IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE TWENTIETH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MS JUSTICE G.ROHINI WRIT PETITION NO : 10066 of 2009 Between: The Agricultural Market Committee, Bhainsa, Adilabad District, Rep. by its Selection Grade Secretary. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Bhainsa Municipality, Bhainsa, Adilabad District, Rep. byits Commissioner, 2 P. Chinnannaa, S/o. Muthamma, R/o. 1-2-47/1, Bhainsa, Adilabad District. .....RESPONDENT(S) Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue an appropriate order or direction more particularly, one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the building construction permission granted by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd respondent for construction of a building in an extent of Ac. 1.08 gts. of land in Sy.No. 342/1/A, situated in Bhainsa, Adilabad District through proceedings in Proc.No. G1/530/08 (B.A.No. 54/2009), dated 18-4-2009 as illegal, arbitrary, unjust, against the principles of natural justice and in violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and set-aside the said proceedings. Counsel for the Petitioner : MR. V.V.N.NARAYANA RAO Counsel for the Respondents: MR. POLISETTY RADHA KRISHNA(SC FOR MPL(TA)) The Court made the following : THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION NO.10066 OF 2009 ORDER: The Agricultural Market Committee, Bhainsa, filed this writ petition seeking a declaration that the building construction permission granted by the 1st respondent – Bhainsa Municipality - in favour of the 2nd respondent for construction of a building in an extent of Ac.1.08 guntas of land in Sy.No.342/1/A, situated at Bhainsa, Adilabad District vide proceedings dated 18.04.2009 as arbitrary and illegal. It is pleaded in the writ petition that on a request made by the petitioner – Agricultural Market Committee Ac.5.38 guntas of land situated in Sy.Nos.342/1/A, 342/1/B and 343 of Bhainsa including the land of the 2nd respondent, was acquired by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nirmal for the purpose of the extension of Cotton Market Yard at Bhainsa. All the claimants were paid compensation and the petitioner Market Committee was put in possession of the land acquired. It is alleged that subsequently the 2nd respondent had occupied the said land to an extent of Ac.1.08 guntas and raised tin sheds claiming that the petitioner Market Committee was put in possession of excess land over and above other than the land acquired. That apart, the 2nd respondent filed O.S.No.52 of 2000 on the file of the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Bhainsa for perpetual injunction restraining the Petitioner Market Committee from interfering with the said Ac.1.08 guntas of land. Though the suit was initially decreed by Judgment dated 10.08.2005, the Appeal preferred by the Petitioner Market Committee, being A.S.No.7 of 2007, on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Nirmal, was allowed by Judgment dated 18.11.2008 thereby setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remanding the matter for consideration afresh after giving an opportunity to the Market Committee to produce further evidence in support of Exs.B-1 to B- 4 documents. The Plaintiff was also given liberty to put in rebuttal evidence. Admittedly, O.S.No.52 of 2000, on remand, is pending. While so, the 2nd respondent made an application dated 7.5.2008 requesting the 1st respondent Municipality for sanction of permission to construct permanent structures in the land in question i.e., Ac.1.08 guntas in Sy.No.342/1/A. The Petitioner Market Committee opposed the same bringing to the notice of the Municipality that a Civil Suit is pending. Consequently, the application of the 2nd respondent was returned by the 1st respondent on 25.6.2008 calling upon the applicant to submit the original registered documents together with link documents and No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Agricultural Market Committee. Without complying with the same, the 2nd respondent filed W.P.No.3410 of 2009 seeking a declaration that the inaction on the part of the Municipality in considering his application dated 7.5.2008 for building permission is arbitrary and illegal and contrary to Sections 212 to 215 of the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965. This Court, without expressing any opinion on merits of the case, disposed of the said writ petition by order dated 20.2.2009 with a direction to the Municipality to consider the application of the writ petitioner therein (the 2nd respondent herein) and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of six weeks. Thereafter, the 1st respondent Municipality vide proceedings dated 18.4.2009 granted permission to the 2nd respondent for construction of a building on the land in question even though the 2nd respondent did not comply with the earlier objections dated 25.6.2008. The petitioner states that the said fact came to its notice only on 6.5.2009 when the 2nd respondent had started the construction work. In the circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed on 11.05.2009 seeking a declaration that the building permission granted by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd respondent is arbitrary and illegal. It is contended by the petitioner that since a Civil Suit is pending between the writ petitioner and the 2nd respondent in respect of the land in question and particularly since the 2nd respondent failed to obtain the NOC from the Agricultural Market Committee, the impugned building permission granted by the Municipality in favour of the 2nd respondent is arbitrary, illegal and liable to be set aside. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in detail and perused the material on record. The petitioner’s claim with regard to the title of the property in question which apparently involves various disputed questions of fact and which has been the subject-matter of O.S.No.52 of 2000 on the file of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Bhainsa cannot be enquired into and adjudicated by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is for the parties to work out their appropriate common law remedy for adjudication of the respective claims made by them with regard to the title to the property in question. As a matter of fact, the question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is only with regard to the legality of the permissions granted to the respondent No.2 construction over the land in question. As held by this Court in M/s. ANNAPURNA BUILDERS, HYDERABAD v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER[1] the Municipality has no power to adjudicate upon the question of title of rival claimants for granting permission to make construction. What all the Municipality required to do is a summary enquiry as to who among the rival claimants has prima facie title. It is also a well-settled law that such a decision by the Municipality would not be binding on any of the parties. In a recent decision in K. PAVAN RAJ v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF HYDERABAD, HYD.[2] having considered an identical issue this Court held as under : “A careful reading of the provisions of the Act and the Bye-laws does not indicate that the Commissioner is empowered to entertain a title dispute and adjudicate the same before disposing of the application for grant of building permission. Indeed, both the provisions of Sections 428 and 429 and clause (v) of Bye-law 4.2 envisage filing of copies of title deeds and there is no provision under which the Commissioner can reject grant of building permit on the ground of title dispute. As held in HYDERABAD POTTERIES PRIVATE LIMITED V. COLLECTOR, HYDERABAD (2001 (3) ALD 600), if any objection regarding title is received, the Commissioner is required to be prima facie satisfied about the applicant’s title to the property and his lawful possession of the same and he cannot decide title dispute because that is neither one of the duties assigned to him nor he is provided with such an adjudicatory mechanism. A person setting up a rival claim of title, is free to approach the court of competent jurisdiction and seek appropriate relief in that regard. If the applications for building permissions are rejected merely on the ground of third parties raising disputes of title, that may result in serious hardship to the owners of the properties where frivolous, speculative and vexatious claims may be made by third parties by setting up title. Therefore, wherever the Commissioner is, prima facie, satisfied about the legal title of the applicant and his lawful possession, he is bound to consider the application for building permission on merits, leaving the objector free to approach an appropriate court of law.” In the light of the above ratio which is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, the objection raised by the petitioner with regard to the title of the land in question by itself does not prohibit the 1st respondent Municipality from granting the building permission provided a prima facie title is made out in favour of the applicant. It is true that the title claimed by the respondent No.2 is disputed by the writ petitioner. However, having regard to the admitted fact that the 2nd respondent has been in possession of the land in question, the 1st respondent Municipality cannot be said to have committed any error in finding a prima facie title in favour of the respondent No.2. At that stage, it is neither necessary nor possible for the 1st respondent Municipality to make any roving enquiry as to the rival claims made by the writ petitioner and the 2nd respondent. At any rate, the satisfaction of the 1st respondent Municipality with regard to title of the 2nd respondent is neither conclusive nor binding on any of the parties and it is always open to the writ petitioner and the 2nd respondent to avail appropriate common law remedy as available under law for adjudication of the question of title in respect of the land in question. Hence, the interference by this Court is unwarranted. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. ______________ G. ROHINI, J. Dt. 20.08.2009 gbs [1] AIR 1988 ANDHRA PRADESH 41 [2] 2008 (1) ALD 792