* THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY + WRIT PETITION No.1491 of 2011 % DT.29.01.2011 # R.Venkat Goud …Petitioner Vs. $ The Revenue Divisional Officer, Kamareddy, Nizamabad District and others … Respondents ^ Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri S.Bhooma Goud ! Counsel for respondents: AGP for Civil Supplies < Gist: > Head note: ? Cases referred: W.P.No.28833 of 2010, dated 18.01.2011 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION No.1491 of 2011 Dated 29th January, 2011 Between: R.Venkat Goud …Petitioner And The Revenue Divisional Officer, Kamareddy, Nizamabad District and others …Respondents Counsel for the petitioner: Sri S.Bhooma Goud Counsel for respondents: AGP for Civil Supplies The Court made the following: ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to set aside proceedings No.B1/2739/2010, dated 20.01.2011, of respondent No.1, whereby he has suspended the petitioner’s fair price shop authorisation of Sajjanpally Village, Lingampet Mandal, Nizamabad District. I have heard Sri S.Bhooma Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies. The petitioner is fair price shop dealer of the above-mentioned village. On the basis of an inspection of his shop, respondent No.2 was directed to stop supply of the essential commodities and entrusted the said shop to a neighbouring dealer through a mediators report. The petitioner filed W.P.No.662 of 2011 questioning the said action. While ordering notice before admission, this Court directed the respondents to permit the petitioner to function as fair price shop dealer so long as his authorisation has not been suspended by passing a specific order. In the meantime, respondent No.1 issued show-cause notice, dated 18.11.2010, framing certain charges. The petitioner submitted his explanation, dated 09.12.2010. By the impugned order, respondent No.1 has kept the petitioner’s authorisation under suspension with immediate effect and directed respondent No.2 to propose an in-charge dealer for Sajjanpally fair price shop for distribution of the essential commodities, until further orders. A perusal of the impugned order, however, does not indicate as to whether the said suspension was substantive in nature or made pending further enquiry, if any. If the suspension is by way of a substantive penalty, the same should be for a limited period. No such period is indicated. Conversely, if further enquiry is envisaged, the respondent should have indicated therein the said fact and taken steps for completion of enquiry. Nothing is discernable from the order of the respondent. While dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Palle Peeraiah v. The District Collector at Warangal and others[1], held as under: “…Under the provisions of the A.P.State Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2008, respondent No.3 is empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose appropriate penalties. Though the said Order does not specifically provide for passing an order of suspension as interim measure, pending enquiry, the provisions of this Order and those of preceding Control Orders are interpreted by this Court to the effect that the order of suspension, pending enquiry, is concomitant to the power of the disciplinary authority and that therefore, even in the absence of an express provision, such a power is vested in the authority. In the counter affidavit, respondent No.3 has stated that having regard to the bad history of the petitioner, he has suspended the authorization after giving a show-cause notice and opportunity to the petitioner to submit his objections. It is axiomatic that an order of suspension can be either interim or final in nature. In contrast to an order of cancellation, an order of suspension can be for a limited period irrespective of whether such an order is interim or final in nature. In the light of the stand taken by respondent No.3, the impugned order passed by him can be construed as final in nature. However, curiously respondent No.3 failed to indicate the period for which the petitioner’s authorization is suspended, even if the same was intended to be as a measure of penalty. The impugned order thus suffers from a serious flaw rendering itself illegal and unenforceable. If respondent No.3 felt that suspension is the appropriate substantive penalty, he could have limited the same for a limited period. Conversely, if he felt that cancellation is the appropriate penalty, he should have imposed such a penalty.” In my opinion, the reasoning of this Court in the above- mentioned judgment squarely applies to this case. Therefore, the impugned order, which is styled as suspension, cannot be sustained and the same is quashed. The respondent No.1 is however given liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with law and in the light of the findings rendered hereinabove. Subject to the above, the writ petition is allowed. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.1819 of 2011 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 29th January, 2011 Note: LR copies to be marked (b/o) VGB [1] W.P.No.28833 of 2010, dated 18.01.2011