IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.2895 of 1997 GOPAL SINGH YADAV, son of late Jagdeo Rai, retired Clerk (of the Directorate of Treasuries) of the Sub-Treasury, Patna City, under Patna Treasury, a resident of Banksmen Colony, Chitragupta Nagar, P.O. Chitragupt Nagar, District- Patna. …… Petitioner. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR. 2. The Accountant General, Bihar, Patna. 3. The Secretary to Government, Finance Department, Bihar, Patna. 4. The Director of Treasuries, Bihar, Patna. …… Respondents. ----------- 05- 28.9.2010 Heard Mr. Ram Ashish Singh for the petitioner, Mr. Shankar Kumar, learned Assistant Counsel to Additional Advocate General No.5 for respondent nos.1, 3 and 4, and Mr. Rakesh Kumar Singh for respondent no.2. The petitioner seeks a direction to the respondent authorities to grant him the benefits of first time-bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1981, and the benefits of second time-bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1986. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this writ petition may be indicated. The petitioner had joined the services of the Bihar Government, and worked in the Patna Collectorate from 22.4.1959, as a Lower Division Clerk. In view of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission, the Government of Bihar 2 issued resolution dated 30.12.1981 (Annexure-1), whereby its employees, both gazetted as well as non-gazetted, were granted the benefits of the first time-bound promotion and the second time-bound promotion as per the details of the directions indicated in paragraph 11 of the resolution. It was enforced with effect from 1.4.1981. According to the scheme, the petitioner claims to be entitled to the benefits of first time-bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1981. The State Government thereafter issued orders stipulating therein that, subject to the details of the scheme, an employee shall be required to pass Hindi Noting and Drafting examination with effect from 29.4.1985, in order to enable him to obtain any promotion. The petitioner‟s further case is that, in view of paragraph 11 of the resolution, he was entitled to the benefits of the second time-bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1986. The petitioner superannuated from the services of the Bihar Government on 31.1.1996. He lodged the present writ petition on 21.3.1997. 3. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It appears to us that the petitioner seems to have raised the issues for the first time in the present writ 3 petition. There is no material on record to show that he had raised the issues while in service, and was either rejected by the authorities or suffered inaction at their hands. The petitioner seems to be raising a stale claim and it is not possible for this Court to entertain the same. 4. In spite of repeated queries, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to explain at all the reasons for this enormous delay. The writ petition suffers from unexplained delay, laches, negligence and acquiescence. It is relevant to state that the benefits of first time-bound promotion and the second time-bound promotion as per paragraph 11 of the resolution are not automatic. There is an element of selection. It is difficult to entertain such a belated writ petition raising such a stale claim. 5. The following portion of the book by Fali S. Nariman, entitled „India‟s legal system: Can it be saved‟, is also relevant in the present context: “More than one hundred years ago, a law member in the Government of India (Hobhouse) recorded in a minute dated 5 September 1872 (on the Bill leading to the Privy Council Appeal Act, 1874) the following observations: In considering what limit should be assigned to the power of appealing, our leading maxim is, that it is the interest of the 4 commonwealth to have and end of law suits. No man has a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes. The State‟s duty is discharged when it has provided such a reasonable amount of attention and skill and honesty as will satisfy reasonable men that their causes have been decided, erroneously or otherwise, on the merits, and according to the best a ability of the judge, and so will prevent them from feeling that resentment of sheer injustice which drives people to take the law into their hands and to wage private war. Upon this principle all laws place some limits to litigation. And so have we placed limits to the power of appealing. Pithily put, and elegantly phrased. The portion about no man having a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wished was quoted by Justice Gajendragadkar (who later became Chief Justice of India) in one of the early reports of the Law Commission of India, but despite what was so wisely said by Mr. Hobhouse and again by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, our laws continue to provide (by way of appeals, reviews and revisions) unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get private affairs ultimately settled. For instance, we have now abolished second appeals, and yet lawyers go on arguing endlessly about the maintainability of intra-court appeals under special laws.” 6. We are reminded of the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Bibek Debroy in his book entitled „In the Dock: Absurdities of Indian Law‟, that the pending litigations in this Country without any addition thereto, will take 324 5 years for disposal. These observations were made more than two decades ago, and the situation has further deteriorated. One Judge perhaps of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in one of his speeches recently has made observations that it will now take 350 years or so to dispose of the pending cases. 7. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. (S K Katriar, J.) (Birendra Prasad Verma, J.) S.K.Pathak/