(1) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, AURANGABAD BENCH, AT AURANGABAD. Letters Patent Appeal No. 77 of 2006 Jai Bhavani Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Georai, Taluka : Georai, District : Beed, Through its Trustee : Bhausaheb s/o. Kacharu Natkar, Age : 45 years, Occupation : Service, R/o. Rakshasbhuwan, Taluka : Georai, District : Beed. .. Appellant. versus 1. Ramesh s/o. Shankarrao Kalkotwar, Age : 47 years, Occupation : Service, R/o. C/o. Shrifal, Chanakyapuri, Behind Government Guest House, Beed, Taluka & District : Beed. 2. The Director of Technical Education, Maharashtra State, Mumbai. 3. The State of Maharashtra, Through its Principal Secretary, Education Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai-32. .. Respondents. .......................... (2) Mr. R.N. Dhorde, Advocate, for the appellant. Mr. S.R. Barlinge, Advocate, for respondent no.1. Mr. S.K. Tambe, Assistant Government Pleader, for respondent nos.2 and 3. .......................... CORAM : B.R. GAVAI & N.D. DESHPANDE, JJ. DATE : 7TH SEPTEMBER 2009. ORAL JUDGMENT (Per B.R. Gavai, J.) : 1. The present appeal takes an exception to the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of this court, dated 24th November 2006, in Writ Petition No. 5387/2006, thereby dismissing the petition, which arose out of the judgment and order dated 22nd June 2006, passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal, Aurangabad, in Appeal No. 63/2004, thereby setting aside the order of dismissal of the present respondent no.1 and directing reinstatement of present respondent no.1 on his original post of Principal of the Pharmacy Institute, with continuity and back wages. 2. The appeal has been allowed by the School Tribunal and the petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this court, basically on the ground that there is violation of the provisions of Rule 36 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of (3) Service) Rules, 1981. 3. Though Mr. R.N. Dhorde, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, has relied on the judgment of Division Bench of this court, in the case of Ganesh Mahadeorao Thawre Vs. Central Hindu Military Education Society (2007(5) Bom.C.R. 680), contending that the Division Bench has held that it is permissible for the President of Society to delegate powers to any other member of the management, we are unable to accept the said contention. 4. The Full Bench of this court, in the case of National Education Society, Nagpur, and another Vs. Mahendra s/o. Baburao Jamkar and another (2007(3) Mh.L.J. 707), has in unequivocal terms held as under : " Rule 36(1)(a) of the Rules provides for constitution of Inquiry Committee in respect of an employee while Rule 36(2)(b) provides for constitution of Inquiry Committee for the Head. We have already quoted the definition of "Head" in terms of section 2(9) of the Act. If it is held that there is no requirement for the President of the management to be a member of the Inquiry Committee in case of the Head who is not the Chief Executive Officer, providing separate Inquiry Committee for the Head in Rule 36(2)(b) woule be nugatory. In case such an interpretation is accepted Head of the school would be an employee for the purposes of Rule 36(2)(a) and (4) there was no need to have separate constitution of Inquiry Committee in terms of section 36(2)(b). It is well settled that the Legislature does not use any word unnecessarily. It would be appropriate to quote paragraph 9 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1454. In para 9, the Apex Court observed as under : " ................ Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions. Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something. Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily. ....... " The Full Bench has further observed thus : " We, therefore, hold that in case of Head whether or not he is empowered to act as Chief (5) Executive Officer, the President of the management shall be a member of the Inquiry Committee as contemplated by Rule 36(2)(b)(i) of the Rules of 1981. " 5. In view of clear pronouncement of law by the Full Bench of this court, holding therein that when an enquiry is held in case of a Head, whether or not he is empowered to act as Chief Executive Officer, the President of the management shall be a member of the Inquiry Committee as contemplated by Rule 36(2)(b)(i) of the Rules of 1981, we do not find that any error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the petition of the present appellant. In that view of the matter, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this court. 6. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 7. At this stage, Mr. R.N. Dhorde, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that since the School Tribunal has allowed the appeal only on technical ground, the appellant should be granted permission to hold fresh enquiry against the respondent employee. He also prays for continuation of the interim order passed by this court dated 7th February 2007, thereby a statement was made on behalf of the respondent no.1, that till the disposal of the appeal, the said respondent shall not seek enforcement of the order passed by the School Tribunal. 8. In so far as prayer made by the learned Counsel for the appellant, that permission be granted to hold fresh enquiry against the (6) respondent employee, is concerned, it appears that this prayer was neither made before the School Tribunal nor before the learned Single Judge of this court. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to grant the said prayer which is made before this court for the first time. In so far as prayer for continuation of interim order is concerned, since the appeal arises out of two concurrent orders passed by the School Tribunal and the learned Single Judge of this court, we are not inclined to grant the said prayer. Hence, the said prayer also stands rejected. ( N.D. DESHPANDE ) ( B.R. GAVAI ) JUDGE JUDGE ......................... bgp/77-lpa