1 S.A.No.420_2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO.420 OF 2011 Dharmaji Laxman Pawar -- APPELLANTS V/s. Meena Ravindra Alhat & Ors. -- RESPONDENTS Ms. Deepa Ahuja & Reetesh Singh I/b. M/s. Arun Sakpal & Co. Advocates for Appellants. S.P. Deo & A.S. Deo, Advocate for Respondent No.1 A.R. Patil, A.G.P. For Res.Nos. 2 & 3. CORAM : A.S.OKA, J. DATE : 24th November, 2011. P.C. :- 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant is the 4th defendant. The first respondent is the Plaintiff who is the widow of one Ravindra Dinkar Alhat. The suit property is a plot held by 3rd Respondent society. The case made out by the first respondent is that her father-in-law (Dinkar) was a flood affected person who was granted the plot through the 3rd respondent society. The father-in-law died on 11th August, 1989 and thereafter his son’s name (Ravindra Dinkar Alhat) was mutated in the city survey records. The said Ravindra died on 6th August, 2002. The case made out by the first respondent is that there are no other legal representatives of her father-in-law and her husband except herself. The present appellant is a maternal uncle of the husband of the first respondent. JSN 2 S.A.No.420_2011 2. It is alleged in the suit that the appellant tried to get his name entered in the city survey record. Allegation is that the 2nd respondent was likely to enter the name of the appellant in the revenue record. Therefore, the suit was filed by the first respondent for declaration of ownership. 3. The appellant filed Written Statement contending that he was allottee of the suit plot by the Collector as he was a flood affected person and he has constructed the building on the suit plot. His contention is that deceased father-in-law of the first respondent has no concerned with the suit plot. He submitted that third respondent- Societies had no right to execute any lease in favour of deceased father- in-law of the first respondent. 4. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. An appeal was preferred by the first respondent. The decree of the Trial Court has been set aside in Appeal and the suit filed by the first respondent has been decreed. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed that the first respondent did not step in to witness box, but her constituted attorney entered witness box and deposed on behalf of the 3 S.A.No.420_2011 first respondent. She submitted that the constituted attorney of the first respondent had no right to depose on behalf of the first respondent. She submitted that the first respondent failed to serve suit summons to the third respondent society. She pointed out that the allotment in favour of father-in-law of the first respondent is of the year 1991, which is subsequent to the death of the father-in-law. She submitted that a lease was executed by the society in the name of the father-in-law in the year 1991. She submitted that the appellant produced the letter of allotment of the year 1964 in respect of the suit plot issued by 3rd respondent society and, therefore, it was obvious that the suit plot was allotted by the state government through the society to the appellant way back in the year 1964. She submitted that there is evidence on record to show that certain amounts were paid by the appellant to the society. She submitted that the case made out by the first respondent in the memorandum of appeal is inconsistent with the case made out at the time of hearing. She submitted that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 6. I have considered the submissions. It is true that the first respondent examined the sister of her husband as witness. It cannot be said that the sister had no personal knowledge of the events set out by 4 S.A.No.420_2011 the first respondent. The lease deed dated 18th November, 1991 executed by the 3rd Respondent in favour of the deceased husband of the first respondent was produced and proved before the Court. The Appellate Court has noted that there are recitals in the lease deed at Exh. 45 to the effect that the 3rd respondent society was allotted plots by the State Government for the period of 99 years and the suit plot was allotted by the 3rd respondent society to the father-in-law of the first respondent by making him a member. Even the share certificate issued by the 3rd respondent society was produced and proved before the trial Court. Even in the City Survey record, an entry of the name of the husband of the first respondent has been made. Bank passbook in the name of deceased father-in-law of the first respondent was produced of the year 1977 and even passport was produced of the year 1982 which shows the address of the deceased father-in-law of the suit plot. Tax receipts of the 1971 was produced in the name of deceased father-in-law of the first respondent. Even electricity bills in the name of father-in-law of first respondent were produced in respect of the houses on the suit plot. The Appellate Court referred to voluminous documentary evidence on record produced by the first respondent. 7. On the other hand, the appellant produced alleged letter of 5 S.A.No.420_2011 allotment dated 6th September, 1964 issued to him by the 3rd Respondent society. The Appellate Court have observed the document dated 27th March, 1969 shows that the third respondent society came in to the existence on 27th March,1969. The Appellate Court also observed that there is no outward number and seal of the society on the letter produced by the appellant. Therefore, the Appellate Court found that said letter was doubtful. The other evidence produced by appellant was the certificate at Exh.66 to show that he was a flood affected person. 8. Considering the aforesaid documentary evidence on record, the Appellate Court found that the first respondent has proved the title of her father-in-law and on the other hand the appellant could not established any right in respect of the suit plot. 9. The findings of facts recorded by the Appellate Court are based on appreciation of documentary evidence on record. No substantial questions of law arises. Hence second appeal is dismissed. C.A. 536 of 2009 does not survive and is disposed of. [ A.S.OKA, J ]