1 acd IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 2 OF 2010 M/s Vijaya Sahakari Motor Vahatuk Sanstha Maryadit, Shirawali.. ...Appellant Vs. s Service Manager[Retail & Sale] Indian Oil Corporation Limited ...Respondent. ---- Mr. N.V. Walawalkar, Sr. counsel with Mr. Vilas B. Tapkir, for the Appellant Mr. Nawshad Engineer, counsel i/b R.M.G. Law Associates, for the Respondent. ---- CORAM: B.R. GAVAI, J. DATE : 29TH JANUARY, 2010 P.C.: 1. By this appeal the appellant challenges an order dated 8.12.2009 passed by the learned District Judge-II and Addl.Sessions Judge by which an application for the interim relief under section-9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act came to be rejected. 2. The retail outlet of the appellant was searched and it was 2 found that the sample sold does not conform to the standard and it was also found that there was variance in the record and the actual stock. The outlet therefore came to be sealed. The appellant filed an application under section-9 for interim relief before the learned Trial Court. In the said application, an application below Exh. for ad- interim relief was filed. The same is rejected, hence, the present appeal. 3. Mr. Walawalkar, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that under the rules, there is no provision for sealing. He submits that what is provided is only search and seizure. He therefore submits that action of respondents which is beyond the scope of the rules is not permissible in law. He therefore submits that the learned Judge ought to have granted the interim prayer, as sought by the appellant. He relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sriman Narayan & Anr. in support of the proposition that at the stage of grant of interim relief, the court should not decide the matter as deciding at the stage of trial. 4. Mr. Engineer, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 3 respondents on the contrary submits that the trial court has found that the two independent analysts, had found the sample of the appellant to be not performing to the standard and as such interim relief has been rightly rejected. 5. The scope of the appeal against order of grant refusal of injunction is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or impermissible, it would not be permissible for this court to reverse the same. Equally also it is settled that the Appellate Court it would not be permissible for the Appellate Court to reverse the finding of the trial court, only because it find that the other view is more probable view. 6. The reliance placed by the learned senior counsel on the judgment of the Apex Court is well meritted. What is required to be considered at the stage of grant of injunction is prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The detailed and elaborate discussion of the evidence at that stage is not warranted. However, it is also a settled law that an injunction in the nature of a mandatory relief, has to be granted only in an exceptional case. Unless a party makes out an exceptional and compelling case it 4 would not be permissible to grant injunction in the nature of mandatory injunction. From the perusal of the order it cannot be said that the learned trial court has misapplied to apply the rules governing grant of injunction. As such appeal is without merit and rejected. 7. Needless to state that the appellant is at liberty to apply before the learned judge to expedite the disposal of the application and on such application being made the learned Judge would consider the same sympathetically, without being prejudice by the observation made either by itself or by this Court. (B.R. GAVAI, J.)