THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY WRIT PETITION Nos.629 and 1556 of 2004 COMMON ORDER: The writ petitions are interconnected with each other. Hence, they are disposed of through a common order. Respondent No.1 was employed as Driver in Armoor Depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’) on daily wage basis on 04.04.1996. On 26.08.1996, when he was driving the bus, an accident took place at Dassnagar X road tri-junction. A person, who was attempting to cross the road, was hit by the bus and died on account of injuries. Through an order, dated 05.10.1996, respondent No.1 was removed from service. The appeal filed against it before the Divisional Manager was rejected. However, in the review, the Regional Manager directed that departmental enquiry be conducted. Accordingly, enquiry was conducted and through order, dated 03.11.1997, the Depot Manager, Bodhan removed respondent No.1 from service. An industrial dispute being I.D.No.87 of 1999 was raised by respondent No.1 before the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad. Through an award, dated 28.06.2002, the Labour Court allowed the I.D., set aside the order of removal and directed reinstatement of respondent No.1 with full back wages. W.P.No.1556 of 2004 is filed against it. Respondent No.1 filed M.P.No.94 of 2000 before the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming a sum of Rs.30,051/-. He pleaded that the petitioners did not pay any wages for the period that intervened the date of accident and the date of removal. The Labour Court passed an order, dated 22.01.2003, for the said amount. W.P.No.629 of 2004 is filed against it. Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioners, submits that respondent No.1 drove the bus in a rash and negligent manner, resulting in death of a pedestrian and the Labour Court examined the matter as though it is a criminal case. He contends that the very fact that a person died on being hit by the bus is sufficient to establish the negligence on the part of respondent No.1. He further submits that being a daily wage employee, respondent No.1 was not entrusted with the duties ever since the accident took place and there was no justification for awarding wages from the date of accident till the date of removal from service. Sri V.Jithender Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, submits that the evidence on record clearly established that the accident occurred solely on account of the negligence on the part of the pedestrian and the Labour Court has examined the matter from the correct perspective. He further submits that respondent No.1 has taken all possible precautions while crossing a stationary lorry and the accident occurred due to sudden movement of the pedestrian in his anxiety to get the bus. He also submits that his client is entitled to be paid the wages immediately preceding the date of removal, since no order of suspension was passed against him. The occurrence of accident involving the bus that was driven by respondent No.1 was not disputed. He was crossing a lorry parked on the left side of the road. Even assuming that the pedestrian was crossing the road by running across the lorry, respondent No.1 was required to be careful and cautious. Whether the accident occurred at a place where there was no traffic or in a busy locality, proper caution such as blowing of horn and seeing on both sides to ensure that nobody is crossing the road ought to have been taken. The very fact that the person died speaks to the circumstances. The Labour Court did discuss the evidence on behalf of the Corporation and respondent No.1. However, the approach was akin to that in a criminal case. The effort of the Labour Court must not be to verify whether respondent No.1 is guilty of rash and negligent driving under the relevant provisions of the I.P.C. It is only to see whether there was any negligence on the part of respondent No.1, as an employee of the Corporation in driving the bus. For instance, the discussion by the Labour Court proceeded on these lines. “Admittedly, the Chief Inspector is not an eye witness to the accident, nor he conducted thorough enquiry at the place of accident. The only eye witness he examined stated before the Chief Inspector that the accident was not at all due to the fault on the part of the petitioner. However, the Chief Inspector says that he collected a rough sketch prepared by the police as an Ex.M1 and since there was a skid mark on 27 feet as recorded by the police he was of impression that the petitioner was driving the bus at a high speed and could not control the vehicle when the pedestrian was crossing the road. Admittedly as per the first report submitted by the Chief Inspector marked as Ex.M7 by the time he visited the accident spot on 26.08.1997 it was 10.00 p.m. the accident bus was also removed from the place of accident. He did not observe the place of accident but he simply recorded the statements marked as Exs.M2 to M4. Admittedly he is not the person who prepared the rough sketch in Ex.M1. He did not personally observe the alleged skid marks since it is impossible for him to trace the same at a dead of a night since there was no sort of lighting at the place of accident.” . When respondent No.1 did not dispute the occurrence of the accident, all this discussion is superfluous. The Conductor of the bus, which was being driven by respondent No.1, would naturally speak in favour of his co-employee. Therefore, though there would have been justification for directing reinstatement of respondent No.1 on sympathetic grounds, the Labour Court ought not to have burdened the Corporation with the obligation to pay back wages. Coming to the other writ petition, it is not in dispute that respondent No.1 was not paid wages from 26.08.1996 to 03.11.1997, the period which covers the one between the date of accident and the date of removal. The justification pleaded by the Corporation is that no duty was assigned to respondent No.1 and in that view of the matter, it is not under obligation to pay any wages. It is not a case where the Corporation did not engage the services of any daily wage employees at all during that period. The denial of entrustment of work to respondent No.1 was only on account of his involvement in the accident. However, no orders similar to the one of suspension pending enquiry were passed. In respect of Drivers appointed on regular basis, orders of suspension are passed soon after any accident takes place and that would be in force till the final orders are passed in the disciplinary proceedings. Hence, this Court is of the view that respondent No.1 ought to have been denied the wages in totality. In a way, he can be treated as having been kept under suspension. The award of 50% of wages for that period would meet the ends of justice. Hence, W.P.No.1556 of 2004 is partly allowed setting aside that portion of the award passed by the Labour Court in I.D.No.87 of 1999, which directed payment of back wages, and upholding it in other respects. W.P.No.629 of 2004 is partly allowed modifying the award in M.P.No.94 of 2000 directing that respondent No.1 shall be entitled to 50% of the amount that was awarded by the Labour Court. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY,J Dt:30.09.2010. Note: L.R. copy to be marked. kdl