R.S.A. No.1008 of 2008 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH REGULAR SECOND APPEAL No.1008 of 2008 DATE OF DECISION: 7 th APRIL, 2011 Balwinder Kaur .... Appellant Versus Jasbir Kaur and others .... Respondents CORAM :- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. N. MITTAL. PRESENT: Mr. B. R. Mahajan, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Anil Chawla, Advocate for respondent No.3. * * * * L.N. MITTAL, J. (ORAL) Plaintiff Balwinder Kaur having been partly successful in both the courts below has filed the instant second appeal. Case of the plaintiff-appellant is that Bawa Singh agreed to sell the suit property to Arjun Singh vide agreement to sell dated 20.06.1980 for Rs.1000/- and also delivered possession thereof to Arjun Singh and received the entire sale consideration and executed agreement dated 20.06.1980. However both Bawa Singh and Arjun Singh have since died. Plaintiff and defendants No.5 to 7 are heirs of Arjun Singh whereas defendants No.1 to 4 are heirs of Bawa Singh. Original agreement has been lost on account of death of Arjun Singh. However, there is entry of the agreement in the register of deed writer, who scribed it. Arjun Singh was in possession of the suit property and after his death, plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. Sale deed was to be executed within one month after getting permission from competent authority. R.S.A. No.1008 of 2008 -2- Arjun Singh always remained ready and willing to perform his part of contract but Bawa Singh did not obtain necessary permission from the competent authority nor executed the sale deed. Now there is no necessity to obtain permission from the competent authority, but still defendants No.1 to 4 refused to execute the sale deed pursuant to the agreement. Accordingly, plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of the impugned agreement to sell and also for permanent injunction. Defendants No.1,2 and 4 broadly denied the plaintiff's allegations and pleaded that defendant No.1 and 2 are in possession of the suit property. Various other pleas were also raised. Defendant No.3 also filed similar written statement. Subsequently the defendants did not appear and were proceeded ex parte. Learned Civil judge (Junior Division), Amritsar vide judgment and decree dated 03.01.2007 partly decreed the plaintiff's suit for permanent injunction restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from interfering in possession of the plaintiff over the suit property and from dispossessing her therefrom illegally and forcibly except in due course of law. However, suit for execution of the sale deed on the basis of impugned agreement has been dismissed as time barred. First appeal preferred by the plaintiff has been dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar vide judgment and decree dated 31.08.2007. Feeling aggrieved, plaintiff has filed the instant second appeal. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that suit for specific performance of the impugned agreement cannot be said to be time barred because no time was fixed in the agreement for performance thereof and, R.S.A. No.1008 of 2008 -3- therefore, according to Article 54 of the Schedule to the limitation Act, 1963, limitation period for seeking the said relief commenced when plaintiff had knowledge of refusal of the performance. Reliance in support of this contention has been placed on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gunwantbhai Mulchan Shah & Ors. Versus Anton Elis Farel & Ors., 2006(2) RCR (Civil) 251. I have carefully considered the aforesaid contention but find the same to be unacceptable. The alleged agreement is dated 20.06.1980 whereas the suit was filed on 01.06.2004 i.e. almost 24 years after the agreement was executed. The plaintiff's case is that permission under the Urban Land Ceiling Act (in short the Act) was to be obtained by Bawa Singh for executing the sale deed and within one month of the said permission, the sale deed was to be executed. However, the said Act was repealed in the year 1999. Consequently, after repeal of the Act, there was no necessity of seeking any such permission for execution of the sale deed and plaintiff immediately became entitled to get the sale deed executed in terms of the agreement. Consequently, limitation period started running at least since the date when the Act was repealed. However, even thereafter, the suit was not filed within the limitation period of three years. Consequently, the suit has been rightly held to be barred by limitation. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for determination in the instant second appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. (L. N. MITTAL) JUDGE 7th April, 2011 'raj'