* THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY + WRIT PETITION No.20847 of 2011 % DT.06.09.2011 # A.P.Rao …Petitioner Vs. $ The Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, rep.by its Commissioner, Tank Bund, Hyderabad and others … Respondents ^ Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri Dammalapati Srinivas ! Counsel for respondents: Dr.Y.Padmavathi < Gist: > Head note: ? Cases referred: 1. AIR 1996 SC 671 2. (2010) 2 SCC 497 3. (2010) 3 SCC 732 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY Writ Petition No.20847 of 2011 Dated 06th September, 2011 Between: A.P.Rao …Petitioner And The Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, rep.by its Commissioner, Tank Bund Raod, Hyderabad and others …Respondents Counsel for the petitioner: Sri Dammalapati Srinivas Counsel for respondents: Dr.Y.Padmavathi The Court made the following: ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to set aside letter, bearing No.98/ACP/CX/GHMC/2011, dated 24.05.2011, of respondent No.2. The petitioner obtained building permission vide permit No.2/96 on 18.12.2009 for construction of stilt for parking and four upper floors over plot No.208, Prashashan Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. According to the conditions of permit and also the statutory requirement, the petitioner has to commence construction within one year from the date of grant of permission and complete the same within three years thereafter. By notice, vide letter bearing No.98/ACP/CX/GHMC/2011, dated 03.02.2011, respondent No.2 informed the petitioner that he has not commenced the construction work within one year and hence, the permission is deemed to have expired. The petitioner was accordingly called upon to submit fresh proposals along with plan showing clear site terrain and structural designs, enclosing NOC and plans attestation of the Managing Committee, Prashashan Nagar Cooperative House Building Society (for short ‘the Society’) as required under the Society’s bye-law No.33 for granting a fresh permission. In reply to the said show-cause notice, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 15.02.2011, wherein he has denied the allegation that he has not commenced the work within one year. He has stated that the plot is covered with huge sheet rocks and the rock cutting work was going on for the last several months. It is further explained that as deployment of heavy machinery and blasting was not permitted in view of existence of houses in the neighbourhood, the rock cutting work could not be completed and that added to the same, heavy rains have made the compound wall falling on the rear side damaging the construction equipment. It is also stated that the petitioner constructed a compound wall with two rooms and obtained water and electricity connections, which show that the construction was commenced within one year after obtaining permission. The petitioner submitted further explanation on 10.04.2011, wherein he has reiterated his stand that he commenced work within one year and that the construction activity was going on slow pace because of huge volume of rock. By order, dated 24.05.2011, respondent No.2 concluded that the cutting of sheet rock was completed after completion of one year and therefore, the permission is deemed to have expired. It is also alleged that as per the physical position, there is a huge level difference due to existence of a big sheet rock at rear side of the plot and that as per the NOC of the Society obtained by the petitioner, number of floors permitted is not mentioned. The petitioner was, therefore, called upon to submit fresh proposals along with the plan showing the clear site terrain and structural designs along with NOC from the Society. This communication is questioned in this writ petition. At the hearing, Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the impugned proceedings are in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice because they failed to advert to the contents of the two explanations submitted by the petitioner. He further submitted that even though the show-cause notice referred to only one aspect, namely, that the petitioner failed to commence the construction within one year, the impugned order is based on certain factors which were not mentioned in the show-cause notice. The learned counsel placed reliance on letter, dated 15.04.2010, enclosed to the reply affidavit of the petitioner, to drive home his submission that as a fact, commencement letter was sent to respondent No.2 on 15.04.2010. The learned counsel further submitted that even assuming that the petitioner has not commenced the construction work within one year, under Section 440(2) of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’) he is entitled to a fresh notice for commencement of the construction and complete the same within the stipulated period of three years. Dr.Y.Padmavathi, learned Standing Counsel for GHMC appearing for the respondents, opposed the above contentions and submitted that the petitioner having failed to commence construction work within one year of obtaining permission, permit itself ceases to operate and that therefore, the impugned order is in conformity with the provisions of Section 440 of the Act. She further submitted that the petitioner’s explanation was considered from proper perspective and the same was rejected as respondent No.2 was satisfied that the petitioner failed to commence construction within the period of one year as stipulated under the provisions of the Act and also under the conditions of the permit. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. As regards the submission of the learned counsel that under Section 440(2) of the Act non-commencement of construction within one year does not lead to expiry of the permit, I find it not necessary to adjudicate on this aspect at the present stage because this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained for the reason that respondent No.2 failed to advert to the contents of the petitioner’s explanation in the impugned order, apart from the fact that he has relied upon the factors which do not find a mention in the show-cause notice. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a show-cause notice was issued only on one ground, namely, that the petitioner failed to commence construction work within one year. There are no specific allegations of terrain being uneven with huge level difference and the NOC obtained by the petitioner not containing the number of floors permitted for construction. With reference to these two aspects, the petitioner had no opportunity of submitting his explanation. The petitioner in his explanation has asserted that he has commenced construction work within one year. He has also given reasons for the delay in completion of rock cutting work. A perusal of the impugned order does not show that any specific reasons are assigned for disbelieving the petitioner’s plea that the construction work was commenced within one year. Respondent No.2 has merely reinforced the allegation contained in the show-cause notice without relying upon the specific circumstances in support of his conclusion that the petitioner failed to commence construction work within the stipulated period of one year. The law is well settled that absence of reasons vitiates the decision and duty to give reasons forms integral part of principles of natural justice (see Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd., v. Union of India[1], Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society[2] and Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagarik Samity[3]). Examined from this perspective, this Court is of the opinion that respondent No.2 ought to have given proper reasons in rejecting the petitioner’s explanation regarding the alleged failure to commence the construction work within the stipulated period of one year. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has indeed given the commencement notice, I am afraid, this Court cannot give a finding thereon at this stage for the reason that for the first time the petitioner has filed a copy of the purported notice containing seal of the office of the Commissioner, dated 20.04.2010. There was no opportunity for the respondents to verify this aspect. Inasmuch as the impugned order is being set aside with the direction to respondent No.2 to reconsider the petitioner’s explanation and pass a fresh order, respondent No.2 is directed to consider this plea of the petitioner also, namely, that he has in fact issued the commencement notice, dated 15.04.2010. For the above-mentioned reasons, the impugned order is set aside. Respondent No.2 is directed to re-consider the petitioner’s explanation and pass a fresh order after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.25331 of 2011 is disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 06th September, 2011 Note: LR copies to be marked. (b/o) VGB [1] AIR 1996 SC 671 [2] (2010) 2 SCC 497 [3] (2010) 3 SCC 732