IN THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OFCHHATTISGARH A1 BILASPUR (C.G.) M.C.C.NO. ft-l^ GF 2011 O'tVtSIOn APPLICANTS. ,•" ^/^/^ ^' /..' /CLf~ '•V~l RESPONDENT 1. S. Tarini Catel Feeit 2. Rajeev Sinha, S/o Tarini Prasad Sinha, aged about 58 years (Died) 3. Neetin Sinha, S/o Late Rajeev Sinha, aged about 37 years All are the R/o Opposite Puranadaal Mill, Ganjpara Ward, Post Raipur, Tahsil 8s District Raipur, Chhattisgarh VERSUS M/s Krishna Daal Mill, Registered Partnership Firm Baloda Bazaar Naka, Bhatapara, Post Bhatapara, Tahsil Bhatapara, f District Raipur, Chhattisgarh APPLICATION FOR RESTOItATION OF WRIT PETITION N0. 1298/2006 WHICH WAS DISMISSED FOR WANT QF PROSECUTION ON 20.03.2006 BY THE OR^>ER SINGLE BENCH OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH The applicanl.s naxned above, most respectfully beg to submit as under:- p^ l..-A-'<~4&N ^^£7'^^^ lt ^ 's^?^^^\ ^ t "^'^-••'^ K ^. - ^ ^St e c ivir. 1. S. Tarini Catel Feed, 2. Rajeev- Sinha, S/o Tarlni Prasad Sinha, aged about 58 years (Died) 3. Neetin Sinha, S/o Late Rajeev Sinha, aged about 37 years, All are the R/o Opposite Puranadaal Mill, Ganjpara Ward, Post Raipur, Tahsil & Dlstrict Raipur, Chhattisaarh. VERSUS M/s Krishna Partnership Tahsil Chhattisgarh ai Mill, Registered 1 Baloda Bazaar , Post Bhatapara, District Raipur, The applicants/defendants have'.filed this petition for restoration of W.P. No. 1298/2006, which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 23 March, 2006 as no one appeared on behalf of the applicants when the matter was taken up for hearing on admission by the Court. Civil suit .No. 51 B/2002 is pending in the Court Qf First Additional District Judge, Raipur. In the said civil suit an order was passed on 02.01.2006 on an appiication filed by the respondent/plaintiff under order VIII rule 6 of the code of civil procedure. The said order was challeriged ~by the applicants by; flling W.P. No. 1298/2006 on :?A '•A t... 10.02.2006. There were many defaults In the writ petition, therefore, it was listed before the Additional Registrar (J) on many occasions and ultimately it was listed before the bench on 23.03.2006. Since no one appeared at the time of call of matter on 23.03.2006, the same was dismissed for want of prosecution. The restoration application is barredtiy 1886 days. Therefore, an application (I.A. No.01/2011) has been filed for condonation of de!ay in filing the restoration application. The solitary ground taken in the I.A. No.01/2011 is that the counsel for the appiicants never informed that their writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court and the applicants were under impression that their writ petition is pending, however, when they came to know about the dismissal of the writ petltion, they have fiied this restoration application. We have heard Mr. Kunal Das on I.A. No.01/2011 . reoortsd m Aff? f962 S.C. 361, the Supreme Court observed that in construing Section 5, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In ot'ner words, when the period of iimitation prescribed has expired She decree hoider has obtained a benefit under the !aw of limitation to treat the decree as beyond chailenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decrey holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in oc^er that judieial power and discretion in that behaif should b'e exercised to advance substantia! justice. ^ the Supreme Court held that "the law of limitation is founded on the public policy: it is enshrined in the maxim "Interest rewublicae 110 sit litiism." (It te for the general welfare that a period be put to p ./•' M.C.C, ^ litigation). The rules of limitation are not meant to destroyvth€-ri( the parties. They are meant to see that parties do no resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time". The Apex Court also held that "the length of delay is no matter, accsptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes, delay of the shortest range may be uncondonabie due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory." If we examine the case in hand, we find that the appticants have utterly failed to explain the delay of 1886 days in fiiing the restoration application. Even no specific dates etc are mentioned in their application that when they met with the counsel and when the counse! ^ave them repiy that the matte is stil! pending. It does not disciose about any sincere effort which the applicants made for k'nowing about the status of their case at any point of time after fiiing it in the year 20Q6. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to accept the ground taken by the applicants for condonation ofdelay of 1886 days in fiting this application. We find that t'nere is no reasonable explanation for the deiay of said period and a casual and vague attempt has been made to offer expianation in the above manner. For the foregoing reasons, !.A. No.01/2011 fails. The same is li.able to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Consequently 1VI.C.C. No. 574/2011 is also dismissed. Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge Sd/- Radhe Shyam Sharma Judge