1 caf3096-11.doc ttm IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3096 OF 2011 IN FIRST APPEAL ST.NO.17923 OF 2011 The Municipal Corporation for Greater Mumbai .. Applicants Vs. Mr.Ramsumer Sukharam Kanojia .. Respondent Mr.Vinod Mahadik for the applicants None for the respondent CORAM: K.K. TATED, J. DATE: 15th DECEMBER, 2011 PC: 1. Heard the learned counsel for the Corporation. Though respondent is served, no one appeared in the matter when the matter was called out. 2. This application is preferred by original defendants for condonation of delay of 3 years one day in preferring appeal against the judgment and decree dt.5.5.08 passed by City Civil Court in L.C.Suit No.1799 of 2004. 3. The learned counsel for the applicants states that since the 2 caf3096-11.doc applicants being a Corporate Body, administrative decision and procedure has to be followed before preferring any appeal and in that procedure, there is delay in preferring the present appeal. He mainly relied on para 2 of the Civil Application for explaining the delay of three years and one day. Para 2 of the Civil Application reads thus: “2. The Appellant state that the Trial Court has passed an order on 5.5.2008. The Appellant state that there is a delay caused, since the Applicants being a Corporate Body, administrative decision and procedure has to be followed. The appellants state that as there is a change in office staff and the papers are mixed with the other papers, the applicants are not able to prefer the appeal and being aggrieved by the order of the Hon’ble Court dated 5.5.2008.” 4. On the basis of this submission, the learned counsel for the applicants submits that there is good chance of success in the present appeal and therefore, in the interest of justice, delay be condoned. 5. It is to be noted that in the present case, the Trial court passed judgment and decree on 5.5.08 and thereafter, the applicants applied for certified copy of judgment and decree on 2.6.08 and the same was ready for delivery on 8.7.08. From 8.7.08, the applicants have not explained the delay in preferring the present appeal. The present 3 caf3096-11.doc appeal is filed in this court on 6.7.11. 6. I do not find any sufficient cause for condoning three years and one day delay. Our High Court in the matter of Laxman N. Divekar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1998 (3) BCR 291 held that there cannot be different standard for Government and private parties for condonation of delay. Though certain latitude can be given to the Government but discretion has to be exercised on well settled principles only. Para 4 of the said Authority reads thus: “4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables the Appeal Court to admit the appeal after the prescribed period on the appellant/applicant satisfying the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time. It is the satisfaction about the sufficiency of the cause in not preferring the appeal in time that confers the jurisdiction to the Appeal Court in condoning the delay in filing appeal. If the appellant does not show the sufficient cause nor does the Court record the finding that the cause shown by the appellant is sufficient in not preferring the appeal in time, the Court does not possess power to arbitrarily condone delay in the name of advancing substantial justice merely because the appellant litigant happens to be the Government. It need not be emphasised that no separate standards to determine the sufficient cause could be laid, be it a private party or the 4 caf3096-11.doc State; though the factors which are peculiar to the functioning of the Government conditions may require pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court, when the State is an applicant, may give certain amount of latitude because of impersonal nature of administrative working in the State. Nevertheless it is incumbent upon the Court that discretion is exercised in accord with well recognised principles. The discretion so exercised by the Court must proceed on material which spells out sufficient cause. The sufficient cause has to be considered with pragmatism and of course with justice oriented approach but "any cause' cannot be construed as "sufficient cause". It is necessary for the Court to apply its mind to the cause shown to satisfy itself whether the cause so shown is 'sufficient' or not. The Court cannot on its whims jump to the conclusion on generality that the Government cannot be thrown out at the threshold taking general view of the matter that considering the function of the Government and it's bureaucracy that the delay was caused due to inaction by the Government officer without adverting to the facts and cause shown. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. No doubt, in the very nature of the governmental functioning the decision is not taken by an individual and the matters are processed at various levels but if in such processing, there is any delay, it is for the Government to explain such delay sufficiently setting out the specific facts where the matter was held up which resulted in delay. However, on 5 caf3096-11.doc general, vague and ambiguous averments that the appellant is the State and because of the rush of the administrative work and other pre-occupations the appeal could not be filed within time, by no stretch could be accepted as sufficient cause. The Court ought to bear in mind that a very valuable right is secured to the successful litigant on expiration of limitation and this right should not be casually disturbed and that applicant is not entitled to condonation of delay as a matter of right. The applicant, before it can seek condonation of delay and invoke discretion of the Court must show that there was no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides on its part.” 7. In the above mentioned facts and circumstances, Civil Application preferred by original defendants for condonation of delay is rejected. 8. Civil Application is disposed of accordingly. (K.K.TATED,J.)