1 mst IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.3025 OF 2001 Tata Finance Ltd. and others Applicants versus Hitechi Jewellery Ind. Ltd. and others Respondents Shakuntala Joshi for applicants. Y.M.Nakhawa, APP for the State. CORAM : A.S.OKA, J. DATE : 29th June 2009 JUDGEMENT :- 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The applicants have been arraigned as accused nos.1 and 11 in a private complaint filed by the first respondent. The complaint has been filed alleging commission of offence under section 420, 465, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code against the applicants and 4th to 12th respondents. On the said complaint an order was passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 4th July 2001 directing that the complaint be sent to the concerned Police Officer for investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Code") 2. The allegation made by the first respondent in the complaint is that 2 in July 1998 the representative of the first applicant (applicant no.2 - accused no.11) approached the first respondent company and met its Directors. According to the case of the first respondent, the second applicant represented to the Directors of the first respondent that finance could be made available by the first applicant for the purchase of cars. According to the case of the first respondent, the applicant no.1 company dominated the will of the Directors of the first respondent to sign on various documents in respect of two vehicles namely Mercedes and TATA Sierra. According to the case of the first respondent, it's Directors signed various blank documents of the first applicant. It is stated in the complaint that the first respondent delivered post dated blank cheques to the first applicant. It is stated that the first respondent got delivery of TATA Sierra vehicle and on the date of filing of the complaint the total amount of Rs. 2,55,486/- has been paid by the first respondent to the first applicant company. The allegation is that though a commitment was made earlier, the first applicant did not supply a set of photocopies of various documents. It is contended that the agreements executed between the first applicant and first respondent does not bears the dates and other particular. 3. The allegation in the complaint is that on 10th October 2000 four persons arrived at the premises of the first respondent at Bhayandar and tried to take forcible possession of TATA Sierra vehicle. It is alleged that when the Director of the first respondent resisted, the said four persons used abusive and threatening language. Therefore, the Director of the 3 first respondent rushed to the Police Station and lodged complaint. It is alleged that on 11th October 2009 the said persons arrived in a jeep and kept a watch on the movements of the family members of the Directors. As there was a threat that the first applicant will take possession of the TATA Sierra vehicle, the first respondent filed a civil suit and prayed for an injunction restraining the first applicant from taking over possession of the vehicle. The allegation in the complaint is that all the documents were executed by the first respondent by putting signatures on blank places indicated. Thus, in substance, the allegation in the complaint is that the applicants and other accused have fraudulently and dishonestly induced the first respondent to sign upon the blank spaces on the documents knowing fully well that the said act is likely to cause damage to the property of the first respondent. 4. It must be stated here that on 21st September 2001 this Court issued Rule and stayed the further investigation on the basis of impugned order dated 04th July 2001. 5. The prayer for quashing is made on various grounds. The first ground is that on plain reading of the averments made in the complaint no case was made out of commission of any cognizable offence. It is pointed out that the civil suit filed by the first respondent-complainant was disposed of on the ground that the dispute between the first respondent and the first applicant has been referred to the Arbitrator. The sole arbitrator made an award on 30th May 2001 directing the first respondent- 4 complainant to pay hire charges along with interest to the first applicant and also directed the first respondent to deliver possession of Mercedes car within a period of fifteen days. Reliance has also been placed on order dated 13th June 2001 passed in Arbitration Petition No.60 of 2001 in exercise of powers under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. By the said order Receiver was appointed in respect of the vehicles in question with a direction to appoint first respondent as an agent of the Receiver subject to paying monthly installments in pursuance of the hire purchase agreement. It is pointed out that subsequently the Receiver has sold the vehicles. None appears for the first respondent. 6. On plain reading of the complaint filed by the first respondent it appears to be an admitted position that the first respondent availed of loan facility granted by the first applicant for the purposes of acquiring the vehicles. A suit for an injunction was filed by the first respondent seeking to restrain the first applicant from taking over possession of the vehicles. The suit has been dismissed. There is already an arbitration award made against the first respondent. In terms of the order passed by this Court in a petition under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, now the vehicles have been possessed and sold. 7. Taking the averments made in the complaint as it is, no case of commission of any cognizable offence has been made out. Apart from all this, now the civil suit of the first respondent has been dismissed. There is already an arbitral award made directing the first respondent to pay the 5 hire charges with interest and to deliver the possession of cars. The Court Receiver was appointed by this court in proceedings under section 9 of the said Act of 1996 who took the possession of the said vehicles and later on sold the said vehicles. 8. There was no warrant for the Magistrate to issue a direction under section 156(3) of the said Code of 1973. In the circumstances, the application must succeed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). Hence, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). (A.S.OKA, J.)