SWGLE BEMCH &^' f^ro). / ^(Y^:^- .-^^- WRIT PETTOON{SERVICE) N0.^_ OF SURENDRA.SlMGHBHADORyi Ag&aboatSQ Years, StoStm Kripal Singh Bhadoria, R/oQuarterNo. I® -40, Kteandut, DistfiGt: South Bastar, Q^antewaSa <C.G.) ^...-^fe5 •^-- ^•^^ Sc^e^J-- '^'^ —.«^^ 's'^< srrs-ft.^ -\. \c£^ 1'i ff "?!^f/?Tee^" 1 X. 'i"'-^"~'A'<s- /S- 1. NATIONAL MINERAL OEVELOPMENT CORPORATtON UM1TED, Head Office - Hyderahad Mazab<Masab)Tank, CastteHBt, 2. The General ManageT, N. M. D. C. BaBadBa tron Ore PfOjeet, Deposft No. 14, Ktrandul, Di^rx^South Baslar, Dantewada, (C.G.) /3. Oirector <Prd.), Natiooal ^Bneral D. C. Ud, MassabTank Hyderabad. RrT PETFF10N UNDER ART1CLE 22& OF TNE COMSTITnT10N OFtMoy^ .^. rr HI6H CWRT OF JU&ICAWRE AT BILASPUft. CHHAmSSARH Writ Petition (Servicel No.4541 of 2006 Surendra Singh Bhadoria -Versus- National Mineral Development Corporation Limited ond two others 7H POST FOR OR&ER ON 4'" SB'TEMBER. 2006 Sd/- L.C. Bhadoo Judge n -\- HI6H COURT OF JUMCATURE AT BILASPUR. CHHATTIS6ARH Writ Petition ISerwce) No.4541 of 2006 Surendra Singh Bhadoria - Versus - National Mineral Development Corporation Limited and two others Present;- AAr. yo9esh Pandey, Advocate; For the petitioner. OR t> E R (Passed on 4" September. 2006) L.C. J. 1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 12-12-2004 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No.2, the ©eneralKwnaqer, National Mineral Development Corporation Limited, Kirandui, whereby respondent No.2 has imposed a penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner and further disqualified the petitioner for future employment, as a!so ofthe order dated 20-10-2005 (Annexure P-2), whereby the appellate authority dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 2. Brief facts ieading to filing of this writ petition are that the petitioner has joined the services under respondent No.2 in the year 1980 and in due course of time he reached to the post of Mechanic-cum-Oper-ator &rade-II. On 16- 3-2003, the petitioner &. Junior Manager Screen Ptant-II Hv. S.C. 6'upta were on duty in third shift. Mr. &upta wos in-char9e of shift and during the course of duty, the petitioner herein assauited Mr. S.C. fiupta for which AAr. 6upta made a written complaint which led to suspension of the petitioner on the same day. Disciptinar-y proceedin9 was instituted against the petitioner to enquire into the alleged misconduct of the petitioner who indulged in beating Junior Manager Mr. S.C. 6upta. The enquiry officer ofter conducting enquiry . in accordance with the procedure reached to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner regwding misconduct stand proved. The discipiinary authority (the ©eneralManager - respondent No.2) vide the •s impugned order dated 12-12-3304 dismissed the petitioner from service 09ainst which the pe+itioner preferred an appeal, however the same was also dismissed bythe appellate authority vide order dated 20-10-2005. 3. It is not out of piace to mention here that relatin9 to the same incident first information report was lodged in Police Station: Kirandul, where after investigation, chsr9e sheet was filed against the petitioner for commission of offence under Section 323 of the I.P.C. in the Court of Judiciol fAagistrcte, tiantewada. Learned Ma9istrate convicted the petitioner for the said offence. However, he was 9iven the benefit of probation instead of sentencing him immediateiy. 4. I ha.ve heard learned counsel for the petitioner, on admission. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner" argued that apert from the evidence of Mr. S.C. &upta before the enquiry officer, no other independent writness was produced by the Department in order to establish charge against the petitioner, therefore, merely on the basis of the evidencs of Mr. S.C. 6upta, the complainant, the decision of the enquiry officer to hold the petitioner guiity for the alleged misconduct is illegal. Hence, the impugned order requires to be quashed, as the same is based on insufficient evidence regarding the misconduct of the petitioner. The second argument of tearned counse! is that the penalty of dismissal from ses'vice imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the misconduct alleged against him. 6. i-faving heord learned counsei for the petitioner, I have perused the record. Law regardin9 the power of judicial review of the 1-figh Court against the order passed by the disciplinary authority in departmental enquiry is no lorger res integra and wet! settled by the catena of judgments of the Apex Court. 7. It is the sotisfaction of the discipiinary authority/appellate authority, based onthe evidence and material available on record,to reach tothe conclusionas to whether the charge of misconduct has been proved. They are the sole jud9es offacts. The High Court while exercisin9 the power ofjuciicial rewew against the order- of the disciplinary authority/appellate authority cannot act as an appellate authority and re-appreciate the evidence, and cannot iook upon the proof of sufficiency of evidence. The Hi9h Court whiie exercising the '\\ power of judicial review can cer-tainly interfer-e with the order if the same is based on no evidence, the principles of natural justice have been violated and can reviewr the manner in which the decision was made and that the officer conducted the enquiry was not competent to do so. The technical rules of Evidence Act have no application in the matter of departmental enquiries. Principie of preponderance of probabilities and some materials on record have to be applied. I am fortified in my view by the following jud9ments of the Apex Court. 8. In the matter of B.C. Chahirvedi vs. Union of India ond othe^ reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Apex Court held that the Hi9h Court while exercising judicia] review cannot take his decision ss Court of appeai but certainly can reviewthe manner in which the decision was made. The scopeof judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye ofthe Court. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by Q competent officer or wrhether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findin9S or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authorityto reach a finding of fact or conciusion. But the finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technicat rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, applyto disciplinsry proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliabjlity of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. When the authority accepts the evidence and the conclusion receives support there from, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authority is the soie jud9e of fscts. Where appea! is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The court in its power of judicia! review doss not act as sppellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Cour-t may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the detinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natura! justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion pr finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court muy interfere with the conclusion or the finding. 9. In the matter of Stote of Rayosthon vs. B,K. tteena and others reported in JT 1996 (8) SC 684, the ApexCourt has held that "in case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some materials on record are necessaryto arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct". Again in the matter of Lalit Pepli vs. Canora Bank and others peported in J7 2003 @ SC 494, the Apex Court has held that "Whi!e exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justiee. Judicial revieu' is not akin to adjudication cf the case on merits as an appella+e authority". 10. In the matter of R.S. Soini vs. Stote of Punjab ond others reported in JT 1999 (6) SC 507, in paragraph 16, the Apex Court has held that "Before advertin9 to the first contention appeltant regar'ding want of material to establish the charge, and of non- application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the Court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground thot the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion ofthe inquiring authority, it is not i-he function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquirin9 authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some !egal evidence to substantiate the findin9 and the aclequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings. 11. Bssed on the above principie, if we look into the order impugned ss wetl as the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer, the evidence of AAr. S.C. 6upta shows that on 16-3-2003 when Alr. S.C. 6upta along with the petitioner arer'e on duty, Mr. S.C. Gupta asked the petitioner that as and when the Screen stopped functioning, the side water valve be closed becouse there should not be wastage of wcrter. On hearing this, the petitioner became furious, started abusing AAr. Gupta, assaulted him with fist on ri9ht side of the face. AAr. 6upta immediately reported the matter to Deputy Mano.ger s~. M.P. Reddy over telephone. Mr. M.P. Reddy, who has been examined by the enquiry officer has corroborated the above evidence and stoted that AAr. 6upta informed him about the inddent when he was at his residence, when he was about to leove for the Plant after hearin9 about the incident, he received another telephone call from ,r. 6upta that the petitioner has oqwn assautted him. When he reached the Offiee, he sawthat AAr. Supta ail alone wos sittin; in the Office, he was not in a position to speak and his cheek was in swollen condition. Mr. AP. Reddy immediately reported the matter to the Deputy ©eneralMana9er (Mechanical). On the next day, the matter was reported to Police Station: Kirandul i»herethe case was re9istered and charge sheet was filed a9ainst the petitioner in which he was held guilty. Mr. 6upta was medically examined and the injury was found on his body. Other persons who were examined by the petitioner in defence have simply stated that they are not aware about the incident. They have not stated that no such incident wos 12. Therefore, it cannot be said that the finding of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority holding the petitioner guilty for misconduct is bnsed on no evidence or any principles of natural justice have been violoted t»hile conducting the enquiry. In the present csse, there was ample evidence to reach to the conclusion that the misconduct ofthe petitioner stands proved, as such, the ar9ument advanced by learned counset for the petitioner thatthe finding of the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority is perverse,is 13. Now, eoming to'the second point that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the misconduct levelled a9ainst the petitioner, regarding proportionality of punishment, law is well settied. It is for the disciplinary authority/appellate authority to take decision, looking to the mognitude ond gravity of misconduct, as to which is the befitting punishment to be imposed upon the delinquent officer commensurate with the misconduct in order to maintain discipline of the Qffice. The power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. The Court can interfere with the punishment imposed on the delinquent officer only when it reaches to the reasoned conclusion that iooking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the alle9ed misconduct ofthe petitioner,the punishment is disproportionatetothe misconduct which shocks the conscience of the Court. The punishment is unduly harsh or vindictive, irrational or perverse and is not stood up to the test of doctrineof proportionality. I am fortified in myview bythejudgment ofthe ApexCourt in the matter of B.C. Choturvedi (suprcO, in which the Apex Court has held that "the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evjdence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The 1-ligh Court/Tribunal, while exercismg the power of judiciat review, cannot normaily substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. Ifthe punishment imposed by the disciplinary author'ity or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either- directing the disciplinary/appellote authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to ghorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropria+e punishment wfith cogent reasons in support thereof." Similar'ly, in the matter of Chcur'mon Commereia! Bank and otha^ vs. P.C. Kskkcr reported in 3T 2003 (2) SC 78, the Apex Court has held thot "Quanturri of punishment and the question of proportionality - Power of court to interfere in the matter of punishment - Usciptinar'yproceedings a9dnst the respondent bank officer- On charges being found to have been established, bank dispensing with the services - Respondent failing before the appellate authority as also on review - the court finds that a punishment is shockingly disproportionate it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion and mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Further the charges against the respondent not being casual in nature but being serious, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment." The Court hetd that "the Court should not interfere with the administrator''s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was w shocking to the conscience of the court. The court shoutd not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. 15. If «elook into the facts of the present case, when the petitioner along with Mr. S.C. 6upta, Officer of the petitioner, was on duty, AAr. Supta asked the petitioner to per-form certain duty on which without any rhyme or reason,the petitioner- attacked A4r. &upta with fist on his face as a result of which f. &upta received injury and when he telephoned to AAr. MP. Reddy, the petitioner a9ain ossaulted Mr. ©uptaas to why he has reported the matter to r. Reddy over telephone. This misconduct ofthe petitioner wss required to be dealt with sternly, as in order to maintam discipiine, decorum and dignity of the Office, such psrsons must be dealt wjth severe punishment. If such persons are ai!owed to continue in the Office by imposing iessw punishment, then discipline of the Office is bound to be destroyed and it may not be possible for any person to take work from subordinates cnd there will be chaos in the Office. Beating a senior officer while on duty in the Office itself is a serious and grave miseonduct and that is why criminal case was also lodged against the petitioner, as such, I am of the considered opinion that lookin9 to the misconduct of the petitioner, the punishment of dismissal from service is in no way disproportionate to the misconduct of the petitioner. Therefore, there isno force in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner' that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the misconduct. No other point was confessed or argued before the Court by learned counsel for the petitioner. 16. In the circumstanees, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and therefore it is hereby dismissed, at the admission stage itself without costs. L.C. Bhadoo Judge Soma