IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.8442 of 2009 Ganesh Prasad Jaiswal @ Ganesh Prasad, S/o Late Ram Pyare Lal, R/o Arya Samaj Mandir Road, Narkatiyaganj, P.S. Sikarpur, Distt. West Champaran at Bettiah. --------- Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. Om Prakash Gupta, S/o Late Ram Dulri Gupta, R/o Village Hasopur, P.S. Rajghat, Distt. Gorakhpur (U.P.). ---------- Opposite parties ----------- 4 27.7.2009 Heard Mr. Dinesh Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as also Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Gupta, learned counsel for the informant-opposite party no.2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order rejecting his prayer for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. when the Court below has looked into the charge-sheet as also the materials available on record and has found that there are sufficient materials to frame charge. The only submission on which the counsel of the petitioner has stressed is that earlier there was U.D. Case for the same occurrence and when the same was still under the process of being investigated, lodging of the present case after a lapse of four years by itself was a valid circumstance for the court below to 2 discharge the petitioner. This Court would find that in the same case, when proceedings were initiated against the co-accused Prem Chand Jaiswal by virtue of taking cognizance, the said co-accused had moved this Court by raising this very plea but this Court by a reasoned order dated 31.10.2007 in Cr. Misc. No. 48116 of 2006 had rejected the same by holding that the status of U.D. Case cannot be equated as that of the First Information Report under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. To be more specific, this Court had held as follows:- “------The contention of the learned counsel is that the report was made after four years of the occurrence and in face of the fact that for the same occurrence an Unnatural Death case was registered by the same police station by the same informant the order was unwarranted. The second contention was that the learned Court below appears not having a clear decision as regards the constitution of offences and as such, fell in error in passing the summoning order. The third contention was that a report of the U.D. Case was that a report of the U.D. Case was also a F.I.R. and it could not be ignored in the light of another report for summoning an accused. If one considered the provisions of 3 section 154 Cr.P.C., it may transpire to him from the provision of the Police station regarding the commission of a cognizable offence by some persons known or unknown is the F.I.R. If one considers the contention of the learned counsel regarding the report of U.D. Case being F.I.R., what one may find is that it does not fulfil the criteria because the unnatural death may not ultimately be relatable to an offence, more so a cognizable offence. Secondly, the Cr.P.C. does not treat the report of an U.D. Case as such. The document as defined by section 154 Cr.P.C. the ingredients of F.I.R. as indicated above, specially about the commission of a cognizable offence and that too by some persons known or unknown is a must for document if it is required to be treated as F.I.R. As regards the propriety of the launching of the prosecution, a belated attempt in that behalf could never be a ground for quashing the prosecution.-----“ This Court is not only in agreement with the aforesaid view taken in the case of another co-accused in this very case but would find that even the court below has found that the charge in fact has also been framed in a separated trial of co-accused. Thus now when the petitioner is trying to raise same ground of only U.D. Case being a bar of F.I.R. which also as noted above, has already been rejected 4 by this Court on the aforesaid order dated 31.10.2007 in Cr.Misc. No. 48116 of 2006, it would be difficult to take any different view on the same issue. This Court bound by principles of comity of court must maintains the consistency and follow the precedents laid down in the same case. Moreover, the scope of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for discharge is very limited inasmuch as the trial court does not have much option if from records of the case and document submitted therewith he would consider that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. As noted above, not only the police had filed charge-sheet in this case but on the basis of the materials available on record, the court below had come to a positive finding that the charge on the same suit of allegation in fact had already been framed in the earlier separated trial of co-accused of the same court and this case being only the part of it, even the court below could not have taken a different view as referred to in the case of co-accused Prem Chand Jaiswal in the same 5 case. The last submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that even if the entire allegations in the F.I.R. is taken into totality and accepted no offence is made out against the petitioner has to be only noted for its being rejected. This court would find that a prima-facie case was made out against the petitioner in the F.I.R. itself which was also fully corroborated in courtse of investigation of police which had submitted a charge-sheet. It has also been recorded in the impugned order that contrary to the U.D. Case, the witnesses had supported the occurrence and the allegation made in the First Information Report. The delay in lodging F.I.R. or some inconsistency in the version of informant cannot be looked into at the stage of taking cognizance or disposing of an application for discharge and at least on such defence plea of the petitioner the entire prosecution against him cannot be quashed by this Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as there is no scope of holding a mini trial at 6 the stage of framing charge. Accordingly, this Court would not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. At this stage, counsel for the informant has informed this Court that the trial has already been commenced which has been immediately controverted by Mr. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner by saying that no witnesses has been examined. If that be so, this court direct the court below that to conclude trial within a period of one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order specially when the counsel for the informant has undertaken to produce witness on day to day basis. Be that as it may, this Court would not find any error in the impugned order and accordingly, the same in the light of aforesaid observations and directions is hereby dismissed. Rsh (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)