THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI W.P. No. 15174 of 2005 O r d e r: (Per N.V. Ramana, J.) This case has a chequered history. The litigation between the petitioner and respondent No.1 and its members, with respect to the land in question, started as far back as in the year 1979, and both of them are fighting a ceaseless and relentless battle, the petitioner claiming that it forms part of Sy. No.403, which is classified as government land, while respondent No.1 and its members claiming that it is a private patta land and is situated in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki of Shaikpet village. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 2. The land in question, is situated in Shaikpet village. The petitioner claims that Shaikpet village is a sarfakahs village. That in 1920, sethwar was prepared for 353 survey numbers. The land in an extent of Acs. 3228.02 guntas in Sy. No. 129 was shown as government land. In 1921, the sethwar was divided into Sy. Nos. 129/1 to 129/10; that an extent of Acs. 3097.39 gts, was shown in Sy. No. 129/1 and Acs. 190.03 gts. was shown in Sy. Nos. 129/2 to 129/10 as patta land. In 1924, supplementary sethwar was issued deleting Sy. No. 353 because of boundary dispute with adjoining village, and that upon merger of sarfakhas in Diwan in 1949, Shaikpet village vested in the Government. 3. While respondent No.1 and their members claim that the then Hyderabad Government, allotted the land in question, in an extent of Acs. 10.00 each in Sy. No. 129/11 paiki to Narayana and Ramulu in the year 1930. That the said two persons sold their respective extents of Acs. 10.00 of land to one T.V. Ramachandraiah under two registered sale deeds in the year 1964. In the year 1965, the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, allotted House Nos. 8-2-269/1 and 8-2-269/2 and mutated the name of T.V. Ramachandraiah in the municipal records. Thereafter, T.V. Ramachandraiah, sold the land in question to respondent No.1-Society, which having carved out 21 plots, allotted them to respondent Nos. 2 to 36. 4. While so, it is the case of respondent No. 1 that when M/s. Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited, M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association and the Collector, Hyderabad, tried to interfere with their possession and enjoyment of the land in question, respondent No.1 filed suit in O.S. No. 1615 of 1979 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for perpetual injunction. M/s. Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society, as defendant No.1 in the suit filed written statement stating that the government allotted land in an extent of Acs. 53.00 in Sy. No. 403, that the property claimed by respondent No.1, as per the documents, is situated on Road No.3, but they are claiming it to be located on Road No. 2 of Banjara Hills. M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen, as defendant No. 2, filed written statement, stating that they are in possession and enjoyment of Acs. 9.07 guntas. The Collector, Hyderabad, as defendant No. 3 filed written statement stating that as per the revenue records of Shaikpet village, there is no Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. Subsequently, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Hyderabad, was impleaded as defendant No. 4. The VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, having considered the pleadings of the respective parties, by judgment dated 19.09.1991 dismissed the suit. 5. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner filed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 on the file of the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Special Court), to declare respondent No.1 herein and three others as grabbers of government land in an extent of 1616 Sq. mtrs. in Sy. No. 403/part correlates to T.S. No. 1/1/1, Block ‘B’ Ward No.10 of Shaikpet village. While respondent No.2 and others claimed that the land in their possession and enjoyment is located in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and that it did not form part of the land claimed by the petitioner in Sy. No. 403/part. At the very same time, respondent No.1 filed appeal in A.S. No. 209 of 1991 on the file of V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, questioning the judgment dated 19.09.1991, passed by the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, dismissing the suit. 6. While so, the Special Court, vide judgment dated 29.12.1995, dismissed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 holding that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence, with an observation that the said judgment does not prelude the petitioner from instituting fresh proceedings against respondent No.1 and its members if on proper enquiry it is found that Ex. B27, is not true and correct and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession of land in Sy. No. 403 and not in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. 7. Respondent No.1 filed copy of the judgment in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 as an exhibit in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, and based on the findings arrived at therein, the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit as prayed for, inter alia holding that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence and that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title were in possession of the land in question since 1930. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed second appeal in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, and this Court by judgment dated 01.03.1999, dismissed the same confirming the judgment of the first appellate Court. 8. After dismissal of the second appeal by this Court, the petitioner filed the present L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999 to declare respondent No.1 and its members as grabbers of the land in question and for recovery of the possession. Questioning the initiation of fresh proceedings, respondent No.1 filed writ petition in W.P. No. 16097 of 2000 praying to declare that the present L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999 filed by the petitioner, is hit by the principles of res judicata and that in view of the judgment of the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, the present L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999 is not maintainable. A Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 11.02.2000 allowed the writ petition. Questioning the same, the petitioner filed Civil Appeal No. 3607 of 2003, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by order dated 21.04.2003, set aside the order dated 11.02.2000 passed in the writ petition, allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Special Court with a direction to decide the plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue. 9. Pursuant to the remand order, the parties filed joint memo before the Special Court on 15.04.2004, requesting the Special Court to take up trial of the L.G.C. decide the same on merits on all the issues framed. The Special Court having decided the same, including the plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue, by reason of the impugned order dated 02.03.2005, dismissed the L.G.C. filed by the petitioner. 10. Questioning the said judgment passed by the Special Court, the petitioner invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue: A Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, after calling for the records relating to an connected with the judgment dated 02.03.2005 in L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999 on the file of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, at Hyderabad and quash the same, as it is illegal and pass such other or further orders as are deemed fit and proper. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 11. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the petitioner-Government submitted that the Special Court relying on the judgment dated 29.12.1995 passed by it earlier in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 has committed an error in holding that the present L.G.C., is not maintainable. He submitted that since the Special Court by judgment dated 29.12.1995 while dismissing L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 observed that the said judgment does not preclude the petitioner from instituting fresh proceedings against respondent No.1 and its members, if it is found that Ex.B27 is not true and correct and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession of Acs. 20.00 of land in Sy. No. 403 and not in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, the present L.G.C., filed by the petitioner, which is based on the report of the District Collector, is maintainable. 12. He further submitted that the findings recorded by this Court in its judgment dated 01.03.1999 passed in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, being in a suit for injunction and not suit for title, do not operate as res judicata so as to bar the present L.G.C., which is filed to declare respondent No.1 and its members as land grabbers. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagir Singh & Ors.[1]. He further submitted that merely because respondent No.1 and its members obtained decree of perpetual injunction against the petitioner, it does not mean that the petitioner is not entitled to initiate land grabbing proceedings against respondent No.1 and its members, who are grabbers of government land. 13. He submitted that since the apex Court by order dated 21.04.2003, passed in Civil Appeal No. 3607 of 2003, which arose out of the proceedings in the present L.G.C., directed the Special Court to decide the plea of res judicata as preliminary issue, the Special Court ought to have decided the same, and when it felt that the present L.G.C. is hit by the principles of res judicata, it ought not to have gone into other issues and decided the same on merits. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai[2]. 14. He further submitted that the Special Court failed to consider the fact that respondent No.1 and its members are claiming the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, which is non-existent, and in the guise of making claim to the land in the said survey number, they are claiming land in Sy. No. 403, which belongs to government. He further submitted that since Ex. C1 marked in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, copy of which is marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, as Ex. B27, is a product of fraud and mischief played by the officials of the petitioner, the Special Court, ought not to have placed much reliance on the same, so as to hold that there exists Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and that respondent No.1 and its members are in occupation and possession of the same. He further submitted that the Special Court committed a grave error in not considering Exs. A7 and A11, namely true copy of Town Survey Register and original map of Jubilee Hills Development plan, which show that the land in question belongs to government. 15. He further submitted that since respondent No.1 and its members are not party to the proceedings in L.G.C. No. 71, they cannot derive any benefit of the findings recorded by the Special Court with regard to the genuineness of Ex. C1 marked therein, and contend that the said findings operate as res judicata, against the petitioner, and in support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Anjuman Ara Begum[3]. He further submitted that the Special Court committed grave error in not considering the effect of Exs. A1 to A20, especially Ex. A1, A7, A11 and A20, relied on by the petitioner and negativing the case of the petitioner just relying on Exs. B2, B3 and B20 (copy of which is marked as Ex. B27, filed by respondent No.1 and its members, is illegal and arbitrary. 16. He further submitted that as respondent No.1 and its members filed applications seeking regularization of land in question, which is in their possession, it should be deemed that they have not disputed the title of the State to the land in question, and in support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. V. Mandal Revenue Officer[4] and Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah[5]. 17. He lastly contended that if at all this Court is not convinced and inclined to allow the writ petition, having regard to the nature of grounds raised by the petitioner, the matter be at least remanded to the Special Court, for consideration afresh. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 18. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the petitioner having themselves subjected to the jurisdiction of the Special Court and having filed a joint memo for trial of all the issues framed in the L.G.C., now cannot contend that the Special Court ought to have decided the issue relating to res judicata as preliminary issue first, and that since it felt that the present L.G.C. is barred by the principles of res judicata, it ought not to have decided other issues on merits. 19. He submitted that this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the order of a inferior Tribunal, only to correct errors of jurisdiction, in that, if it is demonstrated by the petitioner that the order impugned is without jurisdiction, not supported by any evidence, is based on inadmissible evidence and is in violation of the principles of natural justice. He submitted that the petitioner having neither pleaded any of the aforesaid grounds against the impugned order passed by the Special Court nor demonstrated the same, they are not entitled to writ of certiorari against the impugned order. He further submitted that this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or re-evaluation of evidence. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan[6] and State of A.P. v. Prameela Modi[7], and of a Division Bench of this Court in T. Surya Rao v. Dr. G. Ramakrishna Rao[8] and P. Vijayalakshmi Devi v. MRO, Shaikpet Mandal, Hyd.[9]. 20. He submitted that the Special Court in the judgment passed in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and this Court in the judgment passed in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, which confirmed the judgment in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, have consistently found and held that Sy. No. 121/11/paiki is in existence and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession thereof, and the said finding having attained finality, the Special Court, did not interfere with the same, and considering the evidence placed before it in the present L.G.C., held that Sy. No. 121/11/paiki is in existence and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession thereof, and that being so, it is not open for this Court, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, to interfere with the same, and more particularly when it is not the case of the petitioner that the said finding recorded by the Special Court, is without jurisdiction, is perverse or is based on no evidence or has been made without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 21. He submitted that even though the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, did not preclude the petitioner to initiate fresh proceedings against respondent No.1 and its members, the same is subject to proper enquiry with regard to genuineness of Ex. B27 marked therein, and respondent No.1 and its members being in possession of the land in Sy. No. 403 and not in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, and no enquiry having been conducted by the petitioner with respect thereto, and no order having been passed by the Collector with respect to non-existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, the present L.G.C. is not maintainable. He further submitted that no notice whatsoever was given to respondent No.1 and its members when the town survey was conducted, except the Tahsildar, and hence no credence can be given to the entries in the town survey register-Ex. A7, relied on by the petitioner to contend that the land is a government land. 22. He submitted that respondent No.1 and its members filed applications for regularization under protest, and in fact, pendency of litigation, is a condition precedent under G.O. Ms. No. 166, to file regularization application, and therefore, the action of respondent No.1 and its members, in making applications for regularization, cannot be treated as their admitting the title of the petitioner to the land in question. Hence, he submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned order, and prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. 23. Heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioner-Government, the learned counsel for respondent No.1- Society and the learned counsel for unofficial respondent Nos. 2 to 34. 24. Having regard to the arguments advanced by the respective parties, the following questions do arise for consideration in the writ petition: 1. Whether the Special Court, having decided the issue relating t o r e s judicata as preliminary issue in the affirmative, committed an error in deciding the other issues on merits? 2. Whether the Special Court committed an error in holding that the present L.G.C. in view of the judgment dated 01.03.1999 of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1991, is hit by the principles of res judicata? 3. Whether the Special Court, was justified in holding that in view of its earlier order dated 29.12.1995, passed by it in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and the judgment dated 01.03.1999 of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, the present L..G.C. is not maintainable? 4. Whether Sy. No.129/11/paiki is in existence, and if so, whether the land claimed by respondent No.1 is in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, is a private patta land or formed part of land in in Sy. No. 403/part, which the petitioner contends is a government land? 5. Whether the Special Court by not giving credence to Ex. A11 and other Exs. namely A1, A7 and A20, and based on Ex. B27 marked in the present L.G.C., was justified in holding that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence? 6. Whether respondent No.1 and their members, by filing applications before the Government seeking regularization of the land in their possession have conceded the title of the petitioner in respect of the land in question? and 7. Whether the petitioner has made out any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Special Court? 25. Before we proceed to answer the above question, we may examine the scope and power of this Court to interfere with the order passed by an inferior Tribunal, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India? PARAMETERS AND SCOPE OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 26. The petitioner invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India, to question the impugned order dated 02.03.2005, passed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999. 27. The parameters and scope of this Court to interfere with the order of an inferior tribunal in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution is very limited. This court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction. The writ Courts would issue writ of certiorari only in cases where it is demonstrated that while passing the impugned proceedings, the inferior tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or has acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in it, acted in contravention of the principles of natural justice, in that it has passed orders without issuing notices and without providing opportunity of hearing, committed an error apparent on the face of the record, or the conclusions/findings arrived at by it are based on no evidence whatsoever or the conclusions/findings arrived at by it, based on the evidence adduced by the parties, are perverse. The object of writ of certiorari is to keep the exercise of powers by the inferior judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals within the limits of the jurisdiction assigned to them by law and to restrain from acting in excess of their authority, by moving to the High Court the proceedings of the inferior court or tribunal for the purpose of quashing them. 28. What are the conditions that are necessary for issuing writ of certiorari was succinctly stated by the apex Court in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani[10] as follows: When any body of persons (a) having legal authority, (b) to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, (c) having the duty to act judicially, (d) act in excess of their legal authority – a writ of certiorari may issue. Unless all these conditions are satisfied, mere inconvenience or absence of other remedy does not create a right to certiorari. 29. Thereafter, the question as to when a writ of certiorari can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the Constitution of India, came up for consideration before the apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan. The apex Court having considered the said question, answered as follows: A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can, similarly, be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercise it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error or law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. An error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari must be one which is apparent on the face of the record. Thus where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected