1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD SECOND APPEAL NO. 154 OF 1990 Sobhagchand Tejmal Jain (Gatagat) age major, occup. business, r/of Appellant/ Budhwar Peth, Madhavnagar, Sangli ori.deft. versus M/s Govindram Surajmal and Co. Respondent/ New Mondha, Jalna. ori.pltff. ------- Shri S.S. Bora, Advocate, for the appellant. Smt. A.D. Rakh, Advocate, for the respondent. Coram : P. R. Borkar, J. Date : March 17, 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Heard Shri S.S.Bora, learned Advocate for the appellant and Smt. A.D. Rakh, Advocate for Respondent. 2. This second appeal is filed against money decree of Rs.16,180 passed by the 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalna, in R.C.S. No.531 of 1982 decided on 20.4.1989 which decree is further confirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jalna, in Regular Civil Appeal No.105 of 1989 decided on 10.1.1990. 2 3. Briefly stated, the facts are that the respondent- plaintiff is a proprietary firm carrying on business of Adat shop at New Mondha, Jalna. On 14.9.1982, plaintiff had supplied 75 bags of jawar and 25 bags of wheat to the appellant-defendant. The total value of the grain supplied was Rs20,975.00/=. Since the appellant-defendant did not pay the amount, suit for recovery of Rs.21,180/= including interest, was filed. 4. The appellant-defendant filed written statement of total denial. However, he admitted that he had contracted to purchase food grains; that he received telegraphic notice, but contended that no goods were received except as shown in bill no.904. 5. The trial court came to the conclusion that the goods were supplied as claimed by the plaintiff. However, the trial court also held that an amount of Rs.5000/= was paid. Therefore allowing deduction to that extent, the trial court decree the suit for Rs.16,180/=. 6. In the appeal before the District Court, the points were framed as to whether there was sale of grain as claimed; whether there was delivery of bags and whether the plaintiff was entitled to future interest at the rate claimed. Answers to the points were in the affirmative. 3 7. This second appeal was admitted on 25.6.1990 without framing any substantial question of law. After hearing both the sides, it does not appear that there is any substantial question of law arising in this second appeal. The judgments of both the courts below are mainly on facts. After going through the said judgments, I am satisfied that those are reasoned judgments and cannot be said to be perverse judgments. 8. In the circumstances, second appeal is dismissed. pnd/sa154.90 (P.R.BORKAR, J.)