RSA No.3040 of 2010 & 1 RSA No. 2837 of 2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision:11.08.2010 1) RSA No.3040 of 2010 Satpal and another .....Appellants Versus Ranbir Singh and others .....Respondents 2) RSA No. 2837 of 2010 Om Parkash .....Appellant Versus Municipal Council, Rohtak ....Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR. Present: Mr. Surinder Mohan Sharma, Advocate, for the appellants. **** M EHINDER S INGH S ULLAR , J.(oral) As common questions of law and facts are involved in the above indicated appeals, arising out of the same impugned judgments and decrees, between the same parties, therefore, I propose to dispose of the same by virtue of this common judgment in order to avoid the repetition. 2. As the Courts below duly recapitulated and described the factual matrix of pleadings and evidence brought on record by the parties in detail, therefore, there appears to be no necessity to again reproduce and repeat the same in this regular second appeal. However, the matrix of the facts, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of the present appeal and emanating from the record, is that Sant Kumar, Sat Pal and others appellants/plaintiffs in Regular RSA No.3040 of 2010 & 2 RSA No. 2837 of 2010 Second Appeal No. 3040 of 2010 and Om Parkash son of late Sh. Ghanishyam Dass appellant/plaintiff in Regular Second Appeal No. 2837 of 2010 (hereinafter to be referred as “the plaintiffs”) filed two different suits for a decree of declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining Municipal Council, Rohtak and another (hereinafter to be referred as “the defendants”) from interfering in their ownership and peaceful possession in any manner, inter alia, pleading that they have inherited the property from their fathers and forefathers and as such they are owners in possession of the disputed Gher. They have constructed the mangers (Khurdies) and made the store of cow dung cake (Bitoras). They are using the suit property for other household purposes, which had fallen in the area of Municipal Committee, Rohtak. 3. Concisely the plaintiffs claimed that they are owner and in possession of the disputed property but defendant-Municipal Council, intends to interfere into their possession without any legal right. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the plaintiffs filed the suit for a decree of declaration and permanent injunction against the defendants in the manner, indicated here-in-above. 4 The defendants contested the suit and filed the written statement, inter alia, pleading certain preliminary objections of maintainability of the suit, locus standi of the plaintiffs, non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties. On merits according to the defendant-Committee, the suit property is a public street and had already vested in the Municipal Council, being used since 1982 described as such in the Municipal record and the plaintiffs had got no right, title or interest in it. The defendants have denied the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs over the disputed property. It will not be out of place to mention here that the defendant has stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the plaint and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Controverting the allegations contained in the written statements and reiterating the pleadings of the plaint, the plaintiffs filed the replication. RSA No.3040 of 2010 & 3 RSA No. 2837 of 2010 6. In the wake of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the relevant issues for proper adjudication of the case. 7. The trial Court, owing to the request of the parties, consolidated both the above indicated cases, vide order dated 21.02.2003 and treated the civil suit bearing No.110 of 2001 titled as Sant Kumar, Sat Pal and others Vs. Ranbir Singh and another as main suit. 8. The parties to the litigation produced on record the oral as well as documentary evidence, in order to substantiate their respective stands. 9. Having completed all the codal formalities and on ultimate analysis of the evidence on record, the trial Court dismissed both the civil suits by virtue of common impugned judgment and decree dated 12.01.2010. 10. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, appellants- plaintiffs filed the appeals bearing Civil Appeal No. 14 of 2010 and Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2010, which were dismissed as well by the first Appellate Court vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.05.2010. 11. The appellants-plaintiffs still did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and filed the present appeals. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, having gone through the record with his valuable assistance and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the appeal. 13. Ex facie, the main arguments of the learned counsel that since the plaintiffs are proved to be owner and in possession of the disputed property so the Courts below fell in error in dismissing their suit, is not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well. 14. As is evident from the record that the plaintiffs filed the suits claiming themselves to be owner and in possession of the disputed Gher, denominated by letters ABCD shown in yellow colour in the site plan. That means a heavy burden of proof was upon them to prove that they are owner and in RSA No.3040 of 2010 & 4 RSA No. 2837 of 2010 possession of the disputed property. They have miserably failed in this relevant connection. 15. On the contrary Ex.D7 is the application, which was given by the inhabitants of the locality in the year 1982, requesting the Municipality to declare the disputed portion as a public street. Consequently, Municipal Committee, issued the notices Ex.D11 to Ex.D14 to the original owners in the year 1982 itself. The perusal of the application Ex.D7 and notices Ex.D11 to D14 would reveal that the disputed space was used as a street and it was so declared as public-street by the Municipal Committee. Ex.D1 is the copy of sale deed dated 20.04.1987. As per description given in the sale deed Ex.D1, there is street in the western side of plot of Ranbir Singh. It corroborates the case of the defendant Municipal Committee that the site in question is a public street, which is being used by public at large and has been so recorded in the Municipal record. 16. In this manner, the Courts below have rightly negatived the claim of the plaintiffs in this regard. Therefore, the contrary arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs 'stricto sensu' deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 17. No other meaningful arguments have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs so as to assail the finding of Courts below. All the remaining contentions relatable to the appreciation of evidence, now sought to be urged on behalf of appellants-plaintiffs have already been duly considered and dealt with by the Courts below, in this relevant direction. 18. There is another aspect of the matter which can be viewed from a different angle. The trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court has taken into consideration and appreciated the entire relevant evidence brought on record by the parties in the right perspective. Having scanned the admissible evidence in relation to the pleadings of the parties, the Courts below have recorded the well- articulated and well-reasoned concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs are neither RSA No.3040 of 2010 & 5 RSA No. 2837 of 2010 owner nor in possession and the disputed portion is a public-street which is being used as such by public at large. Such pure concurrent findings of facts based on the evidence, cannot possibly be interfered with by this Court, while exercising the powers conferred under Section 100 CPC, unless and until, the same are illegal and perverse. No such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, so as to take a contrary view, than that of the well-reasoned decision arrived at by the Courts below, in this regard. 19. Meaning thereby the entire matter revolves around the re- appreciation and re-appraisal of the evidence on record, which is not legally permissible and is beyond the scope of second appeal. Since no question of law, muchless substantial, is involved in the second appeal, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh & Anr 2008 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 688 : 2008 AIR (SC) 1749, so, no interference is warranted, in the impugned judgments/decrees of the Courts below as contemplated under Section 100 CPC, in the obtaining circumstances of the present case. 20. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs. 21. In the light of aforementioned reasons, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed. August 11, 2010 (MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR) naresh.k JUDGE