2. N ‘916 92.. ct• 7177 0? 9.? 10 .T7JK liT F37IIOAL.CR? DiNeR 77.7 the 26th 1717 of Nee 19 7CT’ L319 77i , 7171 ri cii1 :1 CORAL?. COWDA •J’ ?iCflITl.71i 1*7.), 1305/1992 AETWEEN: hoC, Reman, ‘‘ C at CoiN a.i..cut 69 veers. rc... 1507105, :tii 7rees’, (lendhineejar, 9 rp I o re”9 :.Dur:vanereivaea, “cC i”IOV I, lIRe Oe’”raD In 4 eererce (Dorrcratter j 4 IV Wji • 1 iNn strie .1 Assurenr’P Eli: i:o:.r•e • Ohorco )eti? Rcmbe.y1300 020, rei 07 Lit.. 5. noon en Fiena.ijno Director, 2, The ht±one., Insurance L 1L1o3, Mj691eton Street, Calcu tta130() 771 Lot it: O’Esei rrnor:—.rom eq it Iii ::e c.tc r, ,,,R .1*6?Oh0615 ‘to (pi,, Sr:i, “ scnLrna. Raju, Oily,) This Writ Retitioni .is filed under .Artioles 7 26 6. 7 27 of ii. e CO ri’t’ 7 Li OiL. Li Li 0. With &C 4t r’er “t 9—l’—El 10° a on o” 0 - t r” rror ic’-n’ L’’ C I” iNc °s 13 riot’ s on - S Li ‘C Dud i’:’n t. 0 Li ‘ I 0n.n ‘, ‘45 -c Tfrht; 7r 7 lust 7. tion oomlnc on for hear’ .1 no t Li. LiA ‘ “ QL 4 C Li sE’ CO JL ‘7 .1 iL. — 3 — wIthout authority of law, hence lsarred counsel submits that the imnurned order is ljabl-e to be quashed., 3, urther, the second oround of attack of tre rr reo orhor ho t at t-c c’er od 5r is dated 8th November 1991 in dismissing the petitioner from his service with e.Ef oct frcm the earlier hote 18—3—82 .retrospectively, whIch is tota.lly impermissible in. law, The misconducts alseged against the petitioner vioe at anewure—B has not been proved, even as per the findings of the enquiry off icer on issue No • 5, whi,le answering the said issue, the enquiry officer hes held that the petitioner has committed an act of mis—conduct, which finding is perverse, the disciplinary Authority without application of mind the facts of the case and evidence on record has accented the nerverse findings of the enquiry officer and passed the order of d.isunissal which is inmugned i.n the writ petition and hence, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the sante, I;U 4— 4, Learned counsel Sri. £1, Sown Raft appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently suftits that the first ground rearding nuthority of the disciplinary Authority in continuing the Displinary ProceedinQsAaPainst the petitioner cannot be re-agitated in this petition as there was a direction to the Respondent—cor: ration in the earlier judgment of this Court in the writ etition referred. to above to continue the enquiry proceed.ings and to conclude the... sane wirnan sJx months from the date of that Judgment. Therefore, it is not open for the petitioner to contend in these proceedings that the continuation of \de—novo enquiry aqanst the petitioner is totally imperm . issible in law Learned counsel appearino for th€..* respondents eLsi:orcrinq nit; sftmission, 5U54T1±t5 that as: ret the directions given by this Court in the earlier V . we fl . ant ø!g C,, 4 a U wee ‘ we we K, ‘4 ‘i a 0. we ‘2 a 0 0 U ‘1 we we nflftS weia it ,1 a 0. we e n it “s e a a a $ a • re • 0 I-’ a a ft ID U, 2 ‘j ‘2 1 . a it we Jdi C • 4 a n a K 14 4 fli ma0 we )d. it ft it ID I 0) U ID it I” . •nwe • ‘4 0 a o o’ • we a. it we we 0• -a we o • it 2 ‘4 ‘1 ‘1 ii 0 a we Iwe0IftoUt4 4 a a it a a owe wee it g it ft it..are o SZwe a ca t 0 ‘1 it 1 I” m a6a challenged by the petitioner is legal and valid. S. Having heard the learned counsel appeating for the petitioner and respondents on the basis of submissions made by them I have perused the writ petition averments and documents produced by the petitioner and I have answered the legal points raised by the parties as hereunder. 6. It is an undisputed fact that as on 3l-3”83, the petitioner service was terminated by attaining the age of superannuation. It is also’31ñdisputed fact that this urt has not considered legal aspect as to whether the disciplinary Authority could have continued with the deenovo enquiry against the petitioner. when there is no provision under the Regulations of the Company to the effect that it could continue enquiry proceedings against a retired employee. 7. Learned counsel appearing fcr the —-.7 netitioner Mr. Survanaravana lao placed strong reliance in supoort cf his s-uirissicn, an at. Dniat*” fr.d. 4, ata unreported. judgment renderedgri N, MADEGOWDA v, THE KARNATAKA S ILK INDUSTRIES CORPORATI ON AND ANOThER in W,ASO9O/96 LAD. on l67—l997 the very same questIon ws raised in the said writ Appeal and that was considered by this urt and laid down the law as hereunder:— “The learned counsel ap?pearlncl for the appellent has submitted that the learned Single Judge after holding that the order of the discp1inary authority being liable to be set aside was not justified in remandin..g the case to the disciplinary authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law, It is submitted t.hit as the appe.llant haa: mean while superannuated. there did not exist relationship of eimployer and employee between the parties ,.. The Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB v. KaSMI PAM (AIR 1770 SC 214) htL& that, no disciplinary action could b.c taken. against a government servant af.ter his retirement. It was further ‘S oñ:j a n. ‘.3 ,c p a ac ‘i 0 , a jan I-’pait4 P3 I-’ I-’ pa at e Ph a>’ a. aeit5g a) 0 H j t ipaO a. 1 pa pa ‘0 ?;0ic1n nGQ 0 S’r’paç’u” (p 0 P3 “ pa o i • a paw gr it pa , pa nrvgn0g0g’ 1 a, a •o an ,‘i it P3 pa • Hi ô • pa 0 0 - 0 pare DEC ft 0 2 It g 0 1. it i’ pa 0 Pt I I‘0 as the case may be, if that relations.•hip• ceases to exist the employer or the master also loses his power of disciplinary control. As early as in the year 1937 the Privy Council in R.T RANCACHAPI v SECRETARY OF STATE observe “It seems to require no demo•ns•tration that an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service at a time when, as their Lordships hold, he had for some months duly and properly ceased tc be ir. the service, was a mere muility and cannot he sustained .- The general principle is well settled and it was so stated by the Supreme Court in STATE OF ASSAIl v. PADMA RAM and more recently eiterated in C.LVARMA v. STATE OF. MADHYA PR%ADESH AND ANOTHER. It must, therefore, be held that the employer has no right to deal with its ex—empioyee in its disciplinary jurIsdiction after the employee has superannuated, Authorities are legion, ——10 ijfly\[ ;‘ \_____ and it is not necessa.ry to multiply Authorities in view of the authoritative rronouncements cy tre tunreme court, fle High Gourts have also consistently laid down the same rincile” . Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his suhoision laced strong 4 reliance oh the definition2(g) of the Regulation or: the General Insurance (Gonduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975, which rcads thus:— “2(g) — Emplovee means any employee of the. corporation and/or its subsidiaries othe.r than the casual, work charged or contingent staffi’ By relying upo.:n the said clause of the definition, he. submits that the oroer of dismissal is unsustainable in law for the reason tAot as on the date of passing the. order, the netitione:r was no Ion...geL an ewploye:e and the reIationship Flanloag. and Emz In cc was ceased. Therefore, eze.rcise of power ty the first respondent invok inn the recr lations referred to above 5 bt3,1’.t 4 ——ii. 1 — 11 — No doubt in the earlier writ netition proceedings, the question regarding as to whether the Disciplinary nuthori ty could proceed further to conduct de—novo enjuiry against the employee even after he attains the age of superannuation was not considered with reference and this Court. In vi.ew of the law declarndy the Apex A _w aw-1caoown -bw—nla -a&cgs C ltIs Sion —-.cou r r fr Bench of this court and another judgment of this court. referred to above continuing enquiry proceedings against the petitioner who had retired is totally without jurisdiction and authority of iaw Therefore, the ground urged by thez learned, counsel for the: etitioner that the iuipugr.ed order of dJ. smissai dismissing the cetitioner from service from 18—3—82 is bad’ in law, is tenable in law ard cost be accepted. But the sudnission of the learned counsel for the respondent is not tenable in law, in view of the law dec].ared by the Apex couz.t. and thIs Court, hence the subinissior. of the respondrnts 2L5. P.6 d coun 1*e4 ::: . : .j 7 — 12 — 10. In addition to the above reasons the impugned order of dismissal is also bad for another reason that the ndsconduct alleged aoainst the metitioner is not orovea, I was taken to the findings 0± tJe enquiry officer. Issue No.5 framed by•• the enquiry officer is relevant for the t.urpose consids.rithe contention urged: by the searnea counsel icr the petitioner in this reqard, which reads thus: “It is not estahli shed during the course of th.e enquiry, to•• whom the amount of Ps. 4,161/— (cash) was given. This ouestion remains unanswered, 11. Learned oounsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently submits that it has hear unanswered fl. the issue No.5. dflfl. further there 4 JL is oitegorical finding of factby th:e Enquiry Officer that it is estatlahed that the cash of Pa . 4 • 161— of the Company .has been. 0’ti rCie . sr;rr’tac 1C ‘V —13-. Sri. N.G. Raman has contributed to this act. In the last paragraph of the report, the enquiry officer has held that from the enquiry proceedings as well as from factual depositions of the management witnesses, and facts conveyed during the enquiry, it is established that Sri. N.G. Raman hcs involved and contributed to the dishonest, fraudulant dnd mis-appropriation acts in the withdrawal of Rs.4,l61/— (cash). Therefore, he submits that findings of the Enquiry Officer are contrary to the conclusioqs arrived at by him on Issue No • 5 and the reasons recorded by the Enquiry Officer on that issue in his enquiry report$t ‘Mt taT4i& 1 12. Having gone through the relevant portion of the Enquiry Report extracted in this Judgment, as referred to in the preceding paragraph, I am of the view that the Enquiry Officer has answered the Issue No.5 in favour of the petitioner, thereby — 14 — the charge pertaining to the alleged misappropriation of Rs.4,161/a against the petitioner is not proved is a finding of fact recorded in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the enquiry officer WaS not correct in holding that charge against the petitioner was proved in his operative portion of the Report. Therefore. this Court holds that the report is perverse, as the findings and conclusions of the enquiry officer are inconsistant dnd contradictory with each other. This important aspect 0± the case has not been considered by the Disciplinary Authority, while exercising his power and passing the impugned order, therefore • the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 13. tr the reasons stated supra, the petitioner is entitled tor the relief sought for by him in this writ petition. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The impugned order at Annemre—Z —is