CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. DATE OF DECISION: May 18 , 2011. Parties Name Nishan Singh ...PETITIONER VERSUS State of Haryana and others ...RESPONDENTS CORAM: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jasbir Singh Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kumar Garg PRESENT: Mr. Pankaj Midha, Advocate, for the petitioner Mr. Kamal Sehgal, Addl. A.G., Haryana; Jasbir Singh, J. (oral) JUDGMENT This writ petition has been filed with a prayer to quash a notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (in short the Act) on February 23, 1989, proposing to acquire a vast track of land for a public purpose, namely, for development and utilisation of land as Residential and Commercial area for Sector 13 Panipat. Further challenge has been laid to a declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on February 22, 1990. The petitioner is owner of about 1.75 Acres of land. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -2- It is contention of counsel for the petitioner that the land was ordered to be acquired in a pick and choose manner. Further in the year 2008, the land of some other land-owners was released from acquisition, whereas that relief was not given to the petitioner. When notice of motion was issued on March 30, 2009, following order was passed by this Court: “Grievance in the petition is that land of the petitioner was acquired vide notifications dated 23.2.1989 and 22.2.1990 under Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “the Act”) and award was announced. However, the petitioner did not receive any notice and he has already raised construction prior to notification under Section 4 of the Act and now, he is sought to be dispossessed without considering his claim for exemption from acquisition in accordance with declared policy of the State. Similar matter is said to be pending for 14.5.2009 being C.W.P. No. 5698 of 2003, in which dispossession has been stayed. Notice of motion to respondent No. 1 only. Ms. Palika Monga, AAG, Haryana, present in Court, accepts notice. Put up alongwith CWP No. 5698 of 2003 on 14.5.2009. In the meanwhile, there will be interim order in the same terms with regard to area covered by construction.” It is not in dispute that the Award in this case was passed on CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -3- February 21, 1992. This writ petition was filed in the year 2009, i.e., more than 17 years after passing of the above said Award. In this writ petition, an attempt has been made by the petitioner to convince the Court to get relief, by stating that the publication of the notifications never came to his notice. Such a plea is not acceptable. It was a huge acquisition. It has come on record that the notices under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued as per mandatory provisions of the Act. It has also come on record that even contents of the notifications were notified by issuing a proclamation in the locality concerned. To claim relief, reliance was placed upon a judgment passed by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 7548 of 1990, titled as The Panipat Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. The State of Haryana and others, rendered on March 26, 2003 (P-18). We feel that no benefit can be granted to the petitioner in this writ petition. At an appropriate time, the petitioner did not even file objections under Section 5-A of the Act to oppose the proposed acquisition. If that is so, in terms of the ratio of the judgment in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3822, this writ petition is not maintainable. It was observed as under: “ 8. In connection with owners or persons interested who have not filed objections under Section 5A, in principle, it must be accepted that they had no objection to Section 4 notification operating in respect of their property. On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections, they might have locus standi to contend that Section 5A inquiry was not CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -4- conducted properly. We, therefore, agree in principle with the view of the three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram's case that whose who have not filed objections under Section 5A, could not be allowed to contend that the Section 5A inquiry was bad and that consequently Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the section 4 notification would lapse. If, therefore, no objections were filed by the respondents, logically the Section 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned. 9. But learned senior counsel for the respondents contends that the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18.11.1988 in B.R. Gupta's case had quashed the entire Section 5A proceedings and that even in case the respondents had filed objections, the position would not have been different. We cannot accept this contention. We are of the view that in respect of those who did not object to the Section 4(1) notification by filing objections under Section 5A, the said notification must be treated as being in force. The writ petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that in some other cases, the notification was quashed and that such quashing would also enure to their benefit.” Furthermore, no explanation has been given for a huge delay of about 17 years to lay challenge to the acquisition. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Aggarwal, CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -5- Civil Appeal No. 3604 of 2011, decided on April 26, 2011, re: delay in laying challenge to the proposed acquisition has observed as under: “16. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but one of the several rules of self imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystallized rights of the parties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench considered the effect of delay in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held: “…………It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it………………… ………It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any Rule for universal application. It may however be stated CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -6- as a general Rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. ………………………Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable.” 17. In matters involving challenge to the acquisition of land for public purpose, this Court has consistently held that delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously and relief denied to the petitioner if he fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay. The Court has also held that the delay of even few years would be fatal to the cause of the petitioner, if the acquired land has been partly or wholly utilised for the public purpose.” CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -7- In the above said case, on account of delay of about six years, the writ petition was dismissed. Furthermore, in the reply filed, the respondents have specifically stated as under: “9. That the contents of Para No. 9 of the civil writ Petition are matter of record. However, with regard to the acquisition proceeding it is stated that the land in question along with the other Land was acquired fully in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Award related to the above said notification was announced on 21.2.1992 and the possession was handed over to HUDA on the same day. It is admitted that compensation regarding Khasra Nos. 4453, 4454 and 5156 is lying upaid in the office because it is never demanded by the petitioner intentionally. He can get it from the office of the Land Acquisition Collector at any working Day. It is relevant to mention here that the payment, regarding other Khasra Nos. of the petitioner, received by him. Para No. 1 to 5 of preliminary objection is reiterated here for the sake of repetition.” The respondents have done everything , which was required at their part. The petitioner failed to lay challenge to the acquisition at the appropriate time. Furthermore, to claim discrimination, nothing has been brought on record. Under what circumstances, land of others was released in the year 2008 nothing has come on record except to place on record some CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4978 OF 2009 -8- release orders. In view of the facts, mentioned above, in terms of the ratio of the judgment in the case of The Panipat Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. (supra), no relief can be given to the petitioners as the facts in this case are altogether different. No case is made out for interference. Dismissed. ( Jasbir Singh ) Judge (Rakesh Kumar Garg) Judge May 18 , 2011. DKC