Regular Second Appeal No. 3591 of 1986 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 3591 of 1986 Date of decision: 28.04.2010 Swaran Singh ...Appellant Versus The State of Punjab ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Ms. Puneeta Sethi, Advocate for the appellant. None for the respondent. RANJIT SINGH J. This order will dispose of two Regular Second Appeal Nos. 3333 and 3591 of 1986, as the common question of fact and law arises in these two appeals. Facts are being taken from RSA No. 3591 of 1986. The appellant was working as a Conductor with Punjab Roadways Depot, Moga. He had filed this suit to challenge the orders of stoppage of increments with cumulative effect passed on 03.11.1977, 30.11.1978, 08.02.1978, 09.08.1982, 21.01.1983 and 18.03.1983. The plea was that all the orders were illegal null and void and thus ineffective qua the rights of the appellant. The facts in brief as can be noticed, are that the appellant was serving as Conductor since the year 1975. On 03.11.1977 order stopping 4 annual grade increment with cumulative effect was made on the ground that he had not issued ticket to passenger and thus Regular Second Appeal No. 3591 of 1986 2 had caused loss to the State. Again on 31.11.1978 his one annual grade increment with cumulative effect was stopped on the allegation that he was not in a proper dress and was using a private punch for punching the tickets. Yet another order was passed on 09.08.1982, stopping 3 annual grade increment with cumulative effect for not issuing tickets to the passengers. Stoppage of 2 annual grade increment with cumulative effect was passed on 21.01.1983 for similar allegations. Yet again, on 18.03.1983 order directing stoppage of 4 annual grade increment for not issuing tickets to police constable, who was travelling in the bus, was awarded. The appellant had accordingly challenged the validity of all the orders on the ground that no preliminary inquiry was held and thus rules of natural justice stood violated. It was also pleaded that the appellant was not afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself and that he was not given any personal hearing. Plea also was that the impugned order were non-speaking and thus arbitrary. It was also pleaded that the statement of passengers were not recorded by the inquiry officer, who was stated to be biased. The written statement was filed by the respondents who justified the impugned orders to be perfectly valid and having been passed after following the due procedure as given under Punjab Civil service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970. Preliminary objection in regard to the mailability of the suit was also raised on the ground that the suit was barred by time. It was also pleaded that the appellant was not entitled to grant of special increment as he had participated in the strike. The suit proceeded on the following issues:- Regular Second Appeal No. 3591 of 1986 3 1. Whether the impugned orders dated 21.1.83, 9.8.1982, 18.3.1983, 8.2.1978, 3.11.1977 and 30.11.1978 are null and void and ineffective against the rights of the plaintiff? OPP 2. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration prayed for ? OPP 4. Relief. The suit was dismissed and accordingly the appellant filed an appeal against the same, which was also dismissed. He has accordingly filed this Regular Second Appeal. The suit filed by the appellant has primarily been dismissed on two counts. It was held that the suit filed by the appellant to challenge some of the orders was barred by limitation as the orders were passed during 1977-78 whereas the suit was filed on 23.7.1983. The Court accordingly held that the orders dated 3.11.1977, 8.2.1978 and 30.11.1978 were barred by limitation. In addition, order dated 9.8.1982 was also held to be bad on the ground that it was non-speaking order. Remaining orders were held legal and valid. It was further observed that the order of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect was a minor penalty and hence there was no requirement of holding any inquiry. The counsel for the appellant would submit that the view taken by the trial Court as well as by the First Appellate Court in this regard cannot be sustained. The counsel first submits that the plea of limitation accepted by the courts would be contrary to the settled legal position. As per the Regular Second Appeal No. 3591 of 1986 4 counsel the punishment of stoppage of increment when awarded would give a recurring cause of action on every month on the payment of salary. In support, the counsel has drawn my attention to M.R. Gupta versus Union of India and others (1995) 5 Supreme Court Cases 628. In this case it is held that :- “ The Tribunal misdirected itself when it treated the appellant's claim as “one time action” meaning thereby that it was not a continuing wrong based on a recurring cause of action. The claim to be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the salary when the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance with the rules. This right of a government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with the rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind.” The counsel would also submit that the punishment of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect now has been held as major punishment. In this regard, counsel would refer to Kulwant Singh Gill versus State of Punjab 1990 (6) SLR 73, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that imposition of stoppage Regular Second Appeal No. 3591 of 1986 5 of increment with cumulative effect would fall under Rule 5(v) of the Rules and as such, regular inquiry would be needed. In this view of the settled legal position, judgment under appeal cannot be sustained. In my view, substantial questions of law arise to the following effect:- a) Whether the punishment of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect is a major penalty or not? b) Whether the stoppage of increment if ordered would gave a recurring cause of action or one time of cause of action? In view of the legal position as noted above on the basis of law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the impugned judgment would call for interference and cannot be sustained. The same is set aside. The Regular Second Appeal is, therefore, allowed. If needed, fresh decree sheet be prepared accordingly. April 28, 2010 ( RANJIT SINGH ) rts JUDGE