1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FIRST APPEAL NO. 273 OF 2000 ALONGWITH FIRST APPEAL NOS. 274 TO 280 OF 2000 The State of Maharashtra ) .......Appellant versus Kalyanchand Manakchand Lalwani)........ Respondant. Mr. A.R. Patil AGP for the Appellant. Mr. P.N. Joshi for the respondent. CORAM: SWATANTER KUMAR, C.J., & A.P. DESHPANDE, J. DATED: 09th SEPTEMBER, 2008. P.C.: 1. By this judgment we dispose of the above eight appeals, which were listed for hearing before the court. The Reference Court vide its award judgment dated 30th June 1999 enhanced the compensation payable to the claimants varying in each award which was passed by the Collector with statutory benefits of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, limited to the amount of excess land value i.e. awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The State came in appeal challenging the 2 higher compensation awarded to the claimants. By the present appeals the legality and correctness of the judgment is challenged mainly on the ground that the compensation awarded to the claimants for acquisition of their land is unduly excessive and is based upon the finding recorded without proper appreciation of evidence. The necessary facts are that the Special Land Acquisition Officer acting on behalf of the State issued a Notification under section 4 of the Act on 12th March 1981. This acquisition was for public purposes namely Integrity Urban Development Project at Manmad, District Nashik. The Special Land Acquisition Officer exercising powers of the Collector under the Act published his award under section 11 of the Act on 23rd September 1986 and awarded the compensation to the claimants for acquisition of their land. The claimants were dis-satisfied by the compensation and preferred a reference under section 18 of the Act which in turn formulated by the Collector to the Reference Court vide its judgment and award dated 23-01-1991 and enhanced the compensation payable to the claimants. 2. We have already noticed the challenge on behalf of the State. However on behalf of the claimants while praying to sustain the award made by the Collector it is also argued that the claimants would be entitled to interest on the composite amount inclusive of excess value of the land and other statutory benefits 3 on the amount payable to the claimants in accordance with the law. 3. Secondly it is contended that even if the judgment of this court in First Appeal No.1505/96 decided on 27th August 2004 relied upon by the State has to be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, he is entitled to increase at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount determined as fair market value of the land at the time of its acquisition. 4. We are unable to contribute to the argument raised on behalf of the State that the judgment of the learned Reference Court is based on no evidence. In fact, the learned Reference Court has not only examined the sale deeds, which were basis for its entire discussion and conclusion, and various land reference and judgments of this court, which were produced as Exhs. 23, 25, 31, 32, 45 and 52. Reliance was also placed upon Section 23 in Land Reference No. 270/87 decided by the court. Be that as it may, it is entirely unnecessary for us to debate any further on this issue as it is even commonly conceded at the bar in the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manmad Municipal Council Vs. Rikabchand M. Lalwani and anr. In First Appeal No.1505 of 1996, which squarely covers the issue on fact and law involved in the present case. The said judgment 4 relates to the same village and land acquired for the same project. In otherwords this judgment being on the principle of Audi Altran parten clearly concludes the issue in the present appeal. There is no dispute even to this proposition. However the counsel appearing for claimants submits that the claimants have preferred appeal against this judgment, obviously without prejudice to the right of the parties. Applying the costs determined in the First Appeal of Shivchand, we will take the face value at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. meter and in that case though the reference court has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. mtr. the Division Bench of this Court by a detailed judgment has reduced the compensation payable to the claimants at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. mtr. In the case of Rikabchand (supra) Notification under section 4 was issued on 27-2-1981. While in the present case it has been issued on 13-12-1988. Thus there is difference of merely seven years and ten months. Thus the claimants would be entitled to some element of increase for the intervening period between the two notifications. The learned counsel appearing for claimants relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Omprakash (Dead) by Lrs. And others Vs. Union of India and another reported in 2004 LAC 493 (SC). While the counsel appearing for the Claimants contended that the increase should be 12% per annum, and thus they would be entitled to receive compensation at the rate of Rs. 58 per sq. mtr. 5 On the contrary, the counsel appearing for the State relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer Vs. Ramanjulu and others reported in (2005) 9 SCC 594 to contend that the increase in any case should not be more than 10%. This would depend on the evidence produced by the parties. There is no evidence led by the Plaintiff to show on record that there was slight increase in the land price and that there were different transactions, which would justify the highest percentage to be awarded so as to enable the court to award to the claimants the maximum percentage of increase that would be paid to them. Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, and particularly the judgment of this court in Rikabchand's case where different sale deeds were considered we are of the considered opinion that it will be just and fair to award 10% increase to the claimants in the intervening period. Therefore while determining just and fair market value of the land as on the date of acquisition, we would award compensation to the claimants at the rate of Rs. 53 per sq. mtr. i.e. Rs. 30/- as awarded in the case of Rikabchand and 10% increase in the intervening period from 27-4-1981 to 13-12-1988. As far as payment of interest on the excess land value, it is contended on behalf of the State that no such cross objection or cross appeal is filed on behalf of the claimant while challenging the finding 6 recorded by the learned Reference Court in the impugned judgment. Thus the claimants cannot claim any benefit. It will be useful to refer to the relevant paragraph of the judgment of the Reference Court where the reliefs of enhancing the compensation payable to the claimants at the rate of Rs. 340 per sq. mtr. is granted which reads thus: “ In view of Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act the Claimants are entitled to get interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of possession for the first year and after its expiry further interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum till realisatioon of the entire amount of the excess land value i.e. Land value awarded by the Court less the Land value awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (for this reliance is kept on the decision of Apex Court in Premnath kapoor Vs. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. 1996 (2) S.C.C.C. 71.)” 5. At the outset, we may notice that on the conjoint reading of Order 41, Rules 22 and 33, the power of the Court to grant appropriate raise would not be controlled by the limitation and objection raised on behalf of the State. However, these are statutory benefits, which are payable to the claimants not by any act of State but in law. These are compulsory acquisition and to deny even the statutory benefits to the claimants would be unjust and unfair. The claimants are supporting the judgment 7 which had granted relief to them much in excess than what the court has granted. To that extent the appeal of the State is to be accepted. In these circumstances, we find the contention of the State are tenable. The learned counsel appearing for the claimants relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court (supra) and contended that the statutory benefits can be granted to the claimants even if the cross objection or cross appeal was not specifically filed. Besides this, the constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunder Vs. Union of India reported in 2001 (7) SCC 211 has also taken the same view. In this view of the matter there is no reason for this court to deny the statutory benefits to the claimants. It is the duty of the court to see that the statutory benefits are granted to the claimants and being not digested of their right without payment of their compensation. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in holding that the claimants would be entitled to interest on the deposit amount i.e. excess land value and of the statutory benefits. In view of the above discussion, we accept partially the appeals filed by the State and modify the order of the learned Reference Court to the extent that the claimants would be entitled to receive compensation of the land at the rate of Rs. 53/- per sq. mtr. with interest on deposit amount i.e. excess land value and statutory benefits. The amount withdrawn by the claimants, if it is in excess of the decree passed by this court, the claimants shall 8 restore the same to the State within four weeks from today. No order as to costs. CHIEF JUSTICE A.P. DESHPANDE, J.