1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No. 48 of 2003 Date of decision: 03.06.2008 ____________________________________________________________ Shashi Paul Sharma. Appellant. -vs- Hon’ble High Court of H.P. and others. Respondents. _______________________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh, J. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh, J. Whether approved for reporting1? No. For the appellant : Mr. K.D. Sood, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, Advocate, for respondent No.1. _________________________________________________________ Surjit Singh, J. (oral) Heard and gone through the record. This appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge, whereby writ petition, filed by the appellant, seeking quashing of his termination order dated 27-11-1991, Annexure-P8, has been dismissed on the ground that the same is not maintainable, on account of earlier writ petition No. 900 of 1992 seeking grant of the same prayer, on the same grounds having already been dismissed. Appellant was employed as a Clerk in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Hamirpur. A case of theft was registered against him. He was sent up for trial. Trial Court acquitted him of the charge. During the pendency of the trial, appellant had been placed under suspension. After the verdict of his acquittal, he was re-instated. However, some time after re-instatement, his services were terminated, under rule 5 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. That Whether reporters of the Local papers are allowed to see the judgment? 2 order was challenged by filing writ petition No. 900 of 1992 which was dismissed in limini vide order dated 2-4-1993. That order was not challenged by filing any appeal or by filing S.L.P. in the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Order of acquittal in the theft case passed in favour of the appellant by the trial Court was challenged in appeal in this Court. This Court dismissed the appeal against the order of acquittal, vide judgment dated 12-9-1995. After that, appellant made a representation to the District and Sessions Judge seeking the revocation of order of his termination dated 27-11- 1991 (Annexure-P8). That representation was rejected. Then the appellant filed writ petition No. 1906 of 1996 which has been dismissed by the impugned order by the learned Single Judge, on the ground that a writ petition founded on the same grounds and seeking the same relief having already been dismissed, the second writ petition is not maintainable. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. We see no merit in the present appeal in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and another –v- Labh Chand (1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 495. Para 20 of the Report, which is reproduced herein below, lays down that subsequent writ petition should not be entertained by the same Court when the grounds, on which the relief is sought, are the same and the relief sought is also the same and there is no additional ground: “20. When a Judge of Single-Judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by 3 another Single-Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non- availing of alternative remedy. Second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the learned Single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognized power. Besides, if a learned Single Judge could entertain a second writ petition of a person respecting a matter on which his first writ petition was dismissed in limine by another learned Single Judge or a Division Bench of the same court, it would encourage an unsuccessful writ petitioner to go on filing writ petition after writ petition in the same matter in the same High Court, and have it brought up for consideration before one Judge after another. Such a thing, if is allowed to happen, it could result in giving full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in that any other of any Bench of such court refusing to entertain a writ petition could be ignored by him with impunity and relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh writ petition. This would lead only to introduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court and there could be no finality for an order of the court refusing to entertain a writ petition. It is why, the rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second writ petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject- matter respecting which the first writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same court even if the order of such dismissal was in limine, bt it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non- 4 exhaustation of alternative remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as salutary rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of courts”. Learned counsel submits that in the present case, there is an additional ground because representation made by the appellant after affirmation of his acquittal by the Hon’ble High Court on account of dismissal of appeal against acquittal, had been dismissed by the District and Sessions Judge without application of mind. The submission is fallacious. What has been challenged in the present case and what had been challenged in the earlier writ petition is the same thing, i.e, the order of termination dated 27-11-1991 Annexure-P8. Once the appellant had availed judicial remedy by filing the earlier writ petition against the aforesaid order of termination of his service, the dismissal of his subsequent representation was of little consequence. Also we do find that there was nexus between the filing of the appeal against acquittal of the appellant and the order of his termination Exhibit-P8. For the foregoing reasons, we see no merit in the present appeal. The same is therefore dismissed. (Surjit Singh) Judge. (Surinder Singh) Judge. June 3, 2008. (bm) 5 6