IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1355 of 2011 Kundan Singh S/O Sri Amar Nath Singh and two others. … Petitioners. Versus Smt. Chandra Kala Nayal W/O Sri Bhupal Singh Nayal and others. … Respondents. Mr. Amish Tewari, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioners. Mr. Harsh Vardhan Sah, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent no.1-caveater. Date July 07, 2011. Hon’ble B.S.Verma, J. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 21-8-2009 (Annexure No.7) passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division) Almora (for short the Prescribed Authority) in Rent Control Case No. 2 of 2008m /Smt. Chandra Kala Nayal Vs. Nathu Singh and the judgment and order dated 15-6-2011 (Annexure No. 10) passed by the District Judge, Almora, in Rent Appeal No. 6 of 2006 Chandra Mohan Singh Vs. Smt. Chandra Kala Nayal and others. By the order dated 21-8- 2009, the Prescribed Authority has allowed the release application of the landlord-respondent no.1, moved under Section under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) and directed the opposite party Nathu Singh son of late Har Singh (since deceased) to vacate the shop in question and to deliver its vacant possession to the applicant within a period of two months. By the order dated 15-6-2011 the appeal preferred by the legal heirs of deceased Nathu Singh namely Chandra Mohan Singh and three others has been dismissed by the learned District Judge. Relevant facts giving rise to the present writ petition in brief are that the landlady-respondent no.1 moved an application for release of the shop in question under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on the ground of her bona fide need to settle her employed son 2 Tarual Nayal in the business. The release application was resisted by the tenant Nathu Singh (since deceased) by filing his written statement/objection. He denied the bona fide need of the landlady and alleged that the landlady has been trying to evict him from the shop in question on one pretext or the other. Her son Tarun Nayal has been preparing for competitions to get a good job. It was asserted that the son of the landlady has no need for the shop in question, therefore, he was not produced in evidence. The opposite party is a tenant of the shop in question for the last sixty years and the shop in question is the only source of livelihood and in case the same is ordered to be vacated, the family of the opposite party shall dies due to starvation. The release application has been moved just to realise high rent in future. Both the parties filed affidavits and other papers in support of their contentions. The learned Prescribed Authority after hearing both the parties recorded its findings on the points of bona fide need and comparative hardship. The learned Prescribed Authority has come to the conclusion that the need of the landlady to engage her son Tarun Nayal in the business is bona fide and genuine. On the point of comparative hardship, the Prescribed Authority has observed that during the pendency of the release application, the tenant has not made any effort to get alternative accommodation, therefore, the point of comparative hardship was also decided against him. Ultimately, by order dated 21-8-2009, the release application moved by the landlady was allowed directing the opposite party to vacate the shop in question within a period of two months. It appears that after the order dated 21-8-2009 was passed, the opposite party Nathu Singh had died. Therefore, aggrieved by the said order, the legal heirs of the deceased Nathu Singh, namely Chandra Mohan Singh and others filed appeal before the District Judge Almora, which was registered as Rent Appeal 3 No. 6 of 2009. The learned District Judge after hearing both the parties, recorded an independent finding on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. The appellate court after thrashing the entire evidence came to the conclusion that the need of the landlady for the shop in question is bona fide and genuine. On the point of comparative hardship, the learned appellate Court has found that the landlady would suffer greater hardship if the release application is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the legal heirs of the original tenant-Nathu Singh has been dismissed by order dated 15-6-2011, which gave rise to the present writ petition. The main ground of challenge raised in this writ petition is that the two courts below did not consider that the need of the applicant/respondent no.1 is not bona fide and genuine and that the need for the son has been developed after dismissal of earlier S.C.C. suit filed by the applicant and that no finding has been recorded by the Prescribed Authority on the point of comparative hardship. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material placed on record. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably 4 possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under:- “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the finding of the Prescribed Authority that the need of the landlord is bona fide is not based on appraisal of evidence and that no finding has been recorded on the point of comparative hardship of the landlord and tenant. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1- landlady has urged that the finding on the point of bona fide need is a finding of fact and the evidence cannot be reassessed in writ 5 jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 further submitted that the learned Prescribed has recorded findings both on bona fide need and comparative hardship and that the finding on the point of comparative hardship finds place at page nos. 5 and 6 of the impugned order. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned appellate court has also recorded its independent findings on both the issues and there is concurrent finding of fact on the points of bona fide need and comparative hardship. In the case at hand, learned Prescribed Authority after considering the evidence led by the parties have recorded a finding that the need of the landlady is bona fide to get her son Tarun Nayal settled in the business and that the balance of comparative hardship tilted in favour of the landlady. The appellate court has also recorded independent findings of the fact that the need of the landlady-respondent No.1 is bona fide and that no greater hardship would be caused to the tenant-petitioner if an order of eviction would be passed against him. In the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others (supra), the Apex Court has held in paragraph 36 as under:- “36. A finding as to bona fide requirement for doing readymade garments’ business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly recorded by the appellate authority. The said finding was a finding of fact. Neither could it have been interfered with, nor has it been set aside by the writ court. In view of the above position, the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition.” In that case, the Apex Court in paragraph no. 47 has further observed as under:- “47. In the case on hand, a finding had been recorded by the appellate authority that requirement of the landlord for doing business by Matloob Ahmad, husband of Applicant 6 was bona fide and genuine. Thus, the requirement of the landlords was established. The said finding stands today. The High Court by a cryptic order, without disturbing the said finding which was based 6 on appreciation of evidence, set aside the order of eviction against the tenant, inter alia, observing that Matloob Ahmad was a “retired person” and was getting pension and was living in his village at a distance of five kilometers from Dehradun. It is no doubt true that the tenancy was created before about fifty years but that should not be a ground for depriving the landlord for doing business if the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable.” In the case of Ganga Devi Vs. District Judge, Nainital and others [(2008) 7 Supreme Court Cases, 770], the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the provision of Rule 16(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules 1972, wherein the Apex Court relying on the case of Bhagwan Dass Vs. Jiley Kaur [1991 Supp.(2), SCC, 300] has observed in paragraph no. 23 as under:- “23. In Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur this Court distinguishing the earlier decision of this Court in Bishan Chand v. ADJ stated the law in the following terms: (Bhagwan Dass case, SCC p. 303, para 7) “7. …. It was also pointed out in this case that the provisions of Rule 16(2) of the Act (sic Rules) had not been considered at all. In our opinion, the said decision is clearly distinguishable. Firstly, the instant case was one where there was an outweighing circumstance in favour of the landlord, namely, that two of her sons after completing their education were unemployed and wanted to carry on business for self-employment. Secondly, as already seen above, it was not a case where the provisions of Rule 16(2) can be said to have been ignored by the District Judge. Thirdly, it was a case where there was even this additional circumstance that the appellant had brought no material on record to indicate that at any time during the pendency of this long drawn out litigation he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was unable to get it.” The “thirdly” referred to therein applies to the fact of this case.” 7 In the case at hand, from a perusal of the judgment and order passed by the two courts below, it reveals that the entire controversy on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship has been elaborately dealt with and the concurrent findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the learned appellate court are fully based on appraisal of evidence. Both the courts below also found that the tenant-petitioners have not made any effort to search alternative accommodation during the pendency of the proceedings. For the reasons and discussion above, I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. The writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed outright. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that one-year time may be granted to the petitioners to vacate the premises. The writ petition is dismissed. Costs easy. However, in order to do complete justice, one year time is granted to the petitioners to vacate the shop in question and to deliver its vacant possession to the landlady, provided the petitioners furnish a written undertaking to that effect before the Prescribed Authority within a period of eight weeks from today. The petitioners shall pay regular rent of the shop in question every month by the 7th day of the next month for each previous month. In case of default, as directed above, the landlady-respondent no.1 shall be at liberty to get the shop in question vacated in accordance with law. (B.S.Verma, J.) RCP