IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.6166 of 2009 Between: K.N. Chary S/o. Ramachandraiah APSRTC, Parkal Depot, Warangal District, R/o. Papaiahpet, Chennaraopet Mandal, Warangal District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Warangal, Warangal District. 2 The Depot Manager, APSRTC, Narsampet Depot, Warangal District. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.S.PRADEEP KUMAR Counsel for the Respondents:GP FOR LABOUR The Court made the following : ORDER: This writ petition is filed for issuance of certiorari to quash award, dated 13.11.2006 in I.D.No.217 of 2003 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, Warangal (for short ‘the Industrial Tribunal’). Heard Sri S.Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The petitioner is a driver of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’). He caused an accident while driving bus bearing registration No.AP10 Z 7283 on route Narsampet to Hyderabad on 20.06.2001. The accident resulted in death of a cyclist. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner in connection with the said accident. After full-fledged enquiry, the petitioner was removed from service by respondent No.2 vide his order, dated 15.12.2001. The petitioner approached the Industrial Tribunal by way of I.D.No.217 of 2003 under Section 2(A)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’). The Industrial Tribunal framed the following points. 1. Whether the petitioner is (sic has) driven the vehicle No.AP10 Z 7283 on route Hyderabad – Narsampet in rash, negligent and in high speed with lack of anticipation on 20.06.2001 and caused fatal accident with a cyclist by name Angothu Dillu, S/o Ravija aged about 50 years, coming in the opposite direction at the outskirts of Girnibai at about 22.50 hrs, who received head injuries and was succumbed to injuries on the way to hospital in Narsampet, which constitutes misconduct under Reg.28(xi)(a) of APSRTC Employees (Conduct) Reg.1963? 2. Whether the punishment imposed on him is proportionate to the alleged misconduct of the petitioner and is justified or not. If so, to what relief? On an analysis of the evidence on record, the Industrial Tribunal felt that there was contributory negligence on the part of the cyclist and that the punishment of removal imposed on the petitioner was disproportionate to the proven misconduct. Accordingly, the Industrial Tribunal directed reinstatement of the petitioner as driver with continuity of service but without back wages and other attendant benefits. This award is questioned by the petitioner in this writ petition. At the hearing, Sri S.Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal is not justified in denying the back wages to the petitioner. In my considered view, the writ petition suffers from unexplained delay of more than two years. Even according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner was reinstated in the month of March, 2007. Two years elapsed since the date of his reinstatement and the petitioner failed to offer any reasons for the delay of two years in filing this writ petition. The law is well settled that this Court ordinarily does not entertain stale claims. In Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd[1] the Privy Council held as under: “Now, the doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Moon Mills Ltd., v. M.R. Meher[2] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service[3]. In Karnataka Power Corporation Limited and another v. K.Thangappan and another[4], the Supreme Court held as under: “Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports[5]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” As the petitioner failed to explain the reasons for delay of more than two years after passing and publication of the award, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition. Even on merits also, having examined the findings of the Industrial Tribunal, I am of the view that no injustice is done to the petitioner because the Industrial Tribunal has set aside the punishment of removal from service and directed reinstatement without back wages and other attendant benefits. As the Industrial Tribunal has not reversed the finding of negligent driving on the part of the petitioner, it has rightly used its discretion vested in it by Section 11A of the Act and applied the doctrine of proportionality in ordering the petitioner’s reinstatement without back wages with continuity of service. This approach of the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the premises as above, the writ petition is dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of main petition, WPMP.No.8055 of 2009 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 24th MARCH, 2009. kvni [1] (1874) 5 PC 221 [2] AIR 1967 SC 1450 [3] AIR 1969 SC 329 [4] (2006) 4 SCC 322 [5] (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769