IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.2415 OF 2011 Between : Kalavathamma ... PETITIONER A N D N.Nagalakshamma …RESPONDENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 2415 OF 2011 ORDER: This Civil Revision Petition, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’), is directed against the order and decree, dated 16.03.2011, in I.A.No.438 of 2010 in O.S.No.602 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, whereunder and whereby, the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Act’) to condone the delay of 336 days in setting aside the ex parte decree, dated 16.06.2009, was dismissed on the ground that each day’s delay has not been properly explained. 2. O.S.No.602 of 2008 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, was filed by the respondent herein for declaration that she is legally wedded wife of late N.Venkateswarlu and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant from receiving his death benefits and the District Forest Officer, Kurnool from paying the same to defendant. Admittedly, the petitioner herein/defendant received summons in the suit and engaged an Advocate. When the case was coming up for filing the written statement as the petitioner was absent an ex parte decree was passed. After coming to know about the ex parte decree, the petitioner herein filed the above Interlocutory Application to condone the delay of 336 days in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. After hearing both sides, the Court below dismissed the application. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the Advocate engaged by the petitioner in the trial Court has not informed the date of hearing, the petitioner could not file the written statement; that she is prosecuting the case diligently and that the delay is not intentional and hence, he prays set aside the impugned order. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the delay has not been properly explained by the petitioner and hence, he prays to dismiss the Civil Revision Petition. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in Shaik Rahima Begum and another V. Kadiri Narayanamma[1], wherein it is held thus: “The present petition was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay involved in filing the appeal. Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3-A C.P.C. state that the delay involved in filing the appeal can be condoned only if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ no doubt deserves to receive a liberal construction, but striking a just and equitable balance between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievance on the merits of the appeal for cause beyond his reasonable control. This is a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion of the Court and each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts. “Sufficient Cause” should be given to a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no ignorance nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. In condoning the delay, the Court should consider that by lapse of time a legal right has been accrued to the other side and that right should not be disturbed lightly without sufficient cause. But, if ‘sufficient cause’ is shown the Court has ample power to condone the delay. If the delay is to be condoned as a matter of course even when no such ‘sufficient cause’ is shown and when there is inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant by putting forth the theory of liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause’, it will clearly lead to undesirable results and will amount to encourage the inaction and mala fides on the part of the persons trying to take recourse to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by approaching the Court whenever they want to do so for questioning the orders of the Court by filing an application for condonation of delay at their will and pleasure. If liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is to be extended to such an extent, then practically there is no necessity for having Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the statute as it will amount to saying that the affected party can come and file a petition for condonation of delay at whatever time he wants by putting forth some reason or other, whether true or false and soliciting the discretion of the Court in his favour. I am afraid that such a liberal construction cannot be imported into the expression ‘sufficient cause’ as incorporated in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order 41 Rule 3-A CPC. The facts of the present case reveal that the respondent was grossly negligent in prosecuting her litigation and there are also no bona fides on her part in putting forth the cause for delay involved and as such, the orders of the lower Court allowing such petition cannot be sustained.” 6. The word ‘sufficient cause’ is not defined under Section 5 of the Act. But, it must mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the said provision. A person is prevented by a sufficient reason or cause and that cause or reason is acceptable to the Court, then the delay, if any, can be condoned. But, when the delay is shown to be wanton or willful, such a delay cannot be condoned. 7. The trial Court dismissed the application on the ground that each day’s delay has not been properly explained by the petitioner. Law does not require a party to explain each day’s delay but if over all explanation is given, then certainly the delay can be condoned. It is not in dispute that the petitioner/defendant received summons in the suit and engaged an Advocate. Advocate filed Vakalat on behalf of the petitioner, but thereafter, the written statement was not filed and so, she was set ex parte and an ex parte decree was passed. The reason for delay in filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is that the Advocate, who was engaged by the petitioner in the trial Court, did not inform her about the date when the case was posted for filing written statement. Therefore, the reason given by the petitioner appears to be proper and correct. Unless she receives a letter from her advocate, she would not be in a position to go to the advocate’s house to give instructions. The affidavit filed in support of the petition would disclose proper reason for not filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 CPC in time. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order, dated 16.03.2011 in I.A.No.438 of 2010 in O.S.No.602 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, and consequently, the said petition stands allowed. The trial Court is directed to pass appropriate orders on the application filed by the petitioner under Order IX Rule 13 CPC after giving reasonable opportunity to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________ K.C.BHANU. J AUGUST 23, 2011. YVL [1] 1996 (4) ALT 401