IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO : 1609 of 2005 Between: Paladugu Ramesh, s/o Venkata Koteswararao, Nandanuru Village, Ungaturu Mandal, Krishna District. ..... PETITIONER AND District Registrar, Registration and Stamps Department, Nalgonda, Nalgonda District. .....RESPONDENT Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.K.V.SATYANARAYANA Counsel for the Respondent:GP FOR REVENUE The Court made the following: ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a writ of mandamus to set aside order, dated 10.06.2003 passed by the respondent whereby he impounded the unregistered sale agreement concerning the petitioner. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The petitioner filed O.S.No.146 of 1992 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Kodad, Nalgonda District for permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. In the said suit, the petitioner sought to mark a document styled as agreement of sale as an exhibit. On the objections raised by the defendants in the suit to the effect that the said document cannot be treated as agreement since the instrument contained the recital of delivery of possession, the learned District Munsif held that the document is a sale deed and directed payment of deficit stamp duty and penalty of Rs.2,35,895/- under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short ‘the Act’). Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner sought for reference of the document for adjudication in terms of Section 40 of the Act to the District Collector, who is also designated as District Registrar of Stamps. On such reference being made, the respondent passed order, dated 03.10.1998 wherein he declined to adjudicate the issue on the ground that the learned District Munsif already decided the said issue. Questioning the said order, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.30012 of 1998 and this Court by order, dated 20.02.2003 allowed the said writ petition by setting aside the said order. While doing so, this Court directed the respondent to adjudicate the issue and pass appropriate orders as to the amount of stamp duty and penalty payable by the petitioner in respect of the disputed document. Purporting to act on the said order, the respondent passed the impugned order. Without being aware of the said order, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.10525 of 2004 in this Court. At that stage, the petitioner came to know that the respondent passed the impugned order, the validity of which is questioned in the present writ petition. At the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent discharges judicial function under Section 40 of the Act and it is, therefore, incumbent upon him to give notice and hear the petitioner before adjudicating the dispute referred to him. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in The Board of Revenue, Chepauk, Madras v. Poosarla China Appalanarasimhulu[1]. I have carefully perused the said judgment. One of the questions referred to and decided by the Full Bench was whether the Collector acting under Section 40 of the Act discharges judicial function or not. While answering the said question, the Full Bench held as under: “Under Section 40, when a Collector impounds any instrument, and if he is of opinion that such an instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment of the proper duty and the amount required to make up the same together with a penalty of five rupees, or if he thinks fit, an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or of the deficient portion thereof, whether such amount exceeds or falls short of five rupees. Before he requires the payment, the Collector must come to a conclusion that such instrument is not duly stamped. The powers exercisable under Section 40 is subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Under Section 56(2) if the Collector feels doubt in ascertaining the amount of duty with which the instrument is chargeable, he is authorized to draw up a statement of the case and refer it with his own opinion thereon for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. On the receipt of the statement of the case and the opinion of the Collector, such authority shall consider the case and send a copy of the decision to the Collector, who shall thereupon proceed to assess and charge the duty in conformity with such decision. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may refer the case with its opinion, to the High Court. The question referred shall be decided by the High Court, and under Section 59(2), the Revenue Authority shall, on receiving the order of the High Court, dispose of the case conformably to such judgment. These sections are part of an integrated scheme for ascertaining the quantum of stamp duty and penalty payable on a document which depend upon the interpretation of the document and the provisions of the Stamp Act and sometimes raising complicated questions thereon. The duty of the Collector is, therefore, a judicial one and the fact that a hierarchy of tribunals is provided for emphasized that fact. Though Section 40 does not in terms say that the opinion of the Collector should be expressed and implemented, after giving notice to parties, the principles of natural justice require that it should be done so.” Neither the impugned order nor the counter-affidavit contains any statement that before passing the impugned order, the petitioner was given notice and heard. Since the law is well settled by the above reproduced judgment of the Full Bench that the respondent discharges judicial function while adjudicating the dispute under Section 40 of the Act and he failed to hear the petitioner before deciding the issue, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is accordingly, quashed. The respondent is directed to adjudicate the issue afresh within a period of eight (8) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order after hearing the petitioner in person or through his counsel. The writ petition is accordingly, allowed. C.V.NARAGJUNA REDDY, J 11th June, 2008. kvni [1] 1957 ALT 1