WA 308/2010 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE IA ANSARI THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AK GOSWAMI This is an intra-court appeal against the judgment and order, dated 10.09.2008, passed, in Contempt Case (Civil) No.649/2006, whereby a learned Single Judge of this Court, while imposing punishment on the persons, who were proceeded against , further directed payment of compensation, but scaled down the quantum of compe nsation, which the appellant had demanded. It is basically scaling down of the q uantum of compensation, which is under challenge in this appeal. 2. We have heard Mr. M.K. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, for the appell ant, and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam. 3. The material facts, leading to the present appeal, may, in brief, be set out as under: (i) The appellant’s vehicle, bearing Registration No.AS-01L-7753 and being used as a tourist vehicle, was requisitioned, on 21.02.2005, by the Distr ict Authorities in Kamrup and was handed over to the Army Authorities for being used for maintenance of law and order. Claiming that the vehicle had been damage d and the same was not being returned to the appellant presumably because the co ndition of the vehicle was such that it could not have been returned, the appell ant filed a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeki ng issuance of appropriate writ(s) commanding the respondents to release the veh icle and also pay compensation for the damage caused to the vehicle. The writ pe tition gave rise to WP(C) No.4909/2005. (ii). The respondents in the above writ petition [i.e. WP(C) No.4909 of 2005] resisted the writ petition by contending that the vehicle had been ordered to be released as far back as on 19.04.2005 and a notice was duly issued, in this reg ard, on 21.05.2005, addressed to the appellant to obtain custody of the vehicle. The respondents also contended that despite sending reminders and notices to th e petitioner, she did not come forward to take charge of the vehicle. The furthe r case of the respondents was that the vehicle was inspected on 18.04.2005 and t he same was found to be in good and running condition. (iii). The appellant, as petitioner in the above writ petition, countered the c ontentions of the respondents by pointing out that even on 18.04.2005, the vehic le was in the use of the Army Authorities and there was no reason for the Distri ct Authorities to get the vehicle inspected on 18.04.2005 inasmuch as the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, had duly certified use of the vehicle during the period f rom 21.02.2005 to 19.04.2005. (iv). Having examined the claim and counter-claim, the writ petition [i.e. WP( C) No.4909 of 2005] was disposed of, on 25.07.2006, with the following direction s : 8. I dispose of the writ petition with the following directions :- (1) The requisition compensation in respect of the vehicle (Tata Sumo) beari ng registration No.AS-01/L-7753, during such period that it remained under requi sition till the actual release of the vehicle under good and running condition s hall be paid to the petitioner within one month from the date of receipt of a ce rtified copy of this order. (2) The District Transport Officer, Kamrup, Guwahati shall cause an inspecti on of the vehicle in question to the made by the competent person in order to as sess the damage caused to the vehicle and such assessment shall be computed in t erms of the money that would be required to put the vehicle back on the road. To wards assessing the damage caused to the vehicle, a copy of the assessment repor t shall be furnished to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati. Asses sment shall be made and the report shall be submitted within one month. (3) The Deputy Commissioner shall within a period of 6(six) weeks from the d ate of the report from the District Transport Officer, Kamrup, Guwahati pay to t he petitioner the compensation for damage as may be assessed. (v). In effect, the direction, as below, by the order, dated 25.7.2006, afore mentioned, was to pay to the writ petitioner compensation from the date of requi sition till actual release of the vehicle in good and running condition. The dir ection to pay compensation till actual release of the vehicle in good and runnin g condition was given, because the learned Single Judge observed to the effect t hat the vehicle had remained in the custody of the respondents from 21.02.2005 t o 10.03.2008. By way of appeal or otherwise, since the respondents had not chall enged the directions so given, the directions, as indicated hereinbefore, attain ed finality. (vi) Alleging that the directions given by the order, dated 25.7.2006 in the writ petition, namely, WP(C) No.4909 of 2005, were being wilfully and deliberat ely violated, an application was made by the appellant herein seeking drawing of contempt proceedings against three persons. This contempt application gave rise to Contempt Case (Civil) No.649/2006. By judgment and order, dated 10.09.2008, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that there has been willful and delibe rate violation of the directions, which had been given in the writ petition afor ementioned. In the Contempt Proceeding, it was, once again, pointed out by the p ersons proceeded against that the vehicle had been released on, at least, 02.05. 2005, with due intimation to the petitioner and it was, therefore, incumbent, on the part of the petitioner, to receive the vehicle and even if some damage had been caused to the vehicle, the petitioner could have raised this issue after ta king back the vehicle. The learned Single Judge, however, noted that the order, dated 25.07.2006, whereby the writ petition had been disposed of, shows that the direction was to pay the requisitioned compensation till actual release of the vehicle in good and running condition. The learned Single Judge, therefore, took the view that compensation was required to be paid to the petitioner till actua l release of the vehicle in good and running condition. (vii). The learned Single Judge also concluded, in the judgment and order dated 10.9.2008, passed in the above contempt proceeding, that the vehicle had remain ed in the custody of the respondents till its deemed release on 10.03.2008. The learned Single Judge disbelieved the procedee’s contention that the vehicle had been released on 02.05.2005 as had been contended by the respondents. Having tak en the view that there had been willful and deliberate violation of the directio ns given by the Court, on 25.7.2006, in the writ petition [i.e. WP(C) No.4909 of 2005], the Contempt Application was disposed of, on 10.09.2008, with the follow ing further observations and directions: 48. The petitioner has given the figure of the requisition compensation of R s.11,46,390/- taking the requisition period from 21.02.05 to 10.03.08 (1113 days ). The daily requisition fee has been shown at Rs.1030/- per day. While it is tr ue that the vehicle remained in custody of the respondents till 10.03.08, but ha ving regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the case and also in view of the fact that even if the vehicle was not in custody of the respondents, the re was no guarantee that the petitioner’s vehicle would have earned that much of amount, I am of the considered opinion that ends of justice would be met if the requisition compensation is assessed at 50% of the requisition compensation for the period in question calculated on the basis of the prescribed and prevalent daily requisition fee. The amount shall be paid to the petitioner by way of acco unt payee cheque as expeditiously as possible but at any rate not later than 31. 10.08. Further, the petitioner will be entitled to the cost of the proceeding to be borne by the predecessor of the incumbent and the present incumbent of the o ffice of the respondent No.2, i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, namely Shri Abinash Joshi and Sri Pratik Hazela. The amount shall be deposited in equal share of Rs. 5000/- by both the officers with the Registry of the High Court and the petition er will be entitled to withdraw the same upon furnishing proper identity. 49. With the aforesaid directions and expressing displeasure on the conduct of the respondents with a note of warning to the respondent Nos.1 and 3 and seve re reprimand to both Shri Abinash Joshi and Shri Pratik Hazela, this contempt pr oceeding is closed. (viii) Aggrieved by the fact that the order, dated 25.07.2006, passed in the wri t petition [i.e. WP(C) No.4909 of 2005], by virtue of the order, dated 10.09.200 8, aforementioned, had scaled down the compensation to 50% of the assessed amoun t and contending that no power was available with the Court, while dealing with a contempt proceeding, to reduce the amount of compensation, which the appellant was, otherwise, entitled to receive, the appellant herein [who was the petition er in WP(C) No.4909 of 2005] filed an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The appeal gave rise to Contempt Appeal No.03/2009, which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court, on 20.11.2009, as non-maintainab le on the ground that an appeal, under Section 19, lies as against punishment im posed on a person in a contempt proceeding and not against the directions, which might have been given as regards the merits of the dispute between the parties and that the remedy against the decision relating to merit of the dispute betwee n the parties reached in a contempt proceeding, can be challenged by way of intr a-court appeal or by seeking special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution . With the conclusions so reached, the appeal, which the writ petitioner-appella nt herein had preferred under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, wa s dismissed. The relevant observations, made in the order, dated 20.11.2009, rea d as under: The conclusions recorded in paragraph 11 of the judgment in MIDNAPORE PEOPLES’ COOP. BANK LTD. (supra) makes it clear that a decision relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction would be open to challenge in an intra-court appeal or by seeking special leave to app eal under Article 136 of the Constitution. In the present case there can be no manner of doubt that the direction/order aga inst which this appeal has been filed relates to the merits of the dispute betwe en the parties, i.e., the precise quantum of the requisition compensation. If th at be so, the conclusion of the Apex Court contained in paragraph 11(V) will squ arely apply so as to make the present appeal under Section 19 of the Act not mai ntainable. We, therefore, take the view that this appeal is not maintainable. I t is accordingly dismissed leaving it open for the appellant to avail of such re medy/remedies indicated in paragraph 11(V) of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MIDNAPORE PEOPLE’S COOP. BANK LTD. (supra). (ix). Following the order, dated 20.11.2009, passed in Contempt Appeal 03/2009 , whereby the contempt appeal was dismissed, this intra-court appeal, as indicat ed above, has been preferred by the appellant impugning the direction to pay 50% of the assessed amount of requisitioned compensation. In the meanwhile, however , the persons, who had been held to have committed contempt of Court and were ac cordingly directed to pay cost, preferred two appeals under Section 19 of the Co ntempt of Courts Act, 1971. These two appeals gave rise to Contempt Appeal Nos.4 and 5 of 2008. By order, dated 28.06.2010, a Division Bench of this Court has d isposed of the appeals. In its order, dated 28.06.2010, it has been pointed out by the Division Bench that during pendency of the contempt appeals, an interim o rder was passed to the effect that an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- be paid to the app ellant and on payment of the said amount, the impugned judgment and order shall stand suspended and that the appellant has accordingly been paid the said amoun t of Rs.2,00,000/-. This apart, the Division Bench also noted, in its order, dat ed 28.06.2010, aforementioned that in compliance with the order, passed by the l earned Single Judge, an amount of Rs.1,97,000/- had already been paid to the pre sent appellant. In all, thus, the Division Bench pointed out, the respondent in the contempt appeals, i.e., the appellant herein, had received almost Rs.4,00,00 0/-. Having noted that the learned Single Judge may have exceeded his contempt j urisdiction by giving direction for payment of 50% of the prescribed and prevale nt requisition fees, the Division Bench, however, observed that it is not inclin ed to re-open the matter since payment had already been made quite sometime bac k in the year 2008 and it would, now, be inequitable to require the respondent i n the contempt appeals, i.e., the present appellant, to repay the payment to the State and the matter be given a quietus to and no further action needs to be ta ken save and except that the reprimand and warning administered to the appellant s will not be used against them in their service profile. The Division Bench fur ther directed that if the cost had not been deposited by the appellant, they nee d not deposit the same as had been directed by the learned Single Judge. The rel evant observations made, and the directions given, in the order, dated 28.06.201 0, read as under: The respondent then preferred a contempt petition in which the learned Single J udge is said to have gone beyond the directions given in the writ petition. This submission is made by learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of the co nclusions arrived at in paragraph 48 of the impugned judgment and order. In fact we find from a perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned Singl e Judge that the submission is correct and that the requisition compensation has been assessed at 50% of the prescribed and prevalent daily requisition fee for the period in question. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the present contempt appeals. During the pendency of the contempt appeals, an interim order was passed by the Division Bench to the effect that an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- be paid to the resp ondent and on payment of that amount, the impugned judgment and order was suspen ded. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- ha s been paid to the respondent and this is confirmed by learned counsel for the r espondent. In other words, the respondent has received about Rs.4,00,00/- from t he State. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Single Judge exceeded his contempt jurisdiction by giving a direction for payment of 50 % of the prescribed and prevalent daily requisite fee. This was over and above t he direction given in the writ petition, which we have reproduced above. While it is true that the learned Single Judge may have exceeded his contempt ju risdiction, we are not inclined to re-open the matter since the payment has been made by the respondent quite some time back in the year 2008. We are of the vie w that due to the long lapse of time, it may be inequitable to now require the r espondent to make over the payment to the State. Accordingly, we direct that the matter be given a quietus to and no further step s need to be taken in respect of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the contempt petition, save and except that the reprimand and warning administe red to the appellants will not be used against them in their service profile. From the record it is not very clear whether the appellants have deposited the c osts of Rs.5,000/- in view of the interim order passed by the Division Bench tha t a total amount of Rs.2,00,00/- should be deposited pending suspension of the i mpugned judgment and order. We, therefore, direct that if the costs have not bee n deposited by the appellants, they need not deposit the same as directed by the learned Single Judge. With these observations both the contempt appeals are disposed of. 4. In the backdrop of the above facts, we are, now, required to decide this appeal. 5. While considering this appeal, it may be noted that the Division Bench h as already noted in its order, dated 28.06.2010, to the effect that the submissi on of the respondent, who had appeared as appellant in the two appeals aforement ioned, was correct that the learned Single Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction b y directing payment to be assessed at 50% of the prescribed and prevalent daily requisition fees. Having noted that the direction had exceeded jurisdiction of t he Court, the Division Bench, while dealing with the two contempt appeals, decli ned to direct the present appellant to return or repay the amount of Rs.3,97,00 0/-, which the appellant had received by virtue of the directions given by the l earned Single Judge. 6. Coupled with the above, we may indicate that in V.M. Manohar Prasad vs. N. Ratnam Raju & Anr., reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610, it was specifically conten ded that a Court while dealing with a contempt application, has no jurisdiction to issue any direction providing any substantive relief to the petitioner moving the contempt petition. The relevant observations made, in this regard, in V.M. Manohar Prasad (supra), read as under: 7. On the basis of what has been indicated above, the first submission is that there is no violation of the order passed by the learned Single Judge directing regularization of the employees, since the said order has not been violated in a ny manner. The matter was considered in the light of the scheme for regularizati on dated 24-04-1994. Secondly, it is submitted that the Contempt Court had no ju risdiction to issue any direction providing any substantive relief to the petiti oners moving the contempt petition. In support of this contention reliance has b een placed upon decisions of this Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. vs. Tara k Nath Ganguly & Ors : (2002) 5 SCC 352 and Notified Area Council vs. Bishnu C. Bhoi : (2001) 10 SCC 636 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1018. 7. Dealing with the above observations made by it in V.M. Manohar Prasad (s upra) the Supreme Court held that under the law, in contempt proceeding, no dire ctions can be issued by the Court providing substantive relief to the contempt a pplicants. The Supreme Court clarified, in V.M. Manohar Prasad (supra), that if a Court finds that its order has been violated, it may punish the contemnor or d ischarge the contemnor, but no order can be passed to supplement the order, whic h may have been passed granting relief, meaning thereby that when a Court conclu des that a contempt has been committed or the Court concludes that no contempt h as been committed, no further directions for compliance of the directions given by the Court, for violation or alleged violation whereof contempt application is made, can be given. The relevant observations made, in this regard, read as und er: There is no doubt about the position under the law that in contempt proceedings no further directions could be issued by the court. In case it is found that th ere is violation of the order passed by the court the court may punish the conte mnor otherwise notice of contempt is to be discharged. An order passed in the co ntempt petition, could not be a supplemental order to the main order granting re lief. 8. From the observations made and the law laid down in V.M. Manohar Prasad (supra) what can be safely gathered is that a Court while dealing with a contemp t proceeding may either punish the contemnor or discharge the contemnor, it can, in neither case would have the power to make any such order, which would supple ment the relief which may have been granted by the order whose violation gives r ise to the contempt proceeding. In short, in a contempt proceeding no mandamus c an be issued by a Court to enforce to supplement the order whereby a relief had been granted to a party and violation of which order or direction had led to the contempt proceeding. This position has been indicated by a Division Bench of th is Court in Writ Appeal No.49 of 2005 [Sri Harendra Bhowmik vs. Shri Subhas Sutr adhar & others], wherein (one of us, Ansari,J. was a party) a learned Single Ju dge of this Court while declining to initiate contempt proceeding directed the r espondents in the contempt proceeding to make order granting regular scale of pa y to the petitioner in whose favour a direction had been passed in the writ peti tion to make a regular pay scale available but the respondents in the writ petit ion i.e. the procedee in the contempt proceeding were alleged to have violated. Dealing with such a situation the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.49 of 2005 [S ri Harendra Bhowmik vs. Shri Subhas Sutradhar & others] observed : In the backdrop of the position of the law indicated above, it becomes clear th at having reached the conclusion that the appellant herein was not guilty of any contempt, and, particularly, when the learned single Judge had declined to init iate any contempt proceeding against the appellant, it becomes clear that no fur ther directions could have been issued by the learned single Judge to the respon dents, in the writ petition, including the present appellant, to pass appropriat e order(s) granting regular scale of pay to the writ petitioners against the pos ts held by them. To this extent, the grievance of the appellant has substance an d cannot, therefore, be ignored. This apart, the observations made by the learne d single Judge, after a conclusion had already been reached that the appellant w as not guilty of the contempt, that the matter does not come to an end with the refusal to initiate contempt proceeding against the respondent is also, in the c ontext of the facts of the present case, not permissible in law inasmuch as this observation was clearly made for the purpose of issuing the mandamus, which the learned single Judge, eventually, issued by directing the respondents to pass a ppropriate order as indicated above. We, therefore, set aside the observations, which read, The matter does not come to an end with the refusal to initiate con tempt proceeding against the respondents and also the directions given, which r ead Accordingly, the respondents shall now do well to pass appropriate order gr anting regular scale of pay to the petitioners which is admissible against the p osts being held by them. Appropriate order shall be passed in this regard within three months from today . 9. What clearly transpires from the above discussion is that the learned Si ngle Judge had, as already noted by the Division Bench, exceeded his jurisdictio n by directing scaling down of the compensation. At the same time, however, the fact remains that it is pursuant to the directions given in the contempt applica tion that payment of Rs.4,00,000/- has been received by the appellant. This apar t, while disposing of the contempt appeal, by order, dated 28.06.2010, the Divis ion Bench did not direct the appellant herein to repay the amount, which had bee n paid to the appellant herein i.e. respondent in the contempt appeal. The Divis ion Bench had declined, as already indicated above, to direct the appellant here in, who was respondent in the contempt appeals, to repay the