Regular Second Appeal No. 1569 of 1990 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Regular Second Appeal No. 1569 of 1990 Date of decision: 10.05.2010 Shardha Nand ...Appellant Versus Municipal Committee, Kharkhauda etc. ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Mr. Roopak Bansal, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. S.S. Pattar, Sr. DAG, Haryana for the State. RANJIT SINGH J. The appellant is aggrieved against the part of the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Sonepat. The appellant had filed the suit seeking declaration that his services were illegally terminated and that he would continue to be in service and would be entitled to backwages for the period he had remained out of service. The appellant was appointed as Peon with the Municipal Committee, Kharkhauda on temporary basis. His name was sponsored by District Employment Officer, Sonepat. Thereafter, appointment letter was issued to him on 17.11.1980. The appellant was on probation for a period of 2 years up to 31.12.1982 and thereafter he claimed to be working as a regular employee. Suddenly his services were terminated on 25.07.1985 in an illegal manner on the ground that he was not enrolled with Employment Exchange. The Regular Second Appeal No. 1569 of 1990 2 appellant would term these allegations to be baseless. The appellant also impugned his order of termination on the ground that it was in violation of the provisions of Section 42 of the Haryana Municipal Act, to dismiss an employee on the ground that he was unfit for employment. He would thus term this order to be illegal, void and not binding on the appellant. The defendant-Municipal Committee resisted the suit on the ground of maintainability, locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action. The plea is that the appellant was kept in service but his name was not included in the list received from the District Employment Officer and he was not present at the time of interview. His appointment was accordingly termed as illegal. Rather it was pleaded that the appointment of appellant was false and frivolous. Strangely, it is claimed that the appellant was not an employee of Municipal Committee, having not been appointed as Peon by the Committee through proper channel. On the basis of pleading, following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the services of the plaintiff have been illegally terminated as alleged?OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit?OPD 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 4. Whether the court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? 5. Relief. The suit filed by the appellant was dismissed against which he filed an appeal. The First Appellant Court allowed the Regular Second Appeal No. 1569 of 1990 3 appeal and held that the termination of the appellant was bad and illegal. However, the prayer of the appellant for grant of backwages was declined on the ground of principle of 'No Work No Pay'. As per the counsel, the principle of No Work, No Pay would not apply to the facts of the present case. The principle is generally not applicable in those cases where an employee though willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault on his part. The counsel would contend that the appellant was always willing and ready to work, which was wrongly not given to him. He accordingly submits that principle of 'No Work No pay' would not be attracted to the facts of the present case. To buttress his argument, the counsel for the appellant would submit that some of the persons whose services were identically terminated had approached the Labour Court, which had not only directed reinstatement of those employees but had so ordered with full backwages. Reference is made to this fact though it has not been properly brought on record. However, this fact is not disputed. In any case, once the termination of the appellant was held to be illegal, the view is possible that he was kept away from work without any fault on his part. This is not a case where the employees remain away from work for his own reasons although work is offered to him. Support can be had from the case of Union of India etc. versus K.V. Jankiraman etc. AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2010. Under these circumstances, it would not be fair to decline him the relief of backwages. This is the only limited prayer made in the Regular Second Appeal. In my view, the substantial question of law in regard to the Regular Second Appeal No. 1569 of 1990 4 right of the appellant to claim backwages, which has been denied to him on the principle of No Work No Pay, would arise in this case. The principle of No Work No Pay would not be attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case. The Regular Second Appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Fresh decree sheet be prepared by the Registry of this Court. May 10, 2010 ( RANJIT SINGH ) rts JUDGE