IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR THURSDAY, THE 8TH JULY 2010 / 17TH ASHADHA 1932 WP(C).No. 19611 of 2010(B) -------------------------- PETITIONER(S): --------------- S.S.CHANDRA BOSE, S/O.K.K.CHANDU, AGED 34 YEARS, RESIDING AT 'HRIDYAM', VELOM PERUVAYAL P.O., KUTTIADY (VIA) KOZHIKODE DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.N.SHANOJ RESPONDENT(S): --------------- 1. THE CHAIRMAN, NAVY CHILDREN SCHOOL, NAVAL BASE, KOCHI-4. 2. VICE CHAIRMAN, NAVY CHILDREN SCHOOL, NAVAL BASE, KOCHI-4. 3. THE PRINCIPAL, NAVY CHILDREN SCHOOL, NAVAL BASE, KOCHI-4. 4. THE DIRECTOR, NAVY CHILDREN SCHOOL, NAVAL BASE, KOCHI-4. THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 08/07/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: C.T.RAVIKUMAR, J. ``````````````````````````````````````````````````````` W.P.(C) No. 19611 of 2010 B ``````````````````````````````````````````````````````` Dated this the 8th day of July, 2010 J U D G M E N T The petitioner was appointed in Navy Children School, Kochi as Art Education Teacher, admittedly, on contractual basis. The period of appointment was from 01-08-2009 to 15-05-2010. The grievance of the petitioner pertains to the action on the part of the respondents in not re-engaging him after the expiry of the aforesaid period of appointment. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that it was after a notification and a selection process consisted of written test and interview that he was appointed against such post. However, there is no contention for the petitioner that the notification pursuant to which he had submitted his application was one for regular appointment to the aforesaid post. Admittedly, it was only for an appointment on contractual basis. That apart, the period of appointment has already expired. Merely because in the case of certain other contractual workers they were re-engaged after the WPC.19611/2010 : 2 : expiry of their period of appointment, the petitioner cannot claim that he is also having a legal right to claim for continuance in service. Whether the management of the said school is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court is also not specifically averred in the writ petition. Whether the post against which the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis was a post sanctioned in terms of any statutory provision or sanctioned by any competent authority is also not evident from the averments made in this writ petition. The settled position is that in the absence of a legal right and a corresponding duty cast upon the authorities, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued. No statutory provision has been brought to my notice by the petitioner under which the petitioner can claim a legal right for continuance under the service of the respondents as an Art Education Teacher in the Navy Children School. Merely because the petitioner was engaged for a short span of period from 01-08-2009 to 15-05-2010 will not and cannot confer any right on him to claim continuity in service. That apart, as noticed hereinbefore, there is absolute absence of pleadings with respect to the maintainability of this writ petition. Even if it is taken as WPC.19611/2010 : 3 : maintainable, for argument sake, I do not find any reason to sustain the claim of the petitioner for the following reasons. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that even in the matter of contractual appointments, the authorities cannot act arbitrarily. To buttress the said contention the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Mahabir Auto Spares and others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation and others [AIR 1990 SC 1031] and M/s.Star Enterprises and others Vs. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and others [(1990) 3 SCC 280]. 4. On going through the facts of the case, I am of the considered view that the decisions thereunder are totally inapplicable to the facts of this case. In fact, in those cases the Hon'ble Apex Court was not dealing with any service related issues. The consequences of violation of contracts in the nature involved in those cases cannot be imported here in view of the facts of this case. As already noticed, the petitioner claims for continuance, rather, for re-engagement based on an appointment WPC.19611/2010 : 4 : on contractual basis for a short period ie., from 01-08-2009 to 15- 05-2010. Merely because the petitioner was given such an appointment for a short period, the respondents cannot be said to have a bounden duty to re-engage the petitioner. In the absence of any relevant provisions conferring such right, I am of the opinion that the conditions relating the very appointment of the petitioner on contractual basis would decide the fate of the petitioner. Admittedly, he had applied for an appointment on contractual basis and the term of appointment has already expired. In the circumstances, I find no merits in this writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed. (C.T.RAVIKUMAR, JUDGE) aks