IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) , THE DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V.AFZULPURKAR MOTOR ACCIDENTS CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.1426 OF 2007 BETWEEN National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another. …APPELLANTS AND Teegala Ravinder and two others. …RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellants: MR. RAVI SHANKAR JANDHYALA Counsel for the Respondents 1 and 2: MR. G.L. NARSIMHA RAO The Court made the following: - JUDGMENT: This is an appeal by the insurance company – respondents 2 and 3 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Principal District Court), Warangal, aggrieved by the award in O.P.No.492 of 2004 dated 12.04.2006. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the parents of the deceased – minor child filed the aforesaid claim petition alleging that on 31.10.2003 when the deceased after attending school went for tuition and while returning therefrom on his bicycle a lorry bearing No. ATK 9549 came in a rash and negligent manner at high speed and dashed against the cycle from behind, as a result, the deceased fell down on the road and came under the rear wheels of the lorry. The said offending lorry belonged to the first respondent in the OP, who is arrayed as respondent No.3 herein. The claim for compensation, therefore, was made, as the minor child succumbed to the injuries on the same night. The claimants, therefore, sought compensation of Rs.6,00,000/-. 3. In the said claim petition, the father of the minor child was examined as P.W.1 and one T. Ramesh was examined as P.W.2, who was an eyewitness to the accident. P.W.2, in his evidence, specifically stated that the offending lorry was driven in a rash and negligent manner and in a high speed dashed against the bicycle of the deceased from behind. Thereafter, the deceased was shifted to the hospital where he later succumbed. The claimants also marked Exs.A1 to A5 out of which Exs.A1 to A4 are certified copies of FIR, charge sheet, Inquest Panchanama and Post Mortem Examination report whereas Exs.A5 is the sterilization certificate given to the claimant; Exs.A6, A7 and A8 relate to merit certificates of the deceased including date of birth certificate and progress card issued by the school. There was no evidence lead on behalf of the appellant or the owner. 4. On consideration of the evidence on record, the tribunal below came to hold on issue No.1 that the accident caused on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending lorry by the driver thereof, based on evidence of P.W.1, which remained unchallenged. Since Ex.B1 insurance policy of the lorry being not contraverted, admittedly, the appellant is the insurer. So far as the second issue regarding quantum of compensation is concerned, the tribunal below found that as per the evidence on record, the deceased was aged 14 years and was a brilliant student and had bright prospects in future and his untimely death that too of only son of the claimants requires to be properly compensated. The tribunal, therefore, assessed the loss of dependency at a notional amount of Rs.1500/- per month working out to Rs.18,000/- per anuum and by applying multiplier 16 with reference to the age of the youngest of the parents (mother aged 37 years) arrived at loss of dependency at Rs.2,88,000/-. In addition to the aforesaid amount, a sum of Rs.30,000/- was awarded towards loss of company of only son to the claimants as well as towards pain and suffering and a sum of Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses, thus, an aggregate amount of Rs.3,20,000/- was awarded. Questioning the said award the present appeal is preferred by the insurance company. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned counsel for the respondents/claimants. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the tribunal below has not based its conclusions with respect to compensation on any material whatsoever. There is no evidence nor it can be assessed as to how the dependency so far as minor children is to be assessed. The amount of Rs.1500/- per month as loss of dependency assessed by the tribunal below, according to the learned counsel, is not justified and so also the multiplier applied in the present case. Learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in KAUSHLYA DEVI v. KARAN ARORA[1], particularly relevant portion of para 6 thereof as under: “6. …9. There are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the splendour of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape-measure. The determination of damages for loss of human life is an extremely difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are claimants, relevant factor would be age of parents.” 7. Learned counsel submits that the above decision in turn had followed the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD v. SATENDER [(2006) 13 SCC 60]. He, therefore, submits that in SATENDER’s case above, the maximum compensation with regard to death of a child aged 9 years was assessed at Rs.1,80,000/- and submits that at best the same criteria should have been applied to the present case also. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents/claimants, on the other hand, submits that the tribunal has taken a minimum of the amount towards contribution and therefore, the award does not warrant any interference. 9. Considering the legal position as enunciated by the two decisions referred to above, it would be noticed that both the aforesaid decisions in turn referred to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in LATHA WADHWA v. STATE OF BIHAR[2]. In LATHA WADHWA’s case the Supreme Court was concerned with claim for compensation for house wives as well as minor children, who died in a fire accident, the Supreme Court specifically considered their contribution to the family at a minimum of Rs.12,000/- per annum. The Supreme Court also approved the method of applying multiplier relevant to the age of the younger of the parents. Paragraph 11 of the aforesaid decision would, therefore, be useful to be extracted herein. “11. So far as the award of compensation in case of children are concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud, has divided them into two groups, first group between the age of group of 5 to10 years and the second group between the age group of 10 to15 years. In case of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years, a uniform sum of Rs.50,000/- has been held to be payable by way of compensation, to which the conventional figure of Rs.25,000/- has been added and as such to the heirs of the 14 children, a consolidated sum of Rs.75,000/- each, has been awarded. So far as the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years, there are 10 such children, who died on the fateful day and having found their contribution to the family at Rs.12,000/- per annum, 11 multiplier has been applied, particularly, depending upon the age of the father and then the conventional compensation of Rs. 25,000/- has been added to each case and consequently, the heirs of each of the deceased above 10 years of age, have been granted compensation to the tune of Rs.1,57,000/- each. In case of the death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rail Co.v. Jenkins, 1913 AC 1, and Lord Atkinson said thus: "...all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact - there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two ofthe facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that the deceased earned money in the past, and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can I think be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them." At the same time, it must be held that a mere speculative possibility of benefit is not sufficient. Question whether there exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always a mixed question of fact and law. There are several decided cases on this point, providing the guidelines for determination of compensation in such cases but we do not think it necessary for us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits, which the parents expected. In case of a bright and healthy boy, his performances in the school, it would be easier for the authorty to arive at the compensation amount, which may be different from another sickly, unhealthy, rickety child and bad student, but as has been stated earlier, not an iota of material was produced before Shri Justice Chandrachud to enable him to arrive at just compensation in such cases and, therefore, he has determined the same on an approximation. Mr. Nariman, appearing for the TISCO on his own, submitted that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his views also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which these children were brought, their parents being reasonably well placed officials of the Tata Iron and Steel Company, and on considering the submission of Mr. Nariman, we would direct that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs. 1.5 lakhs, to which the conventional figure of Rs. 50,000/- should be added and thus the total amount in each case would be Rs. 2.00 lakhs. So far as the children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of TISCO. The TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can get one of his child employed in the company. Having regard to these facts, in their case, the contribution of Rs. 12,000/- per annum appear to us to be on the lower side and in our considered opinion, the contribution should be Rs. 24,000/- and instead of 11 multiplier, the appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis should be worked out to Rs. 3.60 lakhs, to which an additional sum of Rs. 50,000/- has to be added, thus making the total amount payable at Rs. 4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased children.” In addition to the assessment as above, the Supreme Court also upheld that to such assessment of compensation a conventional figure of Rs.25,000/- to Rs.50,000/- is required to be added keeping the facts and circumstances in mind. The two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in turn referred to and relied upon the aforesaid decision in LATHA WADHWA’s case (2 supra) and as such, it would be appropriate to deal with the present appeal in terms of the ratio in LATHA WADHWA’s case. 10. Keeping in view the ratio thereof and adopting contribution at Rs.24,000/- per annum and applying multiplier 15, which is appropriate multiplier in view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above the compensation works out to Rs.3,60,000/-. To the said amount a conventional amount of Rs.25,000/-, if added, the aggregate compensation would work out to Rs.3,85,000/-, which should cover all other heads under which the tribunal below had awarded compensation. However, in the absence of any appeal by claimants, award cannot be interfered accordingly. 11. In view of the above, the impugned order shall stand modified to the extent of awarding interest only, following the decision in SARLA VERMA’s case (3 supra) the interest at 7.5% per annum granted by the tribunal below shall stand modified to 6% per annum. The civil miscellaneous appeal is accordingly allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J July , 2010 DSK [1] (2007) 11 SCC 120 [2] (2001) 8 SCC 197