THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO.12752 OF 2010 Dated 8th June, 2010 Between: G. Devender Reddy …Petitioner And The Government of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. By its Secretary, Industries & Commerece Department and others. …Respondents Counsel for the petitioner : Smt. N. Shobha Counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3 : G.P. for Mines and Geology Counsel for respondent No.4 : Smt. G. Elisha The Court made the following: ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to declare the action of Respondent No.1 in not considering the petitioner’s representation dated 31.3.2010 for granting extension by 41 days in lieu of non- operation of quarry of sand and silt in Musi River bed project, Itukalapahad Gram Panchayat, Nalgonda District, in pursuance of stay orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.11235 of 2008, as illegal and arbitrary. I have heard Smt. Shoba, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Mines and Geology. The petitioner was entrusted with the contract of removal of sand and silt by Respondent No.4-Gram Panchayat. The petitioner has initially approached Respondent No.1 with an application to extend the contract period by 217 days, during which, it has allegedly failed to carry on the work due to heavy rains. Respondent No.1 vide its memo dated 20.4.2009, considered the said application and accepted the petitioner’s request by extending the contract for 217 days. This memo was questioned in W.P. No. 10117 of 2009, by way of a public interest litigation. A Division Bench of this Court allowed the said writ petition on 27.1.2010, while following the judgment of a division Bench of this Court in M.V. Siva Prasad vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others[1] and set aside the order granting extension to the petitioner. The Division Bench, inter alia held as under: “22. The validity of the amended 1966 rules, as notified in G.O. Ms. No. 84, dated 10.4.2007, is not under challenge in any of these writ petitions. The validity of the impugned orders have therefore to be decided in the light of the amended 1966 rules notified in G.O. Ms. No.84, dated 10.4.2007 as it is these rules which are presently in force. Rule 9-L is in two parts. The first limb of Rule 9-L prohibits the competent authority from entertaining any claim made by a successful tenderer/bidder seeking compensation on account of floods or rains or other situation. The second limb of Rule 9-L prohibits grant of extension of lease under any circumstances. Irrespective of the nature of the claim for extension of lease, be it for a valid reason or otherwise, Rule 9-L prohibits the competent authority from granting extension of lease under any circumstances. In view of this prohibition any order passed by the Government or the Director of Mines granting extension of lease would be ultra vires Rule 9-L of the 1966 Rules.“ The Bench further observed in para-24 thus: “Rule 9-K(3) confers power on the Government to issue orders/clarifications, if any, not specifically mentioned in the implementation of A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966. The twin limitations under Rule 9-K(3) for the exercise of power by the Government to issue orders/clarifications is (i) to implement the rules and (ii) with respect to matters not specifically mentioned in the rules. The impugned orders granting extension of lease cannot be said to have been passed in the implementation of the 1966 Rules. Since Rule 9-L, which prohibits grant of extension of lease under any circumstances, forms part and parcel of the 1966 Rules the Government does not have the power under Rule 9-K(3) to issue any orders/clarifications granting extension of lease whatever the circumstances may be. The impugned orders passed by the State Government are neither in the implementation of the 1966 Rules nor with respect to matters not specifically mentioned in the said Rules. The orders under challenge in these batch of writ petitions are therefore not referable to Rule 9-K(3) of the 1966 Rules. Since the power of the Government to issue orders/clarifications is limited to the extent provided under Rule 9-K(3), the impugned orders granting extension of lease are ultra vires the 1966 Rules and are, accordingly, quashed. This judgment has attained finality and the law laid down therein is holding the field. Undeterred by the said judgment, the petitioner once again approached Respondent No.1 with a request to extend the lease period by 41 days on the ground that on account of the interim stay granted in the above mentioned writ petition, he could not carry on the contract. Before respondent No.1, the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court i n Krishna Country Canal Boat Workers & Labour Contract Cooperative Society Ltd., vs. Assistant Director of Mines and Geology & Others[2]. Faced with the above two judgments, which are obviously conflicting with each other, respondent No.1 is stated to have referred the issue for legal opinion and it is reported at the hearing, that the learned Government Pleader to whom the matter was referred has not so far rendered his opinion. It is at this stage, that the petitioner filed the present writ petition. At the hearing, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the Division Bench in the above mentioned judgment held that “under any circumstances” respondent No.1 has no power and authority to grant extension of lease in purported exercise of its power under Rule 9(L) of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short ‘the Rules’), a learned single Judge who considered the above Division Bench judgment held in Krishna Country Canal Boat Workers and Labour Contract Cooperative Society Ltd., (cited-2 supra) that situation arising out of an order of the Court leading to non operation of the mine is not covered by the above Division Bench judgment. The learned Government Pleader opposed this contention and submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court covers every situation and therefore, the rigour of Rule 9(L) applies even to cases where a lessee is prevented from operating a mine on account of interim stay granted by this Court. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. From the law laid down by the Division Bench in its judgment reproduced above it is quite evident that respondent No.1 has no power or jurisdiction to extend the lease for any reason. The words “irrespective of the nature of the claim for extension of lease, be it for a valid reason or otherwise under any circumstances” are wide enough to cover every eventuality, which includes prevention of the lessee from operating the mine on account of the stay granted by the Courts. No doubt, the learned single Judge, while taking note of the said judgment, however, took the view that the eventuality of prevention of the lessee from operating mine by an interim order of the Court is not covered by Rule 9-L. In my opinion, this view does not accord with the Division Bench judgment and I respectfully prefer to follow the ratio laid down by the Division Bench. In the premises as above, I do not find any reason to issue a writ of mandamus to direct respondent No.1 to dispose of the petitioner’s application for extension, because Respondent No.1 is under no legal obligation to dispose of such a representation in the light of the ratio laid down by the Division Bench to the effect that it has no power or jurisdiction to entertain such an application and grant extension. There is another angle to this case. The petitioner was himself a party to the Division Bench Judgment and having suffered the finding that Respondent No.1 has no jurisdiction to extend the lease under any circumstances, it cannot be permitted to raise a contrary stand once again by way of a separate writ petition. For the above mentioned reasons, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. ___________________________ C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Date: 8th June, 2010 pnb [1] 2010(2) ALD 288 (DB) [2] 2010(2) ALD 286