IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL No.1399 OF 2002 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated ______ in WP NO : 9727 OF 1998 on the file of the High Court.) Between: 1 The Special Dy. Collector, LA ( General), Hyd at Nampally Station Road, Hyd. 2 The Defence Estate Officer, AP Circle at Secunderabad. ..... APPELLANTS AND 1 Sama Yadaiah @ Yadi Reddy S/o. Ramaiah R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 2 Sama Ram Reddy died per LRs, Ramaiah 54 R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 3 Sama Pratap Reddy @ S. Pratap Reddy S/o. Sama Narasaiah @ B. Narsimha Reddy, R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 4 Sama Janga Reddy @ B. Janga Reddy S/o. Sama Narasaiah @ B. Narasimha Reddy, R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 5 B. Venkat Reddy S/o. B. Narasimha Reddy R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 6 Smt. S. Yadamma W/o. Anantha Reddy R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 7 G. Malla Reddy S/o. G. Gowra Reddy R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 8 G. Bal Reddy S/o. G. Gowra Reddy R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 9 Sama Sujatha W/o. Late Sama Ram Reddy R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 10 Sama Sridhar Reddy S/o. Late Ram Reddy, R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. 11 Sama Srinivas Reddy S/o. Late Ram Reddy R/o. Champapet Vill, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District. (RRs 9to 11 are brought on record as LRs of the deceased R2 as per C.O. Dt. 13.9.2004 in WPMP.No.2084 of 2004. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellants : THE ADVOCATE GENERAL Counsel for the Respondents: MR.K.RAGHUVEER REDDY The Court made the following : THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO.1399 OF 2002 ORAL JUDGMENT (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar) The respondents in W.P.No.9727 of 1998 are in appeal. By order dated 07.06.2002, the learned Judge allowed the said writ petition quashing Award No.P/1430/89 dated 15.09.1993 to the extent it held that the writ petitioners were not entitled to compensation for the scheduled land. Consequently, the learned Judge held that the writ petitioners were entitled to receive compensation as determined in the said Award, which remained unaltered in all other respects. A further direction was given to the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (General), Hyderabad, the first respondent in the writ petition/first appellant herein, to refer the claim of the petitioners under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the L.A. Act’) to the jurisdictional civil Court for enhancement of compensation and for determination of the correct extent of the land. During the pendency of these proceedings, writ petitioners 1 and 2/respondents 1 and 2 herein expired and their legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents 9 to 14. The parties are referred to as per their array in the writ petition for the sake of convenience. The facts in brief: The writ petitioners claim to be the owners of an extent of Acs.16-35 gts. of land in Sy.No.148 of Jillalaguda Village of Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Land was required by the Defence Estate Officer, A.P. Circle, Secunderabad, 2nd respondent in the writ petition/2nd appellant herein for the usage of the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratories (DMRL). A portion of the land required was notified for acquisition under the provisions of the L.A. Act, while the petitioners’ land was notified under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the RAIP Act’). The possession of the petitioners’ land was taken on 10.11.1978 pursuant to Memo No.J2/1329/1977 dated 07.11.1978 under a panchanama. The petitioners were allegedly paid rents for the land for some time under the provisions of the RAIP Act. While so, the petitioners approached this Court by way of W.P.No.4684 of 1987 challenging the action of the authorities in not acquiring their lands under the L.A. Act, while lands adjacent to theirs were so acquired. The writ petition was allowed by a learned single Judge by Judgment dated 10.07.1987 directing the authorities to issue a notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and finalise the proceedings, including passing of the Award, as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of one year. The said judgment was confirmed in W.A.No.1768 of 1987 by Judgment dated 10.11.1988 directing the authorities to proceed under the L.A. Act and acquire the petitioners’ land as expeditiously as possible having regard to the fact that the possession was taken over by the authorities as long back as in the year 1978. The Special Leave Petition filed by the authorities against the said judgment was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 01.05.1989. As no steps were taken for notifying the petitioners’ land under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act, the petitioners filed Contempt Case No.329 of 1989 before this Court. The authorities filed a counter therein, in the first instance admitting that the petitioners’ land was taken possession of in November, 1978 and that steps were being taken to comply with the earlier orders of this Court. However, an additional counter-affidavit was filed thereafter stating that the petitioners’ land resembled the land in Sy.No.24/3 of Sultanavalva Village which was already acquired in the year 1968. As this Court was not willing to accept this new case projected by the authorities, it appears that a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act published in the Gazette dated 04.09.1990 with respect to the petitioners’ land. Accordingly, the contempt case was closed by order dated 07.09.1990. Thereafter, though the possession of the land was already taken, it appears that an enquiry was conducted under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act and the authorities sought to raise the same plea that the petitioners’ land resembled the land comprised in Sy.No.24/3 of Sultanavalva Village which was already acquired. The Enquiry Officer however rejected this plea taking note of the fact that it had been raised before this Court in C.C.No.329 of 1989, but did not find favour. Thereafter, declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was also published, but no Award was passed. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed W.P.No.13229 of 1993 before this Court seeking a direction to the authorities to pass an Award. Thereafter, Award No.P/1430/89 dated 15.09.1993 was passed fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.50/- per square yard. However, this compensation was denied to the petitioners on the ground that their land was already acquired as part of the land in Sy.No.24/3 of Sultanavalva Village. The petitioners again approached this Court by way of Contempt Case No.604 of 1994 complaining that the said Award was in violation of the earlier orders passed by this Court. It appears that during the course of the contempt proceedings, the authorities were directed by this Court to enquire and verify whether the petitioners had been paid compensation in the earlier acquisition of 1968 relied upon by the authorities. Thereupon, the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned reported that there was no link or relationship between the petitioners and the awardees of the 1968 acquisition of the land comprised in Sy.No.24 of Sultanavalva Village. The petitioners’ attempt to seek a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act was also rejected on the ground that no compensation had been awarded to them. This is the factual scenario which led to the filing of the writ petition from which the present writ appeal arises. The learned single Judge having regard to the above facts and having considered the arguments of the counsel and the material on record, rejected the stand taken by the authorities that the petitioners’ land had been acquired earlier. It was the case of the authorities that an extent of land admeasuring Ac.153.10 gts., comprised in Sy.No.24 of Sultanavalva Village had been acquired in the year 1968. The details thereof are as hereunder: Ac.Gts. Sy.No.24/1 … 18.04 Sy.No.24/2 … 111.28 Sy.No.24/3 … 20.34 Sy.No.24/4 … 2.24 ---------- 153.10 ---------- It was their case that as per the records the extent of Sy.No.24 was only Acs.140-05 guntas, and therefore, an extent of Acs.13-05 gts., acquired in excess was in Sy.No.148 of Jillalaguda Village. It was also argued on behalf of the authorities that the writ petition was hit by laches as the Award was passed in the year 1993 while the writ petition was filed in 1998. This argument did not find favour with the learned single Judge who, having referred to precedential law, observed that the rule of delay and laches does not constitute a rule of law but one of practice based on the discretion to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The learned Judge also found that the stand of the authorities with regard to the earlier acquisition of the petitioners’ land had not been raised in the first round of litigation which had gone right upto the Supreme Court, and therefore, the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata bar the authorities from raising the same at this stage. On facts, the learned Judge was not prepared to accept that the petitioners’ land had in fact been acquired earlier in the year 1968 as a part of Sy.No.24/3 of Sultanavalva village. Holding so, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition with directions to the authorities. Heard the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition for the appellants and Sri K.Raghuveer Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondents. The learned Government Pleader contended that the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata had been misapplied to the facts of the present case. We, however, find no reason to disagree with the conclusions of the learned single Judge in this regard. It is a matter of record that the petitioners challenged the failure of the authorities in notifying their land for acquisition under the L.A. Act before this Court. Neither in the writ petition nor in the writ appeal did the authorities take the stand that the petitioners’ land had already been acquired in the year 1968. Having failed to raise this plea which was available to them even at that time and in view of the direction of this Court to acquire the petitioners’ land under the L.A. Act, which became final in the light of the dismissal of the S.L.P. by the Supreme Court, the authorities cannot seek to raise the plea at this late stage. Further, as pointed out by the learned single Judge, the authorities did try to raise this plea during the course of the contempt proceedings which did not find favour with this Court. It is not open to the authorities to lightly brush aside the said order in the contempt case or seek to assail the maintainability of the contempt case on technicalities at this stage. Having failed to impress this Court with this very plea at that stage, the authorities meekly submitted to the earlier orders by issuing a Section 4(1) Notification under the L.A. Act in respect of the petitioners’ land. Having done so, it appears that the authorities again struck upon this ingenious idea to deny the petitioners their rightful compensation. As observed by the learned single Judge, this case is a stellar example of governmental apathy and callous indifference to the plight of the citizens subjected to the State’s right of eminent domain. Even on facts, the stand of the appellants that the petitioners’ land had already been acquired in the year 1968 is not borne out on facts. It is a matter of record that the petitioners’ land was taken possession of only in November, 1978. It would not have been so, had the land been acquired already in the year 1968. There is no explanation forthcoming as to why this land was not taken possession of if it had been acquired as part of Sy.No.24/3 of Sultanavalva Village in the year 1968. It is also admitted by the authorities that rents were paid to the petitioners for this land for some time under the provisions of the RAIP Act. Thus, for all practical purposes the appellants proceeded to treat this land as an independent land which was acquired under the provisions of the RAIP Act in the year 1978. The failure, if any, on the part of the petitioners to agitate with regard to non- payment of rents under the RAIP Act does not in any way alter the picture. The additional grounds raised by the appellants are also equally lacking in substance and merit. The authorities are not in a position to demonstrate and establish that the petitioners’ land was in fact acquired in the year 1968. During the course of the contempt proceedings in C.C.No.604 of 1994, this Court directed the authorities to enquire and verify into this aspect and it came to light that the petitioners have no link or relationship with the awardees of the land acquisition in Sy.No.24 of Sultanavalva Village in the year 1968. The authorities failed to establish that the petitioners’ land in Sy.No.148 of Jillalguda Village is the same as the land in Sy.No.24/3 of Sultanavalva Village, said to have been acquired in 1968. It is therefore not open to the appellants to state that this is a simple case of payment of compensation to the wrong persons. It is also not open to the appellants to seek to reopen the settled issues that were the subject matter of W.P.No.4684 of 1987 which have attained finality in the light of the dismissal of the S.L.P. by the Supreme Court. The appellants cannot also be permitted to raise any new plea with regard to ceiling laws in respect of the petitioners’ land at this stage. No foundation has been made out as to whether any proceedings were initiated in respect of these lands under the ceiling laws and the plea of the appellants in this regard is obviously a desperate attempt to grasp at straws. The argument advanced by the learned Government Pleader with regard to the so-called delay in the filing of the writ petition is also equally without merit. It is a matter of record that after the passing of the Award, the petitioners approached this Court by way of C.C.No.604 of 1994 and during the pendency of the said contempt case this writ petition was filed. Further, as rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge the principle of delay and laches is one of practice and not a rule of law. In the light of the admitted facts of this case, where the petitioners had been agitating and fighting for their rights since 1987, they cannot be non-suited merely because of some delay on their part in filing the writ petition. It is due to the adamant attitude of the appellants in claiming ad nauseam that the petitioners’ land had already been acquired, in spite of the same being rejected time and again, that the present situation has arisen where the learned Judge not only directed payment of compensation to the petitioners as per the Award dated 15.11.1993, but also directed reference of their claim under Section 18 of the L.A. Act for enhancement of compensation. The appellants cannot now complain that the order of the learned Judge is not tenable on technicalities. We are therefore of the opinion that there is no lacuna or defect, legal or factual, in the order passed by the learned Judge allowing the writ petition. As pointed out by the learned Judge this is a case which calls for introspection on the part of the authorities as to the manner of their functioning. A pedantic and obdurate approach on the part of the authorities at the cost of the exchequer is not in public interest and requires to be checked. The writ appeal is therefore found utterly lacking in merit. Sri K.Raghuveer Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted at the bar that the compensation payable under the Award dated 15.09.1993 has not been paid to his clients till date. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the directions of the learned single Judge should be complied with within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. ------------------------------ T.MEENA KUMARI, J --------------------------- SANJAY KUMAR, J 1st JULY, 2009 PGS THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO.40 OF 2002 (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar) 1st JULY, 2009