CR No. 54 of 2007 [ 1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Revision No. 54 of 2007 (O&M) Date of decision: 15.5.2009 The Punjab State Electricity Board .. Petitioner v. Satinder Pal Singh .. Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL Present: Mr. R. L. Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Vivek Salathia, Advocate for the respondent. Rajesh Bindal J. The judgment debtor is before this Court challenging the order dated 30.9.2006, passed by the learned Executing Court, whereby in execution of a decree passed in favour of the respondent-decree holder, the petitioner has been directed to pay the entire back wages and other emoluments from 1.5.1986 to 28.2.2003. Briefly, the facts are that the respondent filed a suit seeking a declaration that he be treated to be in service with all pay and emoluments and for mandatory injunction directing the petitioner to allow the respondent to join his duty and further for relief of his pay, promotion and other emoluments w.e.f. 1.5.1986. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 14.1.1999. However, in appeal, the learned Additional District Judge reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 3.10.2002. It is in execution of the aforesaid decree that the impugned order has been passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner-judgment debtor submitted that in the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court, it was held that the respondent-decree holder is deemed to be in service of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to allow the respondent to join his duty within a period of one month with liberty to decide the absence period w.e.f. 1.5.1986 onwards or to pass any order on the basis of enquiry pending against the respondent, as deemed proper under the rules and regulations. In execution of the aforesaid decree, the respondent was permitted to join service and in terms of further directions, the period of his absence was decided to be treated as leave of the kind due vide order dated 8.10.2004 and the respondent was directed to complete the CR No. 54 of 2007 [ 2] formalities required therefor. The aforesaid order was not challenged by the respondent in any proceedings. In view of this fact, the learned executing court had gone wrong in directing payment of the amount of back wages and other emoluments from 1.5.1986 to 28.2.2003, once as per the liberty granted in the decree passed against the petitioner, the aforesaid period was treated as leave of the kind due. The direction of the learned Executing Court had gone beyond the decree and hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed upon Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Shyam Bihari Lal Gupta, AIR 2005 SC 3476. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the relief prayed for by the respondent-plaintiff in the suit was that he should be held to be deemed to be in service with all consequential benefits. Once the suit was decreed holding that the respondent-decree holder is deemed to be in service, the emoluments for the intervening period was merely a consequential relief, which automatically flows from the decree. Even though the respondent-decree holder was exonerated in the enquiry held against him, but still the emoluments for the intervening period are being denied and it is directed that the same is to be treated as leave of the kind due, which is totally illegal. The circumstances, under which the respondent was not permitted to join duty, clearly show that the petitioner was biased against him and he is being made to suffer because of no fault on his part. Reliance was placed upon Radha Ram v. Municipal Commtitee, 1982 Lab. I. C. 1857. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. The suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff was decreed by the learned lower appellate court in the following terms: “It is ordered that the appeal is accepted with costs. The plaintiff is deemed to be in service of the defendants and the defendants are directed to allow the plaintiff to join his duty within a period of one month from the date of passing this judgment with a liberty to decide the absence period of the plaintiff w.e.f. 1.5.1986 onwards or to pass any other order on the basis of any enquiry pending against the plaintiff or any other order as deemed proper under the rules and regulations of the Board.” A perusal of the aforesaid terms of the decree show that in the first part, the petitioner was directed to allow the respondent-decree holder to join duty within one month from the date of passing of the judgment and decree. In the CR No. 54 of 2007 [ 3] second part, the petitioner was given liberty to decide the absence period w.e.f. 1.5.1986 onwards or to pass any other order on the basis of any enquiry pending against the respondent or any other order, as deemed proper under the rules and regulations of the Board. Meaning thereby, the petitioner was at liberty to decide as to how the period of absence w.e.f. 1.5.1986 (the date during which the petitioner was not on duty) was to be decided. The stand of the petitioner is that vide office order No. 309 dated 8.10.2004, the competent authority, in pursuance of charge-sheet No. 1277 dated 25.6.1992, had decided to treat the said period of absence as leave of the kind due and the respondent was to complete requisite formalities therefor. With the passing of the aforesaid order, the judgment and decree passed in favour of the respondent-decree holder stood complied with in its entirety. The respondent's claim for back wages for the period from 1.5.1986, considering the same to be a consequential relief, is certainly misconceived. Once the court had given liberty to the petitioner to pass order dealing with the period of absence, for which the respondent had claimed emoluments, it cannot be said that entitlement of emoluments of the respondent should be treated as a consequential relief as a part of the decree once it is held that the respondent is deemed to be in service of the petitioner. Once the specific terms of the decree have already been complied with by the petitioner by passing order dealing with the period of absence w.e.f 1.5.1986, the direction of the Executing Court to the petitioner to pay the emoluments for that period would certainly be beyond the terms of the decree and can very well be termed as without jurisdiction, as it is settled that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the learned court below directing the petitioner to pay the emoluments for the period from 1.5.1986 to 28.2.2003 is set aside. The revision petition is disposed of in the manner indicated above. (Rajesh Bindal) Judge 15.5.2009 mk