CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH -- CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 Date of decision: 21.05.2010 Sameer Mahajan and others ........ Petitioners Versus State of Punjab and another .......Respondents Coram: Hon'ble Ms Justice Nirmaljit Kaur -.- Present: Mr. P S Dhaliwal, Advocate for the petitioners -.- 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement? 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgement should be reported in the Digest? Nirmaljit Kaur, J. This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of FIR No.41 dated 28.03.2010 under Sections 406 and 498-A IPC registered at Police Station Division No.2, Jalandhar. In the case, in hand, the petitioner No.1 is the husband, petitioner No.2 is the father-in-law and petitioner No.3 is the mother in law of the complainant-respondent No.2. While praying for quashing of the FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising out of the same, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that ; a) The allegations in the FIR are absurd and imaginary and there is no iota of truth in the complaint. The complainant is an MBA and is serving with Standard Chartered Bank and is into public dealing and would not have tolerated such a grave misconduct on the CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 2 part of her husband during four years of marriage. b) The matter has been compromised and all the dowry articles have been returned and the present FIR is the misuse of the process of law. c) The reading of FIR makes it clear that it is contrary to the earlier complaint/report made by respondent No.2. Even no specific allegation of entrustment of articles had been levelled against the petitioners. The petitioners had joined investigation and even handed over the second car which is not the dowry article rather had been purchased by raising loan and more than 2 lacs had been paid from the account of the petitioners. d) Lastly, the Police Station at Jalandhar had no jurisdiction as no part of alleged crime has taken place at Jalandhar. Not only this, neither marriage took place at Jalandhar nor petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 ever resided at Jalandhar, neither respondent No.2 parted company at Jalandhar. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai 2004(4) Crl. C.C. 466. Reliance has also been placed on various other judgements titled as Manish Ratan vs. State of M.P. 2007(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 513 and Ramesh and others v. State of T.N. 2005(2) RCR (Crl.) 68, Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India and 7 ors. CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 3 2005(60)SCC 291, Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. V. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 2008(1)SCC 65, Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. Vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr. 2009(4)SCALE 685 and State of Punjab vs. Pritam Chand & Ors. 2009(2) SCALE 457 to state that Sections 498-A and 406 IPC is made out only if the complainant makes allegation of harassment to the extent so as to coerce her to meet any unlawful demand of dowry, or any wilful conduct on the part of the accused is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. Learned counsel for the petitioners has been heard at length. In order to adjudicate upon the issue as to whether any offence under Section 406 and 498-A is made out against the present petitioners, it would be relevant to refer some of the allegations as made in the FIR, which are as under : i) “The accused had stated that they do not require any dowry articles, however, as the marriage came nearer, accused No.2 Kuldip Mahajan, who is father-in-law of the complainant raised the demand for Rs.1,00,000/- cash for himself, diamond set for accused No.3 (mother-in-law) and diamond set for sister-in-law. Further cash was demanded on account of furniture etc. As such, Rs.80,000/- were paid on account of furniture etc. Three days before marriage, a demand for car was made and the parents of the complainant purchased the same at Chandigarh, more so in the name of accused No.1, who is the husband of the complainant. Further gifts, gold ornaments to the tune CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 4 of Rs.5,00,000/- were given besides T.V., Washing Machine, Laptop, Digital Camera, A.C etc. to the accused. After the marriage, the complainant started residing in the house of her father-in-law at Sector 49- D, Chandigarh but the attitude of all the accused remained indifferent towards the complainant.” ii) “the salary of the complainant was being encashed in saving account No.155010100099262 with Axis Bank Ltd. Jalandhar till August 2006. During this period, Sameer Mahajan-accused No.2, who has his account in ICICI Bank Limited, having account No.001301034278 at Chandigarh and later on name of the complainant was also added in this account. Later regular withdrawal were made from the account of complainant at Axis Bank Limited, Jalandhar and deposited in ICICI Bank Ltd., Chandigarh, which were joint account of accused Sameer Mahajan and the complainant. Thus, a total amount of Rs.1,41,000/- were transferred from account of the complainant in Axis Bank Limited to ICICI Bank Limited in the account of accused No.1-Sameer Mahajan.” iii) “the accused on 20.03.2007 withdrew Rs.45,000/- in the name of Sameer Mahajan, on 24.03.2007, withdrawn a sum of Rs.45,000/- in the name of Sushma Mahajan, Rs.45,000/- were withdrawn on 25.04.2007 in the name of Kuldip Mahajan and on 25.04.2007, a sum of Rs.50,000/- were withdrawn in the name of Ruhi Mahajan. Beside above withdrawals, other withdrawals were made to the tune of Rs.60,000/- and Rs.50,000/- and later on encashed in the account of Sameer Mahajan. Thus, the total amount to the tune of approximately Rs.3 lakhs were taken out of the said account.” CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 5 iv) “In order to save her married life, the complainant was forced to purchase a car “Honda City” , which was on the name of the complainant. However, it was for the regular use of the family and initial payment of Rs.3,33,000/- and further installments @ Rs.12,624/- per month were also paid from this account till date.” v) “The refusal by the complainant resulted into maltreatment and beatings and use of filthy language to the complainant and her parents by accused No.1 to 4. In January 2009, accused No.1 to 3 visited Jalandhar and demanded the amount of Rs.50,00,000/- for settling accused No.1 to USA. The father of the complainant gifted Rs.50,000/- and gifts for all. He further asked for time to consider their demand. In the month of May, 2009, accused No.1 to 3 again abused and beaten the complainant that their demand has not been fulfilled as yet complainant suffered injuries at this stage also.” vi) “On the return of the complainant on 04.10.2009 about 8 a.m., accused No.1 to 3 questioned her regarding arrangement of money from her father for sending the accused Sameer Mahajan to USA. On showing her inability, accused No.1-Sameer Mahajan along with accused Nos. 2 and 3 tried to throw her out of balcony from second floor. The complainant held the grill by her hands and started shouting. She suffered injuries to her fingers of both hands. She was then brought inside the house. She was held by her arms by accused No.2 and slapped and punched severely on her face by accused Nos.1 to 3. She was kicked on her stomach and back by accused No.1. She was also held by her hair and thrown on floor. Hearing the shrieks of the complainant, neighbours, namely, Mr. CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 6 T.R. Gupta and his wife, Mr. Brieeh Sharma and Mr. Bhatia came to the house of accused and saved the complainant. The complainant had suffered injuries and bruises all over the body. The neighbours also called the police.” Thus, a perusal of the FIR shows that there is a specific demand of dowry. There is a documentary evidence in the form of Bank Account etc. showing the transfer of amount from the account of the complainant to that of the petitioners. There is a specific demand of car and money on various occasions. The complainant- respondent No.2 also suffered injuries on account of severe beatings. From the perusal of the detailed FIR, the allegations under Sections 406 and 498-A prima-face are made out at this stage. The allegations, therefore, cannot be brushed aside as either being vague or exaggerated. The petitioners, herein, are the husband, father-in- law and the mother-in-law. They are also the main accused in the FIR. There is no doubt with the proposition of law referred to by the learned counsel and judgement cited in support of this case but it is also well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C only if the allegations made in the FIR are taken on face value do not make out any offence under Section 406, 498 of the Indian Penal Code. Since the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C is very wide, the only constrained on the High Court is that it should be exercised with great care and caution. This Court, in the case of Manjula Sinha vs. State of U.P. reported in 2007(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 778, in paras 8 and 9 held as CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 7 under :- “8. Section 482 Cr.P.C does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any expression provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non protest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 8 and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case, where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.” Whereas, from the allegations in the FIR, it is evident that there is not only specific entrustment but there is also specific demand of dowry. There is documentary evidence of transfer of the amount from the account of the respondent to the account of the petitioners. There is specific allegation of beating on account of demand of dowry. Thus, the allegations in the FIR do not permit this CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 9 court to scuttle the investigation at this stage. It does not fall under any of the categories laid down in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in 1991(1) RCR (Crl.) 383 to enable the Court to exercise the discretion under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR. The judgements relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not help the petitioner in the facts and allegation in the present case. The last argument of learned counsel for the petitiones is that Police Station had no jurisdiction as no part of alleged crime took place at Jalandhar. There is no merit in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners in view of the judgement rendered by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another reported as JT 1999(8) SC 25. The Apex Court, while holding that the High Court had committed an error in entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR on the basis of territorial jurisdiction, observed in para 8 of the judgement that:- “8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable for criminal trial. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegation made by the parties that the S.H.O., Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 10 was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the F.I.R. lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because : (1) The S.H.O. has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. is lodged. (2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction. (3) After investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.” After taking into consideration Sections 156, 168, 169 and 170 to chapter XIII of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides for “jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials” held that 'if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police, then FIR can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police CRM No. M 15238 of 2010 11 officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it.” Thus, in view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the SHO at Jalandhar has no power to investigate the matter. In case, the SHO comes to the conclusion that the Jalandhar police has no jurisdiction, the FIR can be forwarded to the police station having the jurisdiction but the FIR cannot be quashed on this ground on account of territorial jurisdiction. The present petition is accordingly dismissed being devoid of merits. (Nirmaljit Kaur) Judge 21.05.2010 gurpreet