IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:16.2.2010 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ELIPE DHARMA RAO AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL Writ Petition No.15710 of 1998 1.K.S.Arjun 2.K.S.Nallathambi 3.K.S.Venugopal ... Petitioners Vs. 1.The Asst.Commissioner (Land Reforms), Erode. 2.The Director of Land Reforms, Chepauk, Madras-5. 3.The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Madras-4. 4.Tmt.Sukumari Subbaian 5.Tmt.Punithavathi 6.Tmt.Dhanalakshmi 7.Tmt.Thilagavathi Varatharajan ... Respondents * * * Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Madras-4, in D.No.359/95, dated 14.5.1998 and quash the same. * * * For petitioners : Mr.B.Kumar, Senior Counsel for Mr.N.Manokaran For R.1 to R.3 : Mr.P.K.Girish Neelakandan, Spl.G.P. * * * https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ O R D E R ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. By this writ petition, we are called upon to discuss and decide the legal question as to 'whether an authority (in this case, the Land Reforms Spl.Appellate Tribunal), who has been conferred with the suo motu powers by a Statute, can make use of the same to nullify a judicial order passed by this Court under the garb of such suo motu powers conferred on him by the Statute'. 2. To appreciate this legal question, the brief facts which could be culled out from the materials placed on record are that the petitioners and the respondents 4 to 7 are the children of one late K.A.Senapathi Gounder, who held lands to an extent of 849.39 ordinary acres, equivalent to 257.203 standard acres as on the date of the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act No.58/61) (hereinafter called as 'the Act') on 6.4.1960; that the draft statement under Section 10(1) of the Act, proposing to declare an extent of 647.69½ ordinary acres equivalent to 183.118 standard acres of land as 'surplus' was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 22.9.1971 by the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Erode/the fist respondent herein and a copy of the Draft Statement was sent to the land owner on 14.10.1971; that on receipt of the Draft Statement, the land owner filed his objections under Section 10(5) of the Act on 29.2.1972 and after considering the objections of the land owner, an order under Section 10(5) of the Act was passed on 5.7.1972 and the order was also served on the land owner. 3. It is further seen from the materials placed on record that as against the above said order dated 5.7.1972, the land owner and his daughters i.e. the respondents 4 to 7 herein have filed appeals before the Land Tribunal/Principal Subordinate Judge, Erode in L.T.A.Nos.360, 428, 429, 430 of 1972 and 340 of 1973 and by the judgment dated 29.6.1973, the Land Tribunal has allowed the said appeals and by setting aside the said order dated 5.7.1972 passed under Section 10(5) of the Act, the Land Tribunal/Principal Sub Court, Erode, had remanded the matter for fresh disposal to the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Erode in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in the said judgment of the Land Tribunal/Principal Sub Court. 4. Thereafter, a revised order under Section 10(5) of the Act was passed on 16.4.1974 by the Authorised Officer, for a second time, as against which an appeal in C.M.A.No.37 of 1975 was filed by the land owner/father of the petitioners and respondents 4 to 7 before the Land Tribunal/Principal Sub Court, Erode and the said Court, by the judgment dated 27.4.1976, has allowed the said appeal, setting aside the order of the Authorised Officer dated 16.4.1974 and remitting the matter back to the Authorised Officer for fresh disposal according to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ law, in the light of the observations made by the Court. 5. Pursuant to the said order of the Land Tribunal and on remand of the matter, an order under Section 10(5) of the Act was passed by the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Erode in his Ref.No.93/MR.I/58-61, dated 28.2.1977, for a third time. In this order, the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) has re-assessed the entire issue, after making personal inspection to the lands, further keeping in view the judgments passed by the Land Tribunal/Principal Sub Court, Erode and allowing certain exemptions in favour of the land owner. 6. At this juncture, it is to be pointed out that the common judgment passed by the Land Tribunal/Principal Sub Court, Erode in L.T.A.Nos.360, 428, 429, 430 of 1972 and 340 of 1973, dated 29.6.1973, thereby setting aside the order passed by the Authorised Officer dated 5.7.1972 and remitting the matter back to the Authorised Officer for fresh consideration and the judgment dated 27.4.1976 passed by the same Court in C.M.A.No.37 of 1975, thereby setting aside the order dated 16.4.1974 passed by the Authorised Officer and remitting the matter again, for a second time, to the Authorised Officer, Erode for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made in the said judgment have not at all been challenged by the respondents 1 and 2 and only pursuant to the said directions issued by the Land Tribunal/Principal Sub Court, Erode, which reached finality, the Authorised Officer, Erode has passed the order dated 28.2.1977. It is to be mentioned that this order passed by the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Erode has also attained finality, since no appeal has been preferred by any party like the 2nd respondent. 7. But, thereafter, contending that some 'mistakes' have occurred in the order dated 28.2.1977, the first respondent, has passed an order under Rule 11(1)(h) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Rules, 1962 in 9S/MRI/58-61, dated 31.7.1979 and based on this, a final statement was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 7.11.1979, declaring an extent of 546.39 ordinary acres, equivalent to 154.618 standard acres as surplus and served on the land owner on 19.12.1979. Aggrieved, the land owner filed a Revision Petition before the Land Commissioner and the said Land Commissioner, Chennai, by his proceedings in Lr.No.P2/RP.11/80 (L.Ref.), dated 8.9.1982 has allowed the said revision petition in part. As against the said order passed by the Land Commissioner, in disallowing a portion of his claim, the land owner/father of the petitioners and the respondents 4 to 7 has filed W.P.No.10290 of 1982 before this Court, but no appeal or anything of that sort has been filed by the Authorised Officer against the allowed part of the prayer of the land owner. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 8. A learned single Judge of this Court, after hearing both sides, has allowed the said writ petition in W.P.No.10290 of 1982, by his order dated 5.10.1990, holding that the final statement published in the Government Gazette dated 7.11.1979 and served on the petitioner therein as well as the order of the Land Commissioner, dated 8.9.1982 are totally without jurisdiction and ordered restoration of the order dated 28.2.1977 passed by the Authorised Officer. The learned single Judge has also ordered that 'it will be open to the authorities to take such action as may be deemed necessary in pursuance of the said order dated 28.2.1977.' This order of the learned single Judge of this Court has also attained finality, since not challenged before the upper forums of law by any of the parties. 9. But, it is seen from the materials placed on record that the said order of the learned single Judge has not been implemented by the respondents 1 and 2. Instead, the Director of Land Reforms, has filed a Revision Petition before the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, under Section 83 of the Act, in D.No.359 of 1995, praying to exercise the suo motu powers of revision and set aside the order dated 28.2.1977 of the first respondent. Since the land owner K.A.Senapathi Gounder expired on 25.2.1992, by filing a petition, his legal heirs/the petitioners and respondents 4 to 7 were impleaded as respondents 3 to 9 to the said proceedings whereupon, they have filed a counter affidavit, praying to dismiss the said Revision Petition. 10. The Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Chennai/the third respondent herein, taking up the issue regarding the maintainability and delay, has held the matter maintainable. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. 11. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the suo motu power of revision conferred on the Tribunal is not intended to be exercised arbitrarily and at a belated point of time, that too to topple the judicial orders, against which no appeal or revision has been filed by the parties, as a result, the said orders reached their finality. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners would further submit that any power conferred upon any statutory authority shall be exercised only to advance the cause of justice and not to upset the settled rights of the parties concerned. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners would also point out that the present revision petition has been filed with a long delay of 23 years, with no appreciable grounds and would pray to set aside the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. 12. On the other hand, on the part of the respondents 1 to 3, the learned Special Government Pleader would submit that no time https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ limit has been prescribed under the Act to exercise the suo motu powers by the Tribunal and therefore, the respondents are perfectly alright in filing the petition before the Tribunal. 13. As a reply, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that it has been held by the upper forums of law that where no time limit has been prescribed for exercise of a power, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. 14. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners would rely on the following judgments: 1.MANSARAM vs. S.P.PATHAK AND OTHERS [AIR 1983 SC 1239] 2.MOHAMAD KAVI MOHAMAD AMIN vs. FATMABAI IBRAHIM [(1997) 6 SCC 71] 3.CORPORATION BANK AND ANOTHER vs. NAVIN J.SHAH [(2000) 2 SCC 628] 4.R.PADMAVATHI vs. THE LAND COMMISSIONER (LAND RECORDS), CHEPAUK, CHENNAI-5 AND ANOTHER [2001 (3) CTC 605] 5.IBRAHIMPATNAM TALUK VYAVASAYA COOLIE SANGHAM vs. K.SURESH REDDY AND OTHERS [(2003) 7 SCC 667] 6.STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS vs. BHATIND DISTRICT COOPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS UNION LTD. [(2007) 11 SCC 363] 7.G.KARMEGAM AND OTHERS vs. JOINT SUB-REGISTRAR, MADURAI AND OTHERS [(2008) 1 MLJ 789 (FB)] 8.PUNDLIK JALAM PATIL (D) BY LRs. vs. EXE.ENG.JALGAON MEDIUM PROJECT AND ANOTHER [2008 (5) CTC 663]. 9.DHARMA PARIPALANA SABHA vs. THE COMMISSIONER, HR & CE, CHENNAI [2010 (1) CTC 147] 15. In the first judgment cited above, reported in AIR 1983 SC 1239, the Honourable Apex Court has held: "When the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time...." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 16. In the second judgment cited above, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71, the Honourable Apex Court has held: "Where no time-limit prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time.... This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat V. Patil Raghav Natha [(1969) 2 SCC 187 has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act (Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976) was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time" 17. In the third judgment cited above, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 628, the Honourable Apex Court has held: "What is reasonable time to lay a claim depends upon the facts of each case. In the legislative wisdom, three years' period has been prescribed as the reasonable time under the Limitation Act to lay a claim for money. We think that period should be the appropriate standard adopted for computing reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter of this nature..." 18. In the fourth judgment cited above reported in 2001 (3) CTC 605, the Authority constituted under Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act passed orders dropping proceedings against one Muthu Reddiar after holding that gift deeds executed by him between date of commencement of such Act and date on which Act was notified were valid on 1.12.1973. The Authorised Office passed another order on 18.11.1988 and et aside order dated 1.12.1973 and declared that the said Muthu Reddiar held excess lands as against which Muthu Reddiar' filed appeal against 1988 order before Land Tribunal and during pendency of such appeal and during pendency of another appeal filed by land owner against another order passed in 1991 modifying extent of excess land. The Director, Land Reforms filed suo motu revision before Tribunal seeking to set aside order passed in 1973 and the Land Tribunal allowed such revision on ground that existence of such order would lead to technical objection regarding 1988 and 1991 order. Under such circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court, speaking through The Hon'ble Mr.Justice V.S.Sirpurkar (as His Lordship then was), has held in para No.11 as follows: "Now it is clear that the issue whether the subsequent order could be passed dated 18.11.1988 on the backdrop of the order dated 1.12.1973 was a substantial issue https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ pending before the Land Tribunal. Under such circumstances, the Special Appellate Tribunal could not have wiped out the order dated 1.12.1973 much less using the so called suo motu powers. We are not able to understand the user of the suo motu powers by the Special Appellate Tribunal. In fact, what was filed before the Special Land Tribunal was nothing but a revision by the Director, Land Reforms. In order to get out of the difficulty of limitation, it is mentioned that the suo motu powers were being activated. What was filed before the Tribunal was, in fact, nothing but a revision under section 83 of the Act. The Tribunal, therefore, could not have ignored the question of limitation as it did. But even if we can take the view, that the Special Appellate Tribunal could go into the merits or demerits of the revision, one fails to understand as to how the Tribunal could have straight- away wiped out the order dated 1.12.1973 which order was fait accompli, which was finally passed against which there was no appeal or revision and which remained on the record till it was set aside by the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 28.4.1998. It is liable to be seen that the said order was referred to in the order dated 18.11.1988 also and yet the order dated 18.11.1988 came to be passed ...." It has further been held in Para No.12 as follows: ".... We therefore feel that in the interest of justice, it would not be proper to allow the order of the Special Appellate Tribunal to be sustained. Instead we will et aside that order holding that the said order is sans propriety in law. The Tribunal erred in law in activating its suo motu powers under Section 83 in particular and decide the precise question which was pending before the Land Tribunal. In our opinion, the suo motu powers cannot be used to pre-empt a particular question and to bye-pass a decision which is legally due from the other Tribunal. In fact, the Special Appellate Tribunal has also given all the findings regarding the correctness or otherwise of the validity of the transactions by Muthu Reddiar. The propriety demanded that the Special Appellate Tribunal should not have entered into those questions, particularly when the matter was pending in an appeal before the Land Tribunal, much less such expression should not have come in a revisional and that too suo motu revisional jurisdiction." 19. In the fifth judgment cited above, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 667, dealing with a case arose under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (21 of 1950), the Honourable Apex Court has held in Para No.9 as follows: ".... Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under sub- section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particularly date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation." 20. In the sixth judgment cited above, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 363, dealing with the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, the Honourable Apex Court has held: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years." 21. In the seventh judgment cited above, reported in (2008) 1 MLJ 789, a Full Bench of this Court, while dealing with the provisions of Indian Stamp Act, and relying on many judgments of the Honourable Apex Court, has held as follows: "33. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court would go to the effect that any power conferred upon any statutory authority shall be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to upset the settled rights of the parties concerned. 34. Applying the above ratio decidendi to the facts of the present case, since the provision viz., sub-section (1) of Section 47-A is quiet as regards the time limit, reference shall be made by the Registering Officer within a reasonable time, which should not be viewed as a one, that has deprived the rights of the parties, thereby causing injustice to them...." 22. In the eighth judgment cited above, reported in 2008 (5) CTC 663, the Honourable Apex Court has held: "It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 23. In the last judgment cited above, reported in 2010 (1) CTC 147, a contemporary Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with a matter wherein the petitioner therein was declared as hereditary trustee by order of the Deputy Commissioner, HR & CE Department and after a lapse of 44 years issued a notice to suo motu review the order of appointing the petitioner therein as trustee, has held: "Though Section 69(2) does not provide for any time limit, we are not sure that the powers of suo motu Revision can be easily exercised after a period of four decades except for very justifiable and compelling reasons, which warrants such drastic exercise of suo motu power of Revision." 24. Since in the case on hand also, the suo motu powers exercised by the Tribunal is in question, for better appreciation of this aspect, we shall now deal with Section 83 of the Act, which reads as follows: "83. Revision by Special Appellate Tribunal – (1) The Special Appellate Tribunal may ofits own motion oron application, call for and examine the record of the authorized officer, the Land Board, the Land Commissioner of the Land Tribunal in respect of anyproceeding undr this Act to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctnes or legality or propriety of any decision passed or order made therein, and if, in any case it appears to the Special Appellate Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly: Provided that every application to the Special Appellate Tribunal for the exercise of the powers under this Section shall be preferred within such period as may be prescribed: Provided further that the Special Appellate Tribunal may admit an application after the expiration of prescribed period if it is satisfied that the party concerned has sufficient cause for not presenting it within such period: Provided also that this section shall not apply to any proceeding of the Land Tribunal in respect of which appeal lies under Section 79 to the Special Appellate Tribunal. (2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under sub-section (1), unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representations." 25. The revisional power vested on the Tribunal under this Section, required the Tribunal to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by an Authorised Officer, Land Board, the Land Commissioner or the Land Tribunal, but definitely not a decision https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the High Court, which has upheld the decision of any such Authority or forum. Even though this Section provides that