.B^^ts-y iN'g^isi^ti.^Giji^e^eMffiv^^ )^....^^!%»^^;i^^ (.::^^ PE'lMiONER: >s"' RESPONDENTS^ ^•y^^ SHatrughan Prasad Sidar^(S^c> Shi-i Sita Rain Sidar, aged sSwU:! QG years, ^E^^^^^^I^ f'rimary fSeal^ Sen^^ J^ Coiniriynity' HealtU^^ <%a^)le; , T^ Distnct Raigarh (CG), R/o Villa^e and- PQst Oodaxn , TettsM Sarangarli, Bistnct ,,Raigarli(G;G). •l..;.'Versus'-:'^ ^'' :.-":'1: :. :1:.1::,- ' ^J^TM^ S^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ WelSaT^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ Departme»Lt^^^ ^ D.K.8^Bliawan,Kait)ur('GG). :^.. -...•:•:..'.--.•:,-'/^ 2. T^ ClihattisgarIi,%aipur(C 3. TtieCX)!!^ 4/ •The-^hjiiviedie^ ^.'••Offieei-,SKaa|ai^^i^^l.[i::H 5: ThelNal^^^ Bistiact^aSl^rli (CG)^. WRIT PE3'TEIGNilJN;@^I^Ii@BE; 22& ©ETHE ;:,:';.:e©NS'iffiM®agiM &:;^ RAI^C^LAK®<aSM l@8aB(3N®K: ^:'.^ated''in'tliei;(ia;iaJsgi:'t:i!Etg^^ pAi^©a.a!R^©isiia®s;§^e)N]3@N'i's: Asy'stati^;i!nKS^ciaiii^li ^a.^ov^^:r':' -'••<:':'-.; j';.: • fAim(^X.^S^WW^^S Bl& ; .;A©^SS^^HM<aaMB@8Bn UINBNUffilis ^'Qr^T^xuiii^yyi^^yiffytWS^ 2^Dated^:3iIio3Si8iiSNBBIU;%i^ ;3. ';'Passed';l)y^:;3Ses@^|^ffBM3i|:lfit'' '^ ^fafS. -• ^s, •ss^ aa B^^^y .6^5®?• • '• •Kila m t8I '^?i3%^ •:^s^ 3£Sa^^^^.S^^^.^^ 1 tpi. ^ !i^ H/ I.3. ^ ^Q\^ s Mo xo s •:^ ^ ^^ <K1 J) HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S) N0. 6713 OF 2009 PETITIONER RESPQNDENTS Roshan Prasad Sidar Versus The State of Chhattisgarh & Others And W.P. (S) Nos.6714, 6746, 6793, 7170 and 7335 of 2009 (Writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India) Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, J. Present:- Shri Rakesh Anthony, Advocate for the petitioners. Shri M.P.S. Bhatia, Dy. Govt. Advoeate forthe State. ORDER(ORAU (Passed on this 29th day of March, 2010) 1. 2. 'Aa', The petitioners, in this bateh of petitions, are aggrieved by the cancellation of their respective appointment orders, without affording an opportunity of hearing. The question of law involved in this batch of petitions i.e. W.P. (S) No. 6713, 6714, 6746, 6793, 7170 and 7335 of 2009 is whether the appointments of the petitioners, who have been appointed after due selection, can be cancelled on the ground of submission of alleged false and forged documents by some of the candidates, without affording an opportunity of hearing ? Thus, these petitions are being considered and decided by this common order. The indispufable facts, in nutshell, in the petitions, are that the petitioners were selected for appointment on the posts of Multipurpose Health Worker, Dresser & Assistant Grade - III through proper selection process and they were accordingly appointed. The petitioners joined their respective posts at 4. JK,, 6. s.iai! respective places on 26-8-2003, 26-8-2003, 26-8-2003, 25-8-2003, 26-8-2003 and the petitioner in W.P. (S) No.7335 of 2009 was joined in the service pursuant to the order dated 1-10-2003, respectively. After sometime, the Chief Medical & Health Officer, Raigarh, cancelled the appointment of the petitioners on the ground of submission of false and forged documents, by order dated 31-10-2009. The impugned order has been filed and marked as Annexure P/9 in writ petition (S) No.6713of2009. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed these petitions seeking a direction to quash the impugned orders, by which the services of the petitioners have been terminated, and to grant relief of continuation of their services on the respective posts and places. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that once the petitioners have been appointed after following proper selection process and after verification of the documents, their appointments cannot be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioners ought to have been given at least an opportunity of hearing to establish the genuineness or bona fide of the documents, which were allegedly discovered, later on, after a period of about five years, by the authorities, as false and forged documents, after appointment of the petitioners. Per contra, Shri Bhatia, learned counsel appearing for the State would submit that, in fact, after affording an opportunity of hearing, the termination orders have been passed. Shri Bhatia would next submit that in the appointment order itself, it has been specifically mentioned that at any point of time, if the documents submitted by the candidates are found to be false and forged, the services of the employee may be terminated. Therefore, the impugned termination orders have been passed by the respondent authorities in accordance with law. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto. 8. It is admitted that the petitioners were appointed after due selection process and after verification of their documents. Subsequently, it was found that some of the documents filed by some candidates/petitioners were not genuine; therefore, the appointment orders of the petitioners, which were made pursuant to the selection process, were cancelled. 9. In this batch of matters, it appears that a notice was issued on 3-10-2009 (Annexure P/8 to W.P. (S) No.6713 of 2009) to produce the original documents. However, thereafter the petitioners were not afforded any opportunity of hearing to put forward fheir case before passing the impugned orders. 10. 'Show cause notice' implies opportunity of submitting an explanation to a clear unambiguous notice. Thus, in the facts of the case an information was brought in the knowledge of the petitioners without giving show cause notice to file response to ^-. prove genuineness or bona fide of the documents. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court Fn' Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others vs. Subhash & Co. , observed as under: 1 (2003)3 SCC 454 ,,"o}3 uoiiou e 'iueLuieeji in^osdssj JQ A)!|!A!O :M9!ASJ O!}S!]JB JQ oiteuiejp e 'uoitusuj 'pasq luone/ussqo :eouez!uBoo 'uojiejedsjd jo^ paMo||e eiuii ^UIUJEM jo uo!}euj!iui ue SuiAsAuos -'o}3 pjeoq 'pjeoeid :BU!I!J e 'SUIUJBM ^USAS sjnin^ e }noqe A||epadsa 'UOIIBIUJO^UI 'pBflUOO IB41 eiEUILUje} O) UOjlUSlUI J84 jo siq p pej}uoo e o} ssiyed eqi ^o suo Aq speiu lueiusounouue |GLUJO^ e '^ueujeounouue IUOIIBLUIIUI,, (fr91.l -d) 9661. 't'661. luyday -pn (eipu|) sjequjeLio pei||V spiA /Oeuo/^o/o s^eqiueqo ,,'o}s 'uoi^ejedejd jo^ PSMO||B 3011} 'BUIUJBM jo uoiieLuiiui ue 6uiA9Auoo 'ois pjeoe|d '6ui}UM e :6uiujeM IUOIIGLUJO^U! ;iueiueounouue :uo!ieLU!}ui,, (W II. 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'/Oeuo/p/o s68//03 issjeAiun s^iafsqaM ..'pejjs^ui sq AELU 6uiqi qons ^o sousisixs 341 qoiqM LU04 s|eu3iBLU 6uiA|ddns LUOJ^ psiisinBuiisip se '6uiLii e io }ueui9ieis siiuysp pue pejip e si SOIIOM, •(66ZI. •d) pnojis 'd Aq ••upg ^'p9}ajdie}ui Aiieioipnr sasejqd pue spJOM '/Oeuo^o/o /e/o/pnp si/j. : SMO||O^ se seueuoipip pue ssueuoipip lepipnf snoueA ui peuyep useq SB4 ..SOIION^ -iins e ui psiy. iuiB[d e epnpui 01 913JIO |BBe| ui q6noue epiM si pue BUIMOU>| e JQ ,,umou>| Cuieq e,, sueauj iioiqm ^eyi}ou,, PJOM UIIB-I sqi LUOJ^ paieuieuo „^osou„ iujs} 941 -si.,, \ Law Lexicon Dictionary - A Legal Dictionary of Legal Terms and Phrases Judicially Defined, 4th Edn., Vol. II, 1989 (p.226) "A person is said to have notice of a fact, when he actually knows that fact, orwhen, but for willful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it." The Law Lexicon Dictionary. 2nd Edn., 1997 (p.1322) (1) Intimation; a writing; placard, board, etc. conveying an intimation or warning (Section 154 IPC and Article 61 (2) (a), Constitution of India); (2) Knowledge or cognizance (Section 56, Indian Evidence Act). 16. "Notice", in its legalsense, may be defined as information concerning a fact actually communicated to a party by an authorized person, or actually derived by him from a proper source, or else presumed by law to have been acquired by him, which information is regarded as equivalent to knowledge in its legal consequences. Dictionary further states: Co Lit 309 Tomlin's Law Dictionary. 17. Notice is making something known, of what a man was or might be ignorant of before. And it produces diverse effects, for, by it, the party who gives the same shall have the same benefit, which otherwise he should not have had; the' party to whom the notice is given is made subject to some action or charge, that otherwise he had not been liable to; and his estate in danger of prejudice. 18. "Notice is a direct and definite statement of a thing as distinguished from supplying materials from which the existence of such thing may be inferred." (Per Parke, 6. Burgh v. Legge). 19. The dictionary gives some other definitions of "notice" as : The legal instrumentality by which knowledge is conveyed, or by which one is charged with knowledge. - The term 'notice' in its full legal sense embraces a knowledge of circumstances that ought to induce suspicion or belief, as well as direct information of that fact. - In its popular sense 'notice' is equivalent to information intelligence, or knowledge." 12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that it cannot be held that proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners before passing the impugned orders. In the present cases, it appears that no opportunity of hearing as required under the principles of natural justice and fair play in action was afforded. 13. It is well settled principle of law that if any order visits with civil consequences, the same is vitiated, if passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee(s). (See Shrawan Kumar Jha and others v. State ofBihar and others , D.K.Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. & Others , Basudeo Tiwari v. Sido Kanhu University & Others4, Canara Bank & Others. v. Debasis Das & Others , Vivekanand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. & Others6, Mohd. Sartaj & another v. State of U.P. & Others, Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & others Vs. State of Punjab & others , Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India & Others, State of Manipur & Others v. Y. Token Singh & Others , Jaswant Singh Pratap Singh Jadeja v. 2AIR (•1991)30310 3 (1993)33cc 259 4A.I.R. (1998)3.c. 3261 5(2003)4SCC557 6 (2005) 5 SCC 337 7 (2006)23cc 315 8 A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 2571 9 (2007) 4 SCC 54 10 (2007) 5 SCC 65 \ <^..N 14. Rajkot Municipal Corporation & another , Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan v. Mehbub Alam Lashkar , State of Punjab & Others v. Constable Avtar Singh (Dead) Through LRs. ). This Court, in the matter of Ku. Punam & Others v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others , wherein an identical issue came up for consideration, observed as under: "20. It is well settled that the purpose of rules of natural justice is not to administer justice alone but to prevent miscarriage of justice and the principles of natural justice are applicable to the administrative order, if such order affects right of a citizen. 20. xxx XXX XXX 15. 21. Applying well settled principle of law to the facts of the cases, there is a common thread that the principle of natural justice is not unruly horse. The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, having regard to the facts situation obtained therein. Thus, the principles of natural justice may not be required to be followed in the cases, where the facts are admitted. Secondly, that it is practically impossible or highly improbable to afford an opportunity of hearing, in the event, of quashing of selection on account of irregularity committed on mass scale, or en-masse cancellation. Thirdly, no useful purpose would be served by affording an opportunity of hearing." Subsequently, the ratio laid down by this Court in Ku. Punam (supra) has been referred approvingly in Mrityunjay Shukla & Others v. Municipal Corporation Raipur & Others . Aa, 11 (2007)103cc 71 12 (2008) 2 SCC 479 13 (2008) 7 SCC 405 14 (2008) 2 CGLJ 366 15 (2009) 1 CGU 97 Gowri 16. Applying the well-settled principles of law to the facts of the cases, the impugned orders dated 31-10-2009 passed in these writ petitions are quashed. The petitioners are entitled to reinstate in their respective services without back wages. However, having regard to the facts situation of the case, liberty is reserved to the respondents to take appropriate action/steps in accordance with law, if so advised, after complying with basic principles of natural justice and fair play in action. 17. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. No order asto costs. Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri -^=S Judge •(^f.