1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.201 OF 2006 IN WRIT PETITION NO.2187 OF 2005 The Chief Officer, Karmala Municipal Council and Anr. .. Appellants Vs. Shri Vithal Shankar Jadhav .. Respondent Mr.M.S.Kumthekar for the appellants None for the respondent CORAM : J. N. Patel, Acting C.J. & S.C.Dharmadhikari, J. DATE : June 9, 2010 P.C. : 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dt.21.12.2005 in Writ Petition No.2187 of 2005. The Writ Petition was filed by the Appellants challenging the order of the Labour Court as also of the Revisional Court. The Industrial Court had by an order dt.16.6.00 allowed the complaint of the respondent and directed the Appellants to cease and desist from the unfair Labour practices and reinstate the respondent with continuity of service and backwages. This order was made on the respondent s complaint alleging unfair labour practices under item ’ no. (1a) (b) and (f) of Schedule IV to the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade 2 Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. 2. The respondent stated in the complaint that he was working with the Appellants in construction department since 1991. He was performing duties such as repairing of Bores, spreading Murum on roads, work on tractors etc. Initially he was paid Rs.25 per day as wages and lastly, he was drawing Rs. 40/­ per day wages. He was rendering continuous services till 4.12.97 on which date the Appellants, Original respondents orally terminated his services. 3. He contended that there is a relationship of employer and employee and that having worked for 240 days in each year, he is entitled to benefits of permanency. Even persons junior to him have been given these benefits There are no reasons assigned while terminating him and in fact the termination is contrary to the standing orders. Therefore, the appellants have engaged in unfair labour practices while terminating his services. 4. Before the Labour Court, the Appellants though duly served, did not remain present. They neither contested the matter nor filed their written statement. Therefore, the Labour Court proceeded in their absence and took on record the necessary documents. After their contents were proved, the Labour Court also offered opportunity to the Appellants to cross­examine the respondent and lead evidence in rebuttal. Even this opportunity has not been availed of. Relying upon the uncontroverted oral and documentary 3 evidence, the complaint was allowed. 5. The appellants carried the matter in revision before the Industrial Court. The only ground on which they assailed the order of the Labour Court was that the learned Judge failed to consider that in calculating 240 days in a year, holidays and weekly offs have to be excluded. The Industrial Court found this contention to be untenable in law and after perusing the order of the Labour Court, so also the entire record, concluded that the computation and calculation is in accordance with law. With such concurrent findings, the learned single Judge rightly refused to interfere in writ Jurisdiction and dismissed the Appellants Writ Petition. We see no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and take a different view. 6. Mr.Kumthekar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants urged that the courts below have failed to consider one vital aspect of the matter, namely, the respondent was not appointed by the Karmala Municipal Council. There was no employer­employee relationship. The Council had engaged a Contractor and it is the contractor who employed the respondent. This contention is raised for the first time and Mr.Kumthekar could not point out anything from the record to demonstrate that it was raised earlier. 7. It is contended that such a plea was raised before the Revisional Court and that was one of the grounds taken in the Writ Petition dismissed by the learned single Judge. One of the grounds raised was lack of employer 4 employee relationship. We are afraid that even before the single Judge such a contention could not have been raised for the first time. That apart, the order of the learned single Judge does not indicate that such plea was raised. In such circumstances, there is no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact. There is no perversity or error apparent warranting interference in writ Jurisdiction. In such circumstances, there is no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J