1 34.sa84.86.09 ast IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO. 84 OF 2009 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 310 OF 2009 Parasu Bhau Gujale & ors. . ....Appellants. Vs. Mallappa Shankar Sagare & ors. ....Respondents. WITH SECOND APPEAL NO. 86 OF 2009 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 314 OF 2009 Vijaykumar Bhiku Patil & ors. . ....Appellants. Vs. Mallappa Shankar Sagare & ors. ....Respondents. Mr. Nilesh Wable a/w Mr. Umesh Mankapure, Advocate for Appellant in SA 84/09. Mr. Vaibhav Gaikwad i/b. J. Shekhar and Co. for Appellant in SA 86/09. Mr. S.S. Patwardhan, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 in both matters. CORAM:- GIRISH GODBOLE, J DATED:- SEPTEMBER 20, 2011 P.C. 1. Heard Mr. Mankapure, Advocate for the Appellants in Second Appeal No. 84 of 2009, Mr. Gaikwad, Advocate for Appellants in Second 2 34.sa84.86.09 Appeal No. 86 of 2009 and Mr. Patwardhan, Advocate for contesting Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 in both the Appeals. 2. R.C. Suit No. 175 of 1982 was filed by Mallappa Shankar Sagare and 3 others for permanent injunction, declaration and subsequently plaint was amended and Decree for removal of construction was also sought. Parsu Bhau Gujale & others filed R.C. Suit No. 192 of 1982 wherein Mallappa Shankar Sagare & others were the contesting Defendants. That Suit was filed for declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction. Since there were alienations during the pendency of the Suits, various parties were added and said added parties adopted defence of earlier parties. Learned CJJD, Vita decreed the Suit No. 175 of 1982 and dismissed the R.C.S. No. 192 of 1982. Against the Decree in R.C. Suit No. 175 of 1982 R.C. Appeal No. 435 of 1989 was filed by the Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 therein and R.C. Appeal No. 518 of 1989 was filed by the other Defendants therein. The Plaintiffs in R.C. Suit No. 192 of 1982 filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 436 of 1989. All the three Appeals were heard together and by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 29/4/2006, all the Appeals were dismissed. 3 34.sa84.86.09 3. Second Appeal No. 84 of 2009 is filed by the Defendant in R.C. Suit No. 175 of 1982 for challenging the Decree in the said suit as confirmed in Civil Appeal No. 435 of 1989. The Second Appeal No. 86 of 2009 has been filed by the Defendant Nos. 5, 6 and 8 in R.C. Suit No. 175 of 1982 as confirmed in R.C. Appeal No. 518 of 1989. Apparently there is no appeal filed for challenging the Decree of dismissal of the R.C. Suit No. 192 of 1982 by the Original Plaintiffs in that Suit and the Appellant in Regular Civil Appeal No. 436 of 1989 by the Appellants in that Appeal. 4. Mr. Mankapure, Advocate for Appellants in SA No. 84/09 advanced the following submissions : a) Since the Trial Court had framed Issue No. 4 in R.C. Suit No. 192 of 1982 regarding the plea of tenancy of Parsu Bhau Gujale, the Civil Court was bound to refer such issue to the Authorities under the Provisions of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948 and, hence, Judgment of the Trial Court as confirmed by the Appellate Court is entirely without jurisdiction as there was statutory obligation on the Courts below to frame such a issue. Even in the other suit namely, R.C. Suit No. 175 of 1982 filed by 4 34.sa84.86.09 Mr. Patwardhan’s client and even otherwise, even if issue was not framed it was obligatory to refer the issue No. 4 in R.C. Suit No. 192 of 1982. Reliance is placed on the Judgment of the learned Single Judge (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J) 2002(5) Bom. C.R. 768 to buttress the said submission that there is statutory obligation cast on the Court. b) It is alternatively submitted that even otherwise from the recitals of the Sale Deed dated 2/2/1963 executed in favour of Bhau Gujale, it was clear that even in that Sale Deed apart from the land admeasuring 3 gunthas which was sold by the said Sale Deed, the surrounding land on the south west and north side was shown to be the land of purchaser therein namely, Bhau R. Gujale and hence a submission was made that a question regarding interpretation of the said sale deed which is a substantial question of law arises. 5. Mr. Gaikwad apart from supporting submissions made by Mr. Mankapure submitted that the Appellant in Second Appeal No. 86 of 2009 were bonafide purchasers for value without notice and hence their possession and structure must be protected. 5 34.sa84.86.09 6. I have carefully considered the aforesaid submissions. The legal position regarding duty of the Civil Court to frame an issue regarding any controversy which can be decided only by an Authority under the provisions of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948 is well established. If an issue arises and such an issue is relevant for deciding the real controversy between the parties, such issue must be framed and once framed must be referred. However, in the present case that has not been done for reasons duly recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Mr. Mankapure is justified in contending that merely because the Advocate for the Appellants did not file a formal application for referring the issue No. 4 in R.C.Suit No. 192 of 1982 to the Mamlatdar, obligation of the Civil Court, being a statutory obligation, could not have been overlooked. However, even overlooking the reasons of the Trial Court in my opinion, considering the peculiar plea of the tenancy which was raised, the facts of this case, the Trial Court was justified in not referring the issue to the Mamlatdar. The plea which was raised by the Appellant was that Bhau Gujale was the exclusive owner of the disputed land 1 Acres 20 gunthas which according to them had been purchased by him in consideration of the alleged surrendering of his alleged tenancy rights in respect of the remaining land of the Sagare family. Thus once the plea of ownership 6 34.sa84.86.09 was raised, it was for the Appellants to establish that plea by showing that by registered instrument ownership of the disputed land is transferred in their favour. That has not been done. 7. In so far as first submission regarding failure of the Civil Court referring the issue is concerned, the reliance placed on the Judgment of the learned Single Judge may not be of much help to the learned Advocate for the Appellant. In the facts of this case and considering peculiar plea which has been raised, the parties had gone to trial, evidence has been led and the two Courts below have recorded concurrent finding that the plea raised by the Appellant is not a bonafide plea so as to make a reference to the competent Authority under section 85(A) of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948. Once these are the findings of fact, the course adopted by the Trial Court and the District Court becomes unassailable. The learned Single Judge Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud has observed thus : “8. Under section 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, if any suit instituted in a Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under the Act, the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such Competent Authority for determination. These provisions have been construed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of M.N. Chandurkar, J., (as the learned Chief Justice then was) and 7 34.sa84.86.09 B.C. Gadgil, J., in (Nilesh Construction Company v. Gangubai w/o Bablya Choudhary), 1982(1) Bom. C.R. 577 : 1982 Mh. L.J. 664. The Division Bench held that this Court has consistently taken the view that before a reference to the Mamlatdar for deciding the issue of tenancy under the Tenancy Act is made, the alleged tenant must disclose in his pleadings details about the tenancy and the exact nature of the right which is claimed by him and that an issue of tenancy cannot be raised on a vague plea. Similarly, in (Pulmati Shyamlal Mishtra v. Ramkrishna Gangaprasad Bajpai), 1981 Mh. L. J. 321 a Division Bench of this Court held that the remittance of any issue of tenancy to the Mamlatdar often involves a long winding and time consuming process. Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates the framing of issues not only on the pleadings, but also upon documents produced. These provisions enable the courts to seek a clarification of bald pleadings, the production of documents in doubtful cases and to seek an explanation in respect of adverse factors. The Division Bench held that there is nothing in section 85 or 85-A or in any other provisions of the adjudication and, relieving it of its duty imposed thereunder. These sections on being found to arise. In the present case, issues were framed. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in (Thomas Anthony v. Varkey Varkey), 2001(1) S.C.C. 35: A. I.R. 2000 S.C. 1 which matter arose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, Mr. Justice D.P. Mohapatra speaking for the Bench of two learned Judged held thus : “16. From the aforementioned provisions the statutory scheme is clear that when a question regarding status of a person as a tenant or as a kudikidappukaran arises in any suit or proceedings before a Civil Court that Court shall refer the matter to the Land Tribunal for a decision on that question only. On receipt of the decision of the Tribunal on the question the trial Court shall decide the suit or proceeding accepting the decision of the Tribunal on the question referred to it. While making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to be have intended that even a patently frivolous, mala fide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceeding and to remain in possession of the property is also be referred to the Tribunal. The statutory provisions, in our considered 8 34.sa84.86.09 view, envisage a case where a bona fide and legally sustainable plea of tenancy is taken by the party, that question shall be referred to the Tribunal.” Having regard to the aforesaid position, it is abundantly clear that it is only a bona fide and legally sustainable claim of tenancy that can be referred to the Competent Authority in exercise of the provisions of section 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 1948.” Thus in view of the above it is clear that only a bonafide plea of tenancy, having atleast some foundation of facts, is the only plea which can be referred to the Authorities under the said Act. In view of the concurrent findings that the plea was not at all bonafide, no error has been committed by the Trial Court and the District Court in not referring the issue to the Competent Authority. 8. The perusal of the Sale Deed dated 2/2/1963 which is relied upon by the Appellants as a source of title of Bhau Gujale in respect of the disputed land would itself falsify their claim regarding the plea of tenancy. The said sale deed is produced at Exh. 104 and the same specifically refers to the fact that the land has been converted from agricultural user to non-agricultural user by the order of Sub-Divisional Officer -Project Officer bearing No. LNA7/7 15.8/10/1958. If that be so, 9 34.sa84.86.09 provisions of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948 obviously ceased to apply and even on that count, findings recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court deserve to be upheld. 9. Now coming to the next submission of Mr. Mankapure of interpretation of the Sale Deed that the two Courts have independently assessed the evidence on record and have recorded a finding of fact that all that had been sold to Bhau Gujale under the Sale Deed Exh. 104 was land admeasuring 3 gunthas (exactly 3400 sq. ft. ) and the small clerical error in the boundaries as mentioned in the said Sale Deed cannot be construed as conferring any title in the remaining land of the boundaries in favour of Bhau Gujale. These are pure findings of facts recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in which there is no perversity and hence no question of law arises. 10. Coming to the submission of Mr. Gaikwad of being bonafide purchaser for value without notice in the Suit, the submission would not detain the Court long. The Appellants in Second Appeal No. 86 of 2009 are admittedly pendence lite purchasers. Principle under section 52 of Transfer of Property Act applies. Even otherwise two Courts have 10 34.sa84.86.09 recorded findings of facts that the purchasers are not bonafide purchasers for value without notice. Apart from this, once it is held that their vendors were having no title, they cannot have better right than their Vendors. No substantial question of law arises in any of these Appeals. No Appeal has been filed against the Decree of dismissal of the R.C. Suit No. 192 of 1982 as confirmed in Civil Appeal No. 436 of 1989 and thus that Decree has been allowed to attain finality. Second Appeals are dismissed. 11. In view of the dismissal of the Appeals, nothing survives in respective Civil Applications. The same are disposed off accordingly. (GIRISH GODBOLE, J)