:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.816 OF 1995 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.816 OF 1995 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.816 OF 1995 Shri Ravindra Nainsukh Sanghavi Age: 43 yrs., Occ: Business, R/at: 617/B, Kasba Peth, Pune 411 011 ...Applicant. v. 1. Laxman Rangnath Nagarkar since deceased through legal heirs and representatives 1a. Jagdish Laxman Nagarkar R/at 617 Kasba Peth, Pune-11. 1b. Sou.Madhuri Balkrishna Deshmukh R/at Flat No.288, Sector No.28, Ganga Nagar, Pradhikaran, Pune. 1c. Sou. Neela Laxman Deshmukh R/at Punit Complex, Sadashiv Peth, Pune-30. 1d. Sou.Mangala Jagdish Thigale R/at Bhelke Nagar, Kothrud, Pune-20. 1e. Sau.Arundhari Chandrashekhar Joshi R/at 1320, Shukrawar Peth, Kusumaarti Apartment, Pune-30. 1f. Sau.Vrunda Shrikant Bokil R/at Bungalow No.16, Amriteshwar Society, Padmavati, Pune-9. ...Respondents. Mr.R.N.Sanghavi, adv. for the Applicant. Mr.S.P.Thorat, adv. for the Respondent Nos.1a to 1f. CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. J.H.BHATIA,J. DATE: 7th February, 2008. DATE: 7th February, 2008. DATE: 7th February, 2008. ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. The respondents before this Court are the legal heirs of the original applicant, who was the landlord :2: and owner of the suit property. The present revision applicant is the original opponent and admittedly he is residing in the premises of the respondent. The landlord filed Miscellaneous Application No.33 of 1993 under Section 13A(2) of The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (In brief ’The Bombay Rent Act’) for possession of the suit premises. According to him, an agreement of leave and licence had taken place between himself and the present applicant and as per that agreement, Block No.4 admeasuring 467 sq.ft. carpet area, having three rooms, balcony and toilet bathroom situated on the City Survey No.617/B was given to the present applicant for residential purpose. Agreement was entered into on 4th June, 1992. Leave and licence agreement was reduced to writing and was executed by the parties on the stamp paper. Period of licence was 11 months beginning from 4-6-92 and was to come to an end on 30th April, 1993. The revision applicant/licencee was to pay an amount of Rs.500/- per month towards the compensation, which was to be known as licence fee. On expiry of the licence period, the licensee had to remove his articles and materials from the house. According to the landlord in spite of expiry of the licence period, the licencee had not vacated the premises. Therefore, he filed proceeding before the Competent Authority under the Bombay Rent Act for possession of the premises. :3: 2. The licensee or the present applicant contested the said application on several grounds. Firstly, according to him, he was not licensee but the tenant and agreement for tenancy had taken place between the parties. He had also deposited an amount of Rs.50,000/- with the respondent. The rent was agreed to be Rs.1,500/- per month. From June, 1993, landlord was claiming Rs.2,500/- per month as rent and he had threatened to evict him from the premises. In view of this, the applicant had filed Civil Suit No.899 of 1993 seeking perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from dispossessing him from the premises without following due process of law. In that matter, temporary injunction was granted in favour of the present applicant. He also contended that the description of the suit premises given in the application filed by the landlord was wrong. He is not in occupation of block no.4 but the block no.3. According to him, as there was no agreement of leave and licence but of lease, the Competent Authority did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application and the jurisdiction will lie with the Small Cause Court. 3. The landlord examined himself and several other witnesses. The present applicant also examined himself and one Gulabsing as witness in respect of his claim. After hearing the parties, the learned Competent Authority came to the conclusion that there was written :4: leave and licence agreement between the parties and, therefore, the present applicant is the licensee and the respondent is the licensor. He rejected the plea of the present applicant that he was tenant or that there was lease agreement between the parties. With these findings, application filed by the landlord came to be allowed and the present applicant was directed to vacate the premises and give possession thereof to the landlord. This order passed by the Competent Authority has been challenged by the present applicant before this Court by filing Revision Application. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the Parties. 5. Mr.Sanghavi the learned counsel for the revision applicant vehemently contended that no leave and licence agreement was reduced to writing and executed between the parties and that the alleged leave and licence agreement Exhibit 52 dated 4-6-1992 is a forged document and that it does not bear the signature of the present applicant. Secondly, he contended that taking into consideration the terms and conditions of this document, it was actually a lease agreement and not an agreement of leave and licence though title of the document is about leave and licence agreement. According to him, the title does not indicate the nature of the document. Thirdly, he contended that there is difference in the description of the property because the present :5: applicant is in occupation of block no.3 and not block no.4 and, therefore, property has been wrongly described in the application filed by the landlord. Mr.Thorat the learned counsel for the respondents however, referred to the contents of the documents, oral evidence and other circumstances in support of the claim made by the respondent. 6. First of all, the objection about the description of the property can be taken up. As per the evidence, which has come on record, it appears that firstly leave and licence agreement Exhibit 127 was entered into on 1st April, 1991. It was for a period of eleven months. It had come to an end by the end of February, 1992. After a few months again leave and licence agreement took place between the parties and that agreement is Exhibit 52. In paragraph 1 of Exhibit 52 dated 4th June, 1992 and the earlier leave and licence agreement, Exhibit 127, description of the property is given. It shows that block no.4 situated on the first floor admeasuring 467 sq.ft. carpet area having three rooms, toilet, bathroom and the balcony situated on the City Survey No.617/B was the subject matter of the agreement. Boundaries of this block were shown as follows: i. To the East:- property of the licensor/first party about which some suit was pending before the :6: Court. ii. To the South:- City Survey No.619/A iii. To the West:- City Survey No.614/1 iv. To the North:- Block No.3 in which the first party, i.e., the licensor was himself residing. In the application and in his oral evidence before the Competent Authority, the landlord gave the same description of the property. However, in the cross-examination, he got confused when he stated that he was not sure if a block number was 3 or 4 but he maintained boundaries of that block. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that in the cross-examination, the present applicant had himself admitted boundaries given in the application as well as in leave and licence agreement. Not only this, he admitted that in the Suit No.899 of 1993, which he had filed against the landlord, he had given the same description of the property and had also claimed that he was occupying block no.4. In view of this documentary evidence and the oral evidence as well as admission of the present applicant, I find that the property has been rightly described and the objection has no substance. 7. The respondent/licensor deposed that the stamp :7: paper for the agreement Exhibit 52 was purchased by the present applicant and on that stamp paper an agreement was reduced to writing and it was executed by the parties. It was also signed by both the parties and the attesting witness in his presence. P.W. Jagdish Thigale was the attesting witness of this document. He has also supported the respondent. He has deposed that the document Exhibit 52 was executed and signed by both the parties. He himself had put his signature as attesting witness on the said document. P.W.Rangnath Chaudhari was a stamp vendor. According to him, the present applicant had purchased stamp paper of Rs.10/- on 21-5-1992 and about this entry was taken in his stamp register at Sr.No.4028. That serial number is also mentioned on the stamp paper sold. Exhibit 52 reveals same serial number on the stamp paper. According to him, Ravindra Sanghavi had put his signature in register as well as on the stamp paper as a purchaser of the document. It is true that in the cross-examination, he admitted that he was not knowing Ravindra Sanghavi personally. He also did not know who had come and described himself as Ravindra Sanghavi. In view of this admission, it appears that stamp paper vendor was not personally acquainted with Ravindra Sanghavi and he did not know whether the present applicant Ravindra Sanghavi was the same person, who had purchased the stamp paper from him. Therefore, much importance can not be given to the signature put by the purchaser in the register as :8: well as well as on the stamp paper in presence of this witness. However, evidence of stamp vendor gains importance in view of the fact that the stamp paper, used for the purpose of writing and executing leave and licence document Exhibit 52 bears serial number 4028 and this number is also found in the register maintained by the stamp vendor wherein he used to take entries about the sale of the stamp papers. Thus, evidence reveals that the stamp paper was infact purchased on 21-5-1992 from the stamp vendor. In view of this, it can be safely held that the stamp paper purchased from this witness on 21-5-1992 was used for the purpose of preparing leave and licence agreement, Exhibit 52. On the basis of this, one can safely come to conclusion that the document was not created after the disputes arose between the parties. 8. The learned counsel for the present applicant vehemently contended that Jagdish Thigale, who claims to be attesting witness is son-in-law of the landlord and, therefore, his evidence can not be believed. Merely because of relationship of the witness with the respondent, his evidence can not be discarded. It is material to note that according to the present applicant, there was agreement of lease and in the cross-examination, he deposed that the lease agreement was reduced to writing. He admitted that there was written proof that he was inducted as tenant. However, :9: he did not produce any such document to prove the tenancy. He examined Gulabsing Gondhale in support of his claim. But Gulabsing only deposed that the agreement had taken place in 1991 and since then the present applicant was residing in the premises of the respondent. According to him, rent was agreed to be Rs.1,500/- per month and an amount of Rs.50,000/- was deposited. However, there is no such document either about the lease agreement or any deposit. There are no rent receipts showing that Rs.1,500/- per month was paid by the present applicant. It is true that evidence reveals that he was living in the premises from April, 1991. About that respondent himself produced leave and licence agreement dated 1st April, 1991 and it is marked Exhibit 127. This document was proved by Chandrashekhar Joshi, who is also attesting witness of this document. From the oral and documentary evidence, it appears that firstly, the present applicant was allowed to occupy the suit premises on 1st April, 1991 for a period of 11 months. Thereafter, he had vacated the premises and after a few months from 4th June, 1992, he again came to occupy the same and at that time, fresh leave and licence agreement Exhibit 52 was executed. On the basis of that agreement, present proceeding has commenced. 9. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant had made an application before the Competent Authority to refer this document to :10: handwriting expert for comparison of the signature. However, that request was refused. In the present case, besides, the evidence of the landlord, there was also evidence of attesting witness to prove that there is signature of the present applicant on the leave and licence agreement, Exhibit 52. The Competent Authority noted that it had compared this signature with the admitted signature of the present applicant on his pursis, Exhibit 92 and he was convinced that both the writings were similar. The learned counsel for the present applicant contended that the Court can not itself come to conclusion by comparing admitted handwriting with the disputed one and it is not safe method of coming to conclusion about the handwriting. According to him, it was necessary to refer the matter to the handwriting expert. It is true that the Court can not and should not give finding about the handwriting merely on the basis of comparison by itself and it has been held by the Supreme Court and several High Courts that the practice of comparison of handwriting by the Court itself and coming to conclusion on the basis of that is not proper and should be deprecated. However, when there is a evidence of witnesses to prove that a particular document is signed by a particular person, for an assurance that the evidence of the witness is true, the Court may certainly compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing of the person. Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act :11: clearly provides that in order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the disputed one. In Satish Satish Satish Jayantilal Shah v. Pankaj Mashruwala, (1997) 2 Crimes Jayantilal Shah v. Pankaj Mashruwala, (1997) 2 Crimes Jayantilal Shah v. Pankaj Mashruwala, (1997) 2 Crimes 203 203 203 Gujarat High Court held that under the law the Court has power to compare signatures/handwriting for strengthening its findings based on other cogent material and evidence on record. If there is other cogent material to show that signature on the disputed document is of the present applicant, the Competent Authority could certainly compare that signature with the admitted signature of the applicant only to verify and strengthen its findings based on the oral evidence. In the present case, besides evidence of the landlord, there was also evidence of the attesting witness to prove that the present applicant had signed leave and licence agreement Exhibit 52. I find nothing wrong in the Competent Authority comparing the disputed signature with the admitted signature of the applicant just to satisfy that the evidence led by the witnesses was true. It is not that the Competent Authority came to conclusion only on the basis of comparison of the admitted signature with the disputed one. In view of this, objection taken by the learned counsel for the applicant can not be upheld. :12: 10. The learned counsel further contended that even if document Exhibit 52 is found to be document executed by the parties still taking into consideration the contents of the same, it can not be called a agreement of leave and licence but it should be treated as a lease agreement. In respect of this contention, he relied upon certain authorities. In Capt. B.V.D’Souza v. Capt. B.V.D’Souza v. Capt. B.V.D’Souza v. Antonio Fausto Fernandes AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1816 Antonio Fausto Fernandes AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1816 Antonio Fausto Fernandes AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1816, Their Lordships held that mere title or description of the agreement is not sufficient but to find out whether it was an agreement of lease or of licence, one has to find out intention of the parties and that can be gathered from the terms of the contract. In view of the specific terms of the contract in that matter, Their Lordships held that it was lease agreement and not a leave and licence agreement. Similar view was taken in Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit The Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit The Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit The Bombay Law Reporter Volume LXXIV Page 144 Bombay Law Reporter Volume LXXIV Page 144 Bombay Law Reporter Volume LXXIV Page 144. In that matter, the plaintiff had inducted defendant for use and occupation of a loft. Agreement reveals that the licensee had no right as a tenant or subtenant and he would not sublet, allow to use, transfer or assign in any way the said loft to any other person. The parties were to give one month’s clear notice about their intention in writing. The defendant was put in exclusive possession of the loft. After referring to the definition of "license" in Section 52 of the Easements Act and that of "lease" in Section 105 of the :13: Transfer of Property Act , Their Lordships observed that a licence confers a right to do or continue to do something in or upon immovable property of grantor which, but for the grant of the right, may be unlawful, but it creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of the grantor. A lease on the other hand creates an interest in the property demised. So the test is whether interest is created in the property. The same view appears to have taken in Miss Aninha Miss Aninha Miss Aninha D’Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur 1964 The Bombay D’Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur 1964 The Bombay D’Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur 1964 The Bombay Law Reporter Volume LXVIL Page 452 Law Reporter Volume LXVIL Page 452 Law Reporter Volume LXVIL Page 452. That matter was under The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 11. It is material to note that all these authorities that is the judgment in Sohan Lal Naraindas Sohan Lal Naraindas Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit and Miss Aninha D’Costa v. Miss Aninha D’Costa v. Miss Aninha D’Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur were rendered prior to 1987. In 1987 the Bombay Rent Act was amended and the special provision in the form of Section 13A(1) and 13A(2) were incorporated for the ejectment of the licensee. Section 13A(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 reads as follows: 13A(2) Landlord entitled to recover possession Landlord entitled to recover possession Landlord entitled to recover possession of premises given on licence on expiry of of premises given on licence on expiry of of premises given on licence on expiry of licence licence licence (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a licensee in possession or occupation of :14: premises given to him on licence for residence shall deliver possession of such premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of licence; and on the failure of the licensee to so deliver the possession of the licensed premises, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of such premises from a licensee, on the expiry of the period of license by making an application to the Competent Authority; and the Competent Authority, on being satisfied that the period of licence has expired, shall pass an order for eviction of a licensee. (2) Any licensee who does not deliver possession of the premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of licence and continues to be in possession of the licensed premises till he is dispossessed by the Competent Authority shall be liable to pay damages at double the rate of the licence fee or charge of the premises fixed under the agreement of licence. The Competent Authority shall not entertain any claim of whatever nature from any other person who is not a licensee according to the agreement of licence. Explanation:- For the purposes of this section- (a) the expression "landlord" does not include a tenant or a sub-tenant who has given premises on licence; (b) an agreement of licence in writing shall be conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein]. From this, it is clear that the licensee should have been inducted for residence in the premises of the landlord and it should have been under a writing. As per explanation (b) " an agreement of licence in writing shall be conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein." In the present case, document Exhibit 52 clearly shows that it was leave and licence agreement. It shows that it was entered into for a period from 4-6-1992 to 30-4-1993. The applicant/licensee was to :15: pay compensation, to be called as licence fee, at the rate of Rs.500/- per month. On expiry of licence, he was to remove his goods without any objection and to hand over the keys to the landlord/respondent/licensor. As per Clause (9), he did not get any right or interest as tenant or subtenant in the premises. He could make use of the house only for residential purpose. In case of contravention of any condition, by giving 7 days notice, licence could be terminated and the respondent/licensor would have right to take back possession. Having mentioned all the conditions, in Clause (11) it was specifically mentioned that this agreement would be subject to the provisions of Section 13A(2) of the Bombay Rent Act as amended in 1987. In view of these contents, it becomes clear that the parties were fully aware that the agreement was entered into as a leave and licence agreement and it was so described and the relevant provisions of Section 13A(2) were also referred to. In view of the explanation (b) to Section 13A(2), an agreement of licence in writing shall be conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein. In view of this specific provision, it must be held that it was an agreement for leave and licence and not for lease as contended by the present applicant. 12. Taking into consideration the evidence on record and the legal position, I find no illegality, irregularity or error in the impugned order. I do not :16: find any substance in the present revision application. 13. In the result, Revision Application stands dismissed. 14. At this stage the learned counsel for the applicant/licencee makes a request that a reasonable time may be given to the applicant to vacate the premises and he is willing to file undertaking that he would vacate the premises within stipulated period without any objection or obstruction. To this the learned counsel for the respondent has no objection. Therefore, the applicant is granted time upto 15th March, 2008 to vacate the premises subject to his filing written undertaking before this Court within two weeks to the effect that he shall vacate the premises and put the respondent/licensor in peaceful possession without any obstruction or objection within the stipulated period. (J.H.BHATIA,J.) (J.H.BHATIA,J.) (J.H.BHATIA,J.)