*THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY Second Appeal No.362 of 2004 % 17.11.2011 Between: # Andalu and others. …Appellants And $ K.Satyavathi (died per L.Rs.) and others. …Respondents ! COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Sri V.VENKATA RAMANA ^ COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS: Sri D.PRAKASH REDDY < Gist: > Head Note: ? CITATIONS: 1. AIR 1966 SUPREME COURT 605 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY Second Appeal No.362 of 2004 JUDGMENT: The legal representatives of the 1st defendant in O.S.No.2200 of 1985 on the file of the learned XIII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad are the appellants. The deceased-1st respondent and the 2nd respondent herein filed the suit against one Sri G.Jangaiah, who is since dead and represented by the appellants, and Sri Azeezuddin, 8th respondent for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule property, admeasuring 8055 square yards. They pleaded that the suit property was initially purchased by one Sri Gogul Chand from the Regional Commissioner of Evacuee Property in an auction in the year 1960 and that a sale certificate was issued in 1964 marked as Ex.A.3. The said land was said to have been sold in favour of Madan Mohan Rao, husband of the 1st respondent and the father of the 2nd respondent under Ex.A.6 in the year 1962. Possession of the property was said to have been delivered to him by competent authority. Reference was also made to an order of attachment obtained for the said property by one Mr.Dwarakadas in E.P.No.53 of 1962 in the Court of II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderbaad in O.S.No.53 of 1962 and to an application filed under Rule 58 of Order 21 C.P.C. by Madan Mohan Rao, in which his title was declared. They alleged that the defendants in the suit tried to interfere with their possession. Jangaiah alone contested the suit and Azeezuddin remained ex parte. It was pleaded that the suit schedule property is not in Survey Nos.294/1 to 12 and on the other hand it is in Survey No.205/3. He claimed title and possession to the land through Exs.B.1 and B.2. He alleged that respondents 1 and 2 were never in possession of the suit schedule property and that they do not have any title. Through his judgment, dated 26.11.1998, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents herein filed A.S.No.457 of 1998. The appeal was allowed through its judgment, dated 12.12.2003. Hence, this second appeal. Sri V.Venkata Ramana, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the lower appellate Court did not even frame any point for its consideration and it has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court just on the basis of certain assumptions. He contends that the respondents failed to place any reliable material in support of their plea as to the possession of the property and still the suit was decreed by the lower appellate Court. Learned counsel submits that the lower appellate Court had virtually ignored the contours of the suit and proceeded to declare the title also to certain extent. Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the possession of the respondents over the suit schedule property commenced with the delivery thereof by the competent authority under Ex.A.6 in the year 1962 and that ever since then, they are in uninterrupted possession by paying the land revenue and property tax. He further submits that though voluminous evidence was placed before the trial Court, it was brushed aside under certain sweeping observations. Learned counsel submits that the perversity on the part of the trial Court is evidenced from the fact that it recorded a finding to the effect that neither of the parties to the suit have established the title or possession vis-à-vis the property. He contends that the necessity for framing independent point by the lower appellate Court did not arise, since the suit was for the relief of injunction simplicitor. The trial Court framed only one issue for its consideration viz., whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? On behalf of the respondents, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.44 were filed. On behalf of the appellants, R.W.1 was examined and Exs.B.1 to B.30 were filed. On dismissal of the suit, the appeal was filed and the same was allowed by the lower appellate Court. It may be true that the lower appellate Court did not frame any points for its consideration. Framing of points by an appellate Court is a requirement under Rule 31 of Order 41 C.P.C. The object underlying the provision is to ensure that the lower appellate Court proceeds in a systematic and effective manner, dealing with various aspects independently and effectively. For the most part of it, the issues that are framed in the suit are reflected in the points to be framed by the lower appellate Court also, because an appeal is treated as a continuation of the suit. Whatever be the object underlying the provision; failure to frame a point by the lower appellate Court cannot be treated as fatal to the exercise undertaken by it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the provision is directory and not framing of points cannot be a ground to set aide the judgment rendered by the lower appellate Court, if it is otherwise in accordance with law. In the instant case, the lower appellate Court had straight away switched over to the discussion as to whether the respondents are entitled for the relief of injunction. It cannot be said that any serious infirmity has crept in on account of non-framing of points. Now, on merits: Though in a suit for injunction, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove the title, the respondents have not only pleaded the manner in which they have acquired title, but also placed all original records pertaining thereto before the Court. The appellants on the other hand pleaded that they acquired title in respect of almost equal extent of land under different documents. The respondents did not lay any claim for the land in Survey No.294, much less the one conveyed by the Regional Commissioner of Evacuee Property to the purchaser in auction by name, Gogul Chand. As long as they did not claim through any common source and none of them claimed rights over the land held or purchased by them, there should not have been any difficulty for the trial Court in decreeing the suit. It is only when both the parties claim rights in respect of the same property with the same boundaries, that the evaluation of the effectiveness of possession would become necessary. In the instant case, the property that was conveyed to Gogul Chand by the Regional Commissioner of Evacuee Property was with definite boundaries on all the four sides. The land covered by Exs.B.2 and B.3 though appears to be equal in its extent, it is evident that the boundaries of the land covered by Exs.B.2 and B.3, purchased by the appellants are different. The common feature, if at all, is that the property which is on the northern side of the suit schedule property is incidentally on the eastern side of the land covered by Exs.B.2 and B.3. Taking this into account, the lower appellate Court expressed the view that the two parcels of the land claimed by the parties herein may be in the neighbourhood. The respondents have placed before the trial Court Ex.A.5, the panchanama, through which the possession of the land covered by Ex.A.3 was delivered to Madan Mohan Rao himself in the year 1962. That needs to be taken as the starting point. Hardly there is any interruption, of the said possession, as is evident from the payment of tax under one category or the other, by the respondents, which is proved by filing the receipts. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court i n Ambika Prasad vs. Ram Ekbal Rai[1] becomes relevant in this regard viz., for drawing a presumption forward or backward, once the starting point as to a particular event is identified. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents failed to prove their possession over the suit scheduler property. Further, much would depend upon the nature of property and the type of exercise of rights over it. For instance, one cannot exhibit the same amount of interest, or exercise same type of rights over a full- fledged building in a busy locality, on the one hand and vacant land in a secluded place on the other hand. Suffice it to say, that the evidence on record in this is sufficient to establish the possession of the respondents over the suit schedule property. It is true that there are certain observations made by the lower appellate Court touching upon the title to the property, may be in a remote way. Even such observations cannot be treated as having any effect in the event of any further adjudication taking place, on the title of the property in the proceedings that may be initiated. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed, however by directing that none of the observations made by the trial Court or the lower appellate Court on the question of title to the suit schedule property shall be treated as final. It is also made clear that the relief of perpetual injunction granted through the present set of proceedings shall be subject to the adjudication of title in any proceedings that may be initiated in future and the consequential relief, that may be granted therein. There shall be no order as to costs. __________ 17.11.2011 Note: L.R.Copy to be marked. (B/o) JSU THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY Second Appeal No.362 of 2004 Date: 17.11.2011 JSU [1] AIR 1966 SUPREME COURT 605