IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO : 224 of 2002 (Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated ______ in WP NO : 8941 OF 2000 on the file of the High Court.) Between: The Managing Director, A.P.S.C.R.I.C. Ltd., 5-10-193, First floor, Haca Bhavan, Hyderabad. ..... APPELLANT AND 1 Smt J.Suryakantham, W/o Sri Vidyasagar, R/o Metro Grave Apartments, Somajiguda, Hyderabad. 2 The Executive Engineer, A.P.S.C.R.I.C. Ltd., 10-2-289/4/B, Shanthinagar, Hyderabad-28, (R2 Not necessary Party) .....RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Appellant:MR.P.R.BALARAMI REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.: MR.P.SRINIVASULU The Court made the following : THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO.224 OF 2002 JUDGMENT: (Per SK,J) The Andhra Pradesh State Co-operative Rural Irrigation Corporation Limited, Hyderabad, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’) is in appeal aggrieved by the Order dated 04.01.2002 in Writ Petition No.8941 of 2000. By the said order, the learned single Judge held the action of the Corporation, vide the impugned proceedings dated 08.12.1999, accepting the resignation tendered by the first respondent/writ petitioner to be illegal as the first respondent had withdrawn her resignation before that date. The learned Judge consequently directed the Corporation to reinstate the first respondent in service. The first respondent entered into the service of the Corporation as an Assistant-cum-Typist on NMR basis in the year 1988 and her services were regularized with effect from 01.01.1992. She applied for leave on health grounds under leave application dated 29.05.1997 and extended the leave upto 30.09.1997. As she continued to be absent even thereafter, it appears that the Corporation initiated disciplinary proceedings by issuing a charge memo on 28.12.1998 calling upon her to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for her unauthorized absence, negligence and dereliction of duties. As she failed to respond to the charge memo aforestated, the Corporation issued a show cause notice on 01.07.1999 directing the first respondent to show cause as to why her services should not be terminated. The first respondent replied to the show cause notice under her letter dated 15.07.1999 requesting the Corporation to drop disciplinary proceedings against her as she had proceeded on leave only on health grounds. She also responded to the charge memo under a separate explanation dated 14.07.1999. While matters stood thus, the first respondent submitted letter dated 20.08.1999 to the Corporation stating that she was not able to discharge her duties due to back pain and that in such circumstances she was willfully intending to resign from her job. She asked for adjustment of her Provident Fund amount against the amounts due from her towards the vehicle loan sanctioned by the Corporation. She requested the Corporation to accept her resignation and issue necessary acceptance orders at an early date. Though it is the case of the first respondent that she submitted the above resignation upon the advice of the Corporation itself, no such recital is found in the letter dated 20.08.1999 and on the other hand, the first respondent stated therein that due to ill-health and her other problems, she was willfully intending to resign from her job. Be that as it may, the first respondent, acting upon the instructions of the Corporation to remit the pending dues vide it’s memo dated 09.09.1999, submitted representation dated 17.09.1999 stating that the amounts due to her towards annual grade increments and pay leave salary may be adjusted against the loan amounts due from her and that she would pay the remaining amount to clear the vehicle loan after such adjustment. In consequence of this representation, the Corporation issued proceedings dated 10.11.1999 sanctioning the annual grade increment due to her. It is the case of the first respondent that while matters stood thus, there was an improvement in her health condition and she approached the Corporation seeking to withdraw her resignation. The first respondent specifically averred that she withdrew her resignation by submitting representation dated 23.11.1999 and that she also issued a telegram of the same date requesting posting orders. It is her grievance that the Corporation, having refused to receive the representation dated 23.11.1999 sent under registered post, failed to act upon the telegram of the same date and on the other hand, issued the impugned proceedings dated 08.12.1999 accepting her resignation. The case of the Corporation on the contrary is that the first respondent never represented for cancellation of her resignation either personally or in writing. The Corporation denied receipt of the telegram and also the representation dated 23.11.1999. The Corporation pointed out that the first respondent approached this Court by way of the writ petition long after the acceptance of the resignation, disentitling her to any relief. The learned Judge accepted the version of the first respondent that she had submitted the letter dated 23.11.1999 withdrawing the resignation tendered under her earlier letter dated 20.08.1999. The learned Judge took note of the fact that the said letter sent under registered post was refused by the Corporation and also of the fact that the first respondent had issued a telegram on the same day requesting posting orders. The learned Judge also took note of the fact that the Corporation itself had kept the matter pending in spite of the request of the first respondent to accept her resignation at an early date, as reflected in the letter dated 20.08.1999. The acceptance of the resignation by the Corporation was nearly four months after the first respondent’s letter dated 20.08.1999. The learned Judge was therefore of the opinion that the first respondent was well within her rights in withdrawing her resignation before it’s acceptance by the Corporation. Relying upon precedential law on this aspect, the learned Judge held that the first respondent had withdrawn her resignation within time and therefore the impugned proceedings dated 08.12.1999 accepting her resignation thereafter were illegal and invalid. He accordingly quashed the same directing the Corporation to reinstate the first respondent in service. Sri P.R.Balarami Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant Corporation, submitted that there was no evidence to show that the first respondent had communicated to the Corporation her intention to withdraw the resignation letter dated 20.08.1999. He contended that the Corporation had not received either the telegram or the registered letter and therefore, in the absence of the intimation of withdrawal of the resignation by the first respondent, the Corporation was justified in accepting the resignation under the impugned proceedings dated 08.12.1999. Per contra, Sri P.Srinivasulu, learned counsel for the first respondent, placed before us the certified true copy of the telegram issued by the first respondent on 23.11.1999 and also the original returned envelope containing the letter dated 23.11.1999 sent by the first respondent to the Corporation under registered post. The telegram issued by the first respondent reads as follows: “THE JOINING REPORT ALONG WITH MEDICAL CERTIFICATE SUBMITTED IN HEAD OFFICE ON TWENTY THIRD NOVEMBER WAS REFUSED TO TAKE IN INWARDS SECTION, KINDLY ISSUE POSTING ORDERS IMMEDIATELY – J SURYAKANTHAM.” In the letter dated 23.11.1999, a copy of which is produced before us, it is stated that the first respondent approached her Doctor for treatment and after treatment, the Doctor stated that she was fit for duty. It is further stated that the first respondent was willing to resume her duties as the resignation submitted by her was also not accepted and that she was withdrawing her voluntary retirement. The envelope containing the letter dated 23.11.1999 sent under registered post bears the endorsement that the same was refused. The endorsement is dated 26.11.1999. Basing on the above, Sri P.Srinivasulu, learned counsel, submitted that the Corporation willfully refused to take cognizance of the attempts of the first respondent to communicate the withdrawal of her resignation and passed the impugned proceedings dated 08.12.1999 accepting her resignation with retrospective effect from 20.08.1999. He asserted that the order under appeal therefore did not call for any interference and sought confirmation of the order of the learned single Judge. The submission of Sri P.Balarami Reddy, learned counsel, that the first respondent approached this Court with inordinate delay cannot be accepted in as much as the impugned proceedings of the Corporation accepting the resignation were passed on 08.12.1999 whereas the writ petition was filed in February, 2000. There is no delay, worth the name, on the part of the first respondent in seeking redressal of her grievance. As per the Corporation’s Special Bye-law No.77 pertaining to ‘Resignation’, the Appointing Authority shall be competent to accept the resignation of an employee, who is required to give at least one month’s notice. Therefore, acceptance of the resignation is mandatory under the Corporation’s own Regulations. In the present case, the first respondent’s resignation dated 20.08.1999 was accepted by the Corporation only on 08.12.1999. The issue presently is whether the first respondent withdrew her resignation before it’s acceptance. The legal position on this aspect has been tried and tested and needs no further belabouring on our part. In BALRAM GUPTA v. UNION OF INDIA[1], the Supreme Court held that a person could withdraw his resignation before it became effective. In PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK v. P.K.MITTAL[2], the Supreme Court reiterated that until the resignation becomes effective it is open to the employee on general principles to withdraw his letter of resignation. Again in J.N.SRIVASTAVA v. UNION OF INDIA[3], the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that even if the voluntary retirement notice of the employee is accepted by the authority, the employee would have locus poenitentiae to withdraw the proposal for voluntary retirement before the date of retirement is reached. In the present case, the retirement of the first respondent under her letter dated 20.08.1999 would be effective only upon it’s acceptance. The first respondent claims to have withdrawn her resignation prior to 08.12.1999, when the impugned proceedings were passed by the Corporation accepting her resignation. Though the Corporation denies receipt of the telegram and the letter dated 23.11.1999, such denial is belied by the facts. The telegram would, in the normal circumstances, be served upon the addressee and there is no possibility of refusal as in the case of registered letter. As the telegram was issued on 23.11.1999, wherein the first respondent referred to the refusal of her joining report along with medical certificate by the Inwards Section of the Corporation and sought posting orders, the Corporation must have obviously been put on notice of the intention of the first respondent to retract her resignation. In such circumstances, the refusal of the registered letter bearing 23.11.1999 by the Corporation, as is borne out by the endorsement of the Postal Authorities, becomes very much possible and believable. It has to be borne in mind that the Corporation had initiated disciplinary action against the first respondent seeking to terminate her services owing to her continued absence from duty. As the first respondent had herself tendered her resignation, it is possible that the Corporation would have wanted to seize such an opportunity to relieve itself of this troublesome employee. However, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in BALRAM GUPTA (1 supra), the Court must condemn circuitous ways to ease out uncomfortable employees. The concerted effort of the Corporation in the present case appears to have been to take advantage of the resignation letter submitted by the first respondent and achieve it’s purpose of ridding itself of her services. In this endeavour, the Corporation deliberately chose not to take notice of the first respondent’s desperate attempts to withdraw her resignation, not only by turning a blind eye to the telegram but by willfully refusing to accept the letter dated 23.11.1999. Though the Corporation may claim ignorance of the contents of the letter dated 23.11.1999 which it refused to receive, the contents of the telegram would have put it on notice of the intention of the first respondent to withdraw her resignation as she sought posting orders therein. Therefore, the action of the Corporation in accepting the resignation by deliberately choosing to ignore the attempts of the first respondent to withdraw her resignation cannot be countenanced. The order under appeal is therefore found to be lawful and valid and does not call for interference in this appeal. The Writ Appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ B.PRAKASH RAO, J. ____________________ SANJAY KUMAR, J. __________ October, 2009. VGSR [1] AIR 1987 SC 2354 [2] AIR 1989 SC 1083 [3] AIR 1999 SC 1571