1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR Jugal Kishore Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.2241/2008) Date of Order :- 06th October, 2009 HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S.CHAUHAN Mr.Dharmendra Pareek, for the petitioner. Mr.Javed Chaudhary, Public Prosecutor. Mr.M.K. Jain, for the complainant. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 19.04.2008 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur whereby the learned Magistrate, while rejecting the protest petition filed by the petitioner, has accepted the negative final report submitted by the Police. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 17.06.2008 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the order dated 19.04.2008 and has confirmed the order dated 19.04.2008. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner filed a criminal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur against the respondent No.2, Kapoor Chand. In the complaint, he stated that the respondent No.2, Kapoor Chand prepared a fabricated document and got it attested with a notary public. On the basis of the said fabricated document, he raised a dispute before the Rent Tribunal, Sawai Madhopur. On 07.05.2007, the complaint was sent for investigation to the Police Station 2 Mantown, District Sawai Madhopur under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Police Station Mantown registered a FIR, FIR No.235/2007, dated 19.05.2007, for offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and started the investigation. After a thorough investigation, the Police submitted a negative final report before the ACJM, Sawai Madhopur. On 30.10.2007, the petitioner filed a protest petition against the negative final report before the court. Vide order dated 19.04.2008, the learned Magistrate dismissed the protest petition and accepted the negative final report. Against the order dated 19.04.2008, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. Vide order dated 17.06.2008, the learned Judge dismissed the revision petition and confirmed the order dated 19.04.2008 passed by the learned Magistrate. Hence, this petition before this Court. Mr. M.K. Jain, the learned counsel for respondent No.2, has raised a preliminary objection before this Court. According to him, since the petitioner had already filed a revision petition before the revisional court, the present misc. petition is unmaintainable, for it is nothing but a second revision petition in the garb of a miscellaneous petition. Secondly, that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be utilized to overcome a bar contained in the Code. On the other hand, Mr. Dharmendra Pareek, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that Section 482 Cr.P.C. begins with a non-obstante clause. Therefore, nothing in the Code can limit the inherent powers of the High Court. Thus, notwithstanding, the bar contained in Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., a miscellaneous petition can be filed and is maintainable even if the 3 party has already filed a revision petition before the Sub-ordinate court. Moreover, since the learned trial court has committed a grave illegality and has overstepped its jurisdiction, in order to do substantial justice to the petitioner, this Court, in fact, should invoke its inherent powers. Heard the learned counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection. Section 482 Cr.P.C. reads as under :- 482. Saying of inherent powers of High Court:- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A bare perusal of the said section clearly reveals that the said section begins with a non-obstante clause. Thus, no provision of Cr.P.C. can limit the inherent jurisdiction of this court. In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the inherent jurisdiction is a vast jurisdiction, which cannot be cribbed, cabined or confined by any provision of code. The very purpose of the inherent jurisdiction is to chase injustice. In case, the High Court is convinced that an injustice has been committed by the sub-ordinate Court, the High Court would be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction and in setting aside the impugned order. Therefore, the preliminary objection that the miscellaneous petition is not maintainable in case a party has already approached the Sub-ordinate court by way of filing of a revision 4 petition as the miscellaneous petition would be nothing but a second revision petition in the garb of a miscellaneous petition, is clearly untenable. Hence, the preliminary objection raided by the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is rejected. Mr. Dharmendra Pareek, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the petitioner had clearly stated in his statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. about the fact that the agreement submitted by respondent No.2, Kapoor Chand, was a forged one. Notwithstanding the clear allegation made by the complainant-petitioner, the learned trial court has meticulously discussed and debated the evidence which was gathered during the course of the investigation. According to the learned counsel, at the initial stage of taking cognizance, the trial court is not permitted to critically examine the evidence and to give its judicious finding on the basis of the evidence. At the preliminary stage of taking cognizance, the trial court is required to only see if a prima facie case exists or not. Since the trial court has elaborately discussed and has come to certain conclusions, clearly the trial court has over-stepped its jurisdiction. Secondly, merely because the dispute may prima facie be in the nature of a civil dispute, it would not oust a person from claiming that the agreement is a forged one. In case, the allegations are about forgery and cheating, the said case cannot be ousted only on the ground that the agreement relates to a case of civil nature. After all, civil liability and criminal liability are two separate and distinct concepts. Therefore, the Investigating Agency could not have debated the nature of the liability, and could not have brushed the allegation of the complainant ostensibly on the ground that the 5 dispute is of civil nature. Similarly, the learned trial court and the revisional court have been swayed by the fact that the document in question relates to a civil dispute which is pending before the rent tribunal. On the other hand, Mr. M.K. Jain, the learned counsel for respondent No.2, has vehemently contended that the controversy with regard to the genuineness or the fabrication of the document stands closed after a finding has been given by the learned trial court in the order dated 19.04.2008 holding the document to be a genuine one. Therefore, the said finding cannot be disturbed by this Court under its inherent jurisdiction. To use the exact words employed by the learned counsel, “the chapter stands closed”. Therefore, it is not for this Court to re-open the said chapter. Secondly, according to the statement of the witnesses, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., no case is made out against the respondent No.2, Mr. Kapoor Chand. Therefore, the learned trial Court was justified in rejecting the protest petition, and in accepting the negative final report submitted by the Police. Hence, the learned counsel has supported both the impugned orders. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders. It is, indeed, trite to state that at the stage of taking cognizance, the jurisdiction of the trial court is extremely limited one. At the preliminary stage, the trial court does not have the power to meticulously examine the evidence and to express its judicious 6 opinion by discussing the evidence. At this initial stage, the court is concerned only with seeing the existence of a prima facie case. Even at this stage, the court is not concerned with the existence of a “strong” prima facie case as such a stage is reached only at the stage of framing of the charge. Therefore, the trial court at the stage of passing its order dated 19.04.2008 is not expected to meticulously discussed the evidence. A bare perusal of the order clearly reveals that the trial court has not uttered a single word with regard to the statement of the complainant-petitioner recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. The material evidence for taking cognizance would be the statement of the complainant given under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Despite the existence of the said statement, the said statement has been totally ignored by the learned Judge. Instead, the learned Judge has given the reasons as to why he believes that the document in question is a genuine one. At this initial stage, it was not for the learned Judge to discuss the genuineness or falsity of the said document. Since there was a prima facie allegation that the said document is a forged one, the said document, in fact, should have been subjected to an examination by the FSL. Unfortunately, the said document has not even been subjected to the FSL. Therefore, it is too premature for the learned Judge to give a judicious finding about the genuineness of the said document. Merely because the document in question relates to a civil dispute pending before the rent tribunal, it cannot oust the complainant from pursuing his remedy under the criminal law. After 7 all, there is an allegation made by the complainant, and allegation relate to offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468 & 471 IPC. Thus, it was imperative to test the genuineness of the document. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by the Investigating Agency as well as by the Sub-ordinate Courts that since the case relates to a civil nature, therefore, the court proceeding cannot be initiated, such a conclusion is highly misplaced. For the reasons stated above, the impugned orders dated 19.04.2008 & 17.06.2008 are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned trial court for reconsidering the evidence produced by the complainant in his protest petition and for passing the order in accordance with law. With these observations, this petition is, hereby, disposed of. (R.S.CHAUHAN)J. Manoj Solanki-