IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.15612 of 2008 1. SITARAM SINGH 2. LAXMAN MANDAL 3. RAM PRAKASH PANDIT 4. VIJAY KUMAR Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. BIHAR SCHOOL EXAMINATION BOARD, PATNA 3. THE SECRETARY, BIHAR SCHOOL EXAMINATION BOARD, PATNA 4. FIRANGI RAI PRIMARY TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE, BARIA CHOWK, MUZAFFARPUR 5. THE PRINCIPAL, FIRANGI RAI PRIMARY TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE, BARIA CHOWK, MUZAFFARPUR For the Petitioners: Shri Rajendra Prasad, Sr. Adv. Rajeev Singh, Adv. For B.S.E.B.: Purnendu Singh, Adv. ----------- 4/ 12/01/2009. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State as also learned counsel for the respondent Bihar School Examination Board. The petitioners claim to be the students of Firangi Rai Primary Teachers Training College, Muzaffarpur for the sessions-1986-87, 1987-88, 1988- 89, 1989-90. As per their own case the examinations were held for the sessions in question in the years 1988 and 1991 itself. Aggrieved by the non-publication of their results they came to this Court in C.W.J.C. No.3325/06 which was disposed on 23.4.2007 with directions to examine their representations and pass orders with regard to the issue of the declaration of their results based on publication of certain earlier results for the session-1985-87. Learned counsel for the petitioners strongly 2 relied upon the Bihar Non-government Physical Teachers Training College and Non-government Teachers Training College and Non-Government Primary Teachers Education College (Contract and Regulation) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1982 Act.”), more particularly Clause-2 (1)(k) thereof which reads as follows:- 2. (1) (d) “jkT; ljdkj dh iwokZuqefr ds fcuk ftls jkT; ljdkj ,slh 'krksZa vFkok ca/kstksa ij nsuk pkgs tks jkT; ljdkj ds fopkj esa mi;qDr gks rFkk tgkWa jkT; ljdkj dh iwokZuqefr jkT; ljdkj }kjk fu/kkZfjr 'krksZa ,oa ca/kstksa ds v/;/khu nh xbZ gks ogkWa oSlh 'krksZa ,oa ca/kstksa dh iwfrZ fd;s fcuk] dksbZ Hkh O;fDr vFkok laLFkk/ lfefr izf’k{k.k f’k{kk ds :i esa 'kkjhfjd izf’k{k.k vFkok 'kkjhfjd f’k{kk vFkok f’k{kd izf’k{k.k vFkok f’k{kd f’k{kk ds fy, midze.k djus] lapkfyr djus] micU/k djus ;k nsus ds fy, dksbZ fon~;ky; ;k egkfon~;ky; laxfBr] vuqjf{kr] izcfU/kr ;k laizofrZr ugha djsxk A” Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously relied upon annexures-4 to 12 to urge that there was deemed permission under Section-2(1)(k) of the 1982 Act when the Government gave directions for accepting the fees and forms. The statutory requirements under the 1982 Act are deemed fulfilled and the respondents had no 3 option but to publish the results in terms of the Bihar School Examination Board Regulation-1964 under Section-17 of Chapter-5 once the examinations had been held. Learned counsel for the State contended that the annexures-4 to 12 primarily concerned the students of the session-1985-87 and whose results had been published, but subsequently cancelled also. It was next contended on behalf of the Board that this Court in C.W.J.C. No.3325/06 did not give any mandamus for publication of the results, but left the matter to the discretion of the respondent board to be exercised in accordance with law. The matter having been considered appropriately, the order 21.8.2008 came to be passed rejecting the prayer for publication of results. It has also specifically held that the recognition was never granted to the institution under the 1982 Act and on the contrary the issue of recognition was specifically rejected by an order dated 23.11.1990. Issues of recognition are issues of facts to be examined and decided by the concerned authorities, if an institution fulfilled the conditions for recognition, meaning thereby, that it met the standards for establishment of the institution for imparting education. If the respondents were satisfied of the ineligibility of 4 the institution to meet the standards for recognition and rejected the same by an order dated 23.11.1990 which never came to be questioned and has not even been questioned in the present writ application except in a very generalized manner in context of the impugned order dated 21.8.2008 there is no occasion for the Court to dwell upon this aspect of the matter. Additionally, if there be a statutory power with conditions laid down for the exercise of that power, there can be no other mode for the exercise of that power except in the manner prescribed. If the 1982 Act required prior permission of the State Government, which was required to fix conditions and binding for such permission, it presupposes a positive order of recognition by the State Government. This Court finds it difficult to accept the argument of deemed permission when the Statute specifically requires a positive order with conditions by the State Government. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the petitioners themselves have acknowledged in paragraph-24 of their writ application that it was an admitted fact that the institution was not recognized. The thrust of the argument is that by virtue of annexures-4 to 12 they were permitted to appear at the orders of the State Government and, therefore, their 5 results must be published. In the background of a positive denial of recognition by order dated 23.11.1990 and that under the 1982 Act there can be no recognition to grant relief on that premise. Recognition having been denied by a positive order dated 23.11.1990, the question of any deemed recognition loses its thrust or even significance as a semblance of a ground. To this Court, the petitioners seek to raise the issues of publication of results for exams of 1988 and 1991 belatedly in the year-2008. The sheet anchor of their arguments are certain orders of this Court in C.W.J.C. No.3325/06 directing the respondents to examine the issues. To this Court the order passed by the authorities in pursuance thereof on 21.8.2008 does not wash off the delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in seeking the publication of their results in 2006 for the examinations held in 1988 and 1991. The Apex Court in 2008(10) S.C.C. 115 (C. JACOB Versus DIRECTOR OF GEOLOGY AND MINING AND ANOTHER) has considered the aspect and impact of delay in seeking such reliefs based on certain observations for consideration made by courts. Considering a much belated challenge to an 6 order of termination where the tribunal had directed the consideration of representation which then came to be rejected and which was sought to be founded as a fresh cause of action, the Apex Court in the discussion at paragraph Nos.8 to 11 held as follows:- 8. “Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on ground of delay (if the application is made before tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying to such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. 9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any “decision” on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and 7 accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” 8 to give rise to a fresh cause of action”. The conclusion of the Court was then recorded in paragraph-14 and 15 in the following terms:- 14. “We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for “consideration”. If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing “consideration” of such claims. 15. The present case is a typical example of “representation and relief”. The petitioner keeps quiet for 18 years after the termination. A stage is reached when no record is available regarding his previous service. In the representations which he makes in 2000, he claims that he should be taken back to service. But on rejection of the said representation by order dated 9-4-2002, he filed a writ petition claiming service benefits, by referring the said order of rejection as the cause of action. As noticed above, the learned Single Judge examined the claim, as if it was a live claim made in time, finds fault with the respondents for not producing material to show that termination was preceded by due enquiry and declares the termination as illegal. But as the petitioner has already reached the age of superannuation, the learned Single Judge grants the relief of pension with effect from 18-7-1982, by deeming that he was retired from service on that day. We fail to understand how the learned Single Judge could declare a termination in 1982 as illegal in a writ petition filed in 2005. We fail to understand how the learned Single judge could find fault with the Department of Mines and Geology, for failing to prove that a termination made 9 in 1982, was preceded by an enquiry in a proceedings initiated after 22 years, when the Department in which the petitioner had worked had been wound up as long back as in 1983 itself and the new Department had no records of his service”. This Court, on the facts of the present case finds no reason to arrive at any different conclusion to hold that the order of this Court dated 23.4.2007 in C.W.J.C. No.3325/06 does not furnish any fresh cause of action to the petitioner which overrides the delay and laches on their part for having moved belatedly for publication of results of an examination held as far back as 1988-91. On both counts, whether it be on merits or on the issue of delay, this Court finds no merit in this writ application. It is accordingly dismissed. KC ( Navin Sinha, J.)