Case Facts:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Criminal Miscellaneous No.41394 of 2011 ====================================================== 1. Md. Mustakim @ Md. Mustkim Mian S/O Mhmood Resident Of Village/ Mohalla- Koiri Tola, Police Station- Bettiah (Town), District- West Champaran. .... .... Petitioner/s Versus 1. The State Of Bihar 2. Alamgeer Ashraf S/O Nesar Ahmad Resident Of Muhalla - Vijaintola, Police Station- Bettiah Town, District- West Champaran. .... .... Opposite Party/s ====================================================== Appearance : For the Petitioner/s : Mr. For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. ====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVAJI PANDEY CAV ORDER (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVAJI PANDEY) 3 08-02-2012 In he present case, application has been filed for quashing the order of cognizance dated 18th June 2010 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah, West Champaran under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (for short, „E.C.Act‟) in Trial No. 108 of 2011. The challenge has been made by the petitioner about sustainability of F.I.R. and order of cognizance on the ground that the FIR does not disclose the violation of any Control Order. Relying on a judgment reported in the case of Ramjee v. State of Bihar, 2010(2) PLJR 158, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this Court while deciding the case 2 has held that it is well settled by a catena of decisions, both of the Apex Court as also this Court, for inviting prosecution [STATUTE] e under Section 3 of the E.C.Act has been contravened or violated and in the absence of such statement or declaration in the fard- beyan or complaint no prosecution lies [STATUTE] etitioner has been disputed by the State. Now on looking to the FIR and the order of cognizance, the fact is that the violation of any Control Order has not been mentioned either in the F.I.R. or in the order of cognizance in this case. This Court in Single Bench has only mentioned about the Hon‟ble Apex Court and this Court without giving any specific example of any case. It will be relevant to rely on the judgment reported in the case of B.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 where the Supreme Court has culled out the ground in which the Court can interfere with the F.I.R. or order of cognizance order which are as follows : “(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. 3 Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 4 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.” Another judgment which can be referred, reiterated the same principle as in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, while deciding the issue under what circumstances, the Court can interfere either with the FIR or complaint petition or with the order of cognizance and has formulated seven points which are as follows: “1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a 5 cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) 6 to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or t

Applicable IPC Section: 482

Statute Text:
Section 482 of the Indian Penal Code. Using a false property mark with intent to deceive or injure any person. Whoever uses any false property mark shall, unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.