IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN THURSDAY, THE 27TH MAY 2010 / 6TH JYAISHTA 1932 FAO.No. 3 of 2010() ------------------- ORDER DATED 13/11/2009 IN IA 5833/2009 IN OS.31/2009 of VI ADDL.DISTRICT COURT, ERNAKULAM .................... APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS ----------------------------------------------------- 1. A.P.SHAJAHAN,AGED 40 YEARS, S/O.A.P.HAMEED,AYIKKAPADATH HOUSE,KANJIRAMUKKU.PO, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,KERALA. 2. A.P.AKBAR,AGED 38 YEARS,S/O.A.P.HAMEED, AYIKKAPADATH HOUSE, KANJIRAMUKKU.P.O,MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,KERALA. 3. A.P.ANWAR,AGED 33 YEARS, S/O.A.P.HAMEED,AYIKKAPADATH HOUSE,KANJIRAMUKKU.PO, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,KERALA. 4. A.SALIM,AGED 42 YEARS,S/O.A.P.HAMEED, AYIKKAPADATH HOUSE,KANJIRAMUKKU.P.O,MALAPPURAM DISRICT,KERALA. 5. M/S GULF BROTHERS HAIR FIXING,PUTHUSSERY BUILDING,NEAR JAWAHARLAL NEHRU INTERNATIONAL STADIUM,DESHABHIMANI JUNCTION,ERNAKULAM.REP.BY ITS PROPRIETOR. A.SALIM. 6. M/S GULF BROTHERS HAIR FIXING,3D FLOOR, POTTEKKATTU BUILDING NEAR PARAMEKKAVU TEMPLE, ROUND EAST,THRISSUR,REP;BY ITS PROPRIETOR A SALIM. 7. M/S GULF BROTHERS HAIR FIXING,2ND FLOOR, BHARATH TOWERS,OPP.KSRTC BUS STAND,CHINNAKKADA, KOLLAM,REP;BY ITS PROPREITOR A.SALIM. 8. M/S GULF BROTHERS HAIR FIXING,EDAPPAL- CHUNKAM,OPP.PETROL PUMP,THRISSUR ROAD,EDAPPAL, MALAPPURAM,REP;BY ITS PROPRIETOR A SALIM. FAO.3/10 2 9. M/S GULF BROTHERS HAIR FIXING, NEAR KSRTC BUS STAND,PERUMBA,PAYYANNOOR,REP;BY ITS PROPRIETOR,A.SALIM. 10. M/S GULF BROTHER HAIR FIXING, RNP BUILDING,SHASTAMANGALAM ROAD,VELLAYAMBALAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-10. REP; BY ITS PROPRIETOR, A SALIM. 11. M/S GULF BROTHERS HAIR FIXING,SOBHA TOWER OPP.ASMA TOWER MAVOOR ROAD,KOZHIKODE. BY ADV. SRI.S.SREEKUMAR SRI.JIJO PAUL SRI.P.MARTIN JOSE SRI.P.PRIJITH RESPONDENT(S): RESPONDENTS /PLAINTIFFS -------------------------------------- 1. M/S GULF GATE HAIR FIXING PVT.LTD.W-5/ 3075,C-4,INTERCITY ARCADE,NEAR BHIMA JEWELLARY, MAVOOR ROAD,KOZHIKODE,HAVING ITS BRANCH OFFICE AND PLACE OF BUSINESS AT MUNDETH BUILDING,NEAR A.J.HALL,KADAVANTHRA ROAD, KALOOR,ERNAKULAM,REP;BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER MR.K.M.SUBHASH). 2. MR.A.P.SAKEER HUSSAIN,AGED 38 YEARS, S/O.A.P.HAMEED,W5/3075,C-24,INTERCITY ARCADE,NEAR BHIMA JEWELLERY,MAVOOR ROAD,KOZHIKODE,CHAIRMAN AND M.D,OF M/S GULF GATE HAIR FIXING PVT.LTD MAVOOR ROAD,KOZHIKODE,HAVING ITS BRANCH OFFICE AND PLACE OF BUSINESS AT NUNDETH BUILDINGS,ERNAKULM. ADV. SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU SRI.JAGAN GEORGE SRI.P.G.PRAMOD SRI.KANDAMPULLY RAHUL THIS FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDERS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 27/05/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING: THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN & S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN, JJ. ------------------------------------------- F.A.O.No.3 OF 2010 ------------------------------------------- Dated this the 27th day of May, 2010 JUDGMENT Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan, J. 1. The defendants in a suit filed under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 challenge an order of temporary injunction issued by the court of first instance. 2. The second plaintiff is the Chairman and Managing Director of first plaintiff, a private limited company. He and defendants 1 to 4 are brothers. All of them, including their proprietary concerns and the first plaintiff company are involved in providing the service of hair fixing and allied services. In 2007, the plaintiffs obtained Ext.A2 registration of trade mark in India. Thereafter, controversies arose regarding the use of the marks in relation to the business. The plaintiffs sued the defendants. FAO.3/10 2 3.The court below found that the services being rendered by the plaintiffs and the defendants, the techniques adopted by them and the area of the human body where the techniques are applied are the same. It is also held that the defendants do not dispute Ext.A2 certificate of registration of trade mark granted to the plaintiffs and the fact that such registration was granted to the second plaintiff. It was also noticed that the defendants do not have a case that they have any legal authority to use the trade mark and name registered in the name of the second plaintiff. 4. The court below took a prima facie stock of the materials produced by both sides and noticed that the trade mark registered in favour of the second plaintiff as per Ext.A2 is “Gulf Gate Hair Fixing” and that the names in which the defendants are running business is identical with the registered trade mark of the plaintiffs and it is deceptively similar to their trade mark. The defendants' contention that their logo “Gulf Brothers” is totally different from the FAO.3/10 3 plaintiffs' logo did not appeal to the court below. Taking note of the decision of the Apex Court in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satys Deo & Others [AIR 1963 S 449], a case in which the concept of deception and deceptive similarity were considered, as also a couple of other decisions having bearing on the point, the court below granted an order of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. 5. In support of this appeal, it is argued on behalf of the defendants/appellants that though Section 15 of the Act provides for registration of parts of trademarks, the plaintiffs have not obtained any such registration and Ext.A2 registration is only of a logo as a whole and in the absence of segregation of the different words of that logo and separate registration in terms of Section 15, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim infringement of trade mark. In furtherance of this argument, it is pointed out that the entitlement for injunction would lie only under sub-section 5 of Section 29 of the Act and an injunction could be issued only if it is shown FAO.3/10 4 that the business concerns of the defendants deal with services using a trade name or mark as registered in favour of the second plaintiff. It is further argued that the effect of registration of parts of a mark are those enumerated in Section 17 of the Act and in view of that, the plaintiffs cannot claim any exclusive right regarding any part of the trade mark other than the mark as registered as per Ext.A2. It is further argued that the word “Gulf” and also the word “Gate” are words of common usage and no particular right could be sought for in relation to those words. The decision of the Apex Court in Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Ltd. v. S.L.Vaswani & Another [(2010) 2 SCC 142] is cited in support of that contention. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/ plaintiffs argued that the court below having adverted to the materials on record and having come to the conclusion that the business of the plaintiffs and the defendants are nothing but providing the same type of services and because the court FAO.3/10 5 below has found the names used by the defendants as deceptively similar to that of the trade mark of the plaintiffs, there is no reason warranting interference in an appeal against an order of temporary injunction which has been granted as an equitable remedy in exercise of discretion. He points out that the finding of the court below cannot be criticised as totally perverse or unavailable on record or that those findings are wholly wrong on the basis of the materials. He further stated that on factual backdrop, Ext.B2 which evidenced a labour contract and also the fact that the plaintiffs had even obtained a protective order from the competent court in UAE go a long way to sustain the impugned order. 7.In Skyline (supra), among other things, the Apex court firmly laid down as principle of law, that once the court of first instance exercised its discretion to grant or refuse the relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the materials placed FAO.3/10 6 before the court of first instance and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter, even if it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity. This was so laid as the ratio deducible from the different precedents referred to in that case. 8.The bench mark for deciding the appeal in hand, having been noticed as above, adverting to the facts of the case in hand, it needs to be noted that the activity being carried on by both the sides is the same; the methodology adopted and the services rendered are the same. The parties are brothers. In this context, it needs to be emphasised that the large chunk business at one time was or is in the gulf countries. Therefore, the use of the word “Gulf” or “Gulf Gate” in relation to hair fixing, that too, by the brothers of the second plaintiff, would prima facie tend to impress upon the FAO.3/10 7 public that the establishments belong to the same entrepreneur. That part of the public which would seek the assistance for such services would definitely be lured to believe that the establishments are one and the same. Section 29(2)(b) of the Act provides that a registered trade mark is infringed when a non permitted user of a mark in the course of trade is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public because of its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the registered trade mark. The identity and similarity of some of the services being covered by the registered trade mark with the goods or services being extended by the defendants cannot be disputed. In fact, there is no dispute on that issue. If that were so, the only issue is as to whether the use of the word “Gulf” or “Gulf Gate” is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public who would be looking out for an establishment that could give them the service of hair fixing. In this context, a group of brothers, by blood, running parallel business of the same nature of which is run by FAO.3/10 8 another brother, only adds to the gravity of the deception that could occur by reason of the confusion as to the identity of the proprietor of the activity. In that view of the matter, we do not find any illegality or unreasonableness in the appreciation of evidence by the court below, holding that the plaintiffs have established a strong prima facie case. Having so held, the balance of convenience and irreparable injury also could be answered only in favour of the plaintiffs because undisputedly, the plaintiffs have a registered trade mark, Ext.A2 registration, standing in the name of the second plaintiff. 9.Blood is stated to be thicker than water. That is a quote from the twentieth century or before. May be, in the twenty first century, wealth is thicker than blood. 10.With the aforesaid, the questions of severable registration under Section 15 and of the sequence of registration of a trade mark referable to Section 17 do not require to be FAO.3/10 9 considered because we have taken the view that even without severable registration, the finding of the court below that the names used by the defendants are similar to the names used by the plaintiffs stands. 11.This leaves yet another point for consideration. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that by virtue of section 34, there is a saving of vested rights referable to prior user. On the basis of materials, there was nothing for the court below to hold that there was any prior user or any sustained vested right in favour of the defendants before the plaintiffs commenced their operations in Kerala and before Ext.A2 registration was granted. 12.Before parting, we hasten to add that the observations herein lead only to the conclusion that the impugned order does not warrant interference in an appeal as the decision of the court below is only on an application for temporary injunction and this judgment confirms that order. The court FAO.3/10 10 below will try the suit untrammelled by anything contained in the impugned order as also in this judgment. Subject to the aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed. No costs. 13. We record the request of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the court below would consider expediting the suit for final decision. Needless to say that such matters would be given appropriate priority in view of the principle regarding priority in IPR matters. The court below will, therefore, consider any request that the plaintiffs may make for early disposal of the suit. Both parties agree that they will co-operate with the trial so that the matter can be disposed of at least within a period of six months. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN, Judge. Sd/- S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN, Judge. kkb.28/05.