MC 1356/2009 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K. MERUNO Amitava Roy, J The present is an application for condonation of delay of 29 days in filing the accompanying writ appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 23.07.20 08 passed in WP(C) No.7380/2002. We have heard Ms. A. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned Amicus Curiae and Mr. S.R. Gogoi, learned counsel for the opposit e party-Management. The pleadings on record reveal that the applicant is a registered Trade Union es pousing the cause of the workman involved, who at the relevant point of time was in the service of the opposite party-Management. Following his dismissal, an In dustrial Dispute was raised and in the Reference Case No.8/99 u/s.10 of the Indu strial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter for short referred to as the Act), the lea rned Labour Court, Assam at Guwahati by its award dated 17.01.2001 answered the reference in favour of the opposite party-Management. Being aggrieved, the applicant approached this Court with the aforementioned wri t petition, which was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 23.07.2008. Acc ording to the applicant, after obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judg ment and order, the memorandum of appeal was filed on 26.09.2008. No applicatio n for condonation of delay was filed as it’s learned counsel was under the impre ssion that no delay had occurred. When on due inquiry to ascertain the reason a s to why the appeal had not long been listed for admission it transpired that it was so as the same (appeal) was delayed by 29 days on the date of its filing, t he instant application for condonation of delay was submitted on 25.03.2009. In course of the hearing, Mr. Gogoi, learned counsel for the opposite party-Mana gement raised the plea that as the instant application had not accompanied the m emorandum of appeal the explanation provided therein for condonation of delay of 29 days is wholly inadequate. According to him the delay for the whole period ranging from the date of the filing of the appeal till date of the instant appli cation ought to be provided. Being confronted with the above stand, the applicant has filed an additional aff idavit contending, in substance, that when the appeal was filed its learned coun sel was under the impression that it was not barred by time and that it was only when it transpired that it was so by 29 days on inquiries being made for the un due delay in its listing, the application for condonation of delay so filed on 2 5.03.2009. The whole period of delay is sought to be explained thus. There is n o affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the opposite party resisting the prayer f or condonation of delay. Ms. Bhattacharyya while reiterating the averments in the applicant’s pleading ha s placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court rendered in AIR 1978 SUPREM E COURT 537 (Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi and others) as wel l as in (2000) 7 Supreme Court Cases 372 (STATE OF M.P. AND ANOTHER Versus PRADE EP KUMAR AND ANOTHER). Mr. Medhi, learned Amicus Curiae while referring to Order 41 Rule 3-A of the Civ il Procedure Code (hereinafter for short referred to as the Code) as well as Cla use 2(2) & (4) of the High Court Rules has submitted that though no period of li mitation as such been prescribed for filing an application for condonation of de lay, it can be construed therefrom that the same ought to accompany the memorand um of appeal when filed. Referring to the decision of this Court in (1991) 1 GL R 339 (STATE OF ASSAM Versus GOBINDA CHANDRA PAUL) as well as of the Calcutta Hi gh Court in AIR 1988 CALCUTTA 28 (Sm. Sipra Dey v. Ajit Kumar Dey) Mr. Medhi has argued that an application for condonation of delay whether for any appeal or a ny other application however can permissibly be filed even after the submission of such appeal and/or the application, the word shall’ notwithstanding in Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code. Mr. Gogoi has however urged that the application read with the additional affida vit filed do not offer any sufficient cause for the condonation of delay, and th at therefore the instant application ought to be rejected. Referring to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned counsel has urged that though no specific time frame has been prescribe d either under the High Court Rules or under the Code for filing an application for condonation of delay, the same by no means can be indefinite. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on a consideration of the m aterials available, we are of the view that the instant appeal ought to be const rued to have been presented validly and as required in law only on the date of w hich the application for condonation of delay has been filed i.e. 25.03.2009. T his view finds support from the decision of the Apex Court in STATE OF M.P. AND ANOTHER Versus PRADEEP KUMAR AND ANOTHER (Supra). The Lordships therein while se ized with a similar issue had observed that if a memorandum of appeal is filed i nvolving delay without any accompanying application to condone the same, the con sequence cannot be fatal. It was held further that if an application to condone the delay is subsequently filed before the appeal is rejected, the same should b e taken up alongwith the already filed memorandum of appeal and only then the Co urt can treat the appeal as lawfully presented. In the above premise, having regard to the explanation provided in the affidav it filed on 22.03.2011, which indicates that the cause of the delay was a bona f ide wrong impression of the learned counsel for the applicant that the appeal filed on 26.09.2008 was on tim e, we are of the view that it is a fit case where the delay ought to be condoned . Ordered accordingly. Consequently, the delay in filing the accompanying appe al is condoned. The Misc. case is allowed. Before we part, we record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. S. K. Medhi, learned Amicus Curiae.