1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, APPELLATE SIDE NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 373 of 2008 Sakubai Bhaiyyalal Thawarkar Vs. Anusaya Bhaiyyalal Thawarkar & Ors. Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court orders or directions and Registrar's orders Court's or Judge's orders Shri V. D. Muley Adv. for petitioner. Shri A. M. Quazi Adv. for respondents. CORAM: J. H. BHATIA J. Dated: 2 nd February, 2009. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Present petitioner claimed to have purchased certain property from Bhaiyyalal Thawarkar under the registered sale deed . She filed Regular Civil Suit No. 8 of 1996 for possession of that property against defendant/respondent No.1 Anusaya. The suit is still pending before the Civil Judge Junior Division Tumsar. 2 Respondent No.3 Kishore who is son of respondent No. 1 Anusaya made an application to be impleaded as defendant in the suit on the ground that Bhaiyyalal was his father, that the property was ancestral and he has also share in the property and that his father did not have any right to sell the property. Application was opposed on behalf of the plaintiff/petitioner. However, the trial Court allowed that application to avoid any multiplicity of proceedings. That order is challenged by the original plaintiff in this petition. 3. Admittedly the petitioner and respondent No.1 both are widows of Bhaiyyalal and respondent No.3 is son of Bhaiyalal from respondent No.1. The petitioner claims that the suit property was sold to her by Bhjaiyyalal under registered sale deed and on that basis she claims possession. If the property was ancestral property in hands of Bhaiyyalal, his son would be entitled to have share in the suit property and as respondent No.3 was not impleaded as defendant he made an application to be impleaded as such. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the plaintiff is a dominus litis and it may be left to him to 3 choose who should be his opponent and no third party can force himself as a defendant in the suit. In support of his contention he relied upon Vithoba Vs. Secretary of State for India through D. C. Nagpur and another A. I. R. 1925 Nagpur 273, wherein this Court had observed as follows: “Ordinarily the plaintiff who comes into Court is the dominus litis and it must always be left to him to choose his opponent against whom he has to claim the relief in the suit. No stranger has any business to intrude into the case and force himself upon a plaintiff who does not want him and who does not claim any relief against him. The plaintiff is the best judge of his own interest. If he seeks relief against a particular individual and impleads that individual as a sole defendant, it is not the look out of the Court or any other third person, to see whether somebody else must be allowed to intrude into the case as a co-defendant, against the plaintiff's will, simply because that third person represents to the Court that he is a person who would be affected by the decision. The first principle of law is that nobody would be bound or affected by the decision to which he is not properly made a party. So far as I can see it is not the intention of law to let third persons ventilate their own grievances in, and thus derive profit from a suit commenced by another at his own cost and for his own benefit.” Learned counsel also points out that this authority has been 4 followed in many matters including in Prabhudayal Mahadeo Sahu Vs. The Nagpur Improvement Trust & Another in Writ Petition 4889 of 2006. In the case of Prabhudayal, the facts of the benefit are not stated and therefore it is difficult to understand what was the claim of the plaintiff and what was the ground on which the respondent No.2 wanted to be impleaded as party. On perusal of judgment in Vithoba Vs. Secretary of State it appears that a third party wanted to intervene. On perusal of the above referred observations it is clear that this Court had stated that ordinarily the plaintiff who comes to the Court is dominus litis and it may be left to him to choose his opponent and third party should not be incorporated or allowed to force himself. I fully agree with this proposition. However this is the ordinary rule but there may be circumstances where a third party may have good cause and reason to intervene and to avoid multiplicity of litigation, this application may be allowed. 4. In the present matter if respondent No.3 is not allowed to be impleaded and if the petitioner succeeds in getting a decree for possession against respondent No.1, at the stage of execution, 5 again obstruction may come from respondent No.3 and that may lead to the multiplity of the litigation. Respondent No.3 is not totally stranger. He is a member of that family and is son of deceased Bhaiyyalal who was holding the suit property and according to defendants the suit property was ancestral property. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case I find no fault with the impugned order allowing the applicant to be impleaded as defendant. 4. At this stage the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks direction to the trial Court to expedite the hearing and dispose of the suit as early as possible because evidence has been already placed on record by the original plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the trial Court shall expedite the hearing and dispose of the suit as early as possible and preferably within one year. Petition stands dismissed with above direction. JUDGE svk