IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO : 10829 of 2002 Between: Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Rep. by its Managing Director, Musheerabad, Hyderabad ..... PETITIONER AND 1 Controller of Legal Metrology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, 209, PWD Building, Gandhi Nagar, Hyderabad- 500 080. 2 Indian Oil Corporation, Rep. by its Senior Divisional Manager, Visakhapatnam. 3 Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Rep. by its Territory Manager, Hyderabad. 4 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Rep.by its Regional Manager, Hyderabad. ..RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:MR K.MADHAVA REDDY (SC FOR APSRTC) Counsel for respondent No.1.: GP FOR CIVIL SUPPLIES Counsel for respondents 2 to 4: None appeared The Court made the following : O R D E R: This writ petition is ﬁled for a writ of Mandamus to declare the action of respondent No.1 in registering 15 cases of short delivery of HSD oil by the pumps at APSRTC Depots and 7 other cases where seals were found tampered under the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985 and demanding payment of compounding fees in 7 cases referred to in Annexure-B through letter No.22295/53/01 dated 27-02-2002 of respondent No.1 as illegal and without jurisdiction. For the purpose of running of its ﬂeet of buses, the petitioner, which is a public utility undertaking and authorized to provide transport to the general public, has been maintaining dispensing pumps in its Depot premises all over the State. Through the said pumps, HSD oil is ﬁlled into the buses. The oﬃcials of respondent No.1 made surprise checks of these dispensation units and registered as many as 22 cases for either short delivery or tampering of seals of the pumps. The petitioner’s plea is that respondent No.1 has no jurisdiction to conduct checks and exercise powers under the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (for short “the 1976 Act”) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985 (for short “the 1985 Act”). At the hearing, Sri K.Madhava Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner-Corporation, submitted that respondent No.1 cannot exercise his power over the petitioner-Corporation as the Corporation does not fall within the deﬁnition of “dealer” in Section 2 (c) of the 1976 Act. He also submitted that as the petitioner-Corporation is not involved in the sale of the HSD oil, it does not fall within the definition of “premises” in Section 2 (r) of the 1976 Act. The learned Government Pleader for Civil Supplies submitted that the petitioner’s premises squarely fall within the deﬁnition of “premises” in Section 2 (r) of the 1976 Act, thereby subjecting itself to the jurisdiction and control of the authorities under the provisions of the 1985 Act. The deﬁnitions of “dealer” and “premises” in Sections 2(c) and 2(r) respectively of the 1976 Act are reproduced herein. “Sec.2(c) “dealer”, in relation to any weight or measure, means a person who, or a ﬁrm or a Hindu undivided family which, carries on, directly or otherwise the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing any such weight or measure, whether for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration, and includes- (i) a commission agent who carries on such business on behalf of any principal (ii) an importer who sells, supplies, distributes or otherwise delivers any weight or measure to any user, manufacturer, repairer, consumer or nay other person, but does not include a manufacturer who sells, supplies, distributes or otherwise delivers any weight or measure to any person or category of persons referred to in this clause. Explanation:- for the removal of doubts, it is herby declared that a manufacturer, who sells, supplies, distributes or otherwise delivers any weight or measure to any person other than a dealer, shall be deemed to be a dealer. 2(r) “premises” includes,- (i) a place where any business, industry, production or trade is carried on by a person, whether by himself or through an agent, by whatever name called, (ii) a warehouse, godown or other place where any weight, measure or other goods are stored or exhibited, (iii) a place where any books of account or other documents pertaining to any trade or transaction are kept, (iv) a dwelling-house, if any part thereof is used for the purpose of carrying on any business, industry, production or trade. Explanation:- “Place” includes a vehicle or vessel or any other mobile device, with the help of which any trade or business is carried on, and also includes any measuring instrument mounted on a vehicle, vessel or other mobile device;” The 1985 Act is made for enforcement of the standards of weights and measures established by or under the 1976 Act. Section 3(o) of the 1985 Act provided that words and expressions used in the 1985 Act and not deﬁned but deﬁned in the 1976 Act shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act. Section 9 of the 1985 Act prohibits use of weights and measures other than standard weights and measures and the said provision reads as under- “9.Prohibition of use of weights and measures other than standard weights and measures.-(1) Notwithstanding any custom, usage or method of whatever nature, no weight or measure, other than the standard weight or measure, shall be used or kept in any premises in such circumstances as to indicate that such weight or measure is intended, or is likely to be used, for any weighment or measurement. (2) On and from the commencement of this Act, no weight, measure or number, other than the standard weight or measure shall be used in, or form the basis of, any contract or other agreement in relation to any trade, commerce, production or protection. (3) Any contract or other agreement, which contravenes the provisions of sub-section (2), shall be void.” The word “premises” is not deﬁned in the 1985 Act. Therefore, the said expression has to be understood in the light of the deﬁnition of “premises” in Section 2(r) of the 1976 Act. As per the said deﬁnition any warehouse, godown or other place where any weight, measure or other goods stored or exhibited falls within the expression “premises”. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that as the goods stored or exhibited is not meant for sale and hence the petitioner’s premises where the HSD oil is stored and supplied to its own vehicles do not fall within the deﬁnition of premises in Section 2 (r), has no merit. The requirement of storage for sale is not envisaged in the said deﬁnition. Irrespective of whether the goods are stored for the purpose of sale or otherwise, the said deﬁnition is attracted. Therefore, there is no basis for the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since no sale is involved, the premises of the Corporation fall outside the scope of the deﬁnition of “premises” in Section 2(r) of the 1976 Act and consequently outside the purview of Section 9 of the 1985 Act. Similarly, the petitioner need not fall within the deﬁnition of “dealer” for the respondents to initiate action under Section 9 of the 1985 Act. As the petitioner’s premises fall within the said deﬁnition, Section 9 of the 1985 Act is very much attracted and consequently no relief can be granted to the petitioner. On the above premises, the writ petition is dismissed. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Dated 11th November, 2008 vrn