1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA WRIT PETITION NO. 182/2011 Shri Mahadeo Laxman Nagzarkar, (deceased) through his L.R.s, a. Yahoda Mahadeo Nagzarkar, b. Shri Santosh Mahadeo Nagzarkar, c. Kum. Laxmi Mahadeo Nagzarkar, d. Shri Damodar Mahadeo Nagzarkar All Indian Nationals and residents of Alemvaddo, Chinchinim, Salcete- Goa .. Petitioners. (Ori. respondents) Versus Shri Jose Antonio Damaciano Laticia Dias Mendes, Major, represented by his duly Constituted Attorney, Smt. Alexandreta Mari Crispina Aguair Mendes, major, Resident of House No.797, Alemvaddo, Chinchinim, Salcete- Goa. .. Respondent (Ori. Applicant) Mr. Shivan Dessai, Advocate for the petitioners. Mr. J. Godinho, Advocate for the respondent. CORAM : A. P. LAVANDE, J. DATE : 13 th July, 2011. ORAL JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Dessai, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Godinho, learned Counsel for the 2 respondent. 2. Rule. By consent, heard forthwith. 3. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the judgment and order dated 24th December, 2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal in Mundkar Revision Application No.45/2004 by which the revision application preferred against the order dated 28th June, 2002 passed by the Deputy Collector Margao in Case No.SDO/SAL/MUND/APPL/64/2001 has been partly allowed. The appeal before the Deputy Collector was filed against the order dated 2nd August, 2001 passed by the Mamlatdar, Salcete in case No.MUND/30/90. 4. In the proceedings between the parties before the Civil Court, an issue of mundkarship arose, which was referred to Mamlatdar for adjudication in Case No.MUND/30/90. By the order dated 2nd August, 2001, the Mamlatdar decided the issue against the respondent. The order passed by the Mamlatdar was ex-parte. It was the case of the respondent that he was not aware of the order passed by the Mamlatdar and the appeal was filed challenging the order passed by the Mamlatdar with an application for 3 condonation of delay. 5. The Deputy Collector by judgment and order dated 28th June, 2002 dismissed the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal preferred by the respondent herein. Against the said judgment and order, the respondent preferred the above revision application to the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment and order has partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Deputy Collector for deciding the application for condonation of delay and thereafter, to proceed in accordance with law. 6. Mr. Dessai, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Deputy Collector in the judgment and order dated 28th June, 2002 has recorded the finding against the respondent on the aspect of condonation of delay and thereafter, proceeded to dispose of the appeal on merits. According to learned Counsel although the Deputy Collector was not entitled to deal with the appeal on merits after holding against the respondent on the issue of condonation of delay, the fact remains that the Deputy Collector has given finding against the respondent on the aspect of condonation of delay and, therefore, the Administrative Tribunal could not have remanded the matter to the Deputy Collector. 4 7. Mr. Godinho, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Deputy Collector has mixed up the issue of condonation of delay and merits and the Deputy Collector could not have disposed of the appeal on merits before deciding the issue of condonation of delay. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Deputy Collector has not given any finding on the aspect of condonation of delay and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in remanding the matter to the Deputy Collector and as such, no interference is warranted with the impugned order. 8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the record, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order is patently unsustainable in law. No doubt, the Deputy Collector could not have decided the appeal preferred by the respondent on merits and he ought to have decided the application for condonation of delay first. But this fact by itself is not sufficient to hold that no finding is given by the Deputy Collector on the aspect of condonation of delay. Perusal of the order dated 28th June, 2002 discloses that the Deputy Collector has clearly adverted to the aspect as to whether sufficient cause has been made out by the respondent in 5 preferring the appeal beyond the period of limitation and has given the finding against the respondent. No doubt, order passed by the Deputy Collector is not happily worded, but the fact remains that the aspect of condonation of delay has been adverted to by the Deputy Collector. Both the Counsel are right in contending that the Deputy Collector could not have decided the appeal on merits after deciding the issue of condonation of delay against the respondent herein. But this fact by itself would not be sufficient to hold that the Deputy Collector has not given any finding on the aspect of the condonation of delay. Specifically the Deputy Collector has mentioned in the operative part of the order that the application for condonation of delay is dismissed and as such, the contention of the respondent that the application for condonation of delay was not considered cannot be accepted. 9. In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment and order remanding the matter to the Deputy Collector is quashed and set aside. The Administrative Tribunal to decide the appeal on merits in the light of the observations made above. 10. The parties to appear before the Administrative Tribunal on 17th August, 2011 at 10.00 a.m. The 6 Administrative Tribunal shall decide Mundkar Revision Application No.45/2004 in the light of the observations made above in accordance with law. 11. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. A. P. LAVANDE, J. SMA