IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILASPUR (CHHATTISGARHl SECOND APPEAL No. ^f S-^1T Sinale&tt»l'tt / 2004 APPELLANT Defendant « Amarjeet Singh, ^ Aged about 54 years,S/o Sohan ^'' Singh, R/o Near Viddhut Mandal ^^y •^y Office Liquor Shop, Ward No. 10, Station Road, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ^ ..• ^^.^"~ :^^ ^' RESPONDENT ^Plaintiff ( VERSUS Gurucharan Singh Bhatiya Aged about 52 years S/o Nanak Singh Bhatiya, R/o Budhwari Para Ward No. 12 Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon SECONDAPPEAL UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1908 Appellant/ Defendant Respondent/ Plaintiff HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR Second Appeal Ne. <89 of 2004 : Amarjeet Singh Vs. : Gurucharan Singh Bhatiya Appellant/defendant by Shri D.N.Pra|apati, Advocat^. Respondent/Plaintiff by Shri Ajit Singh, Advocate. ORDER (Passed on^r/l2^S) Dhirendra Mishra. J This is the defendant's seeond appeal under Sectlen 100 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure as the suit for eviction and damages preferred by the plaintMT has been decreed and the appeal preferred by th®defendant has been dismlssed by the impugned judgment and decree. (Parttos shall hereinafter be referred to as pertheir deseription before the trial Court.) 2. The plaintHT flled si civil sutt with an averment that the defendant was his Ucensee over the suit property and he was residing there wtth the permission of the ptainttfF. However, the defendant carried out some atteration and thereby damaged the suit property whereupon the plalntiff terminated the licence w.e.f. Febmary 2000 and (nformed the same by tetegram and registered nottce dated 31.03.2000. It was ftirther pteaded that the father ofthe plaintW late Shri Nanak Singh purehased the sult property and after his death, the propertywas given to the plalntiff by othw family members. The defendant refused to recdve the notice dated 15.03.2000, by which the plaintiff cancelled his Ucence and thereftfter the sutt for eviction and damages at the rate of Rs.20 per day from 01.04.2000 wasfiled. ./ 6. 6. The defendant denied the averments ofttie ptaint and stated that he has perfected his tttte by adverse possesslon as h®was undisputeclly FesicUtg in the suit house since 1935 as tenant of th®vender Laxminarayan titl 1971. He had also contracted to purehase the property from vencter Shakuntala Bai, however, father ofthe defendant somehowmanaged to purchase the same. The defendant and hls parente continued (o be in possession of the suit property and they decUned to hand overthe vacant possession ofthe suit house tj> the fathw ofthe plaintiff and they had ateo declined th®ownership of the plaintiff. It is also stated that the defetKtant started considering htmself to be the owier of the property and the father ofthe plaNiff also aGtaiowtedged the parents ofthe defendant as owner of the suit house since the house in question was not mutated in the name of father ofthe plaintifftilt the year 2000. Thus the defendant resided in the sutt house as ownerwtthout any interruption and they had never been licensee of the ptaintifF. It was also pteaded that the defendant and his parents obtained electric connection in their names and they dug a tube well and constructed a slabbed house by invsting more (han Rs.50,@00/- and accordingly, they have perfeeted theirtitte by adverse possession andl the sutt preferred bythe plaintWy is bgured by lawofBmttatton. On the basis of pleading of the respecthye parties, the trial Gourt framed various issues and decreed the sutt in favour of the plaintiff by recordinga finding that the defendant was residhg as licensee ofthe plaintiffoverthe suit house and caused damage to the suil hous®whereupon the licenee was vatidly revoked by the plainttff and that th®ctefenctant has not perfected his tttle by adveree possession and accordingly decreed the sutt with costs. The appeal preferred by the defendant has been also dlsmissed by the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. Leamed counsel for the .appeWant/defenctent has chaUengedthe judgments of both the Courts belowon the ground that though the plaintttT has faited to prove as he did not adduce any <toGumentary evidenee to establish that thedefendant was his iicensee, even thenthe Courts below have arrivedtoan erroneous eonclusSon which is eontrary to the evidence t .;..,-.. i .3 availabie on record that the defendant was the licensee of the plaintiff. Leamed counsel for the appellant further submtts that the substantial question of law involved in this appeal is-'whether in the absene* of any evldence oflicence and inview ofthe faet that the defondant was denying titte of the plaintiff stnce 1971 and cla^ming ho®titetitle over the suit property to that ofthe plaintifffor a Gontinuous period of 30 yeare.the sutt flted in the year 2001 was barred by law of Umitatton a.<Kl v^iether the appellant/ctefendant has perfecterj his tttle byadverse possesston?' 7. Le^rned counsel for the appellant rdtes upon th®jy<l9m®ntof the HoRlaite Supreme Court reportedin 1997(111 M.P.W.N. 32 In the mattw <rfTySsU^ Smt. Paro and submits that where a person is in possessjon for a continuous period of 30 years, he cannol betermed as Ucensee. 8. Ihaveheardteamedeounselfortheparties. 9. Both the Courts below on the basis of pteading of the respectwe parties and evidence available on record have arrh/ed at the conclusion that th® parents and grant-parents of defendant were the tenants of vender Laxminarayan from 1935 to 1971 and the suit house was purehaseGi by father of the plaintHT through registered sate deed dated 01.11.1 971 and after purchasing the suft house, the plaintiff had asked f©rvacant possession and the fact oftransfer of ownership was knowi to the parents of the defendant. Both the Courts below on the basis of orat evidence have arrived to a concurrent finding that after the sutt house was purchased by father of the plaintiff, the father ofthe defendant had sought permisslon to live in the said house and they had premised that they shalt vacat®the same and accordingly, tt has been held that oral license has been estaUished. The above finding of the Courts betow on the basis of detailed anatysis and proper appreciation of oral and doeumentary evidence avattabte on record, cannot be interfered at the stage of second appeal. The queslion whether the defendant was licensee of the plainW is a findingoffaetandthesame has been declded in favour ofthe plaintiff and against the defendaftt. 10. The second proposftion of the defendant that h®was reskling tn th®suit premises as owner ofthe house, is contrarytojhe pteadings and evidence 4 available on reGord as he himself admitted that his parents and yand- parents were the tenants of the previous owner who subsequently transfeireclthehoysetGtheptelntiffintheyearlQZIandthedefendants never purchased the same, therefore the <tefenclant cannot ctaim that he resided in thesuithouse as owner solely on the groundthat white rosidtng in the sakl house, he obtained etoGtrie connection, dUQborewHandmade some construction of permaneflt nature. 'w, 11. The judgment In the matterofTulsi Vs. Smt. Paro (supra) reNedupon by laamed counsel for the appetlant, hasno appUeation in the instant case as in the above ctted case, the name of the appeltant had been shown in the revenue records for a period of 20 yeara as Gannaani^ whteh means tenant at v^U'. However, in the present case there is no document to this effect and as already held that both the Courts below on the basis of oral evidence available on record hav®arrived at the conchision that the plaintiff permltted the ancestors ofthe defendant to eoRtuiue In possession ofthesuit premises as licensee and thelteense was ultimately terminated in the year 2000 when the defendant started addition anct alteration of the suit premises tothe detriment efthe interest ofplalntifF. 12. Thus on the basis &f the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the opinton that the impugned judgment and deeree afflrming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court Ss based on proper appreotation of evidence available on reeord. No question of law much tess substantial ' question of law is Involved for adjudieation of this appeal. The appeal being devoid of any substance deserves to be dtemissed at the motlon stage itselfand it Is aceordingly dismissed. Sd/- DfflRENDRA MISHRA Judge