R.S.A. No.2716 of 2011 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH R.S.A. No.2716 of 2011 Date of Decision:12.09.2011 The General Manager, Department of Telecommunications(now BSNL) and others ......Appellants Versus Vijay Kohli and another .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR. Present: Mr.Rajesh Sethi, Advocate, for the appellants. **** M EHINDER S INGH S ULLAR , J.(oral) As is evident from the record that Vijay Kohli son of Sudershan Lal Kohli and his wife Vandana Kohli-respondent-plaintiffs(hereinafter to be referred as “the plaintiffs”) are the absolute owners and in possession of S.C.F. bearing No.54, consisting of basement, ground floor, Ist and second floor, situated in Sector 29, Faridabad. The General Manager, Department of Telecommunications (now Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited)(for brevity “BSNL”) and its officers- appellant-defendants(for short “the defendants”) approached the plaintiffs to hire the entire portion of the demised premises on lease, for the purpose of installation and running of Telephone Exchange, at a monthly rent of `47,902/-, for a period of five years, commencing from 16.03.2001 to 15.03.2006, by means of registered lease-deed dated 09.03.2001. The defendants have paid monthly rent of the demised premises upto July, 2004, but thereafter, reduced the rent amounting to `7,303/-, without any reason by way of unilateral decision, conveyed to the plaintiffs that they would vacate second floor of the premises in question on 30.06.2004 and also reduced the monthly rent from `47,902/- to `39,599/-. Such unilateral reduction in the payment of rent on pro-rata cut basis was claimed to be R.S.A. No.2716 of 2011 2 illegal and against the terms & conditions of the registered lease-deed. They (plaintiffs) lodged protest in this regard and sent several reminders to the defendants, but in vain. 2. Aggrieved by the unilateral decision of the defendants, the plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of `1,95,279/- along with pendente lite and future interest @ 18% per annum and other expenses incurred, in pursuance thereof. 3. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, according to the plaintiffs that, the unilateral reduction of rent by the defendants, without any notice, was arbitrary, illegal and totally against the terms & conditions of the registered lease-deed. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery against the defendants, in the manner depicted hereinabove. 4. The defendants contested the suit and filed the written statement, inter alia, pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the suit, cause of action and locus standi of the plaintiffs. However, it was admitted that the entire portion of the demised premises was taken on lease by the Department, in pursuance of the registered lease-deed dated 09.03.2001. It was claimed that as per Clause 14 of the lease-deed, the defendants were at liberty to terminate the lease at any time by giving one month's notice of the intention to do so. Since, the defendants vacated second floor of the demised premises on 30.06.2004, so, the reduction in the rent was claimed to be legal and cannot be recovered from them. It will not be out of place to mention here that the defendants have stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the plaint and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. In the wake of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the relevant issues for proper adjudication of the case. 6. The parties to the lis, in order to substantiate their respective pleas, brought on record oral as well as the documentary evidence. 7. The trial Court, after taking into consideration the entire oral as well R.S.A. No.2716 of 2011 3 as the documentary evidence brought on record by the parties, partly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for recovery of `1,57,757/- as arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.08.2004 to 28.02.2006 along with interest @ 6% per annum, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 28.01.2010. 8. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court, the defendants filed the appeal, which was dismissed as well by the first Appellate Court, by means of impugned judgment and decree dated 14.02.2011. 9. The appellant-defendants still did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and preferred the present regular second appeal. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant-defendants, going through the record with his valuable assistance and after deep consideration of the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant appeal in this regard. 11. Ex facie, the argument of the learned counsel that, since, as per Clause 14 of the lease-deed, the defendants were entitled to terminate the lease at any time by giving one month's previous notice in writing to the landlord, so, the Courts below committed a legal mistake in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs, lacks merit. 12. What is not disputed here is that the defendants have taken the entire portion/floors of the demised premises on lease, in pursuance of registered lease- deed dated 09.03.2001. Clause 14 of the lease-deed, no doubt postulates that the BSNL shall be entitled to terminate the lease at any time by giving to the landlord one month's previous notice in writing. Be that as it may, but it does not authorise them to bifurcate the tenancy and to unilaterally take a decision to vacate part of the tenancy and to reduce the rent in this respect. 13. That means, Clause 14 did not authorise the defendants unilaterally to reduce the arrears/rent under lease and to put a pro-rata cut in the rate of rent. If the defendants intend to vacate the leased premises, then they have to R.S.A. No.2716 of 2011 4 terminate/surrender the possession of the entire leased property and they have no right to bifurcate the tenancy with regard to some portion, in the manner, they like. 14. Therefore, to me, the trial Court has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. Not only that, the decision of the trial Court was upheld by the first Appellate Court, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 14.02.2011, which in substance is, as under:- “Clause 14 gives no right to unilaterally reduced the area under lease and to consequently put a pro-rata cut in the payable rent. Clause 11 put in operation by the appellants again is not of any help to them because conditions therein do not exist even remotely. It was not on account of intervention of any natural or outside interference or for fortuitous causes that area was reduced. Even though one month's notice was given but it was only convenience of the defendants which formed genesis of surrender of 2nd floor and consequent pro-rata cut in the quantum of rent. Plea of the learned counsel for the appellants is that subsequently executed lease deed of 9.11.2006 with reduced rent of `47,000/- on exclusion of second floor of their tenancy, is a relevant piece of document. This plea has no merit. Terms and conditions only of lease deed of 9.3.2001(Ex.P13) are relevant as it alone binds the parties for the present transaction. Subsequently executed lease deed on 9.11.2006 after consent of both the parties with changed terms and conditions with changed circumstances would not affect the terms and conditions of the lease deed executed earlier on 9.3.2001. This piece of evidence sought to be produced additionally neither advances cause of justice nor is necessary for effective and competent adjudication of the matter in controversy. To allow this application, would rather be unjust and improper as no useful purpose is going to be served in resolution of the dispute. Rather allowing of such application would blur the real issues. It is thus clear that from August, 2004 to February, 2006 rent @ `47,902/- per month is payable. Delivery of possession of second floor to the plaintiffs is inconsequential because pro-rata cut could not have been applied in the payable rent by the appellants. Lease deed nowhere supports their claim on this count.” 15. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants did not point out any material, much less cogent, to contend that how and in what manner, any R.S.A. No.2716 of 2011 5 interference is warranted in the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below. 16. No other meaningful argument has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendants, to assail the findings of the Courts below. All the remaining contentions, relatable to the appreciation of evidence, now sought to be urged on their behalf, have already been duly considered and dealt with by the Courts below. 17. Meaning thereby, the Courts below have recorded the cogent grounds in this context. Such judgments, containing the valid reasons, cannot possibly be interfered with by this Court, while exercising the powers conferred under Section 100 CPC, unless and until, the same are illegal and perverse. No such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, so as to take a contrary view, than that of the well-articulated decision arrived at by the Courts below in this relevant connection. 18. Neither any question of law, much less substantial, is involved in this regular second appeal, nor any other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the appellants. 19. In the light of aforesaid reasons, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed as such. September 12, 2011 (MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR) seema JUDGE