IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.1092 of 2010 Sanjiv Ranjan, son of Sri Chandra Mani Prasad, R/O Village- Nauagarhi, P.S.-Naya Ram Nagar, District-Munger (Bihar). …..Petitioner…Appellant. Versus 1. The Senior Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force (R.P.F.), Northern Railway, Lucknow. 2. The Additional Director General, Railway Protection Force, Baroda House, New Delhi. 3. The Union of India through its Senior Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force (R.P.F.), New Delhi. ….Respondents….Respondents. ----------- 3. 28.06.2011 Heard Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh No.2 for the appellant, and Mr. Anil Singh for the respondents. This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna has been preferred by the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No.7563 of 2010, and is aggrieved by the order dated 4.5.2010, whereby the writ petition was rejected on the ground of maintainability of the writ petition in this Court. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this appeal may be indicated. According to the appellant, he had submitted application for appointment to the post of Constable in RPF, which was forwarded from Bihar. The selection process had taken place at Lucknow. His candidature was rejected on the basis of adverse police 2 report as per the enquiry conducted in Bihar. The authorities at Lucknow had forwarded the communication to the appellant in Bihar. Aggrieved by the order of rejection of his application, he preferred the aforesaid writ petition which has been rejected on the ground that the cause of action in full or part did not take place within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. Hence this appeal at the instance of the appellant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he had noticed the advertisement in Bihar, the enquiry against him had taken place in Bihar, and the order of rejection was delivered to him in Bihar. In his submission, therefore, the present writ petition is maintainable. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and others [(2004)6 SCC 689]. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the order of the learned Single Judge and submits that no part of the cause of action took place in Bihar and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas 3 Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others [(1994)4 SCC 711, paragraph 8]. 5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Law is well settled that communication of the impugned order does not create cause of action. Reference may be made to the judgment in Mithilesh Kumar Vs. The Union of India and others [2007 (4) P.L.J.R. 292). It is equally well settled that advertisement or enquiry also do not create cause of action. Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly relied on the judgment in Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), paragraph 8 of which is reproduced hereinbelow: “8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rate subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc, at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27.1.1993. 4 Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract wok was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15.1.1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27.1.1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. (supra). The State of Jharkhand has been carved out from the undivided State of Bihar in terms of the Bihar Reorganization Act 2000. The question arose whether 5 the present State of Bihar or the present State of Jharkhand has had the jurisdiction to deal with the issues arising in that case. On examination of the facts, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that part of the cause of action arose in the present State of Bihar. That case is not an authority for the proposition whether or not the communication, or noticing an advertisement, or an enquiry also create jurisdiction within the territory where any one of these events took place. The judgment is not relevant in the present context. 7. In the result, we agree with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. This appeal is dismissed. (S.K. Katriar, J.) (Amaresh Kumar Lal, J.) S.K.Pathak/