IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.15970 of 2007 1. Manju Devi wife of Manoj Kumar Mandal 2. Nutan Devi, wife of Pradip Kumar Mandal, both resident of Village- Giddha, P.S. Rupauli District-Purnea ------------ (Purchasers) ---- Petitioenrs. Versus 1.The State of Bihar 2. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna. 3. The Additional Collector, Land Ceiling District- Purnea 4. The D.C.L.R., Dhamdaha, District- Purnea 5. Bikho Bhagat, S/O Late Raghu Bhagat. 6. Arjun Jaiswal 7. Ram Pratap Jaiswal 8. Manoj Jaiswal 9. Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, all sons of Bhiko Bhagat, respondent nos. 5 to 9 all resident of Village-Rampur Parihat Tola, Dumaria, District- Purnea (Respondent nos. 5 to 9 (Pre-emptors). 10. Bindeshwari Sah S/O Late Bhukhlal Sah, resident of Village- Giddha, P.S. Rupauli, Distt. Purnea (Vendor) -------------- Respondents. ------------- 2. 6.3.2009 Heard Mr. Anil Jayaswal for the petitioners, Mrs. Kumari Amrita, learned Standing Counsel No.1(Ceiling) for respondent nos. 1 to 4, and Mr. Ashok Kumar Jha for respondent nos. 5 to 9. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 16.5.2006 (Annexure-5), passed the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna, in Revision Case No. 201 of 2002( Shakuntala Devi Vrs. Manju Devi & Ors.), whereby he has allowed the revision application preferred by the pre-emptor, passed in purported exercise of powers under section 30(2) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned revisional authority has allowed the pre-emption application, inter alia, on the ground that the pre-emptor has been 2 able to explain the delay of two days in deposit of the money along with the pre-emption application. 2. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The four registered sale deeds in favour of the purchasers ( the petitioners herein), were registered on 13.9.2000. The last date to deposit the money, and filing the pre-emption application, in terms of the proviso to section 16(3) of the Act was 12.12.2000. The same was filed on 15.12.2000. Learned counsel for the purchasers (the petitioners) submits that the proviso to section 16(3)(i) of the Act is mandatory in nature, and the time prescribed in sub-section 3 of Section 16 could not have been enlarged. Learned counsel for the two sets of respondents have taken the opposite stand and submit in one voice that the concerned authority has the discretion to condone the delay in depositing the amount. 3. The relevant portion of section 16(3) including proviso thereto is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “16(3) (i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of the transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed: Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten 3 percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision: Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat as the case may be, shall be evicted from land and possession thereof shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten percent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause(i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector, shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed in Order 21, rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) shall be, so far as may be followed.” Learned counsel for the parties have not brought to my notice any judgment interpreting the proviso. We get light from the judgments of courts interpreting the provisions of section 15 of the Bihar Building (Lease Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982, wherein it is laid down that if the rent is not deposited within the time prescribed therein, the defence against ejectment shall be struck off. Earlier decisions interpreted the provision to be mandatory, and not even one days’ delay could have been condoned. The Supreme Court later on reconsidered the position and has now held that the time prescribed therein can in appropriate cases be enlarged; otherwise the provision of law shall operate very harshly against the tenant. He may be precluded from depositing the rent for circumstances beyond his 4 control. For example, there may be strike in the office where the money is required to be deposited, the tenant may be involved in an accident while on way to the office to deposit the money. Learned Standing Counsel has rightly relied on the following reported judgments : (i) A.I.R. 1980 SC 587, Shyamcharan Sharma Vrs. Dharamdas. (ii) A.I.R. 1985 SC 964 (Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and another Vs. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta). (iii) A.I.R.1989 SC 291, Manmohan Kaur Vrs. Surya Kant Bhagwani 4. I am , therefore, of the view that the principle emerging from the judgments of the Supreme Court , interpreting section 15 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, is applicable to the present case. In other words, in a case under section 16(3) of the Act, the authority has the discretion to condone the delay in depositing the amount in appropriate cases. If the delay has been explained, then there is no delay. If the delay has not been convincingly explained, then the bar of limitation applies with full force. 5. The next question which arises for consideration is whether or not the delay has been properly explained in the present case. There was a delay of 2-3 days in the present case in depositing the money and filing the application. In fact, both were done on the same day. The following portion of the impugned judgment is illuminating: 5 “From the Lower Court case record I find that a separate petition for condonation of delay was filed stating therein that within time the original petitioner submitted Challan before the D.C.L.R. on 12.12.2000 which was passed the same day. At Dhamdaha there is no Government Treasury and for depositing the challan she was required to visit the district treasury office. The next day i.e. 13th December, 2000 as a result of call of strike, she could not be able to reach the district treasury office and on 14th December, 2000 she deposited the challan in the district treasury and after the depositing the require money in the bank, thereafter, the case was filed on 15.12.2000, Thus the delay, according to me has properly been explained. The learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1991 (1)PLJR 3 S.C. and also 2000(3) P.L.J.R. 81 S.C. that the delay may be condoned for substantial justice.” In view of the discussion in the impugned judgment, it is evident that the delay was for bonafide reasons and is also negligible. It is open to the authorities under the Act to enlarge the time prescribed by proviso to section 16(3) of the Act in appropriate cases. I am convinced that the delay has been satisfactorily explained, and was for bonafide reasons. 6. No other contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. The writ petition is dismissed. Vinay/ ( S. K. Katriar ,J. )