THE HON’BLE SRI ANIL R. DAVE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE and THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN W.P.No.901 of 1998 ORDER: (Per HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN) This writ petition is filed to quash the demand notice dated 08.01.1998, issued by the 1st respondent, demanding payment of tax of Rs.85,000/- and penalty of Rs.1,70,000/- for the quarter ending 31.12.1997 in respect of the petitioner’s vehicle bearing No.AP12T 4517. The petitioner submitted an application on 30.09.1997 to the 1st respondent informing him that his vehicle was not being put to use from 30.09.1997 onwards for want of repairs. The petitioner claims to have paid tax for the quarter ending 30.09.1997 and that his stoppage application was received by the 1st respondent on 30.09.1997 itself. The petitioner’s vehicle was seized on 23.12.1997 under Vehicle Check Report No.910930. The 1st respondent issued show cause notice dated 26.12.1997 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why tax of Rs.85,000/- and penalty of Rs.1,70,000/- should not be collected for the quarter ending 31.12.1997. In the said show cause notice it is alleged that the Motor Vehicle Inspector had stopped and checked the petitioner’s vehicle bearing No.AP12T 4517 on 23.12.1997 and, among other irregularities, it was found that, while a stoppage report in respect of the vehicle from 01.10.1997 onwards had been filed, the vehicle was found plying without payment of tax for the quarter ending 31.12.1997. The petitioner submitted a reply to the show cause notice on 05.01.1998 pursuant to which the 1st respondent issued the demand notice dated 08.01.1998 demanding payment of tax of Rs.85,000/- and penalty of Rs.1,70,000/- from the petitioner. Sri B.Sivaramakrishnaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner, does not dispute the finding recorded by the 1st respondent, in the impugned demand notice dated 08.01.1998, that on 23.12.1997 at 5.00 p.m., the Motor Vehicles Inspector had stopped and checked the petitioner’s vehicle in Afzulgung and had found the vehicle carrying 10 persons from Bombay to Hyderabad. It is evident that, despite seeking permission for stoppage of the vehicle and, thereby avoiding payment of tax for the quarter ending 31.12.1997, the petitioner was caught red handed by the Motor Vehicle’s Inspector, while plying the vehicle, on 23.12.1997. The only contention urged by the learned counsel is that penalty of 200% of the tax due could not have been imposed. Learned counsel would submit that, under Rule 13 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, it is only if the tax due is for a period exceeding two months, from the beginning of the quarter, can penalty, not exceeding twice the quarterly tax, be imposed. Learned counsel would submit that, in view of the grace period prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.96 dated 21.05.1993, the period provided in the Table to Rule 13 must be so read as to entitle the petitioner to pay tax within 30 days from the commencement of the quarter and it must consequently be held that, even on the date on which the Motor Vehicle Inspector had stopped the vehicle on 23.12.1997, the tax due was for a period less than two months, in which event the maximum penalty, which could be imposed under Rule 13, could not exceed the quarterly tax due. Under Section 6 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963, if the tax due in respect of any motor vehicle has not been paid as specified in Section 4, the Registered owner shall, in addition to payment of the tax due, be liable to penalty which may extend to twice the quarterly tax in respect of that vehicle. Under Section 4 the tax levied under the Act shall be paid in advance within 15 days from the commencement of the quarter. The Government, vide G.O.Ms.No.96 dated 21.5.1993, stipulated that no penalty should be levied under Section 6 if the tax under Section 4, in respect of the motor vehicle, is paid on or before the end of the first month of every quarter. While payment of the tax due, within one month from the commencement of the quarter would preclude the respondent from levying penalty under Section 6, in the case on hand, the petitioner has, admittedly, not paid the tax due for the quarter ending 31.12.1997 within 30 days from the commencement of the quarter i.e., on or before 31.10.1997. The vehicle was found to have been put to use on 23.12.1997, despite the petitioner’s request for stoppage having been acceded to which is more than two months from the commencement of the quarter i.e. 01.10.1997. Rule 13 of the A.P. Motors Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963, reads thus: If the tax due in respect of a motor vehicle has not been paid as specified in Section 4, the Licensing Officer shall impose the penalty under Section 6 of the Act, as specified in the table below: TABLE PERIOD AMOUNT OF PENALTY 1 Within one month from the beginning of the quarter, half year or year, as the case may be Not exceeding one half of the quarterly tax 2 Within two months from the beginning of the quarter, half year or year, as the case may be Not exceeding the amount of quarterly tax 3 For over two months from the beginning of the quarter, half year or year, as the case may be Not exceeding twice the quarterly tax 4 For each calendar month or part thereof in respect of motor vehicles for which life time or lump sum is prescribed Not exceeding 2% of the life time or lump sum tax for calendar month or part thereof subject to a maximum of twice the life time or lump sum tax due It is evident from the aforementioned table that where the period of tax due exceeds two months, from the beginning of the quarter, the amount of penalty which can be levied should not exceed twice the quarterly tax. In the case on hand, the tax due for the quarter was Rs.85,000/- and, as such, the maximum penalty which could have been imposed under Rule 13 was twice the said amount i.e., Rs.1,70,000/-. The first respondent has imposed a penalty of Rs.1,70,000/- which is exactly twice the quarterly tax due and as such the stipulation under Rule 13 has been adhered to. This Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not exercise its discretion to interfere except in larger public interest. A writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari are discretionary unlike a writ of Habeas Corpus which can be sought as a matter of right. One of the principles inherent is that the exercise of discretionary power should be for the sake of justice and if quashing the order results in greater harm to the society then the Court may refrain from exercising the power. (State of Maharashtra Vs. Prabhu[1]). The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised in every case where there is an error of law. In the name of correcting errors of law, Courts ought not to bring forth a situation which would result in injustice and, if justice became the by- product of an erroneous view of law, Courts are not expected to erase it in the name of correcting errors of law. (Roshan Deen Vs. Preetilal[2]). One of the limitations imposed by this Court, on itself, is that it would not allow itself to be turned into a court of appeal to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice. (Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah[3]). Even if a legal flaw might be electronically detected, this Court would not interfere save manifest injustice. (Rashpal Malhotra Vs. Mrs. Satya Rajput[4]; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Vs. K.G.S.Bhatt[5]). The petitioner has been found to be surreptitiously using the vehicle after having intimated the respondents about stoppage of the vehicle which entitled him to exemption from payment of tax for the quarter ending 31.12.1997. But for the fact that he was caught red handed plying the vehicle on 23.12.1997, the petitioner would not have paid the tax due for the quarter ending 31.12.1997 despite having put the vehicle to use. The petitioner has violated the provisions of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and the Rules made thereunder in failing to pay tax within the stipulated period on the false plea that he had stopped putting the vehicle to use. No indulgence need be shown in favour of a person who has violated the law. We see no reason to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner. The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, no costs. ___________________ ANIL R. DAVE, CJ _____________________________ RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J Date:24--06-2009 GK/CVRK [1] (1994) 2 SCC 481 [2] (2002) 1 SCC 100 [3] AIR 1955 SC 425 [4] AIR 1987 SC 2235 [5] AIR 1989 SC 1972