1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. WRIT PETITION NO.3154 OF 2009. 1. Dilip S/o.Ramkrushna Deshmukh, aged about 53 years, Occu.: Business, 2. Diwakar S/o.Ramkrushna Deshmukh, aged about 50 years, Occu.: Business, Both R/o. Dighori, Umred Road, Nagpur (M.S.) .. PETITIONER/S. VERSUS 1. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Department of State Excise, Maharashtra State, Mantralaya, Mumbai. 2. The Collector, State Excise, Maharashtra State, Nagpur (M.S.) 3. Smt. Kamal Wd/o. Santosh Rewatkar, r/o. Pragati Colony, Umred Road, Nagpur. .. RESPONDENT/S. _______________________________________________________________________ Office Notes, Office Memoramda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders of directions Court's or Judge's orders. and Registrar's Orders. ______________________________________________________________________________ Shri S.G.Jagtap, Advocate for Petitioners. Shri P.D.Kothari, A.G.P. for Respondents No.1 & 2. Shri B.B.Hatware h/f. Shri Ingole, Advocate for Respondent No.3. CORAM : R.C.CHAVAN, J. DATED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2009. 1. This petition by two brothers is mainly directed against respondent No.2 Collector’s upholding trivial objections of respondent No.3, their sister, which prevents the petitioners from continuing with CL-III licence, granted to their father. 2 2. The petitioners had once approached the Minister by filing an appeal under Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act against the order passed by the Collector on 14th January, 2008, whereby the Collector had suspended the licence of the petitioners. The Hon’ble Minister had observed that since the petitioners had agreed to give share of profit to respondent No.3 Smt. Kamal, the licence was transferred in the name of the petitioners and respondent No.3. The petitioners were directed to remit share of profit to respondent No.3 by Demand Draft in every three months. 3. On 6th July, 2009 Superintendent, State Excise had dealt with the complaint of respondent No.3 and had observed that respondent No.3 was making false complaints which would not be acted upon in future. He had also warned the petitioners about suspicious statements of accounts submitted by them. It appears that the petitioners and respondent No.3 did not submit any partnership deed to the Collector and eventually on 24th July, 2009 the Collector passed the impugned order suspending licence in favour of the petitioners. It cannot be disputed that before passing this order after 6th July, 2009 no hearing was held. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the alternate remedy under Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act cannot be a bar to invoke jurisdiction of this Court by filing the writ petition, since the principles of natural justice were not followed before passing the impugned order. He has also relied on a judgment of this Court in Nilesh Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 1991 Mh.L.J. 770 to support his contention that in such a case the petition ought to be entertained. Paragraph 4 of the judgment, on which the learned counsel placed reliance, reads as under : 3 “4. To take up the last point first, section 137 provides the remedy of an appeal to a person aggrieved by orders passed by any Prohibition Officer, Collector or Commissioner. In the present case, against the order of the 2nd respondent, the petitioner could have gone in appeal to the State Government. However, the petitioner could have gone in appeal to the State Government. However, Exh. A which is the impugned order, gives the impression of the 2nd respondent acting in consonance with the policy formulated by the State Government. If that be correct, and, on that subject there is no dissenting voice from the respondents, the remedy of preferring an appeal against the impugned order to the State Government would be something in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. When the authorities speak of a person taking recourse to Article 226 only after exhausting other remedies, what they contemplate on the subject of other remedies, are remedies which are meaningful and capable of rendering relief unto him. In the present case the 2nd respondent purports to speak the mind of the State Government and therefore, driving the petitioner to approach the State Government against the impugned order, would be of no assistance. Consequently, this point raised on behalf of the respondents has to be negatived.” 5. It may be seen that the observations in paragraph 4, reproduced above, have absolutely no application to the present case. It is not a case of appeal from Caesar to Caesar. In this case, the “Caesar” had held in favour of the petitioners and therefore, the petitioners need not have any apprehension that they would be knocking the door which would not open. 6. Therefore, since, alternate remedy is available where too the ground of violation of principles of natural justice can be raised, invocation of writ jurisdiction would not be called for. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. JUDGE RR.