Crl.A. 171/2004 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B.K. SHARMA Amitava Roy, J Heard Mr. M.H. Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Z. Kamar, learne d Public Prosecutor, Assam. The instant appeal is against the judgment and order dated 08.06.2004 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar in Sessions Case No.36/03 convicting the a ppellant U/s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer R.I. for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to undergo S.I. for another thr ee months. By order dated 20.12.2004 passed by this Court in MC No.266/2004, the appellant, meanwhile has been released on bail. The order inter alia records the appellan t’s date of birth to be 31.12.1984, meaning thereby that on the date of the alle ged occurrence i.e. 06.03.2002 he was aged 17 years 2 months. In other words, i n terms of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 the appellant on the date of alleged occurrence was a juvenile as defined in Section 2(K) thereof. In the above factual premise, the learned counsel for the appell ant has submitted that the conviction and sentence recorded in the impugned judg ment and order ought to be interfered with and he should be set at liberty for a ll intents and purposes. In support of his contentions, Mr. Ahmed has placed re liance on the decision of the Apex Court in DHARAMBIR Versus STATE (NCT OF DELHI ) AND ANOTHER (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 344. Mr. Kamar with reference to Section 7(A) of the Act has submitted that having re gard to the fact that the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the alleged oc currence he ought to be forwarded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board b y interfering only with the sentence awarded to him by the learned trial Court. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on a consideration of the f acts and circumstances of the case and more particularly the undisputed fact of juvenility of the appellant on the date of the alleged occurrence i.e. 06.03.200 2, we are of the view that the course as suggested on behalf of the prosecution ought to be accepted. This in fact, appears to be the mandate of Section 7(A) 2 of the Act as well. It is submitted at the Bar that the appellant, meanwhile had been in jail in all for a period little over nine months. Section 15(1) of the Act enjoins that a Juvenile Justice Board if satisfied on a n inquiry that the juvenile has committed an offence, then notwithstanding anyth ing to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, it m ay, if it so thinks fit amongst others make an order directing the juvenile to b e sent to a special home for a period of three years. Liberty has also been gra nted to the Board, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstan ces of the case, to reduce the period of stay as it may think fit for reasons to be recorded. In our considered view as the appellant was admittedly a juvenile on the date of the alleged occurrence, the Sessions trial against him in which t he impugned judgment and order has been recorded is non est in law. Resultantly , the impugned judgment and order is also non existent. However, having regard to the mandate of the Act as contained in Section 7(A) & 15 thereof while interfering with the impugned judgment and order, we direct the appellant to present himself before the Juvenile Justice Board, Kokrajhar on 20 .07.2011 without fail. The Board on the appearance of the appellant would pass appropriate order(s) in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs.