1 5 S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.947/2008. Smt. Laxmi Devi Dhobhi Vs. State & Ors. Date of Order :: 8th February 2008. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI Mr. R.S. Saluja, for the petitioner. ..... BY THE COURT: Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the material placed on record, this Court is satisfied that the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) (East), Bhilwara was perfectly justified in rejecting the fundamentally ill-conceived application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff-petitioner; and the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Bhilwara has rightly dismissed the baseless appeal filed against the order of the trial court; and there is no scope for interference in this writ petition. The petitioner-plaintiff has filed a suit, purported to be one for declaration and injunction, with the averments essentially to the effect that she was extended a contract for transportation of nutrition material and the contract was to be operative until the month of March 2008 but the defendants in a wholly illegal manner proceeded to cancel the said contract during its currency and issued fresh notice inviting tenders. 2 The petitioner-plaintiff has prayed for the relief in the plaint of declaring the notice inviting tender dated 19.11.2007 void ab- initio and so also of perpetual injunction against the defendants for not causing any obstruction in execution of the work by herself. In the suit aforesaid, the petitioner filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC seeking temporary injunction to the effect that the defendants may not obstruct execution of the work by her in accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties. The defendants put the said application to contention with the submissions, inter alia, that the rates offered by the plaintiff were highly excessive and the contract was cancelled under the authority of law and in accord with the terms of agreement. It was also stated that it was open for the plaintiff to take part in the fresh tender process. The learned trial court, after hearing the parties, has observed in its order dated 14.12.2007 (Annex.6) that the plaintiff has failed to show that the proceedings adopted by the defendants were actuated by malice; that prima facie case was not in favour of the plaintiff; that the defendant department was entitled to increase or reduce the period or rates of transportation; that the rates of the plaintiff were cancelled for being too excessive; and that neither balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiff nor would she suffer irreparable 3 injury. The learned appellate court has also endorsed the view taken by the learned trial court with the observations that under Clause (6) of the notice inviting tenders dated 08.05.2007, it was open for the defendants to reduce the term- period of the agreement and, therefore, the plaintiff has no prima facie to question the order issued on 15.11.2007 cancelling her contract. So far balance of convenience is concerned, the learned appellate court has referred to the submission of the defendants that they had received lesser rates for transportation in comparison to the rates offered by the plaintiff and has observed that the defendants cannot be insisted upon to get the work executed only through the plaintiff. The learned appellate court has also observed that if any injury was caused to the petitioner because of cancellation of her contract, the same could be compensated in monetary terms and, therefore, there arise no question of any irreparable injury. Seeking to challenge the orders aforesaid, learned counsel Mr. R.S. Saluja appearing for the petitioner-plaintiff has strenuously contended that the learned courts below have acted illegally in making observations of non-existence of any prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that the learned courts have proceeded to put an incorrect interpretation on the meaning, effect, 4 operation, and purport of Clause (6) of the notice inviting tenders as issued on 08.05.2007. Learned counsel further pointed out that earlier the rates as offered by the petitioner were put to negotiation and then were finalised by the respondent-department; and submitted that the respondents are not entitled to rescind the contract during its currency and to suggest that they would call for some other rates. Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to question the observations made by the learned appellate court of the defendants having received lesser transportation rates than those of the plaintiff. Upon such contention sought to be made, the learned counsel was posed a query to show as to what rates have been subsequently received after rescission of her contract. However, learned counsel has expressed his inability to say so. It is not borne out from the record that the petitioner has participated in the later tender proceedings. This writ petition remains bereft of substance. Apart that the submissions as sought to be made in challenge to the impugned orders do not make out any case of jurisdictional error on the part of the learned subordinate courts nor of any error apparent on the face of the record, this Court is satisfied that the case as set up by the petitioner is lacking in legal foundation. Even if the submissions as made by the petitioner are taken on their face value, her case is of illegal termination, 5 leading to breach of contract. For such breach of contract, the relief as sought by the plaintiff-petitioner can hardly be said to be in conformity with the principles of law applicable to the case. In any case, in the present set of facts and circumstances, it is evident on the face of the record that it cannot be said that the petitioner would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction prayed for is not granted; and, even in balance of convenience, the defendants cannot be forced to carry on the contractual relationship with the petitioner though they do not wish to continue with such relationship. For the purpose of the present petition, suffice is to observe that the application for temporary injunction was fundamentally lacking in substance and has rightly been rejected by the subordinate courts. There is no force in the writ petition and the same is, therefore, rejected. (DINESH MAHESHWARI), J. Mohan/