^. Before The Hon'ble State Administradve Tribugal Bench Raipu^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ ?.7^ O.A.No Applicant V/s Respondent Suresh prasad chandania S/o SIiri.S.B. chandania aged 52 yrs, at present working as L.D.C Revenue department at Tahsil office Nagri, Distt: Dhantari (M.P.) 1. StateofM.P.Through The Principal secretary. Revenue Department ,VaUabh Bhawan, Bhopal. 2. The coUector, Dhamtari Distt: Dhamtari (M.P.) 3. The coUector, Raipur Distt: Raipur(M.P.) , 4. The comissioner, Raipur division Raipur (M.P.) AppUcation under Section 19 of Administrative tribunals Act 1985 : 1. Name and adress of appKcant as stated above 2. Nameand address ofrespondents :- as stated above 3. Paticulars of the orders against wliich application in made :- a. (i) Order No :- Departmental enquiry 16 B/121 year 1994-95 Anexure.A-1 BS^""^*' /IF^? COURT OF ATB1LA COURT : HON'BLE MR. SATiSH K. AGNIHI *'B!T OCTiT'nM i i rciii iu! Surssh Prasad Chandania versus ;tate of M.P. (now ChhatEisgam) and others Postfor ^-1-2007 Sd/- SatishK.Agnihotn Judge -^ i, 'aaQSSiK^a^.a^, COURT OF CHHATT1SGARH AT BJLASPUI INGLE : HON'BLE MR. SATiSH K. AGNiHOTRI. .J. Is; Pstitiohsi Resoondents WRiLP&TITlON (S.IN0.28Q40F 200i versus Suresh Prasad Chsndania State of M.P. (now Chhattlsgarh) and others ,Prac;Ant Mr. Manoj Dubey, counsel for the petitloner. Ms. Sunita -iain, Panel Law/er for the Siate/respondents. (Passed on _^: Day of January, 2007) By this writ petition, the pstitioner has chalSengsd the ordsr daied 4-9-1995 (Annexure A-1), whereby the petitioner was demoted frorr, the po-st of Accountant to the origjnal post of Lower Division Cle-k with the punishment of grant of subsistenss aliowance aions during the suspenston period. The petltioner has furthsr chailenged ths vaiidlty ofthe charge-shest (Annexure A-4). 2. This pstition was initially filed before the State Administrative Tribunai. On dissolution of the Stats AdininJstrativs Tribunal, this petition was transferred to this Court and numbered as as* --T-^SSf 3. The indlsputabie facts tn nutshsi! are that the petltioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk on 21-5-1973. Thereafter, he was promoted to fhs post of First Grads CSsrk on 21-7-1981. Subsequently, by order datsd 21-5-1983, the petitioner v/as proi~,oted on the post of Accountant. On 18-1 -1994 (Annexurs A-3), the petitioner wss suspendsd on ths chargss of irreguiarities In transaction of cash- book. Ths charge-sheet (Annexure A-4) was issued thereafter containing the fo'iowing charges : <.f?i^Q5T—lii -SS^ VS ^H ^Gi^l^f ^[^TEsTpi g71<T f^Tv. arfSitaiA f^rtj^^is i^ conif^*iiui»i -srr^'sr wWw 52/f^'Tfw 6-7—83^ n*4 ^ wpf •Tg? —£i^ .-&- ^ l^-^i ^TSTT j ^iT^T W ^Pi^i—"'??7^TR ^lpr ^Hi ^i^l ^Si ;03^ -^i®WT—(2)'SS tq? ^ft ~qt?MST (I'tSii'-lOT sRT _'\ . ^ • ^ c 'cfWt 3?6TRBT q>TS 91—32 !2—93Ti '?Tq?^ 'quff ' £S^?'li^^t teQi^CT^;»lf ^3^ vffv1 ^^jcjT? ^t£~^pt 'of'@~f 1Hsnn?r TQT£|T •<;-^i i' ^T^ 3f4WTT ^^JT ^i^"sTR yHsT *!S,il1 qi|'S<*7—(3) » il ^itti'l'ET (oT Wi'iq'cT7 V \v33 ^i;^^ 02.. ^. Ifc -^- I^.^iq? 28—4—53 w I./' <sl—5—6—i 3rTT£^ -q^ 43 3 4 ^T^IT^I ^ M^"?T f^^ ^T^ ^ f^b^ 'rar s oitt! si'il *!$ *l<i 'a«i«ttfiTigi i<, q^fsq?T—(4) -sSl "^f^gT sT^T 3!4'1 <W^lt ^>i I'-'l-^iS TT ^^cT ^'^ cpKlf^RJ ^ ^'N" "y^TR W"^! '3T?JT -3H^ T^q^Tt? ts^^ oHST^RT ^s' uT.^T.^TT. •sr?f?HT ^Ri <ri^T 4 ^ 2% q'?3^5T" <Sf ?ri%r % W.T ^ ^fS.^^^it&^t^^^^S,SS!!^&^ 70.000/-^ftw-T^lftT^t WT ^^ g(? R'11'tt> 2—S—S3. 9—a—83 T?g 8—9—93 aTrts-T cbo'ldd'i Xjig .ar^f&WTftg arf&^rft %t 4w ftnir | uit ^ gfer iRT qf^Wre t I Sd/- Collector RAIPUR (M.P.)" <'i'~ ~—<r 4. A departmental enquiry was initiated and on enquiry, charges No.1, 2 and 4 were found proved and charge No.3 was found partialiy proved against the petitioner. The Collector, by his order dated 4-9-1995 (Annexure A-1), agreeing with the enquiry report dated 2-2- 1995, demoted the petitioner from the post of Accountant to the original post of Lower Division Clerk with grantof subsistence allowance alone during the suspension period. The petitioner was affordsd an opportunity of hearing on the basis of enquiry report before the impugned order was passed, wherein it was held that the petitioner had committed grave misconduct. 5. The petitioner, being aggrieved, filed an appeal before the Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner, by his order dated 3-8- 1998 (Annexure A-2), having considered the appea! in detail, confirmed the finding of the snquiry officer and the order dated 4-9-1995 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Collector. 6. The petitioner, by this petition, has impugned theorder dated 4-9-1995 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Collector on the sole ground that the documents, required by the petitiQner, vrere not supplied to him. On query as to whether theenquiry officer has relied on those documents, which were required by the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was not able to point out any portion, which deait with the said documents and the enquiry officer heid the charges proved on the basis of the said documents. The petition is very vague, cryptic and lacks relevant materials. 'i- --<»' 7. It is wel! settled principle that the enquiry cannot bs held vitiated on the ground that csrtain documents, as required by the petitioner, not relied in the enquiry, were not supplied to him, and the enquiry officer has held the charges proved not on the basis of such documents. It is further well settied that the enquiry report is not perverse if the finding is based on some evidence and the delinquent employee has been afforded sufficient opportunlty to put-forward his case and further by cross-examining the witnesses of the employer and the relevant documents ars suppiied in advance. 8. The Supreme Court, in the case of Kuldeep Singh vs. Commiss'ioner oi Police and others , observed as under:- "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judjcial scrutiny." "10. A broad distinction has, therefore, tp be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if thsre is some evidence on record which is acceptabie and which could bs relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." <•;. J..-A~^-. 9. The Supreme Court, in the case of yogfnatAD. Bagde vs. State oi ttaharashtra andanotheP, observed as under:- "51. ............... The law is well settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person woutd have reached, it woutd be open tp the High Court as aiso to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep Singhv. Commr. ofPofce" this Court, reiying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kislwre Prasad v. State of Bihaf, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Rao2', Centrat Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jairia, Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai PateF as also RajinderKtimarKifKSra v. Delhi Admn." laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as wel! and the courts can interfere wlth the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the flndings were perverse." 10. The Supreme Court, in the case of \f. Ramana vs. A. SRTCand others , observed as under:- t>- \'-< "11. The common thread runnlng through in all these decisions is that the court shouid not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedurat impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view.of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administratoropen to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that ofthe administrator. The scope of judicial review fe limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision." 11. The Supreme Court, in the case of Punjab Sfate Civll Suppii'es Corpn. Ltd. vs. Sikander Singh , observed as under:- "40. The civiicourt could interfere with the said order in the event, inter alia, it was found that ffie order of dismissal by way of punishment had been imposed in violation of the procedures iaid down in ' the statutory rules or in violation ofthe principles of natural justice or suffered from iliegaiities, or !l!lM(ij?;t!;^iriiiMtt'^rB'n^t^'^n procedural irregularities were committed by the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority in holding the departmental proceedings. ............" 12. The Suprems Court, in the case ef Jayantibhai Pate! vs. Anilbhai Naffsubhai Patel and others, observed as under:- '••te- ''</..iBWti,t "18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised uniess the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the consciencs of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universaliy appiicable to ai! cases, can be evoived. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelibie effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. .........." 13. The second alterriative contention ofthe petitioner is that the punishment awarded to the petitioner be reduced in the interest of justice. ;1:; li 14. The petitioner hasnot pointed out any reason to consider reduction of the punishment as the punishment imposed does not shock the judicial conscience in the facts of the case. The scope of LUJ:lliliiJ.,J- :"y*'. ^ judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and-not the decision. 15. As a result and for the reasons above-stated, this petition isdismissed. No order as to costs. F—- SdA , .SatishK.Agnibotri Judge 1 (1999)23cc 10 2 (1999) 7 SCC 739 3 (2005) 7 SCC 338 4 (2006) 3 SCC 736 5 (2006) 8 SCC 200 'Gopa! ''II !1