1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 1842 /2009 (Gaurishankar Shikshan Sanstha & another VERSUS Meerabai Damodar Meshram & another) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shri A.S. Chandurkar, counsel for the petitioners. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : JUNE 15, 2009. Heard. By this petition, the petitioners impugn the order passed by the Presiding Officer School Tribunal, Nagpur on 17.09.2008 allowing an application filed by the respondent- employee and condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the School Tribunal under the provisions of Section 11 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 subject to the payment of costs of Rupees One Thousand to the petitioner. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the application for condonation of delay as the respondent employee had not shown any sufficient cause for belatedly approaching the Tribunal in filing the appeal under Section 11 of the Act of 1977. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the 2 order passed by the High Court on 21.03.2006 in Writ Petition No.5704/2005 clearly showed that the respondent could have challenged the order of termination independently in an appeal before the Tribunal but, the respondent, in stead of preferring an appeal before the School Tribunal, again preferred Writ Petition No.3596/2006 before the High Court, which was later on withdrawn. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the counsel for the respondent-employee mistakenly filed Writ Petition No.3596/2006 before the High Court and, hence, there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay though this ground was not raised by the respondent-employee in the application for condonation of delay. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners and also perused the impugned order dated 17.09.2008. The order passed by the School Tribunal on 17.09.2008 appears to be just and proper and calls for no interference. It was clearly stated by the respondent- employee in the application for condonation of delay that the termination order was issued by the petitioner during the pendency of Writ Petition No.5704/2005 and the respondent- employee challenged the termination order before the High 3 Court in Writ Petition No.3596/2006 because the other petition was pending before the High Court. The respondent- employee had mentioned in the application that the High Court issued notice to the respondents in Writ Petition No.3596/2006 and after hearing the parties, the High Court permitted the respondent to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file an appeal before the School Tribunal. In view of the statement made in paragraph 3 of the application for condonation of delay, it was clear that Writ Petition No. 3596/2006 must have been preferred before the High Court in view of the advice of the counsel for the respondent- employee and since the respondent was bona fide prosecuting the matter before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3596/2006, the Tribunal rightly held that it was necessary to condone the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the time was spent by the respondent-employee before the wrong forum and the said proceedings were initiated by the respondent before the wrong forum in good faith. The Tribunal then considered that it was necessary to adopt a liberal approach while deciding the application for condonation of delay so as to advance substantive justice to the parties and, hence, it was necessary to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 4 The impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error so as to interfere with the same in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE APTE