1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Writ Petition No.6510 of 2006 (Shivshankar s/o Upasrao Nimbadkar v. The Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee and another) -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-- Office Notes, Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions : Court's or Judge's orders and Registrar's orders. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Shri R.S. Parsodkar, Advocate for Petitioner. Shri S.M. Puranik, Advocate for R- 1. Shri R.M. Bhangde, Advocate for R- 2. CORAM : A.M. Khanwilkar & R.C. Chavan, JJ. DATE : 6th June, 2008 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. We have no hesitation in upholding the conclusion reached by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, which is essentially founded on the documents relied by the petitioner “himself”. One of the document plainly describes the caste of the petitioner as 'Hindu Koshti'. The petitioner having relied on that document cannot be heard to claim that he belongs to 'Halba- Halbi' Community, which alone is notified as Scheduled Tribe in the State of Maharashtra. 3. To get over this position, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the decision of the Committee will have to be overturned on the ground that the Police Vigilance Cell report was not supplied to the petitioner, which was mandatory. Even this submission does not impress us. The Caste Scrutiny Committee has positively recorded in the order that the enquiry report and the documents obtained by the Police Vigilance Cell were 2 sent to the candidate along with the notice of hearing by the Committee, but he chose to remain absent. Assuming that there is some merit in the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner that the relevant reports were not received by the petitioner, the fact remains that the petitioner had himself relied on one of the document which describes his caste as “Hindu Koshti' and not as 'Halba' Tribe. The Committee, amongst other materials available before it, proceeded to invalidate the caste claim of the petitioner on the basis of the said document. We, therefore, find no reason to take exception to the order, which is impugned in this petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then contend that atleast the alternate relief claimed by the petitioner to quash and set aside the order of termination passed by respondent No.2/RBI dated 25-7-2007 and to direct respondent No.2 to reinstate the petitioner in service be granted, invalidation of his caste claim notwithstanding. According to the petitioner, he was in service since 1978 and came to be terminated by the order dated 25-7-2007 due to invalidation of his caste certificate. Strong reliance is placed on the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind and others, reported in 2001(1)Mh.L.J. 1, to buttress this contention. However, what is glossed over by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the latest decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar and others, reported in 2008(2) Mh.L.J. 720. The dictum of the Apex Court in the latter decision does not permit us to accede to the request of the petitioner as claimed by way of alternate relief. The counsel for the petitioner, however, made a fervent attempt to distinguish the judgment of the Apex Court in Dattatraya's case. According to him, the ratio of that judgment can be invoked only if the certificate relied on by the petitioner was found to be fabricated or fradulent. 5. The argument though attractive will have to be rejected. In the 3 case of Dattatraya, it is noticed that the respondent therein was appointed as an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in G.B. Pant Hospital, New Delhi, on his claim that he belonged to Scheduled Tribe-Halba. He joined duty on 20-9-1990. However, when his caste claim was invalidated and the Committee found that he did not belong to 'Halba' Tribe (Scheduled Tribe), the Ministry terminated the services of the respondent therein for falsely claiming to belong to 'Halba' Tribe. Even, in the present case, the petitioner approached respondent No.2 with the claim that he belongs to 'Halba' Tribe. In support of that claim, the petitioner relied on the caste certificate, which mentions the petitioner's tribe as 'Halba' tribe. However, during the scrutiny of the caste claim, the documents relied on by the petitioner himself revealed that he belonged to 'Koshti' community, which is not a part of 'Halba' Tribe. In other words, even in the present case the claim of the petitioner that he belonged to 'Halba' Tribe was false and therefore has been made the basis of taking action of termination. It would have been a different situation if the petitioner was to seek employment on the claim that he belongs to 'Koshti' caste being a Scheduled Tribe. That claim would pass off as one of the mistaken belief. But when the petitioner in spite of knowledge that he belongs to 'Koshti' community seeks employment as 'Halba' Tribe is certainly a case of false claim, similar to one in Dattatraya's case. 6. As aforesaid, Dattatraya's case, which is latest in point of time, deals with this aspect and expounds that the person, who has secured employment on the basis of such false caste claim, cannot be permitted to be continued in service, as that would deprive the legitimate candidate belonging to a Scheduled Tribe of employment. The Court went on to observe that the proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of the false caste certificate so that the post may be filled in by a 4 candidate which is entitled to the benefit of reservation. We are bound by the said observations of the Apex Court, which squarely apply to the fact situation of the present case. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner then invited our attention to the decision of the Apex Court dated 16-1-2007 in the case of Central Warehousing Corporation v. Jagdishkumar Vitthalrao Panjankar and another. The observations in the said decision obviously will have to be treated as having been made in fact situation of that case, whereas the present case is clearly covered by the exposition of the Apex Court in Dattatraya's case, as discussed earlier. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then contend that it will have to be kept in mind that the petitioner's claim was founded on the basis of common understanding prevailing at the relevant time before 1984 till the decision of our High Court in the case of Milind v. State, reported in 1987 Mh.L.J. 572. Much emphasis was placed on facts noted in paragraphs 20 to 23 of the said decision. This argument clearly overlooks that the observations of our High Court made in paragraphs 20 to 23 in Milind's case were considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind, which arose out of the self-same judgment, reported in 2001 Mh.L.J. 1, in paragraph 31 thereof. In effect, the Apex Court has set aside the observations in paragraphs 20 to 23 of the Bombay High Court on the reasoning that the circulars referred to therein issued by the State Government were of no avail, as the State Government has no authority to modify or alter the Scheduled Tribe Order. Besides, the petitioner was in the employment of Reserve Bank of India and working at Ahmedabad, for which reason also the circulars issued by the State Government were of no avail and had no application to Reserve Bank of India. 9. The counsel for the petitioner lastly relied on the decision in the 5 case of Punjab National Bank and another v. Vilas s/o Govindrao Bokade and another, reported in 2007(3) Mh.L.J. 805, to persuade us that the petitioner ought to be continued in service having served for sufficiently long time. Even this decision has been considered in our order dated 5-5-2008 passed in Writ Petition No.2864 of 2007. In paragraph 7 of the said order, we have noted that we were bound by the decision of the Apex Court in Dattatraya's case being three Judges and latest in point of time. 10. Having given thoughtful consideration, although we may express sympathy for the petitioner, it is not possible to extend our jurisdiction in view of invalidation of the (false) caste claim of the petitioner by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, on which basis the petitioner secured employment. 11. The petition has no merit and it is, therefore, dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE pdl