WA 169/2011 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE I.A. ANSARI THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE H. BARUAH Aggrieved by the order, dated 01.12.2010, passed, in WP(C) No.5871/2000, as the writ petition has been allowed, the respondents, in the writ petition, have pref erred this appeal. We have heard Mr. G. Das, learned counsel, for the appellants, and Ms. N.S. Thak uria, learned counsel, for the writ petitioner-respondent. The controversy in the writ petition, as discernible from the pleadings of the p arties and the materials on record, is an agreement, which had been entered into between the petitioner-respondent, on the one hand, and the State Bank of India , a body constituted under the Bank of India Act, 1959, (in short, ’the Bank’), on the other, in respect of temporary appointment/engagement of the writ petitio ner in the construction of a building, at Itanagar, meant for housing the Branch /office/staff quarters of the Bank, the petitioner having been temporarily appoi nted and engaged as Site Engineer pursuant to the offer, which the petitioner ha d made to the Bank to supervise construction of the said building. In order to c learly appreciate the nature of the contract, which the petitioner had with the Bank, the relevant terms and conditions of the agreement aforementioned, which w as executed on 29.09.97, are reproduced below: 2. The services of the Site Engineer with the Bank as mentioned in paragraph (i ) above are purely on temporary basis and will terminate automatically on the co mpletion of the construction of the building or one year from the date of the ag reement whichever is earlier. The Bank shall having regard to the progress of th e Building may engage services of the Site Engineer for further such period as d eemed necessary by executing a similar agreement. The Site Engineer agrees that he is not entitled for and will not claim any permanent employment in the Bank b y virtue of such engagement and his services are engaged/assignment is given on temporary basis. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6. The services of the Site Engineer may be terminated at any time at the Bank’s discretion on one month’s notice. Further, if the work of the Site Engineer is found unsatisfactory, the Bank will have the right to dispense with his temporar y services without notice notwithstanding the non-completion of the construction of the building. 7. Unless his services are terminated by the Bank under the Provisions of Clause (6) thereof, the Site Engineer undertakes not to leave or abandon the temporary services/assignment given by the Bank during the term of this agreement (i.e., till the completion of the construction of one year whichever is earlier) and sh ould he do so, it is hereby agreed that he will pay all losses and damages whats oever suffered by the Bank as a result of his leaving or abandoning the temporar y services/assignment with the Bank. The Site Engineer may for valid reasons dis continue his services with the Bank by giving 3 month’s notice in writing provid ed the Bank is not put to loss as mentioned above. Pursuant to the agreement, dated 29.09.97, aforementioned, the petitioner contin ued to work as a Site Engineer. By a letter, dated 11.10.2000, the Bank terminat ed the contract, on 11.11.2000, making it clear that the petitioner’s service wo uld no longer be required by the Bank with effect from 12.11.2000. The letter, d ated 11.11.2000, was clearly a notice of termination as contemplated by Clause 6 of the said agreement. Aggrieved by the termination of his appointment, by lett er, dated 11.11.2000, the petitioner filed the said writ petition. Referring to, and relying upon, an order of the Supreme Court, passed in Civil A ppeal No.7349-7351/2002 (Debojit Das Vs. State Bank of India), the writ petition was disposed of, on 01.12.2010, by directing the Bank to continue the engagemen t of the petitioner on contractual basis as long as the projects are available w ith the Bank. It is the correctness of this direction, which is under challenge in the present appeal. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted, at the very outset, that a contract of employment, such as, the one at hand, is not specifically enf orceable. An inherently temporary appointment or engagement, as the one at hand, could not have been converted into a kind of permanent engagement for all such projects, which may be available with the Bank, by taking recourse to Article 22 6 of the Constitution of India. The parties are, ordinarily, bound by the terms of a contract. The contract, in the present case, was for construction of one bu ilding at Itanagar and, on completion thereof, the agreement was to expire. The engagement of the petitioner was, however, continued. This did not vest in the p etitioner any indefeasible right to claim that as long as any project of the Ban k continues, the petitioner’s engagement shall be continued. This contention of the petitioner was ex facie contrary to the very agreement, which the petitioner had relied upon. What, thus, the petitioner sought to enforce, by invoking Article 226, was enfor cement of a condition, which did not exist in the agreement and which, if allowe d, would have shaken the sanctity of the agreement between the parties concerned . The fact that the Supreme Court has, in similar circumstances, directed the Ba nk to continue to retain, in service, the appellants, in the said appeal, as lon g as the project is available, the fact remains that the Supreme Court has the p ower to pass any order to do complete justice between the parties; whereas the H igh Court does not have any such power under Article 226. Even in the order, und er appeal, it has been clearly observed by the learned Court that the decision r endered shall not be treated as precedent. The petitioner’s engagement was, admittedly, not made after publication of any a dvertisement. Similarly situated persons were, thus, not given any opportunity t o participate in the matter of contractual employment. In such circumstances, di recting the petitioner to be kept engaged by the Bank as long as the projects co ntinue would be tantamount to denying similar opportunity of engagement/temporar y appointment to other persons, similarly situated, which the petitioner has bee n enjoying. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are of the view th at the directions, given to the Bank, to continue to keep the petitioner engaged , on contractual basis, as long as projects are available with the Bank, is cont rary to the agreement between the parties concerned and such an order, if allowe d to survive, would cause serious miscarriage of justice. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is hereby set aside. With the above observations and directions, this appeal shall stand disposed of. No costs.