IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.251 of 2002 SATRUGHAN DAS, S/O LATE KISHUN LAL YADAV, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE-BAIRO TOLA BRAHMPUR, POLICE STATION-SUPAUL, DISTRICT-SUPAUL. ........................................ PETITIONER Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR. 2. BIHAR STATE BOARD OF RELIGIOUS TRUST THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, BIDYAPATI MARG, PATNA. 3. THE SPECIAL OFFICER, BIHAR STATE BOARD OF RELIGIOUS TRUST, BIDYAPATI MARG, PATNA. 4. THE ASSISTANT OFFICER SUPERINTENDENT, BIHAR STATE BOARD OF RELIGIOUS TRUST, BIDYAPATI MARG, PATNA. 5. THE SUB-DIVISIONAL OFFICER, SUPAUL, DISTRICT-SUPAUL. ...................................... RESPONDENTS ----------- 5. 27.4.2009 Heard Counsel for the petitioner and Counsel for the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board. In this writ application, the petitioner has assailed the correctness of an order dated 21.8.2001 passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer, Supaul directing the petitioner to hand over the possession of property, both movable and immovable of Bairo Thakurbari to Halka Karamchari pursuant to an order passed by the President of Bihar State Hindu Religious Trust Board (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’). Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Board had no jurisdiction to pass such an order on the basis of which the impugned order has been issued by the Sub- Divisional Officer inasmuch as the property of Bairo Thakurbari is entirely a private property of the petitioner and there is no such Samarpannama or any dedication which would make the trust property a religious trust in terms of Section 2(l) of Bihar 2 Hindu Religious Trust Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. He would therefore question the very jurisdiction of the Board to interfere in the properties of the Bairo Thakurbari which is claimed to be personal property of the petitioner. Mr. Ambuj Narain Choubey, learned counsel for the Board, on the other hand with reference to his counter affidavit would submit that petitioner has purposely not challenged the main order which was passed in terms of Section 33 of the Act by the President of the Board as contained in Annexure A series and in absence thereof petitioner cannot maintain this writ application inasmuch as the consequential order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer only relates to from the main order of the President of the Board. This Court would find that the whole dispute has proceeded in haphazard manner. The petitioner has not challenged the main order passed by the President of the Board and the Board has relied on an order of its President appointing temporary trustee under Section 33 of the Act whose tenure now is only for one year. Admittedly the period of one year even from the date of amendment is over and as such the life of such order with regard to temporary trustee is already over. This Court would find that the main dispute as alleged by the petitioner, despite being given earlier opportunity to him, as explained in the counter affidavit was not sought to be resolved by submitting his explanation for satisfying the 3 Board that there is no religious trust, so as to permit the Board to either appoint a trustee or frame policy for its management. However now the amended provision of Section 2(l) read with Section 2(u) of the Act vests full power to the Board to decide, in the first instance, as to whether the alleged trust including its property belongs to a private trust or a public trust. In that view of the matter, if the petitioner approaches before the Board by filing a representation within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order, the Board/its Administrator shall pass the necessary order after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and decide as to whether Bairo Thakurbari in question is a part of private trust or a public trust. As a follow up measure, in case the Board would find that the Bairo Thakurbari is part of public religious trust, it would take steps for framing scheme and managing the Thakurbari in terms of provisions made therein but on the other hand if it is found that the said Thakurbari is a private trust, the Board would indicate so in the order and would thereafter not interfere in the possession of the petitioner. There being a serious dispute as to whether the petitioner is in possession of the property in terms of the interim order dated 14.3.2002 or such possession was handed over by the petitioner entirely to the Halka Karamchari, this Court would direct for maintaining status quo as on date till the Administrator of the Board would pass a final order with regard to the nature of the trust. It is also 4 made clear that in the event the petitioner would not file his representation before the Board within the time framed indicated above., the Board or its Administrator own its own on the basis of its records and after necessary enquiry was pass an order with regard to nature of Bairo Thakurbari and thereafter would be free to take any decision in the interest of the said Bairo Thakurbari. Counsel for the Board would point out that originally this writ petition was filed by Laxmi Das, who was the Mahanth as per the records of the Board but Shatrughan Das the present petitioner who has been substituted under order of this Court should not be allowed to creating an impression by the petitioner that he is the Chela of Laxmi Das and had a right to represent the interest of the trust. Mr. V. Nath would submit that this question would be only relevant if the trust is held to be a public trust because in case the trust is a private trust whether Laxmi Das had any one Chela or more Chela will be of no concern for the Board. This Court however must clarify that it has not decided the issue as to whether petitioner is the Mahantha of Bairo Thakurbari or that he is the chela of Laxmi Das, the erstwhile Mahantha of the siad Thakurbari or that his substitution in this case in place of Laxmi Das the original writ petitioner by this Court by itself in view of an order dated 23.3.2007 in I.A. No. 1586/2007, would be an evidence of his being successor of Laxmi Das. As and when this right of being 5 Mahantha will be claimed before any authority including the Board and/is a court, the same will be determined and decided on the basis of evidence to be produced by the petitioner. With the aforesaid observations and directions this writ application is finally disposed of. Narendra/ ( Mihir Kumar Jha, J. )