THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO C.R.P.Nos. 2262 & 2560 OF 2003, 166 OF 2005 AND C.R.P.NO.4665 OF 2007 COMMON ORDER: Heard Sri C.Prakash Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Sri K.Raghuveer Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondents. All these Civil Revision Petitions relate to a dispute with regard to an extent of Ac.11.20 guntas in Sy.No.56, Ac.1.13 guntas in Sy.No.57 and Ac.1.04 guntas of land in Sy.No.58 situated at Jangaon, Warangal District. The lands originally belong to P.Mohan Reddy. One Gajjela Mallaiah claimed to be a protected tenant of the suit schedule properties and he applied for ownership certificate and the Land Reforms Tribunal granted the same on 31-08-1975 and the land holders preferred an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer who by his order dated 26-04-1976 remanded the matter for holding a de novo enquiry but no enquiry was conducted. During the year 1989, the protected tenants filed an application seeking restoration of the possession and the MRO conducted an enquiry and ordered restoration of possession. An appeal was filed under Section 90 of the A.P.(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 ( for short “the Act”) to the Joint Collector and the said appeal was allowed on 23-09-1991 on the basis of a compromise petition said to have been filed by the Advocate of the protected tenants. The protected tenants claimed that fraud was played and then preferred an appeal to the Joint Collector to set aside the said order but the appeal was rejected and as against that order W.P.No.12108 of 1992 and W.P.No.2203 of 1994 were filed and the matter was again remanded to the MRO by judgment dated 30-12-1996 to conduct a fresh enquiry. Pursuant to that order, the MRO conducted an enquiry and issued Protected Tenancy Certificate (P.T. Certificate) by order dated 22-08- 1997 rejecting the claim of the landlords about the oral surrender in 1952 and possession was said to have been delivered to the protected tenants on 23-10-1997. While matter stood thus, the landlords preferred W.A.Nos.1154 and 1155 of 1997 against the orders in W.P.No.12108 of 1992 and 2203 of 1994 and the Writ Appeals were allowed on 19-01-1998 with certain directions. According to the revision petitioners, there was a misrepresentation by the landlords that they are already preferred an appeal against the orders of MRO which was not correct. The appeal filed by the landlords against the order of MRO dated 22-08-1997 was challenged to the Joint Collector and the same was dismissed as being time-barred and the landlords preferred C.R.P.No.3038 of 2001 condoning the delay and directing an enquiry. In the meantime, on 04-05-2001 the RDO issued the protected 38-E certificate with regard to land in Sy.No.56 but did not give the certificate with regard to other lands in Sy.Nos.57 and 58. The landlords and tenants preferred the appeals to the Joint Collector, who confirmed the order and therefore the landlords filed CRP No.2262 of 2003 and the protected tenants filed C.R.P.2560 of 2003 for refusal of the patta for part of the land. In view of the directions in C.R.P.3038 of 2001, the Joint Collector has taken the appeal on file and passed the order on 18-11-2004 whereunder the order of the MRO was set aside issuing the tenancy certificate for the land in Sy.No.56. Consequently, challenging that order the protected tenants filed C.R.P.166 of 2005. C.R.P.4665 of 2007 relates to the claim of another protected tenant Kallem Ramaiah whose claim for protected tenancy certificate for the land in Sy.No.54 to an extent of Ac.6.20 guntas of land was rejected. Hence the C.R.P.4665 of 2007 was filed. A decision in this case rests upon the fact as to whether the late Gajjela Mallaiah was the protected tenant and was entitled to the ownership certificate and possession of the property and also as to whether Kallem Ramaiah was the protected tenant. In this case, it is the specific contention of the land owners that the tenants have surrendered their lands in 1952 and they have kept quite for several years and in 1975 though ownership certificate was obtained, it was set aside by the RDO and the matter was remanded but no enquiry was conducted by the MRO and in 1989 application for possession was sought after lapse of several years and possession was obtained and the tenancy certificate issued by the MRO and the ownership certificate issued by the RDO under Section 38-A of the Act are to be considered. Any decision will depend upon the fact as to whether the theory of surrender of possession in 1952 which was said to have been recorded in revenue records and accepted by the revenue authorities is true or not and as to whether any presumption of loss of possession by voluntary act can be drawn. Evidently, the original record with regard to above facts and also the record before the R.D.O pertaining to the year 1975-76 where for the first time the plea of surrender was taken up with some documents and the R.D.O has set aside the order of the M.R.O and directed a de novo enquiry and the said file is not available. The fact remains from 1976 till the application for possession was filed no attempt was made by the protected tenant for restoration of possession. Evidently, from 1952 till 1975, and thereafter from 1975 till 1989 the protected tenant kept quite. It is common knowledge that if any person has got interest in the property and rights are created under the statute and entitled for protection and possession would not keep quite for a longer time. Though the principle of limitation may not apply but at the same time the law of limitation prescribes extinguishment of rights of the owner if he keeps quite for a longer time without ascertaining any rights. On the same principle also there is no reason as to why the conduct of the tenant should not be viewed as to the factum of the voluntary surrender and a valid surrender under statute. Though till 1954 the oral surrender is recognized as valid, it is only after 1954 the surrender was required to be in writing. In this case, the above question does not arise since the landlords are claiming that the surrender was in 1952. The law of evidence clearly presumes a state of fact to exist and continue in favour of the owner of the property unless and until the contrary is proved. Evidently, the possession was lost by the tenant and it is conspicuously absent in all the applications as to when the possession was lost. It was not a grievance of a forcible dispossession complained of by the tenants at any point of time. Therefore, the court has to weigh the probabilities of an existence of a fact by keeping in mind the conduct of the parties. For the above reasons only in the decision reported in Ponnala Narsing Rao Vs. Nallolla Pantaiah and others([1]) the Supreme Court has held that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing an application under Section 32, still it must be filed within a reasonable time and in case of belated applications the opposite party must prove to have been adversely affected thereby. So also in an unreported decision of this Court in C.R.P.Nos.1511 and 2072 of 2005 [Vema Hanumantha Rao Vs. M/s.Priaya Darshini Co-Op Housing Society Limited] this court has considered the above decision and found that that the Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1988 AP 77 [Sada Vs. Tahsildar, Utnoor] giving benefit to the protected tenant though out of possession was held to be not holding the field. The delay in approaching the authorities for P.T certificate or restoration of possession has to be taken into consideration. In a decision reported in Bheemati Dawood Vs. Madichetty Rachaiah and others([2]) the same view has been expressed. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners on the other hand contends that the Joint Collector has based the order which is under challenge in C.R.P.166 of 2005 on surmises and basing on secondary evidence, which is not at all admissible and the reasons to interfere with the order of M.R.O are not valid and therefore the right of the protected tenants for ownership and also restoration of possession cannot be denied. He relied upon a decision reported in Venkanna and others Vs. Pichikuntal Buchamma and others([3]) whereunder it was held that surrender must be in writing and admitted before the Tahsildar. He also relied on the Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1988 AP 77 [ Sada Vs. Tahsildar, Utnoor] whereunder the provisions of Telangana Area Tenancy Act were considered and the surrender should be only in writing. He also relied on a decision reported in Edukanti Kistamma(dead) Through L.Rs and others Vs. S.Venkatareddy(dead) Through L.Rs and others([4]) whereunder it was held that a statute prescribes a particular method of surrender and right to possession should be done according to the statute. As already stated, before considering the validity of the order dated 08-11-2004 which is the subject matter in C.R.P.No.166 of 2005 which finally decides the rights of the parties, it is useful to refer to the judgment dated 19-01-1990 of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1154 and 1155 of 1997 which challenges the de novo enquiry of the MRO and also the validity of the compromise said to have been entered has to be decided. The directions of the Division Bench are as follows:- 1. In the pending appeal, it is open to the appellants to contend before the Joint Collector that in view of the compromise, the certificate under Section 38(E) of the Act should not have been granted; it is equally open to the 3rd respondent to contend otherwise. 2. The Joint Collector shall decide the matter expeditiously within three months from the date of receipt of this order after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. 3. In the meanwhile, status quo as to possession of the land which has already been restored to respondent No.3 and the possession of the remaining lands will be maintained. Assuming to be that the contention of the learned counsel that secondary evidence which was looked into by the Joint Collector which was ignored by M.R.O is to be accepted as correct, still the court has to consider whether there was a surrender in 1952 voluntarily by the tenants. In this connection, one fact which is to be noted is that it is not for the first time that the landlords have pleaded such a surrender in 1989. Even in 1975 when 38(E) certificate was given by the Tribunal the D.R.O vide order dated 26-04-1976 remanded the matter and the landlords contended that there was surrender in 1952 and 1953. Therefore, this plea was not raised for the first time in 1989. There is no reason as to why the tenants have kept quite without pursuing de novo enquiry before the Tribunal when having obtained the order earlier without participation of the landlords in the enquiry. This is a strong circumstance in favour of the landlords. Added to that, before the competent quasi judicial authority, who is the Joint Collector when the matter was pending questioning the order of the MRO dated 06-07- 1990 a compromise has been entered and it was recorded. In fact, during that enquiry in 1991 also the same plea of surrender was raised and the records were found to be not traceable. As per the said compromise, the tenants have agreed that they have no rights in the property and also further admitted that there was a surrender on 28-05- 1952 and it was verified by the Tahasildar and statement was recorded and the tenancy certificate was cancelled on 01-06-1958 but somehow it was not entered in the tenancy records. It is quite clear from the order of the Joint Collector dated 23-09-1991. The Division Bench in the Writ Appeals have given an opportunity to the parties to rely upon this compromise and also kept open the rights of the tenants to show that this compromise is not valid. But, however, no material was placed before the Joint Collector and no evidence was adduced to show that the above compromise recorded in 1995 before the Joint Collector is vitiated by fraud or ignorance or for any other reasons on which it was sought to be avoided. If once a valid compromise is entered into and when that compromise is found to be valid and binding and not proved otherwise, the parties to the compromise cannot go beyond it and therefore the above compromise certainly estopes the tenants from claiming that there was no surrender in 1952 and that they have got still rights in the property. If the admissions in this compromise which are contained in the order of a Tribunal exercising quasi judicial power is taken into consideration, then the fact cannot be disputed that the contention of the landlords that there was surrender in 1952 is true. The consequential inference drawn by the Joint Collector in the order dated 08-11-2004 basing on the available documents cannot also be faulted. In fact, the MRO has accepted the part of surrender with regard to other tenants, but somehow with regard to rights of the revision petitioners in C.R.P.166 of 2005 claimed by G.Mallaiah, different reasons were given by the MRO. When the person entitled to rights keeps quite for a longer time and when there is no fault of the owners about the records which are to be maintained by the Government and when once the revenue authorities has accepted the probabilities based on the circumstances that there was surrender in 1952 and also found that there was no possession recorded after 1952 in any of the pahanies, the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners cannot be accepted. Therefore, in view of the above circumstances and also particularly the fact that the compromise admitting the surrender in 1952 was entered by the tenants which is binding, it is not open for the revision petitioners to contend that the order of the Joint Collector dated 08-11-2004 suffers from any infirmity. On the other hand, the conduct of silence of the tenants for a longer time without ascertaining the rights speaks volumes about the untenability of their claim and probably when the value of the properties have increased an attempt is being made to enrich. Therefore, for all the above reasons, I dot find any reasons to interfere with the order of the Joint Collector dated 08-11-2004 which is the subject matter in C.R.P.166 of 2005 and accordingly C.R.P.No.166 of 2005 is liable to be dismissed. When once the surrender is accepted the consequential orders passed by the revenue authorities are not valid and accordingly the C.R.P.2560 of 2005 is also liable to be dismissed and C.R.P.No.2262 of 2003 is to be allowed. So far as the C.R.P.No.4665 of 2007 is concerned, the order under revision does not suffer from any infirmity since the surrender by the original tenant Kallem Ramaiah in 1952 appears to be valid and which was accepted by the lower authorities on facts. Accordingly C.R.P.4665 of 2007 is also liable to be dismissed. In the result, C.R.P.Nos.2560 of 2003, 166 of 2005 and 4665 of 2007 are dismissed. C.R.P.No.2262 of 2003 is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. _______________________ N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO,J 11-08-2011 TSNR [1] (1998) 9 SCC 183 [2] 2004(4) ALT 402 [3] 1971 A.P.L.J 266 [4] (2010) 1 SCC 756