Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 Date of decision: February 18, 2008 Mohinder Singh … Petitioner Versus Mehar Singh & Others. … Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Present: Mr. M.S. Bedi, Advocate for petitioner. Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. (Oral) In the present revision petition, on behalf of complainant, there is challenge to the acquittal of respondent-accused. In case FIR No. 167 dated 09.12.1994 registered at Police Station Sadar Malout, Mehar Singh, Hakam Singh and Uttar Singh alias Bhucha were tried for offences under section 326/325/323/324/34 IPC. It is a case of the prosecution that Balwinder Singh, brother of the complainant Mohinder Singh had dispute regarding the passage with accused respondent Mehar Singh. The dispute over the passage (pahi) was subject matter of the civil suit, which was pending before the court and it is stated that nephews of complainant Mohinder Singh had stay in their favour. On 09.12.1994, in the morning at about 7.00 a.m., Mohinder Singh along with his nephews, Jagjit Singh, Sukhminder Singh and Hardev Singh were going on a tractor to the fields. When they were near the house of Mehar Singh accused respondent, it is alleged that their tractor was way laid by Mehar Singh accused armed with Gandasa, Hakam Singh accused armed with Jandral and Uttar Singh alias Bhucha Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 2 Singh accused armed with Dang. On the lalkara raised by Mehar Singh, it is alleged that two Gandasa blows were caused on the fingers of right hand of the Mohinder Singh complainant. It is further stated that Uttar Singh gave two Dang blows on the back leg of Mohinder Singh. It is further stated that Hakam Singh accused gave two blows with Jandral to Sukhminder Singh on his left arm. Mehar Singh is said to have given Gandasa blow to Jagjit Singh on both of his arms and thereafter, assailants ran away. The cause of grudge is a dispute over the passage (pahi), for which suit in the civil Court was pending. The learned trial Court has returned the finding that in the present case, prosecution witnesses were aggressors and has granted right of self-defence to the accused. There was a dispute over the pahi (i.e., passage). Trial Court came to the conclusion that it is proved from the revenue record that the land where pahi (passage) might exist was being cultivated by Mehar Singh accused respondent. Furthermore, learned trial Court in para 12 and 13 has held as under: “12. I have gone through the medical evidence produced on the file and find that same is shaky, as doctor Devinderjit Singh PW2 declared injury no.1 on the person of Mohinder Singh to be grievous in nature, without going through the X-ray reports. As he admitted in his cross- examination that he cannot say whether the cut was superficial or deep one and further stated that it can be explained by the radiologist. He further admitted in his cross examination that it is not possible that only little finger should be injured with a weapon like gandasa from enemy hand, but he further stated that it is possible that this injury could be from a friendly hand. Otherwise X-rays have not linked with the PWs. Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 3 13. Now from the evidence on file it is clear that Dr.Mehar Singh is of age 72/75 years, accused Bucha Singh alias Uttar Singh is disabled from his right hand (Ex.D1). So we are only left with Hakam Singh healthy man and accused. Now majority of the injuries on the person of injured are attributed to Mehar Singh and some of the injuries are attributed to Hakam Singh. I do not believe that a man of age of 70/75 years could cause injuries as alleged by prosecution. One man can not cause so much injuries to three PWs/ Prosecution witnesses. Thus in my opinion by causing injuries by friendly hand and on the basis of unknown injuries and by producing fake medical certificates, complainant lodged criminal proceedings against Dr.Mehar Singh and others.” It was held in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707 Mahendra Partap Singh vs. Sarju Singh and another, relying upon D.Stephens vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196, as under: “only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 4 a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352), Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: “This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 5 exceptional cases when “there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.” In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re- trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = (AIR 1968 SC 707) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with Criminal Revision No.648 of 1996 6 an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. “In other words” said this Court, “the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 444. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh vs. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. There is no merit. Present revision petition is dismissed. [Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia] Judge February 18, 2008. rps