IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.11090 of 2008 SHAKUNTLA KUMARI, W/O DR. RAMASHISH SINGH, R/O BODH BIHAR COLONY, P.O.-BAHADURPUR HOUSING COLONY, P.S.-AGAMKUAN, DISTRICT- PATNA. …………PETITIONER. Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR. 2. DIRECTOR, SECONDARY EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, NEW SECRETARIAT, PATNA. 3. DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, PATNA. 4. PRINCIPAL, GOVERNMENT MIDDLE SCHOOL, NOZAR KATRA, GULZARBAGH, PATNA CITY. …………RESPONDENTS. ----------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Vivek Prasad, Adv. For the State : Mrs.Archana Sinha, AC to SC-12. ----------- 3 15.10.2011 Records show that by order of the District Superintendent of Education dated 12.08.1994, as contained in Annexure-4, petitioner was put under suspension in contemplation of a departmental inquiry, on the charge of having committed dereliction of her duties in revision of the electoral roll. Annexure-7, an order of the District Superintendent of Education dated 20.05.2006, shows that petitioner’s suspension was revoked and she was directed to join her duties in the school. However, in spite of revocation of suspension her salary and dues of subsistence allowance 2 was not paid to her. Hence she filed this writ application. It appears that during the pendency of this writ application final orders were passed in the proceeding by the District Superintendent of Education, through his order contained in memo no.7274 dated 15.12.2008, a copy whereof is Annexure-A to the counter affidavit, by which she was released from the departmental proceeding with the punishment that for the period of suspension she shall not be paid anything towards her salary except the subsistence allowance. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the order of punishment was passed only in respect of withholding her full salary of the suspension period, except the subsistence allowance, the same had to be treated as passed in terms of the provisions of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code. He places reliance on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. [2006 (4) PLJR 514] followed by this Court in the case of Chakradhar Das Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. [2007 (3) 3 PLJR 835] to contend that whenever a punishment of withholding of entire salary of suspension period is passed the same must comply with the Principles of Natural Justice. A counter affidavit has been filed in the case and learned counsel for the respondents submits that petitioner did not cooperate in the proceeding which delayed it and hence order of punishment has been passed for withholding of full salary of the suspension period. The conduct of the petitioner during her suspension period and in the departmental proceeding is not relevant for consideration of the question raised by learned counsel for the petitioner in this case. The Division Bench of this Court has clearly held that since the withholding of full salary of suspension period amounts to a punishment under Rule 97, a separate show cause notice and opportunity to be heard has to be given to the delinquent before such punishment could be imposed. The observations of the Division Bench made in Paragraph 9 of the judgment is appropriate 4 to be reproduced hereinbelow for easy reference:- “Apart from these questions, so far the main question for which this matter has been referred, is concerned, it appears that for imposing the punishment no.(iii) that the petitioner shall not get anything for the period of suspension save and except the subsistence allowance, the disciplinary authority was required to give separate show cause notice to the delinquent in terms of Rule 97(3) of the Code. This part of the order, therefore, is not permissible in absence of any such notice to the delinquent employee.” Admittedly, the order of withholding of full salary of the petitioner of the suspension period is without any notice to the petitioner in this regard. In the circumstances, that part of the order of punishment, as contained in Annexure-1, by which full salary of the petitioner of the suspension period has been denied to her, is quashed. The respondents will be at liberty to issue notice to the petitioner, if they so desire, in the matter, giving her reasonable opportunity to be heard and then only will be at liberty to pass a fresh 5 order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, after the petitioner joined in 2006, on the suspension being revoked, her pay scale was not revised with consequent payment of monetary benefits thereof, although, vide Annexure-9 series, the District Education Officer has accepted that the petitioner is entitled for revised pay scale. It is obvious that once petitioner has joined her duties after revocation of her suspension, she is entitled to all the benefits of service including the fixation of her pay scale and its revision in accordance with law. The writ application is disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. Arvind/ ( J.N. Singh, J.)