THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R.SUBHASH REDDY WRIT PETITION No.17272 of 2010 ORDER: Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for the respondents. In this writ petition, petitioner questions the order bearing No.E1/496/2010, dated 07.05.2010, passed by the first respondent - District Registrar, Guntur, and Memo bearing No.S2/8549/2010, dated 17.06.2010, issued by the second respondent - Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Hyderabad. The petitioner is a plaintiff in O.S.No.186 of 2008 filed against one Smt. Muppalla Padmavathi, Wife of Muppalla Chaitanya Eswar, seeking specific performance of agreement of sale receipt, dated 27.02.2004, executed by her. In the said suit, on his request, the said document was referred to the first respondent for impounding. Thereupon, the first respondent by notice, dated 21.04.2010, demanded him for payment of stamp duty of Rs.1,92,850/- on the aforesaid document to consider for impounding, and penalty at ten times as per Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short ‘the Act’). On receipt of the said notice, the petitioner submitted a representation. On such representation, by order, dated 07.05.2010, the first respondent asked the petitioner to deposit deficit stamp duty of Rs.1,92,850/- and penalty of Rs.5,78,550/-, which is of 3 times of the stamp duty, total amount is Rs.7,71,400/-. As against the same, the petitioner approached the appellate authority i.e. the second respondent, who in turn, vide Memo, dated 17.06.2010, directed the first respondent to take necessary action to finalize the case as per rule position and instructions and to dispose of the same without any delay. It is the case of the petitioner that the first respondent is demanding stamp duty and penalty by applying Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act. It is also his case that there was no recital of delivery of possession in the document in question, as such, stamp duty chargeable is only under Article 6(A) but not Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act. A counter-affidavit is filed by the first respondent. In the counter-affidavit, while denying various allegations levelled by the petitioner, it is stated that as per the recitals of the agreement of sale receipt, the executant has agreed to sell the house property @ Rs.2,950/- per sq.yard and received an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- cash and Rs.4,00,000/- through cheque, total Rs.5,00,000/-, on the date of its execution. While referring to the letter, dated 15.03.2010, addressed by the District Judge, Guntur, to the first respondent for impounding the document in question, it is stated that the answering respondent calculated the stamp duty in accordance with Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act and made demand. It is further stated that as per the contents of the document in question, which is styled as a sale receipt, it comes under the category of agreement of sale of immovable property consists of a site and a house in it, and chargeable under Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act. Further, while referring to the impugned memo issued by the appellate authority, it is stated that although demand notices were issued on 21.04.2010 an 23.06.2010, in view of the letter, dated 05.07.2010, addressed by the District Judge, Guntur, to the answering respondent to return the document in question, which was sent accordingly, no final orders are passed on the objections raised by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the orders of this Court in the cases of M.HARINARYANA @ HARIBABU v. CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY AND COMMISSIONER INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND STAMPS, ANDHRA PRADESH[1] a n d SINGAMSETTY VARALAKSHMAMMA AND ANOTHER v. CHERUKURU JANARDHANA REDDY[2]. I n M.HARINARAYANA’ s case (1 supra), with regard to Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act, this Court held as follows: “From a reading of Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A, it is also clear that it is applicable only in relation to agreements for development/sale in relation to construction of a house or building including a multi-unit house or building or unit of apartment/flat/portion of a multi-storied building or for development/sale of any other immovable property. In the instant case, from the recitals of agreement of sale dated 28th of March 2001, it is clear that it is not an agreement for any of the purposes mentioned under Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that as much as the value of the property was more than Rs.50,000/-, it makes no difference whether it falls within the ambit of Article 6(C) or 6(A), as in either case, the stamp duty prescribed is only Rs.100/-. The language used in Article 6(B) and also the judgment of this Court in Pechetti Ramakrishna’s case (supra) clearly supports the case of the petitioner that for the agreement dated 28th of March 2001, the chargeable duty indicated in Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A cannot be applied. In such an event, the further question which is to be considered by this Court is whether in view of the recitals of the agreement and in the absence of any endorsement on the agreement regarding delivery of possession, can such an agreement be construed as a sale within the meaning of explanation 1 to Article 47-A of Schedule 1-A. In this regard, the counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of M.Madushdan Reddy’s case (supra). In this judgment, while considering the similar situation, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that pursuant to an agreement, if delivery of possession at a subsequent point of time is evidenced by the very agreement in the form of an endorsement, explanation 1 to Article 47-A of Schedule 1-A gets attracted. In the same judgment, it is further held that even if delivery of possession has taken place at a subsequent date, but the same is not evidenced by the agreement, it does not attract explanation 1 of Article 47-A of Schedule 1-A. Paragraph 4 of the judgment is relevant for the purpose of the present case and it reads as under- “It is settled principle of law that the nomenclature of a document is not a decisive factor. From the point of view of admissibility, it is the contents of the document that assume importance. If a document, though named as agreement of sale, contains all ingredients of sale, it is to be treated as a sale deed. In such cases, its admissibility would depend upon the compliance with the requirements, such as, stamp duty and registration. The amendment brought about through A.P. Act 21 of 1995 to Article 47A of Schedule 1A of the Stamp Act had narrowed down the distinction between an agreement of sale and a sale deed from the point of view of stamp duty. The explanation added through the amendment reads as under: “An agreement to sell followed by or evidencing delivery of possession of the property agreed to be sold shall be chargeable as a “Sale” under this Article: Provided that, where subsequently a sale deed is executed in pursuance of an agreement of sale as aforesaid or in pursuance of an agreement referred to in clause (b) of Article 6, the stamp duty, if any, already paid or recovered on the agreement of sale be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the sale deed.” From a reading of the Explanation, it is evident that if an agreement evidenced delivery of possession of the property agreed to be sold, it is liable to be charged as a sale deed. An important distinction brought about by various situations, having relevance to this Explanation, needs to be noted. There are certain agreements, which contain a recital to the effect that the possession has already been delivered to the purchaser or is being delivered through the agreement itself. In such a case, undoubtedly, the agreement is liable to be charged as if it is a sale deed. There are also agreements, which provide for delivery of possession at a future point of time, be it subject to payment of the balance or any portion of consideration, or on occurrence of any event. Here again, two situations may be contemplated. If such delivery of possession at a subsequent point of time is evidenced by that very agreement in the form of an endorsement, etc., it gets attracted by Explanation 1. On the other hand, even if the delivery of possession has taken place at a subsequent date, but the same is not evidenced by the agreement, it does not attract Explanation 1. In such an event, the document deserves to be treated as agreement simplicitor, notwithstanding the fact that possession of the subject-matter of the agreement was delivered, otherwise than through an endorsement on the agreement itself.” In Singamsetty Varalakshmamma’s case (2 supra), when an identical question fell for consideration, this Court held that in similar circumstances, Article 6(A) of Schedule 1-A of the Act will only apply, but not Article 6(B) thereof. Merely because the representation was filed seeking deduction of penalty that does not prevent the right of the petitioner to challenge the very imposition, if the said demand is not in accordance with the Act. In view of the same and as it is stated that the objections of the petitioner were not considered and no final decision is taken by the first respondent pursuant to the impugned memo issued by the appellate authority, I allow the writ petition by setting aside the order, dated 07.05.2010, with a direction to the first respondent to consider the matter afresh and pass appropriate orders. The petitioner is permitted to file further objections, if any, within a period of three (3) weeks from today. I am sure, the first respondent shall consider the objections of the petitioner in the light of the orders of this Court in the cases referred to above and take appropriate decision and communicate the same to him. No order as to costs. ______________________ R.SUBHASH REDDY, J 30th AUGUST, 2010. Note: issue c.c. in one week. kvni [1] 2008(2) ALD 515 [2] 2008(6) ALD 340