- 1 - IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION APPEAL NO.759 OF 2002 IN INSOLVENCY PETITION NO.49 OF 2001 P.S.Srinivasan. .. Appellant (Org.Debtor) Vs. Mukesh Babu Financial Services Ltd. .. Respondent (Org.Creditor) -- Shri H.S.Khakawala i/b M/s.Nankani & Associates for the Appellant. None present for the Respondent. -- CORAM : SRI R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR & SRI P.B.MAJMUDAR, JJ DATED : 20TH JUNE, 2008 P.C. 1. Heard Shri Khakawala, the learned advocate for the Appellant. None present for the Respondent. Perused the records. 2. The only point which arises for consideration in the matter is whether, in view of the fact that the insolvency proceedings were sought to be initiated on the basis of the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, such proceedings are maintainable or not ? - 2 - 3. It is not in dispute that on 19th April, 1999 the arbitral award came to be passed against the appellant herein, based on which the proceedings were sought to be initiated. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant that no such proceedings would lie in view of the provisions of Section 9 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, as, in order to initiate the proceedings there has to be a decree by the Court and the award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be said to be a decree within the meaning of the said expression under the provisions of law. 4. The issue sought to be raised no more requires consideration as the same is well settled by a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Paramjeet Paramjeet Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., reported in AIR 2007 SC 168. It has been clearly held therein that the award passed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is different from a decree or an order passed by the Court in civil proceedings. 5. The expression "as if" to be found in Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would not itself transform an award into a decree and the - 3 - legal fiction created thereunder is for the limited purpose of enforcement of an award as a decree, and it is not intended to make it a decree for all purposes under all statutes. Section 9 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 clearly requires executable decree to enable initiation of the insolvency proceedings thereunder. Bearing in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s Paramjeet Singh Patheja’s case (supra) case (supra) case (supra), the appellant is justified in contending that the proceedings under the said Act could not have been initiated on the basis of the arbitral award. 6. On the limited ground stated above, the appeal succeeds and the impugned order is hereby set aside. The Insolvency Petition No.49 of 2001 stands dismissed. 7. There shall be no order as to costs. ( R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR, J ) ( P.B.MAJMUDAR, J )