1 WP : 190/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.190 OF 2011 M.E.C. Engineering .... Petitioner Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. .... Respondents Mr. Shripad Murthy i/by Mr. Piyush N. Shah, Advocate for petitioner. Mr. Puneet Chaturvedi, Advocate for respondent no.1. Mrs. U.V. Kezriwal, APP for State. Coram : Smt. R.P.SondurBaldota, J. Date : 7th March, 2011 P.C. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. 2. The short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether a litigant can be permitted to interrupt the process of delivery of judgment for any reason. By the consent of parties, the petition being disposed off finally at the stage of admission. The petition is vehemently opposed by respondent no.1. 3. The facts of the case stated in brief, leading to the petition are as follows : Respondent no.1 filed four complaints under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act i.e. (i) CC No.1615/SS/2002 against the petitioner, (ii) CC No.2465/SS/2002 against Stone Crushing Company, (iii) CC No. 1616/SS/2002 against S.K. Transport and (iv) CC No.2464/SS/2002 against 2 WP : 190/2011 G.S. Transport. In all the four cases, after recording separate plea, evidence has been recorded separately. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure has also been recorded separately. After conclusion of the arguments, the learned Magistrate on 23rd December 2010, commenced dictation of the judgment. During the course of the dictation, it was realised by petitioner that the learned Judge is pronouncing a common judgment in all the cases. Therefore, he filed the applications at Exhibits 84, 85 and 86 submitting that there was no application filed by either of the parties for deciding the four cases jointly and since the trials had been conducted separately the cases, they may not be disposed off by a common judgment. The application was opposed by respondent no.1- complainant contending that it was yet another ploy of the accused to delay disposal of the cases against him. 4. The learned Magistrate heard the rival submissions on the applications filed, and rejected the same by his order dated 24th December 2010. In the order, he observed that commencement of dictation of the judgment had started on 23rd September 2010 and the judgment was deferred to the next day because the court time was over. On the earlier day, the issue of giving common judgment had been decided and the discussion of point no.1 about jurisdiction of the court was in progress. He, then dismissed the applications with following observations : “According to learned counsel for complainant this application is nothing but an obstruction in delivery of judgment. It be strictly viewed being baseless, frivolous. On the other hand it was right of accused to see that there should no prejudice. However, as it is decided to pronounce common judgment as parties common issues are involved. 3 WP : 190/2011 Facts are similar submissions written are also same. Hence, application is rejected with costs. 5. The petitioner then carried the order in revision to the Sessions Court by preferring Criminal Revision Application No.51 of 2010. The revision application was dismissed by the Sessions Court observing that though there were four separate cases in which separate evidence had been recorded and though the judgment in each case is expected to be given separately, since the dictation of the judgment had already commenced, it would not be proper to stop the same midway. The Sessions Court further observed that had the question been raised by the petitioner before commencement of dictation of the judgment, probably the trial Court could have taken the same into consideration. 6. Mr. Murthy, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits in earnest, that the petitioner could never have imagined that the trial court would proceed to give a common judgment in the four cases that have been tried separately. He points out that the moment it was realised by the petitioner that a common judgment was being delivered in the four cases, he made the application without losing time submitting that a common judgment would cause prejudice to him and requesting for separate judgment in each case. Mr. Chaturvedi, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submits that it was incorrect on the part of the petitioner to interrupt the judgment and the only course available to the petitioner in the event of he being aggrieved by the common judgment was to challenge it before the higher court. 4 WP : 190/2011 7. As has been rightly submitted by Mr. Murthy, there is no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure for a common judgment in respect of the cases which have been tried separately. There is a provision for common trial i.e.Section 219 Cr.P.C., under which when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last date of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial. But such offences cannot exceed three in number. The offences beyond that number must be tried separately. Section 353 of Criminal Procedure Code which makes general provision for “Judgment” requires the judgment in “every trial” to be pronounced in the manner stated in the provision. This would mean that there must be a separate judgment for each trial. In view of this legal position, the petitioner was actually correct in pointing out to the Court the basic infirmity in the judgment under the dictation. The Sessions Court though accepted this position found fault with the timing of the petitioner’s application. Mr. Murthy, however, submits that an error can be corrected by the Court at any time until signing of the judgment and relies upon the following observations of Allahabad High Court in Subedar and others vs. The State, reported in 1956 Criminal Law Journal, page 1039. “It is always open to a Judge to correct himself. I would even go to the extent of saying that if any illegality or irregularity is pointed out to the Judge before he actually signs and delivers the final judgment in Court, it is his duty to take that point into consideration”. 5 WP : 190/2011 8. Ordinarily a litigant ought not to be allowed to interrupt the process of delivery of judgment. He cannot by filing applications at that stage pre- empt the judgment and thereby dominate the process of administration of justice. The present application, however, must be treated as an exception because the petitioner could not have even imagined that the Court may proceed to give common judgment in four different trials. Therefore, he could not have filed the application at any earlier point of time. In these peculiar facts of the case and in the interest of justice, the petition is required to be allowed. 9. Rule is made absolute. The orders impugned in the petition dated 11th January 2011 passed by the learned District Judge-1, & Additional Sessions Judge, Vasai and 24th December 2010 passed by learned J.M.F.C., (Deputation) Railway Court, Vasai are set aside. The JMFC, Railway Court, Vasai is directed to give separate judgments in the four trials. Parties to act on authenticated copy of this order. ( Smt. R.P. SondurBaldota, J.)