Letters Patent Appeal No.288 OF 1999 ***** Against the judgment dated 16.4.1998 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in F.A. No.345 of 1977. ***** Bihar State Board of Religious Trust, through Sri Ram Kripal Yadav, President, Vidyapati Marg, P.S. Kotwali, Patna-800001. Plaintiff- Respondent-.. Appellant. Versus 1. Most. Sakalwaso Devi, W/o Late Kesho Pd. Singh. 2. Shri Brajesh Singh. 3. Shri Awadhesh Singh 4. Shri Bhuneshwar Singh 2 to 4 are sons of late Kesho Prasad Singh. 5. Smt. Lilawati Devi, w/o Brajesh Singh 6. Sri Munna Kumar, S/o Brajesh Singh. 7. Smt. Nilam Devi, W/o Shri Munna Kr. 8. Sonu Kumar, minor, represented through his father and natural guardian, Munna Kr. 9. Komal Kumri, minor, represented through her father and natural guardian Munna Kumar 10. Shri Dhurendra Kr. Singh, S/o Brajesh Singh 11. Smt. Tunni Devi, W/o Shri Dhurendra Kr. 12. Vikash Kumar, minor, represented by his father Dhurendra Kr. 13. Ritu Kumari, minor, represented by her father Dhirendra Kumar 14. Gudiya Kumari 15. Rubi Kumari, Both D/o Brajesh Singh 16. Smt. Dharmshila Devi, W/o Shri Awdhesh Singh. 17. Shri Chunu Kumar 18. Banti Kumar. 19. Babban Kumar Sl. 17 to 19 are sons Awdhesh Singh 20. Sudha Devi, D/o Shri Awadhesh Singh. 21. Smt. Nita Devi, W/o Shri Bhuvaneshwar Singh. 22. Anand Kumar 23. Pappu Kumar Both sons of Shri Bhuvaneshwar Singh. 24. Jitu Kumar 25. Siku Kumar Both minor sons represented through their father Bhuvaneshwar Singh. 26. Neha Kumari, a minor represented by her father and natural guardian Bhuvaneshwar Singh. All residents of village- Ranipur Chakia, P.O. Begumpur, P.S. Bypass (Patna), District- Patna. ...Defendant- Appellant- Respondents. ****** 2 For the Appellant: Mr. Shekhar Singh, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Kamal Nayan Choubey, Sr. Advocate. ***** P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR KATRIAR THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JYOTI SARAN ***** S K Katriar & J. Saran, JJ. It arises out of a judgment of reversal. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna has been preferred by the respondent of F.A. No.345 of 1977 (Mossomat Phuljharia Kuer and another Vs. The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust), and is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16.4.1998, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the said appeal, whereby the judgment and decree dated 26.2.1977, passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Patna, in T.S. No.110 of 1964/130 of 1974 (Bihar State Board of Religious Trust Vs. Mussamat Phuljharo Kuer and another), has been set aside. The learned Trial Court had held that the trust in question is a public trust within the meaning of Section 2(l) of the Bihar State Hindu Religious Trust Act (hereinafter referred to as the „Act‟), which has been set aside by the learned Single Judge and has held that the trust in question is a private 3 trust. We shall go by the description of the parties occurring in the plaint. 2. The plaintiff (the present appellant) instituted the suit for declaration that the order dated 29.6.1964, passed by the Board under the provisions of Section 43 of the Act be set aside, and for the further declaration that the suit property constitutes a public trust within the meaning of Section 2(l) of the Act. The Authority under section 43 had decided that it is a private trust. Aggrieved by the same, the Board preferred the suit. The learned trial court framed the following issues for adjudication: (1) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (2) Has the plaintiff got any valid cause of action for the suit? (3) Is the suit bad for misjoinder of parties? (4) Is the suit barred by limitation? (5) Has the suit been under valued and the court fee paid insufficient? (6) Are the Smarpannamas dated 8.6.46 and 22.9.50 legal valid and operative? (7) Is the suit temple in question and the property dedicated for the temples public trust and public trust property? (8) Is the order of authority passed under section 43 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act dated 29.6.64 illegal invalid and without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside? 4 (9) Is the plaintiff entitled to a declaration that the trust in question relating to the temple in question and the dedicated property is a public trust? (10) To what relief or reliefs if any is plaintiff entitled? On a consideration of the materials on record, the learned trial court decreed the suit on contest and set aside the order dated 29.6.1964 of the learned Authority and held that it is a public trust. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned trial court, the family preferred the said First Appeal No.345 of 1977, which has been decreed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff (appellant herein) has assailed the validity of the impugned judgment on various grounds. He submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in interpreting the documents of dedication. He further submits that the plaintiff‟s witnesses have deposed to the effect that the members of the public at large have access to the temple as a matter of right. In his submission, therefore, the learned Single Judge has erred in setting aside the judgment of the learned trial court. 5 4. Learned counsel for the defendants (respondents herein) has supported the impugned judgment. 5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The learned Single Judge on a thoughtful consideration of the materials on record has concluded that it is evident from a perusal of the recitals of the deeds creating the trust that the same was created for the purpose of worship of the family members. He has further held that the learned trial court clearly erred in holding that, in the absence of a prohibitive clause in the deed of Samarpannama, the members of the public at large were not prohibited from entry into the Trust and is in substance a case of mis-direction. The absence of such a prohibitive clause is raising chimerical issues. There is no need to incorporate such a prohibitive clause when the founder intended to create a private trust for the worship of the family. He has further held that the management of Thakurwari was retained by the executants themselves during their life-time, whereafter it was vested in the appellant of the first appeal. He has further held that clear indications have come to notice whereby alienation of the property at the hands of the Shebait has been clearly prohibited. There is no 6 clause or circumstance indicated in the deed which can lead to the conclusion that the trust was created for the benefit of the general public. Neither the members of the public nor the intervention of the public is at all contemplated in the deed. The fact is that the deed of dedication (Samarpannama) provides jkx&Hkksx of the Deities, and for lk/kw vH;kxr would be entertained, does not in the least detract from the position that it was intended to be a private trust. Such a clause is naturally to be found in private trusts, because such hospitality to lk/kw vH;kxr would be treated to be private entertainment at the hands of the family members, and is really in satisfaction of spiritual aspirations. Common belief amongst the Hindu is that worship of lk/kw takes them closer to the God, and also the old Hindu saying that “vfrfFk nsoks Hko%“. There is no indication at all that the members of the public are associated with the management of the trust. The learned Single Judge has taken guidance from the celebrated judgment in Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar and others, reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 133, to determine the nature and character of a trust. 6. We entirely agree with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The Scope and sweep of jurisdiction under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent was the subject-matter of discussion in the judgment 7 of a Division Bench in Barhu Ram and others Vs. Butai Ram and another, reported in 1999 (2) B.L.J. 618, paragraph 15 of which is relevant in the present context and is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “15. Counsel for the appellants submitted in a Letters Patent Appeal, it is open to this Court not only to consider questions of law, but also to go into questions of fact and in this appeal it is open to this Court to set aside the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and the appellate Court. While it is true that the special jurisdiction of this Court under Letters Patent does not inhibit the Court from going into questions of fact as well as questions of law, it is equally well settled that findings of fact may be set aside by this Court only if there are good reasons to do so. The appellants must be able to demonstrate before this Court that the findings of fact are either perverse or palpably unreasonable and therefore unsustainable. If the trial Court and the appellate Court have correctly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded findings which can be said to be reasonable, there will be no justification for setting aside such findings of fact. We have, therefore, noticed broadly the evidence on record with a view to satisfy ourselves as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and the appellate Court are either perverse, unreasonable or are based on no evidence or are vitiated for any other reason.” (Emphasis added) 7. Keeping in view the constraints of narrow jurisdiction of Letters Patent Appeal, we find ourselves unable to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the learned Single judge. The 8 findings recorded by him are surely possible views, let alone the question of being perverse or palpably unreasonable findings. 8. In the result, We do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. (S K Katriar, J.) (Jyoti Saran, J.) Patna High Court, Patna Dated the 12th day of August, 2009. S.K.Pathak/ (N.A.F.R.)