THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF AUGUST 2009. C.R.P.NO. 1552 OF 2009. Between: P.Meharunnisa …….Petitioner vs. K.Venkateshwara Sharma ……Respondent. THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH C.R.P.No. 1552 of 2009. ORDER: The Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved by the order dt. 20.2.2009 in I.A.No.512 of 2009 in O.S.No. 1793 of 2004 on the file of the V Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Tirupathi whereby the petition filed under Section 148 r/w 151 C.P.C. is dismissed. The petitioner is the plaintiff in the suit and he filed I.A.No. 512 of 2009 under Section 148 r/w 151 C.P.C. seeking to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, as per the Judgement and Decree dt.12.12.2008 and consequently permit him to pay balance sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- to the defendant and pass such other orders as may be just and necessary. The court below by an order dt. 20.2.2009 dismissed the said application on the ground that the court has become functus officio. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision petition is filed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the court below erred in dismissing the application the ground that it has become functus officio. He further submitted that the court has got ample power to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration under Section 148 r/w 151 C.P.C. and that the order of the court below is erroneous as it failed to exercise the discretion vested in it. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent does not dispute the power of the court to extend the time under Section 148 r/w 151 C.P.C. but he contends that no opportunity was given to the respondent to file a counter to the petition and no notice was served on the party respondent or on the Counsel for the respondent, who stopped advocate practice. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that he does not know about the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respondent. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the reasoning given by the court below while dismissing the application is correct or not? The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No. 1793 of 2004 on the file of the V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupathi for specific performance of contract of an agreement of sale dt. 19.7.2004 executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The court below after due trial decreed the suit by the Judgement dt. 12.12.2008 directing the defendant to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving balance sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- and the plaintiff was directed to deposit the said amount within one month from the date of decree, failing which the suit shall stand dismissed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suit was decreed on 12.12.2008. On 17.12.2008, the petitioner/plaintiff made an application for supply of certified copy of Judgment and decree, which was furnished to him on 2.2.2009. He further submitted that as the time stipulated in the Judgment and decree was expired, he immediately filed I.A.No.512 of 2009 under Section 148 r/w 151 C.P.C. praying the court below to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/-, which was dismissed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the order impugned is erroneous as the court below failed to exercise the power vested in it. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision in Johri Singh vs. Sukh Pal Singh 1 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court explaining the Section 148 C.P.C. held as under: “This section empowers the court to extend the time fixed by it even after the expiry of the period originally fixed. It by implication allows the court to enlarge the time before the time originally fixed. The use of the word ‘may’ shows that the power is discretionary, and the court is, therefore, entitled to take into account the conduct of the party praying for such extension.” The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on another decision in Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India 2 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the court to enlarge time that may have been fixed by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the Court.” The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision in Sardar Mohar Singh vs. Mangilal 3 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “From the language of sub-section (1) of Section 28, it could be seen that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance not it becomes functus officio. The very fact that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. It would also be clear that the court has power to enlarge the time in favour of the Judgment-debtor to pay the amount or to perform the conditions mentioned in the decree for specific performance, in spite of an application for rescission of the decree having been filed by the judgment-debtor and rejected. In other words, the court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance……..” Section 148 C.P.C. deals with enlargement of time and provides: “Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period (not exceeding thirty days in total) even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.” Section 151 C.P.C. deals with inherent powers of the Court and provides: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.” A reading of Sections 148 and 151 C.P.C. coupled with the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (extracted supra), it is clear that that the court has got ample power to extend the time stipulated for the performance or doing of any act if the act could not be performed within the time ordained for reasons beyond the control of the party. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the petitioner/plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale and the suit was decreed subject to a condition that the plaintiff should pay balance sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- within one month from the date of the decree and the said condition is not complied with. The reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition are that the suit was decreed on 12.12.2008 and the petitioner made an application for supply of certified copy of Judgment and decree on 17.12.2008, which was supplied to him on 2.2.2009 i.e. after expiry of the time stipulated in the Judgement and decree and that after coming to know of the fact that the time granted for depositing the balance sale consideration was expired, the petitioner immediately filed I.A.No. 512 of 2009 under Section 148 r/w 151 C.P.C. seeking extension of time. It is further stated in the affidavit that his counsel could not see the A- diary on 12.12.2008 and the Advocate clerk also did not inform him about the condition stipulated in the Judgement and decree and the non-deposit of balance sale consideration as ordained in the Judgment and Decree is purely for the reasons stated above, which were beyond his control. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the court below ought to have allowed the application taking into consideration the facts and circumstance of the case and the reasons given in the affidavit for non-compliance of the Judgement and decree within the time stipulated instead of dismissing the same on the erroneous ground that the court has become funtus officio. The point is accordingly answered. In the result, the C.R.P. is allowed and the impugned order dt. 20.2.2009 passed in I.A.No. 512 of 2009 in O.S.No. 1793 of 2004 on the file of V Addl. Jr. Civil Judge, Tirupathi is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. _________________ G.CHANDRAIAH,J 17.8.2009. KRB. THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH C.R.P.No. 1552 of 2009. Dated: 17.8.2009. 1 (1989) 4 Supreme Court Cases 403 2 (2205) 6 Supreme Court Cases 344 3 (1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 217