HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 34 OF 2010 DATED 21ST DAY OF JANUARY, 2010, BETWEEN The Food Inspector, Nizamabad, Rep. by the Public Prosecutor ….Appellant And P.Chandrasekhar … Respondent HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 34 OF 2010 JUDGMENT: 1. This Criminal Appeal, under Section 378(3) & (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the judgment dated 01.09.2004 passed in C.C.No. 78 of 2001 on the ﬁle of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Armoor, whereunder and whereby, the respondent/accused was found not guilty of the oﬀence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 and was acquitted under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. 2. The brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the present Criminal Appeal may be stated as follows: On 31.10.1999 at about 12.10 noon, P.W.1-Food Inspector, Nizamabad, along with his Attender, inspected the shop of the respondent/accused and found about 30 Kgs. of green gram dal in an open gunny bag kept for sale to public for human consumption. The respondent/accused did not disclose the source of supply nor did he produce any bill for the said commodity. P.W.1, suspecting the said commodity to be adulterated, served Ex.P.2 notice on the accused and purchased 750 grams of the said commodity for Rs.19.10 Ps. under Ex.P.3 cash receipt attested by the mediators. He divided the said commodity into three equal parts and placed them into dry, clean and empty plastic containers, sealed them and sent one of the samples to the Public Analyst. The Public Analyst, after analysis, opined in his report Ex.P.13 that the commodity was adulterated. After obtaining sanction, he ﬁled a complaint in the Court on 14.2.2001 against the respondent/accused for the oﬀence under Section 16(1) (a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 3. When the accused was examined under Section 251 of Cr.P.C., he denied the oﬀence, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 4 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.22. No evidence, either oral or documentary, was marked on behalf of the respondent/accused. 5. The trial Court, on a consideration of the evidence both oral and documentary brought on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and consequently acquitted the respondent/accused of the oﬀence alleged against him. Hence, this appeal. 6. Now, the point for determination is whether the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the accused for the oﬀence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 and whether the judgment of the trial court is correct, legal and proper? 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the Public Prosecutor contended that the prosecution has proved the oﬀence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954. She submitted that the P.W.1 after purchasing the commodity from the shop of the accused and after following the due procedure, sent one of the samples to the Public Analyst, who after analysis opined that the same is adulterated and therefore the violation of the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 by the Accused was substantiated. Hence, she prays to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused. 8. There cannot be any dispute that there is a presumption under law that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless contrary is proved. That presumption of innocence is further strengthened by an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. Unless there are substantial or compelling reasons, this Court will not ordinarily disturb the ﬁndings of the trial Court. If the trial Court has given any perverse ﬁnding, then it can be a ground to interfere with the order of acquittal. Similarly, if admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been looked into for the purpose of arriving at a particular ﬁnding, then also it can be said to be a compelling reason to interfere with the same. 9. In this case, P.W.1-Food Inspector, after purchasing the article of food from the shop of the respondent/accused, divided it into three equal parts, kept them in sealed empty plastic containers and sent one of the samples to Public Analyst on 1.11.1999. The Public analyst after analysis found in his report Ex.P.13, dated 20.11.1999 that the said commodity was adulterated. However, the Food Inspector, ﬁled the complaint against the respondent/accused on 14.2.2001 i.e. after lapse of ﬁfteen months and the same was taken on ﬁle on 15.2.2001. Therefore, there is delay of about 15 months in issuing the notice under Section 13(2) of the Act. Even if the accused makes a request to send the second sample for analysis to the Director of Central Laboratory, no useful purpose would be served, in view of the fact that because of lapse of long time the second sample kept for chemical test may not be ﬁt for analysis. So the true values of the article of food in question would not be derived correctly because of delay. Even though the accused did not make any request for sending the second sample to the Central Laboratory after receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, it would be a futile exercise to make such an attempt. Further, the Court below disbelieved the evidence of mediator who is PW.4 and thereby there is no independent testimony to support the oﬀence alleged against the respondent/accused. 10. Considering these aspects, the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused. There are no compelling or substantial reasons to interfere with the order of the acquittal. 11. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, conﬁrming the judgment dated 01.09.2004 passed in C.C.No. 78 of 2001 on the ﬁle of the Judicial Magistrate of First class, Armoor. -------------------------------- JUSTICE K.C. BHANU DATED 21ST JANUARY, 2010. MSNR.