HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR D.B.: HON’BLE Mr. JUSTICE SUNIL KUMAR SINHA & HON’BLE Mr. JUSTICE RADHE SHYAM SHARMA WRIT PETITION (C ) NO.5033I2011 PETITIONER RESPONDENTS M/s. Mahamaya Fuels, Raipur Through Praveen Agarwal (one of the partners of the Mahamaya Fuels, Rajpur) S/o SM Jogi Ram Mittal, Aged about 27 years, R/o At PO—Rajpur, District Surguja (C.G.) Versus 1 State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Secretary, Department of Agriculture D.K.S.Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) The Managing Director, Chhattisgarh State Marketing Agricuitural (Mandi) Board, Beej Bhawan, G.E. Road,, Telibandha, Raipur (C.G‘) Superintendent Engineer, C.G. State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, Beej Bhawan, G.E. Road, Telibandha Raipur (C.G.) Executive Engineer, Bilaspur Circle, C.G. State Agricultural Marketing (Mandi) Board, WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Appearance : Mr. Amrito Das and Mr. Jay Prakash Shukla, Counsel for the petitioner. Dy. Government Advocate Mr. A.S. Kachhwaha, Dy. Advocate General respondents 2 to 4. Mr. Ajay Dwivedi, respondent No.1 . for for WRIT PETITION (C ) NO.5033/2011 ORAL ORDER (20.10.201 1) The following order of the Court was passed by Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. Heard finally with the consent of Iearned counsel for the parties. The petitioner is a partnership tirmi It was awarded contract for construction of a godown in the capacity of 1500 Metric Tonnes at Seed Processing Centre, Dharampur. lt appears that the work could not commence and on the allegations of breach of agreement, the contract awarded to the petitioner was cancelled and it was decided that the work shall be completed by calling another tender on the risk and cost of the petitioner. An order dated 08.08.2011 (Annexure P/1) in this regard was served upon the petitioner. ln the said order, apart from the above, it was also directed that the petitioner would be debarred from participating in any future tender process of the department/ Mandi Board for a period of 1 year. The petitioner thereafter tiled this writ petition challenging the validity of the said order. Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel for the petitioner, on 30.08201 1, while arguing on admission, submitted that as far as cancellation of the contract is concerned, that would be amenable to Arbitration‘jurisdiction as per Clause 29 of the general conditions of the agreement. However, he submitted that debarring the petitioner for a period of 1 year by the impugned order was without jurisdiction and was unreasonable. This Court, while entertaining the writ petition on the said date, issued notice to the respondents only on the point of debarring the petitioner for a period of 1 year by the impugned order dated 08.08201 1. f WRIT PETITION (C ) NO.5033I2011 Mr. Das argues that the order of debarring the petitioner from participating in future tender process for 1 year has been passed in utmost violation of principles of natural justice and before passing such order, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. He also argues that no show cause notice in this regard was ever issued to the petitioner and a direct order, which is almost a blacklisting order, has been passed. Reply‘on behalf of the respondents has been tiled. Mr. Kachhwaha submits that no separate notice to show cause for debarring the petitioner was issued to the petitioner before passing such order. There is also no provision in the contract that after termination of the contract on’account of its breach, the contractor shall be essentially deb/arred from participating in future tender process, as has been done inthe instant case. The Supreme Court, in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of lndia, AIR 1981 SC 818, discussed at length the meaning of natural justice and observed as follows : "The phrase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straitjacket of a cast iron formula. Historically “natural justice" has been used in a way “which implies the existence of moral principles of self-evident and unarguable truth.“ Natural justice by Paul Jackson, 2'“ Ed, page 1. ln course of time Judges-nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to “equality and good conscience.” Legal experts of earlier generation did not draw any distinction between “natural justice" and “natural IaW‘. “Natural justice" was considered as “that part on natural law which relates to the administration of justice.” ‘‘1; @ WRIT PETITION (C ) NO.5033I2011 In Raqhunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1989 SC 620, it furth'er held that the order of blacklisting has the civil consequence for future business of person concerned and the person affected by order has right of being heard and making representations against order even though rules do not provide so expressly. Therefore, on the above principles, it is apparent that before passing any order against the interest of a person the fundamental‘principle is that he should be given a proper opportunity of hearing and to show cause as to why such order should not be‘passed. The opportunity should not be a mere formality and it should be the real opportunity for the person concerned to put up his case for consideration of the concerned authority against the proposed consequence of the show cause notice issued against him. When the matter relates to blacklisting or further restrainment, it is more imperative to follow the principle of natural justice because it has a civil consequence and it has an affect of preventing a person from the. privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the concerned authority for the purpose of gains, that’s why, the fair play requires that he should not be given only an opportunity to show cause or that of hearing but also an opportunity of representation against such orders of putting him into blacklist Admittedly, in the instant matter, principles of natural justice have not been followed and an order of debarring the petitioner, which amounts to blacklisting for a period of 1 year, has been passed. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 08.08.2011 (Annexure Pl1), so far as it relates to debarring the petitioner from participating in future tender process for a period of 1 year, cannot be sustained and the same has to be set aside. 6F) WRIT PETITION (C ) No.5033/2011 Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 08.08.2011 (Annexure P/1), so far as it relates to debarring the .petitioner from participating in future tender process for a period of 1 year, is quashed. There shall be no order as to cost(s). Sd/- ll SUNH. KUMAR SEIHA Judge shyna 5d/~ Radhe Shyam Sham“ Judge s (a.