IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Criminal Misc. Application No. 460/2005 Shyam Vir Singh …….Petitioner Versus State of Uttaranchal & Ors. …….Respondents September 30, 2010 Hon’ble Dharam Veer, J. Heard Mr. Manish Arora, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. MA Khan, Brief Holder for the State and Mr. Lalit Sharma, Advocate for the respondent no. 5. By means of this petition, moved under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, CrPC), the petitioner has prayed for quashing the summoning order dated 4.8.1992 passed by the Munsif Magistrate in Criminal Case No. 199/1992, Devraj v. SK Singh u/s 406 IPC as well as the order dated 25.5.2005 whereby the revision preferred against the aforesaid order dated 4.8.1992 has been dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Udham Singh Nagar. Facts, in brief, are that on 6.11.1987, the respondent no. 5 lodged an FIR against the petitioner and other co-accused in PS Kichha which was registered as case crime no. 217/1987 under Section 406 IPC. On 27.8.1988 the investigation of this case was transferred from PS Kichha to SIS Branch, Haldwani. Thereafter on 21.12.1991, again the investigation of this case was returned to the concerned police station. Thereafter on 25.5.1992, the I.O. moved an application before the Munsif Magistrate, Rudrapur stating that this matter has already become time barred according to Section 468 CrPC and the time was finished on 6.11.1990 and, therefore, the I.O. sought extra time for the investigation in this case. This application was rejected by the Munsif Magistrate vide order dated 29.5.1992. Thereafter on 20.6.1992, the I.O. submitted the final report, but the Munsif Magistrate, Rudrapur vide order dated 4.8.1992 dismissed the final report and condoned the delay and summoned the petitioner. The petitioner preferred revision against the aforesaid order dated 4.8.1992, but it was 2 dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Udham Singh Nagar vide order dated 25.5.2005. Learned Counsel for the petitioner very vehemently argued that the case against the petitioner is barred by Section 468 CrPC. I find substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner as the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence under Section 406 IPC. Undoubtedly, the Section 406 IPC provides punishment with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. The maximum limitation provided under sub-clause (2) of Section 468 CrPC is three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. Hence, in the present case, the limitation shall be determined with reference to Section 406 IPC as the petitioner has been summoned to face the trial under this Section. Hence, apparently limitation provided under Section 468 CrPC in the instant case is three years and, therefore, the present matter has become time barred as the case was registered on 6.11.1987 and the matter became time barred on 6.11.1990, but the cognizance order has been passed on 4.8.1992. Section 468 CrPC is reproduced below for the sake of convenience: “468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.—(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be— (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only. (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; 3 (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most sever punishment.” Having considered the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner; perusal of FIR, summoning order dated 4.8.1992 and the revisional order dated 25.5.2005 and other papers available on record, I am of the view that the case against the petitioner is time barred by virtue of the provisions contained under Section 468 CrPC because of the petitioner has been summoned under Section 406 IPC and, therefore, the maximum limitation provided under Section 468 CrPC is three years and the matter became time barred on 6.11.1990, but the cognizance order has been passed on 4.8.1992. Hence, the impugned summoning order being time barred is liable to be quashed in respect of the petitioner. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded above, the petition is allowed. Summoning order dated 4.8.1992 passed by the Munsif Magistrate in Criminal Case No. 199/1992, Devraj v. SK Singh u/s 406 IPC as well as the revisional order dated 25.5.2005 passed by the Sessions Judge, Udham Singh Nagar are hereby quashed in respect of the petitioner. (Dharam Veer, J.) 30.9.2010 PRABODH