IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Special Appeal No. 10 of 2011 N arpat Singh ...…………. Appellant Versus Managing Director ...…………. Respondent Mr. M.C. Pant, Advocate for the appellant. JUDGMENT Coram : Hon’ble Barin Ghosh, C. J. Hon’ble U.C. Dhyani, J. BARIN GHOSH, C.J. (Oral) A charge sheet was issued to the appellant. The appellant gave a reply thereto. The charge sheet was then enquired upon. On the basis of the enquiry, thus conducted, a punishment order was also passed. When the punishment order was brought to the notice of the Managing Director of the employer, he found that the Managing Director of the employer, was the disciplinary authority of the appellant, whereas the charge sheet was not issued by the Managing Director of the employer and even the order of punishment was also not passed by the Managing Director of the appellant. In the circumstances, the Managing Director of the employer put to an end the entire proceedings as were initiated on the basis of said 2 charge sheet, but at the same time held out that the charges forming part of the said charge sheet, are required to be enquired into. Subsequent thereto, Managing Director of the employer, appointed an Enquiry Officer, and forwarded to him the charge sheet, as was issued earlier, as well as a reply thereto, as was given by the appellant, with direction to hold de novo enquiry on the said charges. A copy of this letter was sent to the appellant. It is not the contention of the appellant that no de novo enquiry was conducted by the newly appointed Enquiry Officer. The newly appointed Enquiry Officer, after conclusion of the enquiry, submitted his report, and thereby indicated that the charge Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 to 7 stand proved, and charge No. 4 is partially proved, whereas charge No. 8 is not proved. A copy of the enquiry report was then served upon the petitioner, he was also intimated what he has to say as regards proposed punishment of dismissal. Petitioner gave a reply, whereupon the petitioner was dismissed from service by the order impugned in the writ petition. 2. In the writ petition, it was contended by the appellant that admittedly the original charge sheet was issued by a person incompetent and that having been noted by the competent authority, it was obligatory on the part of the competent authority to issue a fresh charge sheet, which has not been done, and hence the entire proceeding is vitiated. It was also contended that inasmuch as the appellant was not chargesheeted by the disciplinary authority, and accordingly, he was not given an opportunity to give a reply thereto, question of appointment of an 3 Enquiry Officer did not arise. It was also contended that in the backdground of the case, as are admitted, it would be evident that the matter was concluded with a closed mind, and on the basis of the predetermined decision. It was not, however, the case of the appellant in the writ petition that no de novo enquiry was conducted. The appellant also did not seriously contend in the writ petition that the materials brought on record of the de novo enquiry do not suggest establishment of the charges as were found to have been proved, fully or partially, by the Enquiry Officer. 3. The fact remains that all the eight charges were serious in nature. One of them was pertaining to payments purported to have been made, when in fact no such payment was made. The quantum thereof was about ` 4,63,000/-. In respect of the said charge, it was contended that per chance or by mistake receipts submitted, suggesting expenditure of the amounts, did not contain signatures. It was contended that the people, who were supposed to have received those amounts, did not make any complaint that they have not received the same. The fact remains that an unsigned voucher is no acknowledgement of payment, and accordingly, a prudent person could come to the conclusion that such receipts were no evidence of expenses incurred. Similar were the other charges, and in the similar circumstances, a prudent person could come to the conclusion that the charges as stood proved, or partially proved, in fact stood proved. 4 4. In the appeal, the appellant is harping on the point that the disciplinary proceeding is vitiated on account of non-observance of the procedure laid down for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding, and that the disciplinary proceeding was concluded with closed mind, and with predetermined conclusion. 5. We think that when the disciplinary authority held that the charges, as were framed earlier by an unauthorized person, are required to be gone in de novo, the disciplinary authority not only approved those charges, but also held that those are required to be gone in. The disciplinary authority knew that the appellant had given a reply to the said charge sheet. A copy of the charge sheet and a reply thereto were sent to the newly appointed Enquiry Officer to the notice of the appellant. While the disciplinary authority knew that the appellant has given a reply to the charge sheet, it also knew the nature of the contentions contained in the reply. He knew that the appellant was vehemently denying the allegations contained in the charge sheet. In the circumstances, appointment by the disciplinary authority of an Enquiry Officer with such knowledge cannot be said to be imprudent or not in accordance with the procedure. It is true that on the basis of the selfsame charge sheet as well as the selfsame reply, the disciplinary proceeding was purported to be completed by an unauthorized person. The fact remains that when such attempt was made to conclude the disciplinary proceeding, some other order was passed than the order as was ultimately passed by the disciplinary authority after 5 conclusion of the de novo enquiry proceedings. In the circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the order, purported to be passed in the earlier unauthorized disciplinary proceeding, was substituted in the subsequent regular disciplinary proceedings, and accordingly, it is also difficult to accept that the disciplinary proceeding was ultimately concluded with closed mind or with any predetermination. 6. In the appeal, it has been contended that two of the territories in respect whereof two charges were framed, went under the jurisdiction of similar authority as that of the employer having its business in the State of Uttar Pradesh, and accordingly, the employer had no authority to go into the question of misconduct by the appellant in relation to those territories. We do not accept this contention of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant was under the disciplinary authority of his employer, and working of the appellant in those territories was continuous functioning of the appellant, which later on entailed the appellant to be associated with its employer. 7. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed. (U.C. Dhyani, J.) (Barin Ghosh, C.J.) 16.09.2011 Negi