*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY +WRIT PETITION No.3503 of 2005 % Dated: 02-07-2008 # K. Masthan Rao & another. Petitioner VERSUS $ Land Acquisition Officer-cum- Revenue Divisional Officer, Ongole, Prakasam District & another. Respondents ! Counsel for the Petitioners: Mr. M.V.S. Suresh Kumar ^Counsel for the Respondents: AGP for Land Acquisition. <GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? Cases referred 1. 2000 (2) ALD 418 2. AIR 1964 SC 1006 3. AIR 1970 SC 898 4. AIR 1974 SC 259 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE SECOND DAY OF JULY, TWO THOUSAND EIGHT ONLY PRESENT: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.3503 of 2005 Between: K. Masthan Rao & another. … Petitioners AND Land Acquisition Officer-cum- Revenue Divisional Officer, Ongole, Prakasam District & another. … Respondents Counsel for the petitioners : Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar Counsel for the respondents: AGP for Land Acquisition This Court made the following: THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.3503 of 2005 ORDER:- A hopelessly belated claim made by the petitioners for reference of a purported dispute under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’), having not been responded to by the respondents, the present writ petition is filed, wherein the petitioners have sought for a writ of Mandamus to declare the inaction of the respondents in referring the dispute under Section 18 of the Act. This writ petition is concerned with an extent of Ac.1.91 cents in Sy.No.94/5 of Annavarappadu Village, Ongole, Prakasam District. Wholly vague and inaccurate pleadings contained in the affidavit of the petitioners, notwithstanding, it could be culled out from the contents of the counter affidavit of respondent No.1 that following the notification issued under Section 4(1) and declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, an award enquiry was conducted on 28.02.1976. It is admitted by the petitioners in their additional affidavit that their father, late Sri K. Nagaiah, received the compensation amount under protest. Though the petitioners and the respondents are silent on the time around which the amount was received, it is reasonable to presume that the father of the petitioners would have received compensation in the year 1976 itself. Thereafter, the petitioners’ father died. It is not known when his death took place. The petitioners allowed years to pass by. After more than a quarter century of their father receiving the compensation amount, the petitioners have got legal notice dated 17.11.2003 issued to respondent No.1, wherein it is claimed that award was passed in the name of Kommuri Nagaiah, that neither the notice of award under Section 12 (2) of the Act nor a copy of the award was furnished either to the petitioners or to the original awardees, that the petitioners were requesting respondent No.1 to refer the matter to the civil Court and that in spite of such repeated requests, respondent No.1 has not chosen to refer the dispute to the civil Court. As is their wont, respondents were indifferent in replying to the said notice and that obviously made the petitioners bold to file this writ petition more than 1½ years later. At the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners argued with conviction that no award notice was served on the petitioners under Section 12 (2) of the Act and therefore limitation for seeking reference under Section 18 has not started running and that therefore the inaction of the respondents in referring the dispute to the civil Court is arbitrary. He submitted that the petitioners cannot be denied their valuable statutory right vested under Section 18. Before dealing with this contention, let me first point out the inaccuracies and vagueness of the pleadings of the petitioners. In paragraph 2 of their affidavit, they claim that the land belongs to them and that the same was acquired under notification dated 02.12.1978 and award was passed on 12.03.1976. The date ‘02.12.1978’ is an obvious mistake, because, on their own showing the award, which was passed on 12.03.1976, could not have preceded the notification. Very curiously the same date is mentioned in the counter affidavit also. Since the record reveals that the award was passed on 12.03.1976 and in the counter affidavit it is pleaded that declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette on 26.01.1976, it is reasonable to presume that draft notification was published on 02.12.1975. Be that as it may, the entire affidavit proceeded on the premise that the petitioners were the owners of the property and there is no whisper that their father was the original owner and award was passed in his name. The respondents have also matched the petitioners in not leading the Court properly by showing in paragraph 3 that “K. Masthan Rao is the name of the land owner”. That it is absolutely incorrect could be seen from the additional affidavit dated 1.03.2005 of the petitioners, wherein they have stated for the first time that their father received the compensation under protest and made several representations during his life time to refer the matter to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act and that no notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act was served either on their father during his life time or on them. The fact that the petitioners’ father was the recognized owner is quite evident from page 2 of the award, wherein his name is shown as the registered holder or occupier of the extent of Ac.1.91 cents in Sy.No.94/5. In the backdrop of the above facts, the short question is whether in the guise of non-receipt of award notice under Section 12 (2), the petitioners are entitled to seek reference of the dispute for enhancement of compensation under Section 18 of the Act after expiry of more than three decades? Under Section 18 of the Act, the maximum time limit of two months is stipulated from the date of receipt of a notice of award for making an application for reference. A Full Bench of this Court in Special Deputy Collector, Singareni Collieries Co., Ltd., Godavarikhani v. Dasari Ramulu and others[1] on which the learned counsel placed heavy reliance undoubtedly held that notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act shall necessarily mean notice of contents of the award and not mere knowledge of passing of an award and that the burden of alleging and proving of the service of notice either actually or constructively, is on the State when it intends to take advantage by contending that the application seeking reference under Section 18 is barred by limitation. In paragraph 30 of the Judgment, it is observed that the notice of award, may in some of the circumstances, be attributable to the knowledge of the claimant. In the counter affidavit, it is specifically pleaded that after the award was passed on 12.03.1976, notices under Section 12 (2) of the Act were issued and all the land owners have received the compensation amount without protest. Sadly, in spite of a specific requisition by the Court, the respondents failed to produce the record. Therefore, this Court does not have the benefit of verifying from the record whether the notices were actually served on the father of the petitioners. The petitioners did not help the cause of the respondents either by approaching this Court more than 27 years after passing of the award, during which period there would have been a possibility of the record being destroyed or misplaced. Therefore, from the available material, it is necessary to determine the question whether the awardee had the notice of award either express or constructive. While the respondents alleged that the father of the petitioners received compensation amount without protest, in response to the notice of award issued under Section 12 (2) of the Act, the petitioners in their additional affidavit admitted the fact that their father received the compensation, but under protest. They also stated that their father made several representations during his life time to refer the matter to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, even in the absence of direct evidence to show that notices were served on the father of the petitioners, it is reasonable to presume that his father received the notice under Section 12 (2), without which he would not have approached the respondents and received the compensation amount whether with or without protest. This conclusion of mine, derives support from the petitioners’ further pleadings that during the life time of their father, he made several representations to refer the matter to the civil Court. The very fact that he allegedly made several representations shows that he not only had the knowledge of passing of award, but also its contents without which he would not have made the said request. These very pleadings of the petitioners are enough for this Court to hold that during the lifetime of the petitioners’ father, he not only received compensation, but had knowledge of the award. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted to take shelter under the plea that unless the respondents are able to show that award notices are served under Section 12 (2) of the Act, limitation for their claim for reference of dispute under Section 18 does not start running. When once it is concluded that the petitioners’ father had knowledge of passing of award and its contents, the further question is whether he approached the respondents within the time stipulated under Section 18. On their own showing, the petitioners’ father made several representations for reference. They did not plead when those representations were made. They have not specifically pleaded whether those representations were made in writing or through oral request. None of those alleged representations have been filed before the Court. Having admitted that their father made several representations, the onus shifts to the petitioners to show that the earliest representation made by their father was within the time limit stipulated in Section 18(2)(b) of the Act. The petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Therefore, this Court has no option, but to hold that the claim of the petitioners’ father for reference of the dispute under Section 18 is barred by limitation. There is yet another ground for dismissing this writ petition. The petitioners slept over the issue for decades and suddenly woke up with a legal notice got issued on 17.11.2003. Not even a scrap of paper has been filed in support of their averment that for a long time they have been pursuing with the respondents. They have donned the role of Rip Van Winkle. Very surprisingly the petitioners have not even disclosed the time around which their father died. From these facts, the conclusion is irresistible that the claim of the petitioners is wholly speculative and the writ petition suffers from uncondonable laches. Assuming that the respondents have not discharged their statutory duty under Section 18 and the valuable right is vested in the petitioners, while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court would not extend its helping hand to the persons, who were indolent and lethargic in asserting their rights, if any (see State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai[2], Tilokchand and Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay and another[3], R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharastra[4]). For all the abovementioned reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the writ petition, WPMP.No.4727 of 2005 filed by the petitioners for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous. C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Date: 02.07.2008 ES LR copies to be marked. [1] 2000 (2) ALD 418 [2] AIR 1964 SC 1006 [3] AIR 1970 SC 898 [4] AIR 1974 SC 259