I , 37# % 24.02.2010 Present : Mr. Rajiv Shukla for the petitioner. Mr. R.C. Chawla for the respondent. +CM. No. 2402/2010 in WP(C) No. 1148/201Q * Allowed subject to all just exceptions. WP(C) No. 1148/2010 By this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 28.1.2010 passed by the respondent no.l. The petitioner also seeks directions to direct the respondent tribunal not to insist upon the petitioner to deposit 25% of the assessed amount or any amount in the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 14-B of the Employees' Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has filed appeal under Section 7-1 challenging the order passed under Section 14-B of the said Act, and therefore, no directions could have been given by the appellate tribunal to the petitioner to deposit any amount as a condition for entertaining the appeal. Counsel further submits that in fact the appellate tribunal has Digitally Signed By:AMULYA Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. Signature Not Verified :ry already directed notice on the appeal but still has imposed the condition of pre-deposit of 25% of the amount of the damages. In support of his arguments counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of this court in M/s. Old Village Industries Ltd. Vs. The Asstt. Provident Fund Commissioner Employees Provident Fund Organization & Anr., 115{2004) DLT 510. Mr. R.C. Chawla counsel for respondents appears on advance notice. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Since this court in the aforesaid judgment has already taken a view that pre-deposit can be directed only when an appeal is filed under Section 7-A of the Act and not where challenge has been made against an order passed under Section 14-B of the said Act. It would be relevant to produce the relevant para from the said judgment as under: "The power to waive or reduce the amount to be deposited is relatively to the amount determined by the Officer under Section 7 A of the Act. In other words the pre-requisite of deposit of 75% of the demanded amount applicable to an order passed under Section 7 A and not to other provisions. The Legislature in its own wisdom has restricted the application of the provisions of Section 8(1) to the order passed under Section 7 A. Such provisions are to be construed strictly and cannot be given a wider meaning so as to create a liability which is intended to be correct to the entertainment of an appeal. The liability to deposit arises in the situation strictly contemplated under the provisions of this section. There is nothing in the section so as to extend its application to an order passed under Section 148 of the Act. An employer has a right to prefer an appeal against an order under Section 148, under Section 7(1) of the Act but the pre-condition of deposit for entertainment of such an appeal is not covered under Section 7-0 of the Act. Thus, I have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the respondents that it would be mandatory for the employer to deposit 75% of such amount before appeal can be entertained or even that there cannot be stay of recovery of the said amount by the Appellate Authority. The argument raised on behalf of the respondents would be untenable even for another reason that damage is the consequence of the demand raised under Section 7 A of the Act. The provisions of Section 148 of the Act attracted only if there is default on the part of the employer. · It being a consequential liability essentially must fall in the category of not the principal liability to attract stringent provisions of pre-deposit to the hearing of the appeal. Such provisions being related to revenue would be construed strictly whether to the advantage or disadvantage of the person upon whom the liability is sought to be fastened. Once the provisions of Section 7-0 does not include j an appeal against an order under Section 148 then it would be in no way permissible to include such an order by implication or otherwise." In the light of the aforesaid legal position, it is quite manifest that the order passed by the learned appellate tribunal directing the petitioner to deposit 25% of the assessed amount is ex-facie illegal. The said direction in the impugned order is accordingly set aside. With these directions, the petition stands disposed of. DASTI. FEBRUARY 24, 2010 mg KAILASH GAMBHIR,J i/ --...!,