THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.22229 of 1996 DATED:01.02.2008 Between: M.Rama Krishna and others. …Petitioners And The Chariman and another. ..Respondents. THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.22229 of 1996 ORDER: Aggrieved by the common award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam, dated 08.07.1996, in so far as it relates to I.D.Nos.167, 169, 174 and 209 of 1992, 34 and 36 of 1993 and 388 of 1995, the present Writ Petition is filed. The Labour Court dismissed the batch of I.Ds., holding that the petitioners therein were not entitled to any relief. The petitioners herein had invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”), contending that termination of their services was contrary to Section 25(F) and (H) of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal observed that, in all the cases, the petitioners were taken as NMRs, on daily wage basis, only from 01.10.1991 and removed from service on 21.03.1992, and thus, all of them had worked for about 172 days, in the 12 month period prior to their termination from service. The Tribunal took note of the admissions of the management witness in cross-examination, that the decision to appoint the petitioners as NMRs was pursuant to an agreement between the Management and the Union and that the said agreement required that the piece rated workers be appointed as regular NMRs only from 01.10.1991. The Tribunal held that, in such circumstances, it was difficult to accept the statement made on behalf of the petitioners that they alone were appointed prior to 01.10.1991, when all NMRs were appointed, pursuant to an agreement between the Management and the Union. Observing that none of the petitioners herein had completed the required service of 240 days continuously, in one year, preceding their termination, the Tribunal held that the petitioners were not entitled for the benefit of Section 25(F) of the Act and that the respondents had not contravened the provisions of the Act, in retrenching the workers. Before this Court, Sri K.S.R.Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that, in the absence of any evidence being let in by the respondents to show that the petitioners had worked for less than 240 days, the Tribunal had grossly erred in holding that the petitioners had not completed 240 days of service in the 12 month period preceding their termination. Learned counsel would point out that, in the absence of any documentary evidence being placed on record, the oral evidence let in by the petitioners-workmen and their assertion that they had completed 240 days of service in the 12 month period preceding their termination ought to have been accepted. I must express my inability to agree. It is well settled law, as held by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions in Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. Mani[1], Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Sowaran Singh[2], Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh[3], Chief Engineer (Construction) v. Keshava Rao (dead) by Lrs.[4] and Range Forest Officer v. S.T.Hadimini[5], that the onus is on the workman to prove that he had completed 240 days of service in the 12 month period preceding his termination, that he had to adduce other evidence in addition to his self-serving oral testimony and that the burden to establish that he had completed 240 days of service in the 12 month period preceding his termination could not be shifted on the employer. The Supreme Court also held that the mere fact that the respondent-employer had not adduced any evidence would not justify the Industrial Tribunal drawing an adverse inference against them. In these batch of I.Ds., except the self-serving oral evidence of the petitioners-workmen, no other evidence , either oral or documentary, has been adduced on their behalf. Sri K.S.R.Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioners, would now seek to draw the attention of this Court to certain documents, which do not form part of the material on record before the Industrial Tribunal. It is well settled law that this Court, while exercising its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is concerned only with an examination of the validity of the impugned award and cannot rely on evidence, which was not let in before the Industrial Tribunal and which has been sought to be relied on for the first time in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel would further contend that the respondent-Society has adequate work even as on date and there is no justification for them to disengage the services of the petitioners-workmen. He would further contend that in other public sector undertakings, under the control of the State Government, the services of employees similarly situated, have been regularized and denial of such benefits to the petitioners herein was arbitrary and illegal. As noted above, this Court in certiorari proceedings is concerned only with the validity of the award and not matters extraneous thereto. As to whether the respondents have adequate work and whether the petitioners should have been continued in service etc., are all not questions, which this Court would be justified in considering, when the subject matter of challenge is the award of the Industrial Tribunal. The only question which necessitates examination is whether the findings of the Industrial Tribunal, that the petitioners had not completed 240 days of service in the 12 month period preceding their termination which would entitle them for protection under Section 25(F) of the Act, is based on the evidence on record or whether the finding recorded, in this regard, is perverse and is based on no evidence. As noted above, the findings of the Labour Court are based on the evidence on record and its conclusions can neither be said to be perverse nor as based on no evidence. The award of the Industrial Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity necessitating interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Sri K.S.R.Murthy, would also refer to the averments in the counter-affidavit wherein the respondents have stated that, since the first respondent-Society is not an instrumentality of the State, the writ petition is not maintainable. Learned counsel would submit, rightly so, that the writ petition has been filed challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal and the mere fact that the respondent-Society, which was a party before the Industrial Tribunal, is not an instrumentality of the State, would not exclude the jurisdiction of this Court from examining the Award of the Tribunal in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Be that as it may, the Award of the Industrial Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity necessitating interference. The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. __________ 01.02.2008 GJ [1] 2005 (5) SCC 100 [2] 2005 (8) SCC 481 [3] 2005 (8) SCC 750 [4] 2005 (11) SCC 229 [5] 2002 (3) SCC 25