1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA WRIT PETITION NO. 105 OF 2003. 1. Smt. Maria Candida Raimunda Fernandes Pereira, widow, major of age; 2. Ms. Lucia Pereira, major of age; 3. Shri. Nevil Pereira, major of age, 4. Shri Elrique Pereira, major of age & 5. Shri lyndon Pereira, major of age, all residents of H. No.221, Fatorda, Margao .. Petitioners. V e r s u s 1. Smt. Ernestina Pereira alias Ernestina Abreu e Pereira, (since Deceased through legal heirs) i. Mrs. Joanita Pereira ii. Mrs. Vera Pereira iii. Mr. Joseph Salema iv. Mr. Rosario Rebello All residents of H. No.221, Fatorda, Margao, Salcete, Goa. 2. Shri Antonio Salvador Rosario Pereira, bachelor, major of age, r/o. H. No.221, Fatorda,Margao (through his attorney-holder the respondent no.1) 3. Shri Francisco Wenceslau Periera, bachelor, major of age, r/o H.No.221, Fatorda, Margao 4. Ms. Telma Conceicao Pereira, 2 spinster, major of age, r/o H.No.221, Fatorda, Margao 5. Ms. Wilma Pereira, spinster, major of age, r/o H.No.221, Fatorda, Margao .. Respondents Mr. A. Silva, Advocate for the petitioners. Mr. Shivan Dessai, Advocate for the respondents CORAM : A. P. LAVANDE, J. Reserved on : 14 th September, 2010. Pronounced on : 13 th October, 2010. JUDGMENT : This petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India takes exception to the order dated 15th March, 2002 passed by Additional District Judge, South Goa, Margao in Civil Miscellaneous Application no.123/1999 dismissing the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in preferring appeal against the decree dated 2nd February, 1988 passed in Special Civil Suit no.41/1983/A. 2. Mr. Dessai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the writ petition filed by the appellants, is not maintainable in as much as the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to file Second Appeal in as much 3 as when the appeal is dismissed refusing to condone the delay, it is a decision in the appeal and, therefore, the appropriate remedy for the appellant, would be to file Second Appeal against the impugned order. In support of his submissions, Mr. Dessai relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sundar Sarma Vs. Pannala Jaiswal and others; (2005)1 SCC 436. 3. Per contra, Mr. Silva, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that by the impugned order, the Lower Appellate Court has refused to condone the delay and as such, there is no decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court and as such, Second Appeal is not maintainable. He further submitted that availability of the alternate remedy is not always bar in entertaining writ petition. He further submitted that the authority in the case of Shyam Sundar Sarma (supra), cannot be treated as a precedent for proposition that if the appeal is dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation, only remedy available to the parties is to file appeal. In support of his submissions, Mr. Silva relied upon the following judgments : (i) S. Satnam Singh and Others Vs. Surender Kaur and Another; AIR 2009 SC 1089. (ii) Committee of Management and another V. Vice- Chancellor and Others;AIR 2009 SC 1159. 4 (iii) Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha Vs. Mahant Ram Niwas and Another; AIR 2008 SC 2187. (iv) Smt. Nausaee and others Vs. Lyakat and others; AIR 2005 Allahabad 367. (v) Uttaranchal Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Mansaram Nainwal; AIR 2006 2840 4. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 5. As stated above, the present petition has been filed challenging the order passed by the Lower Appellate Court dismissing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The net result of the said order is that the appeal filed against the decree stands dismissed. In the case of Shyam Sundar Sarma (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with the scope of order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C. In the said judgment, the Apex Court referred to the case of Mela Ram and Sons Vs. CIT; AIR 1956 SC 367, in which the Apex Court held that an appeal preferred out of time is an appeal and order dismissing it as time barred, is one passed in an appeal. In the said decision, the Apex Court referred to its earlier decision and followed the view taken by the Privy Council. 6. The Apex Court also referred to the decision of 5 the Apex Court in the case of Sheodan Singh Vs. Daryao Kunwar; AIR 1966 SC 1332 rendered by Four Judges' Bench, in which the question arose as to whether the dismissal of an appeal from decree on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation was a decision in the appeal. In the said case, the Apex Court held thus : “We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision of the trial court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal.” 7. The Apex Court also referred to the case of Board of Revenue Vs. Raj Brother Agencies; (1973)4 SCC 216, in which similar principle was applied. 8. The Apex Court also referred to the case of Ratan Singh Vs. Vijay Singh; (2001) 1 SCC 469 rendered by Two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in which it was held that the dismissal of an application for condonation of delay would not amount to a decree and, therefore, the dismissal of appeal as 6 time barred was also not a decree. The Apex Court in Shyam Sundar Sarma's case (supra) held that the judgments in the case of Mela Ram and Sons and Sheodan Singh were not brought to the notice in the case of Ratan Singh and, therefore, the view expressed in the case of Ratan Singh could not be accepted as laying down the correct law on the question. 9. I shall now deal with the authorities cited on behalf of the petitioners herein. In the case of Nausaee and Others (supra), the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court does not get merged in the order of the Appellate Court in case the appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation and consequently, no Second Appeal would lie against such an order and writ petition would be maintainable. 10. In the case of Dadu Dayal Mahasabha, the Apex Court held that the judgment of the Court should not be interpreted as a statute and the observations made by the superior Court is not binding and what is binding is the ratio of the decision. 11. In the case of Committee of Management (supra), 7 the Apex Court held that availability of alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for filing a petition. In the said case, the validity of the provision was challenged and as such, the Apex Court held that availability of an alternate remedy was not bar in filing the writ petition. 12. In the case of S. Satnam Singh (supra), the Apex Court held that the Court with a view to determine whether the order passed by it is decree or not, must take into consideration the pleadings of the parties and the proceedings leading up to the passing of an order. The Apex Court held that in order to find out whether the order passed by the Court is decree or not, it must satisfy the following test: “(i) There must be an adjudication; (ii) Such adjudication must have been given in a suit; (iii) It must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit; (iv) Such determination must be of a conclusive nature; and (v) There must be a formal expression of such adjudication.” 8 13. In the case of Uttaranchal Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Mansaram Nainwal; AIR 2006 2840 relied upon by Mr. Silva, the Apex Court held that a decision is the precedent on its own facts and it is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent and only thing in a Judge's decision binding on a party is the principle upon which the case is decided. 14. In the case of Mela Ram and son's case (supra), the Apex Court has clearly held that when the appeal is dismissed on the ground of bar of limitation, an order passed by the Lower Authority stands confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 15. In Sheodan Singh's case (supra), Four Judges' Bench of the Apex Court held that when a decision is given on merits by the Trial Court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on preliminary ground like limitation, it must be held that such dismissal, when it confirms the decision of the Trial Court on merits itself amounts to appeal being heard and finally decided on merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal. 9 16. In my considered opinion, the judgment in the case of Sheodan Singh (supra) is squarely applicable in the present case. By virtue of the impugned order, the Lower Appellate Court has refused to condone delay thereby a decision of the Trial Court stands confirmed on merits and the same amounts to appeal being heard and finally decided on merits. This being the position, the ratio laid down in the case of Sheodan Singh (supra) is squarely applicable in the present case. I am unable to place any reliance upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by Mr. Silva, which runs contrary to the view taken in the case of Sheodan Singh (supra). 17. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Committee of Management (supra) also does not advance the case of the petitioners in as much as in the said case, the petition was filed challenging the validity of the provision. In this factual background, the Apex Court held that the writ petition was maintainable. Similarly, the ratio in the case of S. Satnam Singh (supra) would not advance the case of the petitioners. 18. In view of the ratio in the case of Sheodan Singh (supra), it must be held that the dismissal of the appeal by the 10 Appellate Court on the ground of limitation amounts to adjudication of the matter on merits. 19. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioners against the impugned order, is not maintainable since the appropriate remedy for the petitioners, is to file Second Appeal. 20. In the result, therefore, the writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs. A. P. LAVANDE, J. SMA