IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA LPA No.383 of 2009 1. JAI KUMAR SINGH SON OF LATE SURYADEO SINGH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE- TAMSHI,P.S.- KUTUMBA,DISTRICT- AURANGABAD 2. ALPANA SINGH D/O SRI RAM NIWAS SINGH, R/O VILLAGE— TAMSHI, P.S.- KUTUMBA, DISTRICT- AURANGABAD …………………………APPELLANTS Versus 1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA 2. THE DIRECTOR, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA 3. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, PATNA 4. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT- AURANGABAD 5. MD. SHABIR AHMAD S/O MD. SHARIF R/O MOHALLA- ISHAN TOLI, P.S.- AURANGABAD, DISTRICT- AURANGABAD 6. KIRHSNA KUMAR SINGH S/O BINDESHWARI SINGH, R/O VILLAGE- GHUGHI, P.S.- KUTUMBAM, DISTRICT- AURANGABAD 7. SUNIL KUMAR PANDEY, S/O YOGESH PANDEY, R/O VILLAGE- WAAR, P.S.- MADANPUR,DISTRICT- AURANGABAD …………………….RESPONDNETS. ----------- For the appellants :- Mr. Rajendra Pd. Singh, Sr. Advocate For the State :- Mr. Lalit Kishore, Sr. Advocate, AAG III Mr. Rabindra Kr. Priyadarshi, AC to AAG III Mr. Piyush Lal, AC to AAG III. ------------------------ 10 30/11/2009 Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the State of Bihar. Altogether four writ petitions, filed by large number of petitioners, have been dismissed through the common judgment and order dated 22.1.2009. The appellants are 2 of the 5 writ petitioners of C.W.J.C. No. 14222 of 2008. The main issue between the parties relates to recognition of Shiksha Visharad degree granted by Hindi 2 Sahitya Sammelan, Prayag, Allahabad as equivalent to a degree of Bachelor in Education in the State of Bihar. If the issue was decided in favour of the appellants, they would have gained eligibility for appointment as Panchayat Teachers. The writ court has considered an earlier judgment of this court in the case of Rajnish Kumar Versus State of Bihar reported in 2007 (2) PLJR 641 whereby a learned Single Judge of this Court held that in absence of any documentary proof, the plea asserting that prior to coming into force of the National Council for the Teachers Education Act on 17.8.1995 or even thereafter, the decree of Shiksha Visharad was accepted as a decree equivalent to teachers training qualification cannot be accepted. Accordingly, similar claims in a number of analogous writ petitions were rejected. In L. P. A. No. 45 of 2007 preferred against that judgment, the Division Bench did not interfere or take a different view but only allowed the prayer of the appellants in those appeals that they may approach the State Government for effectively deciding the issue in accordance with law. After the aforesaid order of the Division Bench the issue was decided against the candidates aspiring to become teachers by a decision dated 24.7.2008. That was challenged through a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. 3 No. 15605 of 2007 and analogous cases. The writ court by order dated 9.9.2008 came to the finding that the decision had been taken at the stage of Principal Secretary of the Department whereas it should have been taken at the government level, hence, the order dated 24.7.2008 was set aside and the matter was remanded for a fresh reasoned decision by the State Government. Such fresh decision dated 20.11.2008 also declined to grant equivalence claimed by the writ petitioners. The writ court on looking into the original records came to the conclusion that this time the matter had received the consideration and approval of the departmental minister on 18.11.2008 and only, thereafter, the decision dated 20.11.2008 was issued in compliance of the order of this court. The writ court further considered the submission that the order should be declared illegal because the decision had been issued without sending the matter for consideration before the Chief Minister, which, according to the writ petitioners, was required by Rule 32 (a) (ii) of the Rules of Executive Business which has been extracted by the writ court which held that ordinarily such matters are required to be disposed under the authority of the Minister Incharge of Department as per Rule 21 of the 4 Rules of Executive Business and in any case according to the writ court, the Rules of Executive Business were only directory. The same issue was raised before us and after considering the matter from different perspective, we find that the basic issue was whether the State of Bihar had ever recognized or granted equivalence between the decree of Shiksha Visharad granted by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan and the decree of B. Ed. or not. For deciding this issue the impugned order dated 20.11.2008 itself discloses that opportunity was given to the writ petitioners/claimants to produce all relevant materials. In our view, the issue arising in the writ petitions did not require a policy decision which usually governs present and future matters but required a thorough scrutiny of relevant documents and claims for coming to a reasoned decision whether the claim of the writ petitioners was correct or not. Such a case may loosely be called as a policy decision on account of its significance and effect on several persons like the writ petitioners but this alone may not ipso facto place the case into the category of:- “cases raising questions of policy and cases of administrative importance not covered by the third schedule”. Hence, in our view, in order to succeed it was necessary for the writ petitioners to produce before the 5 State Government or before this court necessary documents which could support their claim that the degree which they have from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan issued prior to 1995 has been given status of a degree equivalent to a B. Ed. Degree by the State of Bihar or even by State of Uttar Pradesh. No such document was produced either before the government or before us. We are also in agreement with the views of the writ court derived after referring to several supreme court judgments that mater relating to grant of equivalence or fixing eligibility criteria for recruitment fall within the ambit of policy to be decided by the State and this court cannot stand in appeal over such policy decisions unless it is proved that a particular policy decision is malafide, perverse or irrational so as to be arbitrary. Since we are in agreement with the views expressed by the writ court, it is not necessary to discuss the matter any further in details. The appeal is found to be without merits. It is dismissed accordingly. (Shiva Kirti Singh, ACJ.) (Shyam Kishore Sharma, J.) avin