1 FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET No. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR Second Appeal No. 617/2006 (Prabhakar Shankarrao Arghode & another VERSUS Bhimrao Rodbaji Ghorse) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Shri S.P. Kshirsagar, counsel for the appellant. Shri A.V. Khare, counsel for the respondent. CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J. DATE : JULY 4, 2008. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The respondent is the original plaintiff. A suit was filed by the plaintiff for possession of the suit property and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had purchased the suit property from defendant Parbatabai on 10.02.1969 for an amount of Rs.2,000/- by a registered sale-deed. The plaintiff was put in possession of the suit property on 10.02.1969 only. It was then pleaded by the plaintiff that there were some proceedings initiated by the plaintiff in the year 1983 under the provisions of Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the defendants had tried to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff. After the orders were passed in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendants were put in possession of the suit property by the plaintiff in the year 1983. 2 Since the defendants were not ready to handover the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff, the plaintiff instituted the suit in the year 1984. The defendants denied the claim of the plaintiff and pleaded that the alleged sale transaction dated 10.02.1969 was not indeed a sale transaction but, the sale-deed was executed as a security towards loan amount of Rs.1,000/- which was advanced by the plaintiff to the defendants. According to the defendants, an amount of Rs.1,000/- was required by the defendants for the performance of the thirteenth day ceremony of the brother of defendant no.2 and the plaintiff, therefore, advanced a loan of Rs.1,000/- to the defendants. According to the defendants, the loan amount of Rs.1,000/- was already refunded to the plaintiffs on 27.04.1970 and 03.05.1972. On the aforesaid pleadings, the defendants sought the dismissal of the suit. Both the Courts concurrently held that the transaction dated 10.02.1969 was an outright sale transaction and was not a loan transaction as pleaded by the defendants. The Courts considered the fact that after the sale-deed was registered on 10.02.1969, the plaintiff applied for mutation of his name in the revenue records and the necessary entries were recorded in the name of plaintiff in the revenue record after issuance of notice to the defendants. The Courts considered the fact that the suit property was recorded in the name of the 3 plaintiff immediately after the registration of the sale- deed. The Courts also observed that though the defendants had proved the payment of Rs.500/- and Rs.400/- to the plaintiff on 27.04.1970 and 03.05.1972 respectively, there was nothing on record to show that the payment of the aforesaid amount had any connection or relation with the execution of the sale-deed dated 10.02.1969. The Courts, therefore, held that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the suit property as the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that he had put the defendants in possession of the suit property in the year 1983. Since the Courts recorded the aforesaid finding, the Courts also held that the defendants failed to prove that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. The findings recorded by both the Courts are pure findings of fact which do not give rise to any substantial question of law. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE APTE