IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA C. REV. No.5 of 2009 SHEO KUMAR SINGH, SON OF SHRI BALDEO SINGH RESIDENT OF VILLAGE MAHUA SINHARI, P.S.- MAHUA, DISTRICT- VAISHALI. .Petitioner Versus 1. CHAIRMAN,STATE TRANS.APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, PATNA 2. NORTH BIHAR REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, MUZAFFARPUR THROUGH ITS SECRETARY. 3. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, VAISHALI AT HAJIPUR 4. BINOD RAM, SON OF SHRI SAKALDEEP RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE ALIPUR MUKUND, P.S.- MAHUA, DISTRICT- VAISHALI 5. THE STATE OF BIHAR ……..Opposite parties For the petitioner Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma For the State ----------- 4 01.05.2009 Heard Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma for the petitioner. 2. This review application has been preferred by the appellant of L.P.A. No. 662 of 2008 (Shiv Kumar Singh Vrs. Chairman State Transport Appellate Tribunal Patna & Ors), whereby the appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 4.12.2008. learned counsel for the petitioner submits that his appeal was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that he had failed to produce a copy of the agreement dated 1.3.1988, making settlement with respect to set up a bus-stand at village Mahua, District- Vaishali. It is, therefore, submitted that he may be permitted to place on record a copy of the agreement, the order dismissing the appeal may be recalled, and the appeal may be re-heard on merits after consideration of the agreement. 3. The facts are not in dispute. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this application may be indicated. The 2 very proceedings are with respect to settlement to set up a bus- stand at village Mahua, in pursuance of the advertisement issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Patna. The present petitioner, one Manoj Kumar, Dayanand Singh, and others were applicants. After consideration of the applications, the learned Authority found that none of the applicants qualified for settlement. A fresh advertisement was, therefore, ordered for where all the eligible persons, and all eligible persons were entitled to apply for consideration. The said Manoj Kumar preferred a revision application before the Transport Tribunal bearing T.R. No. 39 of 2006, and the present petitioner preferred a similar revision application bearing T.R. No. 37 of 2006, challenging the said order dated 11.9.2006, both of which were dismissed by common order dated 16.3.2007. Manoj Kumar and the present petitioner preferred separate writ petitions before this Court bearing C.W.J.C. No. 6666 of 2007 Manoj Kumar Vrs. The State of Bihar & Ors), and C.W.J.C. No. 6744 of 2007 (Shiv Kumar Singh Vrs. Chairman State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Patna & Ors ), both of which were dismissed by a common order dated 8.7.2008, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Aggrieved by the order, the present petitioner preferred L.P.A. No. 662 of 2008 (Shiv Kumar Singh Vrs. Chairman State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Patna & Ors), which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 4.12.2008. The said Manoj Kumar had also challenged the order of the learned Single Judge by preferring L.P.A. No. 624 of 2008, 3 and was dismissed by a separate order dated 4.12.2008.There is no knowing whether or not Manoj Kumar pursued the matter any further in this Court or not. The present writ petitioner has filed this review application in view of the following observations made in order of the Division Bench. “5. Although, the counsel for the appellant criticized the judgment of the Single Judge on diverse grounds, inter alia, that the contentions advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner (present appellant) were not decided and that Manoj Kumar was not necessary party in the transport revision filed by the appellant before the State Transport Tribunal and, more over, there was no objection by Manoj Kumar as he had already filed a separate revision application but as a matter of fact, the counsel for the appellant did not show us the agreement dated 1st March, 1988 entered into between him and the district administration despite our repeated query. The perusal of the agreement was important as it has been cancelled on two stated grounds, namely, (one) that the settle (appellant) was involved in a murder case and (two) that by power of attorney executed in favour of Ramprit Rai, he has sublet and parted with the possession of the bus-stand. We have to, therefore, assume that on the stated grounds the agreement was liable to be cancelled On facts, both the stated grounds are not denied.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he was unable to produce copy of the agreement dated 1.3.1998, as a result of which he could not satisfy the Court about incorrectness of the decision declaring him ineligible on the two grounds of his involvement in the murder case, and letting out the premises of the bus-stand. 5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. In spite of repeated queries, learned counsel for the petitioner 4 purposely refused to see reason that the proceedings hitherto resulting in order dated 16.3.2007 of the Tribunal, the order dated 8.7.2008 of the learned Single Judge, and the order dated 4.12.2008 of the Division Bench, were confined to the question of validity or otherwise of the order dated 11.9.2006. As stated hereinabove, that was an order whereby the applicants were found to be ineligible , fresh advertisement was directed whereby all the eligible persons were at liberty to submit their applications for consideration in accordance with law. We have not been able to appreciate from the needlessly elaborate submissions on behalf of the petitioner as to the relevance of the said agreement dated 1.3.1988, in the present context. Secondly, if it had any relevance at all, the petitioner was free to produce it in his revision application before the Tribunal, the Writ Court, and before the Appellate Court. On his own showing, he was himself a party to the agreement, and, therefore, his failure or refusal to produce in three substantive proceedings initiated by him is entirely attributable to him. It has although been a gross abuse of the process of the Court which has worsened the situation beyond all tolerance by preferring the frivolous review application. 6. The further question is, can such an errant litigant be permitted to bring upon such an unbearable load on the judicial system. This issue was raised by one of us (S.K.Katriar, J) and answered in order dated 7.1.2009, in Civil Review No. 127 of 2007 (Vidya Prasad Singh Versus The State of Bihar), the relevant 5 portion of which is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference. “ It is difficult to recall the judgment in question also in view of growing pendency in courts in India. I am reminded of the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Bibek Debroy in his book entitled „In the Dock: Absurdities of Indian Law‟, that the pending litigations in this country without any addition thereto, will take 324 years for disposal. The following portion of the book by Fali S. Nariman, entitled „India‟s legal system: Can it be saved”, are relevant in the present context: “More than one hundred years ago, a law member in the Government of India (Hobhouse) recorded in a minute dated 5 September 1872(on the Bill leading to the Privy Council Appeal Act, 1874) the following observation: In considering what limit should be assigned to the power of appealing, our leading maxim is, that it is the interest of the commonwealth to have an end of law suits. No man has a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes. The state‟s duty is discharged when it has provided such a reasonable amount of attention and skill and honesty as will satisfy reasonable men that their causes have been decided, erroneously or otherwise, on the merits, and according to the best ability of the judge, and so will prevent them from feeling that resentment of sheer injustice which drives people to take the law into their hands and to wage private war. Upon this principle all laws place some limits to litigation. And so have we placed limits to the power of appealing. 6 Pithily put, and elegantly phrased. The portion about no man having a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wished was quoted by Justice Gajendragadkar (who later became Chief Justice of India) in one of the early reports of the Law Commission of India, but despite what was so wisely said by Mr. Hobhouse and again by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, our laws continue to provide (by way of appeals, reviews and revisions) unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get private affairs ultimately settled. For instance, we have now abolished second appeals, and yet lawyers go on arguing endlessly about the maintainability of intra-court appeals under special laws.” Furthermore, learned counsel for the writ petitioner is right in his submission that in case of doubt and difficulty with respect to pre-emption cases, the court should lean in favour of the purchaser.” 7. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Writ Court, the order dated 11.9.2006 had spent its force. Settlement was finalized, and settled in favour of a third person. The said Dayanand Singh, the petitioner of the analogous Civil Review no. 4 of 2009, has preferred T.R. No. 35 of 2007, before the Tribunal, challenging the fresh settlement. We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioner has burdened this Court with a most unwarranted matter and should be mulcted with costs. Soon after the submissions had on behalf of the petitioner concluded, we 7 offered more than once to the learned counsel for the petitioner to withdraw this application but he expressed his inability. 8. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/-, which shall be deposited in the High Court Legal Services Committee, Patna, within a period of four weeks from today. pkj (S.K. Katriar, J.) ( Kishore K. Mandal, J. )