IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM WRIT PETITION NO : 26320 of 2000 Between: Majji Satyanarayana S/o Suryanarayana R/o Tarluvada, Vizianagaram Dist. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 Addl. Commissioner, Endowments Dept. Tilak Road, Abids, Hyderabad 2 The Dy. Commissioner Endowments Dept., Hyderabad 3 Executive Officer MANSAS Trust, Vizianagaram .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue an appropriate order or direction or a writ particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus declaring that the orders passed by the 2nd respondent herein dt: 27-5-1997 passed in O.A.No.118/90 and the orders of the 1st respondent dt: 18-12-2000 made in R.P.No.92/98 affirming the orders passed by the 2nd respondent arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction apart from being voilative of fundamental principles of natural justice Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.KOKA RAGHAVA RAO Counsel for the Respondent No.: MS.M.VIDYAVATHI The Court made the following : THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM Writ Petition No. 26320 of 2000 Oral Order: The 2nd respondent, by the order dated 27.05.1997 in O.A. No. 118 of 1990, determined the petitioner to be an encroacher of land in an extent of Ac.36.25 cents in old Survey No. 62/1 (R.S.No.70) of Tharlavada village of Visakhapatnam District. The land belongs to MANASAS Trust, an endowment institution. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred a revision to the 1st respondent. By the order dated 18.12.2000, the 1st respondent rejected R.P. No. 92 of 1998. The petitioner is before this Court assailing the primary order as confirmed by the revisional order of the 1st respondent. The petitioner claims to have been granted lease of an extent of Ac.36.25 cents in July, 1972 for a period of 10 years. In fact, he appears to have continued on the land and as per the official records inducted as a tenant during the period 01.07.1983 to 30.6.1989 on an annual rent of Rs.4,000/-. A lease was granted to the petitioner enuring upto 30.06.1989. As per the resolution approved by the trust, a quit notice was issued on 09.06.1989 directing the petitioner to vacate the land. The petitioner not having acquiesced to the notice to vacate the land, the trust reported to the Endowment Authorities that not only had the petitioner defaulted in huge lease amounts for a period of six years from 01.07.1983 to 30.06.1989 but even after the lease expired had not vacated the land. Thereupon, proceedings under Section 83 (1) of the A.P. Charitable & Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short ‘the Endowments Act’) were initiated and the order dated 27.05.1997 passed by the 2nd respondent treating the petitioner as an encroacher and directing his eviction by recourse to coercive process, if necessary. As already recorded, the revisional proceedings also ended against the petitioner, which gave rise to this writ petition. Before the 2nd respondent, the issue debated was whether the petitioner was granted lease of agricultural land or non-agricultural land and whether the provisions of the A.P.(Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Tenancy Act’) were applicable since the petitioner claimed the lands to be agricultural lands. The 2nd respondent by the order in O.A. No. 118 of 1990 concluded that the land in question is not grazing land falling within the provisions of Section 18(1) (d) of the Tenancy Act but is dry land and therefore the Tenancy Act has no application. However, the 2nd respondent determined the petitioner to be an encroacher within the meaning of Section 83 of the Endowments Act. The 1st respondent concurred with this conclusion while rejecting the revision and sustained the order of eviction. The writ petition was filed on 27.12.2000 on the pleaded premise that the land being agricultural land, the provisions of the Tenancy Act are applicable. It is asserted that the petitioner should be evicted only by following the process under Section 13 of the Tenancy Act but not under Section 83 of the Endowments Act and therefore the primary order in O.A. No. 118 of 1990 and revisional order in R.P. No. 92 of 1998 are incompetent, unsustainable and ought to be invalidated. In the light of legislative and precedential developments, the legal regime operating today is wholly distinct from the regime presumed by the parties to this lis and the quasi-judicial Tribunals i.e., the 1st and 2nd respondents. The Tenancy Act was a legislative exercise to provide for the payment of fair rent by cultivating tenants and for regulating the relations of landlords and cultivating tenants of agricultural lands and for matters connected therewith. By A.P. Act 39 of 1974, Section 10 of the Tenancy Act was amended to incorporate a provision that every lease subsisting at the commencement of this Amendment Act shall be deemed to be in perpetuity. This Amendment was brought into force with effect from 01.07.1980. Section 13 of the Tenancy Act enjoins conditions for termination of tenancy and other provisions of the Act contain ancillary and incidental provisions. Section 17 confers over-riding efficacy to the provisions of the Tenancy Act qua any pre-existing law, custom, usage, decree or order of a court. The Endowments Act is legislative exercise which repealed and substituted the 1966 Endowments Act. Section 82(1) of this Act deals with lease of agricultural lands and enjoins that any lease of agricultural land belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any institution or endowment, subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act, held by a person who is not landless poor, shall notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, stand cancelled. Sub-section (2) of Section 82 spells out certain benefits to landless poor persons and the explanation to Sub-section (2) of Section 82 defines the expression ‘landless poor’ as meaning a person whose total extent of land held either as an owner or as a cultivating tenant or both does not exceed Ac. 2.50 gts of wet land or Ac. 5.00 of dry land and whose annual income does not exceed Rs.12,000/- p.a. The other explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 82 is not germane for the purpose of this writ petition. By an Amendment to the Endowments Act in 1982 by A.P. Act 27 of 2002 (with effect from 26.8.2002) sub-section (5) was introduced declaring that the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1950 shall not apply to any lease of land belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious institutions or endowment as defined in the Act. As a consequence of the legislative declaration as to cancellation of all tenancies of agricultural lands belonging to endowment, qua Section 82 of the Endowments Act, tenants of endowment lands felt adversely impacted and filed writ petitions before this court challenging the vires of Section 82 of the Endowments Act. A learned single Judge of this Court accepted the challenge and declared Section 82 of the Endowments Act to be ultra vires Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution to the extent leases of marginal and small farmers are not excluded from the ambit of extinction of leases declared under Section 82 of the Endowments Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Endowments Act was also declared invalid in its entirety. In an intra-court appeal, a Division of this Court held that Section 82(2) of the Endowments Act violated the equal protection injunction of Article 14 of the Constitution. The matter was then carried in appeal to the Supreme Court, by the State. The Supreme Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Nallamilli Rami Reddi[1], reversed the opinion of the A.P. High Court and upheld the validity of Section 82 of the Endowments Act. As a consequence, the validity of Section 82 of the Endowments Act was affirmed ab initio, since Nallamilli Rami reddi’s decision did not enjoin a prospective operation to the open Court pronouncement. As a consequence of the Supreme Court decision in Nallamilli Rami Reddi’s case (1 supra), any lease of agricultural land belonging to an endowment, subsisting as on the date of commencement of the Endowments Act, unless held by a person, who is not a landless poor person, stood cancelled. The Endowments Act has come into force with effect from 28.05.1987. Though the petitioner was initially granted lease of this extent of land in 1972, he appears to have continued cultivation of the land with intermittent grants of lease and the last formal lease granted to the petitioner was pursuant to the resolution of the executive committee of the trust dated 09.11.1983 by which the petitioner was granted lease for the period 01.07.1983 to 30.06.1989. In view of the declaration in Section 82(1) of the Act, the lease of the petitioner which enured upto 30.06.1989 in terms of grant of lease, however, stood cancelled on account of the legislative declaration on and with effect from 28.05.1987. On such extinction of the lease, the petitioner could be evicted by following the procedure under Sections 83 and 84 of the Endowments Act treating him to be an encroacher. Accordingly, proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under Section 83 of the Endowments Act, presuming him to be an encroacher, for his eviction. In the said proceedings before the second respondent, on the basis of the assumptions as to the operative legal regime at that point of time, it was claimed by the petitioner that he was entitled to the benefits of the Tenancy Act and further that he was a protected tenant, meaning that he had a right to continue in perpetuity, qua, the provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act. The Endowments Department sought to demolish this creative claim of the petitioner by taking an equally creative defence, namely that the land was not an agricultural land. It was this tangential debate that determined the adjudication and the second respondent held that the land was not agricultural land, the provisions of the Tenancy Act would not apply, the petitioner is an encroacher and, therefore liable to be evicted by recourse to the provisions of Section 84 of the Endowments Act. The first respondent adjudicated upon the revision in R.P. No. 92 of 1998 on the same factual and legal premise which operated with the second respondent. The concurrent conclusions of the respondents 1 and 2 was however that the petitioner is an encroacher, liable to be evicted. Sri Koka Raghava Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would however contend that since at the time of determination of the issues by the primary authority and the revisional authority the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi’s case (1 supra) was not pronounced and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court held the field, the finding by the authorities below that the provisions of the Tenancy Act had no application cannot be sustained and since the provisions of Section 82(1) of the Endowments Act were also not in operation at that time (having been invalidated by the Division Bench of this Court), it cannot be presumed that the petitioner’s tenancy was cancelled on the date of coming into force of the Endowments Act. It is additionally urged by Sri Koka Raghava Rao that the petitioner was entitled to be treated as a tenant in perpetuity on the application of the provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act. The above contentions do not commend acceptance of this Court. It is trite that determinations by judicial authority as to the interpretation of a statute operates retroactively. When the Division Bench of this Court affirmed the conclusion by a learned Single Judge that Section 82(1) of the Endowments Act was ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution on account of violation of equal protection injunctions of Article 14, Section 82(1) of the Endowments Act must be treated as having been declared ab initio invalid, particularly since it is a settled principle of law as explicated by several pronouncements by the apex Court that the High Courts cannot prospectively over rule, vide L.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab[2], and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar[3]. In any event, in Nallamilli Rami Reddi’s case (1 supra), the Supreme Court reversed the determination by the Division Bench of this Court and upheld the vires of Section 82 of the Endowments Act. Since the Supreme Court did not pronounce its judgment in Nallamilli Rami Reddi’s case (1 supra) to be prospective, it is axiomatic that validity of Section 82 of the Endowments Act stood restored ab initio. Consequently, on every relevant date of the adjudication of the issue relating to the petitioner’s status as a tenant, by the first and second respondent, Section 82 of the Endowments Act was operative proprio vigore. On the above analysis, the tenancy of the petitioner in respect of an extent of Ac.36.25 cents of agricultural land in Survey No.62/1 of Tharlavada village, Visakhapatnam District (though enuring upto 30.06.1989 by virtue of the resolution dated 09.11.1983 of the executive committee of the MANASAS Trust), stood cancelled on the coming into force of the Endowments Act, in view of the legislative declaration in Section 82 of the Endowments Act, since the petitioner is not a landless poor person. It requires to be noticed that not only has the Bill, which eventually became the Endowments Act, was reserved for the consideration of and received the assent of the President, but Section 151 of the Endowments Act enacts a bar of jurisdiction to the institution of any suit or legal proceeding in any Court of law in respect of the administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matter of dispute for determining or deciding for which a provision is made by the Act. The status of an occupant of an endowment property, whether he is an encroacher, shall be determined under Section 83 of the Endowments Act and not elsewhere. In any event, the Endowments Act in the context of the provisions of the Tenancy Act must be considered a special enactment dealing inter alia with properties endowed to an institution or endowment regulated by the provisions of the Endowments Act. On the above premise, the petitioner cannot gainfully contend that notwithstanding the legislative declaration of cancellation of his lease by Section 82 of the Endowments Act, he is nevertheless entitled to the status of a perpetual tenant, qua, the provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act. On this analysis, as the petitioner’s lease stood determined/cancelled by the legislative declaration, he has rightly been considered as an encroacher and proceedings initiated for his eviction by recourse to Sections 83 and 84 of the Endowments Act and the orders impugned cannot be impeached on any rational grounds. Sri Koka Raghava Rao, the learned Senior Counsel would faintly endeavour to urge that the petitioner could be considered a landless poor person because there is nothing on record to show that he owned land other than the extent of Ac.36.25 cents of the endowment land cultivated by him as a tenant. This contention does not also merit acceptance. The explanation to Sub-suction (2) of Section 82 defines landless poor as meaning a person whose total extent of land held by him either as owner or as cultivating tenant or as both does not exceed Ac.2-50 cents of wet land or Ac.5-00 of dry land. The petitioner was admittedly cultivating Ac.36-25 cents of land. Even if it be dry land, that cultivation alone without any other land owned or cultivated by the petitioner, would take him out of the definition of a landless poor person. If the petitioner is not a landless poor person, as he is demonstrately not, he cannot resist the legislative declaration of cancellation of his lease nor the consequent characterization as an encroacher. On the aforesaid analysis, though the reasons recorded by the second and first respondents for treating the petitioner as an encroacher appear to be fallacious, the eventual conclusion that the petitioner is an encroacher and the consequent order that eviction must follow, seem to be impeccable, warranting no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the aforesaid analysis, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order granted earlier stands dissolved. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. ____________________ GODA RAGHURAM, J. Date: 31.03.2009 Nsr [1] AIR 2001 SC 3616 [2] AIR 1967 SC 1643 [3] AIR 1994 SC 1074