1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.7208 OF 2003 Sugarabi A. Sattar Qazi ..Petitioner. Vs. The Head Master, Ismail Urdu Primary School and others ..Respondents. .... Mr. R.D. Suryawanshi for the Petitioner. Mr. Nitin Jadhav for Respondent No.3. ... CORAM: DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 18th June, 2008. P.C. : 1. The Petitioner moved the School Tribunal at Solapur in an appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 on 4th May, 2000. The case of the Petitioner is that by a letter of appointment dated 1st June, 1990 she was appointed in the Urdu Primary School conducted by the First and Second Respondents. The memo of appeal contains an averment that the original of the letter of appointment was never issued to the Petitioner and what was instead issued was only a photocopy in which the date and the period of appointment was kept blank. The Petitioner has averred that she was constrained to pay a donation to the management and a further donation for obtaining the approval of the 2 management for admission to the postal D.Ed. course. According to the Petitioner the management had illegally attempted to change the muster rolls. The case of the Petitioner is that from June 1996 the secretary directed her to sign on a particular muster roll maintained by the secretary. On 15th November, 1996 an advocate's notice was issued on behalf of the Petitioner. According to the Petitioner, the Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Solapur addressed letters on 20th July, 1998, 31st August, 1998 and 2nd January, 1999 both to the Education Extension Officer and to the management directing them to allow the Petitioner to sign in the service muster, but the management did not comply with the direction. A further direction was issued by the Education Officer on 30th March, 2000. In paragraph 25 of the memo of appeal, the Petitioner averred that on 13th March, 2000 the secretary prevented her from signing on the muster and directed her to leave the school. Accordingly the Petitioner moved the Tribunal with the plea that with effect from 13th March, 2000 her services had been terminated. 2. The School Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appeal which was filed on 4th May, 2000 was beyond limitation 3 since there was a delay of more than three years and ten months since the date on which the Petitioner was prevented from signing the muster in the first instance. This delay according to the Tribunal was not explained. 3. The contention of Counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that there was no delay on the part of the Petitioner in moving the Tribunal. The case of the Petitioner, it is urged, is that since January 1996 the management had changed and replaced the muster of the school and despite several letters written by the Education Officer between July 1998 and March 2000, the management had declined to comply with the direction to permit the Petitioner to sign on the regular muster register. According to the Petitioner it was on 13th March, 2000 that her services were terminated. 4. In these proceedings on 20th February, 2004 the Respondents have entered appearance through learned counsel. 5. On the basis of the material on the record, there is merit in the submissions which have been urged in the Court on behalf of 4 the Petitioner. The Tribunal has in the order impugned in these proceedings proceeded on the basis that the termination took place in June 1996 when the Petitioner was prevented from signing the muster and that on 15th February, 1996 an advocate's notice was addressed to the management. A fair reading of the memo of appeal, however, shows that the grievance of the Petitioner was that though she was appointed on a clear and permanent vacancy, the management had resorted to a devious tactic of changing the muster roll. The Petitioner has claimed that it was on her representation that the Education Officer had in fact directed the management by letters dated 20th July, 1998, 31st August, 1998, 2nd January, 1999 and 30th March, 2000 to permit the Petitioner to sign the regular muster register. According to the Petitioner her services were terminated on 13th March, 2000 when she approached the secretary, who was impleaded as Second Respondent to the appeal. Having regard to these averments in the memo of appeal, it is impossible to subscribe to the view of the Tribunal that the appeal was barred by limitation. Under Section 9 (2) an appeal against an order of termination has to be filed within 30 days. Under sub section (3) of Section 9 the Tribunal has the power to condone the delay for sufficient cause. In paragraph 30 5 of the memo of appeal, the Petitioner had submitted that an application for condonation of delay was being filed by way of abundant precaution. Having regard to the circumstances which have been set out herein above, and the explanation of the Petitioner in the memo of appeal, there is merit in the contention that the Tribunal adopted a rather technical view of the matter in dismissing the application. The Petitioner had satisfactorily explained the delay in moving the Tribunal and the application filed by the Petitioner ought to have been allowed. In the circumstances, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 13th March, 2002 is quashed and set aside. The delay on the part of the Petitioner in preferring an appeal before the Tribunal is accordingly condoned. The appeal shall stand restored to the file of the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall now proceed to hear and dispose of the appeal on merits after furnishing to the parties an opportunity of being heard. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. *****