THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN W.P. No.36532 of 1998 DATED: 31.01.2008 Between:- Ranga Rao Mane. … PETITIONERS AND The Presiding Officer, Labour Court-I, Hyderabad and another. …….. RESPONDENTS THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.36532 of 1998 O R D E R: Petitioner herein filed an application, under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, in I.D.No.301 of 1991, to declare the termination of his services as illegal and arbitrary and to direct the second respondent to reinstate him into service with continuity of service, back wages and attendant benefits. Petitioner-workman filed his claim statement and the second respondent-Company filed its counter before the Labour Court. On the basis of the pleadings, the Labour Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the petitioner is a workman of the respondent? 2. Whether the alleged oral termination orders dated 11-08-1990 are true, and if so, whether the same are valid and legal? 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement and backwages and for what period? 4. To what relief? On issue No.1, as to whether the petitioner was employed by the second respondent, the Labour Court noted that the petitioner had examined himself as WW.1 and had relied on Exs.W.1 to W.4, that Ex.W.2, the Minutes of the General Body Meeting of the second respondent, and Ex.W.3, the application submitted by the workman to the Deputy Registrar of Trade Union and Deputy Commissioner of Labour requesting for registration of their Union, did not establish that the petitioner was working with the second respondent-Company. With regards Ex.W.1 the identity card issued by the E.S.I. Corporation, the Labour Court noted that the said identity card was issued to the petitioner on 30-03-1975, nearly 15 years prior to filing of the I.D. The Labour Court noted that since a recent identity card was not filed and Ex.W.1 did not contain the name of the second respondent-Company, it could not be relied upon to contend that the petitioner was employed with the second respondent. With regards Ex.W.4, the provident fund slips issued by the Provident Fund Commissioner, the Labour Court noted that they pertained to the years 1978-79 to 1989-90. The Labour Court, however, took note of the admission of WW.1, in cross-examination, that the provident fund slips did not contain the name of the second respondent-Company. The Labour Court found it difficult to connect the provident fund slips with the second respondent-Company and, in such circumstances, it was satisfied that, while the provident fund slips pertained to the petitioner-workman, there was nothing to show that they related to his employment with the second respondent-Company. The Labour Court held that the evidence of WW.1, and Exs.W.1 to W.4, did not warrant the conclusion that the petitioner was employed under the second respondent. The Labour Court also took note of the evidence adduced on behalf of the second respondent-Company by MW.1 and Exs.M.1 to M.3, and observed that the workman had not elicited in cross- examination that he was employed with the second respondent. The Labour Court, after examining the evidence of WW.1 and Exs.W.1 to W.4 vis-à-vis the evidence of MW.1 and Exs.M.1 to M.3, concluded that the petitioner-workman had failed to prove that he was an employee of the second respondent-Company at any point of time. Since issue No.1 was held against the petitioner, all the other issues were automatically negatived. Sri B.Kamalakar Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, would seek to take this Court through the documents, to contend that the Labour Court had failed to appreciate the documents in the proper perspective. Learned counsel would submit that, on a true construction of the documents in question, it was evident that the petitioner-workman was employed with the second respondent. It must be borne in mind that the scope of certiorari proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is limited and this Court would not re-appreciate the facts on record nor would sit in appeal over findings of fact recorded by the Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts. It is only where the findings recorded are perverse or are based on no evidence, or where there is a patent error of law apparent on the face of the record, would there be any justification for interference. It is not even urged before this Court that the award of the Labour Court suffers from any such infirmity. I see no justification, therefore, to interfere with the award of the Labour Court. The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. ____________ 31-01-2008 usd