( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 3594 OF 2008 Dhule Municipal Corporation, through Municipal Commissioner, Dhule Municipal Corporation, Dhule. PETITIONER VERSUS Pushpabai Shankarrao Thombare, R/o House No. 32, Milind Housing Society, Kumar Nagar, Taluka and District Dhule. RESPONDENT ..... Mr. S.P. Shah, advocate for the petitioner. Mr. P.S. Patil, advocate for the respondent. ..... [CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] [DATE OF JUDGEMENT RESERVED : 24th February, 2010] [DATE OF JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED : 9th March, 2010] JUDGEMENT : 1. By this petition, the petitioner challenges judgement and order dated 7th March, 2008 rendered by Member, Industrial Court, Dhule, in revision application ( 2 ) (ULP) No. 14/2007 whereby judgement and order of Labour Court, Dhule in complaint (ULP) No. 49/2005 was confirmed. The Labour Court allowed the complaint (ULP) No. 49/2005 filed by the respondent seeking her reinstatement and absorption in service with continuity. 2. The respondent filed complaint (ULP) No. 49/2005 in the Labour Court, Dhule alleging that the petitioner committed unfair labour practices within the meaning of Item No. 1 (a) to (d) and (f) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, “the MRTU & PULP Act”). Her case before the Labour Court was that she was dismissed from service on 2nd May, 2005 by the petitioner without following due procedure. She asserted that she was subjected to unfair labour practices. She asserted that she was employed as daily rated clerk and had worked for more than 240 days since 1971. According to her, on 1st June, 1994, she was orally terminated and had, therefore, filed complaint application (ULP) No. 177/1994 in Labour Court, Dhule. The petitioner thereafter appointed her on 10th October, ( 3 ) 1996 and, therefore, she had withdrawn the earlier complaint application. She was again terminated from service on 2nd May, 2005 without following the principles of natural justice. Hence, she was subjected to unfair labour practices and as such, was entitled to seek reinstatement in service. 3. The petitioner resisted the complaint application on the ground that the respondent was never regularly employed on any post. It was denied that by order dated 10th October, 1996, she was absorbed in service. The petitioner contended that the respondent was not given any regular appointment and could not be treated as permanent employee. It was further alleged that she was not appointed on any post nor can be treated as regular appointee because she had never been recruited by following required procedure. The petitioner categorically averred that no advertisement was published, nor the respondent had been selected by the duly constituted Selection Committee. Consequently, the petitioner sought dismissal of the complaint application. The learned Labour Judge held that ( 4 ) provisions of the Model Standing Orders (MOS) were violated by the petitioner. The Labour Court further held that service record of the respondent was not produced and as such, the contentions of the petitioner were unacceptable. The petitioner had relied on certain case-law including that of “Uma Devi” i.e. “Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Uma Devi and others” (2006 AIR SCW 1991). The Labour Court did not discuss the ratio of the case law referred by the petitioner and simply held that those cases were not applicable to the fact situation of the present case. The petitioner, therefore, preferred revision application which came to be dismissed vide the impugned judgement. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. The petitioner’s counsel has placed on record certain documents alongwith a list and synopsis. The respondent also filed some documents on record. ( 5 ) 6. On perusal of the impugned judgement, it is amply clear that the learned Member of the Industrial Court failed to formulate required points for determination. A hold-all point was framed as below : “Whether the revision application filed by the Applicant-MSRTC deserves to be allowed ?” The wording of the point framed by the revisional Court discloses that there was no application of judicial mind while framing the points for consideration. The very fact that the word “Applicant-MSRTC” was used, does give clue to infer that the point was borrowed from some other revision application filed by the M.S.R.T.C. and it was typed mutatis mutandis. The learned Member of the Industrial Court simply briefly reproduced the facts of the case and a single line general argument of the counsel for the petitioner. The revision application purports to show that various grounds were raised in the memo of revision. In ground No. 21, the specific contention was raised that the learned Judge of the Labour Court committed error while declining to rely on ( 6 ) the authorities which were referred during course of the argument. The petitioner had referred to six (6) authorities including the case of “Uma Devi”. Not a single authority is discussed by the revisional Court. The revisional Court failed to even refer to any of the authority out of the six (6) such judgements relied upon by the petitioner. There is absolutely no discussion as to why those authorities could not be referred and discussed while considering the revision application. 7. The learned Member of the Industrial Court, in fact, rendered a very cryptic judgement and order without considering the rival submissions of the parties. The learned Member of the Industrial Court dismissed the revision application only by observing that termination of the service of the respondent was not as per paragraph 5 of the appointment order and, therefore, it was colourable exercise of the employer’s right. The learned Member further made a general and omnibus statement that there was no apparent error on face of the record. Consequently, the revision ( 7 ) application was dismissed. It goes without saying that the revision application was “disposed off”, but not “judicially decided”. For, the impugned judgement is bereft of reasons. The impugned judgement does not reflect due application of judicial mind. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider other contentions based on merits. The documentary evidence placed on record need not be discussed and gone into having regard to basic infirmity found in the impugned judgement of the revisional Court. I refrain myself from making any caustic remarks about the quality of the impugned judgement, in view of settled norms of judicial discipline, though I find it totally unsustainable in the eye of law. Needless to say, the impugned judgement is perverse. 8. In view of foregoing discussion, the impugned judgement deserves to be set aside. Hence, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned judgement is set aside. The matter is remitted to the revisional Court by restoring the revision proceedings, with direction to decide the same afresh having regard to the legal ( 8 ) position and the factual position of the present case. The revisional Court shall endeavour to decide the matter afresh after framing of necessary points for determination and after due consideration of the rival submissions. The revision application be expeditiously decided, as far as possible within period of six (6) months. The parties are directed to appear before the revisional Court on 29th March, 2010. Rule partly made absolute accordingly. No costs. [ V.R. KINGAONKAR ] JUDGE NPJ/wp3594-2008