*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY + M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1029 & 1162 of 2011 %24.06.2011 #Gurja Dhanmma and others. ..appellants. Vs. $Koli Venkateswara Rao and others. ..Respondents. !Counsel for the appellants : Sri S.Chandraiah ^Counsel for the Respondents : --- <Gist : >Head Note: ?Cases Referred: THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1029 & 1162 of 2011 COMMON JUDGMENT: Similar question of law arises for consideration in these two appeals, filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘the M.V. Act’). Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment. M.A.C.M.A.No.1029 of 2011 arises out of O.P.No.879 of 2007. The appellants filed the O.P before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Ranga Reddy District, against the respondents therein, claiming compensation of Rs.4 lakhs on account of the death of Gurja Srisailam. It was pleaded that Srisailam, the husband of the 1st appellant and father of appellants 2 and 3, and son of appellants 4 and 5, was working as Driver on a lorry bearing No.AP-29-T-2457, and when he was proceeding from Hyderabad to a cement factory, on 24- 02-2006, an accident occurred due to collision between the lorry driven by him, and another lorry bearing No.AP-16-Y 0556, owned by the 1st respondent and insured with the 2nd respondent. Srisailam died on account of the accident. Other relevant facts were pleaded. The 1st respondent remained ex parte. The matter was contested by the 2nd respondent alone. It was urged that the appellants filed W.C.No.58 of 2004 before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, at Nalgonda, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (for short ‘the W.C. Act’), claiming Rs.4,50,000/- as compensation, and that a sum of Rs.3,81,007/- was awarded as compensation. The copy of the award was filed. The Tribunal took note of the fact that the appellants availed the remedy under the W.C. Act, dismissed the O.P., through order dated 03-01-2011 by invoking Section 167 of the M.V. Act. The appellants in M.A.C.M.A.No.1162 of 2011 filed O.P.No.127 of 2003 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Nalgonda, claiming compensation of Rs.4 lakhs, on account of the death of Gandepuri Yadagiri, the husband of the 1st appellant, and father of appellants 2 to 4. According to them, Yadagiri, was working as a Driver on a Car bearing No.AP-11-V-9424, owned by one Purushotham Reddy, the 3rd respondent, and that the car was insured with the 4th respondent. On 25-12-2002 he was proceeding from Secunderabad to Satrampadu of West-Godavari District, and the Car dashed against a stationed lorry bearing No.AP 16 T-3945, owned by the 1st respondent and insured with the 2nd respondent. It was alleged that the accident occurred and Yadagiri died, since the lorry was not parked in a proper manner and on account of the same. As in the other case, here also the owner of the lorry remained ex parte, and the insurer alone had to contest the matter. Apart from taking other pleas, the 2nd respondent i.e. the insurer stated that the appellants filed W.C.No.26 of 2003 before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Nalgonda, under the W.C. Act, and that through an order dated 10-12-2003, the said Authority awarded a sum of Rs.2,38,641/- as compensation. It was also stated that C.M.A.No.3039 of 2004, filed by the appellants herein, seeking enhancement of the compensation, is pending, before this Court. The Tribunal dismissed the O.P., through order dated 30-09-2010 on the ground that the appellants have already availed the remedy under the W.C. Act. Sri S. Chandraiah learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the remedy under the W.C. Act is available only against the employer and that the O.P filed before the Tribunal was against the owner of the vehicle as against which, the deceased was a third party. Learned counsel contends that the payment of compensation under the W.C. Act is an act of discharge of obligation by an employer towards a workman, whereas the liability arising under the M.V. Act is in the field of torts. He further submits that the claim under Section 163-A of the W.C. Act is almost akin to the one, under Section 140 of the M.V. Act, and in that view of the matter, Section 167 of that Act does not act as a bar for the claims made by the appellants. Apart from providing for the registration of motor vehicles, grant of driving licences and other matters connected therewith, the M.V. Act provides for a mechanism for determination of compensation payable to the victims of an accident that occurred on account of the use of motor vehicle at a public place. Realizing that the liability arising out of the accidents may be phenomenal, and that the owners of the vehicles involved in the accidents may not be able to meet it by themselves, or that the victim may not be able to recover the amounts effectively, Parliament made the insurance of motor vehicles compulsory by incorporation extensive provisions in the M.V. Act. The extent to which the policy must cover the liability is mentioned under Section 145, and other relevant provisions. Section 165 of the M.V Act provides for establishment of Tribunals for determination of the compensation. Other provisions in Chapter-II, and the relevant Schedules provide guidance to the Tribunals in determining the compensation. The W.C. Act, on the other hand, is a legislation, which is intended to protect the interests of the workmen. It contains elaborate provisions for determination of compensation in the event of death or injuries to the workmen. The cause for the injuries or death of the workmen is not restricted to motor accident. Compensation can be awarded under that Act for any injuries or death that occur in the course of employment. The parameters fro determination of compensation under that Act are totally different from those under the M.V. Act. It is not uncommon that in the accidents involving motor vehicles the drivers or other employees engaged upon a vehicle receive fatal or serious injuries. The workmen so engaged, in the event of receiving any injuries; or their dependents, in case of death, can claim compensation. It is quite possible that on the same set of facts a claim can be made under the provisions of the M.V. Act or of the W.C. Act, by the injured or their dependants, as the case may be. The forum under each of the said enactments is different. If the proceedings are instituted in both the for a, compensation comes to be awarded twice, for the same event or cause of action. To avoid multiplicity of such claims, the Parliament incorporated Section 167 in the M.V. Act, which reads: “167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases:- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.” The purport of this provision is clear. It provides for an option to the claimants to choose the remedy available under the M.V. Act or the W.C. Act, and thereby, prohibits the remedies being availed under both the enactments, on the same cause of action. The only exception is that any claim made under Chapter X of the M.V. Act, which deals with ‘no fault liability’, shall not be a bar to avail the remedy under the W.C. Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 141 of the M.V. Act, is to the effect that, if a claimant is entitled to compensation on the principle of ‘fault’, the amount, if any, claimed towards ‘no fault liability’, shall be taken into account. Even this small exception carved out in Section 167 of the M.V. Act, does not come into play, if a claimant had first approached the Authority under the W.C. Act. Irrespective of the provision of the W.C. Act invoked by the claimant, the very institution of the proceedings thereunder would disentitle a claimant from availing the remedy under the M.V. Act. Further, the possibility to claim ‘no fault liability’ does not exist, since that can take place only as a first step, before claiming compensation on the principle of ‘fault’. The reverse process is impermissible. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the appellants availed the remedy under the M.V. Act. In case the compensation was not adequate, they ought to have preferred appeal under Section 30 of the M.V. Act, if otherwise permissible in law. In fact, such a step was taken in one of the cases. An attempt is made to sustain the claims under the M.V. Act, on the ground that sub-section (2) of Section 163A, is similar in its purport, to Section 140. This contention cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, Section 167 of the M.V. Act exempts only those claims that are made under Chapter X and Section 163A does not occur in that Chapter. Secondly, assuming that there is any similarity between Sections 140 and 163A(2), it is only when a claim is made first under those provisions that a possibility may exist to invoke the remedy under the provisions of the W.C. Act, and as observed in the preceding paragraphs, it cannot take place in the other way. Hence, the M.A.C.M.As. are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ____________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J Dt:24.06.2011 L.R. copy to be marked. KO/GJ There shall be no order as to costs. _______________________ L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. Dt.21-06-2011. KO