IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. L.P.A. No. 933 of 2011 ( O&M ) DATE OF DECISION : 20.09.2011 Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation, now known as Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation .... APPELLANT Versus Tara Chand and others ..... RESPONDENTS CORAM :- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH KUMAR MITTAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR Present: Mr. Kamal Sehgal, Advocate, for the appellant. Mr. M.L. Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No.1 to 13. * * * SATISH KUMAR MITTAL , J. The appellant has filed this Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment dated 16.4.2009, passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby a bunch of 84 writ petitions (including the writ petition filed by respondent No.1) was disposed of, as all those petitions were involving adjudication to the same set of notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). In some of the cases, the State of Haryana and the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation, Chandigarh filed separate Letters Patent Appeals, which were time barred, and the applications filed in those cases seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals were dismissed, which resulted into dismissal of the LPA No. 933 of 2011 -2- appeals being barred by limitation. In one such appeal, i.e. in LPA No. 1853 of 2010, filed by the State of Haryana an others, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal being barred by limitation, a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order : “The appellants have filed this Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment dated 16.4.2009, passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the notifications dated 17.9.2004 and 27.10.2004, issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'), respectively, for acquiring lands of certain persons, including respondents No.1 and 2, situated in various villages of District Gurgaon, for a public purpose, namely for setting up of Choudhary Devi Lal Industrial Model Township Phase V, Manesar, by invoking the urgency provisions and dispensing with the requirement of Section 5-A of the Act, have been quashed. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, has quashed the aforesaid notifications, after coming to the conclusion that the State Government has failed to exercise its power to abide by the mandate of law, and proceeded to invoke Section 17 (4) of the Act arbitrarily, without application of mind. However, while quashing the aforesaid notifications, the State Government has been given the liberty to initiate a fresh process of acquisition after complying with the provisions of the Act. The said order was passed by the learned Single Judge on 16.4.2009, whereas the instant appeal has been filed on 21.12.2010, i.e. after a considerable delay of more than one year and one month (415 days), along with an application (CM LPA No. 933 of 2011 -3- No. 5549 of 2010) for condonation of delay, which reads as under :- “1. That the above stated Civil Writ Petition was decided by the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh on 16.04.2009 by Mr. Justice Rajive Bhalla, Judge of the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in favour of the respondent/ petitioner. 2. That the State Government has decided to file Letters Patent Appeal in this case. 3. That the Advocate General, Haryana has opined to file the above LPA in the Hon'ble Court vide their memo No. 1425 dated 13.01.2010. 4. That the Legal Remembrance and Secretary to Government Haryana, Law and Legislative Department, Chandigarh agreed with the views of the Advocate General, Haryana and, accordingly, issued instructions to the Advocate General, Haryana for filing the LPA vide their memo No. 1425 dated 13.01.2010. 5. That from the averments made in the above paras, it is revealed that there is no malafide on the part of the appellant in filing the LPA at this stage. There is no intentional delay rather it is a procedural delay in filing the present LPA. Thus the delay of 415 days deserves to be condoned. It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the present application may kindly be accepted and the delay of 415 days in filing the present appeal may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice.” The application is supported by the affidavit of the Joint Secretary to Government Haryana, Industries and Commerce LPA No. 933 of 2011 -4- Department, Chandigarh. After hearing learned counsel for the appellants on the aforesaid application, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellants have failed to make out a case for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. As per the averments made in the application, after pronouncement of the order on 16.4.2009 by the learned Single Judge, on 13.1.2010, the Advocate General, Haryana, gave opinion to file appeal against the said order. It has not been explained at all as to why such a long time (about 9 months) was taken by the Advocate General, Haryana, to take the decision for filing appeal against the said order. Further, when on the same day i.e. on 13.1.2010, the Legal Remembrance and Secretary to Government Haryana, Law and Legislative Department, Chandigarh, after endorsing the decision of the Advocate General, Haryana, issued instructions to the office of Advocate General, Haryana, to file appeal, then why the appeal was filed on 14.12.2010, i.e. after more than 11 months. No explanation has been given at all for filing the appeal after such a long delay. In para 5 of the application, it has been stated that there is no malafide on the part of the appellants and no intentional delay in filing the appeal. It has been stated that the delay in filing the appeal is procedural, which deserves to be condoned. Now, the question arising for consideration is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellants have sufficiently explained the delay in filing the appeal. In Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that normally the expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of LPA No. 933 of 2011 -5- the Limitation Act, 1963 should be given liberal interpretation, so that the substantial justice can be done between the parties, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of that case. There cannot be a straightjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished by a party seeking condonation of delay. In the instant case, what to talk of a sufficient cause, the appellants have not given any explanation for the period consumed by them in taking decision to file appeal and for another long period taken in filing the appeal, after taking of the decision to file the appeal. In our opinion, the appellants are totally negligent and in-active in pursuing their remedy of appeal. On the one hand, the appellants want to acquire the land of farmers/land owners for a public purpose, by invoking the urgency provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act and by dispensing with the mandatory requirement of filing objections under Section 5-A of the Act, which could have been filed within thirty days of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. On the other hand, the State Government has taken more than one year and one month in filing the appeal against the order, whereby the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were quashed on the ground that the State Government was not justified in invoking the urgency provisions and dispensing with the mandatory requirement of filing objections under Section 5-A of the Act, while acquiring the land. Furthermore, by the impugned order, the appellants were permitted to again initiate the acquisition proceedings by following the procedure, as prescribed under the Act. If the LPA No. 933 of 2011 -6- matter was so urgent, then within the period, which has been taken by the State Government to file appeal against the impugned order, fresh acquisition proceedings could have been completed by them. It has also been observed in Ram Nath Sao's case (supra) that while considering the matter of condonation of delay, the courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. In the present case, after quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, the State Government was not debarred from acquiring the land by following procedure. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that by the impugned order, enormous loss and irreparable injury has been caused to the appellants. On the other hand, by the negligent default or in- action on the part of the appellants, the valuable right of respondents No.1 and 2, which has accrued due to non-filing of appeal within the time, has been defeated. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellants argued that since the appellant is the State, therefore, this Court should take a liberal view in condoning the delay. It is true, as has been held by the Apex Court in Pundlik Jalam Patil (deceased) by LRs v. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project & Anr., 2008 (4) RCR (Civil) 885, that when the State and its instrumentalities are seeking condonation of delay, they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for Government authorities. Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or LPA No. 933 of 2011 -7- collusion on the parts of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts have been pleaded by the appellants. Rather, as we have discussed earlier, in the application itself, no explanation at all has been given for filing the appeal after more than 11 months of taking the decision to file appeal. It is for the appellants to establish the sufficient cause that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired, it was not possible for them to file the appeal within time. In view of above, we are of the opinion that the appellants have failed to show cause any sufficient reason for condoning the inordinate delay in filing the instant appeal. Therefore, the application (CM No. 5549 of 2010) for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is dismissed. Resultantly, the instant appeal is also dismissed, being barred by limitation.” We have been informed that the Special Leave Petition No. CC 12933 of 2011, filed against the aforesaid order has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 16.8.2011. The instant appeal, filed against the same order passed by the learned Single Judge, is also barred by limitation, as there is delay of 344 days in filing this appeal, and the appellants have filed an application (CM No. 2621 of 2011) for condonation of delay. In the application, same grounds have been taken for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, as LPA No. 933 of 2011 -8- were taken in CM No. 5549 of 2010 in LPA No. 1853 of 2010. Therefore, for the same reasons, as recorded in LPA No. 1853 of 2010, the application is dismissed. Resultantly, the instant appeal is also dismissed, being barred by limitation. ( SATISH KUMAR MITTAL ) JUDGE September 20, 2011 ( ARVIND KUMAR ) ndj JUDGE