IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Letters Patent Appeal No.703 of 2007 IN (CIVIL WRIT JURISDICTION CASE No. 11242/2004) =================================================== 1. Dhrub Kumar Roy, Son of Late Basawan Rai, resident of Village- Karbasin, P.O. Sahar, Police Station- Sahar, District- Bhojpur. 2.Bhartendu Singh, Son of Sri Pramhansh Singh, resident of Village- Siyaruya, Police Station- Jagdishpur, District- Bhojpur. ------------------Petitioners-------Appellants. Versus 1. Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited, Budha Marg, Patna, through its Managing Director. 2. The Managing Director, Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited, Budha Marg, Patna. --------------------Respondents. 3.Brij Nandan Singh, Son of Late Ramjee Singh, resident of Village- Ranipur, Post Office- Ranipur, Police Station- Paliganj, District- Patna. -------------------Petitioner------Respondent Counsel for the Appellants:- Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Advocate. Counsel for the Respondents no. 1 & 2:- Rajesh Prasad Choudhary, Advocate. ======================================================= CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. T. MEENA KUMARI and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH ----------------- ORAL JUDGMENT (Per: HONOURABLE JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH) . ----------------- Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned counsel for the respondent- Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 26.7.2007 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 11242 of 2004 by a learned Single Judge of this 2 Court. 3. The issue involved was that the writ petitioners had submitted their resignation from service to the Managing Director of the respondent Bank on 3.6.2004. In the resignation letter itself it was mentioned that the same would be effective from 4.6.2004, that is, the very next day. From the facts it appears that though no formal order came to be passed for sometime, the petitioners having an after thought withdrew their resignation by letter dated 16.7.2004. Finally, the respondent Bank by letter dated 20.8.2004 accepted the resignation tendered by the petitioners but the same was made effective from the date of issue of the letter. 4. Learned Single Judge has taken note of these facts and has also taken note of the fact that during the pendency of the writ petition the petitioners no. 1 and 2 had accepted all their dues as per the acceptance of their resignation on 29.6.2007 and 20.12.2006 respectively. With regard to the third petitioner, the writ petition came to be allowed since he had refused to accept his dues as per the acceptance letter. In this background, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by petitioners no. 1 and 2 of the said writ petition since the same 3 stood dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two points in support of the contention in the present appeal. Firstly, he submits that since prior to the issuance of letter accepting resignation, the appellant had withdrawn their resignation and thus, as per the settled law by the Hon’ble Courts including the Hon’ble Apex Court, once an employee exercises his discretion in withdrawing his resignation prior to its acceptance, the employer is bound to take cognizance to the same and act accordingly. He submits that this not having been done the letter accepting resignation is vitiated in law and deserves to be set- aside. 6. He secondly, submits that as per the law settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court even though during the pendency of the writ petition the appellants accepted their dues, still the same would not act as a hurdle in the writ Court in allowing the writ petition. In support of his contention he has taken this Court to various decisions. 7. The first one is a case decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 13.3.2002 in the case of Shambhu Murari Sinha Vs. Project & Development India Limited & Anr. reported in 4 2002 (2) PLJR SC 172. Reference has been made especially to paragraphs no. 18 and 19 of the said judgment. Firstly, this Court would like to clarify that the said judgment relates to resignation tendered under the voluntary retirement scheme which is governed by its own terms and conditions which governs the employees. Secondly, it is also important to note that there is a basic difference between the facts of that case compared to the present case. In the case cited the factual disengagement of the employee by issuance of release memo was subsequent to their having withdrawn their option for voluntary retirement from a particular date. In the present case, the offer to resign was from the very next date and for the next over one and a half month there was absolutely no communication or effort on behalf of the appellants to reconsider or withdraw the same. Further, on query from this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner was not in a position to readily inform as to whether the appellants actually worked even beyond their date of resignation, that is, 4.6.2004 or not. 8. Be that as it may, since we have distinguished the case on facts, the said judgment is 5 not of much help to the appellants in the present case. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Vijay Das Vs. State Bank of India & Ors. reported in 2003 (1) PLJR 45. Reference has been made especially to paragraphs no. 6 to 8 of the said Judgment. The said case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case in as much as the withdrawal of resignation by the petitioner of that case was rejected only on the ground that there was an outer limit for submitting the withdrawal offer at that time. This not being the case at hand the ratio of that Judgment shall not apply in the present case. 9. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to another Judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court (Ranchi Bench as it then was) in the case of Madan Mohan Tanti Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1991 (2) PLJR 583. The relevant paragraphs to which our attention has been drawn are paragraphs no. 12, 18 and 19. This Court will indicate that the foundational facts are different since the judgment which has been cited is with regard to a scheme of voluntary retirement that is 6 governed by the terms and conditions of such scheme. In the present case there being no such scheme or clear law the petitioners cannot as a matter of right invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court for the relief which has been sought in the writ petition. For these reasons, the said judgment does not come to the rescue of the appellants. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank has drawn our attention to a Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bank of India and Ors. Vs. O. P. Swarnakar & Ors. along with analogous cases as reported in (2003) 2 S.C.C. 721. The relevant paragraphs are 114 and 115. Though being short the import is that once the payments pursuant to acceptance of such resignation has been accepted, it would be deemed that the employees concerned have accepted the benefits and could not be permitted to approbate and reprobate nor can they be allowed to resile from their earlier stand. Learned counsel submits that in view of the fact that the appellants have accepted whatever was due to them pursuant to the order accepting their resignation now they cannot come forward and agitate their cause of action again taking the stand that their resignations were wrongly 7 accepted in light of the settled law. Learned counsel states that in another Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A. K. Bindal and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2003) 5 S.C.C. 163 the same principle has been held, that is, once the employee accepts the benefits as per the resignation tendered by him, the relationship of employer and employee seizes and the employee cannot have any claim to agitate or any grievance with regard to such acceptance of his resignation. 11. After hearing the rival contentions, this Court feels that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The ground taken by the parties and the reasons for which the learned Single Judge did not interfere are in accordance with law and are affirmed. However, this Court would like to clarify the point that since the resignation letter dated 3.6.2004, as per the stand of the appellants themselves, came into effect from 4.6.2004, the respondents in their purported act of accepting the resignation were obliged to do so from the date as indicated in the resignation letter which was 4.6.2004. This Court holds that the same would be deemed to come into effect from 4.6.2004 but would hasten to add that if the appellants have 8 been paid their salary etc. till 20.8.2004, that is, the date of the formal letter by which the resignations were accepted the same shall not be recovered from the appellants. This has been done in view of the fact that the respondent which is State under Article 12 of the Constitution and being an organization the processing of such request does take time and definitely it would be unreasonable to expect that the same would be done and final decision leading to issuance of letter of acceptance would also be issued within one day by the respondent. To this aspect this Court cannot shut its eyes and in this view of the matter also there is no infirmity in the order accepting resignation. 12. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal being devoid of merit fails and is accordingly dismissed. Patna High Court Dated 11th of July, 2011 Anand Kr./NAFR (T. Meena Kumari, J.) (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.)