IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (M/S) No. 804 of 2010 Almora Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd., Lala Bazar, Almora through its Secretary/General Manager. … Petitioner. Versus 1. Chief Information Commissioner, Uttarakhand, Sector 1, C- 39, Defence Colony, Dehradun. 2. Sri Surendra Agrawal, Editor, “Surya Jagran”, 104 Ishwar Vihar, Phase-II, Raipur Road, Dehradun. … Respondents. Mr. Manoj Tiwari Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sandeep Adhikari, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Vipul Sharma, Advocate, for the respondents No.1. Date May 21, 2010. Hon’ble B.S.Verma, J. (Stay Application No. 3913 of 2010) Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent no.1 and perused the record. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sough the following relief:- A. To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 30-4-2010 passed by Respondent No.1 in Appeal No. A (A) 2255 of 2010, Surendra Aggrawal Vs. Almora Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. (Annexure No. 15 to the writ petition). B. To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring the proceedings initiated by Respondent No. 1 against the petitioner as without jurisdiction in view that the petitioner Bank is a private self-financed Primary Cooperative Society receiving no financial aid or help from the Government, RBI, NABARD etc. C. To issue any other writ order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. D. Award the cost of the writ petition in favour of the petitioner. 2 According to the petitioner, the Almora Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. is a Primary Cooperative Society having no financial assistance or funding from the Government, Central or the State and there is no administrative or financial of the Government over the petitioner-Bank. Therefore, under the provisions of Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short the Act), the petitioner cannot be treated to be a public authority as has been defined under Section 2(h) of the Act. The grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner society not being covered under the definition of the ‘public authority’ as given under Section 2(h) of the Act, therefore, the impugned order dated 30-4-2010 (Annexure-15) could not have been passed by the respondent no. 1 against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner’s co-operative society cannot be termed as “public authority”. The learned counsel has placed reliance upon the Apex Court judgment in paragraph nos. 17 and 18 of the case of Dalco Engineering Private Limited Vs. Satish Prabhakar Padhey and others [(2010) 4 Supreme Court Cases, 378]. In paragraph no. 17, the following observations have been made:- “17. The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 defines “public property” as meaning any property owned by, or in the possession of, or under the control of-(i) The Central Government; or (ii) any State Government; or (iii) any local authority; or (iv) any corporation established by, or under a Central, Provincial or State Act; or (v) any company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act 1956; or (vi) any institution, concern or undertaking which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in that behalf provided that the Central Government shall not specify any institution, concern or undertaking under that sub-clause unless such institution, concern or undertaking is financed wholly or substantially by funds provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government or by one or more State Governments, or partly by the 3 Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments. Thus the term is always used to denote certain categories of authorities which are “State” as contrasted from non-statutory companies which do not fall under the ambit of “State”. In paragraph no. 18, the Apex Court has relied upon the judgment in the case of S.S.Dhanoa V. MCD [(1981) 3 SCC, Page 431] wherein the meaning of the term “corporation” as been considered in paragraph nos. 7 to 10 of the judgment. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1, Mr. Vipul Sharma, has contended that the impugned order is only a show cause notice and the petitioner may raise this plea before the respondent no.1 in its reply. According to him, the petitioner is a “public authority”. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, without entering into the merits of the case, since the second appellate court has not passed any final order on the basis of show cause notice issued by it, the respondent no. 1 is directed to take a decision on the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner whether the petitioner-Almora Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. is covered under the definition of the term “public authority” as given under Section 2(h) of the Act or not, before proceeding further in the matter. Till the decision is taken by the respondent no. 1, no action pursuant to the notice (Annexure-15) shall be taken against the petitioner. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed of finally. (B.S.Verma, J.) RCP 4