THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO WRIT PETITION No. 27920 of 1998 O R D E R: This Writ Petition is preferred by a driver-workman of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (henceforth referred to as ‘the Corporation’), calling in question that portion of the Award passed by the Labour Court-III, Hyderabad in I.D.No. 119 of 1994, denying payment of back wages for the period the petitioner-workman was kept out of service. The facts that gave rise to this Writ Petition are these: The writ petitioner was employed with the state-owned Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation as a driver since 1977. While he was in service of the said Corporation, it was alleged that on 24.09.1990, at about 10.00 p.m., he tried to forcibly enter the residence of a fellow-employee in his absence, with an intent to outrage the modesty of the wife of the said fellow-employee. It was further alleged that pursuant to the cries of help let out by the lady, the neighbours intervened and rescued her from the custody of the petitioner, thus, preventing any untoward incident taking place. On the strength and basis of these allegations, a criminal complaint was lodged against the petitioner which was registered as Crime No. 47 of 1990, under Sections 448 and 354 I.P.C. The police have taken up investigation and after recording the statements of five individuals, the writ petitioner was apprehended on 02.10.1990. Since he had complained of unbearable stomach pain, he has been sent up for medical examination and treatment. After he was discharged from the hospital on 08.10.1990, he has been arrested by the local police and sent to judicial remand. After the charge sheet was laid, C.C.No. 101 of 1991 was taken up for trial. The prosecution, in all, examined seven witnesses in support of the charge. P.W.1 was the fellow-employee of the writ petitioner into whose house, the writ petitioner was alleged to have trespassed. P.W.2 was the wife of P.W.1. P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 are said to be the neighbours, who have rescued P.W.2. P.W.6 was the Medical Officer, who examined the accused on 02.10.1990 and treated him till he was discharged on 08.10.1990. P.W.7 was the Investigating Officer. It was not disputed that P.W.1 was not present at the time the incident took place at his house and hence, he was not an eye witness to the incident. P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5, who are said to be the neighbours of P.Ws.1 and 2 and who are said to have rescued P.W.2 on the date of the incident, did not support the prosecution during the course of trial and they were declared to have turned hostile. P.W.6 being the Medical officer, who treated the accused and P.W.7 being the Investigating Officer, the only evidence that was led in of an eye witness is that of P.W.2. During the course of her examination, P.W.2 deposed that the accused has forcibly entered their house at about 10.00 p.m., on 24.09.1990, during the absence of her husband, with an intent to outrage her modesty and that apprehending danger at the hands of the accused, she let out cries of help to which P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 responded and rescued her duly chastising the accused. Thus, even during the course of her examination, P.W.2 did not allege that the accused has, in fact, done anything to her which can be construed as to have constituted the offence of outraging the modesty of a woman. It is an admitted fact that the accused was the owner of the premises, where P.Ws.1 and 2 are the tenants. Therefore, the criminal Court did not have hesitation to record a finding that there is not sufficient evidence on record to prove the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused-petitioner herein and hence, acquitted him, by its judgment rendered on 27.01.1992. However, even, during the course of pendency of the criminal case, the writ petitioner has been subjected to disciplinary proceedings on two counts. The first count of misconduct is substantially the same as that of criminal case, C.C. No. 101 of 1991. The second count was that he had failed to intimate the factum of his arrest by the police on 08.10.1990 followed by being sent up for judicial remand, to his employer namely the Corporation. A domestic enquiry followed and based upon the evidence gathered thereat, the writ petitioner was found guilty of the misdemeanor contained in both the counts and charges. By an order passed on 18.03.1991, he has been inflicted with the punishment of removal from the service. Appeal preferred by the writ petitioner there against has failed as the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of punishment of removal, through his orders dated 24.04.1992. After the writ petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charge, he has invoked the provision available under Section 2-A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and raised an Industrial Dispute bearing No.119 of 1994, calling in question the correctness and validity of the order of punishment of removal imposed against him. The Labour Court, by its Award, dated 24.04.1997, had come to the conclusion that the entire material, which was produced by the prosecuting agency before the criminal Court, was described as not sufficient by a competent Criminal Court to hand down any conviction to the petitioner and, therefore, merely because the standard of proof in a domestic enquiry is different from that of the criminal Court, it shall not be construed that there was sufficiency of evidence on record. The second charge being not a very substantive charge but merely a violation of the code of conduct of not informing the employer of the arrest by the police, the Labour Court felt it appropriate to exercise the discretionary power available to it in favour of the writ petitioner. Therefore, it had passed an Award setting aside the order of removal passed against the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner was directed to be reinstated into service with continuity of service with all attendant benefits. The Labour Court has specifically denied the payment of back wages for the period the writ petitioner was out of employment. The Labour Court has assigned the reason for denying the back wages as the writ petitioner is responsible for inviting a criminal case on to himself, inasmuch as he ought not to have visited the residence of a fellow-employee at about 10.00 p.m. on 24.09.1990, even though he may be the owner of the said premises. Since the Corporation is no way responsible for this kind of misdemeanor, invited by the writ petitioner, and since the writ petitioner has not rendered any service to the Corporation following the principle of ‘no pay for no work’, the Labour Court has denied payment of back wages. It is that portion of the Award passed by the Labour Court which is made the subject matter of challenge in this Writ Petition. The contention that is canvassed seriously before this Court in the above Writ Petition is that when once a competent criminal Court acquits a person of the criminal charge laid against him, it would be improper for a domestic Tribunal to arrive at entirely opposite to such a conclusion. The proper course for the employer should have been to await the judgment of the criminal Court and instead, in the instant case, it had proceeded to conduct a domestic enquiry against the writ petitioner. It is further contended that the substantial misdemeanor alleged against the writ petitioner in Charge No.1 is almost identical in all respects to the charge laid by the prosecuting agency in criminal case, C.C.No. 101 of 1991. The second limb of the charge was purely a technical violation committed by the writ petitioner, inasmuch as, he was arrested by the local police on 08.10.1990 and he has been sent up to judicial remand, as a grave offence is alleged to have been committed by him. In view of his detention, he could not have informed the said factum to his employer and hence, he could not be penalized for an act, which is difficult to be performed or complied with, in view of his being sent to judicial remand by the local police. It was further contended that the Labour Court having arrived at a finding that the charges alleged against the writ petitioner being unsustainable, ought to have ordered for payment of back wages also apart from ordering for his reinstatement. Denial of back wages would amount to imposing a punishment in the form of economic distress and, therefore, the Award of the Labour Court to this extent is vitiated. Learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation has resisted this Writ Petition by strenuously contending that the Corporation is bound to insist upon its employees to maintain a certain amount of dignified conduct when they are employed by a State-owned Corporation like Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and any misconduct on the part of an employee which is capable of visiting adversely on the working environment should not be viewed lightly. Hence, the Corporation cannot be faulted for having subjected the writ petitioner to a domestic enquiry based upon a complaint received by it that the writ petitioner has forced his entry into the house of another employee of the Corporation at an odd hour like 10.00 p.m. and particularly, in the absence of the fellow-employee. For having thus invited a count of misdemeanor on to himself, the petitioner cannot try to take advantage of the acquittal accorded by the criminal Court in C.C.No. 101 of 1991, inasmuch as the three independent witnesses namely P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 have not supported the prosecution theory and the lone eye witness P.W.2 has pointed that the actual offence has been prevented from being committed by the accused. According to the leaned Standing Counsel for the Corporation, the conduct exhibited by the writ petitioner, even though may not amount to an act of criminal trespass, but nevertheless, it is a misconduct within the purview of the code of discipline enforced by the Corporation. At any rate, the learned Standing Counsel argues that not intimating the employer of the arrest by the local police in connection with a grave crime on 08.10.1990, followed up by judicial remand, is a misconduct and the Labour Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of the domestic Tribunal in respect thereof. The learned Standing Counsel, therefore, justifies the finding recorded by the Labour Court and its conclusion to deny the writ petitioner payment of any back wages. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions. The domestic Tribunal has substantially considered the same evidence, which formed part of the evidence marshalled before the Criminal Court in C.C.No. 101 of 1991 and it had come to a reasonable conclusion that the writ petitioner has made an unjust entry into the house of a fellow-employee at an unacceptable hour of the day i.e. at 10.00 pm., particularly when he was informed that the fellow- employee was not at home. Be that as it may, the criminal Court has noticed that even P.W.2, who was the prosecutrix, in fact, did not allege that her modesty was outraged or attempted to be outraged by the writ petitioner, but however, out of her apprehension of impending danger, she cried out for help and consequently, the neighbours have intervened and prevented the possible mischief intended by the accused. Therefore, the main thrust of the allegation contained in the criminal case that the writ petitioner attempted to outrage the modesty of a woman, did not have the necessary basis. Insofar as the allegation of trespass is concerned, when the criminal Court has been informed that the petitioner-accused was the owner of the said premises and P.Ws.1 and 2 are his tenants, the criminal Court perhaps is justified in coming to a conclusion that even that limb of the charge that the accused has trespassed into the premises may not be sustainable. It is for these reasons, the writ petitioner has been acquitted by the criminal Court, but nevertheless the fact remains that he has been arrested by the police on 08.10.1990 and he has been remanded for judicial custody thereafter. This factum was not brought to the notice of the Corporation. Therefore, he is at least guilty of this misdemeanor though it may be difficult for an accused person, who has been arrested and remanded to judicial custody, to inform the same to his employer, but however, the whole unhappy incident has been brought about not due to any fault on the part of the employer but perhaps, the writ petitioner had had to blame himself. For no fault of the Corporation, it was prevented from utilizing the services of the writ petitioner as a driver. It had to pay the writ petitioner subsistence allowance from such time he has been suspended from service. Apart from losing productivity on account of the writ petitioner, the Corporation has also suffered enough. Therefore, in my mind, the Labour Court has rightly balanced the interest of both sides. Awarding back wages for the entire period of absence from service is not an automatic affair upon ordering reinstatement into service of a workman. All relevant factors have got to be taken into consideration and account including the fact that the workman could not secure alternative employment in spite of the efforts put in by him in that respect. There is no material on record brought about by the writ petitioner to establish as to how he failed to secure any alternative employment in the post 18th March 1991 period when he was removed by the Corporation and up to 13.06.1997 when he was reinstated by the Corporation pursuant to the Award passed by the Labour Court. Therefore, the Award of the Labour Court, denying payment of back wages to the writ petitioner, appears to be a fair and reasonable conclusion reached at by the Tribunal. The writ petitioner has not made out a strong or compelling case for awarding back wages during the period of his absence from the service. I do not find any merit in this Writ Petition. Hence, it is dismissed, but however, without costs. ---------------------------------- (NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO, J) 10th November 2009 ksld