CR.A/1619/2003 1/17 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1619 of 2003 For Approval and Signature: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.P.DHOLAKIA HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE DN PATEL ========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ========================================================= DEEPAK ALIAS DEEPO GOVINDBHAI VIDYADHAR - Appellant Versus STATE OF GUJARAT - Opponent ========================================================= Appearance : MR HRIDAY BUCH for the Appellant. MR AJ DESAI, APP for the Opponent. ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.P.DHOLAKIA and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE DN PATEL Date : 24/10/2008 CR.A/1619/2003 2/17 JUDGMENT CAV JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.PATEL) 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgement and order of conviction and sentence dated 19th November,2003 passed by learned Additional City Sessions Judge, Court No.9, Ahmedabad city in Sessions Case No.103 of 2002 and Sessions Case No.194 of 2002, whereby the present appellant, who is original accused no.1 has been held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/-. The appellant is also convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default, further sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of one month, for the offence punishable under Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. Rest of the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and had been acquitted. Against this order, the original accused No.1- appellant has preferred this appeal. 2. Necessary brief facts of the case, are as under: (i) As per prosecution, the incident has taken place on 26th September,2001 between 10:30 to 11:00 a.m.. The present appellant caused injuries by a sharp cutting CR.A/1619/2003 3/17 JUDGMENT instrument (Gupti) to Bharatbhai Amrutbhai Patel. The present appellant chased the deceased and the incident had taken place at nearby Nehrubridge, over river Sabarmati at Ahmedabad. The present appellant was caught red handed and was handed over to Ellisbridge Police Station. The witness, who had seen the whole incident is an advocate practising in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. The deceased had received injuries on left side of the chest. Size of wound is 1.5 cm x 0.75 cm and the depth of injury was 9 cm, as per deposition of doctor, especially in para-11. Investigation was over and charge-sheet was filed and Sessions Case No.194 of 2002 was registered against the present appellant and upon evidence of witnesses, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced for the offence of murder of Bharatbhai Amrutbhai Patel and against this order of conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been preferred. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, who has submitted that the so called eye-witnesses are chance witnesses and had not seen the incident. There is no other eye-witness to the incident and, therefore, offence is not proved against the present appellant. There was only one injury to the deceased. There was no previous animosity and there was no preplanned and well designed action of murder and, therefore the case of the CR.A/1619/2003 4/17 JUDGMENT appellant ought to be considered under Part-II of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and the order of conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. We have heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State, who has submitted that the present appellant was caught red handed by the eye- witnesses and other witnesses. The appellant was taken to Ellisbridge Police Station of city of Ahmedabad. Looking to the deposition of P.W.No.1, who is an advocate, he has clearly narrated the whole incident. His presence is natural one. He has seen the whole incident, while going to the Metropolitan Magistrate Court from over Nehrubridge, over river Sabarmati, Ahmedabad. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that though P.W.No.2, who is also an advocate, turned hostile, looking to his deposition at Exh-25, there are several corroborations to the material facts narrated by eye- witness P.W.No.1 at Exh-24. Though other panch witnesses have turned hostile, it is stated by learned Additional Public Prosecutor that by the evidence of police witness namely Ojas Nagendrabhai Majmudar, PW-20 at Exh-69, discovery of weapon has been proved and looking to FSL report, there is enough corroboration to the eye-witness P.W.No.1. Ld.Additional Public Prosecutor further CR.A/1619/2003 5/17 JUDGMENT submitted that looking to the deposition given by Dr.Saumilbhai Premchand Merchant PW-10 at Exh-47, the injury was caused by a sharp cutting instrument (Gupti), on the vital part of the body of the deceased. Injury was on the chest of the deceased. The depth of the injury was 9 cm. As per para-11 of the deposition of the Doctor, injury was so forceful and vigorous, that the heart of the deceased was penetrated and left side lung of the deceased was also penetrated. This injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature, to cause death of the deceased. Injury was possible by the weapon discovered at the beheast of the present appellant. Thus, by this evidence also, there is enough corroboration to the eye- witness P.W.No.1 and, therefore, Trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. No error has been committed by the Trial Court in appreciating the evidence as offence of murder has been proved beyond reasonable doubt against the present appellant and, therefore, the order of conviction may not be altered or quashed by this Court. 5. We have heard learned counsel for both the sides, who have read and re-read the evidence on record. It appears from the deposition of P.W.No.1, who is advocate and an eye-witness of the incident, which had taken place on 26th September,2001, that when he was going CR.A/1619/2003 6/17 JUDGMENT to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, he had seen the incident, which had taken place between 10:30 a.m. to 11.00 a.m. P.W.No.1 namely Hemantbhai Muljibhai Parikh, who is an advocate, while passing from over Nehrubridge, over Sabarmati river in city of Ahmedabad, had seen the whole incident. He has narrated in his deposition that it is the present appellant, had caused injuries by a sharp cutting instrument (Gupti). Injuries were caused on the chest of the deceased. After seeing the incident, this witness shouted and chased the present appellant. P.W.Nos.1 and 2 were going together on scooter. Thereafter, the present appellant was caught and, ultimately, he was handed over to police at Ellisbridge Police Station. There were some dispute as to the boundary of Naranpura Police Station and Ellisbridge Police Station, but, the fact remains that this witness has seen the incident. There is a clear narration of weapon. Injuries were caused at the chest of the deceased and the appellant was caught red handed. Looking to the deposition given by this witness, very natural is the deposition given by P.W.No.1. Very candidly, he has narrated the whole incident without exaggeration. He has stated that he cannot identify the appellant in the Court, but, the appellant was caught immediately after the incident and was handed over to the police. Looking to the cross-examination of this witness, nothing is CR.A/1619/2003 7/17 JUDGMENT taken away or shaken from his examination-in-chief. Thus, presence of this witness is natural at the time of scene of offence and who has given clear deposition without omissions and contradictions and without any exaggeration. It appears that he is a trustworthy witness. 6. Looking to the deposition given by Niranjanbhai Muljibhai Soni, P.W.No.2 at Exh.25, it appears that he has turned hostile. He is a lawyer, who is practising in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate. P.W.Nos.1 and 2 were going on scooter to the Court via Nehrubridge, over river Sabarmati. Though he turned hostile, looking to his deposition, he has admitted several facts, which provide corroboration to P.W.No.1 – eye-witness. This witness corroborates about scene of offence. He has also seen the weapon. He has also seen that the injured had fallen down. He had also seen the appellant running away. He had also seen some persons taking assaulter to the Ellisbridge Police Station. Thus, except giving name of the present appellant, he has narrated the whole incident, like eye-witness – P.W.No.1. This witness has provided corroboration to the material facts narrated by eye-witness P.W.No.1. 7. Looking to the deposition given by Dr.Saumilbhai Premchadbhai Merchant – P.W.No.10 at Exh-47, who has CR.A/1619/2003 8/17 JUDGMENT performed postmortem of the deceased Bharatbhai Amrutbhai Patel, he has narrated injuries in column no.17 of the postmortem note, as under : (i) Stab wound seen on front of lower part of left side of chest, 13 cm left lateral to Midline and 9 cm below & 1.5 cm lateral from the left nipple. - Size of wound is 1.5 cm x 0.75 cm, cavity and deep vertical - Both angle acute and sharply cut edges. (ii) Two abrasing of 0.5 x 0.5 cm Each on palmer aspect of right thumb, red in colour. Looking to column No.20, Internal injuries were found corresponding to External injuries. It has been narrated by Doctor that left lung has been pierced through and through pierces the lower part of upper lobe of left lung. Injury has also pierced the apex of heart. Thus, left lung and heart both were pierced by this stab wound. Injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature, to cause death to the deceased. Looking to this postmortem note, which is at Exh-48, Dr.Saumilbhai Merchant, P.W. No.10 at Exh-47, has provided enough corroboration to P.W.Nos.1 and 2. It has been narrated by P.W.No.10 that the injury can be caused by weapon shown to him. CR.A/1619/2003 9/17 JUDGMENT 8. Looking to F.S.L. Report at Exh- 79, blood was found upon the weapon and it was of the same group of the deceased. Panchnama of discovery of weapon at Exh-70 has been proved by the deposition of P.W.No.20 namely Ojas Nagendrabhai Majmudar, who is Investigating Officer. Looking to the deposition of P.W.No.20, he has proved the panchnamas especially panchnama of weapon discovered at the beheast of the appellant. Thus, looking to the deposition of prosecution witness, it appears that P.W.No.1 is eye-witness, who is an advocate, who has seen the incident, which had taken place between 10:30 a.m. to 11 a.m.. It is the present appellant, who had caused injuries on the chest of the deceased by a sharp cutting instrument (Gupti). Thereafter, P.W.No.1 had chased the appellant and he was caught red handed and ultimately accused was handed over to the Ellisbridge Police Station. Looking to his deposition and other evidence, he is a trustworthy witness. Though P.W.No.2 has turned hostile, enough corroboration has been provided by this witness. He has also narrated that the deceased was assaulted by a sharp cutting instrument (Gupti). Thereafter, assaulter had run away. He was chased, caught and handed over to the police. Thus, without giving name of the appellant, every fact has been proved by this P.W.No.2. Though, he has been declared hostile, there is enough corroboration by his deposition to the deposition CR.A/1619/2003 10/17 JUDGMENT given by eye-witness P.W.No.1. Also, looking to the deposition of the Doctor, who is P.W.No.10 at Exh-47, who has performed postmortem of the deceased, which is at Exh-48, the injury has been caused on the vital part of the body. He has narrated in detail the nature of injuries in column Nos. 17 and 20 of the postmortem note. Length, width and depth have also been narrated by him. The injury was so severe that pierced left lung as well as heart and, therefore, injured was done to death. Injury was sufficient, in ordinary course of nature, to cause death of the deceased. Looking to the deposition of P.W.No.20, who is Investigating Officer, he has proved various panchnamas including panchnama of discovery of weapon at Exh-70, at the beheast of the appellant and looking to the F.S.L.report, there was a presence of blood group “B” upon the weapon, which was of the deceased. 9. As a cumulative effect of these evidence and looking to the evidence of eye-witnesses, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt, that the present appellant has committed murder of Bharatbhai Amrutbhai Patel. No error has been committed by the Trial Court in appreciating the evidence. It has been vehemently submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that there was only one blow given by the appellant and, therefore, CR.A/1619/2003 11/17 JUDGMENT case of the present appellant falls under Part-II of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. We are unable to accept this contention of learned counsel for the appellant mainly for the reason that looking to the nature of injury, as per postmortem note and deposition of Dr.Saumilbhai Merchant, PW No.10 at Exh-47, the injury was 2 cm x 0.75 cm on the chest of the deceased, it was a stab wound. The depth of the injury was 9 cm, as per Para-11 of deposition of Doctor at Exh-47, which has penetrated lower part of upper lobe of left lung and it also pierced the apex of heart. Thus, both lung as well as heart were penetrated by this stab injury and this injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased, as per column No.33 of the postmortem note. Looking to nature of injury and depth of injury, it must have been given with all force and vigour. 10. In view of these facts, the present appellant had committed murder of the deceased, as per clause thirdly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. V/s. Virendra Prasad, reported in AIR 2004 SC 1517, as under: “7. The academic distinction between "murder" and "culpable homicide not amounting to murder" has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and CR.A/1619/2003 12/17 JUDGMENT meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences : Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done- Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done? INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. CR.A/1619/2003 13/17 JUDGMENT 8. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the "intention to cause death" is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300. 9. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a first-blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words "likely to cause death" occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one CR.A/1619/2003 14/17 JUDGMENT of degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probability as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury......... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 13. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at page 468) : "The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion." 14. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case (supra) for the applicability of clause "thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300, IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to CR.A/1619/2003 15/17 JUDGMENT cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, from the aforesaid judgement, it has been held that intention to cause death is not an essential requirement of clause (2), but, intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause of Section 300. It has also been held in this judgement that only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause thirdly of Section 300 of Indian Penal Code. It has been argued by learned counsel for the appellant that in fact, P.W.No.1 is a chance witness and, therefore, his presence is doubtful and, therefore, conviction cannot be based upon sole evidence of PW No.1. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that this witness is a natural witness. His presence at the scene of offence is also a natural one. P.W.No.1 was a practising advocate. While going to CR.A/1619/2003 16/17 JUDGMENT Metropolitan Magistrate's Court between 10:30 a.m. to 11 a.m., he had seen the incident. He had seen the present appellant causing injuries by a sharp cutting instrument (Gupti). Injured had fallen down. Thereafter, the present appellant had run away and was chased by P.W.No.1 and, thereafter, he was caught red handed and was handed over to Ellisbridge Police Station. Looking to his cross- examination also, nothing is coming out in favour of the appellant. On the contrary, there is enough corroboration by the evidence of P.W.No.2, P.W.No.10 and P.W.No.20 to the deposition of P.W.No.1. Thus, P.W.No.1 is a trustworthy witness and has explained the whole incident accurately. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that as per prosecution, whole incident has taken place between 10:30 to 11.00 a.m., and so there might be several other witnesses and prosecution has not examined other eye-witnesses and, therefore, benefit ought to have been given to the present appellant. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that it is for the prosecution, to choose its witness. They have chosen an advocate as a prosecution witness. If one eye-witness is giving clear deposition and who is a trustworthy witness and when his deposition is corroborated by other evidence, it is sufficient, for the proof of the offence. Presence of P.W.No.1 is natural. He caught accused by chasing him. Gupti a weapon CR.A/1619/2003 17/17 JUDGMENT was recovered at the behest of accused found having human blood group of deceased, as per FSL report. 11. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid evidence, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the case against the appellant. It is the present appellant, who has committed murder of the deceased. No error has been committed by the Trial Court in appreciating the evidence. We see no reason to alter judgement and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no substance in this appeal and, therefore,