..•1S;M .!..':.li;> P.= ^t/WL^ ??=^ i'i'-'s^i i W'iMF'^-t' IF.JU TT! RiV ^•f,.'. •w;^»? : HON'I ^A?^?T @?TiTir>^; ^!rs 'Sys'^i S 3~ £a 1 i! f i'iirfFS'ii 3'S'^i/. PeTITiONERS The State of ChhatSisgarh, Through Secrstary, versus RESPONDENTS D.K.S. Buiiding, Mantrai; Raipur. The Conser/ator of Forest, Durg Circie, Durg (M.P.) The Divisiona! Forest Officer, Production Division, Khairagarh (M.P.) Ramesh Kumar Janbandhu son of Shri Sakharam Janbandhu aged about 51 years, Ex-Forest Guard, Production Division Khairagarh R/o Village Baigatola Post Etara Q'ah. Khairagarh) Distt. Rajnandgaon (MP) The State Administrative Tribunal, at Through : its Registrar Mr. Vinay Harlt, iearned Dy. A.G. for the petitioners/ State. Mr. Vsnay Pandsy, Seamed counse! for respondent No.1. (Passedon 12tnAprii, "he foltowing ors! order of the Court was passed by This writ petition arises out of disciplinary action taken by the State Govemment against the 1 respondent-deiinquent. The 1 respondent whiie ssrving as Forest Guard In charge of Bamboo Coupe 'A' Karela in Khairagarh Production Range was issued with a charge memo dated 24.02.1987 aiieging that on 20.01 .1987 he had removed 1685 numbers of commercial bamboos in Truck No. MPT 9263 from stack No.77 dishonestly and 'committed theft thereof; these bamboos were seized on ;¥. fhe same day by tn charge Forest Beat Guard Shri Kama! Narayan vide POR No. 4107/05 and thus, he committed a serious misconduct bv committing theft of Government property. The 1 respondent was placed under suspensson on 20.01.1987 in contempiation of the departmentat enquiry. Along with the charge memo, the 1 respondent v»'as sei'ved wiih the statement of imputations, iist of documents and iist of witnesses. The 1 respondents submitted his sfatement of defence to the charge merno. The defence taken by the 1 respondent is that there was a iong-standino practice prevalent as per which although transportation of bamboos was dons by hiring trucks, yet, challans were issued by the Forest Authorities concerned showing that the transportation wouid be done by bullock carts. Howsvsr, no carting chailan was pi'oduc-ed by the 1 respondent whers seizure of the bamboos v/as effscted. (2) The Discipiinar/ Authority not being satisfied with the above explanation of the 1 respondent-deiinquent decided to conduct a regular departmentai eriquiry by appointing Shri P.P. Gosal, Assistsnce Conserirator of Forest. The enquiry officer havlng conducted a regula;' departmentai enquiry retumed hls finding holding that the 1 respondent- delinquent is guilty of misconduct aifeged against him. On receipt of the above finding, the Discipiinar/ Authority having appiied its mind and taken Into account the nature of fhe misconduct committed bv the 1 ine i respondent, thought it appropriate to dismiss him from service as s disciplinary measure. Accordingly, the Discipiinary Authority passed ths order (Anne.xure A-3 dated 22.06.1990), dismissing the 1st respondent from servtce. Being aggrieved by the above order of the Discipiinary Authority , the 1 respondent preferred departmenta! appeal to the Conservator of Forest, Durg Circie, Durg. The Appellate Authority without finding any merit in the Appeal dismissed the appea! on 22.02.1992 (Annexure A-1). Being aggrieved by the abo've orders, the 1 respondent instituted Originai Appiication No.1129/1992 before the h4adhya Pradesh SSaSe Administrative Tribuna! (for short 'the Tribunal') at Jabaipur. (3) The Tribunal hsving opined that the Disciptinary Authority- is influenced by certain observations made by the iearned Sessions Judge in his judgment dated 01 .11.1988 in the conflscation proceedings initiated against the owner of the truck involved in the transportation of the bamboos in decision-making; that from the statement of labourers whc used to ioad the bamboos on trucks, it cou'd be seen that there was a normal practtee of transporting bamboos by hiring trucks though challans were issusd for transoorting bamboos in buiiock carts and that the bamboos transported by the 1 responded were not found at the place v/here they were used to be kept, aiiowed the Originai Application by its order dated 27.03.1999 and quashed the order of the Discipiinary Authority as wei! as that of the Appeilate Authority and directed ihe petlttoners herein to reinstate the 1 respondent into servlce. As regafds payment of back wages, the Tribunai directed the petitioners to take a decision as per Fundamentai Rute 54 read with Fundamental Ruls 54-A. (4) We have heard the iearned counsei for the parties, perused the impugned order of the Tribunal, the orders made by the Discipiinary Authority and the Appeiiate Authority and other material papers appended to the writ petition. (5) !t was contended on the behaif of the petitioners/State that the reason assigned by the Tribunal to aliow the original applica'tions are not sermane to the decision-making; that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the charge leveled against the 1 respondent-delinquent was satisfactoriiy estabiished by the petitioners by adducing substantive legat evidence; that the defence put forth by the 1 respondent-deiinquent js not tenable; that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciatlng {he evidence on record as If it is an Appellate Court forgeffing the wei! established principle that the judicial review is against decision-making process and not agalnst a decision itself. Learned counse! appearlng on behaif of the 1 respondent , per contra, v/hiie supporting the impugned order ofthe Tribunal and assailing the vatidity of the order made by the Discipiinary Authority and that of th®Appeilate Authority would strenuousiy contend that the 1 respondent is a grass-root ievei offlcial of the Forest Department and what he did has had ora! approva! of his immediate officer superior and in fact, iransporting bamboos by hiring trucks was usual practice though chalians were issued to transport bamboos by buiiock cart, and that the Tribunai did not take Shat fact into consideration in the decision-making. !t was also c-ontended by the tearned counse! for fhe 1 respondent-deiinquent that She Disciplinary Authority was very much influenced by the adverse observations made by the Learned Sessions Judge in his order dated 1.11.1998 in confiscation proceedings, and that that materiai was used by •the Disciplinary Authority against the delinquent without givlng him any opportunity to have his say in the matter, thereby vioiating ths principles ofnaturaijustice. (6) Having heard iearned counsel for the parties, a short question that arises for decision is whether the 1 respondent-deiinquent has made out any ground before the TribunaS warranting interference of s the Tribuna! with the discipiinary action taken by the department against the 1 respondent-deiinquent. [7) The scope of judicia! review of discipSinary proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very much circumscribecl and iimiSed by virtue of a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and High Courts. !n High Court of JudicaSure at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Pati!, the Apex Court heid : "......... interfsrence with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted while exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had heid proceedings in violation of the principies of naturai justtee or in vioiatlon of statutory reguiations prescribing the mode for such enquiry or If the decision of the authority is vitiaSed by considerations extraneous to the evidence and mer.te of the case, or If the conciusion made by the authoritv on She vsry face of it is whoiiy arbitrary or capricious that no reasonabie person couid have arrived at such a conclusion or grounds very similar to t'ne abovs. But \ve cannot overiook Shat the departmenta] authority (in this case, the Discipiinary Committee of the High Court) js the sole Judge of the facts if the enquiry has been properiy conducted. The settled iegal position is that if there is some legai evidence on which the findings can be based, its adequacy or even reliabiHty of the evidence is not a matter of canvassing before the High Court in a writ petitlon under Articie 226 of the Constitution". (8) in Indlan Oil Corporation Limited v. Ashok Kumar Arora', the Apex Court he!d: "At the outset it needs to be mentloned that the High Court in 1. (2000)13cc4ie 2. 1987 (2)8upreme248 6 such cases of departmentai enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exereise powers of appeiiate Court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited, for instance, where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principies of natura! justics, danlal of reasonable opportunity; justice, denia! of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence and/or the punishment is totaily disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee......." j3) !n Rae Bareli Kshetriva Gramin Sank v. Bhoia the Supreme Court held; "......... Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of Shs case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, In the proceedings under Articie 226 of the Constitution, does not act as an appeilate authority but exercise within the limlts of iudicial review to correct the errors of !aw or Drocedurat errors leading to manifest injustice or vioiation of ths' principles of natural justice.... The High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeai and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the Enquiry OfRcer and accepted by the discipiinary authority. in these Circumstances, the question of examsning the evidence as was done by the High Court as Appeilate Court, is w'noiiy iliegal and cannot be sustatned". (10) In State of U.P. and others v. Nand Kishore Shukia" the Apex Court held- "..........It is settled thatthe Court is not a Cour': of appeal to go into the question of imposition of punishment. It is for the discipiinary authority to consider what wouid be 3. 1997 (3)3upreme 480 4. (19965 3 SCC 750 heid: nature of the punishment to be imposed on the Government servant based upon the provsd misconduct against the Government servant. its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the Court. The only question is v/hether the disciplinary authority would have passed such an order. It is settled iaw that even one of the charges if held proved is sufficient for imposition of penalty by the disciptinary authority or by the appeilate authority, the court wouid be loath to interfere with that part of the order............... (11) This Court in B. Anand Mohan v. Government of India "...........The High Court in cases of departmentat enquiries and findings recorded therein does not exereise the powers of the Appeilate Court and the jurisdiction of the High Court is very restricted and !imited and it is only in exceptional cases that such jurisdiction has to be exercised, to wit, when it is found that the domestic enquiry stands vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice or denial of reasonable opportunity or that the findings are based on no evidence or the punishment imposed is totally disproportionate to the proven misconduct of an empioyee.............." (12) In the premise of the abovs-noted weii-settled orinciples governing judicial review of discipiinary proceedings, iet us proceed to examine the factua! position in this case. The charge leveled against the 1 respondent-deiinquent is that on 20.01.1987 he had removed 1685 numbers of commercia! bamboos in Truck No. MPT 9263 from stack No.77 dishonestly and committed theft thereof. These bamboos were seized onthesame day by In charge Forest Beat Guard ShriKama! 5. 1998 (3) ALD 231 (DBJ Narayan vlde POR No. 4107/05. Having framed the above charge against the 1 respondent, it is true, it was the burden of the DiscipSinary Authority to prove that charge. Therefore, the first question to be considered is whether the above charge was proved by the Disciplinafy Authority by adducing evidence. The Beat Guard who selzed the bamboos was examined as a witness in support of the charge by the Disciplinary Authority, and he, in his evidence, has categorically stated that fhe 1st respondent was transporting bamboos in the Truck il!ega!ly and without the authority of the department and without obtaining the Chaiisn. The defence put forth by the delinquent is that as per the then prevaiiing practice, though chaiians were issued to transport bamboos by hsring bullock carts, actuaily bamboos were used to be transported by hiring trucks. This piea ofthe 1 respondent-deiinquent remained as a piea only without substantiating the same by any evidence. Aiternatively, it needs to be noticed that even assuming that such illegai practice was resorted to in some cases, that itseif wouid not be a vatid ground for the 1 respondent to violate the statutory rule which undeniably required the 1 responcient to obtain transit permit from the prescribed authority to remove the bamboos specifying the quantum/numbers of bamboos and destination of removal. When ths Bamboos were seized, the delinquent was accompanying the bamboos and when he was questioned about his authority to transport bamboos by hiring truck, he was not in a position to produce any document in support of his action. Therefore, the charge framed againstthe 1d respondent-delinquent is saSisfactorily proved bythe department by adducing satisfactory evidence. (13) This takes us to the contention of the learned counss! for the delinquent that the Disciplinary Authority in ths decision-making was 9 influenced heavily on certain observations made by the learned Sessions Judge in confiscation proceedings initiated by the Authorized Officer against the owner of the truck involved in the transportation of the bamboos. It is true that the Discipiinary Authority has referred to certaln adverss observations of the leamed Sessions Judge made against the cietinquent. !t is well ssttied that a disciplinary action should be based on objective considerations and not on subjective satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority. it is also well-known and settied principte of iaw that if an authority which is required to pass an order on objective facts/ considerations or in other words on the basis of objective satisfaction and the Reviewing Court finds Shat the order made by such authority 'ss based on relevant as well as irrelevant considerations, the Reviewing Court could see whether such decision of such authority could be sustained on the basls of relevant considerations eschewing irretevant considerations. This principte is rested on the other well recognized principle that the Court under Article 226 of the ConstituSion while reviewing disciplinar/ actiors cannot go into sufficiency and adequacy of the evidence on the basis of which factua! findings are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. We are of the considered opinion that, even completely eschewing the obseroations of the iearned Sessions Judge from decision-making, the charge framed against the 1 respondent is satisfactoriiy proved by the Dlsciptinary Authority by adducing ciinching evidence, if we may say so. Therefore, simply because, the Discipiinary Authority has referred to the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge, that circumstance could not have been a good and valid ground for the Tribunal to step in and interfere with the disciplinary action taken by the Disciplinary I. ,'f.Q 10 (14) We are satisfied that the punishment imposed on the first respondent is reasonable and proportionate to the gravity of misconduct conducted by him, and it does not warrant our interference. It needs to be noticed that the theft or misappropriation even of a small amount or property of the employer may have to be viewed seriously. Nay, in a case of this nature if the employer takes a strict view, the same cannot bs termed to be so irrationa! so as to attract the Drinciples of Wednesburv unreasonabteness. In Om Kumar and others v. Union of India the Apex Court upon taking into consideration its earlier decision in Union of India v. Ganayutham held that the action on the part of the State authority can be tested on the touch stone of doctrine of proportionaiity, but the Court wi!l interfere therewith only in the event it is held to be so irrationa! or unreasonabie so as to attract the principles of Wednesbury Unreasonabteness of Artide 14 of the Constitution of india. No grounc! is made out to apply that principle in this case. (1S) In Sfate of Tamil Nadu v. K. Guruswamy the Apex Court heSd that when a deiinquent officer is charged with misconduct- of corruption no other punlshment than the dismissa! is cailed for. !n B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India it was held: "18. A revievv of the above legai position would establish that She discipiinary authority, and on appeal the appeliate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. S. JT 2000 (Supp!. 3) SC 92 7. JT 1997 f7)SC 572 8. (1996) 7 SCC 114 9. A1R199SSC484 They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exereising the pov/er of judicial review, cannot normaiiy substitute its own conclusion on penatty and impose some other penalty. ifthe punishment irnposed by the discipiinary authority or the appeilate authority shocks the conscience of the High CourbTribuna!, it wouid appropriately mouict the retief, either directing the discipiinary/appeliate authority to reconsider the penaEty imposed, or So shorten the iitigation, it may itseif, in exceptionat and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." (16) !t is, Sherefore, evident from the aforementioned decisions that only in exceptiona! and rare cases, the Court or the Tribunal would interfere with the punishment imposed by the employer and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. in the Instant case, the first respondent is guiity of theft of 1685 numbers of commercia! Bamboos beionging to the Forest Department. The misconduct committed by the first rsspondent not oniy vsry serious in nature but also touches upon morai turpitude of the delinquent. If the Courts were to interfere in such matter, the Court would be subjected to social ridicuie and be accused of resting its opinion on subjective satisfaction and mispiaced sympathy on a wrong person. We are satisfied that the punishment imposed on the delinquent as a discipllnaiy measure is propionate So the gravity of misconduct committed by him. (17) No other contentions/grounds were urged before us by learned counsel for the parties. (18) In t'ne result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the wri't petition and set-aside the irnpugned order of the Tribunal and dismiss 12 .9'? Originai Appllcation No.1129/92 filed by the 1st respondent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we, however, direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Sd/- Chief Justice Sd/- Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh Judge Rr;ajssh'