1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3872 OF 2007 Mr. O. P. Mishra ] Age 42, H-104, Ambeince Lagoon Apartments ] National Highway – 8, Gurgaon 122 002 ]..Applicant versus 1. The State of Maharashtra ] 2. C. A. Louis ] 2/A/103, Hema Park, Bhandup (E) ] Bombay – 42 ] 3. Deputy Inspector General (Prison) ] Hd. Qrts. Near Lajwanti Garden Chok, ] Janakpuri, New Delhi ]..Respondents Mr. B. D. Joshi with Ms. Bharti Mahant for Applicant. Mr. H. J. Dhedia - APP for Respondent No. 1 - State. Mr. C. Antony Louis - Respondent No. 2 present in person. CORAM : B. R. GAVAI, J. DATED : APRIL 23, 2010. ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. Rule, returnable forthwith. The learned APP waives service for the State and the respondent no. 2 waives service for himself. Heard by consent. 2. By way of present application, the applicant prays for quashing and setting aside the Order dated 6th August 2005 vide which the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai has issued process against the applicant – accused in C.C. No. 281/M/2004. 3. A complaint came to be filed by the respondent No.2 herein against 2 the accused persons for offence punishable under Section 164 r.w. 34 of Indian Penal Code. In a nutshell the allegation made in the complaint is that at the relevant time, when accused nos. 1 and 2 were in charge of Jail No. 3 and Jail No. 4, Tihar Jail, New Delhi, that inspite of the production warrants issued by the learned Magistrate in C.C. Nos. 439, 440, 441 and 442/S/2003 the accused have not produced the accused persons in their custody before the court and as such committed an offence punishable under Section 166 r.w. 34 of IPC. 4. Upon the verification of the complainant recorded, the learned Magistrate has issued the process against the accused persons. After the receipt of the summons from the learned trial court, the applicant who according to him was working as a Superintendent (Jail) Central Jail, Tihar, Delhi from 3rd February 2003 till 24th June 2003 has approached this Court for quashing of the proceedings. 5. Mr. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submits that the allegations in the complaint are pertaining to a period between 3rd February 2003 and 24th June 2003. It is submitted that the applicant had relieved from the charge on 24th June 2003 and therefore the period of alleged offence i.e. between June to September 2004, is much after he ceased to hold the office. The learned counsel further submits that the 3 complaint has been filed without obtaining the requisite sanction of the competent authority and therefore the learned Magistrate has erred in issuing process. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Subhash s/o. Luther Manmothe vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [ 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2503] 6. The respondent no.2 appears in person. I have heard him at length. He submits that when the process has been lawfully issued by the learned Magistrate by exercising the lawful discretion, it is not permissible for this Court to exercise its Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and substitute the discretion with the one exercised by the learned Magistrate. He submits that upon reading the averments in the complaint, the learned trial court has arrived at a satisfaction that the ingredients to constitute an offence have been made out and therefore issued the process. He submits that in the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, this Court would not reconsider the matter and sit in an appeal over the discretion exercised by the learned Magistrate. He further submits that the ground raised by the applicant that he was not holding the office at the relevant time is the matter of evidence which cannot be gone into by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. He submits that this Court is not expected to conduct trial while considering the application under Section 482. 4 7. The respondent no. 2 – party in person relies on the judgments of the Apex Court in the following cases: (i) S. N. Palanitkar & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. [2001 Cri.L.J. 4765]; (ii) Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & ors. [1976 Cri.L.J. 1533]; (iii) State of Madhypa Pradesh vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta & Ors. [2004 Cri.L.J. 598]; (iv) S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla & Anr. [2005 Cri.L.J. 4140] He also relied on the judgments of this Court in the matters of : (i) Natural Sugar and Allied Industries Ltd. & Anr. vs. Razzak s/o. Hazi Gaffar & Ors. [2006 (5) AIR Bom R 284]; (ii) Unreported Judgment in the case of Lt. Gen. Jagdish Narain (Retd.) & Anr. vs. C. Antony Louis & Ors. in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1353 of 1999 dated 21st October, 1999; (iii) M/s. S. B. & T. International Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2006(2) AIR Bom R. 275]; He also relied on the judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Bijaya Das & Ors. vs. State of Orissa & Anr. [2003 Cri.L.J. 5 1621], judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Thakur Singh & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [2002 Cri.L.J. 131] and the judgment of Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Pritam Singh vs. Tawi Educational Trust [2005 Cri. L.J. 277] 8 From the perusal of the complaint, it could be seen that the complainant has averred that he had filed a complaint in CC Nos. 439, 440, 441 and 442/S/2003 against M/s. Hoffland Finance Ltd. and M/s. Hoffland Capital and their Directors alleging economic offence to the tune of Rs.100 crores. According to the complainant the said company had also defrauded him to the tune of more than Rs.7,00,000/-. It is averred by him that out of the several accused in the said crime, two were in custody of the accused no. 2 and one was in the custody of accused no. 1. It is alleged that the accused nos. 1 and 2 though were repeatedly sent production warrants for production of the said three accused, the accused were ignoring and not complying with the said warrants. According to the complainant the last of such warrants came to be issued on 3rd August 2004 which was to be complied with by 27th September 2004 and therefore for non compliance with the same, an offence under section 166 r.w. 34 of IPC have been committed by the accused. 9. By now the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 6 of Cr.P.C. has been well defined by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. A party in person has rightly pointed out the various authorities to point out as to what is the scope of this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., this Court is only required to examine the averments made in the complaint to find out as to whether the ingredients to constitute an offence have been made out or not. Party in person is equally right in contending that at the stage of considering the application for quashing, this Court is not expected to go into the material supplied by the accused in support of his defence. 10. In the light of the various judgments cited by the party in person, the Court would be required to examine as to whether the order of issuance of process by the learned Magistrate calls for interference or not. The complaint has been filed by the complainant for offence punishable under Section 166 of IPC. Section 166 reads thus: “166. Public servant disobeying law, with intent to cause injury to any person.- Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will, by such disobedience, cause injury to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or 7 with both.” It could thus be seen that to prima facie establish the case for the aforesaid offence the following ingredients would be necessary: (i) that the person concerned should be a public servant; (ii) he knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant; (iii) this is done with an intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will by such disobedience cause injury to any person; It could thus clearly be seen that the “mens rea” is one of the essential ingredient of the said offence. As a natural corollary it can only be a natural person who can be charged with an offence punishable under Section 166 coupled with a fact that he is a public servant. The perusal of the complaint would reveal that the accused have been arrayed as “Superintendent in- charge Jail No. 3, Tihar Jail, New Delhi” and “Superintendent in-charge Jail No. 4, Tihar Jail, New Delhi”. An offence under Section 166 cannot be against a particular office. An offence under Section 166 can only be against a person who holds an office. From a bare perusal of the complaint, it could be seen that the accused arrayed are the Superintendent in-charge of Tihar Jail. It can clearly be seen that the persons who at the relevant time were holding the office of the Superintendent of Tihar Jail have not been arrayed as accused. It has also to be averred in the complaint that the person who is 8 charged with an offence under Section 166 knowingly disobeyed any direction of law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant. The perusal of the complaint would reveal that there is no such averment in the complaint that the accused have knowingly disobeyed any direction of the law as to the way in which they are supposed to conduct themselves as such public servants. Under Section 166 one another necessary ingredient is that the disobedience of the accused has to be with an intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will by such disobedience cause injury to any such person. Such an averment is also not present in the complaint. 11. There is another angle to the matter. The applicant has specifically averred in the application that the applicant is a public servant and is protected by the provisions of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. The assertion by the applicant has not been denied by the respondent no. 2 – party in person by filing any affidavit in reply. Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. provides that in case public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government and is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting in his official duty, the Court should not take cognizance except with the previous sanction of the State Government or the Central Government. The party in person who countered the submission on behalf of applicant has relied on the judgment 9 of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mohan Prakash Dubey & Ors. vs. State [92 (2001) Delhi Law Times 206]. In the aforesaid case, the accused were charged with offences punishable under Section 353 and 354 of IPC . The learned Single Judge in the said case found that the question as to whether the petitioners were public servants who could not be removed except with the sanction of the Government was question of fact and could be examined only during trial. In the said case the learned Single Judge further found that no material was placed on record to show that the petitioners were not removable from their office without sanction of the Government. Such is not the case here. The applicant has specifically averred in the application that he is entitled to protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. This fact has not been countered by the respondent no. 2 – party in person. In any case it could be seen from the bare allegation in the complaint that it is the case of the complainant that the accused have disobeyed the directions for production of other accused in some of the crimes. From the bare allegation of the complaint it could be seen that the accused have been charged of offence alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. I therefore find that the reliance placed by the applicant on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Subhash s/o. Luther Manmothe (cited supra) is well placed. I find that since even according to the allegation of the complainant, the accused have failed to 10 discharge their public duty and act as per the directions of the Magistrate, the accused are squarely entitled to protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Smt. Nagawwa (cited supra), on which the respondent no. 2 – party in person relies has observed thus: “.....Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1)where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2)where the allegations made in the complaint are potently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3)where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4)where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence 11 of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings.” The present case is squarely covered by the 4th category enumerated by the Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case. 13. Therefore, in my considered view, the complaint taken at its face value does not disclose the ingredients to constitute offence under Section 166 of IPC. Apart from that, I am also of the considered view that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence unless there was a sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Apart from that I find that the complaint itself against an office, without naming the persons who were holding the office and without there being a specific averment as to what action or inaction on part of the persons alleged to have committed offence in the body of the complaint, would not be maintainable. 14. I therefore find that the learned Magistrate has erred in issuing the process, Rule is therefore made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). (B. R. GAVAI, J.)