1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE Letters Patent Appeal Stamp No.34702 of 2002 In First Appeal no.1143 of 2001 M/s.Raghoji Motor Goods Transport Limited & ors. Appellants Vs. Smt.Seetabai Vitthal Rathod & ors. Respondents Mr.G.S.Godbole for appellants. Mr.J.S.Chandanani for respondents. CORAM: B.H.MARLAPALLE & D.B.BHOSALE,JJ. Reserved on : August 21, 2008. Pronounced on : September 1, 2008. ORDER (PER B.H.MARLAPALLE,J.) : 1. This Letters Patent Appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and order of the Single Bench of this Court in First Appeal No.1143 of 2001 rendered on 19/3/2002. First Appeal No.1143 of 2001 was directed against the judgment and order dated 2/5/2001 rendered by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Judge, Labour Court at Solapur thereunder allowing Application (WC) No.13 of 1987. First Appeal No.1143 of 2001 was filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. We have noted that the Letters Patent Appeal has been filed on or after 6/9/2002. We had called upon the learned counsel for the appellants to argue on the point of 2 maintainability of this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. It was submitted by Mr.Godbole that the bar of Section 100-A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and as substituted by Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 is not applicable in the instant case as the impugned order of the Single Bench is dated 19/3/2002 i.e. prior to 1/7/2002. In support of these contentions Mr.Godbole relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rahul Sharad Awasthi Vs. Ratnakar Trimbak Pandit & ors. [2004 (5) Bom.C.R. 50] [2004 (5) Bom.C.R. 50] [2004 (5) Bom.C.R. 50]. The Full Bench in the said case concluded as under: (i) Section 100-A in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 substituted by section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 takes away the right of Letters Patent Appeal on and from 1st July, 2002 in respect of the suit filed before that date where the judgment or order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court in appeal against an original decree or order from such suit is rendered on or after 1st July, 2002 i.e., the date on which the amendment is brought into force. 3 Put it briefly, no Letters Patent Appeal shall lie from the judgment, decree or order of a Single Judge in the first appeal (or by whatever name called) given on or after coming into force of the new section 100-A i.e. 1st July 2002. (ii) The provisions of section 100-A in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 substituted by section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 shall not apply to the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court in appeal against an original decree or order rendered before 1st July, 2002 and the Letters Patent Appeal preferred against such judgment or order on or after 1st July, 2002. (iii) In relation to the suit instituted prior to 1st July, 2002 and the judgment or order of the Single Judge of the High Court in appeal against an original decree or order rendered before 1st July, 2002, the pending Letters Patent Appeals as on 1st July, 2002 preferred against such judgment and order of 4 the Single Judge shall remain unaffected by section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as substituted by section 4 of the Cod eof Civil Proceudre (Amendment) Act, 2002. 3. As per Mr.Godbole the observations in clause (ii) from the order of the Full Bench and as reproduced hereinabove are applicable in the instant case and the Single Judge passed the impugned order on 19/3/2002 and, therefore, though the Letters Patent Appeal has been filed after 1st July 2002 the amended provisions of Section 100-A and brought into force with effect from 1/7/2002 are not applicable in the instant case. We have no hesitation in agreeing with Mr.Godbole on his contentions that the provisions of Section 100-A of CPC as substituted and brought into force with effect from 1/7/2002 are not applicable in the instant case. 4. LPA Stamp No.15833 of 2005 filed against the judgment and order of the Single Bench in First Appeal No.696 of 2001 has been dismissed by us today as not maintainable and the said First Appeal in that case was filed under Section 82 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. Undoubtedly the order 5 passed by the Single Bench was after 1/7/2002 and Section 100-A of CPC as amended and brought into force with effect from 1/7/2002 has been held to be applicable by us to the said case. 5. It needs to be noted that Application (WC) No.13 of 1987 has been decided by the learned Judge of the Labour Court in his capacity as the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. A Judge of the Labour Court is a Member of the Judicial Service within the meaning of Article 236(b) of the Constitution as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Labour Law Practitioners’ Association and ors. [AIR 1998 SC [AIR 1998 SC [AIR 1998 SC 1233] 1233] 1233]. The application filed before him under Section 19 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a judicial proceeding. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the said Act states that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under that Act. Section 30(1) states that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the orders of a Commissioner. The first proviso below Sub-section (1) of Section 30 6 states that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. 6. In the case of Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi & ors. vs. M/s. Mackinon Machinazie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1970 Mh.L.J. 705] [1970 Mh.L.J. 705] [1970 Mh.L.J. 705], a Division Bench of this Court held that the judgment and order passed by the Single Bench in an appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act could be brought in question by filing a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. However, subsequently in the case of Dhondubai Murlidhar Reddi Vs. Proprietor, Jankidas Khandsari Sugar Factory [1991 Mh.L.J. 624] [1991 Mh.L.J. 624] [1991 Mh.L.J. 624], another Division Bench of this Court took a contrary view and held that a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court is not maintainable against the judgment and order passed by the Single Bench in an appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Therefore a reference was made to the Full Bench in the case of Gangwani & Co. Vs. Saraswati Maniram Banewar [2001 (3) All MR [2001 (3) All MR [2001 (3) All MR 370] 370] 370]. The Full Bench agreed with the view taken in the case of Dhondubai Reddi (Supra) and overruled the 7 view taken in the case of Rajiyabi Sayi (Supra). In para 33 of its judgment the Full Bench stated as under: "33. Though Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides appeal against the order passed by the Commissioner, however, all the orders passed by the Commissioner are not appealable and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under this Section is limited one and can be exercised when there is a substantial question of law involved in the matter. The High Court will not interfere with the findings arrived at by the Commissioner when the same are not vitiated by substantial error of law. In this context, it appears that at the most appellate remedy provided under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act can be equated for the limited purpose with that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure since in both these cases, interference by the High Court is possible only if there is a substantial question of law involved and not otherwise. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 8 puts an embargo on any further appeal under Letters Patent against an appellate judgment rendered by the Single Judge of the High Court. The object is to minimise delay and give finality to the adjudication. Section 100-A is inserted by the Amending Act of 1976 and after enforcement of Section 100-A, no appeal would be available from the judgment, decree or order of Single Judge in second appeal. Though the decision given by the Single Judge of the High Court in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, in the circumstances of the case, is not a judgment as envisaged in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay), however, even if we presume it to be so, even then the decision given by the Single Judge under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act will have same effect as that of the decision rendered by the Single Judge in second appeal and in view of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent Appeal against such decision of the Single Judge will not be maintainable. The view expressed by us is also consistent with the aims and objects of the Workmen’s 9 Compensation Act." . We are bound by the view taken by the Full Bench in Gangwani’s case (Supra) and we do not find any reason to take a different view. 7. Hence by following the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gangwani & Co. (Supra), we hold that this Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable and the same is hereby dismissed in limine as such. (D.B.BHOSALE,J.) (B.H.MARLAPALLE,J.)