{ 1 } IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR J U D G M E N T D.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6963/2005 SECRETARY, I.C.A.R. & ORS. VS. SHRI SANCHAL BILGRAMI & ANR. Date of Judgment : 14.12.2010 PRESENT HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SAPRE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.M. TOTLA Mr. J.P. Joshi, for the petitioners. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, for the respondents. BY THE COURT: (PER HON'BLE A.M. SAPRE, J) This is a writ petition filed by the non-applicant of O.A.No 320/2004 against the order dt 30.8.2005 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal (for short hereinafter referred to as Tribunal) Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur in aforementioned O.A. 2. So the short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether Tribunal was justified in allowing the O.A. and in consequence was justified in quashing the charge sheet issued to the applicant (respondent herein) on the ground of delay. 3. Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. They, however, need mention in brief infra. 4. The writ petitioner (hereinafter for brevity called Institute) is a research Institute functioning under the { 2 } supervision of the Union of India – Ministry of Agriculture. The respondent was appointed in the year 1988 by the Institute on the post of what is called “F and AO and was then promoted as Accounts Officer and then as Sr Finance and Accounts Officer and posted at Shillong. 5. On 2.9.88, he was alleged to have issued one cheque for a sum of Rs.1,19,775 in favour of one Advocate against his professional bill for one case in Supreme Court. A further sum of Rs. 3,51,000 was alleged to have been released during the period when he was on leave by other employee. The respondent then paid an amount of Rs.3,71,000 further against one bill of Rs.5,37,000 to said lawyer for one case in Supreme Court. All these payment were made in the year 1988. 6. On 22.12.2004, the respondent was served with a charge sheet under Rule 14 of C.C.S (CCA) Rules 1965. The charge was in relation to the aforementioned payments sanctioned and released in favour of lawyer who conducted the case of Institute in Supreme Court as an Advocate on record. According to writ petitioner (Institute), the respondent while releasing the aforementioned payments failed to maintain absolute integrity and hence violated Rule 3(1) (ii) and (iii) of C.C.S. (conduct) Rules 1964. The grave men of charge was that he failed to properly verify/check the bills before releasing the payment thereby caused loss to the institution. It is this charge sheet which was sought to be impugned in the O.A. before the Tribunal by the respondent out of which this writ petition arise interalia on the ground that it was hopelessly delayed, having been issued almost after 16 years of the alleged incident. It was contended that such belated charge sheet be quashed at its threshold on the ground of delay. The Institute filed a reply and sought to { 3 } support the issuance of charge sheet on the ground that the matter was being pursued by the various authorities from time to time in last 16 years, including by C.B.I. and hence there is no delay in its issuing the charge sheet. The Institute then set out the dates to show as to how the issue was being taken up for processing by the department from time to time that eventually led to issuance of the charge sheet. 7. The Tribunal did not accept the stand taken by the Institute and while upholding the challenge made by the respondent quashed the charge sheet on the ground of delay. Placing reliance on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases reported in State of Punjab and others V. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570=1995(2) SLJ 126 (SC), State of A P V. N Radhakrishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154,], State of M.P Vs. Bani Singh and Another [1990(2) SLR 798.] and A R Antulay V. R S Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225], it was held that the law laid down in these cases fully applies to the facts of the case for quashing the charge sheet on the ground of inordinate delay. It is against this order; the Institute felt aggrieved and filed this writ petition. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner (Institute) while challenging the impugned order, contended that Tribunal erred in quashing the charge sheet on the ground of delay. It was contended that firstly, there was no delay and secondly even assuming that there was, then also it was explained by the Institute. It was thus contended that this Court should allow the writ petition and while setting aside of the impugned order dismiss the original application (O.A.) filed by the respondent herein and in consequence uphold the charge sheet for holding an inquiry under the rules. Learned counsel also placed reliance on two decisions reported in 1998 (9) SCC 135 and 1987 RLR 538. { 4 } 9. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent (applicant) contended that no case whatsoever is made out for interference in the impugned order of the Tribunal and therefore the writ petition should be dismissed. Learned counsel further placed reliance on the decisions that were relied on by the Tribunal, namely State of Punjab and others V. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570=1995(2) SLJ 126 (SC), State of A P V. N Radhakrishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154,], State of M.P Vs. Bani Singh and Another [1990(2) SLR 798.] and A R Antulay V. R S Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225]. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in this writ petition. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in its reasoning so also in conclusion while allowing the original application of the respondent and in consequence was right in quashing the charge sheet on the ground of delay. 11. Law on the point as to whether a charge sheet issued after a lapse of considerable time from the date of occurrence of misconduct can be set aside or not on the ground of delay and lashes by the Court/Tribunal remains no more res integra and stands decided by several decisions of the Supreme Court. The first case on this issue is reported in A.I.R. 1990 SC 1308 (State of M.P. vs. Bani Singh). It is in this case, the Supreme Court while quashing the charge sheet on the ground of delay laid down principals as to when and in which circumstances, the charge sheet can be quashed. This decision is being consistently followed by the Supreme Court in later years as is clear from the decisions reported in 2005 (6) SCC 36 and 2006(5) SCC86. This is what has been laid down in the case of Bani singh . “The appeal against the order dt. 16-12-1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not { 5 } have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The irregularities which were the subject - matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.” 12. Applying the aforementioned principal to the facts of this case, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge sheet on the ground of delay. Here is a case, where the delay is of 16 years. In the cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent including the one quoted supra, the delay was 12, years and in other cases it was between 5 to 10 years and the Supreme Court upheld the questioning of the charge sheet on the ground of delay. We, however, do not mean to suggest that only time period should be seen while quashing but it must { 6 } also be seen as to why delay was caused and whether there was sufficient cause to condone the delay in issuance of charge sheet. In other words, if the employer is able to satisfy with sufficient material on record as to why the delay was caused in issuance of charge sheet, then in such circumstances, the Court can ignore the delay and uphold the charge sheet for being probed on its merits. In this case, we have not been able to notice such facts though an attempt was made by the writ petitioner (employer) to point out. 13. As is clear from the charge leveled against the respondent, it was in relation to sanction/payment of money paid to one advocate on record against his bill raised in one case of the Institute pending in the Supreme Court. The amount was paid in the year 1988. This fact that payment was made in the year 1988 was within the knowledge of the writ petitioner (Institute) since inception. It being a Government Institute, it was also subjected to yearly audit and infact was subjected to audit 16 times from the date of payment till the issuance of charge sheet. There was, thus, no justification on the part of the writ petitioner to have waited for 16 years for issuance of charge sheet to respondent. It could have been done in the year 1988 itself or within reasonable time. 14. We do not agree to the submission of learned counsel for the writ petitioner when he contented that since the issue was taken up by C.B.I. and hence delay occurred. There is no merit in this submission. As observed supra, so far as writ petitioner was concerned, they had come to know of the alleged misconduct in the year 1988 itself and hence nothing prevented them from initiating the departmental proceedings immediately after the occurrence in the year 1988 or immediately thereafter. The investigation undertaken by the C.B.I. had nothing to do so far as departmental inquiry was { 7 } concerned, and the same could have been initiated regardless of any investigation undertaken by the C.B.I. 15. So far as two cases relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for writ petitioner are concerned, we have gone through the same and we find that they are distinguishable on facts. The facts of Bane Singh's case (supra) and other two relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent are more nearer to the facts of the present case and hence they were rightly relied upon by the Tribunal for quashing the charge sheet. 16. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner then argued that departmental inquiry was conducted during pendency of this writ petitioner as permitted by this Court by an interim order and even the report is now placed on record. It was thus his submission, that writ petitioner be now permitted to proceed with the inquiry and pass final orders. We find no merit in this submission. If any inquiry was conducted pending writ petition, then it would not take away the right of the respondent to prosecute the case because he has succeeded before the Tribunal in getting the charge sheet quashed. He has, therefore, every right to take the benefit of the order passed by the Tribunal in his favour. In this view of the matter, the issue relating to the delay in issuance of charge sheet continue to remain alive and can be gone into by this Court with a view to find out as to whether the Tribunal was right in quashing the charge sheet or not. Since, we have held that Tribunal was right in its reasoning and conclusion in quashing the charge sheet on the ground of delay, there was no need for holding any inquiry on the basis of delayed issuance of charge sheet and even if any Departmental Enquiry is held pending litigation, it would be of no consequence so far as respondents right to prosecute this case is concerned. { 8 } 17. In the light of foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this writ petition that fails and is dismissed. As a consequence, all interim orders passed in the writ petition are recalled. ( C.M. TOTLA),J. ( A. M. SAPRE ),J. /Anil/