IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.8183 of 2009 L.P.G.GAS UPBHOKTA KALYAN SRANKCHAN SAMITI Versus THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS ----------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, Sr. Advocate Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate For the I.O.C. : Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the B.P.C.L. : Mr. Madhuresh Prasad, Advocate For the H.P.C.L. : Mr.Rabindra Nath Kanth,Advocate 2 20.7.2009 The petitioner is a registered Society. It was established for the welfare of the L.P.G. consumers and creates awareness amongst them. It has challenged the educational qualification contained in one of the brochures. The petitioner submits that the requisite educational qualification mentioned therein visa vis the marks allotted is discriminatory and does not bear any nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The brochure has prescribed Matriculation as minimum qualification for allocation of dealership. Educational qualifications have been categorized under three different levels e.g. Level I, Level II and Level III. Persons having educational qualification in Level I, II and III are entitled to 15, 12 and 10 marks respectively. Post Graduate in Management, Diploma in Management from I.I.M., Graduation in Engineering/Law and Chartered Accountant qualify under Level I and are entitled to 15 marks. Learned counsel submits that thus the educational qualification mentioned therein deprives a Diploma holder from any other Management Institute other than the I.I.M. of any additional marks. He further submits that persons possessing educational 2 qualification enumerated under Level II gets 12 marks whether he is Diploma in Engineering or are having Post Graduate degree. He thus submits that Diploma in Engineering from any Institute is entitled to 12 marks whereas Diploma in Management from Institute other than IIM is not entitled to even 12 marks. He next argues that how a Diploma in Engineering can be entitled in the same Level II with one possessing Post Graduate degree. He next contends that some of the educational qualifications prescribed in the brochure for L.P.G. Distribution do not have any relevance with the nature of job to be performed. He further submits that though equality clause does not prohibit any reasonable classification but still the same should have some nexus with the object sought to be achieved. According to him, educational qualifications and marks earmarked do not have any relevance. In support of his contention, learned counsel relies upon a decision in the case of (i) K.Thimmappa & Ors Vs Chairman, Central Board of Dirs., SBI and another, A.I.R. 2001 SC 467; (ii) in the case of Suneel Jatley Vs State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1984 SC 1534; (iii) M/s Laxmi Khandsari Vs State of U.P., A.I.R. 1981 SC 872 and (iv) Harak Chand Vs Union of Inida, A.I.R. 1970 SC 1453 at Paragraph 16. In the case of K.Thimmappa (Supra) the Apex Court while dealing with the issue of reasonable classification in paragraph 3 it has been held as follows: “(a) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things which are grouped together from others 3 left out of the group; and (b) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object under consideration. Article 14 of the Constitution does not insist that the classification should be scientifically perfect and a Court would not interfere unless the alleged classification results in apparent inequality. When a law is challenged to be discriminatory essentially on the ground that it denies equal treatment or protection, the question for determination by Court is not whether it has resulted in inquality but whether there is some difference which bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere differentiation does not per se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view. If a law deals with members of well defined class then it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. It is for the Rule Making Authority to determine what categories persons would embrace within the scope of rule as merely because some categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the rule are left out wound not render the Rule or 4 KHAN the Law enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of Article 14. It is not possible to exhaust the circumstances or criteria which may afford a reasonable basis for classification in all cases. It depends on the object of the legislation, and what it really seeks to achieve. The ratio of the decisions in other cases noted above is also substantially in same terms and as such this court is not referring to them separately. The learned counsel for the respondents state that the petitioner has no locus standi. They submit that this matter has become infructuous. As per Clause 10 of the advertisement, the last date for filing application for allotment of distributorship was 19.2.2009 which date has since long expired. In view of the nature of order that is being passed this court would not like to go into the issue of locus standi as the instant application has become infructuous.The last date for filing the application for allotment of dealership as per brochure was 19.2.2009 and the instant writ petition has been filed on 16.7.2009. However, it would be open to the petitioner to make a representation before the respondent no.1 for redressal of its grievance. With the aforesaid observations, this writ petition stands disposed of. (S.P.Singh,J)