IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 75 OF 2010 MR. SHEIKH GAFFAR APANNA ALIAS ALTAF, MAJOR ... Petitioner Versus SHRI DIGAMBAR PETKAR ... Respondent Shri V. A. Palekar, Advocate for the Petitioner. Shri M. S. Joshi, Advocate for the Respondent. Coram:- N. A. BRITTO, J. Date:- 28th September, 2010 P.C.:- Heard. The short point for consideration is whether the Order dated 6-3-2009 of the learned J.M.F.C., Mapusa was revisable by the learned Sessions Judge under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. After completion of the evidence of the Complainant, and before the statement under Section 313 of the Code of the accused could be recorded, the Complainant filed an application dated 23-1-2009 to examine one Tulsidas Golatkar. This application is purported to have been filed under Section 311 of the Code. The name of the said Golatkar was not mentioned on any list which the Complainant is required to file under Section 204(2) of the Code. The learned J.M.F.C. dismissed the said application, inter alia, observing that the Complainant had failed to show that the witness was a material witness and as such, the application was not maintainable under Section 311 of the Code. The objection to the maintainability of the revision was taken before the learned Sessions Judge and reliance was placed on Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others(AIR 1977 SC 2185) on which reliance has also been placed by Shri M. S. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision did refer to the expression "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the Code and stated that it merely denoted orders of a purely interim nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Explaining further, the Apex Court stated that order summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, would amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie but orders which are matters of moment which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Shri V. Palekar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/Accused submits that the Order dated 6-3-2009 was an Order summoning the accused who was earlier not cited in the complaint or the list annexed thereto and summoning of such a witness was nothing but an interlocutory order and in support of the said submission, Shri Palekar has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam(2009(5) SCC 153) wherein the Apex Court has stated that an order passed by the trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 of the Code were interlocutory orders and as such a revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) of the Code. Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent/Complainant submits that by not summoning the said witness the right of the Complainant would be substantially affected, and, therefore the order not summoning the said witness could not have been considered as interlocutory order. The submission is that the revision against the said order was maintainable before the learned Sessions Court. As already stated, the said witness was not cited by the Complainant as required under sub-section(2) of Section 204 of the Code but that does not mean that the Complainant was precluded from filing such a list subsequently. Although, the application dated 23-1-2009 was styled as an application filed under Section 311 of the Code, it was an application for summoning further witnesses which could have been considered by the trial Court under sub-section(2) of Section 254 of the Code. Nevertheless, the application was only for summoning the said witness as a witness of the Complainant for which the permission was declined by the learned trial Court, and, therefore as clearly stated by the Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others(supra) an order summoning of a witness was an interlocutory order against which no revision was maintainable. The Order dated 6-3-2010 could not have been called either as intermediate or quasi final which substantially affects the rights of the parties. In the above view of the matter, the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to revise the Order dated 6-3-2009. This petition therefore succeeds and the impugned Order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 6-3-2010 is hereby set aside. N. A. BRITTO, J. RD.