RSA 160/2011 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY In assailment is the judgment and order dated 28.4.2011 passed by the learned Di strict Judge, Kokrajhar in Title Appeal No. 1/2011 dismissing the appeal and the reby affirming the judgment and order dated 4.12.2010 passed by the learned Civi l Judge, Kokrajhar in Title Suit No. 7/2008. Heard Mr R Duwarah, learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant/ plaintiff instituted the aforementioned suit claiming her self to be the owner, pattadar and occupant of the suit land measuring 4 Bigha 2 Katha 11 Lecha covered by Dag No. 203 and included in Periodic Patta No. 22 at village Habrubil of No.1 Ripu Mouza under Gossaigaon Revenue Circle described in Schedule-A to the plaint. According to her, she inherited the suit land along w ith other plots from her father late Palu Hembrom who expired in the year 1994. Thereafter, the suit land was also mutated and recorded in her name vide order d ated 1.8.98 passed by the Circle Officer, Gossaigaon Revenue Circle in M.C. No. 44/1997-98. Meanwhile, the respondent No.1 filed application before the Circle Offic er, Gossaigaon Revenue Circle claiming mutation of the suit land in his favour contending that his father Ganga Prosad Sha (since deceased) had purchased the s ame from the father of the appellant/ plaintiff. In this application which was r egistered as M.C. No. 184/2004-05 the appellant submitted her written objection inter alia pleading that the suit land had never been sold by her father in favo ur of the respondent or his father as claimed. Mutation, however, was granted in favour of the respondent No.1 vide order 16.10.2007 of the Circle officer, Goss aigaon Revenue Circle in the aforementioned mutation case. Alleging that the sale deed purportedly witnessing the transaction invol ving the aforementioned land was a forged one and that the respondent No.1 had n either acquired any right, title and interest therein or had possessed the same on the basis thereof, the suit was eventually filed for declaration of her right , title and interest therein and also for permanent injunction against the respo ndent No.1 restraining him from interfering with her possession thereof. A decre e for declaration that the order dated 16.10.2007 passed in M.C. No. 184/2004-05 as well as registered sale deed No. 269/2637 dated 22.4.1963 on the basis of wh ich the respondent No.1 had claimed the right, title and interest in the suit la nd to be forged, null and void was also prayed for. In the suit the respondent N os. 2,3 and 4 were the State of Assam; Circle Officer, Gossaigaon Revenue Circle and Sub-Deputy Collector, Gossaigaon respectively. The respondents contested the suit. Whereas the respondent No.1 denied t he allegation made vis-à-vis the sale in particular and the possession of the su it land by the appellant/ plaintiff and claimed his title therein on the basis o f sale deed dated 22.4.1963 as well as the order of mutation referred to hereina bove, the official respondents endorsed his (respondent No.1) title in the suit land as well as the possession thereof since after the registered sale deed date d 22.4.1963. They also confirmed mutation of the name of the respondent No.1 in the suit land vide order dated 16.10.2007 of the Circle Officer, Gossaigaon Rev enue Circle in M.C. No. 184/2004-2005. Noticeably, there is no dispute with rega rd to the identity of the suit land. The appellant/ plaintiff also amended the p laint with the assertion that if the registered sale deed had actually been exec uted by her father she at that time had acquired right, title and interest in th e suit land by adverse possession. The appellant/ plaintiff, thus, in amending h er plaint took an alternate and inconsistent stand. Issues were framed and thereafter on a scrutiny of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record the suit was dismissed. The learned Lower App ellate Court rejected the appeal as well. Mr Duwarah has emphatically argued that as the respondent No.1/ defendan t No.1 had failed to prove the sale deed in compliance of Section 67 of the Indi an Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’), the t ransaction as referred to therein has remained unproved and, thus, the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has taken this Court through the evidence in particular of the respondent No.1/ defendant No.1 and has also pressed into service the decisions of this Court in Bhuponarayan Singh -vs- Piloo Mura, (1999) 1 GLR 412 and in Kir an Das -vs- Uma Ram Bhuyan & Anr., (2006) 3 GLR 376. The pleadings on record and the arguments advanced have been duly consid ered. Section 67 of the Evidence Act mandates that if a document is alleged to b e signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person ’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. This legal precept was t aken note by this Court in Bhuponarayan Singh (supra). The plaintiff in the suit therein asserted against the execution of the registered deed of sale on which the defendant sought to rely in his defence. The plaintiff alleged that the sale deed was false and fictitious. Certain other suspicious circumstances attendant on the execution of the document were also noticed by this Court. In this backg round, adverting to Section 67 of the Act, this Court observed that when a deed is challenged as false and fictitious, the execution thereof must be proved as r equired thereunder. In Kiran Das (supra), in the face of the categorical denial of the defen dants in the suit against execution of a sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff, it was held that the signatures appearing on the document as executants ought t o have been proved by the plaintiff to be those of the defendants or that they (defendants), as vendors, had executed the sale deed. In absence of any evidence to that effect, this Court held that the execution of the sale deed had remaine d unproved. While there cannot be any quarrel on the requirement of law as embodied in Section 67 of the Act, the pleaded orientation of the parties and the facts a nd circumstances of the case would definitely have a decisive bearing on the nat ure and degree of proof called for in compliance thereof. As noticed hereinabove , though the appellant/ plaintiff had denied the execution of the sale deed by h er father in favour of the father of the respondent No.1/ defendant No.1, mutati on in respect of the land involved was granted by the Circle Officer, Gossaigaon Revenue Circle in his (respondent No.1/ defendant No.1) favour. That the appel lant/ plaintiff had taken an alternative stand of adverse possession in case the sale deed had been executed by her father in favour of the father of the respon dent No.1/ defendant No.1 is also a factor which cannot be lightly brushed aside . This in a way demonstrates lack of certainty and consistency of her stand vis -à-vis the sale deed dated 22.4.63. Though mutation per se does not confer title on the pattadar in respect of the immovable property involved, it is trite that the same is sanctioned only on a prima facie satisfaction of his title in as we ll as the possession thereof. On a perusal of the evidence-in-chief of the respondent No.1/ defendant No.1, it is apparent therefrom that he had not only owned and proved the sale de ed but had also exhibited the signature of the Sub-Registrar as Exhibit-A(1). Ad mittedly, on the date of recording of the evidence the vendor, Late Palu Hembrom was not in existence, he having expired in the year 1994. Though advisedly the respondent No.1/ defendant No.1 could have, to consolidate his possession furthe r, produced witnesses in support of the transaction, in the facts and circumstan ces of the case, the omission to do so does not per se invalidate the document o r the transaction as contained therein. The learned Lower Appellate Court has o n a threadbare scrutiny of the evidence on record sustained the validity of the document. It has also reached a finding that the appellant/ plaintiff had failed to prove adverse possession against the respondent No.1/ defendant No.1 vis-à-v is the suit land. The authorities cited on behalf of the appellant as noticed h ereinabove are clearly distinguishable on facts. In the above view of the mater, this second appeal lacks in merit and is dismissed. No costs.