IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.13976 of 2009 1. JAGDISH PASWAN, Son of Late Bhikhari Paswan. 2. Chandan Kumar, Son of Sri Jagdish Paswan. 3. Chanchala Kumari, Daughter of Sri Jagdish Paswan. 4. Kundan Kumar, minor son of Sri Jagdish Paswan, petitioner no.4 is minor under the guardianship of their father petitioner no.1-Jagdish Paswan. All are resident of permanent resident of village-Kishanpur, P.S.-Bathanaha, District-Sitamarhi, at present C/o-Lalita DEvi, Mohalla-Zeromile, P.S.-Ahiyapur, District-Muzaffarpur. ……………Petitioners. VERSUS 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The District Judge-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Muzaffarpur. 3. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Daya Complex, Aghoriya Bazar, P.S.-Kazi Mohammedpur, District- Muzaffarpur. 4. Sri Arun Kumar Singh, Son of Nageshwar Singh, resident of village-Singrahiya, P.S.-Sahiyara, District-Sitamarhi. ………….Respondents. ----------- 03. 19.01.2010 Learned lawyer for the Respondent Insurance Company is present and both parties have been heard at length. This case really depicts a sorry state of affairs both in respect of the Officers manning the Tribunal as well as Officers (Lawyers) assisting such Tribunal. An application for compensation as a consequence of motor vehicle accident in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was filed by the claimants which was - 2 - registered as Claim Case No. 388 of 2008 before the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal, Muzaffarpur presided by the District Judge, Muzaffarpur. He has non-suited the claimants without proper adjudication virtually on the preliminary issue that the claimants do not reside or work for gain within the jurisdiction of Muzaffarpur Court and further that the amendment to Sub-Section 2 of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act apparently having been deleted, the claimants’ applications could not be entertained at Muzaffarpur. Having heard the parties. Both the grounds can not be sustained. Firstly it must be noticed that Sub-Section 2 to Section 166 was inserted by way of substitution by Amendment Act 54 of 1994. Sub-Section 2 is quoted hereunder :- [(2) Every application under sub-section(1) shall be made, at the opinion of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that where no claim for compensation under section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.] - 3 - A plain reading of Sub-section 2 gives the option to the claimants to file claim before a Tribunal under whose jurisdiction either the accident took place or where the claimant reside or works for business or otherwise or where the defendants reside. Thus seen the place of suing is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal where cause of action arises or the person suing normally resides or where the defendants reside. The first thing that has to be seen is if the defendant resided within the jurisdiction of the Muzaffarpur Claims Tribunal then it is sufficient to maintain claim at Muzaffarpur. That would be irrespective of where the accident took place or where the claimants reside. In the present case it is not in dispute that the defendant was the Divisional Manager of Insurance Company at Muzaffarpur and thus on the simple issue the claim could not be shut out from Muzaffarpur. Learned Judge obviously did not appreciate the provision in the correct prospective. The second ground for rejecting the claim and returning the same is even more curious. As noticed above Sub-section 2 to Section 166 was added by way of substitution giving this extended jurisdiction or right to sue by Amendment Act, 54 of 1994. The amendment was of a permanent nature. The amendment took effect and the newly inserted Sub-section 2 became a permanent part of the - 4 - statute. In 2001 the Repealing and Amendment Act 2001 was passed by the Central Government repealing several such Amending Acts which were on the statute book that included Amendment Act 54 of 1994 as well. The whole purpose of such a Repealing and Amending Act is to remove it from the statute books enactments which have served its purpose and amending act is one of them where amendments having been permanently made to the parent statute, the Amendment Act ceases to serve any purpose and unnecessarily, remains on the statute book. They are thus called Repealing and Amending Act. It is well established that such Acts do not have the effect of repealing the act done under the Act. Thus the amendment already effected as a consequence of the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 is not taken away. In this connection, reference may also be made to Section 6 A of The General Clauses Act, 1897 which is quoted hereunder:- “S.6-A. Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation.-Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.” - 5 - In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P.Singh 11th Edition 2008, the relevant commentary in relation of this provision which explains the whole situation may also be useful, which is quoted hereunder:- “The object of Repealing and Amending Acts is not to bring in any change in law but to remove enactments which have become unnecessary. “Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendment to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence.” The repeal of an amending Act, therefore, has no repercussion on the parent Act which together with the amendments remains unaffected. It was, therefore, held that section 6(1A) introduced in the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, by the amending Act of 1949 was not affected when the amending Act was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952.” It is surprising who instruct the learned Judge on this issue and under what circumstances the learned judge took such a peculiar and curious view in law. Sub-section 2 of Section 166 very much remains on the statute notwithstanding repeal of Amendment Act 54 of 1994. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal is wholly without jurisdiction and is set aside as such. The Tribunal is directed to entertain, adjudicate and decide the claims of the petitioner claim in accordance with law expeditiously on merits preferably within 6 months. At the Bar it is mentioned that a large number of Claims Cases - 6 - have similarly been dismissed by the Muzaffarpur Tribunal on this ground alone. It would be advisable for the Tribunal to recall all such orders and decide the cases afresh on merits expeditiously preferably within 6 months. The writ application is allowed. Shageer/Trivedi (Navaniti Prasad Singh, J.)