IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE APPELLATE SIDE APPELLATE SIDE WRIT PETITION NO. 4184 OF 1993 WRIT PETITION NO. 4184 OF 1993 WRIT PETITION NO. 4184 OF 1993 Maharashtra State Farming Corporation, Pune. ... Petitioner. V/s. 1. Babulal Waman Wani. 2. Sau Shantabai Babulal Wani. 3. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malegaon. 4. State of Maharashtra. 5. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. ... Respondents. P.L.Naik for the petitioner. Sumit Khaire holding for P.N.Joshi for respondent Nos.1 and 2. S.D.Rayrikar, AGP for respondent Nos.3 and 4. CORAM: V.C.DAGA, J. CORAM: V.C.DAGA, J. CORAM: V.C.DAGA, J. DATED: 15th January 2009. DATED: 15th January 2009. DATED: 15th January 2009. JUDGMENT : JUDGMENT : JUDGMENT : -------- -------- -------- . This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 9th October, 1992 passed by the Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal ("MRT" for short) in Appeal No.ALC.A2 of 1992, whereby appeal was allowed and the order dated 31st March, 1992 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malegaon in Case No.Tenancy/Washi/887/888/91 came to be set aside. The Facts : The Facts : The Facts : --------- --------- --------- 2. The factual matrix surfaced is that the petitioner is Maharashtra State Farming Corporation, a Government company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner had leased to respondent Nos.1 and 2 some of their lands situated at Ravalgaon admeasuring 19 acres 14 gunthas and 12 acres 23 gunthas respectively through Ravalgaon Sugar Factory at Ravalgaon. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 said to be the husband and wife stayed together at Ravalgaon. The names of respondent Nos.1 and 2 are shown in the ration card along with other members of the family, which demonstrates that both of them were and are staying together. 3. According to the petitioner, after coming into operation of the Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 ("Ceiling Act" for short), somewhere in the year 1963, certain lands held by Ravalgaon Sugar Factor including the land belonging to respondent Nos.1 and 2 were declared surplus under the provisions of the said Act. 4. It appears that the State Government framed - 3 - scheme to allot certain area admeasuring 4 acres 20 gunthas of land to the original owners whose lands were given to Ravalgaon Sugar Factory under the provision of section 28-1AA of the Ceiling Act. The said scheme was adopted in the year 1970 and the applications were required to be made to the Special Deputy Collector, Ravalgaon for allotment of lands. The respondent Nos.1 and 2, who constituted one family as defined in section 4 of the Ceiling Act appear to have individually and separately applied for allotment of lands on the basis of vague representation that they are separated and should be treated as separate units. It appears that two units were released in their favour. 5. Having noticed the fact that two separate units were allotted in favour of the respondent Nos.1 and 2, petitioner made representation to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malegaon Division, Malegaon to enquire into the matter. The Sub-Divisional Officer gave fresh opportunity of hearing to respondent Nos.1 and 2 and vide his order dated 31st March, 1992, withdrew one unit holding that they are husband and wife living together and directed them to return one unit to the petitioner. - 4 - 6. The aforesaid order dated 31st March, 1992 was challenged by respondent Nos.1 and 2 in appeal filed before the MRT. As stated earlier, the MRT vide order dated 9th October, 1992 allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 31st March, 1992 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malegaon. The said order is subject matter of challenge in this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. Submissions : Submissions : Submissions : ----------- ----------- ----------- 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order suffers from illegality on three counts. Firstly, it is in breach of principles of natural justice since no hearing was given to the petitioner by the MRT. Secondly, the appeal itself was not maintainable under section 33 of the Ceiling Act as the order impugned in the appeal itself was not referable to any of the clauses mentioned in section 33 of the said Act. Thirdly, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 did not produce any evidence on record to show that there was legal divorce between them. In these circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is without jurisdiction; bad ab initio void - 5 - being in breach of principles of natural justice and that the appeal was not tenable before MRT. On merits he submits that for want of evidence, the MRT could not have allowed the appeal. 8. The learned A.G.P. appearing for the State could not refute either of the submissions made by the petitioner. On the contrary he supported the contentions of the petitioner. 9. So far as respondent Nos.1 and 2 are concerned, Mr.P.N.Joshi, Advocate appearing for them is not present. The advocate holding for Mr.Joshi sought for adjournment which was refused since this petition is pending in this Court past more than 16 years. The engagement of advocate in another Court cannot be a ground for grant of adjournment. No return is filed in the petition except affidavit dated 15th March, 1994; wherein the contentions raised by the petitioner are not dealt with. In his view of the matter, I have no option but to decide this petition on the basis of material available on record. Consideration : Consideration : Consideration : ------------- ------------- ------------- 10. Having heard learned counsel for the - 6 - petitioner, if one turns to section 33 of the Ceiling Act which provides for appeal against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer to the MRT, one would find that the order impugned in the appeal does not fall in any of the clauses of section 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner is, thus, justified in contending that the appeal was not maintainable before the MRT. From the order it is clear that the petitioner (respondent No.3 therein) was not present before the MRT, since it had no notice of hearing. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly in breach of principles of natural justice, hence ab initio void. Assuming that the appeal was maintainable, even then the findings recorded by the MRT are not based on any evidence. There is no material on record to suggest that there was legal divorce between respondent Nos.1 and 2. In these circumstances, the findings recorded by the MRT are unsustainable. 11. In the result, petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (b) and (c) with no order as to costs. - 7 - (V.C.DAGA, J.) (V.C.DAGA, J.) (V.C.DAGA, J.)