IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE FIFTH DAY OF NOVEMBER, TWO THOUSAND EIGHT ONLY PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.19680 of 2000 Between: Pederla Sivarama Prasad … Petitioner AND Director of Settlements, A.P., Hyderabad & another. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioner : Sri D. Prakash Reddy Counsel for the respondents: GP for College Education This Court made the following: THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.19680 of 2000 ORDER:- This writ petition is ﬁled for a Writ of Prohibition against respondent No.1 restraining him from proceeding with RP.No.81 of 1982, as illegal and to declare that the said proceedings are barred under Section 64-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, ‘the Act’). There has been a longstanding dispute over Ac.6.53 cents of land in NTS.No.39 of Machavaram between the family of the petitioner and respondent No.2 College (for short, ‘the College’). The College was founded by the erstwhile Zamindar of Vuyyur - Nuzvid in memory of his father late Sri Raja Venkatadri Apparao Bahadur in July, 1937. The management of the College was taken over by the Government of Andhra Pradesh under G.O.Ms.No.1691, Education, dated 29.01.1958. Under gift deed dated 30.12.1966 the College committee transferred all the movable and immovable properties to the Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by Director of Public Instruction. The father of the petitioner approached the Settlement Oﬃcer under the provisions of the Act and obtained a rough patta in respect of the said land in the year 1968. The College ﬁled O.S.No.97 of 1973 on the ﬁle of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada (for short, ‘the Trial Court’) for recovery of possession of the property after evicting the petitioner’s father therefrom and for recovery of mesne proﬁts for use and occupation of the property. The case of the College is that in Fasli 1366 its Managing Committee leased out the property to the father of the petitioner for Rs.225/- under cowl deed dated 09.05.1956 for cultivation purpose, that the lessee admitted the title of the College in ATP.No.270 of 1957 ﬁled in the Estate Manager’s Court under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 and that the petitioner’s father managed to get a patta for the property by playing fraud, indulging in misrepresentation and suppression of facts. The College pleaded that the patta does not cloth the lessee with any title or interest in the property. The petitioner’s father resisted the suit. While denying the title of Raja of Vuyyur - Nuzvid, he pleaded that one Ghulam Mohiddin, in whose favour the land owner Azimtullah surrendered the rights over the said land, was the Inamdar and he came into the occupation and enjoyment of Ac.7.30 cents over which he acquired permanent rights of occupancy after Machavaram Estate was abolished in 1958 and that his status as cultivating tenant was recognized by the Government in February, 1959. Apart from other pleas, the defendant had set up title by adverse possession and raised objection to the maintainability of the suit itself. The Trial Court framed several issues including issue Nos.3 and 7 viz., whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and whether the defendant has perfected his title to the plaint scheduled property by adverse possession, respectively. As regards issue No.3, the Trial Court held that the issue regarding validity of grant of a rough patta is amenable for appeal under Section 56 (1) (c) of the Act, that without getting the patta cancelled by the appropriate authority by ﬁling such an appeal, a suit in a Civil Court does not lie and that consequently the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. It further held that the patta granted to the defendant under the provisions of the Act is binding on the plaintiﬀ and that the plaintiﬀ is not entitled to evict the defendant and seek relief of vacant possession. On issue No.7 the Trial Court held that the defendant perfected his title by adverse possession. The College ﬁled AS.No.1159 of 1979 against the said judgment in this Court. The said appeal was initially disposed of by this Court by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 12.08.1987. The learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal while agreeing with the conclusion of the Trial Court though not with its reasons, by holding that the question whether the rough patta obtained by the defendant is valid or not cannot be decided by the Civil Court and that it is the Settlement Oﬃcer, constituted under Section 56 of the Act, who should adjudicate the rights between the parties and decide among the rival claimants who is the lawful ryot. On that reasoning the learned Judge set aside the ﬁndings recorded by the Trial Court and directed the College to approach the Settlement Oﬃcer for obtaining ryotwari patta in respect of the land before seeking relief of possession against the petitioner. On a review ﬁled by the petitioner’s father, the said order was reviewed and the appeal was restored to ﬁle by order dated 08.03.1989. It was held in the said order that by the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamilnadu vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam[1], the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate on the real nature of the land is not ousted under the provisions of the Act and that the said judgment was obviously not brought to the notice of the learned Judge, who dismissed the appeal. After review, the appeal came to be disposed of on merits. In the judgment in the appeal, this Court observed as under: “Therefore, it follows that having issued the ryotwari patta, if the Government wants to cancel the ryotwari patta, the Government can do so only by following the provisions of Section 3(d) of the Act and following the procedure prescribed under the Rules made in G.O.Ms.No.1634. The suit is not a remedy for obtaining possession.” While observing that except vague allegation in the plaint, no material was placed on record either in the pleadings or in the evidence to substantiate the allegation that the defendant obtained the pattas by fraud or misrepresentation or suppression of facts, this Court held that the suit was not maintainable as framed by the College. While dealing with the point whether the Government is estopped from denying the title of the defendant, the learned Judge observed: “In the face of Exs.B2 and B3, rough pattas issued in favour of the defendant and in the absence of any steps taken by the Government to cancel the said pattas and to obtain possession from the defendant under due process of law, I ﬁnd on this point that the Government is estopped from denying the title of the defendant in the suit property.” On point No.3, which pertained to non-joinder of necessary parties, this Court observed that the relief of possession cannot be granted against the defendant unless the rough pattas are cancelled. The learned Judge, while obviously referring to order dated 12.08.2007 passed by this Court in the ﬁrst instance, dismissing the appeal with the observation that it was open to the College to seek redress before the Settlement Oﬃcer for grant of ryotwari patta, held that the direction given to the College to approach the revenue authorities for grant of a patta in respect of the suit property was quite redundant. Obviously, at the instance of the College, the case was posted “for being mentioned” and the judgment was modiﬁed and the learned Judge deleted the abovementioned observation as unnecessary. After dismissal of O.S.No.97 of 1973, the College ﬁled a revision petition under Section 5 (2) of the Act before respondent No.1 in October, 1980. Much after dismissal of AS.No.1159 of 1979 by this Court, the father of the petitioner ﬁled an application in the year 1994 requesting respondent No.1 to dismiss the revision petition itself in view of the ﬁndings rendered by the Civil Court and conﬁrmed by this Court. The petitioner’s father died on 16.11.1995 and later the petitioner was brought on record as the deceased’s legal representative in the year 2000. On receipt of ﬁnal notice dated 21.09.2000 ﬁxing 20.10.2000 for enquiry by respondent No.1, the petitioner ﬁled the present writ petition. At the hearing, Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that as the mater was already decided by the Civil Court, which was aﬃrmed by this Court, the same issue cannot be re-agitated before respondent No.1. Alternatively, he submitted that since the Civil Court gave a categorical ﬁnding that the petitioner’s father perfected his title by adverse possession, continuation of revision proceedings by respondent No.1 is a mere exercise in futility. Opposing these contentions, learned Government Pleader for College Education submitted that the suit ﬁled by the College was dismissed on the ground of its non-maintainability and therefore the College approached respondent No.1 by invoking the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act. He further submitted that undisputedly respondent No.1 is vested with the revisional jurisdiction to decide the validity of the rough patta granted in favour of the petitioner’s father and therefore the Writ of Prohibition cannot be maintained. He further submitted that the ﬁnding of the Civil Court on adverse possession while dismissing the suit as not maintainable is not sustainable and binding on respondent No.2. In support of his contention he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar Gupta vs. Rochiram Nagdeo[2]. I have given serious thought to the respective submissions of the learned counsel. I n M/s. East India Commercial Co., Ltd., Calcutta and another vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta[3] the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of Writ of Prohibition, held that a Writ of Prohibition is an order directed to an inferior Tribunal forbidding it from continuing with a proceeding therein on the ground that the proceeding is without or in excess of jurisdiction or contrary to the laws of the land, statutory or otherwise. In S. Govinda Menon vs. Union of India[4] the Supreme Court, while dealing with the nature of the jurisdiction to grant a Writ of Prohibition, held: “The jurisdiction for grant of a writ of prohibition is primarily supervisory and the object of that writ is to restrain Courts or inferior tribunals from exercising a jurisdiction which they do not possess at all or else to prevent them from exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the object is to conﬁne Courts or tribunals of inferior or limited jurisdiction within their bounds. The writ of prohibition lies not only for excess of jurisdiction or for absence of jurisdiction but also in a case of departure from the rules of natural justice. But the writ does not lie to correct the course, practice or procedure of an inferior tribunal or a wrong decision on the merits of the proceedings. The writ cannot be issued to a Court or an inferior tribunal for an error of law unless the error makes it go outside its jurisdiction. A clear distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the manner in which it is exercised. If there is want of jurisdiction then the matter is corum non judice and a writ of prohibition will lie to the Court or inferior tribunal forbidding it to continue proceedings therein in excess of jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added). In the present case there is no dispute on respondent No.1 having jurisdiction to entertain a revision and adjudicate on the validity of the rough patta granted in favour of the petitioner’s father. Indeed, that was the main premise on which O.S.No.81 of 1982 was dismissed. The said view was reiterated by this Court in the appeal by speciﬁcally observing that in the absence of any steps taken by the Government to cancel the pattas and to obtain possession from the defendant by following due process of law, the Government is estopped from denying the defendant’s title. The College was thus non-suited at the instance of the petitioner’s father by the Civil Court for seeking recovery of possession without questioning the validity of the rough patta. Following the dismissal of the suit, the College ﬁled the revision petition. Thus, having successfully got the suit ﬁled by the College dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability, it is not permissible for the petitioner to preempt the College’s right to avail the remedy of revision to get the validity of grant of rough patta adjudicated on merits. The scope of this Court’s jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Prohibition being limited to the cases of either inherent lack of jurisdiction or exercise of excessive jurisdiction, a writ of Prohibition cannot be issued against respondent No.1 by exercising the revisional jurisdiction admittedly vested in him. The learned Senior Counsel made strenuous eﬀorts to convince this Court that in the face of the categorical ﬁnding of the Civil Court on the question of adverse possession, continuation of revision proceedings is an exercise in futility. This contention, though appears attractive at the ﬁrst blush, is without merit on a deeper scrutiny. When once the jurisdiction of respondent No.1 is conceded, this Court will not further examine what will be the consequences of exercise of such jurisdiction. It would quite well be that eventually respondent No.1 may throw out the revision, in which case, the ﬁnding of the Civil Court on adverse possession may not assume any relevance at all. If the rough pattas granted in favour of the petitioner’s father are set aside and the College seeks to recover its possession from the petitioner, then only the ﬁnding on the adverse possession and the binding nature of such a ﬁnding will assume signiﬁcance. This is also the reason for me in not going into the contention of the learned Government Pleader that such a ﬁnding of the Civil Court given while dismissing the suit is not binding on the College, advanced based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pavan Kumar Gupta (2 supra). I n S.B. Dharma Reddy vs. The Director of Settlements, A.P., Hyderabad and another [5] this Court declined to issue a Writ of Prohibition to interdict the revisional authority from proceeding with the revision on the ground of long delay. By observing that it is for the revisional authority to consider the said plea while deciding the revision, the Court observed that the petitioner therein was faced only with a show cause notice and that he has every right to explain his case before the authority, which has issued the show cause notice including the question of time involved in the matter leading to the issue of show cause notice at a belated stage. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner argued that respondent No.1 being quasi-judicial authority had exceeded its jurisdiction in asking the College to bring the legal representatives of the deceased father of the petitioner on record. There cannot be any dispute that respondent No.1 certainly acted in excess of its jurisdiction by giving such a notice. Though this constitutes a serious procedural impropriety, I am not prepared to annul the revisional proceedings on this ground alone, because more than eight years had elapsed from that time and there would have been change in the incumbent of the oﬃce of respondent No.1. It is reasonable to presume that the succeeding oﬃcer will proceed with the case on merits in an unbiased manner and adjudicate the dispute strictly in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be free to raise all the legally sustainable objections before respondent No.1 including the issues such as the failure of respondent No.2 to ﬁle a statutory appeal under Section 56 (1) (c) of the Act and the long delay in questioning the validity of rough patta, as advanced by the learned Senior counsel in this writ petition. In the event of passing an adverse order, the petitioner shall be free to avail the appropriate legal remedy available to him to question such an order. For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. Since the dispute is pending for a substantially long time, respondent No.1 is directed to dispose of the revision as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As a sequel to dismissal of the writ petition, WPMP.Nos.24938 of 2000 and 21687 of 2006 are also dismissed. ____________________________ C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Date: 05.11.2008 ES [1] AIR 1986 SC 794 [2] (1999) 4 SCC 243 [3] AIR 1962 SC 1893 [4] AIR 1967 SC 1274 [5] 1989 (1) ALT 137