IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY WRIT PETITION NO:16269 of 1999 Between: M.Bose S/o. Akkaiah R/o. 60 Feet Raod, Prakash Nagar, Narasraopet, Guntur District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur, 2 The A.P.S.R.T.C. Rep by its Managing Director. Musheerabad, Hyderabad. 3 The Divisional Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C, Narasaraopet, Guntur District. 4 The Depot Manager A.P.S.R.T.C, Vinukonda Depot, Guntur District. .....RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner:MR. B.PARAMESWARA RAO FOR MR.P.PRABHAKARA RAO Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 to 4:MR. C.PRAKASH REDDY The Court made the following : ORDER: This writ petition is filed for a writ of certiorari to quash award, dated 08.02.1999 passed in I.D.No.183 of 1993 on the file of the Labour Court, Guntur, whereby it confirmed order, dated 24.12.1984 passed by respondent No.4 imposing punishment on the petitioner. The petitioner, who is a Conductor in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’) was at the relevant time working in Vinukonda Depot. While conducting bus bearing No.AAZ 3485, he was found to have re-issued six tickets of denomination of 50ps. to six passengers, which lead to issue of charge sheet, dated 24.12.1984. After completion of enquiry, respondent No.4 by his order, dated 23.04.1985 imposed on the petitioner penalty of reduction of basic pay by six incremental stages with permanent effect from Rs.575/- to Rs.485/- besides treating the period of suspension as not on duty for all purposes. After a lapse of about eight years, the petitioner approached the Government for reference of dispute under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’) and the Government accordingly, referred the dispute to the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court, the Corporation has taken the specific plea that there was inordinate delay of more than eight years in the petitioner raising the dispute and, therefore, the I.D. was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. The Labour Court having accepted the said plea of the respondents, dismissed the I.D. vide it’s award, dated 08.02.1999 on the ground of delay, without going into the merits of the case. This award is questioned in this writ petition. The question, which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the Labour Court was right in rejecting the I.D. on the ground of delay when once the Government has referred the dispute under the provisions of the Act. In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Limited [1] , the Supreme Court held that even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or board dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. It further held that the Court in appropriate cases can direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. The said judgment was referred to and relied upon by the workman in Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways [2] . The Supreme Court distinguished the said judgment as under: “The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the Tribunal committed error in denying relief to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The learned counsel submitted that in industrial dispute delay should not be taken as a ground for denying relief to the workman if the order/orders under challenge are found to be unsustainable in law. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. And another. We have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also perused the aforementioned decision. We do not find that any general principle as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been laid down in that decision. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the management in the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case on hand the plea of delay was raised and was accepted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the present case. Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt the discretion is to be exercised judicially. The High Court on consideration of the matter held that there was no ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal. We are not satisfied that the award of the Tribunal declining relief to the petitioner, which was confirmed by the High Court suffered from any serious illegality which warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed.” (Emphasis added) In my considered view, the case on hand is similar to the one decided by the Supreme Court in BalbirSingh (2 supra). As noted earlier, the Corporation has specifically raised the issue of inordinate delay in the petitioner raising the industrial dispute. As held by the Supreme Court in Balbir Singh (2 supra), whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. In Balwant Singh v. Labour Court [3] , a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the contention that when once reference has been made, the Labour Court is precluded from examining whether the claim is barred by delay. The Division Bench held that the discretion of the Government is not unfettered or arbitrary and that equally, it is open to the adjudicating Court to consider whether the claim is stale and the explanation, if any for the delay is satisfactory. In the present case, the Tribunal used sound discretion on the strength of proper reasoning to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of long delay, which remained unexplained by the petitioner. For the above-mentioned reasons, I do not find any jurisdictional error or patent illegality in the impugned award warranting interference of this Court. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 23rd DECEMBER, 2008. kvni [1] 1999-LLN-2-674 [2] 2001 SCC (L&S) 165 [3] 1995-PLR-111-298