THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.KANTHA RAO CRL. PETITION No. 2272 of 2008 ORDER: This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash the complaint petition in C.C.No. 235 of 2000 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karimnagar in so far as the petitioner herein is concerned. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. The petitioner is A.9 in C.C.No. 235 of 2000 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karimnagar. The 1st respondent a resident of Karimnagar filed a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. seeking to punish the petitioner herein and other accused for the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act, which was taken on file and registered as C.C.No. 235 of 2000. The case of the 1st respondent is that he joined in a chit run by A.2 and that A.1 is looking after the affairs of the chit fund company and that the petitioner is one of the Directors of the Company. Further case of the 1st respondent is that A.1 issued three cheques to him after completion of chit period and when he presented the said cheques for collection of the amount, the same were dishonoured and after issuing a legal notice demanding the accused to pay the amount covered by the cheques in question, he filed a private complaint before the learned Magistrate against A.1 toA.10 for the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/A.9 submits that since no role is attributed to the petitioner in the matter of issuing the cheques in question except stating that he is one of the Directors of the Chit Fund Company, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act. His argument is that unless a specific allegation is made in the complaint petition that the petitioner is in charge of the affairs of the Chit Fund Company and he was responsible for issuing the cheques in question, the complaint is not maintainable against him. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd., vs. Neeta Bhalla [1] wherein the Supreme Court held as under: “…there is almost unanimous judicial opinion that necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a person can be subjected to a criminal process. A liability under Section 141 of the Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a company, the principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable. Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making a person liable under the said provision. That the respondent falls within the parameters of Section 141 has to be spelled out. A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the first instance on the basis of averments contained therein. If the Magistrate is satisfied that there are averments which bring the case within Section 141, he would issue the process. We have seen that merely being described as a director in a company is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 141. Even a non-director can be liable under Section 141 of the Act. The averments in the complaint also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case which is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.” The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in Saroj Kumar Poddar vs. State 2[2] wherein the Supreme Court following the ration in above decision (1st supra) held as under: “Section 141 raises a legal fiction. By reason of the said provision, a person although is not personally liable for commission of such an offence would be vicariously liable therefore. Such vicarious liability can be inferred so far as a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is concerned only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint petition, are made so as to make the accused therein vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company. Before a person can be made vicariously liable, strict compliance with the statutory requirements would be insisted.” From the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited decisions, it is clear that unless some specific allegation is made against an accused in the complaint petition stating that he is directly or indirectly concerned with the affairs of the company and was responsible for the issuance of the cheques dishonoured, no criminal liability can be fastened against him and a mere statement that he is one of the Directors of the Company is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 141 of the N.I. Act. In the instant case, as already pointed out, the 1st respondent in his complaint petition except stating that the petitioner is one of the Directors of the Chit Fund Company made no specific allegation against him as the person looking after the affairs of the company and was responsible for issuing the cheques in question. In the absence of any such allegation, the 1st respondent cannot prosecute the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act. For the foregoing reasons, the complaint petition in C.C.No. 235 of 2000 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karimnagar in so far as the petitioner/A.9 is concerned is quashed. The criminal petition is accordingly allowed. ______________________ R.KANTHA RAO,J 17.06.2010. krb. THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.KANTHA RAO CRL. PETITION No. 2272 of 2008 Dt. 17.06.2010. [1] (2005) 8 SCC 89. [2] (2007)3 SCC 693