- 1 - IN IN IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.437 OF 1996 APPEAL NO.437 OF 1996 APPEAL NO.437 OF 1996 Vishwas Bhosle ...Appellant vs. 1.Shri Harish Savla 2.Shri Mohd.Saraiya 3.State of Maharashtra ...Respondents Mr.J.C.Satpute with Mr.H.V.Mehta for the appellant Mr.R.B.Paranjape with Mr.Pradeep Kadam for Respondent no.1 Mr.J.P.Yagnik A.P.P. for State CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: A.S.OKA,J. A.S.OKA,J. A.S.OKA,J. DATE DATE DATE : MARCH 3,2009 : MARCH 3,2009 : MARCH 3,2009 ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the Appellant and the learned counsel for the first respondent. 2. The first and second respondents have been prosecuted for the offence punishable under section 135 (1) (a) r/w section 135 (1) (ii) of the Customs Act,1962 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). By the impugned order dated 16th March 1994 the first and second respondents have been acquitted. 3. According to the prosecution case, the first respondent was proceeding towards Dubai by a Panam Airways Flight No.PA-073. The baggage of the first respondent consisted of a suit case bearing a first class tag whereas in the passenger manifest of the said flight, the name of first respondent was - 2 - manifested in the economy class. The first respondent cleared himself through the Immigration and Customs Counter. He gave nil declaration. When he was proceeding towards the security check he was stopped on suspicion at about 3.45 a.m. He was questioned as to whether he was carrying any prohibited or restricted goods. He answered in the negative. The suitcase of the first respondent was opened. A card-board carton wrapped with gift parcel wrapping paper was recovered from the said suitcase. The said carton was opened in presence of panchas. It was revealed that the same contained foreign currency like Saudi and Omani Rials, Bahrein Dinars and U.A.E. Dirhams equivalent to Indian Rs.4,79,050/-. The said foreign currency was seized under the panchanama in the reasonable belief that the first respondent was illegally attempting to export the said currency out of India. It was the case of the prosecution that the first and second respondents were known to each other and they used to meet each other frequently. The allegation is that the first respondent who is a resident of Mulund had gone to the residence of second respondent at Juhu on 15th August 1983 at about 6.30 p.m. The foreign currency seized by the Customs Officers was given by the second respondent to the first respondent. The second respondent had gone to the airport to see off the first respondent. It was alleged that the export of foreign exchange out of India is prohibited by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,1963 - 3 - (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FERA’ Act). The case of the prosecution is that the export of foreign exchange out of India in contravention of the provisions of Section 13(2) of the ‘FERA’ Act amounts to an offence under section 135 (1) (a) of the said Act which is made punishable under section 135 (1) (ii) of the said Act. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken me through the notes of evidence and other material on record. He submitted that though the statements of the first and second respondents recorded under section 108 of the said Act were retracted, the finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge on retraction of the statement is in favour of the appellants. He submitted that unless it is proved that the statements are vitiated either by fraud or mis representation, the same will have to be accepted. He submitted that though the finding of the trial court was that the statements under section 108 of the said Act were retracted only on the basis of the said statements, the accused persons could have been convicted. His submission is that there is clear evidence on record to show that foreign currency was found in the bag carried by the first respondent which was handed over to him by the second respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was enough evidence on record to prove the guilt of the respondents. He submitted that the impugned Judgment and Order is perverse. - 4 - 5. The learned counsel for the first respondent supported the impugned Judgment and Order. He submitted that no interference is called for in an Appeal against acquittal. 6. With a view to appreciate the prosecution case, it will be necessary to refer the evidence of P.W.1 Madan Nathu Mhatre who was an Intelligence Officer of Customs. The material part of his evidence reads thus : "1. In the month of August 1983 I was working a Intelligence Officer and was posted at Sahar Airport. On the night intervening 15th and 16th, I was on duty 10 p.m. to 10 a.m. on next day. Penam Airways flight No.PA-073 arrived at the Airport about 3 a.m. Accused no.1 had booked a passage for Dubai for that flight. The accused No.1 had one suit-case of maroon coloured, bearing a tag of first class. The name of accused no.1 was mentioned in the economic class in the manifest of said Penam Airways. The accused no.1 had cleared the baggage through the Immigration and Customs Counter. He had given nil declaration and was proceeding towards security check prior to boarding the flight. After the security check, the accused no.1, came to customs counter. After the customs check, he was stopped on suspicion by one I, officer Shri S.Y.More. I was present along with More. Two panchas were called. Shri D.G.Diwan Superintendent - 5 - of the Customs was called at the same time. The accused was asked whether he was carrying any contraband and he replied in the negative. The maroon coloured suit-case was opened in the presence of the panchas. The bag was contained on cardboard carton, wrapped in paper which is normally used for parcel. The carton was opened. The accused was again asked, as to whether the carton containing any contraband items and accused replied in the negative. In the presence of the panchas, the carton was opened. In the carton the foreign currency of diffident countries were found. The countries were Dubai, Omni Rials, some Dirhams. The foreign currency valued at Rs.4,79,050/- Indian currency. The accused no.1 did not have permission from the Reserve Bank of India to possess the said currency. Hence, under the reasonable belief that accused no.1 illegally export the foreign currency out of India in contravention of F.E.R Act,1973; the foreign currency was seized under the panchnama by me..." 7. The said witness was cross examined before framing charge as well as after framing charge. In the cross examination he stated that the tag of first class was on the handle of the suitcase of the first respondent. P.W.no.1 stated that he noticed the first class tag was tied with the suit case of the first respondent whereas the name of the first respondent was - 6 - in the economic class. He stated that the baggage identification tag was not tied around the handle of the suit case of the first respondent. 8. P.W.no.2 is Mr.D.G.Diwan who was at the relevant time Superintendent of Customs. He recorded the statement of the first respondent under section 108 of the said Act. 9. P.W.No.3 Mr.Sharad Yeshwant More was at the relevant time Customs Preventing Officer. The material part of his version reads thus : "1...I was keeping a watch at the Departure Hall. At about 3.15 p.m. I noted a suit case on the conveyor belt. It was maroon coloured golden make. It was bearing the baggage-tags of PENAM Airways for the flight No.PA-073. The destination was Dubai. The Sr.number of the passengers was 73 as mentioned on the tags. There was one more baggage tags attached to the same bag, showing that the passenger was travelling by the first class. 2. I took out the said suit case from the conveyor belt and verified the passenger’s manifest of Penam Airways flight No.PA-073. The Sr.number of the 73 of the passenger was shown in the economic class and the name was Savla H.D. I suspected the suit case, as the passenger was - 7 - manifested in the economical class and baggage tags shows first class. I with the help of P.W.1 Mhatre traced out the passenger, who had cleared through the immigration and customs, and was proceeding to security check. The accused no.1 before the court is the same passenger. I call customs Superintendent Diwas P.W.No.2 and appraised him about my suspicion about the brief case and accused no.1. Thereafter the accused no.1 was taken to examination counter. The suit case was already taken to examination counter. We called two panchas. Accused no.1 was asked to identify his suit case. He identified the suit case in presence of panchas..." 10. P.W.no.4 is Hiranand Jamnadas Vajirani who was working as Intelligence Officer at Bombay International Airport at Sahar. He accompanied P.W.1 and P.W. 5 Lalitchandra Suvarna, Superintendent of Customs at the time of the search of the flat of the second respondent. The P.W.No.6 Lalitchandra Suvarna searched the residential flat of the second respondent. 11. It is not in dispute that the accused retracted the statements made under section 108 of the said Act. The question is whether the conviction can be based on the retracted confession under the said Act. On this aspect it will be necessary to refer to the decision of the Apex Court - 8 - in the case of K.I.Pavunny vs.Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin [(1997) 3 S.C.C PAGE 721]. In paragraph 20 of the said Judgment, the Apex Court has held thus : "20. The question then is whether the retracted confessional statement requires corroboration from any other independent evidence. It is seen that the evidence in this case consists of the confessional statement, the recovery panchnama and the testimony of PWs 2,3 and 5. It is true that in a trial and proprio vigore in a criminal trial, courts are required to marshal the evidence. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence may consist of direct evidence, confession or circumstantial evidence. In a criminal trial punishable under the provisions of the IPC it is now well settled legal position that confession can from the sole basis for conviction. If it is retracted, it must first be tested whether confession is voluntary and truthful inculpating the accused in the commission of the crime. Confession is one of the species of admission dealt with under sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and section 164 of the Code. It is an admission against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some of these provisions. If a confession is proved by unimpeachable - 9 - evidence and if it is of voluntary nature, it when retracted, is entitled to high degree of value as its maker is likely to face the consequences of confession by a statement affecting his life, liberty or property. Burden is on the accused to prove that the statement was obtained by threat, duress or promise like any other person as was held in Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Punjab (AIR para 30. If it is established from that record or circumstances that the confession is shrouded with suspicious features, then it falls in the realm of doubt. The burden of proof on the accused is not as high as on the prosecution. If the accused is able to prove the facts creating reasonable doubt that the confession was not voluntary or it was obtained by threat, coercion or inducement etc., the burden would be on the prosecution to prove that that confession was made by the accused voluntarily. If the court believes that the confession was voluntary and believes it to be true, then there is no legal bar on the court for ordering conviction. However, the rule of prudence and practice does require that the court seeks corroboration of the retracted confession from other evidence. The confession must be one inculpating the accused in the crime. It is not necessary that each fact or circumstance contained in the confession is separately or independently corroborated. It is enough if it receives general corroboration. The - 10 - burden is not as high as in the case of an approver or an accomplice in which case corroboration is required on material particulars of the prosecution case. Each case would, therefore, require to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances in which the confession came to be made and whether or not it was voluntary and true. These require to be tested in the light of a given set of facts. The high decree of proof and probative value is insisted in capital offences." In paragraph 25 the Apex Court has held thus : "25. It would thus be seen that there is no prohibition under the Evidence Act to rely upon the retracted confession to prove the prosecution case or to make the same basis for conviction of the accused. Practice and prudence require that the court could examine the evidence adduced by the prosecution to find out whether there are any other facts and circumstances to corroborate the retracted confession. It is not necessary that there should be corroboration from independent evidence adduced by the prosecution to corroborate each detail contained in the confessional statement. The court is required to examine whether the confessional statement is voluntary; in other words, whether it was not obtained by threat, - 11 - duress or promise. If the court is satisfied from the If the court is satisfied from the If the court is satisfied from the evidence evidence evidence that it was voluntary, then it is required to that it was voluntary, then it is required to that it was voluntary, then it is required to examine examine examine whether the statement is true. If the court on whether the statement is true. If the court on whether the statement is true. If the court on examination examination examination of the evidence finds that the retracted of the evidence finds that the retracted of the evidence finds that the retracted confession confession confession is true, that part of the inculpatory portion is true, that part of the inculpatory portion is true, that part of the inculpatory portion could could could be relied upon to base the conviction. However, be relied upon to base the conviction. However, be relied upon to base the conviction. However, prudence prudence prudence and practice require that the court would seek and practice require that the court would seek and practice require that the court would seek assurance assurance assurance getting corroboration from other evidence getting corroboration from other evidence getting corroboration from other evidence adduced adduced adduced by the prosecution. by the prosecution. by the prosecution." (emphasis added) 12. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court it is very clear that if the court on examination of the evidence finds that the retraction confession was proved, the part of the statement which is inculpatory could be relied upon to base the conviction. However, prudence and practice requires the court to seek corroboration from the other evidence adduced by the prosecution. Therefore, once the confessional statement under section 108 of the said Act is retracted, the conviction cannot be based only on the statement under section 108 of the said Act. 13. In the light of this legal position, a reference will have to be made to the evidence on record and to the findings recorded by the trial Judge. The learned Judge held that held - 12 - that the only evidence against the second respondent was the statement of the first respondent under section 108 of the said Act. 14. He found that the evidence of P.W.nos.1 and 3 as regards seizure of cash was inconsistent. the P.W.No.1 stated that the bag was taken from the first respondent and the other witness stated that the bag was seized from the conveyor belt. In fact, the P.W.No.1 denied the correctness of the suggestion that the bag was not found with the first respondent. The P.W.No.3 stated that he traced out the passenger i.e. the first respondent with the help of the P.W.No.1. Therefore, the aforesaid discrepancy was very material. The P.W.no.3 in his cross examination stated as under : "....It is true that boarding card is given to the passenger on the counter where he tenders his ticket. It is indicated in the board card as to in which class the passenger has to travel. It is also correct to say that the baggage is then collected by Air Lines Staff and put on the conveyer belt. It is thereafter sent to the Air craft. It is removed by the employee of the air lines. The passenger is not concerned with the checked in the baggage till he reaches his destination..." He admitted that the key of the seized bag was not found with - 13 - the first respondent. Most importantly the P.W.no.1 admitted that the first class baggage identification tag attached to the bag was not bearing the name of the passenger sent number or ticket number. 15. The learned Trial Judge has observed thus : "18...It has come in the evidence of the prosecution witness that there was one economy class tag on the suitcase in which foreign currency is alleged to have been found and that another tag was of first class. The prosecution has not led any evidence to show as to how the two baggage tags come to be found on the suitcase. The airticket produced in the court bears only one baggage identification tag that is of economy class. The prosecution has not adduced cogent and trustworthy evidence to co-relate the suitcase in which foreign currency was found with the accused no.1..." 16. Thus, there is no material on record to draw any corroboration to the statement under section 108 of the said Act. 17. At this stage a submission is made by the learned counsel for the appellant that an application made by the appellant for issuing warrant to the certain witnesses was erroneously - 14 - rejected by order dated 7th March 1994. He submitted that only on this ground the order of remand may be passed by permitting the appellant to lead additional evidence. The incident is of the year 1983. The Appeal is of the year 1996. Now at this stage in the year 2009,it will be unjust to send back the matter for leading further evidence of the prosecution. Therefore, prayer for remand cannot be acceded to , considering the peculiar facts that the incident has taken place 25 years back. 18. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge are on the appreciation of evidence and documents on record. Even assuming that the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant are accepted, it can be said at highest that another view could have been taken. However, this is no ground for interference in an appeal against acquittal. 19. Thus, the view taken by the learned Magistrate is certainly a possible view. No case is made out for interference. There are no compelling reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal. 20. Hence, the Appeal is accordingly dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE