Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 Date of Decision: 04.10.2010 Chander Mohan @ Bunti ....Petitioner Versus State of Haryana and other ....Respondents CORAM : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Nirmaljit Kaur Present:- Mr. Sanjay Vashisth, Advocate for the petitioner. Ms. Preeti Choudhary, A.A.G., Haryana for the respondent-State. Mr. B.S. Walia, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 4. ***** 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? ** NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of FIR No.63 dated 10.02.2008 under Sections 376/328 IPC and 3/33 of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 registered at Police Station Sadar, Bhiwani and all consequential proceedings arising thereon including charge sheet dated 06.06.2008 on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties vide compromise deed dated 31.07.2010. The facts, in short, as stated are that on the statement of respondent No.2, namely, Madhu Bala d/o Jagdish (respondent No.3) and Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 2 sister of Yogender Singh (respondent No.4), the above mentioned FIR was registered. After the investigation of the case, final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C was prepared and challan was submitted against the petitioner only. In the report submitted in the challan dated 17.03.2008, SHO Police Station Sadar, Bhiwani specifically mentioned that during the course of investigation, no other accused was found involved. Relevant part of the same is reproduced as under :- “ Investigation has been completed in the case and worth evidence for challaning the accused are available. In the case, during investigation, only one accused Chander Mohan is stated to be involved. No evidence or clue is found to be verified qua other accused. Therefore, challan against accused in column No.11 with the witnesses mentioned in column No.13 is submitted to this Court. During trial, witnesses mentioned in column No.13 may be summoned through summons. That the petitioner was held to be juvenile as per the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000. Consequently, accused was charge-sheeted by Principle Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Bhiwani, for the offence under Sections 376/328/34 of IPC for criminal case No.185-1 of 2008.” It is not disputed that the prosecutrix-respondent No.2 had herself admitted that at the time of incident, she was 16-17 years of age. Thus, the petitioner, as well as, respondent No.2, both were below the age of 18 years. Presently, both the petitioner and respondent No.2 have attained the age of majority. Accordingly, the present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of the said FIR on the basis of compromise having been arrived at between the parties. Respondent no.2 prosecutrix herself, respondent No.3-father of the prosecutrix and respondent No.4-brother of the prosecutrix have compromised the issue in Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 3 the presence of several respectables of the village and relatives. The execution of the compromise deed has been affirmed by respondents No.2, 3 and 4 separately by executing affidavits dated 31.07.2010 before the Notary Public at Bhiwani. There is no doubt that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., quashing the FIR on the basis of compromise involving such serious offence as in the present case, should be exercised with restraint. At the same time, the compromise in an FIR involving such offences should not be thrown out or ignored without examining the facts. In the present case, the petitioner accused is a minor. As per Section 14 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the Juvenile Board is required to complete the enquiry within four months from the date of its commencement. In the present case, the matter is pending for the last more than two years as the FIR is dated 10.02.2008. Secondly, as per Section 15 of the said Act, the maximum sentence that can be awarded is by sending the juvenile to special home for a period of three years besides of course even releasing the juvenile on probation of good conduct. Moreover, some of the objects to be obtained by the said Act are detailed in para 13 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan reported as 2009(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 878, which are as under :- “ 13. As indicated in the very beginning of this judgment, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, was enacted to deal with offences allegedly committed by juveniles on a different footing from adults, with the object of rehabilitating them. The need to treat children differently from adults in relation to commission of offences had been under the consideration of the Central Government ever since India achieved independence. With such object in Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 4 mind, Parliament enacted the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, in order to achieve the constitutional goals contemplated in Articles 15(3), 39(e) and (f), 45 and 47 of the Constitution imposing on the State a responsibility of ensuring that all the needs of children are met and that their basic human rights are fully protected. Subsequently, in keeping with certain international Conventions and in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985, commonly known as the Beijing Rules, the Legislature enacted the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to attain the following objects : (i) to lay down the basic principles for administering justice to a juvenile or the child; (ii)to make the juvenile system meant for a juvenile or the child more appreciative of the developmental needs in comparison to criminal justice system as applicable to adults; (iii)to bring the juvenile law in conformity with the United Convention on the Rights of the Child; (iv)to prescribe a uniform age of eighteen years for both boys and girls; (v)to ensure speedy disposal of cases by the authorities envisaged under this Bill regarding juvenile or the child within a time limit of four months; (vi)to spell out the role of the State as a facilitator rather than doer by involving voluntary organizations and local bodies in the implementation of the proposed legislation; (vii)to create special juvenile police units with a humane approach through sensitization and training of police personnel; (viii)to enable increased accessibility to a juvenile or the child by establishing Juvenile Justice Boards and Child Welfare Committees and Homes in each Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 5 district or group of districts; (ix)to minimize the stigma and in keeping with the developmental needs of the juvenile or the child, to separate the Bill into two parts – one for juveniles in conflict with law and the other for the juvenile or the child in need of care and protection; (x)to provide for effective provisions and various alternatives for rehabilitation and social reintegration such as adoption, foster care, sponsorship and aftercare of abandoned, destitute, neglected and delinquent juvenile and child.” The said Act ultimately came into force on 1st April, 2001.” The above said judgment, in para 2, has specifically held that a juvenile is to be treated differently and while doing so, observed in para 2 as under :- “2. This appeal raises certain questions which are fundamental to the understanding and implementation of the objects for which the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the `Juvenile Justice Act, 2000') was enacted. The said law which was enacted to deal with offences committed by juveniles, in a manner which was meant to be different from the law applicable to adults, is yet to be fully appreciated by those who have been entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the same, possibly on account of their inability to adapt to a system which, while having the trappings of the general criminal law, is, however, different therefrom. The very scheme of the aforesaid Act is rehabilitatory in nature and not adversarial which the courts are generally used to. The implementation of the said law, therefore, requires a complete change in the mind-set of those who are vested with the authority of enforcing the same, without which it will be almost impossible to achieve the objects of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.” Thus, in view of the above discussion, the facts which emerge Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 6 are that the petitioner and the accused were under 18 years of age. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is applicable to them. The matter has been compromised. The object of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is to reform juvenile to minimize the stigma and in keeping with the developmental needs of the juvenile or the child. Learned Single Bench of this Court, while accepting the compromise under same offence in the case of Surinder Kamboj and others vs State of Punjab and another reported in 2008(1) RCR (Criminal) 21, held as under :- “9. Normally courts may be reluctant to cut short prosecution in such like cases and quash FIR on the basis of compromise, but this case appears to be different and strange in nature. The prosecutrix apparently has blown hot and cold at different stages of the case. She first approached Human Rights Commission but then withdrew her complaint when it was found not substantiated on enquiry. She then approached this Court for proper enquiry into the FIR but again made a somersault by moving application for withdrawing her petition at subsequent stage. She seems to be somewhat consistent now and does not wish to prosecute this FIR registered at her instance. This matter was enquired into under the directions of Human Rights Commission. This independent probe has revealed that the allegations are not substantiated. It appears that the prosecutrix has been playing into the hands of some persons and has been used as pawn in some political game. This perhaps is the only explanation for her changing stances at different stages of the pendency of this case. The fact remains that now the prosecutrix is no more interested in prosecuting this FIR against the petitioners. The proceedings against the petitioners would thus appear to be an abuse of process of Court. Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 7 10. xxx xxx xxx xxx 11. There is nothing to suggest that compromise in this case is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery. Considering the facts as noticed in detail, it will be futile to allow this prosecution to continue and if allowed to continue, it may lead to abuse of the process of Court.” This Court, in the case of Talwinder Singh @ Laddu vs. State of Punjab reported in 2008(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 970, was pleased to quash the FIR under similar offence and nature i.e. under Section 376 IPC and held as under :- “6. Keeping in view the enunciation of law as referred to above and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the present case, once the matter has been compromised between the parties, no useful purpose will be served by proceeding with the prosecution. Accordingly, FIR No.33 dated 15.02.2008 registered under Sections 363, 342, 366, 376 and 120-B IPC at Police Station, Islamabad, Amritsar and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.” This Court in the case of Sawinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others passed in Crl. Misc. No.M-1455 of 2010 had also while relying on the above said judgments accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR under Sections 366, 363, 120-B and 376 IPC. Quashing herein is at the instance of victim herself. She wants to forget her past. For continuing the trial, she will have to make various visits to the Court. It is an offence which is degrading for the victim as well. Her father and brother are standing by her side supporting her and equally concerned that she must be allowed to move on with her life. Both the petitioner and victim were minor. They both need protection and require to be treated differently and helped to forget the trauma than be Crl. Misc. No.M-22999 of 2010 8 forced to go through it. The only way to forget it is by closing the chapter once for all. Thus, there is no hesitation in accepting the compromise in the peculiar facts of the present case. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No.63 dated 10.02.2008 under Sections 376/328 IPC and 3/33 of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 registered at Police Station Sadar, Bhiwani and all consequential proceedings arising thereon including charge sheet dated 06.06.2008 on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties vide compromise deed dated 31.07.2010 are hereby quashed in the interest of justice. (NIRMALJIT KAUR) 04.10.2010 JUDGE gurpreet