1 wp3383.11 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 3383 OF 2011 Meenakshi @ Meena Ashok Jondhale, Age: 35 years, Occ: Labourer, R/o. Nimgaonjali, Tq. Sangamner, District Ahmednagar. ...PETITIONER VERSUS 1. Sow. Anita Bhaskar Vairal, Age: Major, Occ: Business, R/o. Galli No.9,Indira Nagar, Sangamner, Tq. Sangamner, Dist. Ahmednagar. 2. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited, Near Hotel Karam,Sangamner, Tq. Sangamner, Dist. Ahmednagar. ...RESPONDENTS ... Mr. Rajendra L. Kute, Advocate for petitioner. Mr. Dhongade, Advocate holding for Mr. R.D. Bhalerao, Advocate for respondent No.1. Mr. S.V. Kulkarni, Advocate for respondent No.2. ... CORAM: S.S. SHINDE, J. DATE : 17TH DECEMBER, 2011 ORAL JUDGMENT : . Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner 2 wp3383.11 and learned Counsel for the respective respondents. 2 Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With consent, heard finally. 3. Short point is raised in this petition whether the order passed by the Tribunal to hear the application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, "said Act") at the time of final hearing of the main claim petition, is sustainable in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another vs. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More, reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1769. . Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that, the application was filed by the petitioner herein under section 140 of the said Act. It was incumbent upon the Tribunal to decide the said application, however, by the impugned order, hearing of the said application is deferred 3 wp3383.11 and it is observed that, the said application to be heard at the time of final hearing of the main claim petition. Such order is impermissible. The Tribunal was supposed to decide the application under section 140 of the said Act immediately. Learned Counsel in support of his contention placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji (supra) and submitted that, the provisions of section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1947 are parameteria with the provisions of section 140 of the M.V. Act, 1988. This position is also not disputed by the Counsel for the respective respondents. 4. According to the Counsel for the petitioner, in the case of Shivaji (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a view that, the provision of section 92A of the Act of 1947 is a special provision and the Tribunal is not required to follow normal provision prescribed under the Act and Rules with regard to adjudication of the 4 wp3383.11 claim under section 160 of the said Act for the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under section 92A. Therefore, according to the Counsel for the petitioner, the application filed by the petitioner herein under section 140 of the said Act is required to be disposed of expeditiously as per judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji (supra). 5. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that, the writ petition is not maintainable challenging the impugned order and the appeal is maintainable. IN support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yallwwa and others vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, reported in 2007(6) S.C.C. 657. He further submits that, the respondents have no objection if the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the entire matter within one month from today. Therefore, the Counsel for the respondents submits that, the writ petition 5 wp3383.11 may be dismissed. 6. I have given due consideration to the rival submissions. The point raised in this petition is no more res integra. It is also not in dispute that, provisions of section 92A of the M.V. Act, 1939 are paramateria with Section 140 of the New Act. The said provisions of old Act are saved in new Act of 1988, and to that effect, section 140 is provided. Therefore, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji (supra) is squarely applicable in the facts of this case. Para-42 and 43 of the said judgment reads thus : "42. Rule 306C prescribes the procedure of disbursement of compensation u/S. 92A to the legal heirs in case of death. The submission of Shri. Sanghi is that in spite of the aforesaid amendments which have been introduced in the Rules after the enactment of S. 92A, the Claims Tribunal is required to 6 wp3383.11 follow the procedure contained in the other rules before awarding compensation under S. 92A of the Act. In other words, it must proceed to adjudicate the claim after the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to file the written submission under Rule 298, by framing issues under Rule 299 and after recording evidence in accordance with Rules 300 and 301 and that it is not permissible for the Claims Tribunal to make an order purely on the basis of the documents referred to in Rules 291 A, 306A and 306B. In our opinion, the said submission of Shri. Sanghi cannot be accepted. The object underlying the enactment of Section 92A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs.15,000/- in case of death and Rs.7500/- in case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim u/S. 110A of the Act. This would be apparent from the provisions of S. 92B of the Act. S. 92(B) of the Act provides 7 wp3383.11 that a claim for compensation u/S. 92A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement u/s.92A and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation u/S. 92A shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place. With a view to give effect to the said directive contained in S. 92B of the Act, the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and has inserted special provisions in respect of claims under S. 92A in Rules 291 A, 291 B, 297(2), 306A, 306B, 306C and 306D of the Rules. The object underlying the said provisions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim petition u/s. 92A of the Act. The said object would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for, adjudicating a claim petition u/S. 110A of the Act. Moreover, for awarding compensation u/S. 92A of the Act, the 8 wp3383.11 claims Tribunal is required, to satisfy itself in respect of the following matters :- (i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle ; (ii) the said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or death of the person whose legal representative is making the claim ; (iii) the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. 43. The documents referred to in Rules 291 A and 306B will enable the Claims Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters. The panchnama and the First Information Report will show whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle in question. The Injury Certificate or the postmortem report will show the nature of injuries and the case of 9 wp3383.11 death. The Registration Certificate and Insurance Certificate of the motor vehicle will indicate who is the owner and insurer of the vehicle. In the event of the Claims Tribunal feeling doubtful about the correctness or genuineness of any of these documents or if it considers, it necessary to obtain supplementary information or documents, Rule 306A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain such supplementary information or documents from the Police, medical or other authorities. This would show that Rr. 291A, 306A and 306B contain adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation U/S. 92A of the Act and in view of these special provisions which were introduced in the Rules by the amendments in 1984, the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim u/S. 110A of the Act for the purpose of making an order on a claim petition u/S. 92A of 10 wp3383.11 the Act . " 7. Therefore, in the light of observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji (supra), the Tribunal should have decided the application under section 140 of the said Act immediately since the said provision is a special provision to redress the grievance of the claimant quickly. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is not sustainable. 8. The contention of the Counsel for the respondents that, the writ petition is not maintainable and is devoid of any merits. The Tribunal has not passed any order and therefore, there was no question of filing appeal. The Tribunal has observed that, the application under section 140 of the said Act be heard at the time of final hearing of the main claim petition. Therefore, there is no order as such by the Tribunal. Therefore, absence of any order except the contention of the respondents that, the appeal 11 wp3383.11 is maintainable is of no avail. Therefore, in the aforesaid background and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji (supra), the impugned order deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, it is set aside. 9. The pending application under Section 140 of the said Act, before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sangamner be heard immediately and the Tribunal should decide the said application within one month from today. It is needless to observe that, while deciding the said application, the reasonable opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the parties. It is made clear that, the Tribunal should not grant any adjournment and hear the said application as expeditiously as possible, however, within one month from today. Rule made absolute in above terms. Writ Petition is allowed to the above extent, same stands disposed of. sd/- [S.S. SHINDE, J.] sut/DEC11