.4 F ^ HIGH COURT OF CHHAmS(?ARH AT BILASPU WntPetition No, 1872 of 2002 07 ^. D.P. Verma -Versus- The Stete ofChhattisgarh & others y-fli Post for order on J February, 2006. Sd/- Satish K. Agnihotri Judge 2.2.2006 •V 0;^ HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURB CHHATnSGARH: BILASPUR Single Beach: Hon'ble Shti Satish K. Aguihotri, J. WRIT PETITION N0. 1872 OP 2002 Petitioner Respondents D.P. Verma, Retired M.P.P. & A.S;, aged about 75 years, R/o. House No. MIG-213, Nutan Enclave, New Smile Sweets New Sarkauda, Bilaspur. Versus : 1. The State of Chhattisgarh, Through Secretaiy Piiiance D.K.S. Bhawau, Raipur. 2. The Dircctor, Pinaace, Accounts & Pension, Dircctorate Raipur(C.G.). 3. The State of Madhya Pradesh Through the Secretary, Fiuaace Vallabh Bhavan, Bhopal(C.G.j. 4. The Dircctor, Fiaaace, Accounts & Peasion, Directorate, Raipur (C.G.). 5. The Treasuiy Officer, District Treasuiy, BUaspur (C.G.). Present: Shri S.C. Verma, coimsel for the Petitioner. Shri Paakaj Shrivastava, Panel lawyer for fhe Respondents No. 1, 2, 4 aad 5. Shri Sachia Singb Rajput, couiisel for fhe Respondent No. 3 ORDBR (3<i February, 2006) Heard. 1. The present writ petition ffled under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of ludia seeks a direction against the respondents to pay uiterest for delayed paymeut of pension aad gratuity. '1 080 The facts ia nutsheU. are that fbe petitioner was working as Fiaance & AcGounts Of&cer in the treasury departnieiit of undivided State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner retired from his offiee on 28.2.1989 on attamiag the age of superacmuation. The petitioner was not graated retu-al dues uniaediately. The petltioner started receiviag his retiral beaefits after a period of niore fhan seven years fi-oin 7.12.1996 (Aiuiexure P-2). The Seiiior Treasiuy Officer, DistrictTreasury Raipur directed the Treasury Ofi&cer, District Treasury, Bilaspur for release of pension aud gratuily in April aad Deceiuber 1996 respectively. The petitioner has filed fhis petition claiming interest on fhe coinmuted pension amount i.e. 48450/- fixiin 1.3.1989 to 7.4.1996, fhe day petitioner received fhe amount after retiremeat on 28.2.1989. The petitioner fiirther claicued iaterest on gratuily i.e. 19800/- from 1.3.1989 to 6.12.1996, fh.e day petitioner received gratuity. The petitioner also clauned interest on the ataount of pension i.e. 2324/- fromi 1.3.1989to6.12.1996. The petitioner has inade a representation ou 5.9.1997 (Axiuexure P-6) to the Director, Accounts aad Pension, Bhopal for payment of uiterest on the above stated amount for the delayed period. Beiag aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this petition on 30.8.2002. Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, leamed counsel appearing for fhe respondent No. 3 objected to fhe jurisdiction of this Court on Oesl 1 "^ 'i the ground that fhe petitioner retired from. Jabalpur. The petitioner was granted pension fi?oiii Jabalpur and the pension was calculated aad released fix>in the of&ce of Director, Treasuiy and Accoiints, Bhopal and as such no cause of action pardy or whoUy arose within the territorial jurisdiction of fhe High Court of Chhattisgarh and as such fhis petition is not laauitaiaable under Article 226 (2) of fhe Constitution of India. 7. Leamed couasel for the respondent No. 3 further subinitted on inerit fhat on retireinent, the petitioner was paid provisional pension of Rs. 650/- per inonth and provisional gratuity of Rs. 19305/- on 1.3.1989 by fhe Joint Director, Treasuiy and Pension, Jabalpur because the departuiental enquiry was pendiag against the petitioner. Rule 64 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1976, provides for graat provisional pension and provisioaal gratuily in case departaiental proceediug is penduig against the retired exuployee tiU coinpletion of the proceediilg. It was further subiuitted fhat fhe provisional aaiount was iucreased froia 50% to 90% oa 1.7.1991. The petitioner was paid fuU pension in fhe year 1996, when aU the proceediags aad iavestigation peuding against hitn was concluded. 8. Shri Pankaj Shrivastava, leamed counsel appearmg for the respondents No. 1, 2, 4 and 5 adopted the subinission aiade by the respondent No. 3. 9. I have heard leamed counsel for the parties and perused the records. 082 10. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India provides that any High Court exercisiag jiirisdiction in. relation to fhe temtories wifhia which the cause of action whoUy or ia part arises for fhe exercise of such power, notwittistanduig that the seat of such Goverainent or auftiorily or fhe residence of such person is not withia those territories. 11. In the preseat case, the petitioner retired on 28.2.1989 froia Jabalpur, but the pension was released froin fhe office of Treasuiy Officer, District Treasury, Bflaspur at the direction of fhe Senior Treasuiy Officer, District Treasuiy, Raipur. 12. The State of Chhattisgarh was carved out from undivided State of Madhya Pradesh on 1.11.2000 under fhe provisions of Madhya Pradesh Reoi^aaization Act, 2000. Raipur and BUaspur are situated wittun the territorialjurisdiction of State of Chhattisgarh and fhe final pension was released froTa- the Distriet Treasuiy, Bilaspur at the direGtion of the Senior Treasuiy OfScer, Raipur and as such it camiot be held that no cause of action even in. part has arisen wifhia fhe territory of State of Chhattisgarh. 13. The Supreme Court ia Oil aad Natural Gas Commissioa Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others1 held as under:- "5. Claiise (1) ofArticle 226 begius wifh a non abstante clause - notwifhstanding anything ia Article 32 - and pirovides fhat eveiy High Court shatl have power "throughout the territories iu relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to aay person or aufhority, includmg in appropriate cases, auy Ctoverament, '^yithin fhose territories" directions, orders i(1994) 4 Supreme Court Cases 711 083 or writs, for the enforcenient of aay of the r^hts conferred by Part III or for aay ofher purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Coiirt inay exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, whoUy or in part, had arisen withia the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notavifhstandiiig that the seat of such Goveraiuent or aufhority or the residence of such person is not wifhia fhose territories. On a plain readiag ofthe aforesaid two clauses ofArticle 226 of fhe Constitution it becoines clear fhat a High Court can exercise fh.e power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforceinent of any of the fundaniental rights conferred by Part III offhe Constitution or for aiiy other purpose if ftie cause of action, whoUy or in part, had arisen within fhe territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwifhstaiiding that the seat of the Govemment or auttionty or fhe residence of the person agaiast whoin the direction, order or writ is issued is not wifhia the said temtories. In. order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO inust show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen wifhiu the territorial jurisdietion of that Court. That is at best its case in. the writ petition.. 6.1t is weU settled fhat the expression "cause of action" rueaus that bundle of facts which fhe petitioaer inust prove, if traversed, to entitle 1iim fo a judgnient ia his favour by the Court. In Chaad Koiir V. Partab Siagh Lord Watson Said: "....fhe cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which inay be set up by fhe defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by fhe plaintiff. It refers eiitirely to the grouiid set forth m fhe plaint as the cause of action, or, ia other words, to fhe inedia upon which fhe plauitifF asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion ia his favour. 084 14. Therefore, ia determiiung the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction fhe court m.ust take all the facts pleaded is. support of the cause of action tato consideration albeit without einbarkitig upon an enquiry as to the correctoness or ofherwise of fhe Said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition xnust be answered on fhe basis of avennents raade ia the petitiou, the trufh or otherwise whereof being iminaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction inust be decided on fhe facts pleaded ia fhe petition. Therefore, the question whefher iu the instant case the Ciilcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertam and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts aUeged inust depend upon whefher the avennents inade ui paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of fhe cause of action had arisen wifhin fhe jurisdiction of the Culcutta High Court*. The Supreine Court in Natloaal Textile Corporatioa Ltd. and others V. M/s. Haribox Swalrana aad others2 held as under :- "10. Under Clause (2) ofArdcle 226 ofthe Constitution, the High Court is einpowered to issue writs, orders or directions to aay Govenunent, authority or person exercisiag jurisdiction iu relation to the temtories wifhin which the cause of action, whotly or in part, anses for the exercise of such power, aotwithstaading that the seat of such Govemment or authority or fhe residence of such person is not withia those territories. Cause of action as understood iu the civil proceedin.gs ineaas eveiy fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove iu order to support his right to a judginent of the Court. To put it in a differeat way, it is bundle offacts which taken with law 2AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1998 085 appUcable to fhein, gives the plaintiff a right to reUef agaiust the defendant. In Union of India V. Adnai Exports Ltd. AIR 2002 SC 126 in the context of clause (2) of Ardcle 226 of the Constitution, it has been explained fhat each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion fhat those facts give rise to a cause of action wifhin the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis fhat is involved in fhe case. Facts which have no bearing wifh fhe Us or dispiite iuvolved in fhe case, do uot give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concemed. A similar question was examined in State of Rajasfhan V. M/s Swaika Properties, AIR 1985 SC 1289. Here certain properdes belougiag to a company which had its registered office in Calcutta were sought to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 of fhe Rajasfhan Urban Iinprovenient Act was served upon the company at Calcutta. The question which arose for consideration was whether the service of notice at fb.e head oflBce of the compaay at Calcutta could give rise to a cause of action within the State of West Bengal to enable the Calcutta High Court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where challenge to acquisitioa proceedm.gs conducted ia Jaipur was inade. It was held that the entire cause of action culmmating ia fhe acquisition of fhe land under Section 152 of the Rajasthan Act arose wifhin fhe territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and it was not necessaiy for fhe coinpany to plead fhe service of notice upon thein at Calcutta for graut of appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashiag the notice issued by the Rajasfhan Govemnient iinder Section 52 8 086 of the Act. It was fhus held fhat Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition". 15. Applying ratio of fhe decisions of fhe Supreme Court cited above, it is weU estabUshed fhat the High Court is einpowered to issue writs/orders or direction to aay Govenuaent Aufhority or person exercising jurisdiction ia relation to the territories within which the cause of action, whoUy or ia part arises for the exercise of such power. In the present case, cause of action which ineaas buadle of facts which the petitioner must prove, has arisen with fhe territorial jurisdiction of State of Chhatdsgarh isi part because the order granting pension was passed at Raipur, which is now a part of State of Chtiatdsgarh. Hence, it is held that fhis Court has jurisdiction to entertain fhis petition. 16. On inerit, the petitioner was graiited provisional peitsion and provisional gratuity iuiinediately on. retirenient because departinental enquiiy was pendiag agaiTist fhe petitioner, uiider Rule 64 of the Madhya Pradesh Civffl Service (Pension) Rules, 1976. In such cases, where the departmental or judicial enquiry/proceediag is pending, the retired einployee is entitled to provisional pension only i.e. 50% of the total pension. 17. In ftie present case, even fhe payraent of provisional payment was increased from 50% to 90% by oider dated 1.7.1991. In fhe facts of the case, it caanot be held fhat fhe payment of fuU pension aad gratuily was withheld without auy reason. The petitioner was paid provisional pension and provisional 08 7 < '•il .1 Bablu Nf-1 gratuity fbom March, 1989 and thereafter full paymeiit of pension and gratuitywas luade. Thus, fhe petitioner is not entitled to any iaterest on delayed pa3?XD.ent ofpension as the payinent of pension and gratuity was delayed ba aecottnt of pendeney dfthe department proceediags. 18. The petitioiierwas paid fuB pension and gTatutty in the year 1996, tlhereafler tlie petitiQn.ei has not taten aiiy^^s^ seeldng^a dufcc^n of ttus Cou^ Tfae petitioner has filed fhis petition 30.8,2008 wifhoyt explaumig reasons &r sueh del^. It is well settfed ^principle oflaw tihat a writ ciaiLnot be entertatned after a Icnag delay wlafiri •the petitkiiter has &fled to esl^Ush that delay^^^ ^ reasonable. ©nthat acc&lurt also fhjs petitibn <leserves to be dislnissed. : • ^ ' ,. . ,' '.;':.':. 1;' 19. For the reasons stated above/:ftus petitiDn is dismjssetl.j No order as to costs. . Sd/- Satish K.Aghihotri Judge