HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH S.A.No.906 of 2011 JUDGMENT: This Second Appeal is directed against the decree and judgment dated 28-05-2011 passed in A.S.No.204 of 2010 on the fie of the Additional District Judge-cum-Judge, Family Court, Guntur, whereunder and whereby, the decree and judgment dated 22-01-2010 in O.S.No.454 of 2007 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli, were confirmed. 2. The appellant is the plaintiff in O.S.No.454 of 2007. She filed the said suit seeking specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 13-04-1985 and 10-03-1987 and for permanent injunction. Initially, one Siva Ramakrishnaiah was the original owner of the suit schedule property and he agreed to sell the said property to the plaintiff and accordingly executed the agreement of sale dated 13-04- 1985. While so, the plaintiff lost the said agreement of sale due to theft took place in her house and again she obtained another agreement of sale dated 10-03-1987 from Siva Ramakrishnaiah. However, before executing the sale deed, Siva Ramakrishnaiah died and then the plaintiff started demanding the defendants, who are the legal representatives of the Siva Ramakrishnaiah, to execute the sale deed. Since the defendants had not come forward to execute the sale deed, she filed the suit. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the said suit. In its judgment, it was observed that the agreement of sale dated 10-03-1987 is true and valid, but however held that the said agreement of sale is barred by limitation and the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform her part of contract of sale. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff filed A.S.No.204 of 2010, on the file of the Additional District Judge –cum-Judge, Family Court, Guntur. The lower appellate Court once again considered the points viz., whether the agreement of sale is true and valid and whether there are latches on the part of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform her part of contract and whether the plaintiff is entitled to perform her part of contract of sale and whether there are any grounds to set aside the findings of the learned trial Judge. All the issues went against the appellant/plaintiff. With regard to the issue whether the agreement of sale is true or valid is concerned, though it was held in favour of the plaintiff, but, however, the lower appellant Court came to the conclusion that there are latches on the part of the plaintiff in maintaining silence for more than 20 years without explaining the reasons why she has not taken steps for the specific performance of contract of sale, and that the plaintiff should have performed her part of contract within a reasonable time and that the delay is stayed at her, and therefore, the agreement of sale is barred by time and hence, the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of contract of sale. Accordingly, confirming the judgment and decree in O.S.No.454 of 2007, dated 22-01-2010, dismissed the appeal. Challenging the same, the plaintiff approached this Court and filed the second appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant land perused the record. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff contended that both the Courts below failed to consider the fact that the time is not an essence of contract. He further contended that the appellant- plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property, but the Courts below failed to consider the relief of permanent injunction. Further, the Courts below have failed to grant at least alternative relief for refund of advance amount. Hence, he prayed to allow the second appeal setting aside the judgment and decrees delivered by both the courts below. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff and perused the entire material on record including the judgments of the Courts below, I am of the opinion that there are no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings given by the Courts below and I do not see any perversity or legal infirmities in the judgments under impugned. 6. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff that both the Courts below failed to consider in granting alternative relief of refund of advance amount though the appellant-plaintiff paid Court fee for both the reliefs such as specific performance of contract of sale and for injunction is concerned, merely because the plaintiff paid the Court Fee for both the reliefs, the contention of the appellant-plaintiff cannot be accepted in the absence of any alternative relief was prayed in the main suit for refund of advance amount. Therefore, such alternative relief cannot be granted under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Hence, I am of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this second appeal. 7. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. ________________ V.ESWARAIAH, J. 05 -08-2011 Kvr