A-12 % 16.09.2010 Present: Dr. Shyamla Pappu, Sr. Advocate with Mr. R. Krishnaamorthi, Advocate for the Appellant. Mr Sandeep Sethi, Senior Advocate with Mr Lalit Gupta, Advocate for the Respondent. + CM No.18059/2009 (Delay) in FAO(OS) 615/2009 * Learned counsel for the Respondent rightly and justifiably does not oppose this Application. We have noted the contents of the Application and are satisfied that the error in computation of the period of limitation is bona fide. Application is allowed and delay in fihng the Appeal is condoned. FAQ (OS) 615/2009 & CM 18060/2009 (Stay) This Appeal assails the Order of the learned Single Judge passed on 6^^ March, 2009. The Appellant had filed a Suit for permanent injunction in favour of Rani Parvati Devi and against Turner Morrison Ltd., Defendant No.l, Turner Morrison Land Ltd., Defendant No.2 and Shri P.V.Kapur, Senior Advocate, Defendant No.3, restraining these Defendants, their servants, agents and assignees from interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the possession of B-25, Qutab Institutional Area, New Delhi. This resulted into legal actions being preferred by the Defendants in that suit. In that Suit an Application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act came to be Digitally Signed By:AMULYA Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. Signature Not Verified filed. By the Impugned Order the learned Single Judge has appointed Justice A.B.Saharya (Retd.) as the Arbitrator in place of Shri P.V.Kapur who was nominated by the Respondent. Several Division Benches of this Court have returned the opinion that an Order passed pursuant to an Application under Section 8 of the Act is not appealable. In Canbank Financial Services Ltd. v. Haryana Petrochemicals Ltd. and Anr, 2008 (2) ARB LR 365 (Delhi), a Division Bench comprising Manmohan Sarin and Manmohan, JJ. have not only returned this view but have also specifically dealt with the question of whether the dismissal of a suit pursuant to an Application under Section 8 would take away the right of preferring a Regular First Appeal. The relevant portion reads thus:- 4. The learned counsel for Appellant submits that the act of allowing Section 8 application tantamounts to a plaint being rejected and therefore, Appellant could maintain this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code. The Appellant's counsel further submits that the impugned order being in the nature of a judgment deciding valuable rights of the Plaintiff to maintain a civil suit is challengeable under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. In this connection the Appellant also relies upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania reported in AIR 1981 SCC 1786. 5. To our mind the embargo on appeals in Section 37 is an absolute and categorical one. Moreover, in the instant case the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is a special act dealing with the arbitrations, specially limits the extent of judicial 0/ K- 7: '••• intervention inasmuch as it provides that no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Concihation Act, 1996 is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 5. Extent of judicial intervention.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matter governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. 6. It is also well settled in catena of cases that an appeal is a creature of the statue, the right to :> appeal inheres in no one. Since in the present case ' Section 37 uses an expression that an appeal shall lie from the following orders and from no others, it to our mind consciously takes away the right of appeal against other orders. Any other interpretation, to our mind, would render the expression "and from no others" as otiose or nugatory. The Apex Court in catena of cases has held that any interpretation which renders words of a statue "otiose" is to be avoided and eschewed. Consequently, appeal to the Division Bench hes only from the two orders mentioned in Section 37 (1) and reliance of the Appellant on Section 96 of CPC is misconceived." In Rites Limited v.JMC Projects (India) Ltd., 2009 (2) Arb. LR 64 (Delhi), the Division Bench comprising Mukul Mudgal and Vipin Sanghi, JJ. have articulated the very same conclusion. So far as this Bench is concerned we have separately held to the same. In Shivnath Rai Harnarain India Company v. Glencore Grain Rotterdam & Ors., 2009 (113) DRJ 509 (DB), one of us (Vikramajit Sen, J.) had expressed this view and in Jindal 1> Exports Ltd. v. Fuerst Day Lawson (LPA 116/2010 decided on 2V' April, 2010) one of us (Mukta Gupta, J.) had arrived at the very same conclusion. In view of the uniform understanding of the law of different Division Benches of this Court we hold that the present Appeal is not maintainable. Dismissed. September 16, 2010 mm A VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. MUKTA GUPTA, J.