IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Criminal Misc. Application No. 618 of 2008 Saurabh Jain …… Petitioner Versus State of Uttarakhand and another …… Respondents …….. Mr. Ramji Srivastava, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Nandan Arya, A.G.A. for respondent no. 1. Mr. Naresh Pant, Advocate for respondent no. 2. Hon’ble V.K. GUPTA, C. J. In this petition filed U/s 482 Cr.P.C., the Petitioner seeks the quashing of the criminal proceedings only on the ground that the amount in question has been paid by the Petitioner to Respondent no.2 and, therefore, the criminal proceedings be quashed. In support of this submission, Mr. Ramji Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner has referred to and relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court; firstly, in the case of Jagdish Chanana and others Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in JT 2008 (4) SC 511 and secondly, the Judgment dated 26.03.2008 (unreported) in Criminal Appeal No. 555 of 2008: Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition are that the Petitioner is one of the Directors in the Company M/s Sitarganj Rice Mill Pvt. Ltd., Village Bhitora, District Udham Singh Nagar. M/s Sitarganj Rice Mill Pvt. Ltd. (“Company” for short) had entered into an agreement with Respondent no. 2 with respect to a loan transaction since it had obtained a loan of Rs. 29,80,000/- and Rs. 5,00,000/- from Respondent no. 2 Corporation in the years 1988 and 1989. As a security to the repayment of the said loan amounts, the Company had mortgaged/pledged certain properties, moveable as well as immovable, belonging to it in favour of respondent no. 2 Corporation. An F.I. R. was lodged against the petitioner and another person on 17.12.1996 alleging therein that even while the loan amount was due for payment, the aforesaid two persons removed from the premises in question the mortgaged/pledged machines to some other place. 2 Specific allegation was that by practicing deception and fraud, these persons had removed mortgaged/pledged machines with a view to gain undue advantage for themselves and incur disadvantage to the Corporation. The case accordingly u/s 406 I.P.C. was sought to be made out against the petitioner and the aforesaid other person. Charge-sheet was filed in the Court under Section 406 I.P.C. It is in this background that the prayer in this petition for quashing the criminal proceedings has been made on the only ground that in the meanwhile the Company has liquidated the entire loan amount. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and in my considered opinion, the aforesaid Judgments of the Supreme Court are not applicable in this case. A very careful reading of the aforesaid two Judgments of the Supreme Court clearly spells out three very essential, vital and critical ingredients which can form the basis of quashing the proceedings in a criminal case, in a particularly given fact situation. These three ingredients, which can safely be culled out from the aforesaid two Judgments are as under: 1. A Compromise had been arrived at in the aforesaid cases between the accused party and the complainant party, the terms whereof clearly spelling out that the parties did not want to proceed further in the criminal cases; 2. The dispute or allegation forming the subject-matter of the F.I.R./ Criminal Complaint was purely of a personal nature and; 3. There was no public policy involved, looking to the nature of the allegations made against the accused in the F.I.R. or the Complaint. If the aforesaid three ingredients are applied in the present case, what I find is that the present case is not covered at all by the ratio in the aforesaid two Judgments of the Supreme Court. Firstly, there is no 3 Compromise at all having been arrived at or entered into between the Company or the Petitioner and Respondent no. 2 Corporation. The only fact which the Petitioner alleges is about the payment of the entire outstanding amount (which fact is not disputed by the learned counseling appearing for Respondent no. 2). Clearing the outstanding dues is one thing, but entering into a Compromise in which the parties also agree that the pending criminal cases be sorted out is quite different. Admittedly, in the present case, Respondent no. 2 and the Company or Respondent No. 2 and the Petitioner have not entered into any Compromise to the aforesaid effect or in the aforesaid terms. Secondly, the allegations against the Petitioner were certainly not of a personal nature and there was a clear public policy involved in the present case because the Petitioner was charged of committing an offence punishable U/s 406 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the petitioner had removed the mortgaged/pledged machinery from the premises in question with a view to gain undue advantage to the Company and to incur disadvantage to respondent no. 2 Corporation. At the risk of reiteration, I do wish to point out that such an allegation is neither personal nor can it be termed to be not violating the public policy. I am afraid no relief can be granted to the Petitioner in the present petition by the application of the aforesaid two Judgments of the Supreme Court on the only ground of clearance of the outstanding dues. The petition is dismissed. (V. K. Gupta, C.J.) 16.07.2009 A