HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR W.A.No. 1548 of 2005 Date: 15-12-2010 Between: Management of Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd ………. Appellant and K. Doraiswamy and another ……… Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR W.A.No. 1548 of 2005 JUDGMENT: (Per BPR, J) The management is the appellant in this appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which seeks to assail the orders of the learned single Judge in allowing a writ petition filed by the first respondent, as per the orders, dated 27-07-2005 in W.P.No.29871 of 1998, wherein the order of the Labour Court, Guntur, passed in M.P.No.56 of 1995, dated 24-08- 1998 rejecting the application filed by the first respondent- employee, purportedly under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’), was set aside. 2. Heard Sri Venkatswar Rao Vikram, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and Sri Prattipati Venkateswarlu, Sri Nuthanapati Krishna Murthy and learned Government Pleader for Labour, appearing for respondents. 3. The facts, most of which are not in dispute, are that the present management of the appellant is different from the management which was in the saddle of the appellant company at the relevant point of time, when the services of the first respondent were sought to be dealt and meddled with. Briefly the facts are that the first respondent was initially appointed as a Weaver with the appellant in the year 1962 and he has been working as such. However, on certain allegations and after framing the charges and also holding an enquiry, he was dismissed from service as per the orders, dated 04-07-1985. Therefore, the management sought for permission as provided for under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act by filing M.P.No.59 of 1985 before the Labour Court since a dispute was pending. However, the said application was dismissed as per the orders, dated 30-06-1986. Challenging the same, a writ petition was filed by the erstwhile management of the appellant in W.P.No.12984 of 1986, which was disposed of by an order, dated 15-04-1994 noting that since the appellant company was closed six years back, no orders are necessary. It has been noticed that pending the said writ petition, the orders, which were under challenge in M.P.No.59 of 1985, dated 30-06-1986, were suspended by an interim order. Subsequent to the disposal of the said writ petition, the first respondent issued a notice on 15-02-1995 seeking permission to join back the duty in view of the disposal of the writ. Since there was no response, the present application has been filed by the first respondent in M.P.No.56 of 1985 purportedly under Section 33-C(2) of the Act claiming for wages all along. The main thrust on which the present claim rests, is to the effect that since there is no removal from service and in spite of rejection of the application filed by the management for permission and the same has been virtually confirmed by dismissal of the writ filed by them, he would be entitled to the wages as claimed therein for various periods specifically mentioned. 4. Contesting the same, the appellant, which is being now under the control of the new management, sought to disown the entire liability on the ground that as on the date of taking over the management, the first respondent was not on the rolls and they are not bound by any of those proceedings issued earlier, more so in view of the memorandum of understanding, which was accepted and recorded while passing the order in Case No.42 of 1989 before the BIFR, which has come into force w.e.f. 16-06-1994. Since such understanding would amount to settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act, it cannot go beyond or have any application for prior incidents with the erstwhile management and with this sole contention and also in view of the fact that the present management is not a party to any of the action taken by the erstwhile management or even the proceedings either in I.D.No.60 of 1985 or in M.P.No.59 of 1985 or W.P.No.12984 of 1986, no liability can be fastened and they are not answerable. 5. After holding a regular enquiry, where both sides let in their evidence, the Labour Court accepted the contention of the appellant herein to disown the liability in view of the dismissal order passed by the erstwhile management and there being no award passed for any reinstatement and therefore, held that the provisions under Section 33-C(2) of the Act cannot be invoked. Assailing the same, the present writ petition has been filed by the first respondent. 6. After considering the respective submissions from both sides and by going in detail as to the pros and cons of the chequered events, which lead to the present proceedings and the claim by the first respondent, the learned single Judge did not accept the version as set forth by the appellant herein and rejected the same on the ground that admittedly the first respondent was employed by the earlier management of the appellant and also their being no dispute about the factum of such termination and the proceedings in M.P.No.59 of 1985 and also in W.P.No.12984 of 1986. Irrespective of whether such proceedings purportedly under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was required or not, the fact remains that there is no termination as such and the attempt on the part of the erstwhile management to seek permission having been negatived and the said proceedings having become final, the appellant cannot wriggle out of the liability arising thereunder. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the learned single Judge found that the change of Management would not have any different course as far as the claim of the first respondent is concerned and he would necessarily be deemed to be on the rolls of the industry even as on the date of taking over by the present management i.e., on 21-12- 1994. Further it was specifically pointed out by the learned single Judge that the appellant having taken over the management did not take any proceedings to set at naught the earlier proceedings either in M.P. or in the writ petition and no applications have been filed against them, and those proceedings were allowed to become final, conclusive and binding, and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant can ignore all these proceedings. Further any amount on the part of the Labour Court in disallowing the claim on the acceptance of the objections of the appellant would amount to a review of an earlier order passed by the Labour Court, which is not permissible. Therefore, having found that the Labour Court had committed total erroneous approach in considering the facts and as long as the earlier proceedings remain in force and set at naught in the appropriate manner or by due proceedings as known to be law, the claim of the first respondent is perfectly justified and sustainable. The learned single Judge has given detailed reasons on all these aspects, which we have perused in detail and in depth. 7. After considering the averments made on behalf of the appellant, which are nothing but a reiteration of the same objections as set forth all along, we do not find any fresh ground or error to come to a different conclusion with the findings of the learned single Judge or even the reasons as given in support of each such finding. Even now, nothing has been pointed out on behalf of the appellant as to how all the earlier proceedings could be set at naught or can be held to be not binding on the appellant. Merely because there is a change of management or any settlement as such, that itself would not take away the liability, which impinges on incoming management. We are in entire agreement with the said finding and the reasons of the learned single Judge. 8. Even though an attempt has been made on behalf of the appellant that the memorandum of understanding, dated 29-01- 1994 would wash away all the earlier liabilities existing as against the erstwhile management and the same would be binding under Section 18 of the Act, we are not in agreement with any such contentions. When there is nothing either in the memorandum of understanding or even by any interpretation of the aforesaid provisions, it cannot be said that the liability as such gets fastened on the appellant though with the earlier management can be said to be not enforceable nor continues to exist as such. 9. In view of the above reasons, we do not find any merits in this appeal and the writ appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. _________________ B. PRAKASH RAO, J ________________ SANJAY KUMAR, J Date: 15-12-2010 YCR