IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.15391 of 2010 1. Nilu Kumari W/O Nikhil Priyadarshi R/O Mohalla- East Gandhi Maidan, P.S.- Jehanabad, Distt.- Jehanabad Versus 1. The State Of Bihar 2. The Principal Secretary Social Welfare Deptt., Govt. Of Bihar, Patna 3. The Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya 4. The District Magistrate, Jehanabad 5. The District Programme Officer, Jehanabad 6. The Child Development Project Officer, Jehanabad 7. Sangeeta Kumari W/O Vidayabhushan Sharma C/O Shashi Bhushan Sharma, R/O Mohalla- East Gandhi Maidan, P.S.- Jehanabad, Distt.- Jehanabad ----------- 3. 29.07.2011 Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the State. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 12.8.2010 of the Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya in Appeal No. 45 of 2008, preferred by Respondent no. 7. By the impugned order Respondent no. 7 has been reinstated on the post of Anganwari Sevika at Anganwari Centre No. 156,Gandhi Maidan-A, District Jehanabad. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that earlier Respondent no. 7 had been selected and appointed. Consequent to allegations for dereliction in discharge of duties against her, her services were terminated by the District Magistrate on 12.1.2008.She instituted an appeal. In the meantime pursuant to a fresh selection process, the petitioner had been appointed on 9.5.2008. The appellant did not bring this development to the attention of the Appellate Authority. The petitioner was not impleaded as party defendant. The appeal was barred by time (seven days late). In this manner the appeal was allowed and the order of termination set aside. Learned Counsel for the State submits that the defect in termination of Respondent no. 7 was a patent and not a latent illegality. The appellate order requires no interference in the peculiar facts of the case. 2 The guidelines laid down for appointment of Anganwari Sevika are more in the nature of administrative instructions and do not have statutory force. The question of limitation in filing the appeal cannot be tested on the yardstick of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Clause (11) of the guidelines has to be understood in the context of the nature of illegality of the order and the reasonable explanation that may be furnished for the delay if any. The Court does not consider the delay of seven days only as fatal in the facts of the case. Had the delay been unreasonable, different questions may have arisen for consideration. A Division Bench of this Court in 2004 (2) PLJR 833 (Smt. Sajjan Devi & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) has held that an Anganwari Sevika was entitled to the basic minimum requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice before her removal on the ground of alleged dereliction in discharge of duties. The perusal of the order dated 12.1.2008 terminating the services of Respondent no. 7 does not reflect that any show cause notice was given to her and defence considered. On the contrary, it seeks to rely upon certain departmental instructions of the Director, ICDS, permitting removal without show cause notice. That apparently is contrary to the law laid down by this Court. The legal effect of an order in violation of the principles of natural justice has been explained in AIR 1974 SC 1471 (Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat) at Paragraph -19 as follows:- “19. In the present case, a fundamental right of the petitioner has been encroached upon by the police commissioner without due hearing so the Court quashed it - not killed it then but performed the formal obsequies of the order which had died at birth. The legal result is that the accused was never guilty of flouting an order which never legally existed.” 3 There is no material placed by the petitioner to satisfy the Court that notice was in fact issued to Respondent no. 7 before such termination. If the termination of Respondent no. 7 was therefore contrary to law itself, any interference by this Court on the ground that the appellate order was passed without impleading the petitioner and/or granting her hearing would result in revival of an illegal order. No Court of law shall pass an order contrary to law. The Court therefore finds it difficult to interfere with the appellate order as it stands. Additionally, it has been pointed out on behalf of the State that the petitioner was appointed on 9.5.2008 after institution of the appeal by the Respondent no. 7 on 19.2.2008. The contention of the petitioner that her consequent termination was also in violation of the principles of natural justice without an opportunity, does not appeal to the Court as it is satisfied that in the facts of the case it shall be but an empty formality. The petitioner has been removed in pursuance of certain orders passed by the adjudicatory authority when even if she had been heard, on the facts of the present case, no difference consequences shall have ensued. In the entirety of the discussion there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The writ application is dismissed. Snkumar/- (Navin Sinha,J.)