IN IHE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR IN THE MATTER OF: PETlIlONER/ APPELLANT VERSUS RESPONDENTS NOJ/ RESPDENT No. 1 / 1. RESPONDENT NO.2/ RESPONDENT NO. 2 /2. 2m? /2010 WRIT PETITION (227) NO. D.H. Dcma, S/o Late Shri Ashoncmd Doma, Aged about 50 years, R/b Industrial Ward, Dhamtari, District- Dhomtari, (C.G.) The Estate Officer. South Easl Railwoy Management Compound. W.R.S. Colony, Raipur, Chhattisgarh Union of India, Through Chief Manager, South East Railway. Garden Reach, Kotkata. West Bengal, WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA ON B : Hon’bie Shri Manindra Moha‘ hrivasiava. S n S J. 29-04-201 0 Mr. Ankit Shigial, counsei for the p titioner. ‘ Ms. , v m aushma Ali. counsel fm‘ resp dams on advance copy umier insmiciions from Shri Amit Chaudhari, standing counsel for 1' spondents. By this peti‘cion umier Article 227 the constituiion of inc‘da, petitianer has assaiied kgality and validity of order dated 13/03/2 {0 by which 16 petitionex‘s appeal under Section 9 of the Public Hemises (Eviction of mmuo' orized occupants) Act 197i (for shun ” the Act of 1971") has been dimiissed as barrecvby lit aitation. Leamed counsei for the petitioner makes two fold submissions. The first submission g9; of learneo counsel for the petitioner is that in View or the provisions contained under Section 9. Sub-Section 2(a), the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of pu‘olication of the order under Sub-Section l of Section 5 of the Act of $71. it is submitted that though the order was passed by the Estate Officer ’3 z. [OS/o3, t In. the same was ammo as required by? Section 5 of Sub-Section l. oniy on 8/ 03. He therefore submits that the perioci of limitation would commence only non": $09 '08 and not before that. it is submitteci that the appeal was initially filed on 12/09/08 befo the District Judge. Raipur but later on District Judge, Raipnr vioe its order dated 23/09/08 conned the appeai With iiherty to file the same before the District Judge, Dhamtari wherea er the appeal was presented on 24/‘(19/0'8; before- the District Judge, Dhamtari. The second rnission of learned counsel for the petitioner though assuming that there was delay in ii the appeal, as the petitioner had also moved an appiication under Section 5 of the Limitati Act. 1963, by way of abundant caution iearned Court below was o iiged to consider the 5a s aiso reiied upon the iudgment of Aiiaha‘oad High Court in the case of Farina Nand Vs. District Judge. Mirzapur and others. AIR l9g8, 264. Submission of learned counsel for 1e resnondent is that the perusal of impugned order would show that the District Judge. R ipur returned the appeal on 23/08/0? whereafter l ‘o i oi Learned counsel for the petitioner m . S' ‘ 0 ’ r a mm Wm mmmafga ihe appeai was fiievl before the learned Cont beio‘w afier delay 1 of 2i; M aays 1 anu 1 thermore c appeal was not fiied within the period af iimi ziion prescribed undé‘r ihe law that the finding of ihe leamea‘ Com below t} at the appeai was baned by l.mitation does not suffer from any error much less an error app arent on the record and therefore the petiiion is iiab‘xe to be oismissed. ,/ . A pemsal of impugned order shows that While considemg as to whether the appeal W43 flied within the per.od of limitation or not. iearned Conn below has completely misclireeted itself. A bare perusal of Section 9 of Sub-Section 2(a) shows rhat the appeal is required to be llled within 12 days hjom date of publication of the oréier moor Suh- Section l of Section 5. However. in the entire order, the learned Court below While considerlng the case of the petitioner has cor puted the period of limitation from the date of passing of the order without taking into c Section 9 of Sub-Section 2 (a) of the Act, 19 . tleration the statutory provisions contained in The facts ofthe case are that initial the appeal was filed before the District Judge Raipur. Later on, the same was returned and presented before the Court below. This aspect was not taken into consideration. More , it appears that the petitioner, by way of abundant caution. had moved an applicat imder Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the app al. Though the impugied order records that L. tire L appeal is barred by limitation, there is consideration of petitioner‘s application for condonation of delay. The order does not eflect that any of the grounds raised by the petitioner in the application for condomon f delay were considered. The order does not show that any satisfaction has been recorded at the cause shown for delay is not sufficient. in view of the above discussion, th impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is therefore set aside. Learned Court be ow shall reconsider the entire matter afresh, by taking into consideration the statutory provis ns contained in Section 9 of Sub—Section 2 (a) of the Act and pass appropriate orders in aco'rdanoe with law. Farties shall appear before the Additional District Eudge (ETC), Dhatn ri onlfiih hfwfi i ritVIV/ai'iindra Mohair Sdh §hrivaistava judge \ owl; i—_ t o l 7 i o r i n" i