THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION Nos.23629, 23962, 23964, 23991, 23993, 24022, 24028, 24030, 24032, 24036, 23919, 24418, 24425, 24439, 24492 & 24497 OF 2009. Dated: 27.11.2009 Between : Gannu Sanjeeva Rao … Petitioner And 1. The Chairman, Visakhapatnam Port Trust, Administrative Office Building, Port Area, Visakhapatnam-500 035 and another. … Respondents THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION Nos.23629, 23962, 23964, 23991, 23993, 24022, 24028, 24030, 24032, 24036, 23919, 24418, 24425, 24439, 24492 & 24497 OF 2009. COMMON ORDER : Since common questions of fact and law arise for consideration, all these writ petitions are heard together and decided by this common order: The petitioners herein are the employees of the 1st respondent – Visakhapatnam Port Trust. It is not in dispute that on the allegation of involvement in a scam relating to embezzlement of Bank funds, Cr.No.23-A, dated 28.9.2004 has been registered against some of the employees of the 1st respondent, including the petitioners herein under Section 120-B, 420, 468 & 471 of I.P.C. and Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), ACB, Visakhapatnam, after investigation filed a charge-sheet and C.C.No.2 of 2009 is pending on the file of the Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam in which all the petitioners herein are shown as accused. While so, the impugned orders dated 24.09.2009 came to be passed placing the petitioners under suspension in exercise of the powers conferred by Regulation 7 (1) (b) of the Visakhapatnam Port Employees’ (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1968 (for short, ‘CCA Regulations’) pending the disciplinary proceedings with regard to the criminal case pending against them before the Court of the Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam. The said orders are challenged in these writ petitions contending that since the alleged criminal case registered against the petitioners is not relating to the discharge of the regular duties of the petitioners as employees of the 1st respondent, the impugned suspension order is unwarranted and unjustified. It is also contended that the respondents failed to take into consideration the relevant factors while exercising the power conferred under the CCA Regulations and they failed to exercise the statutory function reasonably and bona fide. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as well as the other material available on record. Regulation 7 (1) (b) of Visakhapatnam Port Employees’ (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1968 runs as under: “7. SUSPENSION: (1) An employee may be placed under suspension— (a) Where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial; (c) Where in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State. (2) … … … … …. …. …. ….” On a plain reading of the above provision, it is clear that an employee can be placed under suspension where disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending. Similarly where a case against an employee in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial he can be placed suspension. In the instant case, admittedly C.C.No.2 of 2009 on the file of the Court of Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam is pending trial and all the writ petitioners are arrayed as accused. In the circumstances, Regulation 7 (1) (b) is squarely attracted and therefore the order of suspension is well within the authority vested under Regulation 7 (1) (b). However, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that having failed to exercise such power soon after registration of crime in the year 2004 or during investigation or upon filing of charge-sheet in the year 2008, there is no justification to place the petitioners under suspension at this distant period of time. It is also contended that since the petitioners were neither arrested nor detained in the police custody at any point of time and particularly since the petitioners were not charged with any allegations of corruption or misuse of official position, the impugned suspension is totally unwarranted and amounts to arbitrary exercise of power conferred under law. While placing reliance upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in D. RAMESH SINHA v. CADRE AUTHORITY, HYD.[1], the learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that since the impugned orders of suspension are passed as per the directions of the C.B.I. without independent application of mind by the respondents to the relevant factors the impugned orders are liable to be declared as arbitrary and illegal. There can be no dispute about the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in the above decision that while exercising the statutory power the competent authority has to apply its mind independently as to whether the condition precedent for exercising such power exists. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if the Statutory Authority ignores the relevant factors or takes into consideration the factors not germane for passing of the order, then such order would be vitiated in law. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is explained that though a crime was registered against the petitioners in the year 2004, the petitioners did not bring it to the notice of the respondents and they came to know of the said proceedings only through letter dated 31.08.2009 addressed by the Superintendent of Police (CBI) to the Chief Vigilance Officer of the 1st respondent informing that the petitioners are the accused in C.C.No.2 of 2009. It is also stated that disciplinary proceedings are contemplated against the petitioners and accordingly in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 7(1)(b) of the CCA Regulations, the impugned orders of suspension have been passed. The law is well-settled that the evidence which is to be considered in disciplinary proceedings is independent of the criminal proceedings and the pendency of criminal investigation does not foreclose the disciplinary proceedings. Even where disciplinary proceedings are based upon the very same allegations upon which the criminal proceedings are initiated, there is no absolute bar from proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case, the impugned suspension is not based upon the allegations upon which the criminal proceedings are initiated and pending against the petitioners. Apparently the disciplinary proceedings are contemplated on the ground that a case in respect of a criminal offence against the petitioners is under trial. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings on the said ground is permissible under the Regulations and pending such disciplinary proceedings or contemplating such proceedings Regulation 7 (1) (b) empowers the respondents to place an employee under suspension. It is relevant to note that the impugned orders of suspension do not amount to punishment and on conclusion of the enquiry, the respondents may decide to reinstate the petitioners into service notwithstanding the criminal case pending against them in the Court of Special Judge for CBI Cases. It is for the respondents to take appropriate decision after giving an opportunity to the petitioners to make their representation as provided under Regulations and the interference by this Court at this stage is not warranted on any ground whatsoever. For the aforesaid reasons, all these Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs. ____________ G. ROHINI, J. Dt. 27.11.2009 gbs [1] 2002 Suppl. (2) ALD 687 (DB)