THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.BHAVANI PRASAD W.P.No.5002 of 2010 ORDER: (Per Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed, J) This writ petition is filed assailing the order dated 16.02.2010 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Tribunal’) in O.A.No.55 of 2010, whereunder and whereby the transfer proceedings dated 02.01.2010 of the first respondent from Yeleshwaram to Gollaprolu were set aside. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the first respondent, while working as Tahsildar in the Collector Office, Kakinada, was transferred and posted to Pithapuram on 10.01.2005 and joined duty. He was again transferred to the Mandal Revenue Office, Karapa on 11.04.2006. Aggrieved by the same, he filed O.A.No.2109 of 2000, wherein the Tribunal granted interim order of status quo. While the matter stood thus, he was again transferred and posted as Administrative Officer in the Office of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Rampachodavaram on 05.05.2007. Challenging the same, he filed another O.A.No.2748 of 2007, wherein the Tribunal on 17.05.2007 granted interim order of status quo, as a result of which, the order dated 05.05.2007 was kept in abeyance vide proceedings dated 18.05.2007 of the first respondent. Subsequently, O.A.No.2748 of 2007 was closed as infructuous on 05.07.2007, but the first respondent was not repatriated to his original place. Pursuant to the representation made by the first respondent, he was posted as Tahsildar, Uppalaguptam on 15.03.2008 and from there he was transferred to Yeleshwaram on 06.06.2009. Thereafter, he was again subjected to transfer from Yeleshwaram to Gollaprolu Mandal vide proceedings dated 02.01.2010 and the 4th respondent was posted in his place. Aggrieved by the same, he filed O.A.No.55 of 2010 before the Tribunal and the same was allowed. Challenging the same, the petitioners filed the present writ petition. 3. Heard the learned Government Pleader for Services-II and the learned counsel for the first respondent. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the transfer proceedings dated 02.01.2010 were issued to the first respondent on administrative grounds and unless the transfer is effected with mala fides and is contrary to the statutory rules, it cannot be interfered with and therefore, the impugned order is contrary to the executive instructions. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Apex Court in BAREILLY ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., v. SIRAJUDDIN (Civil Appeal No.131 of 1959 dated 21.03.1960) wherein it was held as under: “The argument that the appellant did not give any reason for this retransfer though there was hue and cry against it seems to us to be wholly beside the point. Even the Tribunal did not feel inclined to make a definite finding that it was because of the union activities of the respondent that he was retransferred; it has only suggested that as a possibility. The failure of the appellant to give specific reason for the retransfer of the respondent appears to be the sole basis on which the conclusion of mala fides is founded. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the findings of mala fides can be made by industrial tribunals only after sufficient reliable evidence is led in support of it. Such a finding should not be made lightheartedly or in a casual manner as has been done by the tribunal in the present case. He has further drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Apex Court in DIRECTOR OF SCHOOL EDUCATION, MADRAS v. O. KARUPPA THEVAN[1], wherein it was held as under: “The Tribunal has erred in law in holding that the respondent employee ought to have been heard before transfer. No law requires an employee to be heard before his transfer when the authorities make the transfer for the exigencies of administration. However, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that in view of the fact that respondent’s children are studying in school, the transfer should not have been effected during mid-academic term. Although there is no such rule, we are of the view that in effecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant was unable to point out that there was such urgency in the present case that the employee could not have been accommodated till the end of the current academic year. We, therefore, while setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal, direct that the appellant should not effect the transfer till the end of the current academic year. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs. Learned Government Pleader also contended that the first respondent being a responsible Tahsildar and Mandal Executive Magistrate has violated the instructions of the higher authorities by indulging in agitations, rasta rokos and also involved in criminal cases and as per the directions of the Government, he has been transferred on administrative grounds. 5. Learned counsel for the first respondent contended that within a span of eight months, the first respondent has been transferred from one place to another without assigning any reasons whether such transfer was made on administrative grounds. He further contended that the Tribunal has not committed any error in setting aside the order impugned therein and drawn the attention of this Court to the judgments of the Apex Court in MOHINDER SINGH GILL v. THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI [2] and in A. VENUGOPAL RAO v. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER[3] wherein it was held as under: “In a case of this nature, the Court will not exercise its power of judicial review at the instance of a person who in the event of the order of transfer as against the 5th respondent being upheld would be entitled to come to his place at Movva. The State does not question the order of the Tribunal. In all probability it has accepted the order of the Tribunal. For the purpose of finding out as to whether an order of transfer has been passed by way of or in lieu of punishment or otherwise depends on facts and circumstances of each case. It is well settled principle of law that an order of transfer on administrative ground is permissible but an order of transfer by way of or in lieu of punishment is not. Only because the order impugned before the learned Tribunal did not cast any stigma the same cannot by itself be conclusive on the point that the allegations against the 5th respondent by the Collector had not been acted upon. The sequence of events as noticed hereinbefore clearly go to show that the report of the Collector had been acted upon at all levels. The 5th respondent being Deputy Executive Engineer (Panchayat Raj) could have been transferred only the State Government and an order of transfer could not have been passed by any person at the instance of the Collector.” 6. Now, the point for consideration is whether the order passed by the Tribunal suffers from any legal infirmity or procedural error. 7. We have perused the material on record. The scope of interference in the order of transfer is very narrow and limited. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision or passed by an authority not competent to do so, the same cannot be interfered with. In STATE OF U. P. vs. GOBARDHAN LAL[4] the Apex Court held as under: Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer.” In the above extracted portion of the Apex Court, it is specifically mentioned that the Courts or Tribunals, though they are appellate authorities, cannot interfere with the transfer orders, which will generally be passed on administrative grounds. In view of the same, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the transfer order dated 02.01.2010 since the first respondent was transferred from Yeleshwaram to Gollaprolu as a part of disciplinary action contemplated against him and also on administrative reasons. 8. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. No order as to costs. _____________________ GHULAM MOHAMMED,J ____________________ G.BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date:11.03.2010. sj [1] 1994 Supp(2) SCC 666 [2] AIR 1978 SC 851 [3] 2002 Suppl.(1) ALD 147 (DB) [4] 2004(11) SCC 402