IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.6501 of 2011 RAJ KUMARI GUPTA . Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS . ----------- For the Petitioner: Mr. Anil Sinha, Adv. For the State: Mr. Mayank Rukhyar, Adv. For Nagar Parishad: Mr. Arbind Kr. Pandey, Adv. 2/ 11/04/2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. The petitioner is stated to be the Vice- Chairman/Deputy Chief Councilor of Nagar Parishad, Motihari, aggrieved by the notice dated 4.4.2011 issued by the Executive Officer calling for a special meeting to discuss a No Confidence Motion against him under Section-25(iv) of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the notice is contrary to the statutory provisions. Section- 25(iv) of the Act provides that a meeting has to be called in the manner prescribed. Rule-2(i) of the Bihar Municipal No Confidence Motion Process Rules, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as 2010 Rules) provides that notice shall be issued by the Chief Councilor. The notice issued by the Executive Officer therefore shall not suffice and is illegal. It is next submitted that Rule-2(iv) of the 2010 Rules provides that the notice shall contain the reasons/allegations on which basis the No Confidence Motion is sought to be brought. 2 The notice dated 4.4.2011 is vague and contains no reasons/allegations. Learned counsel for the State points out that Section-36(b) of the Act provides for the appointment of an Executive Officer. The notice has been issued by a statutory authority on behalf of the Chief Councillor of the Nagar Parishad. The notice fulfils the requirements with regard to reasons/allegations. No other infirmity having been pointed out in the notice the Court may not interfere with the same. Section-25(iv) of the Act provides for calling of a special meeting to consider a No Confidence Motion on a resolution moved by not less than one third of the total councilors. The fulfillment of this statutory requirement is not in dispute as it is also not in dispute that the notice suffers from any other infirmity with regard to time period etc. It does not suffer from any of the infirmities as indicated in the proviso to Section-25(iv). The Executive Officer being a statutory authority through whom the Municipality Acts in its day-to-day functioning, the Court finds it difficult to read down Rule-2(i) of the 2010 Rules to mean that the notice should be issued specifically under the pen of the Chief Councilor alone. The Chief Councilor may authorize the Executive Officer to issue notice on his behalf. A notice issued by the Executive Officer suo motu 3 without the concurrence of the Chief Councilor may not meet the requirement of the law. But for this, if the challenge is laid out in a writ petition, the foundational fact shall have to be established and asserted that the Executive Officer had acted on his own on a resolution given by the requisite number of Members without the approval, knowledge and concurrence of the Chief Councilor. Merely because the impugned notice may not use the words “as directed” shall not lead to any presumption that the notice was issued without the concurrence of the Chief Councilor. On the contrary, when an order is passed under a statutory provision by a statutory functionary there is a presumption of its correctness. The onus to rebut it shall lie on the person who challenges it. The petitioner has failed to discharge that onus. The second ground that the notice does not meet the statutory requirements for lack of reasons/allegations does not satisfy the Court. The notice very clearly states that the conduct of the petitioner was not in the interest of the Government, public interest and of the Councilors. Government projects were being hampered. Corruption was being encouraged. Nepotism was being encouraged in the Nagar Parishad. Provisions of the Act were being violated because of all of which the members had lost confidence in him. 4 The Court is more than satisfied that it gives a reasonably clear indication of what was proposed to be discussed. The members were expressing lack of confidence in the petitioner due to his conduct and manner of functioning. Obviously, specifics would come up during the discussion of the No Confidence Motion when the petitioner would have been available to defend himself. The Court is not satisfied that the notice at this stage is required to be in the manner of a charge-sheet as required in a departmental proceeding spelling out each individual charge along with evidence in its support. Grassroots democracy entails an open discussion on all issues which are broadly spelt out for the discussion. It cannot be said that the petitioner was completely unaware or kept in the dark for what reasons a no confidence motion was proposed against him.Quite obviously, no finding on any act contrary to public interest or government procedures, encouraging nepotism, obstructing works can be passed during the No Confidence Motion on an abstract basis. The discussion on the floor of the house would naturally take place based on incidents under each heading when both sides shall exchange their views. The reliance placed by the petitioner on a Division Bench decision in 2002(1) P.L.J.R. 280 (Sindhu Devi Vs. The State of Bihar and Others) is misconceived on 5 facts. The notice for the No Confidence Motion proposed has been quoted in paragraph-6. It simply states that the meeting was called in context of the protest letter for discussion. The Court therefore at paragraph-7 held that there is not a shred nor a whisper of what was the wrong done. Presently, the Court has held that the notice does spell out the alleged wrongs proposed to be discussed. In 2002(3) P.L.J.R. 201 (Lalan Singh and Others Vs. The State of Bihar and Others) the Division Bench at paragraph-4 noticed that the person who was required to face the No Confidence Motion did not know the misdemeanors or allegations which he had to meet. Presently, it has already been discussed that the notice for the No Confidence Motion succinctly states the issues on which the discussion was to take place. On facts the present case is therefore clearly distinguishable. The Court therefore finds no merit in this application. The writ application stands dismissed. KC ( Navin Sinha, J.)