IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.17320 of 2009 1. RAM PRIT RAI S/O LATE BALDEV RAI R/O VILL.- NAREPUR (WEST), P.S.- BACHHWARA, DISTT.- BEGUSARAI Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, ROAD CONSTRUCTION DEPTT., GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 2. THE SECRETARY, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION DEPTT., GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA 3. JOINT SECRETARY-CUM-CHIEF VIGILANCE OFFICER, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION DEPTT., GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA ----------- 02 09.02.2010 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. Pursuant to institution of a Vigilance Case under the provisions of the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act on 15.7.2008 the petitioner was taken into custody. By virtue of Rule 9 (2) of the Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005 (hereinafter called the Suspension Rules) he was deemed to have been suspended on that date when the formal order was issued on 18.9.2008. The orders states that it was being issued under Rule 9 (1) (A) (C) and (2) (A) of the Suspension Rules. Rule-9 (1) (A) deals with the suspension in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. Rule-9 (1) (C) deals with a suspension in respect of a criminal offence, enquiry or trial and the satisfaction that it was expedient to suspend the 2 Government servant in public interest. The operation and effect of the two clauses has been adequately considered by a Full Bench of this Court in 2009 (4) P.L.J.R. 272 (The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Gyan Kumar Ram & Ors.). The two provisions have been interpreted differently. The benefit of Rule 9 (3) can be available to a Government servant only if the suspension is under Rule 9 (1) (A). An order of suspension under Rule 9 (1) (A) is governed by the time limitation prescribed in Rule 9 (7) while an order of suspension under Rule 9 (1) (C) is not governed by any such time limitation. Therefore, the question of acting under Rule 9 (3) assumes significance in respect of an order of suspension under Rule 9 (1) (A) only as, if the suspension is under Rule 9 (1) (C), Rule 9 (6) (1) shall come into play and there shall be no need of any fresh order of suspension. The petitioner was then released from custody on 25.10.2008 and submitted his joining on 27.10.2008. If the suspension was under Rule 9 (1) (A) read with Rule 9 (2) (A) the authorities were required to accept his joining and not otherwise. His application for joining remained pending when he reminded the authorities on 13.11.2008. The order of suspension was then revoked on 6.3.2009 3 narrating that he had been suspended under Rule 9 (1) (A) and (2) (A). The petitioner was placed under suspension the same day i.e. 6.3.2009 afresh. The order of suspension refers to his request for acceptance of his joining dated 13.11.2008 which, in turn, refers to his joining on 27.10.2008 submitted earlier, but makes no reference to the same. Having considered the submission on behalf of the petitioner, this Court finds no error in the impugned order of suspension dated 6.3.2009 issued afresh as that is well within the powers of the authorities. There is no merit in the writ application to that extent. Charges have already been framed on 11.5.2009. Let the departmental proceedings be now concluded expeditiously, preferably within a maximum period of six months from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order provided the petitioner himself co-operates. The next submission on behalf of the petitioner appeals to the Court that he cannot be saddled with the loss because of the delay done by the respondents in accepting his joining on 27.10.2008 till 6.3.2009 and for which there is no explanation in the order of suspension, much less 4 does it refer to his earlier request for joining dated 27.10.2008, but only refers to his latter reminder dated 13.11.2008. Learned counsel for the State sought to persuade this Court that the order of suspension dated 18.9.2008 was, in fact, an order of suspension under Rule 9 (1) (C) and, therefore, there was no time limitation applicable and no fresh orders of suspension were required. There is no occasion for this Court to consider a hypothetical argument when the respondents from their written orders and their conduct are very clear with regard to the provisions under which they were acting. Once the respondents accepted the joining of the petitioner and issued a fresh order of suspension, there is no scope for any doubt that they had issued the order of suspension under Rule 9 (1) (A). That there be no confusion at all in the minds of the respondents is more than apparent from the recitals contained in the fresh order of suspension dated 6.3.2009 which unequivocally clarifies that the order of suspension was under Rule 9 (1) (A) and (2) (A). The incongruous argument on behalf of the respondents has only to be stated to be rejected. If it was a 5 suspension with no time limitations, there was no occasion for the respondents to accept the joining of the petitioner. This Court is satisfied that the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for consideration of his monetary claims with regard to the period between 27.10.2008 to 5.3.2009. The petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer for the administrative lapses of the administrator. Let the claims of the petitioner for that limited period of time be considered in accordance with law and disposed off by a reasoned and speaking order to facilitate judicial review, should such need arise for the same in light of the aforesaid discussion within a maximum period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. The writ application is allowed only to the extent indicated. P.K. (Navin Sinha, J.)