IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Criminal Petition No.6490 of 2008 Between: Sathi Satyanaryana Reddy and another .. Petitioners AND Smt. Sathi Padma and another .. Respondents ORDER: The criminal petition is directed against the proceedings in D.V.C. No.4 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tanuku and respondents 2 and 3 to the domestic violence case sought for quashing of further proceedings against them alleging that after marriage of their son Vishnu Reddy with the 1st respondent herein on 03-02-2006, the 1st respondent herein and Vishnu Reddy led their marital life in England where they and Vishnu Reddy resided and no part of the cause of action for the domestic violence case arose in India. During the visits of the petitioners, who are British citizens, to India on visitors visas, no incident involving any domestic violence had happened and the 1st respondent can claim any reliefs only against her husband and not against the petitioners. The petitioners were, in fact, arrested and released on bail in crime No.53 of 2008 of Attili police station on a complaint by the 1st respondent and continuance of the proceedings is an abuse of process of law. 2. The background for the request of the petitioners had its commencement on 22-09-2008 with a report from the 1st respondent to the protection officer. The 1st respondent herself stated that she was looked after well for a month after the marriage, in Britain by her husband and parents-in-law and it was since then that they were demanding Rs.20,00,000/- from the parents of the 1st respondent. The consequent incidents were alleged to have happened in Britain only and not in India and the 1st petitioner was alleged to have brought back the 1st respondent to India in the second week of June, 2007 and handed over to her father. The complaint also alleged another incident on 17-09-2008 at the place of the petitioners when the father of the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent were claimed to have been abused in foul language and to have been necked out of the house of the petitioners. Similar treatment was claimed to have been extended to the maternal uncle of the 1st respondent. 3. Thus, it is seen, on a close perusal of the contents of the complaint made by the 1st respondent to the protection officer, that except the alleged incident on 17-09-2008, no other relevant incident relating to the matrimonial life of the 1st respondent took place in India and even the allegations made about the events that took place in Britain were omnibus in character against the husband and the parents-in-law without specification or details of the dates on which any specific incident had happened. The events between 03-02-2006, the date of the marriage and 2nd week of June, 2007, the date of return of the 1st respondent to India, thus, were not stated with specifics or details so as to attribute any conduct amounting to an offence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “the Act”) or such conduct as would invite liability for any relief that can be granted against the parents-in-law under any of Sections 18 to 22 of the Act or to any interim relief under Section 23 thereof. The altercation between the parties on 17-09-2008 was not arising out of the matrimonial life of the 1st respondent with her husband, but arose due to the attempt by the 1st respondent and her parents along with her uncles and relatives to question the conduct of the parents-in-law towards her. At any rate, the reliefs sought for in the domestic violence case ultimately appear to be available only against the husband, except may be the request for a protection order under Section 18 of the Act. But when the petitioners are citizens and residents of Great Britain and the 1st respondent is at present a resident of India and even the native place of the petitioners is different from the place of residence of the 1st respondent, any need for any protection order against the petitioners also cannot be even prima facie physically presumed. 4. Sri C. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel brought to notice the different provisions of the Act which may signify that the invocation of the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act would have to have some territorial relevance. The learned counsel apart from referring to Section 1 sub-section (2) extending the Act to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, further referred to the definition of ‘Magistrate’ under Section 2(i) whereunder the Magistrate was defined to mean a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction, among other things, in the area where the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. The learned counsel further referred to the duties and functions of Protection Officers specified in Section 9, which included making a domestic incident report while forwarding copies thereof to the Officer or Incharge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been committed. Such copies were also directed to be provided to the service providers in that area. The learned counsel also referred to the further provision in Section 9 to make available a safe shelter home to the aggrieved person while sending a copy of the report of lodging such person in a shelter home, to the police station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the shelter home is situated. Similar reference is also made to sub-section (1) (g) of Section 9 of the Act, whereunder any copy of a medical report has to be forwarded by the Protection Officer to the police station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. It is true that Section 27 of the Act provides for jurisdiction of the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate within the local limits of which the person aggrieved or the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or where the cause of action has arisen and even a cause of action, which has arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, may be possibly construed to be within the jurisdiction of a Magistrate with reference to the residence or business or employment of the person aggrieved or the respondent. But still the provision, in the view of the learned counsel, has to be read together with the other provisions of the Statute, which make a specific reference to the area where the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. Sri C. Praveen Kumar emphasizes that Section 28 of the Act, which provides for procedure for the proceedings under the Act, makes them be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereunder the local jurisdiction of criminal Courts at different levels was required to be specified by statutory notifications under different provisions. The learned counsel also invited attention to Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which mandates that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed, and also Section 188 thereof which provides for offences committed outside India by citizens of India being subject to trial at any place in India at which he may be found. The said provision enables any offences by a non-citizen to be triable in India only if such non-citizen commits such an offence on any ship or aircraft registered in India. While the petitioners herein are citizens of United Kingdom, the enabling provision under Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot come to the rescue of the 1st respondent and Sri Praveen Kumar further referred to the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006, which made similar references to the local limits of jurisdiction and area of committal of domestic violence in Rule 5. 5. The contention of the learned counsel in this regard about any culpable conduct, which may provide cause of action for claiming a relief under the Act, committed outside India by a person who is not a citizen of India being not subject to any proceedings under the Statute, has considerable force. But no final expression of opinion need be made in this behalf in this particular case wherein the allegations about the conduct of the parents-in-law, who are citizens in United Kingdom, were vague, general and indefinite without any specifics and where the sole incident, which was alleged to have happened in India, cannot be considered to have any relevance to the matrimonial or domestic life of the 1st respondent. The continuance of the domestic violence case against the petitioners under such circumstances, more so, when the other reliefs could not have been claimed against the petitioners, and grant of any protection order against the petitioners will be an empty formality, will be a travesty of justice. Under the circumstances, the further proceedings have to be quashed against the petitioners. 6. Therefore, the further proceedings in D.V.C. No.4 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tanuku against the petitioners are quashed and the criminal petition is allowed accordingly. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 12-10-2011 Svv