PETITIONER Muktipad Ghoshai S/‘o Late Shri B.N.Ghoshal, Aged ~ 62 years, Ret. Assistant Engineer Water Resources Dep1t., R10 J-B Parijat Colony, Nehm Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.) VERSUS State of Chhattisgarh Through the Principal Secretary Water Resources Department D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) Engineer-in—Chief Water Resources Depanment, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Raipur (C.G.) Chief Engineer, Minimata Hasdeo Bango Project, Biiaspur (C.G.) WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR RESPONDENTS Present: Shri P.K.Bhaduri, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri Y.S.Thaknr,‘Govt. Advocate for the State/respondents. ‘The indisputable faets, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed as OVerseer/Sub-Engineer in the Water Resources Department on 09.08.1966. Thereatter, by order dated 05.10.1983, the petitioner was promoted to the postof Assistant Engineer. The petitioner, thereafter continued to work as Assistant Engineer till the date of his retirement i.e. 3 1 .05.2005. ORDER By this petition, the petitioner seeks reliefof grant ofhigher gade of pay- scale/Kramonnati from the year 1999 with all arrears and interest till the date ofhis retirement. Aiter retirement, the petitioner has tiled this petition on 09072007 claiming for the relief of Kramonnati / higher grade of pay~scale W.e.i'the year 1999. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, :1. WRIT PETITION (S) No. 4041 61'2007 Single Bench : Hon’ble Justice Shri Satish K. Agnihotri. (Passed on 12m day of July, 2007) AFR ‘” as per circular dated 17m March, 1999 (Amexure P/l), the petitioner was entitled to be granted higher grade of pay-scale met completion of 24 years of service as he was not gamed more than one promotion during his life time. Leamed counsel relies on clause 2(b) ofthe circular for the purpose of grant ofhigher grade ofpay~soalelKramonnati. 4. According to the learned counsel: the petitioner completed 12 years of service in the year 1978, Thereaiter, the petitioner was promoted on 15.10.1983. The petitioner completed 24 years of service from the first date of joining with only one promotion in his service career. Learned counsel further submits that the other similarly situated employees have been granted higher grade of pay-scale from the year 1999. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to grant oftixation of higher gade of pay scale and revision ofpension. 5. As per the petitioner’s own submission, the petitioner became entitled for grant of higher grade of pay.sca1e much before the year 1999 but the cause of action arose in the year 1999 when the other similarly situated employees were granted higher gade ofpay scale. 6. The petitioner has retired iiom service W.e.f 31.05.2005. The petitioner (a has neither raised any grievance nor fiied any petition before the date of his retirement except certain representations, which were made to the concerned authorities. Fiiing more than one representation cannot arrest the limitation. It is well settled that if one representation is not replied to, the aggieved person may approach the Court within a reasonable time. In the case on hand, the petitioner made his first representation aiter a period of three years i.e, in September, 2002 (Annexure P/2), thereafter May, 2003 (Annexure P/3) and March 2006 (Annexure P/4). e rlation oftec'en nd t mlebsists dg te d Th e hrployer a he epoye-su urin h perio f service; not thereaiter. The petitioner“ ought to“ have raised his grievance in the year 1999 itseli. 'or 'when he was in service, before this Court. Aiier retirement. the netitioner again waited for two years to file thispetition.»Thus. this petition i5 not maintaina‘ble in view of the fact that ‘ the petitioner has siept over his right *for'a sujiiciently longtime without explaining unreasonable and inordinate delay ofeight years. This petition has been filed after a long inordinate and unexylained delay of over 8 years. Thenpetitioner has not been able to produce or submit any reason for condonation of such a long delay in filing this petition. It is well settled that High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent' and the lethargic as the‘belated approach may have the effect of inilicting not only hardship as inconvenience but aiso injustice on third parties. The Siipreme Court in Jagdish Narain Maltiar Vs. The State of Bihar & others‘ observedas under: ‘7 . “Thus it was m August. 1963 that the appellant discovered that his servxces weie wally determined mi goas liiisconduet F01 nearly 3 years thereaiter he kept on submitting one memorandum after an nlei to me Govennnentand. it was not until-late in ‘l 966 that he filed a Writ Petition in the High Courtito challenge the order of remotiah The memorials presented by him to the Government were in the nature ofmercv petitions and he should have realized that n1 pursumg a remedy which was not dul appomted under the law he was putting in peril a right ot high value and sigritfimnce By his conduct he disabled the High Court irom exercmina its extraordinarv oowers in his favour We are therefore of the opinion that the High Court was justified in, refusing to entertain the petition " r TheSupreme w in P N. riadasivaswau'y Vs State of Tamil Naeu - observed asunder: \‘ t lAiR 1973 $61343 2A1R‘i-974 so 2271 r - o y I I g? It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length oftime. ~ But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretioii for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiousiy for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 12. The Supreme Court in State of M.P‘. & others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and otherss thither observed as under: “Now: it is well settled that the power ofthe High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part ofthe petitioner in iiiing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of faetors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition tiled atter unreasonable delay, it may have the eEect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgnent with reference to various decisions ofthis Court where it has been emphasized time and again that Where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained ofis unconstitutional or illega ." ‘ 13. The Supreme Court in Bum Standard Co. Ltd. & others Dinahandhu Majumdar e3; another" also observed as under: ”The very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee, in our View, should be a sufficient reason for the s (i986; 4 soc 566 .. (1995) 4 scc 172 “ 36 High Coun, not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquieseeiice, urldue deiay and ladies.” 14. The Supreme Court in Kamataka Power CorporationLtd. through its Chairman & Managing Director & another Vs. K. Thangappan & anothers observed as undsr: “Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Couit when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may retiise to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse oftime and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad V. Chief Controller of imports and Exports 0f course, _ the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” In the present cases, the cause ofaction arose in the year 1999. when the other similarly situated employees were granted the beneht of higher grade of pay scale. The petitioner has not taken anysteps ever since till this petition was iiled’on 09.07.2007 and remained tardy and indolent. This belated approach'would certainly cause hardship and inconvenience to other side. 16. As a result and for the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable on the ground .of delay in approaching this Court. Sd/— Satish K. Agnihotri Judge s (2006) 4 sco322