INDIAN EXPLOSIVES LTD.[1] and stated that 1950 Act is only an Act providing identification of evacuee properties and their administration by various departments, whereas under 1954 Act, the displaced persons would be identified and allotment of lands would be made. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents have no authority to cancel the allotment made earlier while invoking suo-moto revisional powers available under Section 24 read with Section 33 of 1954 Act. Even otherwise, in the present case, the action is initiated on different grounds, such as; 1) Under Rule 34 E allotment of land in excess of Rs.10,000/- in value is not permissible. The present allotment has been made in contravention of Rules 34, 53 to 56. The lands allotted are worth Rs.2.50 crores approximately. 2) The petitioner’s claim to be persons displaced during the break up of India and Pakistan and India proper. Some of the allottees were not even born then and do not satisfy the definition of displaced persons as seen from the applications. 3) The orders appear to have been passed in a hurry without proper enquiry and without application of mind to the relevant legal provisions and factual situation. 4) Some of the allottees figure in more than one order. The learned counsel for respondents also drawn the attention of the Court to the orders passed in W.P.No.16367 of 2003, wherein it is held that since the respondents have already filed objections and alternative remedy is available, the question of maintaining the present writ petition does not arise and the petitioners were relegated to the original authority. The learned counsel for respondents also reminded the Court as to the scope of judicial review and drawn the attention of Court to the judgment in U.P. STATE SPINNING CO. LTD. v. R.S.PANDEY AND ANOTHER[2], wherein it was held; “Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. .................There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction………” Further, it is stated that the established principles cannot be disturbed by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment in UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. AND ANOTHER v. JABAR SINGH AND OTHERS[3], wherein it was held; “In the instant case, the workmen have not made out any exceptional circumstances to knock the door of the High Court straightaway without availing the effective alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act. But the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and a specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute. The High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. There are several decisions to the same effect. The respondents have not made out any strong case for making a departure. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the writ petitioners (the respondents herein) who have not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal are not entitled to any relief in the writ petitions. They are not entitled for any benefits of reinstatement, back wages and continuity of service. On the other hand, the respondents in civil appeals arising out of special leave petitions as detailed infra who approached the Tribunal and the High Court are entitled for the relief of reinstatement……………” The learned counsel for respondents further contended that the dispute raised in the earlier writ petitions is not the same as that of the present writ petition. Therefore, the question of applicability of Doctrine of Res judicata and Doctrine of Finality does not arise. I am not in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for respondents. The issue that had fallen for consideration in the earlier writ petition and in the present writ petition is one and the same. In fact, all these issues were raised either directly or indirectly in the earlier round and they attained finality and the State shall not be allowed to indulge in such repeated litigated on the unfounded grounds. Therefore, the Doctrine of Finality as well as Doctrine of Res judicata are applicable in this case in its full force. Be that as it may, it is important to notice that while disposing of Writ Appeal Nos.37, 43 and 54 of 1994, this Court categorically held that the respondents are at liberty to work out their remedies by way of filing a Suit before the competent Civil Court. In fact, even according to the respondents, a suit was filed, however, the plaint was rejected as not maintainable under law. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents have filed Appeal Suit before this Court and the same is pending. In spite of the same, the present proceedings were issued. This attitude of the respondents would indicate that the respondents are bent upon to harass the petitioners on one ground or the other. When they failed in the earlier round of litigation upto Supreme Court, they filed a suit and the same was returned as not maintainable. The present proceedings were initiated purported to be in exercise of revisional powers under the Act on some unreasonable grounds, after more than 20 years of allotment. No details were given and even no proper explanation could have been possible for the petitioners in view of vagueness of grounds raised. All the issues raised now as to the validity of allotment, eligibility or non-eligibility of the petitioners and others in this regard were available to the respondents even in the course of earlier litigation and nothing prevented them from doing so. Though such course was available, the respondents have not adopted the same and allowed the matter to attain finality before the Apex Court. Having done so, it is not proper on the part of the respondents to rake up the issue again and again on some unreasonable and unfounded technical grounds as is found by the Supreme Court as noticed above in URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. MOHAN LAL. It is further interesting to notice that the petitioners were allotted lands in Athivelli of Medchal mandal and Uppal kalan villages. Both these allotments were the subject matter of earlier litigation and attained finality. Even while invoking powers under Section 24 read with Section 33 of 1954 Act purported to be under suo-moto revisonal powers, the respondents have not initiated any action in respect of Athivelli village of Medchal mandal. The present action is initiated only in respect of lands in Uppal kalan villages. The impugned notice was issued on 20.8.2003 and immediately thereafter, explanation was submitted which was pending before the respondents for more than four years. The writ petition was filed in the year 2007 and even during the pendency of writ petition till date, the matter was not