M.A.N0. //5// 2904 Kishore Chand Ramlo S/o Late Govind Ramlo, aged about 28 years, R/o Sector 4, Bhilai, Dist : Durg—(C,G.) Appellant (Claimant) Versus Regpondents . ,1. Smt. Jaspal Kaur W/o Gurvinder Singh alias (Non—Applicahts) i Raja, R/o Near Gardar Bridge, / Dallirajara, Dist : Durg—(C.G.) 2. The National Insurance Company Ltd., Gurunanak Chowk, Jagdalpur 3. The Baj aj Aliens General Insurance Co.Ltd., / Through M/s Vandana Auto Vandana House, G.E.Road, R'aipur-(C.G.) ISC. APPEAL U/S 17gOF THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT. H M V, Rs.25,000.00 Rs. 15.00‘ Claim in Appeal Fees Court fees paid EN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILAS U ” HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH &T BILASPUR MISC. APPEAL NO. 1 15 OF 2004 Kishore Chand Ramlo 'Versus— t .Smt. Jaspak Kaur argd other JUDGMENT Sd/- ‘ Fakhruddin Acting Chief Justice Post for [14 -2-2005 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MISC. APPEAL NO. 1 15 OF 2004 e KiShore Chanel Ram 10 -Versus— Smt. Jaspal Kaur and Others Appellant by Shri Prafu11 Bharat, Advocate t Respondent No.2 by Shri Anand Gupta, Advocate. Respondent. no. 8 by Shri S’S. Rajput, Advocate . JUDGMENT Heard finally, with consent. 2. This appeal has been tiled against the order dated 30-12—2003 passed by the Motor Accident. Claims Tribunal, Jagdalpur whereby the application for interim compensation flled by the appellant has been rejected. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant filed a claim petition along with an application under Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act for grant of interim compensation stating that the accident occurred on 8— l 1-2002 at about 10,00 RM. lt was stated that While the appellant along with his friend Jaiprakash was going from Bhilai to Jagdalpur on a motorcycle of his brotheribearing registration No. CG O4 ZM 2494 namely Bajaj Boxer, and when he reached near Asna Dhaba, a truck bearing registration No. CG O7 ZC 2845 was parked by its driver in the middle of the road Without Indicator, Parking light and at the time another vehicle was coming from opposite x \\ \ / / 3 \ > = rm R) Side and due to bright light of that vehicle, he could ot see the parked truck and collided with the saiatruck. De to said accident his, Spine Survical got fractured an 15 stiche wer sewed in his skull and he also uffered paralysis of entire body just below the chest. Before the Court below it was submitted that the claimant was working i Tractor Agency as'a Sales Officer and was geing Rs. 5,00g/— per month It was frther submitted that due to the said accint, he suffered permanent disabili and he is unable to work, It was lso submitted that n the treatment e has to incur heav expenses. Te claiman claimed Rs. 9,00,600/ — in all heads from the respondents. 4. The respondents fild reply and denied the claim of the appellant. 5. The Court below has reected the application for grant of ntem compensation on the round that since the accident had occurred due to the negligence a s of ppellant, he i not entitled for any interim compensation. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal as failed to conside that the oy requirement while consdering the application under Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act is that. an accident was occurred out of the use of otor vehicle and at the stage of grant of r interim compensation, the claimant is not required to plead nd establish the act that the death or permanent dsablement wa due to any wrongful ac, negligence or dult of h owner. t h r nl i n d u d s e s n a tt u de tv a ‘ i h y h t e j iri g m a f I i s“ t efa te 7. Counsel for the appellant plaC€d reliance on a decision in the case of Shamina Begum and others —v- Raiendra Waghmare and another (1999(2) JLJ 23 1) Where While dealing with section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act, it waS held in para 7 that for awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to satisfy itself Whether an accident has arisen out of the use of ‘.~‘ motor vehicle. 8. Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Harbans Singh Tuteja :v— Vinod Niarmalkar and another (2002(2) CJLJ 33 1). Para 5 of the judgment is relevant and quoted below:— ”5.' Learned counsel for the applicant in support of his contention placed reliance on a judgment of Supreme Court reported in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another ~v- Vatschala Uttam More {AIR 1 991 SC 1 769) where the Apex Court while interpreting the scope of Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (corresponding to Section 140 of the Act) quoted with approval the law enunciated by it in an earlier decision in case of Guirat State Road Transport Corporation —v- Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (AB? 1 987 SC 1690) observed in paras 1 1 and 12 as under :- ‘1 1‘ It is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been granted under Section 92-A of the‘Act to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on account of motor vehicles accidents. Now they can claim Rs. 1 5) 000/- without proof of any'negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. Thispart ofthe Act is clearly a departurefrom the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the pait of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified. \ , 12. It is thus evident that Section 92A in the nature of beneficial Zegtsiation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of ‘a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the Courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose, The same approach has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions i x ‘ of the Act. (See Motor Owners’ Insurance Co. Ltd. —v- Judavji Keshavji Modi {1981” ACJ 507 (SC) and Ska’ndia Insurance Co. Ltd. —v— Kikilaben Chandravadan {1 98 7 ACJ 41 1 (SC). ’ ‘In Shivaji Davanu Patil (Supra); the Supreme Court has enunciated the principles of law that no fault provision, as is propounded in section 92 — A of the Act of 1939, correspondent to section 140 of the Act, is in the nature as of a measure of social justice a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious statutory payment of fixed amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. The underlying object of the provision would be defeated ifthe Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under section I 1 OA of the Act of 1 939 corresponding section 1 66 of the Act, but before ordering compensation under this provision the Tribunal has to satis@ itself that the requirement ofsection are satisfied}: 9. Counsel for the appellant further relied on the decision in me case of K. Nandakumar ~V— Managing Director, Thanthal Perivar Transport Corporation (AIR 1996 SC 1‘2 17). Para 4 of the judgment. is relevant and quoted belOW:- ‘ um “4t There was; therefore, on a plain reading or Section 92-A, particularly the first part of sub- section (4) thereof no basis for holding that a claim thereunder could be made only if the person who had died or suffered permanent disablement had not been negligent,‘ The provision being clear, no external aid to its construction such as the Statement of Objects and reasons, was called for. ” In View of the provisions contained under Section 140 of the Act and the judgments cited and discussed herein above, in the opinion of this Court, the Court belo ‘was not justifled ’in rejecting the application for interim V 5 compensation flied by the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is not sustainable and the same is set asideiTh‘e appellant is entitled for interim compensation of Rs. 25,000/— and respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to pay the amount of interim award jointly Within a period of 3O days. It is made clear that if the amount is not paid within the stipulated period, it shall early interest@ nyv‘ 11. With the aforesaid observations and directions the appeal is allowed with costs. 10. Sd/— 12. i Fakhruddin t Acting ChiefJustice‘ l 1t - 2 ooos Counsel fee as per scale. n1“ d LJ f w