( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 695 OF 2002 1. Pravara Rural Education Society’s Pravara Public School at Pravaranagar, Tq. Shrirampur, Dist. Ahmednagar, through its Secretary, Smt. Vidya Pandurang Waje, R/o as above. 2. Pravara Rural Education Society’s Pravara Public School at Pravaranagar, Tq. Shrirampur, Dist. Ahmednagar, through its Principal, Shri Kisan Sukhdeo Temkar, R/o as above. PETITIONERS VERSUS Viroba s/o Rambhau Padir, R/o Kolar Bhagwati, Tq. Shrirampur, Dist. Ahmednagar RESPONDENT ..... Mr. A.D. Shinde, advocate holding for Mr. V.D. Hon, advocate for the petitioners. Mr. R.L. Kute, advocate holding for Mr. R.N. Dhorde, advocate for the respondent. ..... [CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] [DATE : 24th June, 2009] ( 2 ) ORAL JUDGEMENT : 1. By this petition, the petitioners are challenging judgement and order rendered by the learned Member of the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, in review petition (ULP) No. 2/2001 in the context of complaint case (ULP) No. 426/1998. 2. Question of significance involved in the petition is whether the Industrial Court has power of review likewise a regular civil Court and whether in exercise of such power, the earlier judgement rendered in complaint case (ULP) No. 426/1998 could be upsetted likewise an Appellate Tribunal. 3. The respondent was appointed to work as watchman w.e.f. 01-06-1987 at the petitioner No. 2 school. He was lateron transferred to junior college at Kolhar. His case before the learned Member of the Industrial Court was that he was employed on payment of Rs. 1700/- per month as monthly salary. He asserted ( 3 ) that without any substantial reason, the petitioners stopped payments of the salary. His salary was reduced to Rs. 1634/- and subsequently, it was changed to Rs. 30/- per day. The change in the salary structure was so made without giving him proper opportunity of hearing. He was in continuous service for more than 240 days during the preceding year and, therefore, was entitled to claim continuation of the service as well as compensation on account of unfair labour practice adopted by the petitioners. He filed such proceedings under section 28 read with Items 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule-IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, “the MRTU & PULP Act”). 4. The petitioners challenged jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to entertain the complaint case (ULP) No. 426/1990. The petitioners averred that the respondent was never appointed as watchman. The petitioners contended that the respondent was not in service from 1997 and that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such complaint. ( 4 ) 5. The learned Member of the Industrial Court considered the question of jurisdiction. The learned Member, by judgement and order dated 27th March, 2001, came to the conclusion that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute because it arose out of service conditions of the employee (respondent) who was governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short, “the MEPS Act”). The learned Member of the Industrial Court held that in the teeth of such special enactment, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is impliedly barred under section 9 of the MEPS Act. The complaint case filed by the respondent was, therefore, dismissed for want of jurisdiction with liberty granted to him to take appropriate proceedings before the School Tribunal. 6. The respondent preferred review application (ULP) No. 1/42/2001. By order dated 07-11-2001, which is impugned herein, the learned Member of the Industrial Court allowed the review application and quashed its ( 5 ) earlier judgement and order dated 27-03-2001. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. The controversy involved in this petition is about availability of review powers with the Industrial Court. It is not necessary to examine whether the case of the respondent could come within provisions of section 9 of the MEPS Act or he could have availed remedy before the civil Court. Once the Industrial Court had disposed of the complaint application for the reason that there was total lack of jurisdiction available to it, after holding that the case of the respondent could come within provisions of the MEPS Act, the same judgement and order could not have been ordinarily upsetted in the exercise of review jurisdiction. 9. Section 30 of the MRTU & PULP Act deals with powers of Industrial and Labour Courts. The proviso appended to sub-section (2) of section 30 would make it amply clear that the Court may exercise review powers ( 6 ) only in context of the interim order passed by it. There is no review power available in the context of the final orders of the Tribunal. In the absence of any specific provision under the MRTU & PULP Act, it is difficult to assume that the learned Member of the Industrial Court could have exercised the review power. 10. It is well settled that the review power is creation of the statute. Unless there is specific confirment of such power, a Tribunal cannot assume such a power in order to change its judgement and order. There was no arithmetical or typographical mistake which could be cured in the exercise of inherent power. The learned Member of the Industrial Court had decided the jurisdictional issue on merits. The same Tribunal cannot, due to some change in the view, exercise the review jurisdiction likewise an appellate Court/Tribunal. The learned Member of the Industrial Court failed to appreciate the scope of the review jurisdiction. ( 7 ) 11. The Apex Court in “Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Management of M/s. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and others” (2005 AIR SCW 1561), held that the Industrial Tribunal had become functus officio after the award was passed under section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, had no power to recall the award. The Apex Court observed : “Applying these principles it is apparent that where a Court or quasi judicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its judgement or order can be reviewed on merit only if the Court or the quasi judicial authority is vested with power of review by express provision or by necessary implication. The procedural review belongs to a different category. In such a review, the Court or quasi judicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate proceeds to do so, but in doing so commits a procedural illegality which goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by the Court or quasi judicial authority without notice to the opposite party or under a ( 8 ) mistaken impression that the notice had been served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the power of procedural review may be invoked. In such a case the party seeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground which may justify a review.” 12. In “Kuwarben Chhabildas Patel through her C.A. Pratapsingh Chhabildas Patel v. State of Maharashtra and others” 2003 (3) Mh.L.J. 948, a Single Bench of this Court held that the Slum Tribunal constituted under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re- development) Act, 1971, cannot exercise the review powers. 13. The Industrial Tribunal had no power to review its own judgement and particularly, when there was no new material discovered after the earlier judgement and ( 9 ) order or any patent error pointed out from face of the record. Considering these aspects of the matter, the impugned judgement and order is without jurisdiction and liable to be interfered with. 14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned judgement and order is set aside. The respondent would be at liberty to seek appropriate remedy before the appropriate forum as may be permissible under the law. The Rule is made absolute. No costs. 15. In view of disposal of writ petition, the civil application No. 2570/2003 does not survive and hence, stands disposed of accordingly. [ V.R. KINGAONKAR ] JUDGE NPJ/WP695-02