THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4441 of 2009 O R D E R: Publication filed showing proof of substituted service of the notice on respondent Nos.1 and 2. Heard Sri J.K.Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Sri P.Sriharsha Reddy, learned counsel for the third respondent. None appears for respondent Nos.1 and 2 in spite of substituted service of notice by publication. The revision petitioners are the defendants in O.S.No.92 of 1985 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Narsapur, and the suit was decreed ex parte on 26.7.1988. The ex parte decree was set aside and the suit was restored to file on 09.02.2007 and after examination of PW.1, the defendants were stated to have failed to cross-examine PW.1, resulting in an ex parte decree again on 31.7.2007, subsequent to which, I.A.No.319 of 2008 was filed to set aside the said orders. The said I.A. was stated to have been ordered to be allowed on payment of costs of Rs.2,000/- by 13.3.2009 and as costs were not paid on 13.3.2009 or 16.3.2009, the said I.A.No.319 of 2008 was dismissed for default. The defendants then filed I.A.No.81 of 2009 for restoration of I.A.No.319 of 2008 expressing readiness to pay costs earlier imposed. The request was resisted by the plaintiffs contending that the defendants ought to have requested for enlargment of time for payment of costs under Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code. They could not have filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 7 r/w 151 of the C.P.C. to set aside the said order. The trial Court passed the impugned order noting that in the suit of the year 1985, the defendants always failed to appear at various stages and they are habituated to come up with petitions to set aside the adverse orders against them after committing default in appearance on the regular dates of hearing. The trial Court, therefore, was not inclined to accept the request and dismissed the petition. The defendants claimed in this revision that the costs could not be paid as the counsel for the respondents was reluctant to accept the said costs and the defendants were not at fault in not being able to pay the costs on the appointed dates. The point for consideration is whether the defendants should be permitted to pay the costs imposed in the earlier petition and be permitted to have a decision on merits in the suit. The affidavit in support of the petition by the second defendant stated on oath that on 13.3.2009, the date on which the costs were to be paid, the Presiding Officer was on casual leave and the counsel for the other party avoided to receive the costs. He also stated that on the next date of hearing on 16.3.2009, he was sick and his counsel could not represent the matter before the Court. It is for those reasons that the default of the defendants was said to have occurred and this statement on oath was not specifically contradicted in the counter-affidavit filed by the third respondent and the only objection seems to be against the provision under which the petition is filed claiming that the petition should have been filed only under Section 148 of the C.P.C. It is well settled that mere mention of a wrong provision of law will not disentitle a partly to a relief if he is otherwise entitled to such relief under some other provision and the respondents herein thus positively admitted the jurisdiction of the Court to enlarge the time for payment of costs under Section 148 of the C.P.C. The trial Court in the impugned order appears to have been more influenced by the fact that in the 1985 suit the defendants were protracting the trial on some pretext or the other and were never participating in the proceedings. Whatever might have been their earlier conduct, the reasons stated by the second defendant for non-payment of the costs imposed in I.A.No.319 of 2008 do not appear to be unreasonable and as rules of procedure are intended to be handmaids of justice, but not to punish the parties for their technical lapses and as the object of the judicial procedure is to determine the questions in controversy between the parties on merits and not otherwise, the default of the defendants/revision petitioners may be condoned on appropriate terms. The defendants/revision petitioners can be directed to pay further costs to the District Legal Services Authority and also the costs imposed earlier on which this application can be suitably allowed. Therefore, the order of the Junior Civil Judge, Narsapur in I.A.81 of 2009 in I.A.No.319 of 2008 in O.S.No.92 of 1985, dated 7.7.2009 is set aside and the said I.A.No.81 of 2009 will be allowed on deposit of Rs.1,000/- as costs to the credit of the District Legal Services Authority, Medak at Sangareddy and also on payment of the costs of Rs.2,000/- imposed in I.A.No.319 of 2008 earlier to the learned counsel for the respondents before the trial Court within 15 days from today. In default of either the deposit of Rs.1,000/- to the credit of the District Legal Services Authority or payment of Rs.2,000/-to the learned counsel for the respondents within the said period of 15 days from today, I.A.No.81 of 2009 shall stand dismissed. The Civil Revision Petition is ordered accordingly without costs. In the event of I.A.No.81 of 2009 being allowed and I.A.No.319 of 2008 being consequently allowed and the suit being restored to file, the trial Court shall make every endeavour to expeditiously dispose of the suit on merits in accordance with law after every reasonable opportunity to both parties, at any rate within a period of six months from the date of restoration of the suit. _____________________ G.BHAVANI PRASAD,J 9th July, 2010. PNV