WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 1 of 24 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI JUDGMENT RESERVED ON: 01.12.2008 % JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON: 07.01.2009 + (1) W.P.(C) 6216/2008 SHRI SATYA SAI COLLEGE OF EDUCATION .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate And (2) W.P(C)No.6813/08 VINAYAK COLLEGE OF EDUCATION .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate And (3) W.P(C)No.6969/08 SHARADDHANATH TEACHER EDUCATION COLLEGE .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate And WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 2 of 24 (4) W.P(C)No.6970/08 ASIAN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate And (5) W.P(C)No.7475/08 SANT RAMKRISHNA KANYA MAHAVIDYALAYA .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate And (6) W.P(C)No.7477/08 YADUVANSHI COLLEGE OF EDUCATION .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate And (7) W.P(C)No.7932/08 ADARSH KRISHNA COLLEGE OF EDUCATION .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 3 of 24 And (8) W.P(C)No.7959/08 JAI MURTI COLLEGE .... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate versus NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ..... Respondent Through: Mr. V.K. Rao and Mr. Ayushya Kumar, Advocate CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI 1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes 3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes in the Digest? VIPIN SANGHI, J. 1. In this batch of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution a preliminary objection has been raised with regard to the lack of territorial jurisdiction in this Court to entertain these petitions. These petitions have been filed by various institutions situated in the states of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana against the National Council for Teacher Education (the Council), which has its head office at Delhi. The Council, in all these petitions, has also been impleaded through its Northern Regional Committee in Jaipur. The petitioners are running their respective institutes by offering courses in Teacher Training with the approval of the respondent Council. Each of them WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 4 of 24 applied for approval of the Council either for additional intake in the course(s) already being run by them, or for starting additional course(s) in subjects of teacher education. The applications were made to the Northern Regional Committee of the Council in Jaipur. 2. The impugned orders/acts of omissions resulting in the approval not being granted are attributed to the Northern Regional Committee of the Council at Jaipur. The question is, whether the petitioners can approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to impugn the acts/omissions of the Northern Regional Committee of the Council, situated in Jaipur, merely because the head office of the Council is situated in Delhi. Article 226 of the Constitution, in so far as it is relevant reads as follows:- “226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court would have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 5 of 24 by virtue of sub-Article (1) of Article 226, inasmuch as, the head office of the Council is situated in Delhi. He submits that it is not necessary that some part of the cause of action should have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, for this Court to get vested with the jurisdiction to exercise the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is argued that the Council has framed Regulations prescribing the procedure for dealing with applications for seeking recognition of courses/additional courses/additional intake. The Northern Regional Committee has misinterpreted/misapplied the Regulations while considering the applications of the petitioners. Since the Regulations have been framed by the Council in Delhi, it is argued that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions. Counsel for petitioner has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: - 1. Vareli Weavers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1996) 3 SCC 318 2. Appollo Tyres Ltd. v. Union of India 1980 ELT 428 [Del] 3. M/s J.K. Industries v. Union of India 2002 V AD (Delhi) 668 4. Ela Kumar v. AICTC 117 [2005] DLT 371 5. Bernard D’Mello v. IFC Ltd. 12 [2004] DLT 371 6. Union of India v. Oswal Wollen Mills Ltd. [1984] 3 SCR 342 7. Nirmal Kumar Sikdar v. Chief Electoral Officer AIR 1961 Cal 289 8. U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P. (1995) 4 SCC 738 WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 6 of 24 9. Mohd. Ashfaq v. Union of India 43 [1991] DLT 504 10. Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 7 SCC 640 11. Sthapati Engineers v. CBRI 66 [1997] DLT 232 12. Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim [2007] 11 SCC 335 13. Agencia Commercial International Limited & Ors. Vs. Custodian Branches of Banco Nacional Ultra Marino AIR 1982 SC 1268 4. To examine the aforesaid issue, it is necessary to refer to a few provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (the Act) whereunder the Council is constituted. The Council is established under Section 3 of the said Act. The Council is declared to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and it may sue and be sued by its name. The functions of the Council are set out in Section 12 of the Act. The primary function to be performed by the Council is to take steps for ensuring planned and coordinated development of teacher education and for the determination and maintenance of uniform standards for teacher education throughout India. The expression “Regional Committee” is defined to mean a committee established under Section 20 of the Act. 5. Section 20 of the Act provides that the Council, by notification in the official gazette, may establish the following Regional Committees, namely, Eastern Regional Committee, Western Regional Committee, Northern Regional Committee and Southern Regional Committee. The constitution of the Regional Committees is provided for in Section 20(3). Section 20(6) states that the Regional Committee, WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 7 of 24 in addition to its functions stipulated under Sections 14, 15 & 17, may perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Council or as may be determined by Regulations. Under Section 20(7) it is provided that the functions of, the procedure to be followed by, the territorial jurisdiction of, and the manner of filling casual vacancies among members of a Regional Committee shall be such as may be determined by Regulations. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the aspect of recognition of teacher education institutions. Every institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education is obliged to apply for grant of recognition under the Act. The application has to be made to the concerned Regional Committee. On receipt of an application by the Regional Committee, the Regional Committee is required to examine the same. It may either accept or refuse the application by granting or refusing the grant of recognition. The order granting or refusing recognition is required to be published in the official gazette and communicated in writing for appropriate action to the institution and the examining body, local authority or the State Government and Central Government. Section 15 deals with the aspect of permission for establishment of a new Course or training by a recognized institution, and provides that an application for this purpose has to be made to the Regional Committee concerned. 6. The submission of Mr. V.K. Rao, learned counsel for the respondent Council is that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of any of the petitioners, inasmuch as, the petitioners are situated outside the jurisdiction of this WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 8 of 24 Court; they made the applications to the Northern Regional Committee of the Council at Jaipur, and; the applications have also been dealt with and responded to, or allegedly remained inactioned by the Northern Regional Committee at Jaipur. He, therefore, submits that this Court would have no jurisdiction, particularly when the Northern Regional Committee has been constituted as a statutory body under Section 20 of the Act and is required to discharge statutory functions under Sections 14, 15 & 17 of the Act. It is the actions/omissions of the Northern Regional Committee which are in question in these writ petitions. The grievance of the petitioner that the Northern Regional Committee has misinterpreted the Regulations dated 10.12.2007 is also an issue arising in relation to the conduct of the Northern Regional Committee only, and merely because the Regulations so interpreted by the Northern Regional Committee are framed by the Council, that by itself would not vest this Court with jurisdiction. 7. So far as the location of the head office of the respondent National Council at Delhi is concerned, it is argued by Mr. Rao that merely because the Council has its head office at Delhi, this Court would not have the territorial jurisdiction as the Northern Regional Committee is a separate statutory body located at Jaipur; it is the acts/omissions of the Northern Regional Committee by which the petitioners are aggrieved, and it is these acts/omissions which, according to the petitioners, give each of them the cause of action to file these writ petitions. It is also argued that merely because the WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 9 of 24 disputes raised by these petitioners on merits may require the interpretation of the Regulations framed by the Council at Delhi, that fact would not vest this court with jurisdiction. Mr. Rao has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254. 8. I now proceed to deal with the various decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his aforesaid submissions. Varieli Weavers Private Limited (supra) was a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in an appeal preferred against the order of a Division Bench of this Court whereby this Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The issue raised by the appellant was with regard to classification of the partially oriented yarn (POY) imported by the appellants. The respondent authorities had sought to classify the imported POY on the basis of a circular issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, which stated that POY was assessable to countervailing duty and Excise Duty at the final denirage stage, that is after the POY had been texturized. The submission of the appellants was that there was no warrant for levying countervailing duty upon imported goods by treating them as goods into which they would be transformed after undergoing a process. They had already been subjected to duty in the state in which they were, when imported. In these circumstances the court observed that the circular, on the basis of which the duty was levied, having been issued in Delhi, the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s writ petition. WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 10 of 24 Firstly, I may notice that on the merits of the aforesaid dispute the respondents conceded the case in favour of the appellants. Secondly, there is no discussion to be found on the aspect of the Delhi High Court having territorial jurisdiction on account of the fact that the circular, on the basis of which the appellants were subjected to countervailing duty at the final denierage stage, had been issued from Delhi. The said decision, therefore, cannot constitute a binding precedent for the proposition that a High Court would have territorial jurisdiction only on account of the fact that the circular, which has all India application, has been issued within the jurisdiction of that particular High Court. In fact, this proposition has been squarely considered in Kusum Ingots (supra) and it has been held that the place of issuance of the circular/law, which has application all over the country, would not by itself give jurisdiction to the Court within whose jurisdiction the circular/law was issued. Kusum Ingots (supra) is a later and a larger bench decision of the Supreme Court and would, in any event, prevail over the decision in Vareli Weavers Private Ltd. (supra). 9. The next decision relied upon by the petitioner viz. Appollo Tyres Limited (supra) is of little assistance. In this case, the petitioner had assailed the press note which had been issued by the Central Government at New Delhi. In these circumstances it was held that this court had jurisdiction. Firstly, it appears that the issue of jurisdiction was decided on the basis that a part of the cause of action WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 11 of 24 had arisen in Delhi wherefrom the impugned press note was issued. Therefore, it is Article 226(2) which was involved and not 226(1). However, in the present cases the petitioners have impugned the various communications/orders issued by the Northern Regional Committee in Jaipur by resort to Article 226 (1) of the Constitution. Secondly, even if one were to proceed on the basis that the Court assumed jurisdiction merely because the impugned press note was issued from Delhi, this decision would be contrary to the later Supreme Court decision in Kusum Ingots (supra). Similar was the case in M/s. J.K. Industries Limited (supra). In this case, the impugned order/notification/clarificatory order was issued from New Delhi. Reference may be made to Para 29 of the judgment in this regard. The decision in Poona Battling and Ors (supra) also falls in the same category as J.K. Industries (supra), Appllo Tyres Limited (supra). In this case as well, the letter, which formed the basis of the show cause notice issued to the petitioner was issued from Delhi. It is on that basis that the Court held that this Court would have territorial jurisdiction since the issuance of the said letter dated 14.04.1978 was a part of the cause of action and the case squarely fell under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution. In U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad (supra), the issue of jurisdiction was decided again on the basis that cause of action had arisen upon the issuance of order/notification by the Government at Lucknow and held that the bench at Lucknow had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Moreover, this decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Kusum WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 12 of 24 Ingots and Alloys Limited Vs. UOI (2004) 6 SCC 254. This decision again is, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner. 10. Ela Kumar (supra) also has no relevance to determine the issue of territorial jurisdiction arising in the present petitions. That was a case where respondent No.1 AICTE changed the eligibility criteria for the post of Assistant Professor, rendering the petitioner ineligible for the said post after he had appeared in the interview at the YMCA Institute of Engineering, Faridabad, Haryana – respondent No. 2. When the petitioner had sought redressal of his grievance, he was informed that AICTE had directed the respondent No.2 Institute to decide his eligibility as per the amended notification dated 19.02.2003. The relief sought in the writ petition filed by the petitioner was to seek a mandamus to AICTE respondent No.1 to modify its notification dated 19.02.2003 and to bring it conformity with an earlier corrigendum notification and to declare him eligible for the post of Assistant Professor in the respondent No.2 institute. The learned Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction on the premise that the relief sought by the petitioner was directed against the respondent No.2 institute located in Faridabad which fell outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench concluded that the relief sought by the petitioner was, in fact, directed against the respondent No.1 AICTE which had issued the corrigendum notification changing the eligibility criteria. In these circumstances the Division Bench held that the writ petition was WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 13 of 24 maintainable in this Court since the AICTE is located at Delhi. From the judgment of the Division Bench it does not appear that the notification in question dated 19.02.2003 was not issued from Delhi, and that the same had been issued from any other place outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the aforesaid decision also has no relevance to determine the issue in hand. 11. Bernard D’mello (supra) relied upon by the petitioner would certainly have come to the petitioner’s rescue since the learned Single Judge of this Court held that this court would have jurisdiction to issue a writ to any authority whose registered office is situated within Delhi by resort to Article 226 (1) of the Constitution of India. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this decision has been overruled on the aforesaid aspect of territorial jurisdiction in Bernard D’mello Vs. IFCI Ltd LPA 723/2001 and LPA 920/2004 decided on 05.10.2006 reported as 2006 IX AD (Delhi) 493. The Division Bench considered various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court including the decision in Sector 21 Owners Welfare Association Vs. Airforce Naval House Board 1996 1 AD Delhi 471, and held as follows: “21. The learned Single Judge in dealing with the said issue has largely based his judgment on Article 226(2) (Sic) 226(1) and the situation of the Registered Office in Delhi. The learned Single Judge while dealing with the issue of territorial jurisdiction considered the plea questioning the jurisdiction of this Court by invoking Article 226(2) (Sic) 226(1) of the Constitution. It was urged that that since the MDI Institute is at Gurgaon, Haryana and all subsequent events such as the Board's decision, the communication and receipt of this WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 14 of 24 communication by the Petitioner all occurred at Gurgaon, no part of the cause of action accrued in Delhi and hence this Court did not possess the jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition. The relevant portion of the Single Judge's judgment reads as under: “The fact that the Registered Office of the Respondent No. 2 is within the territory of the Union Territory of Delhi would clothe this Court with territorial jurisdiction. It may be noted that prior to insertion of Sub-article (2), some of the High Courts were of the opinion that where the cause of action arose a writ petition could be filed in those High Courts as well. This view was constitutionally recognized by amending Article 226 of the Constitution and insertion of Sub-article (2). In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was brought that the purpose of the amendment was to clothe the high courts with jurisdiction where the cause of action arose. It may also be noted that in Sub-article (2) the word used is "also". This clearly shows that the jurisdiction conferred by the Sub-article (2) is in addition to the jurisdiction conferred on the courts under Sub-article (1) and not in derogation thereof. In other words, with regard to writ petitions, it is not only the High Courts within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose which would have jurisdiction, but even the court within the territorial jurisdiction of which the Respondent resides would have jurisdiction. Residence of a juristic entity would be the place its Registered Office is situated.” 22. The learned Single Judge thus held that since that the Registered Office of the Respondent No. 2 was within the territory of the Union Territory of Delhi this Court was equipped with the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 23. ………………………………… 24. In our view, the writ petition would have been entertainable in Delhi High Court in case the appeal was preferred to the appellate authority situated in Delhi and the impugned order was passed by the appellate authority in Delhi or any cause of action arose qua the WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 15 of 24 Registered Office in Delhi. However, this is not so. The facts of the present case and indeed the pleadings clearly show that no appeal was preferred pursuant to the impugned order dated 23rd September, 2003. There is no plea in the entire writ petition which refers to any cause of action arising qua the Registered Office situated in Delhi. The Petitioner's grievance sought to be highlighted in the writ petition which according to Mr. Gonsalves brought in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court was based upon a complaint which preceded the impugned order of termination. There is no grievance raised in Delhi after the impugned order of termination nor is there any prayer in the writ petition which relates to any cause of action which has taken place in Delhi. Even the averments about the cause of action contained in paragraph 29 of the writ petition only proceed on the basis that the Registered Office of the MDI is situated in Delhi. This in our view is not ipso facto sufficient to entitle this Court to entertain the writ petition in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adani Export's case and the judgment of this Court in Sector 21 owners Welfare Association case (supra). Accordingly, we are of the view that in so far as the entertainment of the writ petition on the existing pleadings is concerned, the MDI is entitled to succeed. However, this judgment has proceeded on the pleadings of the case and our consequent view that on the existing pleadings, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition irrespective of the fact of whether this Court had territorial jurisdiction. We are however, not ruling out the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in an appropriate case where there are appropriate pleadings to that effect.” 12. Unfortunately, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited an overruled decision. This, I assume is a bonafide error. The counsel for the petitioner, it is hoped, would be more careful in future and take care to make all reasonable efforts to ascertain, whether a decision has been overruled before citing the same. In Sector 21 Owners Welfare Association Vs. Airforce Naval House Board (supra) the Division Bench of this Court after considering various decisions held as WP(C) No.6216/08 Page 16 of 24 follows: “The law reflected by the abovesaid decisions is that the emphasis has shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against to the situs of the accrual of cause of action wholly or in part. It is also clear that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause