Regular Second Appeal No. 1230 of 1987 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 1230 of 1987 Date of decision: 07.04.2010 The Punjab State ...Appellant Versus Jarman Singh ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Ms. Ambika Luthra, AAG, Punjab for the appellant. Mr. N.P.S. Mann, Advocate for the respondent. RANJIT SINGH J. When the case is taken up for hearing, Mr. S.S. Brar, Advocate, says that he has received the written instructions from respondent-Jarman Singh not to pursue the case on his behalf in this Regular Second Appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Brar says that he has received oral instructions to this effect as well. Accordingly, he seeks permission to withdraw himself from this case. The counsel is accordingly permitted to withdraw from this case. Thereafter, Mr. N.P.S. Mann, Advocate appears and has placed on record his Power of Attorney to represent the respondent- Jarman Singh. The order of dismissal of respondent-plaintiff, Jarman Singh, which was upheld by the trial Court was reversed by the First Appellant Court. Aggrieved against the same, the State has filed this Regular Second Appeal No. 1230 of 1987 2 Regular Second Appeal. Respondent-Jarman Singh, had filed this suit to impugn the order of his dismissal ordered on 19.2.1981 by Commandant 36 Battalion Bahadurgarh. The respondent-plaintiff preferred an appeal against the Department, which was dismissed by DIG, PAP Jalandhar. He thereafter filed the revision petition, which was dismissed by the IG, Police Punjab. Having thus failed to get in the relief, the respondent-plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration impugning the orders dated 19.2.1981 and the subsequent order passed in his appeal and revision. It was alleged in the complaint that there was no evidence on record to show the charges levelled against the respondent- plaintiff. It was pleaded that police Rules 13.4, 16.2 and 16.38 were violated while passing the impugned order. Plea was that the statements of witnesses, which were recorded, were not supplied to the respondent-plaintiff and the impugned order was in violation of principle of natural justice. It was urged that mandatory rules were not followed by the punishing authority while passing the impugned order. The respondent-plaintiff was charge sheeted for having abused an officer in-charge or escort and his fellow Constables while he was under the influence of liquor. Allegation also was that when an attempt was made to take him for medical examination, the respondent-plaintiff ran away from the place to avoid his medical examination and thus remained absent till he joined the duties on the following day. It is not disputed before me that the inquiry officer was detailed to hold the inquiry and after finding given by the inquiry Regular Second Appeal No. 1230 of 1987 3 officer, the respondent-plaintiff was served a show cause notice. Having obtained his reply, the order dismissing him from service was passed. The plea raised by the respondent-plaintiff for violation of Rule 16.2 of Punjab Police Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'Rule') was considered by the trial Court and the suit was dismissed. The First Appellate Court, however, came to his rescue primarily on the ground that there was violation of Rule 16.2 of the Rules. It was also pleaded that the period of absence, which was ordered to be treated as leave without pay, would lead to condone the absence and the charge of absence thus would disappear. This limb of submission was accepted by the First Appellate Court but the Court went ahead to note that there was another charge against the respondent-plaintiff for having abused the Head Constable while being under the influence of liquor. The First Appellate Court came to view that provisions of Rule 16.2 of the Rules stood violated as punishment of dismissal under this rule can only be awarded for gravest acts of misconduct or as a cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. The First Appellate Court also found that the impugned order did not give any indication that the appellant/Commandant 38 Battalion PAP had applied his mind to this aspect of the rule position to say whether this was a gravest act of misconduct imputed on the part of the respondent-plaintiff, Jarman Singh. As per the counsel, this opinion was required to be reflected in the impugned order by the First Appellate Court but the same was not found so recorded. Without going into this legal aspect of the issue, I find that the finding returned by the First Appellate Court would call for Regular Second Appeal No. 1230 of 1987 4 interference only on the ground of misreading of the impugned order of dismissal passed by the appellant-Commandant. I have perused the impugned order of dismissal as passed by appellant- Commandant. Having discussed the various aspects of the evidence, the gravity of the allegation made against the respondent-plaintiff was considered and it was viewed that dismissal would only be an appropriate punishment in this case. The true translation of the relevant portion of the impugned order would read as under:- “Having perused the entire file and the finding returned by the inquiry officer, I am in agreement with the report given by the inquiry officer. The allegation made against are condemnable and would amount to grave violation of police discipline. Accordingly, the only appropriate punishment for such allegation would be the dismissal from service.” This would clearly indicate that the Commandant was conscious of the requirement of Rule 16.2 of the rules and had clearly viewed the allegation against the appellant to be grave in nature. Considering the requirement of discipline in the police force he had thus viewed that the dismissal would be only appropriate punishment that would meet the ends of justice. It cannot thus be said that there is any violation of Rule 16.2 of the rules. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the First Appellate Court cannot be sustained. The substantial question of law that the punishment of dismissal could only be awarded for a gravest act of misconduct, was not rightly considered and appreciated in the factual background emerging from the record and thus the impugned judgment would Regular Second Appeal No. 1230 of 1987 5 need to be corrected. The Regular Second Appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Fresh decree sheet be accordingly prepared by the Registry of this Court. April 07, 2010 ( RANJIT SINGH ) rts JUDGE