1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR 1. S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.7114/91 M/s. S.M.S. Investment Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. State & Ors. 2. S.B. CIVIL CONTEMPT PETITION NO.75/07 Jamea Hydayat Trust vs. Shri A.S. Gill & Anr. 3. S.B. CIVIL CONTEMPT PETITION NO.84/07 M/s. S.M.S. Investment Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Shri Amarjot Singh Gill & Anr. 4. S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.1172/92 M/s. S.M.S. Investment Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. State & Ors. 5. S.B. CIVIL CONTEMPT PETITION NO.85/07 M/s. S.M.S. Investment Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Shri Amarjot Singh Gill & Anr. Date of order : 19/2/2009. HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMAD RAFIQ Shri K.K. Mehrishi, Sr. Advocate with Shri Harsh Kulsheshtra ) Shri R.K. Goyal ) Shri Bipin Gupta ) for the petitioners. Shri Ganesh Meena, Government Counsel ) Shri Laxman Meena, Deputy Government Counsel) for State Shri Tej Prakash Sharma ) Shri N.K. Joshi ) Shri Sunil Nath ) Shri Prateek Singh for Shri Bharat Vyas) for the respondents. ****** These two writ petitions have been filed by M/s. S.M.S. Investment Corporation (P) Ltd. In the Civil Writ Petition No.7114/91, the petitioner has challenged two orders dated 30.10.1991 and 15.11.1991 passed by 2 District Collector and the order passed by Tehsildar dated 19.11.1991. In the second Writ Petition No.1172/92, the petitioner has challenged the allotment of land by Jaipur Development Authority to Central Reserve Police Force (for short-C.R.P.F.) vide order dated 20.6.1991 and the order dated 20.8.1991 and has prayed for a declaration that such allotment is nonest and has prayed that the respondents be directed to vacate the possession of such land and restore the same to the petitioner company. Shri K.K. Mehrishi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has argued that late Shri Sawai Mansinghji, the former ruler of Jaipur through his Power of Attorney Ravchandrapal Singh vide registered sale deed dated 20.6.1963 had transferred the disputed land measuring 1300 bighas situated in Village Lalwas of Amer Tehsil to the petitioner for a consideration of Rs.20,000. The sale deed to this effect was registered before Sub-Registrar, Amer on 20.10.1963. Petitioner after purchasing the above referred to land was getting the same 3 cultivated through his tenants, who had been inducted by late Shri Man Singhji and had attorned to the petitioner. Such tenants were paying rent by way of share of produce to the petitioner and its lessees. The land was known as Honey Due Range and was entered as such in the revenue records in the jamabandi of village Lalwas from Samvat 2010 onwards till the impugned orders were passed. Learned counsel submitted that the State Legislature enacted Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners' Estate Act, 1963 (for short- the Land Owners' Act). This Act was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 12.4.1964 and was immediately brought into force. Under Section 7 thereof, the date of vesting of the lands in the State was notified as 1.9.1964. It was contended that there could be no question of vesting of land in the State as it already stood transferred to the petitioner by above referred to sale deed on 20.9.1963 much prior to the enforcement of the Land Owners' Act. According to Section 9 and 9A of the Act, Collector issued notice to the land owners asking them to deliver 4 the records and possession of their lands. The Collector made an enquiry and by order dated 17.4.1976 held that the above land was personal property of former ruler of Jaipur Shri Man Singhji and has been transferred to the petitioner company by the registered sale deed, which was legal transfer and was capable of being recognised. The Collector therefore recognised such lands as that of the petitioner and acquired only remaining area of 160 bighas of land. The order of the Collector was ultimately challenged before this Court in a writ petition. This Court vide its judgement dated 21.2.1986 set aside the said order and remanded the matter back to the competent authority for determination of compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Land Owners' Act. Shri K.K. Mehrishi, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that till date, the Divisional Commissioner who is presently the competent authority under the Land Owners' Act has not been able to determine the compensation and the matter is pending with him for last more than three decades. It is 5 however contended that the impugned orders have been passed independent of the provisions of the Land Owners' Act and the premises on which the impugned orders have been passed is the alleged violation of Section 63(4) and 63(7) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and therefore this petition can be heard and decided despite pendency of the proceedings before the Divisional Commissioner. In the writ petition no.1172/92, Shri K.K. Mehrishi, the learned counsel submitted that the allotment of part of the land could not be made by the Jaipur Development Authority (for short-JDA)to Union of India for the use of Central Reserve Police Force. The JDA claims the land to be their own on the strength of the alleged vesting of such land in government whereas no such vesting has taken place and in any case the above referred to three orders, including the order passed by the Tehsildar were already subject matter of challenge in the first of these writ petitions. The JDA could not without recourse to due process of law either dispossess the petitioner or 6 otherwise take possession of the said land. The vesting of the land does not taken place in favour of JDA even according to Section 102A of the Land Revenue Act as the land is not such which is in the nature of the lands covered by Section 54 of the JDA Act. The JDA therefore had no legal authority to transfer such lands to Union of India / CRPF. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the writ petition and submitted that in identical writ petition wherein challenge was made to the very same order of the Tehsildar dated 19.11.1991, the S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4878/92 filed by one Nathu Singh and Abdul Rashid Mir was disposed of by the learned Single Judge observing that right of the petitioner as lessee would be same as that of the lessor and he cannot have better title since the question with regard to title of the lessor itself was pending consideration before the Compensation Commissioner. Thus the writ petition was held premature and the same was disposed of with liberty to petitioners to file their objections before the 7 Compensation Commissioner and direction to the said Commissioner to decide the same after holding the proper enquiry and hearing to the parties. When the D.B. Special Appeal (W) No.191/94 was filed, the division bench took note of the argument that appellant in that case being a lessee and that Tehsildar and for that matter, any other authority had no jurisdiction to pass the order in question for eviction of the appellant. The division bench rejected this argument being misconceived by holding that the learned Single Judge has already protected interest of the parties by directing that till matter is decided by the Compensation Commissioner, the petitioner shall not be dispossessed. Learned counsel submitted that the division bench in the aforesaid case disposed of appeal with direction to the parties to appear before the Commissioner and with further direction to the Divisional Commissioner to fix a firm date of hearing and proceed further in accordance with law. Learned counsel therefore submitted that when with regard to validity of very same order passed by Tehsildar dated 19.11.1991, 8 which is consequential to the first two orders passed by District Collector dated 30.10.1991 and 15.11.1991, which are all challenged in the first of these writ petitions, the division bench of this Court has passed a particular order, the Single Bench of this Court cannot possibly take another view of the matter and that the petitioners will have to in any case await outcome of proceedings before the Compensation Commissioner. The writ petitions be therefore dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has rejoined and submitted that in the present case also the interim order of status quo has been passed on 13.10.2006 but here in this case objection submitted by the petitioner was already rejected by the competent authority i.e. Compensation Commissioner under Section 10 of the Land Owners' Act on 17.9.1996 and the appeal filed by the petitioners thereagainst was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 10.5.2002. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the petitioners in such situation cannot be left remediless and that 9 they cannot be required to wait till outcome of the proceedings before the Compensation Commissioner, which have already remained pending for so long. It was argued that similar protection of status quo be extended to the petitioners as was extended to the appellants in the aforesaid judgement of division bench. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents clarified that the interim order dated 13.10.2006 in the present case was passed on the basis of application filed by the respondent no.11 for restraining respondent no.1 to 8 from entering or encroaching upon any part of the land and in that context, the direction was prayed to be issued to maintain the status quo only with regard to land in dispute as it exists today. The interim order of status quo was thus confined to that part of the land over which the rights were claimed by respondent no.11 and not on the entire chunk of land. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner did not pay the land revenue to the State ever since 1963 and that the division bench passed the order of 10 status quo in the above judgement because already in favour of the appellant in that case status quo order had been passed by the Single Bench, which was directed to be continued till their objections were disposed of by the Compensation Commissioner. Learned counsel submitted that if the objections filed by the petitioner were rejected upto Revenue Board and it did not avail any remedy thereagianst, it has to blame itself and cannot claim any equity on that basis. Consideration of the arguments aforesaid and perusal of the order passed by the division bench in Special Appeal (W) No.191/94, supra clearly show that in the writ petition that was filed in that case the order passed by Tehsildar dated 19.11.1991 was under challenge and in the first of these writ petitions also the very same order dated 19.11.91 is under challenge and in fact the order of the Tehsildar has been passed in purported compliance of the other orders passed by the District Collector, which are also challenged. Order passed by the Tehsildar dated 19.11.91 11 therefore is a consequential order. I am not inclined to uphold the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that in spite of division bench having taken one view of the matter, sitting singly, I should proceed to examine validity of impugned order/s passed on the premise that there was violation of provisions of Section 63(iv) and 63(vii) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. When division bench in the context of challenge to the same order has upheld the view taken by the Single Bench that petitioner in that case being a lessee, his right would be just the same as that of the lessor and he cannot have better title and when the question with regard to title of the lesser is pending adjudication before the Compensation Commissioner, he could not have any independent right or title. In view of that opinion expressed by the division bench, I find no reason to take any other view because admittedly, in the present case also, the petitioner is claiming right on the strength of sale deed which as per its own admission, was executed in its favour by the erstwhile ruler of the Jaipur State Shri 12 Man Singhji, who in the case decided by Division Bench also similarly transferred such rights in favour of the petitioners. In that case, if the title of the lesser is under examination before the Compensation Commissioner, the petitioner independently cannot claim any better or superior right. In spite of challenge to the order of Tehsildar dated 19.11.1991, which was passed on the basis of alleged infraction of provisions of Section 63(iv) and 63(vii), if the Division Bench has already directed proceedings before the Commissioner to take precedence, the present writ petitions deserve to be disposed of in the same manner. So long as the vesting of the land in the State and the consequential vesting thereof in Jaipur Development Authority is not held to be illegal in the proceedings pending before the Compensation Commissioner, question of examining validity or otherwise of the allotment made in favour of Union of India / C.R.P.F. would not arise and would also be a premature question. If the objections submitted by the petitioners have already been rejected by 13 the Divisional Commissioner and the order of such rejection has been affirmed by the Board of Revenue while dismissing their appeal and if the petitioners have not taken any remedy thereagainst, there obviously cannot be any occasion now to require them to go back to the Commissioner and raise objections afresh. In any case, their right and title, if any whatsoever, would be dependent on the ultimate outcome of the proceedings pending before the Compensation Commissioner and his decision as to the right or title he grants or concedes to the erstwhile ruler of the Jaipur State late Shri Man Singhji or his legal heirs, only thereafter the same would devolve upon the petitioner and not there before. In view of the discussion made above, the present writ petitions are dismissed as being premature. The status quo order passed by this Court on 13.10.2006 in favour of respondent no.11 is directed to continue subject to final outcome of the proceedings on objections that are raised by the respondent no.11 before the Divisional Commissioner. 14 In view of the judgement passed by this Court dismissing the writ petitions, the contempt petitions are also dismissed. Notices issued therein stand discharged. Parties will bear their own costs. (MOHAMMAD RAFIQ), J. RS/