1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.7493/02 Ashok Kumar Garg vs. Judge, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal & Anr. Date of order : 28/1/2009. HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMAD RAFIQ Shri Suresh Kashyap for the petitioner. Shri R.C. Joshi for the respondent. ****** REPORTABLE Heard learned counsel for the parties. This writ petition has been filed against the order passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (for short- Tribunal) dated 30.8.2002 by which the application of the petitioner filed under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was dismissed. This application was moved on the premise that the petitioner was appointed with the respondent establishment on 12.8.93. His services were illegally terminated on 31.8.94. When the Central Government referred this industrial dispute, M/s. I.B.P. Co. Ltd., Bhiwari, Distt. Alwar was impleaded as a party thereto. Head office and the registered office of the company have got full and effective control over their branch office at Bhiwari. Several 2 notices sent to the Bhiwari unit remained unserved. Eventually it turned out that Bhiwari branch itself has been closed down. Since the company at Bombay is controlling unit of Bhiwari, in the absence of their impleadment, the award that may be ultimately passed would remain un-enforced and it was therefore prayed that the IBP Company Ltd., Shiveri (East), Mumbai and M/s. IBP Co. Ltd., Calcutta be impleaded as necessary party. Shri Suresh Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the aforesaid arguments and submitted that the learned Tribunal has wrongly rejected the application on the premise that the petitioner was not able to show as to how the head office and registered office exercised control over the employees of the non-applicant establishment. Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued that petitioner was appointed only by Bhiwari unit and his services were also terminated by Bhiwari unit. Head office and registered office had no control over the petitioner 3 and that the petitioner never impleaded the head office and registered office as party respondents before the Conciliation Officer. Obviously, therefore they could not be joined as respondents in the proceedings before the Tribunal. It was argued that the Tribunal has taken the correct view. Even otherwise, similar matters have been dismissed by this Court entertaining the claim of the identically situated workman, therefore, it would be an exercise in futility to now implead the head office and registered office and require the Tribunal to further proceed in the matter. When the notice of the writ petition was issued to the respondents, this Court vide its order dated 25.10.2002 stayed further proceedings pending before the Tribunal. I am therefore not inclined to accept the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition may be decided on the analogy of the decisions rendered by this Court in the cases of similarly situated workmen, for that would tantamount to frustrating the proceedings on an industrial dispute pending before the 4 Tribunal. Once the appropriate government has made reference on an industrial dispute, the proceedings shall have to be taken to its logical conclusion. Whatever has transpired in the matters pertaining to identically situated workman can be brought to the notice of the Tribunal by the respondents, This objection is therefore overruled. On merits of the case, however, I may notice judgement of the Supreme Court in Hochtier Gammon vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa & Ors.-(1950-1983) 7 SCLJ page 653, wherein it was held as under: “Though Section 18(3)(b) postulates the existence of an implied power in the Tribunal to add parties and summon them, in the instant case that power cannot be exercised because having regard to the limited nature of the implied power the party meant to be joined as a party to the reference cannot be regarded as a necessary party under the provisions of Section 18(3)(b).” It would be evident from the above referred to judgement of the Supreme Court 5 that for a decision of impleadment of party in the scope of Section 18(3), test must be that the addition of the party is necessary to make adjudication effective and enforceable. In other words, the result would be that non-joinder of such party would make the proceedings ineffective and enforceable. In the present case, the respondents do not deny that Bhiwari unit was their unit and that it stopped functioning but they have come out with a rider that it was an independent unit and had its own set up and used to independently control its employees. The view taken by the Tribunal that the petitioner was not able to show that how head office and registered office exercised their control over the employees of the Bhiwari unit cannot be justified. Section 18 (3) in its clause (c) clearly includes not only the principal party which is impleaded but also heirs, successor or assigns, to which dispute relates. In the present case, the head office and registered office would definitely fall within this category for the obvious reason that without them there can 6 be no effective enforcement of the award that might be ultimately passed. Registered office or the head office are now sought to be joined because the Bhiwari unit as per own admission of the respondents, has stopped functioning. Upholding their plea would mean that even if the reference proceedings are taken to their logical conclusion and an award is passed in favour of workman, such award would nevertheless remain the unforceable and thus the whole exercise would be rendered meaningless. This in effect would mean rendering the petitioner workman as remediless. Such an interpretation of the provisions of Section 18(c) would negate the very purpose of the welfare legislation which is what the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.8.2002 is set aside. The application u/s 18(3) of the Act filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal is allowed. The Tribunal shall proceed in the matter in accordance with law. (MOHAMMAD RAFIQ), J. 7 RS/