1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA APPEAL UNDER ARBITRATION NO.4/2006 State of Goa Representation by the Executive Engineer, Works Division XIX, Public Works Department, Bambolim, Goa. ......... Appellant. Verus Mr. C.V. Naik, Civil Contractor, Residing at Excelsior Chambers, 1st Floor, M.G. Road, Panaji, Goa. ......... Respondent. Mr. S. R. Rivonkar, Government Advocate for the appellant. Mr. S. D. Lotlikar, Senior Advocate with Ms. Preeti Lotlikar, Advocate for the respondent. CORAM : S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J. Date : 12th September, 2008. ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2 2. An application being Civil Misc. Application No. 267/2001 was filed by the applicant/appellant State of Goa, through its Executive Engineer, Works Division XIV, Public Works Department, Bambolim, Goa, challenging the Award made in favour of the respondent by the learned Arbitrator on 29.9.2001. 3. It is not necessary to enter into any detailed controversy, nor reproduce the facts as set out in the impugned order, because the only ground on which Shri Rivonkar sought to challenge the impugned order is that it fails to consider the issue of limitation. In his submission, the contract stipulation and the relevant provisions/Articles of the Limitation Act, 1963 have been brushed aside by the Court below while dismissing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. The argument on limitation proceeds thus : In the submission of Shri Rivonkar, the work which was to be completed within 180 days by 28/9/1991, actually took 272 days for completion and was, thus, completed on 29.12.1991. The respondent/ claimant approached the appellants on 3.1.2000, that is, after lapse of 8 years 3 from the date of its completion. That is how all his claims, including the one under final bill were time-barred. The reference was, therefore, not maintainable and ought to have been rejected on this ground alone. 5. The Arbitrator and the learned IInd Addl. District Judge, Panaji have not accepted this challenge. The limited jurisdiction conferred on the Court below under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 may have permitted the appellant to raise this plea, but it does not appear to me that the Award could have been set aside on this ground. 6. It is undisputed before me that the claim before the Arbitrator proceeded not on the basis that the demand was raised by the respondent for the first time on 3.1.2000, but, having accepted the correctness of the final bill certified by the Authority and yet, payment not being released thereunder, the Arbitrator's jurisdiction was invoked by the respondent/claimant. In other words, it is not as if that the claim was made for the first time on 3.1.2000, but the final bill having been accepted all that the claimant desired that the amount thereunder be released and disbursed. That having not been disbursed, the claim was raised. It is not the contention of Shri Rivonkar that such a claim was barred by time. The contention proceeds on the basis that after 29.12.1991 the claimant approached the appellant for the first time on 4 3.1.2000. Once that is not the factual position, but the claim arose on account of non-release and non-disbursement of the amount under the admitted final bill, then, both the learned Arbitrator and the learned IInd Additional District Judge, were right in holding that the claims were not time-barred and could have been entertained. 7. I see no reason to differ with the concurrent view recorded by the learned Arbitrator and the learned IInd Additional District Judge, as no perversity is brought to my notice in their reasoning. The reasoning is based upon factual position and the admitted dates. In such circumstances, it is not possible to agree with Shri Rivonkar that the Award is bad in law, or the claims were not capable of being entertained. This was the only ground on which the impugned order is challenged before me. This is the only contention raised before me to challenge the Award and the Order of the learned IInd Additional District Judge. Having found no substance in the same, there is no alternative, but to reject the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J. ssm.