WA 18/2011 BEFORE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE I A ANSARI HON’BLE MR JUSTICE A C UPADHYAY Aggrieved by the dismissal of his writ petition by judgment and order, dated 20. 11.2007, passed in WP(C) No. 1549/2002, the writ petitioner has preferred this a ppeal. We have heard Mr. PKR Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant, and Ms. B. Goel, learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents . The basis of dismissal of the writ petition is a conclusion, reached by the learned Single Judge of this Court, that the writ petitioner (i.e., the appe llant herein), was a contractual appointee and the State respondents were free t o keep him engaged or to terminate his engagement inasmuch as the contract of em ployment, under which the petitioner had been appointed as a sub-Inspector of Po lice (B), was for a period of one year. While dismissing the writ petition, lea rned Single Judge, however, observed that having regard to the experience gather ed by the petitioner in the post, which the petitioner had been holding, it woul d remain open to the respondents to re-engage the petitioner if the respondents wished so. There is no dispute at the Bar that the appellant’s appointment was unde r a scheme, which was considered in Mohd. Abdul Kadir v. Director General of Pol ice, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 611, wherein, having considered the nature of appo intment made under the Scheme aforementioned, the Supreme Court observed and dir ected as under: *** *** *** 16. We may next consider the challenge to the procedure of annual terminatio n and reappointment introduced by the Circular dated 17-3-1995. The PIF Scheme a nd the PIF Additional Scheme were introduced by the Government of India. The Sch eme does not contemplate or require such periodical termination and reappointmen t. Only ex-servicemen are eligible to be selected under the Scheme and that too after undergoing regular selection process under the Scheme. They joined the Sch eme being under the impression that they will be continued as long as the PIF Ad ditional Scheme was continued. The artificial annual breaks and reappointments w ere introduced by the State agency entrusted with the operation of the Scheme. T his Court has always frowned upon artificial breaks in service. 17. When the ad hoc appointment is under a scheme and is in accordance with the selection process prescribed by the scheme, there is no reason why those app ointed under the scheme should not be continued as long as the scheme continues. Ad hoc appointments under schemes are normally coterminous with the scheme (sub ject of course to earlier termination either on medical or disciplinary grounds, or for unsatisfactory service or on attainment of normal age of retirement). Ir respective of the length of their ad hoc service or the scheme, they will not be entitled to regularisation nor to the security of tenure and service benefits a vailable to the regular employees. In this background, particularly in view of t he continuing Scheme, the ex-serviceman employed after undergoing the selection process, need not be subjected to the agony, anxiety, humiliation and vicissitud es of annual termination and re-engagement, merely because their appointment is termed as ad hoc appointments. 18. We are therefore of the view that the learned Single Judge was justified in observing that the process of termination and reappointment every year should be avoided and the appellants should be continued as long as the Scheme continues, but purely on ad hoc and temporary basis, coterminous with the Scheme. The Circ ular dated 17-3-1995 directing artificial breaks by annual terminations followed by fresh appointment, being contrary to the PIF Additional Scheme and contrary to the principles of service jurisprudence, is liable to be quashed. *** *** *** *** 26. The appeal is allowed in part accordingly as follows: (i) The Circular dated 17-3-1995 is quashed. The appellants shall not be subject ed to annual terminations and reappointments (subject to observations in paras 1 6-18 above). (ii) The benefit of this order will be available to other similarly situated ad hoc border staff, even if they have not approached the Court for relief. In view of the above, the interlocutory applications for impleading are disposed of as having become infructuous. (iii) This order will not however come in the way of ad hoc employees working as border staff, being subjected to any periodical medical examination or service review to assess their fitness and suitability for continuation. In the face of the observations made and the directions given, in Mohd. Abdul Kadir (supra), it becomes clear that the present appellant’s appointment a s a sub-Inspector of Police (B) was an ad hoc appointment under the said Scheme. It is also clear from the pleadings as well as the materials on record that th e petitioner came to be appointed following a selection process, which had taken place as prescribed by the Scheme. In such circumstances, the ad hoc appointme nt of the appellant, as indicated in Mohd. Abdul Kadir (supra), was co-terminus with the Scheme subject to the termination of his appointment either on the grou nd of misconduct or on the ground of unsatisfactory performance or on attainment of normal retirement age. In view of the fact that the appellant’s appointment, though ad hoc, was co-terminus with the Scheme and that the Scheme has remained in force till date , the termination of the appellant’s service by the notice, dated 13.02.2001, is sued by the Superintendent of Police (B), Assam, was illegal and ought not to ha ve been allowed to stand good on record. The learned Single Judge fell into err or in dismissing the writ petition, because of the fact that the Scheme, whereun der the appellant was appointed, and the decision of the Supreme Court, in Mohd. Abdul Kadir (supra), had not been brought to the notice of the learned Single J udge. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are of the view that in the facts and attending circumstance of the present case, the term ination of the appellant’s service being illegal, the same needs to be set aside and, consequently, the appellant needs to be re-engaged on the same terms and c onditions as were available under the Scheme at the time of his appointment/enga gement subject to such modification(s), as the Scheme might have, in the meantim e, undergone. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we hereby direct that the r espondent No. 4, namely, Superintendent of Police (B), Assam, Guwahati, shall ex amine the service record of the appellant and, unless the appellant’s service is found to have been terminated on the ground of the appellant’s inefficiency or his unsuitability, and that too, after giving him due notice, the appellant shal l be re-engaged/re-appointed as sub-Inspector of Police (B) if the appellant’s s ervice is found, pursuant to the directions given hereinbefore, to have been ter minated on the ground of the appellant’s inefficiency or unsuitability but no no tice was given to him before termination of his service, the respondent No. 4 an d/or the authority concerned shall remain free to serve on the appellant such no tice, as was required, and, then take a decision in the matter. If the appellan t’s appointment, as indicated hereinbefore, is found to have been terminated not on the ground of his inefficiency or unsuitability, then, he shall be appointed subject to the conditions as have been mentioned in Mohd. Abdul Kadir (supra), namely, (i) The appellant shall not be subjected to annual terminations and rea ppointments, and (ii) this order will not come in the way of the appellant’s bei ng subjected to any periodical medical examination or service review to assess h is fitness and suitability for continuation. The whole exercise, as regards the appellant’s re-engagement/re-appointm ent, as directed hereinabove, shall be completed within a period of one month fr om the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the respondent No. 4 herein. If the appellant feels aggrieved by the decision(s), which may be taken by the r espondents and/or the order(s), which may be passed by the respondents, the appe llant shall be at liberty to take recourse to such provisions of law as may be p ermissible. The appellant may submit to the respondent No. 4 a certified copy o f this order alongwith a copy of the writ petition and a copy of the order, date d 20.11.2007, which was impugned in the writ petition. With the above observations and directions, this writ appeal stand dispo sed of. Furnish a copy of this order to the learned Government Advocate.