IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.1145 of 2010 Krishna Gopal Singh S/o Late Kameshwar Prasad Singh, resident of village+P.O. Mothha, P.S.Marhowraha, District- Saran at Chapra. ………… Appellant. Versus 1.The State Of Bihar through District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra. 2.The District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra. 3.The District Superintendent of Education, Saran at Chapra. 4.Block Development Officer, Marhowraha, P.O.+ P.S. Marhowraha, District – Saran at Chapra. 5.Mukhiya Gram Panchayat Raj Narharpur, Narharpur, P.S. Marhowraha, District- Saran at Chapra. 6.The Panchayat Secretary, Gram Panchayat Raj Narharpur, District-Saran at Chapra. 7.The District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority, Saran at Chapra. 8.Praveen Kumar Son of Gyandeo Singh, R/O village+P.O. Pirauta, P.S.Baniyapur, District- Chapra. ……… Respondents. 2 29.6.2011 Heard learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri Vijay Kumar Pandey, Assistant counsel to G.P.20. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature at Patna has been preferred by the appellant of C.W.J.C.No.18557 of 2009, and is aggrieved by the order dated 29.4.2010, whereby the writ petitioner has been dismissed, and the writ petitioner‟s prayer for reinstatement as Panchayat teacher has been rejected with the liberty to file representation before the appropriate forum either for creation of post against which he can be adjusted, or to adjust him against any available post. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. It appears that one Praveen Kumar was appointed as Panchayat teacher on the strength of his Vocational course, treating it to be equivalent to Intermediate. 2 Doubts arose about the validity of the Vocational Course, and Praveen Kumar‟s appointment was dispensed with. The petitioner was appointed in his place.Praveen Kumar challenged the same by preferring C.W.J.C.No.14430 of 2007, which was disposed of with the observation that the petitioner‟s reinstatement shall abide the result of L.P.A. No.469 of 2008. The appeal was ultimately allowed wherein it was held that the Vocational course in question is equivalent to Intermediate. Praveen Kumar was,therefore, reinstated in service. After the services of Praveen Kumar were dispensed with, the appellant herein was appointed in his place. After reinstatement of Praveen Kumar, the service of the appellant herein was dispensed with leading to application before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Saran at Chapra. The same was rejected leading to the present writ petition,which has been rejected with the following observations- “ The reinstatement of Praveen Kumar, being consequential to petitioner’s termination. I do not find any error in the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Petitioner has liberty to represent his case before appropriate forum either for creation of post against which he can be adjusted, or post against which he may be appointed”. We agree with the order of the learned Tribunal as well as the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the appellant‟s case. We, however, disagree with the observation made by the learned Single Judge to the effect that “…..petitioner has liberty to represent his case before appropriate forum either for creation of post against which he can be adjusted, or post against which he may 3 be appointed”. Unwarranted liberty has been given to the petitioner which has the potential of creating unnecessary burden on the Panchayat, in a situation where the observations have been made in the absence of the Panchayat. No notice had been issued to the Panchayat, nor it had appeared on its own. We are in this connection reminded of Sub-Section (3) of Section 11 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟), which is reproduced hereinbelow: “11(3). Every Gram Panchayt shall be a body corporate by the name of the Gram Panchayat and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and subject to such restrictions as are imposed by or under this Act or any other enactment, shall be vested with the capacity of suing or being sued in the corporate name,of acquir- ing, holding and transferring properly, mova- ble or immovable, whether without or within the limits of the area over which it has autho- rity, or entering into contracts and of doing all things necessary, proper and expedient for the purpose for which it is constituted.” This provision of law came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in 2011(2)BBCJ 657; State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Nagendra Prasad Arya & Ors., wherein it has been held that every Panchayat is a separate legal entity which can sue or be sued in its own capacity. The State Government should be mindful of the position that the State Government is a separate and distinct entity from the Panchayat. Therefrore, the aforesaid observations could not have been made in the absence of the concerned Panchayat. We are mindful of the legal position that no appellant can be worse off than the impugned Judgment. This principle of law, however, may not be applicable to the discretionary, prerogative 4 writ jurisdiction where interest of justice is the paramount consideration. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with the further direction that the underlined portion hereinabove is expunged from the order of the learned Single Judge. AnilKrSinha ( S.K. Katriar , J.) (Amaresh Kumar Lal,J.)