FAO No. 5328 of 2005 1 IN THE PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AT CHANDIGARH FAO No. 5328 of 2005 Date of Decision : 29.1.2010 Mithlesh & others .......... Appellants Versus Satbir Singh & others ...... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD K. SHARMA Present : Mr. N.K. Malhotra, Advocate for the appellants. Mr. Inderjit Sharma, Advocate for respondent No. 3. **** VINOD K. SHARMA, J. This appeal by the claimants is directed against the award dated 20.01.2005, passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtak, (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”), vide which the claim petition filed by the claimant / appellants under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), stands dismissed as not maintainable. The appellant / claimants claimed compensation on account of death of Mahipal in a motor vehicular accident under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was claimed by the claimants that at the time of death deceased was 40 years of age, and used to earn around Rs. 18,000/- (Rupees eighteen thousand only) per month from the agriculture and dairy farming. FAO No. 5328 of 2005 2 Keeping in view the stand taken by the appellant / claimants the income of deceased was Rs. 18,000/-(Rupees eighteen thousand only) per month, the learned Tribunal held that the claim Petition under Section 163- A of the Act was not competent. The learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition, in view of the fact, that Section 163-A of the Act is a special provision for particular class of persons, whose income is Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) per annum. The person with higher income cannot scale down his income to claim benefit under Section 163-A of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended, that the Hon'ble High Court of Gauhati, Aizawl Bench, in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. B.L. Rochhunga and another 2009 ACJ 2139, held that a person drawing higher income than Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) per annum can also maintain a petition under Section 163-A of the Act. However, reading of the judgment shows that it goes against the appellant as the Hon'ble High Court of Gauhati, Aizawl Bench, in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. B.L. Rochhunga and another (supra) relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it was held as under :- “(67) We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala's case, 2001 ACJ 827 (SC), has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes provisions of section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct FAO No. 5328 of 2005 3 scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All the other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.” 11. The legal position stood thus, the above submissions of the appellant's counsel becomes untenable and it can safely be held that no error of law was committed by the learned Tribunal in entertaining the claim petition and awarding compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act although claimant's annual income is more than Rs. 40,000/-” The reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court At Ahmedabad in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. P. Saguna and another 2009 ACJ 1733. The reliance on this judgment is misconceived, as the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court did not consider the question whether a person having higher income than Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) per annum could claim compensation under Section 163-A of the Act. The Hon'ble Full Bench of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Guruanna Vadi and another Vs. The General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and another, 2001(3) RCR (Civil) 693 has been pleased to lay down as under: “33. Question No. 4 : The Legislature intended to extend the benefit of this provision to a chosen class of persons. The intention to limit it to a certain class is exemplified in the Schedule appended to the statute. The schedule forms part of the statute and it often gives the details and FAO No. 5328 of 2005 4 forms for working out the policy underlying the statute. The division of a statute into section and Schedules is a mere matter of convenience and the Schedule, therefore, has to be treated as a substantive enactment which, sometimes, may even go beyond the scope of a section to which the schedule is appended. The Second Schedule limits the operation of the section to a limited class of persons whose income is Rs.40,000/- or less per annum. The prescription of the outer limit of Rs.40,000/- under the Schedule does not take away the right of the person to claim compensation under any other provision of the Act. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to provide the luxury of choice to persons whose income does not exceed Rs.40,000/- in order to obviate the need for such persons to involve themselves in a long drawn litigation, the cost and consequences of which may work to their disadvantage and ultimate failure of justice. Such a beneficial provision which is more in the nature of advancement of social justice, keeping in view a select class of citizens, cannot be construed by Courts as applicable to all class of citizens. But, in case the person with the higher income notionally brings down his income to Rs.40,000/- in order to present his claim under Section 163-A the same can be permitted. 34. It is one of the principles of FAO No. 5328 of 2005 5 statutory interpretation that what was not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by Courts. To do so will amount to legislating which is not the function of the Courts. T hat it would be more logical to enlarge the application of a provision to all class of citizens by itself would be no ground for the Courts to read something into a provision not intended by the Legislature as it would amount to usurpation of the legislative function under disguise of interpretation.” In view of settled law, and from bare reading of Section 163-A of the Act, no fault can be found with the award passed by the learned Tribunal. No merit. Dismissed. 29.1.2010 ( VINOD K. SHARMA ) 'sp' JUDGE