IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.RAMULU W.P.Nos.15650, 15664 and 15857 of 2003 WRIT PETITION No.15650 of 2003 Between: The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad, rep by Commissioner ..... PETITIONER AND 1 P. Srinivas Yadav, S/o. P. YadagiriYadav C/o. P. Raghurapuri Road No.4, R/o. 7-105/1, Madhurapuri, Road No.4, Dilsuknagar, Hyderabad. 2 The Govt. of A.P. rep by its Secretary Municipal Administration & Urban Development, Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad - 22. 3 The Industrial Tribunal-1, Hyderabad. A.P. ....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue appropriate writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF CERTIORARI calling for the records relating to and in connection with the award dated 31-12-2002 passed in I.D.No.19/01 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad. A.P. and set aside the same. Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr.R.RAMACHANDRA REDDY Counsel for the Respondents: The Court made the following : COMMON ORDER: In all these three Writ Petitions, common questions of law and fact arise for consideration; therefore, they are being disposed of by this common Order. It appears, respondents/workmen were engaged by the petitioner-Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad on daily wage basis as Section Writers and were entrusted with census work. It was the case of the respondents/workmen that their services were terminated abruptly/orally without following the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 (for short ‘the Act’). Therefore, they raised a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad under Section 2-A(2) of the Act, Petitioner-management raised an objection as to the very maintainability of the petitions under Section 2-A(2) of the Act stating that the Municipal Corporation is not an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act and, therefore, the applications under Section 2-A(2) of the Act are not maintainable. However, the fact that the respondents/workmen had completed 240 days of service in the calendar year preceding the date of their termination was not disputed. Under those circumstances, the Tribunal held that the petitioner-management is an ‘industry’ within the meaning Section 2(j) of the Act. Further, while terminating the services of the workmen, the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F and G were not followed and thus directed reinstatement of the workmen afresh without continuity of service and without any back wages. Aggrieved thereby, the present Writ Petitions are filed. While admitting the Writ Petitions, interim stay of the impugned Awards was granted on condition of the petitioner-Management paying the wages as per the provisions of Section 17-B of the Act. It is given to understand that the provisions of Section 17-B were complied with. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the Municipal Corporation is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act; therefore, the very petitions under Section 2-A(2) of the Act are not maintainable and thus going into other questions, such as, violation of provisions of Section 25-F & G does not arise. Whereas, learned counsel for the respondent-workmen supported the impugned Awards passed by the Tribunal and stated that the Tribunal has not committed any error calling for interference of this Court under Article 226 Constitution, particularly, in a case of this nature where it was found that there was a violation of mandatory provisions of Section 25-F & G of the Act and granted only the relief of reinstatement afresh. I have given my earnest consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the impugned Award and other material made available on record. The Tribunal while dealing with the aspect as to whether the petitioner- Corporation is an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act and whether the 1st respondent is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act has elaborately dealt with the matter and while relying upon the judgment reported in BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD v. A. RAJAPPA held that the petitioner-management is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) the Act and the respondent is a ‘workman’ as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. I am of the opinion that these are all settled principles of law. If the Municipal Corporation engages any person on daily wage or contingent basis, unless he is governed by the Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution, he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, and Municipal Corporation is an ‘industry’. The Management has not asserted that the service conditions of the respondent-workmen are governed by the Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution and, therefore, it is a civil post. Under these circumstances, the findings recorded by the Tribunal that the petitioner is an ‘industry’ and the 1st respondent is a ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act cannot be disturbed. Insofar as the finding that the respondent/workmen had worked for more than 240 days is concerned, there is no dispute about the same. Therefore, the findings recorded against point No.2 that there was a gross violation of mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot be said to be either arbitrary or illegal. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not made out any case calling for interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Writ Petitions are devoid of merits and are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs 15-4-2008 prk