HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA WRIT PETITION No. 25479 of 2006 ORDER: (per Honourable Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao) Heard Sri Aka Venkataramana, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Government Pleader for Services-II. The petitioner, who was working as a Junior Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Supply Officer, Circle-II, Hyderabad, filed this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia seeking to assail the order in O.A.No.3879 of 2004, dated 26.09.2005, on the file of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, dismissing his application, filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, whereby the proceedings No.1999/C.S.II/A2/2002-6 of the first respondent, dated 12.03.2004, to treat the period of suspension as on duty, was rejected. Brief facts involved in the present case are that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 03.01.1992 by the Chief Rationing Officer, vide proceedings dated 03.01.1992, on the ground that he was involved in a Criminal Case in S.C.No.81 of 1993, registered for the offences under Sections 304-B, 498-A IPC and Section 3 (2)(4) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, along with three other accused. The said proceedings ended in acquittal by the I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad by judgment dated 09.01.1995. The matter was carried in appeal by the State in Criminal Appeal No.24 of 1996 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 07.08.1998. The petitioner states that having regard to his acquittal, both by the trial Court and this Court, he made a representation before the authorities concerned for treating the period of suspension as on duty. By the proceedings dated 12.03.2004, the first respondent observed that since the judgments, both of the trial Court and this Court, were on the ground of “benefit of doubt” and not on merits, it cannot be said that the period of suspension undergone by the petitioner was wholly unjustified. The said proceeding was challenged in the aforesaid O.A. and the same was dismissed on the premise that whenever an employee is acquitted in any criminal case, it is not automatic for such an employee to get treated the period of suspension as on duty with all benefits and certainly it involves due consideration of the individual cases depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Services-II, the points that arise for consideration are whether the claim of the petitioner to treat the entire period of suspension as on duty with all benefits is justified; and whether rejection of the same by the first respondent, under the proceedings dated 12.03.2004, is justified. There is no dispute with regards the facts leading to the petitioner’s suspension. The entire claim centers around as to how the period of suspension has to be treated. There is no dispute with regards the petitioner’s involvement in the aforesaid Criminal Case and his acquittal both by the Trial Court and this Court. The petitioner would contend that as he was acquitted in the Criminal Case, the entire period of suspension has to be treated as on duty and made a representation to that effect to the first respondent. The first respondent, vide proceedings dated 12.03.2004, rejected the petitioner’s request to treat the period of suspension as on duty on the ground that the Courts had acquitted him on the ground of “benefit of doubt” and not on merits. It is clear therefrom that the authorities have not properly considered the case of the petitioner in a proper perspective, that his entitlement for treating the suspension period as on duty, and that the benefits to which he would be entitled to. Admittedly, the petitioner has been acquitted. Whether such acquittal may be on the ground of benefit of doubt or otherwise, the fact remains that the petitioner was acquitted and that itself cannot be a ground to deny him the right to treat the period of suspension as on duty. The authorities might have any other reason which may be justified, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to reject the claim of the petitioner but not such ground where acquittal was recorded by the Court after regular trial, be it on the ground of benefit of doubt or otherwise. His acquittal amounts to washing away the allegations, which are made against him, for the offences he was charged of. Therefore, it cannot be said that such rejection is valid and justified. We hold that the respondent-authorities cannot reject the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the Court had acquitted him on the ground of “benefit of doubt” but not on merits. Both the proceedings of the first respondent, dated 12.03.2004, and the order of the Tribunal in O.A.No.3879 of 2004, dated 26.09.2005, are set aside. The respondent-authorities are directed to consider the case of the petitioner afresh and pass appropriate orders on merits after giving notice to him. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed. No order as to costs. B.PRAKASH RAO,J B.N.RAO NALLA,J Date:14.09.2010 usd