CWP No 16063 of 2009 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH CWP No 16063 of 2009 Date of decision January 21 , 2010 The Sonepat Hindu Educational and Charitable Society, Industrial Area, Sonepat through its President/Manager Shri Bhagwan Gupta. ....... Petitioner Versus State of Haryana and others ........ Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN Present:- Mr. SKS Bedi, Advocate for the petitioner. **** K. Kannan, J (oral). 1. On a notice issued via complaint to the State Information Commissioner against the petitioner-institution which is being run with 95% grant of the government, the objection of the petitioner was that it is not a “Public authority” under Section 2 (h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and therefore they did not come within the purview of the Act and were not amenable to jurisdiction of the Commission. A decision had been taken by the State Public Commission that the institution is receiving grant from the Government and making a reference to two decisions of this Hon'ble Court in DAV College Trust and Management Society and others Vs. DPI (Colleges) UT dated 25.2.2008 and Principal Sanatab Dharam Girls College, Ambala Cantt in CWP No. 455 of 2008 the commission held that an institution that has state grant substantially is an institution which will necessarily be a 'public authority' and would be amenable to the jurisdiction. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the substantial aid without taking note the fact that besides payment of salary to the teachers, the aid did not extend to the expenditure incurred by CWP No 16063 of 2009 2 the institution. It was the further contention on behalf of the petitioner that the decision of this Court relating to the applicability of the Act to the College was literally on a concession made by the counsel that the Act was applicable and that it was a Public Authority having received substantial grant from the Government. A judgment rendered on such concession ought not to be applied to the case of the petitioner which contests the position of expression 'substantial aid' to the College and therefore the said decision did not apply. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Rule 6 contemplates a procedure that would allow for occasion for parties to let in evidence, submit documents etc., and the decision taken by the authority without following such a procedure was liable to be set aside. Yet another objection that has been taken by the petitioner is that the Commission cannot act through a single Officer and the jurisdiction exercised is contrary to the composition of the commission, as contemplated under the Act. 3. The Right to Information Act itself is a legislation that brings in greater transparency to public institutions and makes room for a whole new dispensation in the new millennium. The interpretation to the expression given under the Act must be made to ensure that the information that is sought is at all times given and even when it is not sought, all relevant details shall always be voluntary disclosed by putting a system in place to allow for a free flow of information. The functions of authority must be such that there is an easy access to all information for any member of public. An interpretation which is sought to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the substantial aid must be taken only in the context of the aid for all expenditure and in a case where the aid was only for expenditure for disbursement of salary to teachers, it cannot be a substantial aid. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers his statement in the writ petition that out of the total expenditure which is incurred by the CWP No 16063 of 2009 3 institution the grant that was from the government approximated only to 25%. It is a contention made for the first time before this Court and such a stand was not taken before commission. Even otherwise in my view 20% of total out lay of expenditure in an institution that is purported to incur an expenditure of over 3.13 crores cannot be said to be a meager amount and therefore, I reject the contention advanced by the petitioner as regards the fact that the said aid is not substantial. Again, the contention that the decision rendered by the Division Bench was a matter of concession cannot be taken, for the Division bench was squarely addressing the same issue as to whether a non governmental institution receiving substantial grants from the government would be public authority and the substantial contribution was taken by the Division Bench only in the context of the aid given for its disbursement of salary of teaching and non-teaching staff. The Division Bench did not even think it necessary to refer to the outlay of all the expenses and the contribution to the salaries itself was taken to be a sufficient ground to apply a yardstick of substantial contribution. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to a judgment of Bombay High Court in Nagar Yuwak Shikshan Sanstha, Wanadongri, Nagpur and another Vs. Maharashtra State Information Commissioner, Nagpur and another reported in AIR 2010 Bombay 1 that states that the expression 'Control' used in the definition of public authority is in the sense of control over their management and affairs and running of trust and college. Mere control over fee structure, admissions, new courses etc., would not be 'control' contemplated by the definition. I do not feel obliged to make a restrictive interpretation to be followed. I am bound by the decision of this Court that spells out the very position which is convassed by the petitioner before this Court. 4. The other contention of the petitioner was that the proceedings set out under Rule 6 were not followed cannot be accepted in CWP No 16063 of 2009 4 cases where the respondent sought to fend off the jurisdiction of the commission on a technical plea that they were not amenable to jurisdiction and refused to part with the information sought to be produced. The constitution of the Commission also cannot be a subject of challenge for so long as the act is done in the name of the commission. The absence of any one member cannot have bearing to the validity of the order of the commission. 5. The intervention sought through the writ petition is rejected as the same does not merit acceptance. No costs. (K. KANNAN) JUDGE January 21,2010 archana.