IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.581 of 2010 Divisional Manager, The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Divisional Office, Daya Complex, Aghoriya Bazar, P.S.Kazi Mohammadpur, District-Muzaffarpur. ….Appellant. Versus 1 The State of Bihar. 2. Jagdish Paswan son of Late Bhikhari Paswan. 3. Chandan Kumar son of Sri Jagdish Paswan 4. Chanchala Kumari daughter of Sri Jagdish Paswan 5. Kundan Kumar son of Sri Jagdish Paswan minor son of Sri Jagdish Paswan under guardianship of their father All 2 to 5 are resident of village-Kishanpur, P.S.Bathanaha, District-Sitamarhi. At present C/o Lalita Devi, Mohalla-Zero Mile, P.S. Ahiyapur, District-Muzaffarpur. 6. The District Judge-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Muzaffarpur. 7. Sri Arun Kumar Singh son of Naeshwar Singh, resident of village-Singrahiya, P.S.Sahiyara, District-Sitamarhi. ..Respondents. For the appellant : Mr. Barun Kumar Choudhary,Advocate. For respondent no.1 : Mr. P.K.Shahi, Advocate General Mr.Roy Shivaji Nath, A.A.G.-IV For respondent nos.2 to 5: Mr. Shambhu Saran Singh, Advocate. ----- With LPA No.678 of 2010 Pramod Mishra son of Late Tejnarain Mishra, resident of village + P.O.Thumma, P.S.Runnisaidpur, District-Sitamarhi. ….Respondent-Appellant. Versus 1. Jagdish Paswan son of Late Bhikhari Paswan. 2. Chandan Kumar son of Sri Jagdish Paswan 3. Chanchala Kumari daughter of Sri Jagdish Paswan 4. Kundan Kumar son of Sri Jagdish Paswan All permanent resident of village-Kishanpur, P.S.Bathanaha, district-Sitamarhi at present C/o Lalita Devi, Mohalla-Zero Mile, P.S. Ahiyapur, District- - 2 - Muzaffarpur. … Writ petitioners-Respondents. 1st set. 5. The State of Bihar. 6. The District Judge-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Muzaffarpur. 7. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Daya Complex, Aghoriya Bazar, P.S.Kazi Mohammadpur, District-Muzaffarpur. Respondent no.3-Respondents 2nd set. 8. Sri Arun Kumar Singh son of Naeshwar Singh, resident of village-Singrahiya, P.S.Sahiyara, District-Sitamarhi. Respondent no.4-Respondent 3rd set. ----- For the appellant : Mr. Y.V.Giri, Senior Advocate Mr. Raju Giri, Advocate. For respondent no.5 : Mr. P.K.Shahi, Advocate General Mr.Roy Shivaji Nath, A.A.G.-I For respondent no.7 : Mr.Barun Kumar Choudhary, Advocate Mr.Lalit Narain Jha, Advocate. ----- P R E S E N T: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MIHIR KUMAR JHA O R D E R (28.04.2010) As per Dipak Misra, C.J. In these two appeals, the assail is to the order dated 19.01.2010 passed by the learned single Judge in CWJC No.13976 of 2009. L.P.A.No.581 of 2001 has been filed by the Insurer, namely, the Oriental Insurance Company Limited and L.P.A.no.678 of 2010 has been preferred by the owner of the vehicle. Be it noted, the defensibility of the order is called in question on the similar foundation. - 3 - 2. The basic facts which are necessitous to be depicted for adjudication of these appeals are that an action was initiated under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, „the Act‟) by the claimants who are the private respondents herein in claim case No.388 of 2008 before the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal, Muzaffarpur (for short, „the tribunal‟) for grant of compensation. The tribunal addressed itself to the issue whether the tribunal at Muzaffarpur had got jurisdiction to admit the claim petition and grant compensation to the claimants. The motor accident, as admitted, had taken place under the jurisdiction of Bathnaha Police Station in the district of Sitamahri. The tribunal on scrutiny of Section 166 of the Act came to hold that the tribunal at Muzaffarpur had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 3. It is worth noting while coming to such a conclusion the tribunal took note of the provision in Section 166 of the Act, the amendment that came into existence in Motor vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act 54 of 1994) and the Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 (Act 30 of 2001). The learned single Judge, as is manifest from the order, took note of sub-section (2) of Section 166 which was inserted by way of substitution by Amendment Act 54 of 1994. After scanning the said provision, the learned single Judge posed the question - 4 - whether the defendant resided within the jurisdiction of the Muzaffarpur Claims Tribunal to attract the concept of territorial jurisdiction. He recorded a finding that it is not disputed that the office of the Divisional Manager of the Insurance Company is situate at Muzaffarpur and hence, the claim could not be shut out from Muzaffarpur and the tribunal had erroneously appreciated the provision. As his evincible from the order of the learned single Judge, he has referred to Section 6A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which deals with Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation which basically provides that the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such appeal. The learned single Judge referred to the principle of statutory interpretation by learned Author Justice G.P.Singh and quoted a passage therefrom which deals with the object of Repealing and Amending Act. We think it apt to reproduce the said passage: “The object of Repealing and Amending Acts is not to bring in any change in law but to remove enactments which have become unnecessary. “Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendment to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence.” The repeal of an amending Act, therefore, has no repercussion on the parent Act which together with the amendments remains unaffected. It was, therefore, held that - 5 - section 6(1A) introduced in the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, by the amending Act of 1949 was not affected when the amending Act was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952.” 4. Thereafter, the learned single Judge opined that sub-section (2) of Section 166 very much remains on the statute notwithstanding repeal of Amendment Act 54 of 1994. Being of this view, the learned single Judge proceeded to issue the following directions: “In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal is wholly without jurisdiction and is set aside as such. The Tribunal is directed to entertain, adjudicate and decide the claims of the petitioner claim in accordance with law expeditiously on merits preferably within 6 months. At the Bar it is mentioned that a large number of Claims Cases have similarly been dismissed by the Muzaffarpur Tribunal on this ground alone. It would be advisable for the Tribunal to recall all such orders and decide the cases afresh on merits expeditiously preferably within 6 months.” 5. At the very outset, we must say the interpretation based by the tribunal on Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 (Act 30 of 2001) is fallacious inasmuch as by the amending Act the provision contained in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), remained unaffected. The view expressed by the learned single Judge on this score that there was no question of any revival. In fact, the amendment that had - 6 - been brought into the statute book by Amendment Act 54 of 1994 was permanent in nature. 6. The fulcrum of the matter is whether the learned single Judge is right in holding that the tribunal at Muzaffarpur would have jurisdiction to deal with the claim cases preferred under Section 166 of the Act because of the office of the Divisional manager of the Insurance Company exists. 7. It is submitted by learned counsel for the insurer and owner that if Section 166 of the Act is appreciated in proper perspective and interpreted in a purposeful manner, it cannot be broadly stated that the existence of the divisional office would clothe the tribunal with the jurisdiction to deal with an application under Section 166 of the Act. It is canvassed by them that if such an interpretation is placed on the said provision, there would be complete anarchy in entertainment and adjudication of the claim cases and the purpose of the Act would stand frustrated. 8. The learned counsel for the claimants, per contra, supported the order passed by the learned single Judge contending, inter- alia, that the insurer, being a defendant and the office of the Divisional Manager in scheme of things falls - 7 - within the concept of the „defendant‟, therefore, territorial jurisdiction rests with the tribunal at Muzaffarpur. 9. To appreciate the core issue it is seemly to refer to Section 165 of the Act which deals with Claims Tribunals. It reads thus: “165. Claims Tribunals.- (1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles” includes claims for compensation under section 140 and section 163A. (2) A claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the State Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or more members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he— (a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or (b) is, or has been a District Judge, or (c) is qualified for appointment as a High Court Judge or as a District Judge. - 8 - (4) Where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State Government, may by general or special order, regulate the distribution of business among them. 10. Section 166 which deals with application for compensation, is reproduced below: “166. Application for compensation.- (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub- section (1) of Section 165 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be : Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: - 9 - Provided that where no claim for compensation under section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. 3. ***** 4. The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub- section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” 11. Section 166 (2) of the Act came to be interpreted in Adarwati and another Vs. Mohanlal & Ors, 2001 ACJ 1992, wherein the learned single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh after referring to the provision has held thus: “ It is very clear that an applicant can file an application within the jurisdiction of the claims Tribunal- (i) where the accident occurred; or (ii) before the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on his business; or (iii) within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on his business. Now, the word „or‟ separates the three clauses and clear grammatical construction would be that the applicant can choose either of the three for getting the option. The very fact that there are three options implies that claimant has been given a right to choose one of the three possible places for exercising his option in a given case. Where the claimant exercises the option given in second clause mentioned above, all that the Claims Tribunal is required to find out, if the claimant resides or carries on his business within its territorial jurisdiction. The residence of the claimants in this case is of consequence the legislature gave them benefit of the option - 10 - given in the second clause by going out of the way.” 12. A division of Calcutta High Court in Bharti Mondal and others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, 2000 A I H C 701, speaking through S.B.Sinha, (as his Lordship then was) has held thus: “6A. After the amendment by M.V.Amendment Act, 1994, the claimant has been given the option to file a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at either of the three places mentioned in Section 166(2) of the Act. It may be a place where the accident has taken place or it may be a place where the claimant resides or it may be a place where the defendant resides. 7. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether as contended by Mr. Krishanu Barik, learned counsel for the appellant that the residence of the Insurance Company would confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal within whose local limits the Insurance Company resides. 8. For the purpose of jurisdiction, the reference to residence of the Insurance Company under Section 166(2) of the M.V.Act as in the instant case cannot have any application, inter alia, for two reasons; (1) the Insurance Company is normally not a defendant to the claim petition; (2) Unless an application is made in terms of Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Company cannot contest the claim on merit. 9. The Insurance Company has a limited defence in terms of Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is only entitled to a notice in terms of the said provision. The Insurance Company can raise defences which are contained in Section 149(2) of the Act. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a - 11 - defendant in the real sense of the term. Furthermore, residence of a body corporate inter alia, is its principal place of business. A divisional office cannot be said to be a place of residence of a body corporate. If that proposition is accepted, a claim petition against the insurance company can be filed at any place in India as the four major Insurance Companies which had come into being after nationalization of the Insurance Companies have offices throughout India.” 13. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision in Mantoo Sarkar V. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, 2009 ACJ 564, wherein the Apex court while dealing with the concept of territorial jurisdiction has opined thus:- “10. The said Act is a special statute. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal having regard to the terminologies used therein must be held to be wider than the civil court. A claimant has a wide option. Residence of the claimant also determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 11. What would be a residence of a person would, however, depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case.” 14. As we perceive the decision rendered in Bharti Mondal and others (supra) is directly on the issue and we respectfully concur with the same. Hence, the learned single Judge has fallen into error by holding that the Insurance Company can be sued wherever the divisional office of the Insurance Company is situate. The said conclusion is not - 12 - correct. As far as the place of residence is concerned, the same has to be decided depending upon fact situation in each case. 15. In view of our preceding analysis, the order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the tribunal to consider the factual matrix on the aforesaid anvil of law. 16. Resultantly, both the appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. ( Dipak Misra, C.J.) ( Mihir Kumar Jha, J.) Patna High Court. Dated 28th April, 2010. A.F.R. Sunil/