THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR Crl. R.C.No.1270 of 2005 Date: .09.2011 Between: Smt. Kotla Suvarna … Petitioner AND Kotla Rami Reddy and another … Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR Crl. R.C. No.1270 of 2005 ORDER: This is a revision against the acquittal order. The first respondent is accused No.1. The revision petitioner is his wife. She was PW.1 before the trial Court. She laid a case against as many as 14 accused alleging that A.1 was guilty of treating her cruelty and consequently punishable for the offence under Section 498-A of the India Penal Code (IPC) and that he was also guilty of contracting a second marriage and thus punishable for the offence u/s.494 IPC. She further claimed that the other accused assisted A.1 in the bigamous marriage and thus became liable for punishment u/s.494 r/w Sec.109 IPC. 2. The prosecution examined PWs.1 to 6. The learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kodangal, Mahabubnagar District found all the accused including A.1 not guilty of the offences under Sections 494 and 494 r/w 109 IPC. The learned Magistrate also found A.2 and A.3 not guilty of the offence u/s.498-A IPC. He, however, found A.1 guilty of the offence u/s.498-A IPC and recorded a sentence of Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) for a period of two years and fine of ` 4,000/- with appropriate default sentence against A.1. Thus, the only conviction was against A.1 and the conviction was u/s.498-A IPC and not u/s.494 IPC. 3. A.1 preferred appeal before the I Additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar. The learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Mahaboobnagar, reversed the finding of the trial Court and acquitted A.1 for the charge u/s.498-A IPC. Assailing the same, PW.1 preferred the present revision. 4. As already pointed out, the revision petitioner is PW.1, de facto complainant. A.1 is the first respondent in this revision. Sri V.V. Ramana, learned counsel for PW.1 contended that the prosecution has established the guilt of A.1 for the offence u/s.498-A IPC beyond reasonable doubt and the acquittal of A.1 by the appellate Court is unjust and is liable to be set aside. 5. Smt. Barkha, learned counsel for the first respondent/A.1, on the other hand, reminded that this is revision against acquittal and that the scope of revision against acquittal is very limited. 6. She placed reliance upon Jagannath Choudhary v. Ramayan Singh[1]. The Supreme Court exhaustively considered the scope of revision u/s.401 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) in this case. The Supreme Court referred to K. Chinaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another A.P.[2] where the scope of criminal revision was dealt with by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the scope of criminal revision is confined to determine whether the assailed judgment is erroneous or otherwise. The learned counsel for A.1 also placed reliance upon a very recent decision in A. Shankar v. State of Karnataka[3]. In that case, the Supreme Court observed “It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court under compelling circumstances should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e., the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence. (Vide Abrar v. State of U.P. [4] and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka [5].)” 7. Thus, it is the contention of the learned counsel for A.1 that reversal of the finding of the appellate Court is an exception and that if there is no perversity in the judgment of the appellate Court, the judgment of acquittal recorded by the appellate Court cannot be countenanced, merely because another view is also possible. I agree with this contention of the learned counsel for A.1. This view of the Supreme Court shall be kept in mind while examining the evidence. 8. As already noticed, A.1 is the resident of PW.1. A.2 and A.3 are the parents of A.1. A.4 is the alleged second wife of A.1. A.5 to A.17 are the relatives and friends of A.1, who allegedly participated and abetted A.1 in committing bigamy. PW.1, who is the de facto complainant and the revision petitioner, is the wife of A.1. PWs.2 and 3 are the parents of PW.1. These are the main dramatic personae in this case. 9. PW.1 was given in marriage to A.1 in 1992. It is the case of PW.1 that A.1 contracted a second marriage on 11.10.1997 marrying A.4 while the marriage of A.1 with PW.1 was subsisting. In fact, the marriage between PW.1 and A.1 has been subsisting even today. However, so far as the marriage between A.1 and A.4 is concerned, the trial Court did not believe the same. Appeal was not preferred therefrom by the revision petitioner. Inasmuch as the judgment of acquittal for the offence Sec.494 IPC has become final, that aspect need not be considered. 10. The case of the prosecution is that when PW.1 was given in marriage to A.1, ` 20,000/- in cash and 50 tulas of gold and other household articles were presented by PWs.2 and 3. It is the further case of the prosecution that A.1 demanded further cash of ` 25,000/- as additional dowry and that on 29.07.1997 he necked out PW.1 from the house. Admittedly, none of the prosecution witnesses in PWs.2 to 6 were eyewitnesses to the alleged criminal conduct of A.1. It is only PW.1 who witnessed the criminal behaviour of A.1 and also became the victim of the same. Be that as it may, the evidence of PW.1 would be sufficient to convict the accused for the offence u/s.498-A IPC, if the evidence is trustworthy and inspiring. While so, the appellate Court examined the case of the prosecution with reference to the evidence of PW.1 and other witnesses. After thorough examination, the appellate Court recorded that PW.1 never alleged that A.1 beat PW.1. Curiously, PW.1 did not complain about the conduct of A.1 for the period till 1996. Even the parents of PW.1 deposed that the matrimonial life was happy for about 2 or 3 years after the marriage. It is, indeed, the case of PW.1 that A.1 started harassing PW.1 for additional money since about 1996. PW.1 deposed that mediations were held five or six times on petty issues and that at the time of the last mediation, the named mediators like Pratap Reddy, Kavali Venkat Reddy, Poturu Ram Reddy and others participated. Curiously, none of these mediators was examined by the prosecution to prove her case. 11. It is the contention of the learned counsel for A.1 that the basis of the complaint is the greed of PW.1. Smt. Bharka, learned counsel for A.1 drew my attention to the cross-examination of PW.1. In the cross-examination of PW.1, dated 28.12.1999, PW.1 deposed that if A.1 settles Ac.6.00 cents of land in favour of the children and pays ` 30,000/- to ` 40,000/- to PW.1, PW.1 was ready to join A.1. It is the contention of the learned counsel for A.1 that cat was out of the bag from this admission of PW.1 that the basis of the entire complaint is the greed of PW.1 to grab landed property and cash from PW.1. 12. Sri V.V. Ramana, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/de facto complainant/PW.1 also referred to the evidence of PW.1 in this context and contended that the evidence of PW.1 cannot be read in isolation. There cannot be two views in this regard. An isolated sentence from the evidence of a witness cannot be picked up to arrive at a conclusion. The overall evidence deserves to be assessed to determine what a witness has been speaking or has been intending to state. 13. A reading and further reading of PW.1, however, clearly indicates that there have been differences between PW.1 and A.1 and that PW.1 is prepared to forget the differences if her conditions regarding settlement of immovable properties on payment of cash are met. I am afraid that the evidence of PW.1 cannot be conclusively to establish the guilt of A.1, in view of this glaring inadvertent admission on the part of PW.1. Added to it, none of the alleged mediators for any of the mediations was examined by PW.1 to prove her case. PWs.4 and 5 are supposed to be independent witnesses who are aware about the dispute between PW.1 and A.1 and are supposed to state that A.1 was responsible for the dispute. As they did not support the prosecution story, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor put leading questions to them with the permission of the Court. Nevertheless, PWs.4 and 5 did not establish the prosecution story. 14. Consequently, the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 alone remained to prove the guilt of A.1. 15. First, PW.1 failed to prove her case by examining any independent witness. Secondly, PW.1 made an admission that she was willing to join A.1 if her conditions are met. The evidence of PW.1, therefore, is highly susceptible and cannot form the basis for conviction of the accused for the offence u/s.498-A IPC. 16. The prosecution did not examine any independent account of the cruelty by A.1 towards PW.1, barring for the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 who are interested inter se. The appellate Court in this background was perfectly justified in disbelieving the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 in recording the acquittal of the accused. There are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the acquittal recorded by the appellate Court. The appellate Court was perfectly justified in holding that the prosecution failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 17. The revision is, therefore, unsustainable and is, accordingly, dismissed. ________________ K.G. SHANKAR, J Date: .09.2011 Isn [1] 2002 (2) ALT (Crl.) 91 (SC) [2] AIR 1962 SC 1788 [3] (2011) 6 SCC 279 [4] (2011) 2 SCC 750 [5] (2011) 4 SCC 779 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 488