IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.763 of 2010 ***** Shyam Kishore Singh son of Late Darbari Singh, resident of village Gadua, P.S. Warsaliganj, district-Nawadah. …. …. Petitioner-Appellant Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya. 3. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Nawadah. 4. The Sub Divisional Officer, Nawadah Sadar, Nawadah. 5. The Block Supply Officer, Warsaliganj, Nawada. …. …. Respondents-Respondents ----------- For the petitioner : Mr. Shashi Bhushan Singh, Advocate For the State : Mr. Harendra Pd. Singh, G.A.-VI Mr. Bindhyachal Rai, A.C. to G.A.VI -------------- 2. 23.4.2010. I.A. No.4026 of 2010: - This is an application for condonation of delay of 294 days in preferring the appeal. We have heard Mr. Shashi Bhushan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, on the question of limitation. Before issuing notice, we have thought it seemly to consider the merits of the case. As is evident from the order of the learned Single Judge passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6079 of 2009, it is perceivable that he has declined to interfere with the order passed by the Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya in Revision Case No. 91 of 2007, whereby he has affirmed the order passed by the appellate authority on - 2 - 7.6.2007 and 14.8.2007. Be it noted, the appellate authority is the Collector-cum-District Magistrate. The petitioner was a licensee for a fair price shop, which was granted under Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984. The learned Single Judge has referred to clause 29 of the 1984 Order and expressed the view that the Commissioner has not rightly interfered with the order passed by the appellate authority as it did not suffer from any jurisdictional irregularity or impropriety. That apart he has also held that the appellate authority had discussed the matter in detail and the Commissioner was not expected to exercise jurisdiction as if he was sitting in appeal. In this context, we may refer with profit the decision in State of U.P. and others v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc., AIR 1989 Supreme Court 997, wherein the Apex Court has expressed thus: “28. It not unoften happens that what appears to be a judicial review for breach of natural justice is, in reality, a review for abuse of discretion. It is true that amongst the many grounds put forward in the show cause notice dated 19.1.1986, quite a few overlap each other and are distinguishable from those urged for the cancellation of the lease itself. Some of the grounds might, perhaps, be somewhat - 3 - premature. Some of them even if true are so trivial that no authority could reasonably be expected to cancel the permission on that basis. For instance the ground that the permission was applied for and granted in the name of one only of the two lessees would be one such. However, Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 W.L.R. 1155 refers to the merits- legality distinction in judicial review. Lord Hailsham said: “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.” Lord Brightman observed : “…. Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made…” And held that it would be an error to think: “…. that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision-making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.” When the issue raised in judicial review is whether - 4 - a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant, factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision- making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. In the present case, it is, however, not necessary to go into the merits and relevance of the grounds having regard to the view we propose to take on the point on natural justice.” We have referred to the aforesaid decision only to highlight that the decision making process as found by the learned Single Judge is absolutely correct and hence, there is no error to be rectified in this intra-Court appeal. In the result, there is no justification to issue notice on the question of limitation and accordingly the delay in filing the appeal stands rejected and as a fall out the appeal stands dismissed in limine. Pawan/- (Dipak Misra, CJ) (Mihir Kumar Jha, J)