FA/1287/1985 1/7 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD FIRST APPEAL No. 1287 of 1985 For Approval and Signature: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE KS JHAVERI ========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ========================================================= DILIPGIR NRANGIR GOSAI - Appellant(s) Versus SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER - Defendant(s) ========================================================= Appearance : MR AJ PATEL for Appellant(s) : 1, MR DASHRATH CHAUHAN, AGP for Defendant(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE KS JHAVERI Date : 02/09/2008 ORAL JUDGMENT 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and award dated 22/3/1985 passed by the learned Extra FA/1287/1985 2/7 JUDGMENT Assistant Judge, Kaira at Nadiad in Workmen Compensation Case No.9 of 1982 whereby the learned Judge has partly allowed the claim of the claimant. 2. Brief facts of the case are that some portion of land of claimant bearing survey no.3 situated in the sim of village Anklav, Taluka- Borsad is acquired by the State of Gujarat by accepting proposal from the Executive Engineer of the State of Gujarat for the purpose of constructing residential quarters for policemen. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 24/4/1980 and under Section 6 of the Act was published on 29/1/1981. Notice under Section 9 of the Act was served upon the claimant. Claimant has claimed compensation at the rare of Rs.2000/- per area. After considering the matter, Land Acquisition Officer has published his award on 23/2/1982 and awarded Rs.7.50/- per sq. mtr. As against the same, the claimant has claimed Rs.20/- per sq. mtr. Being aggrieved by this award, the claimant by an application moved the Collector for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector therefore, filed present Compensation Case No.9 of 1982 before the District Court Kaira at Nadiad and the same was partly allowed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Nadiad by his judgment and award dated 22/3/1985 and the learned Judge has awarded additional compensation amounting to FA/1287/1985 3/7 JUDGMENT Rs.41,519.70 together with solatium at the rate of 15 percent and interest at the rate of 4.5 percent per annum from 23/2/1982 till payment. 3. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Reference Court has not granted benefit under Section 23(2) of the Act which is the only contention to be considered in this appeal. 5. The aforesaid contention is squarely covered by the decision in the case of Union of India and another vs. Raghubir Singh, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1933. Para 31, 32 and 34 of the said judgment reads as under: “31. We now come to the merits of he reference. The reference is limited to the interpretation of S.30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment of the Amendment Act, solatium was provided under S. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly, “the Parent Act”) at 15% on the market value of the land computed in accordance with s. 23(1) of the Act, the solatium being provided in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 was introduced in the House of the People on 30 April, 1982 and upon enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 commenced operation with effect from 24 September, 1984. S. 15 of the Amendment Act amended S. 23(2) of the Parent act and substituted the words '30 per centum' in place of the FA/1287/1985 4/7 JUDGMENT words '15 per centum'. Parliament intended that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available albeit to a limited degree, even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by enacting S. 30(2) in the Amendment Act. S. 30(2) f the Amendment Act provides: “(2) the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 23 ....... of the principal Act, as mentioned by clause (b) of S. 15 ..... of this Act ..... shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act.” In construing S. 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under S. 11 of the Parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under S. 23 of the Parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under S. 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by S. 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by S. 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982. 32. The question is: what is the meaning of the words “or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award?” Are they limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30 April, 1982. We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal FA/1287/1985 5/7 JUDGMENT before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against 'any such award'. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words 'any such award' mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of S.30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 – in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30 April, 1982. to our mind, the words 'any such award' cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court of of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of for a (forum?) contemplated in the parent Act these appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words 'any such award' are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those word appear in S.30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words S.30 (2) of the Amendment act extends the benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. We find ourselves in agreements with the conclusion reached by this Court in K.Kamalajammanniavaru (dead) by Lrs. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1985 SC 576) (supra), and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (AIR 1985 SC 1576) (supra). The expended meaning given to S.30(2) in the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word 'such' in the collocation 'any such award' in S.30(2). Due significance must be attached to that words, and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be FA/1287/1985 6/7 JUDGMENT confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. 34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (AIR 1982 SC 758) (supra), but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh (AIR 1985 SC 1576) (supra), but the judgment in Bhag Singh (supra) as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of S. 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under S. 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word 'or' has been used in S. 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it i to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of S. 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word 'or' is used with reference to the stage which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under S. 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of S. 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates, if the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of S. 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the FA/1287/1985 7/7 JUDGMENT Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.” 6. In view of the above, it is clear that the appellant is entitled to solatium. 7. In the premises aforesaid, it is held that the appellant is entitled to solatium on the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal. The award of the Tribunal is modified to the aforesaid extent. Appeal is allowed accordingly. (K.S.JHAVERI, J.) (ila)