IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN WEDNESDAY, THE 10TH NOVEMBER 2010 / 19TH KARTHIKA 1932 CRP.No. 309 of 2010() -------------------------- (E.A.NO.1457/02,E.P.NO.104/99 IN O.S.NO.198/95 OF SUB COURT ERNAKULAM) ....... REVN. PETITIONER(S): JUDGEMENT DEBTORS 1 TO 3 & 5 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. MRS. FATHIMA BEEVI, W/O. LATE KHALID HAJI, AGED 68 RESIDING AT NO. 10, APPA GARDENS, KILPAUK, MADRAS. 2. SRI. ANWAR, S/O.LATE KHALID HAJI, AGED 40,RESIDING AT NO. 10, APPA GARDENS, KILPAUK, MADRAS. 3. SRI. ANSAR, S/O. LATE KHALID HAJI, AGED 39,RESIDING AT NO. 10, APPA GARDENS, KILPAUK, MADRAS. 4. MRS. SABBY D/O. LATE KHALID HAJI, AGED 38, ASHIANA, PARAVILLA, PACHALLOOR.P.O., TRIVANDRUM. BY ADV. SRI.S.SREEKUMAR RESPONDENT(S): DECREE HOLDER-4TH JUDGMENT DEBTOR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. MRS. K.P.GEETHA, W/O. K.D.AJAYAGHOSH, KARUMALI HOUSE, BROTHERS VILLA, VENNALA, EDAPPALLY SOUTH VILLAGE, KOCHI-682028, NOW RES. AT 2A IIND FOOR TRANQUIL RESIDENCY CIVIL LANE ROAD, CHEMBUMUKKU, COCHIN-21. 2. SRI. ZAKIR, S/O. LATE KHALID HAJI AGED 35, NOW AT POST BOX NO. 24801, DOHA, QATAR. ADV. K.G.ANIL BABU THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 28/10/2010, ALONG WITH FAO.47/2010 & CRP.NO.310/2010 THE COURT ON 10/11/2010 PASSED THE FOLLOWING: svs/ THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN & P. BHAVADASAN, JJ. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C.R.P. Nos.309 & 310 of 2010 & F.A. O. No. 47 of 2010 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 10th day of November, 2010. ORDER Bhavadasan, J , Three applications were filed in execution proceedings, namely, E.A. 1457 of 2002 filed by the decree holder and two Execution Applications, namely, E.A. 521 of 2003 under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also E.A. 520 of 2003 to adjudicate the claims put forward, filed by the judgment debtors. By the impugned order, the applications filed by the judgment debtors were dismissed and the application filed by the decree holder seeking delivery of the property was allowed. 2. In order to appreciate the issues involved in this case, some facts may be necessary. C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 2 3. The predecessor in interest of the revision petitioners and the appellants herein owned 22 cents of land with a building therein. That was rented out to the first respondent herein for a monthly rent of Rs.3,450/-. While the tenancy continued, on 22.5.1994 an agreement for sale was entered into between the lessor and the lessee, lessor agreeing to sell and lessee to purchase the property for a total consideration of Rs.17,00,000/- and Rs.6,50,000/- was paid as advance. The decree holder then sued the vendors alleging that they failed to perform their part of the contract and filed suit for specific performance. After trial, the court exercised its discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and a decree directing return of the advance amount with interest was passed on 29.11.1997. C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 3 4. The decree holder put the decree in execution as per E.A. 104 of 1999 on 5.3.1999. Notice was ordered on the execution petition and it was posted to 22.5.1999 for return of notice. On 22.5.1999 fresh notice was ordered to the judgment debtors and the execution petition was posted to 25.6.1999. Again on 25.6.1999 notice was ordered and was posted to 14.10.1999. Subsequently there were several adjournments for return of notice and ultimately on 21.12.1999 again fresh notice had to be ordered and the case posted on 28.1.2000. It appears that the notice could not be served on the judgment debtors and therefore the decree holder sought substituted service. That was effected by paper publication. Thereafter execution proceedings continued and ultimately notice under Order XXI Rule 66 was ordered and the case was posted to 14.6.2000. That was so done after setting the C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 4 judgment debtors ex-parte. Again notice was taken out by substituted service by publication and the case was posted to 17.3.2001. On that day since there was no appearance on behalf of the judgment debtors, they were set ex-parte again and the case was posted for settlement of sale proclamation to 3.7.2001. 5. It appears that on 3.7.2001 the execution petition filed by the decree holder was dismissed for default. Order dismissing the execution petition was reviewed and E.P.104 of 1999 was restored to file and the execution proceedings were posted to 17.7.2001 for settlement of sale proclamation. On 17.7.2001 proclamation was settled and the case was posted for sale of the property to 18.9.2001. On 18.9.2001 the property was sold for Rs.10,01,000/- and it was purchased by the decree holder. The sale was confirmed on 17.11.2001 and the sale certificate was C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 5 issued on 12.4.2002. Thereafter, the decree holder moved the execution as per E.A. 1457 of 2002 under Order XXI Rule 95 of CPC seeking delivery. 6. Receiving intimation about the proceedings, it is stated that the judgment debtors entered appearance and they filed two applications, namely, E.A. 521 of 2003, claiming right over the property, which was brought to sale and E.A. 520 of 2003 to set aside the sale. The main contention urged by them were that they had no notice of the execution proceedings and they were unaware of the same. Therefore, they could not file the necessary objections at the appropriate stage. It is specifically stated that the decree holder was fully aware of the correct address of the judgment debtors and without taking steps to have summons served on the correct address, he ultimately had it served by substituted service. They also contended that since the C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 6 notice had been published only in an English newspaper, they did not come across the same. Their further contention was that the entire property need not have been sold and sale of a portion of the property would have been sufficient to meet the decree debt. They took objection to the conduct of the court in restoring the execution petition dismissed for default without notice to them. On these grounds they prayed for setting aside the sale upholding their claim. 7. It may be noticed that during the pendency of the suit the original defendant died and his legal heirs were brought on the party array. In the execution proceedings, a daughter of the original defendant was examined as P.W.1. The decree holder examined R.Ws. 1 to 3 and had Exts.B1 to B24(j) marked. The execution court on an appreciation of the materials before it and after considering the rival contentions found that the C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 7 claim made by the judgment debtors as per E.A. Nos. 520 and 521 of 2003 cannot be accepted and allowed E.A. 147 of 2002 directing delivery. 8. C.R.P. 310 of 2010 is directed against the order in E.A. 520 of 2003. C.R.P. 309 of 2010 is directed against the order in E.A.1457 of 2002 in E.P. 104 of 1999. F.A.O. is directed against the order of delivery in E.A.1457 of 2002. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the revision petitioners before this court pointed out that no notice in the proceedings was served on any of the judgment debtors and it was cleverly manipulated by the decree holder. There was no ground for ordering substituted service and the decree holder deliberately had taken such steps to see that notice is not served on the judgment debtors. There is nothing to indicate, according to learned counsel, that the C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 8 judgment debtors were evading notice so as to take recourse to Order V Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that at any rate, the entire extent of property, 22 cents, need not have been sold to meet the decree debt and sale of a portion of the suit property would have been sufficient to satisfy the decree. Since this aspect has not been considered by the executing court while ordering sale, the sale is vitiated. Learned counsel also pointed out that the act of the court in restoring the E.P. dismissed for default under Section 151 CPC without notice to the judgment debtors also cannot be sustained. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents in these proceedings before this court countered the contentions put forward by the petitioners by pointing out that notice was sent by registered post. The notices were taken out in the same address as in C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 9 the suit and there is no reason as to why notice could not have been served. At any rate, the decree holder had taken alternate mode of service, namely, substituted service through publication, which is considered as good service of summons. It is contended that the judgment debtors were all the while aware of the proceedings and in fact on several occasions the decree holder had approached the judgment debtors requesting that the amount may be paid so that he need not continue the execution proceedings. It was emphasized that notices were taken out at various stages of the execution proceedings and the judgment debtors cannot be heard to say that they had no notice of the execution proceedings. The restoration of the E.P. dismissed for default under Section 151 of CPC is perfectly within the powers of the execution court. In C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 10 short, the stand taken is that none of the contentions urged by the petitioners before this court are sustainable in law. 11. We could not find much force in the contention with regard to the lack of notice to the judgment debtors. It has to be noticed that the address given in the execution petition was the same as the one that was given in the plaint and there is no reason to believe that the decree holder had managed the affairs in such a way so as to ensure that the judgment debtors had no notice of the proceedings. It is true that there is no order by the court that either the notice had been served or that it has returned unserved. Whatever that be, the proceedings show that the decree holder had taken steps several times so as to ensure that notice is served on the judgment debtors, and inspite of his best efforts to do so, the notice could not be served. It was C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 11 under those circumstances that the decree holder was compelled to take recourse to substituted mode of service by publication. We are not impressed with the contention taken by the petitioners before this court that since notice was published in an English newspaper, it could not deemed to be proper service. 12. However, the claim of the decree holder that the execution court was perfectly justified in restoring the E.P. dismissed for default under Section 151 of CPC cannot be accepted. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents before this court relied on the decision reported in Radhakrishnan v. State of Kerala (2006(1) K.L.T. 28). According to learned counsel, the order dismissing the E.P. for default could not be treated as one under Section 105 sub-rule (2) and therefore Order XXI Rule C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 12 106 has no application. Under such circumstances, it was legal for the court to take recourse to Section 151 CPC. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners before this court on the other hand contended that it could not be said that the order dismissing the application does not fall within the ambit of Order XXI Rule 105(2) CPC. Learned counsel pointed out that on 3.7.2001 E.P. was posted for settlement of sale proclamation. It was not as if that it was a routine posting of the execution proceedings. On that day, the decree holder was absent and therefore execution petition happened to be dismissed. The order falls squarely within Order XXI Rule 105(2) CPC. If that be so, according to learned counsel, recourse has to be taken under Order XXI Rule 106 CPC to have the E.P. restored C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 13 to file. Going by Order XXI Rule 106 C.P.C., the E.P. could not have been restored without notice to the judgment debtors. 14. In support of his contention that Section 151 could not be taken aid of in such cases, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners before this court relied on the decision reported in Ram Chand and Sons sugar Mills v. Kanhayalal (AIR 1966 SC 1899), Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee (AIR 1970 SC 997) and Ramkarandas v. Bhagwandas (AIR 1965 SC 1144). 15. The proceedings in the execution petition have already been narrated. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners before this court, the execution petition was posted to 3.7.2001 for settlement of sale proclamation. E.P. was posted for a specific purpose and it could not be said that it was a routine posting and that on that day no steps had to be C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 14 taken for the progress of the proceedings. Settlement of sale proclamation is a judicial function and therefore the execution petition was posted for a specific purpose to 3.7.2001. On that day, admittedly the decree holder was not present and the court dismissed the E.P. For default. 16. One may at this juncture refer to the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, i.e. Radhakrishnan v. State of Kerala (2006(1) K.L.T. 28). On going through the decision, it can be seen that in that case the execution petition was posted to 20.5.1998 not for hearing, but for being put up with the back records. Hearing mentioned in Order XXI Rule 105 must mean some act to be done by the parties for the progress of the proceedings. It was under those circumstances it was held that dismissal for default on C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 15 that day did not fall within the ambit of Order XXI Rule 105(2) CPC. The case was not posted for any judicial determination on 20.5.1998. 17. The above decision can have no application to the facts of the present case. In the decision referred to above, on 20.5.1998, the day on which execution petition was posted, decree holder had nothing to do for the progress of the proceedings. It was only a routine posting by the court to have the back records of the case. It is not so in the case on hand. In this case, the posting on 3.7.2001 was for settlement of sale proclamation and the settlement of sale proclamation is a judicial function. As rightly noticed, it could not be said that it was a routine posting and no steps had to be taken by any party for the progress of C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 16 the proceedings. In such circumstances, the dismissal could be treated as one under Order XXI Rule 105(2) CPC. 18. Then two questions arise for consideration, they are i) whether the court below was justified in restoring E.P. dismissed for default under Section 151 of CPC and ii) whether the court below was justified in doing so without issuing notice to the judgment debtors. 19. In the decision reported in Ramkarandas's case (supra), it was held as follows: “The inherent powers are to be exercised by the court in very exceptional circumstances, for which the Code lays down no procedure. Rule 4 of O.37 expressly gives power to a Cort to set aside a decree passed under the provisions of that Order. Express provision is thus made for setting aside a decree passed under O.37 and hence if a case does not come C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 17 within the provisions of that rule, there is no scope to resort to S.151 for setting aside such a decree.” 20. In the decision reported in Ram Chand and Sons sugar Mills's case (supra), it was held as follows: “Section 151 of the Code reads: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.” The words of the section appear to be rather wide. But the decisions of this Court by construction, limited the scope of the said section. In Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the question raised was whether a Munsiff had inherent powers under S.151 of the Code to appoint a commissioner to seize account books. This court held that he had no such power. C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 18 Raghubar Dayal, J., speaking for the court, observed: “The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in S.151 of the Code when the exercise of these powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.” This Court again in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Raja Seth Hiralal, considered the question whether a Court had inherent power under S.151 of the Code to issue a temporary injunction restraining a party from proceeding with a suit in another State. In that context, C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 19 Raghubar Dayal, J., after quoting the passage cited above from his earlier judgment, interpreted the said observation thus: “These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in S.151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of these powers is not because these powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the Legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice.” This court again in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 Sc 993 at p.1003 considered the scope of S.151 of the Code. One of the questions raised was whether an order made by a Court under a situation to C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 20 which O.IX, R.7 of the Code did not apply, could be treated as one made under S.151 of the Code. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. made the following observations: “It is common ground that the inherent power of the Court cannot override the express provisions of the law. In other words, if there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. the prohibition contained in the Code need not be express bu may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which relates.” Having regard to the said decisions, the scope of the inherent power of a court under S.151 of the Code may be defined thus : The inherent power of a Court is in addition to C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 21 and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. But that power will not be exercised, if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of S.151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” 21. In the decision reported in Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee (AIR 1970 SC 997), it was held as follows: “The High Court in our opinion erred in holding that the correctness of the remand order was open to review by it. The order in question was made under Rule 23, Order 41, C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 22 Civil Procedure Code. That order was appealable under Order 43 of that Code. As the same was not appealed against, its correctness was no more open to examination in view of Section 105(2) of the Code which lays down that where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. The High Court has misconceived the scope of its inherent powers. Under the inherent power of Courts recognised byS.151, C.P.C., a Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the Court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 23 avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.” 22. In the light of the above decisions, there can be no doubt regarding the fact that if there is a specific provision in the C.P.C. for a particular purpose, one cannot take the aid of Section 151 of C.P.C. for seeking remedy provided for that purpose. 23. One may refer to the provision applicable, i.e. Order XXI Rule 106 C.P.C. It reads as follows: “106. Setting aside orders passed ex parte, etc..- (1) The applicant, against whom an order is made under sub-rule (2) of rule 105 or the opposite party against whom an order is passed ex-parte under sub-rule (3) of that rule or under sub-rule (1) of rule 23, may apply to the Court to set aside the order, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the application was called on for hearing, the Court C.R.P.309/10 & con.cases . 24 shall set aside the order on such terms as to costs or otherwise a it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for the further hearing of the application. (2) No order shall be made on an application under sub-rule (1) unless notice of the application has been served on the other party. (3) An application under sub-rule (1) shall be made within thirty days from the date of the order, or where, in the case of an ex parte order, the notice was not duly served, within thirty days from that date when the applicant had knowledge of the order.” 24. A bare reading of the provision indicates that an order of restoration under the said provision could not have been