1` IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Writ Petition No. 4374/2009 Mohd. Israil Mohd Ishaque vs. State of Maharashtra and others. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders Court's or Judge's or directions and Registrar's orders. Orders. CORAM : A.P.Lavande and P.D.Kode,JJ DATE : 14.10.2009 Heard Mr. P.B.Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. By this petition, the petitioner challenges order dated 23.7.2009 passed by the respondent no.4 in appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 17.8.2008 passed by the competent authority under the Slums Area Development Act (‘The Act’ for short). The petitioner has also challenged the vires of Section 35 of the Act on the ground that it does not provide power to the appellate authority to condone the delay. 3. The petitioner preferred the above referred appeal to the respondent no.4 against the order dated 17.8.2008 on 8.11.2006. Under section 35 of the Act the period of limitation prescribed is 30 days and there is 2` no express provision in the act to condone the delay. Mr. Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 35 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India more particularly Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as no power to condone the delay has been given to the appellate authority against the order passed by the competent authority. According to Mr. Patil, under the Act ordinarily appeals are preferred by the Slum Dwellers and the poor persons and, therefore, ordinarily they are are not aware that the period of limitation is 30 days and as such the prescribed period of 30 days for filing appeal without any power to condone the delay is patently arbitrary and illegal. He has also referred to some of the provisions of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act as well as the Maharashtra (Municipal Councils) (Nagpur Panchayats And Industrial Townships Act, 1965 to point out that under this statute longer period of limitation is prescribed for challenging the orders passed by the authorities under the Act. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is well settled by catena of the decisions of the Apex Court that power to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies only to the courts and not tribunals. Reference in this connection may be made to the Apex Court Judgment in Sakuru vs. Tanaji (AIR 1985 3` Supreme Court, 1279). Unless the Tribunal is given specific power to condone the delay the Tribunal constituted under the Act has no power to condone the delay. In the present case neither Section 35 of the Act nor any other provision of the Act permits the Tribunal to condone the delay. 5. Providing a remedy in the statute is the Legislative function and it is for the Legislative to make appropriate provisions in the statute. No litigant can claim a statutory or constitutional right to have a particular period of limitation for preferring appeal against the order passed under a particular statute. The provision of a statute which does not give power to condone the delay to a Tribunals cannot be attacked on the ground that it is ultra vires the Constitution of India and more particularly Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The argument of Mr. Patil based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India is patently unsustainable in law. There is no question of equality being claimed by a litigant in approaching the Courts and in approaching the Tribunals. If the statute specifically does not provide power to condone the delay to the Tribunal, the necessary sequitur is that the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay since Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to the Courts and not to the Tribunals. When the Act has not given power to condone the delay, in our considered opinion, the 4` appellate authority was absolutely justified in not condoning the delay and dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner beyond the period of 30 days i.e. on 8.11.2006. It is for the legislature to make appropriate provisions in the Act to give power to the appellate authority to condone the delay if sufficient cause is made out. In the present case the legislature in its wisdom has decided not to give such a power to the appellate authority and it is not for the High Court to sit in Judgment over the wisdom of the legislature for not enacting such provisions. Reliance placed by Mr. Patil upon some provisions of the other Acts is of no help to the petitioner to challenge the decision in the present petition. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the present petition. Hence, the petition is rejected. JUDGE JUDGE patle 5`