IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA C.R. No.749 of 2010 SMT. SHAKUNTALA DEVI wife of Radhey Shyam Churiwala, resident of Mohalla Sujaganj, Jai Ram Marwari Lane, P O. Head Post Office, P. S. Kotwali, District- Bhagalpur. ....Defendant-Petitioner. Versus SAJJAN KUMAR BAJORIA son of Late Rameshwar Lal Bajoria, resident of Mahabir Prasad Dwebedi Road, P. O. Bhagalpur, P. S. Kotwali, District- Bhagalpur. ....Plaintiff-Opposite party. ----------- 4. 9.12.2010 Heard Mr. Bimlendu Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. P. Jittu, learned counsel for opposite parties. The petitioner, defendant in an eviction suit, is aggrieved by judgment dated 21st June, 2010 passed in Eviction Suit No. 18 of 2005. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the core issue of the personal necessity of the plaintiff-opposite party even after being challenged by the defendant-tenant petitioner by both oral and documentary evidence, the Court below has failed to record any finding in this regard except reaching to its conclusion. He has in this context submitted that the petitioner had examined four witnesses and had adduced also her documentary evidence in the form of Ext. A, Ext. B to B/8, Ext. C, Ext. D and Ext. E. but in the impugned 2 judgment the Court below save and except recording the heading of such documents has made no discussion as with regard to cumulative effect of those evidence. In fact, he has also invited attention of this Court to the finding recorded in paragraph no. 6 of the impugned judgment which according to him has been reached without any discussion even on the oral evidence led by the parties. Mr. Jittu, learned counsel for opposite party however while supporting the impugned judgment has submitted that once the Court below had gone into the scope of evidence in paragraph no. 4 of the judgment, there was no further requirement for its separate consideration and therefore the conclusion arrived either in respect of personal necessity or partial eviction is unassailable either on fact or in law. In the opinion of this Court, the learned Munsif has, ignored the basic principle of recording a judgment. A judgment has to be based on findings and such findings are to be arrived after analyzing and discussing the weight of evidence adduced by the parties. From the reading of the text of the impugned judgment this much becomes clear that paragraph nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were only addressed 3 to the case of the respective parties or the nature of evidence adduced by them. At least from these four paragraphs, it cannot be said that the Court below had made even any analysis or evaluation of such evidence led by the parties. Then comes paragraph 5 and 6 which are only two paragraphs of the impugned judgment wherein it has been held as follows:- Þ5- mHk; i{kksa ds vfHkcpuks rFkk muds n~okjk izLrqr ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{;ksa ds foospuk ls ;g Li"V gS fd izfroknh fookfnr ifjlj esa fdjk;knkj gS ftuls oknh fookfnr ifjlj O;fDrxr vko’;drk ds vk/kkj ij [kkyh djkuk pkgrs gSA izfrokfnuh us dgk gS fd izgykn oktksfj;k csjkstxkj ugha gS cfYd nok dk nqdku pykrk gSA ijUrq izfrokfnuh us ,slk dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; izLrqr ugha fd;k gS ftlls fofnr gks fd izgykn dqekj oktksfj;k nok dh nqdku pykrs gS rFkk og csjkstxkj ugha gS izfrokfnuh us ;g Hkh dgk gS fd oknh us ekdsZV dkEiysDl dk fuekZ.k djk;k gS rFkk mls fdjk;k ij fofHkUu nqdkunkjks dks fn;k gSA ;fn og csjkstxkj gksrk rks mlh dkEiysDl dh nqdku esa O;olk; djrkA bl laca/k esa oknh us dgk gS fd fookfnr ifjlj ,u0ih0 f}osnh jksM ij gS rFkk og mlds yMds ds O;olk; gsrq lcls mi;qZDr gS fof/k ds vuqlkj Hkh nqdku ds p;u djus dk vf/kdkj oknh dks gS rFkk izfroknh mls pSysUt ugha dj ldrs gSA oknh us ;g Hkh dgk gS fd vkaf’kd fu"dklu ls mlds vko’;drk dh iqrhZ ugha gksxh ijUrq izfroknh us ml laca/k esa dqN ugha dgk gSA oknh fookfnr ifjlj dh O;fDrxr vko’;drk ds rF; dks lkfor djus esa lQy jgs gSA 6- mijksDr foospuk ds vk/kkj ij eS bl fu"d"kZ ij igq¡prk gw¡ fd oknh dks fookfnr ifjlj dh lnHkko iwoZd ,oa ;qfDr eqDr :i ls vko’;drk gS rFkk vkaf’kd fu"dklu ls oknh ds vko’;drk dh iwfrZ ugha gksxh A vr% okn fcUnq la[;k ¼iii½ ,oa ¼iv½ dh oknh ds i{k esa fuf.kZr fd;k tkrk gSAÞ From the reading of the aforementioned 4 paragraphs 5 and 6, it would be clear that again either the Court below was overimpressed with the principle of law as with regard to choice of the landlord to retain a particular premise or overawed by the case of the landlord in support of his claim of personal necessity. These cryptic observation followed by conclusions therefore also cannot be said to have contained the discussion on the comparative value of the evidence adduced by the parties specially when, the plaintiff –opposite party had examined as many as six witnesses and had also exhibited three documents in evidence as against four witnesses examined by the defendant-petitioner apart from five documents exhibited by him. It thus remains a mystery to this Court which without looking into those documents cannot be made aware from the reading of the judgment as to what was the scope of such defence documents exhibited by the defendant-petitioner inasmuch as there is absolutely no discussion as to any of the documents adduced in evidence adduced by the defendant-petitioner. This Court will thus have no hesitation in holding that finding recorded either in paragraph 5 with regard to personal necessity or in paragraph 6 with regard to partial eviction is not only 5 vitiated but in fact wholly perfunctory in nature. By now it is well settled that an issue of partial eviction has not to be pleaded by the parties but in fact whenever the issue of personal necessity has to be decided, it is the duty of the Court to also go into the question of partial eviction in the light of the materials on record. Merely because the plaintiff had stated that partial eviction will not serve his purpose, cannot be a ground for decreeing the suit by holding that the plaintiff’s requirement would not be fulfilled by way of partial eviction. It would be in fact the duty of the Court to record such finding on the basis of size of the premises and comparative needs of the landlord viz. a viz. tenant. Here in this case, the plaintiff had come out with a case that her son was unemployed and after obtaining graduation degree in Commerce he had required a separate premise for doing his own business. What was the nature of the business of the son of the plaintiff-opposite party and how much area was required to a new comer in the business, was definitely required to be looked into even for deciding the issue of partial eviction. The issue of partial eviction in fact had also to be gone into in the light 6 of the stand taken by the defendant-petitioner inasmuch as she was herself doing her business along with her husband and two sons and therefore the comparative requirement of both the parties relating to business had to be gone into for deciding the crucial mandatory issue of partial eviction. As noted above, in paragraph 6 there is absolutely no consideration in this regard. This Court is therefore satisfied that the impugned judgment on account of its being cryptic and non-speaking cannot be sustained, specially when the core issue of personal necessity and partial eviction has not been examined in the light of the evidence on record. That being so, this Civil Revision Application is allowed and the impugned judgment and the resultant decree is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Court below which would now take up the suit from the stage of argument and after hearing the parties would pronounce its fresh judgment as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. kanchan (Mihir Kumar Jha, J.)