1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.2932 of 1994 Sukharam s/o. Kanoba Kakade Age 28 years , Occ. Service, R/o. Brahman Gally Kalamnoorie, Dist. Parbhani. Petitioner Versus 1] The State of Maharashtra through its Secretary Law and Judiciary Department Mantralaya, Bombay-32. 2] The Registrar, High Court of Judicature Appellate Side, Bombay 3] The Hon'ble District Judge, Parbhani. 4] Shri Rahane, Civil Judge Sr. Dn. & Enquiry Officer, Parbhani. Respondents Mr. S.B. Talekar, Advocate for the petitioner Mr. V.D. Rakh, AGP for the respondents CORAM : B.R. GAVAI & S.V. GANGAPURWALA,JJ. DATE : 24TH JUNE, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT [ PER S.V. GANGAPURWALA] : 2 1] Vide the present petition, the petitioner takes exception to the order dated 13/12/1993, passed by the District Judge, Parbhani, thereby passing an order of De-novo enquiry. 2] The petitioner was placed under suspension and a Departmental Enquiry was initiated against him. The Enquiry Officer who conducted the enquiry, exonerated the petitioner but the Disciplinary Authority did not concur with the finding of enquiry officer, held the petitioner to be guilty, and passed an order imposing punishment of stoppage of 3 increments. Thus, being aggrieved by the same, filed an application for review of the said order before the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority, by its order dated 13th December,1993, set aside the earlier order and passed an order of De-novo enquiry against the petitioner. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this court. 3] Shri Talekar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no basis for ordering a de-novo enquiry, nor there is any provision for the same. As such, he prayed for setting aside the impugned order. 4] The proceedings which were taken up by the petitioner were in the nature of a review. The relevant rules nowhere lay down any remedy of a review. Under the statute, the Disciplinary Authority did not have the powers of review. When the statute did not provide any power to the Disciplinary Authority to review its own order, the Disciplinary Authority did not have inherent power to review the same. It is trite law that power of review has to be 3 specifically conferred by the statute. In absence of any provision conferring power of review on the authority, the authority cannot exercise any power of review. In this context, useful reference can be had to the dictum of the Apex Court in the matter of “K.M.E. Union Vs. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. “ reported in 2005 AIR SCW 1561. 5] In the light of the above, as the Disciplinary Authority did not have the powers to review, we hereby set aside the order impugned in the present petition i.e. the order dated 13/12/1993. 6] The petitioner has not challenged the order dated 31/3/1993, passed by the Disciplinary Authority by filing an appeal. As such the said order has achieved finality and stands confirmed. In the earlier order dated 31/3/1993, the Disciplinary Authority has not passed any order with regard to monetary benefits during the period of suspension. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any monetary benefit during the said period. But the period of suspension would be computed as `period on duty' for the purpose of continuity in service and pensionary benefits. Rule made absolute on above terms. There shall be no orders as to costs. [S.V. GANGAPURWALA,J.] [B.R. GAVAI,J.] 4 grt/wp