HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.S.R. VARMA AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD W.P. Nos.3547, 3607 and 3642 of 2008 W.P. No.3547 of 2008: Between: M. Devendar Prasad and others .. Petitioners and The Commissioner and Special Officer, Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Tankband, Hyderabad and another .. Respondents W.P. No.3607 of 2008: Between: K. Ramanaiah and others .. Petitioners and The Commissioner and Special Officer, Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Tankband, Hyderabad and others W.P. No.3642 of 2008: Between: M. Loaknadh Dass and others .. Petitioners and The Commissioner and Special Officer, Greater Hyderbad Municipal Corporation, Tankband, Hyderabad and others .. Respondents Date: 28-02-2008 COMMON ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice G. Bhavani Prasad) The employees working on deputation in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, whose deputations were cancelled and who were repatriated to respective parent departments, challenged their being repatriated on cancellation of deputation describing them as non-local officers, in a batch of Original Applications before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). They were successful in persuading the Tribunal to grant interim relief, but were ultimately unsuccessful with the Tribunal dismissing the entire batch of Original Applications by common order dated 08-02-2008. The writ petitioners were appointed respectively in their parent departments and were working as such before being deputed to work in the borrowing department and while they were so working, the State Government issued a Circular No.9543/MC/2007-12, dated 02-07-2007 directing cancellation of deputations to local cadre posts from other local cadres as the same is affecting the employment and promotional opportunities of the local candidates against the spirit of Presidential Order. In pursuance of the Government instructions, repatriation of the applicants to the parent departments was ordered by the borrowing department. The Tribunal granted interim orders on admitting the Original Applications and on the questions in controversy between the parties arising from the rival contentions, the Tribunal framed points for consideration about the applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Organisation of Local Cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruitment) Order, 1975 (for short “the Presidential Order”), validity of G.O.Ms.No.610, GAD, dated 30- 12-1985 and the legality of the impugned orders of cancellation of deputation and repatriation of the applicants to their parent departments. In the impugned common order, the Tribunal opined that it is not necessary to decide the applicability of the Presidential Order or the validity of G.O.Ms.No.610 for the purposes of these cases and proceeded to hold that the applicants have no legal right to assail the orders of cancellation of deputation and repatriation. The Tribunal referred to G.O. (P) No.10, Finance & Planning (FW- FR.II) Department, dated 22-01-1993 containing the consolidated instructions relating to deputation and observed the deputation to be an incident of service which does not affect the service conditions of the employee and that it is for the borrowing and lending departments to decide about deputation or repatriation through administrative action. The Tribunal referred to Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others[1] discouraging interference by Courts with transfer orders except in very rare cases of mala fide motives or prohibition by statutory or service rules. The Tribunal applied the principle to deputations opining that it is the prerogative right of the employer to transfer an employee and the employee has no right to work in a particular place only. The Tribunal did not place reliance on Dr. S.S. Waghe v. Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences, Hyderabad and others[2] in the absence of full text of the judgment and followed Ratilal B. Soni and others v. State of Gujarat and others[3] affirming the right of the employer to order repatriation of deputationist at any time. Observing that repatriation is governed by doctrine of pleasure, the Tribunal held that irrespective of the applicability or otherwise of the Presidential Order and G.O.Ms.No.610 and the validity of the State Policy, the inherent power of the employer to cancel deputation cannot be questioned in the absence of any mala fide intentions or prohibition by any statutory or service rules. The said order is challenged in these writ petitions on identical grounds claiming that the cancellation of deputation prior to the expiry of the period of deputation without putting the deputationists on notice ought to have been examined with reference to the applicability of the Presidential Order and validity of G.O.Ms.No.610. When the deputation was for a particular period as per rules and could have been extended, the principle of promissory estoppel prohibits any premature repatriation. Even assuming that the doctrine of pleasure and prerogative right to cancellation of deputation have relevance, each case has to be examined individually on merits more so with reference to the effect of such repatriation on the education of the employees’ children and the settlement of the family and any prerogative right must be exercised very cautiously but not in a routine manner, more so when the employee faces no adverse remarks. Transfer and deputation are two different things. For effective implementation of the programmes and policies of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, work is being extracted from the deputationists due to lack of sufficient and efficient staff for the Corporation. Hence, the writ petitioners desired the impugned order to be set aside and the petitioners to be declared to be entitled to be continued in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. The learned counsel representing both parties reiterated their respective contentions in support of and against the impugned order. “The concept of ‘deputation’ is well understood in service law and has a recognized meaning” observed the Apex Court in State of Punjab and others v. Inder Singh and others[4]. The Apex Court pointed out that: “ ‘Deputation’ has a different connotation in service law and the dictionary meaning of the word “deputation” is of no help. In simple words “deputation” means service outside the cadre or outside the parent department. Deputation is deputing or transferring an employee to a post outside his cadre, that is to say, to another department on a temporary basis. After the expiry (of) period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per the Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer is outside the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the authority who controls the service or post from which the employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know his rights and privileges in the deputation post.” The Apex Court referred to D.M. Bharati v. L.M. Sud[5] holding that promotions earned by an employee on deputation did not enjoin any protection, Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat (3 supra) holding that the deputationist could be reverted to his parent cadre at any time and he did not get any right to be absorbed on the deputation post, Puranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh[6] holding that a repatriated deputationist could not claim promotions in the parent department on the basis of officiation in a higher post in the borrowing organization, and R. Prabha Devi v. Govt. of India[7] holding that unless eligibility conditions as per rules are satisfied, the employee has no right to be considered for promotion; and distinguished the decisions in T. Shantharam v. State of Karnataka[8], Narayan Yeshwant Gore v. Union of India[9] and Narender Chadha v. Union of India[10]. With reference to the various judgments above referred to, the Apex Court pointed out that the law on deputation and repatriation is quite settled and there was no escape for the respondents in that case to go back to their parent departments and working there as constables or head constables, as the case may be. In fact, in the case under consideration of Their Lordships, a false hope was instilled in the deputationists about their continuing in CID holding higher ranks till the age of superannuation and the conduct of the borrowing department in suddenly asking the deputationists to go back to their parent department when they have put in best years of their lives in that department, appeared unjust. The Apex Court observed that it would have been more appropriate for the borrowing department to repatriate the deputationists after the expiry of the initial period of deputation or at least they should have been told the consequences of their continuing on deputation and sudden repatriation. Still the Apex Court affirmed the order of the High Court only to the extent of the option given to the deputationists who have put in 20 years of qualifying service to seek voluntary retirement from the borrowing department in the ranks they were holding and set aside the judgment in respect of all other reliefs granted. The authoritative pronouncement of law on the subject by the Apex Court in reiteration of all the earlier decisions makes it patent and obvious that the deputationists have no option except to go back to their parent department when the borrowing department repatriates them even if suddenly and maybe even unjustly. A Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab[11] referring to Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat (3 supra) and other precedents, held that: “In service jurisprudence, “deputation” is described as an assignment of an employee of one department or cadre to another department or cadre. The necessity for sending on deputation arises in “public interest” to meet the exigencies of “public service”. The concept of deputation is based upon consent and voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee, corresponding acceptance of such service by the borrowing employer and the consent of the employee to go on deputation. A deputation subsists so long as the parties to this tripartite arrangement do not abrogate it. However, if any one of the parties repudiate the agreement, the other two have no legally enforcible right to insist upon continuance of the deputation. Even in the cases where deputationists continue for a pretty long period and options for their “absorption” in the borrowing department were taken, yet their repatriation to the parent department was upheld by the Apex Court in Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1990 SC 1132 : {1991(3) SLR 77 (SC)} after holding that “the appellants being on deputation, they could be repatriated to their parent cadre at any time and they do not get any right to be absorbed on the deputation post. “Deputation” per se being a contractually made ad hoc arrangement, seldom confers any right upon a deputationist, either for completion of the term of deputation or regularization of such stop-gap arrangement.” The contention before the Division Bench was also against premature repatriation before the expiry of the term expressly stipulated in the orders of deputation. But the Division Bench held in the light of the above legal position that the deputationists have no legal and/or vested right to continue on deputation with the borrowing department even for the period stipulated in the orders taking them on deputation. It is true that in Dr. S.S. Waghe v. Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences, Hyderabad (2 supra), repatriation of a deputationist before completion of the period of deputation appeared to have been quashed and more so, in the absence of any review of the deputationist’s work and performance at the end of one year. Administrative reasons cited for repatriation appeared to have not been accepted. But the terms and conditions of the deputation therein or the administrative reasons cited for repatriation are herein not available and it is not known whether the order was held vitiated due to any mala fide intentions or prohibition by any statutory or service rules. At any rate, this decision was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the order in W.P. No.3113 of 2008, dated 19-02-2008 (to which one of us (Hon’ble Sri Justice D.S.R. Varma) is a party) to be contrary to the view taken by the Apex Court in Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat (3 supra) and State of Punjab and others v. Inder Singh and others (4 supra). The Division Bench in the above referred to order was dealing with premature cancellation of deputation and upheld the same subject to the qualification that the same can be made on genuine, bona fide and justifiable grounds. It is seen from the counter-affidavits of the Additional Commissioner of the respondent Corporation in the Original Applications that it was the spirit and not the letter of the Presidential Order that prompted the decision to cancel all deputations to local cadre posts from other local cadres so as to erase any effect on the employment and promotional opportunities of the local candidates. Whether the Presidential Order and G.O.Ms.No.610 in terms validly apply to Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation or the deputationists working with it, is, therefore, academic and if the Government or the borrowing department decided to give effect to the spirit of the Presidential Order, the same was not shown to be not genuine or bona fide or justifiable or to be vitiated by any mala fide intentions or prohibition by any statutory or service rules. If so, mature or premature cancellation of deputation in exercise of the prerogative right of pleasure of the employer cannot be successfully questioned before the Tribunal or this Court. Any question of promissory estoppel does not arise in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court nor do any difficulties of the deputationists due to premature repatriation overweigh the right of the borrowing department to summarily eject the deputationists from its services. The performance or non-performance of an employee or any adversity or otherwise in his service record are, ex-facie, extraneous and not germane to such consideration. The need for effective implementation of the programmes and policies of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and suffering of the Corporation for lack of sufficient and efficient staff are matters to be taken care of by the Corporation and not the deputationists and therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal does not appear susceptible to any judicial review by this Court within the restricted scope of such review in these writ petitions. Before parting with the case, it has to be noted with anguish and pain that very strong expressions were used in the course of questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned order in the affidavits in support of the writ petitions. While every party to a lis before a Court or a Tribunal has every right to question the conclusions of fact or law arrived at by such Court or Tribunal in any appropriate proceeding before an appropriate Forum as prescribed and permitted under law, such challenge to any judicial order should, in all propriety, be confined to submissions on merits. It is our earnest hope and trust that use of such unsavory language will be avoided in future. Reverting back to the merits of these writ petitions, for the reasons already elaborated above, the writ petitions have to fail and are accordingly dismissed, but under the circumstances, without costs. _______________ D.S.R. VARMA, J Date: 28-02-2008 _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Svv [1] (2007) 8 Supreme Court Cases 150 [2] 2004 (2) ALD (NOC) 87 [3] AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1132 = 1990 SCC (L&S) 630 [4] (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 372 [5] 1991 SCC (L&S) 1193 [6] 1995 SCC (L&S) 95 [7] 1988 SCC (L&S) 475 [8] 1995 SCC (L&S) 537 [9] 1995 SCC (L&S) 1040 [10] 1986 SCC (L&S) 226 [11] 2005 (1) SLR 629