HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY CRL.A.No.478 OF 2003 JUDGMENT: This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 10-10-2002 in C.C.No.294 of 1998, on the file of the V- Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, wherein the complaint filed by the appellant herein against the respondents alleging offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘the Act’) ended in acquittal. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the records. 3. The averments of the complaint, in brief, are as follows:- The first accused is the director of Bhagyanagar Castings Limited and the second accused is the managing partner of Aashiana Investments Stocks and Shares Consultants. A-2 received loan of Rs.20 lakhs from the complainant by cheque bearing No.476693 drawn on Andhra Bank for the purpose of investment and executed a stamped receipt on 10-09-1996. A-2 received a further sum of Rs.5 lakhs by cheque bearing No.476696 drawn on Andhra Bank and issued a stamped receipt dated 23-09- 1996. A-1 issued a cheque bearing No.456136 in repayment of the entire loan amount of Rs.25 lakhs on Vasavi Cooperative Urban Bank Limited. When the cheque was presented in Andhra Bank, it was dishonoured for want of funds vide memo dated 20-09- 1997. A legal notice was issued to the accused demanding payment of the amount. A-1 gave a reply with false allegations. 4. During the pendency of the case, A-2 filed C.R.P.No.4185 of 1999 for quashing the proceedings against him and by order dated 28-02-2002, this Court quashed the proceedings against A-2. Hence, A-1 alone faced the trial. 5. During trial, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.P-1 to P-7 were marked on behalf of the complainant. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the first accused. 6. On a consideration of the evidence available on record, the trial Court held that as the loan was admittedly taken by A-2 but not A-1, there was no legally enforceable liability against A-1 and hence the prosecution against A-1 is not sustainable. Accordingly, A-1 was found not guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Act and was acquitted thereof. 7. Even as per the averments in the complaint, the amount of Rs.25 lakhs was borrowed from the complainant by A-2 but not A-1. It is specifically averred that A-2 initially received loan of Rs.20 lakhs on 10-09-1996 and subsequently A-2 received a further loan of Rs.5 lakhs on 23-09-1996 by issuing two cheques. A-1 is said to have issued cheque, which was subsequently dishonoured, in repayment of the loan of Rs.25 lakhs due by A-2. Thus, even according to the complainant, A-2 was the person who borrowed the amount and incurred the liability to repay the same. In the compliant, it is further averred that on the instructions of the accused, he presented the cheque for realization. It is not disclosed as to which of the accused instructed the complainant to present the cheque. It is further averred that the cheque was initially dishonoured on 20-09-1997 and approached A-1 and A-2 and on their request, he gave them three months’ time to arrange for payment and again after three months, on the instructions of the accused, he presented the cheque for realization and it was again dishonoured on 29-12-1997 for want of funds. It is not disclosed as to which of the accused again instructed him to present the cheque for realization. The notice issued to A-2 was admittedly returned as ‘unclaimed’. A-1 received notice Ex.P-3 and gave the reply-Ex.P-7 denying his liability to pay the amount as he has not borrowed any amount from the complainant. The notice-Ex.P-3 does not specify as to which of the accused borrowed the amounts and which of them issued the cheque in repayment of the same, but in para 5 of Ex.P-3 notice it is stated that in the event of failure to pay the amount within 15 days, the complainant will be constrained to “initiate appropriate proceedings against you and also against Sri Balaji, Director of Bhagyanagar Castings Limited, as contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act”. From the tenor of the contents of Ex.P-3, the learned counsel for the respondent/accused would contend that though the name of A-1 is also noted as second addressee in Ex.P-3, the notice, in fact, was directed only against A-2 but not A-1. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the notice-Ex.P-3 was addressed to A-1 as well and A-1 gave a reply-Ex.P-7 denying his liability as he never admittedly borrowed any amount from the complainant and he never issued any cheque to the complainant in discharge of any such liability. It is further pleaded in Ex.P-7 reply notice by A-1 that the cheque drawn on Vasavi Cooperative Urban Bank Limited was misused by A-2 without the knowledge of A-1 and immediately on coming to know from his banker that the cheque was presented by the complainant, A-1 by his letter dated 25- 09-1997 called upon A-2 to surrender all the cheques belonging to him. In the grounds of appeal, the appellant/complainant has put forward a new version stating that the said cheque was originally issued for Rs.20 lakhs on 31-03-1997 and the complainant refused to receive the same as the debt due was Rs.25 lakhs and thereupon A-1 corrected the date from 31-03-1997 to 30-06-1997 and also corrected the amount from Rs.20 lakhs to Rs.25 lakhs under his signatures. The subject cheque shows that the dates and also the amounts were altered. The complainant had not chosen to put forward any explanation for the said corrections at any time earlier during the pendency of the case before the trial Court and for the first time a new version is put forward in the grounds of appeal. It only indicates that the complainant is not coming forward with clean hands and has been indulging in different versions at different stages. 8. The learned counsel for the complainant would contend that as the first accused had not chosen to give evidence, his plea that he gave a cheque to A-2 and it was misused by A-2, remains unsubstantiated. It is well settled that the initial burden lies on the complainant to establish that a cheque was, in fact, issued by A-1 in favour of the complainant and it was in discharge of legally enforceable liability. Section 138 of the Act contemplates that in order to constitute an offence, the cheque must have been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Explanation to Section 138 of the Act states that the ‘debt or other liability means’ a legally enforceable debt or other liability. No doubt, Section 139 of the Act stipulates that it shall be presumed that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The said presumption arises only when the initial burden is discharged by the holder of the cheque that he did, in fact, receive the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 of the Act. Admittedly, A- 1 was not indebted to the complainant. The debt was incurred by A-2. Consequently, the liability to repay the same was also incurred by A-2. It is not the case of the complainant that A-1 stood guarantee for the said loan taken by A-2 and in discharge of any such obligation arising in a contract or surety or the guarantee that the cheque was issued by A-1. The notice Ex.P-3 and the complaint are totally silent as to the circumstances under which A-1 happened to issue the cheque for the debt due by A-2 to the complainant. 9. In KAMALA S. V. VIDYADHARAN M.J. & ANOTHER[1], the Apex Court held as follows:- “This Court clearly laid down the law that standard of proof in discharge of the burden in terms of Section 139 of the Act being of preponderance of a probability, the inference therefor can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record but also from the reference the circumstances upon which the accused relies upon. Categorically stating that the burden of proof on accused is not as high as that of the prosecution.” In present case, in view of the complainant’s own version and there being admittedly no debt or liability incurred by A-1, the non-examination of A-1 is not fatal and A-1 can seek to establish his version and disprove the claim of the complainant by relying upon the admissions of the complainant himself. 10. In GOPAN V. TONNY VARGHESE[2], the High Court of Kerala held that simply because the cheque contained the signature of the accused, it cannot be said that it was drawn by the accused as contemplated under Section 138 of the Act. In the present case also, no doubt, the signature on the cheque is not disputed by A-1, but he never admitted that he issued any cheque for Rs.25 lakhs in favour of the complainant. The complainant has, therefore, to initially establish that A-1 had drawn a cheque in his favour for a sum of Rs.25 lakhs and it is only then that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act comes into operation. When admittedly A-1 has not borrowed any amount from the complainant, his version that A-1 gave him the cheque in discharge of the debt of Rs.25 lakhs, taken by A-2, cannot be believed at all. 11. In KRISHNA JANARDHAN BHAT V. DATTATRAYA G.HEGDE[3], the Apex Court held as under:- “We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability to promote grater vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is essential to the economic life of a developing country like India. This, however, shall not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not say how presumption drawn should be held to have rebutted. Other important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely presumption of innocence as human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by Section 139 should be delicately balanced. Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on record and having regard to legal principles governing the same.” The presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the Act cannot, therefore, be raised simply because the cheque contains the signature of the drawer and whether such a presumption can at all be raised or not and if raised whether it stands rebutted or not, depends on the factual matrix of a given case on hand and the evidence, direct and circumstantial, let in therein. 12. In KUMAR EXPORTS V. SHARMA CARPETS[4], the Apex Court held as follows:- “The use of the phrase “until the contrary is proved” in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words “unless the contrary is proved” in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of “may presume” and “shall presume” as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non- existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, this Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant’s rescue” In the present case also, apart from the fact that the complainant had failed to discharge the initial burden so as to enable him to invoke the presumption contained in Section 139 of the Act, from the case of the complainant himself as set out in the complaint and also the statutory notice and the evidence the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, which is rebuttable one, stands rebutted even if it is raised, for the simple reason that admittedly A- 1 never borrowed any amount. Therefore, the question of his repaying any such debt to the complainant does not arise. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant would seek to rely on a decision of the High Court of Madras in K.KRISHNA BAI, M/S SURYA ADVT. PVT. LTD., BANGALORE V. M/S ARTI PRESS, wherein it was held as follows: “A reading of the provision in S.138 of the Act would indicate that the debt or liability towards which the cheque is issued, should be a legally enforceable debt or liability. This would have reference to the nature of the debt or liability and not to the person against whom the debt or liability would be enforced. This is clear by the use of the words’ any debt or liability” which would include a cheque drawn by one person towards a legally enforceable debt or liability of another person. The significant omission of the words “debt or liability” o f that person after the words “any debt or liability” would indicate the intention of the Parliament”. In the above case, on facts, it was found that the liability or debt are legally enforceable against M/s Surya Advertising Private Limited, but the cheque had been issued by M/s Mudra Graphics Private Limited towards the liability due by M/s Surya Advertising Private Limited to the respondent. It was also found that both companies were sister concerns and for a liability due by one, the other sister concern issued the cheque. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that in discharge of the debt admittedly incurred by A-2, the subject cheque was issued by A-1 taking upon himself the said liability. Admittedly, there is no privity between the complainant and A-1 and both are strangers. According to the complainant, A-1 was indebted to A-2 and A-2 was indebted to the complainant and A-1 issued the said cheque to the complainant in discharge of the liability due to A-2. The said plea remains totally unsubstantiated and there is nothing on record to show that there was existence of any tripartite arrangement. The plea of the complainant that the cheque was issued by A-1 on behalf of A-2 and in lieu of the debt due by A-2 to the complainant, remains totally unsubstantiated. The decision cited is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. In facts and circumstances of the present case and on the complainant’s own showing, it must be held that the complainant failed to establish that the cheque was drawn by A-1 in their favour at all and that it was in discharge of any legally enforceable debt due by A-1 to the complainant. The ingredients constituting the offence under Section 138 of the Act are, therefore, not established at all. The trial Court, on proper appreciation of the evidence on record, had rightly held that the prosecution of A-1 for the offence under Section 138 of the Act is not sustainable. 15. In C.ANTONY V. K.G.RAGHAVAN NAIR[5], the Apex Court held as follows:- “Sitting as an appellate court against a judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court, there was an obligation on the part of the High Court to come to a definite conclusion that the findings of the trial court were either perverse or contrary to the material on record because the High Court could not have substituted its finding merely because another contrary opinion was possible based on the material on record. Moreover, while hearing an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court must express its reasons in the judgment for holding the acquittal to be not justified. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial Court.” 16. In view of the principles laid down in the above decisions and the findings of the trial court not found to be either perverse or contrary to the material on record, and there being no valid or justifiable reasons calling for interference with them, it is held that there are no merits in the appeal. 17. In the result, the criminal appeal is dismissed. ____________________ G.V.SEETHAPATHY, J Dated 26th March, 2010 Lrkm. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TEN PRESENT HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY Crl.A.No.478 OF 2003 Between:- K.V.D.Prasad Rao …Appellant A n d Balaji Viswanath, Director, Bhagyanagar Castings Limited., 30/11, SIRI Enclave, Srinagar Colony, Hyderabad and others …Respondents [1] 2007 (2) Supreme 611 [2] III (2008) BC 488 [3] 2008(1) Supreme 306 [4] 2009(1) (Crl.) 468 (SC) [5] (2003) 1 SCC 1