IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATE1) THIS THE 201r DAY OP AUGUST, 2010 BEFORE THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA WRIT PETITION No.3069J2008JKLRj BETWEEN: H. VENKATESH REDDY 5/0. LATE H.M. HANUMA REDDY AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESIDING AT CHIN NAPPANAHALLI VILLAGE, MARATHAHALLI POST, BANGALORE 560037 2 HTHIPPAREDDY S/O. LATE H.M. FIANUMAREDDY AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.22. “SATHYA SAl NILAVAM”, CHINNAPPANAHALLI VILLAGE. MARATHAHALLI POST BANGALORE 560037. 3. H.M. SATYANARAYANA REDD S/U L\TEH.M HANUMAREDDY AGED BOU1 61 YEARS, RFSIDING T CHINNAPPANAHALLI ‘VILLAGE, MARATH‘ 1 JIALL1 POST F3ANGALORE mO03 ‘. .. PEITI iONb RS (13 SR. . . A \RAM SEN OR (( NSf L I )T CFJENNARA\ \RFDiY kDV AND: 1, THE TATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA DRAMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE56000 1. 2. THE SPL. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BANGALORE URBAN DISTRiCT DISTRICT OFFICE COMPOUND KG. ROAD, BAGALORE-560009, . . RESPONDENTS (BY SRI, G.KRISHNAMURTHY SPL. GOVT. COUNSEL FOR R1 & 2, SRI.B.V. MURAL1DHAR, A.G.A. FOR R1 & 2) WP IS FILED TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 28/01/2008 PASSED BY R2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BNGALORE DISTRICT T NNEXURE AND SET ASIDE THE SAME AND GRANT SUCH OTHER RELIEFS OF THE LIKE NATURE. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 02 08 2010 COMING ON FOR PRONOL’NCEME\T THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: ORDER The petitioners are before this court seeking for issue of writ of certiorari and quash the order dated 28/01/2008 passed by the second respondent Deøut’ Commissjoncr, Bannalore District in Case No, N FT ()) Coma issioner 29 / 2OO6 OO7 which is impugned s.f 3 Annexure % to the petition. B the said ordrr the Deputy (‘omnussioner has held the existing revenue entncs relating to the property measuring 15 acres 1 guntas in Si No.20 of Chinnappanahalli Village. Krishanarajapuram Hobli, l3angalore East Taluk as illegal arid has directed to enter as ‘Government’ The eviction of unauthorised persons and ret’overv of possession is also ordered The order is made by exercising the suo mow power aailable under Sec. 13b(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred as ‘Act’ for shun). 2 Sri A N Javaram. learned Senior Counsel appeanng for the petitioner at the outset would clarif) that the attack presently is onb i,iith regard to revenue entries and the issue is not relating to title considering thc. nature of proc eedings before the Deput3 Commissioner and iii a writ proceeding before this court. Hence the nval documents at c not rc fared though produced It is contended that the genesis of the action is a Kannada new spaper report dated 2. 02. W)’,. IPircuan; in which ihr repor t has been secured b the Dc puty C onimissionc r from the 4ssistant (‘ommissionc r and the Tsthsildai and :ts such it cannot be c)nsidt red as SW) motn • ns. I F’ rn” (jfli;% :cIj. 4Th- hi t . dli’! 3-, i’’l.itn1’ Silt “ th— r z 4 1 of illegal entries, which is a preconceived notion. When the revenue entries had existed for 40-50 years, the same cannot be nullified by exercising the revisional power, which under all circumstances should be exercised in reasonable time. The order of the Deputy Commissioner is vitiated for non compliance of principles of natural justice and non furnishing of the documents on which reliance has been placed while passing the order. It is contended that the Deputy Commissioner has secured the file and looked into it after the hearing was completed and posting for orders. In respect of total of 15 acres 19 guntas, an extent of 4 acres 39 guntas is admittedly ‘Ainu land’ i.e., cultivable land. The petitioners had right in respect of that land and as such merely because the other extent of land is shown as ‘Kallu Marati’ being kharab the cultivable land cannot be denied. If that land is available the kharab land also would be a part of that land. On all these aspects there is non-application of mind by the Tahsildar and also the Deputy Commissioner. It is also contended that the facts relating to the partition as back on 13/04/1923, subsequent revenue entries, change of nature of land and the activities existing on the land for such long period have all been ignored by the revenue authorities. Hence it is contended the order of the Deputy Commissioner is liable to be quashed. 5 * 3. Per contra Sri. 0. Krishnamurthy, learned Special Government Advocate, sought to justify the impugned order. The press had nodoubt highlighted the illegality, but the authorities have not merely acted on such report and cancelled the revenue entries. On the other hand to examine the correctness of what had appeared in the press they have proceeded in accordance with law by providing opportunity to the petitioner. In the proceedings the petitioners have failed to establish their right to the property and it was noticed that they were enjoying the Government property without any right, based on illegal revenue entries. A detailed show cause notice was issued and the petitioners had filed their objection statement with the assistance of an advocate. No documents were produced to substantiate any of the contentions or right over the property. It is contended that Sec. 136 (3) of the Act is an independent provision and the present proceedings is suo mow proceedings and is the discretionary power of the Deputy Commissioner which can be exercised at any time, more particularly when illegality of the present nature has come to light. Knowledge of fraud is the point in time to initiate action. No contention regarding power or jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner was raised during the course of proceedings. The extent of 10 acres 20 guntas is (a) 6 Rharab land and as such cannot form part of the extent of 4 acres 39 guntas over which occupation is shown in RTC. The prathi book indicates the entire extent as rocky. Even otherwise for the extent of 4 acres 39 guntas no documents are produced though it is contended that occupancy right was granted under karnataka (Personal &. Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act. 1954, Without any right the Government land has been included for partition and without title documents the revenue entries were manipulated. The revenue entries not being documents of title cannot grant any right to the petitioners. In such situation if the order of the Deputy Commissioner is quashed by this court, it would amount to declaring the title of the petitioners which would be contrary to law. The Deputy Commissioner has provided opportunity, considered all contentions, assigned reasons and the direction issued to his subordinate is only to act in accordance with law, The learned counsel has in this regard referred to the objection statement and the documents produced along with it. The file relating to the proceedings iS referred and furnished to the court. -1. Both. the learned senior counsel and the learned Special Government Advocate have referred to certain decided cases in 7 support of their respective contentions. The same would be referred to at the appropriatc stage depending on their relevance. 5. At tile outset it is to be noticed that the contention on either side would indicate the limited scope of this proceedings. Even otherwise the law is well settled that in a proceedings of this nature the tide to the property cannot be decided. All that can be adjudicated is as to whether the existing revenue entries have followed the title and in that regard as to whether the petitioners have atleast established the fact which would prima fade probablise that the revenue entries in the name of the petitioners and their predecessors was a result of such legal right. Further it. will also have to be noticed as to shethet the proceedings which is impugned herein was held in accordance with law in the light of the settled legal prmciples 6. In the instant case there is nn dispute that initialb the issue had appeared in the newspapers and thereafttr action was initiated and in 1h4t rontcm,t much is made about that lct t k the learned Senior Counsel. In this regard the decisions in thc. eases of Ia mm Rzj &hc.tt aid ancthet State of Iirml ‘lads (MR 1)88 C i..rr II . S 1 lzr$.Tiih.N. liamaktish_vi %S (( O?’.t. re 1 naiicse,. antf nihers Is a (AIR 1969 Sc 1201); and Harbhajan Singh vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1961 Punjab 215) were relied on by the learned Senior counsel to contend that judicial notice cannot be taken of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence; a news item without any proof through witnesses of what had actually happened, is of no value and that presumption under Section 81 of Evidence Act to a newspaper cannot be treated as proof of the facts reported therein. Having noticed the same, in my view, there can be no two opinion about the position enunciated therein but the said decisions are not of assistance to the present situation. In the instant case the Deputy commissioner has not ordered reversal of the entries by relying on the paper reports on the face of it without further proceedings. On the other hand the news paper reports have been taken only as a source of information. Thereafter the Deputy couunissioner has secured further information in the appropriate procedure through his subordinates, initiated proceedings as contemplated in law and has thereafter passed orders. The order impugned does not even indicate a trace that he has been influenced by the newspaper report or that he has relied only on the newspaper report and passed the 4 9 I impugned ordi. r. Hem C thi snd contention of the learned Senior Co 1 lns( I is not nthi oils ing acceptc.d flic next ( untentiozi is that the Deputy Commissioner has inittaic ci 1)roc.ecciinQ wider Section 13o(3) of the Act iiitliout there being rKal tltiniant. It is also eontended as to %lierher tht long standing nun could lx reversed and it is further urged that there is no po’cer to resume land under the said provision. Yct another contention is that Ihi prnceedings are iitiated b3 bias as it has becn prot ceded on a preconceii ed notion as the Deput3 Coinniissioner as dii iding his cn n cause. (hi these aspects, the decisions relied on .in. in the cast at Rattan Lal Sharina is. Managing Committee, H RUSS (AIR I Q’ ‘.3 SC 2135) A perusal of the same iirnild indicate that while cplainine the principles of natural justice it is held that itO out can be judc of his own cause. It is slated so in i situation chit rc I he ptr c r ‘ht appcarcd a’ tinn ss iii SUOi 1. of hargt u as t c nit mhcr of the cnquiry C ommittc.e in the ‘asc of Manak La!. Adioci.c i . 1)7 Prc.n’ (.hani Sirth intl t a. SIR 193T qC. 4)) ii ( l’€ .ri.n ‘t ft. ‘ nquin LorrunitUc. as cn c itic id c.a.rhtci fikd ..Litiii frii the patti n ncerncd. it. thc cisc of Ranut ihakur • L , ‘ i; ; . .‘.( — r” I’ • ‘. Id I’c.. ,VLr_1%F,f I t( ‘. ,.‘.ei •‘i.sit” .. 1 ’.. 1 .’;tV •.. .:.! I0 in the case of State of W.B. and others vs. Shivananda Pathak and Others (1998(5) SCC 513) it is held that the Judge should not sit in a Division Bench in a collateral proceeding after his order is set aside by another Division Bench as there would be bias. 8. None of the cited judgments noticed above would be of assistance in the instant case since in the instant situation the statutory provision in Sec. 136 (3) of the Act itself designates the Deputy Commissioner to exercise such power and there is no separate provision if in case the land belongs to the Government. In such circumstance when the power is exercised as per the statutory provision it cannot be a situation where there is violation of principles of natural justice nor is there bias. Further the provision itself provides the suo moto power vested under the Act to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner. Being the revenue head the documents and the contentions are to be considered and order is to be passed. The proceedings of the present nature in any event cannot be considered as an adversarial proceedings. Further there is no specific reason indicated by the petitioner in order to even suggest bias except for the contention that the proceedings is on the basis that it is a Government land. That alone does not constitute 11 1. bias when the Deputy Commissioner is performing a statutory duty and the land in any event would revert to the Government for the benefit of public and there is no personal gain. Further, merely because it is mentioned as “illegal creation of documents etc.” in the subject column of the notice issued to the petitioners, it cannot form bias nor can it be said that there was predetermination. That was the allegation against the petitioners after the preliminary reports and as such they were called upon to explain so that they would have an opportunity to justify the same. Pursuant thereto when the proceedings are required to be held in accordance with law and when it is also open to judicial review, the proceedings cannot be held to be vitiated on such grounds as contended. 9. The next contention is that the revenue entries had stood in the name of the petitioners for a period of over 40-50 years and also that in respect of such entries there is a presumption .under Section 133 of the Act arid as such the Deputy Commissioner could not have initiated action at this stage and nullified the entries. It is further contended that in any event the Deputy Commissioner could not have ordered for taking possession. The decisions cited in this regard are to be noticed. With regard to presumption, in the case of The State of Karnataka and another vs. T.K. Ramacharidrachar and 12 others (ILR 1977 KAR 691 (DB)) it is held that if the entries in record of rights is incorporated as a result of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner or a competent authority superior to him, then such entries were not amenable to correction. However, in para 9 it is held that it can be changed only as per the provision under Section 136 of the Act and not otherwise. The present proceedings is one such proceedings and as such there is no impediment. In the case of Vasantha Ramnath vs. Land Tribunal (1980 (2) Kar IA SN 73) it is held that the name in the record of right having been made by statutory authority would be final and be presumed to be an act regularly perfonned. In the case of Thimxnamma vs. Siddarangaiah (ILR 1988 Karn 1919) it is held under Sec. 133 the entry in record of right and the certified entry in the register of mutations shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or new entry is lawfully substituted thereof. In the case of Laxmi Shedthi and Another vs. Udupi Taluk Land Tribunal & Others (1978(1) KarLJ 119 (DB)) it is held that the Tribunal should consider the legal presumption of revenue entry under Section 133 of the Act and the Tribunal should give reasons for discarding the legal presumption. 10. A perusal of said decisions would nodoubt indicate that the Court has emphasised the presumption of the revenue entries 13 4% with reference to Section 133 of the Act. But what is to be noticed is that the revenue entries were relied on before some other authority or the Land Tribunal who had no authority in law to go behind the correctness or otherwise of the entries. In any event the law is well established in the above decisions and also in catena of other decisions that such presumption is available till there is something contrary to dislodge such presumption. In the instant case the very proceedings initiated is to verify the correctness of such entries and the said proceedings is by the competent authority exercising the power available under the Act and as such the question of drawing such presumption to nullify a legally valid proceedings would not arise. 11. Further, with regard to the long standing revenue entries and deletion of the same, in the case of Sri. Anna Rao & Others vs. Sri. Gundareddy and others (ILl? 1997 Karn 1998) relied by the learned Senior Counsel, the entries which stood for 43 years was sought to be rectified by exercise of inherent power under Section 25 of the Act. Exercise of such power was held to be bad but infact this Court held that such power is available under Sec. 136 of the Act by way of appeal and revision. Infact it is such power which is exercised in the instant case. Though certain observation about the 4- 14 S right to claim adverse possession is also made therein, in the instant case the title is claimed under occupancy right granted under Inams Abolition Act, but without relevant materials. The learned Senior Counsel also placed strong reliance on the decision in the case of M.N. Venkateshaiah vs. The State of Karnataka (ILl? 2005 KAR 5084(DBfl. No doubt the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the facts arising in that case had noticed that the appellants therein were in possession and cultivation from 1940’s and had taken note of the RTC and tax paid receipts, but the appellants therein had also produced Special Dharkast Register extract for the year 1942-43 and Saguvali chit dated 25/05/1942. Reference was also made to an earlier civil suit, though revenue authorities were not parties to that suit. In that context the prima facie evidence of title was noticed. Above all, this Court held that the Tahsildar could not have exercised the power and he had exceeded his jurisdiction. Infact it is held that the Deputy Commissioner should have exercised the power. In the instant case it is the Deputy Commissioner who has exercised the power and the cancellation of grant does not arise when it is not established that infact there was a grant order. Though much was made on behalf of the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner has acted on the report of the ‘I’ahsildar, that in any 15 case is not similar or same as the Tahsildar himself exercising the power. Hence the situation in the cited decision is not analogous to the case on hand and is not of assistance. 12. On the other hand the learned Special Government Advocate relied on the decisions of this Court in the case of The State of Karnataka vs. HB. Munivenkatappa (ILR 2007 KAR 1893) and in the case of Sri, Anjanappa vs. The Tahsildar (WP. No. 17470 of 2007 (KLRRES) c/w. WP. No. 1 1676 of 2007 (KLRRES) dated 15/09/2008) to contend that the question of delay would not arise in such matters since the action can be initiated only at a point when the illegal entries comes to the knowledge of the authorities as otherwise public interest would suffer. The first of the above cited decision nodoubt is rendered in a civil proceedings, where, in a second appeal the question was regarding condonation of delay of 9 years 7 months in filing the appeal but the factual matrix in said appeal is also a similar issue relating to a claim for “kereangala’ under Karnataka (Personal & Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954. In the said case this Court held that if the appeals brought by th.. Government are lost on account of delay, no person is individua.liy affected, but what in ultiniate analysis suffers is the public interest. It is also held that the law of limitation is no doubt 16 the same for private citizens as well for Government authorities and the Government like any other authority must take the responsibility for the acts or omissions of its Officer. But somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter when Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to act of fraud or bad faith on the part of the officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purpose with it. 13. In the second of the cited case, the decision has been rendered on a similar set of facts and in the background of similar contentions, the same have been rejected. It would be appropriate to extract the relevant paragraphs. ‘8. In sofar as the Writ Petition of Vasudevarao is concerned, admittedly he has not produced the grant certificate. He has not produced the saguvali chit. He also relies on the very same document on which the petitioner in the other case relies on. However, in his case the mutation entries were made acting on the documents which he has produced. But, the Tahsildar in the enquiry found out that those entries are made without any basis, he is duty bound to bring the same to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and he has L requested the Deputy Commissioner to take action under Section 1:36(3) of the Act uthich conjèrs power on the Deputy Commissioner to initiate suo moto proceedinys. The arqu mciii that the Deputy Corn missioner cannot act on the recommendation of the Tahsildar and he has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings (iS it is not (1 SilO ,ioto proceedings and, therefrre, the entire proceedings initiated is without jurisdiction, is without any substance. Suo moto proceedings is a proceedings initiated by the Deputy Commissioner on his own but not at the instance of any party. But if he secures an information from any quarter and thereaJer decides to initiate suo moto proceedings, merely because he got the information from some quarter will not vitiate the proceedings. It is settled law from where he gets injbrmation is immaterial. Once he gets a doubt or suspicion he has been vested with the power to initiate proceedings. In fact for such initiation of proceedings there is no time limit. All this is done to protect the public interest. 10 I0 9. In so tar as the contention that. though lie had the jurisdiction to annul the entries in the revenue recordS, he had no jurisdiction to order fbr initiation of evtction proceedzngs, s unthout aug basiS. In tlie course of the order cancelling the imitation entry, he has recorded a categorical finding that it is not based on any valid document of title and he has categorically held that there is any grant in favour of the petitioner. If there is no grant in favour of the petitioner:, f the petitioner is in occupation of a valuable land of the Government, as the Head of the revenue district it is his bounderi duty to evict such persons and take possession. Therefore, as a consequence to the order cancelling the mutation entry, he has directed his subordinates to initiate appropriate action in accordance with law to recover possession. It is in the nature of an observation, guidance and direction to the authorities, lest they sleep over the matter, That by usd7 would not vitiate the said order. By such order the petitioner is oT e icted, lIe will be evicted naccordavce with law )j J*7( p( 1 19 not find any merit in these petitions. Accordingly, both the Writ Petitions are dismissed 14. The Writ Appeal filed by one of the petitioners in W.A. No. 1749 of 2008 against the said order of the learned Single Judge extracted above was dismissed as withdrawn after the same was argued for sometime. As such the said order has attained finality. The said observations squarely applies to the instant case on all the contentions urged. 15. In the above backdrop, though