THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY C.R.P.No.3124 of 2008 ORDER: The respondent filed O.S.No.71 of 1992 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Tadepalligudem, West Godavari District, for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale, dated 17.09.1990. The transaction was in respect of Acs.5.50 cents of land for a consideration of Rs.1,70,000/-. The suit was decreed, on 17.09.1992. According to the decree, the petitioner herein shall execute the sale deed within two months, after receiving the balance of sale consideration. By the date of decree, an insolvency case, being I.P.No.14 of 1990, filed against the petitioner in the same Court, was pending. Petitioner and respondent herein figured as respondent Nos.1 and 2 in that I.P. The Insolvency Court allowed the I.P., through judgment, dated 24.11.1998. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed A.S.No.4 of 1999 in the Court of IV Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Tanuku. The appeal was allowed, on 21.09.2004. The respondent initially filed E.P.(sr)No.2394 of 1996 for execution of decree in O.S.No.71 of 1992. It was returned on 07.08.1997, with certain objections. Thereafter, the 1st respondent withdrew the E.P., on 17.07.2000. He filed I.A.No.302 of 2001 under Section 148 C.P.C., with a prayer to condone the delay of 2928 days in depositing the balance of sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-. The application was opposed by the petitioner. Through its order, dated 17.09.2002, the trial Court allowed the I.A., and condoned the delay. The same is challenged in this C.R.P. Sri S.Sriramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that there was absolutely no basis or justification for the trial Court to condone the delay of 7 years in depositing the amount. He submits that the respondent cannot seek execution of the decree, since it is barred by time, and that the trial Court has almost given life to a decree, which has become otherwise unenforceable. He has raised certain other contentions also. Sri P.V.Vidyasagar, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the revision itself is hopelessly barred, since it is filed six years after the order under revision, was passed. He contends that the respondent was prevented from depositing the balance of sale consideration, in view of the decree passed in I.P.No.14 of 1990. Learned counsel submits that soon after the lower Appellate Court granted stay of execution of the E.P., steps were taken for condonation of the delay. The petitioner challenges the order passed by the executing Court condoning the delay in depositing the decreetal amount. The revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Had it been a revision under Section 115 C.P.C., the limitation to file it would have been 90 days. Though no time is stipulated for filing of revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it was consistently held that it must be filed within a reasonable time. Six months time is treated as reasonable, wherever no limitation is prescribed. By no stretch of imagination, delay of six years can be ignored. Further, the petitioner is not forthcoming with any explanation, as to how he was prevented from approaching this Court for the past 6 years. When his grievance is about the condonation of delay in an application filed by the respondent, he is expected to be prompt in prosecuting the remedies. This Court is of the view that the revision is hopelessly barred by latches, if not limitation. Even on merits, the petitioner does not stand on a strong footing. It has already been mentioned that, by the time the decree for specific performance of agreement of sale was passed, I.P. was pending and shortly thereafter, a decree was passed in the I.P. Mere pendency of I.P. is sufficient to prevent the execution of the decree. Once the creditors of the petitioner have successfully obtained a decree, the execution urged by the petitioner would have been a futile exercise. As rightly advised, the respondent preferred an appeal against the decree in I.P. Soon after the lower Appellate Court stayed the operation of the decree in I.P., he initiated steps for deposit of the balance of sale consideration, which is said to be a small fraction of the total consideration. An objection was raised to the effect that the amount ought to have been deposited within two months from the date of decree and unless the delay is condoned, the respondent cannot deposit the same. Strictly speaking, there was no necessity for the respondent to pray for condonation of delay. The reason is that the two months time stipulated in the decree, in the suit, was for the execution of the sale deed, after receiving the balance of sale consideration. No time, as such, was stipulated for depositing of the amount. The relevant clause of the decree reads as under: “that the defendant be and hereby is directed to execute a proper conveyance and register the same in favour of the plaintiff within two months, after receiving the balance of sale consideration amount from the date of decree.” Be that as it may, once the respondent was prevented from taking steps directed in the decree, in the suit, on account of the pendency of the I.P., and the decree passed therein, he was entitled for the relief of condonation of delay. Section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act assumes significance, in this context. Even after a decree in the I.P. is passed, at a later point of time, it takes effect from the date of presentation of the petition. The judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Dondapati John v. Vaddi Subrahmani[1], relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not apply to the facts of this case. Another judgment in Cherukuri Venkata Rao v. Brahmojosyula Bala Gangadhara Sharma[2], which is also cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, deals with the question of limitation in filing the E.P. and not that of condonation of delay in making the payment. So is the case with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Radhabai v. Pandurang Krishna Tarase[3]. There is one important aspect, which needs to be taken into account. The record discloses that the respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Assuming that the decree obtained by the respondent became inexecutable, on account of his failure to pay the balance of consideration or expiry of period of limitation, the petitioner has to institute separate suit for recovery of possession. In such an event, he cannot prevent the respondent from taking the plea under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, to resist any decree for eviction. Viewed from any angle, no interference is warranted. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J Dated:09.11.2009 L.R. copy to be marked. GJ [1] AIR 1965 AP 260 [2] 1987 ALT (2) 229 [3] 1971 Myslj (1) 463