HONOUBLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Crl.R.C.No.1689 OF 2004 ORDER : The petitioner is the sole accused in C.C.No.468 of 2002 on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru. He was tried for the offences under Sections 304-A and 279 IPC. The trial Court convicted the petitioner for both the offences. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence under Section 304-A IPC. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence under Section 279 IPC. The learned trial Judge directed that both the sentences should run concurrently. The sole petitioner who was the sole accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.218 of 2003 before the Principal Sessions Court, West Godavari at Eluru. Through the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the conviction recorded by the trial Court. So far as the sentence is concerned, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence under Section 304-A IPC as awarded by the trial Court was reduced to six months simple imprisonment. (The learned Sessions Judge did not state whether the reduced sentence was simple imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment, so much so the imprisonment is liable to be treated as simple imprisonment). The sentence of imprisonment for six months as recorded by the trial Court for the offence under Section 279 IPC was maintained by the appellate Court. The learned Sessions Judge also maintained the fine as recorded by the learned trial Judge. Aggrieved by the judgments of the trial Court and the appellate Court, the revision petitioner preferred the present revision. There are as many as 11 witnesses in this case. PW.1 is the husband of the deceased Annapurna. PW.2 is the father of PW.1. PW.3 is the owner of a tyre shop near the scene of offence. PW.4 is a neighbour of the deceased and PW.1. All the four witnesses in PWs 1 to 4 were arrayed as eye-witnesses. PW.5 is the brother of the owner of the lorry involved in the accident. He was examined by the prosecution to establish that the petitioner was the driver of the lorry at the relevant time. PW.5 did not support the prosecution story. He pleaded ignorance as to who was the driver of the lorry at the time of the accident. The remaining witnesses are not eye-witnesses. Thus PWs 1 to 4 alone were examined by the prosecution as eye-witnesses for the accident proper. It is the case of Sri G.Vijaya Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused as the driver of the offending vehicle and that the petitioner/accused consequently is entitled to be acquitted. Admittedly PWs 1 to 4 are strangers to the petitioner. The test identification parade was not conducted in this case. Thus PWs 1 to 4 identified the petitioner as the driver of the offending lorry at the time of the accident by identifying him for the first time in the Court hall. It is well settled law that identification of a culprit by a witness for the first time in the Court without preceded by a test identification parade shall not be accepted if the identified accused was a stranger to the witness. The learned Judge in fact referred to one such decision in Syed Zameer v State of A.P.[1]. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the very identification of the petitioner as the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident is in question, benefit of doubt shall be accrued to the petitioner leading to the acquittal of the petitioner. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 is not sufficient to establish that the petitioner was the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. It may however be pointed out that PWs 1 to 4 established the mode and manner of the accident and that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. What all they failed to establish was that the petitioner was the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. I may refer to Ex.P.14. Ex.P.14 is the trip sheet of the offending vehicle. Before the trial Court, it was contended that Ex.P.14 was a brought up document. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court agreed with the contention of the prosecution that Ex.P.14 trip sheet was genuine. There is no reason to defer from the view adopted by the trial Court and the appellate Court. There is nothing on record to disbelieve the trip sheet. Ex.P.14 trip sheet admittedly bore the signature of the petitioner herein. Indeed PW.5 denied any knowledge about the petitioner being the driver of the offending vehicle. However, it is the case of the prosecution that the trip sheet was seized by police on 10.05.2002, when PW.5 allegedly produced the petitioner/accused before the police. It may not be relevant that PW.5 did not support the prosecution case for the reason that whether PW.5 produced the petitioner before police and whether police seized the trip sheet on 10.05.2002 and consequently, the question about the genuineness of Ex.P.14 trip sheet are not at issue. As already pointed out by me, there is no ground to disbelieve Ex.P.14. Once Ex.P.14 is found to be true, it is for the petitioner/accused to explain his signature on Ex.P.14. When the petitioner/accused failed to do so, despite the absence of oral evidence, the case of the prosecution that the accused was the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident is made out. Consequently the conviction of the petitioner/accused by the trial Court as well as by the appellate Court for the offences under Sections 304-A and 279 IPC are sustainable. The conviction recorded by the trial Court accordingly is sustained. The judgment of the trial Court and the appellate Court do not suffer from any infirmity regarding the conviction of the revision petitioner. Regarding the sentence of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court and the appellate Court, both the Courts apparently have not taken into consideration the age of the petitioner. The offence was allegedly committed in May, 2002. The trial Court delivered its judgment in November, 2003. The appellate Court disposed of the case in September, 2004. In the charge sheet itself, the petitioner/accused was described to be 58 years old. By the time of the judgment of the trial Court, the petitioner must be over 59 years and by the time the appellate Court disposed of the appeal, the petitioner must have been a senior citizen. If the petitioner was about 58 years old at the time of the filing of the charge sheet, he must be around 67 years old now. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is about 70 years old. Even according to the age as mentioned by the prosecution in the charge sheet, the petitioner must be about 67 years old. Where the offence occurred was in 2002 and the petitioner is now 67 years old, I consider it to be an eminently fit case where imprisonment does not deserve to be imposed against the petitioner. The petitioner who was convicted by the trial Court and whose conviction was confirmed by the appellate Court is said to have been in jail for about 15 days in all. The trial Court imposed fine of Rs.2,000/- which stood confirmed by the appellate Court. In view of the age and the nature of the offences proved against the petitioner, I deem it appropriate to reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him subject to the confirmation of the fine as imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court. Accordingly, the conviction for the offences under Sections 304-A and 279 IPC against the petitioner as recorded by the trial Court and by the appellate Court are confirmed. The sentence is modified to imprisonment already undergone for both the offences under Sections 304-A IPC and 279 IPC. The fine of Rs.2,000/- as imposed by the trial Court for the offences under Section 304-A IPC together with the default sentence of three months imprisonment if the petitioner failed to pay the fine amount is maintained. The order that the sentences for the offences under Sections 304-A and 279 IPC should run concurrently is not necessary where the sentence of imprisonment already undergone by the petitioner is considered to be sufficient for both the offences. The Criminal Revision Case is ordered accordingly. ____________________ JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR 10th June 2011 PNV [1] 2002(2) ALT (Crl.) 272 (A.P.)