THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO SECOND APPEAL No.14 of 1995 JUDGMENT: The defendant No.2 is the appellant. These proceedings arise out of a suit filed by the respondent- plaintiff claiming for partition, which has been filed in forma pauperis as an indigent person represented through a next friend claiming partition of schedule ‘A’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ properties. The claim of the plaintiff is for dividing the properties into 3 shares and for allotment of one such share to him and also for future mesne profits. It rests on the basis that he is the member of the Joint Hindu Family and the properties in plaint ‘A’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule are the joint family properties. The contest is only made by the defendants 1 and 2, whereas the defendant No.3 remained ex parte. In the written statement, the defence is that the suit schedule properties are the absolute properties of the 1st defendant and do not form part of the Joint Hindu Family nor constitute as Joint Family properties and therefore no claim can be made by the plaintiff. With these and other allegations as contained in respect of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is born to Venkata Lakshmamma? If so, whether there is no access between the next friend and 1st defendant prior to the birth of plaintiff? 2. Whether the gift deed dated 15-7-1983 by 1st defendant in favour of 2nd defendant is true, valid and binding on plaintiff? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share? If so, to what share? 4. To what future profits plaintiff is entitled to? 5. To what relief plaintiff is entitled to? With the above issues, the parties went into trial. The plaintiffs examined PWs.1 to 6 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5 and defendants examined DWs.1 to 8 and marked Exs.B.1 to B.6 and Ex.X1. On a consideration of the aforementioned material, the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff was not born to PW.1 and not through 1st defendant since the 1st defendant had no access with PW.1. Further, it held that gift deeds are true, valid and binding upon the plaintiff, and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any share. On further appeal, the lower appellate Court framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff-1st appellant was born to P.W.1 through the 1st defendant-1st respondent? 2. Whether the two gift deeds dated 15-7-1983 and 6-8-1983 executed by the 1st defendant- 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd defendant- 2nd respondent are valid and binding on the plaintiff-1st appellant? 3. Whether the plaintiff-1st appellant is entitled for the reliefs of partition and future profits? The lower appellate Court upon considering the submissions from both sides and the points as framed for consideration reversed the findings of the trial Court and allowed the appeal. While so, it was found that the 1st plaintiff was born to PW.1 through 1st defendant, and accordingly decreed the claim for partition. Further, it also held that the gift deeds pleaded in ExsB.2 and B.3 are not valid and binding on the plaintiff. Accordingly, a preliminary decree was passed for division of the plaint ‘A’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties into 3 shares and allotting one such share to the plaintiff. Hence, this appeal. Though, the counsel on either side submitted at length on various aspects, especially, concentrating on the issue of parentage of the plaintiff and the validity of the gift deed, this appeal being one arising under Section 100, necessarily it is to be seen whether any substantial question of law arises. Coming to the aforesaid twin factual aspects, there cannot be any doubt nor there is any dispute to the principle that this constitutes a finding of fact. Therefore, there could not possibly any re- appreciation of the evidence or to come to any different conclusion since the lower appellate Court is a last resort for embarking on the facts or to give a finding thereon. Therefore, it necessarily follows that this Court could not venture to go into once again for re-appreciation nor does it find to come to any different conclusion since nothing as such has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant to show that the said finding arrived at by the appellate Court is in any way perverse. Much canvassing also sought to be done in regard to the very factum of access of PW.1 with DW.1. However, there are all again the matter for enquiry into the facts rather than basing upon any question of law, much less a substantial one. As already held by the apex Court in Kamti Devi V. Poshi Ram [1], while considering the scope of Section 100, which is as follows: “Finding of fact- Father disputing paternity of child born during wedlock – Finding reached by appellate Court on evidence that plaintiff-husband had no opportunity whatsoever to have liaison with the defendant mother for more than 280 days before child was begotten –Cannot be interfered with in second appeal as no substantial question of law would have followed out of such a finding.” In view of the above principles, this Court refrains from peeping into the relevant evidence from both sides or to make any attempt to re-appreciate. Hence, there are no merits nor any question of law, much less a substantial one arises in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ___________________ (B.PRAKASH RAO, J) grk Date: 15 -04-2011 [1] AIR 2001 SC 2226