HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR.M.P. N0. 76 OF 2009 PETITIONER RESPONDENTS Lakhanlal Agrawal, S/o. Chandulal Agarwal, aged about 65 years, R/o. Baradwar, Tahsil-Sakti Distt. Janjgir-Champa (CG) Versus Kailash Kumar Agrawal, S/o. Devishahaya Aganval, aged about 54 years, R/o. Baradwar, Tahsil- Sakti, Distt. Janjgir-Champa (CG) State of Chhattisgarh, Through Sub Divisional Officer Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (CG) PETITION UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 1973 Appearance : Ms. Sharmila Singhai, counsel for the petitioner. Shri Sunil Otwani, counsel for respcndent No.l. Shri Sandeep Yadav, Govt. Advocatd for the State/respondent No.2. c ORAL ORDER (02.03.2009) SUNIL KUMAR SINHA, J. Heard. This petition has been filed underSection 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order dated 21.02.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (CG) in a criminal revision whereby the said Court declined to entertain the revision filed against the order dated 01/09/2007 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sakti in Cr.Case No. 54/2008 under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the attachment of the property in dispute. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti has held that since ,the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 146(1) of the Code (^. CR.M.P.NO. 76 OF 2009 of Criminal Procedure was an interlocutory order, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the revision would not be maintainable. c Learned counsel argues that an order passed under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding attachment of the property by the concerned Magistrate, was not an interlocutory order and a revision filed under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was maintainable against the said order. In the matter of Keshavprasad Bhatt Vs. Rameschandra^ 1990 Cri.L.J. 1541, a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held as follows : An order passed under S. 146 (1), Cr.P.C. attaching properly and appointing receiver is not an "interlocutory orderw within meaning of 8.397(2) and revision against same is maintainable. When the Magistrate passes an order under Sec. 146(1) that order deal finally with rights of parties with regard to the subject matter of the dispute in so far as immediate possession thereof is concerned although the order may be of such duration as is statutorily specified. Those who raise or are concerned with the dispute are debarred from dealing with the attached property in any manner; those claiming to be in possession or claiming to have been forcibly dispossessed on the relevant date are evidently affected seriously by that order. As a result of attachment, even for the specified duration, the nature of the property of subject of the disputer undergoes material change as the property custodia legis. The effect of the order extends not only to existing possession of, but also to right of any of parties to the proceeding under Sec. 145 to possess, the disputed property. In that respect the scope of the order under Sec. 146(1) is wider and its effect is more pervrasive. Because, Sec. 145 expressly debars in the enquiry thereunder any reference to the merits of claims as to rights of any parties to possess the subject of the dispute. The mere fact that the Magistrate may withdraw at any tirae the attachment order when there is no longer any likelihood ofbreach ofthe peace does not, make the order a "temporary?? one and it cannot also be said that it does not affect substantive rights of any parties concerned in the dispute during the period when subject of the dispute remains attached. "Possession" is a substantive right and that right or claim to that right of the parties concerned is substantially affected by that order. And, further, the label <<teinporary?? would be doing violence to the language of the proviso and of the main enactment and importantly, also, to the object of the Chapter itself. -3~ CR.M.P.NO. 76 OF 2009 Emergency powers in the very nature of things can and do provide adhoc treatment and tinkering of civil rights of the parties can only be of "temporary" nature. That would not minimize the effect of an order passed to contain emergency situation as infraction would still be there though that may be lost for specified duration. The order negatively settles rights of parties entitled to possession of the subject matter of the dispute by debarring them from interfering with Court's possession of that on attachment. The unspecified duration of that order buttresses rather the severity of the infraction. It will indeed be wrong to presume that duration to be either long or short as facts of each case would be different. Similarly, it would also be wrong to assume that in every case the Magistrate will exercise the discretion vested in him under the proviso to Sec. 146(1). What is uniinpeachable is that the moment he passes the order and attaches the property, the right of parties to possess the same are frozen and remain so auntil a competent court has determined the rights/? as a consequence of the order, there will arise occasion to decide many questions which await till such a decision is rendered. The power of revision contemplated under Sec. 397 (1) is curtailed by sub-section (2) with the object purely of ensuring that pending enquiries, trial and other proceedings do not suffer protraction. Denial of the right of revision against an order passed under Sec. 146(1) would not obviously fulfill that object. There can be no question of proceeding whether under Sec. 145 or under Sec. 146, suffering any delay in disposal on account of the order passed under Sec. 146(1). Hence revision against such order is not barred by Section 397(2). I am in complete agreement with the views taken by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court and hold that an order passed under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure attaching property and appointing receiver is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, the revision against the said order would be inaintainable. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Janjgir (CG) is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the said Court for deciding the revision afresh after giving due opportunity of hearing to both the parties in accordance with law. Sd/- Sunil Kumar Sinha Judge ^ ^- •^