IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated: 17/04/2003 Coram The Honourable Mr. Justice V.S. SIRPURKAR W.P.No.16776 of 2000 and W.P.Nos.16777 to 16779, 20857 and 20858 of 2000 AND W.P. Nos.553, 585, 2925 of 2001 & 34256 and 35055 of 2002 W.P. No.16776 of 2000 etc. K. Nathmal ..... Petitioner in W.P.16776/2000 K. Dhanasekaran :: Petitioner in W.P.16777/2000 K.S. Sundaram :: Petitioner in W.P.16778/2000 S.D. Premchand :: Petitioner in W.P.16779/2000 S. Santhiraj :: Petitioner in W.P.20857/2000 C. Abdul Khader :: Petitioner in W.P.20858/2000 -Vs- The District Collector Kancheepuram District Respondent in all Kancheepuram ... the above writ petitions W.P. No.553 of 2001 etc. Anbhazhagan :: Petitioner in 553 of 2001 N. Mani :: Petitioner in 585 of 2001 Duraiswamy Naicker :: Petitioner in 2925 of 2001 N. Varadhan :: Petitioner in 34256 of 2002 P.V.K. Vasu :: Petitioner in 35055 of 2002 :versus: The Government of Tamil Nadu rep. by Secretary Industries Department Fort St. George Chennai 600 009 The District Collector :: Respondents 1 and 2 in Kancheepuram District all the above petitions S.D. Premchand K. Dhanasekaran K. Nathmal 3rd respondent in the K.S. Sundaram :: above writ petitions Petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution of India praying for Writ of Mandamus/Certiorarified Mandamus as stated in the respective writ petitions For Petitioners :: Mr. V.T.GoPalan, Senior Counsel for Mr. Ramakrishna Reddy Mr. V. Ramesh For Respondents :: Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy Additional Advocate General Assisted by D.Krishnakumar Special Government Pleader :ORDER V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. This judgment shall dispose of two batches of writ petitions. The first batch will cover the writ petitions, W.P. Nos.16776, 16777, 167 78, 16779, 20857 and 20858 of 2000. In all these writ petitions a direction is sought to extend the lease for the unutilised period of the same. All the petitioners in these writ petitions were granted the lease for quarrying sand on various dates. Their contention is that because of the stay orders, etc. passed by this Court in some other writ petitions, these petitioners could not fully utilise the lease and, therefore, they seek the direction to the Government to permit them to continue the quarrying operation for the unutilised period. The claimed period is 4 years, 4 months and six days; 3 years and 2 months; 4 years and 4 months; 4 years and 4 months; 2 years and 10 months; and 2 years and 10 months respectively in the above petitions. 2. As against this, writ petitions, W.P. Nos., 553, 585, 2925 of 2 001 and 34256 and 35055 of 2002 are the next batch of writ petitions, which are opposing the extension of lease on the ground that the extension would cause serious hazards to the environment inasmuch as the indiscriminate quarrying of the sand of Palar river would deplete the ground-water table and would adversly affect the environment. Other ground is that the vehicles used by the contractors in transporting the sand would cause fatal accidents and would also spoil the roads. 3. The second batch of writ petitions was in the nature of  Public Interest Litigation. However, since it is connected with the abovementioned first batch of writ petitions, these writ petitions are made over to this Court. 4. It is an admitted position that all the leases were granted under Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 ( in short the Rules) and the said rule now exists no more on the statute book. It is a common ground that all the writ petitioners in the first batch of writ petitions were granted the lease for five years under the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules which enabled the State Government to grant the lease for more period as compared to the leases under Rule 8. This was a rule enabling the State Government to grant the lease for more than one year and at its discretion. It is a common ground that all the writ petitioners were granted the lease in the months of August, September, and Novermber, 1995 under Rule 39. These grounds were challenged in some writ petitions and the petitioners in those writ petitions were those who were claiming a better right than the present petitioners. In short, they alleged that the leases should have been granted in their favour and not in favour of the present petitioners. Those writ petitions came to be disposed of as infructuous because the original period for which the leases were granted had itself expired. Therefore, they could not claim the grant of lease in their favour. In those writ petitions because of the interim orders passed, the present petitioners in the first batch of writ petitions could not utilise the whole period of five years. The present writ petitions, therefore, came to be filed claiming the relief of extension of the lease for the unutilised period of the lease, which period has already been indicated above in each writ petition. 5. As against this, the petitioners in the second batch of writ petitions say that no such right exists in these petitioners to claim the extension as, according to them, extending the period would amount to re-writing the lease. Their contention is that since the lease period is over, even it has not been utilised for the full five years, still the lessee will not get any right to work those lease further and more particularly beyond the period which period has ended in the year 2000 itself. Besides this, they have also raised the ground alleging the threat to ecology and environment if the leases were to be extended as prayed for by the petitioners. 6. On this background, we will have to see as to whether firstly any such relief can be granted to the petitioners in the first batch of writ petitions and whether the petitioners in the second batch of writ petitions can justifiably oppose the grant of extension. It is obvious that if the first batch of writ petitions does not succeed, there would be no necessity to decide the second batch of writ petitions. 7. For the sake of narration, facts, dates and the particulars in W.P. No.16776 of 2000 are being utilised. 8. Learned senior counsel, Shri V.T. Gopalan, who led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners in the first batch of writ petitions contends that the petitioners had been able to secure the lease under Rule 39 of the Rules and had also deposited the lease money for five years and had thus moved to their detriment and, therefore, they can legitimately expect to work the lease for the full period of five years and if, for the reasons beyond their control, they could not work out the lease for the full period of five years then, they had every right to work that lease for the unutilised period. Learned senior counsel points out that in hundreds of writ petitions this position was obtained and in a number of writ petitions, the petitioners were allowed to work out their lease for the unutilised period. A number of orders have been placed before me by the learned senior counsel. Besides, the learned senior counsel says that there is an equity in favour of the petitioners for working out the lease for the unutilised period because they had not only parted with money but they have not been able to utilise their lease period fully owing to the orders passed by this Court in the earlier mentioned writ petitions in which the petitioners therein had claimed a rival right against the present petitioners and had claimed the lease for themselves in place of the present petitioners. 9. As against this, learned Additional Advocate General, Shri R. Muthukumarasamy, who led the arguments on behalf of the Government contends that there is no question of now allowing the petitioners to workout the lease for the unutilised period because that would amount to re-writing the lease, which is not permissible. Learned counsel argues that the Division Bench of this Court has also taken a view that such extension is not possible. Learned counsel points out particularly that there was a policy reflected in Rule 39 to create leases at the discretion of the State Government but, however, the said policy has undergone a sea-change and cannot be perpetuated now. Learned counsel points out that Rule 39 has been effaced from the statute book and does not exist any more with effect from 27th June, 1996. Learned counsel further submits that to permit the petitioners to work out the leases now would cause damage to the State exchequer. 10. Learned counsel also suggested that in so far as the second batch of writ petitions is concerned, there is now a State Level Committee formed to consider the question of quarrying of sand from the river-beds and of the leases and particularly in respect of the Palar river could be granted now only with the recommendation of the said Committee. It is assured by the Additional Advocate General further that even after the lease is granted, the authorities would keep on controlling and monitoring the same and there will be every endeavour to see that the agreement clauses are not breached by either encroaching upon the area or digging up the river-bed deeper than permitted. 11. It is to be seen on this rival pleadings as to whether the petitioners in the first batch of writ petitions have any right. Before the advent of Rule 39 of the Rules on the statute book, the leases were granted under Rule 8 whereunder all the conditions and the modalities for grant of lease were provided. Rule 39 brought a sea-change and created ultimate discretion in the State for granting the lease while the erstwhile Rule 8 provided for holding the auction and/or tender for the grant of lease. Rule 39 stayed on the statute book barely for about three years. It was inserted on 8-3-1993 and was deleted on 27-6-1996. Now for the grant of the leases Rule 8 alone would be available to control the modalities and the conditions of grant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that in deleting Rule 39, the State Government has displayed a change in the policy and what was hitherto depended upon the discretion of the State Government or its officers now is fully controlled by the Rule. It is an admitted position that the original period of five years in respect of the leases in question has expired in 2002 itself. The relief which is claimed is in the nature of an equitable relief whereunder the petitioners claim the precise period for which the leases remained unutilised due to the stay granted in the writ petitions filed by the rival claimants for these leases. To put the records straight, it will have to be seen as to whether in reality there was a stay. 12. The Court undoubtedly granted stay order but that was only for a fixed period and thereafter, it was an admitted position that the said stay order was not continued further. May be because of the lethargy on the part of the petitioners or the lethargy on the part of the Government to get the stay order vacated. However, the fact remains that the stay order, which was issued for a limited period died its death and therefore, there was nothing to stop the petitioners to work out their leases but, there also it seems that the petitioners did not move the Collector for a good long period of one year and it is only thereafter that the authorities were moved by the petitioners for permitting them to work the leases. Mr. V.T. Gopalan pointed out that in order to quarry the sand, transit passes are necessary and these transit passes were not being given by the Collector and because of that petitioners did not work the leases though there was no stay for the operation of those leases. What is not understood is that as to why the petitioners did not have the troubles to approach the authorities for these transit passes in good time. There can be no dispute that the parties and more particularly, the petitioners herein wasted the time and did not approach the authorities with the alacrity that was demanded and, therefore, the petitioners cannot blame the Government or the Court for not being able to work their leases for the full period of five years. When we see the records closely, it is apparent that the stay period is very short of few weeks. 13. Be that as it may, still the further question would be as to whether the petitioners could be allowed to work out their leases now. 14. Mr. V.T. Gopalan very heavily relied on a few Supreme Court decisions. To begin with, he relied on the decision in SUBHASH CHANDRA CHAUDHARI AND OTHERS v. RAM MILAN AND OTHERS (1997 (4) scc 480). Learned counsel relied on some observations in this case but, before that, it will be interesting to note the facts thereof. The lease was granted for a period of one year but was cancelled by the Commissioner and ultimately the order of the Commissioner was set aside by the State Government. However, the order of the State Government was stayed. The High Court, on a petition by the petitioner to permit him to work the lease for the unutilised period, the High Court had dismissed the petition. The Apex Court, when approached by the petitioner, made the following observations: It is not in dispute that pursuant to the direction ofthe High Court the auctions were conducted and third parties have been inducted to work out the excavation of the sand; but they are not before us. Though there is some force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that since the working of the period of the lease granted to the appellants was not allowed to be fully utilised on account of the orders passed by the courts or the Commissioner, the time may be extended for the appellants to execute the lease and work out the lease for the residue period. As stated earlier, since the third party rights have already been intervened, in their absence we cannot give the direction as sought for. Learned senior counsel very heavily relies on this decision and says that the Supreme Court in this case has actually made observations to the effect that the petitioners did deserve the extension. 15. The next case relied upon was the famous case of KARNAL DURAI v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TUTICORIN AND ANOTHER (1999 (1) SCC 475). This case also was under the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, more particularly under Rule 8(a)(i) and (iv)(b). Learned senior counsel pointed out on the basis of the language of Rule 8(8)(a)( i) that the period of lease was bound to be held as starting from the execution of the lease deed and, therefore, opined that the old rule alone was applicable in that case. In the advertisement issued it was notified that the leases were to be given only for two years. The said advertisement was amended and modified and the lease was made for three years, up to 31-3-1998. The petitioner in that case had submitted his tender and was found to be the highest bidder. That offer was, however, not accepted by the Collector who felt that the lease money was insufficient. The offer was rejected under the powers of the Collector under Rule 8(6)(b)(ii). In an appeal, the Collectors order was set aside since the offer made by the petitioner/appellant was not unreasonable. However, the Director applied the provisions contained in the amendment to Rule 8-A, which was introduced on 19-12-19 96, by which additional seigniorage fee was payable in addition to the lease amount. When the appeal was allowed on 1-4-1997, a part of the lease period had already expired. Therefore, the Director granted the lease only for the remaining period from 1-4-1993 up to 31-3-199 8. This was challenged by the petitioner by filing the writ petition in the High Court where it was contend3ed that the Director applied the amended rule dated 19-2-1996 so far as the seigniorage fee was concerned. Therefore, the Director should have also given the benefit of the amendment by which it was stated that the lease should run for the period of three years from the date of execution of the lease. The learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition observing that the auction notice specified a particular period between 1-1-1995 and 31-3-1998 and, therefore, the appellant could not claim the three years period as per the amended Rule 8(8)(a). According to the learned single Judge, the amendment was prospective in nature and was not applicable to the leases which had already been processed and rejected by the Collector earlier and that merely because the appellate order was passed subsequent tothe amendment, the appellant could not seek the benefit of the amendment. The Division Bench also confirmed the order in appeal on the ground that if the appeals were to be allowed then the States economic interests would suffer. The Division Bench also considered that the value of the lease now would be much more than for which the lease was granted. The Division Bench also held that the new rules did not apply. The matters went to the Apex Court and the Apex Court observed that the law was settled in State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone (1981 (2) SCC 205) wherein it was held that the application for grant of lease for minerals under the Rules had to be disposed of on the basis of such rules as were in force at the time when the application was disposed of and not by the rules in force at the time when the application for grant of lease was made. The Apex Court ultimately held that on the basis of the amended rule, the three-year period for quarrying of sand is to be counted from the date of execution of the lease and apart from the lease amount, seigniorage fee or deed rent or other charges were also required to be paid. The Apex Court, therefore, took the view that the law laid down in Hind Stone case applied fully and, t herefore, the lease would have to be held to have commenced only from the date of execution of the lease deed. Learned counsel very heavily relied on this case. However this case, in my opinion, would have no application except to the extent in this case though the original period of lease was over the petitioners were actually allowed to work out the leases for the extended period though after making some additional payment. In fact, learned senior counsel also candidly agreed that this did not have the direct bearing on the present controversy which pertains to the unutilised period of lease. In Karnal Durai case, cited supra, though the lease was granted in favour of the petitioner, it had never commenced; in the present case, the lease period has already commenced. Not only that but the petitioners also working on the lease for some time and it was thereafter that the stay orders came to be granted by this Court. In my opinion, this decision will have no bearing. 16. Learned senior counsel then invited my attention to yet another decision in BEG RAJ SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS (2003 (1) SCC 726). The facts in this case are extremely interesting . This was also a case regarding the quarrying of the sand in the river-bed. In that the petitioner had applied for mining lease and the lease was executed for a period of one year with effect from 3-6-1998 and before the expiry of that, the petitioner also sought for renewal for another period of two years which extension was granted by the Collector by order dated 20-12-2000. The consideration for granting the renewal was that as per the policy the lease should have been for a minimum period of three years and that not having been done erroneously by the Collector and the lease having been executed only for a period of one year, the petitioner was entitled for the extension. The Government policy also then underwent a change and the Government now had taken a decision to hold the auction of the sand mining. A competitor of the petitioner preferred a revision against the order of the Collector granting the extension which was a delayed revision. The delay was condoned and the State Government by its order dated dated 22-4-20 00 set aside the order of the Collector influenced mainly by the consideration that the State Government decided to hold the auction of the mining rights, it was likely to gain higher revenue and therefore it was in public interest to transfer mining rights by holding an auction. A revision came to be filed which was dismissed as, in the opinion of the High Court, the period of three years calculated from the date of original grant had in any case come to an end and, therefore, no relief could be granted to the petitioner. The High Court, of course, had given a positive finding in favour of the petitioner that originally itself the lease should have been for three years as per the State Governments policy and that the State Government was not justified in interfering and setting aside the order of the Collector. However, the High Court went on to dismiss the petition on the ground that the relief could not be really granted. Learned senior counsel then invited my attention to the following observation: ... we are not satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events, i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third-party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in-between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him. The present one is such a case. The delay in final decision cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the petitioner. No auction has taken place. No third-party interest has been created. The sand mine has remained unoperated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with GO issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because a little higher revenue can be earned by the State Government that cannot be a ground for not enforcing the obligation of the State Government which it