1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2363 OF 2007 Suresh Bhagwandas Rajpal ) Adult, age about 56 years, Occ. Exporter ) of Readymade Garments, residing at ) Flat No.101/102, Manisha Apartments, ) First Floor, 924, Appasaheb Marathe Marg, ) Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025. ).. Petitioner V/s. Union Bank of India, a body Corporate ) constituted under the Banking Companies ) (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) ) Act, 1970 having their Head Officer at ) 239, Vidhan Bhavan Marg, Nariman Point, ) Mumbai 400 021, and interalia a branch ) at: 75/77, Sant Savta Marg, Mustafa ) Bazar, Byculla, Mumbai 400 010. ).. Respondent Mr. Laxman Venkateshan for the petitioner. Mr. H. Toor, instructed by M/s. N.N. Amin & Co., for the respondent. CORAM: SWATANTER KUMAR, C.J. & J.P. DEVADHAR, J. Judgment reserved on : January 31, 2008 Judgment delivered on: March 13, 2008 2 JUDGMENT (Per Swatanter Kumar, C.J.): 1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed as under:- (a) a Writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Hon'ble DRT II, and the Respondents to act judicially, and as per the provisions of law; (b) a Writ in the nature of `certiorari' calling for all the records of and documents relating to the impugned order from the Hon'ble Mumbai DRT II, to set aside the impugned order, after satisfying about its illegality and invalidity. (c) a Writ of prohibition be issued directing the Hon'ble DRT II, not to; (i) proceed further on the basis of the impugned order, or (ii) issue fresh orders based on RP No.193 of 2006 arising out of the said impugned order filed by the Respondent either against the Petitioner either in his personal capacity or against the Assets owned by him until such time the present Petition is heard and finally disposed off. (d) That the Petitioner be granted such further and other relief as may be deemed fit and proper by this Hon'ble Court; 3 2. However, there is a serious challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition in the present form. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents while relying upon the different judgments of the Supreme Court as well as this court raised a legal plea at the very outset of the hearing of the case that present writ petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has equally efficacious statutory remedy available in terms of the settled principles of law and the High Court may not entertain such a petition in equity and law both. 4. Appropriately, reference to the necessary facts can be made at this stage. The petitioner claims to be proprietor of M/s. Paramount Export, a firm engaged in the business of export of garment. The respondent-bank had filed an application No.318 of 2003 before the Mumbai Debts Recovery Tribunal (II) against one Satguru Fabrics, another proprietory concern of Daulat K. Punjabi of Chembur and others. The petitioner was party respondent to the said application. The petition was moved on the basis of Letter of 4 Guarantee dated 12.1.2000. The Debts Recovery Tribunal vide its order dated 6th June, 2006 passed a decree against respondent Nos.1,2 and 3 in that application. Despite of the allegation that the petitioner had executed a guarantee deed, no order for recovery was passed against the petitioner. Review application being No.18 of 2006 was filed by the bank against the order dated 6.6.2006 in terms of Rule 5A of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 primarily on the ground that the letters of guarantee deed which were not earlier available have been traced subsequently and that the order of recovery should also be passed against the petitioner. This application was contested by the petitioner before the Debts Recovery Tribunal on the ground that such an application was not maintainable and gross injustice was being done to the petitioner by the bank. This Review Application was allowed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 21.11.2006 and the order was also passed against the petitioner. Ultimately, an order for issuance of Recovery Certificate was passed against the petitioner. 5. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, 5 objection of the respondents to the maintainability of the writ petition and without dealing with the merits of the contentions raised, we would prefer to deal with the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the maintainability of the petition at the first instance. 6. In response to the submissions of the respondents, the counsel for the petitioner contended that the review application filed by the bank before the Debts Recovery Tribunal was beyond the scope and provisions of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. According to the petitioner, the application for review and the claims were barred by time and there was no proper evidence before the Debts Recovery Tribunal to allow the review application vide its order dated 21.11.2006. 7. It is not in dispute before us that the Bank had initiated proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal against its debtors/guarantors including the present petitioner. At the first 6 instance, vide order dated 6th June, 2006, the claim was disallowed against defendant No.4 (present petitioner) and was decreed against defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in that application. The mortgaged properties were ordered to be sold in accordance with the said order. It was after the Bank had filed the review application being R.A. No. 18 of 2006 that vide order dated 21st November, 2006, the decree was amended and the words “defendant Nos. 1 to 3” were directed to be substituted by the words “defendant Nos. 1 to 4” and the recovery certificate was accordingly issued. The petitioner took no steps for challenging the correctness of both the orders dated 6th June, 2006 and 21st November, 2006 before the Appellate forum. The only averment made and argument raised before us is that the petitioner had approached the Registry of Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal but he was informed that no appeal could be filed without satisfying the pre-deposit conditions. There is nothing on record before us to establish this plea. Needless to say that under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the petitioner can pray for exemption of compliance to the condition of pre-deposit but admittedly 7 no such steps were taken by the petitioner. It is true that in each and every case, availability of an alternative statutory remedy may not be a complete bar to maintainability of a writ petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is restricted to the cases where the order ex facie is without jurisdiction, beyond the provisions of the Act and in some exceptional cases where it is violative of principles of natural justice or basic rule of law. None of these conditions are satisfied in the present case. The order of review dated 21st November, 2006 was passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal after providing due opportunity to the petitioner, after hearing the parties and examining the documents produced along with the review application filed by the Bank. Merely because the order suffers from legal infirmity, if any, it would not be a sufficient ground to maintain the present writ petition. It was open to the petitioner to take appropriate remedy in accordance with law particularly when an appeal would be maintainable before the Appellate Authority by seeking waiver of the condition of pre-deposit. There is no dispute to the fact that neither an appeal was filed much less an appeal accompanied with an application for exemption as 8 required under the law was filed. In such circumstances, a writ before the High Court would hardly be maintainable. 8. At this stage, we may refer to some of the judgments having bearing on the matter on controversy. In the case of Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan [ 2001 (6) SCC 569], the Supreme Court has clearly enunciated the principle that exhaustion of alternative remedy was essential under the provisions of the Act. The Court held as under: “In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short “the Act”). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum. 6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly 9 barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.” 9. The Aurangabad Bench of this Court in the case of Marathwada Gramin Bank vs. Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others, AIR 2007 Bombay 92, took the view that the petitions filed by the petitioners were not maintainable as there was an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, 2002, and also keeping in view the fact that no special circumstances had been made out by the petitioners even in those cases for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reference can also be made to still another judgment of this Court in the case of Gangaram Biseshwar Agarwal vs. Canara Bank and others, [ 2006 (6) Bom.C.R. 436] 10 10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of (i) S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and others, [ 2004 (7) SCC 166] and (ii) Popcorn Entertainment and another vs. City Industrial Development Corporation and another, [2007 (9) SCC 593], contended that availability of alternative remedy was not a bar to the maintainability of this petition and that, in any case, the High Court should call upon the party to elect either of the remedies. None of these judgments have any application on facts and law in the present case. Both the cases relied upon by the petitioner do not deal with the provisions of the Act. None of the cases have any similarity on facts or law. It is not a case where the alternative remedy had been invoked by the petitioner. On the contrary, the petitioner made no attempts to avail of that remedy and has, after a considerable delay, opted to file a writ petition before this Court particularly when the order reviewed does not suffer from the error of jurisdiction. Even in the case of Popcorn Entertainment (supra) , the Supreme Court while carving out exception to the rule requiring the party to take recourse to alternative remedy stated three grounds viz. the action of the 11 respondents was illegal, violation of principles of natural justice and the petitioner's fundamental rights had been violated. None of these grounds exist in the present case. In terms of Section 22 (2) (e) of the Act, the Tribunal has been vested with the power to review its decisions. Whether a decision was correct on facts and law would have to be examined by the Appellate Authority and not by this Court in exercise of its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the order of the respondent authorities thus can neither be called illegal nor is violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as due opportunity was provided to the petitioner before the order dated 21st November, 2006 was passed. No fundamental right of the petitioner has been violated and, in any case, the Appellate Authority can examine the grievances raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition more appropriately and effectively. 11. Under Section 17 of the Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal has to exercise its powers while under Section 17 (2) of the Act, the Tribunal has to exercise the powers from the appointed day and the 12 appeals would lie to the Appellate Tribunal in accordance with the said provisions. Section 20 postulates that any person aggrieved by an order made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal under this Act can prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. The appeal has to be filed within the prescribed period of limitation and the Appellate Tribunal has been vested with the power to condone the delay. Section 21 of the Act contemplates that where an appeal is preferred by the person aggrieved from the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal and against whom the amount of debt is due, the appeal shall not be entertained by the Tribunal unless the person deposits with the Tribunal seventy- five per cent of the ascertained amount. The Legislature in its wisdom has provided an exception to this Rule by introducing proviso to Section 21. In terms of proviso, the Appellate Tribunal, for reasons to be recorded in writing, can not only reduce the amount to be deposited under this Section but even can waive the pre-deposit condition in its entirety. This statute provides for equally efficacious and equitable remedy. It cannot be construed that the petitioner before this Court would be justified in contending that Registry of the 13 Appellate Tribunal informed him that without pre-deposit, appeal will not be entertained and thus this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The legal grounds taken by the petitioner even in relation to admissibility of the documents filed along with the review application can be more appropriately raised by the petitioner before the Appellate Tribunal. We see no reason to grant relief to the petitioner as prayed and carve out an exception to the rule of adherence to alternative remedy. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their own costs with liberty to the petitioner to raise all pleas before the Appellate Tribunal. CHIEF JUSTICE J.P. DEVADHAR, J.