MACApp. 79/2009 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T VAIPHEI The sole question which falls for consideration in this case is whether this cro ss objection will lie following the dismissal of the connected appeal being Mac Appeal No. 79 of 2009 by this Court on the ground of non-maintainability. For th e purpose of disposal of this case, so much of the relevant facts may be noticed at the outset. The respondent No. 2 filed a claim petition before the Motor Acc ident Claims Tribunal, Kamrup, Guwahati for the death of his brother in a vehicu lar accident on 22-6-2004 at about 2.50 PM at 37 NH at Jayguru near Ganeshmandir by impleading the owner of the offending vehicle, the insurer, namely, the Orie ntal Insurance Co. Ltd. and the driver as party-respondents. At the conclusion o f the trial, the Tribunal passed the judgment dated 25-4-2006 awarding a compens ation of Rs. 3,44,500/- to the respondent No. 2. The insurer, aggrieved by the j udgment of award, then filed the said appeal before this Court. It may be noted that the cross-objector, who had contested the application for condonation of de lay in presenting the appeal, had also filed his cross-objection even before adm ission of the said appeal. In the course of admission hearing, this Court by the order dated 14-5-2010 dismissed the appeal on the ground that the insurer could not challenge the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal without obtaini ng permission from the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 198 8 ( the Act ). In other words, the appeal was not admitted by this Court for hea ring on merits. The cross-objector is the owner of the offending vehicle. There is no dispute that the Tribunal did not fasten the liability to satisfy the awar d upon the cross-objector: it is the insurer which has been directed to satisfy the award. 2. Both Mr. P. Sarma, the learned counsel for the cross-objector, a nd Mr. B.K. Jain, the learned counsel for the claimant/respondent No. 2 have bee n heard at length. As already noticed, the appeal preferred by the appellant-ins urer had been dismissed by this Court on the ground of non-maintainability: no l eave of Tribunal had been taken by it under Section 170 of the Act to contest th e claim petition on all grounds available to the owner of the offending vehicle. Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the procedure for f iling of cross objection, which reads thus: R.22. Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred sep arate appeal.? (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the find ing against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have in his favor; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have t aken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Cou rt within one month from the date of service on his him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or with9in such further time as the ap pellate Court may see fit to allow. Explanation.? A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the ju dgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree insofar as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other findin g which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree is, wholly or in part, in favor of that respondent. (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto.? Such cross obj ection shall be in the form of memorandum, and the provisions of Rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. (3) x x x (4) Where, in any case, in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions relating to pauper appeals shall, so far as they can b e made applicable, apply to an objection under this rule. The provisions extracted above will plainly show that th ere are two limbs of the rule which give two remedies to the respondent: (1) the respondent supports the decree and (2) he attacks the decree by taking cross-ob jections. The use of the word support in Order 41, Rule 22(10) is indicative o f the respondent being given a limited right of sustaining the decree so far as it is in his favor, but does not extend beyond so as to enable him to obtain alt eration giving him a further advantage. This he can secure only by filing an app eal or cross objection. Under sub-rule (4), however, the withdrawal or dismissal of an appeal before or after the hearing is no bar to the hearing of the cross- objection filed by the respondent. In the case at hand, the appeal filed by the appellant-insurer was neither withdrawn nor dismissed in default but was dismiss ed on the ground of non-maintainability. The scope of Order 41, Rule 22 of the C ode of Civil Procedure came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Mpl. C orporation of Delhi v. International Security & Intelligence Agencies, AIR 2003 SC 1515. The following observations of the Apex Court at paragraph 23 of the jud gment, in my opinion, throw light on the controversy involved in this case: 23. Illustratively, we may refer to some judicial opinion as to non-maintainab ility of cross objections consequent upon the non-maintainability of the origina l appeal. In M/s. Malhati Tea Syndicate Ltd. V. Revenue Officer, Jalpaiguri and others, AIR 1973 Calcutta 78, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court presided o ver by P.B. Mukherji CJ (as his Lordship then was) held the cross objection liab le to fall in view of the original appeal itself failing in view of it having be en filed in the name of a company which was no longer in existence. In Dhani Ram v. Sushila Devi, AIR 1977 HP 83, RS Pathak, CJ (as his Lordship then was) held that though Order 41 Rule 22 speaks of an appeal, it contemplates a valid appeal which ordinarily calls for consideration on its merits. It is such an appeal th e pendency of which would entitle the respondent to file a cross objection. An a ppeal which barred by time is not a valid appeal and the cross objection too sha ll have to be rejected. In Chanchalgauri Ramanial and others v. Narendrakumar Ch andulal and others, AIR 1986 Gujarat 55, a Division Bench presided over by Hon b le the Chief Justice held that a cross-objection filed in a validly instituted a ppeal against a decree is as good as an appeal and shall have to be disposed of on merits but if an appeal does not lie any cross objection in such an appeal wo uld not call for adjudication on merits. In Charity Commissioner v. Padmavati an d others, AIR 1956 Bom 86, the CJ speaking for the Division Bench held that in a time-barred appeal where the delay was refused to be condoned the appeal itself was not maintainable and the cross objection would not survive for consideratio n. In A..L.A. Alagappa Chettiar v. Chokalingam Chetty and others, (supra), Walls , CJ, opined that the right of respondent to proceed by way of memorandum of cro ss objections is strictly incidental to the filing of the original appeal in tim e and it is open to a party against whom a memorandum of objections has been fil ed to set up the bar that the original appeal was filed out of time. We are in r espectful agreement with the view of the law taken by several High Courts and no ticed hereinabove. The cross objection is available to be heard if the original appeal is available for hearing on merits. A view to the contrary has been taken by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shakar Lal and another v. Sa rup Lal and another, (1912) 34 ILR Allahabad 140 and Nanak Bakhs and others v. V azir Singh and others, (1909) 4 IC 625 (Punjab Chief Court). Both the decisions are not supported by any convincing reasoning or logic and to say the least do n ot lay down the correct law, in our opinion. (Underlined for emphasis) 3. In the instant case, the appeal filed by the appellant-i nsurer (respondent 1 herein) had been dismissed by this Court on 14-5-2010 at the admission stage on the ground of non-maintainability. In other words, the a ppeal had not yet been admitted when the cross-objection was taken by the cross- objector/respondent 2. Once the appeal of the insurer was found to be not admitt ed, but was dismissed at the threshold, the appeal obviously does not survive fo r consideration on merits. That being the undisputed facts on record, the cross objection is not available for hearing. The appeal was never withdrawn by the ap pellant-insurer nor was it dismissed in default of prosecution. Had that been ei ther of the aforesaid cases, the cross-objection would have been maintainable an d would then be heard on merits. That being not the case here, the cross-objecti on is not maintainable after the appeal filed by the appellant-insurer had been dismissed by this Court at the very threshold. Thus, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in International Security and Inteligence Agency, supra, are cle arly applicable to the facts of this case. Consequently, I do not wish to burden this judgment with the other contentions raised by the learned counsel appearin g for the rival parties on the principle that a Court of law does not decide mor e than what is necessary for disposal of a case. That apart, there is conside rable for in the submission of Mr. B.K. Jain, the learned counsel for the claima nt-respondent that the cross-objector does not have any locus standi to take cro ss-objection for the simple reason that he is not aggrieved by the impugned judg ment of award. The amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal in favor of th e respondent No. 2 was directed to be satisfied by the insurer and not by the cr oss-objector. In M/s Kantilal and ors v. Ramarani Debi and others, AIR 1979 Cal 152, a decision cited by the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent, where the Tribunal had fastened the liability to satisfy the award upon the insurer an d not upon the owners of the offending vehicle, the Calcutta High Court held tha t there was no occasion or right for the owners to prefer any appeal against the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. I am in respectful agreement wit h the view taken by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court. 4. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the cross -objection taken by the cross-objector is not maintainable following the dismiss al of the appeal filed by the appellant-insurer on the ground of non-maintainabi lity. The cross objection is accordingly dismissed but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs