HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI G.S. SINGHVI AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY Writ Petition No.22309 of 1999 Between: Syed Anwar Saleem … Petitioner And The Registrar (Vigilance Cell) High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and another … Respondents :: ORDER :: Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri V. Venkata Ramana Counsel for Respondent No.1 : Sri C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy Counsel for Respondent No.2 : G.P. for Home December 30, 2005 Per G.S. Singhvi, CJ In this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing G.O.Ms.No.48, Law (L.A. & J— Cts.C) Department dated 25-4-1996 vide which he was dismissed from service. He has further prayed for quashing communication No. RoC. 40/ 94/Vigilence Cell dated 21-1-1998 vide which he was informed about rejection of the appeal filed by him against the order of dismissal. The petitioner joined service of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’) as Lower Division Clerk on 15-8-1970. In the course of service he was promoted on various posts in the clerical cadre. In 1986, he was temporarily promoted as Munsif Magistrate. While he was posted as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur, the members of the Bar made complaint casting aspersion on his integrity and conduct. On receipt of the complaint, the High Court got a discreet enquiry made through District Judge, Mahabubnagar, who submitted report dated 10-2-1994 with the finding that allegations enumerated in the complaint were prima facie correct. After considering the preliminary enquiry report, the High Court vide its order dated 15-3-1994 placed the petitioner under suspension. Simultaneously, a regular departmental enquiry was initiated against him under Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1963 (for short ‘the Rules’) and Additional District Judge, Kurnool was appointed as enquiry officer. The following charges were framed against the petitioner: “CHARGE NO.1: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur, during a period of nine months, indulged in corruption by collecting minimum amount of Rs.200/- by way of illegal gratification for granting bails and collecting money for release of the case property in criminal cases and openly demanding huge amounts as bribe for disposal of civil suits and criminal cases and contacting private parties in his chambers and collecting amounts from them by way of illegal gratification and thereby rendering his integrity doubtful and such a conduct of the above Magistrate is unbecoming of a judicial officer and are thereby guilty of grave misconduct in contravention of R.3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964. CHARGE NO.2: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur in the course of his corrupt practices intentionally withheld confiscation of 13 cycles, which were the unclaimed case property produced by the Kollapur Police in S.T.C.30/93 on 24-12-1993 though he ordered confiscation of the cash of Rs.170/- and 7 cocks, which were later auctioned and that on 27-12- 1993, he ordered return of the 13 cycles to the petitioners, who filed petitions through Sri V. Upender, Advocate without any proof of ownership of the cycles by them and he ordered the return of the said cycles in spite of caution given to the contra by Sri C.H. Suryanarayana Murthy, Deputy Nazir of the Court and that he released the said cycles by taking bribes from the concerned petitioners and the said action besides amounting to grave misconduct is also a serious material irregularity committed by him in violation of the procedure sanctioned by law and thus the officer is guilty of grave misconduct and material irregularity in discharge of his official duty which is unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of R.3 of A.P. Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964. CHARGE NO.3: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur performed the marriage of his daughter at Hyderabad and for the said marriage, he took the clothes from the shop of Sri V. Upender, Advocate and other padmasali persons of Pentlavalli village, Kollapur Mandal, by way of illegal gratification and is thus guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964. CHARGE NO.4: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur, sought to justify his corrupt practices by openly telling in a brazen manner that High Court Judges themselves were taking bribes and there was no wrong if he took bribes and further boasting that the Hon’ble Sri Justice Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, Judge of the High Court of A.P. is closely related to him and is his god-father and so, nobody can do any harm to him and indulging in such a talk amounts to misconduct on his part, unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964. CHARGE NO.5: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur, used to close the prosecution evidence without examining the material witnesses whenever approached by the concerned parties, resulting in their acquittal and such a premature closure of the prosecution leading to miscarriage of justice for extraneous considerations amounts to misconduct on his part unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964. CHARGE NO.6: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur, was staying in the Court Chambers during the entire tenure, but claimed house rent allowance without actually taking any house on rent and such illegal drawal of house rent allowance contrary to the rules amounts to misconduct on his part unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964. CHARGE NO.7: That Sri Syed Anwar Saleem, while working as Munsif Magistrate, Kollapur, used to go to Hyderabad on every Saturday by 1 p.m. and return to headquarters on Monday at 12 Noon without permission from the superiors, which amounts to misconduct, unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1964.” The department examined 17 witnesses and produced 51 documents to prove the charges. The petitioner appeared as a witness in support of his defence and produced 18 documents. The enquiry officer submitted report dated 30-10-1995 with the conclusion that the charges No.4, 6 and 7 have been proved against the petitioner and the remaining charges have not been proved. A copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner so as to enable him to make representation against the findings and conclusions recorded by the enquiry officer. The petitioner submitted representation dated 21-12-1995, wherein he controverted the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of charges No.4, 6 and 7. The High Court did not accept the representation of the petitioner and recommended to the government that he be dismissed from service. Accordingly, proposal was forwarded to the State Government, which passed order dated 27-4-1996 dismissing the petitioner from service. Revision filed by the petitioner under Rule 21 (1) and (2) of the Rules, which was erroneously described as appeal and was dealt with as such, was dismissed by the Governor. This was conveyed to him vide letter dated 21-1-1998. The petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal as also rejection of his revision on the following grounds: a. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of charges No.4, 6 and 7 which were accepted by the High Court on administrative side are based on no evidence and, therefore, the order of punishment is liable to be declared as vitiated by an error of law. b. The allegations levelled in the complaint made by the advocates were motivated and the same should not have been acted upon by the High Court for initiation of departmental inquiry. c. Charge No.7 was vague to the core and, in any case, he could not have been punished for leaving the headquarter because he used to obtain permission for doing so from District Judge, Mahabubnagar. In the counter filed on behalf of respondent No.1 it has been averred that the petitioner was dismissed from service because he was found guilty of grave misconduct. It has been further averred that the departmental inquiry was held against the petitioner strictly in accordance with the rules and the principles of natural justice and the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of charges No.4, 6 and 7 are based on cogent evidence produced during the enquiry. Sri V. Venkata Ramana argued that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer on Charges No.4, 6 and 7 are not based on correct appreciation of evidence and the High Court committed a grave illegality by accepting the same and making recommendation to the State Government for the petitioner’s dismissal from service. Learned counsel emphasized that the bald statements made by some advocates that the petitioner had openly claimed his association with a Judge of the High Court and that there was nothing wrong in accepting bribe by the members of the subordinate judiciary because Judges of the High Court were also accepting bribe could not be made basis for recording a finding against him more so when no corroborative evidence was produced by the department to substantiate the charge. He then argued that the finding recorded on the charge of the petitioner taking rent while living in the Chamber is based on a misreading of evidence and should have been ignored by the High Court. In regard to Charge No.7, learned counsel argued that the finding of the enquiry officer is based on surmises and conjectures and, in any case, the petitioner could not be held guilty because he used to leave the headquarters after obtaining permission from District Judge, Mahaboobnagar. In the end, Sri Venkata Ramana argued that even if the Court is not inclined to interfere with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of three charges, the punishment of dismissal should be substituted with a lesser penalty by invoking the doctrine of proportionality. Learned counsel submitted that the extreme penalty of dismissal from service was not at all warranted because the petitioner had not been found guilty of financial misdemeanor. He further submitted that the High Court and the State Government should have taken into consideration the fact that as on the date of punishment, the petitioner had completed 30 years service without any blemish and a less severe penalty like compulsory retirement would have met the ends of justice. Sri C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, counsel for the High Court and the learned Government Pleader defended the decision of the respondents to dismiss the petitioner from service and argued that in exercise of power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot interfere with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the discretion exercised by the employer in the matter of imposition of penalty. Sri Reddy took us through the findings recorded by the enquiry officer to show that all the three charges were found proved on the basis of evidence produced by the department. He submitted that the petitioner has not been able to substantiate the suggestive allegations of ulterior motive on the part of the advocates and, therefore, this Court should not upset the well reasoned findings recorded by the enquiry officer. Sri Reddy emphasized that the High Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters, and, therefore, there is no warrant for interference with the punishment imposed on the petitioner who has been found guilty of grave misconduct. We have given serious thought to the respective arguments. Before adverting to the questions whether the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of Charges No.4, 6 and 7 are based on no evidence and the order of punishment is liable to be declared as vitiated as an error of law and, whether the punishment of dismissal imposed on the petitioner is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or is totally arbitrary, unreasonable and unconscionable, we deem it proper to remind ourselves of the limited scope of the High Court’s power of judicial review in such matters. The prayer made by the petitioner in the writ petition is essentially for issuance of a writ of certiorari. The parameters for exercise of the High Court’s power to issue a writ of certiorari are well defined. Such writ, order or direction can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals or quasi-judicial authorities. A writ can also be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority acts illegally or improperly, i.e., it decides a question without giving an opportunity of hearing to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it is opposed to the principles of natural justice. However, it must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and not appellate one. This necessarily means that the finding of fact reached by the inferior Court, Tribunal, etc., as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings except when the judgment, order or award suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. An error of law is one which can be discovered on a bare reading of the judgment, order or award under challenge along with the documents which have been relied upon by the inferior Court, Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. An error, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailed scrutiny of the evidence produced by the parties and lengthy debate at the bar cannot be regarded as an error of law for the purpose of a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority can be corrected only if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Court etc., had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence and the same has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as error of law which can be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari. Likewise, mere possibility of forming a different opinion on re- appreciation of evidence produced by the parties is not sufficient for issue of a writ of certiorari. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Court’s power to issue the writ of certiorari and laid down the following propositions: “A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court.” In Shaikh Mahammad Umarsaheb v. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab and others their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of High Court’s power under Article 226 to re-appreciate the evidence produced before the trial Judge, held as under: “Where the evidence adduced before the trial Judge was not so immaculate that another Judge might not have taken a different view, it cannot be said that there was no evidence on which the trial Judge could have come to the conclusion he did. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227.” In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others the Supreme Court upheld the order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed against the order of the petitioner’s removal from the office of the President of Municipal Committee. Some of the observations made in that decision, which are worth noticing read as under: “The court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.” The proposition laid down in Sayed Yakoob1 (supra) has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar & Anr. v. Ist ADJ Varanasi & ors. We may now notice some decisions which have bearing on the High Court’s power to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings and the order of punishment. In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, the Supreme Court considered whether the High Court can interfere with the order of punishment simply because finding recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of some charges is found to be vitiated by an error of law and whether it can go into the sufficiency and adequacy of punishment. While reversing the order of Orissa High Court, which had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: “But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were ‘unassailable’, the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the inquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice.” In State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao the Supreme Court indirectly reiterated the proposition laid down in Bidyabhushan Mohapatra5 (supra) and held: “The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding ... under Article 226 of the Constitution.” In Rly. Board v. Niranjan Singh the principle laid down in Bidyabhushan Mohapatra5 (supra) was reiterated. In State of Madras v. G. Sundaram the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition: “High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It cannot consider adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge.” In State of A.P. v. C. Venkata Rao a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court referred to the judgments of Syed Yakoob1 (supra), Bidyabhushan Mohapatra5 (supra), Niranjan Singh7 (supra) and observed: “In considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court need not be applied. Even if that rule is not applied by a domestic