*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY +WRIT PETITION No.5996 of 2001 % Dated 25-08-2008 # Zahruddin Ahmed and others Petitioners VERSUS $ The Land Acquisition Officer Respondents ! Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri K.Subrahmanya Reddy ^Counsel for the Respondents: Asst. Government Pleader for Land Acquisition <GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? Cases referred 1. 2001 (1) ALT 50 (SC) 2. (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 273 3. AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2259 4. 1994 (1) ALT 491 (DB) 5. 2008 (4) ALD 792 6. (1996) 1 Supreme Court Cases 85 7. AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1793 8. 2008 (4) ALD 792 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO : 5996 of 2001 Between: 1 Zahruddin Ahmed S/o Basheeruddin Ahmed S Iddiqui H.No.4-2-64, Hathai Galli, Nizambad. 2 Mohd. Abdul Wahid S/o Abdul Kareem H.No.8-7-90 Line Galli, Nizambad. 3 Veeraiah S/o Ramulu Kumar Gali, Nizambad. 4 Ramulu S/o Agamaiah, Kumar Gali, Nizambad. 5 Pedda Bhumaiah S/o Pedda Rajanna H.No.7-11-309, Koja Colony, Nizambad. 6 Chinna Bhumaiah S/o Pedda Rajanna H.No.7-11-309, Koja Colony, Nizambad. 7 Mada Saimma W/o Mada Sainna H.No.7-10-103, Ashok Nagar, Bodhan Road, Nizambad. 8 Mada Lakshmi D/o Mada Sainna H.No.7-10-103, Ashok Nagar, Bodhan Road, Nizambad. 9 Bantu Ramulu, S/o Rajanna, H.No.7-8-37, Kumar Gali, Nizambad. ..... PETITIONERS AND The Land Acquisition Officer & the Revenue Divisional Officer, A.P., Nizambad 503 001. .....RESPONDENT Counsel for the Petitioners:MR.K.SUBRAHMANYA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent: AGP FOR LAND ACQUISITION The Court made the following : O R D E R: This writ petition is ﬁled for a writ of Certiorari to quash memo No.B/2/12190/93 dated 20-02-2001 passed by the respondent, whereby he rejected the application ﬁled by the petitioners for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) as barred by time. Heard Sri K.Subrahmanya Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition and perused the record. The lands of the petitioners, along with others, were acquired for the purpose of extension of agricultural market yard at Nizamabad town. The respondent passed award on 16- 01-1976 ﬁxing the compensation at the rate of Rs.7,500/- per acre. The respondent referred the matter pertaining to one Akula Rajanna, whose lands were also acquired under the same notiﬁcation, to the Civil Court under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Act as the said Rajanna died and his legal representatives failed to attend the enquiry. The reference was numbered as O.P.No.120 of 1976 and subsequently it was closed as Ajjam Linganna, who is the son of late Rajanna, though served with notice issued by the Civil Court, did not pursue the matter. Subsequently, the said Linganna ﬁled an I.A for reopening of the case and accordingly, the said O.P was reopened and renumbered as O.P.No.471 of 1993. After restoration and renumbering of the O.P, Linganna ﬁled an I.A for amendment of the form of reference to one under Section 18 of the Act and for enhancement of compensation awarded for the acquired land. The said I.A was allowed. The petitioners claimed that as they were not served with Section 12(2) notices, they could not avail their right to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act and that in O.P No.471 of 1993, they ﬁled an application for their impleadment, which was allowed by the reference Court. The reference Court disposed of O.P.No.471 of 1993 on 15-06-1994 by ﬁxing the market value of the acquired lands at Rs.50/- per square yard. The respondent ﬁled A.S.No.1105 of 1994, against the said award and decree, in this Court. He also ﬁled CRP Nos.2279 of 1995 and batch against the order of the reference Court impleading the petitioners and other land owners, who did not make a claim for reference under Section 18 of the Act. By common judgment dated 10-03-1999 passed in CRP Nos.2279 of 1995 and batch and A.S.No.1105 of 1994, this Court allowed the said batch of CRPs and set aside the order impleading the petitioners and others. This Court also allowed the Appeal Suit and set aside enhancement of market value made in favour of Ajjam Linganna. The petitioners and other land owners ﬁled SLPs in the Supreme Court against the orders in the said batch of CRPs. Ajjam Linganna also ﬁled an SLP against the judgment of this Court. The Supreme Court in Ajjam Linganna and others vs. Land Acquisition Oﬃcer- Revenue Divisional Oﬃcer, Nizamabad [1], while conﬁrming the orders of this Court in the batch of CRPs, however, set aside the judgment of this Court in A.S.No.1105 of 1994 and conﬁrmed the award of the Civil Court. The petitioners approached the respondent for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act by way of an application dated 29-01-2001. The said application having been rejected, they filed the present writ petition. At the hearing Sri K.Subrahmanya Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, made strenuous eﬀorts to persuade this Court to hold that the application ﬁled by the petitioners, for redetermination of compensation, is within time. The period of three months prescribed in Section 28-A of the Act, contends the learned Senior Counsel, will start running from the date of the judgment of the ﬁnal appellate Court and not from the award of the reference Court in O.P. No.471 of 1993. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Hansoli Devi and others[2], Union of India and another vs. Pradeep Kumari and others[3] and the judgments of this Court in Marri Venkaiah and others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquistiion), Srisailam Left Bank Channel Unit-2, Gandamvarigudem, Nalgonda District and others[4] and Ganthula Seshagiri Rao vs. Collector, East Godavari District, Kakinada and others[5]. Opposing the above contention, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition contended that the words “within three months from the date of the award of the Court” shall be construed as the award of the reference Court as deﬁned in Section 3(d) of the Act and that so construed, the application ﬁled by the petitioners in the year 2001 is far beyond the time limit of three months from 15-06-1994, the date on which the reference Court disposed of the O.P. In support of her contention, she relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in D.Venkamma and others vs. Special Tahsildar (LA) Unit-IV, Janagareddigudem, West Godavari District[6] and Smt Bhagti (deceased) through her L.Rs., Jagdish Ram Sharma, appellant vs. State of Haryana, respondent[7]. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Under Section 28-A of the Act, the persons, who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector, but have not made an application to him under Section 18 of the Act, are entitled to move the Collector for redetermination of the compensation within three months from the date of the award of the Court. Section 3(d) of the Act deﬁned “Court” as a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed a special Judicial Officer within any speciﬁed local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Therefore, the only question to be decided in this writ petition is whether the time limit of three months starts running from the date of the award of the reference Court or from the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the SLPs ﬁled by the petitioners and Ajjam Linganna. In my considered view, this aspect is no longer res integra in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in D.Venkamma (6 supra) and Smt Bhagti (deceased) through her L.Rs., Jagdish Ram Sharma (7 supra). In D. Venkamma (6 supra), an identical issue arose for consideration of the Supreme Court. In that case, notiﬁcation under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 03-01-1980, award was passed on 31-10-1981, compensation was received by the parties; in the reference made by certain aggrieved parties, the Civil Court enhanced the compensation by its decree dated 21-11-1983 and on appeal ﬁled by the State and cross-objections ﬁled by the claimants, the compensation was further enhanced by the High Court. Based on the judgment of the High Court, the petitioners before the Supreme Court ﬁled an application before the Land Acquisition Oﬃcer for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act on 16-05-1989. The said application was rejected by the Land Acquisition Oﬃcer and writ petition ﬁled by the party was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. However, on appeal, the Division Bench reversed the said judgment. While considering the appeal ﬁled along with the Special Leave Petition by the aggrieved claimant, the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 held as under- “Section 28-A of the Act speaks of redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the “award of the court” and provides that when the court allows any amount in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the person or persons interested in all other land covered by the notiﬁcation under Section 4(1) and who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that he/they had not made an application, by a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of award of the court, require the Collector to redetermine the compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. In other words, the foundation for making an application under Section 28-A is the award of the court. The expression ‘Court’ has been deﬁned under Section 3(d) to mean “a principal civil court of original jurisdiction” and in an appropriate case “a special judicial oﬃcer” appointed by the Government to perform the functions of the court. In other words, the Court of original jurisdiction which receives an order of reference pursuant to an application made under Section 18 is the civil court of original jurisdiction. By necessary implication, judgment of an appellate court made under Section 54 of the Act does not give right or cause of action to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act.” (Emphasis added) In Smt Bhagti (deceased) through her L.Rs., Jagdish Ram Sharma (7 supra), more or less an identical situation arose where the party who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act, without making an application under Section 28-A of the Act within the time limit from the decree of the reference Court waited till the disposal of the appeal by the High Court and ﬁled his application, within 30 days from the date of judgment of the High Court. While dealing with the said case, the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 held as under- “It is contended that the petitioner is entitled to re- determination of compensation on par with others and the question of limitation does not stand in the way. The question, therefore, is; as to when the limitation begins to run for the purpose of ﬁling of an application under Section 28-A of the Act”. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984, introducing Section 28-A had come into force with eﬀect from September 24, 1984. Section 28-A envisages giving of beneﬁt to a person who had accepted the award made under Section 11 without protest and did not avail of the reference under Section 18 for further enhancement and others had the award of enhanced compensation. He has been given right to make a written application to the L.A.O within 30 days from the date of the award of the Court excluding the time taken to obtain a certiﬁed copy of the award of the Court. It is now fairly well settled legal proposition that the award of the Court is the award of the reference Court under Section 18. That is clear from the statement of the objects and reasons as also from the unequivocal language used in Section 28-A(1) of the Act. It is equally well settled legal position that once time has begun to run, it will continue to run until it is stayed by an appropriate Court. The remedy, thereafter stands barred. The proviso to Section 28-A(1) only excludes the time actually taken in obtaining the certiﬁed copy, while computing the period of three months’ limitation prescribed under Section 28-A (1). In other words, the time taken to obtain certiﬁed copy alone is to be excluded in computation of limitation of three months. The reference in Jose Antonio’s Case, (1995 AIR SCW 4735), was conﬁned to the question as to which of the two awards, when there are more than one award passed by the reference Court in respect of the land covered under the same notiﬁcation published under Section 4(1), would give cause of action and to the question (of) limitation to ﬁle application under Section 28-A (1). In other words, the question therein was which of the two dates of two awards, furnishes the period of limitation of three months. In the present case in hand that question does not arise. There are no two awards of the reference Court. In scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 730, a Bench of three Judges of this Court held that “it is obvious on a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28-A that it applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under Section 18. The redetermination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the Court in the reference under Section 18 and an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. The order of the High Court does not give right to ﬁle application under Section 28-A (1).” (Emphasis added) In view of the above authoritative pronouncements, I am of the considered opinion that in the instant case the time began to run to make an application for redetermination from 15-06-1994 i.e., the date on which the Court, which necessarily means the reference Court, disposed of O.P.No.471 of 1993. Therefore, the rejection of the petitioners’ application on the ground that the same is beyond limitation cannot be found fault with. The learned Senior Counsel, however, placed heavy reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Hansoli Devi (2 supra). In the said case, the issues, which were referred to the Larger Bench, are as follows: “1. (a) Whether dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay amounts to ‘not ﬁling an application’ within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? (b) Whether a person whose application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is dismissed on the ground of delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain an application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act? 2. Whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the award of the land Acquisition Collector and has not ﬁled an application seeking reference under Section 18 is ‘a person aggrieved’ within the meaning of Section 28-A?” While answering issue 1(a) and (b), the Supreme Court held that to bar a person from invoking the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, his application for reference must have been answered on merits and mere rejection of his application on the ground of delay cannot be a ground to deny him the beneﬁt under Section 28-A of the Act. There cannot be any quarrel about the said proposition. Indeed following the said judgment, this Court in Guthula Seshagiri Rao vs. Collector, East Godavari District and others [8], negatived the contention advanced on behalf of the Collector, East Godavari District that mere rejection of reference on the ground of delay by the reference Court does not bar the application under Section 28-A of the Act. But, I do not see how the proposition laid down in the above mentioned Constitution Bench judgment comes to the aid of the petitioners in this case. Having carefully considered the said judgment, I am of the view that the issue referred to the said Bench and decided by it has no relevance to the issue arising in this case. Similarly, the judgment in Union of India vs. Pradeep Kumari (3 supra) equally has no application, because in the said case, the question was which of the awards that could be made basis for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act. The Supreme Court held that having regard to the purpose and object for which Section 28-A of the Act has been inserted, a liberal approach has to be made and that all the beneﬁts which were given in the latter awards shall be made available to the applicant under Section 28-A and not necessarily on the basis of the first of the awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer. This judgment is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioners. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Marri Venkaiah (4 supra) equally has no application to this case, because in the said case the question that was decided was whether the limitation of three months starts running from the date of award or from the date of knowledge of the award. The Division Bench considering the beneﬁcial nature of Section 28-A held that the said provision cannot be liberally construed and that it is only from the date of knowledge of the award that limitation starts running. For the above mentioned reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of main petition, interim order dated 03-04-2001 is vacated and WPMP No.7638 of 2001 is dismissed. WVMP No.3054 of 2001 is disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Dated 25th August, 2008 vrn Note: L.R.Copies to be marked. [1] 2001 (1) ALT 50 (SC) [2] (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 273 [3] AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2259 [4] 1994 (1) ALT 491 (D.B) [5] 2008 (4) ALD 792 [6] (1996) 1 Supreme Court Cases 85 [7] AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1793 [8] 2008 (4) ALD 792