IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:08.02.2011 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA S.A.No.1078 of 2006 & M.P.No.1 of 2010 and Cont.Petition No.1291 of 2010 & Sub Appln.No.399 of 2010 1. Srinivasan 2. Murugan .. Appellants in S.A.1078/2006 & Respondents in C.P.1291/2010 (Appellants/Plaintiffs vs. 1. O.G.Janarthanan .. 1st petitioner in C.P.1291/2010 2. O.G.Venkatesan 3. O.G.Jayagopal .. 2nd petitioner in C.P.1291/2010 4. O.G.Viswanathan 5. O.G.Varadharajan 6. Rajamani 7. Kumutha 8. Vasanthi 9. Santhi 10.Bhuvaneswari 11.Badri 12.Sunitha 13.Venkatammal 14.Venkatalakshmi .. 1 to 14 Respondents in S.A.1078/2006/1 to 4 Respondents Plaintiffs 2 to 6 & 8 to 14 This second appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 07.12.2005 in A.S.No.101 of 2004 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Salem confirming the judgment and decree dated 19.12.2003 made in O.S.No.707 of 1990 on the file of the Principal Sub Judge, Salem. Contempt Petition filed under Section 11 of Contempt of Court Act to punish the respondents for willfully committing contempt of the order dated 16.04.2007 passed by this Court in M.P.No.1 of 2007 in S.A.No.1078 of 2006. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ For Appellants in S.A.No.1078/2006 & : Mr.S.V.Jayaraman,Sr.Counsel For Respondents in C.P.No.1291/2010 : for Mr.P.Jagadeesan For R1 to R5, R7 to R11, R13 and R14 in S.A.No.1078/06 & :Mrs.Hema Sampath, Sr.Counsel For Petitioners in C.P.No.1291/2010 for Mrs.R.Meenal Respondents 6 & 7 - No appearance J U D G M E N T This second appeal is focussed by the original plaintiffs animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 07.12.2005 passed in A.S.No.101 of 2004 by the learned Principal District Judge, Salem confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Principal Sub Judge, Salem in O.S.No.707 of 1990. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 2. Compendiously and concisely the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: (a) The plaintiffs who are the appellants herein filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: (i) To permit the petitioners/plaintiffs to sue informa pauperis; (ii) To direct division of the suit properties into 9 equal shares and allot 2 such shares to the petitioners/plaintiffs; (iii) to put the petitioners/plaintiffs in separate possession. (b) The written statement was filed by D2 resisting the suit. The reply statement also was filed by the plaintiffs. (c) Whereupon the trial Court framed the relevant issues. (d) The first plaintiff-Srinivasan examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2-Dhadhagounder and Exs.A1 and A2 were marked. On the side of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B8 were marked. (e) Ultimately the trial Court dismissed the suit, as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ against which appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 3. Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, this Second Appeal has been filed on various grounds inter alia to the effect that both the Courts below failed to take into account the factual as well as the legal issues. 4. The following substantial questions of law are found suggested in the grounds of appeal: "(1) Whether the Lower Courts right in holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to seek for partition of the suit property since the suit property is not their ancestral properties? (2) Whether the Lower Courts right in holding that the suit properties are not ancestral properties? (3) Whether the Lower Courts right in holding that the suit for partition without a prayer for setting aside the sale deed Ex.B8 is not maintainable in law? (4) Whether the Lower Courts right in dismissing the suit in toto, especially when the first defendant had purchased only 1.00 acre of land out of the total 1.25 Acres of land in the suit property? (5) Even assuming without admitting that the sale in favour of first defendant under Ex.B8 is valid, whether or not the plaintiffs entitled to get the remaining, unsold extent of 0.25 acres in the suit property?" (extracted as such) 5. My learned Predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the lower Courts are right in holding that the suit property is not ancestral property of the plaintiffs? (2) In view of the specific admission by D.W.1 that the defendants had agreed to have the sale deed executed only to an extent of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1.00 acre out of 1.25 acres and they have no objection for granting a decree for the balance land of 0.25 acre in favour of the plaintiffs and on the basis of the recitals in the written statement to that effect, whether or not the plaintiffs entitled to get a decree atleast for 0.25 acre of land in the suit property? (3) Whether the lower Courts are right in holding that the suit for partition without a prayer for setting aside the sale deed Ex.B8 is not maintainable in Law? (extracted as such) 6. Heard both sides. 7. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants would put forth and set forth his arguments thus: (a) During trial the first defendant as D.W.1 clearly and categorically deposed as under: "gp/rh/M/8y; xU Vf;fh; fpiuak; bra;Js;nshk;/ g";rhaj;jpy; ngrpa go eh';fs; xg;g[f;bfhz;L 1 1-4 Vf;fUf;F gjpy; xU Vf;fh; nghJk; vd;W Vw;Wf; bfhz;Ltpl;nlhk;/ kPjp fhy; Vf;fh; epyk; Fwp;j;J eh';fs; ghpfhuk; vJt[k; nfl;ftpy;iy/ kPjp me;j fhy; Vf;fh; epyk; Fwpj;J thjpfSf;F jPh;g;g[ Mtjpy; v';fSf;F Ml;nrgid ,y;iy/@ Nevertheless the trial Court as well as the appellate Court failed to take note of it and decree the suit atleast to the extent of 25 cents. (b) As per Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC when a defendant submits to decree, so to say even partly, at any stage of the case it is for the Court to pass a decree based on such admission. However, the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the same and decree atleast to the limited extent. (c) Even though in the memorandum of grounds of appeal filed before the first appellate Court such defects in the judgment and decree of the trial Court were found set out, the appellate Court failed to even consider it. Accordingly, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants would pray for passing a decree atleast to the extent of 25 cents of land, as agreed by D.W.1, in favour of the plaintiffs. 8. By way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellants/plaintiffs, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents/defendants would advance her arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (a) The scope of the suit itself is for partition of 2/9th share in the suit property without adding the necessary parties. Out of the alleged partible estate, only for 2/9th share the plaintiffs filed the suit. Then in that case, they should have added the sharers of the 7/9th share in the alleged partible estate, namely the suit property, but they had not done so. In such a case, by no stretch of imagination the suit framed could be held to be correct. (b) Simply because D.W.1, (D1) a septuagenerian, uttered out certain answers during cross examination, it cannot be tried to be capitalised by the plaintiffs who have not approached the Court with proper suit and by adding proper parties. (c) The claim for 25 cents of land based on the alleged admission of D.W.1 cannot enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs as the plaintiffs are not at all entitled to 25 cents of land and their 2/9th alleged share will not even come to that much extent. (d) When there is concurrent finding of facts by both the Courts below, the question of granting a decree based on such alleged admission by no stretch of imagination could be countenanced. Accordingly, the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents would pray for the dismissal of the Second Appeal. 9. The aforesaid substantial questions of law are taken together for discussion as they are inter linked and inter woven with one another. 10. In view of the specific submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants for decreeing the suit atleast to an extent of 25 cents of land as agreed to by D.W.1 or in the alternative for giving liberty to the plaintiffs to file fresh proceedings incorporating appropriate reliefs and citing necessary parties, I am of the view that a few facts in this regard would be sufficient and I need not ponder over all the details relating to this case. 11.Originally it appears the suit property belonged to three sharers and the plaintiffs' father-Siddhan had 1/3rd share in the suit property and accordingly, narrating a few more facts, the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking partition by adding also the fact that the respondents/defendants herein purchased as per Ex.B8-sale deed, the suit property with improper description and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ specifying excess area. 12. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and incontrovertibly, an arbitration award emerged between the plaintiffs and the contesting respondents/defendants and in that the following extent of property are found agreed to be sold: "Description of property Salem District, Salem Sub Registration District, Salem Town, K Division, third ward, line Andipatti village, T.S.No.807 mitta Survey No.211/1 poramboke punjai extent 0.98 assessment Rs.1.53. S.No.211/2 dry, extent 0.20 asst. Rs.0.31. The property lying west of the land of B.S.S.Bommanna Chettiar vagayara, north of the east west itteri, east of the land belonging to Arumugham and others, and south of the odai the land of Arumugham and others; and the house of Chinnuswami, within these boundaries, the land measuring 420 feet east-west, on the north 433 feet east-west on the south; 160 feet north- south on the east, 124 feet north-south on the west, together with the one well therein and 40 coconut trees, one Eachamaram and all other miscellaneous trees in the said land, (though the property is described to be in Andipatti village, a portion of the same on the north is situate in Annadanapatti village and the area of the land in Annadanapatti village is about 13 cents). The above said property which is subject matter of the agreement now bears the following new T.S.Numbers after taking over the mitta by the Government, viz., Ward H, Block – 25, T.S.13 and Ward H.Block No.27, T.S.No.33/9. The area in T.S.No.13 is 1.09 acres on the eastern side out of 1.27 acres and the area in T.S.No.33/9 is 13 cents immediately north of the above said 1.09 acres and west of the channel." 13. In pursuance of the aforesaid award, Ex.B8-sale deed emerged at the instance of the plaintiffs and others in favour of the respondents/defendants and the description of the property found therein would run thus: @1 tJ mapl;lk; nryk; o nryk; rg; o nryk; lt[d; nf/otpc&d; 3tJ thh;L md;djhdg;gl;o jug;g[ iyd; Mz;og;gl;o fpuhkj;jpy; gHao v!; bek;gh; 922f;F uP/rh;nt brl;oy;bkz;Lgo thu;L vr;/ gpshf; 27 o/v!;/bek;gh; 33-9y; , jw;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJkhd rhFgo tptrha epyk; g{uht[k; ,jw;F mLj;j 2tJ mapl;l brhj;J :?? jdf;fhft[k; jd; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ikdh;fSf;fhft[k; vk;/ rpj;jd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk;/ khhpag;gd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk; ma;ak; bgUkhs; mLj;j ,uz;lhtJ mapl;l brhj;J ? nryk; o nryk; rg; o nryk; lt[d; nf/otpc&d; 6tJ thh;L v!;/ Mz;og;gl;o fpuhkj;jpy; gHao v!; bek;gh; 807f;F uP/rh;nt brl;oy;bkz;Lgo thu;L vr;/ gpshf; 25 o/v!;/bek;gh; 13;f;Fk; rk;ke;jg;gl;l tptrha epyj;jpw;F brf;Fge;jp tpguk; ?? Kdprpgy; fpHnky; ,l;nlhp nuhl;Lf;Fk; tlf;F MwKff;ft[z;lh; tifuhtpw;w epyj;jpw;Fk; bjw;F v';fspl kw;w epyj;jpw;Fk; fpHf;F gp/v!;/gp bghk;kz;z brl;oahu; tifuh tpw;w epyj;jpw;Fk; nkw;F ,jd; kj;jpapy; tlg[uk; fpHnkyo 448 mo bjd;g[uk; fpHnkyo 433 mo fpHg[uk; bjd;tlyo 154 mo nky;g[uk; bjd;tlyo 124 mo ,e;j mst [s;s epyk; g{uht[k; ,jpy; cs;s FtiyVj;jy; Ju!;Jfpzh; xd;Wk;. Jiy xd;Wk;. ,Jfspy; cs;s bjd;idku';fs; 40k; <r;rkuk; xd;Wk; kw;Wk; khtil kutiffs; rfpjKk; nky; bjd;tly; ntypfSk; kw;WKs;s rfy Rje;jpu';fSk; ,Jfspy; V bc&oa{y; ?? c';fps; 1 tf;fkpl;lth; x/$p/bt';fl;luhkbrl;oahh; mila[k; fpua brhj;Jf;F brf;Fge;jp tpguk; ?? Kdprpgy; , l;nlhp nuhl;Lf;Fk; tlf;F MWKff;ft[z;lh; tifuhtpw;w epy';fSf;Fk; bjw;F v';fs; kw;w epyj;Jf;Fk; fpHf;F , d;W ,e;j fpuag;gj;jpug;go c';fspy; 2 yf;fkpl;l x/$p/$dhh;j;jdDf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; gp bc&l;a{y; brhj;Jf;F nkw;F ,jd; kj;jpapy; cs;s rhFgo epyk; tlg[uKk; bjd;g[uKk; fpHnkyo 92 mo nky;g[uk; bjd;tlyo 124 mo fpHg[uk; bjd;tlyo 126 mo ,e;j mst[s;s Rkhh; 0/25 brz;l; tptrharhFgo g[";if epyk; g{uht[k; ,jpy; cs;s bjd;id ?? jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdh;fSf;fhft[k; vk;/ rpj;jd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk;/ khhpag;gd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk; ma;ak; bgUkhs; ku';fSk; khtil kutiffSk; ,e;j brhj;jpy; cs;s fpzh; xd;wpy; thhp tha;f;fhy; tifapYk; 5y; 1 g';F ghj;jpaKk; ,e;j V bc&oa {Yf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ/ ,e;j V bc&oa{y; fpua brhj;J jw;fhy khh;f;fl; epytug;go fpua kjpg;g[ U:/11600/00 gp. bc&l;a{y; c';fspy; 2 yf;fkpl;l X/$p $dhh;j;jdd; mila[k; fpua brhj;Jf;F brf;Fge;jp tptuk; ;/ Kdprpgy; ,l;nlhp nuhl;Lf;Fk; tlf;F MWKfk; tifawh tpw;w epy';fSf;Fk; bjw;F eh';fs; ,d;W ,e;jf; fpuag;gj;jpuk; go c';fspy; 1 yf;fkpl;l X/$p/ bt';fl;luhk brl;oahUf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; V.bc&l;a{y; brhj;Jf;Fk; fpHf;F ,d;W eh';fs; c';fspy; 3 yf;fkpl;l X.$[p/ bt';fnlrDf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; rp/ bc&l;a{y; brhj;Jf;Fk; nkw;F ,jd; kj;jpapy; cs;s rhFgo epyKk; tlg[wKk; bjd;g [wKk; fpHnkyo 88 mo nky;g[wKk; bjd;tlyo 126 mo fpHg[wk; bjd;tlyo 134 mo ,e;j mst[s;s Rkhh; 0/25 brz;L rhFgo epyk; g{uht[k; ,jpy; cs;s bjd;id ku';fSk; kw;w kh til khtif rfpjKk; ,e;j brhj;jpy; cs;s fpzh; xd;wpy; thhptha;f;fhy;tifapYk; 5y; 1 g';F ghj;jpaKk; ,e;j gp/bc&l;a {Yf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ/ ,e;j gp.bc&l;a{y; fpua brhj;J jw;fhy khh;f;fl; epytug;go fpua kjpg;g[ U:gha; 11.600/00 /////// jdf;fhft [k; jd; ikdh;fSf;fhft[k; vk;/ rpj;jd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk;/ khhpag;gd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk; ma;ak; bgUkhs; 11 /////// rp bc&l;a{y; c';fspy; 3 yf;fkpl;l $p/ bt';fnlrd; mila[k; fpua brhj;J tpguk; ;/ Kdprpgy; ,l;nlhp nuhl;Lf;Fk; tlf;F MWKfk; tifuhtpw;w brhj;Jf;Fk; bjw;F eh';fs; ,d;W ,e;j gj;jpuk; K:yk; c';fspy; 2 yf;fkpl;l x/$p/$dhh;jdDf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; gp bc&l;a{y; brhj;Jf;Fk; fpHf;F eh';fs; ,d;W ,e;j gj;jpug;go c';fspy; 4 yf;fkpl;l X/$[p/ b$anghghYf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; gp/bc&l;a{y; brhj;Jf;Fk; nkw;F ,jd; kj;jpapy; cs;s rhFgo epyk; tlg[wKk; bjd;g[wKk; fpH nkyo 81 mo nky;g[wKk; bjd;tlyo 134 mo fpHg[wk; bjd;tlyo 146 mo ,e;j mst [s;s Rkhh; 0/25 brd;l; rhFgo epyk; g{uht[k; ,jpy; cs;s bjd;id ku';fSk; kw;w khtil kutif rfpjk; ,e;j brhj;jpy; cs;s fpzh; xd;wpy; thhptha;f;fhy; tifapYk; 5y; 1 g';F ghj;jpaKk; ,e;j rp/bc&l;a{Yf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ/ ,e;j rp/ bc&l;a{y; fpua brhj;J jw;fhy khh;f;bfl; epytug;go fpua kjpg;g[ U:gha; 11.600/00/ o/bc&l;a{y; c';fspy; 4 yf;fkpl;l X/$p/ b$anfhghyd; mila[k; fpua brhj;J tpguk; ;/ Kdprpgy; , l;nlhp nuhl;Lf;Fk; tlf;F MWKfk; tifuhtpw;w epy';fSf;Fk; bjw;F eh';fs; ,d;W ,e;j gj;jpuk; c';fspy; 5 yf;fkpl;l X/$[p/ tp!;tehjDf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; ,/bc&l;a{y; brhj;Jf;Fk; nkw;F eh';fs; ,e;jg; gj;jpug;go c';fspy; 3 yf;fkpl;l X/$[p/ bt';fnlrDf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; rp bc&l;a{y; rhFgo epyj;Jf;Fk; fpHf;F ,jd; kj;jpapy; cs;s rhFgo epyk; nky;g[uk; bjd;tlyo 146 mo fpHg[uk; bjd;tlyo 132 mo bjd;g[uk; fpHnkyo 87 mo tlg[uk; fpHnkyo nky;g[ukpUe;J fpHg[ukhf 31 mo mjpypUe;J bjd;tlyo 23 mo mjpypUe;J fpHg[uk; 58 mo ,e;j mst[s;s Rkhh; 0/25 brz;L cs;s tptrha rhFgo epyk; g{uht[k; ,jpy; cs;s bjd;id ku';fSk; kw;w khtil kutif rfpjKk; ,e;j brhj;jpy; cs;s fpzh; xd;wpy; thhptha;f;fhy; tifapYk; 5y; 1 g';F ghj;jpaKk; ,e;j o/bc&oa{Yf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ ,e;j o bc&l;a{y; fpua brhj;J jw;fhy khh;f;fl; epytug;go fpua kjpg;g[ U:gha; 11.600/00 /////// jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdh;fSf;fhft[k; vk;/ rpj;jd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk;/ khhpag;gd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk; ma;ak; bgUkhs; //// , bc&l;a{y; c';fspy; 5 yf;fkpl;l x/$p/tp!;tehjd; mila[k; fpua brhj;Jf;F tpguk; ;/ Kdprpgy; ,l;nlhp nuhl;Lf;fk; tlf;F uh$tha;f;fhYf;F bjw;F eh';fs; ,d;W ,e;j gj;jpuk;go c';fspy; 4 tf;fkpl;l x/$p/b$anfhghYf;F fpuak; bra;a[k; o/bc&l;a{y; tptrha epyj;Jf;F fpHf;F gp/v!;/gp bghk;kz;zbrl;oahh; tifuhtpw;F epyj;jpw;Fk; nkw;F ,jd; kj;jpapy; cs;s tptrhaepyk; bjd;g [uk; fpHnkyo 85 mo tlg[uk; fpHnkyo 75 mo nky;g[uk; bjd;tlyo 132 mo fpHg[uk; bjd;tlyo 154 mo ,e;j mst [s;s Rkhh; 0/25 brz;L epyk; g{uht[k; ,jpy; cs;s bjd;id ku';fSk; kw;w khtilkutif rfpjKk; ,e;j brhj;jpy; cs;s fpzh; xd;wpy; thhptha;f;fhy; tifapYk; 5y; 1 g';F ghj;jpaKk; ,e;j ,/ bc&l;a{Yf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ ,e;j ,/ bc&l;a{y; fpua brhj;J jw;fhykhh;f;fl; epytug;go fpua kjpg;g [ U:gha; 11.600/00 i& brhj;Jf;fs; g{uht[k; tptrha rhFgo epyk; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ i& brhj;Jf;fs; bkapd;nuhl;oy; ,Ue;J cs;g[wk; ,l;nlhp nuhl;oy; ,Uf;fpwJ i& fpua brhj;Jf;fs; (5Ie;J bc&l;a{y;) g {uht[k; jw;fhy khh;ffl;epytug;go fpua kjpg;g[ U:gha; 58.000/00 jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdh;fSf;fhft[k; vk;/ rpj;jd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk;/ khhpag;gd; jdf;fhft[k; jd; ikdUf;fhft[k;. vk; ma;ak; bgUkhs;/////@ 14. It so happened that during cross examination of D.W.1 some questions were put by the Advocate for the plaintiffs and ultimately he got an answer as extracted supra. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants such alleged admission or concession was given by D.W.1 unwittingly and without understanding the proper purport of the questions put to him as he was a Septuagenerian. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants, Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case and Ex.B8 cannot be interpreted in such a manner quite antithetical to the clauses found set out therein. 15. A bare perusal of the decree emerged out of the award- Ex.B7 as well as the sale deed-Ex.B8 displays and demonstrates that there are slight discrepancies regarding the extent. The learned Senior Counsel for the defendants would submit that Ex.B8 is a registered sale deed and the plaintiffs are eo nomine parties and in such a case they cannot veer round and take a plea quite antithetical to what they committed themselves in black and white, in the form of Ex.B8 and Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act shall be a bar against them, I would like to agree with the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents/defendants for the reason that once there is a registered sale deed then Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act would enure to the benefit of the vendees and they can insist upon the enforcement of those clauses in stricto sensu. 16. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs would try to explain and expound, clarify and highlight that not even for a moment he would try to point out that the clauses in Ex.B8 should be varied and understood differently, but he would press for placing reliance on the deposition of D.W.1 as extracted supra and consequently for passing a decree to that much limited extent. 17. At this juncture, necessarily one important fact should be considered. I would like to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2010) 4 SCC 753 [Karam Kapahi and others v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and another], certain excerpts from it would run thus: "37. The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about "which there is no controversy" [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the Master of Rolls, in Thorp v. Holdsworth]. 38. In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. Prior to amendment the Rule read thus: "6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admission he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just." 39. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering judges to use it "ex debito justitiae", a Latin term, meaning a debt of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment. 40. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by 'pleading or otherwise in writing' but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression 'or otherwise' is much wider in view of the words used therein namely: 'admission of fact...either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing'. 41. Keeping the width of this provision in mind https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ this Court held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and Ors. v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan SCC at page 285 (para 8) ]. Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas's commentary on the Code, 16th Edition, Volume II, page 2177]. 42. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, this Court, while construing this provision, held that the Court should not unduly narrow down its application as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. 43. In that case it was contended on behalf of the appellant, Uttam Singh Duggal, that: (a) Admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be those which are made in the pleadings. (b) The admissions would in any case have to be read along with the first proviso to Order 8 Rule 5 (1) of the Code and the Court may call upon the party relying on such admission to prove its case independently. (c) The expression 'either in pleadings or otherwise' should be interpreted ejusdem generis. [See para 11, pages 126-127. of the report] Almost similar contentions have been raised on behalf of the Club. In Uttam Singh those contentions were rejected and this Court opined no effort should be made to narrow down the ambit of Order 12 Rule 6. 44. In Uttam Singh this Court made a distinction between a suit just between the parties and a suit relating to Specific Relief Act where a declaration of status is given which not only binds the parties but also binds generations. The Court held such a declaration may be given merely on admission (SCC para 16 at page 128 of the report). But in a situation like the present one where the controversy is between the parties on an admission of non-payment of rent, judgment can be rendered on admission by Court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 45. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code has been very lucidly discussed and succinctly interpreted in a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shikharchand v. Mst. Bari Bai G.P. Singh , J. (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring judgment explained the aforesaid rule, if we may say so, very authoritatively at page 79 of the report. His Lordship held: (AIR para 19) "...I will only add a few words of my own. Rule 6 of Order 12 of the Code of civil Procedure corresponds to Rule 5 of Order 32 of the Supreme Court Rules (English), now Rule 3 of Order 27, and is almost identically worded (see Annual Practice 1965 edition Part I. p. 569). The Supreme Court Rule came up for consideration in Ellis v. Allen (1914) Ch 904. In that case a suit was filed for ejectment, mesne profits and damages on the ground of breach of covenant against sub-letting. Lessee's solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors in which fact of breach of covenant was admitted and a case was sought to be made out for relief against forfeiture. This letter was used as an admission under Rule 5 and as there was no substance in the plea of relief against forfeiture, the suit was decreed for ejectment under that rule. Sargant, J. rejected the argument that the rule is confined to admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 in the same order (same as ours) and said: 'The rule applies wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed.' Rule 6 of Order 12, in my opinion, must bear the same construction as was put upon the corresponding English rule by Sargent, J. The words "either on the pleadings or otherwise" in Rule 6 enable us not only to see the admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to