IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.4626 of 2007 Munilal Mandal, son of Bhagwat Mandal, resident of Bhag Kohalia, P.O. & P.S.- Forbesganj, District-Araria. .... Petitioner. Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. The Collector, Araria, District- Araria. 3. The Deputy Collector Land Reforms (D.C.L.R.), Forbesganj, District- Araria. 4.Ramanlal Mandal, son of Late Chintu Mandal. 5. Jagdish Mandal, son of Bhagwat Mandal. Sl. No.4 and 5 are resident of Bhag Kohalia, P.S. & P.O.- Forbesganj, District- Araria. .... Respondents. ----------- 02- 27.1.2009 Heard Mr. Sarangdhar Jha for the petitioner, learned Assistant Counsel to Mr. O.P. Upadhya, Standing Counsel No.2 (Ceiling) for respondent nos.1 to 3, and Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh for respondent no.4. We have not felt the necessity of issuing notice to respondent no.5 in view of the nature of the order that I am going to pass. 2. It arises out of proceeding under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), and is directed against the order dated 22.1.2007 (Annexure-2), passed by the learned Collector of the district of Araria, in 2 Land Ceiling Appeal Case No.107 of 2005-06 (Ramanand Mandal Vs. Munilal Mandal and others), whereby he has allowed the appeal preferred by respondent no.4 herein, has set aside the order of the learned first authority, and has consequently rejected the present petitioner’s application under section 16(3) of the Act. 3. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Respondent no.4 is a purchaser of the lands in question from respondent no.5 (Jagdish Mandal) by virtue of a registered deed of absolute sale of 14.8.2004. The petitioner filed an application under section 16(3) of the Act before the learned L.R.D.C., Forbesganj, District- Araria. The same was allowed by order dated 7.5.2004 (Annexure-1), passed by the learned L.R.D.C., Forbesganj, in Case No.08 of 2004-05 (Munilal Mandal Vs. Ramanand Mandal), on the ground that the petitioner is an adjoining raiyat with respect to the vended plot and is also a co-sharer of the purchaser. Aggrieved by this order, respondent no.4 herein preferred appeal which has been allowed by the impugned order. The learned appellate authority has held that the 3 petitioner is an adjoining raiyat as well as a co-sharer. He has further held that the purchaser is also a co-sharer. He has, therefore, allowed the purchaser’s appeal, has set aside the order of the learned L.R.D.C., and has rejected the petitioner’s application under section 16(3) of the Act. Law is well settled that if the purchaser is able to establish that he is either a co-sharer or an adjoining raiyat, the pre-emption application must fail even though the pre-emptor is also a co-sharer and/or adjoining raiyat. 4. I must consider the objection raised by the petitioner that the learned appellate authority has allowed the appeal on the ground that the pre-emption application was barred by limitation and the learned first authority has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. In his submission, the authorities have the power to condone the delay. He rightly relies on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kula Nand Jha & others Vs. The State of Bihar and others, reported in 1998 (2) P.L.J.R. 693, wherein it has been held that the authorities dealing with the application under section 16(3) have the powers to condone the delay in view of 4 the provisions of section 16(3) of the Act read with sections 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act. The revisional authority and the appellate authority has surely committed error in law by holding that the pre-emption application was barred by limitation and the learned first authority had no power to condone the delay. However, this does not deflect from the correctness of the impugned order because he has mainly dealt with the matter on merits and recorded appropriate findings of facts indicated hereinabove. After having discussed the matter on merits he has towards the end of the order incidentally mentioned the issue relating to limitation. The petitioner’s contention is rejected. 5. I must also consider the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for respondent no.4. He submits that the petitioner has rushed to this court without exhausting the statutory remedy available to him. I am unable to accede to the submission, inter alia, for the reason that an aggrieved person can move this Court in writ jurisdiction without exhausting the statutory remedy available to him in appropriate cases. For example, if the impugned 5 order is in violation of the principles of natural justice, or it raises pure question(s) of law. This principle of law is based on sound public policy, inasmuch as the aggrieved party is saved of the harassment, expenditure, and time. Furthermore, the narrow scope of writ jurisdiction is well known. If the aggrieved party moves this Court in writ jurisdiction without exhausting the statutory remedies, he has done so at his own risk by subjecting himself to the limited jurisdiction of this Court. 6. In the result, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. (S K Katriar, J.) S.K.Pathak/