1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. WRIT PETITION NO. 3072 OF 2008 (Dattatraya Shankarrao Mahakalkar .v. State of Maharashtra and others) Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram appearances, Court's orders or directions Court's or Judge's Orders and Registrar's orders. CORAM : D.D. SINHA AND PRASANNA B. VARALE, JJ. 13TH AUGUST, 2008 Heard Smt. Neeta Jog, the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is directed against the order dated 21.02.2008 passed by the Tribunal whereby the original application filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed. The following facts are not in dispute. That, the petitioner was appointed as “Mishrak” in the respondent/Department on 10.10.1974 and at the relevant time his date of birth which was recorded in the office record was 16.07.1947. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner, in the year 2001, came to know from his uncle that his date of birth is 03.10.1949 and not 16.07.1947 and, therefore, submitted application in the year 2001 for correcting the date of birth. It is contended that the said application was rejected by the department and, therefore, the petitioner approached the Tribunal 2 against the said order. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the said original application was rejected by the Tribunal and, therefore, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition bearing No. 4550/2005 before this Court which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 29.11.2005, by quashing the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that after the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal, the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the department and again referred the matter back to the department for reconsideration of the application of the petitioner which was submitted in the year 2001 for change of date of birth on its own merit according to law. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondent/Department, by giving same reason, rejected the application of the petitioner and, therefore, once again the petitioner approached the Tribunal which has dismissed the original application by passing impugned order. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that insofar as the delay in moving the 3 application for change of date of birth is concerned, this aspect was earlier considered by this Court and allowed the writ petition, matter was remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. If that is so, it was not open for the department to reject the application on the ground of delay and, therefore, the order passed by the department as well as the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, both are unsustainable in law. Considered the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is no doubt true that on the earlier occasion, the petitioner has approached this Court and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the issue. However, it is well settled that so far as the change of date of birth is concerned, the employee is entitled to do so if there is no specific rule to move an application within the reasonable time from the date on which such employee is appointed in the government department. It is also well settled that at the fag end of the career, it is not permissible for the employee to move an application for change of date of birth. In the instant case, apart from the inordinate delay which is caused in moving the application for change of date of birth, there are other reasons given by the department as well as by the Tribunal as to why the certificate submitted by the 4 petitioner in respect of his date of birth cannot be accepted. In that view of the matter, there is no case made out for showing indulgence. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE *rrg.