IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition No. 861 of 2004 (M/S) Union of India …….. Petitioner Versus M/s Agarwal Builders and Furnishers and others …….. Respondents ………. Mr. Arvind Vashistha, Assistant Solicitor General for the petitioner. Hon’ble V.K. GUPTA, C. J. The Award passed by the Arbitrator was challenged by respondent no. 1 in the Trial Court on various grounds including the ground that the Arbitrator had given the Award beyond the statutory period of four months without having sought any extension either from the Trial Court or with the consent of the parties. The learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 24th September, 1998 set aside the Award passed by the Arbitrator on the ground that it was given beyond the statutory period and was, therefore, a nullity in the eyes of law. The petitioner filed an appeal U/s 39 (1) of Arbitration Act, 1940 against the aforesaid judgment dated 24th September, 1998. Vide judgment dated 4th November, 2003, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal and upheld and affirmed the view and finding of the learned Trial Court. In the present petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid two judgments. Sub-Section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 clearly bars the filing of a second appeal. Sub-Section (2) of Section 39 reads thus: “(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” Even though the petitioner has approached this Court purportedly under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner was clearly 2 prevented from doing so in view of the specific mandate contained in Sub- Section (2) of Section 39. When Sub-Section (2) talks of baring a second appeal from an order passed in appeal (under Sub-Section (1)) it clearly means that an order passed by an Appellate Court cannot be challenged in any Court under the guise of any proceeding other than the aggrieved party filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. Only the remedy of approaching the Supreme Court has been preserved and made available to a party feeling aggrieved of an order passed by an Appellate Court exercising jurisdiction under Sub-Section (1) of Section 39. I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. The same is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs. (V. K. Gupta, C. J.) 20.03.2009 A