IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.877 of 2011 (Arising out of C.W.J.C. No. 19489 of 2010 dispose of on 15.4.20110) Pankaj Kumar Gupta, aged about 47 years, S/o Late Suryadeo Narayan Gupta, resident of village Phateh Tola, P.O.& P.S. Tripolia, District East Champaran at Motihari……...Petitioner……Appellant. Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The Principal Secretary, Planning and Development Department, Govt. of Bihar, old Secretariat, Patna. 3. The Joint Director, Planning and Development Department, Government of Bihar, old Secretariat, Patna. 4. The District Magistrate, Siwan. (Respondents)…Respondents. ----------- 2. 29.8.2011 Heard the parties. The Writ Court had interfered with the order of suspension dated 25.11.2010 contained in Annexure-4 by holding that the suspension shall not be retrospective but shall be effective from date of order i.e. 25.11.2010. The Writ Court has also directed that the respondents to treat the joining of the petitioner as accepted from 20.9.2010 itself, and treat the petitioner on duty and entitled for full salary and all allowance till suspension from 25.11.2010. On behalf of the appellant, it has been submitted that earlier the authorities had committed a mistake in not accepting the joining of the appellant immediately on 20.9.2010 and in seeking guidelines from the Secretary of the Department. He further submits that although the delay in acceptance of joining did not have adverse effect because his joining has been accepted from 20th September, 2010 but subsequent order of suspension dated 25.11.2010 should be deemed to be illegal because by that very 2 order a direction was given for acceptance of his joining and also for further suspension. Accordingly to the learned counsel further suspension should have been ordered by issuing a separate order in view of rule 9 (3) (ii) of the Bihar Government Servant (Clarification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 (in short, ‘Rules’). The learned counsel for the State has submitted that the separate order in the context would mean a different order from the order of suspension or deemed suspension for the period of custody. In our view, the subsequent order of suspension amounts to a separate order of suspension from a period after he came out of custody. No doubt there was an error in again suspending the appellant from an earlier date but that error has now been corrected by the Writ Court. Learned counsel for the State has rightly submitted that under Rule 9 (6) (b) of the Rules, the State Government has powers to put the petitioner under suspension on account of pendency of departmental proceeding. We find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. Mkc/ (Shiva Kirti Singh, J.) (Shivaji Pandey, J.)