RSA 26/2001 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE UB SAHA The instant second is filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the judgment of r eversal dated 22nd December 2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Div. Kar imganj in Title Appeal No. 42 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the learned Civil J udge set aside the judgment dated 30.09.1997 followed by a decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jr. Div., Karimganj in Title Suit No. 43 of 1993. Heard Mr. BR Dey, learned senior counsel assisted by Md. MH Rajb arbhuiyan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. GN Sahewa lla, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms S Senapati, learned counsel for the r espondents. Facts needed to be discussed are as follows:- Appellant-plaintiffs is the owner of the second schedule land wh ich is included in the first schedule of the plaint of the original owner Lt. Ta iyab Ali, who was the father of the plaintiff-appellants and the respondent - de fendant Nos. 1 and 2 leaving behind his wife and six sons. After the death of Ta iyab Ali, deceased father they started possessing the land after inheriting the same by mutual partition and the second schedule land fell in the share of the p laintiff-appellants but the plaintiff become very much apprehensive on receiving information that the defendant-respondent (for short defendant) in collusion wi th the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 started a propaganda and if it happens the defenda nt would incur irreparable loss. The plaint has been subsequently amended and stated that a forge d document has been prepared in the name of the defendant which is void and ille gal. Hence, the suit is filed for cancellation of the sale deed dated 01.08.1969 and confirmation of the possession by restraining the appellant permanently fro m interfering with right, title and possession over the 2nd schedule land. The defendant, respondent No. 3 herein contested the suit by fil ing written statement and pleaded therein that no cause of action arose for fili ng the suit and the same is also bad for nonjoinder of necessary party as well a s barred by the law of limitation. It is further stated in the written statement that second schedule land has been purchased by the respondent No. 3 from the r espondent Nos. 1 and 2, who are the brothers of the plaintiffs, and their mother on 01.08.1969 and got delivery of possession and since then the defendant No. 3 has been possessing the land without any interruption. While the defendant No. 3 has been enjoying the possessory right, there was a resettlement operation and the patta has been issued in the name of the defendant-respondent No. 3. it is also pleaded that the defendant No. 3 is bonafide purchaser who became the owner by virtue of purchase and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. After considering the pleadings of both the sides, the trial cou rt framed the following issues:- (i) Whether there is a cause of action for the suit? (ii) Whether the 2nd schedule land is under the 1st schedule land of the plai nt? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are possessing the 2nd schedule land by way of am icable partition? (iv) Whether the suit land is ancestral property of the plaintiff? (v) To what relief or reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled to get? Additional Issue (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get decree as prayed for? The Court below after deciding these issues decreed the suit vide judgment date 25.09.1997 in Title Suit No. 43/93. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of the trial court, the defendant-responden t No. 3 herein, preferred an appeal before the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Div. Kar imganj which was registered as Title Appeal No. 42 of 1997. Learned appellate co urt after hearing the parties set aside the judgment and decree passed by the le arned trial court stating inter alia, that as revealed from the evidence, all th e respondents attained maturity by the year 1972 and in fact they are living tog ether which is very much evident from Exhibit-A by which all the brothers togeth er sold land to Pramila Rani Sankar and that was in the year 1977. The suit as s uch is also hit by Article 6 of the Limitation Act. The learned Trial Court further stated in its judgment that though exhibit B is challenged as forged document, no evidence is produced to prove that it is forge d or collusive document. The plaintiff-appellants also did not produce the respo ndent Nos. 1 and 2, to negative Exhibit B because the signatures of the responde nt Nos. 5 and 6 have also been identified and proved by the DW2, but the same ha s not been done. Before concluding the judgment the learned Appellate Court also stated t hat the learned Trial Court did not consider Exhibit C the Katcha patta nor cons idered exhibit A, the sale deed of 1977 nor considered the witnesses of any of t he witnesses of either side and decreed the suit on wrong assumption that the re spondent filed suit for confirmation of possession and so there is no need to de cide who is actually possessing the land in question. This Court while admitted the appeal formulated the following substantial questi ons of law :- (i) Whether the finding of the lower appellate court that there was no amica ble partition amongst the brothers (plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1 and 2) i s tenable in the face of the admission of the defendant in the written statement about the amicable partition? (ii) Whether the ground for disbelieving the plaintiffs’ witnesses are releva nt? (iii) Whether the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) erred in law by wrongly i nterpreting the contents of Exhibit-B the sale deed by which the defendant No. 3 purchased an areas of .33 decimal only out of the entire land measuring .92 dec imals? Mr. Dey while attacking the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate cour t would contend that the appellate court decided the appeal wrongly basing on th e findings of the trial court on issue No. 3. He also tried to convince this Cou rt that the appellate court failed to consider that there was amicable settlemen t amongst the brothers and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have had no right to sell the share of the present appellants. Mr. Sahewalla while supporting the impugned judgment would contend that the subs tantial questions formulated by this court cannot be considered to be substantia l questions of law. At best these questions can be considered as questions of la w and for filing a second appeal, the appellants are bound to satisfy the court that there are some substantial questions of law involved in the matter. He furt her submits that when the mother of the appellants sold the land to the responde nt No. 3, defendant therein, have no right to raise the question regarding the s ale deed on a subsequent date after attaining their majority and thus the learne d Appellate Court after discussing the evidence on record rightly held that the evidence of DWs have also not been discussed by the trial court below. It appears from the record that the DW1, i.e. the respondent No. 3 herein, in hi s statement specifically stated that he purchased the land from respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and from their mother Chaya Bibi who sold the land for the interest of t he family. The original sale deed was marked by the trial court as Exhibit B. It further appears from the record that since the purchase of the land as mentione d in Exhibit B the respondent No. 3 has been possessing the same and during the settlement operation of 1981, the revenue official while visited the locality fo und him in possession of the land and he also produced Exhibit B to the official s and on perusal of the same the settlement authority issued katcha khatian in f avour of him for the land mentioned in Exhibit B and the said patta has also bee n exhibited as Exhibit C. Though the appellant plaintiff suggested DW1 in his cross that in the sale deed their mother Chaya Bibi did not put her thumb impression but did not raise and q uestion regarding the signature of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, meaning thereby the appellants accepted the signature of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as well as the sal e deed. After going through the entire judgment of the learned appellate court this Cour t is of considered opinion that the learned appellate court did not commit any w rong while setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial cou rt mainly discussing issue No. 3. This court is of further opinion that no substantial question of law is raised b y the appellants and Mr. Sahewalla very rightly pointed out that the substantial questions of law formulated by this Court are not substantial questions of law, rather they are questions of fact and in a second appeal the appellate court ha s no right to consider the questions of fact. Court can interfere with an appell ate judgment in a second appeal when there is substantial question of law involv ed. The trial court committed error and the learned appellate court rightly inte rfered with it. In view of the above, the instant appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. No order as to costs.