IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH : HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE SIXTH (06TH) DAY OF SEPTEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN Present: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY C.R.P.No.4435 OF 2009 Between: Chillakur Dasaradharamireddy … Petitioner And: Pakaka Ushakumari and another … Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY C.R.P.No.4435 OF 2009 ORDER: This civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 19.08.2009 in I.A.No.247 of 2007 in O.S.No.19 of 2007, on the file of the Additional District Judge-cum-Family Court, Nellore, wherein the said application filed by the 1st respondent herein under Order I Rule 10 CPC, seeking to come on record as 2nd defendant, was allowed. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 3. The petitioner herein filed the suit O.S.No.19 of 2007 against the 2nd respondent for specific performance of suit agreement of sale dated 04.01.2007. The 2nd respondent/defendant filed written statement contesting the suit. The 1st respondent herein filed I.A.No.247 of 2007 seeking to get her impleaded as 2nd defendant in the suit, claiming title over the suit property. According to her, the suit property was purchased by her father under a registered sale deed vide document bearing No.114 of 2001 and later he settled the same in her favour under a registered settlement deed dated 01.10.2004 and ever since she has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit land. She further alleges that the plaintiff in collusion with the defendant fabricated the suit agreement of sale and filed the suit collusively to defeat her rights in the property. The petitioner herein, the plaintiff, filed a counter opposing the said application contending that she is not a proper or necessary party to the suit filed by him against the defendant for specific performance of the suit agreement and the 1st respondent herein is setting up an independent title and, therefore, she cannot be impleaded in the present suit. The defendant, 2nd respondent herein, also filed a counter contending that the claim of the 1st respondent herein, the proposed party, is false and the sale deed of 2001 in favour of her father Venkata Krishnaiah was fabricated and forged and neither the 1st respondent’s father nor the 1st respondent has got any title over the suit property. The learned Additional District Judge, by the impugned order, allowed the application mainly on the ground that the presence of the proposed party who is setting up a rival claim over the suit property would avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed the present revision petition. 4. The petitioner herein filed the suit against the 2nd respondent for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale dated 04.01.2007. The 2nd respondent is contesting the suit. The 1st respondent, proposed party, is setting up independent claim of title over the suit property under a registered settlement deed executed in her favour by her father. The question that arises for consideration is whether she can be permitted to get impleaded in this suit filed for specific performance. 5. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent seeks to rely on a decision in KONA VENKATA SIVA SURYA CHANDRASEKHAR AND ANOTHER V. BONDA VENKUNAIDU AND OTHERS[1] wherein a learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court permitted impleadment of proposed party in a suit for specific performance to avoid multiplicity of litigation. 6. Order I Rule 10(2) CPC enables the Court at any stage of the proceedings to order joining of any party as a plaintiff or defendant who ought to have been joined or whose presence may be necessary to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 7. In a decision in KASTURI v. IYYAMPERUMAL AND OTHERS[2], the Apex Court while dealing with the scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC with reference to a suit for specific performance held as follows: “….In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are - (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.” After dealing with the scope of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, the Apex Court further held as follows: “8. We have carefully considered sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Act. From a careful examination of the aforesaid provisions of sub- sections (a) to (e) of the Specific Relief Act we are of the view that the persons seeking addition in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale who were not claiming under the vendor but they were claiming adverse to the title of the vendor do not fall in any of the categories enumerated in sub-sections (a) to (e) of section 19 of the Specific Relief Act. 9. That apart, from a plain reading of section 19 of the Act we are also of the view that this section is exhaustive on the question as to who are the parties against whom a contract for specific performance may be enforced. 10. As noted hereinearlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. XXXX XXXX XXXX 14…….As noted hereinearlier, in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is an admitted position that the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted hereinearlier that in the event, the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. In the case of Vijay Pratap and Ors. v. Sambhu Saran Sinha and Ors. , this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character.” 8. In the above case also, the proposed parties based their claim on independent title and possession of the suit property. It was held that by the impleadment of those parties, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale would get enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. The learned District Judge in the impugned order observed that the impleadment of the proposed defendant would not change the nature of the suit nor will it cause prejudice to the interest of either of the parties. The nature and complexion of the suit would certainly get changed from a suit for specific performance to one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. A plaintiff has always got a choice to implead the defendants against whom he seeks to enforce his rights. He cannot be compelled to implead parties against whom he does not seek any relief in the suit. A third party claiming rights over the same subject matter setting up an independent claim of title is certainly entitled to initiate separate proceedings to vindicate his claim, but cannot be thrust on the plaintiff who does not seek any relief against the proposed party. The presence of the 1st respondent proposed party is not at all necessary for resolution of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant and for adjudication of the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance of the suit agreement. It is stated that the proposed defendant has already filed a suit for declaration of her title. She is certainly entitled to vindicate her rights by separate proceedings, but she cannot be permitted to get impleaded in the present suit as her presence is not required for effective adjudication of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in the above decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case and in view of the same, the impugned order, permitting the 1st respondent herein to get impleaded, is held unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. 9. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed and consequently I.A.No.247 of 2007 in O.S.No.19 of 2007, on the file of the Additional District Judge-cum-Family Court, Nellore, filed by the 1st respondent herein stands dismissed. Interim suspension granted earlier stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. ______________________ G.V.SEETHAPATHY, J 06th September, 2011 Lrkm [1] 2007(3) ALD 108 [2] AIR 2005 SC 2813