mg MM "‘EGH SGUR‘E‘ OF SHHATT¥$$£§RH ink“? B§LE§$PU§§ LQ$§ : Hon’bge Shari HLIJatm, {snag incéim k Enn’h‘ae 3hr; V.K.S'm&vastavag Judgéa Wm Petman Mawé‘é‘ eé" ’égw QREEER FQR GQ§E$§DERA?EC3€\E Chief Justice Mél’EE‘ELE $HFI§ VK $RQWA3?&W3‘§ aiv <§ .W sw— " V.K. Shrivastava > _ Judge E§$§2§Q? P©$‘3” FGR PR§E€€3€2N€§E§£ENT $i: ?§‘%§ G¥§$E§ : Q3i€§§i2fziW Sdl- Chief Justice '* éég§f¢§igai “ " ' " 7* gmz‘xgééé? \ i7 J HIGH CQUm’ 63F ¢EHAW§$G ARH AT EELAEz‘FBR QEWSBQE‘! BEN$H €QR§E§§ 1 HOH‘aLE $HR§ HL. EJA ''Eii, xii g: ?§$N’5LE $H§§E ELK. S“?i§iiV§$Tila\i&, J. Vssww “mama? fuaaa ..K Udhaw Ram Sharma, S/e 3hr§ Ram Qa’rah SHam‘n nged at ;.‘i H4 years: ‘ , lrst grace Vierk mus‘amw Gradr: baliecmraze Governmen£ sasguta, Q’wi‘m Q/c r\'0+’€(‘1;/5, Devi—g'ng, Ambikapur, Distrmwargdla \k P) Pawomr Versus State of Wadlmy' ma‘e I m0 I. Secretary, gnoarmpnr a? meveme‘ Mantramya, V Elam Bhawm BLm-pal he Coéiec‘tor‘ Sarguja (Ambmaww\ Distric’cSanj (MR) 3) Principai Eecretary, Govt. 0f MP. Revenue Department. ‘V‘ nii'aiaya, Vaéiabh Bhawan‘ Ehapa: 4) The Secretary, Govt. 3f MP spar—went o? Qevewe; Mantraaya: Iehh Bhawah B“ “a (MP) Qecretarv Gmr' (sf m 0f Reveme enawan amp ( 33.} h.. fhe the, Odieomr: k t gt Greed“ Caa‘ecéc, Bastar, §£ecmreue weer (M 3 ) have AammIetraYve ribunai, lnl‘irak Bencn aaaapur through fie Ustrar j ‘$as?» 4, x, w wSC: a f S. Agraww, uA. $ R $ E R Wassea? an Q3” .éig. " Q3“ Shri 8hr: 832 Pregem‘ : ‘or the T'e foiicwing order 0f the Com was passed by HA, Sax: m. in this petition filed under Armies 225 and 227’ 7 n Carstmmon or rilv cails in question the common Grder passed bv the (a .e Admn trative Tr‘nu‘a. wbaipu we n Jab r Tnbunafforsnm} €n OAN0.1089 of 1989 conr‘eded w ‘1 OA “OCT o? “New eatec: m r L “ ‘ .. o r 1 e a 5x A m a / 253021998 By the impugned order, the Tribunal has rejecied 00m the originaé apphcationg filed by the appticantfpetmoner. In order to appreciate ihe contentions canvassed by Shri Amréto Dae, {earned couneei appearing fer the petitioner reference to the facts of the ease in exteneo requires to be made. , (2) The factuai matrix is as under : The petitianer was appointed ae Ciass I Cierk in the office of the Cotiector, Sarguja {Ambikapur}. He was kept under euspeneien pendéng departmental enquiry en 12.09.85. Aner holding an enquiry as envisaged Lmder the MP. Civil Services (Classification, Conti‘oi & Appeal) Rules 1 (‘t‘ne Rules, 196i“? for short) and in accordance with the principiee cf naturai iuetice, an omler came to be passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the petitioner from service on 020481 (3i The petitioner being aggrieved bv the aforesaid order had queetioned the same before the Tribunai in OANQGE? ct 1‘388. T'ne Tribunai by its order dated 15.02% was pleased to set aside the order of dismissai passed by the disciplinary authority and ordered for a fresh enquiry. At this stage itseli, it wouid be proper to notice the reasons assigned by the Tribunal for setting aside the order of dismissai passed by the disoipiinaiy authority, One of t’ne reasons assigned by the Tribunal was that the enquiry officer after comeietion ‘oi the enquiry proceedings had not asked the deéinqnent official to otter his mianation, if any, as oontempiated t, der sub—ruie ’18 of Ruie “i4 o: ; the Ewes? \ 1%6. 8econdty, the enquiry officer ought to have examined the District Magistrate. who had alleged, that, the petitioner had forged the signatare of the Executive Magistrate, Ambikabur. The Tribunal had further obeerveo i: its order that criminal cases are filed against the petitioner for the verv ame offence aiieged in the charge memo and those oases are pending, and therefore, the enquiry officer shoutd keee his enquiry proceedinge in abevance tit! the criminai proceedings are over or in the alternative to coneider the aopiication of the petitioner tiied for seeiting appointment of a legai practitioner ;a ro deknd him in the enquiry proceedings. Whiie d§$p03ing 0‘? éhe appé%sation, the Tribunal in our opinion) had inadvertenw med the expressicm ‘to hom‘ a fresh enquiry’ and thereaf‘ier had remanded the mat€er te the ciiecipiinary authority {4) :t aepeare that by an order dated 2903.89, the dissiptinary authedty h e: eaeeed a fresh order keeping the petitioner under euepeneion pending departmental enquiry and the Order was given effect to from the date of ihe order of dismieeai. Aggrieved by that Order, the peiiiioner had enoe again approached the Tribunai m O.A.No.1098 er” 19894 When ‘i‘ne matter was pending before rne Tribunai, r re siaied in the petition, rider L rue e peJiioner fr had moved an appiioationi’repreeentation before the State Government inter aiia requesting the Govt. to revoke the order of suspension passed by the Coiieotor dated 29.03% it aepeare that the Uho‘er Secretary to the State Government had passed the order dated 62.0795 revoking the oae of suspeheion paeeed by the Coiiector dated 2903.89 and by that order he had not only directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service and also keep all the y departmentai enquiry proceedihge tn aeeyance tiil the criminal oaeee against r the petitioner are deoided in one way or the otheri Pursuant to the order eaeeed, it appears that the petitioner had reported for ddtv in the ptaoe he wae originaliv working prior tothe order of suspension passed. (5) lt is further stated in the petition that since there were eenain criminai cases against the eetitioner‘and he had been arrested for more than 48 hours, and therefore a fresh suspension order was paseed on 23.09% and the petitioner has questioned the said order before the State Adminietrative Tribunal bv fiiing apotioation, O.A.No.2507 of 1%6. i (6) Dunng the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunai, the resp ndents have passed yet another order dated 22.0”; 97, revoking the order passed by the Under Secretary to the State Government dated 02.07.96, The petitioner being aggrieved by the said oraer of {evocatiom 9a3sed, has fiied an application for amendment of the pieadings and aiso for addiéima§ prayer in 0A. No.2507 o? ‘i §96. (7} Since the parties were comman and the issues were more or isss aimiiar, the Hibunai-‘nad thought ii fit t0 ciub the GA. Noe. meg of 1989 and 2507 of i996 for its consideration and decision. Afier a detaiied diecuseion the Tribunal has reieoted both these aepiioation by its order dated 28% 19% it ie toe correctness or otherwiee of the said order ie the subéeot matte? of this writ petttton. (23} Shri Amrito Des. teamed oouneet appearing for the petittoner wouio‘ submit that the respondents after passing a detaiied order dated G2.D7r’r§96 revoking the order or“ suspension dated 29.03.1989, could not have revoked the same by passing a cryptic order dated 22.01.1997. Alternativeiv, it is contended that the order passed by the respondents dated 22.91.1997 doee not oodtaih any reasons and therefore is arbitrary, unfair and unjuet and vioiative of Artiste t4 of the Constitution of tndia and unfair procedure offending Artiole 21 et the Constitution of India. Eiaboreting this contention the learned counsel would submit that the fair ptay requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons, when it affects the riqhts of the eetitioner and since the order contains no reasons, the same is no order in the eye or” law and therefore, the Tribunal was not iustitied in sustaining the orders passed by the respondents dated 2291 1997. ‘ (9) The teamed counsel by inviting our attention to sub—R ile 4 of Rule 9 of the Ruies, 1966 would submit, that, the rule oontemplates that it shouid be the authority comoetent to place a Government servant under suspension to decide as to whether a further enquiry against him on the allegations on wnioh the oenalty ot dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was oridinally proposed, then oniy a Government employee wouid be deemed to ee under suspension. In the instant case, since the Tribunal had directed Ehat me campatenL authoritv shaii hoid a fresh departmentai enq 'iry and therefore; there was no discretien ieft with the diesipiinary authority to hoid further enquiry under sub-ruie 4 ei‘ Rule 9 of the Rules, 1966 and theiefore, ihvoKihg :he said provieian aepiicant could not have been kept under suspension. (1 O) in regard to the first contention canvaeeed by learned counsel for the " et an arder had been passed oy the State Government revoking the order of suspension paeeed by the discipiinan,’ authority dated 2908.1989. The order so made. was, firstly, contrary to sub—ruie 4 of Ruie 9 of the Rules, 1966‘though in the order reference is made to the orders passed in GA. No.1089 ot 1:989; and connected matter. it is a mistake and the appiicant cannot take advantage of such a mistake. Secondly, in the context of the administrative decision, its order and decision may not contain the reasons, but it may be available in the records, but at this length of time and because of the bifurcation of iviadhya Pradesh State, it may not be possible to secure the records to find out whether the reasons are forthcoming from the records. Therefore, we may presume that the records wouid contain reasons for the decision. Even otherwise atso, tt is not required that the reasons shouid be as eiaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The reasons may be precise, but stiit it may convey what weighed in the mtnd of the authority whiie passing the order and therefore, every case , . View in background, if we look at the order passed by the authority dated 22.01.1997, we cannot hold that it does not contain any reasons and therefore, arbitrary, unfair and uniust. Therefore, first ttm‘o ot' the argument canvassed by the teamed counsei has no merit. petitiener, in our View, it is devoid of merits. it is no doubt true, has to ‘oe iudged tn the light of its own facts and circumstances Keeping this (1 ’i‘) Secondiy, the authority who has bassed the order has the authority to withdraw his eariier order, if for any reason, the same is in contitct with the settled legal princioies or contrary to the rules or contrary to the decision or tSl iuréediciianai Ccurt. But, before recalling 0r reviewing its earHar order; the omv requirement is that a person agaiee‘r whom such am om‘er reGwres ts be gaaesed Shomd be heard in the mafter. It is not ihe caee of the petiiioner'e Eeamee caunse: ihat the authority before paeeing the order dated 22.01.?9‘337 ham. m; iesued any notice to the petitiener. Therefare, it cannot be easel that the $tate had; no competence to'pass the order dated 22m .1 99?. (12) Th teamed counsel for the petittoner wouéd further oontenc‘ that the (I) Tribunal While dieposing of the petitioner‘s apphcation N066? of 19B8 hes eoeotticattv directed that the departmenta! enqairy be hetd afresh and according to the teamed couneei that oniv means that there was no discretion tee with tee disciplinary authority. but to hoio‘ a fresh enquiry and not to hold further enquiry and therefore, sub-ruie 4 ot Ruie 9 of the Rules, 19663 would not be appiioa‘oie in the present caee and therefore, petitioner cannotlbe said to he undet deemed suspension, ln order to resolve the controversy the tuie requires to be noticed and omitting what is not necessary, the reieva 1t ruie is extracted. The same FeadS aS UHCIEI’ i “Where a penalty of dismiesai, removai or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant, is set aside or deciared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of iaw t and the disciplinary authority, on a coneideration o the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further enquiry against him on the aiiegations on which the penalty of diemissai, removai or compuleory retirement was originaiiy imposed, the Government servant shaii be deemed to have been ,oiaced’ under suspension by the appointing authority from the date or’ the originai order of dismissal, removal or compuisory retirement and ehaii continue to remain under suspension untii further orders.“ we.t3) The applicant before the Tribunal had questioned the orders passed bv the disciplinary authority dated 0204.198? dismissing the petitioner from Jiq A we; m m e i [£3 service under the MP (CCA) Ruies 1966. The Tribuna( has aiiowed the application on the ground of procedural irregu!arities said to have been committed by the enquiry officer and has directed the disoipiinary autherity to ‘noid a fresh enquiry. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the Tribunal had directed a fresh enquiry to be hetd: the deemed provision contemplated under sub-rule 4 of Rule 9 of the Du’es 196E cannot be applied and further it cannot be gresumed that the Government servant ie deemed to be under suspension The argument advanced, at the first flash looks attractive, but on a deeper consideration, it has no merit, The Tribunal while passing the order in application N066? of 1988 has no doubt used the expression ‘afresh‘ while directing the disciplinary authority to hold an enquiry and not ‘further’ enquiry. The expression so used py the Tribuhal may be a mistake made inadvertently. in the context in which it is used is understood, the Tribunal had directed the disciplinary authority to hold a further enquiry from the stage the defects are noticed by them in the proceedings of the enquiry officer if it is understood in the manner and in fact requires to ’oe understood only in that manner, the discipiinary authority was whotly justified in tnvoklng the provisions of sub-ruie 4 of Rule 9 of the MP. (CCA) Rutes. 1966. (1 r 4‘1 ln View of the aforesaid citscusston, we are of the View that the Tribune: has not committed any error whatsoever which would call for our interference. Accordingly, petition requires to be retected and it ts rejected. ln‘ the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly. Sd/— Sdl- V.K. Shrivastava .; i. Chief Justice Judge \‘ .