: 1 : SD IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO.415 OF 1999 SECOND APPEAL NO.415 OF 1999 SECOND APPEAL NO.415 OF 1999 WITH WITH WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6763 OF 1999 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6763 OF 1999 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6763 OF 1999 Nivrutti Maruti Ingale & Ors. ...Appellants V/s. Miraj Municipal Council & Ors. ...Respondents Mr.Tejpal S. Ingale, Advocate, for the Appellants. Mr.N.V. Walawalkar, Sr. Advocate, with Mr.V.B. Rajure, Advocate, for Respondent No.1. CORAM : ABHAY S. OKA, J. CORAM : ABHAY S. OKA, J. CORAM : ABHAY S. OKA, J. DATE : 28TH FEBRUARY, 2008. DATE : 28TH FEBRUARY, 2008. DATE : 28TH FEBRUARY, 2008. P.C.: P.C.: P.C.: 1. The Second Appeal is preferred by the original plaintiff Nos.1, 2 and 4 to 6. The 1st respondent is the original first defendant. The 2nd and 3rd respondents are the original plaintiff Nos.3 and 7. 2. According to the case of the appellants, they are conducting their respective business in small stalls by the side of a road near State Transport Bus Stand at Miraj, District Sangli. According to their case, they have been conducting business from the year 1979 and that they are possessing requisite licenses under the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948. It is their contention that the 1st : 2 : respondent-Municipal Corporation is collecting licence fees from them. A suit for injunction was filed by the appellants and 2nd and 3rd respondents on the ground that the appellants were sought to be evicted without following the due process of law. The suit was defended by the 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation by contending that the original plaintiffs were illegally occupying the stalls and, in fact, the said stalls have been causing obstruction to the traffic. 3. The learned Trial Judge held that the original plaintiff Nos.2 and 6 were the licensees of the 1st respondent. The learned Trial Judge granted injunction restraining the 1st respondent from removing the stalls of the original plaintiffs unless a decree from competent Court is obtained by the 1st respondent. An Appeal was preferred by the 1st respondent before the District Court. The said Appeal has been allowed by the impugned Judgment and Decree. The Appellate Court held that the original plaintiffs were neither the tenants nor the licensees of the 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation and that they were trespassers. 4. The learned Advocate for the appellants stated : 3 : that during the pendency of the Second Appeal, the stalls/structures of the 2nd and 4th appellants have been removed. His submission is that apart from the fact that the 1st respondent was collecting fees from the concerned appellants, the 1st respondent cannot dispossess the appellants of their possession over the respective stalls without following due process of law. He submitted that there was no reason for the Appellate Court to disturb the decree passed by the Trial Court which granted only a limited protection to the appellants. Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, he pointed out that the appellants have already applied to the 1st respondent for grant of suitable accommodation elsewhere and the said applications are pending. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent is that the stalls subject matter of the Second Appeal are held to be illegal and the same are obstructing regular traffic on the road. My attention has been invited to certain photographs which are tendered on record. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions. The finding of the Appellate Court is that no documentary evidence could be produced by the appellants and other plaintiffs to show that they were : 4 : either the licensees or the tenants of the 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation. There was no documentary evidence produced in that behalf by the appellants and other plaintiffs. Mere production of tax receipts or licenses under the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 cannot confer legality on the stalls. There is nothing on record to show that the stalls were authorisedly constructed. In the circumstances, the Appellate Court has declined to grant discretionary and equitable relief of perpetual injunction in favour of the original plaintiffs. In absence of any evidence on record to show the legality of the stalls or legal authority of the appellants to occupy the said stalls, it is very difficult to find fault with the findings recorded by the Appellate Court. 6. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the Appeal and the Appeal is liable to be dismissed. 7. It appears that the appellants and in particular appellant Nos.1, 3 and 5 have been occupying the stalls for a long time. It is stated that they have made an application for allotment of suitable accommodation elsewhere in the city. The 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation will have to consider : 5 : the applications made by the appellants. If the applications made by the appellants are not on record, it will be open for the appellants to make such applications within a period of four weeks from today. The 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation will decide the said applications as expeditiously as possible and in any event within a period of eight weeks from today. For a period of three months from today, the stalls in possession of appellant Nos.1, 3 and 5 deserve to be protected. 8. Hence, I pass following order :- "O R D E R" "O R D E R" "O R D E R" (a). The Second Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. (b). Applications / representations made by the appellants for grant of suitable accommodation shall be decided by the 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation within a period of eight weeks from today. (c). If such applications are not made till today, it will be open for the appellants to : 6 : make such applications within a period of four weeks from today. (d). For a period of three months from today, action of demolition shall not be taken against the stalls occupied by the 1st, 3rd and 5th appellants. (e). On completion of period of three months from today, the 1st respondent-Municipal Corporation is free to take action of demolition against the said stalls. (f). In view of dismissal of the Appeal, Civil Application No.6763 of 1999 does not survive and the same is disposed of. (g). Parties concerned to act upon an authenticated copy of this order. [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] [ABHAY S. OKA, J.]