THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH W.P.NO.3700 OF 2008 O R D E R Heard both the counsel. 2. Aggrieved by the award dated 20.11.2006 passed by the Industrial Tribunal – cum – Labour Court at Warangal in I.D.No.94/2004 in modifying the punishment imposed by the Corporation, the Corporation preferred the writ petition. 3. The 2nd respondent – workman is working as Conductor in the writ petitioner – Corporation. While he was conducting the bus bearing no.AAZ 2455 on the route Khamma to Pedda Korukonda on 8.7.1984 a check was exercised at stage no.12/13 at about 17-00 hours and it is found that the workman failed to collect fare and issue tickets to a batch of twenty two coolie passengers who boarded the bus at Muddunoor and bond for Kurnavelly ex- stages 12 to 13 and that he violated the rule ‘issue and start’. Therefore, a charge sheet dated 12.7.1984 was issued and eventually he was inflicted with punishment of deferment of annual increment for a period of three years with cumulative effect, by proceedings dated 11.1.1985. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred appeal on 4.8.1985 and the same was rejected on 9.7.1985. Aggrieved by the same, he sought for conciliation proceedings and the Government referred the dispute to the Tribunal, which is entertained in I.D.No.94/2004 and by the impugned award, the Tribunal modified the punishment imposed by the Corporation, as deferment of annual grade increment for a period two years, but without cumulative effect. 4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner – Corporation is that the charges against the petitioner are proved and by taking a lenient view, he was imposed with the punishment of deferment of annual increment for a period of three years with cumulative effect, in the year 1985 and the appeal filed by him was also rejected in the year 1985 and thereafter, he did not seek any review and after a period of eighteen years, he sought for conciliation proceedings and the same was referred to the Tribunal by the Government and the Tribunal by not considering the aspect of delay, partly allowed the I.D. by modifying the punishment imposed by the Corporation in the year 1985. He stated the workman contended that the punishment was imposed without conducting enquiry. But the said contention is not correct and in fact, a domestic enquiry was conducted and thereafter only, he was removed from service. He further stated that at this length of time, records pertaining the workman are not available and hence the contention of the petitioner that no enquiry was conducted cannot be entertained. The Tribunal is not justified in entertaining the I.D. without considering the unreasonable delay on the part of the workman in seeking conciliation proceedings and hence the impugned order needs to be set aside. In support of his contention with regard to delay in raising I.D., he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in U.P.SRTC v. RAM SINGH[1]. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent – workman, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AJAIB SINGH v. THE SIRHIND CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING-CUM- PRCESSING SERVICE SOCIETY LTD.,[2] contended that provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act do not apply to the reference of dispute to Labour Court and the court can mould the relief based on the facts and circumstances. He stated that punishment of deferment of annual increment for a period of three years with cumulative effect is a major punishment and imposing such a major punishment without conducting enquiry, is illegal and amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in EXEUTIVE DIRECTOR, SYNDICATE BANK vs. K.CHARYA[3]. He contended that if the Corporation is aggrieved by the order of reference by the Government, it ought to have challenged the same, before this court and ought not have participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal and having participated in the said proceedings, the Corporation is not justified in contending that the reference by the Government, is illegal. In support of this contention, he relied on a judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in DIVISIONAL MANAGER, APSRTC, KHAMMAM vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL – CUM – LABOUR COURT, WARANGAL[4]. With these submissions, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 6. From the material on record, it could be seen that the charge against the workman is that he violated the rule “issue and start’ and failed to collected fare and issue tickets to 22 coolie passengers who boarded at stage no.12. It is to be noticed that though the said charges are proved, the gravity of the them needs to be considered. The passengers boarded the bus at stage no.12 and the check took place at stage no.13 and the explanation of the petitioner is that he was counting them and in the meanwhile check was conducted and hence, I am of the view that the petitioner deserves a lenient consideration in imposing the punishment. 7. With regard to delay, it is well settled that provisions under the Limitation Act cannot be made strictly applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is a beneficial legislation and however, the delay may not be unreasonable and that delay cannot by itself be sufficient reason to reject an industrial dispute (see PRAKASH CHANDRA SAHU v. STAE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY[5]. 8. In another judgment reported in AJAIB SINGH v. THE SIRHIND CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING –CUM-PROCESSING SERVICE SOCIETY LTD. (2 supra), the Apex Court held as under: “10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tibunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages.” 9. From the above judgment of the Apex Court it is clear that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and that mere raising the ground of delay by the employer is not sufficient and it has to be proved as a matter of fact by showing real prejudice and even in cases where delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal can mould the relief. The Apex Court has also stated that no reference of the Labour Court can generally be questioned on the ground of delay alone. 10. In the present case, from the material on record, it could be seen that the Corporation though has raised the ground of delay, has not proved the same by producing any cogent evidence and, therefore, on the ground of delay, relief cannot, if permissible under law, be denied. 11. In the judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Singh’s case (1 supra), relied on by the counsel for the writ petitioner, the Apex Court held that the delay shall not be unreasonable. The judgment of the Apex Court is unexceptionable and however, the facts therein disclose that the Labour Court therein passed an ex parte award and no opportunity was given to the Corporation to participate in the proceedings before the Labour Court. In the present case, though the Corporation participated in the proceedings, by producing any cogent evidence, it failed to prove that any real prejudice has been caused because of the delay. Hence, the said judgment of the Apex Court cannot be made squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 12. Considering the facts and circumstances, and the gravity of charge, the Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 11-A, has molded the relief and accordingly modified the punishment as deferment of annual grade increment for a period of two years, but without cumulative effect. 13. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. No costs. AVS -------------------------------- 28--04—2011 [1] (2008)17 SCC 627 [2] AIR 1999 SC 1351 [3] 1996 –LLJ-2-727 [4] 2008(5) ALD 745 [5] (1997)9 SCC 32