IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.SIRI JAGAN FRIDAY, THE 7TH MARCH 2008 / 17TH PHALGUNA 1929 OP.No. 12928 of 1997(L) ----------------------- PETITIONER: -------------- M/S. DHANALAKSHMI BANK LTD, REGISTERED OFFICE TRICHUR, REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, A.N. RAMACHANDRAN SON OF NAGANATHAN AGED 54, RESIDING AT KUNDUR LANE, THRISSUR – 1. BY ADV. SRI.P.F.THOMAS RESPONDENTS: ------------------- 1. SMT. LAKSHMI, PLOT NO.62, NEW HOUSING COLONY, KUDUMBI COLONY, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI – 20. 2. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (C) ALAPUZHA. BY ADV. SRI.H.B.SHENOY THIS ORIGINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07/03/2008, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: S. SIRI JAGAN, J. ------------------------------------ O.P.No.12928 OF 1997 ---------------------------------------- Dated this the 7th day of March, 2008 JUDGMENT The petitioner, a scheduled Bank, is the management in I.D. No. 14/95 before the Industrial Tribunal, Alappuzha. They are challenging Ext.P4 award of the Industrial Tribunal in that industrial dispute. The issue referred for adjudication therein was, “Whether the action of the management of M/s.Dhanalakshimi Bank Ltd., in retrenching Smt. Lakshmi, Part time sweeper with effect from 23.3.1993 is justified or not? If not to what relief she is entitled?” The 1st respondent workman claimed that she was continuously in employment of the Bank from 1978 onwards and her services were illegally terminated on 23.3.1993. According to her, she was being paid Rs.175/ per month as wages. When she filed a petition under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, before the Labour Court, Ernakulam claiming arrears of wages as C.P. No.5/93, the management did not like the same and O.P.NO.12928/97 2 retrenched her from service on 23.3.1993. She submitted before the Labour Court that her retrenchment from service was in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore she is entitled to be reinstated in service with full backwages, continuity of service and other attendant benefits. 2. The petitioner management, while admitting that the 1st respondent was working as a part-time Sweeper in the Bank, contended that she was never employed by the Bank. Their contention was that the Manager of the Bank engaged the workman on his own and was paying the workman from out his pocket, which was reimbursed by the Bank to the Manager. It was admitted that the Bank Manager used to pay Rs.175/- per month to the workman. They raised a contention that the Bank did not supervise or control the work done by the 1st respondent and that there was no instructions issued to the 1st respondent regarding the manner in which the work was to be done. Therefore, they contended that there is no employer – employee relationship between the Bank and the 1st respondent. According to them, the engagement of the workman is purely a personal responsibility of the Branch Manager and not that of the Bank. On these contentions they O.P.NO.12928/97 3 contended that the 1st respondent workman is not entitled to any reliefs in the industrial dispute. 3. The workman filed an application for direction to the Management to produce certain documents, which according to the workman would prove the contentions of the workman. However, the management filed an affidavit saying that there was a shifting of the premises of the Bank for renovation and installation of modern equipments and therefore the documents sought for could not be located and they are continuing search for the same. 4. The Tribunal after assessing the evidence adduced before it came to the conclusion that the workman was actually employed by the Bank as a Part-time Sweeper and the retrenchment of the workman was without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act as a result of which the workman is entitled for reinstatement. Therefore it was held that the workman would be deemed to have been continuing in service till she is validly retrenched and that she is entitled for full backwages till she is validly retrenched. This award (Ext.P4) is under challenge before me. O.P.NO.12928/97 4 5. The main contention of the petitioner is that there was no employer-employee relationship between the management and the 1st respondent workman since she was engaged by the Manager in his personal capacity and there was no supervision or control over the work of the workman by the Bank. They would also seriously dispute that the workman had put in 240 days of continuous service, which only would make her eligible for benefit of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to them, the 1st respondent workman was working only for about an hour every day and only if the workman works continuously for eight hours a day the work of the workman can be counted as one day’s work. Since the workman had not proved that she had 240 days' continuous service at the rate of eight hours per day, she cannot be held to have worked for 240 days continuously. On these grounds the petitioner management would contend that the workman is not entitled to any reliefs in the industrial dispute and therefore Ext.P4 award is liable to be set aside. The petitioner management would also rely on the decisions M/s. PURI URBAN COOPERATIVE BANK V. MADHUSUDAN SAHU AND ANOTHER [(1992) 3 Supreme Court Cases 323] as also The O.P.NO.12928/97 5 Employers in relation to Punjab National Bank V. Ghulam Dastagir [AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 481] in support of their contentions. 6. In answer to the contentions of the petitioner, the counsel for the workman would contend that in so far as the 1st respondent was doing the sweeping work in the Bank’s premises and it was the necessity of the Bank to keep its premises clean, she was being employed by the Bank itself and not by the Manager personally as contended by the petitioner. The counsel would point out that the management never disputed the contention that the workman was continuously working in the Bank from 1978 till March 1993. According to the workman, for reckoning 240 days, it is not necessary that each day should be of the duration of eight hours. The 240 days would be satisfied if the workman works the usual number of working hours allotted to her each day, which need not necessarily be eight hours per day. The counsel points out that otherwise, the very concept of Part-time work would become meaningless in so far as a part-time workman never works for the whole of the working hours of the establishment. The counsel would take me through the oral evidence of the O.P.NO.12928/97 6 Bank Manager, which according to the counsel, would support the contentions of the workman. 7. I have considered the rival contentions in detail. In this case, the Bank does not dispute the fact that the workman was doing sweeping work in the Bank’s premises. In so far as the workman is sweeping the Bank’s premises that is only for the benefit of the Bank and not the Bank Manager personally. Therefore there is no merit in the contention that the workman was being engaged by the Manager in his personal capacity. It is also not disputed that the workman was being paid Rs.175/- per month as remuneration for the work done by her and the same is debited to the Bank and not to the personal account of the Manager, although they would contend that it is first paid by the Bank Manager, which is later reimbursed by the Bank to the Manager. As far as the supervision and control of the work of the workman is concerned, I am not at all impressed by the contentions raised by the petitioner. The contention that the workman does the work on her own without any supervision, does not stand to logic. The Workman is paid wages for sweeping work. One cannot assume that if she does not do the work does the work untidily, the Bank cannot take her to O.P.NO.12928/97 7 task. If she does not do the work properly, one cannot assume that the Manager would pay wages to the workman. Therefore one cannot simply accept the contention of the petitioner management that there was no supervision over the work of the workman. The contention that since the workman starts and finishes work before the start of the working hours of the Bank, the workman is actually not a workman of the Bank, also would not stand legal scrutiny. It is common knowledge that sweeping of a premises of a Bank cannot be done during working hours, when the bank would be full of customers. By the very nature of the work sweeping in a bank has necessarily to be completed before starting of working hours of the bank. Simply because the work is done before the start of the working hours of the Bank, the work does not cease to be work of the bank. It is the necessity of the Bank to have its premises kept neat and clean for which alone the workman has been employed as a Sweeper. That being so, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the workman was being employed by the Bank for the purpose of the Bank only and the Bank Manager has no personal interest in the work done by the workman, and that the remuneration was also O.P.NO.12928/97 8 being paid by the Bank. These are certainly attributes of employer-employee relationship between the Bank and the Workman. 8. The second contention raised by the management is that the 1st respondent workman is working only for an hour every day, and since she is not working for eight hours a day each day's work cannot be counted as one day's work for computing 240 days work, as claimed by her. This contention is also sans logic. They themselves admitted before the Tribunal that in the place of the 1st respondent workman another part-time Sweeper had been appointed, who is doing the sweeping work in the Bank. As per the bipartite settlement also there is a post of part-time sweeper. That being so, the establishment of the Bank contemplates getting sweeping work of the bank done by a part-time sweeper. The very word ‘part-time’ would connote that a workman is not expected to work the entire working hours but only the part of the day. For computing 240 days, each day need not consist of eight hours' work per day. It need only be the normal working hours allotted to the workman per day. In the case of a part- time workman, if the workman does his or her part-time work O.P.NO.12928/97 9 allotted to her for the day, it should be counted as one day’s work for the purpose of computing 240 days. Otherwise, the same would result in very anomalous situation. Therefore I do not find any merit in this contention also. I have gone through the oral evidence of the workman as well as that of the Manager of the Bank. In the evidence of the Manager he does not dispute the fact that the workman had been working in the Bank continuously from 1978 onwards till 1993 when her services were dispensed with. The petitioner has also no case that sweeping work is intermittent work. By the very nature of the business it is imperative that the premises of the bank be swept and cleaned every day. Having admitted the same, the petitioner management cannot now contend that the workman has not proved that she had worked for 240 days in a year. 9. The reliance by the petitioner Bank the two decisions referred to above, according to me, is misplaced. In the decision in MANAGER, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA BANGALORE V. S. MANI AND OTHERS [(2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 100], of course, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the initial burden of proving that the O.P.NO.12928/97 10 workman had continuous service of 240 days is squarely on the workman. But here the management themselves admitted that the 1st respondent had been working continuously from 1978 to 1993. By the nature of the work, the work has to be done on all working days of the Bank. That being so, it is not necessary to prove separately that the workman was actually working for 240 days as contended by him. As such, the said decision does not come to the assistance of the petitioner. Of course they would rely on the very same decision to show that the Tribunal went wrong in relying on the non-production of documents sought to be summoned by the workman. In fact, even without those documents, in view of the deposition of the Manager himself, I am satisfied that the workman had proved that she had continuous service of 240 days in a year. Although I am not satisfied with the explanation given by the Bank for non-production of the documents, in fact they do not dispute the existence of the documents at all. Further those documents if produced, would have assisted the workman in proving her case to the hilt. 7. Of course, the learned counsel for the management would heavily rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in O.P.NO.12928/97 11 Ghulam Dastagir’s case to prove that the workman was the personal employee of the Manager and not the employee of the Bank. In that case the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a personal driver employed by the Manager of the Bank. The Supreme Court held that the driver being engaged by the Manager for his personal purpose for which, only an allowance was being paid by the Bank, there is no employer- employee relationship between the bank and the driver. Here the case is totally different. A sweeper of the Bank is not a personal necessity of the Manager. She cannot be one employed to render personal service to the Manager. She is employed for the requirement of the bank itself. As such, the employment of the workman cannot be considered to be an employment by the Manager for his personal purpose at all. Therefore the facts of the two cases are totally different and not comparable by any stretch of imagination. In view of the above findings, I am satisfied that the workman had with ample evidence proved that she was in continuous employment of the Bank for 240 days and more, and she was illegally retrenched from service without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore I do not O.P.NO.12928/97 12 find any infirmity whatsoever in the award and accordingly the original petition is dismissed. In this case a very lowly paid employee has been denied justice by the Bank by taking all sorts of cantankerous contentions and therefore I am inclined to award costs to the 1st respondent – workman in this case. Accordingly, the petitioner would pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- as costs to the 1st respondent workman. This shall be paid within one month from today. S. SIRI JAGAN, JUDGE Acd O.P.NO.12928/97 13