1 spb/ IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE SIDE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4317 OF 2009 1. M/s. Genesis Color Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ... Petitioners. Versus 1. Rajiv Ramlabhaya Suri & Anr. ... Respondents. --- WITH CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4319 OF 2009 1. M/s. Genesis Color Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ... Petitioners. Versus 1. Anil Ramlabhaya Suri & Anr. ... Respondents. --- Mr. N.K. Thakore i/by Prakash Naik for the Petitioners. Mr. A.M. Sarogi for the Respondent No.1 in both the Applications. Ms. A.T. Jhaveri, APP for the State. --- CORAM : B. R. GAVAI, J. DATED : 25th FEBRUARY, 2010. P.C. : 1. The petitioners have approached this court, challenging the order passed by the learned Magistrate, 12th Court Bandra in Case No. 2272/SS of 2 2008, rejecting the application of the petitioners to return the complaint to the complainant for being filed in the appropriate court. 2. It appears that there was leave and license agreement entered between the petitioners and the father of the respondent no.1 (original complainant). After the demise of the father of the complainant, under the Will the property came to the share of the complainant. Accordingly, certain post dated cheques were issued to the complainant towards licence fees. Some of the cheques were honoured, however, the subsequent cheques were dis- honoured. Accordingly, the criminal compliant came to be filed by the complainant against the petitioners. 3. The petitioners took objection to the jurisdiction of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate at Bandra and prayed for returning the complaint for representation before the appropriate court. The said objection by the petitioners was rejected by the said court. Hence, the present petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the learned Magistrate has erred in holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain this application. He submits that the cheques were issued from Delhi because the petitioners reside at Delhi and as such it is only the court of Delhi which will have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The 3 learned counsel relied on the judgments of the learned single Judge of this court in the case of M/s. Jinraj Pape -Udyog vs. M/s. Dinesh Associates & Anr., reported in 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 89; in the case of Ahuja S/o. Nandkishore Dongre vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. , reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri.) 3357 and in the case of Laxmi Travels vs. G.E. Countrywide Consumer & Anr. reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2482. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harman Electronics Pvt.Ltd. & Anr. vs. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2009 1 Supreme Court Cases 720 and in the case of K. Bhaskaran vs Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr., reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3762. 5. The apex court in the case of K. Bhaskaran, cited supra, in paragraphs 13,14,15 and 16 has observed thus : “13. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the con-catenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence : (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) 4 Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In this context a reference to Section 178 (d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below : “Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas” 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those Courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under section 138 of the Act.” 5 6. It can thus clearly be seen that the apex court in the aforesaid case has observed that complainant can file a complaint in the court which has jurisdiction where one of the five events have taken place. 7. In Harman Electronics’ case, cited supra, the facts were as under : The appellants and the respondent had entered into a business transaction. The appellant was a resident of Chandigarh. The cheque in question was issued at Chandigarh, although his head office was at Delhi. The cheque was presented at Chandigarh and it was also dishonoured at Chandigarh. However, the respondent -complainant issued a notice to the appellant, demanding payment from New Delhi. The said notice was served upon the respondent at Chandigarh. On failure to make the payment, the complaint came to be filed at Delhi. In this background the question arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court is whether the court at Delhi will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It is clear from the paragraph 12 of the judgment in the said case that the cheque was not presented at Delhi. The Apex court considered the issue as to whether merely giving the notice from Delhi would give rise to a cause of action for taking action under the Negotiable Instrument Act. The court, therefore, found that merely giving a notice 6 without the same being duly served could not give rise to a cause of action to file a complaint. The apex court observed that when the bank has several branches and if the complainant is permitted to present a cheque in any of the branch, it will only cause grave harassment to the accused and therefore, it was necessary to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of an accused. In this background the apex court also held that the court at Delhi did not have jurisdiction. 8. Insofar as the judgment of the learned single Judge of this court in the case of Ahuja S/o.Nandkishore Dongre, cited supra, the complainant was resident at village Soyjana, Tah. Manora Dist. Wasim. The accused was the resident of Bhandara. Since there were friendly relations between the accused and the complainant, the complainant gave him hand loan of Rs. 35,000/-. The accused issued three cheques of Rs.15,000/-, and two of Rs.10,000/- of future dates. The cheques were drawn in the Bank of India at Bhandara Branch. The complainant presented those cheques for encashment at Digras. The said cheques were returned with the endorsement that the account was closed. Accordingly, the notice was served from Digras and for non-compliance the complaint came to be filed at Digras. The process was issued and objection to the territorial jurisdiction was rejected by the learned trial court. The court held that since the place of ordinary residence of the complainant is at Soyjana , the court at 7 Digras had no jurisdiction. In the case of M/s. Jinraj Paper Udyog, cited supra, the learned single Judge of this court in paragraphs 52 and 53 has observed thus : “52. What emerges from all these judgments, and more particularly, K. Bhaskaran and Mosaraf Hossain’s cases, could be summed up as under (inspite of risks inherent in such summing up) : 1. Jurisdiction to file a case of offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is not restricted only to the Court within whose jurisdiction the drawee bank is situated and where cheque is actually dishonoured upon presentation, though a complaint could be filed even at such place as payment was intended to be made there. 2. Five components of the offence enumerated in the judgment in K. Bhaskkaran would be relevant for considering the question of jurisdiction. 3. Mere issuance of cheque may not be enough to confer jurisdiction to the Court within whose jurisdiction the cheque was issued. 4. More pertinent, or decisive component would be the place, where the transaction leading to debt or creation of legally enforceable liability, for discharge whereof a cheque is issued, 8 or, where payment was to be made. 5. Drawing a cheque on a particular bank would indicate intention to make payment at the place where such bank is situated and acceptance of such cheque by payee would indicate his consent to receive payment at such place. 6. Since “the payee” is required to issue a notice demanding payment, such place of giving notice would be where, if payee is a company (or other registered establishment) it has a registered office, and in other cases, normally, where the payee ordinarily resides or works for gain, and not any place from where the payee may choose to despatch a notice. 53. The facts of these cases, which may now be examined with reference to the above conclusions, are as under : 1. Both the parties have their shops/offices in Delhi. 2. The transactions which gave rise to the liability took place at Delhi. 3. The cheques were issued/delivered at Delhi. 4. They were drawn on a bank at Delhi and accepted by the complainant. 5. They were presented to the bank at Delhi through payee’s bank at Nagpur and were returned unpaid by the bank at Delhi. 9 6. The complainant does not have any registered office of Nagpur. 7. Notices of demand were issued showing address at the premises of a business associate at Nagpur, when the complainant has office at Delhi. 9. The court held that since except sending of notice nothing had taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Nagpur, the court at Nagpur had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It was specifically found that it was only the court at Delhi which had territorial jurisdiction. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Laxmi Travels, cited supra, is concerned in the said case also all the aforesaid five things/ events mentioned in the judgment of K. Bhaskaran had taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Nagpur except sending of notice from Aurangabad. In this factual background, it was held by the learned single Judge of this court that the court at Aurangabad had no territorial jurisdiction and it is only the court at Nagpur which had the territorial jurisdiction. In the present case the facts are totally different than the facts which were for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Harman Electronics, cited supra, and before the learned single Judges of this court. In those cases, except issuance of notice, the entire five events material in the judgment of K. Bhaskaran had taken place within the territorial 10 jurisdiction of the court where the proceedings were initiated and only issuance of notice was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the proceedings were initiated. In this background, it was held that the courts within the territorial jurisdiction of whom the notice was issued had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In the present case, the cheques are presented at a Bank within the territorial jurisdiction of the court before whom the complaint is filed. The cheques were returned dishonoured to the bank which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is lodged. 10. In this factual background, I find that the present the cases are squarely covered by the law laid down by the apex court in the case of K. Bhaskaran, cited supra. As such no merit is found in the applications. Hence, both the applications are dismissed. (B.R.GAVAI, J.) .....