THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY Crl.Rc.No.1017 of 2002 JUDGMENT: 1. This revision is filed under Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. against judgment made in M.C.No.16 of 2000 dated 16.11.2001 on the file of the Family Court at Kurnool dismissing the petition. 2. The revision petitioner has filed application under Section 4(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short ‘the Act’) claiming monthly maintenance of Rs.500/- from the first respondent-Wakf Board. After considering the matter, the Court below has dismissed the petition holding that the petition is not maintainable against the Wakf Board without exhausting necessary remedy under Section 3 of the Act proceeding against her divorced husband. Hence this revision. 3. It is the contention of learned counsel for the revision petitioner that by virtue of Section 3 of the Act, the revision petitioner got right to proceed against her divorced husband for maintenance within the ‘iddat’ period only and in fact that ‘iddat’ period was over and the question of providing maintenance by him to her beyond that period does not arise and further she got option to approach concerned Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class either under Section 125 Cr.P.C. or under Section 3 or 4 of the Act subject to the completion of ‘iddat’ period subsequent to her husband divorcing her and the Court below committed error in holding that without taking recourse under Section 3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d) of the Act, she got no right to take recourse of Section 4(1) of the Act. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered by this Court in MUNEER HASSAN KHAN v. FAREEDA KHATOON AND ANOTHER[1]. 4. On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned counsel for respondent that by virtue of Section 125 Cr.P.C., the petitioner got right to proceed against her husband for her maintenance even though her husband divorced her and the corresponding iddat period was over in support of which, the learned counsel has relied upon the decision in SHABANA BANO v. IMRAN KHAN[2]. 5. It is to be examined as to whether Section 4 of the Act as it postulates comes into picture only after exhausting the necessary remedies provided under Section 3 of the Act with regards to the question of her maintenance, whereas Section 3 of the Act provides that she got a right to proceed against her divorced husband for the purpose of collecting necessary maintenance during the Iddat period and also collecting Mahr o r Dover from him, section 4 of the Act clearly and categorically postulates that she got right to proceed against her relatives or State Wakf Board to claim maintenance in the manner stated therein during the post iddat period not withstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of the Act or in any other law for the time being in force which includes the application of section 3 of the Act. 6. Actually, it is the observation of the enquiry Court relying upon the decision reported in DANIAL LATIFI AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA [IV (2001) CCR 81 (SC)] that the petitioner is entitled to proceed against her divorced husband Meera Vali and claim a lumpsum amount towards reasonable and fair provision for her livelihood until her death or her remarriage whichever is earlier and therefore the petition filed against the first respondent under section 4(1) of the Act got no application in view of the provisions of section 3 of the Act as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 7. The Apex Court further, held; “The important section in the Act is Section 3 which provides that divorced woman is entitled to obtain from her former husband ‘maintenance’ ‘provision’ and ‘mahr’ and to recover from his possession her wedding presents and dowry and authorise the Magistrate to order payment or restoration of these sums or properties. The crux of the matter is that the divorced woman shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the ‘iddat’ period by her former husband. The wordings of section 3 of the Act appear to indicate that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations: (1) to make a ‘reasoinable and fair provision’ for his divorced wife; and (2) to provide ‘maintenance’ for her. The emphasis of this section is not on the nature or duration of any such ‘provision’ or ‘maintenance’ but on the time by which an agreement for payment of provision and maintenance should be concluded, ‘within the iddat period’. If the provisions are so read, the Act would exclude from liability for post-iddat period maintenance to a man who has already discharged his obligations of both ‘reasonable’ and fair provision’ and ‘maintenance’ by paying these amounts in a lumpsum to his wife, in addition to having paid his wife’s Mahr and restored her dowry as per section 3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d) of the Act”. 8. In SHABANA BANO’s case (2 supra) considered the question of application of Section 125 Cr.P.C. in favour of a muslim woman against her divorced husband, which aspect is quite different. 9. Further, in MUNEER HASSAN KHAN’s case (1 supra) it is considered the scope of Section 3(1) of the Act and it is held that the divorced husband is liable to pay necessary or reasonable maintenance to his divorced wife within the period of ‘iddat’ covering her entire future life or till she gets married for the second time and if he fails to pay the amount accordingly she can approach concerned court under Section 3(2) of the Act to recover the amounts. There is no specific consideration of Section 4 of the Act without exhausting necessary remedy under Section 3 of the Act. 10. In the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court and so also in the light of the judgment of this Court referred above, it is crystal clear that a divorced muslim wife is entitled to reasonable maintenance for her entire future life payable to her during the ‘iddat’ period by her divorced husband by virtue of Section 3 of the Act and unless the same remedy is exhausted the question of application of Section 4 of the Act does not arise at all. Even though the scope of Section 4 of the Act is not considered in the decision of this Court the same is implied in view of the observations made. 11. Therefore, the claim is not tenable when it is clear that Section 3 of the Act has not been complied with before resorting to Section 4 of the Act. 12. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the Court below has examined the matter properly and there is no reason to interfere with its findings. The revision is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. ________________________ G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY,J Date: 23.6.2011 DA [1] 2003(1) ALT (Crl.) 428 (A.P) [2] (2010) 1 SCC 666