IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. C. Revision No.66/2007 Reserved on : 29.9.2010 Decided on: 19.10. 2010. Brijesh Kumar Sood and another. ...Petitioners. Versus Brig. K.K. Sood (Retd.) and another ... Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioners : Mr. Inderjit Narwal, Advocate vice Mr. M.S. Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate vice Mr. K.D. Sood, Advocate for respondent No.1. Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate vice Mr. Satyen Vaidya, Advocate for respondent No.2. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This revision petition is directed against the orders dated 8.5.2007 passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2-S/14 of 2006. 2. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondent No.1-landlord (hereinafter referred to as ‘landlord’ for convenience sake) filed petition under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes. 2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity sake) against the present petitioners-tenants (hereinafter referred to as ‘tenants’ for convenience sake) on the ground of arrears of rent, tenant No.1 has acquired premises which are reasonably sufficient for his and his family requirement and further on the ground of sub-letting and lastly on the ground that the premises under occupation of tenant No.1 are bona fidely required by the landlords for carrying out construction of the building and rebuilding wherein the premises are situated. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, respondent No.2 Sh. Naresh Sharma filed an application under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading him as petitioner in the main petition. The same was allowed by the Rent Controller on 9.8.2005. Tenants preferred appeal against the order dated 9.8.2005 before the Appellate Authority, Shimla. The learned Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 8.5.2007. 3. Mr. Inderjit Narwal has strenuously argued that the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority on 8.5.2007 is against the principles of law. 4. Mr. Rajnish K. Lal and Mr. Vivek Sharma have supported the order passed by the Appellate Authority on 8.5.2007. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings and record carefully. 3 6. Respondent No.2 has purchased the premises in question during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Rent Controller vide sale deed dated 25.9.2004. It is in these circumstances he has moved an application under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Rent Controller. 7. It will be apt at this stage to reproduce section 24 of the Act, which reads thus: 24. Vesting of appellate authority on officers by State Government.- (1) (a) The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such officers and authorities, as it thinks fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller, except the orders for the recovery of possession made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 16, may, within fifteen days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. (In computing the period of fifteen days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded). (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after 4 making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller. (4) The decision of the appellate authority and subject only to such decision, an order, of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in sub-section (5) of this section. (5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.” 8. State Government had issued notification on 10.10.2006 under sub section (1) of section 24 of the Act, which reads thus: “In supersession of this Department notification of even number dated 26.5.1988, published in Rajpatra, Himachal Pradesh (extra-ordinary), dated 7th June, 1988 and in exercise of the powers vested in him under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent control Act, 1987 (Act No. 25 of 1987) the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to confer the powers of appellate authorities on all the District and Sessions Judges/Additional District and Sessions Judges in respect of the urban areas in their respective existing jurisdiction to hear appeals against the orders made by the Rent Controllers under sections, 4,5,11,12,13,14 [except 14 (3) (a) (iii)] and 21 of the Act.” 9. A bare perusal of the language employed in sub- section (1) of section 24 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the State Government may by general or special order, by 5 notification confer on such officers and authorities, as it thinks fit, the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. In the instant case, as per notification dated 10.10.2006, powers of Appellate Authority have been conferred upon all the District and Sessions Judges/Additional District and Sessions Judges in respect of the urban areas in their respective existing jurisdiction to hear appeals against the order made by the Rent Controllers under sections 4,5,11,12,13,14 except 14 (3) (a) (iii) and 21 of the Act. 10. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24 provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller, except the orders for the recovery of possession made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 16 may within 15 days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. 11. This proposition has also come for consideration before the Division Bench comprising Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh. There was divergence of opinion and the matter was placed before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta in Sat Pal versus Sunaina Devi, 2007 (1) Shim. L.C. 163 held that the expression “order” in section 24 (1) (b) of the Act not only 6 includes final orders passed under the Rent Control Act, but shall also include other orders including interlocutory orders, which finally decide a question in issue or issue in controversy relatable to the main case, similarly, interim orders which finally decide issue (s) which have material bearing and may directly effect the final decision of the case can also be appealed against. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta has held as under: “17. The apex Court held that the interlocutory order which fall under categories (i), (ii) and (iii) are ‘judgments’ and, therefore, an appeal lies against them and that orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not judgments and no appeal can be filed against them. 18. I am of the view that the interpretation given to the word ‘judgment’ by the apex Court can also be applied to the word ‘Order’ in Clause 24 (1) (b) of the Act. It is obvious that when the legislature gave the right to appeal, it was of the view that only a person aggrieved by an order can file an appeal. The grievance must be based on certain legitimate grounds and as held by the apex Court orders which merely cause some inconvenience or prejudice to the parties but do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties can never be held to be appealable orders. Similarly, routine orders passed during the progress of the case which do not effect rights of the parties cannot be appealed against. 19. After considering the entire law I am of the view that the word ‘Order’ in Section 24 (1) (b) not only includes final orders passed under the Rent Control Act, but shall also include other orders including interlocutory orders which finally decide a question in issue or issue in controversy relatable to the main case; similarly, interim orders which finally decide issue (s) which have material bearing and may directly effect the final decision of the case can also be appealed against and lastly, orders which though only decide a collateral issue, but which will effect the vital rights and obligations of the parties can be appealed against. In case 7 the various judgments of the apex Court are gone through carefully, it would be clear as to which orders are appealable and which are not. It is neither possible nor is it prudent to set out all the appealable orders in detail. It shall be for the appellate authority in the facts and circumstances of each case to decide whether the order appealed before it falls within the ambit and scope of appealable orders, in the light of the law discussed above. 20. I, therefore, disagree with the opinion of Surjit Singh, J. and agree with the opinion of My Lord the Chief Justice that all orders, including interlocutory orders, passed by the Rent Controller can be challenged in an appeal before the appellate authority, subject to the caveat that the order should either finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case; or it should be an order which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case or which finally decides a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case, but which vitally affects the rights and obligations of the parties and shall have material bearing on the final decision of the case.” 12. The Court is required to interpret the law and particular words used in a statute to spell out what are the appealable order, or whether an appeal would lie against every order, whether interlocutory, or final or would lie only against the final order. The expression “every order” has been construed by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Limited versus Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC799. Their Lordships have held as under: 3. The object of s. 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of s. 38(1), the words “every order of the Controller made under this Act", though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the 8 parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under ss. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under s. 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under s. 38(1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal.” 13. In view of this, section 24 (1) clauses (a) and (b) are required to be harmonized. The appeal is maintainable against the specific orders notified by the State Government and appeal shall also lie against the orders, as explained by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta succinctly in Sat Pal versus Sunaina Devi’s case (supra). 14. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Bose vs. Binod Kanungo and others, AIR 1954 SC 202 have held that whenever it is possible to do so, it is the 9 duty of the Court to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. Their Lordships have held as under: “11. Now, does section 123 (8) contain express provision to the contrary or can such provision be inferred by necessary implication? It is usual, when one section of an Act takes away what another confers, to use a non obstante clause and say that "notwithstanding anything contained in section so and so, this or that will happen", otherwise, if both sections are clear, there is a head-on clash. It is the duty of courts to avoid that and, whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.” 15. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru and others versus State of Mysore and others, AIR 1958 SC 255 have held that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. Their Lordships have held as under: 29. The result then is that there are two provisions of equal authority, neither of them being subject to the other. The question is how the apparent conflict between them is to be resolved. The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. Applying this rule, if the contention of the appellants is to be accepted, then Art. 25(2)(b) will become wholly nugatory in its application to denominational temples, though, as stated above, the language of that Article includes them. On the other hand, if the contention of the respondents is accepted, then full effect can be given to Art. 26(b) in all matters of religion, subject only to this that as regards one aspect of them, entry into a temple for worship, the rights declared under Art. 25(2)(b) 10 will prevail. While, in the former case, Art. 25 (2) (b) will be put wholly out of operation, in the latter, effect can be given to both that provision and Art. 26(b). We must accordingly hold that Art. 26(b) must be read subject to Art. 25(2)(b).” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. Raja Nainar and others, AIR 1959 SC 422 have held that well known construction of a statute is that when two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other not, it is the duty of a Court to adopt the latter and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies. Their Lordships have held as under: “13. There is another difficulty in the way of accepting this argument of the respondent. A candidate may be subject to more than one disqualification, and his nomination paper may be questioned on all those grounds. Supposing that the returning officer upholds one objection and rejects the nomination paper on the basis of that objection without going into other objections, notwithstanding that under s. 36(2) he has to decide all the objections, is it open to the respondents in the election petition to adduce evidence on those objections ? According to the respondent, it is not, so that if the decision of the returning officer on the objection on which he rejected the nomination paper is held to be bad, the Tribunal has no option but to set aside the election under s. 100(1)(c), even though the candidate was, in fact, disqualified and his nomination paper was rightly rejected. Mr. Sinha for the respondent concedes that the result would be anomalous, but he says that the Law of Election is full of anomalies, and this is one of them, and that is no reason for not interpreting the law on its own-terms. It is no doubt true that if on its true construction, a statute leads to anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend and alter the law. But when on a 11 construction of a statute, two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other not, it is our duty to adopt the latter and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies. Anomalies will disappear, and the law will be found to be simple and logical, if it is understood that when a question is raised in an election petition as to the propriety of the rejection of a nomination paper, the point to be decided is about the propriety of the nomination and not the decision of the returning officer on the materials placed before him, and that decision must depend on whether the candidate is duly qualified and is not subject to any disqualifications as provided in s. 36(2)” 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya versus Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Limited, AIR 1962 SC 1543 have held that sub- sections must be read as part of an integral whole. Their Lordships have held as under: “17. In construing section 76 (1) and (2), it would be necessary to bear in mind the relevant rules of construction. The first rule of construction which is elementary, is that the words used in the section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. Since we are dealing with two sub-sections of s. 76, it is necessary that the said two sub-sections must be construed as a whole "each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest." The two sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter-dependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. if repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be avoided.” 12 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Sanjeevayya versus Election Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1967 SC 1211 have held that provisions of Statute should be so read as to harmonise with one another and the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat those of another unless reconciliation is impossible. Their Lordships have held as under: “4. We are unable to accept the argument of the appellant as correct. In our opinion, the provisions of s. 150 of the Act must be interpreted in the context of ss. 84 and 98(c) and other relevant provisions of 'Part III of the same Act. If the interpretation contended for by the appellant is accepted as correct the vacancy must be filled by a bye- election as soon as a member resigns his seat notwithstanding the pendency -of an election petition challenging his election. If the candidate who filed the election petition eventually gets a declaration that the election of the member is void and that he himself had been duly elected there will be two candidates representing the same constituency at the same time, one of them declared to be duly elected at the General Election and the other declared to have been elected at the bye-election and an impossible situation would arise. It cannot be supposed that Parliament contemplated such a situation while enacting s. 150 of the Act. Parliament could not have intended that the provisions of Part VI of the Act pertaining to election petitions should stand abrogated as soon as a member resigns his seat in the Legislature. It is a well- settled rule of construction that the provisions of a statute should be so read as to harmonise with one another and the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat those Of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. The principle stated in Crawford's Statutory Construction at page 260 is as follows: 13 "Hence the court should, when-it seeks the legislative intent, construe all of the constituents parts of the statute together, and seek to ascertain the legislative intention from the whole act, considering every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose and object of the act itself, and endeavouring to make every part effective, harmonious, and sensible. This means, of course, that the court should attempt to avoid absurd consequences in any part of the statute and refuse to regard any word, phrase, clause or sentence superfluous,' unless such a result is clearly unavoidable." 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishan Kumar versus State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1992 SC 1789 have held that where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. Their Lordships have held as under: “11. It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to reconcile the same. In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 225 at p. 268, this Court observed: "The rule of construction is well-settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction." The essence of harmonious construction is to give effect to both the provisions. Bearing these principles in mind it is legitimate. To hold that Section 100(4) prescribed 14 period of limitation of one year in respect the scheme proposed under the provisions of the new Act, while in they case of a scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act, pending on the date of enforcement of the new Act, namely, 1.7. 1989, the period one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) should be computed from the date of commencement of the new Act. This