THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.548 OF 2003. DATED: 10-12-2009. Between: State: Inspector of Police Anti Corruption Bureau, City Range, Hyderabad. … Appellant/Complainant and Addu Ramesh @ Ramesh Yadav. … Respondent/Accused THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 548 OF 2003. JUDGMENT: This Criminal Appeal by the State under Section 378 (1) and (4) Cr.P.C., is directed against the judgment, dated 07-01-2003, in C.C. No.22 of 1998, on the file of the Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases-cum-V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, whereunder and whereby the accused was acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the Act’). 2. Brief facts, that are necessary for disposal of the present Criminal Appeal, may be stated as follows: The respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘Accused Officer’) was working as Assistant Labour Officer, Moulali Circle, Ranga Reddy District. PW1 who is the de facto complainant, is the Managing Director of M/s Ank’s Café situated at ECIL cross rods, Kushaiguda, Hyderabad. On 09-01-1997, the accused officer visited the hotel and asked the Manager of the hotel about the non-renewal of the certificate of the registration of the hotel in the absence of P.W.1 in the hotel. Again on 17-01-1997, the accused officer visited the hotel and found the certificate of registration not renewed from 01-01-1997 to 31-12-1997 and issued a show cause notice to the Manager and collected Rs.500/-towards renewal fee and Rs.250/- towards penalty from P.W.1, but not issued any receipt and demanded Rs.2,000/- as bribe for not booking a case against him. When P.W.1 expressed his inability to pay the same, the accused officer reduced the same to Rs.1500/- and insisted P.W.1 to pay the amount between 3 PM to 5 PM on 18-01-1997 when the accused officer visit the hotel of P.W.1. As P.W.1 was not willing to pay the said bribe amount to the accused officer, he gave complaint on 18- 01-1997 to P.W.5 who registered a case and took up investigation. After observing necessary formalities, P.W.5 made arrangements to lay a trap against the accused officer. Thereafter, the accused officer was successfully trapped on 18-01-1997 at 4.00 PM at P.W.1’s hotel. The tainted amount of Rs.1500/- was recovered from the possession of the accused officer who produced the same from his brief case. After obtaining Ex.P31 sanction from the competent authority, P.W.9 filed the charge sheet. 3. The learned Special Judge framed the following charges against the accused officer: CHARGE NO.1: That you being a public servant working as Assistant Labour Officer, Moulali, R.R. District on 17-01-1997 at 3 P.M. demanded Rs.2,000/- from Karrar Hussain, Managing Partner of M/s Ank’s Café, ECIL Cross rods, Kushaiguda, Hyderabad as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration to do the official favour viz., not to book a case against him for not renewing the hotel licence for the period from 01-01-1997 to 31-12-1997 and at his request reduced your demand to Rs.1500/- and on 18-01-1997 at 4 PM at the said hotel, in pursuance of your earlier demand, demanded and accepted the sum of Rs.1500/- from said Karrar Hussain as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing an official favour viz., not to book a case against him for not renewing the licence of his hotel and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, 1988, and within my cognizance. CHARGE NO.2: That you being a public servant working as Assistant Labour Officer, Moulali on the dates, time and place as mentioned in charge no.1 by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing your position as such public servant, demanded and obtained for yourself a pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs.1500/- in pursuance of your earlier demand on 17-01-1997 from Karrar Hussain for the above said purpose and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of P.C. Act, 1988. When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused officer in Telugu, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. To substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 7 and got marked Exs.P1 to P19 besides case property, M.Os.1 to 8. 5. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused officer was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating material found against him in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. He denied the same. On behalf of the accused officer, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs. D1 and D2 were marked. 6. The trial Court upon consideration of entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, acquitted the accused officer. Challenging the same, State preferred this appeal. 7. Now the point that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution proved its case against the accused officer of the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Act beyond all reasonable doubt and whether the judgment of the trial Court is legal, correct and proper? 8. Mr. V.Ravi Kiran Rao, learned standing counsel appearing for ACB cases contended that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 6 is very clear that the accused officer demanded and accepted the money, that the tainted currency notes was seized from the brief-case of the accused officer, that the official favour not to book any case against P.W.1 was pending, that Ex.D2 does not contain any date and signature of D.W.1 and it is created subsequent to the trap, that there is evidence on record which would go to show that the accused officer visited the hotel of P.W.1 on 17-01-1997 and demanded Rs.2,000/- and later it was reduced to Rs.1500/- for not renewing the licence of the hotel, that on the next day also, the accused officer went to the hotel of P.W.1 and demanded the same, that the earliest version as narrated in Ex.P2 is completely in corroboration with the evidence of P.W.1, that the trial Court has committed illegality in not accepting the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and hence, he prays to set aside the order of acquittal. 9. None appears for the respondent-accused officer in spite of service of notice. 10. The essential ingredients of Section 7 of the Act are: a. that the person accepting the gratification should be a public servant; b. that he should accept the gratification for himself and the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function, favour or dis-favour to any person. 11. Insofar as Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act is concerned, its essential ingredients are: (i) that he should have been a public servant; (ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant, and iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. 12. While dealing with the order of acquittal, though the appellate Court has got full power to re-appreciate the evidence, but it will slow in interfering with the same in view of the fact that there is a presumption under law that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless contrary is proved. That presumption of innocence is further strengthened by an order of acquittal. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in HARBANS SINGH AND ANOTHER V THE STATE OF PUNJAB [1], wherein it was held thus: “The question as regards the correct principles to be applied by a Court hearing an appeal against acquittal of a person has engaged the attention of this Court from the very beginning. In many cases, especially the earlier ones, the Court has in laying down such principles emphasized the necessity of interference with an order of acquittal being based only on compelling and substantial reasons and has expressed the view that unless such reasons are present an Appeal Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The use of the words ‘compelling reasons’ embarrassed some of the High Courts in exercising their jurisdiction in appeals against acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this Court had meant by the words ‘compelling reasons’. In later years the Court has often avoided emphasis on ‘compelling reasons’ but nonetheless adhered to the view expressed earlier that before interfering in appeal with an order of acquittal a Court must examine not only question of law and fact in all their aspects but must also closely and carefully examine the reasons which impelled the lower courts to acquit the accused and should interfere only if satisfied, after such examination that the conclusion reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable.” 13. The entire case rests upon the solitary testimony of P.W.1 with regard to demand and acceptance of bribe amount. If the evidence of P.W.1 is put in the category of wholly reliable, then there is no legal bar to base a conviction solely on the testimony of P.W.1. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in VADVIVELU THEVAR V THE STATE OF MADRAS [2], wherein it was held thus: “Generally speaking oral testimony in this context may be classified into these categories, namely: (i) Wholly reliable (ii) Wholly unreliable (iii) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable In the first category of proof, the Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach on suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.” 14. The evidence of P.W.1 would go to show that on 16-01-1997, the accused officer came to the hotel and collected Rs.500/- towards renewal fee and Rs.250/- towards penalty, but he has not issued any receipt. He again says that on 17-01-1997, the Accused officer came and collected Rs.750/-. The accused officer has demanded Rs.2,000/- for not filing the case. When P.W.1 refused to pay the amount, the accused officer reduced it to Rs.1500/-. As he was not willing to pay the amount, he gave Ex.P2 complaint to P.W.5. It is not in dispute that the hotel of P.W.1 was governed by the provisions of Shops and Establishment Act, Minimum Wages Act, A.P. Labour Welfare Fund Act, Bonus Act and Employees State Insurance Act. They have to pay the required amount to the departments concerned under those Acts. It is not in dispute that the labour licence of the hotel of P.W.1 was not renewed from 01-01-1997. The allegation in Ex.P2-complaint would go to show that on 17-01-1997, the Accused officer came to the hotel and collected Rs.500/- and Rs.250/- respectively towards licence fee and penalty. The Accused officer stated that for non renewal of licence, he has to book a case against him, for which the accused officer demanded Rs.2,000/-. Then P.W.1 expressed his inability. On the next day also, the Accused officer came and asked him to pay Rs.1500/-. The oral evidence of P.W.1 would go to show that on 16-01-1997 the Accused officer came to the hotel and collected Rs.500/- and Rs.250/- towards licence fee and penalty and on that day, he demanded money. That has not been stated in Ex.P2-complaint. There must be nexus between the official favour to be shown by the Accused officer to P.W.1. and demand and acceptance of money. When P.W.1 had already paid certain amounts towards renewal fee and penalty, there is no need for the accused officer to proceed further for filing a case against P.W.1. The second reminder with regard to demand of bribe was on 17-01-1997. Admittedly, on 16-01-1997, he appears to have been not present. That is the reason why, admittedly a notice has been served on D.W.1 who was the Manager of the hotel and obtained signature of the Cashier. That has not been stated so in the earliest report. It is in the evidence of P.W.1 that he filled up Ex.P3, which is the original form III application for renewal of licence fee of the hotel and the Accused officer prepared two receipts and he was about to write third receipt, ACB people caught hold of his both hands and trap was laid. He admitted Exs.P5 and P6 receipts for Rs.300/- and for Rs.1100/- and when he was about to give those receipts, ACB officials caught hold of the Accused officer. Therefore, the version of P.W.1 is almost similar to the contention raised by the Accused officer in Ex.P8-post trap proceedings. A spontaneous explanation was given by the Accused Officer stating that he received the amount from P.W.1 towards licence fee for renewal of registration certificate, but not for any illegal gratification. Though P.W.6 who is accompanying witness stated that he went along with P.W.1, P.W.1 did not state that both went into the hotel. Even in Ex.P8-post trap proceedings, there is no mention that P.W.6 accompanied P.W.1 into the hotel and observed what transpired in the hotel with regard to demand and acceptance. On the other hand, Ex.P8 would go to show that the complainant went into the hotel and other members of the trap party took vantage position in and around the hotel. Therefore, the presence of P.W.6 at the time of demand and acceptance cannot be accepted. 15. Admittedly, D.W.1 who was working as Manager of the hotel was present at the relevant point of the trap in the hotel of mother of P.W.1. His evidence would go to show that the Accused officer told him to pay total Rs.1505/- towards licence fee and other expenses and Ex.D2 is the copy served on him, which contains his signature. Prior to the trap i.e., on 16-01-1997, the Accused officer came to the hotel and asked him to pay the amount. He asked the Accused officer to come on the next day. Then the Accused officer gave application to P.W.1. P.W.1 gave Rs.1500/-. After counting the same, the Accused Officer informed P.W.1 to bring the remaining balance of Rs.5/-. The Accused officer prepared two receipts and about to prepare third receipt, trap party entered into the hotel and caught hold of him. Therefore, his evidence would clearly go to show that the Accused officer received the amount towards legal gratification i.e., for collecting the renewal fee. When two views are reasonably possible, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in KALI RAM V STATE OF HIMACHALPRADESH [3], wherein it was held thus: “Another golden thread which runs through the we of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding he benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab V Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final anolysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” One view is the Accused officer received the amount towards bribe for not booking a case against P.W.1 and the other view is he received the amount for renewal of certificate of registration. Perhaps that is the reason why, the trial Court gave benefit of doubt to the accused. Therefore, the said order of acquittal does not suffer from any infirmities so as to call for interference by this Court. 16. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment, dated 07-01-2003, in C.C. No.22 of 1998, on the file of the Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases-cum-V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. --------------------- K.C.BHANU, J DATED: 10-12-2009 Hsd [1] AIR 1962 SC 439 [2] AIR 1957 SC 614 [3] AIR 1973 SC 2773