( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO. 3475 OF 2010 Manesh s/o Bhaskar Kharmale PETITIONER VERSUS Vikas Shivajirao Khaire & another RESPONDENTS .... Mr. V.D. Hon, advocate for the petitioner. .... [CORAM : V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.] [DATE : 22nd June, 2010] PER COURT : 1. By this petition, the petitioner challenges order rendered by the learned Chairman of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (M.A.C.T.), Ahmednagar on amendment application (Exh-47) in Motor Accident Claims Petition (M.A.C.P.) No. 423/2004. 2. The petitioner is the original claimant. He was allegedly involved in vehicular accident which occurred on 7th February, 2004. It was alleged that the petitioner became ( 2 ) disabled as a result of the accident due to involvement of Luxury Bus, bearing registration No. MH-12/R-705 owned by the respondent No. 1 insured with the respondent No. 2. The petitioner is a driver and sought recovery of Rs. one (1) lac when he filed the petition. He subsequently filed an application for amendment of the pleadings alleging that due to subsequent developments, as a result of severe injuries caused to him, he has lost his job and working capacity. He, therefore, sought amendment to the effect that on account of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, he is entitled to recover Rs. 9,00,000/- (rupees nine lacs) instead of the original claim of Rs. one (1) lac. He gave details of the amounts to which he is entitled in paragraph No. 4 of the amendment application. 3. The learned Chairman of the M.A.C.T. heard learned counsel for the parties and rejected the application for the reason that the application was not in keeping with the letters and spirit of Order-VI Rule-17 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Chairman of the M.A.C.T. held that the amendment in the pleadings could not be permitted because the petitioner had tendered resignation of his post on 13th January, 2007 and that was accepted by the employer on 13th ( 3 ) March, 2007 before filing of the amendment application. It is observed further that the observations in “Prakash Ratanlal @ Ratansa Kasari V. Bhima s/o Banda Dhage & another” 2010 (1) Mh.L.J. 810 would govern the field. Feeling aggrieved by dismissal of the amendment application, the petitioner has sought indulgence of this Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction to allow him to amend the claim petition. 4. Though served, the respondents remained absent. Heard learned counsel Mr. Hon, for the petitioner. I have perused the impugned order. 5. At the threshold, let it be noted that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not strictly applicable to the proceedings before the M.A.C.T. The procedure is ofcourse generally applicable to govern the trial. The proceedings are not in nature of a suit. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that a particular format of the claim petition is provided for under the Motor Accident Claims Rules and the information is required to be furnished as per the format of petition. The delay by itself could not be the reason to deny the request for amendment of the pleadings. The petitioner desired to seek more compensation in view of subsequent developments and the loss of his job and in ( 4 ) particular, working capacity. He may or may not be able to prove such intervening developments. The Court is, however, required to consider such intervening developments in order to do appropriate justice in the matter. The M.A.C. Tribunal is required to consider the quantum of reasonable compensation to which the petitioner is entitled. It is well settled that in an appropriate case, the M.A.C. Tribunal may grant more compensation than which is prayed for, subject to condition that appropriate court fees will be recoverable from the claimant. It is quite clear that the amendment cannot refused only because the application was filed after a certain delay. The trial procedure is envisaged in section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 169 reads as follows : “169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals : (1) In holding any inquiry under section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deed to be a Civil ( 5 ) Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist in holding the inquiry.” Perusal of sub-section (2) of section 169 would make it amply clear that the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of the Civil Courts for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses. It is deemed to be a Civil Court for certain purposes though it is not a Civil Court in stricto senso. Needless to say, the rigours of Proviso appended to Order-VI Rule-17 of the Civil Procedure Code are not attracted when a suitable amendment is sought by the claimant. The very purpose of the scheme under Chapter-XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is to ensure that appropriate and reasonable compensation is made available to a deserving claimant. The intention of the Legislature is quite clear on consideration of sub-section (4) of section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which reads as follows : “166. Application for compensation : ( 6 ) (1) ***** (2) ***** (3) ***** (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” It is obvious that even finding of a formal claim petition can be dispensed with by the Tribunal and the report of accident also can be treated as claim petition for the purpose of section 166. Thus, section 158 (6) read with section 166 (4) give lee way to the Tribunal to initiate the enquiry regarding compensation payable to an injured claimant or to the legal representatives of deceased victim who is/was involved in the vehicular accident due to involvement of a particular known vehicle. In this view of the matter, the impugned order is rather improper and incorrect. 6. In the result, taking overall view of the matter, the petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. [V.R. KINGAONKAR] JUDGE NPJ/wp3475-10