IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Criminal Application No. 305 of 2009 In Criminal Application seeking leave to appeal and appeal against acquittal State of Maharashtra v. Dilip and ors ..................................................................................................................................................................... Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders Court's or Judge's order of directions and Registrar's orders ..................................................................................................................................................................... Mr C.N. Adgokar, APP for State Mr Mahesh Singh, Advocate and Mr Abhay Sambre, Mr Amol Mardikar, Advocates with him for respdts Coram : A.P. Bhangale, J Dated : 15th February 2010 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Delay is condoned. Application disposed of. 2. Office to register application and appeal. Heard learned APP for appellant-State and learned counsel for respondents on application for leave to appeal and appeal against acquittal at length. 3. Considering the impugned judgment and order copy of which is annexed to the memo of appeal, it does appear that the learned trial Judge did consider the evidence on record minutely and observed that that the sanction accorded in the present case is doubtful and could not be proved. It has been found that there were different fonts of typing although they were issued on the same date i.e. On 10.5.2005. Relevant observations of learned trial Judge are thus : “On comparison, both sanction orders (exhibits 49 and 52) it can be seen the different fonts of typing. Both these orders seems to be issued on 10.5.2005. By letter (exh. 53) sanctioned was asked. No other letter was sent to sanctioning authority except (exh. 53(. Sanction Order (exh. 49) was accorded against all three accused Shri Dilip Kalsarpe, Sudhakar Lade and Prabhakar Sakhare. There is signature of Shri Tayade. There is his name as DR. W.B. Tayade below his signature in typing. In last para on page no. 2 of Exh. 49 the word DR is mentioned after word ‘NOW THEREFORE I’. However, Sanction Order (exh. 52) goes to show that below the signature of Shri Tayade his name is written as Dr. W.B. Tayade in handwriting. So also, the said Sanction Order (exh. 52) is accorded against only two accused Dilip Tukaram Kalsarpe and Shri Sudhakar Vithalrao Lade. So also, word DR is not mentioned after the word NOW THEREFORE I. It means on 10.5.2005 two Sanction Orders might have been issued. It has not been clarified by the prosecution. It is very difficult to hold that whether really Sanctioning Authority PW-6 Dr Shri Tayade had applied his mind while granting sanction or he simply typed two Sanction Order in different fonts and accorded sanction or issued one after another on different date putting date as 10.5.2005.” 3. There was, therefore, reasonable doubt as to whether the sanctioning authority had really applied its mind while granting sanction or issued the same in a different manner with each other. This is one material defect of the prosecution case which has been pointed out by learned counsel representing the respondent/accused. Another material defect pointed out is, about the probability that the accused was prosecuted on the account of personal vendetta between Shri Kalsarpe and Shri Lade on one hand and complainant/first-informant on the other. 4. Thus, considering the reasons stated by the learned trial Judge, particularly the observation in paragraph 53 that prior demand must be proved by the prosecution to make the trap legitimately to eradicate corruption otherwise it would be an illegitimate trap. In the present case, prior demand and negotiations were found untrustworthy, Evidence of the first- informant was not corroborated satisfactorily by pancha witness ShriHedau. Thus, it was held that mere acceptance without knowledge of pre-trap demand of bribe by itself cannot be said to be an intentional assistance offered by accused no.3 to accused nos. 1 and 2. Therefore, I find that there is no serious infirmity in the impugned judgment and order which may require interference by the appellate court. One has to bear in mind the principle that presumption of innocence is human right and the prosecution is required to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Further more, since the judgment of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence further, there would be no justification to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal unless it can be pointed out that it is unreasonable view with reference to facts and circumstances of the case. For all these reasons, no ground is made out to grant leave as sought under Section 378 (3) Cr.P.C. It is refused and consequently, criminal appeal is dismissed in limine. Judge.