HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V. SEETHAPATHY W.P.No.16932 of 2001 Date: 01-03-2011 Between: Mohd. Yousuf Ali and others ……. Petitioners and State of A.P. and others ……… Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V. SEETHAPATHY W.P.No.16932 of 2001 ORDER: (Per BPR, J) The petitioner, since died being represented through his legal representatives, who is a retired employee of the respondent-State, files this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking for a writ of Certiorari for the following reliefs: a) To call for the records pertaining to the order, dated 29-09-2000 passed in Review M.A.No.982 of 1996 in M.A.No.907 of 1995 in R.P.No.1903 of 1986 on the file of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), for judicial review by this Court; b) To direct the authorities to implement the order, dated 25- 02-1987 passed in R.P.No.1903 of 1987 by the Tribunal; and c) To grant all consequential benefits like promotion, arrears of pay in the promotional categories etc. At the outset, this is a curious case as to how the State, through its agencies, seeks to set at naught the orders of the Courts below, Tribunals and as well as this Court to defeat the fruits of such proceedings being enjoyed or being made available on one or other ground of surmises without any basis or justification therefor. The brief account as to how the present proceedings arise is that in pursuance of certain disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was sought to be removed from service as per the proceedings, dated 12-01-1982 issued by the Collector. The appeal filed against the said proceedings was rejected by the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Hyderabad, as per the orders, dated 15-05-1985. Challenging the same, the petitioner filed R.P.No.1903 of 1986 before the Tribunal and the same was allowed as per the order, dated 25-02-2007. For convenience sake, the ultimate order passed by the Tribunal in the said R.P. is to the following effect: “In view of the decision given above, it is ordered that the petitioner shall be immediately reinstated in service forthwith in the same rank be hold at the time of his suspension. The question is whether he should get any consequential rights. Since the petitioner is being restored to service without any stigma on his character proved legally, he should get consequential rights on a fair basis. In my view, the petitioner should be given arrears of salary in the rank of LDC subject to all revisions from time to time from the date of his suspension in 1966 upto date subject to deduction of amount already drawn as subsistence allowance. He will get other consequential benefits in accordance with the rules.” It is the above directions, which are laying so far unimplemented inspite of the fact that the petitioner has been knocking the doors of every Court, Tribunal and again back to this Court. Admittedly the aforesaid orders and the direction given by the Tribunal were not implemented. Therefore, the petitioner has filed E.C.P.No.4 of 1988 before the Tribunal and the same was ordered on 20-12-1988 with a direction that the petitioner should approach the competent authority for due implementation of the order, after obtaining certificate from the Tribunal. Accordingly, the petitioner filed E.P.No.9 of 1989 before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for execution of the Tribunal’s order, dated 25-02-2007. However, the said execution petition was dismissed on 28-03-1990 holding that the petitioner is not entitled for the relief. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached this Court by filing revision in C.R.P.No.2375 of 1990, and the same was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the Civil Court for fresh disposal. Later on, the said E.P. was disposed of on 31-01-1994 with a direction to the Government to implement the orders of the Tribunal in R.P.No.1903 of 1986, dated 25-02-1987. Since there was no specific direction for the consequential reliefs in the order, dated 31- 01-1994, the petitioner has filed another revision in C.R.P.No.2377 of 1994 before this Court, which was disposed of by this Court holding that the E.P. is not maintainable in view of the promulgation of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, however, the petitioner was given liberty to approach the Tribunal for implementation of the order, dated 25-02-1987. Under the new Act, Section 27 specifically provides for the procedure for implementation of the orders of the Tribunal. Therefore, the petitioner has again approached the Tribunal by invoking Section 27 by filing application in M.A.No.907 of 1995 for implementation of the orders, dated 25-02-1987. However, the said application was disposed of on 18-03-1996 holding that the application is not maintainable. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed another application in Review M.A.No.982 of 1996 seeking to review the orders, dated 18-03-1996, and ultimately the same was dismissed through the impugned order, dated 29-09-2000, by referring to the earlier orders passed. After referring to the aforesaid chequered events as to how the petitioner has been running from pillar to post, the Tribunal observed in the following manner: “14. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it is seen that the applicant had already approached the concerned authorities for execution of the orders obtained by him in RP 1903/86 dt.25.2.1987 and the said executing authority has come to the conclusion that the applicant has been paid all dues to which he is entitled in the cadre of L.D.C to which he belonged and as he did not pass the required tests for promotion, he was not entitled to claim the amount in the E.P. filed by him and the Execution court was satisfied that the order of the Tribunal in RP 1903/86 dt. 25.2.1987 was complied both in letter and spirit. Accordingly, E.P. 7/89 was dismissed on 28-3-1990. 15. After the order of the Hon’ble High Court in C.R.P.No.2375/90 dt. 13.7.1993, the matter was again considered by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, pursuant to the directions given therein and the applicant again approached the Hon’ble High Court in C.R.P.no.2377/94 for revising the order dt.31.1.1994 made in E.P.No.7/89 in RP 1903/86 by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court. The said CRP 2377/94 was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court by its order dt.6.4.1995. The fact that a subsequent pronouncement that the Administrative Tribunal which issued the order had the necessary authority to entertain Execution Petitions for enforcing its orders, does not confer any fresh right on the applicant to file another M.A. in the nature of Execution Petition, seeking execution of the very same order in RP 1903/86 dated 25.2.1987 for which the applicant filed E.P. 7/89 before the competent Court and the competent Court after careful consideration of the matter dismissed the said E.P. by its order dt.28.3.1990. We are afraid we cannot reopen the issue once again which is already decided by the competent Civil Court for executing the order of the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the M.A 907/96 is not maintainable. 16. As regards Rev.M.A 982/96, in addition to the foregoing discussion, we do not see any error either of law or of facts apparent on the face of the record and no new material is brought before us warranting the Review of the order already passed.” The case of the petitioner, in short, is to the effect that inspite of the fact that the Tribunal did give relief to him by setting at naught the termination orders, yet, no benefits accruing therefrom, as he would be entitled to under law, are being given and hence, the writ. Though on behalf of the respondents the entire proceedings are sought to be sustained on the ground of delay and laches and also on technical plea as to the maintainability, taking into consideration the submissions made across, the only point, which requires to be considered at this length of time, is whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner can be denied of the benefits which he would have been entitled to. On behalf of the petitioner, in support, a decision in UNION OF INDIA v. JUSTICE S.S. SANDHA WALIA [1], is referred for the purpose of awarding interest as provided under Section 34 of C.P.C. for making delay in payment. Similarly the decision in P.L. KANTHA RAO v. STATE OF A.P. [2], is referred to for the purpose of showing that in view of Section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, execution petition before the Civil Court does not lie. The decision in DR. UMA AGARWAL v. STATE OF U.P. [3], is cited to show as to how delay can be found fault with. In DAYARAM DAYAL v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. [4], considering similar such situation and delay, it was held that the same would be fatal. There being no dispute to the fact that the order of removal from service was set aside and the Tribunal allowed the R.P. with a direction for restoration of the petitioner to service without any stigma etc. Necessarily it follows that the said termination becomes non-est and the petitioner would be entitled to all the benefits such as continuity of service, attendant benefits and arrears of salary by taking into account the revisions from time to time. This aspect has been specifically made clear in the very order which is sought to be implemented by the petitioner since inception, as already mentioned above. Therefore, there is no dispute that the petitioner was an employee and he was put back into service with all the benefits. Then there is no reason as to why the same should be denied. By knocking the doors wherever possible, before and after the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the petitioner has been making frantic efforts to see that these benefits are duly provided with. On considering the submissions made across the Bar on behalf of the respondents by the learned Government Pleader and also on perusal of the counter affidavit, we do not find any valid reason to deny all such benefits or even to go against the order of the Tribunal in R.P.No.1903 of 1986, dated 25-02-1987 which has become final since the respondents did not challenge the same by any further proceedings as known to the law. Therefore, on the face of those specific directions and the petitioner may continue to remain in service till the age of superannuation, necessarily the respondents are bound and in fact barred on the principles of res judicata. It is not open to the respondents herein to take advantage of any technicalities or change of Law much less change of Forums. It is now well established that the arm of the law is very wide and it will not allow anybody to go scot- free in disobeying the orders of the Court. Any such action on the part of the respondents in trying to give a go-bye these directions, which have become conclusive and binding, would in fact clearly amounts to disobedience of the Court order and leading to serious consequences thereon. Be that as it may. By taking into account the chequered events and the petitioner’s frantic efforts, we are of the opinion that the respondents herein would take note of the same with serious note and attention and implement the orders without any demor in its proper perspective by providing all that which the deceased petitioner would have been entitled to, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition is accordingly, allowed. The impugned order, dated 29-09-2000 passed in Rev.M.A.No.982 of 1996 in M.A.No.907 of 1995 in R.P.No.1903 of 1986 is set aside. It is held that the deceased petitioner would be entitled to all the benefits including the attendant benefits, arrears of salary etc., as already directed by the Tribunal in the order, dated 25-02-1987 in R.P.No.1903 of 1986. No order as to costs. _________________ B. PRAKASH RAO, J ___________________ G.V. SEETHAPATHY, J Date: 01-03-2011 YCR [1] (1994) 2 SCC 240 [2] AIR 1995 SC 807 [3] (1999) 3 SCC 438 [4] 1997 (8) SUPREME 8