:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.579 OF 2007 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.579 OF 2007 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.579 OF 2007 State of Maharashtra, Food and Civil Supplies Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai ...Applicant v. Smt. Usha Shirish Khandwala, Indian Inhabitant, Residing at Vaibhavi, 14, Ahok Nagar Society, Guru Nanak Road, Juhu Vile Parle, Bombay 400 054. ...Respondent. Mr.V.S.Gokhale, A.G.P. for the Applicant/State. Mr.V.A.Thorat, Sr.Counsel a/w Prachi Tatke and Ms.Jahnavi Joshi i/by D.F. & Diwan, advs. for the Respondents. CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. DATE: 28th January, 2008. DATE: 28th January, 2008. DATE: 28th January, 2008. ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. Heard the learned counsel for the Parties. 2. The Government of Maharashtra, who is the revision applicant before this Court, is the original defendant in RAE and R Suit No.1 of 593/1615 of 1991 filed by the plaintiff for eviction. Admittedly, plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises being flat no.11, admeasuring 1974 sq.ft. situated on the fourth floor in Khetan Bhuvan, Jamshedji Tata Road, Bombay. The building belongs to EK-Omkar Premises Co-operative Society. Admitted fact is that the Government of :2: Maharashtra had taken suit premises from the plaintiff/landlady on leave and licence basis on 29-5-1970 for accommodating the office of the Chief Accounts Officers and the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra in Food and Civil Supplies Department. The period of leave and licence as per the agreement was three years. When the premises were taken by the Government, the plaintiff and two others had the membership rights over the suit premises on co-operative basis. On 28-6-1975 the plaintiff became the sole owner of the suit premises. Admittedly in view of amendment in The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (In brief ’Bombay Rent Act’) in 1973 , the Government of Maharashtra had become the tenant of the plaintiff. On 1-12-1990 the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant/Government and requested to vacate the premises mainly on two grounds, firstly, the plaintiff wanted to commence private coaching classes in the suit premise and, therefore, she reasonably and bonafide required these premises for personal use by running coaching classes and secondly, since 1975 the Government had not paid arrears of permitted increase in outgoings and on this count, she also claimed an amount of Rs.1,08,000/- being arrears of permitted increase in outgoings, which the tenant has to pay as per the terms of the contract. Notice was received but the Government failed to vacate the premises and to pay the arrears. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction and :3: recovery of arrears. 3. The suit was contested by filing written statement dated 15-12-1991 wherein the claim of the plaintiff for eviction on both the grounds was denied. 4. Several issues were framed by the learned trial Court. After hearing the evidence, the learned trial Court found that the plaintiff had proved that she required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for occupation of herself for the purpose of running coaching classes. The trial Court also held that the plaintiff would suffer greater hardship if the decree for eviction is not granted. The learned trial Court however, rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant had failed to pay arrears of increase in outgoings in spite of demand notice. In the result, the suit came to be decreed for eviction and possession on the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement. The defendant/Government preferred an Appeal No.755 of 2004 challenging the findings of the trial Court. In the appeal preferred by the defendant, the plaintiff also filed cross objection no.1 of 2005 challenging the findings of the trial Court in respect of issue pertaining to non payment of permitted increases and the same being one of the grounds for eviction. 5. After hearing the parties, the learned Appellate :4: Court accepted the findings of the trial Court in respect of claim of the plaintiff for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement for personal use. The learned Appellate Court also came to conclusion that if the decree of eviction is refused, the plaintiff would be put to a greater hardship. In addition to that the learned Appellate Court also held that the defendant had failed and neglected to pay the arrears of outgoings and permitted increases in spite of demand notice served upon the Government. The Appellate Court found that the Government was in arrears of permitted increases to the extent of Rs.1,08,000/- on the date of filing of the suit. The Appellate Court also held that the defendant is not ready and willing to pay arrears of permitted increases. With these findings, not only the decree for eviction was confirmed but the Appellate Court also directed the defendant to pay an amount of Rs.1,08,000/- being arrears of outgoings and permitted increases. The Appellate Court also maintained the order passed by the trial Court to hold an enquiry for mesne profits under Section 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure from the date of decree till recovery of possession of the suit premises. The original defendant has challenged these findings in the present Revision Application. 6. The learned counsel for the Parties have taken me through the evidence, pleadings of the parties and :5: the judgments rendered by both the Courts below. The plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1991 contending that she had vast experience in the field of education for a period of 32 years and she held several educational qualifications and, therefore, she wanted the suit premises for the purpose of opening coaching classes therein. The learned A.G.P. contended that she was quite old lady aged about 73-74 years when the decree was passed by the trial Court in the year 2001. According to the learned A.G.P., it is impossible to believe that at such an old age, the plaintiff could commence new innings in the life by opening coaching classes in the suit premises. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlady vehemently contended that the age is no ground to reject her prayer for eviction particularly when on record, there is sufficient evidence to show that she has vast experience in the field of education and particularly teaching experience of about 32 years at the college level. It is contended that when the suit was filed, she was aged about 61-62 years and naturally after retirement, she required the suit premises for starting her private coaching classes. The law does not prohibit to open such coaching classes for imparting education to the students, who need private coaching for improvement in their educational standard. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 581 Shrivastava 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 581 Shrivastava 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 581 wherein the Supreme :6: Court held that crucial date for deciding bona fides is the date of application for eviction by landlord. Subsequent events on account of time consumed in proceedings for eviction of tenant may be relevant only if they are of such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse the need. Taking into consideration, this legal position merely because period of 12-13 years was consumed by the time decree for eviction came to be passed, it could not be stated that the plaintiff no more required the suit premises for her bonafide needs. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff has become physically or mentally unfit to commence such coaching classes. In Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies and another 1997(1) Maharashtra Law Traders & Agencies and another 1997(1) Maharashtra Law Traders & Agencies and another 1997(1) Maharashtra Law Journal 121 Journal 121 Journal 121, the Supreme Court held that the landlord being the best judge of his residential requirement, it is for him to decide how and in what manner he should live. The same logic would be applicable if the landlady wants to use her premises for the purpose of particular occupation or business. Admittedly, the Government had taken the suit premises from the landlady not for residential purpose but for accommodating certain offices and the plaintiff also does not claim eviction and possession on the ground of self residence. According to her, she wants to open coaching classes by virtue of her qualifications and vast teaching experience. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings that the need of the plaintiff is bonafide and, :7: therefore, the decree has been passed. I do not find any fault in the said findings. 7. The Courts below also observed that the Government of Maharashtra may have a large number of offices and a large number of staff members, who are required to be accommodated in different places. The Government has come up with so many new buildings where its offices can be accommodated but the plaintiff/landlady has only one premises, which she can claim for the purpose of carrying out her occupation, i.e., of running coaching classes. Therefore, both the Courts below held that if the decree for eviction is not passed, greater hardship would be caused to the landlady. At this stage, it may be pointed out that as per the evidence on record when the suit premises were taken by the Government, large number of staff members were required to function from the said premises. It has come in the evidence led by the defendant/Government itself that out of 156 staff members assigned to the office of Civil Supplies, hardly 22 or 30 staff members are actually working in the said premises. The other members of the staff are working at different building, where a school is also run. The Courts below noted that in view of this, it appears that the Government will not be put to a greater hardship if the decree for eviction is passed. It may be noted that at the initial stage of arguments in this matter, I had asked the parties to :8: find out whether some part of the suit premises could be given to the landlady for the purpose of running coaching classes. However, after taking instructions from the concerned officer, the learned A.G.P. Mr.Gokhale made a statement before the Court that the concerned department is not agreeable to such proposal. In fact this stand indicates that the Government, infact, will not be put to any difficulty if the decree for eviction is passed and executed. 8. The learned trial Court had noted that the Government had paid rent from time to time and, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act, the decree for eviction could not be passed on that ground. However, the learned Appellate Court rightly noted that Section 12 provides that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any. The learned Appellate Court noted that it was almost admitted fact that the Government is paying only agreed rent but was not paying permitted increases since 1975 and even after service of notice, arrears of the permitted increases were not paid. Section 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed by the Court in any suit for recovery of possession on the ground of arrears of standard rent and :9: permitted increases if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and together with simple interest at the rate of 9% on the arrears of such standard rent and permitted increases. The learned Appellate Court after minutely considering the evidence came to conclusion that the plaintiff had proved that on the date of filing of the suit an amount of Rs.1,08,000/- was in arrears towards the permitted increases. That amount was not paid by the defendant in spite of service of notice by the plaintiff. Not only this neither the defendant paid or tendered that amount on the first date of hearing of the matter before the Court nor it sought any extension of time for making payment. Thus, the defendant failed to avail facility of making payment of arrears of permitted increases under Section 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. 9. Taking into consideration the pleadings and the evidence on record, I find that the learned Appellate Court was right in passing the decree for eviction on both grounds and also passing decree for payment of arrears. I find no illegality, irregularity or perversity in the impugned judgment. I find no substance in the present Revision Application. 10. In the result, Revision Application stands :10: dismissed. 11. At this stage, Mr.Gokhale the learned A.G.P. makes a request that the decree for eviction may not be executed for a further period of six months. Taking into consideration that the premises are occupied by the Civil Supplies Department of the Government and the purpose for which the suit premises are being used by the Government, reasonable time may be given to the Government to vacate the premises. Therefore, decree for eviction shall not be executed for a period of six months from this day subject to some responsible officer of the defendant filing an undertaking within four weeks from this day before this Court that the suit premises shall be vacated without any obstruction within six months from this day. If the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated period, the plaintiff shall be at liberty to execute the decree. (J.H.BHATIA, J.) (J.H.BHATIA, J.) (J.H.BHATIA, J.)