IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN Present HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1628 of 2011 Between: Lal Mohammed & another .. Petitioners AND The Secretary, Agricultural Market Committee, Kalwakurthy & 3 others .. Respondents The Court made the following: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1628 of 2011 ORDER: The Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order in I.A.No.226 of 2011 in O.S.No.48 of 2007, on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar, dated 25.03.2011. 2. The defendants 1 to 4 in O.S.No.48 of 2007 filed I.A.No.226 of 2011 for receiving documents filed along with the petition under Order VIII Rule 1A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “C.P.C”), after condoning the delay in filing them. The affidavit in support of the petition by the Tahsildar, Kalwakurthy, Mahabubnagar, only stated about the documents which were not filed along with the written statement being very essential to decide the case and in view of their relevance to the adjudication of the matter in a proper way, he requested that the documents be received. The plaintiffs opposed the request primarily stating that the defendants did not explain the reasons for the delay in filing the documents and the trial Court, in the impugned order referring to a decision of this Court, considered that it is obligatory on the part of the defendants to explain the reasons for the delay that occurred in filing the documents. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, but the trial Court still left it open to the defendants to come up with an appropriate application, if so advised, giving reasons for the delay that occurred in filing the documents to enable the Court to examine the issue. It is that observation of the Court giving such liberty that led the plaintiffs to file the present revision petition contending that the trial Court was not vested with any such jurisdiction to leave it open to the defendants to file another application to fill up the lacuna in the earlier application. 3. Sri P. Yadgir Rao, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Sri K. Upender Reddy, learned counsel for the first respondent and Sri M. Kanaka Raju, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 2 to 4 are heard. 4. The point for consideration is whether the liberty given by the trial Court to the defendants to make another application for the same purpose, if they are so advised, is permissible. 5. It is true that in UNION OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, (FORMERLY MINISTRY OF DISINVESTMENT), REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, NEW DELHI VS. Y.S. HI-TECH SECURE PRINT PVT. LTD.[1], the learned Judge laid down that in the absence of any reason assigned by the defendant as to why they could not file the documents along with the written statement in their affidavit in support of the application, the refusal to grant leave to receive the documents by condoning the delay was just and right. It is also true that in RAVI SATISH VS. EDALA DURGA PRASAD [2009 3 ALT 236], another learned Judge held that leave sought for can only be granted on adequate reasons being furnished justifying the failure of the obligation in not filing the documents along with the written statement earlier. 6. However, the question herein is not the absence of justification for the defendants specified in the affidavit of the Tahsildar, Kalwakurthy, Mahabubnagar, for not filing the documents earlier, but the liberty given by the Court to the defendants to come up with an appropriate application, if so advised, giving reasons for the delay. The nature of various interlocutory orders has been considered by the Apex Court in the celebrated decision reported in ARJUN SINGH VS. MOHINDRA KUMAR AND OTHERS[2] and the Apex Court held that interlocutory orders are of various kinds and some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. The Apex Court opined that such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. The Apex Court also referred to other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category which are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they did not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation, but the principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not, however, necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. Thus, if an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred on the application of any rule of res judicata, but would be rejected for the same grounds on which the original application was refused. If the principle of res judicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issue, whereas in the other case, on proof of fresh facts, the Court would be competent, nay would be bound to take those into account and make an order conformably to the facts freshly brought before the Court. 7. Whether the present interlocutory order falls under the first category or the second category of interlocutory orders referred to by the Apex Court is for determination by the trial Court and the grievance of the revision petitioners is only about the trial Court again giving an opportunity to the defendants to file a fresh application giving the reasons for the delay to enable the Court to examine the issue. It will be suffice to clarify that if any such application were to be filed by the defendants because of the liberty given by the Court in the impugned order, the Court has not only to examine whether the delay in filing the documents was adequately and satisfactorily explained as to persuade the Court to exercise its judicial discretion in favour of receiving the documents but also examine whether such consideration of the grounds for delay is permissible in the light of the interlocutory orders already passed earlier in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the decision above referred to and various other precedents on this aspect of this Court and the Apex Court. 8. Subject to said directions to the trial Court to consider not only the grounds for the delay in filing the documents, but also the maintainability of a second application for the purpose in the light of the impugned order and dispose of the said application in accordance with law if such an application were to be made, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of without costs. ______________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 12th August, 2011 KL HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1628 of 2011 Date: 12th August, 2011 KL [1] 2010 (3) ALT 104 [2] AIR 1964 SUPREME COURT 993