IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 361 of 2003. Date of Decision: 18th August, 2010. _______________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh ….Appellant. Versus Narain Dass and another ..Respondents. Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh, J. Whether approved for reporting1? Yes. For the appellant : Mr. Anshul Bansal, Additional Advocate General and Mr. J.S. Rana, Assistant Advocate General. For the respondent : Nemo. ____________________________________________________ SURINDER SINGH, J. (Oral) The respondents were acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 451, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 7(B) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 31st May, 2003. 2. In short, the prosecution case can be stated thus. On 17th January, 2000, complainant Kumari Kirna (PW-1) was alone in her house. Around 6.00 p.m., the respondents were allegedly drunk. They were coming through the bridle-path leading to village ‘Dogri’ Whether reporters of the Local papers are allowed to see the judgment? - 2 - through her house. They noticed Kumari Kirna standing in Verandah. When the respondents reached nearest, they started hurling abuses and proclaimed that ‘you Dagi- Chamar do not know anything’. She told them to go away, but respondent Narain Dass came to the Verandah of her house and caught hold of her from the arm and asked as to whom she had cast her vote. On this, she retaliated that he had no business to ask this. Thereafter respondent Narain Dass further asked as to why she voted for Raj Kumar and not in favour of Nikka Ram and warned her to teach her a lesson. Having said so, he left the place. 3. In the evening, her father Banka Ram came to his house and the entire incident was narrated to him. Next day, he went to the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. On 20th January, 2000, Kirna accompanied by her father lodged the FIR for the offences aforesaid. Police collected the material and recorded the statements of the witnesses. The Challan against the respondents was presented in the Court for their trial. At the end of the trial, the respondents were acquitted. 4. Shri J.S. Rana, learned Assistant Advocate General for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Court did not appreciate the evidence on record in the right perspective and had given undue - 3 - weight to the minor contradictions and further that the delay in lodging the FIR stood properly explained. If the evidence is read dispassionately, there are grounds to convert the acquittal into conviction. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments and have carefully examined the record. 6. The alleged eye witnesses PW-3 Jhejh Ram and PW-5 Kalru Devi did not say that the complainant was ‘Dagi-Chamar’ by caste. To attract the provisions of Section 7 (B) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the complainant is a member of ‘Scheduled Caste’ as defined in Clause 24 of Article 366 of the Constitution of India. The ocular version of the prosecution witnesses to conclude this fact is quite insufficient. Therefore, the said offence was rightly held to have not been proved, by the learned trial Court. 7. In so far as the other offences are concerned, to substantiate the version of the complainant PWs-3 and 5 aforesaid have been examined, but their version is different to that of the complainant. The prosecution case initially says that the respondents had come to the courtyard of the house of the complainant, it was then they hurled abuses to the complainant, when the complainant asked them to go - 4 - away respondent Narain Dass entered into the Verandah and allegedly caught hold of her from the arm and asked to whom she had voted, whereas PW-5 Kalru Devi alleged eye witness stated that the respondents were exchanging hot words to the complainant and she did not say that they entered the courtyard of the complainant and thereafter respondent Narain Dass came to Verandah and caught hold of her from the arm and called her ‘Dagi-Chamar’, whereas this fact has not been stated by PW-3 Jhejh Ram. 8. The above apart, there is no mention of the alleged eye witnesses in the FIR which was registered by the complainant after about three days of the alleged occurrence. Of course, the prosecution has tried to explain the delay, but the explanation rendered is not free from suspension. According to the prosecution case, on the next day of the alleged occurrence the father of the complainant had gone to Police-Post, Nankhari to report the matter. He told that the police compelled to bring his daughter along. The reason was not known. The initial story which was disclosed was enough to lodge the FIR disclosing a cognizable case. There was no need to call for complainant for the purpose. Even otherwise, had it been so, the learned trial - 5 - Court rightly observed that he could have brought her on the same day when the distance of Police Post is only 10-11 kilometers from his house, whereas the FIR was lodged on 20th January, 2000 which appears to be after thought and due deliberations having the scope of suggestions and distortions. 9. Keeping in view the above discussion, the offences charged cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, I find that the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court is borne out from the evidence on record, which requires no interference. As such, the appeal is dismissed being merit-less. 10. The respondents are discharged of their bail bonds entered upon by them at any stage during the proceedings of this case. 11. Appeal stands disposed of. August 18, 2010. (Surinder Singh), J. (rc)