1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA WRIT PETITION NO. 70 OF 2007 WITH MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 365 OF 2009. 1. Smt. Taramati H. Wadker Aged 60 years, housewife. 2. Shri Rohidas H. Wadker(son), Aged 35 years(since deceased) 2(a) Smt. Roshan Rohidas Wadker, 2(b) Master Harischandra Rohidas Wadker, 2(c) Master Rohit Rohidas Wadker, All residing at H.No.42, Borda, Margao, Goa. 2(b) and 2(c) represented by 2(a). 3. Shri Jeena alias Ulhas H. Wadker (son), aged 33 years. 4. Miss Anita H. Wadker, (daughter) aged 30 years. 5. Shri Chandu H. Wadker(son) aged 29 years. All residing at H. No.42, Borda, Margao, Goa. ... Petitioners versus 1. Mr. Rui J. Valladares 2. Mrs. Rita Amelia Valladares e Andrade 3. Mrs. Ruta Valladares e Roach 4. Mr. Brian Mark Roach 2 5. Mr. Remo Jose Valladares 6. Mr. Elizabeth D'Souza e Valladares 7. Mrs. Rolanda Valladares e Pereira 8. Mr. Mario Cotta Pereira 9. Mrs. Rena Valladares e Barbosa 10. Mr. Assis Ismail Barbosa All residing at Borda, H.No.50, Margao, Goa. 11. Administrative Tribuinal of Goa, IIIrd floor, Dada Vaidya Hospital, Market, Panaji, Goa. ... Respondents Shri S. D. Lotlikar, Senior Advocate with Ms. G. Xettigar, Advocate for the Petitioners. Shri Y. V. Nadkarni, Advocate for Respondent Nos.1 to 10. CORAM : N. A. BRITTO, J. DATE : 26TH JUNE, 2009. JUDGMENT This Writ Petition is directed against Order dated 9-5-2005 of the learned Administrative Tribunal, Panaji, by which the learned Administrative Tribunal has rejected an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed by the Petitioners herein, on the ground that it is barred by res judicata. 3 2. Some facts are required to be stated to dispose of this Writ Petition. The landlady(now represented by the Respondents herein) had filed an eviction suit against the tenant(now represented by the Petitioners), inter alia, on the ground of non payment of rent before the Rent Controller. 3. Records and Proceedings of the Rent Controller show that as the proceedings of the said eviction case came towards an end on 8-10-2001 the landlady's witness was examined but Shri Rohidas Wadker(one of the Petitioners who was present) chose not to cross-examine the said witness. On 22-10-2001, the said Petitioner declined to give his own evidence and therefore the date was fixed for written arguments on 21-11-2001 on which date, on behalf of the landlady, written arguments were filed. One of the Petitioners who was present did not file any written arguments. The proceedings were fixed on 21-12-2001, and on this day, an order of eviction was made in the presence of the Advocate of the landlady and the said Petitioner Rohidas Wadker. 4. The Petitioners remained inactive thereafter, and, after the Mamlatdar sought to execute the said Order in May, 2002, that the Petitioners herein filed an appeal before the Administrative Tribunal with an application for condonation of delay on the ground that the file of the Rent Controller was not traceable but on guesswork that the Petitioners had come to know that an ex-parte order was made in March, 2002, and they came to know about the eviction order only in the third week of May, 2002. That application came to be rejected by 4 Order dated 14-5-2004, and the Petitioners did not challenge the said order but again filed other appeal with an application for delay on 10-9-2004, for condonation of delay, of two years, seven and half months in preferring the appeal against the Order dated 21-12-2001, and it is this application which has been rejected by the impugned Order on the ground of res judicata. This application was filed with the affidavit of the very same Petitioner who contended that previous appeal was a bogus appeal which was filed by the Petitioners on the advice of their lawyer who had stated that an ex-parte order was passed probably in March, 2002, when no such order was passed but the order was passed on 21-12-2001 which had gone unchallenged due to the filing of the said appeal. 5. Shri S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, submits that the First Appeal with the application for condonation of delay filed on 17-5-2002 was against an order supposedly passed by the Rent Controller in March, 2002 but there was no such order passed by the Rent Controller and as such no appeal could have been filed against a non existing order and thus the appeal filed against a non existing and imaginary order was not maintainable and much less entertainable, and therefore was liable to be rejected and consequently the said application ought to have been dismissed automatically inasmuch not even a certified copy of the order of March, 2002 was filed along with it. Learned Senior Counsel contends that the First Appeal with application for condonation was improperly constituted, and, therefore there was no question of deciding it on merits. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the appeal 5 filed on 17-5-2002 with application for condonation, was not an appeal in the eyes of law and the Petitioners were misled in filing the same. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the learned Tribunal ought to have considered in the subsequent application whether the delay was condonable or not and ought to have rejected the application on merits, and not as barred by res judicata. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the delay was neither deliberate nor intentional and was not attributable to the conduct of the Petitioner and as such the learned Tribunal erred in dismissing the application of the Petitioners without touching the merits of the same. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the first appeal along with the application for condonation, by no stretch of imagination could have been considered as an application/appeal against the eviction order dated 21-10-2001 as no certified copy of the impugned Order was annexed to it nor any grounds assailing the same were urged before the Court and since the said order was not an order passed on merits and as it was against an imaginary order supposedly passed in March, 2002, that appeal could not have been decided on merits and a decision in the said appeal would not operate as res judicata. The submission therefore is that the case be remanded for the learned Administrative Tribunal to decide the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal on merits. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the case of Shri Govind Mahadev Bandekar v. Smt. P. Cusum@ Jankibai R. Usgaokar(2001(2) ALL MR 699) wherein a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:- 6 “What this Section would contemplate is that there must be a properly constituted application before the Rent Controller or the Appellate or Revisional Authority. It is a matter of exercise of jurisdiction. If a petition itself discloses no cause of action, then the Tribunal could not have passed an order under Section 32(4) irrespective of the fact whether the respondent before him had deposited rent or not. The foundation of exercise would be a properly constituted petition. All that the Administrative Tribunal or the Rent Controller has to consider is whether based on the pleadings in the petition if there be any cause of action or whether the appeal was barred by limitation. If the pleadings disclose a cause of action, then only the jurisdiction to pass the eviction order would arise. Insofar as the appeal is concerned, there would be properly constituted appeal before the authority, if the appeal is filed within the prescribed period of time as set out under Section 45(3). Otherwise there would be no case for the Tribunal to invoke jurisdiction under Section 32(4). Its jurisdiction would flow only after the delay in filing the appeal was condoned”. 6. Shri Y. V. Nadkarni, learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondents, has submitted that it is the same Rohidas Wadker who had filed an affidavit in support of the first application stating that the guesswork had revealed that the ex-parte Order was passed in the month of March, 2002, and now he is before the Court stating that the First Appeal with application was a bogus appeal filed under the advice of their lawyer who had stated that the ex-parte Order was passed 7 probably in March, 2002, after changing an Advocate, and, such a conduct on the part of the litigants should not be encouraged but on the contrary needs to be deprecated and in support thereof learned Counsel has placed reliance on the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another v. N. Raju Reddiar and another (1997) 9 SCC 736) wherein the Apex Court stated that once the petition for review is dismissed, no application for clarification should be filed, much less with the change of the Advocate on record. This practice of changing the Advocates and filing repeated petitions should be deprecated with a heavy hand for purity of administration of law and salutary and healthy practice. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court proceeded to dismiss the application with exemplary costs of Rs.20,000/- as it was an abuse of the process of the Court in derogation of healthy practice and further ordered that the amount should be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Services Committee within four months. Shri Nadkarni has also referred to the Order of the learned Administrative Tribunal dated 14-5-2004 in support of his contention that the First Appeal with application for condonation of delay filed by the Petitioners was disposed of on merits after considering that the Petitioners were directed to be evicted by the Rent Controller by Order dated 21-12-2001. 7. There is no dispute that the First Appeal along with application for condonation of delay was filed by the Petitioners on vague allegations and even without producing a certified copy of the Order dated 21-12-2001 or any other order which then according to the Petitioners was passed in March, 2002, and 8 which according to them now, was an imaginary order against which an appeal was filed but the fact remains that the Respondents in order to prove the falsity of the claim made by the Petitioners produced the order of the Rent Controller dated 21-12-2001 and this aspect has been noted by the learned Administrative Tribunal in its Order dated 14-5-2004 by observing that “this version of the Applicants cannot be believed as the Respondents during the course of argument produced on record a copy of the impugned Judgment and Order dated 21-12-2001 and from the entries made by the office of the Rent Controller in the said copy, it is clean (sic. seen) that the certified copy of the impugned Judgment and Order was applied for by the Respondents on 12-6-2002”. 8. The learned Tribunal further observed that “when the impugned Judgment and Order had been passed on 21-12-2001 and the application for condonation of delay and the Appeal challenging the same has been filed presuming that the impugned Judgment and Order is passed in March, 2002, one cannot lightly brush aside the submissions of P.G. Dessai, learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent that the Applicants have been negligent and inactive during the pendency of the case before the Rent Controller and even after its disposal so much so that the Applicants who were represented by Advocate Adarkar did not make any efforts to find out as to when the impugned Judgment and Order was passed and that apart neither in the Appeal Memo nor in the application for condonation it was stated by the Applicants that they have filed 9 any application for certified copy and the same is pending nor any copy of such application has been produced on record. 9. The Tribunal also observed that “thus from the contents of the Appeal Memo and the application for condonation of delay it can be made out that the Applicants had taken the eviction case filed against them before the Rent Controller very lightly. From the conduct of the Applicants of not disclosing the date of impugned Judgment and not producing the certified copy with the Appeal Memo, inference can be drawn that the Applicants want to have the delay condoned by keeping this Tribunal in the dark about the actual delay and negligence and inaction which has been clearly and specifically laid in the impugned Judgment and Order of the Rent Controller”. 10. Learned Tribunal further observed that “to explain delay by presuming that the impugned Judgment and Order was passed in March, 2002, the Applicants have made allegations that by giving the Applicants date of hearing as 3-6-2002, the Rent Controller took the applicants for a ride and by proceeding with the matter ex-parte passed the impugned Judgment and Order in March, 2002”. 11. Lastly, the Tribunal observed as follows:- “The Applicants have absolutely failed to explain the delay in filing the Appeal 10 against the impugned Judgment and Order which has been passed on 21-12-2001and of which the Applicants had knowledge on the very day of its passing in view of the circumstances as stated above”. 12. Although, the Appeal with application for condonation of delay was improperly constituted when it was filed, the falsehood of that application was brought to light by the Respondents by producing the Order dated 21-12-2001 and after taking into consideration the said Order that the learned Tribunal proceeded to dismiss the said application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In other words, it was an application rendered on the merits of the case. In other words, the learned Tribunal refused to condone the delay after coming to the conclusion that the Petitioners knew of the said Order dated 21-12-2001 on the very day it was passed. The Privy Council in Sri Krishna Chandra v. Challa Ramanna and others(AIR 1932 Privy Council 50) has held that where a point is not properly raised by the plaint, but both parties have without protest chosen to join issue upon that point, the decision on the point would operate as res judicata between the parties. This principle squarely applies to the case of the Petitioners. 13. The Apex Court in Lal Chand and others v. Radha Kishan (AIR 1977 SC 789) has stated that the principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good conscience which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue 11 should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. 14. The Apex Court in Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik and another v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge and others(1989 Supp. (2) SCC 627) has again stated that the expression 'heard and finally decided' in Section 11 means a matter on which the Court has exercised its judicial mind and has after argument and consideration come to a decision on a contested matter. It is essential that it should have been heard and finally decided. What operates as res juidicata is the ratio of what is fundamental to the decision but it cannot be ramified or expanded by logical extension. . 15. In the case at hand, what was fundamental in issue was the Order dated 21-12-2001. The first application was decided with reference to that order. The learned Tribunal has now held that the Tribunal having decided once the application for condonation of delay filed with the Appeal challenging the Judgment dated 21-12-2001 holding that the Petitioners had not approached the Tribubal with clean hands and having suppressed the date of the impugned Order intentionally so as to not to disclose its negligence, a fresh application for condonation of delay filed by the Petitioners along with the Appeal challenging the same Judgment between the same parties is definitely barred by res judicata. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal that the said second application was not maintainable in view of the principle of res judicata, the Petitioners 12 application has been earlier decided by the Tribunal by Order dated 14-5-2004, in my view, cannot be faulted. The Petitioners and particularly the said Rohidas Wadker who has been piloting the litigation on behalf of the Petitioners by making false grounds inspite of having been present before the Rent Controller on the date the order was passed and having signed the proceedings, filed the first application dated 20-5-2002 and after the same was dismissed, by making allegations against his Advocate filed the said second application which has been rightly dismissed by the Tribunal and yet the Petitioners have approached this Court and have managed to stall the execution for almost four years. The Petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/-, to be deposited by the Petitioners within a period of thirty days. A sum of Rs.5000/- will be paid to the Respondents and the balance amount will be paid into the account of the State Legal Services Authority as was done in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another v. N. Raju Reddiar and another(supra). 16. Petition dismissed. Rule discharged. N. A. BRITTO, J. RD