IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY WRIT PETITION No : 26386 of 2007 Between: M/s. Stencils and Stencils Limited, IDA Nacharam, Ranga Reddy District. ..... PETITIONER AND 1 The Commissioner of Labour, Anjaiah Karmika Bhavan, RTC 'X' Roads, Hyderabad. 2 The Appellate Authority under SEction 53 of A.P. Shops and Establishment Act, 1988-cum-Asst. Commissioner of Labour, Circle-II Anjaiah Karmika Bhavan, RTC 'X' Roads, Hyderabad. 3 Sri D.Mohan Rao S/o.Venkatswamy, R/o. Plot No.57, Maruthinagar, Near A.S. Rao Nagar, ECIL (post), Hyderabad. .....RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to call for the records from the Respondents herein by issuing a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari by quashing the impugned order in Letter No.11/12677/07, dt. 22.10.2007 of the 1st Respondent herein as unjustified, illegal, arbitrary, perverse and also in violation Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the 1st respondent herein to transfer S.A.No.1of of 2005 and also P.G.No.4/2006 on the file of 2nd respondent authority to any other authority and pass such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioner:MR.P.SRIDHAR RAO Counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 & 2: GP FOR LABOUR Counsel for the Respondent No.3: Sri M.V.Rama Rao. The Court made the following : ORDER: The petitioner challenges the letter, dated 22.10.2007, addressed by the first respondent, in relation to transfer of S.E.No.1 of 2005 and P.G.No.4 of 2006 on the file of the second respondent. The petitioner is a manufacturing company and the third respondent is its employee. The latter filed S.E.No.4 of 2003 before the Labour Officer-II, Rangareddy District, making certain claims against the former. The claim was allowed by the Labour Officer, through an order, dated 15.10.2005. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed an appeal, S.E.No.1 of 2005, under Section 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’). The third respondent has also filed P.G.No.4 of 2006 against the petitioner, under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 before the second respondent. Both the matters are pending adjudication. The petitioner filed I.A.No.1 of 2007 before the second respondent with a prayer to transfer S.E.No.1 of 2005 to any authority constituted under Section 53 of the Act. Similar application for transfer was also filed in P.G.No.4 of 2006. Through an order, dated 20.08.2007, the second respondent rejected the applications. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a petition before the first respondent. The same was rejected by the first respondent, vide letter, dated 22.10.2007. Hence, this writ petition. The third respondent filed counter-affidavit denying the allegations made by the petitioner. According to him, the petitioner had resorted to all possible tricks, to protract the proceedings, on one pretext or the other. Sri P. Sridhar Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the second respondent did not exhibit the required amount of fairness and impartiality, in hearing S.E.No.1 of 2005 and P.G.No.4 of 2006. He submits that the genuine request of the petitioner for adducing additional evidence was not acceded to, and that to victimize the petitioner, the case was posted on a festival day though no other cases were posted on that day. He submits that the petitioner does not expect impartial judgment before the second respondent. Learned Government Pleader for Labour and Sri M.V.Rama Rao, learned counsel for the third respondent, submit that the applications filed by the petitioner are not maintainable in law, and that the allegations made therein are absolutely baseless and incorrect. They submit that at the instance of the petitioner, the matter, which was reserved for orders way back in the year 2006, was reopened and the efforts of the petitioner are only to avoid the second respondent. Serious doubt exists as to the very maintainability of the application filed by the petitioner before the second respondent seeking transfer of proceedings from that authority, to another. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, for such transfers. Learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to cite any provision, which permits or provides for such a course of action. Even where a provision, like Section 24 of CPC, exists, an application for transfer of proceedings from one Court or authority to another is to be presented before a superior forum. In such cases, the superior Court would examine the matter dispassionately if necessary, by calling for report from the subordinate Court or authority, where the proceedings sought to be transferred are pending, and take a decision. Filing of an application before the very forum that too, in the absence of any provision of law is unknown. If permitted, it would result in complaining the authority against itself. This, in a way, would bring about situation where, an authority is required to decide the very allegations made against it. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the petitioner is untenable in law, apart from being highly objectionable. Coming to the facts of the present case, this Court is both disappointed, and shocked to know that the petitioner has been unfair to the second respondent. False, frivolous and baseless allegations were made, in the anxiety to avoid the adjudication by the second respondent. The record discloses that the second respondent has been excessively fair to the petitioner, by accommodating it on number of occasions. For instance, in P.G.No.4 of 2006, the authority granted 26 adjournments to the petitioner between 27.02.2006 and 12.06.2007 to file counter-affidavit. The fact remains that the petitioner did not file counter-affidavit. So far as S.E.No.1 of 2005 is concerned, the arguments in that case were heard and the case was reserved for orders on 20.06.2006. At that stage, petitioner filed applications to reopen the case and to permit it to adduce additional evidence. The second respondent exhibited indulgence and ordered both the applications, though, grant of permission to adduce evidence at the stage of appeals is rare. Still, the petitioner had the audacity to accuse the second respondent, of being not fair and impartial. In his affidavit, the petitioner stated that the second respondent made an observation in the open Court that he would dismiss the appeal. If that were to be so, the question of reopening the appeal after reserving it for orders, granting permission to the petitioner, to adduce evidence at the stage of appeal, would not have arisen. One of the strong grounds urged by the petitioner is that the case was posted on 20.03.2007, which is said to be a day of Ugadi Festival. It is not in dispute that 20.03.2007 is a working day. In case the petitioner or his counsel had any inconvenience, necessary request could have been made. It was not even stated that any request for adjournment was made and refused. The very fact that no adverse orders were passed on that day, is sufficient to demonstrate the frivolous nature of the allegation. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon certain precedents, in support of his contention, that a request for transfer of the proceedings, from one forum to another must be acceded to, once a party expresses its apprehension that it may not get impartial adjudication. I n NANDI VELUGU LAKSHMI BHARATHI v. VELUGU CHANDRASEKHAR[1], this Court held that an application for transfer under Section 24 CPC can be made, even at an advanced stage. There is no quarrel with this proposition. In PREM KISHAN v. BUNDU [2], it was observed that if a party expresses apprehension that it may not get fair treatment, the proceedings deserve to be transferred. A perusal of the judgment discloses that the High Court recorded a finding to the effect that the conduct of the Presiding Officer of the trial court had added strength to the apprehension of the petitioner. I n PUSPA DEVI SARAF v. JAINARAIN PARASRAMPURIA[3], the Supreme Court was dealing with a case, where the proceedings were sought to be transferred from the court of one Additional District Judge, to another. The application was filed before the Principal District Judge, who in turn, called for report from the Presiding Officer of the concerned Additional District Judge. Apart from denying the allegations made against him, he took the view that the same amounts to contempt of court. The Supreme Court took the same into account, and felt that it would be no longer proper, to continue the proceedings, on the file of that Court. Such a situation does not exist in this case. This court strongly deprecates and denounces the manner in which the petitioner conducted itself, and the felicity, with which it made allegations against the 2nd respondent. It has already been pointed out that the application filed by the petitioner is not tenable in law. Firstly, the provision under which it was filed was not cited. Secondly, the application was filed before the very officer, who is adjudicating the disputes. Thirdly, the allegations made in the petition are baseless and unfounded. It is true that, notwithstanding the falsity of the allegations made in the application filed under Section 24 CPC, the superior Courts would normally direct the transfer of the proceedings, lest the party reels under the impression that it is not being given an impartial treatment. However, the same cannot be stretched to such an extreme, where a party, with impunity choses to make frivolous, baseless and unfounded allegations. If the request for transfer is acceded to, in such cases, it would amount to giving a licence to the parties, to make allegations of any kind, some times marring the reputation of the very institution, and then walk away with the order of transfer of proceedings. In the process, the very morale of the institution, in which the proceedings are pending, would receive a dent. A situation would emerge, where the Presiding Officer has to think always in terms of guarding himself, from the possibility of facing allegations, as and when the party senses that the result in the case may not be in his favour. Freedom of mind is one of the basic tents of adjudication. If that is at stake, the whole process would lose its sheer. Further, it is not as if that a party, who suffers a judgment in the hands of an adjudicator, is without any remedy. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis to grant relief to the petitioner. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________ L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J Dated:10.03.2008 sj ..... REGISTRAR // TRUE COPY // SECTION OFFICER To 1.2CCs to the Government Pleader for Labour, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad. (OUT) 2.2CD copies Form-NIC-OGS/WP{KURR} [1] 2003 (4) ALD 212 [2] AIR 2003 Rajasthan 62 [3] (1992)2 SCC 676