R.S.A. No. 1396 of 2010 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH R.S.A. No. 1396 of 2010 (O&M) Date of decision: 31.03.2010 Haryana Vidyut Parsaran Nigam Ltd., Panchkula and others ....Appellants versus Smt. Geeta Devi and others ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD K. SHARMA Present: - Mr. K.S. Malik, Advocate, for the appellants. *** VINOD K. SHARMA, J. (ORAL) This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 24.3.2009, passed by the learned lower appellate Court, decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondents, for recovery of damages on account of death of Randhir Singh by electrocution. The learned trial Court, dismissed the suit for want of proof of negligence, on the part of the appellants for maintaining the electric supply, and also for the reason, that no complaint regarding defect, in electric line was made to the department by the complainant or any villager prior to or after the incident. In appeal, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was reversed, and the plaintiff/respondents were held entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.2,40,000/- (Rupees two lac and forty thousand only). In order to hold the defendant/appellants responsible for the negligence, the learned lower appellate Court placed reliance on R.S.A. No. 1396 of 2010 (O&M) -2- letter Ex.PA, which was written by the SDO, wherein death by electrocution was admitted. The learned lower appellate Court also appreciated the evidence i.e. post-mortem report, wherein it was recorded that the deceased had died due to the electrocution. On appreciation of evidence, the learned lower appellate Court held that the negligence of the appellants in maintaining the electricity supply, was proved. The learned lower appellate Court awarded compensation of Rs.2,40,000/- (Rupees two lac and forty thousand only), by taking the income of the deceased to be only Rs.1,500/- (Rupees one thousand and five hundred only) per month, for the reason that the plaintiff/respondents were not able to prove the claimed income of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) per month. It was for want of proof, that the income of the deceased, was taken to be Rs.1,500/- (Rupees one thousand and five hundred only) and thereafter by applying the settled principle for grant of compensation, 1/3rd was deducted towards personal expenses and the loss was calculated at Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) per month. Furthermore, keeping in view the age of the deceased and by applying suitable multiplier, a sum of Rs.2,40,000/- (Rupees two lac and forty thousand only) was granted, as damages. Learned lower appellate Court did not agree with the contention of the appellants, with regard to the fact that the suit was liable to be dismissed for want of court fee. The learned lower appellate Court accordingly accepted the appeal and passed the decree subject to depositing of court fee for a sum R.S.A. No. 1396 of 2010 (O&M) -3- of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lac only), as was claimed. Mr. K.S. Malik, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, challenged the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court by contending that this appeal raises the following substantial questions of law: - “1. Whether the appellants can be held liable to pay compensation without proving the negligence on the part of the officials in discharging their duty? 2. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court is outcome of misreading of evidence and, therefore, perverse?” In support of the substantial questions of law, the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended, that the learned lower appellate Court wrongly reversed the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, even though the plaintiff/respondents had failed to prove the negligence on the part of the officials in maintaining the electricity supply or their negligence in performance of their duties. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that in absence of any complaint prior or after the incident, the learned lower appellate Court could not have attributed negligence to the appellants. The judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court, therefore, is outcome of mis-reading of evidence, thus, perverse. On consideration, I find no force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. Ex.PA was a letter written by SDO, wherein the death by electrocution was admitted, as the correspondence was done by SDO with the brother of the deceased. Not only this, plaintiff/respondents led evidence to prove the death by R.S.A. No. 1396 of 2010 (O&M) -4- electrocution, by placing and proving the post-mortem report. The oral evidence was also led in support of the complaint. The learned lower appellate Court, on appreciation of evidence, recorded a finding of fact that the negligence on the part of the appellants. It was proved that there was a current in the pole, which resulted in electrocution of the deceased. The finding of the learned lower appellate Court, cannot be said to be outcome of misreading of evidence or perverse, as contended. This Court in Regular Second Appeal cannot reappraise the evidence, as the learned lower appellate Court is final Court of finding of fact. The finding recorded by the learned lower appellate Court on facts cannot be interfered with, unless shown to be outcome of misreading of evidence or otherwise perverse. The substantial questions of law, referred to above, are answered against the appellants. This appeal is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 279 days in filing the appeal. The reason given for condonation of delay reads as under: - “2. That the impugned judgment and decree was passed on 24.3.2009 and the appellant applied for getting the certified copy of the same on 27.3.2009 which was prepared on 28.3.2009 and received by the appellant on 2.4.2009. After getting the copy of the impugned judgment and decree which was sent to the L.R. office on 20.4.2009 for giving its opinion for filing the appeal. The L.R. advised the appellant for filing the appeal in this Hon'ble court. However, the instruction for filing appeal issued vide letter dated 20.10.2009 which was received by R.S.A. No. 1396 of 2010 (O&M) -5- the appellant on 4.11.2009. Due to procedural official delay, the delay of 279 days in filing the present R.S.A. has occurred.” The reading of para 2 would show that the allegations are vague, and do not disclose particulars as to where the huge delay of 279 days occurred. Though, the law of limitation is very liberal and benefit of procedural delay is required to be given, but at the same time, the law for the State authorities, as well as the general public, is the same. Therefore, without details, as to how the procedural delay has occurred, it is not possible to find out whether the delay is bona fide or due to negligence on the part of the applicant. The averments made, therefore, do not make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 279 days in filing the appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed on merits as well as on the ground of limitation. (Vinod K. Sharma) Judge March 31, 2010 R.S.