1 unreported IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD. WRIT PETITION NO.2612 OF 1991. Pramod S/o Raghunathrao Deshpande, Aged 35 years, Occ.unemployed, R/o Siddhartha Nagar, Block No.4, Room No.19, Municipal Colony, Ahmednagar, Dist. Ahmednagar. ... Petitioner. Versus 1. Ahmednagar Municipal Council, Ahmednagar, through its Chief Officer. 2. Member, Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, Dist. Ahmednagar. ... Respondents. ... Mr.S.V.Natu, advocate for the petitioner. Mr.V.R.Dhorde, advocate holding for Mr.R.N.Dhorde, advocate for the Respondednt No.1. Respondent No.2 served. ... CORAM : V.R.KINGAONKAR,J. Date : 13.01.2010. ORAL JUDGMENT 1. By this petition, the petitioner 2 challenges judgment and order rendered by the learned Member of Industrial Court, Ahmednagar in proceedings of complaint (ULP) No.277/1987. He had initiated the complaint proceedings through the Labour Union U/s 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, "MRTU and PULP Act"). 2. The petitioner's case before the Industrial Court was that in 1979 he was employed by the Municipal Council. He worked between 1979-1984 in Town Planning Department from 1984-85 in Public Works Department and from 1986 as Peon in Octroi Department of the Municipal Council. He was initially appointed on daily wages. He was subsequently appointed for period between 13.5.1981 to 14.10.1981 on regular basis. Though he completed 240 days continuous work on establishment of the Municipal Council, yet, he was not continued in service. The Municipal Council adopted unfair labour practice by giving him temporary work and meagre payment. The Municipal Council further adopted unfair labour 3 practice by refusing to confirm him in the service and to give him benefits of a permanent servant. He, therefore, claimed status as a permanent employee and sought the benefits arising out of such status on account of permanency. 3. Heard learned counsel. 4. The question involved in this petition is whether the petitioner was entitled to continuation in service due to his completion of 240 days continuous service or because he was asked to work as a Badli worker and was not continued by giving artificial breaks and thereby unfair labour practice was adopted by the Municipal Council. 5. At the outset, let it be noted that the City Workers' Union had filed the complaint proceedings for and on behalf of several workers including the petitioner. The petitioner was denied the benefits on the ground that he did not complete 240 days continuous service. It was 4 noticed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court that the petitioner had worked only for 189 days. It appears from the record that the petitioner was employed on daily wages for some period in 1979. In this context, it may be gathered from testimony of PW Pramod (Petitioner) that he never asserted that he was required to work as a Badli worker. According to him, he had worked on daily wages between 1979-1984. The period of his work as a casual labour, without any regular appointment order as such, can not be counted for the purpose of reckoning the service of 240 days. He was unable to give details regarding the continuous service for more than 240 days during the relevant period. He relied upon a copy of duty list (Exh.U-11). The duty list dated 29.6.1986 revealed that he was employed as a Peon in Octroi Department. There is no denial to his such employment as a Peon. However, the Industrial Court noticed that the petitioner had not worked continuously for more than 240 days. 6. Significantly, the correctness of the 5 statement showing actual working days of the employees (Exh.C-7) was not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The petitioner vaguely disputed correctness of the statement during his deposition. However, the said statement was undisputed by the learned counsel Mr.K.Y.Modgekar, who appeared for the petitioner's Union. It was noticed from entries in the relevant statement (Exh.C-7) that between 1985-86, the petitioner had worked for 189 days. Thus, he did not fulfill the criteria required for the purpose of claiming benefits of permanency etc. The finding of fact rendered by the Industrial Court is based on material which was produced before it. In the exercise of writ jurisdiction, such finding of fact can not be disturbed without there being any substantial reason to reach conclusion that the same is perverse. Considering the reasons ascribed by the Industrial Court and the nature of material placed before it, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned judgment does not call for interference. 6 7. In the result, the petition is dismissed. No costs. (V.R.KINGAONKAR,J.) asp/office/wp261291