:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION JURISDICTION CRIMINAL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1206 OF 2007 APPEAL NO.1206 OF 2007 APPEAL NO.1206 OF 2007 Moin Vairuddin Qureshi Age 37 years, Occupation Business, 85, Wandodi Bazar Pune, at present detained behind bar at Yerwada Central Prison, Dist. Pune ..Appellant V/s State of Maharashtra ..Respondent Mr.Uday Warunjikar for the appellant Mrs.A.S. Pai for the State CORAM CORAM CORAM : S.B. MHASE : S.B. MHASE : S.B. MHASE & A.A. A.A. A.A. SAYED JJ. SAYED JJ. SAYED JJ. DATE DATE DATE : : : 20TH 20TH 20TH FEBRUARY, 2009 FEBRUARY, 2009 FEBRUARY, 2009 JUDGMENT JUDGMENT JUDGMENT (PER A.A. SAYED, J.) (PER A.A. SAYED, J.) (PER A.A. SAYED, J.) 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 6th December, 2006, in Special Case No. 8/2005, passed by the Special Court constituted under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOC Act) at Pune, whereby the application of the appellant seeking discharge came to be rejected. 2. The appellant (alongwith others) is an accused in the said Special Case No.8/2005. According to the appellant, he was also shown as accused in another case under MCOC Act being Special Case No.1/1999. By :2: judgment and order dated 6th October, 2002 in the said Special Case No.1/1999, the appellant alongwith the other accused persons, were held guilty for the offence punishable under section 3(i) (ii) of MCOC Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs each and in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. The appellant and said other accused persons were also convicted of the offence punishable under section 3 r/w section 25 of the Arms Act and section 33 r/w 34 of Indian Penal Code. Accordingly the appellant was detained and was undergoing his sentence in connection with the said case. The appellant challenged the above order of conviction in the above Special Case No. 1/1999, by preferring a Criminal Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 1271/2002 before this Court, which is admitted and is pending hearing and final disposal. After rejection of an earlier bail application, the appellant was ultimately granted bail on 29th July, 2003 by this Court in the said Criminal Appeal. 3. However, the appellant was again arrested on 17-06-2004 on the ground that he had further :3: committed offence punishable under the provisions of MCOC Act on the basis of evidence collected during investigation in CR No.212/2004 registered under section 399, 402 IPC, 2(25), 4(25) Arms Act and 37 (1) r/w 135 of Bombay Police Act and he is again detained and is behind bars. In the above circumstances, the appellant filed an application before the Special Court on 30-05-2005 from jail for discharge from this second case under MCOC Act being Special Case No. 1263/2005 and C.R. No. 212/2004. The discharge application ultimately came to be rejected by the impugned order-hence, the present appeal. 4. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is falsely implicated in C.R.No.212/2004 which was registered at the instance of API Jagdish Satav and he was arrested again on 17-06-2004 within a period of one year of his release on bail on 29-07-2003 in Criminal Appeal No.1271/2002 by wrongly invoking the provisions of MCOC Act. The learned Counsel contended that the provisions of MCOC Act are not applicable in the present case. It is contended by him that no FIR under the provisions of :4: MCOC Act has been filed as required under the law and the requirements under section 23(1) (A) of MCOC Act have not been followed and therefore, cognizance of the case could not have been taken. It is his contention that the proposal was defective and the sanction order is not issued by the proper authority. It is his submission that there was no incriminating material placed before the sanctioning authority and that only sections of MCOC Act have been added and that there was no application of mind by the sanctioning authority and the order of sanction was passed mechanically. The learned Counsel further pointed out the list of various offences under which the appellant has been charged till date. The learned Counsel pointed out that since 1999 till 29-07-2003 he was detained and was behind bars and therefore, there was no possibility of committing of any offences by the appellant during this period. The learned Counsel further submitted that since MCOC Act came into force in the year 1999, the offences prior to 1999 cannot be considered for taking cognizance of the offences under MCOC Act. He submitted that the material placed before the Authority for seeking sanction was in respect of the :5: same offences in which, he was already earlier booked and convicted under MCOC Act and therefore, according to him there is double jeopardy in respect of the prosecution against the appellant, which is violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. He submitted that it was only a malafide action on the part of the police to somehow keep the appellant behind bars. 5. The learned Counsel invited our attention to the preamble, Section 23 and the definitions of "organised crime", "continuing unlawful activity", "organized crime syndicate" under the MCOC Act and submitted that looking to the stringent provisions of the MCOC Act, sufficient safeguards have been provided, which are not followed in the present case. The learned Counsel assailed the sanction order also on the ground that there was no objective and subjective satisfaction on the part of the sanctioning authority to grant sanction on the basis of material which was placed before him, as only list of the FIRs was placed before him and not the relevant contents of the FIRs and investigation papers. The learned Counsel also assailed the :6: impugned order on the ground that the learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate the case of the appellant in its proper perspective, and therefore, considering all the aspects of the matter, the impugned order is required to be set aside and the appellant be discharged. The learned Counsel has relied upon the following judgments:- (1) Lalit Lalit Lalit Somdatta Somdatta Somdatta Nagpal V. K.K. Pathak, Spl. Inspector Nagpal V. K.K. Pathak, Spl. Inspector Nagpal V. K.K. Pathak, Spl. Inspector General General General of Police, Kolhapur Range, of Police, Kolhapur Range, of Police, Kolhapur Range, reported in 2005 (2) Bom. C. R.(Cri) 62. (2) Altaf Ismail Sheikh Altaf Ismail Sheikh Altaf Ismail Sheikh vs. vs. vs. State of Maharashtra, State of Maharashtra, State of Maharashtra, reported in 2005 (1) Bom. C.R.(Cri) 833, (3) Ashok Gyanchand Vohra Vs. State Ashok Gyanchand Vohra Vs. State Ashok Gyanchand Vohra Vs. State of of of Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharashtra, reported in 2006 (1) Bom. C.R.(Cri) 183, (4) State of Maharashtra Vs. Nitendrasingh, State of Maharashtra Vs. Nitendrasingh, State of Maharashtra Vs. Nitendrasingh, reported in 2005 (1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 337, (5) Rambhai Rambhai Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi and others V. State Gujrat Nathabhai Gadhvi and others V. State Gujrat Nathabhai Gadhvi and others V. State Gujrat reported in (1997) 7 SCC 744. 6. On the other hand, the learned APP supported the impugned order and submitted that by adding sections of MCOC Act to the FIR already registered under the provisions of IPC, it cannot be said that the procedure is not in accordance with law. To support this contention, the learned APP relied upon :7: the case of John D’Souza V. Assistant Commissioner John D’Souza V. Assistant Commissioner John D’Souza V. Assistant Commissioner of of of Police, Police, Police, reported in 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 2899. The learned APP submitted that in an application for discharge, only a prima facie case is required to be seen by the learned Special Judge. The learned APP taking us through the compilation of documents produced by her containing the copies of the proposal, letter/order of approval, sanction order and Government Resolutions, submitted that the entire procedure has been followed and the sanction order has been passed only after due satisfaction of the proper sanctioning Authority viz. Additional Director General of Police and Commissioner of Police, Pune City on the basis of approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime), Pune and after placing all materials before the Sanctioning Authority. She has also relied upon the Government Resolutions dated 17-7-2001 and 6-8-2001 which are part of the compilation produced by her and submitted that the proposal was sent by the proper authority and the approval order has been granted by the sanctioning authority after proper application of mind as is reflected in the order of sanction. The learned APP further contended that the appellant is :8: an habitual offender and has formed a crime syndicate of which he is the leader and he has committed serious criminal offences. Refuting the allegations of malafide, the learned APP pointed out that the appellant was arrested when he and his accomplices were preparing to commit dacoity and a revolver of English make was also seized from him. The learned APP submitted that the appellant singly and jointly has committed offences like rioting, extortion and other offences against human body and property and he has formed a crime syndicate and created terror in the minds of the people of Pune City with the intention of obtaining pecuniary advantages. She further submitted that the provisions of MCOC Act are attracted in the case of appellant and that the provisions of MCOC Act have been properly applied by following due procedure of law and that there was no double jeopardy as alleged by the appellant and therefore the impugned order does not require any interference by this Court. 7. We have heard the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant and the Ld. APP and perused the material on record including the compilation of documents :9: submitted by the Ld. APP. 8. The material placed before us disclose that the appellant alongwith the other co-accused were arrested on 16-12-2004 in C.R. No. 212/2004 for offences under sections 399 and 402 of IPC, Sections 3(25), 4(25) of the Arms Act and sections 37(1) r/w section 135 of the Bombay Police Act after a tip-off was received from an informant in the office of the Lashkar Police Station, Surveillance Squad, that the appellant alongwith the other accused persons were preparing to commit an offence of extortion. Accordingly, a trap was laid and ultimately the appellant and 2 other accused persons, who were waiting in Indica V-2 car and also the two other accused persons who came on foot and sat in the car, were swooped upon and were nabbed, though, one of the accused persons managed to flee. Insofar as the appellant was concerned, he was found in possession of a revolver. Other accused persons were also found with live cartridges, sickle with 12 inches blade, kukri, etc. The appellant and the accused persons were thus nabbed when they had gathered and were preparing to commit a robbery and accordingly C.R. :10: No. 212/2004 was registered against them. According to the prosecution, during the course of investigation it transpired that the appellant and the accused persons are members of an organized crime syndicate, of which the appellant was the leader and they have committed several offences jointly and singly, and the appellant was involved in about a dozen offences of rioting, extortion, possessing illegal weapons, attempt to commit dacoity, offences against human body etc. and the appellant and other accused persons had created terror in the minds of the people of Pune city and had obtained illegal pecuniary benefits thereby. 9. Thereafter, upon a proposal dated 4-02-05 from the Inspector of Police, Lashkar, through the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Lashkar Division, Pune-1 and Dy. Commissioner of Police, Zone II, in relation to seeking permission to initiate action as per section 3 of MCOC Act against the crime registered in Lashkar police station CR No. 212/04, the Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime), Pune, after scrutinizing the said proposal and the report and documents submitted to him, vide his order dated :11: 10.02.2005 approved the proposal and granted permission as per the provisions of section 23(1)(a) of MCOC Act, to make applicable section 3(1)(ii), (2) (4) of MCOC Act to the offence registered at Lashkar Police Station under C.R. No. 212/04 and directed that further investigation into the registered offence be handed over to the Asstt. Commissioner of Police, Lashkar Division, Pune City. The Additional Director General of Police and Commissioner of Police, Pune City, thereafter, upon receiving the letter of the Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime), Pune City and the papers of investigation in C.R. No. 212/04, having regard to the evidence brought on record during the investigation of the said C.R. No. 212/04 and having satisfied himself that prima facie case was made out against the appellant and other accused persons to prosecute them under MCOC Act, accorded sanction under section 23(2) of MCOC Act for prosecution of the appellant and the other accused persons for the crimes committed by them under section 3 of MCOC Act for taking cognizance by the Special Court. 10. The position in law as to whether a separate :12: FIR needs to be recorded by a Police Officer after the approval under section 23(1)(a) is granted by the approving authority is settled by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court (Smt. Ranjana Desai and D.B. Bhosle JJ) in the case of John D’Souza vs. John D’Souza vs. John D’Souza vs. Assistant Assistant Assistant Commissioner of Police, Commissioner of Police, Commissioner of Police, reported in 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 2899, relied upon by the Ld. APP. In that case the Division Bench has held in para 20 of the said judgment as follows:- " In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that no separate FIR needs to be recorded by a Police Officer after the approval contemplated by section 23(1)(a) is granted by the Joint Commissioner of Police". Considering the above view, to which we respectfully agree, the grievance of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the provisions of MCOC Act are merely added to the original FIR registered under the ordinary law and no separate FIR is recorded and that the procedure in accordance with law has not been followed, cannot be accepted. 11. Coming to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is noted that in the case of Lalit Somdatta Nagpal vs. K.K. Pathak, Spl. Lalit Somdatta Nagpal vs. K.K. Pathak, Spl. Lalit Somdatta Nagpal vs. K.K. Pathak, Spl. :13: Inspector Inspector Inspector General of Police, Kolhapur Range, General of Police, Kolhapur Range, General of Police, Kolhapur Range, (supra) of the Division Bench of this Court (R.M.S. Khandeparkar & P.V. Kakade, JJ) it was held that section 23(1) of MCOC Act opens with a non obstante clause which shows its provisions are mandatory and have to be applied strictly and approval has to be by Competent Officer and should precede the recording of the information regarding of evidence under the MCOC Act. There can be no quarrel to the proposition laid down by the Division Bench in this regard. However, in the present case, having come to the conclusion that the procedure under the MCOC Act have been duly followed, as discussed hereinbelow, this decision cannot not come of any assistance to the appellant. 12. The next decision relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant is the case of Altaf Ismail Altaf Ismail Altaf Ismail Sheikh Sheikh Sheikh vs. State of Maharashtra, vs. State of Maharashtra, vs. State of Maharashtra, (supra). In that case it was held by the Division Bench of this Court (R.M.S. Khandeparkar & P.V. Kakade, J ) that the offences prior to 24-02-1999 i.e when MCOC Act came into force, cannot be considered for taking cognizance of the offences under MCOC Act and that there is double jeopardy in respect of the :14: prosecution against the appellant, which is violation of Article 20(2) of Constitution of India, which enjoins that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. The facts in that case, however, are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as in that case, the approval and sanction was sought in respect of offences prior to 24-02-1999 whereas in the present case approval and sanction is in respect of offence committed in the year 2004. Merely because it is mentioned in the police report that the appellant had a history of crime related activities which included offences of the year 1999 and earlier, would not enure to the benefit of the appellant in any manner so as to vitiate the sanction. Moreover, the offence registered under C.R. No. 212/04 to which the provisions of MCOC Act are applied, is clearly an independent offence vis-a-vis the offence registered under C.R. No. 145/99 for which the appellant was prosecuted and punished. Being so, there can be no question of double jeopardy and it cannot be said that there is any violation of the mandate of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. :15: 13. We are unable to comprehend how the decision of the Full Court in the case of Ashok Gyanchand Ashok Gyanchand Ashok Gyanchand Vohra Vohra Vohra Vs. State of Maharashtra Vs. State of Maharashtra Vs. State of Maharashtra, (supra) relied upon by appellant is applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case the issue before the Court was essentially as to whether a "private complaint" under section 9 (1) of MCOC Act is tenable and the "powers" of the special court in relation to "private complaints"; whereas in the present case there is no "private complaint" involved at all. The Full Court decision in the above referred case of Ashok Ashok Ashok Gyanchand Vohra Vs. State of Maharashtra Gyanchand Vohra Vs. State of Maharashtra Gyanchand Vohra Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), was infact necessitated because of conflict of views of two Division Benches of this Court, in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh, State of Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh, State of Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh, (supra) which is also relied upon by the appellant and the case of Saquib Abdul Hamid Nachan Vs. State Saquib Abdul Hamid Nachan Vs. State Saquib Abdul Hamid Nachan Vs. State of Maharashtra, Maharashtra, Maharashtra, in 2005(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri) 325. Though the views of the Division Bench in the case of State State State of of of Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh (supra) have in effect been agreed to by the Full Bench and the case having being exhaustively dealt with by the Full Bench, we do not see why the case of State of State of State of Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharashtra Vs. Nitenrasingh, Vs. Nitenrasingh, Vs. Nitenrasingh, (supra) has been :16: relied upon by the appellant. In any event, having held that the Full Court decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, obviously the case of State of Maharashtra vs. State of Maharashtra vs. State of Maharashtra vs. Nitendrasingh Nitendrasingh Nitendrasingh (supra) would also not be applicable to the case in hand. 14. The case of Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi vs. Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi vs. Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi vs. State State State of Gujarat of Gujarat of Gujarat (supra) has been next relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant to contend that in that case, the Apex Court had held that the sanction order was vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind since what the authority did in that case, was merely granted permission to add sections of TADA. The facts in the present case are entirely different. In the decision cited above, there was no sanction at all to prosecute the appellant therein; however, in the present case there is a valid sanction in place by the sanctioning authority. Hence this decision is also of no assistance to the appellant. 15. Upon going through the material on record, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the :17: procedure adopted by the Authorities to make the provisions of MCOC Act applicable to the facts of the case. We find that the approving authority has approved the proposal and granted permission as per the provisions of section 23(1)(a) of MCOC Act, to make applicable section 3(1)(ii), (2) (4) of MCOC Act to the offence registered at Lashkar police Station C.R. No. 212/04 after scrutinizing the said proposal and the report and documents submitted to him and it was also directed that further investigation into the registered offence shall be handed over to the Asstt. Commissioner of Police, Lashkar Division, Pune City. 16. Similarly, we also find that the sanctioning authority has accorded his sanction under section 23(2) of MCOC Act for prosecution of the appellant for the crime committed by him under section 3 of MCOC Act for taking cognizance by the Special Court after due satisfaction and upon going through the papers of investigation in Lashkar Police Station, C.R. No. 212/04. 17. It has come on record that the appellant is a :18: habitual offender and according to the prosecution he has formed a crime syndicate of which he is the leader and the appellant has been involved in several offences, jointly and singly and created terror in the minds of people in Pune City and has obtained illegal pecuniary benefits and he has committed offences against human body and property, like rioting, extortion, murder, attempt to commit murder, grievous hurt, possessing illegal weapons, attempt to commit dacoity, etc with the sole intention of obtaining pecuniary benefits. It has further come on record in relation to the C.R. No. 212/04 that the appellant alongwith the other accused persons had assembled with dangerous weapons like revolver, live cartridges, sickle with 12 inches blade, kukri etc. and were in preparation of committing dacoity. As recorded by the Special Court, more than one chargesheets were filed against the appellant during the preceding ten years in respect of cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years and which offences were committed with the object of obtaining economic or pecuniary gain and the court has taken cognizance of the said offences which were undertaken as a member of an :19: organized crime syndicate. 18 . In light of the above discussion, we do not agree with the contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the provisions of MCOC Act are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Apart from mere submissions in that regard, nothing is placed on record by the appellant to substantiate the contention that he has been falsely implicated and the entire action of the concerned authorities is malafide and is only with a view to detain him and keep him behind bars. We further find that the contentions raised by the appellant as enumerated in para 4 and 5 hereinabove, are devoid of merit and without substance. 19. It is significant to note that though several contentions have been raised and argued before us by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant in this Appeal, these contentions were not raised before the Special Judge. Moreover, most of the grounds which are argued across the bar are also not reflected and/or do not find place in the Appeal Memo. :20: 20. It is a settled law that at the stage of passing the order in terms of section 227 of Cr.P.C., the Trial Court has only to find out whether there exists sufficient ground so that a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused, and the High Court, ordinarily, is not to interfere with the trial Court’s order for framing charge unless there is glaring injustice. This principle has been laid down by a catena of judgments over the years and if any authority is required, gainful reference may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Om Om Om Wati V. State, Wati V. State, Wati