1 Ash IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 2192 OF 2010 M/s. Ronuk Industries Pvt. Ltd. .. Petitioners Vs Mr. Mansingh Rangappa Patil & Ors. .. Respondents -- Shri F.E. D’Vitre, Senior Counsel with Shri V.P. Sawant for the Petitioner. None for the Respondents. -- CORAM : A.S.OKA, J. DATE : 4TH MAY, 2010 P.C: . On 26th March, 2010, notice for final disposal at the admission stage was issued. The Petitioner is the original Plaintiff. The challenge in this Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to the order dated 12th January, 2010 by which the learned Trial Judge allowed the application made by the 1st to 4th Respondents at Exhibit – 49. 2. The case of the Petitioner is that the consent terms duly signed by the Petitioner and the Respondent Nos.1 to 5 were tendered before the Trial Court on 30th October, 2009. The order passed by the learned Trial Judge on the said consent terms records that the 1 to 5 Defendants along with their Advocate were present and they admitted that the terms in the consent terms are correct. It appears that an application was made by the 1st 4th Defendants at Exhibit – 49 raising an objection for passing a consent decree in terms of the consent terms. In the said 2 application, the said Respondents contended that the consent terms were never read over to the said Respondents and that they have signed the same without understanding the consequences thereof. It was contended that the concerned Respondents are not conversant with the English language. A direction was sought in the alternative that the Petitioner be directed to modify the consent terms to such extent as was orally agreed/arrived at earlier earlier between the parties. By the impugned order, the learned Judge allowed the said application and directed that the consent terms at Exhibit – 48 are not accepted. 3. After having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, I find that the entire approach of the learned Trial Judge is erroneous. In Paragraph 9 of the impugned order, the learned Judge observed that the 6th and 7th Defendants ( 6th and 7th Respondents herein ) were not parties to the consent terms. The 2nd ground is in Paragraph 11 of the impugned order which reads thus: - “I hold that, when the defendants are not ready for compromise and they are alleging that, the terms of compromise are not explained to them by their advocate and said terms are not the terms as actually agreed by them, then in such situation, it will not be desirable to pass any decree on the basis of the said consent terms. It will cause prejudice to the defendant.” 4. It must be noted here that while making observation that the 6th and 7th Defendants have not signed the consent terms, the learned Judge has ignored the material portion of the consent terms. In Clause No.16 thereof, it is stated that the Plaintiff was not pressing the suit against the 3 said two Defendants. Moreover, merely because the 1st to 4th Respondents stated that they are not willing to compromise, the learned Judge could not have rejected the consent terms. 5. There is an order dated 30th October, 2009 passed by the learned Trial Judge on the consent terms recording that the 1st to 5th Respondents were present along with their Advocates and they have admitted the terms. Thereafter, on 6th November, 2009, some of the Defendants made the application alleging that the consent terms were not read over to them. This was a case where the Trial Court was bound to hold an inquiry in terms of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This was a case where the Petitioner was alleging that there was a settlement arrived at and some of the Defendants after signing the consent terms were denying the settlement. It was a duty of the Court to decide the question as to whether there was a settlement as alleged by the Petitioner. Without deciding the said question, the learned Judge appears to have been carried away by the bald statement of the concerned Defendants that the terms of the compromise were not explained to them by their Advocate and the terms incorporated therein are not the terms actually explained to them. The fact that the 6th and 7th Defendants have not signed consent terms is not relevant as the Petitioner is not pressing the suit against them. In the circumstances, the impugned order will have to be quashed and set aside and the learned Judge will have to be directed to hold an inquiry and decide the question of compromise in 4 accordance with the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the said Code. 6. Hence, I pass the following order. (a) The impugned order dated 12th January, 2010 is quashed and set aside and the Application at Exhibit – 49 is restored. (b) The learned Trial Judge is directed to follow the mandate of proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the said Code. (c) The Trial Judge will make adjudication and will record a finding on the question of settlement as expeditiously as possible and preferably by the end of July, 2010. (d) Till the finding is recorded, the Trial Court will not proceed with the hearing of the suit. (e) The Petition is partly allowed in above terms with no orders as to costs. (A.S.OKA, J)