IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CR. APP (DB) No.1150 of 2010 PAWAN KUMAR, S/O LATE JOGESHWAR PRASAD YADAV @ BHAGATJI, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE – KOLHA BIGHA, P.S. – WARSILIGANJ, DISTRICT – NAWADA. ……… APPELLANT. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR. 2. NAND KISHORE YADAV, S/O RASHIDEO PRASAD YADV, R/O CHAKWAY, P.S. WARSALIGANJ, DISTRICT – NAWADA. ……….. RESPONDENTS. ----------- 02/ 30.09.2010 The informant of Warsaliganj P.S. Case No. 52 of 1996, which ultimately culminated into Sessions Trial No. 129 of 1999/267 of 2009, has appealed against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. V, Nawada on 2nd of August, 2010, by which the sole respondent Nand Kishore Yadav was acquitted of the charges under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act. The father of the appellant was the deceased and he was, as per the prosecution story, had gone to Warsaliganj market in connection with some work but, did not return up to 8.00 p.m. on 4.4.1996. The informant was informed by residents of village Lila Bigha that the deceased, father of the appellant, had been shot and killed near Makanpur village on the pitch road. The appellant went there. He found that his father was lying dead near the eastern bank of the road and 2 near the dead body the cover of the bullet was found. He lodged an FIR against unknown without even raising a doubt as to who could have committed the murder of his father. He fairly reported that he had no doubt against anyone about the participants in committing the offence. The case was registered. The investigation was taken up and after submission of charge sheet the case was ultimately sent to the Court of Sessions by commitment order, which was probably passed in the year 1999. The trial court devoted 16 years and ultimately the judgment of acquittal was passed. It appears that a compromise petition also was filed but, during the course of trial the appellant appeared in the witness box and named the respondent as the culprit without ever having given such statement before the police. The FIR also did not name the respondent as the person who had perpetrated the offence. The other witnesses also deposed that the father of the appellant was killed but they could not be found by the court saying that they had either themselves seen the commission of the offence or were 3 informed by a particular person about the act being committed by the respondent. In fact, every witness except the informant (PW 11) came to depose that they simply learnt about killing of the deceased by the appellant. This was the reason that the learned trial Judge was recording a finding that the evidence of those witnesses was of no use as no source from where the information about the commission of the offence by the respondent was received by the witnesses was disclosed to the court. The testimony of PW 11, i.e., the present appellant was discarded on many counts; one and the foremost being that he had not named any one in the FIR and undoubtedly he had not given any statement in addition to the FIR, which was recorded on 5.4.1996 at 6.30 a.m. He was naming the respondent for the first time in court and that too on account of gathering the name of the respondent from persons; again not disclosing the names of those persons, who could have told the appellant that it was this respondent Nand Kishore Yadav, who had perpetrated the offence. On this quality of evidence the learned trial Judge was still not gathering sufficient courage to point out that it 4 was a case of no evidence. But in our considered view it was not a case in which an innocent man should have been to the rigors of facing a trial before the Court of Sessions for over 16 years. We simply wonder as to how courts below could not identify this singular aspect of the trial so as to ending the trial at an appropriate stage, may be, at the stage of Sections 227 or 228 of the Cr.P.C. Probably the court could not muster courage to say that it may not be the accused who had committed the offence and thereby discharge the accused. This was the reason that innocent Indian, like, the respondent could be dragged for 16 years to face the trial by standing in the dock of the accused, we regret that the respondent was put to such daunting harassment. The courts suffered and this Court also suffers because the valuable time of this Court has been wasted by the unscrupulous act of the present appellant by bringing this appeal before us for hearing at the admission stage. The wastage of our valuable time by virtue of taking resort to the provisions of Section 372, Proviso Cr.P.C. should be stopped and it has to be 5 brought to an end if it appears merely to waste of the court’s time without any valid purpose. Undoubtedly, the present appeal has been filed for wasting the court’s time. As such, the appellant must be visited with some exemplary cost. The Court has powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. We direct that the appellant pays Rs.5,000/- as cost for filing a frivolous case by way of present appeal before this Court to the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee. The fine must be deposited within a month of the present order. In case the fine is not paid then the court below shall take up the matter with the Collector of the District, who shall initiate a proceeding under Section 421 of the Cr.P.C. for realization of fine from the present appellant. This appeal is dismissed in the above light and with the above direction. DKS/ (Mridula Mishra, J.) (Dharnidhar Jha, J.)