IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.1013 of 2008 Bihar State Agriculture Marketing Board (abolished) through its Administrator, Pant Bhawan, Bailey Road, P.S. Kotwali, District- Patna …….. Respondent/Appellant Versus 1. Heera Prasad s/o Sri Satya Bilash Ram, resident of village and post – Udaypur, P.S. Sanjhauli, District – Rohtas …… Respondent Ist set 2. The Agriculture Commissioner-cum- Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of Bihar, Patna ……… Respondent IInd set --- For the appellant: Mr. Rajiv Roy, Advocate For the respondent no.1 Mr. Jai Prakash Verma, Advocate --- 3 22-01-2009 Respondent – appellant aggrieved by the order dated 16th September, 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC. No.8254 of 2007, has preferred this appeal under Clause – 10 of the Letters Patent. Short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the writ petitioner – respondent no.1 was an employee of the Bihar State Agriculture Marketing Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”). The Act by which the Board - appellant herein, was created got repealed by the Bihar Agriculture Produce Market (Repealing) Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Section - 6 of the Act provides for absorption of officers and employees of the appellant Board. Section 6 of the Act - 2 - which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows: “Section 6 (i) On and from the date of repeal of the Act, all officers and employees of the Board shall remain in employment, as if the Act has not been repealed and they shall continue to be paid same salary and allowances as was payable on the date of repeal of the Act till such time. State Government has taken such final decision as is provided hereafter. (ii) The State Government shall constitute a committee of Secretaries consisting of three Secretaries who shall prepare detail scheme of absorption, retirement, compulsory retirement or voluntary retirement, other service conditions of officers and employees of the Board and the Committee. Scheme prepared by group of Secretaries shall be placed before the State Government within two months from the date of enforcement of the present Act. The State Government shall thereafter approve the Scheme: Provided that it shall be open to the State Government to modify, amend or suggest modification or amendment and the scheme thereafter shall be made operational in such form and interest as finally approved by the State Government Scheme approved by the State Government shall be considered as statutory scheme framed under this Act. (iii) After the scheme approved by the State Government is enforced it shall be fully implemented in its form and intent within three months from the date of its enforcement. (iv) Group of Secretaries constituted under Sub Section (ii) above shall be competent to decide utility and deployment of officers and employees of the Board or the Committee during transition period and it shall not be open to any officer or employee to question decision of group of Secretaries. (v) Scheme framed under this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding any other Act, Ordinance, Rule, regulation, direction, order or - 3 - instruction and condition of service of officers and employees of the Board or the Committee, shall be governed and regulated under the scheme to the extent provision has been made in the scheme: Provided further that it shall be competent for the State Government to amend, modify, alter or substitute the scheme so framed for removal of difficulties in implementation of the scheme.” From a plain reading of section 6 (ii) of the aforesaid Act, it is evident that a Committee of Secretaries was to be constituted to prepare detail scheme of absorption, retirement, compulsory retirement or voluntary retirement and other service conditions of the employees of the Board and the Committee. In the light of the aforesaid provision a Committee of Secretaries was constituted which submitted its recommendation. Clause 3.6 of the recommendation, inter alia, provides that the daily wage employees would be given a month‟s salary and would be removed immediately thereafter. Respondent no.1 filed writ application, inter alia, contending that they are entitled to the benefits flowing from section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Single Judge upheld the contention of - 4 - respondent no.1 and observed as follows: “The Court, therefore, holds that Clause 3.6 by virtue of which the respondents State has refrained from giving compensation under section 25F is in violation of the statute to that extent. The respondents have a duty to work out the liability of these petitioners in accordance with the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and take steps for payment of the compensation depending upon the length of service which the petitioners have rendered under the respondents. Even if for the sake of argument, the abolition of the erstwhile marketing board is treated as a case of „closure‟ within the definition of section 2(cc) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even then under Section 25(FFF) the compensation is similar in nature to Section 25F.” Mr. Rajiv Roy, appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the impugned decision of the learned Single Judge is in the teeth of the Division Bench judgment of this court dated 24th September, 2008 passed in LPA. No.482 of 2008. We do not find any conflict in the decision impugned in the present writ application and the Division Bench judgment. In the present case, writ petitioner – respondent did not challenge the order of termination but questioned Clause 3.6 of the decision by which the State Government has decided not to grant compensation to the - 5 - employees. While considering the same, the learned Single Judge held that the said decision is in violation of section 25 F of the Act. The decision of the Division Bench in LPA No.482 of 2008 is in relation to a case in which the order of termination was assailed on the ground of violation of section 25 F of the Act and in that it was held that employees can take recourse to the remedy before the Labour Court. In the said case, the validity of Clause 3.6 of the decision has not all been gone into. No other error has been pointed out by Mr. Roy in the impugned order. We do not find any merit in the appeal. It is dismissed in limine. Neyaz/- C.K. Prasad, ACJ. S. K. Sharma, J.