THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY Second Appeal No.66 of 2010 ORDER: The appellant filed O.S.No.560 of 2004 in the Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa, against the respondents, for the relief of declaration of title, recovery of possession and mandatory injunction for removal of structures on the suit schedule, a strip of land, admeasuring 2 ½ feet x 53 feet. She executed a gift deed, dated 13.03.1995, in favour of the 1st respondent donating a plot with the dimensions of 20 feet x 53 feet, mentioned in suit schedule. Her allegation was that the 1st respondent encroached into the suit schedule property, and made construction thereon. It was alleged that when an objection was raised in the year 1996 as to the said construction, the 1st respondent promised to handover the encroached portion, whenever he sells away the property gifted to him, in favour of third parties. He is said to have transferred the property gifted to him, together with encroached portion in favour of respondents 2 and 3, without keeping up his promise. The suit was resisted by respondents by raising several grounds, including the one of denial, and in the alternative, of acquiescence and estoppel. The trial Court decreed the suit through its judgment, dated 17.04.2006. Aggrieved thereby, respondents 2 and 3 filed A.S.No.72 of 2006 in the Court of IV Additional District Judge, Kadapa. The appeal was allowed through judgment, dated 28.08.2009. Hence, the Second Appeal. Sri V.R.Reddy Kovvuri, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the respondents did not dispute the title to the appellant over the suit property and there was absolutely no justification for the lower Appellate Court in reversing the decree passed by the trial Court. He contends that the permission accorded by the appellant, to the 1st respondent, in the context of retaining the construction on the suit schedule property for a limited period, cannot be treated as acquiescence, nor would it lead to estoppel. Sri Sheshagiri Rao, learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3, on the other hand, submits that even according to the appellant, the objectionable construction was made in the year 1996 and she did not take any steps for recovery of possession thereof, till the suit was filed. He contends that his clients are bona fide purchasers from the 1st respondent and that there was no basis for filing the suit, at all. The trial Court framed as many as six issues, touching the various aspects of the dispute involved in the suit. The appellant examined PWs.1 to 3 and filed Exs.A.1 to A.6. The respondent deposed as DWs.1 to 3, respectively. It appears that no documentary evidence was filed by them. The trial Court took on record, Exs.C.1 to C.3, the report submitted by a Commissioner, and two plans attached thereto. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, it decreed the suit. In the appeal before it, the lower Appellate Court framed four points for its consideration, which read: 1 “Whether the cause of action for seeking mandatory injunction started running from the date of construction of the house by 1st defendant or not? 2 Whether the knowledge of the plaintiff over construction of the house by 1st defendant in the encroached portion is an estoppel against the plaintiff or not? 3 Whetehr the doctrine of acquiescence is applicable in the present case or not? 4 What are the equities, if any, to which the parties are entitled?” After undertaking extensive discussion, it allowed the appeal and has set aside the decree passed by the trial Court. There is no denial of the fact that the 1st respondent is beneficiary of the gift made by the appellant in respect of a plot of land, admeasuring 20 feet x 53 feet. Either inadvertently or deliberately, he encroached into an extent of 2 ½ feet into the property owned by the appellant, abutting the plot gifted to him, in the course of construction made in the year 1996. There should not have been any difficulty for the appellant in recovering the possession of that strip, before any construction was made. The appellant herself stated that when she raised an objection, the 1st respondent undertook to restore the possession of the strip of land to the appellant, as and when he alienates the property gifted to him by the appellant. Even if that were to be true, the appellant should not have accepted that offer. As a matter of fact, that offer is uncertain, because no one can be sure, as to whether the 1st respondent would sell the property, at all and if so, when. It is also not practical because construction was made upon it. For the reasons best known to her, the appellant was satisfied with the said offer and did not take any further steps. It is also relevant to mention that the rights of even that fluid nature, were not reduced into writing. Everything is said to be oral. The cumulative effect of these developments is that the appellant has acquiesced in the acts and omissions on the part of the 1st respondent in encroaching into the suit property. That in turn would give rise to estoppel, and preclude the appellant from raising any plea against the 1st respondent. The sale of the property between the 1st respondent and respondents 2 and 3 took place under Ex.A.1, on 10-03-2003. The suit was filed one year thereafter. That sale by itself does not create any cause of action in favour of the appellant, reason being that acquiescence on her part came into existence much before that. Once the 1st respondent acquired rights flowing from the acquiescence of the appellant, he has every right to transfer them in favour of respondents 2 and 3. The lower Appellate Court has discussed in detail the doctrines and principles of acquiescence and estoppel and furnished cogent reasons in support of its conclusion, to reverse the decree passed by the trial Court. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in the Second Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. Dt.15.06.2010. GJ/KO