IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOMAS P.JOSEPH THURSDAY, THE 18TH MARCH 2010 / 27TH PHALGUNA 1931 RSA.NO. 245 OF 2010() -------------------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 17/11/2009 IN IA 1648/2007 IN AS.67/2008 OF SUB COURT, OTTAPPALAM OS.167/1998 OF MUNSIFF COURT, OTTAPPALAM .................... APPELLANT/APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF --------------------------------------------------- ASMABEEVI, D/O.KUNHU MUHAMMED, AGED 36 YEARS, KARUPPAM VEETTIL, K.K.COLONY, MUNDAMUKA AMSOM, CHUDUVALATHUR DESOM, OTTAPALAM TALUK. BY ADV. SRI.JACOB SEBASTIAN SRI.S.SANTHOSH KUMAR (BALARAMAPURAM) RESPONDENT(S): RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. KUNHIMALU @ KHADEEJA, W/O.PALAKKAPARAMBIL LATE MOOSA, AGED 66 YEARS, MUNDAMUKA AMSOM, CHUDUVALATHUR DESOM, OTTAPALAM TALUK. 2. RAZACK, S/O.PALAKKAPARAMBIL LATE MOOSA, MUNDAMUKA AMSOM, CHUDUVALATHUR DESOM THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18/03/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: THOMAS P.JOSEPH, J. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = R.S.A. NO.245 of 2010 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 18th day of March, 2010 J U D G M E N T --------------------- Appellant before me is the plaintiff in O.S.No.167 of 1998. That is a suit for recovery of possession of the property referred to in the plaint schedule. According to the appellant property belong to her as per document No.1094 of 1996 executed by one Latheef. The said Latheef had earlier assigned 7½ cents of land to the appellant and her children as per document No.2641 of 1988. Property of respondents is situated on the south of the suit property. She alleged trespass into the suit property on 18.3.1998. Respondents contended that appellant has no title or possession over the disputed plot of land and that Latheef had no property with him after assignment deed No.2641 of 1988 (relating to the 7.5 cents assigned to the appellant and her children). They also contended that execution of assignment deed No.1094 of 1996 was only to facilitate a false claim over their property. Appellant gave evidence as P.W1 and proved Exts.A1 to A4. On the side of respondents D.W.1 was examined and they R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 2 :- proved Exts.B1 to B3. Exhibit C1 series are the report and plan produced by the Advocate Commissioner. Trial court found that appellant is not entitled to recover possession of the property. That finding was based also on an admission made by the appellant as P.W.1 that the entire property of Latheef was assigned to her as per Ext.B2, assignment deed No.2641 of 1988. After 1350 days appellant filed A.S.No.67 of 2008 with I.A. No.1648 of 2007 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (for short, “the Act”) to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Reason stated in the affidavit is that she had instructed her counsel to prefer an appeal, counsel promised to do so but in August, 2007 when she made enquiry she was told that no appeal had been filed. Application was opposed by the respondent denying the statements in the affidavit of the appellant as to cause of delay and contending that there was no sufficient cause to condone the delay. Appellant gave evidence as P.W1. Respondents examined her counsel as R.W.1. Learned Sub Judge found that reasons stated by the appellant for condonation of delay is proved to be incorrect and hence the request for condonation of delay cannot be R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 3 :- entertained. I.A. No.1648 of 2007 was dismissed. Consequence was dismissal of A.S. No.67 of 2008. Hence the Second Appeal raising by way of substantial question of law whether first appellate court was legally correct on the facts and circumstances of the case in dismissing I.A. No.1658 of 2007. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353), State of Kerala v. Havea Combines (2009 [1] KLT 451) and State of Karnataka v. Moideen Kunhi (AIR 2009 SC 2577). Learned counsel submitted that the expression “sufficient cause” must be given liberal interpretation so as to advance cause of justice, appellant has a meritorious case to be argued before the first appellate court and on the facts and circumstances of the case, also considering the pitiable situation in which the appellant is placed first appellate court ought to have exercised discretion in favour of the appellant and condoned the delay. According to learned counsel even if delay is condoned what could happen at the R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 4 :- worst is that if the appeal of the appellant is not meritorious it would end in a dismissal. 2. Section 5 of the Act gives discretionary jurisdiction on the court to condone delay when it is shown that party concerned was prevented by sufficient cause from not filing the appeal on time. The Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd (AIR 1962 SC 361) has stated that discretion in that regard can be exercised only if sufficient cause is shown as is clear from the expression “may be admitted” occurring in Sec.5 of the Act. No doubt, authoritative pronouncements on the point say that in considering whether sufficient cause is made out courts have to adopt a liberal approach so as to advance the cause of justice. At the same time courts cannot also be oblivious of the fact that law of limitation is a Statute of peace and repose intended to give finality for decisions of the court and to prevent long, dormant claims being raked up again. Question whether a party was prevented by sufficient cause from not preferring the appeal on time has to depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 5 :- Katiji (supra) Supreme Court has stated the guidelines to be borne in mind while considering sufficient cause is made out. One of the circumstances stated is that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Legislature has conferred power on the court under Sec.5 of the Act to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merit. In State of Kerala v. Havea Combines (supra) mistaken legal advice was held to be not generally applicable as sufficient cause to condone delay. It was held that the question whether there was sufficient case must be decided on the facts of the case. In State of Karnataka v. Moideen Kunhi (supra) decision taken is that the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal consideration to advance cause of justice. I think, there could be no quarrel on the above propositions. Power of the court is to administer justice and in cases where a liberal interpretation of the expression 'sufficient cause' is required it is the responsibility of the court to do so. It is also the position of law that whether circumstances pleaded would amount to sufficient cause has to be decided on the R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 6 :- facts pleaded. Court cannot go beyond the facts pleaded to hold that party concerned has sufficient cause to prefer the appeal beyond the prescribed time. The Supreme Court in Pundik J.Patil v. Executive Engineer (2009 [1] KLT SN 25 (Case No.26) SC ) held that incorrect statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay itself is sufficient to reject the application without any further enquiry as to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient cause to condone the delay. That is because a party taking a false stand to get rid of the bar of limitation should not be encouraged to get any premium on the falsehood on his part by condoning delay. 3. Now coming to the facts pleaded in the case on hand as I stated earlier case set up by the appellant is that after the suit was dismissed on 9.10.2003 copy of judgment and decree were applied on 3.11.2003 and she had instructed the counsel to prefer the appeal and the counsel in turn promised to do so. In August, 2007 (i.e., after almost 4 years) she enquired about the matter and learnt that no appeal had been preferred. Appellant gave evidence as P.W1 in that line. But in cross-examination she R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 7 :- stated that she got back the case records from her counsel on 27.11.2003. This is also proved by the endorsement made by the appellant (Ext.X1) to that effect. She has also stated that she had consulted several lawyers in the matter and all of them had advised her to file appeal. But to none of them the case file which was with her was given. Respondents examined the counsel for the appellant as R.W.1. He stated that after the dismissal of the suit appellant got back the file from him (as admitted by P.W.1 and as seen from Ext.X1). Thereafter appellant approached the Women’s Commission, Lok Adalath and the Police with her case as to recoverability of the property. 4. The only ground pleaded by the appellant is about the instruction given to the counsel and promise made by him to file appeal. That has been proved to be incorrect, if not false by the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 and Ext.X1. Once reason stated by the appellant is found to be incorrect then the question of liberal interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause” based on incorrect facts did not arise as observed by the Supreme Court in Pundik J.Patil v. Executive Engineer (supra). In such a situation R.S.A. No.245 of 2010 -: 8 :- court cannot travel beyond the case pleaded by the appellant to find out a case for the appellant and then hold that there is sufficient cause and condone the delay. Appellant has to blame herself for the delay. In the light of the above I am inclined to think that by no stretch of imagination reason stated by the appellant can be brought within the mischief of the expression “sufficient cause”. That being the legal and factual position I do not find anything illegal in the first appellate court refusing to condone the delay. No substantial question of law is involved. Second Appeal is dismissed in limine. Interlocutory Application Nos.618 and 619 of 2010 shall stand dismissed. THOMAS P.JOSEPH, JUDGE. vsv