IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.J.CHELAMESWAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON MONDAY, THE 15TH NOVEMBER 2010 / 24TH KARTHIKA 1932 W.A.No. 2671 of 2009 --------------------- (AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT IN WPC.12623/2009 DATED 19.08.2009) .................... APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS IN WPC. ----------------------------------------- 1. KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PATTOM,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. 2. DISTRICT OFFICER, KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, DISTRICT OFFICE, ERNAKULAM, KAKKANAD,KOCHI-682 030. BY ADV. SRI.ALEXANDER THOMAS, SC, KPSC RESPONDENT/PETITIONER IN WPC. --------------------------------- U.JAYALEKSHMY, ULLAS, ARIMBASSERI,THRIKKAKARA P.O., KOCHI-682 021, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.M.K.DAMODARAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE AND BY SRI.P.K.VIJAYAMOHANAN THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 15/11/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: J. CHELAMESWAR, CJ & P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON, J. .............................................................................. W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 ......................................................................... Dated this the 15th November, 2010 J U D G M E N T J. Chelameswar, CJ. Aggrieved by the judgment in W.P.(C) No. 12623 of 2009 dated 19th August, 2009, the respondents therein have preferred the instant appeal. The first appellant notified on 28.03.2007 that posts of Assistant Gr.II/Junior Clerk/LDC etc in various Government owned Companies/Corporations/Boards etc would be filled up and invited applications from eligible candidates. The notification indicated that the last date for submission of the applications was 02.05.2007. However, it appears that the last date for submission of application was subsequently extended. Neither before the learned Single Judge nor before us, a copy of the notification is produced. But it is the admitted case of all the parties that the notification specified that the applications could be submitted by 'conventional method' or by 'on-line'. Admittedly, the respondent/writ petitioner made an application W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 2 by following the conventional method, i.e, written application. She was invited to participate in the written examination conducted by the appellant on 23.03.2008. She participated and her name was included in the select list of candidates, who secured the prescribed minimum marks for being considered for further process of selection, published on 07.02.2009. On 26.06.2009, the respondent herein was called upon to produce certain original documents for verification. At that stage, the appellants noticed that the original application of the respondent did not bear her signature and therefore her case was liable to be rejected or that she is required to be excluded from the zone of consideration for selection to the above mentioned posts. 2. Challenging the said action of the appellants, the respondent approached this Court by filing the above mentioned Writ Petition. By the judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and directed the appellants to treat the petitioner's application as a valid application. Hence this appeal. W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 3 3. The specific case of the respondent before the learned Single Judge was that the appellants had prescribed two modes of applications. In so far as the candidates, who submitted applications by 'on-line', are concerned, there was no requirement of appending signature of the candidates to the application, as by the very nature of the application, it is not possible for the candidates to append signature to the application. It may be mentioned herein that even regard to 'on- line' application, it is possible to have digital signature appended to the application. But the appellants did not prescribe such a condition that the 'on-line' applications should bear digital signature. It is only in the case of applications made in the 'conventional' form, the appellants stipulated and insisted that the signature of the candidates, is compulsory and failure to append the signature in such cases would entail rejection of the applications. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the following judgments in support of his argument: W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 4 i) 1992 (1) KLT Page 20 SN. (Case No. 26) [Sreekumari vs. Public Service commission] ii) 2010 (1) KLT 258. [ Neena vs. Public Service Commission ], iii) 2008(4) SCC 171 [Dhananjay Malik and others vs. State of Uttaranchal and others] iv) 2008(9) SCC 403 [T. Jayakumar vs.A. Gopu and another]. 5. The first of the above mentioned judgment states the purpose behind the condition insisting upon that the application to be signed and held : “Signature is intended to vouch-safe the correctness of the entries made in the application.” There cannot be any second opinion regarding the correctness of the analysis made by the said judgment. The question in the instant case is not regarding the purpose or objective to be achieved by insistence of appending signature to the applications. W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 5 As already mentioned earlier, there are two modes of making the applications, viz, in one method, there is insistence of signature, whereas in the other, such insistence is not made, thereby creating two different classes of applicants. The burden is on the appellants to justify that such classification is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and such classification bears a nexus to the objective sought to be achieved. Except stating that the applicant is fully aware of the condition at the time of making the application, no further explanation has been offered as to what is the objective sought to be achieved on insisting upon signature only in the case of one class of applications. 6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that in the case of 'on-line' applications, the applicants is assigned a 'bar code' the moment the application is made, which according to the appellant serves as sufficient safeguard in the context of any controversy which may arise subsequently regarding the correctness of the application. W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 6 Except for the above assertion, the appellant could not demonstrate how such assignment of bar code would ensure fixing responsibility . 7. The learned Counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to earlier in 2008 (4) SCC 171 . Coming to the decision reported in 2008(4) SCC 171 [ Dhananjay Malik and others vs. State of Uttaranchal and others], the learned Counsel relied upon and emphasised on paragraph No.7 of the judgment which reads as follows: “7. It is not disputed that the respondent writ petitioners herein participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the educational qualification was clearly indicated in the advertisement itself as BPE or graduate with diploma in Physical Education. Having unsuccessfully participated in the process of selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement and selection with W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 7 regard to requisite educational qualifications were contrary to the Rules.” 8. We are of the opinion that the Supreme Court was not considering the case of a complaint of an artificial classification violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The case before the Supreme Court was one where obviously the appellant had a case that the qualification prescribed in the advertisement calling for the applications to fill up certain posts were not in conformity with the statutory rules prescribing the qualification for the posts sought to be filled up. It was in that context that the Supreme Court opined that a candidate who participated in the selection process would not be heard to raise such a complaint. We are respectfully of the opinion that the above said judgment has no application in the issue before us. 9. Coming to 2008(9)SCC 403 [T. Jayakumar vs. A. Gopu and another], it was the case where a candidate while applying for a post, submitted his application without appending his signature. The said application was received within the W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 8 prescribed time. After submitting his application, the candidate realised his mistake and submitted a second application, which, of course, reached the authorities beyond the permissible date. The candidature of the said candidate was rejected by the appointing authority on the ground that the application received within the time did not bear the signature of the applicant. One of the submission advanced in that case was that since the candidate was allowed to participate in the selection process, his application could not be rejected at a belated stage on the ground that the application was not signed. The Supreme Court once again rejected the said submission in the following words: “ 12. We are not aware of any principle of law under which once a candidate is allowed participation in the selection process, the selection authority is precluded from examining whether his application was complete, in order, within time or otherwise acceptable. A defect in the application form that renders the candidate ineligible might be overlooked in the initial screening and as a result he may be called for W.A.No. 2671 OF 2009 9 interview and may get a chance to take part in the selection process but that alone does not mean that the candidate cannot be held ineligible for selection at a later stage once the defect in the application comes to light. We may point out once again that it is also not a case where two modes of applications were involved. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellants failed to establish any reasonable nexus between the classifications made and the object sought to be achieved. In the said circumstances, we do not see any merit in the appeal and the appeal is dismissed. J. CHELAMESWAR, CHIEF JUSTICE. P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON, JUDGE. lk