IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.19892 of 2010 HARENDRA SINGH Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 02. 14.12.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. The petitioner is aggrieved by the notice dated 18.11.2010 fixing the special meeting for moving of the “No Confidence Motion” against him after adjourning the previous meeting fixed on 8.11.2010. The petitioner is stated to be the Pramukh. The contention on his behalf is that the “No Confidence Motion” against him proposed to be moved by the requisite number of members elected directly was never placed before him and therefore the question of his refusal to convene the special meeting does not arise. It is next denied that the notice was then sought to be served upon him by the Executive Officer much less that he refused acceptance of the same on 22.10.2010. The next submission is that even if the petitioner had refused acceptance of the notice as is alleged, under Section 44 (3) (I) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat Act), it was for the Up-Pramukh or 1/3rd of the total number of members directly elected only to fix the date of meeting. Thereafter the Executive Officer was required to give notice 2 to all and convene the meeting. The notice for the meeting has been issued by the Executive Officer himself who is not authorized to do so under the law. The last submission is that, if the Executive Officer issued the notice on 3.11.2010, fixing the date of the meeting as 8.11.2010 it was bad in law under Section 46 (4) of the Panchayat Act as the requirement for seven clear days notice to hold meeting was not satisfied. The last contention is that under Section 44 (3) (I) of the Panchayat Act once the meeting had been convened for 8.11.2010, it was required to be held and could not have been postponed to 18.11.2010 as that is strictly prohibited under the aforesaid Section. Learned counsel for the State submits that the special meeting has been held. The petitioner has lost the “No Confidence Motion”. He declined participation in the discussions. In reply, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he was willing to participate on 8.11.2010. The meeting was postponed. He had no information of the re-scheduled date of 18.11.2010 and therefore could not participate in the discussions. The Panchayat Raj Act works on the principles of grass root democracy. Those who operate the Act at the first tier of democracy, the elected members of the Panchayat do not possess the same level of legal 3 intelligence and legal awareness as shall be available with persons who participate in the State Assembly or Parliament. The limitations of the bearers of democracy at the first level cannot be equated with the latter two. The rigours of the statutory interpretation that may be applied to a provision of law regulating the moving of “No Confidence Motion” before the State Assembly or the Parliament may not be the same in its application to the Panchayat Act. Being the first level of democracy, the Court shall avoid a hyper technical interpretation which may prove counter productive to the constitutional scheme of grass root democracy. The Court shall see the substance of the compliance. If substantial compliance be there, and more particularly if the person raising the grievance has more than one issue to answer himself, the Writ Court may not interfere. In ,(2004) 7 SCC 654 (Rupadhar Pujari v. Gangadhar Bhatra) it has been held at paragraph-8 as follows : - “8. True it is that the relief clause in the election petition in the present case is not very happily worded. The election petitioner would have been better advised to specifically seek a declaration to the effect that he was elected. However, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that panchayat elections are part of Gram Swaraj system. Most of the provisions relating to election and election petitions in the laws governing Panchayats are in pari materia with the provisions contained in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Yet the procedural laws relating to 4 panchayat elections and election petitions cannot be allowed to be interpreted with too much of rigidity and by indulging in hair-splitting. A recent decision by a Constitution Bench in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta 1 once again reminds us to remember that laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantive and real justice. Procedural laws must be liberally construed to really serve as handmaid of justice, make them workable and advance the ends of justice. Technical objections which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and deny substantial and effective justice should be strictly viewed for being discouraged, except where the mandate of the law inevitably necessitates it.” The petitioner has annexed all documentary evidence right from the inception of the requisition for a “No Confidence Motion” against him moved on 18.10.2010, inclusive of the notice sent to him by the Executive Officer alleged to have been refused acceptance by the petitioner including the endorsement of the person who sought to serve the petitioner. The notice dated 3.11.2010 and 18.11.2010 have also been brought on record by him. There is no statement in the writ petition of the sources from which the petitioner was made available the documents. Quite obviously the logical conclusion is that he was closely and actively monitoring development hoping for the best that for the one reason or the other due to legal lacunae the meeting may not be held. The contention of the petitioner that he was never sought to be served the copy of the notice by the Executive Officer stands belied by his own 5 conduct when despite annexing the endorsement of his refusal disclosing the name of the person who sought to serve it upon him, the writ petitioner no where denies that no such person as named in the endorsement existed in the Panchayat Samiti. The Court is not satisfied that merely because the Executive Officer had convened the meeting himself it was vitiated. This was more a matter of procedure only. Ultimately it was the Executive Officer who was to convene the meeting. The next contention of the petitioner merits consideration when he urges that the Executive Officer could not have postponed the meeting fixed on 8.11.2010. There is no occasion for the Court to consider the authority of the Executive Officer to adjourn the meeting for justifiable reasons and whether the direction in Section 44 (3) (I) to that effect was an absolute fiat. This Court on another reason comes to the conclusion that the adjournment of the meeting fixed for 8.11.2010 for which the Executive Officer may have been competent stands vitiated by reason of the recitals contained in the order adjourning the meeting not by independent application of mind but by abdication of his statutory powers at the behest of the District Magistrate and the S.D.O. referring to no reasons. 6 The fact remains that the petitioner has actively shied away from facing the “No Confidence Motion”. Whatever he contends were matters which could have been raised by him when the “No Confidence Motion” was being discussed in the floor of the house. Grass root democracy demanded that the petitioner participate in the discussion and not that should win by default. The fact of the matter is that the “No Confidence Motion” has been tabled and the petitioner has lost the same. It shall not be conducive to the working of grass root democracy for the Court to impose a person on whom the members do not have confidence. In any event of the matter, the tenure of the elected members is now coming to an end and elections are slated in the next 3 to 4 months. This Court for reasons discussed of the petitioner having actively shied away from facing the “No Confidence Motion”, having lost the same and that the fresh elections are scheduled to be held within the next few months is not persuaded to interfere. The application is dismissed. P.K ( Navin Sinha, J.)