CRP 250/2007 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE IA ANSARI JUDGMENT & ORDER In this revision stands challenged the judgment and order, dated 16.08.2 007, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sonitpur, Tezpur, in Criminal Appeal No.42(S-4)/2006, whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Sonitpur, has upheld the ju dgment and order, dated 15.11.2006, passed, in GR Case No.231/2002, by the learn ed Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, (M), Biswanath Chariali, convicting the a ccused-petitioner under Section 498A IPC and sentencing him to suffer rigorous i mprisonment for three years and pay fine of Rs.5,000/- and, in default of paymen t of fine, suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of six months. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described thus: (i) Smti MS is a legally wedded wife of the accused-petitioner, thei r marriage having been solemnized, on 03.07.97, according to Hindu rites and cus toms. After her marriage, MS stayed with the accused as her husband at his house situated in village Balijan, Bilotia. After about six months of her marriage wi th the accused-petitioner, he started asking, on one plea or another, MS to brin g money from her parents. On some occasions, MS did bring small amounts of money from her father and handed over the same to her husband. The members of the fam ily of MS’s husband started ridiculing and teasing MS by saying that the propert ies given to her, at the time of her marriage, by her parents were sub-standard. Gradually, MS’s husband and in-laws started not only abusing MS, but also start ed calling her parents by various names, such as, monster, devil, etc. In course of time, MS was told by her husband that he would bring a second wife and that she (MS) should give consent for a second marriage as she was unable to bear any child for him. On 06.05.2002, MS was asked to bring Rs.70,000/- from her parent al house and she was threatened with dire consequences if she failed to bring, w ithin 14.05.2002, the money, so demanded. On 10.05.2002, MS’s husband called a ’ mel’ (i.e., sitting of the elders for settlement of disputes) and put pressure, with the help of some of his co-villagers, on MS to give her consent to her husb and performing a second marriage. In the meeting, so held, as MS declined to gi ve her consent, several restrictions were put on her in retaliation inasmuch as she was asked not to use any room other than the room, which had been provided t o her for her dining and sleeping, no one would be allowed to visit her and that she would have to leave for her school at 8.30 am and be back home by 5 pm. At night, her room was kept locked from outside. In fact, on 10.05.2002, when MS ca me to know that a ’mel’ would be called, she made a representation to Choyduar N ari Suraksha Samitee, which is an organization for protecting women from the cru elty and harassment; but before the said Samity could take effective steps, MS w as reminded, on 13.05.2002, by her husband that she would have to pay Rs.70,000/ - by 14.05.2002. Even MS’s gold ornaments were taken away forcibly from her. Una ble to bear what she was being subjected to, MS went to her school on 14.05.2002 , where she was working, and taking leave from the Principal of the school, she went to Gohpur Police Station and lodged there an Ejahar informing the police ab out what she was being made to undergo, Ext.1 being the said Ejahar. Treating th is Ejahar as FIR, a case was registered by the police. After lodging the FIR, MS went to her parental house and has remained there since then. On completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet against MS’s husband, i.e., the accused- petitioner, and some of his relatives. (ii) To the charge framed against them under Section 498A IPC, all the accuse d pleaded not guilty. In support of their case, prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses. Having found MS’s husband guilty of the charge framed against him under Section 498A IPC, the learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and pa ssed sentence against him as mentioned hereinabove. The remaining accused were, however, acquitted. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence passed against him, MS’s husband preferred an appeal, which, as already indicated hereinabove, stands disallowed. It is, in these circumstances, that the accused-petitioner ha s impugned his conviction and the sentence passed against him in the present rev ision. 3. I have heard Mr. AK Bhattacharjee, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioner, and Mr. K. Munir, learned Addl. Public Prosecu tor, Assam. 4. Appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learne d Senior counsel, has pointed out that to the accusations made against the accus ed-petitioner that he had subjected his wife to cruelty, there is no direct evid ence except that of the wife of the accused-petitioner and as far as the evidenc e given by remaining witnesses are concerned, these are all hearsay pieces of ev idence inasmuch as the accused-petitioner’s wife (PW2) has, nowhere, revealed, i n her evidence, the name(s) of any person(s), who had been reported by her about the harassment, which she was undergoing, and the demands for money, which were being raised. In the face of such silence of PW2, points out Mr. Bhattacharjee, the evidence given by the remaining witnesses as to what PW2 had reported to th em as regards the cruelty, which she was being allegedly subjected to, is nothin g, but hearsay. However, the learned Courts below, submits Mr. Bhattacharjee, re lied heavily upon such hearsay evidence and derived great support from such inad missible pieces of evidence for coming to the conclusion that the evidence given by PW2 is credible and trustworthy. If hearsay pieces of evidence are kept excl uded from consideration, contends Mr. Bhattacharjee, there remains only the evid ence of PW2 and her sole evidence is, in itself, not sufficient to warrant convi ction of the accused-petitioner. It is also pointed out by Mr. Bhattacharjee tha t the examination of the accused-petitioner, under Section 313 Cr.PC, was wholly inadequate inasmuch as none of the incriminating pieces of evidence given by th e witnesses, other than PW2, were put to the accused-petitioner, while he was be ing examined under Section 313 Cr.PC and, hence, without eliciting the accused-p etitioner’s response to the circumstances, which appeared to the learned trial C ourt to be incriminating, the evidence given by these witnesses could not have b een relied upon to form conviction of the accused-petitioner thereon. 5. Reacting to the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, it is submitted by Mr. Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that the evide nce of PW2, when considered in conjunction with the evidence given by the other witnesses, it becomes transparent that PW2 had been subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A IPC and, hence, conviction of the accused-petitioner deserves to be maintained. 6. While considering the present revision, what needs to be noted is that t he present case is not one of those cases, where conviction is based on no evide nce at all. It is, no doubt, true, as pointed by Mr. Bhattacharjee, that the evi dence given by PW3, who is brother of PW2, PW6, who works in Kanaklata Adarsha S chool and who claims to have forwarded PW2’s representation made against her hus band and the relatives of her husband to the President, Nari Surakhsa Samitee, P W7, who is known to both PW2 as well as her husband, PW8, a friend of PW2’s brot her, PW13, who was, at the relevant point of time, holding charge of the office of the President of Chayduar Nari Suraksha Samittee, PW14, a brother of PW2, hav e all deposed to the effect that they had come to know from PW2 that she was be ing subjected to cruelty by raising various demands for money, by making accusat ion that she was unable to bear a child for her husband and by putting pressure on her to give her consent for a second marriage of her husband. The evidence, s o given, by all these witnesses is, undoubtedly, hearsay, for, they are, admitte dly, not eye witnesses to the alleged harassment of PW2 and their clear assertio n is that they had come to know about PW2’s harassment on being reported by her to them; whereas there is no distinct and clear assertion, in the evidence of PW 2, that she had reported the occurrence to any of these witnesses. 7. What is, now, of utmost importance to note is that a trial Judge is not merely a recording machine of evidence given by the witnesses nor can he be a si lent spectator to the evidence produced by the parties. Though a trial Judge mus t not drop the mantle of a Judge and assume the role of a prosecutor or a defenc e counsel, the fact remains that his duty is to reach the truth and Section 165 of the Evidence Act gives the Judge adequate power and authority to put any ques tion to any witness at any time - be it during the course of examination-in-chie f or cross-examination or at the end of any such examination or re-examination - which, to the Judge, appears to be necessary for a just decision of the case an d in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant fact. Though a Judge must not usurp the function of a counsel, he needs to participate, in the trial, in such a manner as would ensure that the evidence, adduced by the parties, is legal an d such evidence becomes clear, complete and intelligible. A Judge, who merely si ts at a trial and records evidence without caring to conduct examination of the witnesses in order to ensure that evidence on record becomes intelligible, must be held to have not performed his duty as warranted by law. A Judge is not merel y an observer. It is his duty to explore, within permissible limits, the truth. If, therefore, a Judge finds that the examination of a witness is not being cond ucted in such a way as to unfold complete truth, it is not only right for the Ju dge, but his duty to intervene and put such questions as may be warranted and pe rmissible within the ambit of Section 165. A Judge cannot behave like a passive agent, when a case is tried before him. He has the power and also the duty to qu estion the witnesses in order to elicit relevant materials. A case cannot be all owed to suffer for failure of any of the parties to elicit relevant materials fr om a witness. It is to discover the truth and bring, on record, the relevant fa cts that a Judge has been vested with the power to put questions under Section 1 65. It is with this object in view that the Judge has been vested with the power to call any witness or recall any witness at any time suo moto or at the instan ce of any of the parties if it becomes necessary for a just decision of the case . If the prosecution omits to bring out any relevant fact or the defence elicits from a witness, in the cross-examination, a statement, which is obscure or inco mplete, the defence does not acquire (the Judge must bear in mind) a vested righ t in such limited cross-examination. It is the duty of the Judge to remove such obscurity or incompleteness by putting appropriate question. In such a case, it is, rather, the duty of the Judge, conducting the trial, to elicit from the witn ess complete information so that the evidence given by him or her becomes clear and intelligible, though his putting of questions cannot be in a manner as if th e witness is under cross-examination nor can such examination be aimed at destro ying or diluting the effect of the cross-examination of the witness by the defen ce. It is for this reason that a Court shall not put, in exercise of its powers under Section 165, leading question or put words into the mouth of the witness. 8. Bearing in mind the position of law with regard to a court’s duty to put to a witness any such question, which is necessary for the purpose of bringing, on record, a relevant fact or to bring, on record, the proof of a relevant fact , when I turn to the case at hand, what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that in her examination-in-chief, nothing was stated by PW2 to indicate if she h ad reported the demand for money raised by the accused-petitioner or had reporte d about the various restrictions, which were being put on her, or the harassment , which she was alleged to have been undergoing at the house of the accused-peti tioner. In her cross-examination, however, she deposed, Each time I went to my house, I had told about the tortures inflicted on me by my husband. The defence did not elicit from PW2, as to who were the persons to whom she had reported ab out the torture inflicted on her. In this backdrop, when the evidence of PWs 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14 is that they had been reported by PW2 about the cruelty that she was being subjected to, it became the duty of the learned trial Court to elicit from PW2 as to who were the person(s) whom she had reported each time she had g one to her parental home. The evidence given by PW2, in her cross-examination, t hat each time, she went to her home, she reported the torture inflicted on her b y her husband is completely vague and obscure, for, the evidence, so given, did not indicate as to who were the person(s) to whom she had reported about the tor ture, which was being perpetrated on her. In these circumstances, as already ind icated hereinbefore, it was the duty of the learned trial Court to elicit, by pu tting appropriate questions, as to who were the person(s) to whom she had told a bout the torture inflicted on her by her husband. Failure to put relevant questi ons to PW2 was a serious lapse on the part of the learned trial Court. If the cl arification is not taken from PW2, the evidence given by PWs 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14 remains completely hearsay. Considered thus, it is clear that failure to elicit relevant facts from PW2, in the circumstances as indicated hereinbefore, would c ause serious miscarriage of justice if this lapse is allowed to continue. 9. What emerges from the above discussions is that if relevant facts, as po inted out above, are not elicited from PW2, the evidence given by PWs 6, 7, 8, 1 3 and 14 would remain hearsay. Logically, therefore, PW2 ought to have been re-c alled by the learned trial Court and relevant questions ought to have put to her for arriving at a fair and just decision of the case, for, not re-calling PW2 w ould result in serious miscarriage of justice. This aspect of the case appears t o have not been taken into account by the learned appellate Court. The learned a ppellate Court ought to have set aside the conviction of the accused-petitioner and ought to have remanded the case to the learned trial Court with direction to re-call PW2 and elicit from her as to who were the persons to whom she had repo rted, each time she went home, about the torture inflicted on her by her husband . 10. An apprehension has been expressed by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Senior counsel, that any such re-calling of PW2 would enable the prosecution to fill up the lacuna. While considering this submission, it needs to be pointed out that the duty of the Court is to discover the truth and obtain proof of relevant fact s. The question as to whether PW2 had reported to anyone about what she alleges to have been undergoing, at her matrimonial house, is, undoubtedly, a relevant f act and this relevant fact necessitates putting of appropriate questions to PW2 by the Court in exercise of its power under Section 165, when the prosecution ha s not discharged its duty in this regard. Explaining as to what can be regarded as a lacuna in a prosecution’s case, the Apex Court, in Rajendra Prasad Vs. Narc otic Cell, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 110, observed : 7. It is a common experience in criminal courts that defence counsel wo uld raise objections whenever courts exercise powers under Section 311 of the Co de or under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by saying that the court could not fill the lacuna in the prosecution case . A lacuna in the prosecution is n ot to be equated with the fallout of an oversight committed by a Public Prosecut or during trial, either in producing relevant materials or in eliciting relevant answers from witnesses. The adage to err is human is the recognition of the p ossibility of making mistakes to which humans are prone. A corollary of any such laches or mistakes during the conducting of a case cannot be understood as a la cuna which a court cannot fill up. 8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a la tent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should nor mally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the manage ment of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a t rial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduce d or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After a ll, function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among t he parties performed better. 9. The very same decision Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India 1 which caution ed against filling up lacuna has also laid down the ratio thus: (AIR Headnote) It is therefore clear that the criminal court has ample power to summon any per son as a witness or recall and re-examine any such person even if the evidence o n both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court must obviously be dicta ted by exigency of the situation, and fair play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides and that only the requirements of justice command the examinati on of any person which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 10. Dealing with the corresponding section in the old Code (Section 540) Hidayat ullah, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for a three-Judge Ben ch of this Court had said in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra 2 a s follows: It would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction, statutory law confers a powe r in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witnes s or examine one present in court or to recall a witness already examined, and m akes this the duty and obligation of the court provided the just decision of the case demands it. In other words, where the court exercises the power under the second part, the enquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything sudd enly or unexpectedly but whether the court is right in thinking that the new evi dence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. 11. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has also observed in the same tone in Ram Chander v. Sta te of Haryana. 12. We cannot therefore accept the contention of the appellant as a legal propos ition that the court cannot exercise power of resummoning any witness if once th at power was exercised, nor can the power be whittled down merely on the ground that the prosecution discovered laches only when the defence highlighted them du ring final arguments. The power of the court is plenary to summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the case if the court considers it necessary for a just decision. The steps which the trial court permitted in this case for resumm oning certain witnesses cannot therefore be spurned down or frowned at. (Emphas is is supplied) 11. From the observations made in Rajendra Prasad’s case (supra), it clearly transpires that lacuna in a case of prosecution or defence would mean an inhere nt and not accidental slip or omission nor does lacuna mean patent wedge, but a latent wedge. An oversight or inefficiency in the management of a case is not a lacuna. In the present case too, the prosecution’s failure to obtain information from PW2 as to whom she had reported the happenings of her matrimonial house is a failure of management of the case by the prosecution and not an inherent weak ness of its case, for, unless the prosecution puts appropriate questions to PW2, she cannot give requisite answers and for the failure of the prosecution to put necessary questions to its witness, the witness’s evidence cannot be thrown out . It is in such cases that a Judge’s role, as indicated above, arises under Sect ion 165, Evidence Act. It may also be pointed out that Section 311 CrPC, which e mpowers a Judge, in a criminal trial, to call or re-call a witness is one of the facets of his powers under Section 165, Evidence Act, and the Judge must ensure that he does what is necessitated for a just decision of a case bearing, of cou rse, in his mind the recognized limitations within which such power has to be ex ercised. 12. In fact, emphasizing what role a Judge should play in a trial, the Apex Court, in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble, reported in (2003 ) 7 SCC 749, observed : 34. The courts exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected. The tri al/first appellate courts cannot get swayed by abstract technicalities and close their eyes to factors which need to be positively probed and noticed. The court is not merely to act as a tape recorder recording evidence, overlooking the obj ect of trial i.e. to get at the truth, and oblivious to the active role to be pl ayed for which there is not only ample scope but sufficient powers conferred und er the Code. It has a greater duty and responsibility i.e. to render justice in a case where the role of the prosecuting agency itself is put in issue. (Emphas is is supplied) 13. From the position of law laid down in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan(supra), i t becomes transparent that a Court is not a tape recorder, which has to merely r ecord evidence. Far from this, when the Court’s object is to do justice, it cann ot overlook the necessity to reach the truth. Hence, while a Court cannot assume the role of a party to a case, it nevertheless has the duty to remove vagueness or obscurity from a witness’s evidence so that the evidence becomes intelligibl e to a Court of law. 14. There is yet another circumstance, which needs some observations by this Court. As has been correctly pointed out by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Senior c ounsel, the learned