IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.2519 of 2009 RAVINDRA THAKUR Versus THE CHAIRMAN,GAYA ZILA PARISHAD &ORS. ----------- 2 26/2/2009 Heard counsel for the petitioner and counsel appearing on behalf of Gaya Zila Parishad. Grievance of the petitioner in this writ application can be better appreciated if the prayer made in paragraph no.1 of this writ application is reproduced, which reads as follows:- “That this is an application for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, particularly in the nature of writ of CERTIORARI, for quashing of a so-called order of respondent Zila Parishad, Gaya by which rent of the shop leased out to the petitioner has been enhanced from Rs.1 per sq.ft. to Rs.4 per sq.ft. with effect from January 2000 which has been made known from the information furnished by the D.D.C. Respondent No.2 on 6.12.2007 under Right to Information Act, 2005 (as contained in Annexure 5 series to this writ application), whereas respondent Zila Parishad has already accepted rent of shop till December 2005 and in lieu thereof issued receipt, which is illegal, arbitrary, malafide and against the provisions of tenancy law as the rent of the premises/shop can not be enhanced unilaterally with retrospective effect, where the Zila Parishad has already accepted the rent of the shop from the writ petitioner upto 2 December, 2005. The writ petitioner further prays to direct the respondents to renew the lease of the shop after the adjustment of construction cost of the shop duly leased out with the petitioner in terms of lease agreement dated 28.09.1992 as contained in Annexure 1 to this petition.” From a bare reading of the aforementioned prayer it would become clear that the petitioner in this writ application, actually seeks to question enhancement of rent made by the Zila Parishad from January, 2000. Such grievance of the petitioner with regard to fixation of rent in the capacity of tenant against the alleged illegal action of the landlord Zila Parishad, can definitely be gone into under the relevant statute, namely, Bihar Building (Lease, Rent, Eviction and Control) Act by seeking determination of fair Fair rent in terms of Sections 5 and 6 thereof. That being so, the aforesaid grievance of the petitioner, on account of existence of efficacious alternative remedy, can be looked into by the House Controller of Gaya district. Counsel for the petitioner, 3 however, has placed reliance on a lease deed as contained in Annexure-1 to submit that once rights of the parties were set out in the said lease deed dated 28.9.1992, the Zila Parishad was not entitled to take any unilateral decision in course of enhancement of rent that too with retrospective effect. This Court after carefully gone into the contents of the said lease deed as contained in Annexure-1 has found that the period of lease under the lease deed was only for a period of five years beginning from January, 1992 to December, 1996 with a clause for renewal on fresh terms and conditions. The moment this position becomes clear, the plea of retrospectivity in enhancement of rent with effect from the year 2008 automatically falls on the ground. The petitioner after December, 1996 may be holding over as a tenant of Zila Parishad, but his right for continuing will always depend on the future terms and conditions and if the Zila Parishad has enforced enhanced rent from the year 2000 for all its shops, this Court cannot find the same 4 to be in violation of any clause of the said agreement or any law. Counsel for the petitioner next submits that since the petitioner has accepted rent at the rate of Rs.1/- as per original lease deed of 1992, the Zila Parishad will be stopped from giving force to its decision for payment on enhanced rent from January 2000. Such argument again seems to be one of desperation, inasmuch as, right of Zila Parishad as a landlord to enhance rent and collect the same flows not only from its agreement but also from the statutory provisions of Bihar Municipal Act and/or Law of Contract. If the petitioner is so aggrieved he can also take recourse to filing of a civil suit by invoking the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, but then the writ petition for this purpose will not be maintainable. That being so, this Court does not find any merit in this writ application and the same is accordingly dismissed. (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.) Abhay Kumar