IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 256 OF 2010 IN STAMP NUMBER (APPLN.) NO. 2272 OF 2010 NATIONAL AVIATION COMPANY OF INDIA LTD., ... Applicant Versus M/S. UNITED AIR TRAVEL AND 2 ORS., ... Respondents Mr. Shivan Dessai,advocate for the applicant. Mr. P. P. Singh,advocate for Respondent nos. 1 & 2. Coram:- A. P. LAVANDE, J. Date:- 16th August, 2011 P.C: Heard Mr. Dessai, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. By this application, the applicant seeks condonation of delay of 421 days in filing applicaiton for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 25/2/2009 passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge-3, North Goa, Panaji in Criminal Appeal No.66/2008 by which appeal preferred by the respondents against judgment and order of conviction dated 29/7/2008 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panaji in Criminal Case No.849/OA/02/C convicting the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. By the impugned order the lower appellate Court has set aside the conviction of the respondents no.2. 3. Mr. Dessai, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that though the delay is substantial, the same has been caused on account of time taken in taking decision by the applicant. The applicant is a Government Company and as such, some time was taken in taking decision to file application/appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate Court. Learned counsel relied upon the averments made in paragraph 3 of the application which disclose that substantial time was taken in taking a decision regard filing of appeal on account of the procedure which had to be followed by the applicant, which is a Government company. 4. According to the learned counsel, the term "sufficient cause" has to be liberally construed and serious prejudice would be caused to the applicant if delay is not condoned inasmuch as the acquittal by the lower Appellate Court by reversing a well reasoned order of the learned Magistrate is patently unsustainable in law. In support of his submission,learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: i) Shiv Mandhukar Giri Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 2189. ii) Chatrapati Co-op. Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Amit s/o. Ashok Thepade, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 3104. 5. Mr Singh, learned counsel for the respondent nos 1 and 2 submitted that the conduct of the applicant has been quite casual and the applicant did not bother to collect the certified copy till 26/6/2009 and thereafter the explanation offered by the applicant is that the file was moved from table to table to take decision as to whether to file appeal or not. In support of his submissions Mr. Singh relied upon unreported Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. C.L. Jain Woolen Mills Pvt.Ltd and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of P.K. Ramchandran Vs. State of Kerala and anr., (1997) 7 Supreme Court Cases 556 and in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and anr. Vs. State of Gujarat, 1981 1 SCC 495. 6. Record discloses that the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order passed by the lower appellate Court on 25/2/009 was applied for on the same date and the same was ready for delivery on 27/2/2009. The certified copy was collected on 26/6/2009. The period of limitation for filing special leave to appeal against the order of acquittal is 60 days. There is absolutely no explanation as to why the certified copy was not collected from 27/2/2009 till 25/06/2009. 7. It is well settled that a party seeking condonation of delay has to offer explanation for the delay caused upon expiry of the period prescribed for filing the appeal. In the present case, there is absolutely no explanation as to why after the period of 60 days expired, the certified copy which was ready was not collected by the applicant. Somewhere in last week of April 2009 the period prescribed for filing leave to appeal had expired. This being the position, I find that the judgment relied upon on behalf of the respondents in case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and anr. (supra) is squarely applicable. The conduct of the applicant is such that the applicant does not deserve any indulgence from this Court inasmuch as the reasons given for seeking condonation of delay are absolutely untenable in law. 8. As stated above, there is absolutely no explanation as to why the certified copy of the impugned order was not collected from February 2009, almost for a period of four months. The explanation given by the applicant for the delay after the certified copy was obtained also is vague and no details have been given. Although the applicant is a Government company, this fact by itself would not be sufficient to condone the delay of 421 days caused in filing the application for special leave to appeal. It is to be noted that after the expiry of period of limitation, certain rights are created in favour of the other party in whose favour an order is passed and therefore the burden is on the party seeking condonation of delay to justify by giving explanation that the party was prevented by certain cause from not filing the appeal within the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. No doubt, in the two judgments relied upon by Mr. Desai, learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the term of "sufficient cause" is to be liberally construed by placing reliance upon the judgment reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353. It is well settled that each case has to be decided on its own merits. 9. In my considered opinion, the conduct of the applicant in the present case after the judgment was delivered by the lower appellate Court was quite causal and as such, I am of the considered view that the applicant has not made out sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Even applying the ratio in the judgments relied upon by Mr. Dessai, I find myself unable to hold that the applicant has made out sufficient cause to condone the delay of 421 days. In the result, therefore, I do not find any merit in the application. Hence, the application is dismissed. A. P. LAVANDE, J. ap/-