1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3745 OF 2008 IN W.P.NO.3164 OF 1994 (Decided) (VIDARBHA YOUTH WELFARE SOCIETY & ANR. VS. PRESIDING OFFICER, COLLEGE TRIBUNAL & OTH.) _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions and Registrar's orders. Court's or Judge's orders ______________________________________________________________________________________________ None for the applicant. Dr. Anjan De, Advocate for Respondent. CORAM : R.C.CHAVAN, J. DATED : OCTOBER 23, 2008. 1. This is an application for speaking to minutes by original respondent No.2 in Writ Petition No.3164/1994, which was decided by judgment dated 13th December, 2006. The applicant wants a clarification in relation to liability of the management to pay applicant's dues for the period from 14.11.1994 when an interim relief was granted in favour of the petitioner by this Court till the petition was dismissed on 13.12.2006. 2. Upon notice, the original petitioner appeared and has filed reply. 2 3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant/original respondent No.2. The counsel for the original petitioner was not available. 4. The petition was filed taking exception to the order passed by the College Tribunal on an appeal by the applicant, whereby the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 01.01.1992 terminating the applicant's services. This Court directed maintenance of status-quo on 14.11.1994. Since the tribunal had permitted period of three months for holding further inquiry and had directed that if the management failed to hold and complete the inquiry within a period of 3 months, they were to reinstate the applicant, on 14.11.1994, when this Court directed maintenance of status quo, the applicant had obviously not joined. The petition by the Non-applicant eventually came to be dismissed as has already been recounted. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P., reported at (2003)8 SCC 648, where in paragraphs 26 and 28 the Court has held as 3 under : “26. .... The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. 27. .... .... .... 28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of court” embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the 4 test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces it judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict......” 5. In view of this, there can be no doubt that dismissal of the petition would result in the interim order merging in the final decision and, therefore, the applicant would, as corollary , be entitled to all the benefits which he was entitled to under orders of the College Tribunal which was impugned in the petition. It is not necessary to make this position explicit by any modification in the judgment which is sufficiently clear. The application is, therefore, disposed of. JUDGE RR.