THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NOs.18881, 19105, 19286, 19751, 23770, 24564, 250 25278 and 25612 of 2006 and 1900, 2703, 2742, 2697, 3269, 3270, 3 3483, 6413, 6424, 7042, 7046, 9222, 10159, 10463, 10680, 10936, 109 12957, 15447, 22952, 22966, 23937, 25131 of 2007 Date:28-12-2007 WRIT PETITION NOs.18881 of 2006: Between: R.Veera Raghava Prasad. … Petitioner AND The District Collector Krishna District at Machilipatnam and another. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioner: Sri C.Raghu Counsel for respondents: G.P. for Land Acquisition. THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NOs.18881, 19105, 19286, 19751, 23770, 24564, 250 25278 and 25612 of 2006 and 1900, 2703, 2742, 2697, 3269, 3270, 3 3483, 6413, 6424, 7042, 7046, 9222, 10159, 10463, 10680, 10936, 109 12957, 15447, 22952, 22966, 23937, 25131 of 2007 COMMON JUDGMENT:- In this batch of cases, the petitioners, besides raising issues specific to their cases, also raised the common issue, viz., whether the proceedings initiated by respondents for acquiring their agricultural lands without their conversion for non-agricultural use, viz., house sites, are invalid as being contrary to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006 (for short “the 2006 Act”). Therefore, all these Writ Petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Before going into the individual issues raised in these Writ Petitions, I propose to decide the common issue first. In all these cases, the lands proposed to be acquired are agricultural lands. They are proposed to be acquired for providing house sites to the poorer sections of the Society. In the affidavits filed in support of their respective Writ Petitions, the petitioners averred that under Section 3 of the 2006 Act, which came into force from 2-1-2006, no agricultural land shall be put to non-agricultural purposes, without the prior permission of the competent authority, and that the person, who intends to use the agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, has to make an application to the competent authority for such conversion in the prescribed form by payment of a specified fees. It is further averred that under Section 3(6) the competent authority may reject the request for conversion by giving reasons. On this premise, the petitioners averred that in the face of the prohibition contained in Section 3 on the use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, the impugned notifications, under which the petitioners’ agricultural lands are proposed to be acquired, are liable to be declared as illegal. In the separate counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, it is averred that the provisions of the 2006 Act have no application to the lands proposed to be acquired for providing house sites to the poorer sections of the Society. Sri C.Raghu, Sri P.Sri Raghuram, Sri T.Jagadeesh, Sri Ch.Dhananjaya and Smt.A.Chaya Devi advanced their arguments on behalf of the petitioners on this issue and the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition made his submissions on behalf of the respondents. The sheet-anchor of their arguments is that the proposed acquisition of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose (providing house sites), without conversion, is in the teeth of the provisions of Section 3 of the 2006 Act. Sri C.Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioners, relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB V. SANJEET SINGH GREWAL[1]. Sri P.Sreeraghuram, learned counsel, submitted that though a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 1-10-2007 rendered in Writ Petition No.22809 of 2006 rejected a similar contention, this issue requires fresh consideration in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in SANJEET SINGH GREWAL (1 supra). Sri T.Jagadish, learned counsel, submitted that while Rule 71 of A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules envisaged prohibition of conversion of any agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes without permission from the District Collector concerned, for the first time a comprehensive Statute was introduced by way of the 2006 Act. He submitted that the objective of this Act is to enable the neighboring agricultural land owners to raise objections to usage of land for non- agricultural purpose, and that Section 3 prohibits such usage of the land without prior permission from the competent authority. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel. To appreciate the above mentioned contentions of the learned counsel, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the 2006 Act. The long title of the Act reads as under: “ An Act to Regulate the Conversion of Agricultural Land to Non- Agricultural Purposes and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and to repeal the Andhra Pradesh Non- Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons are as follows: “The Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Land Assessment Act, 1963 provides for the levy of assessment on lands used for Non- agricultural purposes. The ‘Non-agricultural land’ as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act, means Land other than the land used exclusively for the purpose of agriculture but does not include the land used exclusively for (i) Cattle sheds; (ii) hay ricks. Section 3 of the Act, is the charging section according to the areas and rates indicated in the Schedule therein. The Schedule sets out the rates of assessment per Sqr.Mtr. of land used per Fasli year (a) for industrial purpose; (b) for commercial purpose; and (c) for any other Non-agricultural purpose including residential purpose. The High Court of A.P. in S.V. Cements Ltd., Vs. R.D.O. Nandyal and others – (1993 (2) ALT 32) interpreted the word ‘used’ recurring in Section 3 and the Schedule of the said Act means not only actually used but also means any land meant to be used or set apart for being used. On appeal, the Apex Court in the Federation of A.P. Chamber of Commerce and Industry and others Vs. State of A.P. (C.A.No.1039/2000) on 04-08-2000 held that it is only the land which is actually in use for an Industrial purpose as defined in the Act that can be assessed to non-agricultural assessment at the rate specified for land used for Industrial purposes. If the Supreme Court orders are implemented by charging NALA, the demand will go down to 75% of the total demand. The Government have evolved New Industrial policy and orders were issued exempting all Industrial units from levy of NALA with effect from 01-04-2000 to 31-03-2005. Accordingly, Government have decided to abolish NALA by repealing the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Land Assessment Act, 1963 in its present form and to introduce levy in lump sum at the rate of 10% (Ten percent) of the basic value of the land in arrears as may be fixed by the Government from time to time as one time measure at the time of conversion by undertaking a specific legislation”. Section 2(a) defined the word ‘agricultural’ as: (i) the raising of any crop or garden produce; or (ii) the raising of orchards; or (iii) the raising of pasture; or (iv) Hay-ricks. Section 2(b) defined ‘Agriculture lands’ as lands used for agriculture. Section 2© defined ‘Conversion’ as change of land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes and Section 2(d) defined ‘Non-agricultural land’ as land other than Agricultural land. Section 3(1) imposes prohibition on use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes without prior permission of the competent authority. Sub-Sections (2) to (6) of Section 3 provide for the procedure for conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose. Under Section 4, with effect from the date of commencement of the Act every owner or occupier of agricultural land shall have to pay a conversion fee for non-agricultural purposes at the rate of 10% of the basic value of the land in areas as may be notified by the Government from time to time. Section 6 provides for imposition of penalty if any agricultural land is put to non-agricultural purpose without obtaining the prior permission of the competent authority under Section 3 of the 2006 Act. Section 7 exempts application of the provisions of the 2006 Act to the following lands, viz., (a) Lands owned by the State Government; (b) Lands owned by a local authority and used for any communal purposes so long as the land is not used for commercial purposes; (c) Lands used for religious or charitable purposes; (d) Lands used by owner for household industries involving traditional occupation, not exceeding one acre; (e) Lands used for such other purposes as may be notified by the Government from time to time. Section 8, which repealed the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963 is as follows: “Any person aggrieved by an order of the Revenue Divisional Officer may file an appeal before the Collector within sixty days of receipt of such order by the applicant”. From the long title of the 2006 Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is clear that this Act is brought into existence in place of the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Land Assessment Act, 1963 in the wake of the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the word ‘used’. In Section 3 of the repealed Act and the new Industrial policy, the State Government exempted Industrial Units from levy of Non-Agricultural Land Assessment (NALA) with effect from 1-4-2000 to 31-3-2005. A conjoint reading of the Long Tile, the Statement of Objectives and Reasons and Section 8 leaves one in no doubt that this Act is intended to replace the earlier enactment on recovery of NALA by regulating the conversions and prescribe and recover fees for converting agriculture land for non-agricultural purposes. The provisions of the said Act are, therefore, required to be considered keeping in view the purpose for and the objects with which the Act is made. While interpreting the provisions of a Statute, the Long Title and the Statement of Objects and Reasons constitute internal aids to arrive at the true purport of a statutory provision. In ASWINIKUMAR GHOSE V. ARABINDA BOSE[2] the Supreme Court held: “One cannot but be impressed at once with the wording of the full title of the Act. Although there are observations in earlier English cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from consideration in construing the statutes, it is now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light on its construction, although it cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment”. I n WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE V. MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE[3] the Supreme Court held: “The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained”. In NEW INDIA SUGAR MILLS LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, BIHAR[4] the Supreme Court observed: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature”. I n BUSCHING SCHMITZ PRIVATE LTD. V. P.T.MENGHANI[5] the Supreme Court held: “The Court should adopt an object oriented approach keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits”. However, in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ORISSA V. BUDHRAJA AND COMPANY[6], the Supreme Court held: “The object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain language used by rewriting the section or substituting words in place of the actual words used by the Legislature”. In the light of the settled law, on the interpretation of the Statutory provisions from the above mentioned judgments, the prohibition contained in Section 3 of the 2006 Act is required to be interpreted. A careful reading of Section 3, as a whole, clearly indicates that a person shall not use agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes without paying the stipulated conversion fees and obtaining the permission of the competent authority. The 2006 Act is, therefore, intended to achieve the purpose of user of the agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes through a regulatory mechanism. It is significant to notice that certain categories of lands are exempted from the application of the provisions of this Act and one such category relates to the lands owned by the State Government. The attempt on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioners to relate the provisions of this Act to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) and contend that without conversion the State cannot propose to acquire the agricultural land for putting it to non- agricultural use, has no legal basis at all. In my considered view, the provisions of the two enactments operate in different areas. While the Act empowers the State to acquire private lands for public purposes and also for being used by Companies for the purposes mentioned in Part-VII of the said Act, the purposes and objects of the 2006 Act are confined only to regulate the conversion of agricultural land for non- agricultural use and prescribe and recover NALA. Neither of the two Acts places any restriction on the State’s power of eminent domain to acquire agricultural land for being used for non-agricultural purposes. That, far from placing such a prohibition on the State, the State is exempted from the application of the provisions of the 2006 Act, is clear from the provisions of Section 7(a) of the said Act. In the impugned notifications, the State, through its functionaries, has proposed to acquire the agricultural lands for being put to non-agricultural purposes. Section 3 of the 2006 Act only prohibits use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes without permission from the competent authority and it dose not prohibit acquisition of agricultural land for future use for non- agricultural purposes. Thus, the conditional prohibition contained in Section 3 would only apply at the stage when a person, who acquired agricultural land seeks to put the same to non-agricultural use. There is, thus, no prohibition, whatsoever, on an individual or the State to acquire agricultural land with a view to use it for non-agricultural purposes in future. Once the State acquires the land under the provisions of the Act, it becomes the owner and it is exempted from the application of the provisions of the 2006 Act by virtue of Section 7(a) of the said Act. In view of such an exemption, the restrictions, if any, placed by the provisions of the 2006 Act on the use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose will have no application to the lands so acquired by the State. In BHAGAT SINGH V. STATE OF U.P.,[7] the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the land owners that the proposed acquisition for establishment of a market yard in an area where the Master Plan permitted use of the land for ‘light industries’ held that the acquisition will not be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for the purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. It was further held that acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of the user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made and that it will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon its judgment i n AFLATOON V. Lt. GOVERNOR OF DELHI {(1975) 4 SCC 285} wherein it negatived the contention of the land owners that the acquisition of the land was contrary to the concept of ‘planned development’ envisaged in the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and held that the fact that actual development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the said Act and that while Section 12 is only concerned with the planned development, it has nothing to do with the acquisition of the property, and acquisition generally precedes development. The ratio laid down in the above mentioned judgments squarely applies to the present cases where the State, under the provisions of the Act is empowered to acquire any land provided it satisfies the test ‘public purpose’ and when once it acquires the land and becomes it’s owner, it will be subject to the provisions of the 2006 Act. Therefore, the power of the eminent domine inhered in the State is in no way curtailed, controlled or limited by the provisions of the 2006 Act. A Division Bench of this Court, of which I am a party, negatived a similar contention raised in Writ Petition Nos.22809 of 2006 and batch in judgment dated 1-10-2007. While answering question No.4 framed therein, the Division Bench held as under: “The argument of Shri P.Sri Raghuram that the agricultural lands cannot be used for non-agricultural purposes without obtaining prior permission under the said Act and, therefore, the acquisition of the petitioners’ land should be nullified merits summary rejection because Section 3(1) of the 2006 Act contemplates the prior permission of the competent authority only when agricultural land is actually put to non-agricultural purpose. In these cases, that eventuality will happen only when the government succeeds in acquiring the land. So far, the acquisition proceedings could not be finalized because of the interim orders passed by this Court. Therefore, the impugned acquisition cannot be annulled by assuming that after taking possession of the land, the government will put the agricultural land to non-agricultural use without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority”. The view taken by the Division Bench fortifies my opinion that the stage for application of the provisions of the 2006 Act would not set in until the acquisition is complete. A learned single Judge of this Court in CHANDANA MEENAKSHI V. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, REVENUE & LAND ACQUISITION DEPARTMENT[8] also took a similar view by holding that the necessity of obtaining prior permission under the provisions of the 2006 Act will not arise at the stage of notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and that the permission for conversion is required to be obtained only before using the agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose. The learned Judge on that premise held that the notifications issued for acquisition couldn’t be invalidated on that ground. In SANJEET SINGH GREWAL (1 supra), on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the proposed acquisition by the State of Punjab of huge extent of about 9354 acres of land in 29 villages for setting up of a new town viz., Anandgarh, was set aside by the Supreme Court mainly on the ground that the mandatory procedure of selection of the site by the Board constituted under the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (for short “the 1995 Act”) before initiating proceedings for acquisition was not followed. While referring to the provisions of the 1995 Act, the Supreme Court in paras 28 and 38 held thus: “28. Clause (i) of sub-Section (2) of Section 28 is significant. It provides that the State Government or the Board may require the authority (PUDA) to take up the works in connection with the preparation and implementation of regional plans, master plans and new township plans, and town improvement schemes. It does not empower PUDA to declare the site for a new town as a planning area though it is authorized to prepare and implement new township plans. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that after a site for a new town is selected by the Board and declared as a planning area in exercise of its powers under Section 56 of the Act, the authority designated as the planning agency for that area, can take up the works in connection with the preparation and implementation of new township plans. 38. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of this Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal V. Union of India – (1996) 10 SCC 721 – submitting that the acquisition for planned development is a public purpose. Once a public purpose has been specified by the Government, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is not vitiated on account of the fact that planned development was not specified with particularization of the land in question needed for the public purpose. In the instant case the issue is quite different. The land has been acquired on the request of the New Town Planning Authority constituted under Section 31 of the Act for development of the new town of Anandgarh. The High Court has quashed the notification not on the ground that the detailed scheme had not been specified in the notification, but on the ground that there did not exist any valid public purpose in the absence of a validly declared planning area, namely, a site for a new town, by the competent authority by notification in the Official Gazette under Section 56 of the Act of 1995”. A careful reading of the said judgment discloses that Section 42 of the 1995 Act enabled the State Government, at the request of the authority constituted under that Act, to acquire the land owned by the Central Government under the provisions of the Act subject to the conditions laid down in the said provision. Therefore, there was an interplay of the two statutory enactments, viz., 1995 Act and Act, and unless the provisions of the former Act are complied with, the State Government could not validly invoke the provisions of the Act for acquiring the lands. From the above reproduced paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the acquisition was quashed on the ground that in the absence of a validly declared planning area under the 1995 Act, no valid public purpose could be said to exist. I am, therefore, of the view that the said judgment of the Supreme Court, relating to a case involving two statutory enactments and where the acquisition was invalidated on the ground of violation of mandatory statutory requirements of one of the two enactments, compliance of which was sine qua non for acquisition, has no application to the present case. For all the aforementioned reasons, I hold that the acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents cannot be invalidated on the ground of non-conversion of agricultural land for being used for non- agricultural purposes. I shall now deal with individual cases. Writ Petition Nos.18881 and 19286 of 2006 and 1900, 2697, 2703, 2742, 3269, 3270, 3359, 3483, 9222, 10463, 10945, 22966 and 23937 of 2007: Since the contentions raised in these Writ Petitions are almost common, they are dealt with together. In all these Writ Petitions, the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act were published in accordance with the said provision. It is mentioned in the said notifications that the District Collector, Krishna District appointed the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, to conduct enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. One of the grounds of challenge of the impugned notifications is that delegation of power of holding enquiry under Section 5-A in favour of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, is contrary to the provisions