: 1 : IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.5110 OF 1997 Shri Ganesh Parshuram Devrukhkar ... Petitioner V/s. The Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd.& Anr. ... Respondents Mr.R.S. Upadhyay for Petitioner Mr.V.P. Vaidya for Respondent No.1 CORAM: SMT.NISHITA MHATRE, J. DATED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 ORAL JUDGMENT: The petition challenges the order of the Industrial Court passed in revision. The Industrial Court has dismissed the complaint filed by the Petitioner while quashing and setting aside the order passed on 1.11.1996 by the Labour Court granting relief to the petitioner. 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was employed with Respondent No.1 from 10.6.1971. A strike was declared on 18.1.1982 in the Textile Mills in the city of Mumbai. The strike was declared illegal. According to the petitioner, he did not join the strike and instead corresponded with the respondent in order to resume duty. This correspondence ensued between : 2 : 1.3.1985 and 31.3.1987. The petitioner contends that he continued even thereafter to make representations to the respondent company so that he could join duty. However, since the petitioner's grievance was not redressed by the respondent company, he filed a complaint under the MRTU & PULP Act on 10.4.1993. This complaint was filed under Item 1(a), (b), (d), (e) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. The grievance of the petitioner in the complaint was that he was not on strike; that he reported for duty at the gate of the mill daily, however, he was not permitted to work as the respondent desired to victimise him. The Petitioner has also stated that no charge sheet was issued to him nor was any enquiry held. He further contended that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate and therefore, prayed that the order be set aside. 3. The written statement was filed by the employer contending that the Petitioner had failed to report for duty and that on or about 24.4.1982 his services had been terminated. The Respondents Company has also stated that since the strike was declared illegal, the Petitioner ought to have reported for work. It is pleaded that all the workmen were directed to report for work immediately after the strike was declared to be illegal. 4. The Labour Court has allowed the complaint by observing that the Respondent Company had committed an unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. It further concluded that there was : 3 : insufficient evidence to prove that the services of the workman had been terminated in violation of the principles of law and that the Respondent Company had committed unfair labour practices under Item 1(a), (b), (d), (e) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. 5. Being aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court holding that an unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act had been committed, the Respondents herein preferred a revision application No.170 of 1996. The revision application was allowed by the Industrial Court. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner takes exception to the order of the Industrial Court. He submits that the Court should not be impressed with hypertechnicalities while dealing with such matters if on facts there is material on record to indicate that an unfair labour practice has been committed by the employer. He submits that although there may not be any pleading in that behalf, the Court should not shut its eyes to the material on record which indicates that an unfair labour practice has been committed under item 1(f) of the Schedule IV. He relies on the judgment in the case of Manoj Shankar Salvi v/s. Special Steels Ltd. &Ors., 2000 III CLR 639, where a learned Single Judge of this Court had held that if a workman is discharged without holding a fair and proper enquiry, it would lead to the natural conclusion that the action had been taken not in good faith bu in colourable exercise of the employer's rights which in : 4 : turn would indicate victimisation of the workman. The learned counsel for the Respondents has pointed out that there are no pleadings whatsoever on the issue with respect to Item 1(f) and therefore, the Labour Court has erred in allowing the complaint and directing the Respondents to cease and desist from committing an unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) of schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. He has also submitted that the lack of pleadings cannot be substituted by evidence. He points out that it is now well settled that even in matters dealing with industrial jurisprudence there must be pleading on record before the Labour Court/Industrial tribunal can consider the evidence on record relatable to those pleadings. 7. On perusing the impugned order, I find that that the Industrial Court has committed no error in setting aside the order of the Labour Court. The Industrial Court has observed that the learned counsel for the complainant i.e. the Petitioner herein had admitted that there were no pleadings on record in respect of an unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. The Industrial Court has rightly observed that the complaint must be a concise statement of material facts which constitute different unfair labour practices, the date of occurrence thereof and the name of the person who has committed the unfair labour practice. In my opinion, the Labour Court has without considering the pleadings on record held that the Respondents had committed an unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) of the Schedule IV of the : 5 : MRTU & PULP Act. It is trite that even in cases relating to industrial jurisprudence the evidence must be based on the pleadings on record. The evidence cannot be a substitute for the pleadings. This is more so in the case of a complaint under MRTU & PULP Act which is a rigorous statute involving penal consequences. The unfair labour practice complained of must be specifically stated in the complaint. When admittedly the pleadings on the unfair labour practice under item 1(f) are absent in the complaint, the Labour Court could not have declared that the Respondent Company has committed an unfair labour practice under that Item. 8. The judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner do not aid the Petitioners in any manner. These judgments were delivered in the facts and circumstances obtaining in those cases. The pleadings in those cases were specific and, therefore the Courts have granted relief to the workmen involved. In Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that a certain amount of discretion is vested with the Industrial Tribunal acting under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the Tribunal should not be unduly influenced by the academic questions of law. However, the Court has also observed that the Tribunal must attempt to deal with the merits of each case according to its facts and circumstances and that questions which are ancillary or which would necessarily arise for proper and complete adjudication would have to be dealt with by the Tribunal. The Division Bench while making these observations was : 6 : dealing with a matter in which a Reference was made for adjudication of an industrial dispute to the Tribunal. The employer had contended that there was no employer-employee relationship between itself and the workman. It is in these circumstances that the Court has made these observations. However, in the present case, there are no pleadings with respect to the unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) for this Court to apply the ratio in Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd.(supra). When the Petitioners had filed the complaint under Items 1(a), (b), (d), (e) and (g), he could not get any relief by contending now that an unfair labour practice under Item 1(f) had been committed, especially when the Labour Court has held that the Petitioner had been unable to establish his case under aforesaid items. 9. In my view, therefore, the order of the Labour Court cannot be sustained and has rightly been set aside by the Industrial Court. There is no need to interfere with the order of the Industrial Court. There is no perversity or error of law apparent on the face of the record in the impugned order requiring any interference by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 10. Rule discharged. No costs.