IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH:: HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY NINTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT:: HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY C.R.P.Nos.5186 & 5189 OF 2008 C.R.P.No.5186 OF 2008 Between: Thota Brahma Swamulu …Petitioner A n d Idamkanti Sujatha and others ..Respondents A N D C.R.P.No. 5189 OF 2008 Thota Brahma Swamulu …Petitioner A n d Idamkanti Sujatha and others ..Respondents HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.V.SEETHAPATHY C.R.P.Nos.5186 & 5189 OF 2008 COMMON ORDER: C.R.P.No.5186 of 2008 is directed against the order dated 24.10.2008 in I.A.No.222 of 2008 in I.A.No.130 of 2005 in O.S.No.1 of 2004, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, wherein the said application filed by the petitioner herein under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC to get impleaded as one of the respondents, was dismissed. 2. C.R.P.No.5189 of 2008 is filed against the similar order in I.A.No.220 of 2008 dismissing the application filed by the petitioner to get impleaded in I.A.No.129 of 2007 in I.A.No.130 of 2005 in O.S.No.1 of 2004, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Darsi. 3. As the two civil revision petitions arise out of the same proceedings in between the same parties, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. None appeared for the respondents. Perused the record. 5. Respondents 1 to 3 filed the suit O.S.No.1 of 2004 against the other respondents for partition and separate possession of their share in the suit schedule property. A preliminary decree was passed on 27.09.2004. They filed I.A.No.6 of 2004 in the suit for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating plaint ‘A’ an ‘B’ schedule properties and by order dated 09.01.2004, injunction was granted. The plaintiffs filed I.A.No.130 of 2005 for passing the final decree. They also filed I.A.No.129 of 2007 seeking a direction to the defendants to produce ‘B’ schedule Ashok Leyland lorry before the Court and to sell the same. By order dated 26.06.2005, D-2 (5th respondent herein) was directed to produce the vehicle. As D-2 did not produce the vehicle, the plaintiff filed an application for production of the vehicle by the RTO authorities. The RTO authorities filed report stating that the vehicle stands in the name of the petitioner herein Brahma Swamulu and not in the name of 5th respondent Srinivas Reddy. The defendants i.e., respondents 4 to 9 remained ex parte in a final decree petition I.A.No.130 of 2005. Therefore, the petitioner filed I.A.No.220 of 2008 seeking to get impleaded as respondent I.A.No.129 of 2007 and I.A.No.130 of 2005 to get impleded in I.A.No.129 of 2007. 6. The petitioner herein claims to have purchased the lorry bearing No.AP 26 U 2786 from one Gaddipati Sambasiva Rao in the year 2007 and his name was entered in the C book and connected records. G.Sambaiva Rao is said to have purchased the lorry from Shaikh Rahim on 30.06.2006. Shaikh Rahim is stated to have purchased the lorry from Hanuma Reddy (6th respondent) in 2003. Hanuma Reddy is said to have purchased the lorry from Srinivas Reddy (5th respondent) in the year 2003. By order dated 09.01.2004 in I.A.No.6 of 2004, the 5th respondent herein (D-2) was restrained from alienating the property. According to the petitioner even by that date, the lorry was already sold by 5th respondent-Srinivas Reddy in favour 6th respondent-Hanuma Reddy and he in turn sold the same to Shaikh Rahim. Be that as it may, admittedly, the petitioner claims to have purchased the lorry in the year 2007 from G.Sambasiva Rao, who is said to have purchased it from Shaikh Rahim in 2006. The preliminary decree was passed on 27.09.2004 and final decree proceedings are pending. The alleged alienation in favour of the petitioner having taken place during the pendency of the proceedings, the same is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Admittedly, the petitioner has not obtained permission of the Court nor is the purchase effected under the authority of the Court. 7. I n BIBI ZUBIADA KHATOON V. NABI HASSAN SAHED[1], the apex Court held as follows: “It is not disputed that the present petitioner purchased the property during pendency of the suit and without seeking leave of the court as required by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner being a transferee pendente lite without leave of the court cannot, as of right, seek impleadment as a party in the suits which are long pending since 1983. It is true that when the application for joinder based on transfer pendente lite is made, the transferee should ordinarily be joined as party to enable him to protect his interest.” It was further held that ‘there is no absolute rule that the transferee pendente lite without leave of the court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suits. 8. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act states as follows: 'During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India ..... of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose.' A plain reading of the above provision contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would disclose that the alienation of the property, which is subject matter of the suit, affecting the rights of the parties is prohibited, except under the authority of the Court. 9. In above case, it was further held that admittedly the authority or order of the court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties and therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52 and the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit. 10. In the above decision, a reference was made to the decision in DHURANDHAR PRASAD SINGH V. JAI PRAKASH UNIVERSITY[2], wherein it was held as follows: "Where a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be property conducted by the plaintiff on record, yet he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary." 11. In RUKYA BEE VS. SYED AFZAL[3], suit for partition was filed in December 1991 and the alienation by respondents 2 to 4 in favour of first respondent took place in August 1991 prior to filing of the suit. A preliminary decree was passed on 19.07.1995, which attained finality with the dismissal of the first appeal and also second appeal. Thereafter, an application was filed by the plaintiffs for passing final decree. The first respondent therein filed an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC seeking to come on record on the ground that he purchased the entire schedule property on 20.08.1991 from respondents 2 to 5 even prior to filing of the suit. He contended that the suit was filed in collusion with the vendor with a view to defeat the alienation. The trial Court allowed the application filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC. While disposing the revision, this court directed that it shall not be open to the first respondent therein to canvass the correctness of the preliminary decree to the extent of the share of the petitioners therein and that it shall be open to him to enforce his rights in that regard, by filing a separate suit. It was further held that ‘the parties or persons claiming through them have to abide by the terms of the preliminary decree and if any third party is aggrieved by the preliminary decree in any manner, the only course open to him is to file an independent suit and to put forth his contentions.’ The doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applied in the above case, as the purchase was prior to filing of the suit. 12. In view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the petitioner, who is the alleged purchaser, is held not liable to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings in I.A.No.129 or I.A.No.130 of 2005, as the purchase is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. In the result, both the civil revision petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ____________________ G.V.SEETHAPATHY, J 29th June, 2011 Lrkm. [1] AIR 2004 SC 173 [2] AIR 2001 SC 2552 [3] 2005 ALT (4) 465