R. S. A. No.1822 of 2009 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. Case No. : R. S. A. No.1822 of 2009 Date of Decision : July 16, 2010 Mehar Singh Rathee .... Appellant Vs. Ranbir and others .... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. N. MITTAL * * * Present : Mr. Naresh Kaushik, Advocate for the appellant. * * * L. N. MITTAL, J. (Oral) : This is second appeal by plaintiff Mehar Singh Rathee, who remained unsuccessful in both the courts below. Defendants-respondents (seventy in number) were employees of Haryana State Electricity Board (HSEB). Their services were terminated by HSEB w.e.f. 01.08.1987. Plaintiff claims himself to be office bearer of Trade Unions, although otherwise the plaintiff is an Advocate. In a meeting held on 20.08.1987 at Sonepat, it was decided that industrial dispute be raised regarding termination of services of the defendants. The plaintiff was authorized to pursue the said case on behalf of the defendants as their authorized representative (AR) in the Labour Court, Rohtak. In lieu thereof, R. S. A. No.1822 of 2009 2 the defendants allegedly agreed to pay Rs.5,500/- each to the plaintiff and the amount was to be paid after decision up to Hon'ble Apex Court. Accordingly, the plaintiff pursued the case of the defendants before the Labour Court. Vide two separate Awards dated 11.06.1992, Labour Court ordered reinstatement of defendants with continuity of service and full back wages. In writ petitions filed by HSEB against the Awards of the Labour Court, this Court, vide order dated 06.11.1996, directed that the defendants would be paid only 40% of the back wages and except to this extent, the writ petitions were dismissed. Defendants were paid 40% back wages by HSEB in June-July 1997. The plaintiff claimed that defendants had not paid his fee of Rs.5,500/- each as agreed. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought recovery of consolidated amount of Rs.5,19,750/- from all the defendants or Rs.7,425/- each from the defendants, which included interest @ 12% per annum from 07.11.1996 till 07.10.1999 i.e. for pre-suit period. The plaintiff also claimed pendente lite and future interest @ 18% per annum. The defendants, however, pleaded that they had agreed to pay Rs.500/- to the plaintiff in lieu of his services as AR of defendants in the Labour Court and defendants had paid the said amount in advance to the plaintiff. It was also pleaded that defendants engaged their own counsel to defend the writ petitions in the High Court and the plaintiff did not represent the defendants in the High Court. R. S. A. No.1822 of 2009 3 Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sonepat, vide judgment and decree dated 24.07.2006, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. First appeal preferred by the plaintiff has been dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat, vide judgment and decree dated 13.12.2008. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred the instant second appeal. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. In support of plaintiff's version that he was to be paid Rs.5,500/- by each defendant, there is only bald, oral and self-serving statement of the plaintiff, which is not sufficient to prove his case. On the other hand, the said statement has been rebutted by the defendants inasmuch as many defendants stepped into the witness-box as witnesses. On the face of it, the claim of the plaintiff appears to be patently false. In the year 1987, when the industrial dispute was raised, the plaintiff could not have claimed Rs.3,85,000/- as fee for representing the defendants as AR in class action industrial dispute. By any standards, the defendants would not have agreed to pay such huge amount in the year 1987. At that time, perhaps even the fee of a very celebrated Advocate at district level could not be so high. In those days, the level of fee at district level was hardly in five figures. The very basis of the claim of the plaintiff appears to be inherently false and unreliable. R. S. A. No.1822 of 2009 4 Learned counsel for the appellant contended that some of the defendants had filed written statement in previous suit instituted by the plaintiff, which was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to file fresh suit and in that written statement, those defendants had admitted the claim of the plaintiff. The contention, although apparently attractive, cannot be accepted. Said written statement was sought to be proved by examining Mr. S. S. Gulia, Advocate as PW-4. However, statement of said witness was completely shattered in cross-examination. He admitted that the said defendants had not engaged him as their counsel, while filing written statement. On the other hand, they had engaged some other counsel. The said witness also admitted that the said defendants had not signed the written statement in his presence. Even the Power of Attorney in his favour was simply signed by him and was not filled up by him. His statement has been analysed by both the courts below and has been found to be wholly unreliable. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the defendants may be directed to pay Rs.500/- each to the plaintiff. This contention is also devoid of merit because the defendants' case is that they had already paid the said amount of Rs.500/- each to the plaintiff. Plaintiff's statement that no amount was paid to him is patently unreliable in view of his version. There is concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below R. S. A. No.1822 of 2009 5 against the plaintiff on appreciation of evidence. The said finding is not shown to be perverse or illegal in any manner so as to call for interference in the instant second appeal. The contentions raised by counsel for the appellant relate to appreciation of evidence, but evidence is not to be re- appreciated again for the third time in second appeal. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant do not raise any substantial question of law for decision in the second appeal. Courts below have not misread or misappropriated the evidence so as to warrant interference in second appeal. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant second appeal, which is accordingly dismissed in limine. July 16, 2010 ( L. N. MITTAL ) monika JUDGE