IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.655 of 2009 1. NAND KISHORE PRASAD, son of Late Lachhan Prasad 2. Ram Chandra Prasad, Son of Late Lachhan Prasad both residents of Village Durgauli, P.O. Bansonhi P.S. Mashrakh, District Saran. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR 2. Additional Collector, Saran, Chapra. 3. D.C.L.R. Marhawrah, District Saran, Chapra. 4. Deokali Devi, W/O Sunder Parit, resident of Village Durgauli, P.O. Bansonhi, P.S. Mashrakh, District Saran. 5. Sulochana Kunwar W/O Late Chirkut Sah 6. Raju Sah, Son of Late Chirkut Sah 7. Ssabita Devi, wife of Sughan Sah, daughter of Late Chirkut Sah, All residents of village Durgauli, P.O. Bansonhi, P.S. Mashrakh, District Saran. 8. Bidya Devi, wife of Badari Prasad, daughter of Late Lachhan Prasad, resident of village & P.O. Pachraur, P.S. Taraiyan, District Saran. 9. Panpati Devi, wife of Uma Shankar Prasad, daughter of Late Lachhan Prasad, resident of village Bhithi, P.S. Goreyakothi, District Saran. ----------- 6 3.12.2010 Having heard counsel for the appellants, we are of the considered view that there is no flaw in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.3.2009 passed in C.W.J.C. No.183 of 2008, whereby and whereunder, he has affirmed the order of revenue authority passed under Bihar Land Ceiling (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) holding that the appellants could not have been substituted after four years of the date of death of the land holder. The facts which are not in dispute and in fact would be essential for disposal of this appeal lies in very narrow compass. Father of the appellants had filed an application for pre-emption under section 16 (3) of the Act in relation to a piece of land measuring 1 katha 2 dhurs appertaining to Khata No.84, Plot No.527 of village- Durgauli, P.S. Mshrakh in the district of 2 Saran which was transferred by one Chirkut Sah in the name of respondents 3rd set (Respondent nos. 8 and 9). Such application of pre-emption was allowed by order dated 22.9.1992 in Land Ceiling Case No.15 of 1991-92 and in absence of appeal/revision the said order has also became final. It has to be noted that the order dated 22.9.1992 had to be followed by a sale deed, but respondent nos. 8 and 9 did not execute any sale deed nor father of the appellant did take any steps as envisaged under section 16 of the Act by getting the same executed. In fact, he had abandoned the whole issue and after more than seven years of the order in his favour he died on 24.11.1999, whereafter again no steps for substitution was taken by his legal heir/representative till 28.6.2003, when the application in question was filed seeking substitution for the purpose of executing the order dated 29.9.1999. Such order was rejected by the D.C.L.R was further affirmed by the appellate authority by order dated 25.7.2007, whereafter the writ application in question was filed. The learned Single Judge having examined the factual scenario, as noticed above, had held that the writ application itself suffered from unexplained delay and laches and in fact the pre- emptor and his heirs who were writ petitioners had abused the process of the Court. After the writ petition has been dismissed, the appellants-writ petitioners are in appeal before us. Learned counsel for the appellants had tried to submit 3 that once the respondent nos. 8 and 9 did not assail the order in favour of father of the appellants, whereby and whereunder, his application for pre-emption was allowed, respondent nos. 8 and 9 would not be entitled to retain the land in question and heirs of the pre-emptor will have perpetual right to enforce the same at any point of time. He has, in fact, submitted that once money was also deposited, execution of sale deed was mere a formality. In the opinion of this Court, all these aspects would probably take a back-seat, inasmuch as, the application in question which came to be considered before the learned Single Judge which was one for seeking substitution in the pre-emption proceeding. Admittedly, in the pre-emption case the pre-emptor land holder had died in the year, 1999 and yet an application for substitution was filed after more than four years of his death. The provisions of substitution under the Act having been provided under section 45 of Act, modality of which has also been given in Rule 55 of the Rules which reads as follows:- “Procedure for substitution of legal representative in case of death of the land-holder:- (1)The application for the substitution of legal representative under section 45-C shall be filed in Form L.C. 29 within thirty days of death of the land holder by the legal representative of the deceased land-holder. (2)On receipt of the application under sub-rule (1), the Collector or the appropriate authority shall substitute the name of the legal representative and proceed with the case. (3)Where no application is received within the period prescribed under sub-rule (1), Collector or the appropriate authority shall proceed to substitute the name of the legal representative on his own motion. (4)Where a question arises as to whether 4 any person is or is not the legal representative of the deceased land-holder, such question shall be determined by the Collector or the appropriate authority.” From a bare reading of Rule 55 it is thus clear that a fixed period of thirty days has been prescribed for filing of the substitution petition in prescribed Form L.C.29, by the heirs of the deceased land holder. In the present case, admittedly no application was filed within a period of thirty days muchless in Form L.C.29. Thus in absence of any provision in the statute for condoning the delay in filing of the substitution petition such a delay of four years in filing the substitution petition dated 9.7.2005 could not have been condoned. Moreover the effect of such substitution if allowed in the year 2005 could have led to execution of an order of D.C.L.R. dated 22.9.1992 at a point of time when even a civil suit had become barred by limitation on expiry of period of 12 years on 21.9.2004. Therefore, the learned Single Judge had correctly not exercised the discretionary power under Article 226 by interfering with such an order refusing substitution after unexplained delay of seventeen years in getting the order of pre-emption passed in 1992, executed in favour of the father of the appellants who did not take any steps for getting the sale deed executed in his lifetime and thus would be deemed to have abandoned his right to pre- emption which is admittedly a very weak right and can be easily lost. That being so, we find no error in the impugned order 5 and therefore this appeal being devoid of any merits is accordingly dismissed. Abhay/Sudip. (T. Meena Kumari, J.) ( Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)