-t-- 53?-22??Ji^I^!.i!3l-S^E?^ -?I?S?. a^.?.^'- 3TT?-.Wi. asqm, ^r?r a-ft%T?t, grg^N rr^rrq mrfwr T'TTcfft'pa?' qr1to(3^ ?q ®Tq?Tf?ErrpI9, mR^, TtTe-- cfs^ ?g ftnT- rrw? SKoyog 1^95 qog'o OTgq, 5Trr-<rf^Et, 3-SI fttOT T^lTR, qmff vw, »fttrrd ^og'oj ^ fy^^s^^^L ;000 ... OT^? !2j ST^TO, J?g fttffT Wqy^?t, 5 ^r' ifl^pr, 8(g5T W:T, i^nn pfoyo^ g-Tqr'f, ffrsHft? rr^rreERTftqr rrr^t^cR' gTltoRzr ?q SeiT 3?STftgTpI!T, TTD^ TTW^ §flog"o aTr^wt ar^r yrrfcj urrr 19 TT""^ ysrrafw altCTTcr a'ftif^ra 1935. •8 arN;r$T ^it-g^ f4«w :- i.i ar^®$T l^wi - ^t rra<ftnT<ii W^T^, TO 56 q4 arw? yg^ftr crrng^ aggTpr, fft?r affyyr?^-, ?rrg^r q-T^nii y:n'1^!rT CTTwttw gTW^r??'WT KSTftRrre? rrw? jitog-o^ ... 2 r,':isa:S's!se''f!(-s HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR Sinflile Bench: Hon'ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. Writ Petition fSl No.3201/2005 PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS: R. L. Agrawal Versus State of M. P. and others FQR PRONOUNCMENT OF ORDER0N 2^> 4.201° Sd/- ManindraMohanShrivastava Judge c5) HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR Sinale Bench: Hon'ble Shri Manindra Mohan Shrivastava. J. WritPetition (S) No.3201/2005 PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS: R. L. Agrawal Versus State of M. P. and others Present: Shri V. K. Pandey, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Satish Gupte, Govt. Advocate for the State/respondents. ORDER (Passed on^April, 2010) This petition has been filed by the petitioner chaltenging the order dated 18-09-19^ (Annexure A-1) and 12-12-1990 (Annexure A-2). Petitioner's grievance is that by order impugned, though other Sports OfRcers were granted senior and selection grade pay scale, petitioner was illegally left out and the benefit of senior/selection grade pay scale was illegally withheld. However, he was entitled for grant of those pay scales from the date when other Sports OfRcers were granted by the impugned order dated 18-09-1989 (Annexure A-1) and 12-12-1990 (Annexure A-2), (2) Case of the petitioner is that petitioner was initially appointed as Physical Training Instructor (Sports Teacher) in Paluram Dhananiya Post Graduate Commeree & Arts College, Raigarh, vide order dated 19-09-1970 (Annexure A- 14). The said college was a private college. After successful and satisfactory completion of period of probation, the petitioner was confirmed vide order dated 16-10-1971 (Annexure A-16). The cottege was taken over by the Government -W^l ^^^,"^ tteisa;,. wsss. 1t,, 'fosrf'''^1 f"'....-^" ""^B^^S'^"'' with effect from 01-10-1986, vide Govemment's order dated 25/30-08-1986 (Annexure A-17). Vide order dated 24-04-1989 (Annexure A-18), petitioner was absorbed on the post of Senior Sports Officer. Vide order dated 16-10-1990 (Annexure A-9), revised U.G.C. pay scale was to be granted to Sports Officer based on their educational qualification. According to the petitioner, he fulfilledatl the eligibility criteria for grant of revised U.G.C. pay scale in senior grade. According to the petitioner, in view of eligibility critsria laid down in government instruction/guidelines in the matter of grant of revised U.G.C. pay scale in senior/selection grade, petitioner was also entitled for grant of senior pay scale when other Sports OfRcer were granted senior pay scale vide order dated 18-09- 1989 (Annexure A-1) and 12-12-1990 (Annexure A-2). It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner ttiat the petitioner submitted a representation on 16-10- 1989 as soon as impugned order dated 18-09-1989 (Ahnexure A-1) was issued. On the representation made by the petitioner from time to time, several communications were made by the Principal of the College to the State Government/Higher authoritjes, but no order was passed by the government witti regard to theclaim ofthe petitioner. Ultimately, the instant petition was filed by the petitioner on 08-03-2000. (3) Per contra, "rt is stated by the respondents that cause of action arose in the year 1989-90 and when senior/selection grade pay scale was granted to other Sports Officsrs, the petitioner preferred first representation on 16-10-1989 (Annexure A-3). True it is that number of representaflons were made but repeated representations did not justify delay on the part of the petitioner. It is submjtted Uiat the petition suffers from detay and laches as instant petition has been filed after 10 years. On merits, it is submitted that Sports Officer appointed prior to 30-06-1986 must possess Post Graduate Certificate in Physical Edueation. According to Rules framed in •\990, the minimum qualification for Sports Offlcer is Post Graduate Certificate with 55% marks and at least 50% marte in graduation. fis the case of the petitioner was covered under the first category that he must poss.ess Post Graduate Certificate (M.Pd.) in Physical Education, the petitioner was not entitled to senior/selection grade pay scale. It is submitted that the petitioner did not held basic qualification of M.Pd (Post Graduate Certificate in Physical Education) nor did acquire higher qualification, even friough, the govemment had issued circulars Annexure R-2 and R-3 granting time to those, who are not possessed of required qualification, to acquire requisite qualification. (4) Before considering the merits of the case, 1 shall first deal with the delay aspects, as learned counsel for the respondente has strenuously submitted that the instant petition suffers from great and inordinate delay and laches. He argues that while other Sports OfRcers were granted senior/selection grade revised pay ^, scale vide order dated 18-09-1989 (Annexure A-1) and 12-12-1990 (Annexure A- " 2), petitioner though submitted representation, but thereafter, he ought to have approached within reasonable time. It is submitted that at the time when the cause of action arose, remedy was available with the petitjoner to file petition before the State Administrative Tribunal, which by that time, had came into existence and the period of limitation for filing petition was prescribedunder " Section 21 of the State Administrative Tribunal's Act, 1985. The petitioner did not file any petition and 10 years thereafter, the instant petition was filed before the Tribunal. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that though a representation was made on 16-10-19^ (Annexure A-3), as no decision was taken in his case, he kept on making representation and Principat of the Coltege kept on making correspondence with the Directorate and the State Govemment. •^;. ""» vms-. s This was continued for several years and when the petitioner found that in spite of various communications made by the Principal from time to time, grievance has not been redressed, recourse to remedy under the law was finally taken by filing petition before the Tribunal on 08-03-2000. (5) The cause of action arose for thepetitioner when other Sports Officer were granted senior and setection grade pay scale in the year 1989-90 vide impugned order dated 18-09-1^9 (Annexure A-1) and 12-12-1990 (Annexure A- 2). When first order of grant of senior pay scale was issued, by which, Sports Officers of various colleges were granted senior pay scale, the petitioner made representation on 16-10-1989 (Annexure A-3). The communications placed on record shows that after passing of the impugned order dated 12-12-1990 (Annexure A-2), Principal of the College forwarded the records relating to the case of the petitioner pursuant to tetter dated 17-07-1991 of the Directorate of Higher Education, Bhopal. After almost 2 & % years, another communication atong wth relevant service records of the petitioner were forwarded for consideration. ThereafEer, Vide memo dated 23-12-1994, again, petitioner's application along with retevant record was forwarded for consideration. Vide representation dated 23-12-1994 made to the Commissioner, Higher Education, the petitioner also reiterated his claim. Thereafter, another memo was sent bythe Principal of the College on 03-02-1995 informing them that the confldential <eports of the period during which petitioner was working in a private college are not available and certificate to that effect is being forwarded. Thereafter, pursuant to another memo dated 24-06-1996 of the Commissioner, Higher Education, details of petitioner's service were again forwarded vide letter dated 15-07-1996 (Annexure A-8). It appsars that another memo dated 07-05-1997 of the Commissioner, Higher Education was received requiring the Principal to again •i!ft 1 send the details of the petitioner, in response to which, Principal of the Coilege sent another memo dated 16-06-1^7 to the Commissioner. Vide memo dated 26-10-1998, again information with regard to the case ofthe petitioner was sent. After about 8 months, petitioner submitted a representation on 29-06-1999 to the Principal for not refemng his case to the committee for resolution. Thereafter, another memo dated 13-07-1999 was sent by the Principal of the Coilege to the Commissioner, Higher Education, Bhopal informing about the pendency of the petitioner's case. The petitioner thereafter submitted another representation on 24-07-1999 (Annexure A-13) to the Commissioner, Higher Education, Bhopal. Finally, this petition was filed on 08-03-2000. (6) From the aforesaid facte and circumstances of the case and correspondence, it is found that when the petitioner made first representation in the year 1989, the case of the petitioner was forwarded by the Principal to the Directorate in the year 1991 , and thereafter, it was only correspondence going on between the Principal and the Directorate. Petitioner, however, did not approach any Court of law. Petitioner as a prudent pereon, was required to take recourse to remedy available to him under the law within a reasonable period, However, petitioner did not take such steps. From the documents placed on record, it is found that the Principal kept on sending information to the Directorate as and when required. The Directorate a!so sent various letters and communications 'time and again requiring the Principal to send information, detailed records relating to the case of the petitioner. It is clear that the grievance of the petitioner remained subsisting for years to come yet the petitioner did not take any remedy available to him under the law. Though, this Court is not bound by the period of limitation prescribed for filing petition before the State Administrative Tribunal as required under Section 21 ofthe State Administrative Tribunal's Act, 1985, yet it ...s".y-''x''e''[.K. :! }if^:s..,^ '% -^ ^ 't^JJ ^ is relevant circumstance that there was a Tribunal functioning in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh where the petitioner could have filed the petition. However, petitioner did not approach the Court of law. Section 21 of the State Administrative Tribunal's Act, 1985 provided a limtetion of one year from the date ofthe impugned order and in case, where a representation/appeal is made, one year immediately after expiry of period of six months from the date of representation/appea! was preferred. (7) In the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. And another vs. JabarSingh and others, (2007) 2 SCC 112, it was observed as under: 43. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2&05 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground thatthe petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches. t. (8) Further, in the case of Wew Delhi Municlpal Council v. Pan Singh and others,(2007) 9 SCC 278, the Supreme Court, reiterating the principles relating rto interference in cases where petitioner approached the Court with unexptained de!ay observed as below: 16. There is another aspect ofthe matterwhich cannot be lostsight of. The respondente herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitete their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the sajd scale of pay. After such a tong time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated.It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exereised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant facfors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy2, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jawvant Sing and Karnataka Pvwer Cwpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangapparft.) :l.;a s .s: F< (9) In the case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamit Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, it has been hetd as under;- "It is not that there is any period of limitetion for the Courts to exereise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also ite normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appettant's petition as well asthe appeal." (10) in the case of Sftoop Singh v. Union oflndia, (1992) 3 SCC 136, it was held as under: 8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filted promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for ttie inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result oftheir eariier petitions beingallowed. ^11) In view of the aforesaid settled position, the instant petition is liable to be and is hereby dismteed on the ground of delay and laches only without going into the merits ofthe claim. Sd/- Manindra Mohan Shrivastava Judge