IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CR. REV. No.34 of 2006 PARMESHWAR SINGH Versus STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 8. 25.8.2008. The criminal revision has been preferred against the judgment of acquittal of opposite parties dated 18.8.2005 passed by Shri S.K. Mishra, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, patna in Case No.511(M) of 2000, Tr. No.579 of 2005. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. Prosecution story in brief is that petitioner was an employee of opposite party M/S Durga Printers and was working as Compositor. He was removed from service in the month of January,1992. He brought his matter before Deputy Labour Commissioner, Patna. He referred the dispute under section 10(1)© of the Industrial Dispute Act,1947 to the Labour Court, Patna upon which Reference Case No.52 of 1994 was registered. Ultimately, reference case was decided ex- parte and the management of M/S Durga Printers was directed to reinstate petitioner Parmeshwar Singh with wages and other - 2 - consequential benefits. The award was prepared on 9.6.1999 and copy of it was sent to the Labour Department for its execution. After publication of award, notices were issued to the opposite parties for its compliance but opposite parties neither complied the order nor filed any show cause. Hence, prosecution under section 29 of the Industrial Dispute Act,1947 was filed. The defence of the opposite parties was complete denial of the occurrence. According to them, M/S Durga Printers does not come within definition of Industrial Establishment. The petitioner never worked in the establishment. The award is bad and illegal. No notice was ever served upon them either by Labour Court or Labour Department. The learned trial court has acquitted the opposite parties mainly on the ground that the award in question is not legal and the prosecution has not been able to prove that M/S Durga Printers is an Industrial Establishment. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the judgment of - 3 - acquittal both in law as well as on facts. It is submitted that the labour court was not competent to decide legality or illegality of the award. He has committed gross illegality by holding the award as not legal and genuine. He was only to see as to whether the order of award of Labour Court was complied or not by the establishment. He had no power to go behind the award and order of Labour Court. The learned counsel for the opposite parties did not dispute the legal position. However, it has been submitted that the court below has acquitted the opposite parties on the basis of other facts. Section 29 of the Industrial Dispute Act,1947 provides penalty for breach of settlement or award. It runs as follows : “29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award.- Anyh person who commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for - 4 - a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first and the court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine realized from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion has been injured by such breach.” In view of above provision of the Industrial Dispute Act, it is quite apparent that criminal court has only to see as to whether the award passed by the Labour Court, which is binding on the other side, has been complied with or not. Breach of any term of award itself is punishable under the aforesaid section. - 5 - N.H./ The admitted fact in this case is that the award has not yet been complied with. Petitioner has not yet been reinstated nor any consequential benefits have been given by the opposite parties. In the facts and circumstances, it is quite apparent that the court below has committed illegality by going behind the award passed by the Labour Court. The trial court had no jurisdiction to examine the legality of the award of the Labour Court passed under Industrial Dispute Act. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of acquittal is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the court below to pass fresh order/judgment in accordance with law in the light of the above observation made by this Court. ( Ghanshyam Prasad )